














THE  
DIALOGUES OF PLATO  
*JOWETT*

VOL. I.



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THE  
DIALOGUES OF PLATO

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

WITH ANALYSES AND INTRODUCTIONS

BY

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IN FIVE VOLUMES: VOL. I.

*L. P. Duffouchey*

Third Edition

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
WITH MARGINAL ANALYSES AND OTHER ADDITIONS, AND AN  
INDEX OF SUBJECTS AND PROPER NAMES

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TO MY FORMER PUPILS,  
IN BALLIOL COLLEGE  
AND IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD,  
WHO DURING FIFTY YEARS  
HAVE BEEN THE BEST OF FRIENDS TO ME.  
THESE VOLUMES ARE INSCRIBED,  
IN GRATEFUL RECOGNITION  
OF THEIR NEVER FAILING ATTACHMENT.





*THE additions and alterations which have been made, both in the Introductions and in the Text of this Edition, affect at least a third of the work.*

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## PREFACE

### TO THE FIRST EDITION.

THE Text which has been mostly followed in this Translation of Plato is the latest 8vo. edition of Stallbaum; the principal deviations are noted at the bottom of the page.

I have to acknowledge many obligations to old friends and pupils. These are:—Mr. John Purves, Fellow of Balliol College, with whom I have revised about half of the entire Translation; the Rev. Professor Campbell, of St. Andrews, who has helped me in the revision of several parts of the work, especially of the Theaetetus, Sophist, and Politicus; Mr. Robinson Ellis, Fellow of Trinity College, and Mr. Alfred Robinson, Fellow of New College, who read with me the Cratylus and the Gorgias; Mr. Paravicini, Student of Christ Church, who assisted me in the Symposium; Mr. Raper, Fellow of Queen's College, Mr. Monro, Fellow of Oriel College, and Mr. Shadwell, Student of Christ Church, who gave me similiar assistance in the Laws. Dr. Greenhill, of Hastings, has also kindly sent me remarks on the physiological part of the Timaeus, which I have inserted as corrections under the head of *errata* at the end of the Introduction. The degree of accuracy which I have been enabled to attain is in great measure due



to these gentlemen, and I heartily thank them for the pains and time which they have bestowed on my work.

I have further to explain how far I have received help from other labourers in the same field. The books which I have found of most use are Steinhart and Müller's German Translation of Plato with Introductions; Zeller's '*Philosophie der Griechen*,' and '*Platonische Studien*;' Susemihl's '*Genetische Entwicklung der Platonischen Philosophie*;' Hermann's '*Geschichte der Platonischen Philosophie*;' Bonitz, '*Platonische Studien*;' Stallbaum's Notes and Introductions; Professor Campbell's editions of the '*Theaetetus*,' the '*Sophist*,' and the '*Politicus*;' Professor Thompson's '*Phaedrus*;' Th. Martin's '*Études sur le Timée*;' Mr. Poste's edition and translation of the '*Philebus*;' the Translation of the '*Republic*,' by Messrs. Davies and Vaughan, and the Translation of the '*Gorgias*,' by Mr. Cope.

I have also derived much assistance from the great work of Mr. Grote, which contains excellent analyses of the Dialogues, and is rich in original thoughts and observations. I agree with him in rejecting as futile the attempt of Schleiermacher and others to arrange the Dialogues of Plato into a harmonious whole. Any such arrangement appears to me not only to be unsupported by evidence, but to involve an anachronism in the history of philosophy. There is a common spirit in the writings of Plato, but not a unity of design in the whole, nor perhaps a perfect unity in any single Dialogue. The hypothesis of a general plan which is worked out in the successive Dialogues is an after-thought of the critics who have attributed a system to writings belonging to an age when system had not as yet taken possession of philosophy.

If Mr. Grote should do me the honour to read any portion of this work he will probably remark that I have

endeavour'd to approach Plato from a point of view which is opposed to his own. The aim of the Introductions in these volumes has been to represent Plato as the father of Idealism, who is not to be measured by the standard of utilitarianism or any other modern philosophical system. He is the poet or maker of ideas, satisfying the wants of his own age, providing the instruments of thought for future generations. He is no dreamer, but a great philosophical genius struggling with the unequal conditions of light and knowledge under which he is living. He may be illustrated by the writings of moderns, but he must be interpreted by his own, and by his place in the history of philosophy. We are not concerned to determine what is the residuum of truth which remains for ourselves. His truth may not be our truth, and nevertheless may have an extraordinary value and interest for us.

I cannot agree with Mr. Grote in admitting as genuine all the writings commonly attributed to Plato in antiquity, any more than with Schaarschmidt and some other German critics who reject nearly half of them. The German critics, to whom I refer, proceed chiefly on grounds of internal evidence; they appear to me to lay too much stress on the variety of doctrine and style, which must be equally acknowledged as a fact, even in the Dialogues regarded by Schaarschmidt as genuine, e. g. in the *Phædrus*, or *Symposium*, when compared with the *Laws*. He who admits works so different in style and matter to have been the composition of the same author, need have no difficulty (see vol. iv, Appendix) in admitting the *Sophist* or the *Politicus*. [The negative argument adduced by the same school of critics, which is based on the silence of Aristotle, is not worthy of much consideration. For why should Aristotle, because he has quoted several Dialogues of Plato, have quoted them all? Something must be allowed to chance, and to the nature of the subjects treated

of in them.] On the other hand, Mr. Grote trusts mainly to the Alexandrian Canon. But I hardly think that we are justified in attributing much weight to the authority of the Alexandrian librarians in an age when there was no regular publication of books, and every temptation to forge them; and in which the writings of a school were naturally attributed to the founder of the school. And even without intentional fraud, there was an inclination to believe rather than to enquire. Would Mr. Grote accept as genuine all the writings which he finds in the lists of learned ancients attributed to Hippocrates, to Xenophon, to Aristotle? The Alexandrian Canon of the Platonic writings is deprived of credit by the admission of the Epistles, which are not only unworthy of Plato, and in several passages plagiarized from him, but flagrantly at variance with historical fact. It will be seen also that I do not agree with Mr. Grote's views about the Sophists; nor with the low estimate which he has formed of Plato's Laws; nor with his opinion respecting Plato's doctrine of the rotation of the earth. But I 'am not going to lay hands on my father Parmenides' [Soph. 241 D], who will, I hope, forgive me for differing from him on these points. I cannot close this Preface without expressing my deep respect for his noble and gentle character, and the great services which he has rendered to Greek Literature.

BALLIOL COLLEGE,

*January, 1871.*

## PREFACE

TO

### THE SECOND AND THIRD EDITIONS.

IN publishing a Second Edition (1875) of the Dialogues of Plato in English, I had to acknowledge the assistance of several friends: of the Rev. G. G. Bradley, Master of University College, now Dean of Westminster, who sent me some valuable remarks on the *Phaedo*; of Dr. Greenhill, who had again revised a portion of the *Timaeus*; of Mr. R. L. Nettleship, Fellow and Tutor of Balliol College, to whom I was indebted for an excellent criticism of the *Parmenides*; and, above all, of the Rev. Professor Campbell of St. Andrews, and Mr. Paravicini, late Student of Christ Church and Tutor of Balliol College, with whom I had read over the greater part of the translation. I was also indebted to Mr. Evelyn Abbott, Fellow and Tutor of Balliol College, for a complete and accurate index.

In this, the Third Edition, I am under very great obligations to Mr. Matthew Knight, who has not only favoured me with valuable suggestions throughout the work, but has largely extended the Index (from 61 to 175 pages) and translated the *Eryxias* and *Second Alcibiades*; and to Mr. Frank Fletcher, of Balliol College, my Secretary, who has assisted me chiefly in Vols. iii, iv, and v. I am also considerably indebted to Mr. J. W. Mackail, late Fellow of

Balliol College, who read over the Republic in the Second Edition and noted several inaccuracies.

In both editions the Introductions to the Dialogues have been enlarged, and essays on subjects having an affinity to the Platonic Dialogues have been introduced into several of them. The analyses have been corrected, and innumerable alterations have been made in the Text. There have been added also, in the Third Edition, headings to the pages and a marginal analysis to the text of each dialogue.

At the end of a long task, the translator may without impropriety point out the difficulties which he has had to encounter. These have been far greater than he would have anticipated; nor is he at all sanguine that he has succeeded in overcoming them. Experience has made him feel that a translation, like a picture, is dependent for its effect on very minute touches; and that it is a work of infinite pains, to be returned to in many moods and viewed in different lights.

I. An English translation ought to be idiomatic and interesting, not only to the scholar, but to the unlearned reader. Its object should not simply be to render the words of one language into the words of another or to preserve the construction and order of the original;—this is the ambition of a schoolboy, who wishes to show that he has made a good use of his Dictionary and Grammar; but is quite unworthy of the translator, who seeks to produce on his reader an impression similar or nearly similar to that produced by the original. To him the feeling should be more important than the exact word. He should remember Dryden's quaint admonition not to 'lacquey by the side of his author, but to mount up behind him<sup>1</sup>.' He must carry in his mind a comprehensive view of the whole

<sup>1</sup> Dedication to the *Æneis*.

work, of what has preceded and of what is to follow,—as well as of the meaning of particular passages. His version should be based, in the first instance, on an intimate knowledge of the text; but the precise order and arrangement of the words may be left to fade out of sight, when the translation begins to take shape. He must form a general idea of the two languages, and reduce the one to the terms of the other. His work should be rhythmical and varied, the right admixture of words and syllables, and even of letters, should be carefully attended to; above all, it should be equable in style. There must also be quantity, which is necessary in prose as well as in verse: clauses, sentences, paragraphs, must be in due proportion. Metre and even rhyme may be rarely admitted; though neither is a legitimate element of prose writing, they may help to lighten a cumbrous expression (cp. Symp. 185 D, 197, 198). The translation should retain as far as possible the characteristic qualities of the ancient writer—his freedom, grace, simplicity, stateliness, weight, precision; or the best part of him will be lost to the English reader. It should read as an original work, and should also be the most faithful transcript which can be made of the language from which the translation is taken, consistently with the first requirement of all, that it be English. Further, the translation being English, it should also be perfectly intelligible in itself without reference to the Greek, the English being really the more lucid and exact of the two languages. In some respects it may be maintained that ordinary English writing, such as the newspaper article, is superior to Plato: at any rate it is couched in language which is very rarely obscure. On the other hand, the greatest writers of Greece, Thucydides, Plato, Æschylus, Sophocles, Pindar, Demosthenes, are generally those which are found



to be most difficult and to diverge most widely from the English idiom. The translator will often have to convert the more abstract Greek into the more concrete English, or *vice versa*, and he ought not to force upon one language the character of another. In some cases, where the order is confused, the expression feeble, the emphasis misplaced, or the sense somewhat faulty, he will not strive in his rendering to reproduce these characteristics, but will re-write the passage as his author would have written it at first, had he not been 'nodding'; and he will not hesitate to supply anything which, owing to the genius of the language or some accident of composition, is omitted in the Greek, but is necessary to make the English clear and consecutive.

It is difficult to harmonize all these conflicting elements. In a translation of Plato what may be termed the interests of the Greek and English are often at war with one another. In framing the English sentence we are insensibly diverted from the exact meaning of the Greek; when we return to the Greek we are apt to cramp and overlay the English. We substitute, we compromise, we give and take, we add a little here and leave out a little there. The translator may sometimes be allowed to sacrifice minute accuracy for the sake of clearness and sense. But he is not therefore at liberty to omit words and turns of expression which the English language is quite capable of supplying. He must be patient and self-controlled; he must not be easily run away with. Let him never allow the attraction of a favourite expression, or a sonorous cadence, to overpower his better judgment, or think much of an ornament which is out of keeping with the general character of his work. He must ever be casting his eyes upwards from the copy to the original, and down again

from the original to the copy (Rep. vi. 501 A). His calling is not held in much honour by the world of scholars; yet he himself may be excused for thinking it a kind of glory to have lived so many years in the companionship of one of the greatest of human intelligences, and in some degree, more perhaps than others, to have had the privilege of understanding him (cp. Sir Joshua Reynolds' Lectures: Disc. xv. *sub fn.*).

There are fundamental differences in Greek and English, of which some may be managed while others remain intractable. (1). The structure of the Greek language is partly adversative and alternative, and partly inferential; that is to say, the members of a sentence are either opposed to one another, or one of them expresses the cause or effect or condition or reason of another. The two tendencies may be called the horizontal and perpendicular lines of the language; and the opposition or inference is often much more one of words than of ideas. But modern languages have rubbed off this adversative and inferential form: they have fewer links of connexion, there is less mortar in the interstices, and they are content to place sentences side by side, leaving their relation to one another to be gathered from their position or from the context. The difficulty of preserving the effect of the Greek is increased by the want of adversative and inferential particles in English, and by the nice sense of tautology which characterizes all modern languages. We cannot have two 'buts' or two 'fors' in the same sentence where the Greek repeats *ἀλλὰ* or *γάρ*. There is a similar want of particles expressing the various gradations of objective and subjective thought — *που*, *ὅγ*, *μήν*, *μέντοι*, and the like, which are so thickly scattered over the Greek page. Further, we can only realize to a very imperfect



degree the common distinction between *οὐ* and *μή*, and the combination of the two suggests a subtle shade of negation which cannot be expressed in English. And while English is more dependent than Greek upon the apposition of clauses and sentences, yet there is a difficulty in using this form of construction owing to the want of case endings. For the same reason there cannot be an equal variety in the order of words or an equal nicety of emphasis in English as in Greek.

(2). The formation of the sentence and of the paragraph greatly differs in Greek and English. The lines by which they are divided are generally much more marked in modern languages than in ancient. Both sentences and paragraphs are more precise and definite — they do not run into one another. They are also more regularly developed from within. The sentence marks another step in an argument or a narrative or a statement; in reading a paragraph we silently turn over the page and arrive at some new view or aspect of the subject. Whereas in Plato we are not always certain where a sentence begins and ends; and paragraphs are few and far between. The language is distributed in a different way, and less articulated than in English. For it was long before the true use of the period was attained by the classical writers both in poetry or prose; it was *πολλῆς πείρας τελευταῖον ἐπιγέννημα*. The balance of sentences and the introduction of paragraphs at suitable intervals must not be neglected if the harmony of the English language is to be preserved. And still a caution has to be added on the other side, that we must avoid giving it a numerical or mechanical character.

(3). This, however, is not one of the greatest difficulties of the translator; much greater is that which arises from the restriction of the use of the genders. Men and women

in English are masculine and feminine, and there is a similar distinction of sex in the words denoting animals; but all things else, whether outward objects or abstract ideas, are relegated to the class of neuters. Hardly in some flight of poetry do we ever endue any of them with the characteristics of a sentient being, and then only by speaking of them in the feminine gender. The virtues may be pictured in female forms, but they are not so described in language; a ship is humorously supposed to be the sailor's bride; more doubtful are the personifications of church and country as females. Now the genius of the Greek language is the opposite of this. The same tendency to personification which is seen in the Greek mythology is common also in the language; and genders are attributed to things as well as persons according to their various degrees of strength and weakness; or from fanciful resemblances to the male or female form, or some analogy too subtle to be discovered. When the gender of any object was once fixed, a similar gender was naturally assigned to similar objects, or to words of similar formation. This use of genders in the denotation of objects or ideas not only affects the words to which genders are attributed, but the words with which they are construed or connected, and passes into the general character of the style. Hence arises a difficulty in translating Greek into English which cannot altogether be overcome. Shall we speak of the soul and its qualities, of virtue, power, wisdom, and the like, as feminine or neuter? The usage of the English language does not admit of the former, and yet the life and beauty of the style are impaired by the latter. Often the translator will have recourse to the repetition of the word, or to the ambiguous 'they,' 'their,' &c.; for fear of spoiling

the effect of the sentence by introducing 'it.' Collective nouns in Greek and English create a similar but lesser awkwardness.

(4). The use of relation is far more extended in Greek than in English. Partly the greater variety of genders and cases makes the connexion of relative and antecedent less ambiguous: partly also the greater number of demonstrative and relative pronouns, and the use of the article, make the correlation of ideas simpler and more natural. The Greek appears to have had an ear or intelligence for a long and complicated sentence which is rarely to be found in modern nations; and in order to bring the Greek down to the level of the modern, we must break up the long sentence into two or more short ones. Neither is the same precision required in Greek as in Latin or English, nor in earlier Greek as in later; there was nothing shocking to the contemporary of Thucydides and Plato in anacolutha and repetitions. In such cases the genius of the English language requires that the translation should be more intelligible than the Greek. The want of more distinctions between the demonstrative pronouns is also greatly felt. Two genitives dependent on one another, unless familiarised by idiom, have an awkward effect in English. Frequently the noun has to take the place of the pronoun. 'This' and 'that' are found repeating themselves to weariness in the rough draft of a translation. As in the previous case, while the feeling of the modern language is more opposed to tautology, there is also a greater difficulty in avoiding it.

(5). Though no precise rule can be laid down about the repetition of words, there seems to be a kind of impertinence in presenting to the reader the same thought in the same words, repeated twice over in the same

passage without any new aspect or modification of it. And the evasion of tautology—that is, the substitution of one word of precisely the same meaning for another—is resented by us equally with the repetition of words. Yet on the other hand the least difference of meaning or the least change of form from a substantive to an adjective, or from a participle to a verb, will often remedy the unpleasant effect. Rarely and only for the sake of emphasis or clearness can we allow an important word to be used twice over in two successive sentences or even in the same paragraph. The particles and pronouns, as they are of most frequent occurrence, are also the most troublesome. Strictly speaking, except a few of the commonest of them, ‘and,’ ‘the,’ &c., they ought not to occur twice in the same sentence. But the Greek has no such precise rules; and hence any literal translation of a Greek author is full of tautology. The tendency of modern languages is to become more correct as well as more perspicuous than ancient. And, therefore, while the English translator is limited in the power of expressing relation or connexion, by the law of his own language increased precision and also increased clearness are required of him. The familiar use of logic, and the progress of science, have in these two respects raised the standard. But modern languages, while they have become more exacting in their demands, are in many ways not so well furnished with powers of expression as the ancient classical ones.

Such are a few of the difficulties which have to be overcome in the work of translation; and we are far from having exhausted the list. (6). The excellence of a translation will consist, not merely in the faithful rendering of words, or in the composition of a sentence only, or yet of a single paragraph, but in the colour and style

of the whole work. Equability of tone is best attained by the exclusive use of familiar and idiomatic words. But great care must be taken; for an idiomatic phrase, if an exception to the general style, is of itself a disturbing element. No word, however expressive and exact, should be employed, which makes the reader stop to think, or unduly attracts attention by difficulty and peculiarity, or disturbs the effect of the surrounding language. In general the style of one author is not appropriate to another; as in society, so in letters, we expect every man to have 'a good coat of his own,' and not to dress himself out in the rags of another. (a) Archaic expressions are therefore to be avoided. Equivalents may be occasionally drawn from Shakspeare, who is the common property of us all; but they must be used sparingly. For, like some other men of genius of the Elizabethan and Jacobean age, he outdid the capabilities of the language, and many of the expressions which he introduced have been laid aside and have dropped out of use. (b) A similar principle should be observed in the employment of Scripture. Having a greater force and beauty than other language, and a religious association, it disturbs the even flow of the style. It may be used to reproduce in the translation the quaint effect of some antique phrase in the original, but rarely; and when adopted, it should have a certain freshness and a suitable 'entourage.' It is strange to observe that the most effective use of Scripture phraseology arises out of the application of it in a sense not intended by the author. (c) Another caution: metaphors differ in different languages, and the translator will often be compelled to substitute one for another, or to paraphrase them, not giving word for word, but diffusing over several words the more concentrated

thought of the original. The Greek of Plato often goes beyond the English in its imagery: cp. Laws iii. 695 C, ὦν καὶ νῦν ἔτι συμκρὰ ὀνείρατα λέλειπται; Rep. i. 345 E; ix. 588 C, &c. Or again the modern word, which in substance is the nearest equivalent to the Greek, may be found to include associations alien to Greek life: e. g. δικασταί, 'jurymen,' τὰ μέσα τῶν πολιτῶν, 'the bourgeoisie.' (d) The translator has also to provide expressions for philosophical terms of very indefinite meaning in the more definite language of modern philosophy. And he must not allow discordant elements to enter into the work. For example, in translating Plato, it would equally be an anachronism to intrude on him the feeling and spirit of the Jewish or Christian Scriptures or the technical terms of the Hegelian or Darwinian philosophy.

(7). As no two words are precise equivalents (just as no two leaves of the forest are exactly similar), it is a mistaken attempt at precision always to translate the same Greek word by the same English word. There is no reason why in the New Testament δικαιοσύνη should always be rendered 'righteousness,' or διαθήκη 'covenant.' In such cases the translator may be allowed to employ two words—sometimes when the two meanings occur in the same passage, varying them by an 'or'—e. g. ἐπιστήμη, 'science' or 'knowledge,' εἶδος, 'idea' or 'class,' σωφροσύνη, 'temperance' or 'prudence,'—at the point where the change of meaning occurs. If translations are intended not for the Greek scholar but for the general reader, their worst fault will be that they sacrifice the general effect and meaning to the over-precise rendering of words and forms of speech.

(8). There is no kind of literature in English which corresponds to the Greek Dialogue; nor is the English



language easily adapted to it. The rapidity and abruptness of question and answer, the constant repetition of ἦ δ' ὅς, εἶπε, ἔφη, &c., which Cicero avoided in Latin (*de Amicit.* c. 1), the frequent occurrence of expletives, would, if reproduced in a translation, give offence to the reader. Greek has a freer and more frequent use of the Interrogative, and is of a more passionate and emotional character, and therefore lends itself with greater readiness to the dialogue form. Most of the so-called English Dialogues are but poor imitations of Plato, which fall very far short of the original. The breath of conversation, the subtle adjustment of question and answer, the lively play of fancy, the power of drawing characters, are wanting in them. But the Platonic Dialogue is a drama as well as a dialogue, of which Socrates is the central figure, and there are lesser performers as well:—the insolence of Thrasymachus, the anger of Callicles and Anytus, the patronizing style of Protagoras, the self-consciousness of Prodicus and Hippias, are all part of the entertainment. To reproduce this living image the same sort of effort is required as in translating poetry. The language, too, is of a finer quality; the mere prose English is slow in lending itself to the form of question and answer, and so the ease of conversation is lost, and at the same time the dialectical precision with which the steps of the argument are drawn out is apt to be impaired.

II. In the Introductions to the Dialogues there have been added some essays on modern philosophy, and on political and social life. The chief subjects discussed in these are Utility, Communism, the Kantian and Hegelian philosophies, Psychology, and the Origin of Language<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> There have been added also in the Third Edition remarks on other subjects. A list of the most important of these additions is given at the end of this Preface (see p. xxxviii).

Ancient and modern philosophy throw a light upon one another: but they should be compared, not confounded. Although the connexion between them is sometimes accidental, it is often real. The same questions are discussed by them under different conditions of language and civilization; but in some cases a mere word has survived, while nothing or hardly anything of the pre-Socratic, Platonic, or Aristotelian meaning is retained. There are other questions familiar to the moderns, which have no place in ancient philosophy. The world has grown older in two thousand years, and has enlarged its stock of ideas and methods of reasoning. Yet the germ of modern thought is found in ancient, and we may claim to have inherited, notwithstanding many accidents of time and place, the spirit of Greek philosophy. There is, however, no continuous growth of the one into the other, but a new beginning, partly artificial, partly arising out of the questionings of the mind itself, and also receiving a stimulus from the study of ancient writings.

Considering the great and fundamental differences which exist in ancient and modern philosophy, it seems best that we should at first study them separately, and seek for the interpretation of either, especially of the ancient, from itself only, comparing the same author with himself and with his contemporaries, and with the general state of thought and feeling prevalent in his age. Afterwards comes the remoter light which they cast on one another. We begin to feel that the ancients had the same thoughts as ourselves, the same difficulties which characterize all periods of transition, almost the same opposition between science and religion. Although we cannot maintain that ancient and modern philosophy are one and continuous (as has been affirmed with more truth



respecting ancient and modern history), for they are separated by an interval of a thousand years, yet they seem to recur in a sort of cycle, and we are surprised to find that the new is ever old, and that the teaching of the past has still a meaning for us.

III. In the preface to the first edition I expressed a strong opinion at variance with Mr. Grote's, that the so-called Epistles of Plato were spurious. His friend and editor, Professor Bain, thinks that I ought to give the reasons why I differ from so eminent an authority. Reserving the fuller discussion of the question for another place, I will shortly defend my opinion by the following arguments:—

(a) Because almost all epistles purporting to be of the classical age of Greek literature are forgeries<sup>1</sup>. Of all documents this class are the least likely to be preserved and the most likely to be invented. The ancient world swarmed with them; the great libraries stimulated the demand for them; and at a time when there was no regular publication of books, they easily crept into the world.

(b) When one epistle out of a number is spurious, the remainder of the series cannot be admitted to be genuine, unless there be some independent ground for thinking them so: when all but one are spurious, overwhelming evidence is required of the genuineness of the one: when they are all similar in style or motive, like witnesses who agree in the same tale, they stand or fall together. But no one, not even Mr. Grote, would maintain that all the Epistles of Plato are genuine, and very few critics think that more than one of them is so. And they are clearly all written from the same motive, whether serious or only literary. Nor is there an example in

<sup>1</sup> Compare Bentley's Works (Dyce's Edition), vol. ii. 136 foll., 222.

Greek antiquity of a series of Epistles, continuous and yet coinciding with a succession of events extending over a great number of years.

The external probability therefore against them is enormous, and the internal probability is not less: for they are trivial and unmeaning, devoid of delicacy and subtlety, wanting in a single fine expression. And even if this be matter of dispute, there can be no dispute that there are found in them many plagiarisms, inappropriately borrowed, which is a common note of forgery (compare 330 C foll. with Rep. iv. 425 E, 426 B, vi. 488 A: 347 E with Phaedrus 249 D: 326 A, B and 328 A with Rep. v. 473 C, D, &c.). They imitate Plato, who never imitates either himself or any one else; reminiscences of the Republic and the Laws are continually recurring in them; they are too like him and also too unlike him, to be genuine (*see especially* Karsten, *Commentatio Critica de Platonis quae feruntur Epistolis*, p. 111 foll.). They are full of egotism, self-assertion, affectation, faults which of all writers Plato was most careful to avoid, and into which he was least likely to fall (*ib.* p. 99 foll.). They abound in obscurities, irrelevancies, solecisms, pleonasms, inconsistencies (*ib.* p. 96 foll.), awkwardnesses of construction, wrong uses of words (*ib.* pp. 58, 59, 117, 121). They also contain historical blunders, such as the statement respecting Hipparinus and Nysaeus, the nephews of Dion (328 A), who are said to 'have been well inclined to philosophy, and well able to dispose the mind of their brother Dionysius in the same course,' at a time when they could not have been more than six or seven years of age — also foolish allusions, such as the comparison of the Athenian empire to the empire of Darius (332 A, B), which show a spirit very different from that of Plato; and

mistakes of fact, as e. g. about the Thirty Tyrants (p. 324 C), whom the writer of the letters seems to have confused with certain inferior magistrates, making them in all fifty-one. These palpable errors and absurdities are absolutely irreconcilable with their genuineness. And as they appear to have a common parentage, the more they are studied, the more they will be found to furnish evidence against themselves. The Seventh, which is thought to be the most important of these Epistles, has affinities with the Third and the Eighth, and is quite as impossible and inconsistent as the rest. It is therefore involved in the same condemnation.—The final conclusion is that neither the Seventh nor any other of them, when carefully analyzed, can be imagined to have proceeded from the hand or mind of Plato. The other testimonies to the voyages of Plato to Sicily and the court of Dionysius are all of them later by several centuries than the events to which they refer. No extant writer mentions them older than Cicero and Cornelius Nepos. It does not seem impossible that so attractive a theme as the meeting of a philosopher and a tyrant, once imagined by the genius of a sophist, may have passed into a romance which became famous in Hellas and the world. It may have created one of the mists of history, like the Trojan war or the legend of Arthur, which we are unable to penetrate. In the age of Cicero, and still more in that of Diogenes Laertius and Appuleius, many other legends had gathered around the personality of Plato,—more voyages, more journeys to visit tyrants and Pythagorean philosophers. But if, as we agree with Karsten in supposing, they are the forgery of some rhetorican or sophist, we cannot agree with him in also supposing that they are of any historical value, the rather as there is no early independent testimony by

which they are supported or with which they can be compared.

IV. There is another subject to which I must briefly call attention, lest I should seem to have overlooked it. Dr. Henry Jackson, of Trinity College, Cambridge, in a series of articles which he has contributed to the *Journal of Philology* (1881-6; Vol. x. 132-150, 253-293; xi. 287-331; xiii. 1-40; xiv. 173-230, extending to about 200 pages), has put forward an entirely new explanation of the Platonic 'Ideas.' He supposes that in the mind of Plato they took, at different times in his life, two essentially different forms:—an earlier one which is found chiefly in the *Republic* and the *Phaedo*, and a later, which appears in the *Theaetetus*, *Philebus*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Parmenides*, *Timaeus*. In the first stage of his philosophy Plato attributed Ideas to all things, at any rate to all things which have classes or common notions: these he supposed to exist only by participation in them. In the later Dialogues he no longer included in them manufactured articles and ideas of relation, but restricted them to 'types of nature,' and having become convinced that the many cannot be parts of the one, for the idea of participation in them he substituted imitation of them (xi. 292). To quote Dr. Jackson's own expressions (x. 297),—'whereas in the period of the *Republic* and the *Phaedo*, it was proposed to pass through ontology to the sciences, in the period of the *Parmenides* and the *Philebus*, it is proposed to pass through the sciences to ontology': or, as he repeats in nearly the same words (xi. 320),—'whereas in the *Republic* and in the *Phaedo* he had dreamt of passing through ontology to the sciences, he is now content to pass through the sciences to ontology.'

This theory is supposed to be based on Aristotle's

Metaphysics (Book I. c. 6), a passage containing an account of the ideas, which hitherto scholars have found impossible to reconcile with the statements of Plato himself. The preparations for the new departure are discovered in the Parmenides and in the Theaetetus; and it is said to be expressed under a different form by the *πέρας* and the *ἄπειρον* of the Philebus (vol. x. 275 foll.). The *πέρας* of the Philebus is the principle which gives form and measure to the *ἄπειρον*; and in the 'Later Theory' is held to be the *πόσον* or *μέτρον* which converts the Infinite or Indefinite into ideas. They are neither *περαίνοντα* nor *ἄπειρα*, but belong to the *μικτὸν γένος* which partakes of both.

With great respect for the learning and ability of Dr. Jackson, I find myself unable to agree in this newly fashioned doctrine of the Ideas, which he ascribes to Plato. I have not the space to go into the question fully; but I will briefly state some objections which are, I think, fatal to it.

(1). First, the foundation of his argument is laid in the Metaphysics of Aristotle. But we cannot argue, either from the Metaphysics, or from any other of the philosophical treatises of Aristotle, to the dialogues of Plato until we have ascertained the relation in which his so-called works stand to the philosopher himself. There is of course no doubt of the great influence exercised upon Greece and upon the world by Aristotle and his philosophy. But on the other hand almost every one who is capable of understanding the subject acknowledges that his writings have not come down to us in an authentic form like most of the dialogues of Plato. How much of them is to be ascribed to Aristotle's own hand, how much is due to his successors in the Peripatetic School, is a question which has never been determined, and probably



never can be, because the solution of it depends upon internal evidence only. To 'the height of this great argument' I do not propose to ascend. But one little fact, not irrelevant to the present discussion, will show how hopeless is the attempt to explain Plato out of the writings of Aristotle. In the chapter of the *Metaphysics* quoted by Dr. Jackson (I. 6), about two octavo pages in length, there occur no less than seven or eight references to Plato, although nothing really corresponding to them can be found in his extant writings:—a small matter truly; but what a light does it throw on the character of the entire book in which they occur! We can hardly escape from the conclusion that they are not statements of Aristotle respecting Plato, but of a later generation of Aristotelians respecting a later generation of Platonists<sup>1</sup>.

(2). There is no hint in Plato's own writings that he was conscious of having made any change in the Doctrine of Ideas such as Dr. Jackson attributes to him, although in the *Republic* the platonic Socrates speaks of 'a longer and a shorter way' (iv. 435; vi. 504), and of a way in which his disciple Glaucon 'will be unable to follow him' (vii. 533); also of a way of Ideas, to which he still holds fast, although it has often deserted him (*Philebus* 16 C, *Phaedo* 97-108), and although in the later dialogues and in the *Laws* the reference to Ideas disappears, and Mind claims her own (*Phil.* 31, 65; *Laws* xii. 965 B). No hint is given of what Plato meant by the 'longer way' (*Rep.* iv. 435 D), or 'the way in which Glaucon was unable to follow' (*ib.* vii. 533 A); or of the relation of Mind to the Ideas. It might be said with truth that the conception of the Idea predominates in the first half of the Dialogues, which, according

<sup>1</sup> Cp. the striking remark of the great Scaliger respecting the *Magna Moralia*:  
—*Haec non sunt Aristotelis, tamen utitur auctor Aristotelis nomine tanquam suo.*

to the order adopted in this work, ends with the Republic, the 'conception of Mind' and a way of speaking more in agreement with modern terminology, in the latter half. But there is no reason to suppose that Plato's theory, or, rather, his various theories, of the Ideas underwent any definite change during his period of authorship. They are substantially the same in the twelfth Book of the Laws (962, 963 foll.) as in the Meno and Phaedo; and since the Laws were written in the last decade of his life, there is no time to which this change of opinions can be ascribed. It is true that the theory of Ideas takes several different forms, not merely an earlier and a later one, in the various Dialogues. They are personal and impersonal, ideals and ideas, existing by participation or by imitation, one and many, in different parts of his writings or even in the same passage (cp. Vol. II. p. 13 foll.). They are the universal definitions of Socrates, and at the same time 'of more than mortal knowledge' (Rep. vi. 485). But they are always the negations of sense, of matter, of generation, of the particular: they are always the subjects of knowledge and not of opinion; and they tend, not to diversity, but to unity. Other entities or intelligences are akin to them, but not the same with them, such as mind, measure, limit, eternity, essence (cp. Philebus *sub fin.*; Timaeus *passim*): these and similar terms appear to express the same truths from a different point of view, and to belong to the same sphere with them. But we are not justified, therefore, in attempting to identify them, any more than in wholly opposing them. The great oppositions of the sensible and intellectual, the unchangeable and the transient, in whatever form of words expressed, are always maintained in Plato. But the lesser logical distinctions, as we should call them, whether of ontology or predication,

which troubled the pre-Socratic philosophy and came to the front in Aristotle, are variously discussed and explained. Thus far we admit inconsistency in Plato, but no further. He lived in an age before logic and system had wholly permeated language, and therefore we must not always expect to find in him systematic arrangement or logical precision:—‘*poema magis putandum.*’ But he is always true to his own context, the careful study of which is of more value to the interpreter than all the commentators and scholiasts put together.

(3). The conclusions at which Dr. Jackson has arrived are such as might be expected to follow from his method of procedure. For he takes words without regard to their connexion, and pieces together different parts of dialogues in a purely arbitrary manner, although there is no indication that the author intended the two passages to be so combined, or that when he appears to be experimenting on the different points of view from which a subject of philosophy may be regarded, he is secretly elaborating a system. By such a use of language any premises may be made to lead to any conclusion. I am not one of those who believe Plato to have been a mystic or to have had hidden meanings; nor do I agree with Dr. Jackson in thinking that ‘when he is precise and dogmatic, he generally contrives to introduce an element of obscurity into the exposition’ (J. of Philol. x. 150). The great master of language wrote as clearly as he could in an age when the minds of men were clouded by controversy, and philosophical terms had not yet acquired a fixed meaning. I have just said that Plato is to be interpreted by his context; and I do not deny that in some passages, especially in the Republic and Laws, the context is at a greater distance than would be allowable in a modern



writer. But we are not therefore justified in connecting passages from different parts of his writings, or even from the same work, which he has not himself joined. We cannot argue from the *Parmenides* to the *Philebus*, or from either to the *Sophist*, or assume that the *Parmenides*, the *Philebus*, and the *Timaeus* were 'written simultaneously,' or 'were intended to be studied in the order in which they are here named' (*J. of Philol.* xiii. 38). We have no right to connect statements which are only accidentally similar. Nor is it safe for the author of a theory about ancient philosophy to argue from what will happen if his statements are rejected. For those consequences may never have entered into the mind of the ancient writer himself; and they are very likely to be modern consequences which would not have been understood by him. 'I cannot think,' says Dr. Jackson, 'that Plato would have changed his opinions, but have nowhere explained the nature of the change.' But is it not much more improbable that he should have changed his opinions, and not stated in an unmistakable manner that the most essential principle of his philosophy had been reversed? It is true that a few of the dialogues, such as the *Republic* and the *Timaeus*, or the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*, or the *Meno* and the *Apology*, contain allusions to one another. But these allusions are superficial and, except in the case of the *Republic* and the *Laws*, have no philosophical importance. They do not affect the substance of the work. It may be remarked further that several of the dialogues, such as the *Phaedrus*, the *Sophist*, and the *Parmenides*, have more than one subject. But it does not therefore follow that Plato intended one dialogue to succeed another, or that he begins anew in one dialogue a subject which he has left unfinished in

another, or that even in the same dialogue he always intended the two parts to be connected with each other. We cannot argue from a casual statement found in the Parmenides to other statements which occur in the Philebus. Much more truly is his own manner described by himself when he says that 'words are more plastic than wax' (Rep. ix. 588 C), and 'whither the wind blows, the argument follows' (ib. iii. 394 D). The dialogues of Plato are like poems, isolated and separate works, except where they are indicated by the author himself to have an intentional sequence.

It is this method of taking passages out of their context and placing them in a new connexion when they seem to confirm a preconceived theory, which is the defect of Dr. Jackson's procedure. It may be compared, though not wholly the same with it, to that method which the Fathers practised, sometimes called 'the mystical interpretation of Scripture,' in which isolated words are separated from their context, and receive any sense which the fancy of the interpreter may suggest. It is akin to the method employed by Schleiermacher of arranging the dialogues of Plato in chronological order according to what he deems the true arrangement of the ideas contained in them. (Dr. Jackson is also inclined, having constructed a theory, to make the chronology of Plato's writings dependent upon it<sup>1</sup>.) It may likewise be illustrated by the ingenuity of those who employ symbols to find in Shakspeare a hidden meaning. In the three cases the error is nearly the same:— words are taken out of their natural context, and thus become destitute of any real meaning.

(4). According to Dr. Jackson's 'Later Theory,' Plato's Ideas, which were once regarded as the *summa genera* of

<sup>1</sup> See J. of Philol. xiii. 38, and elsewhere.

all things, are now to be explained as Forms or Types of some things only,—that is to say, of natural objects: these we conceive imperfectly, but are always seeking in vain to have a more perfect notion of them. He says (J. of Philol. xi. 319) that ‘Plato hoped by the study of a series of hypothetical or provisional classifications to arrive at one in which nature’s distribution of kinds is approximately represented, and so to attain approximately to the knowledge of the ideas. But whereas in the Republic, and even in the Phaedo, though less hopefully, he had sought to convert his provisional definitions into final ones by tracing their connexion with the *summum genus*, the *ἀγαθόν*, in the Parmenides his aspirations are less ambitious,’ and so on. But where does Dr. Jackson find any such notion as this in Plato or anywhere in ancient philosophy? Is it not an anachronism, gracious to the modern physical philosopher, and the more acceptable because it seems to form a link between ancient and modern philosophy, and between physical and metaphysical science; but really unmeaning?

(5). To this ‘Later Theory’ of Plato’s Ideas I oppose the authority of Professor Zeller, who affirms that none of the passages to which Dr. Jackson appeals (Theaet. 185 C foll.; Phil. 25 B foll.; Tim. 57 C; Parm. 130 B foll., 142 B–155 E, 157 B–159 E) ‘in the smallest degree prove his point’; and that in the second class of dialogues, in which the ‘Later Theory of Ideas’ is supposed to be found, quite as clearly as in the first, are admitted Ideas, not only of natural objects, but of properties, relations, works of art, negative notions (Theaet. 176 E; Parm. 130 B foll.; Soph. 254 B foll., 258 B); and that what Dr. Jackson distinguishes as the first class of dialogues from the second equally assert or imply that the relation of things to the Ideas, is one of

participation in them as well as of imitation of them (Prof. Zeller's summary of his own review of Dr. Jackson, *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, Vol. I, Berlin, 1888, pp. 617, 618).

In conclusion I may remark that in Plato's writings there is both unity, and also growth and development; but that we must not intrude upon him either a system or a technical language.

BALLIOL COLLEGE,

*October, 1891.*

## NOTE.

*The chief additions to the Introductions in the Third Edition consist of Essays on the following subjects:—*

- |   |                         |
|---|-------------------------|
| (1) Language . . . . .  | Vol. I, 295-321.        |
| (2) The decline of Greek Literature . . . . .   | “ 424-429.              |
| (3) The ‘Ideas’ of Plato and Modern Philo-<br>sophy . . . . .   | Vol. II, 12-25.         |
| (4) The myths of Plato . . . . .  | “ 316-324.              |
| (5) The relation of the Republic, States-<br>man and Laws . . . . .                                   | Vol. III, ccxi-ccxvii.  |
| (6) The legend of Atlantis . . . . .  | “ 429-433.              |
| (7) Psychology . . . . .  | Vol. IV, 175-191.       |
| (8) Comparison of the Laws of Plato with<br>Spartan and Athenian Laws and In-<br>stitutions . . . . . | Vol. V, ccxiii-ccxxxvi. |

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# CHARMIDES.

VOL. I.—I





## INTRODUCTION.

THE subject of the Charmides is Temperance or σωφροσύνη, a *Charmides.*  
peculiarly Greek notion, which may also be rendered Moderation<sup>1</sup>,  
Modesty, Discretion, Wisdom, without completely exhausting by  
all these terms the various associations of the word. It may be  
described as ‘mens sana in corpore sano,’ the harmony or due pro-  
portion of the higher and lower elements of human nature which  
‘makes a man his own master,’ according to the definition of the Re-  
public (iv. 430 E). In the accompanying translation the word has  
been rendered in different places either Temperance or Wisdom,  
as the connection seemed to require: for in the philosophy of  
Plato σωφροσύνη still retains an intellectual element (as Socrates is  
also said to have identified σωφροσύνη with σοφία: Xen. Mem. iii. 9,  
4), and is not yet relegated to the sphere of moral virtue, as in the  
Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (iii. 10).

**Steph.** The beautiful youth, Charmides, who is also the most temperate ANALYSIS.  
159 of human beings, is asked by Socrates, ‘What is Temperance?’  
160 He answers characteristically, (1) ‘Quietness.’ ‘But Temperance  
is a fine and noble thing; and quietness in many or most cases is  
not so fine a thing as quickness.’ He tries again and says (2) that  
temperance is modesty. But this again is set aside by a sophistical  
161 application of Homer: for temperance is good as well as noble,  
and Homer has declared that ‘modesty is not good for a needy  
man.’ (3) Once more Charmides makes the attempt. This time  
162 he gives a definition which he has heard, and of which Socrates  
conjectures that Critias must be the author: ‘Temperance is doing  
one’s own business.’ But the artisan who makes another man’s  
shoes may be temperate, and yet he is not doing his own busi-  
ness; and temperance defined thus would be opposed to the

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Cic. Tusc. iii. 8, 16, ‘σωφροσύνη, quam soleo equidem tum temperan-  
tiam, tum moderationem appellare, nonnunquam etiam modestiam:’ foll.

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division of labour which exists in every temperate or well-ordered state. How is this riddle to be explained?

Critias, who takes the place of Charmides, distinguishes in his answer between 'making' and 'doing,' and with the help of a misapplied quotation from Hesiod assigns to the words 'doing' and 'work' an exclusively good sense: Temperance is doing one's own business; — (4) is doing good.

Still an element of knowledge is wanting which Critias is readily induced to admit at the suggestion of Socrates; and, in the spirit of Socrates and of Greek life generally, proposes as a fifth definition, (5) Temperance is self-knowledge. But all sciences have a subject: number is the subject of arithmetic, health of medicine — what is the subject of temperance or wisdom? The answer is that (6) Temperance is the knowledge of what a man knows and of what he does not know. But this is contrary to analogy; there is no vision of vision, but only of visible things; no love of loves, but only of beautiful things; how then can there be a knowledge of knowledge? That which is older, heavier, lighter, is older, heavier, and lighter than something else, not than itself, and this seems to be true of all relative notions — the object of relation is outside of them; at any rate they can only have relation to themselves in the form of that object. Whether there are any such cases of reflex relation or not, and whether that sort of knowledge which we term Temperance is of this reflex nature, has yet to be determined by the great metaphysician. But even if knowledge can know itself, how does the knowledge of what we know imply the knowledge of what we do not know? Besides, knowledge is an abstraction only, and will not inform us of any particular subject, such as medicine, building, and the like. It may tell us that we or other men know something, but can never tell us what we know.

Admitting that there is a knowledge of what we know and of what we do not know, which would supply a rule and measure of all things, still there would be no good in this; and the knowledge which temperance gives must be of a kind which will do us good; for temperance is a good. But this universal knowledge does not tend to our happiness and good: the only kind of knowledge which brings happiness is the knowledge of good and evil. To this Critias replies that the science or knowledge of good and evil, and

all the other sciences, are regulated by the higher science or knowledge of knowledge. Socrates replies by again parting off the concrete from the abstract, and asks how this knowledge conduces to happiness in the same definite way in which medicine conduces  
175 to health.

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And now, after making all these concessions, which are really inadmissible, we are still as far as ever from ascertaining the nature of temperance, which Charmides already possesses, and  
176 had therefore better rest in the knowledge that the more temperate he is the happier he will be, and not trouble himself with the speculations of Socrates.

In this Dialogue may be noted (1) The Greek ideal of beauty and goodness, the vision of the fair soul in the fair body, realised in the beautiful Charmides; (2) The true conception of medicine as a science of the whole as well as the parts, and of the mind as well as the body, which is playfully intimated in the story of the Thracian; (3) The tendency of the age to verbal distinctions, which here, as in the Protagoras and Cratylus, are ascribed to the ingenuity of Prodicus; and to interpretations or rather parodies of Homer or Hesiod, which are eminently characteristic of Plato and his contemporaries; (4) The germ of an ethical principle contained in the notion that temperance is 'doing one's own business,' which in the Republic (such is the shifting character of the Platonic philosophy) is given as the definition, not of temperance, but of justice; (5) The impatience which is exhibited by Socrates of any definition of temperance in which an element of science or knowledge is not included; (6) The beginning of metaphysics and logic implied in the two questions: whether there can be a science of science, and whether the knowledge of what you know is the same as the knowledge of what you do not know; and also in the distinction between 'what you know' and 'that you know,' *ἃ οἶδεν* and *ὅτι οἶδεν*; here too is the first conception of an absolute self-determined science (the claims of which, however, are disputed by Socrates, who asks *cui bono*?) as well as the first suggestion of the difficulty of the abstract and concrete, and one of the earliest anticipations of the relation of subject and object, and of the subjective element in knowledge — a 'rich banquet' of metaphysical questions in which we 'taste of many

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things' (Rep. i. 354). (7) And still the mind of Plato, having snatched for a moment at these shadows of the future, quickly rejects them: thus early has he reached the conclusion that there can be no science which is a 'science of nothing' (Parm. 132 B). (8) The conception of a science of good and evil also first occurs here, an anticipation of the Philebus and Republic as well as of moral philosophy in later ages.


The dramatic interest of the Dialogue chiefly centres in the youth Charmides, with whom Socrates talks in the kindly spirit of an elder. His childlike simplicity and ingenuousness are contrasted with the dialectical and rhetorical arts of Critias, who is the grown-up man of the world, having a tincture of philosophy. No hint is given, either here or in the Timaeus, of the infamy which attaches to the name of the latter in Athenian history. He is simply a cultivated person who, like his kinsman Plato, is ennobled by the connection of his family with Solon (cp. Tim. 20, 21), and had been the follower, if not the disciple, both of Socrates and of the Sophists. In the argument he is not unfair, if allowance is made for a slight rhetorical tendency, and for a natural desire to save his reputation with the company; he is sometimes nearer the truth than Socrates. Nothing in his language or behaviour is unbecoming the guardian of the beautiful Charmides. His love of reputation is characteristically Greek, and contrasts with the humility of Socrates. Nor in Charmides himself do we find any resemblance to the Charmides of history, except, perhaps, the modest and retiring nature which, according to Xenophon, at one time of his life prevented him from speaking in the Assembly (Mem. 3, 7); and we are surprised to hear that, like Critias, he afterwards became one of the thirty tyrants. In the Dialogue he is a pattern of virtue, and is therefore in no need of the charm which Socrates is unable to apply. With youthful *naïveté*, keeping his secret and entering into the spirit of Socrates, he enjoys the detection of his elder and guardian Critias, who is easily seen to be the author of the definition which he has so great an interest in maintaining (262 B). The preceding definition, 'Temperance is doing one's own business,' is assumed to have been borrowed by Charmides from another; and when the inquiry becomes more abstract he is superseded by Critias (cp. Theaet. 168 E; Euthyd. 290 E). Socrates preserves his accustomed irony to the end; he

is in the neighbourhood of several great truths, which he views in various lights, but always either by bringing them to the test of common sense, or by demanding too great exactness in the use of words, turns aside from them and comes at last to no conclusion.

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The definitions of temperance proceed in regular order from the popular to the philosophical. The first two are simple enough and partially true, like the first thoughts of an intelligent youth; the third, which is a real contribution to ethical philosophy, is perverted by the ingenuity of Socrates, and hardly rescued by an equal perversion on the part of Critias. The remaining definitions have a higher aim, which is to introduce the element of knowledge, and at last to unite good and truth in a single science. But the time has not yet arrived for the realization of this vision of metaphysical philosophy; and such a science when brought nearer to us in the *Philebus* and the *Republic* will not be called by the name of *σωφροσύνη*. Hence we see with surprise that Plato, who in his other writings identifies good and knowledge, here opposes them, and asks, almost in the spirit of Aristotle, how can there be a knowledge of knowledge, and even if attainable, how can such a knowledge be of any use?

The difficulty of the *Charmides* arises chiefly from the two senses of the word *σωφροσύνη*, or temperance. From the ethical notion of temperance, which is variously defined to be quietness, modesty, doing our own business, the doing of good actions, the dialogue passes on to the intellectual conception of *σωφροσύνη*, which is declared also to be the science of self-knowledge, or of the knowledge of what we know and do not know, or of the knowledge of good and evil. The dialogue represents a stage in the history of philosophy in which knowledge and action were not yet distinguished. Hence the confusion between them, and the easy transition from one to the other. The definitions which are offered are all rejected, but it is to be observed that they all tend to throw a light on the nature of temperance, and that, unlike the distinction of Critias between *ποιεῖν*, *πράττειν*, *ἐργάζεσθαι*, none of them are merely verbal quibbles. It is implied that this question, although it has not yet received a solution in theory, has been already answered by Charmides himself, who has learned to practise the virtue of self-knowledge which philosophers are vainly trying to define in words. In a similar spirit we might say





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TION.

to a young man who is disturbed by theological difficulties, 'Do not trouble yourself about such matters, but only lead a good life;' and yet in either case it is not to be denied that right ideas of truth may contribute greatly to the improvement of character.

The reasons why the *Charmides*, *Lysis*, *Laches* have been placed together and first in the series of Platonic dialogues, are: (i) Their shortness and simplicity. The *Charmides* and the *Lysis*, if not the *Laches*, are of the same 'quality' as the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*: and it is probable, though far from certain, that the slighter effort preceded the greater one. (ii) Their eristic, or rather Socratic character; they belong to the class called dialogues of search (*πειραστικά*), which have no conclusion. (iii) The absence in them of certain favourite notions of Plato, such as the doctrine of recollection and of the Platonic ideas; the questions, whether virtue can be taught; whether the virtues are one or many. (iv) They have a want of depth, when compared with the dialogues of the middle and later period; and a youthful beauty and grace which are not found in the later ones. (v) Their resemblance to one another; in all the three boyhood has a great part. These reasons have various degrees of weight in determining their place in the catalogue of the Platonic writings, though they are not conclusive. No arrangement of the Platonic dialogues can be strictly chronological. The order which has been adopted is intended mainly for the convenience of the reader; at the same time, indications of the date supplied either by Plato himself or allusions found in the dialogues have not been lost sight of. Much may be said about this subject, but the results can only be probable; there are no materials which would enable us to attain to anything like certainty.

The relations of knowledge and virtue are again brought forward in the companion dialogues of the *Lysis* and *Laches*; and also in the *Protagoras* and *Euthydemus*. The opposition of abstract and particular knowledge in this dialogue may be compared with a similar opposition of ideas and phenomena which occurs in the Prologue to the *Parmenides*, but seems rather to belong to a later stage of the philosophy of Plato.

# CHARMIDES, OR TEMPERANCE.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, *who is the narrator.*  
CHAEREPHON.

CHARMIDES.  
CRITIAS.

SCENE:—The Palaestra of Taureas, which is near the Porch of the King Archon.

Steph. <sup>153</sup> YESTERDAY evening I returned from the army at Potidaea, and having been a good while away, I thought that I should like to go and look at my old haunts. So I went into the palaestra of Taureas, which is over against the temple adjoining the porch of the King Archon, and there I found a number of persons, most of whom I knew, but not all. My visit was unexpected, and no sooner did they see me entering than they saluted me from afar on all sides; and Chaerephon, who is a kind of madman, started up and ran to me, seizing my hand, and saying, How did you escape, Socrates?—(I should explain that an engagement had taken place at Potidaea not long before we came away, of which the news had only just reached Athens.)

*Charmides.*

CHAEREPHON,  
SOCRATES.

Socrates,  
who has  
just re-  
turned to  
Athens,  
visits his  
old friends  
and tells  
them the  
news from  
the army at  
Potidaea.

You see, I replied, that here I am.

There was a report, he said, that the engagement was very severe, and that many of our acquaintance had fallen.

That, I replied, was not far from the truth.

I suppose, he said, that you were present.

I was.

Then sit down, and tell us the whole story, which as yet we have only heard imperfectly.

I took the place which he assigned to me, by the side of



*Charmides.*SOCRATES,  
CRITIAS,  
CHAEREPHON.He proceeds  
to make en-  
quiries about  
the state of  
philosophy  
and about the  
youth; and is  
told of the  
beautiful  
Charmides,

Critias the son of Callaeschrus, and when I had saluted him and the rest of the company, I told them the news from the army, and answered their several enquiries.

Then, when there had been enough of this, I, in my turn, began to make enquiries about matters at home—about the present state of philosophy, and about the youth. I asked whether any of them were remarkable for wisdom or beauty, or both. Critias, glancing at the door, invited my attention 154 to some youths who were coming in, and talking noisily to one another, followed by a crowd. Of the beauties, Socrates, he said, I fancy that you will soon be able to form a judgment. For those who are just entering are the advanced guard of the great beauty, as he is thought to be, of the day, and he is likely to be not far off himself.

Who is he, I said; and who is his father?

Charmides, he replied, is his name; he is my cousin, and the son of my uncle Glaucon: I rather think that you know him too, although he was not grown up at the time of your departure.

Certainly, I know him, I said, for he was remarkable even then when he was still a child, and I should imagine that by this time he must be almost a young man.

You will see, he said, in a moment what progress he has made and what he is like. He had scarcely said the word, when Charmides entered.

Now you know, my friend, that I cannot measure anything, and of the beautiful, I am simply such a measure as a white line is of chalk; for almost all young persons appear to be beautiful in my eyes. But at the moment, when I saw him coming in, I confess that I was quite astonished at his beauty and stature; all the world seemed to be enamoured of him; amazement and confusion reigned when he entered; and a troop of lovers followed him. That grown-up men like ourselves should have been affected in this way was not surprising, but I observed that there was the same feeling among the boys; all of them, down to the very least child, turned and looked at him, as if he had been a statue.

Chaerephon called me and said: What do you think of him, Socrates? Has he not a beautiful face?

Most beautiful, I said.

But you would think nothing of his face, he replied, if you could see his naked form: he is absolutely perfect.

And to this they all agreed.

By Heracles, I said, there never was such a paragon, if he has only one other slight addition.

What is that? said Critias.

If he has a noble soul; and being of your house, Critias, he may be expected to have this.

He is as fair and good within, as he is without, replied Critias.

Then, before we see his body, should we not ask him to show us his soul, naked and undisguised? he is just of an age at which he will like to talk.

155 That he will, said Critias, and I can tell you that he is a philosopher already, and also a considerable poet, not in his own opinion only, but in that of others.

That, my dear Critias, I replied, is a distinction which has long been in your family, and is inherited by you from Solon. But why do you not call him, and show him to us? for even if he were younger than he is, there could be no impropriety in his talking to us, in the presence of you, who are his guardian and cousin.

Very well, he said; then I will call him; and turning to the attendant, he said, Call Charmides, and tell him that I want him to come and see a physician about the illness of which he spoke to me the day before yesterday. Then again addressing me, he added: He has been complaining lately of having a headache when he rises in the morning: now why should you not make him believe that you know a cure for the headache?

Why not, I said; but will he come?

He will be sure to come, he replied.

He came as he was bidden, and sat down between Critias and me. Great amusement was occasioned by every one pushing with might and main at his neighbour in order to make a place for him next to themselves, until at the two ends of the row one had to get up and the other was rolled over sideways. Now I, my friend, was beginning to feel awkward; my former bold belief in my powers of conversing with him had vanished. And when Critias told him that I was the

*Charmides.*

SOCRATES,  
CHAEREPHON,  
CRITIAS.

whose soul is  
as fair as his  
body.

He himself  
presently  
appears, and  
a ludicrous  
scene ensues.

*Charmides.*SOCRATES,  
CHARMIDES.The feelings  
suggested to  
Socrates by  
the sight of  
him.

person who had the cure, he looked at me in such an indescribable manner, and was just going to ask a question. And at that moment all the people in the palaestra crowded about us, and, O rare! I caught a sight of the inwards of his garment, and took the flame. Then I could no longer contain myself. I thought how well Cydias understood the nature of love, when, in speaking of a fair youth, he warns some one 'not to bring the fawn in the sight of the lion to be devoured by him,' for I felt that I had been overcome by a sort of wild-beast appetite. But I controlled myself, and when he asked me if I knew the cure of the headache, I answered, but with an effort, that I did know.

And what is it? he said.

The cure for  
the headache.

I replied that it was a kind of leaf, which required to be accompanied by a charm, and if a person would repeat the charm at the same time that he used the cure, he would be made whole; but that without the charm the leaf would be of no avail.

Then I will write out the charm from your dictation, he 156 said.

With my consent? I said, or without my consent?

With your consent, Socrates, he said, laughing.

Very good, I said; and are you quite sure that you know my name?

I ought to know you, he replied, for there is a great deal said about you among my companions; and I remember when I was a child seeing you in company with my cousin Critias.

The eyes, as  
physicians tell  
us, cannot be  
cured without  
the head, nor  
the head with-  
out the body;

I am glad to find that you remember me, I said; for I shall now be more at home with you and shall be better able to explain the nature of the charm, about which I felt a difficulty before. For the charm will do more, Charmides, than only cure the headache. I dare say that you have heard eminent physicians say to a patient who comes to them with bad eyes, that they cannot cure his eyes by themselves, but that if his eyes are to be cured, his head must be treated; and then again they say that to think of curing the head alone, and not the rest of the body also, is the height of folly. And arguing in this way they apply their methods to the whole body, and try to treat and heal the whole and

the part together. Did you ever observe that this is what they say? *Charmides.*

Yes, he said.

And they are right, and you would agree with them?

Yes, he said, certainly I should.

His approving answers reassured me, and I began by degrees to regain confidence, and the vital heat returned. Such, Charimdes, I said, is the nature of the charm, which I learned when serving with the army from one of the physicians of the Thracian king Zamolxis, who are said to be so skilful that they can even give immortality. This Thracian told me

that in these notions of theirs, which I was just now mentioning, the Greek physicians are quite right as far as they go; but Zamolxis, he added, our king, who is also a god, says further, 'that as you ought not to attempt to cure the eyes without the head, or the head without the body, so neither ought you to attempt to cure the body without the soul; and this,' he said,

*nor the body  
without the  
soul.*

'is the reason why the cure of many diseases is unknown to the physicians of Hellas, because they are ignorant of the whole, which ought to be studied also; for the part can never be well unless the whole is well.' For all good and evil, whether in the body or in human nature, originates, as he declared, in the soul, and overflows from thence, as if from the head into  
157 the eyes. And therefore if the head and body are to be well,

you must begin by curing the soul; that is the first thing. And the cure, my dear youth, has to be effected by the use of certain charms, and these charms are fair words; and by them temperance is implanted in the soul, and where temperance is, there health is speedily imparted, not only to the head, but to the whole body. And he who taught me the cure and the charm at the same time added a special direction: 'Let no one,' he said, 'persuade you to cure the head, until he has first given you his soul to be cured by the charm. For this,' he said, 'is the great error of our day in the treatment of the human body, that physicians separate the soul from the body.' And he added with emphasis, at the same time making me swear to his words, 'Let no one, however rich, or noble, or fair, persuade you to give him the cure, without the charm.' Now I have sworn, and I must keep my oath, and therefore if you will allow me to apply the Thracian

*Charmides.*SOCRATES,  
CRITIAS,  
CHARMIDES.

charm first to your soul, as the stranger directed, I will afterwards proceed to apply the cure to your head. But if not, I do not know what I am to do with you, my dear Charmides.

Critias, when he heard this, said: The headache will be an unexpected gain to my young relation, if the pain in his head compels him to improve his mind: and I can tell you, Socrates, that Charmides is not only pre-eminent in beauty among his equals, but also in that quality which is given by the charm; and this, as you say, is temperance?

Yes, I said.

Then let me tell you that he is the most temperate of human beings, and for his age inferior to none in any quality.

Yes, I said, Charmides; and indeed I think that you ought to excel others in all good qualities; for if I am not mistaken there is no one present who could easily point out two Athenian houses, whose union would be likely to produce a better or nobler scion than the two from which you are sprung. There is your father's house, which is descended from Critias the son of Dropidas, whose family has been commemorated in the panegyrical verses of Anacreon, Solon, and many other poets, as famous for beauty and virtue and all other high fortune: and your mother's house is equally distinguished; for your maternal uncle, Pyrilampes, is reputed never to have found his equal, in Persia at the court of the great king, or on the continent of Asia, in all the places to which he went as ambassador, for stature and beauty; that whole family is not a whit inferior to the other. Having such ancestors you ought to be first in all things, and, sweet son of Glaucon, your outward form is no dishonour to any of them. If to beauty you add temperance, and if in other respects you are what Critias declares you to be, then, dear Charmides, blessed art thou, in being the son of thy mother. And here lies the point; for if, as he declares, you have this gift of temperance already, and are temperate enough, in that case you have no need of any charms, whether of Zamolxis or of Abaris the Hyperborean, and I may as well let you have the cure of the head at once; but if you have not yet acquired this quality, I must use the charm before I give you the medicine. Please, therefore, to inform me whether you admit

The outward form of Charmides does no discredit to his great ancestors.

Has he temperance also?

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the truth of what Critias has been saying ;—have you or have you not this quality of temperance? *Charmides.*

Charmides blushed, and the blush heightened his beauty, for modesty is becoming in youth ; he then said very ingenuously, that he really could not at once answer, either yes, or no, to the question which I had asked : For, said he, if I affirm that I am not temperate, that would be a strange thing for me to say of myself, and also I should give the lie to Critias, and many others who think as he tells you, that I am temperate : but, on the other hand, if I say that I am, I shall have to praise myself, which would be ill manners ; and therefore I do not know how to answer you. SOCRATES,  
CHARMIDES.  
The modest  
reply of  
Charmides.

I said to him : That is a natural reply, Charmides, and I think that you and I ought together to enquire whether you have this quality about which I am asking or not ; and then you will not be compelled to say what you do not like ; neither shall I be a rash practitioner of medicine : therefore, if you please, I will share the enquiry with you, but I will not press you if you would rather not.

There is nothing which I should like better, he said ; and as far as I am concerned you may proceed in the way which you think best.

159 I think, I said, that I had better begin by asking you a question ; for if temperance abides in you, you must have an opinion about her ; she must give some intimation of her nature and qualities, which may enable you to form a notion of her. Is not that true? A question  
about  
temperance:  
What is it?

Yes, he said, that I think is true.

You know your native language, I said, and therefore you must be able to tell what you feel about this.

Certainly, he said.

In order, then, that I may form a conjecture whether you have temperance abiding in you or not, tell me, I said, what, in your opinion, is Temperance?

At first he hesitated, and was very unwilling to answer : then he said that he thought temperance was doing things orderly and quietly, such things for example as walking in the streets, and talking, or anything else of that nature. In a word, he said, I should answer that, in my opinion, temperance is quietness. First defini-  
tion:  
Temperance  
is quietness.

*Charmides.*

SOCRATES,  
CHARMIDES.

Are you right, Charmides? I said. No doubt some would affirm that the quiet are the temperate; but let us see whether these words have any meaning; and first tell me whether you would not acknowledge temperance to be of the class of the noble and good?

Yes.

But in many actions quickness is found to be better than quietness; e. g. writing, reading, running, etc

But which is best when you are at the writing-master's, to write the same letters quickly or quietly?

Quickly.

And to read quickly or slowly?

Quickly again.

And in playing the lyre, or wrestling, quickness or sharpness are far better than quietness and slowness?

Yes.

And the same holds in boxing and in the pancratiun?

Certainly.

And in leaping and running and in bodily exercises generally, quickness and agility are good; slowness, and inactivity, and quietness, are bad?

That is evident.

Then, I said, in all bodily actions, not quietness, but the greatest agility and quickness, is noblest and best?

Yes, certainly.

And is temperance a good?

Yes.

Then, in reference to the body, not quietness, but quickness will be the higher degree of temperance, if temperance is a good?

True, he said.

And which, I said, is better—facility in learning, or difficulty in learning?

Facility.

Yes, I said; and facility in learning is learning quickly, and difficulty in learning is learning quietly and slowly?

True.

And is it not better to teach another quickly and energetically, rather than quietly and slowly?

Yes.

And which is better, to call to mind, and to remember, quickly and readily, or quietly and slowly?

The former.

*Charmides.*

160 And is not shrewdness a quickness or cleverness of the soul, and not a quietness?

SOCRATES,  
CHARMIDES.

True.

And is it not best to understand what is said, whether at the writing-master's or the music-master's, or anywhere else, not as quietly as possible, but as quickly as possible?

Yes.

And in the searchings or deliberations of the soul, not the quietest, as I imagine, and he who with difficulty deliberates and discovers, is thought worthy of praise, but he who does so most easily and quickly?

Quite true, he said.

And in all that concerns either body or soul, swiftness and activity are clearly better than slowness and quietness?

Clearly they are.

Then temperance is not quietness, nor is the temperate life quiet,—certainly not upon this view; for the life which is temperate is supposed to be the good. And of two things, one is true,—either never, or very seldom, do the quiet actions in life appear to be better than the quick and energetic ones; or supposing that of the nobler actions, there are as many quiet, as quick and vehement: still, even if we grant this, temperance will not be acting quietly any more than acting quickly and energetically, either in walking or talking or in anything else; nor will the quiet life be more temperate than the unquiet, seeing that temperance is admitted by us to be a good and noble thing, and the quick have been shown to be as good as the quiet.

Temperance  
therefore is no  
more quiet-  
ness than  
quickness.

I think, he said, Socrates, that you are right.

Then once more, Charmides, I said, fix your attention, and look within; consider the effect which temperance has upon yourself, and the nature of that which has the effect. Think over all this, and, like a brave youth, tell me—What is temperance?

After a moment's pause, in which he made a real manly effort to think, he said: My opinion is, Socrates, that temperance makes a man ashamed or modest, and that temperance is the same as modesty.

Second defini-  
tion:  
Temperance  
is modesty.



*Charmides.*

Very good, I said; and did you not admit, just now, that temperance is noble?

SOCRATES,  
CHARMIDES,  
CRITIAS.

Yes, certainly, he said.

And the temperate are also good?

Yes.

And can that be good which does not make men good?

Certainly not.

And you would infer that temperance is not only noble, but also good?

That is my opinion.

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But Homer  
says that  
modesty is not  
always good.

Well, I said; but surely you would agree with Homer when he says,

‘Modesty is not good for a needy man’?

Yes, he said; I agree.

Then I suppose that modesty is and is not good?

Clearly.

But temperance, whose presence makes men only good, and not bad, is always good?

That appears to me to be as you say.

And the inference is that temperance cannot be modesty—if temperance is a good, and if modesty is as much an evil as a good?

Third defini-  
tion: Tem-  
perance is  
doing our own  
business.  
Charmides  
had heard this  
from Critias,  
who denies  
that he said it.

All that, Socrates, appears to me to be true; but I should like to know what you think about another definition of temperance, which I just now remember to have heard from some one, who said, ‘That temperance is doing our own business.’ Was he right who affirmed that?

You monster! I said; this is what Critias, or some philosopher has told you.

Some one else, then, said Critias; for certainly I have not.

But what matter, said Charmides, from whom I heard this?

No matter at all, I replied; for the point is not who said the words, but whether they are true or not.

The terms of  
the definition  
are ambigu-  
ous.

There you are in the right, Socrates, he replied.

To be sure, I said; yet I doubt whether we shall ever be able to discover their truth or falsehood; for they are a kind of riddle.

What makes you think so? he said.

Because, I said, he who uttered them seems to me to have meant one thing, and said another. Is the scribe, for example, to be regarded as doing nothing when he reads or writes? Charmides.  
SOCRATES,  
CHARMIDES.

I should rather think that he was doing something.

And does the scribe write or read, or teach you boys to write or read, your own names only, or did you write your enemies' names as well as your own and your friends'?

As much one as the other.

And was there anything meddling or intemperate in this?

Certainly not.

And yet if reading and writing are the same as doing, you were doing what was not your own business? Writing is doing; is writing your enemy's name doing your own business?

But they are the same as doing.

And the healing art, my friend, and building, and weaving, and doing anything whatever which is done by art,—these all clearly come under the head of doing?

Certainly.

And do you think that a state would be well ordered by a law which compelled every man to weave and wash his own coat, and make his own shoes, and his own flask and strigil, and other implements, on this principle of every one doing and performing his own, and abstaining from what is not his own? Must a good citizen make his own coat, etc.?

I think not, he said.

But, I said, a temperate state will be a well-ordered state.

Of course, he replied.

Then temperance, I said, will not be doing one's own business; not at least in this way, or doing things of this sort?

Clearly not.

Then, as I was just now saying, he who declared that temperance is a man doing his own business had another and a hidden meaning; for I do not think that he could have been such a fool as to mean this. Was he a fool who told you, Charmides?

Nay, he replied, I certainly thought him a very wise man.

Then I am quite certain that he put forth his definition as

*Charmides.*

a riddle, thinking that no one would know the meaning of the words 'doing his own business.'

SOCRATES,  
CHARMIDES,  
CRITIAS.

I dare say, he replied.

And what is the meaning of a man doing his own business? Can you tell me?

Indeed, I cannot; and I should not wonder if the man himself who used this phrase did not understand what he was saying. Whereupon he laughed slyly, and looked at Critias.

The secret dis-  
satisfaction of  
Critias,

Critias had long been showing uneasiness, for he felt that he had a reputation to maintain with Charmides and the rest of the company. He had, however, hitherto managed to restrain himself; but now he could no longer forbear, and I am convinced of the truth of the suspicion which I entertained at the time, that Charmides had heard this answer about temperance from Critias. And Charmides, who did not want to answer himself, but to make Critias answer, tried to stir him up. He went on pointing out that he had been refuted, at which Critias grew angry, and appeared, as I thought, inclined to quarrel with him; just as a poet might quarrel with an actor who spoiled his poems in repeating them; so he looked hard at him and said—

Do you imagine, Charmides, that the author of this definition of temperance did not understand the meaning of his own words, because you do not understand them?

Why, at his age, I said, most excellent Critias, he can hardly be expected to understand; but you, who are older, and have studied, may well be assumed to know the meaning of them; and therefore, if you agree with him, and accept his definition of temperance, I would much rather argue with you than with him about the truth or falsehood of the definition.

who maintains  
the definition  
against  
Socrates,

I entirely agree, said Critias, and accept the definition. •

Very good, I said; and now let me repeat my question—Do you admit, as I was just now saying, that all craftsmen make or do something?

Yes.

And do they make or do their own business only, or that of others also?

They make or do that of others also.

And are they temperate, seeing that they make not for themselves or their own business only?

*Charmides.*

Why not? he said.

SOCRATES,  
CRITIAS.

No objection on my part, I said, but there may be a difficulty on his who proposes as a definition of temperance, 'doing one's own business,' and then says that there is no reason why those who do the business of others should not be temperate.

Nay<sup>1</sup>, said he; did I ever acknowledge that those who do the business of others are temperate? I said, those who make, not those who do.

and is quickly  
caught in con-  
tradictions by  
him.

What! I asked; do you mean to say that doing and making are not the same?

No more, he replied, than making or working are the same; thus much I have learned from Hesiod, who says that 'work is no disgrace.' Now do you imagine that if he had meant by working and doing such things as you were describing, he would have said that there was no disgrace in them—for example, in the manufacture of shoes, or in selling pickles, or sitting for hire in a house of ill-fame? That, Socrates, is not to be supposed: but I conceive him to have distinguished making from doing and work; and, while admitting that the making anything might sometimes become a disgrace, when the employment was not honourable, to have thought that work was never any disgrace at all. For things nobly and usefully made he called works; and such makings he called workings, and doings; and he must be supposed to have called such things only man's proper business, and what is hurtful, not his business: and in that sense Hesiod, and any other wise man, may be reasonably supposed to call him wise who does his own work.

He tries to  
save himself  
by new dis-  
tinctions.

O Critias, I said, no sooner had you opened your mouth, than I pretty well knew that you would call that which is proper to a man, and that which is his own, good; and that the makings (*ποιήσεις*) of the good you would call doings (*πράξεις*), for I am no stranger to the endless distinctions which Prodicus draws about names. Now I have no objection to your giving names any signification which you please,

<sup>1</sup> The English reader has to observe that the word 'make' (*ποιεῖν*), in Greek, has also the sense of 'do' (*πράττειν*).

*Charmides.*

SOCRATES,  
CRITIAS.

if you will only tell me what you mean by them. Please then to begin again, and be a little plainer. Do you mean that this doing or making, or whatever is the word which you would use, of good actions, is temperance?

I do, he said.

Then not he who does evil, but he who does good, is temperate?

Yes, he said; and you, friend, would agree.

No matter whether I should or not; just now, not what I think, but what you are saying, is the point at issue.

Fourth definition: Temperance is the doing of good actions.

Well, he answered; I mean to say, that he who does evil, and not good, is not temperate; and that he is temperate who does good, and not evil: for temperance I define in plain words to be the doing of good actions.

And you may be very likely right in what you are saying; 164 but I am curious to know whether you imagine that temperate men are ignorant of their own temperance?

I do not think so, he said.

M. Critias is forced by Socrates to admit that the temperate man does not always know himself to be acting temperately.

And yet were you not saying, just now, that craftsmen might be temperate in doing another's work, as well as in doing their own?

I was, he replied; but what is your drift?

I have no particular drift, but I wish that you would tell me whether a physician who cures a patient may do good to himself and good to another also?

I think that he may.

And he who does so does his duty?

Yes.

And does not he who does his duty act temperately or wisely?

Yes, he acts wisely.

But must the physician necessarily know when his treatment is likely to prove beneficial, and when not? or must the craftsman necessarily know when he is likely to be benefited, and when not to be benefited, by the work which he is doing?

I suppose not.

Then, I said, he may sometimes do good or harm, and not know what he is himself doing, and yet, in doing good, as you say, he has done temperately or wisely. Was not that your statement?

Yes.

Charmides.

Then, as would seem, in doing good, he may act wisely or temperately, and be wise or temperate, but not know his own wisdom or temperance?

SOCRATES,  
CRITIAS.

But Critias refuses to accept this conclusion. Temperance implies knowledge; and the famous Delphic inscription, 'Know thyself,' means only, 'Be temperate.'

But that, Socrates, he said, is impossible; and therefore if this is, as you imply, the necessary consequence of any of my previous admissions, I will withdraw them, rather than admit that a man can be temperate or wise who does not know himself; and I am not ashamed to confess that I was in error. For self-knowledge would certainly be maintained by me to be the very essence of knowledge, and in this I agree with him who dedicated the inscription, 'Know thyself!' at Delphi. That word, if I am not mistaken, is put there as a sort of salutation which the god addresses to those who enter the temple; as much as to say that the ordinary salutation of 'Hail!' is not right, and that the exhortation 'Be temperate!' would be a far better way of saluting one another. The notion of him who dedicated the inscription was, as I believe, that the god speaks to those who enter his temple, not as men speak; but, when a worshipper enters, the first word which he hears is 'Be temperate!' This, however, like a prophet he expresses in a sort of riddle, for 'Know thyself!' and 'Be temperate!' are the same, as I maintain, and as the letters imply [*σὼφρόνει, γνῶθι σαυτὸν*], and yet they may be easily mis-  
165 understood; and succeeding sages who added 'Never too much,' or, 'Give a pledge, and evil is nigh at hand,' would appear to have so misunderstood them; for they imagined that 'Know thyself!' was a piece of advice which the god gave, and not his salutation of the worshippers at their first coming in; and they dedicated their own inscription under the idea that they too would give equally useful pieces of advice. Shall I tell you, Socrates, why I say all this? My object is to leave the previous discussion (in which I know not whether you or I are more right, but, at any rate, no clear result was attained), and to raise a new one in which I will attempt to prove, if you deny, that temperance is self-knowledge.

Fifth definition:  
Temperance is self-knowledge.

Yes, I said, Critias; but you come to me as though I professed to know about the questions which I ask, and as though I could, if I only would, agree with you<sup>1</sup>. Whereas the fact

<sup>1</sup> Reading, according to Heusde's conjecture, *ὁμολογήσουτός σοι*.



*Charmides.*  
*SOCRATES,*  
*CRITIAS.*

is that I enquire with you into the truth of that which is advanced from time to time, just because I do not know; and when I have enquired, I will say whether I agree with you or not. Please then to allow me time to reflect.

Reflect, he said.

But temperance is also a science of something.

I am reflecting, I replied, and discover that temperance, or wisdom, if implying a knowledge of anything, must be a science, and a science of something.

Yes, he said; the science of itself.

Is not medicine, I said, the science of health?

True.

And suppose, I said, that I were asked by you what is the use or effect of medicine, which is this science of health, I should answer that medicine is of very great use in producing health, which, as you will admit, is an excellent effect.

Granted.

What then is the result of it?

And if you were to ask me, what is the result or effect of architecture, which is the science of building, I should say houses, and so of other arts, which all have their different results. Now I want you, Critias, to answer a similar question about temperance, or wisdom, which, according to you, is the science of itself. Admitting this view, I ask of you, what good work, worthy of the name wise, does temperance or wisdom, which is the science of itself, effect? Answer me.

No material result any more than in the abstract sciences.

That is not the true way of pursuing the enquiry, Socrates, he said; for wisdom is not like the other sciences, any more than they are like one another: but you proceed as if they were alike. For tell me, he said, what result is there of computation or geometry, in the same sense as a house is the result of building, or a garment of weaving, or any other work of any other art? Can you show me any such result of them? You cannot.

But still abstract sciences have a subject-matter.

That is true, I said; but still each of these sciences has a subject which is different from the science. I can show you that the art of computation has to do with odd and even numbers in their numerical relations to themselves and to each other. Is not that true?

Yes, he said.

And the odd and even numbers are not the same with the art of computation? *Charmides.*

They are not.

SOCRATES,  
CRITIAS.

The art of weighing, again, has to do with lighter and heavier; but the art of weighing is one thing, and the heavy and the light another. Do you admit that?

Yes.

Now, I want to know, what is that which is not wisdom, and of which wisdom is the science?

You are just falling into the old error, Socrates, he said. You come asking in what wisdom or temperance differs from the other sciences, and then you try to discover some respect in which they are alike; but they are not, for all the other sciences are of something else, and not of themselves; wisdom alone is a science of other sciences, and of itself. And of this, as I believe, you are very well aware: and that you are only doing what you denied that you were doing just now, trying to refute me, instead of pursuing the argument.

Temperance or wisdom is defined to be the science of other sciences, and of itself.

And what if I am? How can you think that I have any other motive in refuting you but what I should have in examining into myself? which motive would be just a fear of my unconsciously fancying that I knew something of which I was ignorant. And at this moment I pursue the argument chiefly for my own sake, and perhaps in some degree also for the sake of others who are my friends. For is not the discovery of things as they truly are, a good common to all mankind?

Personalities are beginning, to which Socrates quickly puts an end.

Yes, certainly, Socrates, he said.

Then, I said, be cheerful, sweet sir, and give your opinion in answer to the question which I asked, never minding whether Critias or Socrates is the person refuted; attend only to the argument, and see what will come of the refutation.

I think that you are right, he replied; and I will do as you say.

Tell me, then, I said, what you mean to affirm about wisdom.

I mean to say that wisdom is the only science which is the science of itself as well as of the other sciences.

A difficulty: A science of itself and other sciences must also be a science of the absence of science.

But the science of science, I said, will also be the science of the absence of science.



*Charmides*SOCRATES.  
CRITIAS.

Very true, he said.

Then the wise or temperate man, and he only, will know 167  
himself, and be able to examine what he knows or does not  
know, and to see what others know and think that they know  
and do really know; and what they do not know, and fancy  
that they know, when they do not. No other person will be  
able to do this. And this is wisdom and temperance and  
self-knowledge—for a man to know what he knows, and what  
he does not know. That is your meaning?

Yes, he said.

Now then, I said, making an offering of the third or last  
argument to Zeus the Saviour, let us begin again, and ask, in  
the first place, whether it is or is not possible for a person to  
know that he knows and does not know what he knows and  
does not know; and in the second place, whether, if perfectly  
possible, such knowledge is of any use.

That is what we have to consider, he said.

And here, Critias, I said, I hope that you will find a way  
out of a difficulty into which I have got myself. Shall I tell  
you the nature of the difficulty?

By all means, he replied.

Does not what you have been saying, if true, amount to  
this: that there must be a single science which is wholly a  
science of itself and of other sciences, and that the same is  
also the science of the absence of science?

Yes.

But is this  
conceivable?

But consider how monstrous this proposition is, my friend:  
in any parallel case, the impossibility will be transparent  
to you.

How so? and in what cases do you mean?

In such cases as this: Suppose that there is a kind of  
vision which is not like ordinary vision, but a vision of itself  
and of other sorts of vision, and of the defect of them, which  
in seeing sees no colour, but only itself and other sorts of  
vision: Do you think that there is such a kind of vision?

Certainly not.

Or is there a kind of hearing which hears no sound at all,  
but only itself and other sorts of hearing, or the defects of  
them?

There is not.

Or take all the senses: can you imagine that there is any sense of itself and of other senses, but which is incapable of perceiving the objects of the senses? *Charmides.*  
SOCRATES,  
CRITIAS.

I think not.

Could there be any desire which is not the desire of any pleasure, but of itself, and of all other desires? *It is not supported by the analogy of sense or of the affections;*

Certainly not.

Or can you imagine a wish which wishes for no good, but only for itself and all other wishes?

I should answer, No.

Or would you say that there is a love which is not the love of beauty, but of itself and of other loves?

I should not.

168 Or did you ever know of a fear which fears itself or other fears, but has no object of fear?

I never did, he said.

Or of an opinion which is an opinion of itself and of other opinions, and which has no opinion on the subjects of opinion in general?

Certainly not.

But surely we are assuming a science of this kind, which, having no subject-matter, is a science of itself and of the other sciences?

Yes, that is what is affirmed.

But how strange is this, if it be indeed true: we must not however as yet absolutely deny the possibility of such a science; let us rather consider the matter.

You are quite right.

Well then, this science of which we are speaking is a science of something, and is of a nature to be a science of something? *and involves a contradiction in the case of comparative terms.*

Yes.

Just as that which is greater is of a nature to be greater than something else<sup>1</sup>?

<sup>1</sup> Socrates is intending to show that science differs from the object of science, as any other relative differs from the object of relation. But where there is comparison—greater, less, heavier, lighter, and the like—a relation to self as well as to other things involves an absolute contradiction; and in other cases, as in the case of the senses, is hardly conceivable. The use of the genitive after the comparative in Greek, *μείζον τινος*, creates an unavoidable obscurity in the translation.

*Charmides.*

Yes.

SOCRATES,  
CRITIAS.

Which is less, if the other is conceived to be greater?

To be sure.

And if we could find something which is at once greater than itself, and greater than other great things, but not greater than those things in comparison of which the others are greater, then that thing would have the property of being greater and also less than itself?

That, Socrates, he said, is the inevitable inference.

Or if there be a double which is double of itself and of other doubles, these will be halves; for the double is relative to the half?

That is true.

And that which is greater than itself will also be less, and that which is heavier will also be lighter, and that which is older will also be younger: and the same of other things; that which has a nature relative to self will retain also the nature of its object: I mean to say, for example, that hearing is, as we say, of sound or voice. Is that true?

Yes.

Then if hearing hears itself, it must hear a voice; for there is no other way of hearing.

Certainly.

And sight also, my excellent friend, if it sees itself must see a colour, for sight cannot see that which has no colour.

No.

Do you remark, Critias, that in several of the examples which have been recited the notion of a relation to self is altogether inadmissible, and in other cases hardly credible—inadmissible, for example, in the case of magnitudes, numbers, and the like?

Very true.

But in the case of hearing and sight, or in the power of self-motion, and the power of heat to burn, this relation to self will be regarded as incredible by some, but perhaps not by others. And some great man, my friend, is wanted, who will satisfactorily determine for us, whether there is nothing which has an inherent property of relation to self, or some things only and not others; and whether in this class of self-related things, if there be such a class, that science which

The relation  
to self gener-  
ally incredible  
and hardly  
ever certain.

is called wisdom or temperance is included. I altogether distrust my own power of determining these matters: I am not certain whether there is such a science of science at all; and even if there be, I should not acknowledge this to be wisdom or temperance, until I can also see whether such a science would or would not do us any good; for I have an impression that temperance is a benefit and a good. And therefore, O son of Callaeschrus, as you maintain that temperance or wisdom is a science of science, and also of the absence of science, I will request you to show in the first place, as I was saying before, the possibility, and in the second place, the advantage, of such a science; and then perhaps you may satisfy me that you are right in your view of temperance.

*Charmides.*

SOCRATES,  
CRITIAS.

Critias heard me say this, and saw that I was in a difficulty; and as one person when another yawns in his presence catches the infection of yawning from him, so did he seem to be driven into a difficulty by my difficulty. But as he had a reputation to maintain, he was ashamed to admit before the company that he could not answer my challenge or determine the question at issue; and he made an unintelligible attempt to hide his perplexity. In order that the argument might proceed, I said to him, Well then, Critias, if you like, let us assume that there is this science of science; whether the assumption is right or wrong may hereafter be investigated. Admitting the existence of it, will you tell me how such a science enables us to distinguish what we know or do not know, which, as we were saying, is self-knowledge or wisdom: so we were saying?

Yes, Socrates, he said; and that I think is certainly true: for he who has this science or knowledge which knows itself will become like the knowledge which he has, in the same way that he who has swiftness will be swift, and he who has beauty will be beautiful, and he who has knowledge will know. In the same way he who has that knowledge which is self-knowing, will know himself.

A knowledge  
of knowledge  
or a know-  
ledge of self  
can

I do not doubt, I said, that a man will know himself, when he possesses that which has self-knowledge: but what necessity is there that, having this, he should know what he knows and what he does not know?

*Charmides.*

Because, Socrates, they are the same.

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SOCRATES,  
CRITIAS.

Very likely, I said; but I remain as stupid as ever; for still I fail to comprehend how this knowing what you know and do not know is the same as the knowledge of self.

What do you mean? he said.

never give us  
a knowledge  
of other  
things; for it  
is incapable  
of distinguish-  
ing them.

This is what I mean, I replied: I will admit that there is a science of science;—can this do more than determine that of two things one is and the other is not science or knowledge?

No, just that.

But is knowledge or want of knowledge of health the same as knowledge or want of knowledge of justice?

Certainly not.

The one is medicine, and the other is politics; whereas that of which we are speaking is knowledge pure and simple.

Very true.

And if a man knows only, and has only knowledge of knowledge, and has no further knowledge of health and justice, the probability is that he will only know that he knows something, and has a certain knowledge, whether concerning himself or other men.

True.

Then how will this knowledge or science teach him to know what he knows? Say that he knows health;—not wisdom or temperance, but the art of medicine has taught it to him;—and he has learned harmony from the art of music, and building from the art of building,—neither, from wisdom or temperance: and the same of other things.

That is evident.

The science or  
knowledge of  
knowledge is  
unmeaning  
and unprofit-  
able.

How will wisdom, regarded only as a knowledge of knowledge or science of science, ever teach him that he knows health, or that he knows building?

It is impossible.

Then he who is ignorant of these things will only know that he knows, but not what he knows?

True.

Then wisdom or being wise appears to be not the knowledge of the things which we do or do not know, but only the knowledge that we know or do not know?

That is the inference.

Then he who has this knowledge will not be able to examine

whether a pretender knows or does not know that which he says that he knows: he will only know that he has a knowledge of some kind; but wisdom will not show him of what the knowledge is?

*Charmides.*  
SOCRATES,  
CRITIAS.

Plainly not.

Neither will he be able to distinguish the pretender in medicine from the true physician, nor between any other true and false professor of knowledge. Let us consider the matter in this way: If the wise man or any other man wants to distinguish the true physician from the false, how will he proceed? He will not talk to him about medicine; and that, as we were saying, is the only thing which the physician understands.

True.

And, on the other hand, the physician knows nothing of science, for this has been assumed to be the province of wisdom.

True.

71 And further, since medicine is science, we must infer that he does not know anything of medicine.

Exactly.

Then the wise man may indeed know that the physician has some kind of science or knowledge; but when he wants to discover the nature of this he will ask, What is the subject-matter? For the several sciences are distinguished not by the mere fact that they are sciences, but by the nature of their subjects. Is not that true?

Quite true.

And medicine is distinguished from other sciences as having the subject-matter of health and disease?

Yes.

And he who would enquire into the nature of medicine must pursue the enquiry into health and disease, and not into what is extraneous?

True.

And he who judges rightly will judge of the physician as a physician in what relates to these?

He will.

He will consider whether what he says is true, and whether what he does is right, in relation to health and disease?



*Charmides.*

He will.

SOCRATES,  
CRITIAS.

But can any one attain the knowledge of either unless he have a knowledge of medicine?

He cannot.

No one at all, it would seem, except the physician can have this knowledge; and therefore not the wise man; he would have to be a physician as well as a wise man.

Very true.

This science of science and of the absence of science which has raised such great expectations in our minds is shown to be impossible.

Then, assuredly, wisdom or temperance, if only a science of science, and of the absence of science or knowledge, will not be able to distinguish the physician who knows from one who does not know but pretends or thinks that he knows, or any other professor of anything at all; like any other artist, he will only know his fellow in art or wisdom, and no one else.

That is evident, he said.

But then what profit, Critias, I said, is there any longer in wisdom or temperance which yet remains, if this is wisdom? If, indeed, as we were supposing at first, the wise man had known what he knew and what he did not know, and knew that he knew certain things and did not know others, and to recognize a similar faculty of discernment in others, there would certainly have been a great advantage in being wise; for then we should never have made a mistake, but have passed through life the unerring guides of ourselves and of those who are under us; and we should not have attempted to do what we did not know, but we should have found out those who knew, and have handed the business over to them and trusted in them; nor should we have allowed those who were under us to do anything which they were not likely to do well; and they would be likely to do well just that of which they had knowledge; and the house or state which was ordered or administered under the guidance of wisdom, and everything else of which wisdom was the lord, would have been well ordered; for truth guiding, and error having been eliminated, in all their doings, men would have done well, and would have been happy. Was not this, Critias, what we spoke of as the great advantage of wisdom—to know what is known and what is unknown to us? 172

Very true, he said.

And now you perceive, I said, that no such science is to be found anywhere.

I perceive, he said.

May we assume then, I said, that wisdom, viewed in this new light merely as a knowledge of knowledge and ignorance, has this advantage:—that he who possesses such knowledge will more easily learn anything which he learns; and that everything will be clearer to him, because, in addition to the knowledge of individuals, he sees the science, and this also will better enable him to test the knowledge which others have of what he knows himself; whereas the enquirer who is without this knowledge may be supposed to have a feebler and weaker insight? Are not these, my friend, the real advantages which are to be gained from wisdom? And are not we looking and seeking after something more than is to be found in her?

That is very likely, he said.

That is very likely, I said; and very likely, too, we have been enquiring to no purpose; as I am led to infer, because I observe that if this is wisdom, some strange consequences would follow. Let us, if you please, assume the possibility of this science of sciences, and further admit and allow, as was originally suggested, that wisdom is the knowledge of what we know and do not know. Assuming all this, still, upon further consideration, I am doubtful, Critias, whether wisdom, such as this, would do us much good. For we were wrong, I think, in supposing, as we were saying just now, that such wisdom ordering the government of house or state would be a great benefit.

How so? he said.

Why, I said, we were far too ready to admit the great benefits which mankind would obtain from their severally doing the things which they knew, and committing the things of which they are ignorant to those who were better acquainted with them.

Were we not right in making that admission?

I think not.

How very strange, Socrates!

By the dog of Egypt, I said, there I agree with you; and I was thinking as much just now when I said that strange

*Charmides.*

SOCRATES,  
CRITIAS.

Yet the *a priori* idea of knowledge may make it easier to learn something and to test the knowledge of others.

A doubt raised about the advantage of a science of sciences, even if it is assumed to be possible.



*Charmides.*

SOCRATES,

CRITIAS.

consequences would follow, and that I was afraid we were on the wrong track ; for however ready we may be to admit that this is wisdom, I certainly cannot make out what good 173 this sort of thing does to us.

What do you mean? he said ; I wish that you could make me understand what you mean.

I dare say that what I am saying is nonsense, I replied ; and yet if a man has any feeling of what is due to himself, he cannot let the thought which comes into his mind pass away unheeded and unexamined.

I like that, he said.

A dream of  
universal  
knowledge.

Hear, then, I said, my own dream ; whether coming through the horn or the ivory gate, I cannot tell. The dream is this : Let us suppose that wisdom is such as we are now defining, and that she has absolute sway over us ; then each action will be done according to the arts or sciences, and no one professing to be a pilot when he is not, or any physician or general, or any one else pretending to know matters of which he is ignorant, will deceive or elude us ; our health will be improved ; our safety at sea, and also in battle, will be assured ; our coats and shoes, and all other instruments and implements will be skilfully made, because the workmen will be good and true. Aye, and if you please, you may suppose that prophecy, which is the knowledge of the future, will be under the control of wisdom, and that she will deter deceivers and set up the true prophets in their place as the revealers of the future. Now I quite agree that mankind, thus provided, would live and act according to knowledge, for wisdom would watch and prevent ignorance from intruding on us. But whether by acting according to knowledge we shall act well and be happy, my dear Critias,—this is a point which we have not yet been able to determine.

But the  
possession  
of all this  
knowledge  
will not nec-  
essarily give  
the knowledge  
of good and  
evil which can  
alone make  
men happy.

Yet I think, he replied, that if you discard knowledge, you will hardly find the crown of happiness in anything else.

But of what is this knowledge? I said. Just answer me that small question. Do you mean a knowledge of shoe-making?

God forbid.

Or of working in brass?

Certainly not.

Or in wool, or wood, or anything of that sort?

No, I do not.

*Charmides.*

*SOCRATES,  
CRITIAS.*

Then, I said, we are giving up the doctrine that he who lives according to knowledge is happy, for these live according to knowledge, and yet they are not allowed by you to be happy; but I think that you mean to confine happiness to particular individuals who live according to knowledge, such  
174 for example as the prophet, who, as I was saying, knows the future. Is it of him you are speaking or of some one else?

Yes, I mean him, but there are others as well.

Yes, I said, some one who knows the past and present as well as the future, and is ignorant of nothing. Let us suppose that there is such a person, and if there is, you will allow that he is the most knowing of all living men.

Certainly he is.

Yet I should like to know one thing more: which of the different kinds of knowledge makes him happy? or do all equally make him happy?

Not all equally, he replied.

But which most tends to make him happy? the knowledge of what past, present, or future thing? May I infer this to be the knowledge of the game of draughts?

Nonsense about the game of draughts.

Or of computation?

No.

Or of health?

Nearer the truth, he said.

And that knowledge which is nearest of all, I said, is the knowledge of what?

The knowledge with which he discerns good and evil.

Monster! I said; you have been carrying me round in a circle, and all this time hiding from me the fact that the life according to knowledge is not that which makes men act rightly and be happy, not even if knowledge include all the sciences, but one science only, that of good and evil. For, let me ask you, Critias, whether, if you take away this, medicine will not equally give health, and shoemaking equally produce shoes, and the art of the weaver clothes?—

Not universal knowledge, but the knowledge of good and evil, is really required by man.

*Charmides.*

whether the art of the pilot will not equally save our lives at sea, and the art of the general in war?

SOCRATES,  
CRITIAS.

Quite so.

Without this  
no other  
science can be  
of much avail.

And yet, my dear Critias, none of these things will be well or beneficially done, if the science of the good be wanting.

True.

But that science is not wisdom or temperance, but a science of human advantage; not a science of other sciences, or of ignorance, but of good and evil: and if this be of use, then wisdom or temperance will not be of use.

This science  
of good or  
advantage is  
affirmed by  
Critias and  
denied by  
Socrates to  
be wisdom.

And why, he replied, will not wisdom be of use? For, however much we assume that wisdom is a science of sciences, and has a sway over other sciences, surely she will have this particular science of the good under her control, and in this way will benefit us.

And will wisdom give health? I said; is not this rather the effect of medicine? Or does wisdom do the work of any of the other arts,—do they not each of them do their own work? Have we not long ago asseverated that wisdom is only the knowledge of knowledge and of ignorance, and of nothing else?

That is obvious.

Then wisdom will not be the producer of health.

Certainly not.

The art of health is different.

Yes, different.

Nor does wisdom give advantage, my good friend; for 175  
that again we have just now been attributing to another art.

Very true.

How then can wisdom be advantageous, when giving no advantage?

That, Socrates, is certainly inconceivable.

Recapitula-  
tion: The  
argument says  
'No' to all our  
definitions.

You see then, Critias, that I was not far wrong in fearing that I could have no sound notion about wisdom; I was quite right in depreciating myself; for that which is admitted to be the best of all things would never have seemed to us useless, if I had been good for anything at an enquiry. But now I have been utterly defeated, and have failed to

discover what that is to which the imposer of names gave this name of temperance or wisdom. And yet many more admissions were made by us than could be fairly granted; for we admitted that there was a science of science, although the argument said No, and protested against us; and we admitted further, that this science knew the works of the other sciences (although this too was denied by the argument), because we wanted to show that the wise man had knowledge of what he knew and did not know; also we nobly disregarded, and never even considered, the impossibility of a man knowing in a sort of way that which he does not know at all; for our assumption was, that he knows that which he does not know; than which nothing, as I think, can be more irrational. And yet, after finding us so easy and good-natured, the enquiry is still unable to discover the truth; but mocks us to a degree, and has gone out of its way to prove the inutility of that which we admitted only by a sort of supposition and fiction to be the true definition of temperance or wisdom: which result, as far as I am concerned, is not so much to be lamented, I said. But for your sake, Charmides, I am very sorry—that you, having such beauty and such wisdom and temperance of soul, should have no profit or good in life from your wisdom and temperance. And still more am I grieved about the charm which I learned with so much pain, and to so little profit, from the Thracian, for the sake of a thing which is nothing worth. I think indeed that there is a mistake, and that I must be a bad enquirer, for wisdom or temperance I believe to be really a great good; and happy are you, Charmides, if you certainly possess it. Wherefore examine yourself, and see whether you have this gift and can do without the charm; for if you can, I would rather advise you to regard me simply as a fool who is never able to reason out anything; and to rest assured that the more wise and temperate you are, the happier you will be.

Charmides said: I am sure that I do not know, Socrates, whether I have or have not this gift of wisdom and temperance; for how can I know whether I have a thing, of which even you and Critias are, as you say, unable to discover the nature?—(not that I believe you.) And further, I am sure,

*Charmides.*

SOCRATES,  
CHARMIDES.

Very likely  
Charmides  
has no need  
of the charm,  
and Socrates  
is a fool who  
is incapable  
of reasoning.

Nevertheless  
Charmides is  
desirous to be  
charmed.

*Charmides.*

SOCRATES,  
CHARMIDES,  
CRITIAS.

Socrates, that I do need the charm, and as far as I am concerned, I shall be willing to be charmed by you daily, until you say that I have had enough.

Very good, Charmides, said Critias; if you do this I shall have a proof of your temperance, that is, if you allow yourself to be charmed by Socrates, and never desert him at all.

You may depend on my following and not deserting him, said Charmides: if you who are my guardian command me, I should be very wrong not to obey you.

And I do command you, he said.

Then I will do as you say, and begin this very day.

You sirs, I said, what are you conspiring about?

We are not conspiring, said Charmides, we have conspired already.

And are you about to use violence, without even going through the forms of justice?

Yes, I shall use violence, he replied, since he orders me; and therefore you had better consider well.

But the time for consideration has passed, I said, when violence is employed; and you, when you are determined on anything, and in the mood of violence, are irresistible.

Do not you resist me then, he said.

I will not resist you, I replied.

LYSIS.





## INTRODUCTION.

No answer is given in the *Lysis* to the question, 'What is Friendship?' any more than in the *Charmides* to the question, 'What is Temperance?' There are several resemblances in the two Dialogues: the same youthfulness and sense of beauty pervades both of them; they are alike rich in the description of Greek life. The question is again raised of the relation of knowledge to virtue and good, which also recurs in the *Laches*; and Socrates appears again as the elder friend of the two boys, *Lysis* and *Menexenus*. In the *Charmides*, as also in the *Laches*, he is described as middle-aged; in the *Lysis* he is advanced in years.

The Dialogue consists of two scenes or conversations which seem to have no relation to each other. The first is a conversation between Socrates and *Lysis*, who, like *Charmides*, is an Athenian youth of noble descent and of great beauty, goodness, and intelligence: this is carried on in the absence of *Menexenus*, who is called away to take part in a sacrifice. Socrates asks *Lysis* whether his father and mother do not love him very much? 'To be sure they do.' 'Then of course they allow him to do exactly as he likes.' 'Of course not: the very slaves have more liberty than he has.' 'But how is this?' 'The reason is that he is not old enough.' 'No; the real reason is that he is not wise enough: for are there not some things which he is allowed to do, although he is not allowed to do others?' 'Yes, because he knows them, and does not know the others.' This leads to the conclusion that all men everywhere will trust him in what he knows, but not in what he does not know; for in such matters he will be unprofitable to them, and do them no good. And no one will love him, if he does them no good; and he can only do them good by knowledge; and as he is still without knowledge, he can have as yet no conceit of knowledge. In this manner Socrates reads a lesson to *Hippothales*, the

*Lysis.*

ANALYSIS.

foolish lover of Lysis, respecting the style of conversation which he should address to his beloved.

After the return of Menexenus, Socrates, at the request of Lysis, 211 asks him a new question: 'What is friendship? You, Menexenus, who have a friend already, can tell me, who am always longing to 212 find one, what is the secret of this great blessing.'

When one man loves another, which is the friend — he who loves, 213 or he who is loved? or are both friends? From the first of these suppositions they are driven to the second; and from the second to the third; and neither the two boys nor Socrates are satisfied with any of the three or with all of them. Socrates turns to the 214 poets, who affirm that God brings like to like (Homer), and to philosophers (Empedocles), who also assert that like is the friend of like. But the bad are not friends, for they are not even like themselves, and still less are they like one another. And the 215 good have no need of one another, and therefore do not care about one another. Moreover there are others who say that likeness is a cause of aversion, and unlikeness of love and friendship; and they too adduce the authority of poets and philosophers in support of their doctrines; for Hesiod says that 'potter is jealous of potter, bard of bard;' and subtle doctors tell us that 'moist is the 216 friend of dry, hot of cold,' and the like. But neither can their doctrine be maintained; for then the just would be the friend of the unjust, good of evil.

Thus we arrive at the conclusion that like is not the friend of like, nor unlike of unlike; and therefore good is not the friend of good, nor evil of evil, nor good of evil, nor evil of good. What remains but that the indifferent, which is neither good nor evil, should be the friend (not of the indifferent, for that would be 'like 217 the friend of like,' but) of the good, or rather of the beautiful?

But why should the indifferent have this attachment to the beautiful or good? There are circumstances under which such an attachment would be natural. Suppose the indifferent, say the human body, to be desirous of getting rid of some evil, such as disease, which is not essential but only accidental to it (for if the evil were essential the body would cease to be indifferent, and would become evil)—in such a case the indifferent becomes a 218 friend of the good for the sake of getting rid of the evil. In this intermediate 'indifferent' position the philosopher or lover of

wisdom stands: he is not wise, and yet not unwise, but he has ignorance accidentally clinging to him, and he yearns for wisdom as the cure of the evil. (Cp. *Symp.* 204.)

After this explanation has been received with triumphant accord, a fresh dissatisfaction begins to steal over the mind of Socrates: Must not friendship be for the sake of some ulterior end? and what can that final cause or end of friendship be, other than the good? But the good is desired by us only as the cure of evil; and therefore if there were no evil there would be no friendship. Some other explanation then has to be devised. May not desire be the source of friendship? And desire is of what a man wants and of what is congenial to him. But then the congenial cannot be the same as the like; for like, as has been already shown, cannot be the friend of like. Nor can the congenial be the good; for good is not the friend of good, as has been also shown. The problem is unsolved, and the three friends, Socrates, Lysis, and Menexenus, are still unable to find out what a friend is.

Thus, as in the *Charmides* and *Laches*, and several of the other Dialogues of Plato (compare especially the *Protagoras* and *Theaetetus*), no conclusion is arrived at. Socrates maintains his character of a 'know nothing;' but the boys have already learned the lesson which he is unable to teach them, and they are free from the conceit of knowledge. (Cp. *Charm.* pp. 175, 176.) The dialogue is what would be called in the language of Thrasyllus tentative or inquisitive. The subject is continued in the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*, and treated, with a manifest reference to the *Lysis*, in the eighth and ninth books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle. As in other writings of Plato (for example, the *Republic*), there is a progress from unconscious morality, illustrated by the friendship of the two youths, and also by the sayings of the poets ('who are our fathers in wisdom' (214 A), and yet only tell us half the truth, and in this particular instance are not much improved upon by the philosophers), to a more comprehensive notion of friendship. This, however, is far from being cleared of its perplexity. Two notions appear to be struggling or balancing in the mind of Socrates: — First, the sense that friendship arises out of human needs and wants; Secondly, that the higher form or ideal of friendship exists only for the sake of the good. That friends are not necessarily either like or unlike, is also a truth confirmed by

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TION.

experience. But the use of the terms 'like' or 'good' is too strictly limited; Socrates has allowed himself to be carried away by a sort of eristic or illogical logic against which no definition of friendship would be able to stand. In the course of the argument (217 D, E) he makes a distinction between property and accident which is a real contribution to the science of logic. Some higher truths appear through the mist. The manner in which the field of argument is widened, as in the Charmides and Laches by the introduction of the idea of knowledge, so here by the introduction of the good, is deserving of attention. The sense of the interdependence of good and evil, and the allusion to the possibility of the non-existence of evil, are also very remarkable.

The dialectical interest is fully sustained by the dramatic accompaniments. Observe, first, the scene, which is a Greek Palaestra, at a time when a sacrifice is going on, and the Hermaea are in course of celebration; secondly, the 'accustomed irony' of Socrates, who declares, as in the Symposium (177 D), that he is ignorant of all other things, but claims to have a knowledge of the mysteries of love. There are likewise several contrasts of character; first of the dry, caustic Ctesippus, of whom Socrates professes a humorous sort of fear, and Hippothales the flighty lover, who murders sleep by bawling out the name of his beloved; there is also a contrast between the false, exaggerated, sentimental love of Hippothales towards Lysis, and the childlike and innocent friendship of the boys with one another. Some difference appears to be intended between the characters of the more talkative Menexenus and the reserved and simple Lysis. Socrates draws out the latter by a new sort of irony, which is sometimes adopted in talking to children, and consists in asking a leading question which can only be answered in a sense contrary to the intention of the question: 'Your father and mother of course allow you to drive the chariot?' 'No they do not.' When Menexenus returns, the serious dialectic begins. He is described as 'very pugnacious,' and we are thus prepared for the part which a mere youth takes in a difficult argument. But Plato has not forgotten dramatic propriety, and Socrates proposes at last to refer the question to some older person (223 A).

## SOME QUESTIONS RELATING TO FRIENDSHIP.

The subject of friendship has a lower place in the modern than in the ancient world, partly because a higher place is assigned by us to love and marriage. The very meaning of the word has become slighter and more superficial; it seems almost to be borrowed from the ancients, and has nearly disappeared in modern treatises on Moral Philosophy. The received examples of friendship are to be found chiefly among the Greeks and Romans. Hence the casuistical or other questions which arise out of the relations of friends have not often been considered seriously in modern times. Many of them will be found to be the same which are discussed in the Lysis. We may ask with Socrates, 1) whether friendship is 'of similars or dissimilars,' or of both; 2) whether such a tie exists between the good only and for the sake of the good; or 3) whether there may not be some peculiar attraction which draws together 'the neither good nor evil' for the sake of the good and because of the evil; 4) whether friendship is always mutual,—may there not be a one-sided and unrequited friendship? This question, which, like many others, is only one of a laxer or stricter use of words, seems to have greatly exercised the minds both of Aristotle and Plato.

5) Can we expect friendship to be permanent, or must we acknowledge with Cicero, '*Nihil difficilius quam amicitiam usque ad extremum vitæ permanere*'? Is not friendship, even more than love, liable to be swayed by the caprices of fancy? The person who pleased us most at first sight or upon a slight acquaintance, when we have seen him again, and under different circumstances, may make a much less favourable impression on our minds. Young people swear 'eternal friendships,' but at these innocent perjuries their elders laugh. No one forms a friendship with the intention of renouncing it; yet in the course of a varied life it is practically certain that many changes will occur of feeling, opinion, locality, occupation, fortune, which will divide us from some persons and unite us to others. 6) There is an ancient saying, *Qui amicos amicum non habet*. But is not some less exclusive form of friendship better suited to the condition and nature of man? And in those especially who have no family ties, may not the feeling pass beyond one or a few, and embrace all



*Lysis.*INTRODUC-  
TION.

with whom we come into contact, and, perhaps in a few passionate and exalted natures, all men everywhere? 7) The ancients had their three kinds of friendship, 'for the sake of the pleasant, the useful, and the good:' is the last to be resolved into the two first; or are the two first to be included in the last? The subject was puzzling to them: they could not say that friendship was only a quality, or a relation, or a virtue, or a kind of virtue; and they had not in the age of Plato reached the point of regarding it, like justice, as a form or attribute of virtue. They had another perplexity: 8) How could one of the noblest feelings of human nature be so near to one of the most detestable corruptions of it? (cp. Symposium 180 ff., 218 ff.; Laws viii, 835 ff.).

Leaving the Greek or ancient point of view, we may regard the question in a more general way. Friendship is the union of two persons in mutual affection and remembrance of one another. The friend can do for his friend what he cannot do for himself. He can give him counsel in time of difficulty; he can teach him 'to see himself as others see him'; he can stand by him, when all the world are against him; he can gladden and enlighten him by his presence; he 'can divide his sorrows,' he can 'double his joys;' he can anticipate his wants. He will discover ways of helping him without creating a sense of his own superiority; he will find out his mental trials, but only that he may minister to them. Among true friends jealousy has no place: they do not complain of one another for making new friends, or for not revealing some secret of their lives; (in friendship too there must be reserves;) they do not intrude upon one another, and they mutually rejoice in any good which happens to either of them, though it may be to the loss of the other. They may live apart and have little intercourse, but when they meet, the old tie is as strong as ever—according to the common saying, they find one another always the same. The greatest good of friendship is not daily intercourse, for circumstances rarely admit of this; but on the great occasions of life, when the advice of a friend is needed, then the word spoken in season about conduct, about health, about marriage, about business,—the letter written from a distance by a disinterested person who sees with clearer eyes may be of inestimable value. When the heart is failing and despair is setting in, then to hear the voice or grasp the hand of a friend, in

a shipwreck, in a defeat, in some other failure or misfortune, may restore the necessary courage and composure to the paralysed and disordered mind, and convert the feeble person into a hero; (cp. Symposium 179 ff.).

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TION.

It is true that friendships are apt to be disappointing; either we expect too much from them; or we are indolent and do not 'keep them in repair;' or being admitted to intimacy with another, we see his faults too clearly and lose our respect for him; and he loses his affection for us. Friendships may be too violent; and they may be too sensitive. The egotism of one of the parties may be too much for the other. The word of counsel or sympathy has been uttered too obtrusively, at the wrong time, or in the wrong manner; or the need of it has not been perceived until too late. 'Oh if he had only told me' has been the silent thought of many a troubled soul. And some things have to be indicated rather than spoken, because the very mention of them tends to disturb the equability of friendship. The alienation of friends, like many other human evils, is commonly due to a want of tact and insight. There is not enough of the *Scimus et hanc veniam petimusque damusque vicissim*. The sweet draught of sympathy is not inexhaustible; and it tends to weaken the person who too freely partakes of it. Thus we see that there are many causes which impair the happiness of friends.

We may expect a friendship almost divine, such as philosophers have sometimes dreamed of: we find what is human. The good of it is necessarily limited; it does not take the place of marriage; it affords rather a solace than an arm of support. It had better not be based on pecuniary obligations; these more often mar than make a friendship. It is most likely to be permanent when the two friends are equal and independent, or when they are engaged together in some common work or have some public interest in common. It exists among the bad or inferior sort of men almost as much as among the good; the bad and good, and 'the neither bad nor good,' are drawn together in a strange manner by personal attachment. The essence of it is loyalty, without which it would cease to be friendship.

Another question 9) may be raised, whether friendship can safely exist between young persons of different sexes, not connected by ties of relationship, and without the thought of love or marriage;



*Lysis.*INTRODUC-  
TION.

whether, again, a wife or a husband should have any intimate friend, besides his or her partner in marriage. The answer to this latter question is rather perplexing, and would probably be different in different countries (cp. Symp. p. 182). It would be hard to deny that without weakness or sentiment or the feelings usually called love, there may be manly friendships of men to women and womanly friendships of women to men; and we allow that the mind may be drawn out and the character enlarged by such attachments. But we also feel that they are attended with many dangers, and that this Romance of Heavenly Love requires a strength, a freedom from passion, a self-control, which, in youth especially, are rarely to be found. The propriety of them must be estimated a good deal by the manner in which public opinion regards them; they must be reconciled with the ordinary duties of life; and they must be justified by the result.

Yet another question, 10). Admitting that friendships cannot be always permanent, we may ask when and upon what conditions should they be dissolved. It would be futile to retain the name when the reality has ceased to be. That two friends should part company whenever the relation between them begins to drag may be better for both of them. But then arises the consideration, how should these friends in youth or friends of the past regard or be regarded by one another? They are parted, but there still remain duties mutually owing by them. They will not admit the world to share in their difference any more than in their friendship; the memory of an old attachment, like the memory of the dead, has a kind of sacredness for them on which they will not allow others to intrude. Neither, if they were ever worthy to bear the name of friends, will either of them entertain any enmity or dislike of the other who was once so much to him. Neither will he by 'shadowed hint reveal' the secrets great or small which an unfortunate mistake has placed within his reach. He who is of a noble mind will dwell upon his own faults rather than those of another, and will be ready to take upon himself the blame of their separation. He will feel pain at the loss of a friend; and he will remember with gratitude his ancient kindness. But he will not lightly renew a tie which has not been lightly broken. . . . These are a few of the Problems of Friendship, some of them suggested by the *Lysis*, others by modern life, which he who wishes to make or keep a friend may profitably study. (Cp. Bacon, *Essay on Friendship*; Cic. *de Amicitia*.)

# LYSIS, OR FRIENDSHIP.

*PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.*

SOCRATES, *who is the narrator.*

MENEXENUS.

HIPPOTHALES.

LYSIS.

CTESIPPUS.

SCENE:—A newly-erected Palaestra outside the walls of Athens.

Steph. 203 I WAS going from the Academy straight to the Lyceum, *Lysis.*  
intending to take the outer road, which is close under the wall. When I came to the postern gate of the city, which is by the fountain of Panops, I fell in with Hippothales, the son of Hieronymus, and Ctesippus the Paeonian, and a company of young men who were standing with them. Hippothales, seeing me approach, asked whence I came and whither I was going. *SOCRATES, HIPPO-THALES.*

I am going, I replied, from the Academy straight to the Lyceum.

Then come straight to us, he said, and put in here; you may as well.

Who are you, I said; and where am I to come?

He showed me an enclosed space and an open door over against the wall. And there, he said, is the building at which we all meet: and a goodly company we are.

And what is this building, I asked; and what sort of entertainment have you?

204 The building, he replied, is a newly-erected Palaestra; and the entertainment is generally conversation, to which you are welcome.

Thank you, I said; and is there any teacher there?

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*Lysis.*

Yes, he said, your old friend and admirer, Miccus.

SOCRATES,

Indeed, I replied; he is a very eminent professor.

HIPPO-

Are you disposed, he said, to go with me and see them?

THALES,

CTESIPPUS.

Yes, I said; but I should like to know first, what is expected of me, and who is the favourite among you?

Some persons have one favourite, Socrates, and some another, he said.

And who is yours? I asked: tell me that, Hippothales.

The love  
fancies of  
Hippothales  
are very  
ridiculous.

At this he blushed; and I said to him, O Hippothales, thou son of Hieronymus! do not say that you are, or that you are not, in love; the confession is too late; for I see that you are not only in love, but are already far gone in your love. Simple and foolish as I am, the Gods have given me the power of understanding affections of this kind.

Whereupon he blushed more and more.

Ctesippus said: I like to see you blushing, Hippothales, and hesitating to tell Socrates the name; when, if he were with you but for a very short time, you would have plagued him to death by talking about nothing else. Indeed, Socrates, he has literally deafened us, and stopped our ears with the praises of Lysis; and if he is a little intoxicated, there is every likelihood that we may have our sleep murdered with a cry of Lysis. His performances in prose are bad enough, but nothing at all in comparison with his verse; and when he drenches us with his poems and other compositions, it is really too bad; and worse still is his manner of singing them to his love; he has a voice which is truly appalling, and we cannot help hearing him: and now having a question put to him by you, behold he is blushing.

Who is Lysis? I said: I suppose that he must be young; for the name does not recall any one to me.

Why, he said, his father being a very well-known man, he retains his patronymic, and is not as yet commonly called by his own name; but, although you do not know his name, I am sure that you must know his face, for that is quite enough to distinguish him.

But tell me whose son he is, I said.

He is the eldest son of Democrates, of the deme of Aexonè.

Ah, Hippothales, I said; what a noble and really perfect

205 love you have found! I wish that you would favour me with the exhibition which you have been making to the rest of the company, and then I shall be able to judge whether you know what a lover ought to say about his love, either to the youth himself, or to others.

Nay, Socrates, he said; you surely do not attach any importance to what he is saying.

Do you mean, I said, that you disown the love of the person whom he says that you love?

No; but I deny that I make verses or address compositions to him.

He is not in his right mind, said Ctesippus; he is talking nonsense, and is stark mad.

O Hippothales, I said, if you have ever made any verses or songs in honour of your favourite, I do not want to hear them; but I want to know the purport of them, that I may be able to judge of your mode of approaching your fair one.

Ctesippus will be able to tell you, he said; for if, as he avers, the sound of my words is always dinning in his ears, he must have a very accurate knowledge and recollection of them.

Yes, indeed, said Ctesippus; I know only too well; and very ridiculous the tale is: for although he is a lover, and very devotedly in love, he has nothing particular to talk about to his beloved which a child might not say. Now is not that ridiculous? He can only speak of the wealth of Democrates, which the whole city celebrates, and grandfather Lysis, and the other ancestors of the youth, and their stud of horses, and their victory at the Pythian games, and at the Isthmus, and at Nemea with four horses and single horses—these are the tales which he composes and repeats. And there is greater twaddle still. Only the day before yesterday he made a poem in which he described the entertainment of Heracles, who was a connexion of the family, setting forth how in virtue of this relationship he was hospitably received by an ancestor of Lysis; this ancestor was himself begotten of Zeus by the daughter of the founder of the deme. And these are the sort of old wives' tales which he sings and recites to us, and we are obliged to listen to him.

When I heard this, I said: O ridiculous Hippothales! how

*Lysis.*

SOCRATES,  
HIPPO-  
THALES,  
CTESIPPUS.

But though he is so devoted a lover, the love poems which he composes are made up of common-places.

*Lysis.*

SOCRATES,

HIPPO-

THALES.

The verses are really in honour of himself if he win his love; or in dishonour of himself if he fail in his pursuit.

can you be making and singing hymns in honour of yourself before you have won?

But my songs and verses, he said, are not in honour of myself, Socrates.

You think not? I said.

Nay, but what do you think? he replied.

Most assuredly, I said, those songs are all in your own honour; for if you win your beautiful love, your discourses and songs will be a glory to you, and may be truly regarded as hymns of praise composed in honour of you who have conquered and won such a love; but if he slips away from you, the more you have praised him, the more ridiculous you will look at having lost this fairest and best of blessings; and therefore the wise lover does not praise his beloved until he has won him, because he is afraid of accidents. There is also another danger; the fair, when any one praises or magnifies them, are filled with the spirit of pride and vain-glory. Do you not agree with me? 206

Yes, he said.

And the more vain-glorious they are, the more difficult is the capture of them?

I believe you.

What should you say of a hunter who frightened away his prey, and made the capture of the animals which he is hunting more difficult?

He would be a bad hunter, undoubtedly.

Yes; and if, instead of soothing them, he were to infuriate them with words and songs, that would show a great want of wit: do you not agree?

Yes.

He injures both his beloved and himself by writing poetry.

And now reflect, Hippothales, and see whether you are not guilty of all these errors in writing poetry. For I can hardly suppose that you will affirm a man to be a good poet who injures himself by his poetry.

Assuredly not, he said; such a poet would be a fool. And this is the reason why I take you into my counsels, Socrates, and I shall be glad of any further advice which you may have to offer. Will you tell me by what words or actions I may become endeared to my love?

That is not easy to determine, I said; but if you will

bring your love to me, and will let me talk with him, I may perhaps be able to show you how to converse with him, instead of singing and reciting in the fashion of which you are accused.

*Lysis.*SOCRATES,  
HIPPO-  
THALES.

There will be no difficulty in bringing him, he replied; if you will only go with Ctesippus into the Palaestra, and sit down and talk, I believe that he will come of his own accord; for he is fond of listening, Socrates. And as this is the festival of the Hermaea, the young men and boys are all together, and there is no separation between them. He will be sure to come: but if he does not, Ctesippus with whom he is familiar, and whose relation Menexenus is his great friend, shall call him.

That will be the way, I said. Thereupon I led Ctesippus into the Palaestra, and the rest followed.

Upon entering we found that the boys had just been sacrificing; and this part of the festival was nearly at an end. They were all in their white array, and games at dice were going on among them. Most of them were in the outer court amusing themselves; but some were in a corner of the Apodyterium playing at odd and even with a number of dice, which they took out of little wicker baskets. There was also

The boys at  
their games.

207 standing with the other boys and youths, having a crown upon his head, like a fair vision, and not less worthy of praise for his goodness than for his beauty. We left them, and went over to the opposite side of the room, where, finding a quiet place, we sat down; and then we began to talk. This attracted Lysis, who was constantly turning round to look at us—he was evidently wanting to come to us. For a time he hesitated and had not the courage to come alone; but first of all, his friend Menexenus, leaving his play, entered the Palaestra from the court, and when he saw Ctesippus and myself, was going to take a seat by us; and then Lysis, seeing him, followed, and sat down by his side; and the other boys joined. I should observe that Hippothales, when he saw the crowd, got behind them, where he thought that he would be out of sight of Lysis, lest he should anger him; and there he stood and listened.

The beauty  
and goodness  
of Lysis.Lysis and his  
friend  
Menexenus  
leave the boys  
and join the  
circle of  
young men.



*Lysis.*SOCRATES,  
MENEXENUS,  
LYSIS.Socrates asks  
which is the  
elder, nobler,  
fairer of the  
two.

I turned to Menexenus, and said: Son of Demophon, which of you two youths is the elder?

That is a matter of dispute between us, he said.

And which is the nobler? Is that also a matter of dispute?

Yes, certainly.

And another disputed point is, which is the fairer?

The two boys laughed.

I shall not ask which is the richer of the two, I said; for you are friends, are you not?

Certainly, they replied.

And friends have all things in common, so that one of you can be no richer than the other, if you say truly that you are friends.

They assented. I was about to ask which was the juster of the two, and which was the wiser of the two; but at this moment Menexenus was called away by some one who came and said that the gymnastic-master wanted him. I supposed that he had to offer sacrifice. So he went away, and I asked Lysis some more questions. I dare say, Lysis, I said, that your father and mother love you very much.

Menexenus is  
called away  
and Socrates  
continues the  
conversation  
with Lysis  
alone.His parents  
love him very  
much; will  
they allow  
him to do  
whatever he  
likes?  
Certainly not.

Certainly, he said.

And they would wish you to be perfectly happy.

Yes.

But do you think that any one is happy who is in the condition of a slave, and who cannot do what he likes?

I should think not indeed, he said.

And if your father and mother love you, and desire that you should be happy, no one can doubt that they are very ready to promote your happiness.

Certainly, he replied.

And do they then permit you to do what you like, and never rebuke you or hinder you from doing what you desire?

Yes, indeed, Socrates; there are a great many things which they hinder me from doing.

What do you mean? I said. Do they want you to be happy, and yet hinder you from doing what you like? for example, if you want to mount one of your father's chariots, and take the reins at a race, they will not allow you to do so—they will prevent you? 208



Certainly, he said, they will not allow me to do so.

Whom then will they allow?

There is a charioteer, whom my father pays for driving.

And do they trust a hireling more than you? and may he do what he likes with the horses? and do they pay him for this?

They do.

But I dare say that you may take the whip and guide the mule-cart if you like ;—they will permit that?

Permit me! indeed they will not.

Then, I said, may no one use the whip to the mules?

Yes, he said, the muleteer.

And is he a slave or a free man?

A slave, he said.

And do they esteem a slave of more value than you who are their son? And do they entrust their property to him rather than to you? and allow him to do what he likes, when they prohibit you? Answer me now: Are you your own master, or do they not even allow that?

Nay, he said; of course they do not allow it.

Then you have a master?

Yes, my tutor; there he is.

And is he a slave?

To be sure; he is our slave, he replied.

Surely, I said, this is a strange thing, that a free man should be governed by a slave. And what does he do with you?

He takes me to my teachers.

You do not mean to say that your teachers also rule over you?

Of course they do.

Then I must say that your father is pleased to inflict many lords and masters on you. But at any rate when you go home to your mother, she will let you have your own way, and will not interfere with your happiness; her wool, or the piece of cloth which she is weaving, are at your disposal: I am sure that there is nothing to hinder you from touching her wooden spathe, or her comb, or any other of her spinning implements.

Nay, Socrates, he replied, laughing; not only does she

*Lysis.*

SOCRATES,

LYSIS.

He is a free-man, yet is governed by a slave.

He may not touch one of his mother's spinning implements,

*Lysis.*SOCRATES,  
LYSIS.

hinder me, but I should be beaten, if I were to touch one of them.

Well, I said, this is amazing. And did you ever behave ill to your father or your mother?

No, indeed, he replied.

and he derives  
no good from  
all his parents'  
wealth.

But why then are they so terribly anxious to prevent you from being happy, and doing as you like?—keeping you all day long in subjection to another, and, in a word, doing nothing which you desire; so that you have no good, as would appear, out of their great possessions, which are under the control of anybody rather than of you, and have no use of your own fair person, which is tended and taken care of by another; while you, Lysis, are master of nobody, and can do nothing? 209

Why, he said, Socrates, the reason is that I am not of age.

I doubt whether that is the real reason, I said; for I should imagine that your father Democrates, and your mother, do permit you to do many things already, and do not wait until you are of age: for example, if they want anything read or written, you, I presume, would be the first person in the house who is summoned by them.

Very true.

But he may  
write or read  
or tune the  
lyre at his own  
discretion.

And you would be allowed to write or read the letters in any order which you please, or to take up the lyre and tune the notes, and play with the fingers, or strike with the plectrum, exactly as you please, and neither father nor mother would interfere with you.

That is true, he said.

Then what can be the reason, Lysis, I said, why they allow you to do the one and not the other?

I suppose, he said, because I understand the one, and not the other.

People will  
trust him in  
what he  
understands.

Yes, my dear youth, I said, the reason is not any deficiency of years, but a deficiency of knowledge; and whenever your father thinks that you are wiser than he is, he will instantly commit himself and his possessions to you.

I think so.

Aye, I said; and about your neighbour, too, does not the same rule hold as about your father? If he is satisfied that

you know more of housekeeping than he does, will he continue to administer his affairs himself, or will he commit them to you?

*Lysis.*

SOCRATES,  
LYSIS.

I think that he will commit them to me.

Will not the Athenian people, too, entrust their affairs to you when they see that you have wisdom enough to manage them?

Even the Athenians or the great king will allow him to manage their affairs, to cook for them, to cure their eyes, if he knows how and can be of any use to them.

Yes.

And oh! let me put another case, I said: There is the great king, and he has an eldest son, who is the Prince of Asia;—suppose that you and I go to him and establish to his satisfaction that we are better cooks than his son, will he not entrust to us the prerogative of making soup, and putting in anything that we like while the pot is boiling, rather than to the Prince of Asia, who is his son?

To us, clearly.

And we shall be allowed to throw in salt by handfuls, whereas the son will not be allowed to put in as much as he can take up between his fingers?

Of course.

Or suppose again that the son has bad eyes, will he allow him, or will he not allow him, to touch his own eyes if he thinks that he has no knowledge of medicine?

210 He will not allow him.

Whereas, if he supposes us to have a knowledge of medicine, he will allow us to do what we like with him—even to open the eyes wide and sprinkle ashes upon them, because he supposes that we know what is best?

That is true.

And everything in which we appear to him to be wiser than himself or his son he will commit to us?

That is very true, Socrates, he replied.

Then now, my dear Lysis, I said, you perceive that in things which we know every one will trust us,—Hellenes and barbarians, men and women,—and we may do as we please about them, and no one will like to interfere with us; we shall be free, and masters of others; and these things will be really ours, for we shall be benefited by them. But in things of which we have no understanding, no one will trust us to do as seems good to us—they will hinder us as far as they

*Lysis.*SOCRATES,  
LYSIS.

can; and not only strangers, but father and mother, and the friend, if there be one, who is dearer still, will also hinder us; and we shall be subject to others; and these things will not be ours, for we shall not be benefited by them. Do you agree?

He assented.

And shall we be friends to others, and will any others love us, in as far as we are useless to them?

Certainly not.

Neither can your father or mother love you, nor can anybody love anybody else, in so far as they are useless to them?

No.

He must learn  
then to be  
useful and  
wise.

And therefore, my boy, if you are wise, all men will be your friends and kindred, for you will be useful and good; but if you are not wise, neither father, nor mother, nor kindred, nor any one else, will be your friends. And in matters of which you have as yet no knowledge, can you have any conceit of knowledge?

Having no  
knowledge he  
has no conceit  
of knowledge.

That is impossible, he replied.

And you, Lysis, if you require a teacher, have not yet attained to wisdom.

True.

And therefore you are not conceited, having nothing of which to be conceited.

Indeed, Socrates, I think not.

When I heard him say this, I turned to Hippothales, and was very nearly making a blunder, for I was going to say to him: That is the way, Hippothales, in which you should talk to your beloved, humbling and lowering him, and not as you do, puffing him up and spoiling him. But I saw that he was in great excitement and confusion at what had been said, and I remembered that, although he was in the neighbourhood, he did not want to be seen by Lysis; so upon second thoughts I refrained. 211

Lysis asks  
Socrates  
to argue with  
Menexenus.

In the meantime Menexenus came back and sat down in his place by Lysis; and Lysis, in a childish and affectionate manner, whispered privately in my ear, so that Menexenus should not hear: Do, Socrates, tell Menexenus what you have been telling me.

Suppose that you tell him yourself, Lysis, I replied; for I am sure that you were attending.

Certainly, he replied.

Try, then, to remember the words, and be as exact as you can in repeating them to him, and if you have forgotten anything, ask me again the next time that you see me.

I will be sure to do so, Socrates; but go on telling him something new, and let me hear, as long as I am allowed to stay.

I certainly cannot refuse, I said, since you ask me; but then, as you know, Menexenus is very pugnacious, and therefore you must come to the rescue if he attempts to upset me.

Yes, indeed, he said; he is very pugnacious, and that is the reason why I want you to argue with him.

That I may make a fool of myself?

No, indeed, he said; but I want you to put him down.

That is no easy matter, I replied; for he is a terrible fellow—a pupil of Ctesippus. And there is Ctesippus himself: do you see him?

Never mind, Socrates, you shall argue with him.

Well, I suppose that I must, I replied.

Hereupon Ctesippus complained that we were talking in secret, and keeping the feast to ourselves.

I shall be happy, I said, to let you have a share. Here is Lysis, who does not understand something that I was saying, and wants me to ask Menexenus, who, as he thinks, is likely to know.

And why do you not ask him? he said.

Very well, I said, I will; and do you, Menexenus, answer. But first I must tell you that I am one who from my childhood upward have set my heart upon a certain thing. All people have their fancies; some desire horses, and others dogs; and some are fond of gold, and others of honour. Now, I have no violent desire of any of these things; but I have a passion for friends; and I would rather have a good friend than the best cock or quail in the world: I would even go further, and say the best horse or dog. Yea, by the dog of Egypt, I should greatly prefer a real friend to all the gold of Darius, or even to Darius himself: I am such a lover of friends as that. And when I see you and Lysis, at your

*Lysis.*

SOCRATES,

LYSIS,

CTESIPPUS,

MENEXENUS.

Socrates has set his heart upon having a friend but has never been able to find one.

*Lysis.*SOCRATES,  
MENEXENUS.

As Lysis and  
Menexenus  
have  
experience in  
friendship he  
would ask a  
question of  
them:—Is the  
lover or the  
beloved the  
friend?

early age, so easily possessed of this treasure, and so soon, he of you, and you of him, I am amazed and delighted, seeing that I myself, although I am now advanced in years, am so far from having made a similar acquisition, that I do not even know in what way a friend is acquired. But I want to ask you a question about this, for you have experience: tell me then, when one loves another, is the lover or the beloved the friend; or may either be the friend?

Either may, I should think, be the friend of either.

Do you mean, I said, that if only one of them loves the other, they are mutual friends?

Yes, he said; that is my meaning.

But what if the lover is not loved in return? which is a very possible case.

Yes.

Or is, perhaps, even hated? which is a fancy which sometimes is entertained by lovers respecting their beloved. Nothing can exceed their love; and yet they imagine either that they are not loved in return, or that they are hated. Is not that true?

Yes, he said, quite true.

In that case, the one loves, and the other is loved?

Yes.

Or must there  
be in friend-  
ship a return  
of love?

Then which is the friend of which? Is the lover the friend of the beloved, whether he be loved in return, or hated; or is the beloved the friend; or is there no friendship at all on either side, unless they both love one another?

There would seem to be none at all.

Then this notion is not in accordance with our previous one. We were saying that both were friends, if one only loved; but now, unless they both love, neither is a friend.

That appears to be true.

Then nothing which does not love in return is beloved by a lover?

I think not.

Vet many  
things are  
dear which do  
not love in  
return; and so  
we arrive at

Then they are not lovers of horses, whom the horses do not love in return: nor lovers of quails, nor of dogs, nor of wine, nor of gymnastic exercises, who have no return of love; no, nor of wisdom, unless wisdom loves them in return. Or shall we say that they do love them, although they are



not beloved by them; and that the poet was wrong who sings—

'Happy the man to whom his children are dear, and steeds having single hoofs, and dogs of the chase, and the stranger of another land'?

I do not think that he was wrong.

You think that he is right?

Yes.

Then, Menexenus, the conclusion is, that what is beloved, whether loving or hating, may be dear to the lover of it: for example, very young children, too young to love, or even  
13 hating their father or mother when they are punished by them, are never dearer to them than at the time when they are being hated by them.

I think that what you say is true.

And, if so, not the lover, but the beloved, is the friend or dear one?

Yes.

And the hated one, and not the hater, is the enemy?

Clearly.

Then many men are loved by their enemies, and hated by their friends, and are the friends of their enemies, and the enemies of their friends. Yet how absurd, my dear friend, or indeed impossible is this paradox of a man being an enemy to his friend or a friend to his enemy?

I quite agree, Socrates, in what you say.

But if this cannot be, the lover will be the friend of that which is loved?

True.

And the hater will be the enemy of that which is hated?

Certainly.

Yet we must acknowledge in this, as in the preceding instance, that a man may be the friend of one who is not his friend, or who may be his enemy, when he loves that which does not love him or which even hates him. And he may be the enemy of one who is not his enemy, and is even his friend: for example, when he hates<sup>1</sup> that which does not hate him, or which even loves him.

That appears to be true.

*Lysis.*

SOCRATES,  
MENEXENUS.

the conclusion that what is beloved is dear and not what loves;

as, for example, young children when they are punished by their parents.

What then is the result?— That neither the lover nor the beloved nor both together are friends.

<sup>1</sup> Omitting *φιλήν*, or reading *μισῇ* instead.



*Lysis.*SOCRATES,  
MENEXENUS,  
LYSIS.

But if the lover is not a friend, nor the beloved a friend, nor both together, what are we to say? Whom are we to call friends to one another? Do any remain?

Indeed, Socrates, I cannot find any.

But, O Menexenus! I said, may we not have been altogether wrong in our conclusions?

I am sure that we have been wrong, Socrates, said Lysis. And he blushed as he spoke, the words seeming to come from his lips involuntarily, because his whole mind was taken up with the argument; there was no mistaking his attentive look while he was listening.

I was pleased at the interest which was shown by Lysis, and I wanted to give Menexenus a rest, so I turned to him and said, I think, Lysis, that what you say is true, and that, if we had been right, we should never have gone so far wrong; let us proceed no further in this direction (for the road seems to be getting troublesome), but take the other path into which we turned, and see what the poets have to say; for they are to us in a manner the fathers and authors of wisdom, and they speak of friends in no light or trivial manner, but God himself, as they say, makes them and draws them to one another; and this they express, if I am not mistaken, in the following words:—

The poets say that 'God is ever drawing like towards like,'

'God is ever drawing like towards like, and making them acquainted.'

I dare say that you have heard those words.

Yes, he said; I have.

And have you not also met with the treatises of philosophers who say that like must love like? they are the people who argue and write about nature and the universe.

Very true, he replied.

And are they right in saying this?

They may be.

Perhaps, I said, about half, or possibly, altogether, right, if their meaning were rightly apprehended by us. For the more a bad man has to do with a bad man, and the more nearly he is brought into contact with him, the more he will be likely to hate him, for he injures him; and injurer and injured cannot be friends. Is not that true?

Yes, he said.

Then, looked at in this way, one half of the saying is untrue, if the wicked are like one another?

Quite so.

But what I imagine to be the real meaning of the words is, that the good are like one another, and friends to one another; and that the bad, as is often said of them, are never at unity with one another or with themselves; for they are passionate and restless, and anything which is at variance and enmity with itself is not likely to be in union or harmony with any other thing. Do you not agree?

Yes, I do.

Then, my friend, those who say that the like is friendly to the like mean to intimate, if I rightly apprehend them, that the good only is the friend of the good, and of him only; but that the evil never attains to any real friendship, either with good or evil. Do you agree?

He nodded assent.

Then now we know how to answer the question 'Who are friends?' for the argument declares 'That the good are friends.'

Yes, he said, that is true.

Yes, I replied; and yet I am not quite satisfied with this answer. By heaven, and shall I tell you what I suspect? I will. Assuming like, inasmuch as he is like, to be the friend of like, and useful to him—or rather let me try another way of putting the matter: Can like do any good or harm to like which he could not do to himself, or suffer anything from his like which he would not suffer from himself? And if neither can be of any use to the other, how can they be loved by one another? Can they now?

They cannot.

And can he who is not loved be a friend?

Certainly not.

But say that the like is not the friend of the like in so far as he is like; still the good may be the friend of the good in so far as he is good?

True.

But then again, will not the good, in so far as he is good, be sufficient for himself? Certainly he will. And he who is sufficient wants nothing—that is implied in the word sufficient.

*Lysis.*

SOCRATES,  
LYSIS.

meaning that  
not the  
wicked,

but only the  
good are  
friends.

But what  
good or harm  
can the good  
do to one  
another which  
they could not  
do for  
themselves?

The good  
have no need  
of friends.

*Lysis.*

Of course not.

SOCRATES,

And he who wants nothing will desire nothing?

LYSIS.

He will not.

Neither can he love that which he does not desire?

He cannot.

And he who loves not is not a lover or friend?

Clearly not.

What place then is there for friendship, if, when absent, good men have no need of one another (for even when alone they are sufficient for themselves), and when present have no use of one another? How can such persons ever be induced to value one another?

They cannot.

And friends they cannot be, unless they value one another?

Very true.

But see now, Lysis, whether we are not being deceived in all this—are we not indeed entirely wrong?

How so? he replied.

Have I not heard some one say, as I just now recollect, that the like is the greatest enemy of the like, the good of the good?—Yes, and he quoted the authority of Hesiod, who says:

Another word  
of a poet:  
'Potter  
quarrels with  
potter.'

'Potter quarrels with potter, bard with bard,  
Beggar with beggar;'

Friendship  
then is of  
opposites.

and of all other things he affirmed, in like manner, 'That of necessity the most like are most full of envy, strife, and hatred of one another, and the most unlike, of friendship. For the poor man is compelled to be the friend of the rich, and the weak requires the aid of the strong, and the sick man of the physician; and every one who is ignorant, has to love and court him who knows.' And indeed he went on to say in grandiloquent language, that the idea of friendship existing between similars is not the truth, but the very reverse of the truth, and that the most opposed are the most friendly; for that everything desires not like but that which is most unlike: for example, the dry desires the moist, the cold the hot, the bitter the sweet, the sharp the blunt, the void the full, the full the void, and so of all other things; for the opposite is the food of the opposite, whereas like receives nothing from

16 like. And I thought that he who said this was a charming man, and that he spoke well. What do the rest of you say?

*Lysis.*

SOCRATES,  
MENEXENUS.

I should say, at first hearing, that he is right, said Menexenus.

Then we are to say that the greatest friendship is of opposites?

Exactly.

Yes, Menexenus; but will not that be a monstrous answer? and will not the all-wise eristics be down upon us in triumph, and ask, fairly enough, whether love is not the very opposite of hate; and what answer shall we make to them—must we not admit that they speak the truth?

But this is a monstrous doctrine. For friendship is of love and not of hate.

We must.

They will then proceed to ask whether the enemy is the friend of the friend, or the friend the friend of the enemy?

Neither, he replied.

Well, but is a just man the friend of the unjust, or the temperate of the intemperate, or the good of the bad?

I do not see how that is possible.

And yet, I said, if friendship goes by contraries, the contraries must be friends.

They must.

Then neither like and like nor unlike and unlike are friends.

Then neither like and like, nor unlike and unlike, are friends.

I suppose not.

And yet there is a further consideration: may not all these notions of friendship be erroneous? but may not that which is neither good nor evil still in some cases be the friend of the good?

How do you mean? he said.

Why really, I said, the truth is that I do not know; but my head is dizzy with thinking of the argument, and therefore I hazard the conjecture, that 'the beautiful is the friend,' as the old proverb says. Beauty is certainly a soft, smooth, slippery thing, and therefore of a nature which easily slips in and permeates our souls. For I affirm that the good is the beautiful. You will agree to that?

The beautiful which is also the good is the friend of the neither good nor evil.

Yes.

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*Lysis.*SOCRATES,  
MENEXENUS.

This I say from a sort of notion that what is neither good nor evil is the friend of the beautiful and the good, and I will tell you why I am inclined to think so: I assume that there are three principles—the good, the bad, and that which is neither good nor bad. You would agree—would you not?

I agree.

And neither is the good the friend of the good, nor the evil of the evil, nor the good of the evil;—these alternatives are excluded by the previous argument; and therefore, if there be such a thing as friendship or love at all, we must infer that what is neither good nor evil must be the friend, either of the good, or of that which is neither good nor evil, for nothing can be the friend of the bad.

True.

But neither can like be the friend of like, as we were just now saying.

True.

And if so, that which is neither good nor evil can have no friend which is neither good nor evil.

Clearly not.

Then the good alone is the friend of that only which is neither good nor evil.

Certainly, it would so appear.

217

Analogy of  
medicine.

And does not this seem to put us in the right way? Just remark, that the body which is in health requires neither medical nor any other aid, but is well enough; and the healthy man has no love of the physician, because he is in health.

He has none.

But the sick loves him, because he is sick?

Certainly.

And sickness is an evil, and the art of medicine a good and useful thing?

Yes.

But the human body, regarded as a body, is neither good nor evil?

True.

And the body is compelled by reason of disease to court and make friends of the art of medicine?

The human  
body, which is  
neither good  
nor evil in  
itself, may, by  
reason of the  
presence of  
evil, have  
need of good.

Yes.

*Lysis.*

Then that which is neither good nor evil becomes the friend of good, by reason of the presence of evil?

SOCRATES,  
MENEXENUS.

So we may infer.

And clearly this must have happened before that which was neither good nor evil had become altogether corrupted with the element of evil—if itself had become evil it would not still desire and love the good; for, as we were saying, the evil cannot be the friend of the good.

Impossible.

Further, I must observe that some substances are assimilated when others are present with them; and there are some which are not assimilated: take, for example, the case of an ointment or colour which is put on another substance.

Evil may be  
present, but  
yet not  
assimilated.

Very good.

In such a case, is the substance which is anointed the same as the colour or ointment?

What do you mean? he said.

This is what I mean: Suppose that I were to cover your auburn locks with white lead, would they be really white, or would they only appear to be white?

They would only appear to be white, he replied.

And yet whiteness would be present in them?

True.

But that would not make them at all the more white, notwithstanding the presence of white in them—they would not be white any more than black?

No.

But when old age infuses whiteness into them, then they become assimilated, and are white by the presence of white.

Certainly.

Now I want to know whether in all cases a substance is assimilated by the presence of another substance; or must the presence be after a peculiar sort?

The latter, he said.

Then that which is neither good nor evil may be in the presence of evil, but not as yet evil, and that has happened before now?

Yes.



*Lysis.*SOCRATES,  
MENEXENUS.The presence  
of evil arouses  
in what is not  
evil the desire  
of good.

And when anything is in the presence of evil, not being as yet evil, the presence of good arouses the desire of good in that thing; but the presence of evil, which makes a thing 218 evil, takes away the desire and friendship of the good; for that which was once both good and evil has now become evil only, and the good was supposed to have no friendship with the evil?

None.

And therefore we say that those who are already wise, whether Gods or men, are no longer lovers of wisdom; nor can they be lovers of wisdom who are ignorant to the extent of being evil, for no evil or ignorant person is a lover of wisdom. There remain those who have the misfortune to be ignorant, but are not yet hardened in their ignorance, or void of understanding, and do not as yet fancy that they know what they do not know: and therefore those who are the lovers of wisdom are as yet neither good nor bad. But the bad do not love wisdom any more than the good; for, as we have already seen, neither is unlike the friend of unlike, nor like of like. You remember that?

Yes, they both said.

Friendship is  
the love of the  
good when  
evil is present.

And so, Lysis and Menexenus, we have discovered the nature of friendship—there can be no doubt of it: Friendship is the love which by reason of the presence of evil the neither good nor evil has of the good, either in the soul, or in the body, or anywhere.

They both agreed and entirely assented, and for a moment I rejoiced and was satisfied like a huntsman just holding fast his prey. But then a most unaccountable suspicion came across me, and I felt that the conclusion was untrue. I was pained, and said, Alas! Lysis and Menexenus, I am afraid that we have been grasping at a shadow only.

Why do you say so? said Menexenus.

Arguments,  
like men, are  
often  
pretenders.

I am afraid, I said, that the argument about friendship is false: arguments, like men, are often pretenders.

How do you mean? he asked.

Well, I said; look at the matter in this way: a friend is the friend of some one; is he not?

Certainly he is.



And has he a motive and object in being a friend, or has he no motive and object?

He has a motive and object.

And is the object which makes him a friend, dear to him, or neither dear nor hateful to him?

I do not quite follow you, he said.

I do not wonder at that, I said. But perhaps, if I put the matter in another way, you will be able to follow me, and my own meaning will be clearer to myself. The sick man, as I was just now saying, is the friend of the physician—is he not?

Yes.

And he is the friend of the physician because of disease, and for the sake of health?

Yes.

And disease is an evil?

Certainly.

And what of health? I said. Is that good or evil, or neither?

219 Good, he replied.

And we were saying, I believe, that the body being neither good nor evil, because of disease, that is to say because of evil, is the friend of medicine, and medicine is a good: and medicine has entered into this friendship for the sake of health, and health is a good.

True.

And is health a friend, or not a friend?

A friend.

And disease is an enemy?

Yes.

Then that which is neither good nor evil is the friend of the good because of the evil and hateful, and for the sake of the good and the friend?

Clearly.

Then the friend is a friend for the sake of the friend, and because of the enemy?

That is to be inferred.

Then at this point, my boys, let us take heed, and be on our guard against deceptions. I will not again repeat that the friend is the friend of the friend, and the like of the like,

*Lysis.*

SOCRATES,  
MENEXENUS,  
LYSIS.

*Lysis.*SOCRATES,  
MENEXENUS.

which has been declared by us to be an impossibility; but, in order that this new statement may not delude us, let us attentively examine another point, which I will proceed to explain: Medicine, as we were saying, is a friend, or dear to us for the sake of health?

Yes.

And health is also dear?

Certainly.

And if dear, then dear for the sake of something?

Yes.

And surely this object must also be dear, as is implied in our previous admissions?

Yes.

And that something dear involves something else dear?

Yes.

But then, proceeding in this way, shall we not arrive at some first principle of friendship or dearness which is not capable of being referred to any other, for the sake of which, as we maintain, all other things are dear, and, having there arrived, we shall stop?

True.

Nothing can  
be dear in the  
highest sense  
for the sake of  
something  
else.

My fear is that all those other things, which, as we say, are dear for the sake of another, are illusions and deceptions only, but where that first principle is, there is the true ideal of friendship. Let me put the matter thus: Suppose the case of a great treasure (this may be a son, who is more precious to his father than all his other treasures); would not the father, who values his son above all things, value other things also for the sake of his son? I mean, for instance, if he knew that his son had drunk hemlock, and the father thought that wine would save him, he would value the wine?

He would.

And also the vessel which contains the wine?

Certainly.

But does he therefore value the three measures of wine, or the earthen vessel which contains them, equally with his son? Is not this rather the true state of the case? All his anxiety has regard not to the means which are provided for the sake of an object, but to the object for the sake of which they are provided. And although we may often say that gold and

silver are highly valued by us, that is not the truth; for there is a further object, whatever it may be, which we value most of all, and for the sake of which gold and all our other possessions are acquired by us. Am I not right?

*Lysis.*

SOCRATES,  
MENEXENUS.

Yes, certainly.

And may not the same be said of the friend? That which is only dear to us for the sake of something else is improperly said to be dear, but the truly dear is that in which all these so-called dear friendships terminate. ✓

That, he said, appears to be true.

And the truly dear or ultimate principle of friendship is not for the sake of any other or further dear.

True.

Then we have done with the notion that friendship has any further object. May we then infer that the good is the friend?


I think so.

And the good is loved for the sake of the evil? Let me put the case in this way: Suppose that of the three principles, good, evil, and that which is neither good nor evil, there remained only the good and the neutral, and that evil went far away, and in no way affected soul or body, nor ever at all that class of things which, as we say, are neither good nor evil in themselves;—would the good be of any use, or other than useless to us? For if there were nothing to hurt us any longer, we should have no need of anything that would do us good. Then would be clearly seen that we did but love and desire the good because of the evil, and as the remedy of the evil, which was the disease; but if there had been no disease, there would have been no need of a remedy. Is not this the nature of the good—to be loved by us who are placed between the two, because of the evil? but there is no use in the good for its own sake.

The good which is loved for the sake of the evil is relative only. Some higher principle of friendship than this is required.

I suppose not.

Then the final principle of friendship, in which all other friendships terminated, those, I mean, which are relatively dear and for the sake of something else, is of another and a different nature from them. For they are called dear because of another dear or friend. But with the true friend or dear, the case is quite the reverse; for that is proved to



*Lysis.*

be dear because of the hated, and if the hated were away it would be no longer dear.

SOCRATES,  
MENEXENUS.

Very true, he replied: at any rate not if our present view holds good.

A passing  
speculation  
respecting the  
nature of evil.

But, oh! will you tell me, I said, whether if evil were to perish, we should hunger any more, or thirst any more, or have any similar desire? Or may we suppose that hunger will remain while men and animals remain, but not so as to be hurtful? And the same of thirst and the other desires,—that they will remain, but will not be evil because evil has perished? Or rather shall I say, that to ask what either will be then or will not be is ridiculous, for who knows? This we do know, that in our present condition hunger may injure us, and may also benefit us:—Is not that true? 221

Yes.

And in like manner thirst or any similar desire may sometimes be a good and sometimes an evil to us, and sometimes neither one nor the other?

To be sure.

But is there any reason why, because evil perishes, that which is not evil should perish with it?

None.

Then, even if evil perishes, the desires which are neither good nor evil will remain?

Clearly they will.

And must not a man love that which he desires and affects?

He must.

Then, even if evil perishes, there may still remain some elements of love or friendship?

Yes.

But not if evil is the cause of friendship: for in that case nothing will be the friend of any other thing after the destruction of evil; for the effect cannot remain when the cause is destroyed.

True.

Evil not the  
true cause of  
friendship.

And have we not admitted already that the friend loves something for a reason? and at the time of making the admission we were of opinion that the neither good nor evil loves the good because of the evil?

Very true.

*Lysis.*

But now our view is changed, and we conceive that there must be some other cause of friendship?

SOCRATES,  
MENEXENUS,  
LYSIS.

I suppose so.

May not the truth be rather, as we were saying just now, that desire is the cause of friendship; for that which desires is dear to that which is desired at the time of desiring it? and may not the other theory have been only a long story about nothing?

Is desire the  
true cause?

Likely enough.

But surely, I said, he who desires, desires that of which he is in want?

Yes.

And that of which he is in want is dear to him?

True.

And he is in want of that of which he is deprived?

Certainly.

Then love, and desire, and friendship would appear to be of the natural or congenial. Such, Lysis and Menexenus, is the inference.

Yes,—desire  
of the natu-  
ral or the  
congenial.

They assented.

Then if you are friends, you must have natures which are congenial to one another?

Certainly, they both said.

And I say, my boys, that no one who loves or desires another would ever have loved or desired or affected him, if he had not been in some way congenial to him, either in his soul, or in his character, or in his manners, or in his form.

Yes, yes, said Menexenus. But Lysis was silent.

Then, I said, the conclusion is, that what is of a congenial nature must be loved.

It follows, he said.

Then the lover, who is true and no counterfeit, must of necessity be loved by his love.

Lysis and Menexenus gave a faint assent to this; and Hippothales changed into all manner of colours with delight.

Here, intending to revise the argument, I said: Can we point out any difference between the congenial and the like?

But our former  
argument

*Lysis.*SOCRATES,  
MENEXENUS,  
LYSIS.

showed that  
the like was  
useless to the  
like: we must  
therefore find  
a way to  
distinguish  
between the  
congenial and  
the like.

For if that is possible, then I think, Lysis and Menexenus, there may be some sense in our argument about friendship. But if the congenial is only the like, how will you get rid of the other argument as to the uselessness of like to like in as far as they are like; for to say that what is useless is dear, would be absurd? Suppose, then, that as we are running a little wild in the argument, we agree to distinguish between the congenial and the like—such a distinction may perhaps be allowed.

By all means.

And shall we further say that the good is congenial, and the evil uncongenial to every one? Or again that the evil is congenial to the evil, and the good to the good; and that which is neither good nor evil to that which is neither good nor evil?

They agreed to the latter alternative.

Then, my boys, we have again fallen into the old discarded error; for the unjust will be the friend of the unjust, and the bad of the bad, as well as the good of the good.

Such appears to be the result.

Shall we say  
that the  
congenial is  
the good?

But again, if we say that the congenial is the same as the good, in that case the good and he only will be the friend of the good.

True.

But that  
proposition  
has been  
already  
disproved.

But that too was a position of ours which, as you will remember, has been already refuted by ourselves.

We remember.

A conclusion  
in which  
nothing is  
concluded.

Then what is to be done? Or rather is there anything to be done? I can only, like the wise men who argue in courts, sum up the arguments:—If neither the beloved, nor the lover, nor the like, nor the unlike, nor the good, nor the congenial, nor any other of whom we spoke—for there were such a number of them that I cannot remember all—if none of these are friends, I know not what remains to be said.

Here I was going to invite the opinion of some older 223 person, when suddenly we were interrupted by the tutors of Lysis and Menexenus, who came upon us like an evil apparition with their brothers, and bade them go home, as it was getting late. At first, we and the by-standers drove them off; but afterwards, as they would not mind, and only



went on shouting in their barbarous dialect, and got angry, *Lysis.*  
and kept calling the boys—they appeared to us to have been *SOCRATES.*  
drinking rather too much at the Hermaea, which made them  
difficult to manage—we fairly gave way and broke up the  
company.

I said, however, a few words to the boys at parting: O  
Menexenus and Lysis, how ridiculous that you two boys, and  
I, an old boy, who would fain be one of you, should imagine  
ourselves to be friends—this is what the by-standers will  
go away and say—and as yet we have not been able to  
discover what is a friend!





LACHES.



## INTRODUCTION.

ph. LYSIMACHUS, the son of Aristides the Just, and Melesias, the son of the elder Thucydides, two aged men who lived together, are desirous of educating their sons in the best manner. Their own education, as often happens with the sons of great men, has been neglected; and they are resolved that their children shall have more care taken of them, than they received themselves at the hands of their fathers.

At their request, Nicias and Laches have accompanied them to see a man named Stesilaus fighting in heavy armour. The two fathers ask the two generals what they think of this exhibition, and whether they would advise that their sons should acquire the accomplishment. Nicias and Laches are quite willing to give their opinion; but they suggest that Socrates should be invited to take part in the consultation. He is a stranger to Lysimachus, but is afterwards recognised as the son of his old friend Sophroniscus, with whom he never had a difference to the hour of his death. Socrates is also known to Nicias, to whom he had introduced the excellent Damon, musician and sophist, as a tutor for his son, and to Laches, who had witnessed his heroic behaviour at the battle of Delium (cp. Symp. 221).

Socrates, as he is younger than either Nicias or Laches, prefers to wait until they have delivered their opinions, which they give in a characteristic manner. Nicias, the tactician, is very much in favour of the new art, which he describes as the gymnastics of war — useful when the ranks are formed, and still more useful when they are broken; creating a general interest in military studies, and greatly adding to the appearance of the soldier in the field. Laches, the blunt warrior, is of opinion that such an art is not knowledge, and cannot be of any value because the Lacedaemonians, those great masters of arms, neglect it. His own experience in actual service has taught him that these pretenders

*Laches.*

ANALYSIS.

are useless and ridiculous. This man Stesilaus has been seen by him on board ship making a very sorry exhibition of himself. The possession of the art will make the coward rash, and subject the 184 courageous, if he chance to make a slip, to invidious remarks. And now let Socrates be taken into counsel. As they differ he must decide.

Socrates would rather not decide the question by a plurality of votes: in such a serious matter as the education of a friend's 185 children, he would consult the one skilled person who has had masters, and has works to show as evidences of his skill. This is not himself; for he has never been able to pay the sophists for 186 instructing him, and has never had the wit to do or discover anything. But Nicias and Laches are older and richer than he is: 187 they have had teachers, and perhaps have made discoveries; and he would have trusted them entirely, if they had not been diametrically opposed.

Lysimachus here proposes to resign the argument into the hands of the younger part of the company, as he is old, and has a bad memory. He earnestly requests Socrates to remain; — in this showing, as Nicias says, how little he knows the man, who 188 will certainly not go away until he has cross-examined the company about their past lives. Nicias has often submitted to this process; and Laches is quite willing to learn from Socrates, because his 189 actions, in the true Dorian mode, correspond to his words.

Socrates proceeds: We might ask who are our teachers? But 190 a better and more thorough way of examining the question will be to ask, 'What is Virtue?' — or rather, to restrict the inquiry to that part of virtue which is concerned with the use of weapons — 'What is Courage?' Laches thinks that he knows this: (1) 'He is courageous who remains at his post.' But some nations fight 191 flying, after the manner of Aeneas in Homer; or as the heavy-armed Spartans also did at the battle of Plataea. (2) Socrates wants a more general definition, not only of military courage, but 192 of courage of all sorts, tried both amid pleasures and pains. Laches replies that this universal courage is endurance. But courage is a good thing, and mere endurance may be hurtful and injurious. Therefore (3) the element of intelligence must be added. But then 193 again unintelligent endurance may often be more courageous than the intelligent, the bad than the good. How is this contradiction

to be solved? Socrates and Laches are not set 'to the Dorian mode' of words and actions; for their words are all confusion, although their actions are courageous. Still they must 'endure' in an argument about endurance. Laches is very willing, and is quite sure that he knows what courage is, if he could only tell.

*Laches.*  
ANALYSIS.

194 Nicias is now appealed to; and in reply he offers a definition which he has heard from Socrates himself, to the effect that (1) 'Courage is intelligence.' Laches derides this; and Socrates enquires, 'What sort of intelligence?' to which Nicias replies, 195 'Intelligence of things terrible.' 'But every man knows the things to be dreaded in his own art.' 'No they do not. They may predict results, but cannot tell whether they are really terrible; only the courageous man can tell that.' Laches draws 196 the inference that the courageous man is either a soothsayer or a god.

Again, (2) in Nicias' way of speaking, the term 'courageous' must be denied to animals or children, because they do not know 197 the danger. Against this inversion of the ordinary use of language Laches reclaims, but is in some degree mollified by a compliment to his own courage. Still, he does not like to see an Athenian statesman and general descending to sophistries of this sort. 198 Socrates resumes the argument. Courage has been defined to be intelligence or knowledge of the terrible; and courage is not all 199 virtue, but only one of the virtues. The terrible is in the future, and therefore the knowledge of the terrible is a knowledge of the future. But there can be no knowledge of future good or evil separated from a knowledge of the good and evil of the past or present; that is to say, of all good and evil. Courage, therefore, is the knowledge of good and evil generally. But he who has the knowledge of good and evil generally, must not only have courage, 200 but also temperance, justice, and every other virtue. Thus, a single virtue would be the same as all virtues (cp. Protagoras, 350 foll.). And after all the two generals, and Socrates, the hero of Delium, are still in ignorance of the nature of courage. They 201 must go to school again, boys, old men and all.

Some points of resemblance, and some points of difference, appear in the Laches when compared with the Charmides and Lysis. There is less of poetical and simple beauty, and more of dramatic interest and power. They are richer in the externals

INTRODUC-  
TION.

*Laches.*

INTRODUC-  
TION.

of the scene; the Laches has more play and development of character. In the *Lysis* and *Charmides* the youths are the central figures, and frequent allusions are made to the place of meeting, which is a palaestra. Here the place of meeting, which is also a palaestra, is quite forgotten, and the boys play a subordinate part. The *séance* is of old and elder men, of whom Socrates is the youngest.

First is the aged Lysimachus, who may be compared with Cephalus in the *Republic*, and, like him, withdraws from the argument. Melesias, who is only his shadow, also subsides into silence. Both of them, by their own confession, have been ill-educated, as is further shown by the circumstance that Lysimachus, the friend of Sophroniscus, has never heard of the fame of Socrates, his son; they belong to different circles. In the *Meno* (p. 94) their want of education in all but the arts of riding and wrestling is adduced as a proof that virtue cannot be taught. The recognition of Socrates by Lysimachus is extremely graceful; and his military exploits naturally connect him with the two generals, of whom one has witnessed them. The characters of Nicias and Laches are indicated by their opinions on the exhibition of the man fighting in heavy armour. The more enlightened Nicias is quite ready to accept the new art, which Laches treats with ridicule, seeming to think that this, or any other military question, may be settled by asking, 'What do the Lacedaemonians say?' The one is the thoughtful general, willing to avail himself of any discovery in the art of war (*Aristoph. Aves*, 363); the other is the practical man, who relies on his own experience, and is the enemy of innovation; he can act but cannot speak, and is apt to lose his temper. It is to be noted that one of them is supposed to be a hearer of Socrates; the other is only acquainted with his actions. Laches is the admirer of the Dorian mode; and into his mouth the remark is put that there are some persons who, having never been taught, are better than those who have. Like a novice in the art of disputation, he is delighted with the hits of Socrates; and is disposed to be angry with the refinements of Nicias.

In the discussion of the main thesis of the Dialogue — 'What is Courage?' the antagonism of the two characters is still more clearly brought out; and in this, as in the preliminary question, the truth is parted between them. Gradually, and not without difficulty,



Laches is made to pass on from the more popular to the more philosophical; it has never occurred to him that there was any other courage than that of the soldier; and only by an effort of the mind can he frame a general notion at all. No sooner has this general notion been formed than it evanesces before the dialectic of Socrates; and Nicias appears from the other side with the Socratic doctrine, that courage is knowledge. This is explained to mean knowledge of things terrible in the future. But Socrates denies that the knowledge of the future is separable from that of the past and present; in other words, true knowledge is not that of the soothsayer but of the philosopher. And all knowledge will thus be equivalent to all virtue — a position which elsewhere Socrates is not unwilling to admit, but which will not assist us in distinguishing the nature of courage. In this part of the Dialogue the contrast between the mode of cross-examination which is practised by Laches and by Socrates, and also the manner in which the definition of Laches is made to approximate to that of Nicias, are worthy of attention.

*Laches.*

INTRODUC-  
TION.

Thus, with some intimation of the connexion and unity of virtue and knowledge, we arrive at no distinct result. The two aspects of courage are never harmonized. The knowledge which in the Protagoras is explained as the faculty of estimating pleasures and pains is here lost in an unmeaning and transcendental conception. Yet several true intimations of the nature of courage are allowed to appear: (1) That courage is moral as well as physical: (2) That true courage is inseparable from knowledge, and yet (3) is based on a natural instinct. Laches exhibits one aspect of courage; Nicias the other. The perfect image and harmony of both is only realized in Socrates himself.

The Dialogue offers one among many examples of the freedom with which Plato treats facts. For the scene must be supposed to have occurred between B. C. 424, the year of the battle of Delium (181 B), and B. C. 418, the year of the battle of Mantinea, at which Laches fell. But if Socrates was more than seventy years of age at his trial in 399 (see Apology), he could not have been a young man at any time after the battle of Delium.



# LACHES, OR COURAGE.

## PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

LYSIMACHUS, *son of Aristides.*

MELESIAS, *son of Thucydides.*

THEIR SONS.

NICIAS.

LACHES.

SOCRATES.

Steph. *Lys.* You have seen the exhibition of the man fighting in  
178 armour, Nicias and Laches, but we did not tell you at the  
time the reason why my friend Melesias and I asked you to  
go with us and see him. I think that we may as well confess  
what this was, for we certainly ought not to have any reserve  
with you. The reason was, that we were intending to ask  
your advice. Some laugh at the very notion of advising  
others, and when they are asked will not say what they  
think. They guess at the wishes of the person who asks  
them, and answer according to his, and not according to  
their own, opinion. But as we know that you are good  
judges, and will say exactly what you think, we have taken  
you into our counsels. The matter about which I am making  
all this preface is as follows: Melesias and I have two sons;  
that is his son, and he is named Thucydides, after his grand-  
179 father; and this is mine, who is also called after his grand-  
father, Aristides. Now, we are resolved to take the greatest  
care of the youths, and not to let them run about as they  
like, which is too often the way with the young, when they  
are no longer children, but to begin at once and do the utmost  
that we can for them. And knowing you to have sons of  
your own, we thought that you were most likely to have  
attended to their training and improvement, and, if perchance

*Laches.*

LYSIMACHUS.

Lysimachus  
and Melesias  
request Nicias  
and Laches to  
advise with  
them  
respecting the  
education of  
their sons.

*Laches.*LYSIMACHUS,  
NICIAS,  
LACHES.

you have not attended to them, we may remind you that you ought to have done so, and would invite you to assist us in the fulfilment of a common duty. I will tell you, Nicias and Laches, even at the risk of being tedious, how we came to think of this. Melesias and I live together, and our sons live with us; and now, as I was saying at first, we are going to confess to you. Both of us often talk to the lads about the many noble deeds which our own fathers did in war and peace—in the management of the allies, and in the administration of the city; but neither of us has any deeds of his own which he can show. The truth is that we are ashamed of this contrast being seen by them, and we blame our fathers for letting us be spoiled in the days of our youth, while they were occupied with the concerns of others; and we urge all this upon the lads, pointing out to them that they will not grow up to honour if they are rebellious and take no pains about themselves; but that if they take pains they may, perhaps, become worthy of the names which they bear. They, on their part, promise to comply with our wishes; and our care is to discover what studies or pursuits are likely to be most improving to them. Some one commended to us the art of fighting in armour, which he thought an excellent accomplishment for a young man to learn; and he praised the man whose exhibition you have seen, and told us to go and see him. And we determined that we would go, and get you to accompany us; and we were intending at the same time, if you did not object, to take counsel with you about the education of our sons. That is the matter which we wanted to talk over with you; and we hope that you will give us your opinion about this art of fighting in armour, and about any other studies or pursuits which may or may not be desirable for a young man to learn. Please to say whether you agree to our proposal.

Should the art  
of fighting in  
armour be  
taught them?

*Nic.* As far as I am concerned, Lysimachus and Melesias, I applaud your purpose, and will gladly assist you; and I believe that you, Laches, will be equally glad.

*La.* Certainly, Nicias; and I quite approve of the remark which Lysimachus made about his own father and the father of Melesias, and which is applicable, not only to them, but to us, and to every one who is occupied with public affairs.

As he says, such persons are too apt to be negligent and careless of their own children and their private concerns. There is much truth in that remark of yours, Lysimachus. But why, instead of consulting us, do you not consult our friend Socrates about the education of the youths? He is of the same deme with you, and is always passing his time in places where the youth have any noble study or pursuit, such as you are enquiring after.

*Laches.*

LYSIMACHUS,  
NICIAS,  
LACHES.

Laches recommends that they shall take Socrates into their counsels.

*Lys.* Why, Laches, has Socrates ever attended to matters of this sort?

*La.* Certainly, Lysimachus.

*Nic.* That I have the means of knowing as well as Laches; for quite lately he supplied me with a teacher of music for my sons,—Damon, the disciple of Agathocles, who is a most accomplished man in every way, as well as a musician, and a companion of inestimable value for young men at their age.

*Lys.* Those who have reached my time of life, Socrates and Nicias and Laches, fall out of acquaintance with the young, because they are generally detained at home by old age; but you, O son of Sophroniscus, should let your fellow demesman have the benefit of any advice which you are able to give. Moreover I have a claim upon you as an old friend of your father; for I and he were always companions and friends, and to the hour of his death there never was a difference between us; and now it comes back to me, at the mention of your name, that I have heard these lads talking  
181 to one another at home, and often speaking of Socrates in terms of the highest praise; but I have never thought to ask them whether the son of Sophroniscus was the person whom they meant. Tell me, my boys, whether this is the Socrates of whom you have often spoken?

Lysimachus had heard the name of Socrates, and makes the discovery that he is the son of his old friend Sophroniscus.

*Son.* Certainly, father, this is he.

*Lys.* I am delighted to hear, Socrates, that you maintain the name of your father, who was a most excellent man; and I further rejoice at the prospect of our family ties being renewed.

Laches praises the courage which was shown by Socrates at the battle of Delium.

*La.* Indeed, Lysimachus, you ought not to give him up; for I can assure you that I have seen him maintaining, not only his father's, but also his country's name. He was my

*Laches.*

LYSIMACHUS,  
SOCRATES,  
NICIAS.

The opinion of Socrates is asked respecting the art of fighting in armour. He would like to hear what Nicias has to say before giving an opinion.

companion in the retreat from Delium, and I can tell you that if others had only been like him, the honour of our country would have been upheld, and the great defeat would never have occurred.

*Lys.* That is very high praise which is accorded to you, Socrates, by faithful witnesses and for actions like those which they praise. Let me tell you the pleasure which I feel in hearing of your fame; and I hope that you will regard me as one of your warmest friends. You ought to have visited us long ago, and made yourself at home with us; but now, from this day forward, as we have at last found one another out, do as I say—come and make acquaintance with me, and with these young men, that I may continue your friend, as I was your father's. I shall expect you to do so, and shall venture at some future time to remind you of your duty. But what say you of the matter of which we were beginning to speak—the art of fighting in armour? Is it a practice in which the lads may be advantageously instructed?

*Soc.* I will endeavour to advise you, Lysimachus, as far as I can in this matter, and also in every way will comply with your wishes; but as I am younger and not so experienced, I think that I ought certainly to hear first what my elders have to say, and to learn of them, and if I have anything to add, then I may venture to give my opinion to them as well as to you. Suppose, Nicias, that one or other of you begin.

*Nic.* I have no objection, Socrates; and my opinion is that the acquirement of this art is in many ways useful to young men. It is an advantage to them that among the favourite amusements of their leisure hours they should have one which tends to improve and not to injure their bodily health. No gymnastics could be better or harder exercise; and this, and the art of riding, are of all arts most befitting to a freeman; for they only who are thus trained in the use of arms are the athletes of our military profession, trained in that on which the conflict turns. Moreover in actual battle, when you have to fight in a line with a number of others, such an acquirement will be of some use, and will be of the greatest whenever the ranks are broken and you have to fight singly, either in pursuit, when you are attacking some one who is defending himself, or in flight, when you have to defend yourself against an

Nicias thinks that the art is an excellent gymnastic, and of the greatest value when the soldier is fighting singly; it will arouse in him noble thoughts, and will enable him to make a better figure in battle.



assailant. Certainly he who possessed the art could not meet with any harm at the hands of a single person, or perhaps of several; and in any case he would have a great advantage. Further, this sort of skill inclines a man to the love of other noble lessons; for every man who has learned how to fight in armour will desire to learn the proper arrangement of an army, which is the sequel of the lesson: and when he has learned this, and his ambition is once fired, he will go on to learn the complete art of the general. There is no difficulty in seeing that the knowledge and practice of other military arts will be honourable and valuable to a man; and this lesson may be the beginning of them. Let me add a further advantage, which is by no means a slight one,—that this science will make any man a great deal more valiant and self-possessed in the field. And I will not disdain to mention, what by some may be thought to be a small matter;—he will make a better appearance at the right time; that is to say, at the time when his appearance will strike terror into his enemies. My opinion then, Lysimachus, is, as I say, that the youths should be instructed in this art, and for the reasons which I have given. But Laches may take a different view; and I shall be very glad to hear what he has to say.

*Laches.*  
*Nicias,*  
*LACHES.*

*La.* I should not like to maintain, Nicias, that any kind of knowledge is not to be learned; for all knowledge appears to be a good: and if, as Nicias and as the teachers of the art affirm, this use of arms is really a species of knowledge, then it ought to be learned; but if not, and if those who profess to teach it are deceivers only; or if it be knowledge, but not of a valuable sort, then what is the use of learning it?

*Laches*  
attaches no  
importance to  
the art, which  
would have  
long ago been  
discovered by  
the Lacedae-  
monians, and  
would have  
been intro-  
duced among  
them, if it had  
been of any  
value.

183 I say this, because I think that if it had been really valuable, the Lacedaemonians, whose whole life is passed in finding out and practising the arts which give them an advantage over other nations in war, would have discovered this one. And even if they had not, still these professors of the art would certainly not have failed to discover that of all the Hellenes the Lacedaemonians have the greatest interest in such matters, and that a master of the art who was honoured among them would be sure to make his fortune among other nations, just as a tragic poet would who is honoured among



*Laches.*

LACHES.

These masters  
of fence never  
venture on La-  
cedaemonian  
ground.

Laches had  
seen this same  
Stesilaus  
cutting a very  
ridiculous  
figure in  
a naval  
engagement.

ourselves; which is the reason why he who fancies that he can write a tragedy does not go about itinerating in the neighbouring states, but rushes hither straight, and exhibits at Athens; and this is natural. Whereas I perceive that these fighters in armour regard Lacedaemon as a sacred inviolable territory, which they do not touch with the point of their foot; but they make a circuit of the neighbouring states, and would rather exhibit to any others than to the Spartans; and particularly to those who would themselves acknowledge that they are by no means first-rate in the arts of war. Further, Lysimachus, I have encountered a good many of these gentlemen in actual service, and have taken their measure, which I can give you at once; for none of these masters of fence have ever been distinguished in war,—there has been a sort of fatality about them; while in all other arts the men of note have been always those who have practised the art, they appear to be a most unfortunate exception. For example, this very Stesilaus, whom you and I have just witnessed exhibiting in all that crowd and making such great professions of his powers, I have seen at another time making, in sober truth, an involuntary exhibition of himself, which was a far better spectacle. He was a marine on board a ship which struck a transport vessel, and was armed with a weapon, half spear, half scythe; the singularity of the weapon was worthy of the singularity of the man. To make a long story short, I will only tell you what happened to this notable invention of the scythe-spear. He was fighting, and the scythe was caught in the rigging of the other ship, and stuck fast; and he tugged, but was unable to get his weapon free. The two ships were passing one another. He first ran along his own ship holding on to the spear; but as the other ship passed by and drew him after as he was holding on, he let the spear slip through his hand until he retained only the end of the handle. The people in the transport clapped their hands, and laughed at his ridiculous figure; and when some one threw a stone, which fell on the deck at his feet, and he quitted his hold of the scythe-spear, the crew of his own trireme also burst out laughing; they could not refrain when they beheld the weapon waving in the air, suspended from the transport. Now I do not deny that

there may be something in such an art, as Nicias asserts, but I tell you my experience; and, as I said at first, whether this be an art of which the advantage is so slight, or not an art at all, but only an imposition, in either case such an acquirement is not worth having. For my opinion is, that if the professor of this art be a coward, he will be likely to become rash, and his character will be only more notorious; or if he be brave, and fail ever so little, other men will be on the watch, and he will be greatly traduced; for there is a jealousy of such pretenders; and unless a man be pre-eminent in valour, he cannot help being ridiculous, if he says that he has this sort of skill. Such is my judgment, Lysimachus, of the desirableness of this art; but, as I said at first, ask Socrates, and do not let him go until he has given you his opinion of the matter.

*Laches.*

SOCRATES,  
LYSIMACHUS,  
MELESIAS.  
The art an  
imposition.

*Lys.* I was going to ask this favour of you, Socrates; as is the more necessary because the two councillors disagree, and some one is in a manner still needed who will decide between them. Had they agreed, no arbiter would have been required. But as Laches has voted one way and Nicias another, I should like to hear with which of our two friends you agree.

Our two  
councillors  
disagree, and  
therefore we  
must appeal  
to Socrates.

*Soc.* What, Lysimachus, are you going to accept the opinion of the majority?

What, and are  
we to decide  
by a majority?

*Lys.* Why, yes, Socrates; what else am I to do?

*Soc.* And would you do so too, Melesias? If you were deliberating about the gymnastic training of your son, would you follow the advice of the majority of us, or the opinion of the one who had been trained and exercised under a skilful master?

*Mel.* The latter, Socrates; as would surely be reasonable.

No, the  
opinion of one  
expert is  
worth that of  
all the rest.

*Soc.* His one vote would be worth more than the vote of all us four?

*Mel.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And for this reason, as I imagine,—because a good decision is based on knowledge and not on numbers?

*Mel.* To be sure.

185 *Soc.* Must we not then first of all ask, whether there is any one of us who has knowledge of that about which we are deliberating? If there is, let us take his advice, though he be one only, and not mind the rest; if there is not, let us seek

*Laches.*SOCRATES,  
MELESIAS,  
NICIAS.

further counsel. Is this a slight matter about which you and Lysimachus are deliberating? Are you not risking the greatest of your possessions? For children are your riches; and upon their turning out well or ill depends the whole order of their father's house.

*Mel.* That is true.*Soc.* Great care, then, is required in this matter?*Mel.* Certainly.What is the  
question?

*Soc.* Suppose, as I was just now saying, that we were considering, or wanting to consider, who was the best trainer. Should we not select him who knew and had practised the art, and had the best teachers?

*Mel.* I think that we should.

*Soc.* But would there not arise a prior question about the nature of the art of which we want to find the masters?

*Mel.* I do not understand.

*Soc.* Let me try to make my meaning plainer then. I do not think that we have as yet decided what that is about which we are consulting, when we ask which of us is or is not skilled in the art, and has or has not had a teacher of the art.

*Nic.* Why, Socrates, is not the question whether young men ought or ought not to learn the art of fighting in armour?

There are two  
questions, one  
relating to the  
means and the  
other to the  
end.

*Soc.* Yes, Nicias; but there is also a prior question, which I may illustrate in this way: When a person considers about applying a medicine to the eyes, would you say that he is consulting about the medicine or about the eyes?

*Nic.* About the eyes.

*Soc.* And when he considers whether he shall set a bridle on a horse and at what time, he is thinking of the horse and not of the bridle?

*Nic.* True.

*Soc.* And in a word, when he considers anything for the sake of another thing, he thinks of the end and not of the means?

*Nic.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And when you call in an adviser, you should see whether he too is skilful in the accomplishment of the end which you have in view?

*Nic.* Most true.

*Soc.* And at present we have in view some knowledge, of which the end is the soul of youth?

*Nic.* Yes.

*Soc.* And we are enquiring, Which of us is skilful or successful in the treatment of the soul, and which of us has had good teachers?

*La.* Well but, Socrates; did you never observe that some persons, who have had no teachers, are more skilful than those who have, in some things?

*Soc.* Yes, Laches, I have observed that; but you would not be very willing to trust them if they only professed to be masters of their art, unless they could show some proof of their skill or excellence in one or more works.

*La.* Quite true.

*Soc.* And therefore, Laches and Nicias, as Lysimachus and Melesias, in their anxiety to improve the minds of their sons, have asked our advice about them, we too should tell them who our teachers were, if we say that we have had any, and prove them to be in the first place men of merit and experienced trainers of the minds of youth and also to have been really our teachers. Or if any of us says that he has no teacher, but that he has works of his own to show; then he should point out to them what Athenians or strangers, bond or free, he is generally acknowledged to have improved. But if he can show neither teachers nor works, then he should tell them to look out for others; and not run the risk of spoiling the children of friends, and thereby incurring the most formidable accusation which can be brought against any one by those nearest to him. As for myself, Lysimachus and Melesias, I am the first to confess that I have never had a teacher of the art of virtue; although I have always from my earliest youth desired to have one. But I am too poor to give money to the Sophists, who are the only professors of moral improvement; and to this day I have never been able to discover the art myself, though I should not be surprised if Nicias or Laches may have discovered or learned it; for they are far wealthier than I am, and may therefore have learnt of others. And they are older, too; so that they have had more time to make the discovery. And I really

*Laches.*

NICIAS,  
SOCRATES,  
LACHES.

The means is  
some kind of  
knowledge;  
the end the  
improvement  
of the soul of  
youth.

Which of us  
can teach and  
has had good  
teachers?

We must  
either tell who  
our teachers  
are, or appeal  
to works of  
our own.

Socrates  
could never  
afford a  
teacher, but  
Nicias and  
Laches may  
have learned  
of the  
Sophists, and  
their opinions  
might be of  
value if they  
only agreed  
with one  
another.

*Laches.*SOCRATES,  
LYSIMACHUS.Who were  
their teachers,  
or do they  
experiment for  
themselves?In the latter  
case they  
should be  
warned  
against trying  
experiments  
on their own  
children.Lysimachus  
suggests that  
Socrates shall  
interrogate  
Nicias and  
Laches.

believe that they are able to educate a man; for unless they had been confident in their own knowledge, they would never have spoken thus decidedly of the pursuits which are advantageous or hurtful to a young man. I repose confidence in both of them; but I am surprised to find that they differ from one another. And therefore, Lysimachus, as Laches suggested that you should detain me, and not let me go until I answered, I in turn earnestly beseech and advise you to detain Laches and Nicias, and question them. I would have you say to them: Socrates avers that he has no knowledge of the matter—he is unable to decide which of you speaks truly; neither discoverer nor student is he of anything of the kind. But you, Laches and Nicias, should each of you tell us who is the most skilful educator whom you have ever known; and whether you invented the art yourselves, or learned of another; and if you learned, who were your respective teachers, and who were their brothers in the art; and then, if you are too much occupied in politics to teach us yourselves, let us go to them, and present them with gifts, or make interest with them, or both, in the hope that they may be induced to take charge of our children and of yours; and then they will not grow up inferior, and disgrace their ancestors. But if you are yourselves original discoverers in that field, give us some proof of your skill. Who are they who, having been inferior persons, have become under your care good and noble? For if this is your first attempt at education, there is a danger that you may be trying the experiment, not on the ‘vile corpus’ of a Carian slave, but on your own sons, or the sons of your friend, and, as the proverb says, ‘break the large vessel in learning to make pots.’ Tell us then, what qualities you claim or do not claim. Make them tell you that, Lysimachus, and do not let them off. 187

*Lys.* I very much approve of the words of Socrates, my friends; but you, Nicias and Laches, must determine whether you will be questioned, and give an explanation about matters of this sort. Assuredly, I and Melesias would be greatly pleased to hear you answer the questions which Socrates asks, if you will: for I began by saying that we took you into our counsels because we thought that you would have attended to the subject, especially as you have children who,



like our own, are nearly of an age to be educated. Well, then, if you have no objection, suppose that you take Socrates into partnership; and do you and he ask and answer one another's questions: for, as he has well said, we are deliberating about the most important of our concerns. I hope that you will see fit to comply with our request.

*Laches.*

NICIAS,  
LYSIMACHUS,  
LACHES.

*Nic.* I see very clearly, Lysimachus, that you have only known Socrates' father, and have no acquaintance with Socrates himself: at least, you can only have known him when he was a child, and may have met him among his fellow-wardsmen, in company with his father, at a sacrifice, or at some other gathering. You clearly show that you have never known him since he arrived at manhood.

Socrates will  
be sure to ask  
you about  
your soul.

*Lys.* Why do you say that, Nicias?

*Nic.* Because you seem not to be aware that any one who has an intellectual affinity to Socrates and enters into conversation with him is liable to be drawn into an argument; and whatever subject he may start, he will be continually carried round and round by him, until at last he finds that he has to  
188 give an account both of his present and past life; and when he is once entangled, Socrates will not let him go until he has completely and thoroughly sifted him. Now I am used to his ways; and I know that he will certainly do as I say, and also that I myself shall be the sufferer; for I am fond of his conversation, Lysimachus. And I think that there is no harm in being reminded of any wrong thing which we are, or have been, doing: he who does not fly from reproof will be sure to take more heed of his after-life; as Solon says, he will wish and desire to be learning so long as he lives, and will not think that old age of itself brings wisdom. To me, to be cross-examined by Socrates is neither unusual nor unpleasant; indeed, I knew all along that where Socrates was, the argument would soon pass from our sons to ourselves; and therefore, I say that for my part, I am quite willing to discourse with Socrates in his own manner; but you had better ask our friend Laches what his feeling may be.

Nicias is of  
opinion that  
such conver-  
sation is very  
profitable.

Laches, like  
Nicias, is very  
ready to be  
cross-exam-  
ined,  
especially  
by a true  
man whose  
deeds  
correspond  
with his  
actions.

*La.* I have but one feeling, Nicias, or (shall I say?) two feelings, about discussions. Some would think that I am a lover, and to others I may seem to be a hater of discourse; for when I hear a man discoursing of virtue, or of any sort



*Laches.*LACHES,  
SOCRATES,  
LYSIMACHUS.

of wisdom, who is a true man and worthy of his theme, I am delighted beyond measure: and I compare the man and his words, and note the harmony and correspondence of them. And such an one I deem to be the true musician, attuned to a fairer harmony than that of the lyre, or any pleasant instrument of music; for truly he has in his own life a harmony of words and deeds arranged, not in the Ionian, or in the Phrygian mode, nor yet in the Lydian, but in the true Hellenic mode, which is the Dorian, and no other. Such an one makes me merry with the sound of his voice; and when I hear him I am thought to be a lover of discourse; so eager am I in drinking in his words. But a man whose actions do not agree with his words is an annoyance to me; and the better he speaks the more I hate him, and then I seem to be a hater of discourse. As to Socrates, I have no knowledge of his words, but of old, as would seem, I have had experience of his deeds; and his deeds show that free and noble sentiments are natural to him. 189 And if his words accord, then I am of one mind with him, and shall be delighted to be interrogated by a man such as he is, and shall not be annoyed at having to learn of him: for I too agree with Solon, 'that I would fain grow old, learning many things.' But I must be allowed to add 'of the good only.' Socrates must be willing to allow that he is a good teacher, or I shall be a dull and uncongenial pupil: but that the teacher is younger, or not as yet in repute—anything of that sort is of no account with me. And therefore, Socrates, I give you notice that you may teach and confute me as much as ever you like, and also learn of me anything which I know. So high is the opinion which I have entertained of you ever since the day on which you were my companion in danger, and gave a proof of your valour such as only the man of merit can give. Therefore, say whatever you like, and do not mind about the difference of our ages.

*Soc.* I cannot say that either of you show any reluctance to take counsel and advise with me.

*Lys.* But this is our proper business; and yours as well as ours, for I reckon you as one of us. Please then to take my place, and find out from Nicias and Laches what we want to

He is willing  
like Solon 'to  
learn many  
things,' but  
of the good  
only.

Lysimachus  
retires  
from the  
argument.

know, for the sake of the youths, and talk and consult with them: for I am old, and my memory is bad; and I do not remember the questions which I am going to ask, or the answers to them; and if there is any interruption I am quite lost. I will therefore beg of you to carry on the proposed discussion by your selves; and I will listen, and Melesias and I will act upon your conclusions.

*Laches.*

SOCRATES,  
LACHES.

*Soc.* Let us, Nicias and Laches, comply with the request of Lysimachus and Melesias. There will be no harm in asking ourselves the question which was first proposed to us: 'Who have been our own instructors in this sort of training, and whom have we made better?'. But the other mode of carrying on the enquiry will bring us equally to the same point, and will be more like proceeding from first principles. For if we knew that the addition of something would improve some other thing, and were able to make the addition, then, clearly, we must know how that about which we are advising may be best and most easily attained. Perhaps you do not understand what I mean. Then let me

Socrates proceeds:—  
Before we can impart a gift we must know the nature of it.

190 make my meaning plainer in this way. Suppose we knew that the addition of sight makes better the eyes which possess this gift, and also were able to impart sight to the eyes, then, clearly, we should know the nature of sight, and should be able to advise how this gift of sight may be best and most easily attained; but if we knew neither what sight is, nor what hearing is, we should not be very good medical advisers about the eyes or the ears, or about the best mode of giving sight and hearing to them.

*La.* That is true, Socrates.

*Soc.* And are not our two friends, Laches, at this very moment inviting us to consider in what way the gift of virtue may be imparted to their sons for the improvement of their minds?

*La.* Very true.

*Soc.* Then must we not first know the nature of virtue? For how can we advise any one about the best mode of attaining something of which we are wholly ignorant?

If we would impart virtue we must know the nature of virtue.

*La.* I do not think that we can, Socrates.

*Soc.* Then, Laches, we may presume that we know the nature of virtue?

*La.* Yes.

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*Laches.*

*Soc.* And that which we know we must surely be able to tell?

*SOCRATES,*

*La.* Certainly.

*LACHES.*

*Soc.* I would not have us begin, my friend, with enquiring about the whole of virtue; for that may be more than we can accomplish; let us first consider whether we have a sufficient knowledge of a part; the enquiry will thus probably be made easier to us.

*La.* Let us do as you say, Socrates.

And the particular virtue with which we are at present concerned is courage.

*Soc.* Then which of the parts of virtue shall we select? Must we not select the one to which the art of fighting in armour is supposed to conduce? And is not that generally thought to be courage?

*La.* Yes, certainly.

*Soc.* Then, Laches, suppose that we first set about determining the nature of courage, and in the second place proceed to enquire how the young men may attain this quality by the help of studies and pursuits. Tell me, if you can, what is courage.

*La.* Indeed, Socrates, I see no difficulty in answering; he who does not run away, but remains at his post and fights against the enemy,—he surely is a man of courage.

Who is the courageous man?

*Soc.* Very good, Laches; and yet I fear that I did not express myself clearly; and therefore you have answered not the question which I intended to ask, but another.

*La.* What do you mean, Socrates?

191

(1) He who stands and fights; and also

*Soc.* I will endeavour to explain; you would call a man courageous who remains at his post, and fights with the enemy?

*La.* Certainly I should.

(2) he who flies and fights.

*Soc.* And so should I; but what would you say of another man, who fights flying, instead of remaining?

*La.* How flying?

*Soc.* Why, as the Scythians are said to fight, flying as well as pursuing; and as Homer says in praise of the horses of Aeneas, that they knew 'how to pursue, and fly quickly hither and thither;' and he passes an encomium on Aeneas himself, as having a knowledge of fear or flight, and calls him 'an author of fear or flight.'

*La.* Yes, Socrates, and there Homer is right: for he was

speaking of chariots, as you were speaking of the Scythian cavalry, who have that way of fighting; but the heavy-armed Greek fights, as I say, remaining in his rank.

*Laches.*

SOCRATES,  
LACHES.

*Soc.* And yet, Laches, you must except the Lacedaemonians at Plataea, who, when they came upon the light shields of the Persians, are said not to have been willing to stand and fight, and to have fled; but when the ranks of the Persians were broken, they turned upon them like cavalry, and won the battle of Plataea.

*La.* That is true.

*Soc.* That was my meaning when I said that I was to blame in having put my question badly, and that this was the reason of your answering badly. For I meant to ask you not only about the courage of heavy-armed soldiers, but about the courage of cavalry and every other style of soldier; and not only who are courageous in war, but who are courageous in perils by sea, and who in disease, or in poverty, or again in politics, are courageous; and not only who are courageous against pain or fear, but mighty to contend against desires and pleasures, either fixed in their rank or turning upon their enemy. There is this sort of courage — is there not, Laches?

Courage is also shown in perils by sea, in disease and poverty, and in civil strife; also in the battle against pleasures and desires.

*La.* Certainly, Socrates.

*Soc.* And all these are courageous, but some have courage in pleasures, and some in pains: some in desires, and some in fears, and some are cowards under the same conditions, as I should imagine.

*La.* Very true.

*Soc.* Now I was asking about courage and cowardice in general. And I will begin with courage, and once more ask, What is that common quality, which is the same in all these cases, and which is called courage? Do you now understand what I mean?

*La.* Not over well.

192 *Soc.* I mean this: As I might ask what is that quality which is called quickness, and which is found in running, in playing the lyre, in speaking, in learning, and in many other similar actions, or rather which we possess in nearly every action that is worth mentioning of arms, legs, mouth,

*Laches.*

*SOCRATES,*

*LACHES.*

voice, mind;—would you not apply the term quickness to all of them?

*La.* Quite true.

*Soc.* And suppose I were to be asked by some one: What is that common quality, Socrates, which, in all these uses of the word, you call quickness? I should say the quality which accomplishes much in a little time—whether in running, speaking, or in any other sort of action.

*La.* You would be quite correct.

What is that common quality in all, which is called courage?

*Endurance.*

*Soc.* And now, Laches, do you try and tell me in like manner, What is that common quality which is called courage, and which includes all the various uses of the term when applied both to pleasure and pain, and in all the cases to which I was just now referring?

*La.* I should say that courage is a sort of endurance of the soul, if I am to speak of the universal element which pervades them all.

*Soc.* But that is what we must do if we are to answer the question. And yet I cannot say that every kind of endurance is, in my opinion, to be deemed courage. Hear my reason: I am sure, Laches, that you would consider courage to be a very noble quality.

*La.* Most noble, certainly.

*Soc.* And you would say that a wise endurance is also good and noble?

*La.* Very noble.

*Soc.* But what would you say of a foolish endurance? Is not that, on the other hand, to be regarded as evil and hurtful?

*La.* True.

*Soc.* And is anything noble which is evil and hurtful?

*La.* It would be wrong, Socrates, to say so.

*Soc.* Then you would not admit that sort of endurance to be courage—for it is not noble, but courage is noble?

*La.* You are right.

*Soc.* Then, according to you, only the wise endurance is courage?

*La.* True.

*Soc.* But as to the epithet 'wise,'—wise in what? In all things small as well as great? For example, if a man

Yes, but it must be a noble or wise endurance.

shows the quality of endurance in spending his money wisely, knowing that by spending he will acquire more in the end, do you call him courageous?

*Laches.*

*SOCRATES,*

*LACHES.*

*La.* Assuredly not.

*Soc.* Or, for example, if a man is a physician, and his son, or some patient of his, has inflammation of the lungs, and begs that he may be allowed to eat or drink something, and the other is firm and refuses; is that courage?

193 *La.* Not at all, any more than the last.

*Soc.* Again, take the case of one who endures in war, and is willing to fight, and wisely calculates and knows that others will help him, and that there will be fewer and inferior men against him than there are with him; and suppose that he has also advantages of position;—would you say of such a one who endures with all this wisdom and preparation, that he, or some man in the opposing army who is in the opposite circumstances to these and yet endures and remains at his post, is the braver?

Is he who by prudent foresight escapes a danger, or he who, having no foresight, endures and remains at his post, the braver?

*La.* I should say that the latter, Socrates, was the braver.

The latter.

*Soc.* But, surely, this is a foolish endurance in comparison with the other?

*La.* That is true.

*Soc.* Then you would say that he who in an engagement of cavalry endures, having the knowledge of horsemanship, is not so courageous as he who endures, having no such knowledge?

*La.* So I should say.

*Soc.* And he who endures, having a knowledge of the use of the sling, or the bow, or of any other art, is not so courageous as he who endures, not having such a knowledge?

*La.* True.

*Soc.* And he who descends into a well, and dives, and holds out in this or any similar action, having no knowledge of diving, or the like, is, as you would say, more courageous than those who have this knowledge?

*La.* Why, Socrates, what else can a man say?

*Soc.* Nothing, if that be what he thinks.

*La.* But that is what I do think.



*Laches.*

SOCRATES,  
LACHES.

And yet  
he is  
the more  
foolish.

*Soc.* And yet men who thus run risks and endure are foolish, Laches, in comparison of those who do the same things, having the skill to do them.

*La.* That is true.

*Soc.* But foolish boldness and endurance appeared before to be base and hurtful to us.

*La.* Quite true.

*Soc.* Whereas courage was acknowledged to be a noble quality.

*La.* True.

*Soc.* And now on the contrary we are saying that the foolish endurance, which was before held in dishonour, is courage.

*La.* Very true.

*Soc.* And are we right in saying so?

*La.* Indeed, Socrates, I am sure that we are not right.

This con-  
clusion can  
never be  
right.

*Soc.* Then according to your statement, you and I, Laches, are not attuned to the Dorian mode, which is a harmony of words and deeds; for our deeds are not in accordance with our words. Any one would say that we had courage who saw us in action, but not, I imagine, he who heard us talking about courage just now.

*La.* That is most true.

*Soc.* And is this condition of ours satisfactory?

*La.* Quite the reverse.

*Soc.* Suppose, however, that we admit the principle of which we are speaking to a certain extent.

*La.* To what extent and what principle do you mean?

194

And yet  
if we show  
endurance  
we may  
very likely  
discover  
that  
courage  
after all is  
endurance.

*Soc.* The principle of endurance. We too must endure and persevere in the enquiry, and then courage will not laugh at our faint-heartedness in searching for courage; which after all may, very likely, be endurance.

*La.* I am ready to go on, Socrates; and yet I am unused to investigations of this sort. But the spirit of controversy has been aroused in me by what has been said; and I am really grieved at being thus unable to express my meaning. For I fancy that I do know the nature of courage; but, somehow or other, she has slipped away from me, and I cannot get hold of her and tell her nature.

*Soc.* But, my dear friend, should not the good sportsman follow the track, and not be lazy?

*La.* Certainly, he should.

*Laches.*

*Soc.* And shall we invite Nicias to join us? he may be better at the sport than we are. What do you say?

SOCRATES,  
LACHES,  
NICIAS.

*La.* I should like to invite him.

*Soc.* Come then, Nicias, and do what you can to help your friends, who are tossing on the waves of argument, and at the last gasp: you see our extremity, and may save us and also settle your own opinion, if you will tell us what you think about courage.

Nicias is  
invited to  
join in the  
enquiry.

*Nic.* I have been thinking, Socrates, that you and Laches are not defining courage in the right way; for you have forgotten an excellent saying which I have heard from your own lips.

He  
suggests  
that  
courage is  
a sort of  
wisdom.

*Soc.* What is it, Nicias?

*Nic.* I have often heard you say that 'Every man is good in that in which he is wise, and bad in that in which he is unwise.'

*Soc.* That is certainly true, Nicias.

*Nic.* And therefore if the brave man is good, he is also wise.

*Soc.* Do you hear him, Laches?

*La.* Yes, I hear him, but I do not very well understand him.

*Soc.* I think that I understand him; and he appears to me to mean that courage is a sort of wisdom.

*La.* What can he possibly mean, Socrates?

*Soc.* That is a question which you must ask of himself.

*La.* Yes.

*Soc.* Tell him then, Nicias, what you mean by this wisdom; for you surely do not mean the wisdom which plays the flute?

*Nic.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Nor the wisdom which plays the lyre?

*Nic.* No.

*Soc.* But what is this knowledge then, and of what?

*La.* I think that you put the question to him very well, Socrates; and I would like him to say what is the nature of this knowledge or wisdom.

Courage  
is the  
knowledge  
which  
inspires fear  
or confidence  
in war, or in  
anything.

195 *Nic.* I mean to say, Laches, that courage is the knowledge of that which inspires fear or confidence in war, or in anything.

*Laches.*

*La.* How strangely he is talking, Socrates.

SOCRATES,  
LACHES,  
NICIAS.

*Soc.* Why do you say so, Laches?

*La.* Why, surely courage is one thing, and wisdom another.

*Soc.* That is just what Nicias denies.

*La.* Yes, that is what he denies; but he is so silly.

*Soc.* Suppose that we instruct instead of abusing him?

*Nic.* Laches does not want to instruct me, Socrates; but having been proved to be talking nonsense himself, he wants to prove that I have been doing the same.

Physicians  
know the  
dangers of  
disease.  
Are they then  
the same  
with the  
courageous?

*La.* Very true, Nicias; and you are talking nonsense, as I shall endeavour to show. Let me ask you a question: Do not physicians know the dangers of disease? or do the courageous know them? or are the physicians the same as the courageous?

*Nic.* Not at all.

*La.* No more than the husbandmen who know the dangers of husbandry, or than other craftsmen, who have a knowledge of that which inspires them with fear or confidence in their own arts, and yet they are not courageous a whit the more for that.

*Soc.* What is Laches saying, Nicias? He appears to be saying something of importance.

*Nic.* Yes, he is saying something, but it is not true.

*Soc.* How so?

The physi-  
cians can  
only tell the  
nature of  
disease,  
not whether  
health is  
better than  
disease,  
life than  
death.

*Nic.* Why, because he does not see that the physician's knowledge only extends to the nature of health and disease: he can tell the sick man no more than this. Do you imagine, Laches, that the physician knows whether health or disease is the more terrible to a man? Had not many a man better never get up from a sick bed? I should like to know whether you think that life is always better than death. May not death often be the better of the two?

*La.* Yes certainly so in my opinion.

*Nic.* And do you think that the same things are terrible to those who had better die, and to those who had better live?

*La.* Certainly not.

*Nic.* And do you suppose that the physician or any other artist knows this, or any one indeed, except he who is skilled

in the grounds of fear and hope? And him I call the courageous. *Laches.*

*Soc.* Do you understand his meaning, Laches?

*La.* Yes; I suppose that, in his way of speaking, the soothsayers are courageous. For who but one of them can know to whom to die or to live is better? And yet, Nicias, would you allow that you are yourself a soothsayer, or are you neither a soothsayer nor courageous? *SOCRATES,  
LACHES,  
NICIAS.*

*Nic.* What! do you mean to say that the soothsayer ought to know the grounds of hope or fear?

*La.* Indeed I do: who but he?

*Nic.* Much rather I should say he of whom I speak; for the soothsayer ought to know only the signs of things that are about to come to pass, whether death or disease, or loss of property, or victory, or defeat in war, or in any sort of contest; but to whom the suffering or not suffering of these things will be for the best, can no more be decided by the soothsayer than by one who is no soothsayer. *Nay, the  
soothsayer  
only knows  
what will  
be best.*

*La.* I cannot understand what Nicias would be at, Socrates; for he represents the courageous man as neither a soothsayer, nor a physician, nor in any other character, unless he means to say that he is a god. My opinion is that he does not like honestly to confess that he is talking nonsense, but that he shuffles up and down in order to conceal the difficulty into which he has got himself. You and I, Socrates, might have practised a similar shuffle just now, if we had only wanted to avoid the appearance of inconsistency. And if we had been arguing in a court of law there might have been reason in so doing; but why should a man deck himself out with vain words at a meeting of friends such as this? *The sooth-  
sayer only  
knows the  
signs of  
the future.*

*Soc.* I quite agree with you, Laches, that he should not. But perhaps Nicias is serious, and not merely talking for the sake of talking. Let us ask him just to explain what he means, and if he has reason on his side we will agree with him; if not, we will instruct him. *According  
to Laches,  
Nicias is  
talking  
nonsense.*

*La.* Do you, Socrates, if you like, ask him: I think that I have asked enough.

*Soc.* I do not see why I should not; and my question will do for both of us.

*Laches.**La.* Very good.

SOCRATES,  
LACHES,  
NICIAS.  
Socrates  
undertakes  
to cross-  
examine  
him.

*Soc.* Then tell me, Nicias, or rather tell us, for Laches and I are partners in the argument: Do you mean to affirm that courage is the knowledge of the grounds of hope and fear?

*Nic.* I do.

*Soc.* And not every man has this knowledge; the physician and the soothsayer have it not; and they will not be courageous unless they acquire it—that is what you were saying?

*Nic.* I was.

*Soc.* Then this is certainly not a thing which every pig would know, as the proverb says, and therefore he could not be courageous.

*Nic.* I think not.

If courage  
is wisdom,  
no animal is  
courageous.

*Soc.* Clearly not, Nicias; not even such a big pig as the Crommyonian sow would be called by you courageous. And this I say not as a joke, but because I think that he who assents to your doctrine, that courage is the knowledge of the grounds of fear and hope, cannot allow that any wild beast is courageous, unless he admits that a lion, or a leopard, or perhaps a boar, or any other animal, has such a degree of wisdom that he knows things which but a few human beings ever know by reason of their difficulty. He who takes your view of courage must affirm that a lion, and a stag, and a bull, and a monkey, have equally little pretensions to courage.

*La.* Capital, Socrates; by the gods, that is truly good. 197  
And I hope, Nicias, that you will tell us whether these animals, which we all admit to be courageous, are really wiser than mankind; or whether you will have the boldness, in the face of universal opinion, to deny their courage.

Thoughtful  
courage is  
a very rare  
quality.

*Nic.* Why, Laches, I do not call animals or any other things which have no fear of dangers, because they are ignorant of them, courageous, but only fearless and senseless. Do you imagine that I should call little children courageous, which fear no dangers because they know none? There is a difference, to my way of thinking, between fearlessness and courage. I am of opinion that thoughtful courage is a quality possessed by very few, but that rashness and boldness, and fearlessness, which have no forethought, are very common qualities possessed by many men, many women, many

children, many animals. And you, and men in general, call by the term 'courageous' actions which I call rash;—my courageous actions are wise actions.

*Laches.*

SOCRATES,  
LACHES,  
NICIAS.

*La.* Behold, Socrates, how admirably, as he thinks, he dresses himself out in words, while seeking to deprive of the honour of courage those whom all the world acknowledges to be courageous.

*Nic.* Not so, Laches, but do not be alarmed; for I am quite willing to say of you and also of Lamachus, and of many other Athenians, that you are courageous and therefore wise.

*La.* I could answer that; but I would not have you cast in my teeth that I am a haughty Aexonian.

*Soc.* Do not answer him, Laches; I rather fancy that you are not aware of the source from which his wisdom is derived. He has got all this from my friend Damon, and Damon is always with Prodicus, who, of all the Sophists, is considered to be the best puller to pieces of words of this sort.

*La.* Yes, Socrates; and the examination of such niceties is a much more suitable employment for a Sophist than for a great statesman whom the city chooses to preside over her.

*Soc.* Yes, my sweet friend, but a great statesman is likely to have a great intelligence. And I think that the view which is implied in Nicias' definition of courage is worthy of examination.

*La.* Then examine for yourself, Socrates.

*Soc.* That is what I am going to do, my dear friend. Do not, however, suppose I shall let you out of the partnership; for I shall expect you to apply your mind, and join with me in the consideration of the question.

*La.* I will if you think that I ought.

198 *Soc.* Yes, I do; but I must beg of you, Nicias, to begin again. You remember that we originally considered courage to be a part of virtue.

We must  
begin again:  
(1) Courage  
is a part  
of virtue.

*Nic.* Very true.

*Soc.* And you yourself said that it was a part; and there were many other parts, all of which taken together are called virtue.

*Nic.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Do you agree with me about the parts? For I say



*Laches.*

SOCRATES,  
LACHES,  
NICIAS.

(2) Courage is  
a knowledge  
of good and  
evil in the  
future.

that justice, temperance, and the like, are all of them parts of virtue as well as courage. Would you not say the same?

*Nic.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Well then, so far we are agreed. And now let us proceed a step, and try to arrive at a similar agreement about the fearful and the hopeful: I do not want you to be thinking one thing and myself another. Let me then tell you my own opinion, and if I am wrong you shall set me right: in my opinion the terrible and the hopeful are the things which do or do not create fear, and fear is not of the present, nor of the past, but is of future and expected evil. Do you not agree to that, Laches?

*La.* Yes, Socrates, entirely.

*Soc.* That is my view, Nicias; the terrible things, as I should say, are the evils which are future; and the hopeful are the good or not evil things which are future. Do you or do you not agree with me?

*Nic.* I agree.

*Soc.* And the knowledge of these things you call courage?

*Nic.* Precisely.

• *Soc.* And now let me see whether you agree with Laches and myself as to a third point.

*Nic.* What is it?

(3) In the  
future, and  
equally in  
the past and  
in the present.

*Soc.* I will tell you. He and I have a notion that there is not one knowledge or science of the past, another of the present, a third of what is likely to be best and what will be best in the future; but that of all three there is one science only: for example, there is one science of medicine which is concerned with the inspection of health equally in all times, present, past, and future; and one science of husbandry in like manner, which is concerned with the productions of the earth in all times. As to the art of the general, you yourselves will be my witnesses that he has an excellent foreknowledge of the future, and that he claims to be the master and not the servant of the soothsayer, because he knows better what is happening or is likely to happen in war: and accordingly the law places the soothsayer under the general, and not the general under the soothsayer. Am I not correct in saying so, Laches?



*La.* Quite correct.

*Laches.*

*Soc.* And do you, Nicias, also acknowledge that the same science has understanding of the same things, whether future, present, or past?

SOCRATES,  
LACHES,  
NICIAS.

*Nic.* Yes, indeed, Socrates; that is my opinion.

*Soc.* And courage, my friend, is, as you say, a knowledge of the fearful and of the hopeful?

*Nic.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the fearful, and the hopeful, are admitted to be future goods and future evils?

*Nic.* True.

*Soc.* And the same science has to do with the same things in the future or at any time?

*Nic.* That is true.

*Soc.* Then courage is not the science which is concerned with the fearful and hopeful, for they are future only; courage, like the other sciences, is concerned not only with good and evil of the future, but of the present and past, and of any time?

*Nic.* That, as I suppose, is true.

*Soc.* Then the answer which you have given, Nicias, includes only a third part of courage; but our question extended to the whole nature of courage: and according to your view, that is, according to your present view, courage is not only the knowledge of the hopeful and the fearful, but seems to include nearly every good and evil without reference to time. What do you say to that alteration in your statement?

*Nic.* I agree, Socrates.

*Soc.* But then, my dear friend, if a man knew all good and evil, and how they are, and have been, and will be produced, would he not be perfect, and wanting in no virtue, whether justice, or temperance, or holiness? He would possess them all, and he would know which were dangers and which were not, and guard against them whether they were supernatural or natural; and he would provide the good, as he would know how to deal both with gods or men.

But if courage is the knowledge of the past, present, and future, it must comprehend all virtue.

*Nic.* I think, Socrates, that there is a great deal of truth in what you say.

*Soc.* But then, Nicias, courage, according to this new

*Laches.*

definition of yours, instead of being a part of virtue only, will be all virtue?

SOCRATES,  
LACHES,  
NICIAS.

*Nic.* It would seem so.

*Soc.* But we were saying that courage is one of the parts of virtue?

*Nic.* Yes, that was what we were saying.

*Soc.* And that is in contradiction with our present view?

*Nic.* Such appears to be the case.

*Soc.* Then, Nicias, we have not discovered what courage is.

*Nic.* We have not.

An altercation  
between  
Laches and  
Nicias.

*La.* And yet, friend Nicias, I imagined that you would have made the discovery, when you were so contemptuous of the answers which I made to Socrates. I had very great hopes that you would have been enlightened by the wisdom of Damon.

*Nic.* I perceive, Laches, that you think nothing of having displayed your ignorance of the nature of courage, but you look only to see whether I have not made a similar display; and if we are both equally ignorant of the things which a man who is good for anything should know, that, I suppose, will be of no consequence. You certainly appear to me very like the rest of the world, looking at your neighbour and not at yourself. I am of opinion that enough has been said on the subject which we have been discussing; and if anything has been imperfectly said, it may be hereafter corrected by the help of Damon, whom you think to laugh down, although you have never seen him, and with the help of others. And when I am satisfied myself, I will freely impart my satisfaction to you, for I think that you are very much in want of knowledge.

They agree in  
recommending  
Lysimachus and  
Melesias to  
refer the  
question re-  
specting the  
education of  
their two boys  
to Socrates.

*La.* You are a philosopher, Nicias; of that I am aware: nevertheless I would recommend Lysimachus and Melesias not to take you and me as advisers about the education of their children; but, as I said at first, they should ask Socrates and not let him off; if my own sons were old enough, I would have asked him myself.

*Nic.* To that I quite agree, if Socrates is willing to take them under his charge. I should not wish for any one else to be the tutor of Niceratus. But I observe that when I mention the matter to him he recommends to me some other tutor and

refuses himself. Perhaps he may be more ready to listen to you, Lysimachus. *Laches.*

*Lys.* He ought, Nicias: for certainly I would do things for him which I would not do for many others. What do you say, Socrates—will you comply? And are you ready to give assistance in the improvement of the youths? *SOCRATES, LYSIMACHUS.*

*Soc.* Indeed, Lysimachus, I should be very wrong in refusing to aid in the improvement of anybody. And if I had shown in this conversation that I had a knowledge which Nicias and Laches have not, then I admit that you would be right in inviting me to perform this duty; but as we are all in the same perplexity, why should one of us be preferred to another? I certainly think that no one should; and under these circumstances, let me offer you a piece of advice (and this need not go further than ourselves). I maintain, my friends, that every one of us should seek out the best teacher whom he can find, first for ourselves, who are greatly in need of one, and then for the youth, regardless of expense or anything. But I cannot advise that we remain as we are. And if any one laughs at us for going to school at our age, I would quote to them the authority of Homer, who says, that

*Then, says  
Socrates, let  
us all go  
to school  
together.*

‘Modesty is’ not good for a needy man.’

Let us then, regardless of what may be said of us, make the education of the youths our own education.

*Lys.* I like your proposal, Socrates; and as I am the oldest, I am also the most eager to go to school with the boys. Let me beg a favour of you: Come to my house to-morrow at dawn, and we will advise about these matters. For the present, let us make an end of the conversation.

*Soc.* I will come to you to-morrow, Lysimachus, as you propose, God willing.



# PROTAGORAS.



## INTRODUCTION.

THE Protagoras, like several of the Dialogues of Plato, is put *Protagoras.*

into the mouth of Socrates, who describes a conversation which *ANALYSIS.*

had taken place between himself and the great Sophist at the house of Callias — ‘the man who had spent more upon the Sophists than all the rest of the world’ (Apol. 20 A), and in which the learned Hippias and the grammarian Prodicus had also shared, as well as Alcibiades and Critias, both of whom said a few words — in the presence of a distinguished company consisting of disciples of Protagoras and of leading Athenians belonging to the Socratic

*Steph.* circle. The dialogue commences with a request on the part of

310 Hippocrates that Socrates would introduce him to the celebrated teacher. He has come before the dawn had risen — so fervid is his

311 zeal. Socrates moderates his excitement and advises him to find out ‘what Protagoras will make of him,’ before he becomes his pupil.

314 They go together to the house of Callias; and Socrates, after explaining the purpose of their visit to Protagoras, asks the

318 question ‘What he will make of Hippocrates?’ Protagoras answers, ‘That he will make him a better and a wiser man.’

‘But in what will he be better?’ — Socrates desires to have a more  
319 precise answer. Protagoras replies, ‘That he will teach him prudence in affairs private and public; in short, the science or knowledge of human life.’

This, as Socrates admits, is a noble profession: but he is or rather would have been doubtful, whether such knowledge can be taught, if Protagoras had not assured him of the fact, for two reasons: (1) Because the Athenian people, who recognize in their assemblies the distinction between the skilled and the unskilled in the arts, do not distinguish between the trained politician and



*Protagoras.*

ANALYSIS.

the untrained; (2) Because the wisest and best Athenian citizens 320  
do not teach their sons political virtue. Will Protagoras answer  
these objections?

Protagoras explains his views in the form of an apologue, in  
which, after Prometheus had given men the arts, Zeus is repre- 321  
sented as sending Hermes to them, bearing with him Justice and  
Reverence. These are not, like the arts, to be imparted to a few 322  
only, but all men are to be partakers of them. Therefore the 323  
Athenian people are right in distinguishing between the skilled  
and unskilled in the arts, and not between skilled and unskilled  
politicians. (1) For all men have the political virtues to a certain  
degree, and are obliged to say that they have them, whether they  
have them or not. A man would be thought a madman who  
professed an art which he did not know; but he would be equally  
thought a madman if he did not profess a virtue which he had not.  
(2) And that the political virtues can be taught and acquired, in 324  
the opinion of the Athenians, is proved by the fact that they  
punish evil-doers, with a view to prevention, of course—mere 325  
retribution is for beasts, and not for men. (3) Again, would parents  
who teach their sons lesser matters leave them ignorant of the  
common duty of citizens? To the doubt of Socrates the best  
answer is the fact, that the education of youth in virtue begins  
almost as soon as they can speak, and is continued by the state 326  
when they pass out of the parental control. (4) Nor need we  
wonder that wise and good fathers sometimes have foolish and  
worthless sons. Virtue, as we were saying, is not the private 327  
possession of any man, but is shared by all, only however to the  
extent of which each individual is by nature capable. And, as a  
matter of fact, even the worst of civilized mankind will appear  
virtuous and just, if we compare them with savages. (5) The 328  
error of Socrates lies in supposing that there are no teachers of  
virtue, whereas all men are teachers in a degree. Some like  
Protagoras are better than others, and with this result we ought  
to be satisfied.

Socrates is highly delighted with the explanation of Protagoras. 329  
But he has still a doubt lingering in his mind. Protagoras has  
spoken of the virtues: are they many, or one? are they parts of a 330  
whole, or different names of the same thing? Protagoras replies  
that they are parts, like the parts of a face, which have their

several functions, and no one part is like any other part. This admission, which has been somewhat hastily made, is now taken

*Protagoras.*

ANALYSIS.

331 up and cross-examined by Socrates:—

‘Is justice just, and is holiness holy? And are justice and holiness unlike one another?’—‘Then justice is unholy.’ Protagoras would rather say that justice is different from holiness, and yet in a certain point of view nearly the same. He does not,

332 however, escape in this way from the cunning of Socrates, who inveigles him into an admission that everything has but one

333 opposite. Folly, for example, is opposed to wisdom; and folly is also opposed to temperance; and therefore temperance and wisdom are the same. And holiness has been already admitted to be nearly the same as justice. Temperance, therefore, has now to be compared with justice.

334 Protagoras, whose temper begins to get a little ruffled at the process to which he has been subjected, is aware that he will soon be compelled by the dialectics of Socrates to admit that the temperate is the just. He therefore defends himself with his favourite weapon; that is to say, he makes a long speech not much to the point, which elicits the applause of the audience.

Here occurs a sort of interlude, which commences with a  
335 declaration on the part of Socrates that he cannot follow a long speech, and therefore he must beg Protagoras to speak shorter.

336 As Protagoras declines to accommodate him, he rises to depart, but is detained by Callias, who thinks him unreasonable in not allowing Protagoras the liberty which he takes himself of speaking as he likes. But Alcibiades answers that the two cases are not parallel. For Socrates admits his inability to speak long; will Protagoras in like manner acknowledge his inability to speak short?

337 Counsels of moderation are urged first in a few words by Critias, and then by Prodicus in balanced and sententious language: and Hippias proposes an umpire. But who is to be the umpire? rejoins Socrates; he would rather suggest as a compromise that Protagoras shall ask and he will answer, and that when Protagoras is tired of asking he himself will ask and Protagoras  
339 shall answer. To this the latter yields a reluctant assent.

Protagoras selects as his thesis a poem of Simonides of Ceos, in which he professes to find a contradiction. First the poet says,

‘Hard is it to become good,’

Protagoras.

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and then reproaches Pittacus for having said, 'Hard is it to be good.' How is this to be reconciled? Socrates, who is familiar with the poem, is embarrassed at first, and invokes the aid of Prodicus, the countryman of Simonides, but apparently only with the intention of flattering him into absurdities. First a distinction is drawn between (*εἶναι*) to be, and (*γενέσθαι*) to become: to become good is difficult; to be good is easy. Then the word difficult or hard is explained to mean 'evil' in the Cean dialect. To all this Prodicus assents; but when Protagoras reclaims, Socrates slyly withdraws Prodicus from the fray, under the pretense that his assent was only intended to test the wits of his adversary. He then proceeds to give another and more elaborate explanation of the whole passage. The explanation is as follows:—

The Lacedaemonians are great philosophers (although this is a fact which is not generally known); and the soul of their philosophy is brevity, which was also the style of primitive antiquity and of the seven sages. Now Pittacus had a saying, 'Hard is it to be good:' and Simonides, who was jealous of the fame of this saying, wrote a poem which was designed to controvert it. No, says he, Pittacus; not 'hard to be good,' but 'hard to become good.' Socrates proceeds to argue in a highly impressive manner that the whole composition is intended as an attack upon Pittacus. This, though manifestly absurd, is accepted by the company, and meets with the special approval of Hippias, who has however a favourite interpretation of his own, which he is requested by Alcibiades to defer.

The argument is now resumed, not without some disdainful remarks of Socrates on the practice of introducing the poets, who ought not to be allowed, any more than flute-girls, to come into good society. Men's own thoughts should supply them with the materials for discussion. A few soothing flatteries are addressed to Protagoras by Callias and Socrates, and then the old question is repeated, 'Whether the virtues are one or many?' To which Protagoras is now disposed to reply, that four out of the five virtues are in some degree similar; but he still contends that the fifth, courage, is unlike the rest. Socrates proceeds to undermine the last stronghold of the adversary, first obtaining from him the admission that all virtue is in the highest degree good:—

The courageous are the confident; and the confident are those

who know their business or profession: those who have no such knowledge and are still confident are madmen. This is admitted. Protagoras.  
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351 Then, says Socrates, courage is knowledge—an inference which Protagoras evades by drawing a futile distinction between the courageous and the confident in a fluent speech.

Socrates renews the attack from another side: he would like to know whether pleasure is not the only good, and pain the only evil? Protagoras seems to doubt the morality or propriety of assenting to this; he would rather say that 'some pleasures are good, some pains are evil,' which is also the opinion of the  
352 generality of mankind. What does he think of knowledge? Does he agree with the common opinion that knowledge is overcome by passion? or does he hold that knowledge is power? Protagoras agrees that knowledge is certainly a governing power.

353 This, however, is not the doctrine of men in general, who maintain that many who know what is best, act contrary to their knowledge under the influence of pleasure. But this opposition of good and evil is really the opposition of a greater or lesser amount  
354 of pleasure. Pleasures are evils because they end in pain, and pains are goods because they end in pleasures. Thus pleasure is seen to be the only good; and the only evil is the preference of  
355 the lesser pleasure to the greater. But then comes in the illusion  
359 of distance. Some art of mensuration is required in order to show us pleasures and pains in their true proportion. This art of mensuration is a kind of knowledge, and knowledge is thus proved once more to be the governing principle of human life, and ignorance the origin of all evil: for no one prefers the less pleasure to the greater, or the greater pain to the less, except from ignorance. The argument is drawn out in an imaginary 'dialogue within a dialogue,' conducted by Socrates and Protagoras on the one part, and the rest of the world on the other. Hippias and Prodicus, as well as Protagoras, admit the soundness of the conclusion.

Socrates then applies this new conclusion to the case of courage—the only virtue which still holds out against the assaults of the Socratic dialectic. No one chooses the evil or refuses the good except through ignorance. This explains why cowards refuse to go to war:—because they form a wrong estimate of good, and  
360 honour, and pleasure. And why are the courageous willing to go to war?—because they form a right estimate of pleasures and

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ANALYSIS.

pains, of things terrible and not terrible. Courage then is knowledge, and cowardice is ignorance. And the five virtues, which were originally maintained to have five different natures, after having been easily reduced to two only, at last coalesce in one. The assent of Protagoras to this last position is extracted with 361 great difficulty.

Socrates concludes by professing his disinterested love of the truth, and remarks on the singular manner in which he and his adversary had changed sides. Protagoras began by asserting, and Socrates by denying, the teachableness of virtue, and now the latter ends by affirming that virtue is knowledge, which is the most teachable of all things, while Protagoras has been striving to show that virtue is not knowledge, and this is almost equivalent to saying that virtue cannot be taught. He is not satisfied with the result, and would like to renew the enquiry with the help of Protagoras in a different order, asking (1) What virtue is, and (2) Whether virtue can be taught. Protagoras declines this offer, but commends Socrates' earnestness and his style of discussion.

INTRODUC-  
TION.

The *Protagoras* is often supposed to be full of difficulties. These are partly imaginary and partly real. The imaginary ones are (1) Chronological,—which were pointed out in ancient times by Athenaeus (v. 59), and are noticed by Schleiermacher and others, and relate to the impossibility of all the persons in the Dialogue meeting at any one time, whether in the year 425 B. C., or in any other. But Plato, like all writers of fiction, aims only at the probable, and shows in many Dialogues (e. g. the *Symposium* and *Republic*, and already in the *Laches*) an extreme disregard of the historical accuracy which is sometimes demanded of him. (2) The exact place of the *Protagoras* among the Dialogues, and the date of composition, have also been much disputed. But there are no criteria which afford any real grounds for determining the date of composition; and the affinities of the Dialogues, when they are not indicated by Plato himself, must always to a great extent remain uncertain. (3) There is another class of difficulties, which may be ascribed to preconceived notions of commentators, who imagine that Protagoras the Sophist ought always to be in the wrong, and his adversary Socrates in the right; or that in this or that passage — e. g. in the explanation of good as pleasure —



Plato is inconsistent with himself; or that the Dialogue fails in unity, and has not a proper beginning, middle, and ending. They seem to forget that Plato is a dramatic writer who throws his thoughts into both sides of the argument, and certainly does not aim at any unity which is inconsistent with freedom, and with a natural or even wild manner of treating his subject; also that his mode of revealing the truth is by lights and shadows, and far-off and opposing points of view, and not by dogmatic statements or definite results.

*Protagoras.*  
INTRODUC-  
TION.

The real difficulties arise out of the extreme subtlety of the work, which, as Socrates says of the poem of Simonides, is a most perfect piece of art. There are dramatic contrasts and interests, threads of philosophy broken and resumed, satirical reflections on mankind, veils thrown over truths which are lightly suggested, and all woven together in a single design, and moving towards one end.

In the introductory scene Plato raises the expectation that a 'great personage' is about to appear on the stage; perhaps with a further view of showing that he is destined to be overthrown by a greater still, who makes no pretensions. Before introducing Hippocrates to him, Socrates thinks proper to warn the youth against the dangers of 'influence,' of which the invidious nature is recognized by Protagoras himself. Hippocrates readily adopts the suggestion of Socrates that he shall learn of Protagoras only the accomplishments which befit an Athenian gentleman, and let alone his 'sophistry.' There is nothing however in the introduction which leads to the inference that Plato intended to blacken the character of the Sophists; he only makes a little merry at their expense.

The 'great personage' is somewhat ostentatious, but frank and honest. He is introduced on a stage which is worthy of him—at the house of the rich Callias, in which are congregated the noblest and wisest of the Athenians. He considers openness to be the best policy, and particularly mentions his own liberal mode of dealing with his pupils, as if in answer to the accusation often brought against the Sophists that they received pay. He is remarkable for the good temper which he exhibits throughout the discussion under the trying and often sophistical cross-examination of Socrates. Although once or twice ruffled, and reluctant to continue the





*Protagoras.*  
INTRODUC-  
TION.

discussion, he parts company on perfectly good terms, and appears to be, as he says of himself, the 'least jealous of mankind.'

Nor is there anything in the sentiments of Protagoras which impairs this pleasing impression of the grave and weighty old man. His real defect is that he is inferior to Socrates in dialectics. The opposition between him and Socrates is not the opposition of good and bad, true and false, but of the old art of rhetoric and the new science of interrogation and argument; also of the irony of Socrates and the self-assertion of the Sophists. There is quite as much truth on the side of Protagoras as of Socrates; but the truth of Protagoras is based on common sense and common maxims of morality, while that of Socrates is paradoxical or transcendental, and though full of meaning and insight, hardly intelligible to the rest of mankind. Here as elsewhere is the usual contrast between the Sophists representing average public opinion and Socrates seeking for increased clearness and unity of ideas. But to a great extent Protagoras has the best of the argument and represents the better mind of man.

For example: (1) one of the noblest statements to be found in antiquity about the preventive nature of punishment is put into his mouth; (2) he is clearly right also in maintaining that virtue can be taught (which Socrates himself, at the end of the Dialogue, is disposed to concede); and also (3) in his explanation of the phenomenon that good fathers have bad sons; (4) he is right also in observing that the virtues are not like the arts, gifts or attainments of special individuals, but the common property of all: this, which in all ages has been the strength and weakness of ethics and politics, is deeply seated in human nature; (5) there is a sort of half-truth in the notion that all civilized men are teachers of virtue; and more than a half-truth (6) in ascribing to man, who in his outward conditions is more helpless than the other animals, the power of self-improvement; (7) the religious allegory should be noticed, in which the arts are said to be given by Prometheus (who stole them), whereas justice and reverence and the political virtues could only be imparted by Zeus; (8) in the latter part of the Dialogue, when Socrates is arguing that 'pleasure is the only good,' Protagoras deems it more in accordance with his character to maintain that 'some pleasures only are good;' and admits that

‘he, above all other men, is bound to say “that wisdom and knowledge are the highest of human things.”’

*Protagoras.*INTRODUC-  
TION.

There is no reason to suppose that in all this Plato is depicting an imaginary Protagoras; he seems to be showing us the teaching of the Sophists under the milder aspect under which he once regarded them. Nor is there any reason to doubt that Socrates is equally an historical character, paradoxical, ironical, tiresome, but seeking for the unity of virtue and knowledge as for a precious treasure; willing to rest this even on a calculation of pleasure, and irresistible here, as everywhere in Plato, in his intellectual superiority.

The aim of Socrates, and of the Dialogue, is to show the unity of virtue. In the determination of this question the identity of virtue and knowledge is found to be involved. But if virtue and knowledge are one, then virtue can be taught; the end of the Dialogue returns to the beginning. Had Protagoras been allowed by Plato to make the Aristotelian distinction, and say that virtue is not knowledge, but is accompanied with knowledge; or to point out with Aristotle that the same quality may have more than one opposite; or with Plato himself in the *Phaedo* to deny that good is a mere exchange of a greater pleasure for a less—the unity of virtue and the identity of virtue and knowledge would have required to be proved by other arguments.

The victory of Socrates over Protagoras is in every way complete when their minds are fairly brought together. Protagoras falls before him after two or three blows. Socrates partially gains his object in the first part of the Dialogue, and completely in the second. Nor does he appear at any disadvantage when subjected to ‘the question’ by Protagoras. He succeeds in making his two ‘friends,’ Prodicus and Hippias, ludicrous by the way; he also makes a long speech in defence of the poem of Simonides, after the manner of the Sophists, showing, as Alcibiades says, that he is only pretending to have a bad memory, and that he and not Protagoras is really a master in the two styles of speaking; and that he can undertake, not one side of the argument only, but both, when Protagoras begins to break down. Against the authority of the poets with whom Protagoras has ingeniously identified himself at the commencement of the Dialogue, Socrates sets up the proverbial philosophers and those masters of brevity the Lacedae-

*Protagoras.*  
INTRODUC-  
TION.

monians. The poets, the Laconizers, and Protagoras are satirized at the same time.

Not having the whole of the poem of Simonides before us, it is impossible for us to answer certainly the question of Protagoras, how the two passages are to be reconciled. We can only follow the indications given by Plato himself. But it seems likely that the reconciliation offered by Socrates is a caricature of the methods of interpretation which were practised by the Sophists — for the following reasons: (1) The transparent irony of the previous interpretations given by Socrates. (2) The ludicrous opening of the speech in which the Lacedaemonians are described as the true philosophers, and Laconic brevity as the true form of philosophy, evidently with an allusion to Protagoras' long speeches. (3) The manifest futility and absurdity of the explanation of ἐμῶν ἐπαίνημι ἀλαθέως, which is hardly consistent with the rational interpretation of the rest of the poem. The opposition of εἶναι and γενέσθαι seems also intended to express the rival doctrines of Socrates and Protagoras, and is a facetious commentary on their differences. (4) The general treatment in Plato both of the Poets and the Sophists, who are their interpreters, and whom he delights to identify with them. (5) The depreciating spirit in which Socrates speaks of the introduction of the poets as a substitute for original conversation, which is intended to contrast with Protagoras' exaltation of the study of them — this again is hardly consistent with the serious defence of Simonides. (6) The marked approval of Hippias, who is supposed at once to catch the familiar sound, just as in the previous conversation Prodicus is represented as ready to accept any distinctions of language however absurd. At the same time Hippias is desirous of substituting a new interpretation of his own; as if the words might really be made to mean anything, and were only to be regarded as affording a field for the ingenuity of the interpreter.

This curious passage is, therefore, to be regarded as Plato's satire on the tedious and hypercritical arts of interpretation which prevailed in his own day, and may be compared with his condemnation of the same arts when applied to mythology in the *Phaedrus*, and with his other parodies, e. g. with the two first speeches in the *Phaedrus* and with the *Menexenus*. Several lesser touches of satire may be observed, such as the claim of philosophy advanced

for the Lacedaemonians, which is a parody of the claims advanced for the Poets by Protagoras; the mistake of the Laconizing set in supposing that the Lacedaemonians are a great nation because they bruise their ears; the far-fetched notion, which is 'really too bad,' that Simonides uses the Lesbian (?) word, *ἐπαίνημι*, because he is addressing a Lesbian. The whole may also be considered as a satire on those who spin pompous theories out of nothing. As in the arguments of the Euthydemus and of the Cratylus, the veil of irony is never withdrawn; and we are left in doubt at last how far in this interpretation of Simonides Socrates is 'fooling,' how far he is in earnest.

*Protagoras.*  
INTRODUC-  
TION.

All the interests and contrasts of character in a great dramatic work like the Protagoras are not easily exhausted. The impressiveness of the scene should not be lost upon us, or the gradual substitution of Socrates in the second part for Protagoras in the first. The characters to whom we are introduced at the beginning of the Dialogue all play a part more or less conspicuous towards the end. There is Alcibiades, who is compelled by the necessity of his nature to be a partisan, lending effectual aid to Socrates; there is Critias assuming the tone of impartiality; Callias, here as always inclining to the Sophists, but eager for any intellectual repast; Prodicus, who finds an opportunity for displaying his distinctions of language, which are valueless and pedantic, because they are not based on dialectic; Hippias, who has previously exhibited his superficial knowledge of natural philosophy, to which, as in both the Dialogues called by his name, he now adds the profession of an interpreter of the Poets. The two latter personages have been already damaged by the mock heroic description of them in the introduction. It may be remarked that Protagoras is consistently presented to us throughout as the teacher of moral and political virtue; there is no allusion to the theories of sensation which are attributed to him in the Theaetetus and elsewhere, or to his denial of the existence of the gods in a well-known fragment ascribed to him; he is the religious rather than the irreligious teacher in this Dialogue. Also it may be observed that Socrates shows him as much respect as is consistent with his own ironical character; he admits that the dialectic which has overthrown Protagoras has carried himself round to a conclusion opposed to his first thesis. The force

*Protagoras.*INTRODUC-  
TION.

of argument, therefore, and not Socrates or Protagoras, has won the day.

But is Socrates serious in maintaining (1) that virtue cannot be taught; (2) that the virtues are one; (3) that virtue is the knowledge of pleasures and pains present and future? These propositions to us have an appearance of paradox — they are really moments or aspects of the truth by the help of which we pass from the old conventional morality to a higher conception of virtue and knowledge. That virtue cannot be taught is a paradox of the same sort as the profession of Socrates that he knew nothing. Plato means to say that virtue is not brought to a man, but must be drawn out of him; and cannot be taught by rhetorical discourses or citations from the poets. The second question, whether the virtues are one or many, though at first sight distinct, is really a part of the same subject; for if the virtues are to be taught, they must be reducible to a common principle; and this common principle is found to be knowledge. Here, as Aristotle remarks, Socrates and Plato outstep the truth — they make a part of virtue into the whole. Further, the nature of this knowledge, which is assumed to be a knowledge of pleasures and pains, appears to us too superficial and at variance with the spirit of Plato himself. Yet in this, Plato is only following the historical Socrates as he is depicted to us in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*. Like Socrates, he finds on the surface of human life one common bond by which the virtues are united, — their tendency to produce happiness — though such a principle is afterwards repudiated by him.

It remains to be considered in what relation the *Protagoras* stands to the other Dialogues of Plato. That it is one of the earlier or purely Socratic works — perhaps the last, as it is certainly the greatest of them — is indicated by the absence of any allusion to the doctrine of reminiscence; and also by the different attitude assumed towards the teaching and persons of the Sophists in some of the later Dialogues. The *Charmides*, *Laches*, *Lysis*, all touch on the question of the relation of knowledge to virtue, and may be regarded, if not as preliminary studies or sketches of the more important work, at any rate as closely connected with it. The *Io* and the lesser *Hippias* contain discussions of the Poets, which offer a parallel to the ironical criticism of Simonides, and are conceived in a similar spirit. The affinity of the *Protagoras* to



the Meno is more doubtful. For there, although the same question is discussed, 'whether virtue can be taught,' and the relation of Meno to the Sophists is much the same as that of Hippocrates, the answer to the question is supplied out of the doctrine of ideas; the real Socrates is already passing into the Platonic one. At a later stage of the Platonic philosophy we shall find that both the paradox and the solution of it appear to have been retracted. The Phaedo, the Gorgias, and the Philebus offer further corrections of the teaching of the Protagoras; in all of them the doctrine that virtue is pleasure, or that pleasure is the chief or only good, is distinctly renounced.

*Protagoras.*  
INTRODUC-  
TION.

Thus after many preparations and oppositions, both of the characters of men and aspects of the truth, especially of the popular and philosophical aspect; and after many interruptions and detentions by the way, which, as Theodorus says in the Theaetetus, are quite as agreeable as the argument, we arrive at the great Socratic thesis that virtue is knowledge. This is an aspect of the truth which was lost almost as soon as it was found; and yet has to be recovered by every one for himself who would pass the limits of proverbial and popular philosophy. The moral and intellectual are always dividing, yet they must be reunited, and in the highest conception of them are inseparable. The thesis of Socrates is not merely a hasty assumption, but may be also deemed an anticipation of some 'metaphysic of the future,' in which the divided elements of human nature are reconciled.





# PROTAGORAS.

## PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

|  |                                     |
|--|-------------------------------------|
| SOCRATES, <i>who is the narrator of<br/>the Dialogue to his Companion.</i> | PROTAGORAS, } <i>Sophists.</i>      |
| HIPPOCRATES.   | HIPPIAS, }                          |
| ALCIBIADES.  | PRODICUS, }                         |
| CRITIAS.   | CALLIAS, <i>a wealthy Athenian.</i> |

SCENE:—The House of Callias.

Steph. 309 *Com.* WHERE do you come from, Socrates? And yet I need hardly ask the question, for I know that you have been in chase of the fair Alcibiades. I saw him the day before yesterday; and he had got a beard like a man,—and he is a man, as I may tell you in your ear. But I thought that he was still very charming.

*Protagoras.*  
COMPANION,  
SOCRATES.  
The fair  
Alcibiades.

*Soc.* What of his beard? Are you not of Homer's opinion, who says<sup>1</sup>

‘Youth is most charming when the beard first appears’?

And that is now the charm of Alcibiades.

*Com.* Well, and how do matters proceed? Have you been visiting him, and was he gracious to you?

*Soc.* Yes, I thought that he was very gracious; and especially to-day, for I have just come from him, and he has been helping me in an argument. But shall I tell you a strange thing? I paid no attention to him, and several times I quite forgot that he was present.

*Com.* What is the meaning of this? Has anything happened between you and him? For surely you cannot have discovered a fairer love than he is; certainly not in this city of Athens.

*Soc.* Yes, much fairer.

*Com.* What do you mean — a citizen or a foreigner?

But there is  
a fairer still.

<sup>1</sup> Il. xxiv. 348.

*Protagoras.*SOCRATES,  
COMPANION,  
HIPPO-  
CRATES.The fairer is  
the wiser, and  
the wisest of  
all men is  
Protagoras.*Soc.* A foreigner.*Com.* Of what country?*Soc.* Of Abdera.*Com.* And is this stranger really in your opinion a fairer love than the son of Cleinias?*Soc.* And is not the wiser always the fairer, sweet friend?*Com.* But have you really met, Socrates, with some wise one?*Soc.* Say rather, with the wisest of all living men, if you are willing to accord that title to Protagoras.*Com.* What! Is Protagoras in Athens?*Soc.* Yes; he has been here two days.*Com.* And do you just come from an interview with him?*Soc.* Yes; and I have heard and said many things.*Com.* Then, if you have no engagement, suppose that you sit down and tell me what passed, and my attendant here shall give up his place to you.*Soc.* To be sure; and I shall be grateful to you for listening.*Com.* Thank you, too, for telling us.*Soc.* That is thank you twice over. Listen then:—He is actually  
in Athens,  
and Hippo-  
crates has  
come to bring  
the good news  
to Socrates.

Last night, or rather very early this morning, Hippocrates, the son of Apollodorus and the brother of Phason, gave a tremendous thump with his staff at my door; some one opened to him, and he came rushing in and bawled out: Socrates, are you awake or asleep?

I knew his voice, and said: Hippocrates, is that you? and do you bring any news?

Good news, he said; nothing but good.

Delightful, I said; but what is the news? and why have you come hither at this unearthly hour?

He drew nearer to me and said: Protagoras is come.

Yes, I replied; he came two days ago: have you only just heard of his arrival?

Yes, by the gods, he said; but not until yesterday evening.

At the same time he felt for the truckle-bed, and sat down at my feet, and then he said: Yesterday quite late in the evening, on my return from Oenoe whither I had gone in pursuit of my runaway slave Satyrus, as I meant to have told you, if some other matter had not come in the way;—on my

return, when we had done supper and were about to retire to rest, my brother said to me: Protagoras is come. I was going to you at once, and then I thought that the night was far spent. But the moment sleep left me after my fatigue, I got up and came hither direct.

*Protagoras.*

SOCRATES,  
HIPPO-  
CRATES.

I, who knew the very courageous madness of the man, said: What is the matter? Has Protagoras robbed you of anything?

He replied, laughing: Yes, indeed he has, Socrates, of the wisdom which he keeps from me.

But, surely, I said, if you give him money, and make friends with him, he will make you as wise as he is himself.

Would to heaven, he replied, that this were the case! He might take all that I have, and all that my friends have, if he pleased. But that is why I have come to you now, in order that you may speak to him on my behalf; for I am young, and also I have never seen nor heard him; (when he visited  
311 Athens before I was but a child;) and all men praise him, Socrates; he is reputed to be the most accomplished of speakers. There is no reason why we should not go to him at once, and then we shall find him at home. He lodges, as I hear, with Callias the son of Hipponicus: let us start.

He wants  
Socrates to  
introduce him  
at once.

I replied: Not yet, my good friend; the hour is too early. But let us rise and take a turn in the court and wait about there until day-break; when the day breaks, then we will go. For Protagoras is generally at home, and we shall be sure to find him; never fear.

But the day  
has not yet  
risen, so the  
two take a  
turn in the  
court.

Upon this we got up and walked about in the court, and I thought that I would make trial of the strength of his resolution. So I examined him and put questions to him. Tell me, Hippocrates, I said, as you are going to Protagoras, and will be paying your money to him, what is he to whom you are going? and what will he make of you? If, for example, you had thought of going to Hippocrates of Cos, the Asclepiad, and were about to give him your money, and some one had said to you: You are paying money to your namesake Hippocrates, O Hippocrates; tell me, what is he that you give him money? how would you have answered?

Socrates seizes  
the oppor-  
tunity of ques-  
tioning  
Hippocrates—  
Why is he go-  
ing to Prota-  
goras?  
What will he  
make of him?

I should say, he replied, that I gave money to him as being a physician.

*Protagoras.*

SOCRATES,

HIPPO-

CRATES.

And what will he make of you?

A physician, he said.

And if you were resolved to go to Polycleitus the Argive, or Pheidias the Athenian, and were intending to give them money, and some one had asked you: What are Polycleitus and Pheidias? and why do you give them this money?—how would you have answered?

I should have answered, that they were statuaries.

And what will they make of you?

A statuary, of course.

Well now, I said, you and I are going to Protagoras, and we are ready to pay him money on your behalf. If our own means are sufficient, and we can gain him with these, we shall be only too glad; but if not, then we are to spend the money of your friends as well. Now suppose, that while we are thus enthusiastically pursuing our object some one were to say to us: Tell me, Socrates, and you Hippocrates, what is Protagoras, and why are you going to pay him money,—how should we answer? I know that Pheidias is a sculptor, and that Homer is a poet; but what special name is given to Protagoras? how is he designated?

They call him a Sophist, Socrates, he replied.

Then we are going to pay our money to him in the character of a Sophist?

Certainly.

But suppose a person were to ask this further question: And how about yourself? What will Protagoras make of you, if you go to see him? 312

He answered, with a blush upon his face (for the day was just beginning to dawn, so that I could see him): Unless this differs in some way from the former instances, I suppose that he will make a Sophist of me.

By the gods, I said, and are you not ashamed at having to appear before the Hellenes in the character of a Sophist?

Indeed, Socrates, to confess the truth, I am.

But you should not assume, Hippocrates, that the instruction of Protagoras is of this nature: may you not learn of him in the same way that you learned the arts of the grammarian, or musician, or trainer, not with the view of making any of them a profession, but only as a part of education, and

The breaking dawn reveals a blush on the face of Hippocrates as he replies, 'A Sophist.'

because a private gentleman and freeman ought to know them? *Protagoras.*

Just so, he said; and that, in my opinion, is a far truer account of the teaching of Protagoras. *SOCRATES, HIPPOCRATES.*

I said: I wonder whether you know what you are doing? And what am I doing? *Do you know what you are doing, or what is the nature of the Sophist?*

You are going to commit your soul to the care of a man whom you call a Sophist. And yet I hardly think that you know what a Sophist is; and if not, then you do not even know to whom you are committing your soul and whether the thing to which you commit yourself be good or evil.

I certainly think that I do know, he replied.

Then tell me, what do you imagine that he is?

I take him to be one who knows wise things, he replied, as his name implies.

And might you not, I said, affirm this of the painter and of the carpenter also: Do not they, too, know wise things? But suppose a person were to ask us: In what are the painters wise? We should answer: In what relates to the making of likenesses, and similarly of other things. And if he were further to ask: What is the wisdom of the Sophist, and what is the manufacture over which he presides?—how should we answer him?

How should we answer him, Socrates? What other answer could there be but that he presides over the art which makes men eloquent? *He is one who makes men talk eloquently about what he himself knows.*

Yes, I replied, that is very likely true, but not enough; for in the answer a further question is involved: Of what does the Sophist make a man talk eloquently? The player on the lyre may be supposed to make a man talk eloquently about that which he makes him understand, that is about playing the lyre. Is not that true?

Yes.

Then about what does the Sophist make him eloquent? Must not he make him eloquent in that which he understands?

Yes, that may be assumed.

And what is that which the Sophist knows and makes his disciple know?

Indeed, he said, I cannot tell.



*Protagoras.*SOCRATES,  
HIPPO-  
CRATES.But if you do  
not know  
what that is,  
you cannot  
safely trust  
yourself to  
him.

Then I proceeded to say: Well, but are you aware of the danger which you are incurring? If you were going to commit your body to some one, who might do good or harm to it, would you not carefully consider and ask the opinion of your friends and kindred, and deliberate many days as to whether you should give him the care of your body? But when the soul is in question, which you hold to be of far more value than the body, and upon the good or evil of which depends the well-being of your all,—about this you never consulted either with your father or with your brother or with any one of us who are your companions. But no sooner does this foreigner appear, than you instantly commit your soul to his keeping. In the evening, as you say, you hear of him, and in the morning you go to him, never deliberating or taking the opinion of any one as to whether you ought to intrust yourself to him or not;—you have quite made up your mind that you will at all hazards be a pupil of Protagoras, and are prepared to expend all the property of yourself and of your friends in carrying out at any price this determination, although, as you admit, you do not know him, and have never spoken with him: and you call him a Sophist, but are manifestly ignorant of what a Sophist is; and yet you are going to commit yourself to his keeping.

When he heard me say this, he replied: So it would seem, if what you say is true.

The Sophist  
is one who  
sells the food  
of the soul,

I proceeded: Is not a Sophist, Hippocrates, one who deals wholesale or retail in the food of the soul? To me that appears to be his nature.

And what, Socrates, is the food of the soul?

Surely, I said, knowledge is the food of the soul; and we must take care, my friend, that the Sophist does not deceive us when he praises what he sells, like the dealers wholesale or retail who sell the food of the body; for they praise indiscriminately all their goods, without knowing what are really beneficial or hurtful: neither do their customers know, with the exception of any trainer or physician who may happen to buy of them. In like manner those who carry about the wares of knowledge, and make the round of the cities, and sell or retail them to any customer who is in want of them, praise them all alike; though I should not wonder,

314 O my friend, if many of them were really ignorant of their effect upon the soul; and their customers equally ignorant, unless, he who buys of them happens to be a physician of the soul. If, therefore, you have understanding of what is good and evil, you may safely buy knowledge of Protagoras or of any one; but if not, then, O my friend, pause, and do not hazard your dearest interests at a game of chance. For there is far greater peril in buying knowledge than in buying meat and drink: the one you purchase of the wholesale or retail dealer, and carry them away in other vessels, and before you receive them into the body as food, you may deposit them at home and call in any experienced friend who knows what is good to be eaten or drunken, and what not, and how much, and when; and then the danger of purchasing them is not so great. But you cannot buy the wares of knowledge and carry them away in another vessel; when you have paid for them you must receive them into the soul and go your way, either greatly harmed or greatly benefited; and therefore we should deliberate and take counsel with our elders; for you and I are still young—too young to determine such a matter. And now let us go, as we were intending, and hear Protagoras; and when we have heard what he has to say, we may take counsel of others; for not only is Protagoras at the house of Callias, but there is Hippias of Elis, and, if I am not mistaken, Prodicus of Ceos, and several other wise men.

*Protagoras.*

SOCRATES,  
THE DOOR-  
KEEPER.

which may be  
wholesome or  
poisonous.

To this we agreed, and proceeded on our way until we reached the vestibule of the house; and there we stopped in order to conclude a discussion which had arisen between us as we were going along; and we stood talking in the vestibule until we had finished and come to an understanding. And I think that the door-keeper, who was a eunuch, and who was probably annoyed at the great inroad of the Sophists, must have heard us talking. At any rate, when we knocked at the door, and he opened and saw us, he grumbled: They are Sophists—he is not at home; and instantly gave the door a hearty bang with both his hands. Again we knocked, and he answered without opening: Did you not hear me say that he is not at home, fellows? But, my friend, I said, you need not be alarmed; for we are not

The porter of  
the house  
shows that  
he is not a  
friend of the  
Sophists.

Socrates paci-  
fies him.

*Protagoras.* Sophists, and we are not come to see Callias, but we want to see Protagoras; and I must request you to announce us. At last, after a good deal of difficulty, the man was persuaded to open the door.

*SOCRATES.*

When we entered, we found Protagoras taking a walk in the cloister; and next to him, on one side, were walking Callias, the son of Hipponicus, and Paralus, the son of Pericles, who, by the mother's side, is his half-brother, and Charmides, the son of Glaucon. On the other side of him were Xanthippus, the other son of Pericles, Philippides, the son of Philomelus; also Antimoerus of Mende, who of all the disciples of Protagoras is the most famous, and intends to make sophistry his profession. A train of listeners followed him; the greater part of them appeared to be foreigners, whom Protagoras had brought with him out of the various cities visited by him in his journeys, he, like Orpheus, attracting them by his voice, and they following<sup>1</sup>. I should mention also that there were some Athenians in the company. Nothing delighted me more than the precision of their movements: they took such care never to come in his way at all; but when he and those who were with him turned back, then the band of listeners parted regularly on either side; he was always in front, and they wheeled round and took their places behind him in perfect order.

A well-trained band of listeners accompany Protagoras while walking in the cloister.

Hippias is seated in the opposite cloister.

After him, as Homer says<sup>2</sup>, 'I lifted up my eyes and saw' Hippias the Elean sitting in the opposite cloister on a chair of state, and around him were seated on benches Eryximachus, the son of Acumenus, and Phaedrus the Myrrhinius, and Andron the son of Androtion, and there were strangers whom he had brought with him from his native city of Elis, and some others: they were putting to Hippias certain physical and astronomical questions, and he, *ex cathedra*, was determining their several questions to them, and discoursing of them.

Prodicus is in the storehouse, but still in bed.

Also, 'my eyes beheld Tantalus<sup>3</sup>;' for Prodicus the Cean was at Athens: he had been lodged in a room which, in the days of Hipponicus, was a storehouse; but, as the house was full, Callias had cleared this out and made the room into

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. x. 600 D.

<sup>2</sup> Od. xi. 601 foll.

<sup>3</sup> Od. xi. 582.

a guest chamber. Now Prodicus was still in bed, wrapped up in sheepskins and bedclothes, of which there seemed to be a great heap; and there was sitting by him on the couches near, Pausanias of the deme of Cerameis, and with Pausanias was a youth quite young, who is certainly remarkable for his good looks, and, if I am not mistaken, is also of a fair and gentle nature. I thought that I heard him called Agathon, and my suspicion is that he is the beloved of Pausanias. There was this youth, and also there were the two Adeimantuses, one the son of Cepis, and the other of Leucolophides, and some others. I was very anxious to hear what Prodicus was saying, for he seems to me to be an all-wise and inspired man; but I was not able to get into the inner circle, and his fine deep voice made an echo in the room which rendered his words indistinct.

*Protagoras.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTAGORAS.

Pausanias the  
lover of  
Agathon.

No sooner had we entered than there followed us Alcibiades the beautiful, as you say, and I believe you; and also Critias the son of Callaeschrus.

Alcibiades  
makes his  
appearance.

On entering we stopped a little, in order to look about us, and then walked up to Protagoras, and I said: Protagoras, my friend Hippocrates and I have come to see you.

Do you wish, he said, to speak with me alone, or in the presence of the company?

Whichever you please, I said; you shall determine when you have heard the purpose of our visit.

And what is your purpose? he said.

I must explain, I said, that my friend Hippocrates is a native Athenian; he is the son of Apollodorus, and of a great and prosperous house, and he is himself in natural ability quite a match for anybody of his own age. I believe that he aspires to political eminence; and this he thinks that conversation with you is most likely to procure for him. And now you can determine whether you would wish to speak to him of your teaching alone or in the presence of the company.

Hippocrates  
and Socrates  
approach  
Protagoras,  
who enlarges  
upon the  
antiquity of  
his art and  
upon the  
jealousies and  
suspensions  
which are  
entertained  
of him.

Thank you, Socrates, for your consideration of me. For certainly a stranger finding his way into great cities, and persuading the flower of the youth in them to leave the company of their kinsmen or any other acquaintances, old or young, and live with him, under the idea that they will be

*Protagoras.*SOCRATES,  
PROTAGORAS.

The Sophists  
of old con-  
cealed them-  
selves under  
the names of  
poets and  
musicians, but  
Protagoras  
thinks that  
openness is the  
best policy.

improved by his conversation, ought to be very cautious; great jealousies are aroused by his proceedings, and he is the subject of many enmities and conspiracies. Now the art of the Sophist is, as I believe, of great antiquity; but in ancient times those who practised it, fearing this odium, veiled and disguised themselves under various names, some under that of poets, as Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, some, of hierophants and prophets, as Orpheus and Musaeus, and some, as I observe, even under the name of gymnastic-masters, like Iccus of Tarentum, or the more recently celebrated Herodicus, now of Selymbria and formerly of Megara, who is a first-rate Sophist. Your own Agathocles pretended to be a musician, but was really an eminent Sophist; also Pythocleides the Cean; and there were many others; and all of them, as I was saying, adopted these arts as veils or disguises because they were afraid of the odium which they would incur. But that is not my way, for I do not believe that 317 they effected their purpose, which was to deceive the government, who were not blinded by them; and as to the people, they have no understanding, and only repeat what their rulers are pleased to tell them. Now to run away, and to be caught in running away, is the very height of folly, and also greatly increases the exasperation of mankind; for they regard him who runs away as a rogue, in addition to any other objections which they have to him; and therefore I take an entirely opposite course, and acknowledge myself to be a Sophist and instructor of mankind; such an open acknowledgment appears to me to be a better sort of caution than concealment. Nor do I neglect other precautions, and therefore I hope, as I may say, by the favour of heaven that no harm will come of the acknowledgment that I am a Sophist. And I have been now many years in the profession—for all my years when added up are many: there is no one here present of whom I might not be the father. Wherefore I should much prefer conversing with you, if you want to speak with me, in the presence of the company.

As I suspected that he would like to have a little display and glorification in the presence of Prodicus and Hippias, and would gladly show us to them in the light of his



admirers, I said: But why should we not summon Prodicus and Hippias and their friends to hear us?

Very good, he said.

Suppose, said Callias, that we hold a council in which you may sit and discuss.—This was agreed upon, and great delight was felt at the prospect of hearing wise men talk; we ourselves took the chairs and benches, and arranged them by Hippias, where the other benches had been already placed. Meanwhile Callias and Alcibiades got Prodicus out of bed and brought in him and his companions.

When we were all seated, Protagoras said: Now that the company are assembled, Socrates, tell me about the young  
318 man of whom you were just now speaking.

I replied: I will begin again at the same point, Protagoras, and tell you once more the purport of my visit: this is my friend Hippocrates, who is desirous of making your acquaintance; he would like to know what will happen to him if he associates with you. I have no more to say.

Protagoras answered: Young man, if you associate with me, on the very first day you will return home a better man than you came, and better on the second day than on the first, and better every day than you were on the day before.

When I heard this, I said: Protagoras, I do not at all wonder at hearing you say this; even at your age, and with all your wisdom, if any one were to teach you what you did not know before, you would become better no doubt: but please to answer in a different way—I will explain how by an example. Let me suppose that Hippocrates, instead of desiring your acquaintance, wished to become acquainted with the young man Zeuxippus of Heraclea, who has lately been in Athens, and he had come to him as he has come to you, and had heard him say, as he has heard you say, that every day he would grow and become better if he associated with him: and then suppose that he were to ask him, 'In what shall I become better, and in what shall I grow?'—Zeuxippus would answer, 'In painting.' And suppose that he went to Orthagoras the Theban, and heard him say the same thing, and asked him, 'In what shall I become better day by day?' he would reply, 'In flute-playing.' Now I want you to make the same sort of answer to this young man and

*Protagoras.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTAGORAS,  
CALLIAS.

They agree to  
hold a council.

The question  
is asked,  
What will  
happen to  
Hippocrates  
if he becomes  
the disciple of  
Protagoras?

Answer: He  
will daily grow  
wiser and  
better,



*Protagoras.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTAGORAS.

But in what?

to me, who am asking questions on his behalf. When you say that on the first day on which he associates with you he will return home a better man, and on every day will grow in like manner,—in what, Protagoras, will he be better? and about what?

in the know-  
ledge of affairs  
private as well  
as public.

When Protagoras heard me say this, he replied: You ask questions fairly, and I like to answer a question which is fairly put. If Hippocrates comes to me he will not experience the sort of drudgery with which other Sophists are in the habit of insulting their pupils; who, when they have just escaped from the arts, are taken and driven back into them by these teachers, and made to learn calculation, and astronomy, and geometry, and music (he gave a look at Hippias as he said this); but if he comes to me, he will learn that which he comes to learn. And this is prudence in affairs private as well as public; he will learn to order his own house in the best manner, and he will be able to speak and act for the best in the affairs of the state.

Do I understand you, I said; and is your meaning that 319  
you teach the art of politics, and that you promise to make men good citizens?

That, Socrates, is exactly the profession which I make.

But such  
knowledge  
cannot be  
taught or com-  
municated  
by one man to  
another.

Then, I said, you do indeed possess a noble art, if there is no mistake about this; for I will freely confess to you, Protagoras, that I have a doubt whether the art of politics is capable of being taught, and yet I know not how to disbelieve your assertion. And I ought to tell you why I am of opinion that this art cannot be taught or communicated by man to man. I say that the Athenians are an understanding people, and such indeed they are esteemed to be by the other Hellenes. Now I observe that when we are met together in the assembly, and the matter in hand relates to building, the builders are summoned as advisers; when the question is one of ship-building, then the ship-wrights; and the like of other arts which they think capable of being taught and learned. And if some person offers to give them advice who is not supposed by them to have any skill in the art, even though he be good-looking, and rich, and noble, they will not listen to him, but laugh and hoot at him, until either he is clamoured down and retires of himself; or if he persist, he is dragged

away or put out by the constables at the command of the prytanes. This is their way of behaving about professors of the arts. But when the question is an affair of state, then everybody is free to have a say—carpenter, tinker, cobbler, sailor, passenger; rich and poor, high and low—any one who likes gets up, and no one reproaches him, as in the former case, with not having learned, and having no teacher, and yet giving advice; evidently because they are under the impression that this sort of knowledge cannot be taught. And not only is this true of the state, but of individuals; the best and wisest of our citizens are unable to impart their political wisdom to others: as for example, Pericles, the father of these young men, who gave them excellent instruction in all that could be learned from masters, in his own department of politics neither taught them, nor gave them teachers; but they were allowed to wander at their own free will in a sort of hope that they would light upon virtue of their own accord. Or take another example: there was Cleinias the younger brother of our friend Alcibiades, of whom this very same Pericles was the guardian; and he being in fact under the apprehension that Cleinias would be corrupted by Alcibiades, took him away, and placed him in the house of Ariphron to be educated; but before six months had elapsed, Ariphron sent him back, not knowing what to do with him. And I could mention numberless other instances of persons who were good themselves, and never yet made any one else good, whether friend or stranger. Now I, Protagoras, having these examples before me, am inclined to think that virtue cannot be taught. But then again, when I listen to your words, I waver; and am disposed to think that there must be something in what you say, because I know that you have great experience, and learning, and invention. And I wish that you would, if possible, show me a little more clearly that virtue can be taught. Will you be so good?

That I will, Socrates, and gladly. But what would you like? Shall I, as an elder, speak to you as younger men in an apologue or myth, or shall I argue out the question?

To this several of the company answered that he should choose for himself.

*Protagoras.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTAGORAS.

Pericles could not teach his own sons politics, nor his ward Cleinias virtue.

Will Protagoras be so good as to prove that virtue can be taught?

Protagoras promises to do so in an apologue.

*Protagoras.*

PROTAGORAS.

The creation  
of the brute  
animals, who  
were equipped  
with the  
qualities  
necessary for  
their preserva-  
tion, while  
men remained  
naked and  
defenceless.

Well, then, he said, I think that the myth will be more interesting.

Once upon a time there were gods only, and no mortal creatures. But when the time came that these also should be created, the gods fashioned them out of earth and fire and various mixtures of both elements in the interior of the earth; and when they were about to bring them into the light of day, they ordered Prometheus and Epimetheus to equip them, and to distribute to them severally their proper qualities. Epimetheus said to Prometheus: 'Let me distribute, and do you inspect.' This was agreed, and Epimetheus made the distribution. There were some to whom he gave strength without swiftness, while he equipped the weaker with swiftness; some he armed, and others he left unarmed; and devised for the latter some other means of preservation, making some large, and having their size as a protection, and others small, whose nature was to fly in the air or burrow in the ground; this was to be their way of escape. Thus did he compensate them with the view of preventing any race from becoming extinct. And when he had provided against their destruction by one another, he contrived also a means of protecting them against the seasons of heaven; clothing them with close hair and thick skins sufficient to defend them against the winter cold and able to resist the summer heat, so that they might have a natural bed of their own when they wanted to rest; also he furnished them with hoofs and hair and hard and callous skins under their feet. Then he gave them varieties of food,—herb of the soil to some, to others fruits of trees, and to others roots, and to some again he gave other animals as food. And some he made to have few young ones, while those who were their prey were very prolific; and in this manner the race was preserved. Thus did Epimetheus, who, not being very wise, forgot that he had distributed among the brute animals all the qualities which he had to give,—and when he came to man, who was still unprovided, he was terribly perplexed. Now while he was in this perplexity, Prometheus came to inspect the distribution, and he found that the other animals were suitably furnished, but that man alone was naked and shoeless, and had neither bed nor arms of defence. The appointed hour

To meet this  
need of theirs  
Prometheus  
stole the arts  
of Athene and

was approaching when man in his turn was to go forth into the light of day; and Prometheus, not knowing how he could devise his salvation, stole the mechanical arts of Hephaestus and Athene, and fire with them (they could neither have been acquired nor used without fire), and gave them to man. Thus man had the wisdom necessary to the support of life, but political wisdom he had not; for that was in the keeping of Zeus, and the power of Prometheus did not extend to entering into the citadel of heaven, where Zeus dwelt, who moreover had terrible sentinels; but he did enter by stealth into the common workshop of Athene and Hephaestus, in which they used to practise their favourite arts, and carried off Hephaestus' art of working by fire, and also the art of Athene, and gave them to man. And in this way man was supplied with the means of life. But Prometheus is said to have been afterwards prosecuted for theft, owing to the blunder of Epimetheus.

*Protagoras.*

PROTAGORAS.

Hephaestus,  
together with  
fire.

322 Now man, having a share of the divine attributes, was at first the only one of the animals who had any gods, because he alone was of their kindred; and he would raise altars and images of them. He was not long in inventing articulate speech and names; and he also constructed houses and clothes and shoes and beds, and drew sustenance from the earth. Thus provided, mankind at first lived dispersed, and there were no cities. But the consequence was that they were destroyed by the wild beasts, for they were utterly weak in comparison of them, and their art was only sufficient to provide them with the means of life, and did not enable them to carry on war against the animals: food they had, but not as yet the art of government, of which the art of war is a part. After a while the desire of self-preservation gathered them into cities; but when they were gathered together, having no art of government, they evil intreated one another, and were again in process of dispersion and destruction. Zeus feared that the entire race would be exterminated, and so he sent Hermes to them, bearing reverence and justice to be the ordering principles of cities and the bonds of friendship and conciliation. Hermes asked Zeus how he should impart justice and reverence among men:—Should he distribute them as the arts are distributed;

But men were  
still destitute  
of political  
wisdom, and  
were in danger  
of being  
exterminated  
by the wild  
beasts.

So to protect  
themselves  
they gathered  
into cities; but  
having no  
sense of right,  
they began to  
destroy one  
another.

Hermes at the  
desire of Zeus  
imparted  
justice and  
reverence to  
them.

*Protagoras.*

PROTAGORAS.

These virtues were distributed, not, like the arts, to a few only, but to all.

that is to say, to a favoured few only, one skilled individual having enough of medicine or of any other art for many unskilled ones? 'Shall this be the manner in which I am to distribute justice and reverence among men, or shall I give them to all?' 'To all,' said Zeus; 'I should like them all to have a share; for cities cannot exist, if a few only share in the virtues, as in the arts. And further, make a law by my order, that he who has no part in reverence and justice shall be put to death, for he is a plague of the state.'

And this is the reason, Socrates, why the Athenians and mankind in general, when the question relates to carpentering or any other mechanical art, allow but a few to share in their deliberations; and when any one else interferes, then, as you say, they object, if he be not of the favoured few; and this, as I reply, is very natural. But when they meet to deliberate about political virtue, which proceeds only 323 by way of justice and wisdom, they are patient enough of any man who speaks of them, as is also natural, because they think that every man ought to share in this sort of virtue, and that states could not exist if they did not. I have explained to you, Socrates, the reason of this phenomenon.

And certainly all men are expected to profess them,

And that you may not suppose yourself to be deceived in thinking that all men regard every man as having a share of justice or honesty and of every other political virtue, let me give you a further proof, which is this. In other cases, as you are aware, if a man says that he is a good flute-player, or skilful in any other art in which he has no skill, people either laugh at him or are angry with him, and his relations think that he is mad and go and admonish him; but when honesty is in question, or some other political virtue, even if they know that he is dishonest, yet, if the man comes publicly forward and tells the truth about his dishonesty, then, what in the other case was held by them to be good sense, they now deem to be madness. They say that all men ought to profess honesty whether they are honest or not, and that a man is out of his mind who says anything else. Their notion is, that a man must have some degree of honesty; and that if he has none at all he ought not to be in the world.

I have been showing that they are right in admitting every



324 man as a counsellor about this sort of virtue, since they are of opinion that every man is a partaker of it. And I will now endeavour to show further that they do not conceive this virtue to be given by nature, or to grow spontaneously, but to be a thing which may be taught; and which comes to a man by taking pains. No one would instruct, no one would rebuke, or be angry with those whose calamities they suppose to be due to nature or chance; they do not try to punish or to prevent them from being what they are; they do but pity them. Who is so foolish as to chastise or instruct the ugly, or the diminutive, or the feeble? And why not? Because he knows that good and evil of this kind is the work of nature and of chance; whereas if a man is wanting in the good qualities which are attained by study and exercise and teaching, and has only the contrary evil qualities, other men are angry with him, and punish and reprove him—of which evil qualities one is impiety, another injustice, and they may be described generally as the very opposite of political virtue. In such cases any man will be angry with another, and reprimand him,—clearly because he thinks that by study and learning, the virtue in which the other is deficient may be acquired. If you will think, Socrates, of the nature of punishment, you will see at once that in the opinion of mankind virtue may be acquired; no one punishes the evil-doer under the notion, or for the reason, that he has done wrong,—only the unreasonable fury of a beast acts in that manner. But he who desires to inflict rational punishment does not retaliate for a past wrong which cannot be undone; he has regard to the future, and is desirous that the man who is punished, and he who sees him punished, may be deterred from doing wrong again. He punishes for the sake of prevention, thereby clearly implying that virtue is capable of being taught. This is the notion of all who retaliate upon others either privately or publicly. And the Athenians, too, your own citizens, like other men, punish and take vengeance on all whom they regard as evil doers; and hence, we may infer them to be of the number of those who think that virtue may be acquired and taught. Thus far, Socrates, I have shown you clearly enough, if I am not mistaken, that your countrymen are right in admitting the

*Protagoras.*

PROTAGORAS.

and are punished for the want of them, which is a proof that they can be acquired and taught.



*Protagoras.*

PROTAGORAS.

But why do  
not good men  
teach their  
sons virtue?

tinker and the cobbler to advise about politics, and also that they deem virtue to be capable of being taught and acquired.

There yet remains one difficulty which has been raised by you about the sons of good men. What is the reason why good men teach their sons the knowledge which is gained from teachers, and make them wise in that, but do nothing towards improving them in the virtues which distinguish themselves? And here, Socrates, I will leave the apologue and resume the argument. Please to consider: Is there or is there not some one quality of which all the citizens must be partakers, if there is to be a city at all? In the answer to this question is contained the only solution of your difficulty; there is no other. For if there be any such quality, and this quality or unity is not the art of the carpenter, or the smith, or the potter, but justice and temperance and holiness and, in a word, manly virtue—if this is the quality of which all men must be partakers, and which is the very condition of their learning or doing anything else, and if he who is wanting in this, whether he be a child only or a grown-up man or woman, must be taught and punished, until by punishment he becomes better, and he who rebels against instruction and punishment is either exiled or condemned to death under the idea that he is incurable—if what I am saying be true, and good men have their sons taught other things and not this, do consider how extraordinary their conduct would appear to be. For we have shown that they think virtue capable of being taught and cultivated both in private and public; and, notwithstanding, they have their sons taught lesser matters, ignorance of which does not involve the punishment of death: but greater things, of which the ignorance may cause death and exile to those who have no training or knowledge of them—aye, and confiscation as well as death, and, in a word, may be the ruin of families—those things, I say, they are supposed not to teach them,—not to take the utmost care that they should learn. Of course, Socrates, they are taught them.

325

They do in  
fact teach  
them in all  
stages of their  
life by

Education and admonition commence in the first years of childhood, and last to the very end of life. Mother and nurse and father and tutor are vying with one another about the improvement of the child as soon as ever he is able

to understand what is being said to him: he cannot say or do anything without their setting forth to him that this is just and that is unjust; this is honourable, that is dishonourable; this is holy, that is unholy; do this and abstain from that. And if he obeys, well and good; if not, he is straightened by threats and blows, like a piece of bent or warped wood. At a later stage they send him to teachers, and enjoin them to see to his manners even more than to his reading and music; and the teachers do as they are desired. And when the boy has learned his letters and is beginning to understand what is written, as before he understood only  
326 what was spoken, they put into his hands the works of great poets, which he reads sitting on a bench at school; in these are contained many admonitions, and many tales, and praises, and encomia of ancient famous men, which he is required to learn by heart, in order that he may imitate or emulate them and desire to become like them. Then, again, the teachers of the lyre take similar care that their young disciple is temperate and gets into no mischief; and when they have taught him the use of the lyre, they introduce him to the poems of other excellent poets, who are the lyric poets; and these they set to music, and make their harmonies and rhythms quite familiar to the children's souls, in order that they may learn to be more gentle, and harmonious, and rhythmical, and so more fitted for speech and action; for the life of man in every part has need of harmony and rhythm. Then they send them to the master of gymnastic, in order that their bodies may better minister to the virtuous mind, and that they may not be compelled through bodily weakness to play the coward in war or on any other occasion. This is what is done by those who have the means, and those who have the means are the rich; their children begin to go to school soonest and leave off latest. When they have done with masters, the state again compels them to learn the laws, and live after the pattern which they furnish, and not after their own fancies; and just as in learning to write, the writing-master first draws lines with a style for the use of the young beginner, and gives him the tablet and makes him follow the lines, so the city draws the laws, which were the invention of good lawgivers living in the olden time;

*Protagoras.*

PROTAGORAS.

the help of  
tutors, nurses,  
teachers, and  
professors of  
all sorts.

When they  
grow up the  
laws become  
their teacher.

Beyond  
question,  
then, virtue  
can be taught.

*Protagoras.*

PROTAGORAS.

these are given to the young man, in order to guide him in his conduct whether he is commanding or obeying; and he who transgresses them is to be corrected, or, in other words, called to account, which is a term used not only in your country, but also in many others, seeing that justice calls men to account. Now when there is all this care about virtue private and public, why, Socrates, do you still wonder and doubt whether virtue can be taught? Cease to wonder, for the opposite would be far more surprising.

But the sons of good men are not always good men, any more than the sons of good artists are always good artists.

But why then do the sons of good fathers often turn out ill? There is nothing very wonderful in this; for, as I have been saying, the existence of a state implies that virtue is not any man's private possession. If so—and nothing 327 can be truer—then I will further ask you to imagine, as an illustration, some other pursuit or branch of knowledge which may be assumed equally to be the condition of the existence of a state. Suppose that there could be no state unless we were all flute-players, as far as each had the capacity, and everybody was freely teaching everybody the art, both in private and public, and reproving the bad player as freely and openly as every man now teaches justice and the laws, not concealing them as he would conceal the other arts, but imparting them—for all of us have a mutual interest in the justice and virtue of one another, and this is the reason why every one is so ready to teach justice and the laws;—suppose, I say, that there were the same readiness and liberality among us in teaching one another flute-playing, do you imagine, Socrates, that the sons of good flute-players would be more likely to be good than the sons of bad ones? I think not. Would not their sons grow up to be distinguished or undistinguished according to their own natural capacities as flute-players, and the son of a good player would often turn out to be a bad one, and the son of a bad player to be a good one, and all flute-players would be good enough in comparison of those who were ignorant and unacquainted with the art of flute-playing? In like manner I would have you consider that he who appears to you to be the worst of those who have been brought up in laws and humanities, would appear to be a just man and a master of justice if he were to be compared with men who

The worst of civilized men are good enough compared with savages.

had no education, or courts of justice, or laws, or any restraints upon them which compelled them to practise virtue—with the savages, for example, whom the poet Pherecrates exhibited on the stage at the last year's Lenæan festival. If you were living among men such as the man-haters in his Chorus, you would be only too glad to meet with Eurybates and Phrynondas, and you would sorrowfully long to revisit the rascality of this part of the world. And you, Socrates, are discontented, and why? Because all men are teachers of virtue, each one according to his ability; and you say Where are the teachers? You might as well  
 328 ask, Who teaches Greek? For of that too there will not be any teachers found. Or you might ask, Who is to teach the sons of our artisans this same art which they have learned of their fathers? He and his fellow-workmen have taught them to the best of their ability,—but who will carry them further in their arts? And you would certainly have a difficulty, Socrates, in finding a teacher of them; but there would be no difficulty in finding a teacher of those who are wholly ignorant. And this is true of virtue or of anything else; if a man is better able than we are to promote virtue ever so little, we must be content with the result. A teacher of this sort I believe myself to be, and above all other men to have the knowledge which makes a man noble and good; and I give my pupils their money's-worth, and even more, as they themselves confess. And therefore I have introduced the following mode of payment:—When a man has been my pupil, if he likes he pays my price, but there is no compulsion; and if he does not like, he has only to go into a temple and take an oath of the value of the instructions, and he pays no more than he declares to be their value.

*Protagoras.*  
 PROTAGORAS.

All men are  
 teachers of  
 virtue to a  
 certain extent.

Such is my Apologue, Socrates, and such is the argument by which I endeavour to show that virtue may be taught, and that this is the opinion of the Athenians. And I have also attempted to show that you are not to wonder at good fathers having bad sons, or at good sons having bad fathers, of which the sons of Polycleitus afford an example, who are the companions of our friends here, Paralus and Xanthippus, but are nothing in comparison with their father; and this is true of the sons of many other artists. As yet I ought not to say

*Protagoras.*

the same of Paralus and Xanthippus themselves, for they are young and there is still hope of them.

SOCRATES,

PROTAGORAS.

Protagoras ended, and in my ear

‘ So charming left his voice, that I the while

Thought him still speaking; still stood fixed to hear<sup>1</sup>.’

Socrates is overwhelmed by the eloquence of Protagoras. But he would like to put a small question to him:— Are the virtues the parts of a whole or the names of one and the same thing?

At length, when the truth dawned upon me, that he had really finished, not without difficulty I began to collect myself, and looking at Hippocrates, I said to him: O son of Apollodorus, how deeply grateful I am to you for having brought me hither; I would not have missed the speech of Protagoras for a great deal. For I used to imagine that no human care could make men good; but I know better now. Yet I have still one very small difficulty which I am sure that Protagoras will easily explain, as he has already explained so much. If a man were to go and consult Pericles or any of our great speakers about these matters, he might perhaps hear as fine a discourse; but then when one has a question to ask of any of them, like books, they can neither answer nor ask; and if any one challenges the least particular of their speech, they go ringing on in a long harangue, like brazen pots, which when they are struck continue to sound unless some one puts his hand upon them; whereas our friend Protagoras can not only make a good speech, as he has already shown, but when he is asked a question he can answer briefly; and when he asks he will wait and hear the answer; and this is a very rare gift. Now I, Protagoras, want to ask of you a little question, which if you will only answer, I shall be quite satisfied. You were saying that virtue can be taught;— that I will take upon your authority, and there is no one by whom I am more ready to be convinced. But I marvel at one thing about which I should like to have my mind set at rest. You were speaking of Zeus sending justice and reverence to men; and several times while you were speaking, justice, and temperance, and holiness, and all these qualities, were described by you as if together they made up virtue. Now I want you to tell me truly whether virtue is one whole, of which justice and temperance and holiness are parts; or whether all these are

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<sup>1</sup> Borrowed by Milton, *Paradise Lost*, viii. 2, 3.



only the names of one and the same thing: that is the doubt which still lingers in my mind.

*Protagoras.*

There is no difficulty, Socrates, in answering that the qualities of which you are speaking are the parts of virtue which is one.

SOCRATES,  
PROTAGORAS.

And are they parts, I said, in the same sense in which mouth, nose, and eyes, and ears, are the parts of a face; or are they like the parts of gold, which differ from the whole and from one another only in being larger or smaller?

They are the parts of a whole differing in the same manner as the parts of a face.

I should say that they differed, Socrates, in the first way; they are related to one another as the parts of a face are related to the whole face.

And do men have some one part and some another part of virtue? Or if a man has one part, must he also have all the others?

By no means, he said; for many a man is brave and not just, or just and not wise.

You would not deny, then, that courage and wisdom are also parts of virtue?

330 Most undoubtedly they are, he answered; and wisdom is the noblest of the parts.

And they are all different from one another? I said.

Yes.

And has each of them a distinct function like the parts of the face;—the eye, for example, is not like the ear, and has not the same functions; and the other parts are none of them like one another, either in their functions, or in any other way? I want to know whether the comparison holds concerning the parts of virtue. Do they also differ from one another in themselves and in their functions? For that is clearly what the simile would imply.

Many men have one part of virtue and not another.

Yes, Socrates, you are right in supposing that they differ.

Then, I said, no other part of virtue is like knowledge, or like justice, or like courage, or like temperance, or like holiness?

No, he answered.

Well then, I said, suppose that you and I enquire into their natures. And first, you would agree with me that justice is



*Protagoras.*SOCRATES,  
PROTAGORAS.

of the nature of a thing, would you not? That is my opinion :  
would it not be yours also?

Mine also, he said.

And suppose that some one were to ask us, saying, 'O Protagoras, and you, Socrates, what about this thing which you were calling justice, is it just or unjust?'—and I were to answer, just: would you vote with me or against me?

With you, he said.

Justice is of  
the nature of  
the just.

Thereupon I should answer to him who asked me, that justice is of the nature of the just: would not you?

Yes, he said.

And suppose that he went on to say: 'Well now, is there also such a thing as holiness?'—we should answer, 'Yes,' if I am not mistaken?

Yes, he said.

Which you would also acknowledge to be a thing—should we not say so?

He assented.

'And is this a sort of thing which is of the nature of the holy, or of the nature of the unholy?' I should be angry at his putting such a question, and should say, 'Peace, man; nothing can be holy if holiness is not holy.' What would you say? Would you not answer in the same way?

Certainly, he said.

And then after this suppose that he came and asked us, 'What were you saying just now? Perhaps I may not have heard you rightly, but you seemed to me to be saying that the parts of virtue were not the same as one another.' I should reply, 'You certainly heard that said, but not, as you 331  
imagine, by me; for I only asked the question; Protagoras gave the answer.' And suppose that he turned to you and said, 'Is this true, Protagoras? and do you maintain that one part of virtue is unlike another, and is this your position?'—how would you answer him?

I could not help acknowledging the truth of what he said, Socrates.

The virtues  
differ, yet  
many of  
them, e. g.

Well then, Protagoras, we will assume this; and now supposing that he proceeded to say further, 'Then holiness is not of the nature of justice, nor justice of the nature of

holiness, but of the nature of unholiness; and holiness is of the nature of the not just, and therefore of the unjust, and the unjust is the unholy:’ how shall we answer him? I should certainly answer him on my own behalf that justice is holy, and that holiness is just; and I would say in like manner on your behalf also, if you would allow me, that justice is either the same with holiness, or very nearly the same: and above all I would assert that justice is like holiness and holiness is like justice; and I wish that you would tell me whether I may be permitted to give this answer on your behalf, and whether you would agree with me.

*Protagoras.*  
SOCRATES,  
PROTAGORAS.  
holiness and  
justice, are  
very much  
alike.

He replied, I cannot simply agree, Socrates, to the proposition that justice is holy and that holiness is just, for there appears to me to be a difference between them. But what matter? if you please I please; and let us assume, if you will, that justice is holy, and that holiness is just.

Pardon me, I replied; I do not want this ‘if you wish’ or ‘if you will’ sort of conclusion to be proven, but I want you and me to be proven: I mean to say that the conclusion will be best proven if there be no ‘if.’

Well, he said, I admit that justice bears a resemblance to holiness, for there is always some point of view in which everything is like every other thing; white is in a certain way like black, and hard is like soft, and the most extreme opposites have some qualities in common; even the parts of the face which, as we were saying before, are distinct and have different functions, are still in a certain point of view similar, and one of them is like another of them. And you may prove that they are like one another on the same principle that all things are like one another; and yet things which are alike in some particular ought not to be called alike, nor things which are unlike in some particular, however slight, unlike.

*Protagoras*  
admits the  
likeness, but  
denies the  
identity of the  
virtues.

And do you think, I said in a tone of surprise, that justice and holiness have but a small degree of likeness?

Certainly not; any more than I agree with what I understand to be your view.

332 Well, I said, as you appear to have a difficulty about this, let us take another of the examples which you mentioned instead. Do you admit the existence of folly?

*Protagoras.*

I do.

SOCRATES,  
PROTAGORAS.

And is not wisdom the very opposite of folly?

That is true, he said.

Protagoras is  
drawn into  
making the  
admission that  
everything  
has but one  
opposite.

And when men act rightly and advantageously they seem to you to be temperate?

Yes, he said.

And temperance makes them temperate?

Certainly.

And they who do not act rightly act foolishly, and in acting thus are not temperate?

I agree, he said.

Then to act foolishly is the opposite of acting temperately?

He assented.

And foolish actions are done by folly, and temperate actions by temperance?

He agreed.

And that is done strongly which is done by strength, and that which is weakly done, by weakness?

He assented.

And that which is done with swiftness is done swiftly, and that which is done with slowness, slowly?

He assented again.

And that which is done in the same manner, is done by the same; and that which is done in an opposite manner by the opposite?

He agreed.

Once more, I said, is there anything beautiful?

Yes.

To which the only opposite is the ugly?

There is no other.

And is there anything good?

There is.

To which the only opposite is the evil?

There is no other.

And there is the acute in sound?

True.

To which the only opposite is the grave?

There is no other, he said, but that.

Then every opposite has one opposite only and no more? •

He assented.

Then now, I said, let us recapitulate our admissions. First of all we admitted that everything has one opposite and not more than one? *Protagoras.*  
SOCRATES,  
PROTAGORAS.

We did so.

And we admitted also that what was done in opposite ways was done by opposites?

Yes.

And that which was done foolishly, as we further admitted, was done in the opposite way to that which was done temperately? Thus, if folly has two opposites, wisdom and temperance, those two opposites must be the same.

Yes.

And that which was done temperately was done by temperance, and that which was done foolishly by folly?

He agreed.

And that which is done in opposite ways is done by opposites?

Yes.

And one thing is done by temperance, and quite another thing by folly?

Yes.

And in opposite ways?

Certainly.

And therefore by opposites:—then folly is the opposite of temperance?

Clearly.

And do you remember that folly has already been acknowledged by us to be the opposite of wisdom?

He assented.

And we said that everything has only one opposite?

Yes.

333 Then, Protagoras, which of the two assertions shall we renounce? One says that everything has but one opposite; the other that wisdom is distinct from temperance, and that both of them are parts of virtue; and that they are not only distinct, but dissimilar, both in themselves and in their functions, like the parts of a face. Which of these two assertions shall we renounce? For both of them together are certainly not in harmony; they do not accord or agree: for how can they be said to agree if everything is assumed to have only one opposite and not more than one, and yet folly, which is

*Protagoras.*

one, has clearly the two opposites—wisdom and temperance?

SOCRATES,  
PROTAGORAS.

Is not that true, Protagoras? What else would you say?

He assented, but with great reluctance.

Then temperance and wisdom are the same, as before justice and holiness appeared to us to be nearly the same. And now, Protagoras, I said, we must finish the enquiry, and not faint. Do you think that an unjust man can be temperate in his injustice?

I should be ashamed, Socrates, he said, to acknowledge this, which nevertheless many may be found to assert.

And shall I argue with them or with you? I replied.

I would rather, he said, that you should argue with the many first, if you will.

Whichever you please, if you will only answer me and say whether you are of their opinion or not. My object is to test the validity of the argument; and yet the result may be that I who ask and you who answer may both be put on our trial.

Protagoras at first made a show of refusing, as he said that the argument was not encouraging; at length, he consented to answer.

Now then, I said, begin at the beginning and answer me. You think that some men are temperate, and yet unjust?

Yes, he said; let that be admitted.

And temperance is good sense?

Yes.

And good sense is good counsel in doing injustice?

Granted.

If they succeed, I said, or if they do not succeed?

If they succeed.

And you would admit the existence of goods?

Yes.

And is the good that which is expedient for man?

Yes, indeed, he said: and there are some things which may be inexpedient, and yet I call them good.

I thought that Protagoras was getting ruffled and excited; he seemed to be setting himself in an attitude of war. Seeing this, I minded my business, and gently said:—

When you affirm, Protagoras, that things inexpedient are good, do you mean inexpedient for man only, or inexpedient altogether? and do you call the latter good?

The good is the expedient; yet some things inexpedient are nevertheless good.

Certainly not the last, he replied; for I know of many things,—meats, drinks, medicines, and ten thousand other things, which are inexpedient for man, and some which are expedient; and some which are neither expedient nor inexpedient for man, but only for horses; and some for oxen only, and some for dogs; and some for no animals, but only for trees; and some for the roots of trees and not for their branches, as for example, manure, which is a good thing when laid about the roots of a tree, but utterly destructive if thrown upon the shoots and young branches; or I may instance olive oil, which is mischievous to all plants, and generally most injurious to the hair of every animal with the exception of man, but beneficial to human hair and to the human body generally; and even in this application (so various and changeable is the nature of the benefit), that which is the greatest good to the outward parts of a man, is a very great evil to his inward parts: and for this reason physicians always forbid their patients the use of oil in their food, except in very small quantities, just enough to extinguish the disagreeable sensation of smell in meats and sauces.

When he had given this answer, the company cheered him. And I said: Protagoras, I have a wretched memory, and when any one makes a long speech to me I never remember what he is talking about. As then, if I had been deaf, and you were going to converse with me, you would have had to raise your voice; so now, having such a bad memory, I will ask you to cut your answers shorter, if you would take me with you.

What do you mean? he said: how am I to shorten my answers? shall I make them too short?

Certainly not, I said.

But short enough?

Yes, I said.

Shall I answer what appears to me to be short enough, or what appears to you to be short enough?

I have heard, I said, that you can speak and teach others to speak about the same things at such length that words never seemed to fail, or with such brevity that no one could use fewer of them. Please therefore, if you talk with me, to adopt the latter or more compendious method.

*Protagoras.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTAGORAS.

*Protagoras  
answers in  
a lengthy  
manner,*

*and is re-  
quested by  
Socrates, who  
pretends to  
have a bad  
memory, to  
make his  
answers  
shorter.*



*Protagoras.*SOCRATES,  
PROTAGORAS,  
CALLIAS.As Protagoras  
declines to  
adopt his  
adversary's  
method,  
Socrates rises  
to depart,

Socrates, he replied, many a battle of words have I fought, and if I had followed the method of disputation which my adversaries desired, as you want me to do, I should have been no better than another, and the name of Protagoras would have been nowhere.

I saw that he was not satisfied with his previous answers, and that he would not play the part of answerer any more if he could help; and I considered that there was no call upon me to continue the conversation; so I said: Protagoras, I do not wish to force the conversation upon you if you had rather not, but when you are willing to argue with me in such a way that I can follow you, then I will argue with you. Now you, as is said of you by others and as you say of yourself, are able to have discussions in shorter forms of speech as well as in longer, for you are a master of wisdom; but I cannot manage these long speeches: I only wish that I could. You, on the other hand, who are capable of either, ought to speak shorter as I beg you, and then we might converse. But I see that you are disinclined, and as I have an engagement which will prevent my staying to hear you at greater length (for I have to be in another place), I will depart; although I should have liked to have heard you.

but is detained  
by Callias.

Thus I spoke, and was rising from my seat, when Callias seized me by the right hand, and in his left hand caught hold of this old cloak of mine. He said: We cannot let you go, Socrates, for if you leave us there will be an end of our discussions: I must therefore beg you to remain, as there is nothing in the world that I should like better than to hear you and Protagoras discourse. Do not deny the company this pleasure.

Socrates  
would be very  
willing to  
comply with  
his wishes if  
he could.

Now I had got up, and was in the act of departure. Son of Hipponicus, I replied, I have always admired, and do now heartily applaud and love your philosophical spirit, and I would gladly comply with your request, if I could. But the truth is that I cannot. And what you ask is as great an impossibility to me, as if you bade me run a race with Crison of Himera, when in his prime, or keep pace with one of the long or day course runners. To such a request I should reply that I would fain ask the same of my own legs; but they refuse to comply. And therefore if you want to see Crison

and me in the same stadium, you must bid him slacken his speed to mine, for I cannot run quickly, and he can run slowly. And in like manner if you want to hear me and Protagoras discoursing, you must ask him to shorten his answers, and keep to the point, as he did at first; if not, how can there be any discussion? For discussion is one thing, and making an oration is quite another, in my humble opinion.

But you see, Socrates, said Callias, that Protagoras may fairly claim to speak in his own way, just as you claim to speak in yours.

Here Alcibiades interposed, and said: That, Callias, is not a true statement of the case. For our friend Socrates admits that he cannot make a speech—in this he yields the palm to Protagoras: but I should be greatly surprised if he yielded to any living man in the power of holding and apprehending an argument. Now if Protagoras will make a similar admission of his inferiority to Socrates in argumentative skill, that is enough for Socrates; but if he claims a superiority in argument as well, let him ask and answer—not, when a question is asked, slipping away from the point, and instead of answering, haranguing at length until most of his hearers forget the question at issue (not that Socrates is likely to forget—I will be bound for him, although he may pretend in fun to have a bad memory). And Socrates appears to me to be more in the right than Protagoras; that is my view, and every man ought to say what he thinks.

When Alcibiades had done speaking, some one—Critias, I believe—went on to say: O Prodicus and Hippias, Callias appears to me to be a partisan of Protagoras: and this led Alcibiades, who loves opposition, to take the other side. But we should not be partisans either of Socrates or of Protagoras; let us rather unite in entreating both of them not to break up the discussion.

337 Prodicus added: That, Critias, seems to me to be well said, for those who are present at such discussions ought to be impartial hearers of both the speakers; remembering, however, that impartiality is not the same as equality, for both sides should be impartially heard, and yet an equal

*Protagoras.*

SOCRATES,  
CALLIAS,  
ALCIBIADES,  
CRITIAS,  
PRODICUS.

He cannot  
run, but  
Protagoras  
can walk.

Yet Prota-  
goras may  
claim to speak  
in his own  
manner.

Not so, says  
Alcibiades,  
unless he will  
admit his  
inferiority to  
Socrates in  
the shorter  
method.

Critias  
attempts to  
reconcile  
Protagoras  
and Socrates.

Prodicus in a  
balanced form  
of words  
advocates  
impartiality.

*Protagoras.*PRODICUS,  
HIPPIAS.

meed should not be assigned to both of them; but to the wiser a higher meed should be given, and a lower to the less wise. And I as well as Critias would beg you, Protagoras and Socrates, to grant our request, which is, that you will argue with one another and not wrangle; for friends argue with friends out of good-will, but only adversaries and enemies wrangle. And then our meeting will be delightful; for in this way you, who are the speakers, will be most likely to win esteem, and not praise only, among us who are your audience; for esteem is a sincere conviction of the hearers' souls, but praise is often an insincere expression of men uttering falsehoods contrary to their conviction. And thus we who are the hearers will be gratified and not pleased; for gratification is of the mind when receiving wisdom and knowledge, but pleasure is of the body when eating or experiencing some other bodily delight. Thus spoke Prodicus, and many of the company applauded his words.

Hippias, in a  
sententious  
speech,  
advocates the  
appointment  
of an arbiter.

Hippias the sage spoke next. He said: All of you who are here present I reckon to be kinsmen and friends and fellow-citizens, by nature and not by law; for by nature like is akin to like, whereas law is the tyrant of mankind, and often compels us to do many things which are against nature. How great would be the disgrace then, if we, who know the nature of things, and are the wisest of the Hellenes, and who, bearing such a high character, are met together in this city, which is the metropolis of wisdom, and in the greatest and most glorious house of this city, should have nothing to show worthy of this height of dignity, but should only quarrel with one another like the meanest of mankind! I do pray and advise you, Protagoras, and you, Socrates, to agree upon a compromise. Let us be your peace-makers. And do not you, Socrates, aim at this precise and extreme brevity in discourse, if Protagoras objects, but loosen 33 and let go the reins of speech, that your words may be grander and more becoming to you<sup>1</sup>. Neither do you, Protagoras, go forth on the gale with every sail set out of sight of land into an ocean of words, but let there be a mean observed by both of you. Do as I say. And let me also persuade you to

<sup>1</sup> Reading *ῥῆμιν*.

choose an arbiter or overseer or president; he will keep watch over your words and will prescribe their proper length.

*Protagoras.*

SOCRATES,  
CALLIAS,  
PROTAGORAS.

This proposal was received by the company with universal approval; Callias said that he would not let me off, and they begged me to choose an arbiter. But I said that to choose an umpire of discourse would be unseemly; for if the person chosen was inferior, then the inferior or worse ought not to preside over the better; or if he was equal, neither would that be well; for he who is our equal will do as we do, and what will be the use of choosing him? And if you say, 'Let us have a better then,' I answer that you cannot have any one who is wiser than Protagoras. And if you choose another who is not really better, and whom you only say is better, to put another over him as though he were an inferior person would be an unworthy reflection on him; not that, as far as I am concerned, any reflection is of much consequence to me. Let me tell you then what I will do in order that the conversation and discussion may go on as you desire. If Protagoras is not disposed to answer, let him ask and I will answer; and I will endeavour to show at the same time how, as I maintain, he ought to answer: and when I have answered as many questions as he likes to ask, let him in like manner answer me; and if he seems to be not very ready at answering the precise question asked of him, you and I will unite in entreating him, as you entreated me, not to spoil the discussion. And this will require no special arbiter—all of you shall be arbiters.

But there can be no arbiter superior to Protagoras, and therefore Socrates suggests that Protagoras shall ask, and he will answer; and when he is tired of asking, Socrates will ask and Protagoras shall answer.

This was generally approved, and Protagoras, though very much against his will, was obliged to agree that he would ask questions; and when he had put a sufficient number of them, that he would answer in his turn those which he was asked in short replies. He began to put his questions as follows:—

Protagoras reluctantly assents, and proposes to base his questions on a passage in Simonides.

339 I am of opinion, Socrates, he said, that skill in poetry is the principal part of education; and this I conceive to be the power of knowing what compositions of the poets are correct, and what are not, and how they are to be distinguished, and of explaining when asked the reason of the difference. And I propose to transfer the question which

*Protagoras.* you and I have been discussing to the domain of poetry; we  
*SOCRATES,* will speak as before of virtue, but in reference to a passage  
*PROTAGORAS.* of a poet. Now Simonides says to Scopas the son of Creon the Thessalian:—

‘Hardly on the one hand can a man become truly good, built four-square in hands and feet and mind, a work without a flaw.’

Do you know the poem? or shall I repeat the whole?

There is no need, I said; for I am perfectly well acquainted with the ode,—I have made a careful study of it.

Very well, he said. And does it appear to you to be a good composition, and true?

Yes, I said, both good and true.

But if there is a contradiction, can the composition be good or true?

No, not in that case, I replied.

And is there not a contradiction? he asked. Reflect.

Well, my friend, I have reflected.

And does not the poet proceed to say, ‘I do not agree with the word of Pittacus, albeit the utterance of a wise man: Hardly can a man be good?’ Now you will observe that this is said by the same poet.

I know it.

And do you think, he said, that the two sayings are consistent?

Yes, I said, I think so (at the same time I could not help fearing that there might be something in what he said). And you think otherwise?

There is an apparent contradiction in the words of Simonides; he blames what he also affirms.

Why, he said, how can he be consistent in both? First of all, premising as his own thought, ‘Hardly can a man become truly good;’ and then a little further on in the poem, forgetting, and blaming Pittacus and refusing to agree with him, when he says, ‘Hardly can a man be good,’ which is the very same thing. And yet when he blames him who says the same with himself, he blames himself; so that he must be wrong either in his first or his second assertion.

Many of the audience cheered and applauded this. And I felt at first giddy and faint, as if I had received a blow from the hand of an expert boxer, when I heard his words and the sound of the cheering; and to confess the truth, I wanted to get time to think what the meaning of the poet really was.



So I turned to Prodicus and called him. Prodicus, I said, Simonides is a countryman of yours, and you ought to come to his aid. I must appeal to you, like the river Scamander in Homer, who, when beleaguered by Achilles, summons the Simoïs to aid him, saying:

‘Brother dear, let us both together stay the force of the hero<sup>1</sup>.’

And I summon you, for I am afraid that Protagoras will make an end of Simonides. Now is the time to rehabilitate Simonides, by the application of your philosophy of synonyms, which enables you to distinguish ‘will’ and ‘wish,’ and make other charming distinctions like those which you drew just now. And I should like to know whether you would agree with me; for I am of opinion that there is no contradiction in the words of Simonides. And first of all I wish that you would say whether, in your opinion, Prodicus, ‘being’ is the same as ‘becoming.’

But the inconsistency is not a real one; for ‘being’ is not the same as ‘becoming.’

Not the same, certainly, replied Prodicus.

Did not Simonides first set forth, as his own view, that ‘Hardly can a man become truly good’?

Quite right, said Prodicus.

And then he blames Pittacus, not, as Protagoras imagines, for repeating that which he says himself, but for saying something different from himself. Pittacus does not say as Simonides says, that hardly can a man become good, but hardly can a man be good: and our friend Prodicus would maintain that being, Protagoras, is not the same as becoming; and if they are not the same, then Simonides is not inconsistent with himself. I dare say that Prodicus and many others would say, as Hesiod says,

‘On the one hand, hardly can a man become good,  
For the gods have made virtue the reward of toil;  
But on the other hand, when you have climbed the height,  
Then, to retain virtue, however difficult the acquisition, is easy<sup>2</sup>.’

Prodicus heard and approved; but Protagoras said: Your correction, Socrates, involves a greater error than is contained in the sentence which you are correcting.

Simonides could never have meant to say that virtue can be easily possessed.

Alas! I said, Protagoras; then I am a sorry physician, and do but aggravate a disorder which I am seeking to cure.

<sup>1</sup> Il. xxi. 308.

<sup>2</sup> Works and Days, 264 foll.



*Protagoras.*

Such is the fact, he said.

SOCRATES,

How so? I asked.

PRODICUS,  
PROTAGORAS.

The poet, he replied, could never have made such a mistake as to say that virtue, which in the opinion of all men is the hardest of all things, can be easily attained.

Socrates has  
learned from  
Prodicus that  
'hard' means  
'evil.'

Well, I said, and how fortunate are we in having Prodicus among us, at the right moment; for he has a wisdom, Protagoras, which, as I imagine, is more than human and of very ancient date, and may be as old as Simonides or even older. Learned as you are in many things, you appear to know nothing of this; but I know, for I am a disciple of his. And now, if I am not mistaken, you do not understand the word 'hard' (*χαλεπόν*) in the sense which Simonides intended; and I must correct you, as Prodicus corrects me when I use the word 'awful' (*δεινόν*) as a term of praise. If I say that Protagoras or any one else is an 'awfully' wise man, he asks me if I am not ashamed of calling that which is good 'awful'; and then he explains to me that the term 'awful' is always taken in a bad sense, and that no one speaks of being 'awfully' healthy or wealthy, or of 'awful' peace, but of 'awful' disease, 'awful' war, 'awful' poverty, meaning by the term 'awful,' evil. And I think that Simonides and his countrymen the Cean, when they spoke of 'hard' meant 'evil,' or something which you do not understand. Let us ask Prodicus, for he ought to be able to answer questions about the dialect of Simonides. What did he mean, Prodicus, by the term 'hard'?

Evil, said Prodicus.

And therefore, I said, Prodicus, he blames Pittacus for saying, 'Hard is the good,' just as if that were equivalent to saying, Evil is the good.

Yes, he said, that was certainly his meaning; and he is twitting Pittacus with ignorance of the use of terms, which in a Lesbian, who has been accustomed to speak a barbarous language, is natural.

Do you hear, Protagoras, I asked, what our friend Prodicus is saying? And have you an answer for him?

Nonsense,  
says Prota-  
goras.

You are entirely mistaken, Prodicus, said Protagoras; and I know very well that Simonides in using the word 'hard' meant what all of us mean, not evil, but that which is not

easy—that which takes a great deal of trouble: of this I am positive. *Protagoras.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTAGORAS.

We were only making trial of you, replies Socrates; but as you are not to be taken in, shall I offer an interpretation?

I said: I also incline to believe, Protagoras, that this was the meaning of Simonides, of which our friend Prodicus was very well aware, but he thought that he would make fun, and try if you could maintain your thesis; for that Simonides could never have meant the other is clearly proved by the context, in which he says that God only has this gift. Now he cannot surely mean to say that to be good is evil, when he afterwards proceeds to say that God only has this gift, and that this is the attribute of him and of no other. For if this be his meaning, Prodicus would impute to Simonides a character of recklessness which is very unlike his countrymen. And I should like to tell you, I said, what I imagine to be the real meaning of Simonides in this poem, if you will test what, in your way of speaking, would be called my skill in poetry; or if you would rather, I will be the listener.

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To this proposal Protagoras replied: As you please;—and Hippias, Prodicus, and the others told me by all means to do as I proposed.

The true ancient philosophy is to be found, not in the long discourses of the Sophists,

Then now, I said, I will endeavour to explain to you my opinion about this poem of Simonides. There is a very ancient philosophy which is more cultivated in Crete and Lacedaemon than in any other part of Hellas, and there are more philosophers in those countries than anywhere else in the world. This, however, is a secret which the Lacedaemonians deny; and they pretend to be ignorant, just because they do not wish to have it thought that they rule the world by wisdom, like the Sophists of whom Protagoras was speaking, and not by valour of arms; considering that if the reason of their superiority were disclosed, all men would be practising their wisdom. And this secret of theirs has never been discovered by the imitators of Lacedaemonian fashions in other cities, who go about with their ears bruised in imitation of them, and have the caestus bound on their arms, and are always in training, and wear short cloaks; for they imagine that these are the practices which have enabled the Lacedaemonians to conquer the other Hellenes. Now when the Lacedaemonians want to unbend and hold free conversation with their wise men, and are no longer satisfied

*Protagoras.*

SOCRATES.

but in the  
pregnant  
brevity of the  
Lacedae-  
monians.

with mere secret intercourse, they drive out all these laconizers, and any other foreigners who may happen to be in their country, and they hold a philosophical *séance* unknown to strangers; and they themselves forbid their young men to go out into other cities—in this they are like the Cretans—in order that they may not unlearn the lessons which they have taught them. And in Lacedaemon and Crete not only men but also women have a pride in their high cultivation. And hereby you may know that I am right in attributing to the Lacedaemonians this excellence in philosophy and speculation: If a man converses with the most ordinary Lacedaemonian, he will find him seldom good for much in general conversation, but at any point in the discourse he will be darting out some notable saying, terse and full of meaning, with unerring aim; and the person with whom he is talking seems to be like a child in his hands. And many of our own age and of former ages have noted that the true Lacedaemonian type of character has the love of philosophy even stronger than the love of gymnastics; they are conscious that only a perfectly educated man is capable of uttering such expressions. Such were Thales of Miletus, and Pittacus of Mitylene, and Bias of Priene, and our own Solon, and Cleobulus the Lindian, and Myson the Chenian; and seventh in the catalogue of wise men was the Lacedaemonian Chilo. All these were lovers and emulators and disciples of the culture of the Lacedaemonians, and any one may perceive that their wisdom was of this character; consisting of short memorable sentences, which they severally uttered. And they met together and dedicated in the temple of Apollo at Delphi, as the first-fruits of their wisdom, the far-famed inscriptions, which are in all men's mouths,—‘Know thyself,’ and ‘Nothing too much.’ 343

Why do I say all this? I am explaining that this Lacedaemonian brevity was the style of primitive philosophy. Now there was a saying of Pittacus which was privately circulated and received the approbation of the wise, ‘Hard is it to be good.’ And Simonides, who was ambitious of the fame of wisdom, was aware that if he could overthrow this saying, then, as if he had won a victory over some famous athlete, he would carry off the palm among his contemporaries.

And if I am not mistaken, he composed the entire poem with the secret intention of damaging Pittacus and his saying. *Protagoras.*

Let us all unite in examining his words, and see whether I am speaking the truth. Simonides must have been a lunatic, if, in the very first words of the poem, wanting to say only that to become good is hard, he inserted *μὲν*, 'on the one hand' ['on the one hand to become good is hard']; there would be no reason for the introduction of *μὲν*, unless you suppose him to speak with a hostile reference to the words of Pittacus. Socrates proposes an explanation, ingenious rather than true, of the verses of Simonides.

Pittacus is saying 'Hard is it to be good,' and he, in refutation of this thesis, rejoins that the truly hard thing, Pittacus, is to become good, not joining 'truly' with 'good,' but with 'hard.' Not, that the hard thing is to be truly good, as though there were some truly good men, and there were others who were good but not truly good (this would be a very simple observation, and quite unworthy of Simonides); but you must suppose him to make a trajection of the word 'truly' (*ἀλαθῆως*), construing the saying of Pittacus thus (and let us imagine Pittacus to be speaking and Simonides answering him): 'O my friends,' says Pittacus, 'hard is it to be good,' and Simonides answers, 'In that, Pittacus, you are mistaken; the difficulty is not to be good, but on the one hand, to become good, four-square in hands and feet and mind, without a flaw—that is hard truly.' This way of reading the passage accounts for the insertion of *μὲν*, 'on the one hand,' and for the position at the end of the clause of the word 'truly,' and all that follows shows this to be the meaning. A great deal might be said in praise of the details of the poem, which is a charming piece of workmanship, and very finished, but such minutiae would be tedious. I should like, however, to point out the general intention of the poem, which is certainly designed in every part to be a refutation of the saying of Pittacus. For he speaks in what follows a little further on as if he meant to argue that although there is a difficulty in becoming good, yet this is possible for a time, and only for a time. But having become good, to remain in a good state and be good, as you, Pittacus, affirm, is not possible, and is not granted to man; God only has this blessing; 'but man cannot help being bad when the force of circumstances overpowers him.' Now whom does

He seems to be adopting the Sophists' arts of interpretation.

*Protagoras.*

SOCRATES.

Socrates by  
the help of  
logic and  
rhetoric strives  
to elicit the  
meaning of  
Simonides.

the force of circumstance overpower in the command of a vessel?—not the private individual, for he is always overpowered; and as one who is already prostrate cannot be overthrown, and only he who is standing upright but not he who is prostrate can be laid prostrate, so the force of circumstances can only overpower him who, at some time or other, has resources, and not him who is at all times helpless. The descent of a great storm may make the pilot helpless, or the severity of the season the husbandman or the physician; for the good may become bad, as another poet witnesses:—

‘The good are sometimes good and sometimes bad.’

But the bad does not become bad; he is always bad. So that when the force of circumstances overpowers the man of resources and skill and virtue, then he cannot help being bad. And you, Pittacus, are saying, ‘Hard is it to be good.’ Now there is a difficulty in becoming good; and yet this is possible: but to be good is an impossibility—

‘For he who does well is the good man, and he who does ill is the bad.’

But what sort of doing is good in letters? and what sort of 345  
doing makes a man good in letters? Clearly the knowing of them. And what sort of well-doing makes a man a good physician? Clearly the knowledge of the art of healing the sick. ‘But he who does ill is the bad.’ Now who becomes a bad physician? Clearly he who is in the first place a physician, and in the second place a good physician; for he may become a bad one also: but none of us unskilled individuals can by any amount of doing ill become physicians, any more than we can become carpenters or anything of that sort; and he who by doing ill cannot become a physician at all, clearly cannot become a bad physician. In like manner the good may become deteriorated by time, or toil, or disease, or other accident (the only real doing ill is to be deprived of knowledge), but the bad man will never become bad, for he is always bad; and if he were to become bad, he must previously have been good. Thus the words of the poem tend to show that on the one hand a man cannot be continuously good, but that he may become good and may also become bad; and again that

‘They are the best for the longest time whom the gods love.’



All this relates to Pittacus, as is further proved by the sequel. · For he adds:—

‘Therefore I will not throw away my span of life to no purpose in searching after the impossible, hoping in vain to find a perfectly faultless man among those who partake of the fruit of the broad-bosomed earth: if I find him, I will send you word.’

(this is the vehement way in which he pursues his attack upon Pittacus throughout the whole poem):

‘But him who does no evil, voluntarily I praise and love;—not even the gods war against necessity.’


All this has a similar drift, for Simonides was not so ignorant as to say that he praised those who did no evil voluntarily, as though there were some who did evil voluntarily. For no wise man, as I believe, will allow that any human being errs voluntarily, or voluntarily does evil and dishonourable actions; but they are very well aware that all who do evil and dishonourable things do them against their will. And Simonides never says that he praises him who does no evil voluntarily; the word ‘voluntarily’ applies to himself. For he was under the impression that a good man might often compel himself to love and praise another<sup>1</sup>, and to be the friend and approver of another; and that there might be an involuntary love, such as a man might feel to an unnatural father or mother, or country, or the like. Now bad men, when their parents or country have any defects, look on them with malignant joy, and find fault with them and expose and denounce them to others, under the idea that the rest of mankind will be less likely to take themselves to task and accuse them of neglect; and they blame their defects far more than they deserve, in order that the odium which is necessarily incurred by them may be increased: but the good man dissembles his feelings, and constrains himself to praise them; and if they have wronged him and he is angry, he pacifies his anger and is reconciled, and compels himself to love and praise his own flesh and blood. And Simonides, as is probable, considered that he himself had often had to praise and magnify a tyrant or the like, much against his will, and he also wishes to imply to Pittacus that he does not censure him because he is censorious.

<sup>1</sup> Reading φιλεῖν καὶ ἐπαυεῖν καὶ φίλον τινὶ κ. τ. 2

Protagoras.

SOCRATES.

The entire poem is really a polemic against Pittacus.





*Protagoras.*SOCRATES,  
HIPPIAS,  
ALCIBIADES.

‘For I am satisfied,’ he says, ‘when a man is neither bad nor very stupid; and when he knows justice (which is the health of states), and is of sound mind, I will find no fault with him, for I am not given to finding fault, and there are innumerable fools’

(implying that if he delighted in censure he might have abundant opportunity of finding fault).

‘All things are good with which evil is unmingled.’

In these latter words he does not mean to say that all things are good which have no evil in them, as you might say ‘All things are white which have no black in them,’ for that would be ridiculous; but he means to say that he accepts and finds no fault with the moderate or intermediate state.

[‘I do not hope,’ he says, ‘to find a perfectly blameless man among those who partake of the fruits of the broad-bosomed earth (if I find him, I will send you word); in this sense I praise no man. But he who is moderately good, and does no evil, is good enough for me, who love and approve every one’]

(and here observe that he uses a Lesbian word, ἐπαίνημι (approve), because he is addressing Pittacus,—

‘Who love and approve every one voluntarily, who does no evil:’

and that the stop should be put after ‘voluntarily’); ‘but there are some whom I involuntarily praise and love. And you, Pittacus, I would never have blamed, if you had spoken what was moderately good and true; but I do blame you because, putting on the appearance of truth, you are speaking falsely about the highest matters.’—And this, I said, Prodicus and Protagoras, I take to be the meaning of Simonides in this poem.

Hippias  
thinks this an  
excellent  
interpretation  
of the poem;  
but he has a  
still better one  
of his own.

Hippias said: I think, Socrates, that you have given a very good explanation of the poem; but I have also an excellent interpretation of my own which I will propound to you, if you will allow me.

Nay, Hippias, said Alcibiades; not now, but at some other time. At present we must abide by the compact which was made between Socrates and Protagoras, to the effect that as long as Protagoras is willing to ask, Socrates should answer; or that if he would rather answer, then that Socrates should ask.

I said: I wish Protagoras either to ask or answer as he is

inclined; but I would rather have done with poems and odes, if he does not object, and come back to the question about which I was asking you at first, Protagoras, and by your help make an end of that. The talk about the poets seems to me like a commonplace entertainment to which a vulgar company have recourse; who, because they are not able to converse or amuse one another, while they are drinking, with the sound of their own voices and conversation, by reason of their stupidity, raise the price of flute-girls in the market, hiring for a great sum the voice of a flute instead of their own breath, to be the medium of intercourse among them: but where the company are real gentlemen and men of education, you will see no flute-girls, nor dancing-girls, nor harp-girls; and they have no nonsense or games, but are contented with one another's conversation, of which their own voices are the medium, and which they carry on by turns and in an orderly manner, even though they are very liberal in their potations. And a company like this of ours, and men such as we profess to be, do not require the help of another's voice, or of the poets whom you cannot interrogate about the meaning of what they are saying; people who cite them declaring, some that the poet has one meaning, and others that he has another, and the point which is in dispute can never be decided. This sort of entertainment they decline, and prefer to talk with one another, and put one another to the proof in conversation.

*Protagoras.*

SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

He is prevented from interrupting by Alcibiades. Socrates would rather have done with the poets and return to the argument.

348 And these are the models which I desire that you and I should imitate. Leaving the poets, and keeping to ourselves, let us try the mettle of one another and make proof of the truth in conversation. If you have a mind to ask, I am ready to answer; or if you would rather, do you answer, and give me the opportunity of resuming and completing our unfinished argument.

I made these and some similar observations; but Protagoras would not distinctly say which he would do. Thereupon Alcibiades turned to Callias, and said:—Do you think, Callias, that Protagoras is fair in refusing to say whether he will or will not answer? for I certainly think that he is unfair; he ought either to proceed with the argument, or distinctly to refuse to proceed, that we may

*Protagoras.*ALCIBIADES,  
SOCRATES.Protagoras is  
compelled to  
resume the  
argument.

know his intention; and then Socrates will be able to discourse with some one else, and the rest of the company will be free to talk with one another.

I think that Protagoras was really made ashamed by these words of Alcibiades, and when the prayers of Callias and the company were superadded, he was at last induced to argue, and said that I might ask and he would answer.

So I said: Do not imagine, Protagoras, that I have any other interest in asking questions of you but that of clearing up my own difficulties. For I think that Homer was very right in saying that

‘When two go together, one sees before the other <sup>1</sup>,’

for all men who have a companion are readier in deed, word, or thought; but if a man

‘Sees a thing when he is alone,’

he goes about straightway seeking until he finds some one to whom he may show his discoveries, and who may confirm him in them. And I would rather hold discourse with you than with any one, because I think that no man has a better understanding of most things which a good man may be expected to understand, and in particular of virtue. For who is there, but you?—who not only claim to be a good man and a gentleman, for many are this, and yet have not the power of making others good—whereas you are not only good yourself, but also the cause of goodness in others. Moreover such confidence have you in yourself, that although other Sophists conceal their profession, you proclaim in the face of Hellas that you are a Sophist or teacher of virtue and education, and are the first who demanded pay in return. How then can I do otherwise than invite you to the examination of these subjects, and ask questions and consult with you? I must, indeed. And I should like once more to have my memory refreshed by you about the questions which I was asking you at first, and also to have your help in considering them. If I am not mistaken the question was this: Are wisdom and temperance and courage and justice and holiness five names of the same thing? or has each of

Half ironical  
eulogium of  
Protagoras.

<sup>1</sup> Il. x. 224.

the names a separate underlying essence and corresponding thing having a peculiar function, no one of them being like any other of them? And you replied that the five names were not the names of the same thing, but that each of them had a separate object, and that all these objects were parts of virtue, not in the same way that the parts of gold are like each other and the whole of which they are parts, but as the parts of the face are unlike the whole of which they are parts and one another, and have each of them a distinct function. I should like to know whether this is still your opinion; or if not, I will ask you to define your meaning, and I shall not take you to task if you now make a different statement. For I dare say that you may have said what you did only in order to make trial of me.

I answer, Socrates, he said, that all these qualities are parts of virtue, and that four out of the five are to some extent similar, and that the fifth of them, which is courage, is very different from the other four, as I prove in this way: You may observe that many men are utterly unrighteous, unholy, intemperate, ignorant, who are nevertheless remarkable for their courage.

Stop, I said; I should like to think about that. When you speak of brave men, do you mean the confident, or another sort of nature?

Yes, he said; I mean the impetuous, ready to go at that which others are afraid to approach.

In the next place, you would affirm virtue to be a good thing, of which good thing you assert yourself to be a teacher.

Certainly, the best of all things; it would be madness to say anything else.

And is it partly good and partly bad, I said, or wholly good?

Wholly good, and in the highest degree.

350 Tell me then; who are they who have confidence when diving into a well?

I should say, the divers.

And the reason of this is that they have knowledge?

Yes, that is the reason.

And who have confidence when fighting on horseback—the skilled horseman or the unskilled?

The skilled.

*Protagoras.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTAGORAS.

To the old question,—  
'Are the virtues one or many?'—the old answer is returned that four out of five are to some extent similar, but the fifth, courage, is very different from the other four.

And the courageous are the confident; but not all the confident are truly courageous.

*Protagoras.*

And who when fighting with light shields—the peltasts or the nonpeltasts?

SOCRATES,

PROTAGORAS.

The peltasts. And so of all other things, he said, if that is your point: those who have knowledge are more confident than those who have no knowledge, and they are more confident after they have learned than before.

And have you not seen persons utterly ignorant, I said, of these things, and yet confident about them?

Yes, he said, I have seen such persons far too confident.

And are not these confident persons also courageous?

In that case, he replied, courage would be a base thing, for the men of whom we are speaking are surely madmen.

Then who are the courageous? Are they not the confident?

Yes, he said; to that statement I adhere.

And those, I said, who are thus confident without knowledge are really not courageous, but mad; and in that case the wisest are also the most confident, and being the most confident are also the bravest, and upon that view again wisdom will be courage.

Protagoras complains that Socrates has misrepresented him.

Nay, Socrates, he replied, you are mistaken in your remembrance of what was said by me. When you asked me, I certainly did say that the courageous are the confident; but I was never asked whether the confident are the courageous; if you had asked me, I should have answered 'Not all of them:' and what I did answer you have not proved to be false, although you proceeded to show that those who have knowledge are more courageous than they were before they had knowledge, and more courageous than others who have no knowledge, and were then led on to think that courage is the same as wisdom. But in this way of arguing you might come to imagine that strength is wisdom. You might begin by asking whether the strong are able, and I should say 'Yes;' and then whether those who know how to wrestle are not more able to wrestle than those who do not know how to wrestle, and more able after than before they had learned, and I should assent. And when I had admitted this, you might use my admissions in such a way as to prove that upon my view wisdom is strength; whereas in that case I should not have admitted, any more than in the other, that the able are strong, although I have admitted



351 that the strong are able. For there is a difference between ability and strength; the former is given by knowledge as well as by madness or rage, but strength comes from nature and a healthy state of the body. And in like manner I say of confidence and courage, that they are not the same; and I argue that the courageous are confident, but not all the confident courageous. For confidence may be given to men by art, and also, like ability, by madness and rage; but courage comes to them from nature and the healthy state of the soul.

*Protagoras.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTAGORAS.

I said: You would admit, Protagoras, that some men live well and others ill?

He assented.

And do you think that a man lives well who lives in pain and grief?

He does not.

But if he lives pleasantly to the end of his life, will he not in that case have lived well?

He will.

Then to live pleasantly is a good, and to live unpleasantly an evil?

Yes, he said, if the pleasure be good and honourable.

And do you, Protagoras, like the rest of the world, call some pleasant things evil and some painful things good?—for I am rather disposed to say that things are good in as far as they are pleasant, if they have no consequences of another sort, and in as far as they are painful they are bad.

Socrates insinuates that the pleasant is the good.

I do not know, Socrates, he said, whether I can venture to assert in that unqualified manner that the pleasant is the good and the painful the evil. Having regard not only to my present answer, but also to the whole of my life, I shall be safer, if I am not mistaken, in saying that there are some pleasant things which are not good, and that there are some painful things which are good, and some which are not good, and that there are some which are neither good nor evil.

Protagoras demurs to this assumption.

And you would call pleasant, I said, the things which participate in pleasure or create pleasure?

Certainly, he said.

Then my meaning is, that in as far as they are pleasant they



*Protagoras.*SOCRATES,  
PROTAGORAS.

are good ; and my question would imply that pleasure is a good in itself.

According to your favourite mode of speech, Socrates, 'let us reflect about this,' he said ; and if the reflection is to the point, and the result proves that pleasure and good are really the same, then we will agree ; but if not, then we will argue.

And would you wish to begin the enquiry? I said ; or shall I begin?

You ought to take the lead, he said ; for you are the author of the discussion.

Let Protagoras reveal to us his mind about knowledge.

May I employ an illustration? I said. Suppose some one who is enquiring into the health or some other bodily quality of another :—he looks at his face and at the tips of his fingers, and then he says, Uncover your chest and back to me that I may have a better view :—the enquiry which I desire to make is of this nature. Having seen what your opinion is about good and pleasure, I am minded to say to you : Uncover your mind to me, Protagoras, and reveal your opinion about knowledge, that I may know whether you agree with the rest of the world. Now the rest of the world conceive knowledge to be a principle not of strength, or of rule, or of command : their notion is that a man may have knowledge, and yet that the knowledge which is in him may be overmastered by anger, or pleasure, or pain, or love, or perhaps by fear,—just as if knowledge were a slave, and might be dragged about anyhow. Now is that your view? or do you think that knowledge is a noble and commanding thing, which cannot be overcome, and will not allow a man, if he only knows the difference of good and evil, to do anything which is contrary to knowledge, but that wisdom will have strength to help him?

Is not knowledge the strongest of all things? Protagoras agrees, but the world will not agree about this and many other things

I agree with you, Socrates, said Protagoras ; and not only so, but I, above all other men, am bound to say that wisdom and knowledge are the highest of human things.

Good, I said, and true. But are you aware that the majority of the world are of another mind ; and that men are commonly supposed to know the things which are best, and not to do them when they might? And most persons whom I have asked the reason of this have said that when men act contrary to knowledge they are overcome by pain, or pleasure,

or some of those affections which I was just now mentioning.

*Protagoras.*

Yes, Socrates, he replied; and that is not the only point about which mankind are in error.

SOCRATES,  
PROTAGORAS.

Suppose, then, that you and I endeavour to instruct and inform them what is the nature of this affection which they call 'being overcome by pleasure,' and which they affirm to be the reason why they do not always do what is best. When we say to them: Friends, you are mistaken, and are saying what is not true, they would probably reply: Socrates and Protagoras, if this affection of the soul is not to be called 'being overcome by pleasure,' pray, what is it, and by what name would you describe it?

which are  
true, never-  
theless.

But why, Socrates, should we trouble ourselves about the opinion of the many, who just say anything that happens to occur to them?

I believe, I said, that they may be of use in helping us to discover how courage is related to the other parts of virtue. If you are disposed to abide by our agreement, that I should show the way in which, as I think, our recent difficulty is most likely to be cleared up, do you follow; but if not, never mind.

You are quite right, he said; and I would have you proceed as you have begun.

Well then, I said, let me suppose them to repeat their question, What account do you give of that which, in our way of speaking, is termed being overcome by pleasure? I should answer thus: Listen, and Protagoras and I will endeavour to show you. When men are overcome by eating and drinking and other sensual desires which are pleasant, and they, knowing them to be evil, nevertheless indulge in them, would you not say that they were overcome by pleasure? They will not deny this. And suppose that you and I were to go on and ask them again: 'In what way do you say that they are evil,—in that they are pleasant and give pleasure at the moment, or because they cause disease and poverty and other like evils in the future? Would they still be evil, if they had no attendant evil consequences, simply because they give the consciousness of pleasure of whatever nature?'—Would they not answer that they are not evil on account of the pleasure which is immediately given by them,

*Protagoras.* but on account of the after consequences—diseases and the like?

*SOCRATES,  
PROTAGORAS.*

I believe, said Protagoras, that the world in general would answer as you do.

Pleasure is evil when it deprives us of some other pleasure.

And in causing diseases do they not cause pain? and in causing poverty do they not cause pain;—they would agree to that also, if I am not mistaken?

Protagoras assented.

Then I should say to them, in my name and yours: Do you think them evil for any other reason, except because they end in pain and rob us of other pleasures:—there again they would agree?

We both of us thought that they would.

Goods are painful which are remedial, and, though they occasion immediate suffering, bring good in the future.

And then I should take the question from the opposite point of view, and say: 'Friends, when you speak of goods being painful, do you not mean remedial goods, such as gymnastic exercises, and military service, and the physician's use of burning, cutting, drugging, and starving? Are these the things which are good but painful?'—they would assent to me?

He agreed.

'And do you call them good because they occasion the greatest immediate suffering and pain; or because, afterwards, they bring health and improvement of the bodily condition and the salvation of states and power over others and wealth?'—they would agree to the latter alternative, if I am not mistaken?

He assented.

'Are these things good for any other reason except that they end in pleasure, and get rid of and avert pain? Are you looking to any other standard but pleasure and pain when you call them good?'—they would acknowledge that they were not?

I think so, said Protagoras.

'And do you not pursue after pleasure as a good, and avoid pain as an evil?'

He assented.

Pain is an evil and pleasure is a good:

'Then you think that pain is an evil and pleasure is a good: and even pleasure you deem an evil, when it robs you of greater pleasures than it gives, or causes pains greater than

the pleasure. If, however, you call pleasure an evil in relation to some other end or standard, you will be able to show us that standard. But you have none to show.'

*Protagoras.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTAGORAS.

I do not think that they have, said Protagoras.

'And have you not a similar way of speaking about pain? You call pain a good when it takes away greater pains than those which it has, or gives pleasures greater than the pains: then if you have some standard other than pleasure and pain to which you refer when you call actual pain a good, you can show what that is. But you cannot.'

but pain is  
also a good  
when it takes  
away a  
greater pain.

True, said Protagoras.

Suppose again, I said, that the world says to me: 'Why do you spend many words and speak in many ways on this subject?' Excuse me, friends, I should reply; but in the first place there is a difficulty in explaining the meaning of the expression 'overcome by pleasure;' and the whole argument turns upon this. And even now, if you see any  
355 possible way in which evil can be explained as other than pain, or good as other than pleasure, you may still retract. Are you satisfied, then, at having a life of pleasure which is without pain? If you are, and if you are unable to show any good or evil which does not end in pleasure and pain, hear the consequences:—If what you say is true, then the argument is absurd which affirms that a man often does evil knowingly, when he might abstain, because he is seduced and overpowered by pleasure; or again, when you say that a man knowingly refuses to do what is good because he is overcome at the moment by pleasure. And that this is ridiculous will be evident if only we give up the use of various names, such as pleasant and painful, and good and evil. As there are two things, let us call them by two names—first, good and evil, and then pleasant and painful. Assuming this, let us go on to say that a man does evil although he knows it to be evil. But some one will ask, Why? Because he is overcome, is the first answer. And by what is he overcome? the enquirer will proceed to ask. And we shall not be able to reply 'By pleasure,' for the name of pleasure has been exchanged for that of good. In our answer, then, we shall only say that he is overcome. 'By what?' he will reiterate. By the good, we shall have to reply; indeed we

When we say  
of a man that  
he is overcome  
by pleasure  
we only mean  
that he is  
overcome  
by a lesser  
pleasure.

*Protagoras.*

SOCRATES.

Whether we  
speak of  
pleasure and  
pain, or of  
good and evil,  
the result is  
the same.

shall. Nay, but our questioner will rejoin with a laugh, if he be one of the swaggering sort, 'It is too ridiculous for a man to do what he knows to be evil when he ought not, because he is overcome by good. Is that, he will ask, because the good was worthy or not worthy of conquering the evil?' And to that question we shall obviously reply, 'Because it was not worthy; for if it had been worthy, then he who, as we say, was overcome by pleasure, would not have been wrong. 'But how,' he will reply, 'can the good be unworthy of the evil, or the evil of the good?' Is not the real explanation that they are out of proportion to one another, either as greater and smaller, or more and fewer? This we cannot deny. And when you speak of being overcome—'what do you mean,' he will say, 'but that you choose the greater evil in exchange for the lesser good?' Admitted. And now substitute the names of pleasure and pain for good and evil, and say, not as before, that a man does what is evil knowingly, but that he does what is painful knowingly, and because he is overcome by pleasure, which is unworthy to overcome. What measure is there of the relations of pleasure to pain other than excess and defect, which means that they become greater and smaller, and more and fewer, and differ in degree? For if any one says: 'Yes, Socrates, but immediate pleasure differs widely from future pleasure and pain'—To that I should reply: And do they differ in anything but in pleasure and pain? There can be no other measure of them. And do you, like a skilful weigher, put into the balance the pleasures and the pains, and also their nearness and distance, and weigh them, and then say which outweighs the other. If you weigh pleasures against pleasures, you of course take the more and greater; or if you weigh pains against pains, you take the fewer and the less; or if pleasures against pains, then you choose that course of action in which the painful is exceeded by the pleasant, whether the distant by the near or the near by the distant; and you avoid that course of action in which the pleasant is exceeded by the painful. Would you not admit, my friends, that this is true? I am confident that they cannot deny it.

He agreed with me.



Well then, I shall say, if you agree so far, be so good as to answer me a question: Do not the same magnitudes appear larger to your sight when near, and smaller when at a distance? They will acknowledge that. And the same holds of thickness and number; also sounds, which are in themselves equal, are greater when near, and lesser when at a distance. They will grant that also. Now suppose happiness to consist in doing or choosing the greater, and in not doing or in avoiding the less, what would be the saving principle of human life? Would not the art of measuring be the saving principle; or would the power of appearance? Is not the latter that deceiving art which makes us wander up and down and take the things at one time of which we repent at another, both in our actions and in our choice of things great and small? But the art of measurement would do away with the effect of appearances, and, showing the truth, would fain teach the soul at last to find rest in the truth, and would thus save our life. Would not mankind generally acknowledge that the art which accomplishes this result is the art of measurement?

*Protagoras.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTAGORAS.

Pleasures are made greater or less by distance; that is, they appear to be greater.

The art of measuring contrasted with the power of appearance.

The numbering principle and the measuring principle are the laws of human life.

Yes, he said, the art of measurement.

Suppose, again, the salvation of human life to depend on the choice of odd and even, and on the knowledge of when a man ought to choose the greater or less, either in reference to themselves or to each other, and whether near or at a distance; what would be the saving principle of our lives? Would not knowledge?—a knowledge of measuring, when the question is one of excess and defect, and a knowledge of number, when the question is of odd and even? The world will assent, will they not?

Protagoras himself thought that they would.

Well then, my friends, I say to them; seeing that the salvation of human life has been found to consist in the right choice of pleasures and pains,—in the choice of the more and the fewer, and the greater and the less, and the nearer and remoter, must not this measuring be a consideration of their excess and defect and equality in relation to each other?

This is undeniably true.



*Protagoras.*

And this, as possessing measure, must undeniably also be an art and science?

SOCRATES,

PROTAGORAS.

They will agree, he said.

Thus we arrive at the conclusion that men err in their choice of good and evil through ignorance, and yet the world refuses to be taught by the Sophists who are the physicians of ignorance.

The nature of that art or science will be a matter of future consideration; but the existence of such a science furnishes a demonstrative answer to the question which you asked of me and Protagoras. At the time when you asked the question, if you remember, both of us were agreeing that there was nothing mightier than knowledge, and that knowledge, in whatever existing, must have the advantage over pleasure and all other things; and then you said that pleasure often got the advantage even over a man who has knowledge; and we refused to allow this, and you rejoined: O Protagoras and Socrates, what is the meaning of being overcome by pleasure if not this?—tell us what you call such a state:—if we had immediately and at the time answered ‘Ignorance,’ you would have laughed at us. But now, in laughing at us, you will be laughing at yourselves: for you also admitted that men err in their choice of pleasures and pains; that is, in their choice of good and evil, from defect of knowledge; and you admitted further, that they err, not only from defect of knowledge in general, but of that particular knowledge which is called measuring. And you are also aware that the erring act which is done without knowledge is done in ignorance. This, therefore, is the meaning of being overcome by pleasure;—ignorance, and that the greatest. And our friends Protagoras and Prodicus and Hippias declare that they are the physicians of ignorance; but you, who are under the mistaken impression that ignorance is not the cause, and that the art of which I am speaking cannot be taught, neither go yourselves, nor send your children, to the Sophists, who are the teachers of these things—you take care of your money and give them none; and the result is, that you are the worse off both in public and private life:—Let us suppose this to be our answer to the world in general: And now I should like to ask you, Hippias, and you, Prodicus, as well as Protagoras (for the argument is to be yours as well as ours), whether you think that I am speaking the truth or not?

They all thought that what I said was entirely true.

Then you agree, I said, that the pleasant is the good, and the painful evil. And here I would beg my friend Prodicus not to introduce his distinction of names, whether he is disposed to say pleasurable, delightful, joyful. However, by whatever name he prefers to call them, I will ask you, most excellent Prodicus, to answer in my sense of the words.

*Protagoras.*  
SOCRATES,  
PROTAGORAS.

Prodicus laughed and assented, as did the others.

Then, my friends, what do you say to this? Are not all actions honourable and useful, of which the tendency is to make life painless and pleasant? The honourable work is also useful and good?

This was admitted.

Then, I said, if the pleasant is the good, nobody does anything under the idea or conviction that some other thing would be better and is also attainable, when he might do the better. And this inferiority of a man to himself is merely ignorance, as the superiority of a man to himself is wisdom.

They all assented.

And is not ignorance the having a false opinion and being deceived about important matters?

To this also they unanimously assented.

Then, I said, no man voluntarily pursues evil, or that which he thinks to be evil. To prefer evil to good is not in human nature; and when a man is compelled to choose one of two evils, no one will choose the greater when he may have the less.

No man  
voluntarily  
pursues evil.

All of us agreed to every word of this.

Well, I said, there is a certain thing called fear or terror; and here, Prodicus, I should particularly like to know whether you would agree with me in defining this fear or terror as expectation of evil.

Protagoras and Hippias agreed, but Prodicus said that this was fear and not terror.

Never mind, Prodicus, I said; but let me ask whether, if our former assertions are true, a man will pursue that which he fears when he is not compelled? Would not this be in flat contradiction to the admission which has been already made, that he thinks the things which he fears to be evil; and no one will pursue or voluntarily accept that which he thinks to be evil?

Then will a  
man pursue  
that which he  
fears, although  
he need not?

*Protagoras.*

That also was universally admitted.

SOCRATES,  
PROTAGORAS.

Then, I said, these, Hippias and Prodicus, are our premisses; and I would beg Protagoras to explain to us how he can be right in what he said at first. I do not mean in what he said quite at first, for his first statement, as you may remember, was that whereas there were five parts of virtue none of them was like any other of them; each of them had a separate function. To this, however, I am not referring, but to the assertion which he afterwards made that of the five virtues four were nearly akin to each other, but that the fifth, which was courage, differed greatly from the others. And of this he gave me the following proof. He said: You will find, Socrates, that some of the most impious, and unrighteous, and intemperate, and ignorant of men are among the most courageous; which proves that courage is very different from the other parts of virtue. I was surprised at his saying this at the time, and I am still more surprised now that I have discussed the matter with you. So I asked him whether by the brave he meant the confident. Yes, he replied, and the impetuous or goers. (You may remember, Protagoras, that this was your answer.)

He assented.

Well then, I said, tell us against what are the courageous ready to go—against the same dangers as the cowards?

No, he answered.

Then against something different?

Yes, he said.

Then do cowards go where there is safety, and the courageous where there is danger?

Yes, Socrates, so men say.

Very true, I said. But I want to know against what do you say that the courageous are ready to go—against dangers, believing them to be dangers, or not against dangers?

No, said he; the former case has been proved by you in the previous argument to be impossible.

That, again, I replied, is quite true. And if this has been rightly proven, then no one goes to meet what he thinks to be dangers, since the want of self-control, which makes men rush into dangers, has been shown to be ignorance.

He assented.

The courageous pursue dangers, but not in the belief that they are dangers. The courageous and the cowardly alike go to

And yet the courageous man and the coward alike go to meet that about which they are confident; so that, in this point of view, the cowardly and the courageous go to meet the same things.

And yet, Socrates, said Protagoras, that to which the coward goes is the opposite of that to which the courageous goes; the one, for example, is ready to go to battle, and the other is not ready.

And is going to battle honourable or disgraceful? I said.

Honourable, he replied.

And if honourable, then already admitted by us to be good; for all honourable actions we have admitted to be good.

That is true; and to that opinion I shall always adhere.

360 True, I said. But which of the two are they who, as you say, are unwilling to go to war, which is a good and honourable thing?

The cowards, he replied.

And what is good and honourable, I said, is also pleasant?

It has certainly been acknowledged to be so, he replied.

And do the cowards knowingly refuse to go to the nobler, and pleasanter, and better?

The admission of that, he replied, would belie our former admissions.

But does not the courageous man also go to meet the better, and pleasanter, and nobler?

That must be admitted.

And the courageous man has no base fear or base confidence?

True, he replied.

And if not base, then honourable?

He admitted this.

And if honourable, then good?

Yes.

But the fear and confidence of the coward or foolhardy or madman, on the contrary, are base?

He assented.

And these base fears and confidences originate in ignorance and uninstructedness?

*Protagoras.*  
SOCRATES,  
PROTAGORAS.  
meet dangers,  
but they have  
different no-  
tions of what  
constitutes  
danger.

*Protagoras.*

True, he said.

SOCRATES,  
PROTAGORAS.

Then as to the motive from which the cowards act, do you call it cowardice or courage?

I should say cowardice, he replied.

And have they not been shown to be cowards through their ignorance of dangers?

Assuredly, he said.

And because of that ignorance they are cowards?

He assented.

And the reason why they are cowards is admitted by you to be cowardice?

He again assented.

Then the ignorance of what is and is not dangerous is cowardice?

He nodded assent.

But surely courage, I said, is opposed to cowardice?

Yes.

Then the wisdom which knows what are and are not dangers is opposed to the ignorance of them?

To that again he nodded assent.

And the ignorance of them is cowardice?

To that he very reluctantly nodded assent.

And the knowledge of that which is and is not dangerous is courage, and is opposed to the ignorance of these things?

At this point he would no longer nod assent, but was silent.

And why, I said, do you neither assent nor dissent, Protagoras?

Finish the argument by yourself, he said.

I only want to ask one more question, I said. I want to know whether you still think that there are men who are most ignorant and yet most courageous?

You seem to have a great ambition to make me answer, Socrates, and therefore I will gratify you, and say, that this appears to me to be impossible consistently with the argument.

Compliment-  
ary speeches  
which  
Socrates

My only object, I said, in continuing the discussion, has been the desire to ascertain the nature and relations of virtue; for if this were clear, I am very sure that the other controversy which has been carried on at great length by both of us—you 361



affirming and I denying that virtue can be taught—would also become clear. The result of our discussion appears to me to be singular. For if the argument had a human voice, that voice would be heard laughing at us and saying: ‘Protagoras and Socrates, you are strange beings; there are you, Socrates, who were saying that virtue cannot be taught, contradicting yourself now by your attempt to prove that all things are knowledge, including justice, and temperance, and courage,—which tends to show that virtue can certainly be taught; for if virtue were other than knowledge, as Protagoras attempted to prove, then clearly virtue cannot be taught; but if virtue is entirely knowledge, as you are seeking to show, then I cannot but suppose that virtue is capable of being taught. Protagoras, on the other hand, who started by saying that it might be taught, is now eager to prove it to be anything rather than knowledge; and if this is true, it must be quite incapable of being taught.’ Now I, Protagoras, perceiving this terrible confusion of our ideas, have a great desire that they should be cleared up. And I should like to carry on the discussion until we ascertain what virtue is, and whether capable of being taught or not, lest haply Epimetheus should trip us up and deceive us in the argument, as he forgot us in the story; I prefer your Prometheus to your Epimetheus, for of him I make use, whenever I am busy about these questions, in Promethean care of my own life. And if you have no objection, as I said at first, I should like to have your help in the enquiry.

Protagoras replied: Socrates, I am not of a base nature, and I am the last man in the world to be envious. I cannot but applaud your energy and your conduct of an argument. As I have often said, I admire you above all men whom I know, and far above all men of your age; and I believe that you will become very eminent in philosophy. Let us come back to the subject at some future time; at present we had better turn to something else.

By all means, I said, if that is your wish; for I too ought long since to have kept the engagement of which I spoke before, and only tarried because I could not refuse the request of the noble Callias. So the conversation ended, and we went our way.

*Protagoras.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTAGORAS.

and Protagoras address to one another. They have somehow both of them changed their position in the course of the argument.





EUTHYDEMUS.



## INTRODUCTION.

THE Euthydemus, though apt to be regarded by us only as an elaborate jest, has also a very serious purpose. It may fairly claim to be the oldest treatise on logic; for that science originates in the misunderstandings which necessarily accompany the first efforts of speculation. Several of the fallacies which are satirized in it reappear in the Sophistici Elenchi of Aristotle and are retained at the end of our manuals of logic. But if the order of history were followed, they should be placed not at the end but at the beginning of them; for they belong to the age in which the human mind was first making the attempt to distinguish thought from sense, and to separate the universal from the particular or individual. How to put together words or ideas, how to escape ambiguities in the meaning of terms or in the structure of propositions, how to resist the fixed impression of an 'eternal being' or 'perpetual flux,' how to distinguish between words and things—these were problems not easy of solution in the infancy of philosophy. They presented the same kind of difficulty to the half-educated man which spelling or arithmetic do to the mind of a child. It was long before the new world of ideas which had been sought after with such passionate yearning was set in order and made ready for use. To us the fallacies which arise in the pre-Socratic philosophy are trivial and obsolete because we are no longer liable to fall into the errors which are expressed by them. The intellectual world has become better assured to us, and we are less likely to be imposed upon by illusions of words.

The logic of Aristotle is for the most part latent in the dialogues of Plato. The nature of definition is explained not by rules but by examples in the Charmides, Lysis, Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Euthyphro, Theaetetus, Gorgias, Republic; the nature of division is likewise illustrated by examples in the Sophist (p. 219 ff.) and

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TION.

*Euthydemus.* Statesman (283 ff.) ; a scheme of categories is found in the *Philebus* (p. 66) ; the true doctrine of contradiction (436 ff.) is taught, and the fallacy of arguing in a circle (p. 505) is exposed in the *Republic* ; the nature of synthesis and analysis is graphically described in the *Phaedrus* (p. 265) ; the nature of words is analysed in the *Cratylus* ; the form of the syllogism is indicated in the genealogical trees of the *Sophist* and *Statesman* ; a true doctrine of predication and an analysis of the sentence are given in the *Sophist* (p. 262) ; the different meanings of one and being are worked out in the *Parmenides*. Here we have most of the important elements of logic, not yet systematized or reduced to an art or science, but scattered up and down as they would naturally occur in ordinary discourse. They are of little or no use or significance to us ; but because we have grown out of the need of them we should not therefore despise them. They are still interesting and instructive for the light which they shed on the history of the human mind.

There are indeed many old fallacies which linger among us, and new ones are constantly springing up. But they are not of the kind to which ancient logic can be usefully applied. The weapons of common sense, not the analytics of Aristotle, are needed for their overthrow. Nor is the use of the Aristotelian logic any longer natural to us. We no longer put arguments into the form of syllogisms like the schoolmen ; the simple use of language has been, happily, restored to us. Neither do we discuss the nature of the proposition, nor extract hidden truths from the copula, nor dispute any longer about nominalism and realism. We do not confuse the form with the matter of knowledge, or invent laws of thought, or imagine that any single science furnishes a principle of reasoning to all the rest. Neither do we require categories or heads of argument to be invented for our use. Those who have no knowledge of logic, like some of our great physical philosophers, seem to be quite as good reasoners as those who have. Most of the ancient puzzles have been settled on the basis of usage and common sense ; there is no need to reopen them. No science should raise problems or invent forms of thought which add nothing to knowledge and are of no use in assisting the acquisition of it. This seems to be the natural limit of logic and metaphysics ; if they give us a more comprehensive or a more definite view of

the different spheres of knowledge they are to be studied; if not, not. The better part of ancient logic appears hardly in our own day to have a separate existence; it is absorbed in two other sciences: (1) rhetoric, if indeed this ancient art be not also fading away into literary criticism; (2) the science of language, under which all questions relating to words and propositions and the combinations of them may properly be included.

To continue dead or imaginary sciences, which make no signs of progress and have no definite sphere, tends to interfere with the prosecution of living ones. The study of them is apt to blind the judgment and to render men incapable of seeing the value of evidence, and even of appreciating the nature of truth. Nor should we allow the living science to become confused with the dead by an ambiguity of language. The term logic has two different meanings, an ancient and a modern one, and we vainly try to bridge the gulf between them. Many perplexities are avoided by keeping them apart. There might certainly be a new science of logic; it would not however be built up out of the fragments of the old, but would be distinct from them—relative to the state of knowledge which exists at the present time, and based chiefly on the methods of Modern Inductive philosophy. Such a science might have two legitimate fields: first, the refutation and explanation of false philosophies still hovering in the air as they appear from the point of view of later experience or are comprehended in the history of the human mind, as in a larger horizon: secondly, it might furnish new forms of thought more adequate to the expression of all the diversities and oppositions of knowledge which have grown up in these latter days; it might also suggest new methods of enquiry derived from the comparison of the sciences. Few will deny that the introduction of the words ‘subject’ and ‘object’ and the Hegelian reconciliation of opposites have been ‘most gracious aids’ to psychology, or that the methods of Bacon and Mill have shed a light far and wide on the realms of knowledge. These two great studies, the one destructive and corrective of error, the other conservative and constructive of truth, might be a first and second part of logic. Ancient logic would be the propaedeutic or gate of approach to logical science,—nothing more. But to pursue such speculations further, though not irrelevant, might lead us too far away from the argument of the dialogue.

*Euthydemus.*

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TION.



*Euthydemus.*INTRODUC-  
TION.

The *Euthydemus* is, of all the Dialogues of Plato, that in which he approaches most nearly to the comic poet. The mirth is broader, the irony more sustained, the contrast between Socrates and the two Sophists, although veiled, penetrates deeper than in any other of his writings. Even Thrasymachus, in the *Republic*, is at last pacified, and becomes a friendly and interested auditor of the great discourse. But in the *Euthydemus* the mask is never dropped; the accustomed irony of Socrates continues to the end. . . . .

ANALYSIS.

Socrates narrates to Crito a remarkable scene in which he has <sup>Steph</sup> himself taken part, and in which the two brothers, Dionysodorus <sup>271</sup> and Euthydemus, are the chief performers. They are natives of Chios, who had settled at Thurii, but were driven out, and in former days had been known at Athens as professors of rhetoric and of the art of fighting in armour. To this they have now added a new accomplishment—the art of Eristic, or fighting with words, <sup>272</sup> which they are likewise willing to teach ‘for a consideration.’ But they can also teach virtue in a very short time and in the very best manner. Socrates, who is always on the look-out for teachers of virtue, is interested in the youth Cleinias, the grandson of the great Alcibiades, and is desirous that he should have the benefit of their instructions. He is ready to fall down and worship them; although the greatness of their professions does arouse in his mind a temporary incredulity.

A circle gathers round them, in the midst of which are Socrates, the two brothers, the youth Cleinias, who is watched by the eager eyes of his lover Ctesippus, and others. The performance begins; <sup>275</sup> and such a performance as might well seem to require an invocation of Memory and the Muses. It is agreed that the brothers shall question Cleinias. ‘Cleinias,’ says Euthydemus, ‘who learn, the wise or the unwise?’ ‘The wise,’ is the reply; given with blushing and hesitation. ‘And yet when you learned you did not <sup>276</sup> know and were not wise.’ Then Dionysodorus takes up the ball: ‘Who are they who learn dictation of the grammar-master; the <sup>277</sup> wise boys or the foolish boys?’ ‘The wise.’ ‘Then, after all, the wise learn.’ ‘And do they learn,’ said Euthydemus, ‘what they know or what they do not know?’ ‘The latter.’ ‘And dictation is a dictation of letters?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘And you know letters?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘Then you learn what you know.’ ‘But,’ retorts Dionyso-

dorus, 'is not learning acquiring knowledge?' 'Yes.' 'And you acquire that which you have not got already?' 'Yes.' 'Then you learn that which you do not know.'

Euthydemus.

ANALYSIS.

Socrates is afraid that the youth Cleinias may be discouraged at these repeated overthrows. He therefore explains to him the nature of the process to which he is being subjected. The two strangers are not serious; there are jests at the mysteries which precede the enthronement, and he is being initiated into the mysteries of the sophistical ritual. This is all a sort of horse-play, which is now ended. The exhortation to virtue will follow, and Socrates himself (if the wise men will not laugh at him) is desirous of showing the way in which such an exhortation should be carried on, according to his own poor notion. He proceeds to question Cleinias. The result of the investigation may be summed up as follows:—

- 279 All men desire good; and good means the possession of goods, such as wealth, health, beauty, birth, power, honour; not forgetting the virtues and wisdom. And yet in this enumeration the greatest good of all is omitted. What is that? Good fortune. But what need is there of good fortune when we have wisdom already: — in every art and business are not the wise also the fortunate?
- 280 This is admitted. And again, the possession of goods is not enough; there must also be a right use of them which can only be
- 281 given by knowledge: in themselves they are neither good nor evil — knowledge and wisdom are the only good, and ignorance and
- 282 folly the only evil. The conclusion is that we must get 'wisdom.' But can wisdom be taught? 'Yes,' says Cleinias. The ingenuousness of the youth delights Socrates, who is at once relieved from the necessity of discussing one of his great puzzles. 'Since wisdom is the only good, he must become a philosopher, or lover
- 283 of wisdom.' 'That I will,' says Cleinias.

After Socrates has given this specimen of his own mode of instruction, the two brothers recommence their exhortation to virtue, which is of quite another sort.

'You want Cleinias to be wise?' 'Yes.' 'And he is not wise yet?' 'No.' 'Then you want him to be what he is not, and not to be what he is? — not to be — that is, to perish. Pretty lovers and friends you must all be!'

- 284 Here Ctesippus, the lover of Cleinias, interposes in great excitement, thinking that he will teach the two Sophists a lesson of

*Euthydemus.*

ANALYSIS.

good manners. But he is quickly entangled in the meshes of their sophistry; and as a storm seems to be gathering Socrates pacifies him with a joke, and Ctesippus then says that he is not reviling the two Sophists, he is only contradicting them. 'But,' says Dionysodorus, 'there is no such thing as contradiction. When you and I describe the same thing, or you describe one thing and I describe another, how can there be a contradiction?' Ctesippus is unable to reply.

Socrates has already heard of the denial of contradiction, and would like to be informed by the great master of the art, 'What is the meaning of this paradox? Is there no such thing as error, ignorance, falsehood? Then what are they professing to teach?' The two Sophists complain that Socrates is ready to answer what they said a year ago, but is 'non-plussed' at what they are saying now. 'What does the word "non-plussed" mean?' Socrates is informed, in reply, that words are lifeless things, and lifeless things have no sense or meaning. Ctesippus again breaks out, and again has to be pacified by Socrates, who renews the conversation with Cleinias. The two Sophists are like Proteus in the variety of their transformations, and he, like Menelaus in the *Odyssey* (iv. 306 ff.), hopes to restore them to their natural form.

He had arrived at the conclusion that Cleinias must become a philosopher. And philosophy is the possession of knowledge; and knowledge must be of a kind which is profitable and may be used. What knowledge is there which has such a nature? Not the knowledge which is required in any particular art; nor again the art of the composer of speeches, who knows how to write them, but cannot speak them, although he too must be admitted to be a kind of enchanter of wild animals. Neither is the knowledge which we are seeking the knowledge of the general. For the general makes over his prey to the statesman, as the huntsman does to the cook, or the taker of quails to the keeper of quails; he has not the use of that which he acquires. The two enquirers, Cleinias and Socrates, are described as wandering about in a wilderness, vainly searching after the art of life and happiness. At last they fix upon the kingly art, as having the desired sort of knowledge. But the kingly art only gives men those goods which are neither good nor evil: and if we say further that it makes us wise, in what does it make us wise? Not in special arts,

such as cobbling or carpentering, but only in itself: or say again that it makes us good, there is no answer to the question, 'good in what?' At length in despair Cleinias and Socrates turn to the

*Euthydemus.*

ANALYSIS.

293 'Dioscuri' and request their aid.

Euthydemus argues that Socrates knows something; and as he cannot know and not know, he cannot know some things and not  
 294 know others, and therefore he knows all things: he and Dionysodorus and all other men know all things. 'Do they know shoe-making, &c.?' 'Yes.' The sceptical Ctesippus would like to have some evidence of this extraordinary statement: he will believe if Euthydemus will tell him how many teeth Dionysodorus has, and if Dionysodorus will give him a like piece of information about  
 295 Euthydemus. Even Socrates is incredulous, and indulges in a little raillery at the expense of the brothers. But he restrains  
 296 himself, remembering that if the men who are to be his teachers think him stupid they will take no pains with him. Another fallacy is produced which turns on the absoluteness of the verb 'to know.' And here Dionysodorus is caught 'napping,' and is induced by  
 297 Socrates to confess that 'he does not know the good to be unjust.' Socrates appeals to his brother Euthydemus; at the same time he acknowledges that he cannot, like Heracles, fight against a Hydra, and even Heracles, on the approach of a second monster, called upon his nephew Iolaus to help. Dionysodorus rejoins that Iolaus was no more the nephew of Heracles than of Socrates.  
 298 For a nephew is a nephew, and a brother is a brother, and a father is a father, not of one man only, but of all; nor of men only, but of dogs and sea-monsters. Ctesippus makes merry with the  
 299 consequences which follow: 'Much good has your father got out of the wisdom of his puppies.'

'But,' says Euthydemus, unabashed, 'nobody wants much good.' Medicine is a good, arms are a good, money is a good, and yet there may be too much of them in wrong places. 'No,' says Ctesippus, 'there cannot be too much gold.' 'And would you be happy if you had three talents of gold in your belly, a talent in your pate, and a stater in either eye?' Ctesippus, imitating the new wisdom, replies, 'And do not the Scythians reckon those to be the happiest of men who have their skulls gilded and see the  
 300 inside of them?' 'Do you see,' retorts Euthydemus, 'what has the quality of vision or what has not the quality of vision?' 'What

*Euthydemus.* has the quality of vision.' 'And you see our garments?' 'Yes.'  
*ANALYSIS.* 'Then our garments have the quality of vision.' A similar play of words follows, which is successfully retorted by Ctesippus, to the great delight of Cleinias, who is rebuked by Socrates for laughing at such solemn and beautiful things.

'But are there any beautiful things? And if there are such, are they the same or not the same as absolute beauty?' Socrates replies that they are not the same, but each of them has some beauty present with it. 'And are you an ox because you have an ox present with you?' After a few more amphiboliae, in which Socrates, like Ctesippus, in self-defence borrows the weapons of the brothers, they both confess that the two heroes are invincible; and the scene concludes with a grand chorus of shouting and laughing, and a panegyrical oration from Socrates:—

First, he praises the indifference of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus to public opinion; for most persons would rather be refuted by such arguments than use them in the refutation of others. Secondly, he remarks upon their impartiality; for they stop their own mouths, as well as those of other people. Thirdly, he notes their liberality, which makes them give away their secret to all the world: they should be more reserved, and let no one be present at this exhibition who does not pay them a handsome fee; or better still they might practise on one another only. He concludes with a respectful request that they will receive him and Cleinias among their disciples.

Crito tells Socrates that he has heard one of the audience criticise severely this wisdom,—not sparing Socrates himself for countenancing such an exhibition. Socrates asks what manner of man was this censorious critic. 'Not an orator, but a great composer of speeches.' Socrates understands that he is an amphibious animal, half philosopher, half politician; one of a class who have the highest opinion of themselves and a spite against philosophers, whom they imagine to be their rivals. They are a class who are very likely to get mauled by Euthydemus and his friends, and have a great notion of their own wisdom; for they imagine themselves to have all the advantages and none of the drawbacks both of politics and of philosophy. They do not understand the principles of combination, and hence are ignorant that the union of two good



things which have different ends produces a compound inferior to either of them taken separately. *Euthydemus.*

ANALYSIS.

307 Crito is anxious about the education of his children, one of whom is growing up. The description of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus suggests to him the reflection that the professors of education are strange beings. Socrates consoles him with the remark that the good in all professions are few, and recommends that 'he and his house' should continue to serve philosophy, and not mind about its professors.

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There is a stage in the history of philosophy in which the old is dying out, and the new has not yet come into full life. Great philosophies like the Eleatic or Heraclitean, which have enlarged the boundaries of the human mind, begin to pass away in words. They subsist only as forms which have rooted themselves in language—as troublesome elements of thought which cannot be either used or explained away. The same absoluteness which was once attributed to abstractions is now attached to the words which are the signs of them. The philosophy which in the first and second generation was a great and inspiring effort of reflection, in the third becomes sophistical, verbal, eristic.

INTRODUC-  
TION.

It is this stage of philosophy which Plato satirizes in the Euthydemus. The fallacies which are noted by him appear trifling to us now, but they were not trifling in the age before logic, in the decline of the earlier Greek philosophies, at a time when language was first beginning to perplex human thought. Besides he is caricaturing them; they probably received more subtle forms at the hands of those who seriously maintained them. They are patent to us in Plato, and we are inclined to wonder how any one could ever have been deceived by them; but we must remember also that there was a time when the human mind was only with great difficulty disentangled from such fallacies.

To appreciate fully the drift of the Euthydemus, we should imagine a mental state in which not individuals only, but whole schools during more than one generation, were animated by the desire to exclude the conception of rest, and therefore the very word 'this' (Theaet. 183 C) from language; in which the ideas of space, time, matter, motion, were proved to be contradictory and imaginary; in which the nature of qualitative change was a puzzle,



*Euthydemus.*  
INTRODUC-  
TION.

and even differences of degree, when applied to abstract notions, were not understood; in which there was no analysis of grammar, and mere puns or plays of words received serious attention; in which contradiction itself was denied, and, on the one hand, every predicate was affirmed to be true of every subject, and on the other, it was held that no predicate was true of any subject, and that nothing was, or was known, or could be spoken. Let us imagine disputes carried on with religious earnestness and more than scholastic subtlety, in which the catchwords of philosophy are completely detached from their context. (Cp. Theaet. 180.) To such disputes the humour, whether of Plato in the ancient, or of Pope and Swift in the modern world, is the natural enemy. Nor must we forget that in modern times also there is no fallacy so gross, no trick of language so transparent, no abstraction so barren and unmeaning, no form of thought so contradictory to experience, which has not been found to satisfy the minds of philosophical enquirers at a certain stage, or when regarded from a certain point of view only. The peculiarity of the fallacies of our own age is that we live within them, and are therefore generally unconscious of them.

Aristotle has analysed several of the same fallacies in his book 'De Sophisticis Elenchis,' which Plato, with equal command of their true nature, has preferred to bring to the test of ridicule. At first we are only struck with the broad humour of this 'reductio ad absurdum:' gradually we perceive that some important questions begin to emerge. Here, as everywhere else, Plato is making war against the philosophers who put words in the place of things, who tear arguments to tatters, who deny predication, and thus make knowledge impossible; to whom ideas and objects of sense have no fixedness, but are in a state of perpetual oscillation and transition. Two great truths seem to be indirectly taught through these fallacies: (1) The uncertainty of language, which allows the same words to be used in different meanings, or with different degrees of meaning: (2) The necessary limitation or relative nature of all phenomena. Plato is aware that his own doctrine of ideas (p. 301 A), as well as the Eleatic Being and Not-being, alike admit of being regarded as verbal fallacies (p. 284 A, B). The sophism advanced in the Meno (p. 80 D), that you cannot enquire either into what you know or do not know,' is lightly

touched upon at the commencement of the Dialogue (pp. 275, 276); *Euthydemus*.  
the thesis of Protagoras, that everything is true to him to whom it  
seems to be true, is satirized at p. 286. In contrast with these  
fallacies is maintained the Socratic doctrine that happiness is  
gained by knowledge. The grammatical puzzles with which the  
Dialogue concludes probably contain allusions to tricks of lan-  
guage which may have been practised by the disciples of Prodicus  
or Antisthenes. They would have had more point, if we were  
acquainted with the writings against which Plato's humour is  
directed. Most of the jests appear to have a serious meaning;  
but we have lost the clue to some of them, and cannot determine  
whether, as in the *Cratylus*, Plato has or has not mixed up purely  
unmeaning fun with his satire.

The two discourses of Socrates may be contrasted in several  
respects with the exhibition of the Sophists: (1) In their perfect  
relevancy to the subject of discussion, whereas the Sophistical  
discourses are wholly irrelevant: (2) In their enquiring, sym-  
pathetic tone, which encourages the youth, instead of 'knocking him  
down,' after the manner of the two Sophists: (3) In the absence of  
any definite conclusion—for while Socrates and the youth are  
agreed that philosophy is to be studied, they are not able to arrive  
at any certain result about the art which is to teach it. This is  
a question which will hereafter be answered in the *Republic*; as  
the conception of the kingly art (291, 292) is more fully developed  
in the *Politicus*, and the caricature of rhetoric (290) in the *Gorgias*.

The characters of the Dialogue are easily intelligible. There is  
Socrates once more in the character of an old man; and his equal  
in years, Crito, the father of Critobulus, like Lysimachus in the  
*Laches*, his fellow demesman (*Apol.* 33 D), to whom the scene is  
narrated, and who once or twice interrupts with a remark after  
the manner of the interlocutor in the *Phaedo*, and adds his com-  
mentary at the end; Socrates makes a playful allusion to his  
money-getting habits. There is the youth Cleinias, the grand-  
son of Alcibiades, who may be compared with Lysis, Charmides,  
Menexenus, and other ingenuous youths out of whose mouths  
Socrates draws his own lessons, and to whom he always seems to  
stand in a kindly and sympathetic relation. Crito will not believe  
that Socrates has not improved or perhaps invented the answers of  
Cleinias (*cp.* *Charm.* 161 foll.; *Phaedr.* 275 B). The name of the

*Euthydemus.*INTRODUC-  
TION.

grandson of Alcibiades, who is described as long dead, τοῦ παλαιοῦ, and who died at the age of forty-four, in the year 404 B. C., suggests not only that the intended scene of the Euthydemus could not have been earlier than 404, but that as a fact this Dialogue could not have been composed before 390 at the soonest. Ctesippus, who is the lover of Cleinias, has been already introduced to us in the Lysis, and seems there too to deserve the character which is here given him, of a somewhat uproarious young man. But the chief study of all is the picture of the two brothers, who are unapproachable in their effrontery, equally careless of what they say to others and of what is said to them, and never at a loss. They are 'Arcades ambo et cantare pares et respondere parati.' Some superior degree of wit or subtlety is attributed to Euthydemus, who sees the trap in which Socrates catches Dionysodorus (296 A).

The epilogue or conclusion of the Dialogue has been criticised as inconsistent with the general scheme. Such a criticism is like similar criticisms on Shakespeare, and proceeds upon a narrow notion of the variety which the Dialogue, like the drama, seems to admit. Plato in the abundance of his dramatic power has chosen to write a play upon a play, just as he often gives us an argument within an argument. At the same time he takes the opportunity of assailing another class of persons who are as alien from the spirit of philosophy as Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. The Eclectic, the Syncretist, the Doctrinaire, have been apt to have a bad name both in ancient and modern times. The persons whom Plato ridicules in the epilogue to the Euthydemus are of this class. They occupy a border-ground between philosophy and politics; they keep out of the dangers of politics, and at the same time use philosophy as a means of serving their own interests. Plato quaintly describes them as making two good things, philosophy and politics, a little worse by perverting the objects of both. Men like Antiphon or Lysias would be types of the class. Out of a regard to the respectabilities of life, they are disposed to censure the interest which Socrates takes in the exhibition of the two brothers. They do not understand, any more than Crito, that he is pursuing his vocation of detecting the follies of mankind, which he finds 'not unpleasant.' (Cp. Apol. 23 B, 33 B.)

Education is the common subject of all Plato's earlier Dialogues.

The concluding remark of Crito, that he has a difficulty in educating his two sons, and the advice of Socrates to him that he should not give up philosophy because he has no faith in philosophers, seems to be a preparation for the more peremptory declaration of the Meno that 'Virtue cannot be taught because there are no teachers.'

*Euthydemus.*

INTRODUC-  
TION.

The reasons for placing the Euthydemus early in the series are : (1) the similarity in plan and style to the Protagoras, Charmides, and Lysis ; — the relation of Socrates to the Sophists is still that of humorous antagonism, not, as in the later Dialogues of Plato, of embittered hatred ; and the places and persons have a considerable family likeness ; (2) the Euthydemus belongs to the Socratic period in which Socrates is represented as willing to learn, but unable to teach ; and in the spirit of Xenophon's Memorabilia, philosophy is defined as 'the knowledge which will make us happy;' (3) we seem to have passed the stage arrived at in the Protagoras, for Socrates is no longer discussing whether virtue can be taught — from this question he is relieved by the ingenuous declaration of the youth Cleinias ; and (4) not yet to have reached the point at which he asserts 'that there are no teachers.' Such grounds are precarious, as arguments from style and plan are apt to be (ὀλισθηρότατον τὸ γένος). But no arguments equally strong can be urged in favour of assigning to the Euthydemus any other position in the series.



# EUTHYDEMUS.

## PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, *who is the narrator  
of the Dialogue.*  
CRITO.  
CLEINIAS.

EUTHYDEMUS.  
DIONYSODORUS.  
CTESIPPUS.

SCENE:—The Lyceum.

Steph. *Crito.* WHO was the person, Socrates, with whom you  
271 were talking yesterday at the Lyceum? There was such a  
crowd around you that I could not get within hearing, but I  
caught a sight of him over their heads, and I made out, as  
I thought, that he was a stranger with whom you were  
talking: who was he? CRITO,  
SOCRATES.

*Socrates.* There were two, Crito; which of them do you mean?

*Cri.* The one whom I mean was seated second from you on the right-hand side. In the middle was Cleinias the young son of Axiochus, who has wonderfully grown; he is only about the age of my own Critobulus, but he is much forwarder and very good-looking: the other is thin and looks younger than he is.

*Soc.* He whom you mean, Crito, is Euthydemus; and on my left hand there was his brother Dionysodorus, who also took part in the conversation.

*Cri.* <sup>1</sup> Neither of them are known to me, Socrates; they are a new importation of Sophists, as I should imagine. Of what country are they, and what is their line of wisdom?

<sup>1</sup> Or, according to the arrangement of Stallbaum:—

*Cri.* Neither of them are known to me.

*Soc.* They are a new importation of Sophists as I should imagine.

*Cri.* Of what country, &c.



*Euthydemus.*SOCRATES,  
CRITO.The various  
accomplish-  
ments of  
Euthydemus  
and Dionyso-  
dorus.

*Soc.* As to their origin, I believe that they are natives of this part of the world, and have migrated from Chios to Thurii; they were driven out of Thurii, and have been living for many years past in these regions. As to their wisdom, about which you ask, Crito, they are wonderful — consummate! I never knew what the true pancratiast was before; they are simply made up of fighting, not like the two Acarnanian brothers who fight with their bodies only, but this pair of heroes, besides being perfect in the use of their bodies, are invincible in every sort of warfare; for they are capital at fighting in armour, and will teach the art to any one who pays them; and also they are most skilful in legal warfare; they will plead themselves and teach others to speak and to compose speeches which will have an effect upon the courts. And this was only the beginning of their wisdom, but they have at last carried out the pancratiastic art to the very end, and have mastered the only mode of fighting which had been hitherto neglected by them; and now no one dares even to stand up against them: such is their skill in the war of words, that they can refute any proposition whether true or false. Now I am thinking, Crito, of placing myself in their hands; for they say that in a short time they can impart their skill to any one. 272

*Cri.* But, Socrates, are you not too old? there may be reason to fear that.

Socrates  
thinks that he  
is not too old  
to become  
their pupil.

*Soc.* Certainly not, Crito; as I will prove to you, for I have the consolation of knowing that they began this art of disputation which I covet, quite, as I may say, in old age; last year, or the year before, they had none of their new wisdom. I am only apprehensive lest I should bring the two strangers into disrepute, as I have done Connus the son of Metrobius, the harp-player, who is still my music-master; for when the boys who go to him see me going with them, they laugh at me and call him grandpapa's master. Now I should not like the strangers to experience similar treatment; the fear of ridicule may make them unwilling to receive me; and therefore, Crito, I shall try and persuade some old men to accompany me to them, as I persuaded them to go with me to Connus, and I hope that you will make one: and perhaps we had better take your sons as a bait; they will want to

have them as pupils, and for the sake of them will be willing to receive us.

*Euthydemus.*

SOCRATES,  
CRITO,  
EUTHYDE-  
MUS.

*Cri.* I see no objection, Socrates, if you like; but first I wish that you would give me a description of their wisdom, that I may know beforehand what we are going to learn.

*Soc.* In less than no time you shall hear; for I cannot say that I did not attend—I paid great attention to them, and I remember and will endeavour to repeat the whole story. Providentially I was sitting alone in the dressing-room of the Lyceum where you saw me, and was about to depart; when I was getting up I recognized the familiar divine sign:

He describes  
the scene of  
which he had  
been a wit-  
ness.

273 so I sat down again, and in a little while the two brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus came in, and several others with them, whom I believe to be their disciples, and they walked about in the covered court; they had not taken more than two or three turns when Cleinias entered, who, as you truly say, is very much improved: he was followed by a host of lovers, one of whom was Ctesippus the Paeanian, a well-bred youth, but also having the wildness of youth. Cleinias saw me from the entrance as I was sitting alone, and at once came and sat down on the right hand of me, as you describe; and Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, when they saw him, at first stopped and talked with one another, now and then glancing at us, for I particularly watched them; and then Euthydemus came and sat down by the youth, and the other by me on the left hand; the rest anywhere. I saluted the brothers, whom I had not seen for a long time; and then I said to Cleinias: Here are two wise men, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, Cleinias, wise not in a small but in a large way of wisdom, for they know all about war,—all that a good general ought to know about the array and command of an army, and the whole art of fighting in armour: and they know about law too, and can teach a man how to use the weapons of the courts when he is injured.

The youth  
Cleinias and  
his lover  
Ctesippus.

They heard me say this, but only despised me. I observed that they looked at one another, and both of them laughed; and then Euthydemus said: Those, Socrates, are matters which we no longer pursue seriously; to us they are secondary occupations.

Indeed, I said, if such occupations are regarded by you as

*Euthydemus.* secondary, what must the principal one be; tell me, I beseech you, what that noble study is?

SOCRATES,  
EUTHYDE-  
MUS.

The two  
Sophists have  
given up  
teaching the  
arts; they are  
now engaged  
in teaching  
virtue.

The teaching of virtue, Socrates, he replied, is our principal occupation; and we believe that we can impart it better and quicker than any man.

My God! I said, and where did you learn that? I always imagined, as I was saying just now, your chief accomplishment to be the art of fighting in armour; and I used to say as much of you, for I remember that you professed this when you were here before. But now if you really have the other knowledge, O forgive me: I address you as I would superior beings, and ask you to pardon the impiety of my former expressions. But are you quite sure about this, Dionysodorus 274 and Euthydemus? the promise is so vast, that a feeling of incredulity steals over me.

You may take our word, Socrates, for the fact.

Then I think you happier in having such a treasure than the great king is in the possession of his kingdom. And please to tell me whether you intend to exhibit your wisdom; or what will you do?

That is why we have come hither, Socrates; and our purpose is not only to exhibit, but also to teach any one who likes to learn.

But I can promise you, I said, that every unvirtuous person will want to learn. I shall be the first; and there is the youth Cleinias, and Ctesippus: and here are several others, I said, pointing to the lovers of Cleinias, who were beginning to gather round us. Now Ctesippus was sitting at some distance from Cleinias; and when Euthydemus leaned forward in talking with me, he was prevented from seeing Cleinias, who was between us; and so, partly because he wanted to look at his love, and also because he was interested, he jumped up and stood opposite to us: and all the other admirers of Cleinias, as well as the disciples of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, followed his example. And these were the persons whom I showed to Euthydemus, telling him that they were all eager to learn: to which Ctesippus and all of them with one voice vehemently assented, and bid him exhibit the power of his wisdom. Then I said: O Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, I earnestly request you to do myself and the

company the favour to exhibit. There may be some trouble in giving the whole exhibition; but tell me one thing,—can you make a good man of him only who is already convinced that he ought to learn of you, or of him also who is not convinced, either because he imagines that virtue is a thing which cannot be taught at all, or that you are not the teachers of it? Has your art power to persuade him, who is of the latter temper of mind, that virtue can be taught; and that you are the men from whom he will best learn it?

Certainly, Socrates, said Dionysodorus; our art will do both.

And you and your brother, Dionysodorus, I said, of all men who are now living are the most likely to stimulate him to philosophy and to the study of virtue?

275 Yes, Socrates, I rather think that we are.

Then I wish that you would be so good as to defer the other part of the exhibition, and only try to persuade the youth whom you see here that he ought to be a philosopher and study virtue. Exhibit that, and you will confer a great favour on me and on every one present; for the fact is I and all of us are extremely anxious that he should become truly good. His name is Cleinias, and he is the son of Axiochus, and grandson of the old Alcibiades, cousin of the Alcibiades that now is. He is quite young, and we are naturally afraid that some one may get the start of us, and turn his mind in a wrong direction, and he may be ruined. Your visit, therefore, is most happily timed; and I hope that you will make a trial of the young man, and converse with him in our presence, if you have no objection.

These were pretty nearly the expressions which I used; and Euthydemus, in a manly and at the same time encouraging tone, replied: There can be no objection, Socrates, if the young man is only willing to answer questions.

He is quite accustomed to do so, I replied; for his friends often come and ask him questions and argue with him; and therefore he is quite at home in answering.

What followed, Crito, how can I rightly narrate? For not slight is the task of rehearsing infinite wisdom, and therefore, like the poets, I ought to commence my relation with an invocation to Memory and the Muses. Now Euthydemus, if

*Euthydemus.*

SOCRATES,  
DIONYSODO-  
RUS,  
EUTHYDE-  
MUS.

Can they  
teach virtue to  
those only  
who are will-  
ing or to those  
also who are  
unwilling to  
learn?

Euthydemus  
begins in a  
lofty and  
cheerful tone.

The scene  
which followed  
was beyond  
description.

*Euthydemus.* I remember rightly, began nearly as follows: O Cleinias, are those who learn the wise or the ignorant?

SOCRATES,  
DIONYSODORUS,  
CLEINIAS,  
EUTHYDEMUS.

The youth, overpowered by the question, blushed, and in his perplexity looked at me for help; and I, knowing that he was disconcerted, said: Take courage, Cleinias, and answer like a man whichever you think; for my belief is that you will derive the greatest benefit from their questions.

Whichever he answers, said Dionysodorus, leaning forward so as to catch my ear, his face beaming with laughter, I prophesy that he will be refuted, Socrates.

The wise only  
learn:

While he was speaking to me, Cleinias gave his answer: and therefore I had no time to warn him of the predicament in which he was placed, and he answered that those who learned were the wise. 276

Euthydemus proceeded: There are some whom you would call teachers, are there not?

The boy assented.

And they are the teachers of those who learn—the grammar-master and the lyre-master used to teach you and other boys; and you were the learners?

Yes.

and yet those  
who learn are  
unlearned;

And when you were learners you did not as yet know the things which you were learning?

No, he said.

And were you wise then?

No, indeed, he said.

But if you were not wise you were unlearned?

Certainly.

You then, learning what you did not know, were unlearned when you were learning?

The youth nodded assent.

and therefore  
the unlearned  
learn and not  
the wise.

Then the unlearned learn<sup>1</sup>, and not the wise, Cleinias, as you imagine.

At these words the followers of Euthydemus, of whom I spoke, like a chorus at the bidding of their director, laughed and cheered. Then, before the youth had time to recover his breath, Dionysodorus cleverly took him in hand, and said: Yes, Cleinias; and when the grammar-master dictated

<sup>1</sup> Omitting σοφοί.



anything to you, were they the wise boys or the unlearned who learned the dictation? *Euthydemus.*

The wise, replied Cleinias.

Then after all the wise are the learners and not the unlearned; and your last answer to Euthydemus was wrong.

Then once more the admirers of the two heroes, in an ecstasy at their wisdom, gave vent to another peal of laughter, while the rest of us were silent and amazed. Euthydemus, observing this, determined to persevere with the youth; and in order to heighten the effect went on asking another similar question, which might be compared to the double turn of an expert dancer. Do those, said he, who learn, learn what they know, or what they do not know?

Again Dionysodorus whispered to me: That, Socrates, is just another of the same sort. *A similar trick of argument.*

Good heavens, I said; and your last question was so good!

Like all our other questions, Socrates, he replied—inevitable.

I see the reason, I said, why you are in such reputation among your disciples.

Meanwhile Cleinias had answered Euthydemus that those who learned learn what they do not know; and he put him through a series of questions the same as before. *The teacher dictates to his pupils that which they do not know: and yet he dictates letters which they know.*

277 Do you not know letters?

He assented.

All letters?

Yes.

But when the teacher dictates to you, does he not dictate letters?

To this also he assented.

Then if you know all letters, he dictates that which you know?

This again was admitted by him.

Then, said the other, you do not learn that which he dictates; but he only who does not know letters learns?

Nay, said Cleinias; but I do learn.

Then, said he, you learn what you know, if you know all the letters?

He admitted that.

Then, he said, you were wrong in your answer.



*Euthydemus.*SOCRATES,  
DIONYSODORUS,  
CLEINIAS,  
EUTHYDEMUS.

The word was hardly out of his mouth when Dionysodorus took up the argument, like a ball which he caught, and had another throw at the youth. Cleinias, he said, Euthydemus is deceiving you. For tell me now, is not learning acquiring knowledge of that which one learns?

Cleinias assented.

The trick  
reversed.

And knowing is having knowledge at the time?

He agreed.

And not knowing is not having knowledge at the time?

He admitted that.

And are those who acquire those who have or have not a thing?

Those who have not.

And have you not admitted that those who do not know are of the number of those who have not?

He nodded assent.

Then those who learn are of the class of those who acquire, and not of those who have?

He agreed.

Then, Cleinias, he said, those who do not know learn, and not those who know.

Socrates  
explains to  
Cleinias the  
sophistical  
mode of pro-  
cedure.

Euthydemus was proceeding to give the youth a third fall; but I knew that he was in deep water, and therefore, as I wanted to give him a respite lest he should be disheartened, I said to him consolingly: You must not be surprised, Cleinias, at the singularity of their mode of speech: this I say because you may not understand what the two strangers are doing with you; they are only initiating you after the manner of the Corybantes in the mysteries; and this answers to the enthronement, which, if you have ever been initiated, is, as you will know, accompanied by dancing and sport; and now they are just prancing and dancing about you, and will next proceed to initiate you; imagine then that you have gone through the first part of the sophistical ritual, which, as Prodicus says, begins with initiation into the correct use of terms. The two foreign gentlemen, perceiving that you did not know, wanted to explain to you that the word 'to learn' has two meanings, and is used, first, in the sense of acquiring knowledge of some matter of which you previously have no knowledge, and also, when you have the knowledge, in the

sense of reviewing this matter, whether something done or spoken by the light of this newly-acquired knowledge; the latter is generally called 'knowing' rather than 'learning,' but the word 'learning' is also used; and you did not see, as they explained to you, that the term is employed of two opposite sorts of men, of those who know, and of those who do not know. There was a similar trick in the second question, when they asked you whether men learn what they know or what they do not know. These parts of learning are not serious, and therefore I say that the gentlemen are not serious, but are only playing with you. For if a man had all that sort of knowledge that ever was, he would not be at all the wiser; he would only be able to play with men, tripping them up and oversetting them with distinctions of words. He would be like a person who pulls away a stool from some one when he is about to sit down, and then laughs and makes merry at the sight of his friend overturned and laid on his back. And you must regard all that has hitherto passed between you and them as merely play. But in what is to follow I am certain that they will exhibit to you their serious purpose, and keep their promise (I will show them how); for they promised to give me a sample of the hortatory philosophy, but I suppose that they wanted to have a game with you first. And now, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, I think that we have had enough of this. Will you let me see you explaining to the young man how he is to apply himself to the study of virtue and wisdom? And I will first show you what I conceive to be the nature of the task, and what sort of a discourse I desire to hear; and if I do this in a very inartistic and ridiculous manner, do not laugh at me, for I only venture to improvise before you because I am eager to hear your wisdom: and I must therefore ask you and your disciples to refrain from laughing. And now, O son of Axiochus, let me put a question to you: Do not all men desire happiness? And yet, perhaps, this is one of those ridiculous questions which I am afraid to ask, and which ought not to be asked by a sensible man: for what human being is there who does not desire happiness?

*Euthydemus.*  
SOCRATES,  
CLEINIAS.

The two  
Sophists were  
having a game  
of play with  
him.

279 There is no one, said Cleinias, who does not.

Well, then, I said, since we all of us desire happiness, how

*Euthydemus.*SOCRATES,  
CLEINIAS.Happiness is  
the possession  
of many good  
things :and good  
things are  
wealth,  
health,  
beauty, good  
birth, power,  
honour, and  
all the  
virtues, jus-  
tice, temper-  
ance, courage,  
wisdom.But we have  
omitted, or  
rather not  
omitted, good-  
fortune ; for it  
is already  
contained in  
wisdom.

can we be happy?—that is the next question. Shall we not be happy if we have many good things? And this, perhaps, is even a more simple question than the first, for there can be no doubt of the answer.

He assented.

And what things do we esteem good? No solemn sage is required to tell us this, which may be easily answered ; for every one will say that wealth is a good.

Certainly, he said.

And are not health and beauty goods, and other personal gifts?

He agreed.

Can there be any doubt that good birth, and power, and honours in one's own land, are goods?

He assented.

And what other goods are there? I said. What do you say of temperance, justice, courage : do you not verily and indeed think, Cleinias, that we shall be more right in ranking them as goods than in not ranking them as goods? For a dispute might possibly arise about this. What then do you say?

They are goods, said Cleinias.

Very well, I said ; and where in the company shall we find a place for wisdom—among the goods or not?

Among the goods.

And now, I said, think whether we have left out any considerable goods.

I do not think that we have, said Cleinias.

Upon recollection, I said, indeed I am afraid that we have left out the greatest of them all.

What is that? he asked.

Fortune, Cleinias, I replied ; \* which all, even the most foolish, admit to be the greatest of goods.

True, he said.

On second thoughts, I added, how narrowly, O son of Axiochus, have you and I escaped making a laughing-stock of ourselves to the strangers.

Why do you say so?

Why, because we have already spoken of good-fortune, and are but repeating ourselves.

What do you mean?

I mean that there is something ridiculous in again putting forward good-fortune, which has a place in the list already, and saying the same thing twice over.

*Euthydemus.*

SOCRATES,  
CLEINIAS.

He asked what was the meaning of this, and I replied: Surely wisdom is good-fortune; even a child may know that.

The simple-minded youth was amazed; and, observing his surprise, I said to him: Do you not know, Cleinias, that flute-players are most fortunate and successful in performing on the flute?

The fortunate  
are only the  
wise under  
another name.

He assented.

And are not the scribes most fortunate in writing and reading letters?

Certainly.

Amid the dangers of the sea, again, are any more fortunate on the whole than wise pilots?

None, certainly.

And if you were engaged in war, in whose company would you rather take the risk—in company with a wise general, or with a foolish one?

With a wise one.

And if you were ill, whom would you rather have as a companion in a dangerous illness—a wise physician, or an ignorant one?

A wise one.

You think, I said, that to act with a wise man is more fortunate than to act with an ignorant one?

He assented.

280 Then wisdom always makes men fortunate: for by wisdom no man would ever err, and therefore he must act rightly and succeed, or his wisdom would be wisdom no longer.

And we are  
deemed fortunate  
when we  
are possessed  
of many good  
things. But  
we must use  
them as well  
as have them.

We contrived at last, somehow or other, to agree in a general conclusion, that he who had wisdom had no need of fortune. I then recalled to his mind the previous state of the question. You remember, I said, our making the admission that we should be happy and fortunate if many good things were present with us?

He assented.

And should we be happy by reason of the presence of good things, if they profited us not, or if they profited us?

If they profited us, he said.

*Euthydemus.*SOCRATES,  
CLEINIAS.

And would they profit us, if we only had them and did not use them? For example, if we had a great deal of food and did not eat, or a great deal of drink and did not drink, should we be profited?

Certainly not, he said.

Or would an artisan, who had all the implements necessary for his work, and did not use them, be any the better for the possession of them? For example, would a carpenter be any the better for having all his tools and plenty of wood, if he never worked?

Certainly not, he said.

And if a person had wealth and all the goods of which we were just now speaking, and did not use them, would he be happy because he possessed them?

No indeed, Socrates.

Then, I said, a man who would be happy must not only have the good things, but he must also use them; there is no advantage in merely having them?

True.

Well, Cleinias, but if you have the use as well as the possession of good things, is that sufficient to confer happiness?

Yes, in my opinion.

And may a person use them either rightly or wrongly?

He must use them rightly.

That is quite true, I said. And the wrong use of a thing is far worse than the non-use; for the one is an evil, and the other is neither a good nor an evil. Do we not say so? 281

He assented.

Now in the working and use of wood, is not that which gives the right use simply the knowledge of the carpenter?

Nothing else, he said.

And surely, in the manufacture of vessels, knowledge is that which gives the right way of making them?

He agreed.

And in the use of the goods of which we spoke at first—wealth and health and beauty, is not knowledge that which directs us to the right use of them, and regulates our practice about them?

He assented.

Illustrations of  
the necessity  
of knowledge  
taken from  
the arts.

Then in every possession and every use of a thing, knowledge is that which gives a man not only good-fortune but success? *Euthydemus.*  
SOCRATES,  
CLEINIAS.

He again assented.

And tell me, I said, O tell me, what do possessions profit a man, if he have neither good sense nor wisdom? Would a man be better off, having and doing many things without wisdom, or a few things with wisdom? Look at the matter thus: If he did fewer things would he not make fewer mistakes? if he made fewer mistakes would he not have fewer misfortunes? and if he had fewer misfortunes would he not be less miserable?

Certainly, he said.

And who would do least—a poor man or a rich man?

A poor man.

A weak man or a strong man?

A weak man.

A noble man or a mean man?

A mean man.

And a coward would do less than a courageous and temperate man?

Yes.

And an indolent man less than an active man?

He assented.

And a slow man less than a quick; and one who had dull perceptions of seeing and hearing less than one who had keen ones?

All this was mutually allowed by us.

Then, I said, Cleinias, the sum of the matter appears to be that the goods of which we spoke before are not to be regarded as goods in themselves, but the degree of good and evil in them depends on whether they are or are not under the guidance of knowledge: under the guidance of ignorance, they are greater evils than their opposites, inasmuch as they are more able to minister to the evil principle which rules them; and when under the guidance of wisdom and prudence, they are greater goods: but in themselves they are nothing? The element  
of knowledge  
or wisdom is  
essential to  
good,

That, he replied, is obvious.

What then is the result of what has been said? Is not this



*Euthydemus.*SOCRATES,  
CLEINIAS.or rather to  
the true and  
only good.To get wisdom  
is necessary  
and honour-  
able, if only  
wisdom can be  
taught.The youthful  
Cleinias is  
confident that  
it may.

the result—that other things are indifferent, and that wisdom is the only good, and ignorance the only evil?

He assented.

Let us consider a further point, I said: Seeing that all 282  
men desire happiness, and happiness, as has been shown, is gained by a use, and a right use, of the things of life, and the right use of them, and good-fortune in the use of them, is given by knowledge,—the inference is that everybody ought by all means to try and make himself as wise as he can?

Yes, he said.

And when a man thinks that he ought to obtain this treasure, far more than money, from a father or a guardian or a friend or a suitor, whether citizen or stranger—the eager desire and prayer to them that they would impart wisdom to you, is not at all dishonourable, Cleinias; nor is any one to be blamed for doing any honourable service or ministration to any man, whether a lover or not, if his aim is to get wisdom. Do you agree? I said.

Yes, he said, I quite agree, and think that you are right.

Yes, I said, Cleinias, if only wisdom can be taught, and does not come to man spontaneously; for this is a point which has still to be considered, and is not yet agreed upon by you and me—

But I think, Socrates, that wisdom can be taught, he said.

Best of men, I said, I am delighted to hear you say so; and I am also grateful to you for having saved me from a long and tiresome investigation as to whether wisdom can be taught or not. But now, as you think that wisdom can be taught, and that wisdom only can make a man happy and fortunate, will you not acknowledge that all of us ought to love wisdom, and you individually will try to love her?

Certainly, Socrates, he said; I will do my best.

I was pleased at hearing this; and I turned to Dionysodorus and Euthydemus and said: That is an example, clumsy and tedious I admit, of the sort of exhortations which I would have you give—and now, will either of you set forth what I have been saying in a more artistic style: or, if you would rather not, will you at least take up the enquiry where I left off, and proceed to show the youth whether he should have all knowledge; or whether there is one sort of knowledge only which will make him good and happy, and

what that is? For, as I was saying at first, the improvement of this young man in virtue and wisdom is a matter which we have very much at heart.

*Euthydemus.*

SOCRATES,  
DIONYSODORUS,  
CTESIPPUS.

283 Thus I spoke, Crito, and was all attention to what was coming. I wanted to see how they would approach the question, and where they would start in their exhortation to the young man that he should practise wisdom and virtue. Dionysodorus, who was the elder, spoke first. Everybody's eyes were directed towards him, perceiving that something wonderful might shortly be expected. And certainly they were not far wrong; for the man, Crito, began a remarkable discourse well worth hearing, and wonderfully persuasive regarded as an exhortation to virtue.

Tell me, he said, Socrates and the rest of you who say that you want this young man to become wise, are you in jest or in real earnest?

I was led by this to imagine that they fancied us to have been jesting when we asked them to converse with the youth, and that this made them jest and play, and being under this impression, I was the more decided in saying that we were in profound earnest. Dionysodorus said:

The quibble of  
Dionysodo-  
rus: Those  
who wish  
Cleinias not to  
be ignorant  
wish him not  
to be.

Reflect, Socrates; you may have to deny your words.

I have reflected, I said; and I shall never deny my words.

Well, said he, and so you say that you wish Cleinias to become wise?

Undoubtedly.

And he is not wise as yet?

At least his modesty will not allow him to say that he is.

You wish him, he said, to become wise and not to be ignorant?

That we do.

You wish him to be what he is not, and no longer to be what he is?

I was thrown into consternation at this.

Taking advantage of my consternation, he added: You wish him no longer to be what he is, which can only mean that you wish him to perish. Pretty lovers and friends they must be who have nothing better to wish for their favourite than that he should perish!

When Ctesippus heard this he got very angry (as a lover well might) and said: Stranger of Thurii—if politeness would

Indignation of  
Ctesippus.

*Euthydemus.* allow me I should say, A plague upon you! What can make you tell such a lie about me and the others, which I hardly like to repeat, as that I wish Cleinias to perish?

EUTHYDE-  
MUS,  
CTESIPPUS.

No one can  
tell a lie, says  
Euthydemus,  
for no one can  
do what is not,  
and, if saying  
is doing, no  
one can say  
what is not.

Euthydemus replied: And do you think, Ctesippus, that it is possible to tell a lie?

Yes, said Ctesippus; I should be mad to say anything else.

And in telling a lie, do you tell the thing of which you speak or not?

You tell the thing of which you speak.

And he who tells, tells that thing which he tells, and no other?

Yes, said Ctesippus.

And that is a distinct thing apart from other things?

Certainly.

And he who says that thing says that which is?

Yes.

And he who says that which is, says the truth. And therefore Dionysodorus, if he says that which is, says the truth of you and no lie.

Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; but in saying this, he says what is not.

Euthydemus answered: And that which is not is not?

True.

And that which is not is nowhere?

Nowhere.

And can any one do anything about that which has no existence, or do to Cleinias that which is not and is nowhere?

I think not, said Ctesippus.

Well, but do rhetoricians, when they speak in the assembly, do nothing?

Nay, he said, they do something.

And doing is making?

Yes.

And speaking is doing and making?

He agreed.

Then no one says that which is not, for in saying what is not he would be doing something; and you have already acknowledged that no one can do what is not. And therefore, upon your own showing, no one says what is false; but

if Dionysodorus says anything, he says what is true and what is. *Euthydemus.*

Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; but he speaks of things in a certain way and manner, and not as they really are.

Why, Ctesippus, said Dionysodorus, do you mean to say that any one speaks of things as they are? *SOCRATES, EUTHYDEMUS, DIONYSODORUS, CTESIPPUS.*

Yes, he said,—all gentlemen and truth-speaking persons.

And are not good things good, and evil things evil?

He assented.

And you say that gentlemen speak of things as they are?

Yes.

Then the good speak evil of evil things, if they speak of them as they are?

Yes, indeed, he said; and they speak evil of evil men. And if I may give you a piece of advice, you had better take care that they do not speak evil of you, since I can tell you that the good speak evil of the evil.

And do they speak great things of the great, rejoined Euthydemus, and warm things of the warm?

To be sure they do, said Ctesippus; and they speak coldly of the insipid and cold dialectician.

You are abusive, Ctesippus, said Dionysodorus, you are abusive! *Ctesippus and the Sophists begin to quarrel; but Socrates restores good-humour with a joke.*

Indeed, I am not, Dionysodorus, he replied; for I love you and am giving you friendly advice, and, if I could, would persuade you not like a boor to say in my presence that I desire my beloved, whom I value above all men, to perish.

I saw that they were getting exasperated with one another, so I made a joke with him and said: O Ctesippus, I think that we must allow the strangers to use language in their own way, and not quarrel with them about words, but be thankful for what they give us. If they know how to destroy men in such a way as to make good and sensible men out of bad and foolish ones—whether this is a discovery of their own, or whether they have learned from some one else this new sort of death and destruction which enables them to get rid of a bad man and turn him into a good one—if they know this (and they do know this—at any rate they said just now that this was the secret of their newly-discovered art)—let them, in their phraseology, destroy the youth and make him

*Euthydemus.*

SOCRATES,  
CTESIPPUS,  
DIONYSODORUS.

wise, and all of us with him. But if you young men do not like to trust yourselves with them, then *fiat experimentum in corpore senis*; I will be the Carian on whom they shall operate. And here I offer my old person to Dionysodorus; he may put me into the pot, like Medea the Colchian, kill me, boil me, if he will only make me good.

Ctesippus said: And I, Socrates, am ready to commit myself to the strangers; they may skin me alive, if they please (and I am pretty well skinned by them already), if only my skin is made at last, not like that of Marsyas, into a leathern bottle, but into a piece of virtue. And here is Dionysodorus fancying that I am angry with him, when really I am not angry at all; I do but contradict him when I think that he is speaking improperly to me: and you must not confound abuse and contradiction, O illustrious Dionysodorus; for they are quite different things.

Dionysodorus denies the possibility of contradiction.

Contradiction! said Dionysodorus; why, there never was such a thing.

Certainly there is, he replied; there can be no question of it. Do you, Dionysodorus, maintain that there is not?

If no man can affirm a negation, no one can contradict.

You will never prove to me, he said, that you have heard any one contradicting any one else.

Indeed, said Ctesippus; then now you may hear me contradicting Dionysodorus.

Are you prepared to make that good?

Certainly, he said.

Well, have not all things words expressive of them?

Yes.

Of their existence or of their non-existence?

Of their existence.

Yes, Ctesippus, and we just now proved, as you may 28 remember, that no man could affirm a negative; for no one could affirm that which is not.

And what does that signify? said Ctesippus; you and I may contradict all the same.

When two persons describe the same thing, or two persons

But can we contradict one another, said Dionysodorus, when both of us are describing the same thing? Then we must surely be speaking the same thing?

He assented.

Or when neither of us is speaking of the same thing? For then neither of us says a word about the thing at all?

He granted that proposition also.

But when I describe something and you describe another thing, or I say something and you say nothing—is there any contradiction? How can he who speaks contradict him who speaks not?

Here Ctesippus was silent; and I in my astonishment said: What do you mean, Dionysodorus? I have often heard, and have been amazed to hear, this thesis of yours, which is maintained and employed by the disciples of Protagoras, and others before them, and which to me appears to be quite wonderful, and suicidal as well as destructive, and I think that I am most likely to hear the truth about it from you. The dictum is that there is no such thing as falsehood; a man must either say what is true or say nothing. Is not that your position?

He assented.

But if he cannot speak falsely, may he not think falsely?

No, he cannot, he said.

Then there is no such thing as false opinion?

No, he said.

Then there is no such thing as ignorance, or men who are ignorant; for is not ignorance, if there be such a thing, a mistake of fact?

Certainly, he said.

And that is impossible?

Impossible, he replied.

Are you saying this as a paradox, Dionysodorus; or do you seriously maintain no man to be ignorant?

Refute me, he said.

But how can I refute you, if, as you say, to tell a falsehood is impossible?

Very true, said Euthydemus.

Neither did I tell you just now to refute me, said Dionysodorus; for how can I tell you to do that which is not?

O Euthydemus, I said, I have but a dull conception of these subtleties and excellent devices of wisdom; I am afraid that I hardly understand them, and you must forgive me therefore if I ask a very stupid question: if there be no falsehood or

*Euthydemus.*

SOCRATES,  
DIONYSODORUS,

CTESIPPUS,  
EUTHYDEMUS.

describe different things, or one person speaks and another is silent, there is no contradiction.

Socrates takes up the argument.

The Sophists maintain that there is no such thing as falsehood or false opinion, or ignorance or the refutation of ignorance.



*Euthydemus.* false opinion or ignorance, there can be no such thing as erroneous action, for a man cannot fail of acting as he is acting—that is what you mean?

SOCRATES,  
EUTHYDE-  
MUS,  
DIONYSODO-  
RUS.

Yes, he replied.

And now, I said, I will ask my stupid question: If there is no such thing as error in deed, word, or thought, then what, in the name of goodness, do you come hither to teach? And were you not just now saying that you could teach virtue best of all men, to any one who was willing to learn?

The Sophists  
are above  
consistency  
and all that  
sort of thing.

And are you such an old fool, Socrates, rejoined Dionysodorus, that you bring up now what I said at first—and if I had said anything last year, I suppose that you would bring that up too—but are non-plussed at the words which I have just uttered?

Why, I said, they are not easy to answer; for they are the words of wise men: and indeed I know not what to make of this word 'non-plussed,' which you used last: what do you mean by it, Dionysodorus? You must mean that I cannot refute your argument. Tell me if the words have any other sense?

No, he replied, they mean what you say. And now answer. What, before you, Dionysodorus? I said.

Answer, said he.

And is that fair?

Yes, quite fair, he said.

Upon what principle? I said. I can only suppose that you are a very wise man who comes to us in the character of a great logician, and who knows when to answer and when not to answer—and now you will not open your mouth at all, because you know that you ought not.

You prate, he said, instead of answering. But if, my good sir, you admit that I am wise, answer as I tell you.

You ask me,  
Socrates, what  
sense my  
words have?  
Things which  
have sense are  
alive:—are  
my words  
alive?

I suppose that I must obey, for you are master. Put the question.

Are the things which have sense alive or lifeless?

They are alive.

And do you know of any word which is alive?

I cannot say that I do.

Then why did you ask me what sense my words had?

Why, because I was stupid and made a mistake. And yet,

perhaps, I was right after all in saying that words have a sense;—what do you say, wise man? If I was not in error, even you will not refute me, and all your wisdom will be non-plussed; but if I did fall into error, then again you are wrong in saying that there is no error,—and this remark was  
 288 made by you not quite a year ago. I am inclined to think, however, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, that this argument lies where it was and is not very likely to advance: even your skill in the subtleties of logic, which is really amazing, has not found out the way of throwing another and not falling yourself, now any more than of old.

*Euthydemus.*

SOCRATES,  
CTESIPPUS,  
CLEINIAS.

Socrates  
retorts upon  
the Sophists  
their own  
statement that  
error cannot  
be refuted.

Ctesippus said: Men of Chios, Thuri, or however and whatever you call yourselves, I wonder at you, for you seem to have no objection to talking nonsense.

High words.

Fearing that there would be high words, I again endeavoured to soothe Ctesippus, and said to him: To you, Ctesippus, I must repeat what I said before to Cleinias—that you do not understand the ways of these philosophers from abroad. They are not serious, but, like the Egyptian wizard, Proteus, they take different forms and deceive us by their enchantments: and let us, like Menelaus, refuse to let them go until they show themselves to us in earnest. When they begin to be in earnest their full beauty will appear: let us then beg and entreat and beseech them to shine forth. And I think that I had better once more exhibit the form in which I pray to behold them; it might be a guide to them. I will go on therefore where I left off, as well as I can, in the hope that I may touch their hearts and move them to pity, and that when they see me deeply serious and interested, they also may be serious. You, Cleinias, I said, shall remind me at what point we left off. Did we not agree that philosophy should be studied? and was not that our conclusion?

Socrates again  
tries to pour  
oil upon the  
waters.

Yes, he replied.

And philosophy is the acquisition of knowledge?

Yes, he said.

And what knowledge ought we to acquire? May we not answer with absolute truth—A knowledge which will do us good?

Certainly, he said.

And should we be any the better if we went about having a

*Euthydemus.* knowledge of the places where most gold was hidden in the earth?

SOCRATES,  
CLEINIAS.

Perhaps we should, he said.

The old  
argument  
resumed.

But have we not already proved, I said, that we should be none the better off, even if without trouble and digging all the gold which there is in the earth were ours? And if we knew how to convert stones into gold, the knowledge would 289 be of no value to us, unless we also knew how to use the gold? Do you not remember? I said.

I quite remember, he said.

Nor would any other knowledge, whether of money-making, or of medicine, or of any other art which knows only how to make a thing, and not to use it when made, be of any good to us. Am I not right?

He agreed.

And if there were a knowledge which was able to make men immortal, without giving them the knowledge of the way to use the immortality, neither would there be any use in that, if we may argue from the analogy of the previous instances?

To all this he agreed.

Then, my dear boy, I said, the knowledge which we want is one that uses as well as makes?

True, he said.

The know-  
ledge which  
makes is not  
to be sepa-  
rated from the  
knowledge  
which uses.

And our desire is not to be skilful lyre-makers, or artists of that sort—far otherwise; for with them the art which makes is one, and the art which uses is another. Although they have to do with the same, they are divided: for the art which makes and the art which plays on the lyre differ widely from one another. Am I not right?

He agreed.

And clearly we do not want the art of the flute-maker; this is only another of the same sort?

He assented.

But suppose, I said, that we were to learn the art of making speeches—would that be the art which would make us happy?

I should say, no, rejoined Cleinias.

And why should you say so? I asked.

I see, he replied, that there are some composers of speeches who do not know how to use the speeches which they make,

just as the makers of lyres do not know how to use the lyres, and also some who are of themselves unable to compose speeches, but are able to use the speeches which the others make for them; and this proves that the art of making speeches is not the same as the art of using them.

*Euthydemus*  
SOCRATES,  
CLEINIAS.

Yes, I said; and I take your words to be a sufficient proof that the art of making speeches is not one which will make a man happy. And yet I did think that the art which we have so long been seeking might be discovered in that direction; for the composers of speeches, whenever I meet them, always appear to me to be very extraordinary men, Cleinias, and their art is lofty and divine, and no wonder. For their art is a part of the great art of enchantment, and hardly, if at all, inferior to it: and whereas the art of the enchanter is a mode of charming snakes and spiders and scorpions, and other monsters and pests, this art of theirs acts upon dicasts and ecclesiasts and bodies of men, for the charming and pacifying of them. Do you agree with me?

The sophistical art is a part of the greater art of enchantment.

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Yes, he said, I think that you are quite right.

Whither then shall we go, I said, and to what art shall we have recourse?

I do not see my way, he said.

But I think that I do, I replied.

And what is your notion? asked Cleinias.

I think that the art of the general is above all others the one of which the possession is most likely to make a man happy.

I do not think so, he said.

Why not? I said.

The art of the general is surely an art of hunting mankind.

What of that? I said.

Why, he said, no art of hunting extends beyond hunting and capturing; and when the prey is taken the huntsman or fisherman cannot use it; but they hand it over to the cook, and the geometricians and astronomers and calculators (who all belong to the hunting class, for they do not make their diagrams, but only find out that which was previously contained in them)—they, I say, not being able to use but only to catch their prey, hand over their inventions to the dialectician to be applied by him, if they have any sense in them.

Cleinias of his own accord declares that the art of the general is not the one most likely to make men happy, because, like the hunts-

*Euthydemus.*

Good, I said, fairest and wisest Cleinias. And is this true?

SOCRATES,  
CLEINIAS,  
CRITO.

man, he can  
only take and  
not use the  
prey.

Certainly, he said; just as a general when he takes a city or a camp hands over his new acquisition to the statesman, for he does not know how to use them himself; or as the quail-taker transfers the quails to the keeper of them. If we are looking for the art which is to make us blessed, and which is able to use that which it makes or takes, the art of the general is not the one, and some other must be found.

Crito suspects  
that neither  
Cleinias nor  
Ctesippus is  
the author of  
this observa-  
tion, but some  
one far supe-  
rior to either  
of them.

*Cri.* And do you mean, Socrates, that the youngster said all this?

*Soc.* Are you incredulous, Crito?

*Cri.* Indeed, I am; for if he did say so, then in my opinion he needs neither Euthydemus nor any one else to be his instructor.

*Soc.* Perhaps I may have forgotten, and Ctesippus was the real answerer.

*Cri.* Ctesippus! nonsense.

*Soc.* All I know is that I heard these words, and that they were not spoken either by Euthydemus or Dionysodorus. I dare say, my good Crito, that they may have been spoken by some superior person: but that I heard them I am certain.

*Cri.* Yes, indeed, Socrates, by some one a good deal superior, as I should be disposed to think. But did you carry the search any further, and did you find the art which you were seeking?

*Soc.* Find! my dear sir, no indeed. And we cut a poor figure; we were like children after larks, always on the point of catching the art, which was always getting away from us. But why should I repeat the whole story? At last we came to the kingly art, and enquired whether that gave and caused happiness, and then we got into a labyrinth, and when we thought we were at the end, came out again at the beginning, having still to seek as much as ever.

*Cri.* How did that happen, Socrates?

*Soc.* I will tell you; the kingly art was identified by us with the political.

*Cri.* Well, and what followed?

*Soc.* To this royal or political art all the arts, including the

art of the general, seemed to render up the supremacy, that being the only one which knew how to use what they produce. Here obviously was the very art which we were seeking—the art which is the source of good government, and which may be described, in the language of Aeschylus, as alone sitting at the helm of the vessel of state, piloting and governing all things, and utilizing them.

*Euthydemus.*

SOCRATES,  
CRITO.

Pursuing the enquiry, we found that the royal or political art was the only one which knew how the other arts were to be used.

*Cri.* And were you not right, Socrates?

*Soc.* You shall judge, Crito, if you are willing to hear what followed; for we resumed the enquiry, and a question of this sort was asked: Does the kingly art, having this supreme authority, do anything for us? To be sure, was the answer. And would not you, Crito, say the same?

*Cri.* Yes, I should.

*Soc.* And what would you say that the kingly art does? If medicine were supposed to have supreme authority over the subordinate arts, and I were to ask you a similar question about that, you would say—it produces health?

*Cri.* I should.

*Soc.* And supposing your own art of husbandry to have supreme authority over the subject arts—what does that do?

292 Does it not supply us with the fruits of the earth?

*Cri.* Yes.

*Soc.* And what does the kingly art do when invested with supreme power? Perhaps you may not be ready with an answer.

Such an art ought to make us useful, and, if wisdom is the most useful of all things, should impart wisdom to us.

*Cri.* Indeed I am not, Socrates.

*Soc.* No more were we, Crito. But at any rate you know that if this is the art which we were seeking, it ought to be useful.

*Cri.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And surely it ought to do us some good?

*Cri.* Certainly, Socrates.

*Soc.* And Cleinias and I had arrived at the conclusion that knowledge of some kind is the only good.

*Cri.* Yes, that was what you were saying.

*Soc.* All the other results of politics, and they are many, as for example, wealth, freedom, tranquillity, were neither good nor evil in themselves; but the political science ought to make us wise, and impart knowledge to us, if that is



*Euthydemus.*SOCRATES,  
CRITO,  
EUTHYDE-  
MUS.

the science which is likely to do us good, and make us happy.

*Cri.* Yes; that was the conclusion at which you had arrived, according to your report of the conversation.

*Soc.* And does the kingly art make men wise and good?

*Cri.* Why not, Socrates?

*Soc.* What, all men, and in every respect? and teach them all the arts,—carpentering, and cobbling, and the rest of them?

*Cri.* I think not, Socrates.

What is this  
superior  
knowledge?

*Soc.* But then what is this knowledge, and what are we to do with it? For it is not the source of any works which are neither good nor evil, and gives no knowledge, but the knowledge of itself; let us determine then what it can be, and what we shall do with it. Shall we say, Crito, that it is the knowledge by which we are to make other men good?

*Cri.* By all means.

*Soc.* And in what will they be good and useful? Shall we repeat that they will make others good, and that these others will make others again, without ever determining in what they are to be good; for we have put aside the results of politics, as they are called. This is the old, old song over again; and we are just as far as ever, if not farther, from the knowledge of the art or science of happiness.

*Cri.* Indeed, Socrates, you do appear to have got into a great perplexity.

Socrates in  
perplexity  
turns to the  
two Sophists  
for an answer.

*Soc.* Thereupon, Crito, seeing that I was on the point of shipwreck, I lifted up my voice, and earnestly entreated and 293 called upon the strangers to save me and the youth from the whirlpool of the argument; they were our Castor and Pollux, I said, and they should be serious, and show us in sober earnest what that knowledge was which would enable us to pass the rest of our lives in happiness.

*Cri.* And did Euthydemus show you this knowledge?

*Soc.* Yes, indeed; he proceeded in a lofty strain to the following effect: Would you rather, Socrates, said he, that I should show you this knowledge about which you have been doubting, or shall I prove that you already have it?

What, I said, are you blessed with such a power as this?

Indeed I am.

Then I would much rather that you should prove me to have such a knowledge; at my time of life that will be more agreeable than having to learn.

Then tell me, he said, do you know anything?

Yes, I said, I know many things, but not anything of much importance.

That will do, he said: And would you admit that anything is what it is, and at the same time is not what it is?

Certainly not.

And did you not say that you knew something?

I did.

If you know, you are knowing.

Certainly, of the knowledge which I have.

That makes no difference;—and must you not, if you are knowing, know all things?

Certainly not, I said, for there are many other things which I do not know.

And if you do not know, you are not knowing.

Yes, friend, of that which I do not know.

Still you are not knowing, and you said just now that you were knowing; and therefore you are and are not at the same time, and in reference to the same things.

A pretty clatter, as men say, Euthydemus, this of yours! and will you explain how I possess the knowledge for which we were seeking? Do you mean to say that the same thing cannot be and also not be; and therefore, since I know one thing, that I know all, for I cannot be knowing and not knowing at the same time, and if I know all things, then I must have the knowledge for which we are seeking—May I assume this to be your ingenious notion?

Out of your own mouth, Socrates, you are convicted, he said.

Well, but, Euthydemus, I said, has that never happened to you? for if I am only in the same case with you and our beloved Dionysodorus, I cannot complain. Tell me, then, you two, do you not know some things, and not know others?

Certainly not, Socrates, said Dionysodorus.

What do you mean, I said; do you know nothing?

Nay, he replied, we do know something.

*Euthydemus.*

SOCRATES,  
EUTHYDE-  
MUS,  
DIONYSODO-  
RUS.

Socrates  
admits that he  
knows some-  
thing and  
does not know  
other things.

But if so, he  
knows and  
does not know  
at the same  
time.

*Euthydemus.*SOCRATES,  
DIONYSODO-  
RUS,CTESIPPUS.  
But this is  
impossible;  
and therefore  
if he knows,  
he knows all  
things.

Then, I said, you know all things, if you know anything? 294  
Yes, all things, he said; and that is as true of you as  
of us.

O, indeed, I said, what a wonderful thing, and what a  
great blessing! And do all other men know all things or  
nothing?

Certainly, he replied; they cannot know some things, and  
not know others, and be at the same time knowing and not  
knowing.

Then what is the inference? I said.

They all know all things, he replied, if they know one  
thing.

O heavens, Dionysodorus, I said, I see now that you are in  
earnest; hardly have I got you to that point. And do you  
really and truly know all things, including carpentering and  
leather-cutting?

Certainly, he said.

And do you know stitching?

Yes, by the gods, we do, and cobbling, too.

And do you know things such as the numbers of the stars  
and of the sand?

Certainly; did you think we should say No to that?

By Zeus, said Ctesippus, interrupting, I only wish that you  
would give me some proof which would enable me to know  
whether you speak truly.

What proof shall I give you? he said.

Will you tell me how many teeth Euthydemus has? and  
Euthydemus shall tell how many teeth you have.

Will you not take our word that we know all things?

Certainly not, said Ctesippus: you must further tell us this  
one thing, and then we shall know that you are speaking the  
truth; if you tell us the number, and we count them, and you  
are found to be right, we will believe the rest. They fancied  
that Ctesippus was making game of them, and they refused,  
and they would only say, in answer to each of his questions,  
that they knew all things. For at last Ctesippus began to  
throw off all restraint; no question was too bad for him;  
he would ask them if they knew the foulest things, and  
they, like wild boars, came rushing on his blows, and fear-  
lessly replied that they did. At last, Crito, I too was carried

Ctesippus  
requires a  
proof of their  
universal  
knowledge.  
They shall tell  
him the num-  
ber of one  
another's  
teeth, and he  
will count  
them.

away by my incredulity, and asked Euthydemus whether Dionysodorus could dance. *Euthydemus.*

Certainly, he replied.

And can he vault among swords, and turn upon a wheel, at his age? has he got to such a height of skill as that?

He can do anything, he said.

And did you always know this?

Always, he said.

When you were children, and at your birth?

295 They both said that they did.

This we could not believe. And Euthydemus said: You are incredulous, Socrates.

Yes, I said, and I might well be incredulous, if I did not know you to be wise men.

But if you will answer, he said, I will make you confess to similar marvels.

Well, I said, there is nothing that I should like better than to be self-convicted of this, for if I am really a wise man, which I never knew before, and you will prove to me that I know and have always known all things, nothing in life would be a greater gain to me. *Socrates would like to be self-convicted of wisdom.*

Answer then, he said.

Ask, I said, and I will answer.

Do you know something, Socrates, or nothing?

Something, I said.

And do you know with what you know, or with something else?

With what I know; and I suppose that you mean with my soul?

Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of asking a question when you are asked one?

Well, I said; but then what am I to do? for I will do whatever you bid; when I do not know what you are asking, you tell me to answer nevertheless, and not to ask again.

Why, you surely have some notion of my meaning, he said.

Yes, I replied.

Well, then, answer according to your notion of my meaning.

*Euthydemus.*SOCRATES,  
EUTHYDE-  
MUS.

Yes, I said ; but if the question which you ask in one sense is understood and answered by me in another, will that please you—if I answer what is not to the point?

It will please me very well ; but will not please you equally well, I imagine.

I certainly will not answer unless I understand you, I said.

You will not answer, he said, according to your view of the meaning, because you will be prating, and are an ancient.

Socrates will not quarrel with the two Sophists ; for he desires to become their pupil.

Now I saw that he was getting angry with me for drawing distinctions, when he wanted to catch me in his springes of words. And I remembered that Connus was always angry with me when I opposed him, and then he neglected me, because he thought that I was stupid ; and as I was intending to go to Euthydemus as a pupil, I reflected that I had better let him have his way, as he might think me a blockhead, and refuse to take me. So I said : You are a far better dialectician than myself, Euthydemus, for I have never made a profession of the art, and therefore do as you say ; ask your questions once more, and I will answer.

Answer then, he said, again, whether you know what you know with something, or with nothing.

Yes, I said ; I know with my soul.

The man will answer more than the question ; for I did not ask you, he said, with what you know, but whether you know with something. 296

Again I replied, Through ignorance I have answered too much, but I hope that you will forgive me. And now I will answer simply that I always know what I know with something.

And is that something, he rejoined, always the same. or sometimes one thing, and sometimes another thing?

Always, I replied, when I know, I know with this.

Will you not cease adding to your answers?

My fear is that this word 'always' may get us into trouble.

You, perhaps, but certainly not us. And now answer : Do you always know with this?

Always ; since I am required to withdraw the words 'when I know.'

You always know with this, or, always knowing, do you

know some things with this, and some things with something else, or do you know all things with this?

All that I know, I replied, I know with this.

There again, Socrates, he said, the addition is superfluous.

Well, then, I said, I will take away the words 'that I know.'

Nay, take nothing away; I desire no favours of you; but let me ask: Would you be able to know all things, if you did not know all things?

Quite impossible.

And now, he said, you may add on whatever you like, for you confess that you know all things.

I suppose that is true, I said, if my qualification implied in the words 'that I know' is not allowed to stand; and so I do know all things.

And have you not admitted that you always know all things with that which you know, whether you make the addition of 'when you know them' or not? for you have acknowledged that you have always and at the same time known all things, that is to say, when you were a child, and at your birth, and when you were growing up, and before you were born, and before the heaven and earth existed, you knew all things, if you always know them; and I swear that you shall always continue to know all things, if I am of the mind to make you.

But I hope that you will be of that mind, reverend Euthydemus, I said, if you are really speaking the truth, and yet I a little doubt your power to make good your words unless you have the help of your brother Dionysodorus; then you may do it. Tell me now, both of you, for although in the main I cannot doubt that I really do know all things, when I am told so by men of your prodigious wisdom—how can I say that I know such things, Euthydemus, as that the good are unjust; come, do I know that or not?

Certainly, you know that.

What do I know?

That the good are not unjust.

Quite true, I said; and that I have always known; but the question is, where did I learn that the good are unjust?

Nowhere, said Dionysodorus.

Then, I said, I do not know this.

*Euthydemus.*

SOCRATES,

EUTHYDE-

MUS,

DIONYSODO-

RUS.

Socrates is compelled to admit that he always knows all things with the same thing.



*Euthydemus.* You are ruining the argument, said Euthydemus to Dionysodorus; he will be proved not to know, and then after all he will be knowing and not knowing at the same time.

SOCRATES,  
EUTHYDE-  
MUS,  
DIONYSODO-  
RUS.

Dionysodorus blushed.  
I turned to the other, and said, What do you think, Euthydemus? Does not your omniscient brother appear to you to have made a mistake?

What, replied Dionysodorus in a moment; am I the brother of Euthydemus?

Thereupon I said, Please not to interrupt, my good friend, or prevent Euthydemus from proving to me that I know the good to be unjust; such a lesson you might at least allow me to learn.

Dionysodorus  
reproved by  
his brother  
Sophist.

You are running away, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, and refusing to answer.

Socrates  
cannot fight  
against the  
pair any more  
than Heracles  
against the  
Hydra.

No wonder, I said, for I am not a match for one of you, and *a fortiori* I must run away from two. I am no Heracles; and even Heracles could not fight against the Hydra, who was a she-Sophist, and had the wit to shoot up many new heads when one of them was cut off; especially when he saw a second monster of a sea-crab, who was also a Sophist, and appeared to have newly arrived from a sea-voyage, bearing down upon him from the left, opening his mouth and biting. When the monster was growing troublesome he called Iolaus, his nephew, to his help, who ably succoured him; but if my Iolaus, who is my brother Patrocles [the statuary], were to come, he would only make a bad business worse.

And now that you have delivered yourself of this strain, said Dionysodorus, will you inform me whether Iolaus was the nephew of Heracles any more than he is yours?

I suppose that I had best answer you, Dionysodorus, I said, for you will insist on asking—that I pretty well know—out of envy, in order to prevent me from learning the wisdom of Euthydemus.

Then answer me, he said.

Disputes  
about the  
words  
nephew,  
brother, or  
father, as

Well then, I said, I can only reply that Iolaus was not my nephew at all, but the nephew of Heracles; and his father was not my brother Patrocles, but Iphicles, who has a name rather like his, and was the brother of Heracles.

And is Patrocles, he said, your brother?

Yes, I said, he is my half-brother, the son of my mother, but not of my father.

Then he is and is not your brother.

Not by the same father, my good man, I said, for Chaeredemus was his father, and mine was Sophroniscus.

And was Sophroniscus a father, and Chaeredemus also?

Yes, I said; the former was my father, and the latter his.

298 Then, he said, Chaeredemus is not a father.

He is not my father, I said.

But can a father be other than a father? or are you the same as a stone?

I certainly do not think that I am a stone, I said, though I am afraid that you may prove me to be one.

Are you not other than a stone?

I am.

And being other than a stone, you are not a stone; and being other than gold, you are not gold?

Very true.

And so Chaeredemus, he said, being other than a father, is not a father?

I suppose that he is not a father, I replied.

For if, said Euthydemus, taking up the argument, Chaeredemus is a father, then Sophroniscus, being other than a father, is not a father; and you, Socrates, are without a father.

Ctesippus, here taking up the argument, said: And is not your father in the same case, for he is other than my father?

Assuredly not, said Euthydemus.

Then he is the same?

He is the same.

I cannot say that I like the connection; but is he only my father, Euthydemus, or is he the father of all other men?

Of all other men, he replied. Do you suppose the same person to be a father and not a father?

Certainly, I did so imagine, said Ctesippus.

And do you suppose that gold is not gold, or that a man is not a man?

They are not '*in pari materia*,' Euthydemus, said Ctesippus,

*Euthydemus.*

SOCRATES,  
DIONYSODO-  
RUS,  
EUTHYDE-  
MUS,  
CTESIPPUS.

they are taken  
in an absolute  
or in a relative  
sense.

The father of  
Euthydemus  
is declared to  
be the father  
of all, and not  
only of all  
men, but of  
all animals.

*Euthydemus.*

EUTHYDE-

MUS,

CTESSIPPUS,

DIONYSODO-

RUS.

and you had better take care, for it is monstrous to suppose that your father is the father of all.

But he is, he replied.

What, of men only, said Ctesippus, or of horses and of all other animals?

Of all, he said.

And your mother, too, is the mother of all?

Yes, our mother too.

Yes; and your mother has a progeny of sea-urchins then?

Yes; and yours, he said.

And gudgeons and puppies and pigs are your brothers?

And yours too.

And your papa is a dog?

And so is yours, he said.

Proceeding in the same line of argument, Dionysodorus declares that a dog who has puppies is a father, and Euthydemus adds that he who beats his dog beats his own father.

If you will answer my questions, said Dionysodorus, I will soon extract the same admissions from you, Ctesippus. You say that you have a dog?

Yes, a villain of a one, said Ctesippus.

And he has puppies?

Yes, and they are very like himself.

And the dog is the father of them?

Yes, he said, I certainly saw him and the mother of the puppies come together.

And is he not yours?

To be sure he is.

Then he is a father, and he is yours; ergo, he is your father, and the puppies are your brothers.

Let me ask you one little question more, said Euthydemus, quickly interposing, in order that Ctesippus might not get in his word: You beat this dog?

Ctesippus said, laughing, Indeed I do; and I only wish that I could beat you instead of him.

Then you beat your father, he said.

I should have far more reason to beat yours, said Ctesippus; what could he have been thinking of when he begat such wise sons? much good has this father of you and your brethren the puppies got out of this wisdom of yours.

But neither he nor you, Ctesippus, have any need of much good.

And have you no need, Euthydemus? he said.

Neither I nor any other man; for tell me now, Ctesippus, if you think it good or evil for a man who is sick to drink medicine when he wants it; or to go to war armed rather than unarmed.

*Euthydemus.*

CTESIPPUS,  
EUTHYDE-  
MUS.

Good, I say. And yet I know that I am going to be caught in one of your charming puzzles.

That, he replied, you will discover, if you answer; since you admit medicine to be good for a man to drink, when wanted, must it not be good for him to drink as much as possible; when he takes his medicine, a cartload of hellebore will not be too much for him?

When a thing  
is good, you  
cannot have  
too much of it.

Ctesippus said: Quite so, Euthydemus, that is to say, if he who drinks is as big as the statue of Delphi.

And seeing that in war to have arms is a good thing, he ought to have as many spears and shields as possible?

Very true, said Ctesippus; and do you think, Euthydemus, that he ought to have one shield only, and one spear?

I do.

And would you arm Geryon and Briareus in that way? Considering that you and your companion fight in armour, I thought that you would have known better. . . . Here Euthydemus held his peace, but Dionysodorus returned to the previous answer of Ctesippus and said:—

Do you not think that the possession of gold is a good thing?

Yes, said Ctesippus, and the more the better.

And to have money everywhere and always is a good?

Certainly, a great good, he said.

And you admit gold to be a good?

Certainly, he replied.

And ought not a man then to have gold everywhere and always, and as much as possible in himself, and may he not be deemed the happiest of men who has three talents of gold in his belly, and a talent in his pate, and a stater of gold in either eye?

Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; and the Scythians reckon those who have gold in their own skulls to be the happiest and bravest of men (that is only another instance of your manner of speaking about the dog and father), and what is still more extraordinary, they drink out of their own skulls

*Euthydemus.* guilt, and see the inside of them, and hold their own head in their hands.

EUTHYDE-  
MUS,  
CTESIPPUS,  
DIONYSODO-  
RUS.

You see that which has the quality of vision; you see our garments; therefore they have the quality of vision.

And do the Scythians and others see that which has the quality of vision, or that which has not? said Euthydemus.

That which has the quality of vision clearly.

And<sup>1</sup> you also see that which has the quality of vision? he said.

Yes, I do.

Then do you see our garments?

Yes.

Then our garments have the quality of vision.

They can see to any extent, said Ctesippus.

What can they see?

Nothing; but you, my sweet man, may perhaps imagine that they do not see; and certainly, Euthydemus, you do seem to me to have been caught napping when you were not asleep, and that if it be possible to speak and say nothing—you are doing so.

And may there not be a silence of the speaker? said Dionysodorus.

Impossible, said Ctesippus.

Or a speaking of the silent?

<sup>1</sup> Note: the ambiguity of *δινατὰ ὁρᾶν*, 'things visible and able to see,' *σιγῶντα λέγειν*, 'the speaking of the silent,' the silent denoting either the speaker or the subject of the speech, cannot be perfectly rendered in English. Compare Aristot. *Soph. Elenchi*, c. iv. (Poste's translation, p. 9):—

'Of ambiguous propositions the following are instances:—

'I hope that you the enemy may slay.

'Whom one knows, he knows. Either the person knowing or the person known is here affirmed to know.

'What one sees, that one sees: one sees a pillar: ergo, that one pillar sees.

'What you *are* holding, that you are: you are holding a stone: ergo, a stone you are.

'Is a speaking of the silent possible? "The silent" denotes either the speaker or the subject of speech.

'There are three kinds of ambiguity of term or proposition. The first is when there is an equal linguistic propriety in several interpretations; the second when one is improper but customary; the third when the ambiguity arises in the combination of elements that are in themselves unambiguous, as in "knowing letters." "Knowing" and "letters" are perhaps separately unambiguous, but in combination may imply either that the letters are known, or that they themselves have knowledge. Such are the modes in which propositions and terms may be ambiguous.'

That is still more impossible, he said.

But when you speak of stones, wood, iron bars, do you not speak of the silent?

Not when I pass a smithy; for then the iron bars make a tremendous noise and outcry if they are touched: so that here your wisdom is strangely mistaken: please, however, to tell me how you can be silent when speaking (I thought that Ctesippus was put upon his mettle because Cleinias was present).

When you are silent, said Euthydemus, is there not a silence of all things?

Yes, he said.

But if speaking things are included in all things, then the speaking are silent.

What, said Ctesippus; then all things are not silent?

Certainly not, said Euthydemus.

Then, my good friend, do they all speak?

Yes; those which speak.

Nay, said Ctesippus, but the question which I ask is whether all things are silent or speak?

Neither and both, said Dionysodorus, quickly interposing; I am sure that you will be 'non-plussed' at that answer.

Here Ctesippus, as his manner was, burst into a roar of laughter; he said, That brother of yours, Euthydemus, has got into a dilemma; all is over with him. This delighted Cleinias, whose laughter made Ctesippus ten times as uproarious; but I cannot help thinking that the rogue must have picked up this answer from them; for there has been no wisdom like theirs in our time. Why do you laugh, Cleinias, I said, at such solemn and beautiful things?

Why, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, did you ever see a beautiful thing?

Yes, Dionysodorus, I replied, I have seen many.

301 Were they other than the beautiful, or the same as the beautiful?

Now I was in a great quandary at having to answer this question, and I thought that I was rightly served for having opened my mouth at all: I said however, They are not the same as absolute beauty, but they have beauty present with each of them.

*Euthydemus.*

SOCRATES,  
CTESIPPUS,  
EUTHYDE-  
MUS,  
DIONYSODO-  
RUS.

A similar  
*double en-  
tendre.*

The speaker  
may be silent  
or may speak,  
or both.

The Sophist  
lightly touches  
upon the  
doctrine of  
ideas.



*Euthydemus.*SOCRATES,  
DIONYSODO-  
RUS.

And are you an ox because an ox is present with you, or are you Dionysodorus, because Dionysodorus is present with you?

God forbid, I replied.

But how, he said, by reason of one thing being present with another, will one thing be another?

Is that your difficulty? I said. For I was beginning to imitate their skill, on which my heart was set.

Of course, he replied, I and all the world are in a difficulty about the non-existent.

What do you mean, Dionysodorus? I said. Is not the honourable honourable and the base base?

That, he said, is as I please.

And do you please?

Yes, he said.

Fresh  
quibbles.

And you will admit that the same is the same, and the other other; for surely the other is not the same; I should imagine that even a child will hardly deny the other to be other. But I think, Dionysodorus, that you must have intentionally missed the last question; for in general you and your brother seem to me to be good workmen in your own department, and to do the dialectician's business excellently well.

What, said he, is the business of a good workman? tell me, in the first place, whose business is hammering?

The smith's.

And whose the making of pots?

The potter's.

And who has to kill and skin and mince and boil and roast?

The cook, I said.

And if a man does his business he does rightly?

Certainly.

And the business of the cook is to cut up and skin; you have admitted that?

Yes, I have, but you must not be too hard upon me.

Then if some one were to kill, mince, boil, roast the cook, he would do his business, and if he were to hammer the smith, and make a pot of the potter, he would do their business.

Poseidon, I said, this is the crown of wisdom; can I ever hope to have such wisdom of my own?

*Euthydemus.*

And would you be able, Socrates, to recognize this wisdom when it has become your own?

SOCRATES,  
DIONYSODO-  
RUS.

Certainly, I said, if you will allow me.

What, he said, do you think that you know what is your own?

Yes, I do, subject to your correction; for you are the bottom, and Euthydemus is the top, of all my wisdom.

Is not that which you would deem your own, he said, that which you have in your own power, and which you are able to use as you would desire, for example, an ox or a sheep—would you not think that which you could sell and give and sacrifice to any god whom you pleased, to be your own, and that which you could not give or sell or sacrifice you would think not to be in your own power?

That which is  
your own you  
can give away  
or sell; e.g.  
the ox or  
sheep which  
you sacrifice.

Yes, I said (for I was certain that something good would come out of the questions, which I was impatient to hear); yes, such things, and such things only are mine.

Yes, he said, and you would mean by animals living beings?

Yes, I said.

You agree then, that those animals only are yours with which you have the power to do all these things which I was just naming?

I agree.

Then, after a pause, in which he seemed to be lost in the contemplation of something great, he said: Tell me, Socrates, have you an ancestral Zeus? Here, anticipating the final move, like a person caught in a net, who gives a desperate twist that he may get away, I said: No, Dionysodorus, I have not.

What a miserable man you must be then, he said; you are not an Athenian at all if you have no ancestral gods or temples, or any other mark of gentility.

Nay, Dionysodorus, I said, do not be rude; good words, if you please; in the way of religion I have altars and temples, domestic and ancestral, and all that other Athenians have.

And have not other Athenians, he said, an ancestral Zeus?

*Euthydemus.*SOCRATES,  
DIONYSODO-  
RUS,  
EUTHYDE-  
MUS,  
CTESIPPUS.

That name, I said, is not to be found among the Ionians, whether colonists or citizens of Athens; an ancestral Apollo there is, who is the father of Ion, and a family Zeus, and a Zeus guardian of the phratry, and an Athene guardian of the phratry. But the name of ancestral Zeus is unknown to us.

No matter, said Dionysodorus, for you admit that you have Apollo, Zeus, and Athene.

Certainly, I said.

And they are your gods, he said.

Yes, I said, my lords and ancestors.

At any rate they are yours, he said, did you not admit that?

I did, I said; what is going to happen to me?

And are not these gods animals? for you admit that all things which have life are animals; and have not these gods life?

They have life, I said.

Then are they not animals?

They are animals, I said.

And you admitted that of animals those are yours which you could give away or sell or offer in sacrifice, as you pleased?

I did, Euthydemus, and I have no way of escape.

Well then, said he, if you admit that Zeus and the other gods are yours, can you sell them or give them away or do what you will with them, as you would with other animals?

At this I was quite struck dumb, Crito, and lay prostrate. Ctesippus came to the rescue.

Bravo, Heracles, brave words, said he.

Bravo Heracles, or is Heracles a Bravo? said Dionysodorus.

Poseidon, said Ctesippus, what awful distinctions. I will have no more of them; the pair are invincible.

Then, my dear Crito, there was universal applause of the speakers and their words, and what with laughing and clapping of hands and rejoicings the two men were quite overpowered; for hitherto their partisans only had cheered at each successive hit, but now the whole company shouted with delight until the columns of the Lyceum returned the

Gods are animals; and if it is admitted that animals may be sold, then the gods may be sold.

sound, seeming to sympathize in their joy. To such a pitch was I affected myself, that I made a speech, in which I acknowledged that I had never seen the like of their wisdom; I was their devoted servant, and fell to praising and admiring of them. What marvellous dexterity of wit, I said, enabled you to acquire this great perfection in such a short time? There is much, indeed, to admire in your words, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, but there is nothing that I admire more than your magnanimous disregard of any opinion—whether of the many, or of the grave and reverend seigniors—you regard only those who are like yourselves. And I do verily believe that there are few who are like you, and who would approve of such arguments; the majority of mankind are so ignorant of their value, that they would be more ashamed of employing them in the refutation of others than of being refuted by them. I must further express my approval of your kind and public-spirited denial of all differences, whether of good and evil, white or black, or any other; the result of which is that, as you say, every mouth is sewn up, not excepting your own, which graciously follows the example of others; and thus all ground of offence is taken away. But what appears to me to be more than all is, that this art and invention of yours has been so admirably contrived by you, that in a very short time it can be imparted to any one.

304 I observed that Ctesippus learned to imitate you in no time. Now this quickness of attainment is an excellent thing; but at the same time I would advise you not to have any more public entertainments; there is a danger that men may undervalue an art which they have so easy an opportunity of acquiring; the exhibition would be best of all, if the discussion were confined to your two selves; but if there must be an audience, let him only be present who is willing to pay a handsome fee;—you should be careful of this;—and if you are wise, you will also bid your disciples discourse with no man but you and themselves. For only what is rare is valuable; and ‘water,’ which, as Pindar says, is the ‘best of all things,’ is also the cheapest. And now I have only to request that you will receive Cleinias and me among your pupils.

Such was the discussion, Crito; and after a few more

*Euthydemus.*  
SOCRATES,  
CRITO.

*Euthydemus.*SOCRATES,  
CRITO.

words had passed between us we went away. I hope that you will come to them with me, since they say that they are able to teach any one who will give them money; no age or want of capacity is an impediment. And I must repeat one thing which they said, for your especial benefit,—that the learning of their art did not at all interfere with the business of money-making.

*Crito remonstrates with Socrates on the impropriety of entering into discussion with such men as the two Sophists;*

*and confirms his opinion by that of an Athenian pleader.*

*Cri.* Truly, Socrates, though I am curious and ready to learn, yet I fear that I am not like-minded with Euthydemus, but one of the other sort, who, as you were saying, would rather be refuted by such arguments than use them in refutation of others. And though I may appear ridiculous in venturing to advise you, I think that you may as well hear what was said to me by a man of very considerable pretensions—he was a professor of legal oratory—who came away from you while I was walking up and down. ‘Crito,’ said he to me, ‘are you giving no attention to these wise men?’ ‘No, indeed,’ I said to him; ‘I could not get within hearing of them—there was such a crowd.’ ‘You would have heard something worth hearing if you had.’ ‘What was that?’ I said. ‘You would have heard the greatest masters of the art of rhetoric discoursing.’ ‘And what did you think of them?’ I said. ‘What did I think of them?’ he said:—‘theirs was the sort of discourse which anybody might hear from men who were playing the fool, and making much ado about nothing.’ That was the expression which he used. ‘Surely,’ I said, ‘philosophy is a charming thing.’ ‘Charming!’ he said; ‘what simplicity! philosophy is nought; and I think that if you had been present you would have been ashamed of your friend—his conduct was so very strange in placing himself at the mercy of men who care not what they say, and fasten upon every word. And these, as I was telling you, are supposed to be the most eminent professors of their time. But the truth is, Crito, that the study itself and the men themselves are utterly mean and ridiculous.’ Now censure of the pursuit, Socrates, whether coming from him or from others, appears to me to be undeserved; but as to the impropriety of holding a public discussion with such men, there, I confess that, in my opinion, he was in the right.

*Soc.* O Crito, they are marvellous men; but what was I going to say? First of all let me know;—What manner of man was he who came up to you and censured philosophy; was he an orator who himself practises in the courts, or an instructor of orators, who makes the speeches with which they do battle?

*Cri.* He was certainly not an orator, and I doubt whether he had ever been into court; but they say that he knows the business, and is a clever man, and composes wonderful speeches.

*Soc.* Now I understand, Crito; he is one of an amphibious class, whom I was on the point of mentioning—one of those whom Prodicus describes as on the border-ground between philosophers and statesmen—they think that they are the wisest of all men, and that they are generally esteemed the wisest; nothing but the rivalry of the philosophers stands in their way; and they are of the opinion that if they can prove the philosophers to be good for nothing, no one will dispute their title to the palm of wisdom, for that they are themselves really the wisest, although they are apt to be mauled by Euthydemus and his friends, when they get hold of them in conversation. This opinion which they entertain of their own wisdom is very natural; for they have a certain amount of philosophy, and a certain amount of political wisdom; there is reason in what they say, for they argue that they have just enough of both, and so they keep out of the way of all risks and conflicts and reap the fruits of their wisdom.

*Cri.* What do you say of them, Socrates? There is certainly something specious in that notion of theirs.

*Soc.* Yes, Crito, there is more speciousness than truth; 306 they cannot be made to understand the nature of intermediates. For all persons or things, which are intermediate between two other things, and participate in both of them—if one of these two things is good and the other evil, are better than the one and worse than the other; but if they are in a mean between two good things which do not tend to the same end, they fall short of either of their component elements in the attainment of their ends. Only in the case when the two component elements which do not tend to the same end are

*Euthydemus.*

SOCRATES,  
CRITO.

Socrates in return disparages Crito's informant. He belongs to a hybrid class, who are a cross between philosophers and politicians, and inferior to either.



*Euthydemus.*SOCRATES,  
CRITO.

evil is the participant better than either. Now, if philosophy and political action are both good, but tend to different ends, and they participate in both, and are in a mean between them, then they are talking nonsense, for they are worse than either; or, if the one be good and the other evil, they are better than the one and worse than the other; only on the supposition that they are both evil could there be any truth in what they say. I do not think that they will admit that their two pursuits are either wholly or partly evil; but the truth is, that these philosopher-politicians who aim at both fall short of both in the attainment of their respective ends, and are really third, although they would like to stand first. There is no need, however, to be angry at this ambition of theirs—which may be forgiven; for every man ought to be loved who says and manfully pursues and works out anything which is at all like wisdom: at the same time we shall do well to see them as they really are.

Crito wants to educate one of his sons, but the teachers of philosophy are such strange beings that he cannot trust him to them.

*Cri.* I have often told you, Socrates, that I am in a constant difficulty about my two sons. What am I to do with them? There is no hurry about the younger one, who is only a child; but the other, Critobulus, is getting on, and needs some one who will improve him. I cannot help thinking, when I hear you talk, that there is a sort of madness in many of our anxieties about our children:—in the first place, about marrying a wife of good family to be the mother of them, and then about heaping up money for them—and yet taking no care about their education. But then again, when I contemplate any of those who pretend to educate others, I am amazed. To me, if I am to confess the truth, they all seem to be such outrageous beings: so that I do not know how I can advise the youth to study philosophy. 307

*Soc.* Dear Crito, do you not know that in every profession the inferior sort are numerous and good for nothing, and the good are few and beyond all price: for example, are not gymnastic and rhetoric and money-making and the art of the general, noble arts?

*Cri.* Certainly they are, in my judgment.

*Soc.* Well, and do you not see that in each of these arts the many are ridiculous performers?

*Cri.* Yes, indeed, that is very true.

*Soc.* And will you on this account shun all these pursuits yourself and refuse to allow them to your son? *Euthydemus.*

*Cri.* That would not be reasonable, Socrates.

SOCRATES,  
CRITO.

*Soc.* Do you then be reasonable, Crito, and do not mind whether the teachers of philosophy are good or bad, but think only of philosophy herself. Try and examine her well and truly, and if she be evil seek to turn away all men from her, and not your sons only; but if she be what I believe that she is, then follow her and serve her, you and your house, as the saying is, and be of good cheer.

Let him think,  
not of the  
goodness or  
badness of the  
teachers, but  
of the truth of  
philosophy.



CRATYLUS.



## INTRODUCTION.

THE *Cratylus* has always been a source of perplexity to the student of Plato. While in fancy and humour, and perfection of style and metaphysical originality, this dialogue may be ranked with the best of the Platonic writings, there has been an uncertainty about the motive of the piece, which interpreters have hitherto not succeeded in dispelling. We need not suppose that Plato used words in order to conceal his thoughts, or that he would have been unintelligible to an educated contemporary. In the *Phaedrus* and *Euthydemus* we also find a difficulty in determining the precise aim of the author. Plato wrote satires in the form of dialogues, and his meaning, like that of other satirical writers, has often slept in the ear of posterity. Two causes may be assigned for this obscurity: 1st, the subtlety and allusiveness of this species of composition; 2nd, the difficulty of reproducing a state of life and literature which has passed away. A satire is unmeaning unless we can place ourselves back among the persons and thoughts of the age in which it was written. Had the treatise of Antisthenes upon words, or the speculations of *Cratylus*, or some other Heracleitean of the fourth century B.C., on the nature of language been preserved to us; or if we had lived at the time, and been 'rich enough to attend the fifty-drachma course of Prodicus' (384 B), we should have understood Plato better, and many points which are now attributed to the extravagance of Socrates' humour would have been found, like the allusions of Aristophanes in the *Clouds*, to have gone home to the sophists and grammarians of the day.

For the age was very busy with philological speculation; and many questions were beginning to be asked about language which were parallel to other questions about justice, virtue, knowledge, and were illustrated in a similar manner by the analogy of the

*Cratylus.*

INTRODUC-  
TION.



*Cratylus.*

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arts. Was there a correctness in words, and were they given by nature or convention? In the presocratic philosophy mankind had been striving to attain an expression of their ideas; and now they were beginning to ask themselves whether the expression might not be distinguished from the idea? They were also seeking to distinguish the parts of speech and to enquire into the relation of subject and predicate. Grammar and logic were moving about somewhere in the depths of the human soul, but they were not yet awakened into consciousness and had not found names for themselves, or terms by which they might be expressed. Of these beginnings of the study of language we know little, and there necessarily arises an obscurity when the surroundings of such a work as the *Cratylus* are taken away. Moreover, in this, as in most of the dialogues of Plato, allowance has to be made for the character of Socrates. For the theory of language can only be propounded by him in a manner which is consistent with his own profession of ignorance. Hence his ridicule of the new school of etymology is interspersed with many declarations, 'that he knows nothing,' 'that he has learned from Euthyphro,' and the like. Even the truest things which he says are depreciated by himself. He professes to be guessing, but the guesses of Plato are better than all the other theories of the ancients respecting language put together.

The dialogue hardly derives any light from Plato's other writings, and still less from Scholiasts and Neoplatonist writers. Socrates must be interpreted from himself, and on first reading we certainly have a difficulty in understanding his drift, or his relation to the two other interlocutors in the dialogue. Does he agree with *Cratylus* or with *Hermogenes*, and is he serious in those fanciful etymologies, extending over more than half the dialogue, which he seems so greatly to relish? Or is he serious in part only; and can we separate his jest from his earnest?—*Sunt bona, sunt quaedam mediocria, sunt mala plura*. Most of them are ridiculously bad, and yet among them are found, as if by accident, principles of philology which are unsurpassed in any ancient writer, and even in advance of any philologer of the last century. May we suppose that Plato, like *Lucian*, has been amusing his fancy by writing a comedy in the form of a prose dialogue? And what is the final result of the enquiry? Is Plato an upholder of the con-

ventional theory of language, which he acknowledges to be imperfect? or does he mean to imply that a perfect language can only be based on his own theory of ideas? Or if this latter explanation is refuted by his silence, then in what relation does his account of language stand to the rest of his philosophy? Or may we be so bold as to deny the connexion between them? [For the allusion to the ideas at the end of the dialogue (439 C) is merely intended to show that we must not put words in the place of things or realities, which is a thesis strongly insisted on by Plato in many other passages] . . . These are some of the first thoughts which arise in the mind of the reader of the *Cratylus*. And the consideration of them may form a convenient introduction to the general subject of the dialogue.

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We must not expect all the parts of a dialogue of Plato to tend equally to some clearly-defined end. His idea of literary art is not the absolute proportion of the whole, such as we appear to find in a Greek temple or statue; nor should his works be tried by any such standard. They have often the beauty of poetry, but they have also the freedom of conversation. 'Words are more plastic than wax' (*Rep.* 588 D), and may be moulded into any form. He wanders on from one topic to another, careless of the unity of his work, not fearing any 'judge, or spectator, who may recall him to the point' (*Theaet.* 173 C), 'whither the argument blows we follow' (*Rep.* 394 D). To have determined beforehand, as in a modern didactic treatise, the nature and limits of the subject, would have been fatal to the spirit of enquiry or discovery, which is the soul of the dialogue. . . . These remarks are applicable to nearly all the works of Plato, but to the *Cratylus* and *Phaedrus* more than any others. See *Phaedrus*, Introduction, *sub init.*

There is another aspect under which some of the dialogues of Plato may be more truly viewed: — they are dramatic sketches of an argument. We have found that in the *Lysis*, *Charmides*, *Laches*, *Protagoras*, *Meno*, we arrived at no conclusion — the different sides of the argument were personified in the different speakers; but the victory was not distinctly attributed to any of them, nor the truth wholly the property of any. And in the *Cratylus* we have no reason to assume that Socrates is either wholly right or wholly wrong, or that Plato, though he evidently inclines to him, had any other aim than that of personifying, in

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the characters of Hermogenes, Socrates, and Cratylus, the three theories of language which are respectively maintained by them.

The two subordinate persons of the dialogue, Hermogenes and Cratylus, are at the opposite poles of the argument. But after a while the disciple of the Sophist and the follower of Heracleitus are found to be not so far removed from one another as at first sight appeared; and both show an inclination to accept the third view which Socrates interposes between them. First, Hermogenes, the poor brother of the rich Callias, expounds the doctrine that names are conventional; like the names of slaves, they may be given and altered at pleasure. This is one of those principles which, whether applied to society or language, explains everything and nothing. For in all things there is an element of convention; but the admission of this does not help us to understand the rational ground or basis in human nature on which the convention proceeds. Socrates first of all intimates to Hermogenes that his view of language is only a part of a sophistical whole, and ultimately tends to abolish the distinction between truth and falsehood. Hermogenes is very ready to throw aside the sophistical tenet, and listens with a sort of half admiration, half belief, to the speculations of Socrates.

Cratylus is of opinion that a name is either a true name or not a name at all. He is unable to conceive of degrees of imitation; a word is either the perfect expression of a thing, or a mere inarticulate sound (a fallacy which is still prevalent among theorizers about the origin of language). He is at once a philosopher and a sophist; for while wanting to rest language on an immutable basis, he would deny the possibility of falsehood. He is inclined to derive all truth from language, and in language he sees reflected the philosophy of Heracleitus. His views are not like those of Hermogenes, hastily taken up, but are said to be the result of mature consideration, although he is described as still a young man. With a tenacity characteristic of the Heracleitean philosophers, he clings to the doctrine of the flux. (Cp. Theaet. 180.) Of the real Cratylus we know nothing, except that he is recorded by Aristotle to have been the friend or teacher of Plato; nor have we any proof that he resembled the likeness of him in Plato any more than the Critias of Plato is like the real Critias, or the Euthyphro

in this dialogue like the other Euthyphro, the diviner, in the dialogue which is called after him. *Cratylus.*

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Between these two extremes, which have both of them a sophistical character, the view of Socrates is introduced, which is in a manner the union of the two. Language is conventional and also natural, and the true conventional-natural is the rational. It is a work not of chance, but of art; the dialectician is the artificer of words, and the legislator gives authority to them. They are the expressions or imitations in sound of things. In a sense, Cratylus is right in saying that things have by nature names (p. 390); for nature is not opposed either to art or to law. But vocal imitation, like any other copy, may be imperfectly executed; and in this way an element of chance or convention enters in. There is much which is accidental or exceptional in language. Some words have had their original meaning so obscured, that they require to be helped out by convention. But still the true name is that which has a natural meaning. Thus nature, art, chance, all combine in the formation of language. And the three views respectively propounded by Hermogenes, Socrates, Cratylus, may be described as the conventional, the artificial or rational, and the natural. The view of Socrates is the meeting-point of the other two, just as conceptualism is the meeting-point of nominalism and realism.

We can hardly say that Plato was aware of the truth, that 'languages are not made, but grow.' But still, when he says that 'the legislator made language with the dialectician standing on his right hand' (390 D), we need not infer from this that he conceived words, like coins, to be issued from the mint of the State. The creator of laws and of social life is naturally regarded as the creator of language, according to Hellenic notions, and the philosopher is his natural adviser. We are not to suppose that the legislator is performing any extraordinary function; he is merely the Eponymus of the State, who prescribes rules for the dialectician and for all other artists. According to a truly Platonic mode of approaching the subject, language, like virtue in the Republic, is examined by the analogy of the arts. Words are works of art which may be equally made in different materials, and are well made when they have a meaning. Of the process which he thus describes, Plato had probably no very definite notion. But he means to express

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generally that language is the product of intelligence, and that languages belong to States and not to individuals.

A better conception of language could not have been formed in Plato's age, than that which he attributes to Socrates. Yet many persons have thought that the mind of Plato is more truly seen in the vague realism of Cratylus. This misconception has probably arisen from two causes: first, the desire to bring Plato's theory of language into accordance with the received doctrine of the Platonic ideas; secondly, the impression created by Socrates himself, that he is not in earnest, and is only indulging the fancy of the hour.

1. We shall have occasion to show more at length, in the Introduction to future dialogues, that the so-called Platonic ideas are only a semi-mythical form, in which he attempts to realize abstractions, and that they are replaced in his later writings by a rational theory of psychology. (See Introductions to the Meno and the Sophist.) And in the Cratylus he gives a general account of the nature and origin of language, in which Adam Smith, Rousseau, and other writers of the last century, would have substantially agreed. At the end of the dialogue, he speaks as in the Symposium and Republic of absolute beauty and good; but he never supposed that they were capable of being embodied in words. Of the names of the ideas, he would have said, as he says of the names of the Gods, that we know nothing. Even the realism of Cratylus is not based upon the ideas of Plato, but upon the flux of Heracleitus. Here, as in the Sophist and Politicus, Plato expressly draws attention to the want of agreement in words and things. Hence we are led to infer, that the view of Socrates is not the less Plato's own, because not based upon the ideas; 2nd, that Plato's theory of language is not inconsistent with the rest of his philosophy.

2. We do not deny that Socrates is partly in jest and partly in earnest. He is discoursing in a high-flown vein, which may be compared to the 'dithyrambics of the Phaedrus.' They are mysteries of which he is speaking, and he professes a kind of ludicrous fear of his imaginary wisdom. When he is arguing out of Homer, about the names of Hector's son, or when he describes himself as inspired or maddened by Euthyphro, with whom he has been sitting from the early dawn (cp. Phaedrus and Lysias;



Phaedr.) and expresses his intention of yielding to the illusion to-day, and to-morrow he will go to a priest and be purified, we easily see that his words are not to be taken seriously. In this part of the dialogue his dread of committing impiety, the pretended derivation of his wisdom from another, the extravagance of some of his etymologies, and, in general, the manner in which the fun, fast and furious, *vires acquirit eundo*, remind us strongly of the Phaedrus. The jest is a long one, extending over more than half the dialogue. But then, we remember that the Euthydemus is a still longer jest, in which the irony is preserved to the very end. There he is parodying the ingenious follies of early logic; in the Cratylus he is ridiculing the fancies of a new school of sophists and grammarians. The fallacies of the Euthydemus are still retained at the end of our logic books; and the etymologies of the Cratylus have also found their way into later writers. Some of these are not much worse than the conjectures of Hemsterhuis, and other critics of the last century; but this does not prove that they are serious. For Plato is in advance of his age in his conception of language, as much as he is in his conception of mythology. (Cp. Phaedrus sub initio.)

When the fervour of his etymological enthusiasm has abated, Socrates ends, as he has begun, with a rational explanation of language. Still he preserves his 'know nothing' disguise, and himself declares his first notions about names to be reckless and ridiculous. Having explained compound words by resolving them into their original elements, he now proceeds to analyse simple words into the letters of which they are composed. The Socrates who 'knows nothing,' here passes into the teacher, the dialectician, the arranger of species. There is nothing in this part of the dialogue which is either weak or extravagant. Plato is a supporter of the Onomatopoetic theory of language; that is to say, he supposes words to be formed by the imitation of ideas in sounds; he also recognises the effect of time, the influence of foreign languages, the desire of euphony, to be formative principles; and he admits a certain element of chance. But he gives no intimation in all this that he is preparing the way for the construction of an ideal language, or that he has any Eleatic speculation to oppose to the Heracleiteanism of Cratylus.

The theory of language which is propounded in the Cratylus is

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in accordance with the later phase of the philosophy of Plato, and would have been regarded by him as in the main true. The dialogue is also a satire on the philological fancies of the day. Socrates in pursuit of his vocation as a detector of false knowledge, lights by accident on the truth. He is guessing, he is dreaming; he has heard, as he says in the *Phaedrus*, from another: no one is more surprised than himself at his own discoveries. And yet some of his best remarks, as for example his view of the derivation of Greek words from other languages, or of the permutations of letters, or again, his observation that in speaking of the Gods we are only speaking of our names of them, occur among these flights of humour.

We can imagine a character having a profound insight into the nature of men and things, and yet hardly dwelling upon them seriously; blending inextricably sense and nonsense; sometimes enveloping in a blaze of jests the most serious matters, and then again allowing the truth to peer through; enjoying the flow of his own humour, and puzzling mankind by an ironical exaggeration of their absurdities. Such were Aristophanes and Rabelais; such, in a different style, were Sterne, Jean Paul, Hamann,—writers who sometimes become unintelligible through the extravagance of their fancies. Such is the character which Plato intends to depict in some of his dialogues as the Silenus Socrates; and through this medium we have to receive our theory of language.

There remains a difficulty which seems to demand a more exact answer. In what relation does the satirical or etymological portion of the dialogue stand to the serious? Granting all that can be said about the provoking irony of Socrates, about the parody of Euthyphro, or Prodicus, or Antisthenes, how does the long catalogue of etymologies furnish any answer to the question of Hermogenes, which is evidently the main thesis of the dialogue: What is the truth, or correctness, or principle of names?

After illustrating the nature of correctness by the analogy of the arts, and then, as in the *Republic*, ironically appealing to the authority of the Homeric poems, Socrates shows that the truth or correctness of names can only be ascertained by an appeal to etymology. The truth of names is to be found in the analysis of their elements. But why does he admit etymologies which are

absurd, based on Heracleitean fancies, fourfold interpretations of words, impossible unions and separations of syllables and letters? Cratylus.

1. The answer to this difficulty has been already anticipated in part: Socrates is not a dogmatic teacher, and therefore he puts on this wild and fanciful disguise, in order that the truth may be permitted to appear: 2. as Benfey remarks, an erroneous example may illustrate a principle of language as well as a true one: 3. many of these etymologies, as, for example, that of *δίκαιον*, are indicated, by the manner in which Socrates speaks of them, to have been current in his own age: 4. the philosophy of language had not made such progress as would have justified Plato in propounding real derivations. Like his master Socrates, he saw through the hollowness of the incipient sciences of the day, and tries to move in a circle apart from them, laying down the conditions under which they are to be pursued, but, as in the *Timæus*, cautious and tentative, when he is speaking of actual phenomena. To have made etymologies seriously, would have seemed to him like the interpretation of the myths in the *Phædrus*, the task 'of a not very fortunate individual, who had a great deal of time on his hands.' (See p. 259.) The irony of Socrates places him above and beyond the errors of his contemporaries.

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The *Cratylus* is full of humour and satirical touches; the inspiration which comes from *Euthyphro*, and his prancing steeds, the light admixture of quotations from Homer, and the spurious dialectic which is applied to them; the jest about the fifty-drachma course of Prodicus, which is declared on the best authority, viz. his own, to be a complete education in grammar and rhetoric (384 B); the double explanation of the name Hermogenes, either as 'not being in luck,' or 'being no speaker' (384 C, 408 B); the dearly-bought wisdom of Callias, the Lacedæmonian whose name was 'Rush' and, above all, the pleasure which Socrates expresses in his own dangerous discoveries, which 'to-morrow he will purge away' (396 E), are truly humorous. While delivering a lecture on the philosophy of language, Socrates is also satirizing the endless fertility of the human mind in spinning arguments out of nothing, and employing the most trifling and fanciful analogies in support of a theory. Etymology in ancient as in modern times was a favourite recreation; and Socrates makes merry at the expense of the etymologists. The simplicity of Hermogenes, who is ready to believe anything

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that he is told, heightens the effect. (See especially 392 E ; 395 A ; 397 D.) Socrates in his genial and ironical mood hits right and left at his adversaries ; *Ὁὐρανός* is so called *ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀρᾶν τὰ ἄνω*, 'which, as some philosophers say, is the way to have a pure mind' (396 C) ; the sophists are by a fanciful explanation converted into heroes (398 D) ; 'the givers of names were like some philosophers who fancy that the earth goes round because their heads are always going round' (411 B, 439 C). There is a great deal of 'mischief' lurking in the following : 'I found myself in greater perplexity about justice than I was before I began to learn' (413 C) ; 'The *ῥ* in *κάτοπτρον* must be the addition of some one who cares nothing about truth, but thinks only of putting the mouth into shape' (414 C) ; 'Tales and falsehoods have generally to do with the Tragic and goatish life, and tragedy is the place of them' (408 C). Several philosophers and sophists are mentioned by name : first, Protagoras and Euthydemus are assailed ; then the interpreters of Homer, *οἱ παλαιοὶ Ὀμηρικοὶ* (cp. Arist. Met. xiii. 6, 7) and the Orphic poets are alluded to by the way ; then he discovers a hive of wisdom in the philosophy of Heracleitus ; — the doctrine of the flux is contained in the word *οὐσία* (= *ὥσια* the pushing principle), an anticipation of Anaxagoras is found in *ψυχῇ* and *σελήνῃ*. Again, he ridicules the arbitrary methods of pulling out and putting in letters which were in vogue among the philologers of his time ; or slightly scoffs at contemporary religious beliefs. Lastly, he is impatient of hearing from the half-converted Cratylus the doctrine that falsehood can neither be spoken, nor uttered, nor addressed ; a piece of sophistry attributed to Gorgias, which reappears in the Sophist (261 C). And he proceeds to demolish, with no less delight than he had set up, the Heracleitean theory of language.

In the latter part of the dialogue Socrates becomes more serious, though he does not lay aside but rather aggravates his banter of the Heracleiteans, whom here, as in the Theaetetus, he delights to ridicule. What was the origin of this enmity we can hardly determine : — was it due to the natural dislike which may be supposed to exist between the 'patrons of the flux' and the 'friends of the ideas' (Soph. 248 A) ? or is it to be attributed to the indignation which Plato felt at having wasted his time upon 'Cratylus and the doctrines of Heracleitus' in the days of his youth ? Socrates, touching on some of the characteristic difficulties of

early Greek philosophy, endeavours to show Cratylus that imitation may be partial or imperfect, that a knowledge of things is higher than a knowledge of names, and that there can be no knowledge if all things are in a state of transition. But Cratylus, who does not easily apprehend the argument from common sense, remains unconvinced, and on the whole inclines to his former opinion. Some profound philosophical remarks are scattered up and down, admitting of an application not only to language but to knowledge generally; such as the assertion that 'consistency is no test of truth' (436 D, foll.): or again, 'If we are over-precise about words, truth will say "too late" to us as to the belated traveller in Ægina' (433 E).

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The place of the dialogue in the series cannot be determined with certainty. The style and subject, and the treatment of the character of Socrates, have a close resemblance to the earlier dialogues, especially to the *Phaedrus* and *Euthydemus*. The manner in which the ideas are spoken of at the end of the dialogue, also indicates a comparatively early date. The imaginative element is still in full vigour; the Socrates of the *Cratylus* is the Socrates of the *Apology* and *Symposium*, not yet Platonized; and he describes, as in the *Theaetetus*, the philosophy of Heraclitus by 'unsavoury' similes — he cannot believe that the world is like 'a leaky vessel,' or 'a man who has a running at the nose' (440 C); he attributes the flux of the world to the swimming in some folks' heads. On the other hand, the relation of thought to language is omitted here, but is treated of in the *Sophist*. These grounds are not sufficient to enable us to arrive at a precise conclusion. But we shall not be far wrong in placing the *Cratylus* about the middle, or at any rate in the first half, of the series.

Steph. Cratylus, the Heracleitean philosopher, and Hermogenes, the  
383 brother of Callias, have been arguing about names; the former  
maintaining that they are natural, the latter that they are conven-  
tional. Cratylus affirms that his own is a true name, but will not  
allow that the name of Hermogenes is equally true. Hermogenes  
384 asks Socrates to explain to him what Cratylus means; or, far  
rather, he would like to know, What Socrates himself thinks  
about the truth or correctness of names? Socrates replies, that

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hard is knowledge, and the nature of names is a considerable part of knowledge: he has never been to hear the fifty-drachma course of Prodicus; and having only attended the single-drachma course, he is not competent to give an opinion on such matters. When Cratylus denies that Hermogenes is a true name, he supposes him to mean that he is not a true son of Hermes, because he is never in luck. But he would like to have an open council and to hear both sides.

Hermogenes is of opinion that there is no principle in names; they may be changed, as we change the names of slaves, whenever we please, and the altered name is as good as the original one.

You mean to say, for instance, rejoins Socrates, that if I agree 385  
to call a man a horse, then a man will be rightly called a horse by me, and a man by the rest of the world? But, surely, there is in words a true and a false, as there are true and false propositions. If a whole proposition be true or false, then the parts of a proposition may be true or false, and the least parts as well as the greatest; and the least parts are names, and therefore names may be true or false. Would Hermogenes maintain that anybody may give a name to anything, and as many names as he pleases; and would all these names be always true at the time of giving them? Hermogenes replies that this is the only way in which he can conceive that names are correct; and he appeals to the practice of different nations, and of the different Hellenic tribes, in confirmation of his view. Socrates asks, whether the things differ as the words which represent them differ: — Are we to maintain with 386  
Protagoras, that what appears is? Hermogenes has always been puzzled about this, but acknowledges, when he is pressed by Socrates, that there are a few very good men in the world, and a great many very bad; and the very good are the wise, and the very bad are the foolish; and this is not mere appearance but reality. Nor is he disposed to say with Euthydemus, that all things equally and always belong to all men; in that case, again, there would be no distinction between bad and good men. But then, the only remaining possibility is, that all things have their several distinct natures, and are independent of our notions about them. And not only things, but actions, have distinct natures, and are done by different processes. There is a natural way of 387



cutting or burning, and a natural instrument with which men cut or burn, and any other way will fail;—this is true of all actions. Cratylus.  
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And speaking is a kind of action, and naming is a kind of speaking, and we must name according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument. We cut with a knife, we pierce with an awl, we weave with a shuttle, we name with a name. And as a shuttle separates the warp from the woof, so a name distinguishes the natures of things. The weaver will use the shuttle well,—that is, like a weaver; and the teacher will use the name well,—that is, like a teacher. The shuttle will be made by the carpenter; the awl by the smith or skilled person. But who makes a name? Does not the law give names, and does not the teacher receive them from the legislator? He is the skilled person who makes them, and of all skilled workmen he is the rarest. But how does the carpenter make or repair the shuttle, and to what will he look? Will he not look at the ideal which he has in his mind? And as the different kinds of work differ, so ought the instruments which make them to differ. The several kinds of shuttles ought to answer in material and form to the several kinds of webs. And the legislator ought to know the different materials and forms of which names are made in Hellas and other countries. But who is to be the judge of the proper form? The judge of shuttles is the weaver who uses them; the judge of lyres is the player of the lyre; the judge of ships is the pilot. And will not the judge who is able to direct the legislator in his work of naming, be he who knows how to use the names—he who can ask and answer questions—in short, the dialectician? The pilot directs the carpenter how to make the rudder, and the dialectician directs the legislator how he is to impose names; for to express the ideal forms of things in syllables and letters is not the easy task, Hermogenes, which you imagine.

‘I should be more readily persuaded, if you would show me this natural correctness of names.’

Indeed I cannot; but I see that you have advanced; for you now admit that there is a correctness of names, and that not every one can give a name. But what is the nature of this correctness or truth, you must learn from the Sophists, of whom your brother Callias has bought his reputation for wisdom rather dearly; and since they require to be paid, you, having no money, had better



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learn from him at second-hand. 'Well, but I have just given up Protagoras, and I should be inconsistent in going to learn of him.' Then if you reject him you may learn of the poets, and in particular of Homer, who distinguishes the names given by Gods and men to the same things, as in the verse about the river God who fought with Hephaestus, 'whom the Gods call Xanthus, and men call Scamander;' or in the lines in which he mentions the bird which the Gods call 'Chalcis,' and men 'Cymindis;' or the hill which men call 'Batieia,' and the Gods 'Myrina's Tomb.' Here is an important lesson; for the Gods must of course be right in their use of names. And this is not the only truth about philology which may be learnt from Homer. Does he not say that Hector's son had two names—

'Hector called him Scamandrius, but the others Astyanax'?

Now, if the men called him Astyanax, is it not probable that the other name was conferred by the women? And which are more likely to be right—the wiser or the less wise, the men or the women? Homer evidently agreed with the men: and of the name given by them he offers an explanation;—the boy was called Astyanax ('king of the city'), because his father saved the city. The names Astyanax and Hector, moreover, are really the same,—the one means a king, and the other is 'a holder or possessor.' For as the lion's whelp may be called a lion, or the horse's foal a foal, so the son of a king may be called a king. But if the horse had produced a calf, then that would be called a calf. Whether the syllables of a name are the same or not makes no difference, provided the meaning is retained. For example; the names of letters, whether vowels or consonants, do not correspond to their sounds, with the exception of *ε*, *ν*, *ο*, *ω*. The name Beta has three letters added to the sound—and yet this does not alter the sense of the word, or prevent the whole name having the value which the legislator intended. And the same may be said of a king and the son of a king, who like other animals resemble each other in the course of nature; the words by which they are signified may be disguised, and yet amid differences of sound the etymologist may recognise the same notion, just as the physician recognises the power of the same drugs under different disguises of colour and smell. Hector and

Astyanax have only one letter alike, but they have the same meaning; and Agis (leader) is altogether different in sound from Polemarchus (chief in war), or Eupolemus (good warrior); but the two words present the same idea of leader or general, like the words Iatrocles and Acesimbrotus, which equally denote a physician. The son succeeds the father as the foal succeeds the horse; but when, out of the course of nature, a prodigy occurs, and the offspring no longer resembles the parent, then the names no longer agree. This may be illustrated by the case of Agamemnon and his son Orestes, of whom the former has a name significant of his patience at the siege of Troy; while the name of the latter indicates his savage, man-of-the-mountain nature. Atreus again, for his murder of Chrysippus, and his cruelty to Thyestes, is rightly named Atreus, which, to the eye of the etymologist, is ἀτηρὸς (destructive), ἀτειρὴς (stubborn), ἀτρεστος (fearless); and Pelops is ὁ τὰ πέλας ὁρῶν (he who sees what is near only), because in his eagerness to win Hippodamia, he was unconscious of the remoter consequences which the murder of Myrtilus would entail upon his race. The name Tantalus, if slightly changed, offers two etymologies; either ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ λίθου ταλαντείας, or ἀπὸ τοῦ ταλάντατον εἶναι, signifying at once the hanging of the stone over his head in the world below, and the misery which he brought upon his country.

And the name of his father, Zeus, Διὸς, Ζηνὸς, has an excellent meaning, though hard to be understood, because really a sentence which is divided into two parts (Ζεὺς, Διὸς). For he, being the lord and king of all, is the author of our being, and in him all live: this is implied in the double form, Διὸς, Ζηνὸς, which being put together and interpreted is *δι' ὃν ζῇ πάντα*. There may, at first sight, appear to be some irreverence in calling him the son of Cronos, who is a proverb for stupidity; but the meaning is that Zeus himself is the son of a mighty intellect; Κρόνος, quasi κόρος, not in the sense of a youth, but quasi τὸ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀκήρατον τοῦ νοῦ — the pure and garnished mind, which in turn is begotten of Uranus, who is so called ἀπὸ τοῦ ὁρᾶν τὰ ἄνω, from looking upwards; which, as philosophers say, is the way to have a pure mind. The earlier portion of Hesiod's genealogy has escaped my memory, or I would try more conclusions of the same sort. 'You talk like an oracle.' I caught the infection from Euthyphro, who gave me a long lecture which began at dawn, and has not only entered into my

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ears, but filled my soul, and my intention is to yield to the inspiration to-day; and to-morrow I will be exorcised by some priest or sophist. 'Go on; I am anxious to hear the rest.' Now that we have a general notion, how shall we proceed? What names will afford the most crucial test of natural fitness? Those of heroes and ordinary men are often deceptive, because they are patronymics or expressions of a wish; let us try gods and demi-gods. Gods are so called, ἀπὸ τοῦ θεῖν, from the verb 'to run;' because the sun, moon, and stars run about the heaven; and they being the original gods of the Hellenes, as they still are of the Barbarians, their name is given to all Gods. The demons are the golden race of Hesiod, and by golden he means not literally golden, but good; and they are called demons, quasi δαίμονες, which in old Attic was used for δαίμονες — good men are well said to become δαίμονες when they die, because they are knowing. Ἡρώς is the same word as ἔρως: 'the sons of God saw the daughters of men that they were fair;' or perhaps they were a species of sophists or rhetoricians, and so called ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐρωτᾶν, or εἶρειν, from their habit of spinning questions; for εἶρειν is equivalent to λέγειν. I get all this from Euthyphro; and now a new and ingenious idea comes into my mind, and, if I am not careful, I shall be wiser than I ought to be by to-morrow's dawn. My idea is, that we may put in and pull out letters at pleasure and alter the accents (as, for example, Διὶ φίλος may be turned into Δίφιλος), and we may make words into sentences and sentences into words. The name ἀνθρωπος is a case in point, for a letter has been omitted and the accent changed; the original meaning being ὁ ἀναθρῶν ἂ ὀπωπεν — he who looks up at what he sees. Ψυχὴ may be thought to be the reviving, or refreshing, or animating principle — ἡ ἀναψύχουσα τὸ σῶμα; but I am afraid that Euthyphro and his disciples will scorn this derivation, and I must find another: shall we identify the soul with the 'ordering mind' of Anaxagoras, and say that ψυχὴ, quasi φνσέχη' = ἡ φύσιν ἔχει or ὀχεῖ? — this might easily be refined into ψυχή. 'That is a more artistic etymology.'

After ψυχὴ follows σῶμα; this, by a slight permutation, may be either = (1) the 'grave' of the soul, or (2) may mean 'that by which the soul signifies (σημαίνει) her wishes.' But more probably, the word is Orphic, and simply denotes that the body is the place of ward in which the soul suffers the penalty of sin, — ἐν ᾧ σώζεται.

‘I should like to hear some more explanations of the names of the Gods, like that excellent one of Zeus.’ The truest names of the Gods are those which they give themselves; but these are unknown to us. Less true are those by which we propitiate them, as men say in prayers, ‘May he graciously receive any name by which I call him.’ And to avoid offence, I should like to let them know beforehand that we are not presuming to enquire about them, but only about the names which they usually bear. Let us begin with Hestia. What did he mean who gave the name Hestia? ‘That is a very difficult question.’ O, my dear Hermogenes, I believe that there was a power of philosophy and talk among the first inventors of names, both in our own and in other languages; for even in foreign words a principle is discernible. Hestia is the same with *ἑσία*, which is an old form of *οὐσία*, and means the first principle of things: this agrees with the fact that to Hestia the first sacrifices are offered. There is also another reading—*ὥσία*, which implies that ‘pushing’ (*ὥθον*) is the first principle of all things. And here I seem to discover a delicate allusion to the flux of Heracleitus—that antediluvian philosopher who cannot walk twice in the same stream; and this flux of his may accomplish yet greater marvels. For the names Cronos and Rhea cannot have been accidental; the giver of them must have known something about the doctrine of Heracleitus. Moreover, there is a remarkable coincidence in the words of Homer, when he speaks of Oceanus, ‘the origin of Gods;’ and in the verse of Orpheus, in which he describes Oceanus espousing his sister Tethys. Tethys is nothing more than the name of a spring—*τὸ διαττώμενον καὶ ἡθούμενον*. Poseidon is *ποσίδεσμος*, the chain of the feet, because you cannot walk on the sea—the *ε* is inserted by way of ornament; or perhaps the name may have been originally *πολλείδων*, meaning, that the God knew many things (*πολλὰ εἰδώς*): he may also be the shaker, *ἀπὸ τοῦ σείειν*,—in this case, *π* and *δ* have been added. Pluto is connected with *πλοῦτος*, because wealth comes out of the earth; or the word may be a euphemism for Hades, which is usually derived *ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀειδοῦς*, because the God is concerned with the invisible. But the name Hades was really given him from his knowing (*εἰδέναι*) all good things. Men in general are foolishly afraid of him, and talk with horror of the world below from which no one may return. The reason why his

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subjects never wish to come back, even if they could, is that the God enchains them by the strongest of spells, namely by the desire of virtue, which they hope to obtain by constant association with him. He is the perfect and accomplished Sophist and the great benefactor of the other world; for he has much more than he wants there, and hence he is called Pluto or the rich. He will have nothing to do with the souls of men while in the body, because he cannot work his will with them so long as they are confused and entangled by fleshly lusts. Demeter is the mother and giver of food — ἡ διδοῖσα μήτηρ τῆς ἐδωδῆς. Herè is ἐρατή τις, or perhaps the legislator may have been thinking of the weather, and has merely transposed the letters of the word ἀήρ. Pherephatta, that word of awe, is φερεπάφα, which is only an euphonious contraction of ἡ τοῦ φερομένου ἐφαπτομένη, — all things are in motion, and she in her wisdom moves with them, and the wise God Hades consorts with her — there is nothing very terrible in this, any more than in her other appellation Persephone, which is also significant of her wisdom (σοφία). Apollo is another name, which is supposed to have some dreadful meaning, but is susceptible of at least four perfectly innocent explanations. First, he is the purifier or purger or absolver (ἀπολοίων); secondly, he is the true diviner, Ἀπλῶς, as he is called in the Thessalian dialect (ἀπλῶς = ἀπλοῦς, sincere); thirdly, he is the archer (ἀεὶ βάλλων), always shooting; or again, supposing α to mean ἄμα or ὅμον, Apollo becomes equivalent to ἄμα πολῶν, which points to both his musical and his heavenly attributes; for there is a ‘moving together’ alike in music and in the harmony of the spheres. The second λ is inserted in order to avoid the ill-omened sound of destruction. The Muses are so called — ἀπὸ τοῦ μῶσθαι. The gentle Leto or Letho is named from her willingness (ἐθελήμων), or because she is ready to forgive and forget (λήθη). Artemis is so called from her healthy well-balanced nature, διὰ τὸ ἀρτεμῆς, or as ἀρετῆς ἰστωρ; or as a lover of virginity, ἀροτον μισήσασα. One of these explanations is probably true, — perhaps all of them. Dionysus is ὁ διδοὺς τὸν οἶνον, and οἶνος is quasi οἶνονος because wine makes those think (οἶεσθαι) that they have a mind (νοῦς) who have none. The established derivation of Ἀφροδίτη διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀφροῦ γένεσιν may be accepted on the authority of Hesiod. Again, there is the name of Pallas, or Athene, which we, who are Athenians, must not forget.



107 Pallas is derived from armed dances — ἀπὸ τοῦ πάλλαιεν τὰ ὄπλα. For Cratylus.  
 Athene we must turn to the allegorical interpreters of Homer, ANALYSIS.  
 who make the name equivalent to θεονόη, or possibly the word was  
 originally ἡθονόη and signified moral intelligence (ἐν ἡθει νόησις).  
 Hephaestus, again, is the lord of light — ὁ τοῦ φάεος ἱστωρ. This is  
 a good notion; and, to prevent any other getting into our heads,  
 let us go on to Ares. He is the manly one (ἄρρη), or the un-  
 changeable one (ἄρρατος). Enough of the Gods; for, by the Gods,  
 I am afraid of them; but if you suggest other words, you will see  
 how the horses of Euthyphro prance. ‘Only one more God; tell  
 me about my godfather Hermes.’ He is ἑρμηνεύς, the messenger  
 or cheater or thief or bargainer; or ὁ εἰρεῖν μώμενος, that is, εἰρέμης  
 108 or ἑρμης — the speaker or contriver of speeches. ‘Well said  
 Cratylus, then, that I am no son of Hermes.’ Pan, as the son of  
 Hermes, is speech or the brother of speech, and is called Pan  
 because speech indicates everything — ὁ πᾶν μνηίων. He has two  
 forms, a true and a false; and is in the upper part smooth, and in  
 the lower part shaggy. He is the goat of Tragedy, in which there  
 are plenty of falsehoods.

‘Will you go on to the elements — sun, moon, stars, earth,  
 aether, air, fire, water, seasons, years?’ Very good: and which  
 109 shall I take first? Let us begin with ἡλιος, or the sun. The Doric  
 form ἁλιος helps us to see that he is so called because at his rising  
 he gathers (ἀλίζει) men together, or because he rolls about (εἰλεῖ)  
 the earth, or because he variegates (αἰολεῖ = ποικίλλει) the earth.  
 Selene is an anticipation of Anaxagoras, being a contraction of  
 σελαενονεοάεια, the light (σέλας) which is ever old and new, and  
 110 which, as Anaxagoras says, is borrowed from the sun; the name  
 was harmonized into σελαναία, a form which is still in use. ‘That  
 is a true dithyrambic name.’ Μείς is so called ἀπὸ τοῦ μειοῦσθαι,  
 from suffering diminution, and ἄστρον is from ἀστραπή (lightning),  
 which is an improvement of ἀναστροπή, that which turns the eyes  
 inside out. ‘How do you explain πῦρ and ὕδωρ?’ I suspect that  
 110 πῦρ, which, like ὕδωρ and κίων, is found in Phrygian, is a foreign  
 word; for the Hellenes have borrowed much from the barbarians,  
 and I always resort to this theory of a foreign origin when I am  
 at a loss. Ἀἴθρ may be explained, ὅτι αἶρει τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς; or, ὅτι αἰεὶ  
 ῥεῖ; or, ὅτι πνεῦμα ἐξ αὐτοῦ γίνεται (compare the poetic word ἀῖται).  
 So αἰθήρ quasi αἰθεῖρ ὅτι αἰεὶ θεῖ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα: γῆ, γαῖα quasi γεννή-



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τεῖρα (compare the Homeric form γεγάσσι); ὥρα, or, according to the old Attic form, ὅρα, is derived ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀρίζειν, because it divides the year; ἐνιαυτὸς and ἔτος are the same thought — ὁ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐτάζων, cut into two parts, ἐν ἑαυτῷ and ἐτάζων, like δι' ὃν ζῇ into Διὸς and Ζηνός.

‘You make surprising progress.’ True; I am run away with, and am not even yet at my utmost speed. ‘I should like very much to hear your account of the virtues. What principle of 411 correctness is there in those charming words, wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest?’ To explain all that will be a serious business; still, as I have put on the lion’s skin, appearances must be maintained. My opinion is, that primitive men were like some modern philosophers, who, by always going round in their search after the nature of things, become dizzy; and this phenomenon, which was really in themselves, they imagined to take place in the external world. You have no doubt remarked, that the doctrine of the universal flux, or generation of things, is indicated in names. ‘No, I never did.’ Φρόνησις is only φορᾶς καὶ ῥοῦ νόησις, or perhaps φορᾶς ὀνησις, and in any case is connected with φέρεσθαι; γνώμη is γονῆς σκέψις καὶ νόμησις; νόησις is νέου or γιγνομένου ἔσις; the word νέος implies that creation is always going on — the original form was νεέσις; σωφροσύνη is σωτηρία φρονήσεως; ἐπιστήμη is ἡ ἐπομένη τοῖς πράγμασιν — the faculty which 412 keeps close, neither anticipating nor lagging behind; σύνεσις is equivalent to συνιέναι, συμπορεύεσθαι τῇν ψυχῇν, and is a kind of conclusion — συλλογισμός τις, akin therefore in idea to ἐπιστήμη; σοφία is very difficult, and has a foreign look — the meaning is, touching the motion or stream of things, and may be illustrated by the poetical ἐσίθῃ and the Lacedaemonian proper name Σοῦς, or Rush; ἀγαθὸν is τὸ ἀγαστὸν ἐν τῇ ταχύτητι, — for all things are in motion, and some are swifter than others: δικαιοσύνη is clearly ἡ τοῦ δικαίου σύνεσις. The word δίκαιον is more troublesome, and appears to mean the subtle penetrating power which, as the lovers of motion say, preserves all things, and is the cause of all things, quasi διαῖδον going through — the letter κ being inserted for the sake of euphony. This is a great mystery which has been confided to 413 me; but when I ask for an explanation I am thought obtrusive, and another derivation is proposed to me. Justice is said to be ὁ καίων, or the sun; and when I joyfully repeat this beautiful notion,

I am answered, 'What, is there no justice when the sun is down?' And when I entreat my questioner to tell me his own opinion, he replies, that justice is fire in the abstract, or heat in the abstract; which is not very intelligible. Others laugh at such notions, and say with Anaxagoras, that justice is the ordering mind. 'I think that some one must have told you this.' And not the rest? Let me proceed then, in the hope of proving to you my  
 414 originality. Ἀνδρεία is quasi ἀνρεία quasi ἡ ἄνω ῥοή, the stream which flows upwards, and is opposed to injustice, which clearly hinders the principle of penetration; ἄρρην and ἀνῆρ have a similar derivation; γυνή is the same as γονή; θῆλυ is derived ἀπὸ τῆς θηλῆς, because the teat makes things flourish (τεθῆλῆναι), and the word θάλλειν itself implies increase of youth, which is swift and sudden ever (θεῖν and ἄλλεσθαι). I am getting over the ground fast: but much has still to be explained. There is τέχνη, for instance. This, by an aphaeresis of τ and an epenthesis of ο in two places, may be identified with ἐχονόη, and signifies 'that which has mind.'

'A very poor etymology.' Yes; but you must remember that all language is in process of change; letters are taken in and put out for the sake of euphony, and time is also a great alterer of words. For example, what business has the letter ρ in the word κάτοπτρον, or the letter σ in the word σφίγξ? The additions are often such that it is impossible to make out the original word; and yet, if you may put in and pull out, as you like, any name is equally good for any object. The fact is, that great dictators of literature like yourself should observe the rules of moderation. 'I will do my best.' But do not be too much of a precisian, or

415 you will paralyze me. If you will let me add μηχανή, ἀπὸ τοῦ μήκους, which means πολὺν, and ἀνεῖν, I shall be at the summit of my powers, from which elevation I will examine the two words κακία and ἀρετή. The first is easily explained in accordance with what has preceded; for all things being in a flux, κακία is τὸ κακῶς ἶν. This derivation is illustrated by the word δειλία, which ought to have come after ἀνδρεία, and may be regarded as ὁ λίαν δεσμὸς τῆς ψυχῆς, just as ἀπορία signifies an impediment to motion (from α not, and πορεύεσθαι to go), and ἀρετή is εὐπορία, which is the opposite of this—the everflowing (ἀεὶ ῥέονσα or ἀειρευτή), or the eligible, quasi αἰρετή. You will think that I am inventing, but I say that if

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κακία is right, then ἀρετή is also right. But what is κακόν? That is 416  
 a very obscure word, to which I can only apply my old notion and  
 declare that κακὸν is a foreign word. Next, let us proceed to καλὸν,  
 αἰσχρόν. The latter is doubtless contracted from αἰσχροῖν, quasi  
 ἀεὶ ἴσχον ῥοῦν. The inventor of words being a patron of the flux,  
 was a great enemy to stagnation. Καλὸν is τὸ καλοῦν τὰ πράγματα —  
 this is mind (νοῦς or διάνοια); which is also the principle of  
 beauty; and which doing the works of beauty, is therefore  
 rightly called the beautiful. The meaning of συμφέρον is explained 417  
 by previous examples; —like ἐπιστήμη, signifying that the soul  
 moves in harmony with the world (σύμφορα, συμφέροντα). Κέρδος is  
 τὸ πᾶσι κεραυνύμενον — that which mingles with all things: λυσιτελοῦν  
 is equivalent to τὸ τῆς φορᾶς λύνον τὸ τέλος, and is not to be taken in  
 the vulgar sense of gainful, but rather in that of swift, being the  
 principle which makes motion immortal and unceasing; ὠφέλιμον  
 is ἀπὸ τοῦ ὠφέλλειν — that which gives increase: this word, which is  
 Homeric, is of foreign origin. Βλαβερὸν is τὸ βλάπτων or βουλόμενον  
 ἀπτειν τοῦ ῥοῦ — that which injures or seeks to bind the stream.  
 The proper word would be βουλαπτεροῦν, but this is too much of  
 a mouthful — like a prelude on the flute in honour of Athene. The 418  
 word ζημιῶδες is difficult; great changes, as I was saying, have  
 been made in words, and even a small change will alter their  
 meaning very much. The word δέον is one of these disguised  
 words. You know that according to the old pronunciation, which  
 is especially affected by the women, who are great conservatives,  
 εἰ and δ were used where we should now use η and ζ: for example,  
 what we now call ἡμέρα was formerly called ἑμέρα; and this shows  
 the meaning of the word to have been ‘the desired one coming  
 after night,’ and not, as is often supposed, ‘that which makes things  
 gentle’ (ἡμερα). So again, ζυγὸν is δυογόν, quasi δέσεις δυεῖν εἰς ἀγωγὴν  
 — the binding of two together for the purpose of drawing. Δέον, 419  
 as ordinarily written, has an evil sense, signifying the chain  
 (δεσμὸς) or hindrance of motion; but in its ancient form διόν is  
 expressive of good, quasi διόν, that which penetrates or goes  
 through all. Ζημιώδης is really δημιώδης, and means that which  
 binds motion (δοῦντι τὸ ἰόν): ἡδονὴ is ἡ πρὸς τὴν ὄνησιν τείνουσα πρᾶξις  
 — the δ is an insertion: λύπη is derived ἀπὸ τῆς διαλίσεως τοῦ σώ-  
 ματος: ἀνία is from α and ἵεναι, to go: ἀλγηδὼν is a foreign word,  
 and is so called ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀλγεινοῦ: ὀδυνὴ is ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνδύσεως τῆς λύπης:

*αχθηδών* is in its very sound a burden: *χαρὰ* expresses the flow of *Cratylus*. soul: *τέρψις* is ἀπὸ τοῦ *τερπνοῦ*, and *τερπνὸν* is properly *έρπνον*, ANALYSIS. because the sensation of pleasure is likened to a breath (*πνοή*) which creeps (*έρπει*) through the soul: *εὐφροσύνη* is named from *φέρεισθαι*, because the soul moves in harmony with nature: *ἐπιθυμία* is ἡ ἐπὶ τὸν *θυμὸν* ἰούσα δύναμις: *θυμὸς* is ἀπὸ τῆς *θίσεως* τῆς *ψυχῆς*: *ἡμερος* — ὅτι ἰέμενος ῥεῖ ἡ *ψυχή*: *πόθος*, the desire which is in another place, *ἀλλοθί πον*: *έρως* was anciently *έρρος*, and so called because it flows into (*έρρει*) the soul from without: *δόξα* is ἡ δῖωξις τοῦ εἰδέναι, or expresses the shooting from a bow (*τόξον*). The latter etymology is confirmed by the words *βούλεσθαι*, *βουλή*, *ἀβουλία*, which all have to do with shooting (*βολή*): and similarly *οἷσις* is nothing but the movement (*οἶσις*) of the soul towards essence. *Ἐκούσιον* is τὸ εἶκον — the yielding — *ἀνάγκη* is ἡ ἀν' ἀγκῇ ἰούσα, the passage through ravines which impede motion: *ἀληθεία* is *θεία* *ἀλη*, divine motion. *Ψεῖδος* is the opposite of this, implying the principle of constraint and forced repose, which is expressed under the figure of sleep, τὸ εἶδον; the *ψ* is an addition. *ὄνομα*, a name, affirms the real existence of that which is sought after — *ὄν* οὐ μάσμα ἔστιν. *ὄν* and *οὐσία* are only *ἰόν* with an *ι* broken off; and *οὐκ ὄν* is *οὐκ ἰόν*. 'And what are *ἰόν*, *ῥέον*, *δοῦν*?' One way of explaining them has been already suggested — they may be of foreign origin; and possibly this is the true answer. But mere antiquity may often prevent our recognizing words, after all the complications which they have undergone; and we must remember that however far we carry back our analysis some ultimate elements or roots will remain which can be no further analyzed. For example; the word *ἀγαθός* was supposed by us to be a compound of *ἀγαστός* and *θόος*, and probably *θόος* may be further resolvable. But if we take a word of which no further resolution seems attainable, we may fairly conclude that we have reached one of these original elements, and the truth of such a word must be tested by some new method. Will you help me in the search?

All names, whether primary or secondary, are intended to show the nature of things; and the secondary, as I conceive, derive their significance from the primary. But then, how do the primary names indicate anything? And let me ask another question,— If we had no faculty of speech, how should we com-

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municate with one another? Should we not use signs, like the deaf and dumb? The elevation of our hands would mean lightness—heaviness would be expressed by letting them drop. 423 The running of any animal would be described by a similar movement of our own frames. The body can only express anything by imitation; and the tongue or mouth can imitate as well as the rest of the body. But this imitation of the tongue or voice is not yet a name, because people may imitate sheep or goats without naming them. What, then, is a name? In the first place, a name is not a musical, or, secondly, a pictorial imitation, but an imitation of that kind which expresses the nature of a thing; and is the invention not of a musician, or of a painter, but 424 of a namer.

And now, I think that we may consider the names about which you were asking. The way to analyze them will be by going back to the letters, or primary elements of which they are composed. First, we separate the alphabet into classes of letters, distinguishing the consonants, mutes, vowels, and semivowels; and when we have learnt them singly, we shall learn to know them in their various combinations of two or more letters; just as the painter knows how to use either a single colour or a combination of colours. And like the painter, we may apply letters to 425 the expression of objects, and form them into syllables; and these again into words, until the picture or figure—that is, language—is completed. Not that I am literally speaking of ourselves, but I mean to say that this was the way in which the ancients framed language. And this leads me to consider whether the primary as well as the secondary elements are rightly given. I may remark, as I was saying about the Gods, that we can only attain to conjecture of them. But still we insist that ours is the true and only method of discovery; otherwise we must have recourse, like the tragic poets, to a *Deus ex machinâ*, and say that God gave the first names, and therefore they are right; or that the barbarians are older than we are, and that we learnt of them; or that antiquity has cast a veil over the truth. Yet all these are not reasons; they 426 are only ingenious excuses for having no reasons.

I will freely impart to you my own notions, though they are somewhat crude:—The letter  $\rho$  appears to me to be the general instrument which the legislator has employed to express all motion



or κίνησις. (I ought to explain that κίνησις is just ἵεσις (going), for Cratylus.  
 the letter η was unknown to the ancients; and the root, κίειν, is a ANALYSIS.  
 foreign form of ἵέναι: of κίνησις or εἰσις, the opposite is στασις).  
 This use of ρ is evident in the words tremble, break, crush,  
 crumble, and the like; the imposer of names perceived that the  
 427 tongue is most agitated in the pronunciation of this letter, just as  
 he used ι to express the subtle power which penetrates through  
 all things. The letters φ, ψ, σ, ζ, which require a great deal of  
 wind, are employed in the imitation of such notions as shivering,  
 seething, shaking, and in general of what is windy. The letters δ  
 and τ convey the idea of binding and rest in a place: the λ denotes  
 smoothness, as in the words slip, sleek, sleep, and the like. But  
 when the slipping tongue is detained by the heavier sound of γ, then  
 arises the notion of a glutinous clammy nature: ν is sounded from  
 within, and has a notion of inwardness: α is the expression of  
 size; η of length; ο of roundness, and therefore there is plenty of  
 ο in the word γόγγυλον. That is my view, Hermogenes, of the  
 correctness of names; and I should like to hear what Cratylus  
 would say. 'But, Socrates, as I was telling you, Cratylus mystifies  
 me; I should like to ask him, in your presence, what he means by  
 the fitness of names?' To this appeal, Cratylus replies 'that he  
 428 cannot explain so important a subject all in a moment.' 'No, but  
 you may "add little to little," as Hesiod says.' Socrates here  
 interposes his own request, that Cratylus will give some account  
 of his theory. Hermogenes and himself are mere sciolists, but  
 Cratylus has reflected on these matters, and has had teachers.  
 Cratylus replies in the words of Achilles: "'Illustrious Ajax, you  
 have spoken in all things much to my mind," whether Euthyphro,  
 or some Muse inhabiting your own breast, was the inspirer.'  
 Socrates replies, that he is afraid of being self-deceived, and  
 therefore he must 'look fore and aft,' as Homer remarks. Does  
 not Cratylus agree with him that names teach us the nature of  
 things? 'Yes.' And naming is an art, and the artists are legis-  
 429 lators, and like artists in general, some of them are better and  
 some of them are worse than others, and give better or worse  
 laws, and make better or worse names. Cratylus cannot admit  
 that one name is better than another; they are either true names,  
 or they are not names at all; and when he is asked about the  
 name of Hermogenes, who is acknowledged to have no luck in



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him, he affirms this to be the name of somebody else. Socrates supposes him to mean that falsehood is impossible, to which his own answer would be, that there has never been a lack of liars. Cratylus presses him with the old sophistical argument, that falsehood is saying that which is not, and therefore saying nothing; — you cannot utter the word which is not. Socrates complains that this argument is too subtle for an old man to understand: Suppose a person addressing Cratylus were to say, Hail, Athenian Stranger, Hermogenes! would these words be true or false? ‘I should say that they would be mere unmeaning 430 sounds, like the hammering of a brass pot.’ But you would acknowledge that names, as well as pictures, are imitations, and also that pictures may give a right or wrong representation of a man or woman: — why may not names then equally give a representation true and right or false and wrong? Cratylus admits that pictures may give a true or false representation, but denies that names can. Socrates argues, that he may go up to a man and say ‘this is your picture,’ and again, he may go and say to him ‘this is your name’ — in the one case appealing to his sense of 431 sight, and in the other to his sense of hearing; — may he not? ‘Yes.’ Then you will admit that there is a right or a wrong assignment of names, and if of names, then of verbs and nouns; and if of verbs and nouns, then of the sentences which are made up of them; and comparing nouns to pictures, you may give them all the appropriate sounds, or only some of them. And as he who gives all the colours makes a good picture, and he who gives only some of them, a bad or imperfect one, but still a picture; so he who gives all the sounds makes a good name, and he who gives only some of them, a bad or imperfect one, but a name still. The artist of names, that is, the legislator, may be a good or he may be a bad artist. ‘Yes, Socrates, but the cases are not parallel; for if you subtract or misplace a letter, the name ceases to be a name.’ 432 Socrates admits that the number 10, if an unit is subtracted, would cease to be 10, but denies that names are of this purely quantitative nature. Suppose that there are two objects — Cratylus and the image of Cratylus; and let us imagine that some God makes them perfectly alike, both in their outward form and in their inner nature and qualities: then there will be two Cratyluses, and not merely Cratylus and the image of Cratylus. But an image

in fact always falls short in some degree of the original, and if images are not exact counterparts, why should names be? If they were, they would be the doubles of their originals, and indistinguishable from them; and how ridiculous would this be! Cratylus admits the truth of Socrates' remark. But then Socrates rejoins,

433 he should have the courage to acknowledge that letters may be wrongly inserted in a noun, or a noun in a sentence; and yet the noun or the sentence may retain a meaning. Better to admit this, that we may not be punished like the traveller in Ægina who goes about at night, and that Truth herself may not say to us, 'Too late.' And, errors excepted, we may still affirm that a name to be correct must have proper letters, which bear a resemblance to the thing

434 signified. I must remind you of what Hermogenes and I were saying about the letter  $\rho$ , which was held to be expressive of motion and hardness, as  $\lambda$  is of smoothness; — and this you will admit to be their natural meaning. But then, why do the Eretrians call that  $\sigma\kappa\lambda\eta\rho\acute{o}\tau\eta\rho$  which we call  $\sigma\kappa\lambda\eta\rho\acute{o}\tau\eta\varsigma$ ? We can understand one another, although the letter  $\rho$  is not equivalent to the letter  $\varsigma$ : why is this? You reply, because the two letters are sufficiently alike for the purpose of expressing motion. Well, then, there is the letter  $\lambda$ ; what business has this in a word meaning hardness? 'Why, Socrates, I retort upon you, that we put in and pull out letters at pleasure.' And the explanation of this is custom or

435 agreement: we have made a convention that the  $\rho$  shall mean  $\varsigma$  and a convention may indicate by the unlike as well as by the like. How could there be names for all the numbers unless you allow that convention is used? Imitation is a poor thing, and has to be supplemented by convention, which is another poor thing; although I agree with you in thinking that the most perfect form of language is found only where there is a perfect correspondence of sound and meaning. But let me ask you what is the use and force of names? 'The use of names, Socrates, is to inform, and he who knows names knows things.' Do you mean

436 that the discovery of names is the same as the discovery of things? 'Yes.' But do you not see that there is a degree of deception about names? He who first gave names, gave them according to his conception, and that may have been erroneous. 'But then, why, Socrates, is language so consistent? all words

437 have the same laws.' Mere consistency is no test of truth. In

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geometrical problems, for example, there may be a flaw at the beginning, and yet the conclusion may follow consistently. And, therefore, a wise man will take especial care of first principles. But are words really consistent; are there not as many terms of praise which signify rest as which signify motion? There is 437 *ἐπιστήμη*, which is connected with *στάσις*, as *μνήμη* is with *μένω*. *Βέβαιον*, again, is the expression of station and position; *ἱστορία* is clearly descriptive of the stopping (*ἰστάναι*) of the stream; *πιστὸν* indicates the cessation of motion; and there are many words having a bad sense, which are connected with ideas of motion, such as *συμφορὰ*, *ἀμαρτία*, &c.: *ἀμαθία*, again, might be explained, as *ἡ ἀμα θεῶ ἰόντος πορεία*, and *ἀκολασία* as *ἡ ἀκολουθία τοῖς πράγμασιν*. Thus the bad names are framed on the same principle as the good, and other examples might be given, which would favour a theory of rest rather than of motion. 'Yes; but the greater number of words express motion.' Are we to count them, Cratylus; and is correctness of names to be determined by the voice of a majority?

Here is another point: we were saying that the legislator gives 438 names; and therefore we must suppose that he knows the things which he names: but how can he have learnt things from names before there were any names? 'I believe, Socrates, that some power more than human first gave things their names, and that these were necessarily true names.' Then how came the giver of names to contradict himself, and to make some names expressive of rest, and others of motion? 'I do not suppose that he did make them both.' Then which did he make — those which are expressive of rest, or those which are expressive of motion? . . . But if some names are true and others false, we can only decide between them, not by counting words, but by appealing to things. And, if so, we must allow that things may be known without names; for names, as we have several times admitted, are the images of 439 things; and the higher knowledge is of things, and is not to be derived from names; and though I do not doubt that the inventors of language gave names, under the idea that all things are in a state of motion and flux, I believe that they were mistaken; and that having fallen into a whirlpool themselves, they are trying to drag us after them. For is there not a true beauty and a true good, which is always beautiful and always good? Can the thing

440 beauty be vanishing away from us while the words are yet in our mouths? And they could not be known by any one if they are always passing away — for if they are always passing away, the observer has no opportunity of observing their state. Whether the doctrine of the flux or of the eternal nature be the truer, is hard to determine. But no man of sense will put himself, or the education of his mind, in the power of names: he will not condemn himself to be an unreal thing, nor will he believe that everything is in a flux like the water in a leaky vessel, or that the world is a man who has a running at the nose. This doctrine may be true, Cratylus, but is also very likely to be untrue; and therefore I would have you reflect while you are young, and find out the truth, and when you know come and tell me. ‘I have thought, Socrates, and after a good deal of thinking I incline to Heracleitus.’ Then another day, my friend, you shall give me a lesson. ‘Very good, Socrates, and I hope that you will continue to study these things yourself.’

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We may now consider (I) how far Plato in the Cratylus has discovered the true principles of language, and then (II) proceed to compare modern speculations respecting the origin and nature of language with the anticipations of his genius.

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1. (I) Plato is aware that language is not the work of chance; nor does he deny that there is a natural fitness in names. He only insists that this natural fitness shall be intelligibly explained. But he has no idea that language is a natural organism. He would have heard with surprise that languages are the common work of whole nations in a primitive or semi-barbarous age. How, he would probably have argued, could men devoid of art have contrived a structure of such complexity? No answer could have been given to this question, either in ancient or in modern times, until the nature of primitive antiquity had been thoroughly studied, and the instincts of man had been shown to exist in greater force, when his state approaches more nearly to that of children or animals. The philosophers of the last century, after their manner, would have vainly endeavoured to trace the process by which proper names were converted into common, and would

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have shown how the last effort of abstraction invented prepositions and auxiliaries. The theologian would have proved that language must have had a divine origin, because in childhood, while the organs are pliable, the intelligence is wanting, and when the intelligence is able to frame conceptions, the organs are no longer able to express them. Or, as others have said: Man is man because he has the gift of speech; and he could not have invented that which he is. But this would have been an 'argument too subtle' for Socrates (429 D), who rejects the theological account of the origin of language 'as an excuse for not giving a reason (426 A),' which he compares to the introduction of the '*Deus ex machinâ*' by the tragic poets when they have to solve a difficulty; thus anticipating many modern controversies in which the primary agency of the Divine Being is confused with the secondary cause; and God is assumed to have worked a miracle in order to fill up a lacuna in human knowledge. (Cp. Timæus, p. 46.)

Neither is Plato wrong in supposing that an element of design and art enters into language. The creative power abating is supplemented by a mechanical process. 'Languages are not made but grow,' but they are made as well as grow; bursting into life like a plant or a flower, they are also capable of being trained and improved and engrafted upon one another. The change in them is effected in earlier ages by musical and euphonic improvements, at a later stage by the influence of grammar and logic, and by the poetical and literary use of words. They develop rapidly in childhood, and when they are full grown and set they may still put forth intellectual powers, like the mind in the body, or rather we may say that the nobler use of language only begins when the frame-work is complete. The savage or primitive man, in whom the natural instinct is strongest, is also the greatest improver of the forms of language. He is the poet or maker of words, as in civilized ages the dialectician is the definer or distinguisher of them. The latter calls the second world of abstract terms into existence, as the former has created the picture sounds which represent natural objects or processes. Poetry and philosophy—these two, are the two great formative principles of languages, when they have passed their first stage, of which, as of the first invention of the arts in general, we only entertain conjecture. And mythology is a link between them, connecting



the visible and invisible, until at length the sensuous exterior falls away, and the severance of the inner and outer world, of the idea and the object of sense, becomes complete. At a later period, logic and grammar, sister arts, preserve and enlarge the decaying instinct of language, by rule and method, which they gather from analysis and observation.

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(2) There is no trace in any of Plato's writings that he was acquainted with any language but Greek. Yet he has conceived very truly the relation of Greek to foreign languages, which he is led to consider, because he finds that many Greek words are incapable of explanation. Allowing a good deal for accident, and also for the fancies of the *conditores linguæ Græcæ*, there is an element of which he is unable to give an account. These unintelligible words he supposes to be of foreign origin, and to have been derived from a time when the Greeks were either barbarians, or in close relations to the barbarians. Socrates is aware that this principle is liable to great abuse; and, like the '*Deus ex machinâ*,' explains nothing. Hence he excuses himself for the employment of such a device, and remarks that in foreign words there is still a principle of correctness, which applies equally both to Greeks and barbarians.

(3) But the greater number of primary words do not admit of derivation from foreign languages; they must be resolved into the letters out of which they are composed, and therefore the letters must have a meaning. The framers of language were aware of this; they observed that *α* was adapted to express size; *η* length; *ο* roundness; *ν* inwardness; *ρ* rush or roar; *λ* liquidity; *γλ* the detention of the liquid or slippery element; *δ* and *τ* binding; *φ*, *ψ*, *σ*, *ξ*, wind and cold, and so on. Plato's analysis of the letters of the alphabet shows a wonderful insight into the nature of language. He does not expressly distinguish between mere imitation and the symbolical use of sound to express thought, but he recognises in the examples which he gives both modes of imitation. Gesture is the mode which a deaf and dumb person would take of indicating his meaning. And language is the gesture of the tongue; in the use of the letter *ρ*, to express a rushing or roaring, or of *ο* to express roundness, there is a direct imitation; while in the use of the letter *α* to express size, or of *η* to express length, the imitation is symbolical. The use of analogous or similar sounds,



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in order to express similar or analogous ideas, seems to have escaped him.

In passing from the gesture of the body to the movement of the tongue, Plato makes a great step in the physiology of language. He was probably the first who said that 'language is imitative sound' (423), which is the greatest and deepest truth of philology; although he is not aware of the laws of euphony and association by which imitation must be regulated. He was probably also the first who made a distinction between simple and compound words, a truth second only in importance to that which has just been mentioned. His great insight in one direction curiously contrasts with his blindness in another; for he appears to be wholly unaware (cp. his derivation of *ἀγαθός* from *ἀγαστός* and *θός*) of the difference between the root and termination. But we must recollect that he was necessarily more ignorant than any schoolboy of Greek grammar, and had no table of the inflexions of verbs and nouns before his eyes, which might have suggested to him the distinction.

(4) Plato distinctly affirms that language is not truth, or '*philosophie une langue bien faite.*' At first, Socrates has delighted himself with discovering the flux of Heracleitus in language. But he is covertly satirising the pretence of that or any other age to find philosophy in words; and he afterwards corrects any erroneous inference which might be gathered from his experiment. For he finds as many, or almost as many, words expressive of rest, as he had previously found expressive of motion. And even if this had been otherwise, who would learn of words when he might learn of things? There is a great controversy and high argument between Heracleiteans and Eleatics, but no man of sense would commit his soul in such enquiries to the imposers of names. . . In this and other passages Plato shows that he is as completely emancipated from the influence of 'Idols of the tribe' as Bacon himself.

The lesson which may be gathered from words is not metaphysical or moral, but historical. They teach us the affinity of races, they tell us something about the association of ideas, they occasionally preserve the memory of a disused custom; but we cannot safely argue from them about right and wrong, matter and mind, freedom and necessity, or the other problems of moral and

metaphysical philosophy. For the use of words on such subjects may often be metaphorical, accidental, derived from other languages, and may have no relation to the contemporary state of thought and feeling. Nor in any case is the invention of them the result of philosophical reflection; they have been commonly transferred from matter to mind, and their meaning is the very reverse of their etymology. Because there is or is not a name for a thing, we cannot argue that the thing has or has not an actual existence; or that the antitheses, parallels, conjugates, correlatives of language have anything corresponding to them in nature. There are too many words as well as too few; and they generalize the objects or ideas which they represent. The greatest lesson which the philosophical analysis of language teaches us is, that we should be above language, making words our servants, and not allowing them to be our masters.

Plato does not add the further observation, that the etymological meaning of words is in process of being lost. If at first framed on a principle of intelligibility, they would gradually cease to be intelligible, like those of a foreign language. He is willing to admit that they are subject to many changes, and put on many disguises. He acknowledges that the 'poor creature' imitation is supplemented by another 'poor creature,'—convention. But he does not see that 'habit and repute,' and their relation to other words, are always exercising an influence over them. Words appear to be isolated, but they are really the parts of an organism which is always being reproduced. They are refined by civilization, harmonized by poetry, emphasized by literature, technically applied in philosophy and art; they are used as symbols on the border-ground of human knowledge; they receive a fresh impress from individual genius, and come with a new force and association to every lively-minded person. They are fixed by the simultaneous utterance of millions, and yet are always imperceptibly changing;—not the inventors of language, but writing and speaking, and particularly great writers, or works which pass into the hearts of nations, Homer, Shakspeare, Dante, the German or English Bible, Kant and Hegel, are the makers of them in later ages. They carry with them the faded recollection of their own past history; the use of a word in a striking and familiar passage gives a complexion to its use everywhere else, and the new use of

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an old and familiar phrase has also a peculiar power over us. But these and other subtleties of language escaped the observation of Plato. He is not aware that the languages of the world are organic structurés, and that every word in them is related to every other; nor does he conceive of language as the joint work of the speaker and the hearer, requiring in man a faculty not only of expressing his thoughts but of understanding those of others.

On the other hand, he cannot be justly charged with a desire to frame language on artificial principles. Philosophers have sometimes dreamed of a technical or scientific language, in words which should have fixed meanings, and stand in the same relation to one another as the substances which they denote. But there is no more trace of this in Plato than there is of a language corresponding to the ideas; nor, indeed, could the want of such a language be felt until the sciences were far more developed. Those who would extend the use of technical phraseology beyond the limits of science or of custom, seem to forget that freedom and suggestiveness and the play of association are essential characteristics of language. The great master has shown how he regarded pedantic distinctions of words or attempts to confine their meaning in the satire on Prodicus in the Protagoras.

(5) In addition to these anticipations of the general principles of philology, we may note also a few curious observations on words and sounds. 'The Eretrians say *σκληρότης* for *σκληρότηρ*' (434 C); 'the Thessalians call Apollo *Ἀπλῶς*' (405 D); 'the Phrygians have the words *πῦρ*, *ἰδωρ*, *κίνες* slightly changed' (410 A); 'there is an old Homeric word *ἐμήσατο*, meaning "he contrived"' (408 A); 'our forefathers, and especially the women, who are most conservative of the ancient language, loved the letters *ι* and *δ*; but now *ι* is changed into *η* and *ε*, and *δ* into ; this is supposed to increase the grandeur of the sound' (418 B). Plato was very willing to use inductive arguments, so far as they were within his reach; but he would also have assigned a large influence to chance. Nor indeed is induction applicable to philology in the same degree as to most of the physical sciences. For after we have pushed our researches to the furthest point, in language as in all the other creations of the human mind, there will always remain an element of exception or accident or free-will, which cannot be eliminated.

The question, 'whether falsehood is impossible,' which Socrates

characteristically sets aside as too subtle for an old man (429 D; cp. Euthyd. 284), could only have arisen in an age of imperfect consciousness, which had not yet learned to distinguish words from things. Socrates replies in effect that words have an independent existence; thus anticipating the solution of the mediæval controversy of Nominalism and Realism. He is aware too that languages exist in various degrees of perfection (435), and that the analysis of them can only be carried to a certain point (422). 'If we could always, or almost always, use likenesses, which are the appropriate expressions, that would be the most perfect state of language' (439 D). These words suggest a question of deeper interest than the origin of language; viz. what is the ideal of language, how far by any correction of their usages existing languages might become clearer and more expressive than they are, more poetical, and also more logical; or whether they are now finally fixed and have received their last impress from time and authority.

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On the whole, the *Cratylus* seems to contain deeper truths about language than any other ancient writing. But feeling the uncertain ground upon which he is walking, and partly in order to preserve the character of Socrates, Plato envelopes the whole subject in a robe of fancy, and allows his principles to drop out as if by accident.

II. What is the result of recent speculations about the origin and nature of language? Like other modern metaphysical enquiries, they end at last in a statement of facts. But, in order to state or understand the facts, a metaphysical insight seems to be required. There are more things in language than the human mind easily conceives. And many fallacies have to be dispelled, as well as observations made. The true spirit of philosophy or metaphysics can alone charm away metaphysical illusions, which are always reappearing, formerly in the fancies of neoplatonist writers, now in the disguise of experience and common sense. An analogy, a figure of speech, an intelligible theory, a superficial observation of the individual, have often been mistaken for a true account of the origin of language.

Speaking is one of the simplest natural operations, and also the most complex. Nothing would seem to be easier or more trivial than a few words uttered by a child in any language. Yet into

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the formation of those words have entered causes which the human mind is not capable of calculating. They are a drop or two of the great stream or ocean of speech which has been flowing in all ages. They have been transmitted from one language to another; like the child himself, they go back to the beginnings of the human race. How they originated, who can tell? Nevertheless we can imagine a stage of human society in which the circle of men's minds was narrower and their sympathies and instincts stronger; in which their organs of speech were more flexible, and the sense of hearing finer and more discerning; in which they lived more in company, and after the manner of children were more given to express their feelings; in which 'they moved all together,' like a herd of wild animals, 'when they moved at all.' Among them, as in every society, a particular person would be more sensitive and intelligent than the rest. Suddenly, on some occasion of interest (at the approach of a wild beast, shall we say?), he first, they following him, utter a cry which resounds through the forest. The cry is almost or quite involuntary, and may be an imitation of the roar of the animal. Thus far we have not speech, but only the inarticulate expression of feeling or emotion in no respect differing from the cries of animals; for they too call to one another and are answered. But now suppose that some one at a distance not only hears the sound, but apprehends the meaning: or we may imagine that the cry is repeated to a member of the society who had been absent; the others act the scene over again when he returns home in the evening. And so the cry becomes a word. The hearer in turn gives back the word to the speaker, who is now aware that he has acquired a new power. Many thousand times he exercises this power; like a child learning to talk, he repeats the same cry again, and again he is answered; he tries experiments with a like result, and the speaker and the hearer rejoice together in their newly-discovered faculty. At first there would be few such cries, and little danger of mistaking or confusing them. For the mind of primitive man had a narrow range of perceptions and feelings; his senses were microscopic; twenty or thirty sounds or gestures would be enough for him, nor would he have any difficulty in finding them. Naturally he broke out into speech — like the young infant he laughed and babbled;



but not until there were hearers as well as speakers did language begin. Not the interjection or the vocal imitation of the object, but the interjection or the vocal imitation of the object understood, is the first rudiment of human speech.

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After a while the word gathers associations, and has an independent existence. The imitation of the lion's roar calls up the fears and hopes of the chase, which are excited by his appearance. In the moment of hearing the sound, without any appreciable interval, these and other latent experiences wake up in the mind of the hearer. Not only does he receive an impression, but he brings previous knowledge to bear upon that impression. Necessarily the pictorial image becomes less vivid, while the association of the nature and habits of the animal is more distinctly perceived. The picture passes into a symbol, for there would be too many of them and they would crowd the mind; the vocal imitation, too, is always in process of being lost and being renewed, just as the picture is brought back again in the description of the poet. Words now can be used more freely because there are more of them. What was once an involuntary expression becomes voluntary. Not only can men utter a cry or call, but they can communicate and converse; they can not only use words, but they can choose them and even play with them. The word is separated both from the object and from the mind; and slowly nations and individuals attain to a fuller consciousness of themselves.

Parallel with this mental process the articulation of sounds is gradually becoming perfected. The finer sense detects the differences of them, and begins, first to agglomerate, then to distinguish them. Times, persons, places, relations of all kinds, are expressed by modifications of them. The earliest parts of speech, as we may call them by anticipation, like the first utterances of children, probably partook of the nature of interjections and nouns; then came verbs; at length the whole sentence appeared, and rhythm and metre followed. Each stage in the progress of language was accompanied by some corresponding stage in the mind and civilization of man. In time, when the family became a nation, the wild growth of dialects passed into a language. Then arose poetry and literature. We can hardly realize to ourselves how much with each improvement of language the powers of the human mind were enlarged; how the inner



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world took the place of the outer; how the pictorial or symbolical or analogical word was refined into a notion; how language, fair and large and free, was at last complete.

So we may imagine the speech of man to have begun as with the cries of animals, or the stammering lips of children, and to have attained by degrees the perfection of Homer and Plato. Yet we are far from saying that this or any other theory of language is proved by facts. It is not difficult to form an hypothesis which by a series of imaginary transitions will bridge over the chasm which separates man from the animals. Differences of kind may often be thus resolved into differences of degree. But we must not assume that we have in this way discovered the true account of them. Through what struggles the harmonious use of the organs of speech was acquired; to what extent the conditions of human life were different; how far the genius of individuals may have contributed to the discovery of this as of the other arts, we cannot say: Only we seem to see that language is as much the creation of the ear as of the tongue, and the expression of a movement stirring the hearts not of one man only but of many, 'as the trees of the wood are stirred by the wind.' The theory is consistent or not inconsistent with our own mental experience, and throws some degree of light upon a dark corner of the human mind.

In the later analysis of language, we trace the opposite and contrasted elements of the individual and nation, of the past and present, of the inward and outward, of the subject and object, of the notional and relational, of the root or unchanging part of the word and of the changing inflexion, if such a distinction be admitted, of the vowel and the consonant, of quantity and accent, of speech and writing, of poetry and prose. We observe also the reciprocal influence of sounds and conceptions on each other, like the connexion of body and mind; and further remark that although the names of objects were originally proper names, as the grammarian or logician might call them, yet at a later stage they become universal notions, which combine into particulars and individuals, and are taken out of the first rude agglomeration of sounds that they may be replaced in a higher and more logical order. We see that in the simplest sentences are contained grammar and logic—the parts of speech, the Eleatic philosophy

and the Kantian categories. So complex is language, and so expressive not only of the meanest wants of man, but of his highest thoughts; so various are the aspects in which it is regarded by us. Then again, when we follow the history of languages, we observe that they are always slowly moving, half dead, half alive, half solid, half fluid; the breath of a moment, yet like the air, continuous in all ages and countries,—like the glacier, too, containing within them a trickling stream which deposits débris of the rocks over which it passes. There were happy moments, as we may conjecture, in the lives of nations, at which they came to the birth—as in the golden age of literature, the man and the time seem to conspire; the eloquence of the bard or chief, as in later times the creations of the great writer who is the expression of his age, became impressed on the minds of their countrymen, perhaps in the hour of some crisis of national development—a migration, a conquest, or the like. The picture of the word which was beginning to be lost, is now revived; the sound again echoes to the sense; men find themselves capable not only of expressing more feelings, and describing more objects, but of expressing and describing them better. The world before the flood, that is to say, the world of ten, twenty, a hundred thousand years ago, has passed away and left no sign. But the best conception that we can form of it, though imperfect and uncertain, is gained from the analogy of causes still in action, some powerful and sudden, others working slowly in the course of infinite ages. Something too may be allowed to ‘the persistency of the strongest,’ to ‘the survival of the fittest,’ in this as in the other realms of nature.

These are some of the reflections which the modern philosophy of language suggests to us about the powers of the human mind and the forces and influences by which the efforts of men to utter articulate sounds were inspired. Yet in making these and similar generalizations we may note also dangers to which we are exposed. (1) There is the confusion of ideas with facts—of mere possibilities, and generalities, and modes of conception with actual and definite knowledge. The words ‘evolution,’ ‘birth,’ ‘law,’ ‘development,’ ‘instinct,’ ‘implicit,’ ‘explicit,’ and the like, have a false clearness or comprehensiveness, which adds nothing to our knowledge. The metaphor of a flower or a tree, or some other work of nature or art, is often in like manner only a

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pleasing picture. (2) There is the fallacy of resolving the languages which we know into their parts, and then imagining that we can discover the nature of language by reconstructing them. (3) There is the danger of identifying language, not with thoughts but with ideas. (4) There is the error of supposing that the analysis of grammar and logic has always existed, or that their distinctions were familiar to Socrates and Plato. (5) There is the fallacy of exaggerating, and also of diminishing the interval which separates articulate from inarticulate language — the cries of animals from the speech of man — the instinct of animals from the reason of man. (6) There is the danger which besets all enquiries into the early history of man — of interpreting the past by the present, and of substituting the definite and intelligible for the true but dim outline which is the horizon of human knowledge.

The greatest light is thrown upon the nature of language by analogy. We have the analogy of the cries of animals, of the songs of birds ('man, like the nightingale, is a singing bird, but is ever binding up thoughts with musical notes'), of music, of children learning to speak, of barbarous nations in which the linguistic instinct is still undecayed, of ourselves learning to think and speak a new language, of the deaf and dumb who have words without sounds, of the various disorders of speech; and we have the after-growth of mythology, which, like language, is an unconscious creation of the human mind. We can observe the social and collective instincts of animals; and may remark how, when domesticated, they have the power of understanding but not of speaking, while on the other hand, some birds which are comparatively devoid of intelligence, make a nearer approach to articulate speech. We may note how in the animals there is a want of that sympathy with one another which appears to be the soul of language. We can compare the use of speech with other mental and bodily operations; for speech too is a kind of gesture, and in the child or savage accompanied with gesture. We may observe that the child learns to speak, as he learns to walk or to eat, by a natural impulse; yet in either case not without a power of imitation which is also natural to him — he is taught to read, but he breaks forth spontaneously in speech. We can trace the impulse to bind together the world in ideas beginning in the first efforts to speak and culminating in philosophy. But there

remains an element which cannot be explained, or even adequately described. We can understand how man creates or constructs consciously and by design; and see, if we do not understand, how nature, by a law, calls into being an organized structure. But the intermediate organism which stands between man and nature, which is the work of mind yet unconscious, and in which mind and matter seem to meet, and mind unperceived to herself is really limited by all other minds, is neither understood nor seen by us, and is with reluctance admitted to be a fact.

Language is an aspect of man, of nature, and of nations, the transfiguration of the world in thought, the meeting-point of the physical and mental sciences, and also the mirror in which they are reflected, present at every moment to the individual, and yet having a sort of eternal or universal nature. When we analyze our own mental processes, we find words everywhere in every degree of clearness and consistency, fading away in dreams and more like pictures, rapidly succeeding one another in our waking thoughts, attaining a greater distinctness and consecutiveness in speech, and a greater still in writing, taking the place of one another when we try to become emancipated from their influence. For in all processes of the mind which are conscious we are talking to ourselves; the attempt to think without words is a mere illusion,—they are always reappearing when we fix our thoughts. And speech is not a separate faculty, but the expression of all our faculties, to which all our other powers of expression, signs, looks, gestures, lend their aid, of which the instrument is not the tongue only, but more than half the human frame.

The minds of men are sometimes carried on to think of their lives and of their actions as links in a chain of causes and effects going back to the beginning of time. A few have seemed to lose the sense of their own individuality in the universal cause or nature. In like manner we might think of the words which we daily use, as derived from the first speech of man, and of all the languages in the world, as the expressions or varieties of a single force or life of language of which the thoughts of men are the accident. Such a conception enables us to grasp the power and wonder of languages, and is very natural to the scientific philologist. For he, like the metaphysician, believes in the reality of

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that which absorbs his own mind. Nor do we deny the enormous influence which language has exercised over thought. Fixed words, like fixed ideas, have often governed the world. But in such representations we attribute to language too much the nature of a cause, and too little of an effect,—too much of an absolute, too little of a relative character,—too much of an ideal, too little of a matter-of-fact existence.

Or again, we may frame a single abstract notion of language of which all existent languages may be supposed to be the perversion. But we must not conceive that this logical figment had ever a real existence, or is anything more than an effort of the mind to give unity to infinitely various phenomena. There is no abstract language '*in rerum natura*,' any more than there is an abstract tree, but only languages in various stages of growth, maturity, and decay. Nor do other logical distinctions or even grammatical exactly correspond to the facts of language; for they too are attempts to give unity and regularity to a subject which is partly irregular.

We find, however, that there are distinctions of another kind by which this vast field of language admits of being mapped out. There is the distinction between biliteral and triliteral roots, and the various inflexions which accompany them; between the mere mechanical cohesion of sounds or words, and the 'chemical' combination of them into a new word; there is the distinction between languages which have had a free and full development of their organisms, and languages which have been stunted in their growth,—lamed in their hands or feet, and never able to acquire afterwards the powers in which they are deficient; there is the distinction between synthetical languages like Greek and Latin, which have retained their inflexions, and analytical languages like English or French, which have lost them. Innumerable as are the languages and dialects of mankind, there are comparatively few classes to which they can be referred.

Another road through this chaos is provided by the physiology of speech. The organs of language are the same in all mankind, and are only capable of uttering a certain number of sounds. Every man has tongue, teeth, lips, palate, throat, mouth, which he may close or open, and adapt in various ways; making, first, vowels and consonants; and secondly, other classes of letters.



The elements of all speech, like the elements of the musical scale, are few and simple, though admitting of infinite gradations and combinations. Whatever slight differences exist in the use or formation of these organs, owing to climate or the sense of euphony or other causes, they are as nothing compared with their agreement. Here then is a real basis of unity in the study of philology, unlike that imaginary abstract unity of which we were just now speaking.

Whether we regard language from the psychological, or historical, or physiological point of view, the materials of our knowledge are inexhaustible. The comparisons of children learning to speak, of barbarous nations, of musical notes, of the cries of animals, of the song of birds, increase our insight into the nature of human speech. Many observations which would otherwise have escaped us are suggested by them. But they do not explain why, in man and in man only, the speaker met with a response from the hearer, and the half articulate sound gradually developed into Sanscrit and Greek. They hardly enable us to approach any nearer the secret of the origin of language, which, like some of the other great secrets of nature,— the origin of birth and death, or of animal life,— remains inviolable. That problem is indissolubly bound up with the origin of man; and if we ever know more of the one, we may expect to know more of the other.<sup>1</sup>

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It is more than sixteen years since the preceding remarks were written, which with a few alterations have now been reprinted. During the interval the progress of philology has been very great. More languages have been compared; the inner structure of language has been laid bare; the relations of sounds have been more accurately discriminated; the manner in which dialects affect or are affected by the literary or principal form of a language is better understood. Many merely verbal questions have been eliminated; the remains of the old traditional methods have died away. The study has passed from the metaphysical into an

<sup>1</sup> Compare W. Humboldt, 'Ueber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues;' M. Müller, 'Lectures on the Science of Language;' Steinthal, 'Einleitung in die Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft.'



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historical stage. Grammar is no longer confused with language, nor the anatomy of words and sentences with their life and use. Figures of speech, by which the vagueness of theories is often concealed, have been stripped off; and we see language more as it truly was. The immensity of the subject is gradually revealed to us, and the reign of law becomes apparent. Yet the law is but partially seen; the traces of it are often lost in the distance. For languages have a natural but not a perfect growth; like other creations of nature into which the will of man enters, they are full of what we term accident and irregularity. And the difficulties of the subject become not less, but greater, as we proceed—it is one of those studies in which we seem to know less as we know more; partly because we are no longer satisfied with the vague and superficial ideas of it which prevailed fifty years ago; partly also because the remains of the languages with which we are acquainted always were, and if they are still living, are, in a state of transition; and thirdly, because there are lacunae in our knowledge of them which can never be filled up. Not a tenth, not a hundredth part of them has been preserved. Yet the materials at our disposal are far greater than any individual can use. Such are a few of the general reflections which the present state of philology calls up.

(1) Language seems to be composite, but into its first elements the philologist has never been able to penetrate. However far he goes back, he never arrives at the beginning; or rather, as in Geology or in Astronomy, there is no beginning. He is too apt to suppose that by breaking up the existing forms of language into their parts he will arrive at a previous stage of it, but he is merely analyzing what never existed, or is never known to have existed, except in a composite form. He may divide nouns and verbs into roots and inflexions, but he has no evidence which will show that the  $\omega$  of  $\tau\acute{\iota}\pi\tau\omega$  or the  $\mu$  of  $\tau\acute{\iota}\theta\eta\mu\iota$ , though analogous to  $\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega$ ,  $\mu\epsilon$ , either became pronouns or were generated out of pronouns. To say that ‘pronouns, like ripe fruit, dropped out of verbs,’ is a misleading figure of speech. Although all languages have some common principles, there is no primitive form or forms of language known to us, or to be reasonably imagined, from which they are all descended. No inference can be drawn from language, either for or against the unity of the human race. Nor is there any proof

that words were ever used without any relation to each other. Whatever may be the meaning of a sentence or a word when applied to primitive language, it is probable that the sentence is more akin to the original form than the word, and that the later stage of language is the result rather of analysis than of synthesis, or possibly is a combination of the two. Nor, again, are we sure that the original process of learning to speak was the same in different places or among different races of men. It may have been slower with some, quicker with others. Some tribes may have used shorter, others longer words or cries: they may have been more or less inclined to agglutinate or to decompose them: they may have modified them by the use of prefixes, suffixes, infixes; by the lengthening and strengthening of vowels or by the shortening and weakening of them, by the thickening or rarefaction of consonants. But who gave to language these primeval laws; or why one race has trilateral, another biliteral roots; or why in some members of a group of languages *b* becomes *p*, or *d*, *t*, or *ch*, *k*; or why two languages resemble one another in certain parts of their structure and differ in others; or why in one language there is a greater development of vowels, in another of consonants, and the like—are questions of which we only ‘entertain conjecture.’ We must remember the length of time that has elapsed since man first walked upon the earth, and that in this vast but unknown period every variety of language may have been in process of formation and decay, many times over.<sup>1</sup> It can hardly be supposed that any traces of an original

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<sup>1</sup> Cp. Plato, *Laws*, iii. 676:—

*Ath.* And what then is to be regarded as the origin of government? Will not a man be able to judge best from a point of view in which he may behold the progress of states and their transitions to good and evil?

*Cle.* What do you mean?

*Ath.* I mean that he might watch them from the point of view of time, and observe the changes which take place in them during infinite ages.

*Cle.* How so?

*Ath.* Why, do you think that you can reckon the time which has elapsed since cities first existed and men were citizens of them?

*Cle.* Hardly.

*Ath.* But you are quite sure that it must be vast and incalculable?

*Cle.* No doubt.

*Ath.* And have there not been thousands and thousands of cities which have come into being and perished during this period? And has not every place had

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language still survive, any more than of the first huts or buildings which were constructed by man. Nor are we at all certain of the relation, if any, in which the greater families of languages stand to each other. The influence of individuals must always have been a disturbing element in primitive language. Like great writers in later times, there may have been many a barbaric genius who taught the men of his tribe to sing or speak, showing them by example how to continue or divide their words, charming their souls with rhythm and accent and intonation, finding in familiar objects the expression of their confused fancies — to whom the whole of language might in truth be said to be a figure of speech. One person may have introduced a new custom into the formation or pronunciation of a word; he may have been imitated by others, and the custom, or form, or accent, or quantity, or rhyme which he introduced in a single word may have become the type on which many other words or inflexions of words were framed, and may have quickly run through a whole language. For like the other gifts which nature has bestowed upon man, that of speech has been conveyed to him through the medium, not of the many, but of the few, who were his 'law-givers' — 'the legislator with the dialectician standing on his right hand,' in Plato's striking image, who formed the manners of men and gave them customs, whose voice and look and behaviour, whose gesticulations and other peculiarities were instinctively imitated by them, — the 'king of men' who was their priest, almost their God. . . . But these are conjectures only: so little do we know of the origin of language that the real scholar is indisposed to touch the subject at all.

(2) There are other errors besides the figment of a primitive or original language which it is time to leave behind us. We no longer divide language into synthetical and analytical, or suppose similarity of structure to be the safe or only guide to the affinities

endless forms of government, and been sometimes rising, and at other times falling, and again improving or waning?

Aristot. *Metaph.* xi. 8. 21: —

'And if a person should conceive the tales of mythology to mean only that men thought the gods to be the first essences of things, he would deem the reflection to have been inspired and would consider that, whereas probably every art and part of wisdom had been *discovered and lost many times over*, such notions were but a remnant of the past which has survived to our day.'

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of them. We do not confuse the parts of speech with the categories of Logic. Nor do we conceive languages any more than civilizations to be in a state of dissolution; they do not easily pass away, but are far more tenacious of life than the tribes by whom they are spoken. 'Where two or three are gathered together,' they survive. As in the human frame, as in the state, there is a principle of renovation as well as of decay which is at work in all of them. Neither do we suppose them to be invented by the wit of man. With few exceptions, e. g. technical words or words newly imported from a foreign language, and the like, in which art has imitated nature, 'words are not made but grow.' Nor do we attribute to them a supernatural origin. The law which regulates them is like the law which governs the circulation of the blood, or the rising of the sap in trees; the action of it is uniform, but the result, which appears in the superficial forms of men and animals or in the leaves of trees, is an endless profusion and variety. The laws of vegetation are invariable, but no two plants, no two leaves of the forest are precisely the same. The laws of language are invariable, but no two languages are alike, no two words have exactly the same meaning. No two sounds are exactly of the same quality, or leave on the ear precisely the same impression.

It would be well if there were a similar consensus about some other points which appear to be still in dispute. Is language conscious or unconscious? In speaking or writing have we present to our minds the meaning or the sound or the construction of the words which we are using?—No more than the separate drops of water with which we quench our thirst are present: the drinking of the whole cup may be conscious; not so the drinking of each particle: So the whole sentence may be conscious, but the several words, syllables, letters are not thought of separately when we are uttering them. Like other natural operations, the process of speech, when most perfect, is least observed by us. We do not pause at each mouthful to dwell upon the taste of it: nor has the speaker time to ask himself the comparative merits of different modes of expression while he is uttering them. There are many things in the use of language which may be observed from without, but which cannot be explained from within. Consciousness carries us

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but a little way in the investigation of the mind; it is not the faculty of internal observation, but only the dim light which makes such observation possible. What is supposed to be our consciousness of language is really only the analysis of it, and this analysis admits of innumerable degrees. But would it not be better if this term, which is so misleading, and yet has played so great a part in mental science, were either banished or used only with the distinct meaning of 'attention to our own minds,' such as is called forth, not by familiar mental processes, but by the interruption of them? Now in this sense we may truly say that we are not conscious of ordinary speech, though we are commonly roused to attention by the misuse or mispronunciation of a word. Still less, even in schools and academies, do we ever attempt to invent new words or to alter the meaning of old ones, except in the case, mentioned above, of technical or borrowed words which are artificially made or imported because a need of them is felt. Neither in our own nor in any other age has the conscious effort of reflection in man contributed in an appreciable degree to the formation of language. 'Which of us by taking thought' can make new words or constructions? Reflection is the least of the causes by which language is affected, and is likely to have the least power, when the linguistic instinct is greatest, as in young children and in the infancy of nations.

A kindred error is the separation of the phonetic from the mental element of language; they are really inseparable — no definite line can be drawn between them, any more than in any other common act of mind and body. It is true that within certain limits we possess the power of varying sounds by opening and closing the mouth, by touching the palate or the teeth with the tongue, by lengthening or shortening the vocal instrument, by greater or less stress, by a higher or lower pitch of the voice, and we can substitute one note or accent for another. But behind the organs of speech and their action there remains the informing mind, which sets them in motion and works together with them. And behind the great structure of human speech and the lesser varieties of language which arise out of the many degrees and kinds of human intercourse, there is also the unknown or overruling law of God or nature which gives order to it in its infinite greatness, and variety in its infinitesimal minuteness — both



equally inscrutable to us. We need no longer discuss whether philology is to be classed with the Natural or the Mental sciences, if we frankly recognize that, like all the sciences which are concerned with man, it has a double aspect,—inward and outward; and that the inward can only be known through the outward. Neither need we raise the question whether the laws of language, like the other laws of human action, admit of exceptions. The answer in all cases is the same—that the laws of nature are uniform, though the consistency or continuity of them is not always perceptible to us. The superficial appearances of language, as of nature, are irregular, but we do not therefore deny their deeper uniformity. The comparison of the growth of language in the individual and in the nation cannot be wholly discarded, for nations are made up of individuals. But in this, as in the other political sciences, we must distinguish between collective and individual actions or processes, and not attribute to the one what belongs to the other. Again, when we speak of the heredity or paternity of a language, we must remember that the parents are alive as well as the children, and that all the preceding generations survive (after a manner) in the latest form of it. And when, for the purposes of comparison, we form into groups the roots or terminations of words, we should not forget how casual is the manner in which their resemblances have arisen—they were not first written down by a grammarian in the paradigms of a grammar and learned out of a book, but were due to many chance attractions of sound or of meaning, or of both combined. So many cautions have to be borne in mind, and so many first thoughts to be dismissed, before we can proceed safely in the path of philological enquiry. It might be well sometimes to lay aside figures of speech, such as the ‘root’ and the ‘branches,’ the ‘stem,’ the ‘strata’ of Geology, the ‘compounds’ of Chemistry, ‘the ripe fruit of pronouns dropping from verbs’ (see above), and the like, which are always interesting, but are apt to be delusive. Yet such figures of speech are far nearer the truth than the theories which attribute the invention and improvement of language to the conscious action of the human mind. . . Lastly, it is doubted by recent philologists whether climate can be supposed to have exercised any influence worth speaking of on a language: such

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a view is said to be unproven: it had better therefore not be silently assumed.

‘Natural selection’ and the ‘survival of the fittest’ have been applied in the field of philology, as well as in the other sciences which are concerned with animal and vegetable life. And a Darwinian school of philologists has sprung up, who are sometimes accused of putting words in the place of things. It seems to be true, that whether applied to language or to other branches of knowledge, the Darwinian theory, unless very precisely defined, hardly escapes from being a truism. If by ‘the natural selection’ of words or meanings of words or by the ‘persistence and survival of the fittest’ the maintainer of the theory intends to affirm nothing more than this — that the word ‘fittest to survive’ survives, he adds not much to the knowledge of language. But if he means that the word or the meaning of the word or some portion of the word which comes into use or drops out of use is selected or rejected on the ground of economy or parsimony or ease to the speaker or clearness or euphony or expressiveness, or greater or less demand for it, or anything of this sort, he is affirming a proposition which has several senses, and in none of these senses can be asserted to be uniformly true. For the laws of language are precarious, and can only act uniformly when there is such frequency of intercourse among neighbours as is sufficient to enforce them. And there are many reasons why a man should prefer his own way of speaking to that of others, unless by so doing he becomes unintelligible. The struggle for existence among words is not of that fierce and irresistible kind in which birds, beasts and fishes devour one another, but of a milder sort, allowing one usage to be substituted for another, not by force, but by the persuasion, or rather by the prevailing habit, of a majority. The favourite figure, in this, as in some other uses of it, has tended rather to obscure than explain the subject to which it has been applied. Nor in any case can the struggle for existence be deemed to be the sole or principal cause of changes in language, but only one among many, and one of which we cannot easily measure the importance. There is a further objection which may be urged equally against all applications of the Darwinian theory. As in animal life and likewise in vegetable, so in languages, the process of change is

said to be insensible: sounds, like animals, are supposed to pass into one another by imperceptible gradation. But in both cases the newly-created forms soon become fixed; there are few if any vestiges of the intermediate links, and so the better half of the evidence of the change is wanting.

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(3) Among the incumbrances or illusions of language may be reckoned many of the rules and traditions of grammar, whether ancient grammar or the corrections of it which modern philology has introduced. Grammar, like law, delights in definition: human speech, like human action, though very far from being a mere chaos, is indefinite, admits of degrees, and is always in a state of change or transition. Grammar gives an erroneous conception of language: for it reduces to a system that which is not a system. Its figures of speech, pleonasm, ellipses, anacolutha, *πρὸς τὸ σημαίνόμενον*, and the like, have no reality; they do not either make curious expressions more intelligible or show the way in which they have arisen; they are chiefly designed to bring an earlier use of language into conformity with the later. Often they seem intended only to remind us that great poets like Aeschylus or Sophocles or Pindar or a great prose writer like Thucydides are guilty of taking unwarrantable liberties with grammatical rules; it appears never to have occurred to the inventors of them that these real ‘conditores linguae Graecae’ lived in an age before grammar, when ‘Greece also was living Greece.’ It is the anatomy, not the physiology of language, which grammar seeks to describe: into the idiom and higher life of words it does not enter. The ordinary Greek grammar gives a complete paradigm of the verb, without suggesting that the double or treble forms of Perfects, Aorists, etc. are hardly ever contemporaneous. It distinguishes Moods and Tenses, without observing how much of the nature of the one passes into the other. It makes three Voices, Active, Passive, and Middle, but takes no notice of the precarious existence and uncertain character of the last of the three. Language is a thing of degrees and relations and associations and exceptions: grammar ties it up in fixed rules. Language has many varieties of usage: grammar tries to reduce them to a single one. Grammar divides verbs into regular and irregular: it does not recognize that the irregular, equally with the regular, are subject to law, and

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that a language which had no exceptions would not be a natural growth: for it could not have been subjected to the influences by which language is ordinarily affected. It is always wanting to describe ancient languages in the terms of a modern one. It has a favourite fiction that one word is put in the place of another; the truth is that no word is ever put for another. It has another fiction, that a word has been omitted: words are not really omitted, but they are no longer needed, and therefore they pass out of use. The common explanation of *κατὰ* or some other preposition 'being understood' in a Greek sentence is another fiction of the same kind, which tends to disguise the fact that under cases were comprehended originally many more relations, and that prepositions are used only to define the meaning of them with greater precision. These instances are sufficient to show the sort of errors which grammar introduces into language. We are not considering the question of its utility to the beginner in the study. Even to him the best grammar is the shortest and that in which he will have least to unlearn. It may be said that the explanations here referred to are already out of date, and that the study of Greek grammar has received a new character from comparative philology. This is true; but it is also true that the traditional grammar has still a great hold on the mind of the student.

Metaphysics are even more troublesome than the figments of grammar, because they wear the appearance of philosophy and there is no test to which they can be subjected. They are useful in so far as they give us an insight into the history of the human mind and the modes of thought which have existed in former ages; or in so far as they furnish wider conceptions of the different branches of knowledge and of their relation to one another. But they are worse than useless when they outrun experience and abstract the mind from the observation of facts, only to envelope it in a mist of words. Some philologists, like Schleicher, have been greatly influenced by the philosophy of Hegel; nearly all of them to a certain extent have fallen under the dominion of physical science. Even Kant himself thought that the first principles of philosophy could be elicited from the analysis of the proposition, in this respect falling short of Plato. Westphal holds that there are three stages of language:

(1) in which things were characterized independently, (2) in which they were regarded in relation to human thought, and (3) in relation to one another. But are not such distinctions an anachronism? for they imply a growth of abstract ideas which never existed in early times. Language cannot be explained by Metaphysics; for it is prior to them and much more nearly allied to sense. It is not likely that the meaning of the cases is ultimately resolvable into relations of space and time. Nor can we suppose the conception of cause and effect or of the finite and infinite or of the same and other to be latent in language at a time when in their abstract form they had never entered into the mind of man. . . . If the science of Comparative Philology had possessed 'enough of Metaphysics to get rid of Metaphysics,' it would have made far greater progress.

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(4) Our knowledge of language is almost confined to languages which are fully developed. They are of several patterns; and these become altered by admixture in various degrees,—they may only borrow a few words from one another and retain their life comparatively unaltered, or they may meet in a struggle for existence until one of the two is overpowered and retires from the field. They attain the full rights and dignity of language when they acquire the use of writing and have a literature of their own; they pass into dialects and grow out of them, in proportion as men are isolated or united by locality or occupation. The common language sometimes reacts upon the dialects and imparts to them also a literary character. The laws of language can be best discerned in the great crises of language, especially in the transitions from ancient to modern forms of them, whether in Europe or Asia. Such changes are silent notes of the world's history; they mark periods of unknown length in which war and conquest were running riot over whole continents, times of suffering too great to be endured by the human race, in which the masters became subjects and the subject races masters, in which driven by necessity or impelled by some instinct, tribes or nations left their original homes and but slowly found a resting-place. Language would be the greatest of all historical monuments, if it could only tell us the history of itself.

(5) There are many ways in which we may approach this study.

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The simplest of all is to observe our own use of language in conversation or in writing, how we put words together, how we construct and connect sentences, what are the rules of accent and rhythm in verse or prose, the formation and composition of words, the laws of euphony and sound, the affinities of letters, the mistakes to which we ourselves are most liable of spelling or pronunciation. We may compare with our own language some other, even when we have only a slight knowledge of it, such as French or German. Even a little Latin will enable us to appreciate the grand difference between ancient and modern European languages. In the child learning to speak we may note the inherent strength of language, which like 'a mountain river' is always forcing its way out. We may witness the delight in imitation and repetition, and some of the laws by which sounds pass into one another. We may learn something also from the falterings of old age, the searching for words, and the confusion of them with one another, the forgetfulness of proper names (more commonly than of other words because they are more isolated), aphasia, and the like. There are philological lessons also to be gathered from nicknames, from provincialisms, from the slang of great cities, from the argot of Paris (that language of suffering and crime, so pathetically described by Victor Hugo), from the imperfect articulation of the deaf and dumb, from the jabbering of animals, from the analysis of sounds in relation to the organs of speech. The phonograph affords a visible evidence of the nature and divisions of sound; we may be truly said to know what we can manufacture. Artificial languages, such as that of Bishop Wilkins, are chiefly useful in showing what language is not. The study of any foreign language may be made also a study of Comparative Philology. There are several points, such as the nature of irregular verbs, of indeclinable parts of speech, the influence of euphony, the decay or loss of inflections, the elements of syntax, which may be examined as well in the history of our own language as of any other. A few well-selected questions may lead the student at once into the heart of the mystery: such as, Why are the pronouns and the verb of existence generally more irregular than any other parts of speech? Why is the number of words so small in which the sound is an echo of the sense? Why



does the meaning of words depart so widely from their etymology? Why do substantives often differ in meaning from the verbs to which they are related, adverbs from adjectives! Why do words differing in origin coalesce in the same sound though retaining their differences of meaning? Why are some verbs impersonal? Why are there only so many parts of speech, and on what principle are they divided? These are a few crucial questions which give an insight from different points of view into the true nature of language.

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(6) Thus far we have been endeavouring to strip off from language the false appearances in which grammar and philology, or the love of system generally, have clothed it. We have also sought to indicate the sources of our knowledge of it and the spirit in which we should approach it. We may now proceed to consider some of the principles or natural laws which have created or modified it.

i. The first and simplest of all the principles of language, common also to the animals, is imitation. The lion roars, the wolf howls in the solitude of the forest: they are answered by similar cries heard from a distance. The bird, too, mimics the voice of man and makes answer to him. Man tells to man the secret place in which he is hiding himself; he remembers and repeats the sound which he has heard. The love of imitation becomes a passion and an instinct to him. Primitive men learnt to speak from one another, like a child from its mother or nurse. They learnt of course a rudimentary, half-articulate language, the cry or song or speech which was the expression of what we now call human thoughts and feelings. We may still remark how much greater and more natural the exercise of the power of imitation is in the use of language than in any other process or action of the human mind.

ii. Imitation provided the first material of language: but it was 'without form and void.' During how many years or hundreds or thousands of years the imitative or half-articulate stage continued there is no possibility of determining. But we may reasonably conjecture that there was a time when the vocal utterance of man was intermediate between what we now call language and the cry of a bird or animal. Speech before language was a *rudis indigestaque materies*, not yet distributed



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into words and sentences, in which the cry of fear or joy mingled with more definite sounds recognized by custom as the expressions of things or events. It was the principle of analogy which introduced into this 'indigesta moles' order and measure. It was Anaxagoras' ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα, εἴτα νοῦς ἐλθὼν διεκόσμησε: the light of reason lighted up all things and at once began to arrange them. In every sentence, in every word and every termination of a word, this power of forming relations to one another was contained. There was a proportion of sound to sound, of meaning to meaning, of meaning to sound. The cases and numbers of nouns, the persons, tenses, numbers of verbs, were generally on the same or nearly the same pattern and had the same meaning. The sounds by which they were expressed were rough-hewn at first; after a while they grew more refined — the natural laws of euphony began to affect them. The rules of syntax are likewise based upon analogy. Time has an analogy with space, arithmetic with geometry. Not only in musical notes, but in the quantity, quality, accent, rhythm of human speech, trivial or serious, there is a law of proportion. As in things of beauty, as in all nature, in the composition as well as in the motion of all things, there is a similarity of relations by which they are held together.

It would be a mistake to suppose that the analogies of language are always uniform: there may be often a choice between several, and sometimes one and sometimes another will prevail. In Greek there are three declensions of nouns; the forms of cases in one of them may intrude upon another. Similarly verbs in *-ω* and *-μι* interchange forms of tenses, and the completed paradigm of the verb is often made up of both. The same nouns may be partly declinable and partly indeclinable, and in some of their cases may have fallen out of use. Here are rules with exceptions; they are not however really exceptions, but contain in themselves indications of other rules. Many of these interruptions or variations of analogy occur in pronouns or in the verb of existence of which the forms were too common and therefore too deeply imbedded in language entirely to drop out. The same verbs in the same meaning may sometimes take one case, sometimes another. The participle may also have the character of an adjective, the adverb either of an adjective or of a preposition.

These exceptions are as regular as the rules, but the causes of them are seldom known to us.

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Language, like the animal and vegetable worlds, is everywhere intersected by the lines of analogy. Like number from which it seems to be derived, the principle of analogy opens the eyes of men to discern the similarities and differences of things, and their relations to one another. At first these are such as lie on the surface only; after a time they are seen by men to reach farther down into the nature of things. Gradually in language they arrange themselves into a sort of imperfect system; groups of personal and case endings are placed side by side. The fertility of language produces many more than are wanted; and the superfluous ones are utilized by the assignment to them of new meanings. The vacuity and the superfluity are thus partially compensated by each other. It must be remembered that in all the languages which have a literature, certainly in Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, we are not at the beginning but almost at the end of the linguistic process; we have reached a time when the verb and the noun are nearly perfected, though in no language did they completely perfect themselves, because for some unknown reason the motive powers of languages seem to have ceased when they were on the eve of completing their work; they became fixed or crystallized in an imperfect form either from the influence of writing and literature, or because no further differentiation of them was required for the intelligibility of language. So not without admixture and confusion and displacement and contamination of sounds and the meanings of words, a lower stage of language passes into a higher. Thus far we can see and no further. When we ask the reason why this principle of analogy prevails in all the vast domain of language, there is no answer to the question; or no other answer but this, that there are innumerable ways in which, like number, analogy permeates, not only language, but the whole world, both visible and intellectual. We know from experience that it does not (*a*) arise from any conscious act of reflection that the accusative of a Latin noun in *us* should end in *um*; nor (*b*) from any necessity of being understood,—much less articulation would suffice for this; nor (*c*) from greater convenience or expressiveness of particular sounds. Such notions were certainly far enough away

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from the mind of primitive man. We may speak of a latent instinct, of a survival of the fittest, easiest, most euphonic, most economical of breath, in the case of one of two competing sounds; but these expressions do not add anything to our knowledge. We may try to grasp the infinity of language either under the figure of a limitless plain divided into countries and districts by natural boundaries, or of a vast river eternally flowing whose origin is concealed from us; we may apprehend partially the laws by which speech is regulated: but we do not know, and we seem as if we should never know, any more than in the parallel case of the origin of species, how vocal sounds received life and grew, and in the form of languages came to be distributed over the earth.

iii. Next in order to analogy in the formation of language or even prior to it comes the principle of onomatopœia, which is itself a kind of analogy or similarity of sound and meaning. In by far the greater number of words it has become disguised and has disappeared; but in no stage of language is it entirely lost. It belongs chiefly to early language, in which words were few; and its influence grew less and less as time went on. To the ear which had a sense of harmony it became a barbarism which disturbed the flow and equilibrium of discourse; it was an excrescence which had to be cut out, a survival which needed to be got rid of, because it was out of keeping with the rest. It remained for the most part only as a formative principle, which used words and letters not as crude imitations of other natural sounds, but as symbols of ideas which were naturally associated with them. It received in another way a new character; it affected not so much single words, as larger portions of human speech. It regulated the juxtaposition of sounds and the cadence of sentences. It was the music, not of song, but of speech, in prose as well as verse. The old onomatopœia of primitive language was refined into an onomatopœia of a higher kind, in which it is no longer true to say that a particular sound corresponds to a motion or action of man or beast or movement of nature, but that in all the higher uses of language the sound is the echo of the sense, especially in poetry, in which beauty and expressiveness are given to human thoughts by the harmonious composition of the words, syllables, letters, accents,

quantities, rhythms, rhymes, varieties and contrasts of all sorts. *Cratylus.*  
 The poet with his 'Break, break, break' or his *ἡ πᾶσιν νεκύνεσαι* INTRODUC-  
*καταφθιμένοισιν ἀνάσσειν* or his 'longius ex altoque sinum trahit,' TION.  
 can produce a far finer music than any crude imitations of things  
 or actions in sound, although a letter or two having this imitative  
 power may be a lesser element of beauty in such passages.  
 The same subtle sensibility, which adapts the word to the thing,  
 adapts the sentence or cadence to the general meaning or spirit  
 of the passage. This is the higher onomatopoeia which has banished  
 the cruder sort as unworthy to have a place in great languages  
 and literatures.

We can see clearly enough that letters or collocations of  
 letters do by various degrees of strength or weakness, length  
 or shortness, emphasis or pitch, become the natural expressions  
 of the finer parts of human feeling or thought. And not only  
 so, but letters themselves have a significance; as Plato observes  
 that the letter *ρ* is expressive of motion, the letters *δ* and *τ* of  
 binding and rest, the letter *λ* of smoothness, *ν* of inwardness,  
 the letter *η* of length, the letter *ο* of roundness. These were  
 often combined so as to form composite notions, as for example  
 in *τρόμος* (trembling), *τραχίς* (rugged), *θραύειν* (crush), *κρούειν*  
 (strike), *θρύπτειν* (break), *ρυνμβεῖν* (whirl),—in all which words we  
 notice a parallel composition of sounds in their English equiva-  
 lents. Plato also remarks, as we remark, that the onomato-  
 poetic principle is far from prevailing uniformly, and further  
 that no explanation of language consistently corresponds with  
 any system of philosophy, however great may be the light which  
 language throws upon the nature of the mind. Both in Greek  
 and English we find groups of words such as string, swing,  
 sling, spring, sting, which are parallel to one another and may  
 be said to derive their vocal effect partly from contrast of letters,  
 but in which it is impossible to assign a precise amount of  
 meaning to each of the expressive and onomatopoeitic letters.  
 A few of them are directly imitative, as for example the *ω* in  
*ῶον*, which represents the round form of the egg by the figure  
 of the mouth: or *βροντή* (thunder), in which the fulness of the  
 sound of the word corresponds to the thing signified by it;  
 or *βόμβος* (buzzing), of which the first syllable, as in its English  
 equivalent, has the meaning of a deep sound. We may observe

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also (as we see in the case of the poor stammerer) that speech has the co-operation of the whole body and may be often assisted or half expressed by gesticulation. A sound or word is not the work of the vocal organs only; nearly the whole of the upper part of the human frame, including head, chest, lungs, have a share in creating it; and it may be accompanied by a movement of the eyes, nose, fingers, hands, feet which contributes to the effect of it.

The principle of onomatopœia has fallen into discredit, partly because it has been supposed to imply an actual manufacture of words out of syllables and letters, like a piece of joiner's work,—a theory of language which is more and more refuted by facts, and more and more going out of fashion with philologists; and partly also because the traces of onomatopœia in separate words become almost obliterated in the course of ages. The poet of language cannot put in and pull out letters, as a painter might insert or blot out a shade of colour to give effect to his picture. It would be ridiculous for him to alter any received form of a word in order to render it more expressive of the sense. He can only select, perhaps out of some dialect, the form which is already best adapted to his purpose. The true onomatopœia is not a creative, but a formative principle, which in the later stage of the history of language ceases to act upon individual words; but still works through the collocation of them in the sentence or paragraph, and the adaptation of every word, syllable, letter to one another and to the rhythm of the whole passage.

iv. Next, under a distinct head, although not separable from the preceding, may be considered the differentiation of languages, *i. e.* the manner in which differences of meaning and form have arisen in them. Into their first creation we have ceased to enquire: it is their aftergrowth with which we are now concerned. How did the roots or substantial portions of words become modified or inflected? and how did they receive separate meanings? First we remark that words are attracted by the sounds and senses of other words, so that they form groups of nouns and verbs analogous in sound and sense to one another, each noun or verb putting forth inflexions, generally of two or three patterns, and with exceptions. We do not say that we know



how sense became first allied to sound; but we have no difficulty in ascertaining how the sounds and meanings of words were in time parted off or differentiated. (1) The chief causes which regulate the variations of sound are (*a*) double or differing analogies, which lead sometimes to one form, sometimes to another; (*b*) euphony, by which is meant chiefly the greater pleasure to the ear and the greater facility to the organs of speech which is given by a new formation or pronunciation of a word; (*c*) the necessity of finding new expressions for new classes or processes of things. We are told that changes of sound take place by innumerable gradations until a whole tribe or community or society find themselves acquiescing in a new pronunciation or use of language. Yet no one observes the change, or is at all aware that in the course of a lifetime he and his contemporaries have appreciably varied their intonation or use of words. On the other hand, the necessities of language seem to require that the intermediate sounds or meanings of words should quickly become fixed or set and not continue in a state of transition (see above, p. 303). The process of settling down is aided by the organs of speech and by the use of writing and printing. (2) The meaning of words varies because ideas vary or the number of things which is included under them or with which they are associated is increased. A single word is thus made to do duty for many more things than were formerly expressed by it; and it parts into different senses when the classes of things or ideas which are represented by it are themselves different and distinct. A figurative use of a word may easily pass into a new sense: a new meaning caught up by association may become more important than all the rest. The good or neutral sense of a word, such as Jesuit, Puritan, Methodist, Heretic, has been often converted into a bad one by the malevolence of party spirit. Double forms suggest different meanings and are often used to express them; and the form or accent of a word has been not unfrequently altered when there is a difference of meaning. The difference of gender in nouns is utilized for the same reason. New meanings of words push themselves into the vacant spaces of language and retire when they are no longer needed. Language equally abhors vacancy and superfluity. But the remedial measures by which both

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are eliminated are not due to any conscious action of the human mind; nor is the force exerted by them constraining or necessary.

(7) We have shown that language, although subject to laws, is far from being of an exact and uniform nature. We may now speak briefly of the faults of language. They may be compared to the faults of Geology, in which different strata cross one another or meet at an angle, or mix with one another either by slow transitions or by violent convulsions, leaving many lacunae which can be no longer filled up, and often becoming so complex that no true explanation of them can be given. So in language there are the cross influences of meaning and sound, of logic and grammar, of differing analogies, of words and the inflexions of words, which often come into conflict with each other. The grammarian, if he were to form new words, would make them all of the same pattern according to what he conceives to be the rule, that is, the more common usage of language. The subtlety of nature goes far beyond art, and it is complicated by irregularity, so that often we can hardly say that there is a right or wrong in the formation of words. For almost any formation which is not at variance with the first principles of language is possible and may be defended.

The imperfection of language is really due to the formation and correlation of words by accident, that is to say, by principles which are unknown to us. Hence we see why Plato, like ourselves unable to comprehend the whole of language, was constrained to 'supplement the poor creature imitation by another poor creature convention.' But the poor creature convention in the end proves too much for all the rest: for we do not ask what is the origin of words or whether they are formed according to a correct analogy, but what is the usage of them; and we are compelled to admit with Hermogenes in Plato and with Horace that usage is the ruling principle, '*quem penes arbitrium est, et jus et norma loquendi.*'

(8) There are two ways in which a language may attain permanence or fixity. First, it may have been embodied in poems or hymns or laws, which may be repeated for hundreds, perhaps for thousands of years with a religious accuracy, so that to the priests or rhapsodists of a nation the whole or the greater

part of a language is literally preserved; secondly, it may be written down and in a written form distributed more or less widely among the whole nation. In either case the language which is familiarly spoken may have grown up wholly or in a great measure independently of them. (1) The first of these processes has been sometimes attended by the result that the sound of the words has been carefully preserved and that the meaning of them has either perished wholly, or is only doubtfully recovered by the efforts of modern philology. The verses have been repeated as a chant or part of a ritual, but they have had no relation to ordinary life or speech. (2) The invention of writing again is commonly attributed to a particular epoch, and we are apt to think that such an inestimable gift would have immediately been diffused over a whole country. But it may have taken a long time to perfect the art of writing, and another long period may have elapsed before it came into common use. Its influence on language has been increased ten, twenty or one hundred fold by the invention of printing.

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Before the growth of poetry or the invention of writing, languages were only dialects. So they continued to be in parts of the country in which writing was not used or in which there was no diffusion of literature. In most of the counties of England there is still a provincial style, which has been sometimes made by a great poet the vehicle of his fancies. When a book sinks into the mind of a nation, such as Luther's Bible or the Authorized English Translation of the Bible, or again great classical works like Shakspeare or Milton, not only have new powers of expression been diffused through a whole nation, but a great step towards uniformity has been made. The instinct of language demands regular grammar and correct spelling: these are imprinted deeply on the tablets of a nation's memory by a common use of classical or of popular writers. In our own day we have attained to a point at which nearly every printed book is spelt correctly and written grammatically.

(9) Proceeding further to trace the influence of literature on language we note some other causes which have affected the higher use of it: such as (1) the necessity of clearness and connection; (2) the fear of tautology; (3) the influence of metre,

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rhythm, rhyme, and of the language of prose and verse upon one another; (4) the power of idiom and quotation; (5) the relativity of words to one another.

It has been usual to depreciate modern languages when compared with ancient. The latter are regarded as furnishing a type of excellence to which the former cannot attain. But the truth seems to be that modern languages, if through the loss of inflections and genders they lack some power or beauty or expressiveness or precision which is possessed by the ancient, are in many other respects superior to them: the thought is generally clearer, the connection closer, the sentence and paragraph are better distributed. The best modern languages, for example English or French, possess as great a power of self-improvement as the Latin, if not as the Greek. Nor does there seem to be any reason why they should ever decline or decay. It is a popular remark that our great writers are beginning to disappear: it may also be remarked that whenever a great writer appears in the future he will find the English language as perfect and as ready for use as in the days of Shakspeare or Milton. There is no reason to suppose that English or French will ever be reduced to the low level of Modern Greek or of Mediaeval Latin. The wide diffusion of great authors would make such a decline impossible. Nor will modern languages be easily broken up by amalgamation with each other. The distance between them is too wide to be spanned, the differences are too great to be overcome, and the use of printing makes it impossible that one of them should ever be lost in another.

The structure of the English language differs greatly from that of either Latin or Greek. In the two latter, especially in Greek, sentences are joined together by connecting particles. They are distributed on the right hand and on the left by μέν, δέ, ἀλλά, καίτοι, καὶ δὲ and the like, or deduced from one another by ἄρα, δὴ, οὖν, τοίνυν and the like. In English the majority of sentences are independent and in apposition to one another; they are laid side by side or slightly connected by the copula. But within the sentence the expression of the logical relations of the clauses is closer and more exact: there is less of apposition and participial structure. The sentences thus laid side by side are also constructed into paragraphs; these again are

less distinctly marked in Greek and Latin than in English. Generally French, German, and English have an advantage over the classical languages in point of accuracy. The three concords are more accurately observed in English than in either Greek or Latin. On the other hand, the extension of the familiar use of the masculine and feminine gender to objects of sense and abstract ideas as well as to men and animals no doubt lends a nameless grace to style which we have a difficulty in appreciating, and the possible variety in the order of words gives more flexibility and also a kind of dignity to the period. Of the comparative effect of accent and quantity and of the different use and varying relation of one to the other in ancient and modern languages we are not able to judge.

Another quality in which modern are superior to ancient languages is freedom from tautology. No English style is thought tolerable in which, except for the sake of emphasis, the same words are repeated at short intervals. Of course the length of the interval must depend on the character of the word. Striking words and expressions cannot be allowed to reappear, if at all, except at the distance of a page or more. Pronouns, prepositions, conjunctions may or rather must recur in successive lines. It seems to be a kind of impertinence to the reader and strikes unpleasantly both on the mind and on the ear that the same sounds should be used twice over, when another word or turn of expression would have given a new shade of meaning to the thought and would have added a pleasing variety to the sound. And we equally reject the repetition of the word and the use of a mere synonym for it,—e. g. felicity and happiness. The cultivated mind desires something more, which a skilful writer is easily able to supply out of his treasure-house.

The fear of tautology has doubtless led to the multiplications of words and the meanings of words, and generally to an enlargement of the vocabulary. It is a very early instinct of language; for ancient poetry is almost as free from tautology as the best modern writings. The speech of young children, except in so far as they are compelled to repeat themselves by the fewness of their words, also escapes from it. When they grow up and have ideas which are beyond their powers of

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expression, especially in writing, tautology begins to appear. In like manner when language is 'contaminated' by philosophy it is apt to become awkward, to stammer and repeat itself, to lose its flow and freedom. No philosophical writer with the exception of Plato, who is himself not free from tautology, and perhaps Bacon, has attained to any high degree of literary excellence.

To poetry the form and polish of language is chiefly to be attributed; and the most critical period in the history of language is the transition from verse to prose. At first mankind were contented to express their thoughts in a set form of words having a kind of rhythm; to which regularity was given by accent and quantity. But after a time they demanded a greater degree of freedom, and to those who had all their life been hearing poetry the first introduction of prose had the charm of novelty. The prose romances into which the Homeric Poems were converted, for a while probably gave more delight to the hearers or readers of them than the Poems themselves. And in time the relation of the two was reversed: the poems which had once been a necessity of the human mind became a luxury: they were now superseded by prose, which in all succeeding ages became the natural vehicle of expression to all mankind. Henceforward prose and poetry formed each other. A comparatively slender link between them was also furnished by proverbs. We may trace in poetry how the simple succession of lines, not without monotony, has passed into a complicated period, and how in prose, rhythm and accent and the order of words and the balance of clauses, sometimes not without a slight admixture of rhyme, make up a new kind of harmony, swelling into strains not less majestic than those of Homer, Virgil, or Dante.

One of the most curious and characteristic features of language, affecting both syntax and style, is idiom. The meaning of the word 'idiom' is that which is peculiar, that which is familiar, the word or expression which strikes us or comes home to us, which is more readily understood or more easily remembered. It is a quality which really exists in infinite degrees, which we turn into differences of kind by applying the term only to conspicuous and striking examples of words or phrases which have this quality. I often supersedes the laws of language or the rules of grammar,



or rather is to be regarded as another law of language which is natural and necessary. The word, or phrase which has been repeated many times over is more intelligible and familiar to us than one which is rare, and our familiarity with it more than compensates for incorrectness or inaccuracy in the use of it. Striking expressions also which have moved the hearts of nations or are the precious stones and jewels of great authors partake of the nature of idioms: they are taken out of the sphere of grammar and are exempt from the proprieties of language. Every one knows that we often put words together in a manner which would be intolerable if it were not idiomatic. We cannot argue either about the meaning of words or the use of constructions that because they are used in one connection they will be legitimate in another, unless we allow for this principle. We can bear to have words and sentences used in new senses or in a new order or even a little perverted in meaning when we are quite familiar with them. Quotations are as often applied in a sense which the author did not intend as in that which he did. The parody of the words of Shakspeare or of the Bible, which has in it something of the nature of a lie, is far from unpleasing to us. The better known words, even if their meaning be perverted, are more agreeable to us and have a greater power over us. Most of us have experienced a sort of delight and feeling of curiosity when we first came across or when we first used for ourselves a new word or phrase or figure of speech.

There are associations of sound and of sense by which every word is linked to every other. One letter harmonizes with another; every verb or noun derives its meaning, not only from itself, but from the words with which it is associated. Some reflection of them near or distant is embodied in it. In any new use of a word all the existing uses of it have to be considered. Upon these depends the question whether it will bear the proposed extension of meaning or not. According to the famous expression of Luther, 'Words are living creatures, having hands and feet.' When they cease to retain this living power of adaptation, when they are only put together like the parts of a piece of furniture, language becomes unpoetical, inexpressive, dead.

Cratylus.

INTRODUCTION.



*Cratylus.*INTRODUC-  
TION.

Grammars would lead us to suppose that words have a fixed form and sound. Lexicons assign to each word a definite meaning or meanings. They both tend to obscure the fact that the sentence precedes the word and that all language is relative. (1) It is relative to its own context. Its meaning is modified by what has been said before and after in the same or in some other passage: without comparing the context we are not sure whether it is used in the same sense even in two successive sentences. (2) It is relative to facts, to time, place, and occasion: when they are already known to the hearer or reader, they may be presupposed; there is no need to allude to them further. (3) It is relative to the knowledge of the writer and reader or of the speaker and hearer. Except for the sake of order and consecutiveness nothing ought to be expressed, which is already commonly or universally known. A word or two may be sufficient to give an intimation to a friend; a long or elaborate speech or composition is required to explain some new idea to a popular audience or to the ordinary reader or to a young pupil. Grammars and dictionaries are not to be despised; for in teaching we need clearness rather than subtlety. But we must not therefore forget that there is also a higher ideal of language in which all is relative — sounds to sounds, words to words, the parts to the whole — in which besides the lesser context of the book or speech, there is also the larger context of history and circumstances 'known and read of all men.'

The study of Comparative Philology has introduced into the world a new science which more than any other binds up man with nature, and distant ages and countries with one another. It may be said to have thrown a light upon all other sciences and upon the nature of the human mind itself. The true conception of it dispels many errors, not only of metaphysics and theology, but also of natural knowledge. Yet it is far from certain that this newly-found science will continue to progress in the same surprising manner as heretofore; or that even if our materials are largely increased, we shall arrive at much more definite conclusions than at present. Like some other branches of knowledge, it may be approaching a point at which it can no longer be profitably studied. But at any rate it has brought back the philosophy of language from theory to fact;

it has passed out of the region of guesses and hypotheses, and has attained the dignity of an Inductive Science. And it is not without practical and political importance. It gives a new interest to distant and subject countries; it brings back the dawning light from one end of the earth to the other. Nations, like individuals, are better understood by us when we know something of their early life; and when they are better understood by us, we feel more kindly towards them. Lastly, we may remember that all knowledge is valuable for its own sake; and we may also hope that a deeper insight into the nature of human speech will give us a greater command of it and enable us to make a nobler use of it<sup>1</sup>.

*Cratylus.*INTRODUC-  
TION.

<sup>1</sup> Compare again W. Humboldt, 'Ueber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues;' M. Müller, 'Lectures on the Science of Language;' Steinthal, 'Einleitung in die Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft;' and for the latter part of the Essay, Delbrück, 'Study of Language;' Paul's 'Principles of the History of Language:' to the second of these works the author of this Essay is largely indebted.



# CRATYLUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, HERMOGENES, CRATYLUS.

**Steph.** *Hermogenes.* SUPPOSE that we make Socrates a party to  
383 the argument?

*Cratylus.* If you please.

*Her.* I should explain to you, Socrates, that our friend  
Cratylus has been arguing about names; he says that they  
are natural and not conventional; not a portion of the  
human voice which men agree to use; but that there is a  
truth or correctness in them, which is the same for Hellenes  
as for barbarians. Whereupon I ask him, whether his own  
name of Cratylus is a true name or not, and he answers  
'Yes.' And Socrates? 'Yes.' Then every man's name, as  
I tell him, is that which he is called. To this he replies—  
'If all the world were to call you Hermogenes, that would  
not be your name.' And when I am anxious to have a  
384 further explanation he is ironical and mysterious, and seems  
to imply that he has a notion of his own about the matter, if  
he would only tell, and could entirely convince me, if he  
chose to be intelligible. Tell me, Socrates, what this oracle  
means; or rather tell me, if you will be so good, what is  
your own view of the truth or correctness of names, which I  
would far sooner hear.

*Socrates.* Son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient saying,  
that 'hard is the knowledge of the good.' And the know-  
ledge of names is a great part of knowledge. If I had  
not been poor, I might have heard the fifty-drachma course  
of the great Prodicus, which is a complete education in

*Cratylus.*

HERMO-  
GENES,  
CRATYLUS,  
SOCRATES.

Cratylus and  
Hermogenes  
have been dis-  
puting about  
names: they  
refer their dis-  
pute to  
Socrates.

Socrates not  
having heard  
the fifty-  
drachma  
course of  
Prodicus,

*Cratylus.*

SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.

is incompetent  
to decide.

grammar and language — these are his own words — and then I should have been at once able to answer your question about the correctness of names. But, indeed, I have only heard the single-drachma course, and therefore, I do not know the truth about such matters; I will, however, gladly assist you and Cratylus in the investigation of them. When he declares that your name is not really Hermogenes, I suspect that he is only making fun of you;— he means to say that you are no true son of Hermes, because you are always looking after a fortune and never in luck. But, as I was saying, there is a good deal of difficulty in this sort of knowledge, and therefore we had better leave the question open until we have heard both sides.

There is no  
correctness in  
names other  
than conven-  
tion, says  
Hermogenes.

*Her.* I have often talked over this matter, both with Cratylus and others, and cannot convince myself that there is any principle of correctness in names other than convention and agreement; any name which you give, in my opinion, is the right one, and if you change that and give another, the new name is as correct as the old — we frequently change the names of our slaves, and the newly-imposed name is as good as the old: for there is no name given to anything by nature; all is convention and habit of the users;— such is my view. But if I am mistaken I shall be happy to hear and learn of Cratylus, or of any one else.

*Soc.* I dare say that you may be right, Hermogenes: let us see;—Your meaning is, that the name of each thing is only that which anybody agrees to call it? 385

*Her.* That is my notion.

*Soc.* Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* Well, now, let me take an instance;—suppose that I call a man a horse or a horse a man, you mean to say that a man will be rightly called a horse by me individually, and rightly called a man by the rest of the world; and a horse again would be rightly called a man by me and a horse by the world:— that is your meaning?

*Her.* He would, according to my view.

*Soc.* But how about truth, then? you would acknowledge that there is in words a true and a false?

But how,  
rejoins  
Socrates,

*Her.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And there are true and false propositions?

*Her.* To be sure.

*Soc.* And a true proposition says that which is, and a false proposition says that which is not?

*Her.* Yes; what other answer is possible?

*Soc.* Then in a proposition there is a true and false?

*Her.* Certainly.

*Soc.* But is a proposition true as a whole only, and are the parts untrue?

*Her.* No; the parts are true as well as the whole.

*Soc.* Would you say the large parts and not the smaller ones, or every part?

*Her.* I should say that every part is true.

*Soc.* Is a proposition resolvable into any part smaller than a name?

*Her.* No; that is the smallest.

*Soc.* Then the name is a part of the true proposition?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* Yes, and a true part, as you say.

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* And is not the part of a falsehood also a falsehood?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then, if propositions may be true and false, names may be true and false?

*Her.* So we must infer.

*Soc.* And the name of anything is that which any one affirms to be the name?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* And will there be so many names of each thing as everybody says that there are? and will they be true names at the time of uttering them?

*Her.* Yes, Socrates, I can conceive no correctness of names other than this; you give one name, and I another; and in different cities and countries there are different names for the same things; Hellenes differ from barbarians in their use of names, and the several Hellenic tribes from one another.

*Soc.* But would you say, Hermogenes, that the things  
386 differ as the names differ? and are they relative to indi-

*Cratylus.*

SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.

is this doctrine  
consistent  
with any dis-  
tinction  
between truth  
and false-  
hood?

If the whole  
is true, the  
parts must be  
true; if propo-  
sitions, then  
names.



*Cratylus.*

SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.

Is Protagoras  
right or wrong  
in his doctrine  
that 'man is  
the measure'  
and that  
things are as  
they appear?

viduals, as Protagoras tells us? For he says that man is the measure of all things, and that things are to me as they appear to me, and that they are to you as they appear to you. Do you agree with him, or would you say that things have a permanent essence of their own?

*Her.* There have been times, Socrates, when I have been driven in my perplexity to take refuge with Protagoras; not that I agree with him at all.

*Soc.* What! have you ever been driven to admit that there was no such thing as a bad man?

*Her.* No, indeed; but I have often had reason to think that there are very bad men, and a good many of them.

*Soc.* Well, and have you ever found any very good ones?

*Her.* Not many.

*Soc.* Still you have found them?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* And would you hold that the very good were the very wise, and the very evil very foolish? Would that be your view?

*Her.* It would.

*Soc.* But if Protagoras is right, and the truth is that things are as they appear to any one, how can some of us be wise and some of us foolish?

*Her.* Impossible.

*Soc.* And if, on the other hand, wisdom and folly are really distinguishable, you will allow, I think, that the assertion of Protagoras can hardly be correct. For if what appears to each man is true to him, one man cannot in reality be wiser than another.

*Her.* He cannot.

*Soc.* Nor will you be disposed to say with Euthydemus, that all things equally belong to all men at the same moment and always; for neither on his view can there be some good and others bad, if virtue and vice are always equally to be attributed to all.

*Her.* There cannot.

*Soc.* But if neither is right, and things are not relative to individuals, and all things do not equally belong to all at the same moment and always, they must be supposed to have their own proper and permanent essence: they are not in

If there is any  
difference be-  
tween good  
and evil, truth  
and falsehood,  
he must be  
wrong, and  
Euthydemus,  
who says that  
all things  
belong to  
all, equally  
wrong.

relation to us, or influenced by us, fluctuating according to our fancy, but they are independent, and maintain to their own essence the relation prescribed by nature.

*Her.* I think, Socrates, that you have said the truth.

*Soc.* Does what I am saying apply only to the things themselves, or equally to the actions which proceed from them? Are not actions also a class of being?

*Her.* Yes, the actions are real as well as the things.

387 *Soc.* Then the actions also are done according to their proper nature, and not according to our opinion of them? In cutting, for example, we do not cut as we please, and with any chance instrument; but we cut with the proper instrument only, and according to the natural process of cutting; and the natural process is right and will succeed, but any other will fail and be of no use at all.

*Her.* I should say that the natural way is the right way.

*Soc.* Again, in burning, not every way is the right way; but the right way is the natural way, and the right instrument the natural instrument.

*Her.* True.

*Soc.* And this holds good of all actions?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* And speech is a kind of action?

*Her.* True.

*Soc.* And will a man speak correctly who speaks as he pleases? Will not the successful speaker rather be he who speaks in the natural way of speaking, and as things ought to be spoken, and with the natural instrument? Any other mode of speaking will result in error and failure.

*Her.* I quite agree with you.

*Soc.* And is not naming a part of speaking? for in giving names men speak.

*Her.* That is true.

*Soc.* And if speaking is a sort of action and has a relation to acts, is not naming also a sort of action?

*Her.* True.

*Soc.* And we saw that actions were not relative to ourselves, but had a special nature of their own?

*Her.* Precisely.

*Cratylus.*

SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.

Things and  
actions have  
their own  
proper nature,  
and are made  
or done by a  
natural pro-  
cess.

This principle  
applied to  
speech.

*Cratylus.*SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.The several  
arts have their  
own proper  
instruments.

*Soc.* Then the argument would lead us to infer that names ought to be given according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument, and not at our pleasure: in this and no other way shall we name with success.

*Her.* I agree.

*Soc.* But again, that which has to be cut has to be cut with something?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* And that which has to be woven or pierced has to be woven or pierced with something?

*Her.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And that which has to be named has to be named with something?

*Her.* True.

*Soc.* What is that with which we pierce?

*Her.* An awl.

*Soc.* And with which we weave?

*Her.* A shuttle.

*Soc.* And with which we name?

*Her.* A name.

*Soc.* Very good: then a name is an instrument?

*Her.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Suppose that I ask, 'What sort of instrument is a shuttle?' And you answer, 'A weaving instrument.'

*Her.* Well.

*Soc.* And I ask again, 'What do we do when we weave?' — The answer is, that we separate or disengage the warp from the woof.

*Her.* Very true.

*Soc.* And may not a similar description be given of an awl, and of instruments in general?

*Her.* To be sure.

*Soc.* And now suppose that I ask a similar question about names: will you answer me? Regarding the name as an instrument, what do we do when we name?

*Her.* I cannot say.

*Soc.* Do we not give information to one another, and distinguish things according to their natures?

*Her.* Certainly we do.

*Soc.* Then a name is an instrument of teaching and of

distinguishing natures, as the shuttle is of distinguishing the threads of the web.

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the shuttle is the instrument of the weaver?

*Her.* Assuredly.

*Soc.* Then the weaver will use the shuttle well — and well means like a weaver? and the teacher will use the name well — and well means like a teacher?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* And when the weaver uses the shuttle, whose work will he be using well?

*Her.* That of the carpenter.

*Soc.* And is every man a carpenter, or the skilled only?

*Her.* Only the skilled.

*Soc.* And when the piercer uses the awl, whose work will he be using well?

*Her.* That of the smith.

*Soc.* And is every man a smith, or only the skilled?

*Her.* The skilled only.

*Soc.* And when the teacher uses the name, whose work will he be using?

*Her.* There again I am puzzled.

*Soc.* Cannot you at least say who gives us the names which we use?

*Her.* Indeed I cannot.

*Soc.* Does not the law seem to you to give us them?

*Her.* Yes, I suppose so.

*Soc.* Then the teacher, when he gives us a name, uses the work of the legislator?

*Her.* I agree.

*Soc.* And is every man a legislator, or the skilled only?

*Her.* The skilled only.

389 *Soc.* Then, Hermogenes, not every man is able to give a name, but only a maker of names; and this is the legislator, who of all skilled artisans in the world is the rarest.

*Her.* True.

*Soc.* And how does the legislator make names? and to what does he look? Consider this in the light of the previous instances: to what does the carpenter look in

*Cratylus.*

SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.

A name is the instrument which teaches and distinguishes natures.

And as the other arts use the work of others, so the teacher uses the work of the legislator, who is the maker of names.



*Cratylus.*

SOCRATES,

HERMO-  
GENES.

The carpenter  
in making the  
shuttle looks  
to the idea or  
natural form  
of the shuttle,  
being such  
as is best  
adapted to  
each kind of  
work.

making the shuttle? Does he not look to that which is naturally fitted to act as a shuttle?

*Her.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And suppose the shuttle to be broken in making, will he make another, looking to the broken one? or will he look to the form according to which he made the other?

*Her.* To the latter, I should imagine.

*Soc.* Might not that be justly called the true or ideal shuttle?

*Her.* I think so.

*Soc.* And whatever shuttles are wanted, for the manufacture of garments, thin or thick, of flaxen, woollen, or other material, ought all of them to have the true form of the shuttle; and whatever is the shuttle best adapted to each kind of work, that ought to be the form which the maker produces in each case.

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the same holds of other instruments: when a man has discovered the instrument which is naturally adapted to each work, he must express this natural form, and not others which he fancies, in the material, whatever it may be, which he employs; for example, he ought to know how to put into iron the forms of awls adapted by nature to their several uses?

*Her.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And how to put into wood forms of shuttles adapted by nature to their uses?

*Her.* True.

*Soc.* For the several forms of shuttles naturally answer to the several kinds of webs; and this is true of instruments in general.

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then, as to names: ought not our legislator also to know how to put the true natural name of each thing into sounds and syllables, and to make and give all names with a view to the ideal name, if he is to be a namer in any true sense? And we must remember that different legislators will not use the same syllables. For neither does every smith, although he may be making the same instrument for the same purpose, make them all of the same iron. The

And so the  
legislator  
looks to the  
true form or  
expression of  
things in  
sounds and  
syllables,  
though, like  
the carpenter,  
he may

form must be the same, but the material may vary, and still the instrument may be equally good of whatever iron made, whether in Hellas or in a foreign country;—there is no difference.

*Cratylus.*

SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.

work in differ-  
ent materials.

*Her.* Very true.

*Soc.* And the legislator, whether he be Hellene or barbarian, is not therefore to be deemed by you a worse legislator, provided he gives the true and proper form of the name in whatever syllables; this or that country makes no matter.

*Her.* Quite true.

*Soc.* But who then is to determine whether the proper form is given to the shuttle, whatever sort of wood may be used? the carpenter who makes, or the weaver who is to use them?

This true form  
is determined  
by the user.

*Her.* I should say, he who is to use them, Socrates.

*Soc.* And who uses the work of the lyre-maker? Will not he be the man who knows how to direct what is being done, and who will know also whether the work is being well done or not?

*Her.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And who is he?

*Her.* The player of the lyre.

*Soc.* And who will direct the shipwright?

*Her.* The pilot.

*Soc.* And who will be best able to direct the legislator in his work, and will know whether the work is well done, in this or any other country? Will not the user be the man?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* And this is he who knows how to ask questions?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* And how to answer them?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* And him who knows how to ask and answer you would call a dialectician?

*Her.* Yes; that would be his name.

*Soc.* Then the work of the carpenter is to make a rudder, and the pilot has to direct him, if the rudder is to be well made.

*Her.* True.



*Cratylus.*SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.

*Soc.* And the work of the legislator is to give names, and the dialectician must be his director if the names are to be rightly given?

*Her.* That is true.

*Soc.* Then, Hermogenes, I should imagine this giving of names to be no such light matter as you fancy, or the work of light or chance persons; and Cratylus is right in saying that things have names by nature, and that not every man is an artificer of names, but he only who looks to the name which each thing by nature has, and is able to express the true forms of things in letters and syllables.

Socrates cannot answer of himself the question, 'What is the natural fitness of names?' The enquiry must be shared between them.

*Her.* I cannot answer you, Socrates; but I find a difficulty in changing my opinion all in a moment, and I think that I should be more readily persuaded, if you would show me what this is which you term the natural fitness of names. 391

*Soc.* My good Hermogenes, I have none to show. Was I not telling you just now (but you have forgotten), that I knew nothing, and proposing to share the enquiry with you? But now that you and I have talked over the matter, a step has been gained; for we have discovered that names have by nature a truth, and that not every man knows how to give a thing a name.

*Her.* Very good.

*Soc.* And what is the nature of this truth or correctness of names? That, if you care to know, is the next question.

*Her.* Certainly, I care to know.

*Soc.* Then reflect.

*Her.* How shall I reflect?

The irony of Socrates:—  
'We must learn of the Sophists.'

*Soc.* The true way is to have the assistance of those who know, and you must pay them well both in money and in thanks; these are the Sophists, of whom your brother, Callias, has—rather dearly—bought the reputation of wisdom. But you have not yet come into your inheritance, and therefore you had better go to him, and beg and entreat him to tell you what he has learnt from Protagoras about the fitness of names.

*Her.* But how inconsistent should I be, if, whilst repudiating Protagoras and his truth<sup>1</sup>, I were to attach any value to what he and his book affirm!

<sup>1</sup> 'Truth' was the title of the book of Protagoras; cp. Theaet. 161 E.

*Soc.* Then if you despise him, you must learn of Homer and the poets.

*Her.* And where does Homer say anything about names, and what does he say?

*Soc.* He often speaks of them; notably and nobly in the places where he distinguishes the different names which Gods and men give to the same things. Does he not in these passages make a remarkable statement about the correctness of names? For the Gods must clearly be supposed to call things by their right and natural names; do you not think so?

*Her.* Why, of course they call them rightly, if they call them at all. But to what are you referring?

*Soc.* Do you not know what he says about the river in Troy who had a single combat with Hephaestus?

'Whom,' as he says, 'the Gods call Xanthus, and men call Scamander.'

*Cratylus.*

SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.

'If not of the  
Sophists, of  
the poets,  
then.'

The Homeric  
distinction of  
the different  
names given  
by Gods and  
men to the  
same things.

Xanthus and  
Scamander.

92 *Her.* I remember.

*Soc.* Well, and about this river—to know that he ought to be called Xanthus and not Scamander—is not that a solemn lesson? Or about the bird which, as he says,

'The Gods call Chalcis, and men Cymindis:'

Chalcis and  
Cymindis.

to be taught how much more correct the name Chalcis is than the name Cymindis,—do you deem that a light matter? Or about Batieia and Myrina<sup>1</sup>? And there are many other observations of the same kind in Homer and other poets. Now, I think that this is beyond the understanding of you and me; but the names of Scamandrius and Astyanax, which he affirms to have been the names of Hector's son, are more within the range of human faculties, as I am disposed to think; and what the poet means by correctness may be more readily apprehended in that instance: you will remember I dare say the lines to which I refer<sup>2</sup>.

Batieia and  
Myrina.

Astyanax and  
Scamandrius.

*Her.* I do.

*Soc.* Let me ask you, then, which did Homer think the more correct of the names given to Hector's son—Astyanax or Scamandrius?

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Il. ii. 813, 814:—

'The hill which men call Batieia and the immortals the tomb of the sportive Myrina.'

<sup>2</sup> Il. vi. 402.

*Cratylus.**Her.* I do not know.SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.*Soc.* How would you answer, if you were asked whether the wise or the unwise are more likely to give correct names?*Her.* I should say the wise, of course.*Soc.* And are the men or the women of a city, taken as a class, the wiser?*Her.* I should say, the men.*Soc.* And Homer, as you know, says that the Trojan men called him Astyanax (king of the city); but if the men called him Astyanax, the other name of Scamandrius could only have been given to him by the women.*Her.* That may be inferred.*Soc.* And must not Homer have imagined the Trojans to be wiser than their wives?*Her.* To be sure.*Soc.* Then he must have thought Astyanax to be a more correct name for the boy than Scamandrius?*Her.* Clearly.*Soc.* And what is the reason of this? Let us consider:—does he not himself suggest a very good reason, when he says,

‘ For he alone defended their city and long walls ’?

This appears to be a good reason for calling the son of the saviour king of the city which his father was saving, as Homer observes.

*Her.* I see.*Soc.* Why, Hermogenes, I do not as yet see myself; and do you?*Her.* No, indeed; not I.

Hector.

*Soc.* But tell me, friend, did not Homer himself also give Hector his name? 393*Her.* What of that?*Soc.* The name appears to me to be very nearly the same as the name of Astyanax—both are Hellenic; and a king (*ἀναξ*) and a holder (*ἔκτωρ*) have nearly the same meaning, and are both descriptive of a king; for a man is clearly the holder of that of which he is king; he rules, and owns, and holds it. But, perhaps, you may think that I am talking

nonsense; and indeed I believe that I myself did not know what I meant when I imagined that I had found some indication of the opinion of Homer about the correctness of names.

*Cratylus.*

SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.

*Her.* I assure you that I think otherwise, and I believe you to be on the right track.

*Soc.* There is reason, I think, in calling the lion's whelp a lion, and the foal of a horse a horse; I am speaking only of the ordinary course of nature, when an animal produces after his kind<sup>1</sup>, and not of extraordinary births;—if contrary to nature a horse have a calf, then I should not call that a foal but a calf; nor do I call any inhuman birth a man, but only a natural birth. And the same may be said of trees and other things. Do you agree with me?

*Her.* Yes, I agree.

*Soc.* Very good. But you had better watch me and see that I do not play tricks with you. For on the same principle the son of a king is to be called a king. And whether the syllables of the name are the same or not the same, makes no difference, provided the meaning is retained; nor does the addition or subtraction of a letter make any difference so long as the essence of the thing remains in possession of the name and appears in it.

The addition or subtraction of a letter or two makes no difference if the principal meaning is retained.

*Her.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* A very simple matter. I may illustrate my meaning by the names of letters, which you know are not the same as the letters themselves with the exception of the four,  $\epsilon$ ,  $\nu$ ,  $\omicron$ ,  $\omega$ ; the names of the rest, whether vowels or consonants, are made up of other letters which we add to them; but so long as we introduce the meaning, and there can be no mistake, the name of the letter is quite correct. Take, for example, the letter *beta*—the addition of  $\eta$ ,  $\tau$ ,  $\alpha$ , gives no offence, and does not prevent the whole name from having the value which the legislator intended—so well did he know how to give the letters names.

*Her.* I believe you are right.

*Soc.* And may not the same be said of a king? a king will often be the son of a king, the good son or the noble son of a good or noble sire; and similarly the offspring of every

Sons usually bear the names of their fathers, yet

<sup>1</sup> Reading

*Cratylus.*SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.

they may be  
considerably  
transformed;  
as before in  
the case of  
animals.  
Other in-  
stances.

kind, in the regular course of nature, is like the parent, and therefore has the same name. Yet the syllables may be disguised until they appear different to the ignorant person, and he may not recognize them, although they are the same, just as any one of us would not recognize the same drugs under different disguises of colour and smell, although to the physician, who regards the power of them, they are the same, and he is not put out by the addition; and in like manner the etymologist is not put out by the addition or transposition or subtraction of a letter or two, or indeed by the change of all the letters, for this need not interfere with the meaning. As was just now said, the names of Hector and Astyanax have only one letter alike, which is the  $\tau$ , and yet they have the same meaning. And how little in common with the letters of their names has Archepolis (ruler of the city)—and yet the meaning is the same. And there are many other names which just mean 'king.' Again, there are several names for a general, as, for example, Agis (leader) and Polemarchus (chief in war) and Eupolemus (good warrior); and others which denote a physician, as Iatrocles (famous healer) and Acesimbrotus (curer of mortals); and there are many others which might be cited, differing in their syllables and letters, but having the same meaning. Would you not say so?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* The same names, then, ought to be assigned to those who follow in the course of nature?

*Her.* Yes.

But when  
the nature of  
the son  
changes, his  
name should  
be changed.

*Soc.* And what of those who follow out of the course of nature, and are prodigies? for example, when a good and religious man has an irreligious son, he ought to bear the name not of his father, but of the class to which he belongs, just as in the case which was before supposed of a horse foaling a calf.

*Her.* Quite true.

*Soc.* Then the irreligious son of a religious father should be called irreligious?

*Her.* Certainly.

*Soc.* He should not be called Theophilus (beloved of God) or Mnesitheus (mindful of God), or any of these names: if



names are correctly given, his should have an opposite meaning. Cratylus.

*Her.* Certainly, Socrates.

*Soc.* Again, Hermogenes, there is Orestes (the man of the mountains) who appears to be rightly called; whether chance gave the name, or perhaps some poet who meant to express the brutality and fierceness and mountain wildness of his hero's nature.

SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.  
Orestes.

395 *Her.* That is very likely, Socrates.

*Soc.* And his father's name is also according to nature.

*Her.* Clearly.

*Soc.* Yes, for as his name, so also is his nature; Agamemnon (admirable for remaining) is one who is patient and persevering in the accomplishment of his resolves, and by his virtue crowns them; and his continuance at Troy with all the vast army is a proof of that admirable endurance in him which is signified by the name Agamemnon<sup>1</sup>. I also think that Atreus is rightly called; for his murder of Chrysippus and his exceeding cruelty to Thyestes are damaging and destructive to his reputation — the name is a little altered and disguised so as not to be intelligible to every one, but to the etymologist there is no difficulty in seeing the meaning, for whether you think of him as *ἀτειρής* the stubborn, or as *ἄτρεστος* the fearless, or as *ἀτηρὸς* the destructive one, the name is perfectly correct in every point of view. And I think that Pelops is also named appropriately; for, as the name implies, he is rightly called Pelops who sees what is near only (*ὁ τὰ πέλας ὁρῶν*).

Agamemnon.

Atreus.

Pelops.

*Her.* How so?

*Soc.* Because, according to the tradition, he had no forethought or foresight of all the evil which the murder of Myrtilus would entail upon his whole race in remote ages; he saw only what was at hand and immediate,—or in other words, *πέλας* (near), in his eagerness to win Hippodamia by all means for his bride. Every one would agree that the name of Tantalus is rightly given and in accordance with nature, if the traditions about him are true.

Tantalus.

*Her.* And what are the traditions?

<sup>1</sup> Ἀγαμέμνων = ἀγαστὸς μένων.



*Cratylus.*SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.The name of  
Zeus is a sen-  
tence in itself.

Cronos.

Uranus.

*Soc.* Many terrible misfortunes are said to have happened to him in his life—last of all, came the utter ruin of his country; and after his death he had the stone suspended (*ταλαντεία*) over his head in the world below—all this agrees wonderfully well with his name. You might imagine that some person who wanted to call him *ταλάντατος* (the most weighed down by misfortune), disguised the name by altering it into Tantalus; and into this form, by some accident of tradition, it has actually been transmuted. The name of Zeus, who is his alleged father, has also an excellent meaning, although hard to be understood, because really like a sentence, which is divided into two parts, for some call him Zena (*Ζῆνα*), and use the one half, and others who use the other half call him Dia (*Δία*); the two together signify the nature of the God, and the business of a name, as we were saying, is to express the nature. For there is none who is more the author of life to us and to all, than the lord and king of all. Wherefore we are right in calling him Zena and Dia, which are one name, although divided, meaning the God through whom all creatures always have life (*δι' ὃν ζῆν ἀεὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ζῶσιν ὑπάρχει*). There is an irreverence, at first sight, in calling him son of Cronos (who is a proverb for stupidity), and we might rather expect Zeus to be the child of a mighty intellect. Which is the fact; for this is the meaning of his father's name: *Κρόνος* quasi *Κόρος* (*κορέω*, to sweep), not in the sense of a youth, but signifying *τὸ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀκήρατον τοῦ νοῦ*, the pure and garnished mind (sc. *ἀπὸ τοῦ κορεῖν*). He, as we are informed by tradition, was begotten of Uranus, rightly so called (*ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀρεῖν τὰ ἄνω*) from looking upwards; which, as philosophers tell us, is the way to have a pure mind, and the name Uranus is therefore correct. If I could remember the genealogy of Hesiod, I would have gone on and tried more conclusions of the same sort on the remoter ancestors of the Gods,—then I might have seen whether this wisdom, which has come to me all in an instant, I know not whence, will or will not hold good to the end.

*Her.* You seem to me, Socrates, to be quite like a prophet newly inspired, and to be uttering oracles.

*Soc.* Yes, Hermogenes, and I believe that I caught the inspiration from the great Euthyphro of the Prospaltian

deme, who gave me a long lecture which commenced at dawn: he talked and I listened, and his wisdom and enchanting ravishment has not only filled my ears but taken possession of my soul, and to-day I shall let his superhuman power work and finish the investigation of names—that will be the thing to do; but to-morrow, if you are so disposed, we will conjure him away, and make a purgation of him, if we can only find some priest or sophist who is skilled in purifications of this sort.

*Cratylus.*

SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.

*Her.* With all my heart; for I am very curious to hear the rest of the enquiry about names.

*Soc.* Then let us proceed; and where would you have us begin, now that we have got a sort of outline of the enquiry? Are there any names which witness of themselves that they are not given arbitrarily, but have a natural fitness? The names of heroes and of men in general are apt to be deceptive because they are often called after ancestors with whose names, as we were saying, they may have no business; or they are the expression of a wish like Eutychides (the son of good fortune), or Sosias (the Saviour), or Theophilus (the beloved of God), and others. But I think that we had better leave these, for there will be more chance of finding correctness in the names of immutable essences;—there ought to have been more care taken about them when they were named, and perhaps there may have been some more than human power at work occasionally in giving them names.

*Her.* I think so, Socrates.

*Soc.* Ought we not to begin with the consideration of the Gods, and show that they are rightly named Gods?

*Her.* Yes, that will be well.

*Soc.* My notion would be something of this sort:—I suspect that the sun, moon, earth, stars, and heaven, which are still the Gods of many barbarians, were the only Gods known to the aboriginal Hellenes. Seeing that they were always moving and running, from their running nature they were called Gods or runners (*θεοὺς, θεόντας*); and when men became acquainted with the other Gods, they proceeded to apply the same name to them all. Do you think that likely?

The Gods were originally only the stars; and as they were always running about they were called *θεοί*.

*Her.* I think it very likely indeed.

Cratylus.

Soc. What shall follow the Gods?

SOCRATES,

Her. Must not demons and heroes and men come next?

HERMO-  
GENES.

Soc. Demons! And what do you consider to be the meaning of this word? Tell me if my view is right.

Demons.

Her. Let me hear.

Soc. You know how Hesiod uses the word?

Her. I do not.

Soc. Do you not remember that he speaks of a golden race of men who came first?

Her. Yes, I do.

Soc. He says of them—

‘ But now that fate has closed over this race  
They are holy demons upon the earth,  
Beneficent, averters of ills, guardians of mortal men <sup>1</sup>.’

Her. What is the inference?

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Soc. What is the inference! Why, I suppose that he means by the golden men, not men literally made of gold, but good and noble; and I am convinced of this, because he further says that we are the iron race.

Her. Very true.

Soc. And do you not suppose that good men of our own day would by him be said to be of golden race?

Her. Very likely.

Soc. And are not the good wise?

Her. Yes, they are wise.

Soc. And therefore I have the most entire conviction that he called them demons, because they were *δαίμονες* (knowing or wise), and in our older Attic dialect the word itself occurs. Now he and other poets say truly, that when a good man dies he has honour and a mighty portion among the dead, and becomes a demon; which is a name given to him signifying wisdom. And I say too, that every wise man who happens to be a good man is more than human (*δαιμόνιον*) both in life and death, and is rightly called a demon.

Heroes.

Her. Then I rather think that I am of one mind with you; but what is the meaning of the word ‘hero’? (*ἥρως*, in the old writing *ἔρως*.)

<sup>1</sup> Hesiod, Works and Days, 120 foll.

*Soc.* I think that there is no difficulty in explaining, for the name is not much altered, and signifies that they were born of love.

*Cratylus.*

SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.

*Her.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* Do you not know that the heroes are demigods?

*Her.* What then?

*Soc.* All of them sprang either from the love of a God for a mortal woman, or of a mortal man for a Goddess; think of the word in the old Attic, and you will see better that the name *heros* is only a slight alteration of *Eros*, from whom the heroes sprang: either this is the meaning, or, if not this, then they must have been skilful as rhetoricians and dialecticians, and able to put the question (*ἔρωτᾶν*), for *ἐρπειν* is equivalent to *λέγειν*. And therefore, as I was saying, in the Attic dialect the heroes turn out to be rhetoricians and questioners. All this is easy enough; the noble breed of heroes are a tribe of sophists and rhetors. But can you tell me why men are called *ἄνθρωποι*? — that is more difficult.

*Her.* No, I cannot; and I would not try even if I could, because I think that you are the more likely to succeed.

399 *Soc.* That is to say, you trust to the inspiration of Euthyphro.

*Her.* Of course.

*Soc.* Your faith is not vain; for at this very moment a new and ingenious thought strikes me, and, if I am not careful, before to-morrow's dawn I shall be wiser than I ought to be. Now, attend to me; and first, remember that we often put in and pull out letters in words, and give names as we please and change the accents. Take, for example, the word *Διὶ φίλος*; in order to convert this from a sentence into a noun, we omit one of the *iotas* and sound the middle syllable grave instead of acute; as, on the other hand, letters are sometimes inserted in words instead of being omitted, and the acute takes the place of the grave.

*Her.* That is true.

*Soc.* The name *ἄνθρωπος*, which was once a sentence, and is now a noun, appears to be a case just of this sort, for one letter, which is the *a*, has been omitted, and the acute on the last syllable has been changed to a grave.

*ἄνθρωπος.*

*Her.* What do you mean?

*Cratylus.*

SOCRATES,

HERMO-

GENES.

*Soc.* I mean to say that the word 'man' implies that other animals never examine, or consider, or look up at what they see, but that man not only sees ( $\delta\pi\omega\pi\epsilon$ ) but considers and looks up at that which he sees, and hence he alone of all animals is rightly called  $\alpha\upsilon\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$ , meaning  $\alpha\upsilon\alpha\theta\rho\omega\upsilon\alpha\ \hat{\alpha}\ \delta\pi\omega\pi\epsilon\nu$ .

*Her.* May I ask you to examine another word about which I am curious?

*Soc.* Certainly.

*Her.* I will take that which appears to me to follow next in order. You know the distinction of soul and body?

*Soc.* Of course.

*Her.* Let us endeavour to analyze them like the previous words.

$\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ .

*Soc.* You want me first of all to examine the natural fitness of the word  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  (soul), and then of the word  $\sigma\tilde{\omega}\mu\alpha$  (body)?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* If I am to say what occurs to me at the moment, I should imagine that those who first used the name  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  meant to express that the soul when in the body is the source of life, and gives the power of breath and revival ( $\alpha\upsilon\alpha\psi\tilde{\upsilon}\chi\omicron\nu$ ), and when this reviving power fails then the body perishes and dies, and this, if I am not mistaken, they called psyche. But please stay a moment; I fancy that I can discover something which will be more acceptable to the disciples of Euthyphro, for I am afraid that they will scorn 400 this explanation. What do you say to another?

*Her.* Let me hear.

*Soc.* What is that which holds and carries and gives life and motion to the entire nature of the body? What else but the soul?

*Her.* Just that.

*Soc.* And do you not believe with Anaxagoras, that mind or soul is the ordering and containing principle of all things?

*Her.* Yes; I do.

*Soc.* Then you may well call that power  $\phi\upsilon\sigma\acute{\epsilon}\chi\eta$  which carries and holds nature ( $\eta\ \phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\nu\ \delta\chi\epsilon\iota\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \acute{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\iota$ ), and this may be refined away into  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ .

*Her.* Certainly; and this derivation is, I think, more scientific than the other.

*Soc.* It is so; but I cannot help laughing, if I am to suppose that this was the true meaning of the name. *Cratylus.*

*Her.* But what shall we say of the next word? SOCRATES,

*Soc.* You mean σῶμα (the body). HEMO-

*Her.* Yes. GENES.

*Soc.* That may be variously interpreted; and yet more variously if a little permutation is allowed. For some say that the body is the grave (σῆμα) of the soul which may be thought to be buried in our present life; or again the index of the soul, because the soul gives indications to (σημαίνει) the body; probably the Orphic poets were the inventors of the name, and they were under the impression that the soul is suffering the punishment of sin, and that the body is an enclosure or prison in which the soul is incarcerated, kept safe (σῶμα, σώζεται), as the name σῶμα implies, until the penalty is paid; according to this view, not even a letter of the word need be changed. The irony of  
Socrates.

*Her.* I think, Socrates, that we have said enough of this class of words. But have we any more explanations of the names of the Gods, like that which you were giving of Zeus? I should like to know whether any similar principle of correctness is to be applied to them. σῶμα

*Soc.* Yes, indeed, Hermogenes; and there is one excellent principle which, as men of sense, we must acknowledge,—that of the Gods we know nothing, either of their natures or of the names which they give themselves; but we are sure that the names by which they call themselves, whatever they may be, are true. And this is the best of all principles; and the next best is to say, as in prayers, that we will call them by any sort or kind of names or patronymics which they like, because we do not know of any other. That also, I think, is a very good custom, and one which I should much wish to observe. Let us, then, if you please, in the first place announce to them that we are not enquiring about them; we do not presume that we are able to do so; but we are enquiring about the meaning of men in giving them these names,—in this there can be small blame. 401

*Her.* I think, Socrates, that you are quite right, and I would like to do as you say. We are not  
enquiring  
about the  
Gods, but  
only about  
men's  
opinions  
concerning  
them.

*Soc.* Shall we begin, then, with Hestia, according to custom?



*Cratylus.*

*Her.* Yes, that will be very proper.

SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.

*Soc.* What may we suppose him to have meant who gave the name Hestia?

*Her.* That is another and certainly a most difficult question.

The first  
imposers of  
names were  
philosophers.

*Soc.* My dear Hermogenes, the first imposers of names must surely have been considerable persons; they were philosophers, and had a good deal to say.

*Her.* Well, and what of them?

*οὐσία*, called  
also with good  
reason *ἐστία*  
(akin to *ἐστία*)  
and *ῥασία*.

*Soc.* They are the men to whom I should attribute the imposition of names. Even in foreign names, if you analyze them, a meaning is still discernible. For example, that which we term *οὐσία* is by some called *ἐσία*, and by others again *ῥασία*. Now that the essence of things should be called *ἐστία*, which is akin to the first of these (*ἐσία* = *ἐστία*), is rational enough. And there is reason in the Athenians calling that *ἐστία* which participates in *οὐσία*. For in ancient times we too seem to have said *ἐσία* for *οὐσία*, and this you may note to have been the idea of those who appointed that sacrifices should be first offered to *ἐστία*, which was natural enough if they meant that *ἐστία* was the essence of things. Those again who read *ῥασία* seem to have inclined to the opinion of Heracleitus, that all things flow and nothing stands; with them the pushing principle (*ῥθοῦν*) is the cause and ruling power of all things, and is therefore rightly called *ῥασία*. Enough of this, which is all that we who know nothing can affirm. Next in order after Hestia we ought to consider Rhea and Cronos, although the name of Cronos has been already discussed. But I dare say that I am talking great nonsense.

*Her.* Why, Socrates?

*Soc.* My good friend, I have discovered a hive of wisdom.

*Her.* Of what nature?

*Soc.* Well, rather ridiculous, and yet plausible.

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*Her.* How plausible?

The flux of  
Heracleitus  
confirmed by  
language.

*Soc.* I fancy to myself Heracleitus repeating wise traditions of antiquity as old as the days of Cronos and Rhea, and of which Homer also spoke.

*Her.* How do you mean?

*Soc.* Heracleitus is supposed to say that all things are in motion and nothing at rest; he compares them to the stream

of a river, and says that you cannot go into the same water twice. Cratylus.

*Her.* That is true.

*Soc.* Well, then, how can we avoid inferring that he who gave the names of Cronos and Rhea to the ancestors of the Gods, agreed pretty much in the doctrine of Heracleitus? Is the giving of the names of streams to both of them purely accidental? Compare the line in which Homer, and, as I believe, Hesiod also, tells of SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.  
Other names  
of Gods.  
Cronos and  
Rhea.

'Ocean, the origin of Gods, and mother Tethys<sup>1</sup>.'

And again, Orpheus says, that

'The fair river of Ocean was the first to marry, and he espoused his sister Tethys, who was his mother's daughter.'

You see that this is a remarkable coincidence, and all in the direction of Heracleitus.

*Her.* I think that there is something in what you say, Socrates; but I do not understand the meaning of the name Tethys. Tethys.

*Soc.* Well, that is almost self-explained, being only the name of a spring, a little disguised; for that which is strained and filtered (*διαττώμενον, ῥηθούμενον*) may be likened to a spring, and the name Tethys is made up of these two words.

*Her.* The idea is ingenious, Socrates.

*Soc.* To be sure. But what comes next?—of Zeus we have spoken.

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then let us next take his two brothers, Poseidon and Pluto, whether the latter is called by that or by his other name. Poseidon.

*Her.* By all means.

*Soc.* Poseidon is *ποσίδεσμος*, the chain of the feet; the original inventor of the name had been stopped by the watery element in his walks, and not allowed to go on, and therefore he called the ruler of this element Poseidon; the *ε* was probably inserted as an ornament. Yet, perhaps, not so; but the name may have been originally written with a double *λ* and not with an *σ*, meaning that the God knew many things

<sup>1</sup> Il. xiv. 201, 302:—the line is not found in the extant works of Hesiod.

Cratylus.

SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.

Pluto.

(πολλὰ εἰδώς). And perhaps also he being the shaker of the earth, has been named from shaking (σειεῖν), and then π and δ have been added. Pluto gives wealth (πλοῦτος), and his name means the giver of wealth, which comes out of the earth beneath. People in general appear to imagine that the term Hades is connected with the invisible (ἀειδής); and so they are led by their fears to call the God Pluto instead.

*Her.* And what is the true derivation?

*Soc.* In spite of the mistakes which are made about the power of this deity, and the foolish fears which people have of him, such as the fear of always being with him after death, and of the soul denuded of the body going to him<sup>1</sup>, my belief is that all is quite consistent, and that the office and name of the God really correspond.

*Her.* Why, how is that?

*Soc.* I will tell you my own opinion; but first, I should like to ask you which chain does any animal feel to be the stronger? and which confines him more to the same spot,—desire or necessity?

*Her.* Desire, Socrates, is stronger far.

*Soc.* And do you not think that many a one would escape from Hades, if he did not bind those who depart to him by the strongest of chains?

*Her.* Assuredly they would.

*Soc.* And if by the greatest of chains, then by some desire, as I should certainly infer, and not by necessity?

*Her.* Clearly.

*Soc.* And there are many desires?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* And therefore by the greatest desire, if the chain is to be the greatest?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* And is any desire stronger than the thought that you will be made better by associating with another?

*Her.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* And is not that the reason, Hermogenes, why no one, who has been to him, is willing to come back to us? Even the Sirens, like all the rest of the world, have been laid under his spells. Such a charm, as I imagine, is the God able to

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. 3. 386, 387.

infuse into his words. And, according to this view, he is the perfect and accomplished Sophist, and the great benefactor of the inhabitants of the other world; and even to us who are upon earth he sends from below exceeding blessings. For he has much more than he wants down there; wherefore he is called Pluto (or the rich). But he will have nothing to do with men while they are in the body; only when the soul is liberated from the desires and evils of the body, has he communion with them. Is there not a great deal of philosophy and reflection in this? for in their liberated state he can bind them with the desire of virtue, but while they are flustered and maddened by the body, not even father Cronos himself would suffice to keep them with him in his own far-famed chains.

*Cratylus.*

SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.

meekly ac-  
cepted by the  
simple-minded  
Hermogenes.

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*Her.* There is a deal of truth in what you say.

*Soc.* Yes, Hermogenes, and the legislator called him Hades, not from the unseen (*ἀειδὲς*) — far otherwise, but from his knowledge (*εἰδέναι*) of all noble things.

\* *Αἰδης.*

*Her.* Very good; and what do we say of Demeter, and Herè, and Apollo, and Athene, and Hephaestus, and Ares, and the other deities?

*Soc.* Demeter is so called because she gives food like a mother (*ἡ διδοῦσα μήτηρ*); Herè is the lovely one (*ἑρατή*) — for Zeus, according to tradition, loved and married her; possibly also the name may have been given when the legislator was thinking of the heavens, and may be only a disguise of the air (*ἀήρ*), putting the end in the place of the beginning. You will recognize the truth of this if you repeat the letters of Herè several times over. People dread the name of Pherephatta as they dread the name of Apollo,—and with as little reason; the fear, if I am not mistaken, only arises from their ignorance of the nature of names. But they go changing the name into Phersephone, and they are terrified at this; whereas the new name means only that the Goddess is wise (*σοφή*); for seeing that all things in the world are in motion (*φερομένῳ*), that principle which embraces and touches and is able to follow them, is wisdom. And therefore the Goddess may be truly called Pherepappe (*Φερεπάφα*), or some name like it, because she touches that which is in motion (*τοῦ φερομένου ἐφαπτομένη*), herein showing her wisdom. And Hades, who is wise, consorts with her, because she is wise. They alter her name

Demeter.

Herè.

Persephone.

*Cratylus.*

SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.

Apollo.

into Pherephatta now-a-days, because the present generation care for euphony more than truth. There is the other name, Apollo, which, as I was saying, is generally supposed to have some terrible signification. Have you remarked this fact?

*Her.* To be sure I have, and what you say is true.

*Soc.* But the name, in my opinion, is really most expressive of the power of the God.

*Her.* How so?

*Soc.* I will endeavour to explain, for I do not believe that any single name could have been better adapted to express the attributes of the God, embracing and in a manner signifying all four of them,—music, and prophecy, and medicine, and archery. 405

*Her.* That must be a strange name, and I should like to hear the explanation.

The fourfold  
interpretation  
of the name.

*Soc.* Say rather an harmonious name, as beseems the God of Harmony. In the first place, the purgations and purifications which doctors and diviners use, and their fumigations with drugs magical or medicinal, as well as their washings and lustral sprinklings, have all one and the same object, which is to make a man pure both in body and soul.

*Her.* Very true.

*Soc.* And is not Apollo the purifier, and the washer, and the absolver from all impurities?

*Her.* Very true.

He is called in  
the Thessalian  
dialect ἀπλός.

*Soc.* Then in reference to his ablutions and absolutions, as being the physician who orders them, he may be rightly called Ἀπολούων (purifier); or in respect of his powers of divination, and his truth and sincerity, which is the same as truth, he may be most fitly called Ἀπλῶς, from ἀπλοῦς (sincere), as in the Thessalian dialect, for all the Thessalians call him Ἀπλός; also he is ἀεὶ βάλλων (always shooting), because he is a master archer who never misses; or again, the name may refer to his musical attributes, and then, as in ἀκόλουθος, and ἄκοιτις, and in many other words the α is supposed to mean 'together,' so the meaning of the name Apollo will be 'moving together,' whether in the poles of heaven as they are called, or in the harmony of song, which is termed concord, because he moves all together by an harmonious power, as astronomers and musicians ingeniously declare.



And he is the God who presides over harmony, and makes all things move together, both among Gods and among men. And as in the words ἀκόλονθος and ἀκοιτις the *a* is substituted for an *o*, so the name Ἀπόλλων is equivalent to ὁμοπολῶν; only the second λ is added in order to avoid the ill-omened sound of destruction (ἀπολῶν). Now the suspicion of this destructive power still haunts the minds of some who do not consider the true value of the name, which, as I was saying just now <sup>1</sup>, has reference to all the powers of the God, who is the single one, the everdarting, the purifier, the mover together (ἀπλοῦς, ἀεὶ βάλλων, ἀπολούων, ὁμοπολῶν). The name of the Muses and of music would seem to be derived from their making philosophical enquiries (μῶσθαι); and Leto is called by this name, because she is such a gentle Goddess, and so willing (ἐθελήμων) to grant our requests; or her name may be Letho, as she is often called by strangers — they seem to imply by it her amiability, and her smooth and easy-going way of behaving. Artemis is named from her healthy (ἀρτεμής), well-ordered nature, and because of her love of virginity, perhaps because she is a proficient in virtue (ἀρετῇ), and perhaps also as hating intercourse of the sexes (τὸν ἄροτον μισήσασα). He who gave the Goddess her name may have had any or all of these reasons.

*Her.* What is the meaning of Dionysus and Aphrodite? Dionysus.

*Soc.* Son of Hipponicus, you ask a solemn question; there is a serious and also a facetious explanation of both these names; the serious explanation is not to be had from me, but there is no objection to your hearing the facetious one; for the Gods too love a joke. Διόνυσος is simply διδοὺς οἶνον (giver of wine), Διδοίνυσος, as he might be called in fun,— and οἶνος is properly ολόνους, because wine makes those who drink, think (οἷεσθαι) that they have a mind (νοῦν) when they have none. The derivation of Aphrodite, born of the foam (ἀφρὸς), may be fairly accepted on the authority of Hesiod. Aphrodite.

*Her.* Still there remains Athene, whom you, Socrates, as an Athenian, will surely not forget; there are also Hephaestus and Ares. Athene.

*Soc.* I am not likely to forget them.

*Her.* No, indeed.

<sup>1</sup> Omitting πολῶν.



*Cratylus.*

SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.

Pallas.

*Soc.* There is no difficulty in explaining the other appellation of Athene.

*Her.* What other appellation?

*Soc.* We call her Pallas.

*Her.* To be sure.

*Soc.* And we cannot be wrong in supposing that this is derived from armed dances. For the elevation of oneself or anything else above the earth, or by the use of the hands, we 407 call shaking (*πάλλειν*), or dancing.

*Her.* That is quite true.

*Soc.* Then that is the explanation of the name Pallas?

*Her.* Yes; but what do you say of the other name?

*Soc.* Athene?

*Her.* Yes.

Athene again.

*Soc.* That is a graver matter, and there, my friend, the modern interpreters of Homer may, I think, assist in explaining the view of the ancients. For most of these in their explanations of the poet, assert that he meant by Athene 'mind' (*νοῦς*) and 'intelligence' (*διάνοια*), and the maker of names appears to have had a singular notion about her; and indeed calls her by a still higher title, 'divine intelligence' (*θεοῦ νόησις*), as though he would say: This is she who has the mind of God (*θεονόα*);—using *a* as a dialectical variety for *η*, and taking away *ι* and *σ*<sup>1</sup>. Perhaps, however, the name *θεονόη* may mean 'she who knows divine things' (*θεῖα νοοῦσα*) better than others. Nor shall we be far wrong in supposing that the author of it wished to identify this Goddess with moral intelligence (*ἐν ἧθει νόησιν*), and therefore gave her the name *ἡθονόη*; which, however, either he or his successors have altered into what they thought a nicer form, and called her Athene.

Hephaestus.

*Her.* But what do you say of Hephaestus?

*Soc.* Speak you of the princely lord of light (*φάεος ἱστορα*)?

*Her.* Surely.

*Soc.* Ἡφαίστος is Φαῖστος, and has added the *η* by attraction; that is obvious to anybody.

*Her.* That is very probable, until some more probable notion gets into your head.

<sup>1</sup> There seems to be some error in the MSS. The meaning is that the word *θεονόα* = *θεοννόα* is a curtailed form of *θεοῦ νόησις*, but the omitted letters do not agree.

*Soc.* To prevent which, you had better ask what is the derivation of Ares.

*Cratylus.*

*Her.* What is Ares?

SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.

*Soc.* Ares may be called, if you will, from his manhood (*ἄρρεν*) and manliness, or if you please, from his hard and unchangeable nature, which is the meaning of *ἄρρατος*: the latter is a derivation in every way appropriate to the God of war.

*Ares.*

*Her.* Very true.

*Soc.* And now, by the Gods, let us have no more of the Gods, for I am afraid of them; ask about anything but them, and thou shalt see how the steeds of Euthyphro can prance.

*Her.* Only one more God! I should like to know about Hermes, of whom I am said not to be a true son. Let us make him out, and then I shall know whether there is any meaning in what Cratylus says.

*Soc.* I should imagine that the name Hermes has to do with speech, and signifies that he is the interpreter (*ἐρμηνεύς*), or messenger, or thief, or liar, or bargainer; all that sort of thing has a great deal to do with language; as I was telling you, the word *εἶπεν* is expressive of the use of speech, and there is an often-recurring Homeric word *ἐμήσατο*, which means 'he contrived'—out of these two words, *εἶπεν* and *μήσασθαι*, the legislator formed the name of the God who invented language and speech<sup>1</sup>; and we may imagine him dictating to us the use of this name: 'O my friends,' says he to us, 'seeing that he is the contriver of tales or speeches, you may rightly call him *Εἰρέμης*.' And this has been improved by us, as we think, into Hermes. Iris also appears to have been called from the verb 'to tell' (*εἶπεν*), because she was a messenger.

*Hermes.*

*Her.* Then I am very sure that Cratylus was quite right in saying that I was no true son of Hermes (*Ἑρμογένης*), for I am not a good hand at speeches.

*Soc.* There is also reason, my friend, in Pan being the double-formed son of Hermes.

*Her.* How do you make that out?

*Soc.* As you are aware, speech signifies all things (*πάν*), and is always making them go round in a circle, and has two forms, true and false?

*Her.* Certainly.

<sup>1</sup> Omitting τὸ δὲ λέγειν δὴ ἔστιν εἶπεν.

*Cratylus.*

SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.

*Soc.* Is not the truth that is in him the smooth or sacred form which dwells above among the Gods, whereas falsehood dwells among men below, and is rough like the goat of tragedy; for tales and falsehoods have generally to do with the tragic or goatish life, and tragedy is the place of them?

*Her.* Very true.

*Pan.*

*Soc.* Then surely Pan, who is the declarer of all things, (*πᾶν*) and the perpetual mover (*ἀεὶ πολῶν*) of all things, is rightly called *αἰπόλος* (goat-herd), he being the two-formed son of Hermes, smooth in his upper part, and rough and goatlike in his lower regions. And, as the son of Hermes, he is speech or the brother of speech, and that brother should be like brother is no marvel. But, as I was saying, my dear Hermogenes, let us get away from the Gods.

The stars,  
elements, etc.

*Her.* From these sort of Gods, by all means, Socrates. But why should we not discuss another kind of Gods — the sun, moon, stars, earth, aether, air, fire, water, the seasons, and the year?

*Soc.* You impose a great many tasks upon me. Still, if you wish, I will not refuse.

*Her.* You will oblige me.

*Soc.* How would you have me begin? Shall I take first of all him whom you mentioned first — the sun?

*Her.* Very good.

ἥλιος.

*Soc.* The origin of the sun will probably be clearer in the Doric form, for the Dorians call him *ἄλιος*, and this name is given to him because when he rises he gathers (*ἀλίζοι*) men together or because he is always rolling in his course (*ἀεὶ εἰλεῖν ἰὼν*) about the earth; or from *αἰολεῖν*, of which the meaning is the same as *ποικίλλειν* (to variegate), because he variebrates the productions of the earth.

σελήνη.

*Her.* But what is *σελήνη* (the moon)?

*Soc.* That name is rather unfortunate for Anaxagoras.

*Her.* How so?

*Soc.* The word seems to forestall his recent discovery, that the moon receives her light from the sun.

*Her.* Why do you say so?

*Soc.* The two words *σέλας* (brightness) and *φῶς* (light) have much the same meaning?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* This light about the moon is always new (νέον) and always old (ἔνόν), if the disciples of Anaxagoras say truly. For the sun in his revolution always adds new light, and there is the old light of the previous month.

*Her.* Very true.

*Soc.* The moon is not unfrequently called σελαναία.

*Her.* True.

*Soc.* And as she has a light which is always old and always new (ἔνόν νέον ἀεὶ), she may very properly have the name σελαστρονεοάεια; and this when hammered into shape becomes σελαναία.

*Her.* A real dithyrambic sort of name that, Socrates. But what do you say of the month and the stars?

*Soc.* Μεῖς (month) is called from μειοῦσθαι (to lessen), because suffering diminution; the name of ἄστρο (stars) seems to be derived from ἀστροπή, which is an improvement on ἀναστροπή, signifying the upsetting of the eyes (ἀναστρέφειν ὤπα).

*Her.* What do you say of πῦρ (fire) and ὕδωρ (water)?

*Soc.* I am at a loss how to explain πῦρ; either the muse of Euthyphro has deserted me, or there is some very great difficulty in the word. Please; however, to note the contrivance which I adopt whenever I am in a difficulty of this sort.

*Her.* What is it?

*Soc.* I will tell you; but I should like to know first whether you can tell me what is the meaning of the word πῦρ?

*Her.* Indeed I cannot.

*Soc.* Shall I tell you what I suspect to be the true explanation of this and several other words?—My belief is that they are of foreign origin. For the Hellenes, especially those who were under the dominion of the barbarians, often borrowed from them.

*Her.* What is the inference?

*Soc.* Why, you know that any one who seeks to demonstrate the fitness of these names according to the Hellenic language, and not according to the language from which the words are derived, is rather likely to be at fault.

*Her.* Yes, certainly.

410 *Soc.* Well then, consider whether this πῦρ is not foreign;  
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*Cratylus.*  
SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.

μείσ-  
ἄστρον.

πῦρ.  
ὑδωρ.

*Cratylus.*  
SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.

for the word is not easily brought into relation with the Hellenic tongue, and the Phrygians may be observed to have the same word slightly changed, just as they have ὕδωρ (water) and κύνες (dogs), and many other words.

*Her.* That is true.

ἀήρ.

*Soc.* Any violent interpretations of the words should be avoided; for something to say about them may easily be found. And thus I get rid of πῦρ and ὕδωρ. Ἀήρ (air), Hermogenes, may be explained as the element which raises (αἶρει) things from the earth, or as ever flowing (ἀεὶ ῥεῖ), or because the flux of the air is wind, and the poets call the winds 'air-blasts,' (ἀήται); he who uses the term may mean, so to speak, air-flux (ἀητόρρον), in the sense of wind-flux (πνευματόρρον); and because this moving wind may be expressed by either term he employs the word air (ἀήρ = ἀήτης ῥέω). Αἰθήρ (aether) I should interpret as ἀειθεῖρ; this may be correctly said, because this element is always running in a flux about the air (ἀεὶ θεῖ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα ῥέων). The meaning of the word γῆ (earth) comes out better when in the form of γαῖα, for the earth may be truly called 'mother' (γαῖα, γεννήτειρα), as in the language of Homer (Od. ix. 118; xiii. 160) γεγάασι means γεγεννησθαι.

αἰθήρ.

*Her.* Good.

*Soc.* What shall we take next?

ῥοαί.

*Her.* There are ῥοαί (the seasons), and the two names of the year, ἐνιαυτός and ἔτος.

ἐνιαυτός.

*Soc.* The ῥοαί should be spelt in the old Attic way, if you desire to know the probable truth about them; they are rightly called the ῥοαί because they divide (ὀρίζουσιν) the summers and winters and winds and the fruits of the earth. The words ἐνιαυτός and ἔτος appear to be the same,—'that which brings to light the plants and growths of the earth in their turn, and passes them in review within itself (ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐξετάζει):' this is broken up into two words, ἐνιαυτός from ἐν ἑαυτῷ, and ἔτος from ἐτάζει, just as the original name of Ζεὺς was divided into Ζῆρα and Δία; and the whole proposition means that this power of reviewing from within is one, but has two names, two words ἔτος and ἐνιαυτός being thus formed out of a single proposition.

ἔτος.

*Her.* Indeed, Socrates, you make surprising progress.

*Soc.* I am run away with.

*Her.* Very true.

*Soc.* But am not yet at my utmost speed.

411 *Her.* I should like very much to know, in the next place, how you would explain the virtues. What principle of correctness is there in those charming words — wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest of them?

*Soc.* That is a tremendous class of names which you are disinterring; still, as I have put on the lion's skin, I must not be faint of heart; and I suppose that I must consider the meaning of wisdom (*φρόνησις*) and understanding (*σύνεσις*), and judgment (*γνώμη*), and knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*), and all those other charming words, as you call them?

*Her.* Surely, we must not leave off until we find out their meaning.

*Soc.* By the dog of Egypt I have not a bad notion which came into my head only this moment: I believe that the primeval givers of names were undoubtedly like too many of our modern philosophers, who, in their search after the nature of things, are always getting dizzy from constantly going round and round, and then they imagine that the world is going round and round and moving in all directions: and this appearance, which arises out of their own internal condition, they suppose to be a reality of nature; they think that there is nothing stable or permanent, but only flux and motion, and that the world is always full of every sort of motion and change. The consideration of the whole class of names which I have mentioned has led me into making this reflection.

The heads of the givers of names were going round and round, and therefore they imagined that the world was going round and round.

*Her.* How so, Socrates?

*Soc.* Perhaps you did not observe that in the names which have been just cited, the motion or flux or generation of things is most surely indicated.

*Her.* No, indeed, I never thought of it.

*Soc.* Take the first of those which you mentioned; clearly that is a name indicative of motion.

*Her.* What was the name?

*Soc.* *Φρόνησις* (wisdom), which may signify *φορᾶς καὶ ῥοῦ νόησις* (perception of motion and flux), or perhaps *φορᾶς ὄνησις* (the blessing of motion), but is at any rate connected with *φέρεσθαι* (motion); *γνώμη* (judgment), again, certainly implies the pon- *γνώμη.*



*Cratylus.*

SOCRATES,

HERMO-  
GENES.

νόησις.

σωφροσύνη.

ἐπιστήμη.

σύνεσις.

σοφία.

ἀγαθόν.

δικαιοσύνη.

Explanation  
of justice  
based on the  
doctrines of  
Heraclitus

deration or consideration (νόησις) of generation, for to ponder is the same as to consider; or, if you would rather, here is νόησις, the very word just now mentioned, which is νέου ἔσις (the desire of the new); the word νέος implies that the world is always in process of creation. The giver of the name wanted to express this longing of the soul, for the original name was νεόεσις, and not νόησις; but η took the place of a double ε. The word σωφροσύνη is the salvation (σωτηρία) of that wisdom (φρόνησις) which we were just now considering. 412  
Ἐπιστήμη (knowledge) is akin to this, and indicates that the soul which is good for anything follows (ἔπεται) the motion of things, neither anticipating them nor falling behind them; wherefore the word should rather be read as ἐπιστημένη<sup>1</sup>, inserting ἐν. Σύνεσις (understanding) may be regarded in like manner as a kind of conclusion; the word is derived from συνιέναι (to go along with), and, like ἐπίστασθαι (to know), implies the progression of the soul in company with the nature of things. Σοφία (wisdom) is very dark, and appears not to be of native growth; the meaning is, touching the motion or stream of things. You must remember that the poets, when they speak of the commencement of any rapid motion, often use the word ἐσύθη (he rushed); and there was a famous Lacedaemonian who was named Σοῦς (Rush), for by this word the Lacedaemonians signify rapid motion, and the touching (ἐπαφή) of motion is expressed by σοφία, for all things are supposed to be in motion. Good (ἀγαθόν) is the name which is given to the admirable (ἀγαστῶ) in nature; for, although all things move, still there are degrees of motion; some are swifter, some slower; but there are some things which are admirable for their swiftness, and this admirable part of nature is called ἀγαθόν. Δικαιοσύνη (justice) is clearly δικαίου σύνεσις (understanding of the just); but the actual word δίκαιον is more difficult: men are only agreed to a certain extent about justice, and then they begin to disagree. For those who suppose all things to be in motion conceive the greater part of nature to be a mere receptacle; and they say that there is a penetrating power which passes through all this, and is the instrument of creation in all, and is the subtlest and swiftest element; for if it were not the subtlest,

<sup>1</sup> Reading ἐμβάλλοντας δεῖ τὸ ἐν: cp. *infra*, 437 A.

and a power which none can keep out, and also the swiftest, passing by other things as if they were standing still, it could not penetrate through the moving universe. And this element, which superintends all things and pierces (*διαῖδν*) all, is rightly called *δικαίον*; the letter *κ* is only added for the sake of euphony. Thus far, as I was saying, there is  
 413 a general agreement about the nature of justice; but I, Hermogenes, being an enthusiastic disciple, have been told in a mystery that the justice of which I am speaking is also the cause of the world: now a cause is that because of which anything is created; and some one comes and whispers in my ear that justice is rightly so called because partaking of the nature of the cause, and I begin, after hearing what he has said, to interrogate him gently: 'Well, my excellent friend,' say I, 'but if all this be true, I still want to know what is justice.' Thereupon they think that I ask tiresome questions, and am leaping over the barriers, and have been already sufficiently answered, and they try to satisfy me with one derivation after another, and at length they quarrel. For one of them says that justice is the sun, and that he and none other, with his penetrating (*διαῖόντα*) and burning (*κάοντα*) force, is the guardian of nature. And when I joyfully repeat this beautiful notion, I am answered by the satirical remark, 'What, is there no justice in the world when the sun is down?' And when I earnestly beg my questioner to tell me his own honest opinion, he says, 'Fire in the abstract;' but this is not very intelligible. Another says, 'No, not fire in the abstract, but the abstraction of heat in the fire.' Another man professes to laugh at all this, and says, as Anaxagoras says, that justice is mind, for mind, as they say, has absolute power, and mixes with nothing, and orders all things, and passes through all things. At last, my friend, I find myself in far greater perplexity about the nature of justice than I was before I began to learn. But still I am of opinion that the name, which has led me into this digression, was given to justice for the reasons which I have mentioned.

*Cratylus.*

SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.

and of An-  
axagoras.

*Her.* I think, Socrates, that you are not improvising now; you must have heard this from some one else.

*Soc.* And not the rest?

*Her.* Hardly.

The simple  
Hermogenes  
is convinced  
that Socrates

Cratylus.

SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.is no longer  
pretending.

ἀνδρεία.

ἄρρην.

ἀνήρ.

γυνή.

θῆλυ.

*Soc.* Well, then, let me go on in the hope of making you believe in the originality of the rest. What remains after justice? I do not think that we have as yet discussed courage (ἀνδρεία),—injustice (ἀδικία), which is obviously nothing more than a hindrance to the penetrating principle (διαϊόντος), need not be considered. Well, then, the name of ἀνδρεία seems to imply a battle;—this battle is in the world of existence, and according to the doctrine of flux is only the counterflux (ἐναντία ροῇ): if you extract the δ from ἀνδρεία, the name at once signifies the thing, and you may clearly understand that ἀνδρεία is not the stream opposed to every stream, but only to that which is contrary to justice, for otherwise 414 courage would not have been praised. The words ἄρρην (male) and ἀνήρ (man) also contain a similar allusion to the same principle of the upward flux (τῇ ἄνω ροῇ). Γυνή (woman) I suspect to be the same word as γονή (birth): θῆλυ (female) appears to be partly derived from θηλή (the teat), because the teat is like rain, and makes things flourish (τεθηλέναι).

*Her.* That is surely probable.

*Soc.* Yes; and the very word θάλλειν (to flourish) seems to figure the growth of youth, which is swift and sudden ever. And this is expressed by the legislator in the name, which is a compound of θεῖν (running), and ἄλλεσθαι (leaping). Pray observe how I gallop away when I get on smooth ground. There are a good many names generally thought to be of importance, which have still to be explained.

*Her.* True.

τέχνη.

*Soc.* There is the meaning of the word τέχνη (art), for example —

*Her.* Very true —

*Soc.* Which may be identified with ἐχονόη, and expresses the possession of mind: you have only to take away the τ and insert two ο's, one between the χ and ν, and another between the ν and η.

*Her.* That is a very shabby etymology.

*Soc.* Yes, my dear friend; but then you know that the original names have been long ago buried and disguised by people sticking on and stripping off letters for the sake of euphony, and twisting and bedizening them in all sorts of ways: and time too may have had a share in the change.

Take, for example, the word *κάτοπτρον*; why is the letter *ρ* inserted? This must surely be the addition of some one who cares nothing about the truth, but thinks only of putting the mouth into shape. And the additions are often such that at last no human being can possibly make out the original meaning of the word. Another example is the word *σφίγξ, σφιγγὺς*, which ought properly to be *φίγξ, φιγγὺς*, and there are other examples.

*Cratylus.*

SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.

*κάτοπτρον.*

*σφίγξ,  
φιγγὺς.*

*Her.* That is quite true, Socrates.

*Soc.* And yet, if you are permitted to put in and pull out any letters which you please, names will be too easily made, and any name may be adapted to any object.

*Her.* True.

*Soc.* Yes, that is true. And therefore a wise dictator, like yourself, should observe the laws of moderation and probability.

*Her.* Such is my desire.

*Soc.* And mine, too, Hermogenes. But do not be too  
415 much of a precisian, or 'you will unnerve me of my strength'. When you have allowed me to add *μηχανή* (contrivance) to *τέχνη* (art) I shall be at the top of my bent, for I conceive *μηχανή* to be a sign of great accomplishment — *ἄνειν*, for *μῆκος* has the meaning of greatness, and these two, *μῆκος* and *ἄνειν*, make up the word *μηχανή*. But, as I was saying, being now at the top of my bent, I should like to consider the meaning of the two words *ἀρετὴ* (virtue) and *κακία* (vice); *ἀρετὴ* I do not as yet understand, but *κακία* is transparent, and agrees with the principles which preceded, for all things being in a flux (*ῥόντων*), *κακία* is *κακῶς ἰδὲν* (going badly); and this evil motion when existing in the soul has the general name of *κακία*, or vice, specially appropriated to it. The meaning of *κακῶς ἰέναι* may be further illustrated by the use of *δειλία* (cowardice), which ought to have come after *ἀνδρεία*, but was forgotten, and, as I fear, is not the only word which has been passed over. *Δειλία* signifies that the soul is bound with a strong chain (*δεσμὸς*), for *λίαν* means strength, and therefore *δειλία* expresses the greatest and strongest bond of the soul; and *ἀπορία* (difficulty) is an evil of the same nature (from *α* not, and *πορεύεσθαι* to go), like anything else which is

*μηχανή.*

*ἀρετὴ,  
κακία.*

*δειλία.*

<sup>1</sup> *Iliad* vi. 265.

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GENES.

κακία and  
ἀρετή again.

an impediment to motion and movement. Then the word *κακία* appears to mean *κακῶς ἵέναι*, or going badly, or limping and halting; of which the consequence is, that the soul becomes filled with vice. And if *κακία* is the name of this sort of thing, *ἀρετή* will be the opposite of it, signifying in the first place ease of motion, then that the stream of the good soul is unimpeded, and has therefore the attribute of ever flowing without let or hindrance, and is therefore called *ἀρετή*, or, more correctly, *ἀειρετιή* (ever-flowing), and may perhaps have had another form, *αἰρετιή* (eligible), indicating that nothing is more eligible than virtue, and this has been hammered into *ἀρετή*. I daresay that you will deem this to be another invention of mine, but I think that if the previous word *κακία* was right, then *ἀρετή* is also right.

κακόν,  
(of foreign  
origin).

*Her.* But what is the meaning of *κακόν*, which has played 416 so great a part in your previous discourse?

*Soc.* That is a very singular word about which I can hardly form an opinion, and therefore I must have recourse to my ingenious device.

*Her.* What device?

*Soc.* The device of a foreign origin, which I shall give to this word also.

*Her.* Very likely you are right; but suppose that we leave these words, and endeavour to see the rationale of *καλόν* and *αἰσχρόν*.

αἰσχρόν.

*Soc.* The meaning of *αἰσχρόν* is evident, being only *ἀεὶ ἴσχον ῥοῆς* (always preventing from flowing), and this is in accordance with our former derivations. For the name-giver was a great enemy to stagnation of all sorts, and hence he gave the name *ἀεισχοροῦν* to that which hindered the flux (*ἀεὶ ἴσχον ῥοῦν*), and this is now beaten together into *αἰσχρόν*.

καλόν.

*Her.* But what do you say of *καλόν*?

*Soc.* That is more obscure; yet the form is only due to the quantity, and has been changed by altering *ον* into *ο*.

*Her.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* This name appears to denote mind.

*Her.* How so?

*Soc.* Let me ask you what is the cause why anything has a name; is not the principle which imposes the name the cause?



*Her.* Certainly.

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*Soc.* And must not this be the mind of Gods, or of men, or of both?

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GENES.

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* Is not mind that which called (*καλέσαν*) things by their names, and is not mind the beautiful (*καλόν*)?

*Her.* That is evident.

*Soc.* And are not the works of intelligence and mind worthy of praise, and are not other works worthy of blame?

*Her.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Physic does the work of a physician, and carpentering does the works of a carpenter?

*Her.* Exactly.

*Soc.* And the principle of beauty does the works of beauty?

*Her.* Of course.

*Soc.* And that principle we affirm to be mind?

*Her.* Very true.

*Soc.* Then mind is rightly called beauty because she does the works which we recognize and speak of as the beautiful?

*Her.* That is evident.

*Soc.* What more names remain to us?

*Her.* There are the words which are connected with *ἀγαθόν* and *καλόν*, such as *συμφέρον* and *λυσitteλoύv*, *ὠφέλιμον*, *κερδα- συμφέρον.*  
*417* *λέον*, and their opposites.

*Soc.* The meaning of *συμφέρον* (expedient) I think that you may discover for yourself by the light of the previous examples,—for it is a sister word to *ἐπιστήμη*, meaning just the motion (*φορὰ*) of the soul accompanying the world, and things which are done upon this principle are called *σύμφορα* or *συμφέροντα*, because they are carried round with the world.

*Her.* That is probable.

*Soc.* Again, *κερδαλέον* (gainful) is called from *κέρδος* (gain), *κερδαλέον.* but you must alter the *δ* into *ν* if you want to get at the meaning; for this word also signifies good, but in another way; he who gave the name intended to express the power of admixture (*κραννύμενοι*) and universal penetration in the good; in forming the word, however, he inserted a *δ* instead of an *ν*, and so made *κέρδος*.

*Her.* Well, but what is *λυσitteλoύv* (profitable)?



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GENES.

λυσιτελοῦν.

ὠφέλιμον.

*Soc.* I suppose, Hermogenes, that people do not mean by the profitable the gainful or that which pays (λύει) the retailer, but they use the word in the sense of swift. You regard the profitable (λυσιτελοῦν), as that which being the swiftest thing in existence, allows of no stay in things and no pause or end of motion, but always, if there begins to be any end, lets things go again (λύει), and makes motion immortal and unceasing: and in this point of view, as appears to me, the good is happily denominated λυσιτελοῦν — being that which looses (λύει) the end (τέλος) of motion. ὠφέλιμον (the advantageous) is derived from ὠφέλλειν, meaning that which creates and increases; this latter is a common Homeric word, and has a foreign character.

*Her.* And what do you say of their opposites?

*Soc.* Of such as are mere negatives I hardly think that I need speak.

*Her.* Which are they?

*Soc.* The words ἀξίμφορον (inexpedient), ἀνωφελές (unprofitable), ἀλυσιτελές (unadvantageous), ἀκερδές (ungainful).

*Her.* True.

*Soc.* I would rather take the words βλαβερόν (harmful), ζημιῶδες (hurtful).

*Her.* Good.

βλαβερόν.

*Soc.* The word βλαβερόν is that which is said to hinder or harm (βλάπτειν) the stream (ρόον); βλάπτειν is βουλόμενον ἄπτειν (seeking to hold or bind); for ἄπτειν is the same as δεῖν, and δεῖν is always a term of censure; βουλόμενον ἄπτειν ροῶν (wanting to bind the stream) would properly be βουλαπτεροῶν, and this, as I imagine, is improved into βλαβερόν.

*Her.* You bring out curious results, Socrates, in the use of names; and when I hear the word βουλαπτεροῦν I cannot help imagining that you are making your mouth into a flute, and puffing away at some prelude to Athene.

*Soc.* That is the fault of the makers of the name, Hermo- 418  
genes; not mine.

*Her.* Very true; but what is the derivation of ζημιῶδες?

ζημιῶδες.

*Soc.* What is the meaning of ζημιῶδες? — let me remark, Hermogenes, how right I was in saying that great changes are made in the meaning of words by putting in and pulling out letters; even a very slight permutation will sometimes

give an entirely opposite sense; I may instance the word *δέον*, which occurs to me at the moment, and reminds me of what I was going to say to you, that the fine fashionable language of modern times has twisted and disguised and entirely altered the original meaning both of *δέον*, and also of *ζημιῶδες*, which in the old language is clearly indicated.

*Her.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* I will try to explain. You are aware that our forefathers loved the sounds *ι* and *δ*, especially the women, who are most conservative of the ancient language, but now they change *ι* into *η* or *ε*, and *δ* into *ζ*; this is supposed to increase the grandeur of the sound.

*Her.* How do you mean?

*Soc.* For example, in very ancient times they called the day either *ἡμέρα* or *ἐμέρα*, which is called by us *ἡμέρα*.

*Her.* That is true.

*Soc.* Do you observe that only the ancient form shows the intention of the giver of the name? of which the reason is, that men long for (*ἡμείπονσι*) and love the light which comes after the darkness, and is therefore called *ἡμέρα*, from *ἡμερος* desire.

*Her.* Clearly.

*Soc.* But now the name is so travestied that you cannot tell the meaning, although there are some who imagine the day to be called *ἡμέρα* because it makes things gentle (*ἡμερα*).

*Her.* Such is my view.

*Soc.* And do you know that the ancients said *δυογόν* and not *ζυγόν*?

*Her.* They did so.

*Soc.* And *ζυγόν* (yoke) has no meaning,—it ought to be *δυογόν*, which word expresses the binding of two together (*δυεῖν ἀγωγή*) for the purpose of drawing;—this has been changed into *ζυγόν*, and there are many other examples of similar changes.

*Her.* There are.

*Soc.* Proceeding in the same train of thought I may remark that the word *δέον* (obligation) has a meaning which is the opposite of all the other appellations of good; for *δέον* is here a species of good, and is, nevertheless, the chain

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HERMO-  
GENES.

*δέον.*

We must  
allow for  
change of  
*ι* into *η* or *ε*,  
and of *δ* into *ζ*.

And so  
*δεον* = *διδόν*.

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GENES.

(δεσμὸς) or hinderer of motion, and therefore own brother of βλαβερόν.

*Her.* Yes, Socrates; that is quite plain.

*Soc.* Not if you restore the ancient form, which is more likely to be the correct one, and read διόν instead of δέον; if you convert the ε into an ι after the old fashion, this word will then agree with other words meaning good; for διόν, not δέον, signifies the good, and is a term of praise; and the author of names has not contradicted himself, but in all these various appellations, δέον (obligatory), ὠφέλιμον (advantageous), λυσιτελοῦν (profitable), κερδαλέον (gainful), ἀγαθόν (good), συμφέρον (expedient), εὐπορον (plenteous), the same conception is implied of the ordering or all-pervading principle which is praised, and the restraining and binding principle which is censured. And this is further illustrated by the word ζημιώδης (hurtful), which if the ζ is only changed into δ as in the ancient language, becomes δημιώδης; and this name, as you will perceive, is given to that which binds motion (δοῦντι ἰόν).

*Her.* What do you say of ἡδονή (pleasure), λύπη (pain), ἐπιθυμία (desire), and the like, Socrates?

ἡδονή.

λύπη.

ἀνία.

ἀλγηδών

ὀδύνη.

ἀχθηδών.

χαρά.

τέρψις.

εὐφροσύνη.

ἐπιθυμία.

*Soc.* I do not think, Hermogenes, that there is any great difficulty about them — ἡδονή is ἡ ὄνησις, the action which tends to advantage; and the original form may be supposed to have been ἡονή, but this has been altered by the insertion of the δ. Λύπη appears to be derived from the relaxation (λύειν) which the body feels when in sorrow; ἀνία (trouble) is the hindrance of motion (α and ἰέναι); ἀλγηδών (distress), if I am not mistaken, is a foreign word, which is derived from ἀλγεινός (grievous); ὀδύνη (grief) is called from the putting on (ἔνδυσσις) sorrow; in ἀχθηδών (vexation) ‘the word too labours,’ as any one may see; χαρά (joy) is the very expression of the fluency and diffusion of the soul (χέω); τέρψις (delight) is so called from the pleasure creeping (ἔρπον) through the soul, which may be likened to a breath (πνοή) and is properly ἐρπνοῦν, but has been altered by time into τερπνόν; εὐφροσύνη (cheerfulness) and ἐπιθυμία explain themselves; the former, which ought to be εὐφροσύνη and has been changed into εὐφροσύνη, is named, as every one may see, from the soul moving (φέρεισθαι) in harmony with nature; ἐπιθυμία is really ἡ ἐπὶ τὸν θυμὸν ἰουσα δύναμις, the power which enters into the

420 soul; *θυμὸς* (passion) is called from the rushing (*θύσεως*) and boiling of the soul; *ἡμερος* (desire) denotes the stream (*ῥοῦς*) which most draws the soul *διὰ τὴν ἔσιν τῆς ῥοῆς* — because flowing with desire (*ἰέμενος*), and expresses a longing after things and violent attraction of the soul to them, and is termed *ἡμερος* from possessing this power; *πόθος* (longing) is expressive of the desire of that which is not present but absent, and in another place (*πov*); this is the reason why the name *πόθος* is applied to things absent, as *ἡμερος* is to things present; *ἔρως* (love) is so called because flowing in (*ἐσρῶν*) from without; the stream is not inherent, but is an influence introduced through the eyes, and from flowing in was called *ἔσρος* (influx) in the old time when they used *ο* for *ω*, and is called *ἔρως*, now that *ω* is substituted for *ο*. But why do you not give me another word?

*Her.* What do you think of *δόξα* (opinion), and that class of words?

*Soc.* *Δόξα* is either derived from *δίωξις* (pursuit), and expresses the march of the soul in the pursuit of knowledge, or from the shooting of a bow (*τόξον*); the latter is more likely, and is confirmed by *οἶησις* (thinking), which is only *οἷσις* (moving), and implies the movement of the soul to the essential nature of each thing — just as *βουλῇ* (counsel) has to do with shooting (*βολή*); and *βούλεσθαι* (to wish) combines the notion of aiming and deliberating — all these words seem to follow *δόξα*, and all involve the idea of shooting, just as *ἀβουλία*, absence of counsel, on the other hand, is a mishap, or missing, or mistaking of the mark, or aim, or proposal, or object.

*Her.* You are quickening your pace now, Socrates.

*Soc.* Why yes, the end I now dedicate to<sup>1</sup> God, not, however, until I have explained *ἀνάγκη* (necessity), which ought to come next, and *ἐκούσιον* (the voluntary). *Ἐκούσιον* is certainly the yielding (*εἶκον*) and unresisting — the notion implied is yielding and not opposing, yielding, as I was just now saying, to that motion which is in accordance with our will; but the necessary and resistant being contrary to our will, implies error and ignorance; the idea is taken from walking through a ravine which is impassable, and rugged, and over-

<sup>1</sup> Reading *θεῷ*.

*Cratylus.*

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HERMO-  
GENES.

*θυμὸς.*

*ἡμερος.*

*πόθος.*

*ἔρως.*

*δόξα.*

*βουλῇ.*

*ἐκούσιον.*

Cratylus.

SOCRATES,

HERMO-

GENES.

ἀναγκαῖον.

grown, and impedes motion — and this is the derivation of the word ἀναγκαῖον (necessary) ἀν' ἄγκη ἰδν, going through a ravine. But while my strength lasts let us persevere, and I hope that you will persevere with your questions.

*Her.* Well, then, let me ask about the greatest and noblest, such as ἀλήθεια (truth) and ψεῦδος (falsehood) and ὄν (being), 421 not forgetting to enquire why the word ὄνομα (name), which is the theme of our discussion, has this name of ὄνομα.

*Soc.* You know the word μαίεσθαι (to seek)?

*Her.* Yes; — meaning the same as ζητεῖν (to enquire).

ὄνομα.

*Soc.* The word ὄνομα seems to be a compressed sentence, signifying ὄν οὐ ζήτημα (being for which there is a search); as is still more obvious in ὀνομαστὸν (notable), which states in so many words that real existence is that for which there is a seeking (ὄν οὐ μάσμι); ἀλήθεια is also an agglomeration of θεία ἄλλη (divine wandering), implying the divine motion of existence; ψεῦδος (falsehood) is the opposite of motion; here is another ill name given by the legislator to stagnation and forced inaction, which he compares to sleep (εὔδειν); but the original meaning of the word is disguised by the addition of ψ; ὄν and οὐσία are ἰδν with an ι broken off; this agrees with the true principle, for being (ὄν) is also moving (ἰδν), and the same may be said of not being, which is likewise called not going (οὐκίον or οὐκὶ ὄν = οὐκ ἰόν).

ἀλήθεια.

ψεῦδος.

What of ἰδν,  
ῥέον, δοῦν?

*Her.* You have hammered away at them manfully; but suppose that some one were to say to you, what is the word ἰδν, and what are ῥέον and δοῦν? — show me their fitness.

*Soc.* You mean to say, how should I answer him?

*Her.* Yes.

*Soc.* One way of giving the appearance of an answer has been already suggested.

*Her.* What way?

Names which  
we do not un-  
derstand are  
probably of  
foreign origin.

*Soc.* To say that names which we do not understand are of foreign origin; and this is very likely the right answer, and something of this kind may be true of them; but also the original forms of words may have been lost in the lapse of ages; names have been so twisted in all manner of ways, that I should not be surprised if the old language when compared with that now in use would appear to us to be a barbarous tongue.



*Her.* Very likely.

*Soc.* Yes, very likely. But still the enquiry demands our earnest attention and we must not flinch. For we should remember, that if a person go on analysing names into words, and enquiring also into the elements out of which the words are formed, and keeps on always repeating this process, he who has to answer him must at last give up the enquiry in despair.

*Her.* Very true.

422 *Soc.* And at what point ought he to lose heart and give up the enquiry? Must he not stop when he comes to the names which are the elements of all other names and sentences; for these cannot be supposed to be made up of other names? The word ἀγαθόν (good), for example, is, as we were saying, a compound of ἀσπτόν (admirable) and θοός (swift). And probably θοός is made up of other elements, and these again of others. But if we take a word which is incapable of further resolution, then we shall be right in saying that we have at last reached a primary element, which need not be resolved any further.

*Her.* I believe you to be in the right.

*Soc.* And suppose the names about which you are now asking should turn out to be primary elements, must not their truth or law be examined according to some new method?

*Her.* Very likely.

*Soc.* Quite so, Hermogenes; all that has preceded would lead to this conclusion. And if, as I think, the conclusion is true, then I shall again say to you, come and help me, that I may not fall into some absurdity in stating the principle of primary names.

*Her.* Let me hear, and I will do my best to assist you.

*Soc.* I think that you will acknowledge with me, that one principle is applicable to all names, primary as well as secondary — when they are regarded simply as names, there is no difference in them.

*Her.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* All the names that we have been explaining were intended to indicate the nature of things.

*Her.* Of course.

*Cratylus.*

SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.

But we should consider also that there is a point at which the analysis of words must stop.

Then some new method is required in the explanation of primary names.



Cratylus.  
SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.

*Soc.* And that this is true of the primary quite as much as of the secondary names, is implied in their being names.

*Her.* Surely.

*Soc.* But the secondary, as I conceive, derive their significance from the primary.

*Her.* That is evident.

*Soc.* Very good; but then how do the primary names which precede analysis show the natures of things, as far as they can be shown; which they must do, if they are to be real names? And here I will ask you a question: Suppose that we had no voice or tongue, and wanted to communicate with one another, should we not, like the deaf and dumb, make signs with the hands and head and the rest of the body?

*Her.* There would be no choice, Socrates.

*Soc.* We should imitate the nature of the thing; the elevation of our hands to heaven would mean lightness and upwardness; heaviness and downwardness would be expressed by letting them drop to the ground; if we were describing the running of a horse, or any other animal, we should make our bodies and our gestures as like as we could to them.

*Her.* I do not see that we could do anything else.

*Soc.* We could not; for by bodily imitation only can the body ever express anything.

*Her.* Very true.

*Soc.* And when we want to express ourselves, either with the voice, or tongue, or mouth, the expression is simply their imitation of that which we want to express.

*Her.* It must be so, I think.

*Soc.* Then a name is a vocal imitation of that which the vocal imitator names or imitates?

*Her.* I think so.

*Soc.* Nay, my friend, I am disposed to think that we have not reached the truth as yet.

*Her.* Why not?

*Soc.* Because if we have we shall be obliged to admit that the people who imitate sheep, or cocks, or other animals, name that which they imitate.

They are the  
imitation of  
that which we  
want to ex-  
press.

*Her.* Quite true.

*Soc.* Then could I have been right in what I was saying?

*Her.* In my opinion, no. But I wish that you would tell me, Socrates, what sort of an imitation is a name?

*Soc.* In the first place, I should reply, not a musical imitation, although that is also vocal; nor, again, an imitation of what music imitates; these, in my judgment, would not be naming. Let me put the matter as follows: All objects have sound and figure, and many have colour?

*Her.* Certainly.

*Soc.* But the art of naming appears not to be concerned with imitations of this kind; the arts which have to do with them are music and drawing?

*Her.* True.

*Soc.* Again, is there not an essence of each thing, just as there is a colour, or sound? And is there not an essence of colour and sound as well as of anything else which may be said to have an essence?

*Her.* I should think so.

*Soc.* Well, and if any one could express the essence of each thing in letters and syllables, would he not express the nature of each thing?

424 *Her.* Quite so.

*Soc.* The musician and the painter were the two names which you gave to the two other imitators. What will this imitator be called?

*Her.* I imagine, Socrates, that he must be the namer, or name-giver, of whom we are in search.

*Soc.* If this is true, then I think that we are in a condition to consider the names *ῥοή* (stream), *ἰέραν* (to go), *ἀχέσις* (retention), about which you were asking; and we may see whether the namer has grasped the nature of them in letters and syllables in such a manner as to imitate the essence or not.

*Her.* Very good.

*Soc.* But are these the only primary names, or are there others?

*Her.* There must be others.

*Soc.* So I should expect. But how shall we further analyse them, and where does the imitator begin? Imitation of the

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*Cratylus.*

SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.

But what sort of an imitation? Not like that of a musician or of a painter.

*Cratylus.*SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.

essence is made by syllables and letters; ought we not, therefore, first to separate the letters, just as those who are beginning rhythm first distinguish the powers of elementary, and then of compound sounds, and when they have done so, but not before, they proceed to the consideration of rhythms?

*Her.* Yes.

The first step  
to separate  
letters into  
classes,

*Soc.* Must we not begin in the same way with letters; first separating the vowels, and then the consonants and mutes<sup>1</sup>, into classes, according to the received distinctions of the learned; also the semi-vowels, which are neither vowels, nor yet mutes; and distinguishing into classes the vowels themselves? And when we have perfected the classification of things, we shall give them names, and see whether, as in the case of letters, there are any classes to which they may be all referred<sup>2</sup>; and hence we shall see their natures, and see, too, whether they have in them classes as there are in the letters; and when we have well considered all this, we shall know how to apply them to what they resemble —

and to see  
whether a sim-  
ple letter is  
used to denote  
simple things,  
or whether  
several are  
mixed, like  
the colours of  
the painter,  
until the man-  
ner in which  
the ancients  
formed lan-  
guage is dis-  
covered by us.

whether one letter is used to denote one thing, or whether there is to be an admixture of several of them; just, as in painting, the painter who wants to depict anything sometimes uses purple only, or any other colour, and sometimes mixes up several colours, as his method is when he has to paint flesh colour or anything of that kind — he uses his colours as his figures appear to require them; and so, too, we shall apply letters to the expression of objects, either single letters when required, or several letters; and so we shall form syllables, as they are called, and from syllables make nouns and verbs; and thus, at last, from the com- 425  
binations of nouns and verbs arrive at language, large and fair and whole; and as the painter made a figure, even so shall we make speech by the art of the namer or the rhetorician, or by some other art. Not that I am literally speaking of ourselves, but I was carried away — meaning to say that this was the way in which (not we but) the ancients formed language, and what they put together we must take to pieces in like manner, if we are to attain a scientific view of the whole subject; and we must see whether the primary,

<sup>1</sup> Letters which are neither vowels nor semivowels.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Phaedrus, 271.

and also whether the secondary elements are rightly given or not, for if they are not, the composition of them, my dear Hermogenes, will be a sorry piece of work, and in the wrong direction.

*Cratylus.*

SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.

*Her.* That, Socrates, I can quite believe.

*Soc.* Well, but do you suppose that you will be able to analyse them in this way? for I am certain that I should not.

But can we  
take language  
to pieces in  
this way?

*Her.* Much less am I likely to be able.

*Soc.* Shall we leave them, then? or shall we seek to discover, if we can, something about them, according to the measure of our ability, saying by way of preface, as I said before of the Gods, that of the truth about them we know nothing, and do but entertain human notions of them. And in this present enquiry, let us say to ourselves, before we proceed, that the higher method is the one which we or others who would analyse language to any good purpose must follow; but under the circumstances, as men say, we must do as well as we can. What do you think?

Our method  
imperfect, but  
we have no  
other.

*Her.* I very much approve.

*Soc.* That objects should be imitated in letters and syllables, and so find expression, may appear ridiculous, Hermogenes, but it cannot be avoided — there is no better principle to which we can look for the truth of first names. Deprived of this, we must have recourse to divine help, like the tragic poets, who in any perplexity have their gods waiting in the air; and must get out of our difficulty in like fashion, by saying that 'the Gods gave the first names, and therefore they are right.' This will be the best contrivance, or perhaps that other notion may be even better still, of deriving them from some barbarous people, for the barbarians are older than we are; or we may say that antiquity has cast a veil over them, which is the same sort of excuse as the last; for all these are not reasons but only ingenious excuses for having no reasons concerning the truth of words. And yet any sort of ignorance of first or primitive names involves an ignorance of secondary words; for they can only be explained by the primary. Clearly then the professor of languages should be able to give a very lucid explanation of first names, or let him be assured he will only talk nonsense about the rest. Do you not suppose this to be true?

If we reject  
imitation we  
must have re-  
course to the  
'Deus ex ma-  
china' or 'the  
barbarian' or  
'the veil of  
antiquity.'

*Cratylus.*

*Her.* Certainly, Socrates.

SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES.

*Soc.* My first notions of original names are truly wild and ridiculous, though I have no objection to impart them to you if you desire, and I hope that you will communicate to me in return anything better which you may have.

*Her.* Fear not; I will do my best.

$\rho$  expresses  
motion.

$\kappaίνησις$  =  
 $\epsilonῖσις$ .

*Soc.* In the first place, the letter  $\rho$  appears to me to be the general instrument expressing all motion ( $\kappaίνησις$ ). But I have not yet explained the meaning of this latter word, which is just  $\epsilonῖσις$  (going); for the letter  $\eta$  was not in use among the ancients, who only employed  $\epsilon$ ; and the root is  $\kappaίειν$ , which is a foreign form, the same as  $\acute{\iota}έναι$ . And the old word  $\kappaίνησις$  will be correctly given as  $\epsilonῖσις$  in corresponding modern letters. Assuming this foreign root  $\kappaίειν$ , and allowing for the change of the  $\eta$  and the insertion of the  $\nu$ , we have  $\kappaίνησις$ , which should have been  $\kappaεῖνσις$  or  $\epsilonῖσις$ ; and  $\sigmaτᾶσις$  is the negative of  $\acute{\iota}έναι$  (or  $\epsilonῖσις$ ), and has been improved into  $\sigmaτάσις$ . Now the letter  $\rho$ , as I was saying, appeared to the imposer of names an excellent instrument for the expression of motion; and he frequently uses the letter for this purpose: for example, in the actual words  $\rhoῆν$  and  $\rhoοῖ$  he represents motion by  $\rho$ ; also in the words  $\tauρόμος$  (trembling),  $\τραχὺς$  (rugged); and again, in words such as  $\κρούειν$  (strike),  $\θραύειν$  (crush),  $\ἐρείκειν$  (bruise),  $\θρύπτειν$  (break),  $\κερματίζειν$  (crumble),  $\ρυμβεῖν$  (whirl): of all these sorts of movements he generally finds an expression in the letter R, because, as I imagine, he had observed that the tongue was most agitated and least at rest in the pronunciation of this letter, which he therefore used in order to express motion, just as by the letter  $\iota$  he expresses the subtle elements which pass through all things. This is why he uses the letter  $\iota$  as imitative of motion,  $\acute{\iota}έναι$ ,  $\epsilonῖσθαι$ . And there is another class of letters,  $\phi$ ,  $\psi$ ,  $\sigma$  and  $\zeta$ , of which the pronunciation is accompanied by great expenditure of breath; these are used in the imitation of such notions as  $\ψυχρὸν$  (shivering),  $\ζέον$  (seething),  $\σειέσθαι$  (to be shaken),  $\σεισμός$  (shock), and are always introduced by the giver of names when he wants to imitate what is  $\φυσῶδες$  (windy). He seems to have thought that the closing and pressure of the tongue in the utterance of  $\delta$  and  $\tau$  was expressive of binding and rest in a place: he further

$\iota$  expressive of  
penetration:

$\phi$ ,  $\psi$ ,  $\sigma$ ,  $\zeta$ ,  
of shaking  
and shivering:

$\delta$ ,  $\tau$ , of bind-  
ing and rest  
at a place:



observed the liquid movement of λ, in the pronunciation of which the tongue slips, and in this he found the expression of smoothness, as in λείος (level), and in the word ὀλισθαίνειν (to slip) itself, λιπαρὸν (sleek), in the word κολλῶδες (gluey), and the like: the heavier sound of γ detained the slipping tongue, and the union of the two gave the notion of a glutinous clammy nature, as in γλίσχρος, γλυκὺς, γλοιῶδες. The ν he observed to be sounded from within, and therefore to have a notion of inwardness; hence he introduced the sound in ἐνδον and ἐντός: α he assigned to the expression of size, and η of length, because they are great letters: ο was the sign of roundness, and therefore there is plenty of ο mixed up in the word γογγύλον (round). Thus did the legislator, reducing all things into letters and syllables, and impressing on them names and signs, and out of them by imitation compounding other signs. That is my view, Hermogenes, of the truth of names; but I should like to hear what Cratylus has more to say.

*Her.* But, Socrates, as I was telling you before, Cratylus mystifies me; he says that there is a fitness of names, but he never explains what is this fitness, so that I cannot tell whether his obscurity is intended or not. Tell me now, Cratylus, here in the presence of Socrates, do you agree in what Socrates has been saying about names, or have you something better of your own? and if you have, tell me what your view is, and then you will either learn of Socrates, or Socrates and I will learn of you.

*Crat.* Well, but surely, Hermogenes, you do not suppose that you can learn, or I explain, any subject of importance all in a moment; at any rate, not such a subject as language, which is, perhaps, the very greatest of all.

428 *Her.* No, indeed; but, as Hesiod says, and I agree with him, 'to add little to little' is worth while. And, therefore, if you think that you can add anything at all, however small, to our knowledge, take a little trouble and oblige Socrates, and me too, who certainly have a claim upon you.

*Soc.* I am by no means positive, Cratylus, in the view which Hermogenes and myself have worked out; and therefore do not hesitate to say what you think, which if it be better than my own view I shall gladly accept. And I should not be at all surprized to find that you have found

*Cratylus.*

SOCRATES,  
HERMO-  
GENES,  
CRATYLUS.

λ expressive  
of liquidity:

γ of detention:

ν of inward-  
ness:

α of size:

η of length:

ο of round-  
ness.

Hermogenes  
asks Cratylus  
to give an  
opinion; but  
the latter  
declines to  
explain so  
important a  
subject all in a  
moment.



*Cratylus.*SOCRATES,  
CRATYLUS.

some better notion. For you have evidently reflected on these matters and have had teachers, and if you have really a better theory of the truth of names, you may count me in the number of your disciples.

*Crat.* You are right, Socrates, in saying that I have made a study of these matters, and I might possibly convert you into a disciple. But I fear that the opposite is more probable, and I already find myself moved to say to you what Achilles in the 'Prayers' says to Ajax,—

'Illustrious Ajax, son of Telamon, lord of the people,  
You appear to have spoken in all things much to my mind.'

And you, Socrates, appear to me to be an oracle, and to give answers much to my mind, whether you are inspired by Euthyphro, or whether some Muse may have long been an inhabitant of your breast, unconsciously to yourself.

Socrates seeks  
to gain the  
assent of  
Cratylus to  
the previous  
argument.

*Soc.* Excellent Cratylus, I have long been wondering at my own wisdom; I cannot trust myself. And I think that I ought to stop and ask myself What am I saying? for there is nothing worse than self-deception—when the deceiver is always at home and always with you—it is quite terrible, and therefore I ought often to retrace my steps and endeavour to 'look fore and aft,' in the words of the aforesaid Homer. And now let me see; where are we? Have we not been saying that the correct name indicates the nature of the thing:—has this proposition been sufficiently proven?

*Crat.* Yes, Socrates, what you say, as I am disposed to think, is quite true.

*Soc.* Names, then, are given in order to instruct?

*Crat.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And naming is an art, and has artificers?

*Crat.* Yes.

*Soc.* And who are they?

*Crat.* The legislators, of whom you spoke at first.

429

*Soc.* And does this art grow up among men like other arts? Let me explain what I mean: of painters, some are better and some worse?

*Crat.* Yes.

*Soc.* The better painters execute their works, I mean their figures, better, and the worse execute them worse; and of

builders also, the better sort build fairer houses, and the worse build them worse. *Cratylus.*

*Crat.* True.

*Soc.* And among legislators, there are some who do their work better and some worse?

*Crat.* No; there I do not agree with you.

*Soc.* Then you do not think that some laws are better and others worse? *But Cratylus cannot be induced by the argument from analogy to admit that names, when not rightly imposed, are names at all.*

*Crat.* No, indeed.

*Soc.* Or that one name is better than another?

*Crat.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Then all names are rightly imposed?

*Crat.* Yes, if they are names at all.

*Soc.* Well, what do you say to the name of our friend Hermogenes, which was mentioned before:—assuming that he has nothing of the nature of Hermes in him, shall we say that this is a wrong name, or not his name at all?

*Crat.* I should reply that Hermogenes is not his name at all, but only appears to be his, and is really the name of somebody else, who has the nature which corresponds to it.

*Soc.* And if a man were to call him Hermogenes, would he not be even speaking falsely? For there may be a doubt whether you can call him Hermogenes, if he is not.

*Crat.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* Are you maintaining that falsehood is impossible? For if this is your meaning I should answer, that there have been plenty of liars in all ages.

*Crat.* Why, Socrates, how can a man say that which is not?—say something and yet say nothing? For is not falsehood saying the thing which is not? *Cratylus denies the existence of falsehood, which he declares to be only an unmeaning sound. This is too much for the common sense of Socrates.*

*Soc.* Your argument, friend, is too subtle for a man of my age. But I should like to know whether you are one of those philosophers who think that falsehood may be spoken but not said?

*Crat.* Neither spoken nor said.

*Soc.* Nor uttered nor addressed? For example: If a person, saluting you in a foreign country, were to take your hand and say: 'Hail, Athenian stranger, Hermogenes, son of Smicrion'—these words, whether spoken, said, uttered, or

*Cratylus.*SOCRATES,  
CRATYLUS.

addressed, would have no application to you but only to our friend Hermogenes, or perhaps to nobody at all?

*Crat.* In my opinion, Socrates, the speaker would only be talking nonsense.

*Soc.* Well, but that will be quite enough for me, if you will tell me whether the nonsense would be true or false, or partly true and partly false: — which is all that I want to know. 430

*Crat.* I should say that he would be putting himself in motion to no purpose; and that his words would be an unmeaning sound like the noise of hammering at a brazen pot.

*Soc.* But let us see, Cratylus, whether we cannot find a meeting-point, for you would admit that the name is not the same with the thing named?

*Crat.* I should.

*Soc.* And would you further acknowledge that the name is an imitation of the thing?

*Crat.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And you would say that pictures are also imitations of things, but in another way?

*Crat.* Yes.

*Soc.* I believe you may be right, but I do not rightly understand you. Please to say, then, whether both sorts of imitation (I mean both pictures and words) are not equally attributable and applicable to the things of which they are the imitation.

*Crat.* They are.

*Soc.* First look at the matter thus: you may attribute the likeness of the man to the man, and of the woman to the woman; and so on?

*Crat.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And conversely you may attribute the likeness of the man to the woman, and of the woman to the man?

*Crat.* Very true.

*Soc.* And are both modes of assigning them right, or only the first?

*Crat.* Only the first.

*Soc.* That is to say, the mode of assignment which attributes to each that which belongs to them and is like them?

*Crat.* Such is my view.

Cratylus is induced to agree that the likeness of a man cannot rightly be attributed to a woman or of a woman to a man;

*Soc.* Now then, as I am desirous that we being friends should have a good understanding about the argument, let me state my view to you. the first mode of assignment, whether applied to figures or to names, I call right, and when applied to names only, true as well as right; and the other mode, of giving and assigning the name which is unlike, I call wrong, and in the case of names, false as well as wrong.

*Cratylus.*

*SOCRATES,  
CRATYLUS.*

*Crat.* That may be true, Socrates, in the case of pictures; they may be wrongly assigned; but not in the case of names — must they not always be right?

*Soc.* Why, what is the difference? May I not go to a man and say to him, 'This is your picture,' showing him his own likeness, or perhaps the likeness of a woman; and when I say 'show,' I mean bring before the sense of sight.

*Crat.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And may I not go to him again, and say, 'This is your name'? — for the name, like the picture, is an imitation.

and the same  
is true of  
words.

431 *May I not say to him — 'This is your name'? and may I not then bring to his sense of hearing the imitation of himself, by saying, 'This is a man;' or of a female of the human species, by saying, 'This is a woman,' as the case may be? Is not all that quite possible?*

*Crat.* I would fain agree with you, Socrates; and therefore I say, Granted.

*Soc.* That is very good of you, if I am right, which need hardly be disputed at present. But if I can assign names as well as pictures to objects, the right assignment of them we may call truth, and the wrong assignment of them falsehood. Now if there be such a wrong assignment of names, there may also be a wrong or inappropriate assignment of verbs; and if of names and verbs then of the sentences, which are made up of them. What do you say, Cratylus?

*Crat.* I agree; and think that what you say is very true.

*Soc.* And further, primitive nouns may be compared to pictures, and in pictures you may either give all the appropriate colours and figures, or you may not give them all — some may be wanting; or there may be too many or too much of them — may there not?

And as there  
are perfect or  
imperfect  
pictures, there  
may be per-  
fect or imper-

*Crat.* Very true.

*Cratylus.*SOCRATES,  
CRATYLUS.fect repre-  
sentations  
in words.

*Soc.* And he who gives all gives a perfect picture or figure; and he who takes away or adds also gives a picture or figure, but not a good one.

*Crat.* Yes.

*Soc.* In like manner, he who by syllables and letters imitates the nature of things, if he gives all that is appropriate will produce a good image, or in other words a name; but if he subtracts or perhaps adds a little, he will make an image but not a good one; whence I infer that some names are well and others ill made.

*Crat.* That is true.

*Soc.* Then the artist of names may be sometimes good, or he may be bad?

*Crat.* Yes.

*Soc.* And this artist of names is called the legislator?

*Crat.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then like other artists the legislator may be good or he may be bad; it must surely be so if our former admissions hold good?

Cratylus tries  
to distinguish  
the case of  
language.

*Crat.* Very true, Socrates; but the case of language, you see, is different; for when by the help of grammar we assign the letters  $\alpha$  or  $\beta$ , or any other letters to a certain name, 432 then, if we add, or subtract, or misplace a letter, the name which is written is not only written wrongly, but not written at all; and in any of these cases becomes other than a name.

*Soc.* But I doubt whether your view is altogether correct, Cratylus.

*Crat.* How so?

*Soc.* I believe that what you say may be true about numbers, which must be just what they are, or not be at all; for example, the number ten at once becomes other than ten if a unit be added or subtracted, and so of any other number: but this does not apply to that which is qualitative or to anything which is represented under an image. I should say rather that the image, if expressing in every point the entire reality, would no longer be an image. Let us suppose the existence of two objects: one of them shall be Cratylus, and the other the image of Cratylus; and we will suppose, further, that some God makes not only a representation such as a painter would make of your outward form and colour,

Socrates  
replies that  
language is an  
image, and  
that no image  
is ever perfect.



but also creates an inward organization like yours, having the same warmth and softness; and into this infuses motion, and soul, and mind, such as you have, and in a word copies all your qualities, and places them by you in another form; would you say that this was Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, or that there were two Cratyluses?

*Cratylus.*

SOCRATES,  
CRATYLUS.

If it were it  
would be no  
longer an  
image.

*Crat.* I should say that there were two Cratyluses.

*Soc.* Then you see, my friend, that we must find some other principle of truth in images, and also in names; and not insist that an image is no longer an image when something is added or subtracted. Do you not perceive that images are very far from having qualities which are the exact counterpart of the realities which they represent?

*Crat.* Yes, I see.

*Soc.* But then how ridiculous would be the effect of names on things, if they were exactly the same with them! For they would be the doubles of them, and no one would be able to determine which were the names and which were the realities.

*Crat.* Quite true.

*Soc.* Then fear not, but have the courage to admit that one name may be correctly and another incorrectly given; and do not insist that the name shall be exactly the same with the thing; but allow the occasional substitution of a wrong letter, and if of a letter also of a noun in a sentence, and if of a noun in a sentence also of a sentence which is not appropriate to the matter, and acknowledge that the thing may be named, and described, so long as the general character of the thing which you are describing is retained; and this, as you will remember, was remarked by Her-  
433 mogenes and myself in the particular instance of the names of the letters.

*Crat.* Yes, I remember.

*Soc.* Good; and when the general character is preserved, even if some of the proper letters are wanting, still the thing is signified; — well, if all the letters are given; not well, when only a few of them are given. I think that we had better admit this, lest we be punished like travellers in Ægina who wander about the street late at night: and be likewise told by truth herself that we have arrived too late;

We shall only  
waste time  
and contradict  
ourselves if  
we deny that  
the general  
character of  
something



*Cratylus.*SOCRATES,  
CRATYLUS.may be  
incorrectly  
represented  
as well as  
correctly.

or if not, you must find out some new notion of correctness of names, and no longer maintain that a name is the expression of a thing in letters or syllables; for if you say both, you will be inconsistent with yourself.

*Crat.* I quite acknowledge, Socrates, what you say to be very reasonable.

*Soc.* Then as we are agreed thus far, let us ask ourselves whether a name rightly imposed ought not to have the proper letters.

*Crat.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the proper letters are those which are like the things?

*Crat.* Yes.

*Soc.* Enough then of names which are rightly given. And in names which are incorrectly given, the greater part may be supposed to be made up of proper and similar letters, or there would be no likeness; but there will be likewise a part which is improper and spoils the beauty and formation of the word: you would agree with me?

*Crat.* There would be no use, Socrates, in my quarrelling with you, since I cannot be satisfied that a name which is incorrectly given is a name at all.

*Soc.* Do you admit a name to be the representation of a thing?

*Crat.* Yes, I do.

*Soc.* But do you not allow that some nouns are primitive, and some derived?

*Crat.* Yes, I do.

Assimilation  
or convention,  
which do you  
prefer?

*Soc.* Then if you admit that primitive or first nouns are representations of things, is there any better way of framing representations than by assimilating them to the objects as much as you can; or do you prefer the notion of Hermogenes and of many others, who say that names are conventional, and have a meaning to those who have agreed about them, and who have previous knowledge of the things intended by them, and that convention is the only principle: and whether you abide by our present convention, or make a new and opposite one, according to which you call small great and great small,—they would say that it makes no

difference, if you are only agreed. Which of these two notions do you prefer? *Cratylus.*

434 *Crat.* Representation by likeness, Socrates, is infinitely better than representation by any chance sign. SOCRATES,  
CRATYLUS.

*Soc.* Very good: but if the name is to be like the thing, the letters out of which the first names are composed must also be like things. Returning to the image of the picture, I would ask, How could any one ever compose a picture which would be like anything at all, if there were not pigments in nature which resembled the things imitated, and out of which the picture is composed?

*Crat.* Impossible.

*Soc.* No more could names ever resemble any actually existing thing, unless the original elements of which they are compounded bore some degree of resemblance to the objects of which the names are the imitation: And the original elements are letters?

*Crat.* Yes.

*Soc.* Let me now invite you to consider what Hermogenes and I were saying about sounds. Do you agree with me that the letter  $\rho$  is expressive of rapidity, motion, and hardness? Were we right or wrong in saying so? Resemblance  
of sounds to  
things is the  
first principle  
of language.

*Crat.* I should say that you were right.

*Soc.* And that  $\lambda$  was expressive of smoothness, and softness, and the like?

*Crat.* There again you were right.

*Soc.* And yet, as you are aware, that which is called by us  $\sigma\kappa\lambda\eta\rho\acute{o}\tau\eta\varsigma$ , is by the Eretrians called  $\sigma\kappa\lambda\eta\rho\acute{o}\tau\eta\rho$ .

*Crat.* Very true.

*Soc.* But are the letters  $\rho$  and  $\sigma$  equivalents; and is there the same significance to them in the termination  $\rho$ , which there is to us in  $\sigma$ , or is there no significance to one of us?

*Crat.* Nay, surely there is a significance to both of us.

*Soc.* In as far as the two letters are like, or in as far as they are unlike?

*Crat.* In as far as they are like.

*Soc.* Are they altogether alike?

*Crat.* Yes; for the purpose of expressing motion.

*Soc.* And what do you say of the insertion of the  $\lambda$ ? for that is expressive not of hardness but of softness.

Cratylus.

SOCRATES,  
CRATYLUS.

Crat. Why, perhaps the letter λ is wrongly inserted, Socrates, and should be altered into ρ, as you were saying to Hermogenes, and in my opinion rightly, when you spoke of adding and subtracting letters upon occasion.

Soc. Good. But still the word is intelligible to both of us; when I say σκληρός (hard), you know what I mean.

Crat. Yes, my dear friend, and of this the explanation is custom.

Soc. And what is custom but convention? I utter a sound which I understand, and you know that I understand the meaning of the sound: this is what you are saying?

435

Crat. Yes.

Soc. And if when I speak you know my meaning, there is an indication given by me to you?

Crat. Yes.

But there is  
unlikeness as  
well as like-  
ness in names  
to things, and  
therefore  
convention or  
custom must  
also be allowed  
to have a  
place.

Soc. This indication of my meaning may proceed from unlike as well as from like, for example in the λ of σκληρότης. But if this is true, then you have made a convention with yourself, and the correctness of a name turns out to be convention, since letters which are unlike are indicative equally with those which are like, if they are sanctioned by custom and convention. And even supposing that you distinguish custom from convention ever so much, still you must say that the signification of words is given by custom and not by likeness, for custom may indicate by the unlike as well as by the like. But as we are agreed thus far, Cratylus (for I shall assume that your silence gives consent), then custom and convention must be supposed to contribute to the indication of our thoughts; for suppose we take the instance of number, how can you ever imagine, my good friend, that you will find names resembling every individual number, unless you allow that which you term convention and agreement to have authority in determining the correctness of names? I quite agree with you that words should as far as possible resemble things; but I fear that this dragging in of resemblance, as Hermogenes says<sup>1</sup>, is a shabby thing, which has to be supplemented by the mechanical aid of convention with a view to correctness; for I believe that if we could always, or almost always, use likenesses, which are

<sup>1</sup> Vide supra, 414 C.

perfectly appropriate, this would be the most perfect state of language; as the opposite is the most imperfect. But let me ask you, what is the force of names, and what is the use of them?

*Cratylus.*  
*SOCRATES,*  
*CRATYLUS.*

*Crat.* The use of names, Socrates, as I should imagine, is to inform: the simple truth is, that he who knows names knows also the things which are expressed by them.

*Cratylus*  
maintains that  
he who knows  
names also  
knows things.

*Soc.* I suppose you mean to say, Cratylus, that as the name is, so also is the thing; and that he who knows the one will also know the other, because they are similars, and all similars fall under the same art or science; and therefore you would say that he who knows names will also know things.

*Crat.* That is precisely what I mean.

*Soc.* But let us consider what is the nature of this information about things which, according to you, is given us by names. Is it the best sort of information? or is there any other? What do you say?

436 *Crat.* I believe it to be both the only and the best sort of information about them; there can be no other.

*Soc.* But do you believe that in the discovery of them, he who discovers the names discovers also the things; or is this only the method of instruction, and is there some other method of enquiry and discovery.

*Crat.* I certainly believe that the methods of enquiry and discovery are of the same nature as instruction.

*Soc.* Well, but do you not see, Cratylus, that he who follows names in the search after things, and analyses their meaning, is in great danger of being deceived?

*Crat.* How so?

*Soc.* Why clearly he who first gave names gave them according to his conception of the things which they signified — did he not?

*Crat.* True.

*Soc.* And if his conception was erroneous, and he gave names according to his conception, in what position shall we who are his followers find ourselves? Shall we not be deceived by him?

But supposing  
that the orig-  
inal giver of  
names was  
mistaken,  
what then?

*Crat.* But, Socrates, am I not right in thinking that he must surely have known; or else, as I was saying, his

*Cratylus.*

SOCRATES.

CRATYLUS,

names would not be names at all? And you have a clear proof that he has not missed the truth, and the proof is — that he is perfectly consistent. Did you ever observe in speaking that all the words which you utter have a common character and purpose?

He may have been perfectly consistent, and yet have proceeded on a false principle.

*Soc.* But that, friend Cratylus, is no answer. For if he did begin in error, he may have forced the remainder into agreement with the original error and with himself; there would be nothing strange in this, any more than in geometrical diagrams, which have often a slight and invisible flaw in the first part of the process, and are consistently mistaken in the long deductions which follow. And this is the reason why every man should expend his chief thought and attention on the consideration of first principles: — are they or are they not rightly laid down? and when he has duly sifted them, all the rest will follow. Now I should be astonished to find that names are really consistent. And here let us revert to our former discussion: Were we not saying that all things are in motion and progress and flux, and that this idea of motion is expressed by names? Do you not conceive that to be the meaning of them?

*Crat.* Yes; that is assuredly their meaning, and the true meaning.

But names are not really consistent. Many words are expressive of rest, though many more of motion. In any case, however, the truth of a principle cannot be established by majorities.

*Soc.* Let us revert to ἐπιστήμη (knowledge), and observe 437 how ambiguous this word is, seeming rather to signify stopping the soul at things than going round with them; and therefore we should leave the beginning as at present, and not reject the ε (cp. 412 A), but make an insertion of an ι instead of an ε (not πιστήμη, but ἐπιστήμη). Take another example: βέβαιον (sure) is clearly the expression of station and position, and not of motion. Again, the word ἰστορία (enquiry) bears upon the face of it the stopping (ἰστάναι) of the stream; and the word πιστὸν (faithful) certainly indicates cessation of motion; then, again, μνήμη (memory), as any one may see, expresses rest in the soul, and not motion. Moreover, words such as ἀμαρτία and συμφορὰ, which have a bad sense, viewed in the light of their etymologies will be the same as σύνεσις and ἐπιστήμη and other words which have a good sense (cp. ὁμαρτεῖν, συνιέναι, ἔτεσθαι, συμφέρεισθαι); and much the same may be said of ἀμθία and ἀκολασία, for ἀμαθία



may be explained as ἡ ἄμα θεῶ ἰόντος πορεία, and ἀκολασία as ἡ ἀκολουθία τοῖς πράγμασιν. Thus the names which in these instances we find to have the worst sense, will turn out to be framed on the same principle as those which have the best. And any one I believe who would take the trouble might find many other examples in which the giver of names indicates, not that things are in motion or progress, but that they are at rest; which is the opposite of motion.

*Crat.* Yes, Socrates, but observe; the greater number express motion.

*Soc.* What of that, Cratylus? Are we to count them like votes? and is correctness of names the voice of the majority? Are we to say of whichever sort there are most, those are the true ones?

*Crat.* No; that is not reasonable.

*Soc.* Certainly not. But let us have done with this question and proceed to another, about which I should like to know whether you think with me. Were we not lately acknowledging that the first givers of names in states, both Hellenic and barbarous, were the legislators, and that the art which gave names was the art of the legislator?

*Crat.* Quite true.

*Soc.* Tell me, then, did the first legislators, who were the givers of the first names, know or not know the things which they named?

*Crat.* They must have known, Socrates.

438 *Soc.* Why, yes, friend Cratylus, they could hardly have been ignorant.

*Crat.* I should say not.

*Soc.* Let us return to the point from which we digressed. You were saying, if you remember, that he who gave names must have known the things which he named; are you still of that opinion?

*Crat.* I am.

*Soc.* And would you say that the giver of the first names had also a knowledge of the things which he named?

*Crat.* I should.

*Soc.* But how could he have learned or discovered things from names if the primitive names were not yet given? For,

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*Cratylus.*  
SOCRATES,  
CRATYLUS.

Another question: If the knowledge of things is only given through names, how could the legislators who first gave names have known things? And yet they could hardly have been ignorant.



*Cratylus.*SOCRATES,  
CRATYLUS.

if we are correct in our view, the only way of learning and discovering things, is either to discover names for ourselves or to learn them from others.

*Crat.* I think that there is a good deal in what you say, Socrates.

*Soc.* But if things are only to be known through names, how can we suppose that the givers of names had knowledge, or were legislators before there were names at all, and therefore before they could have known them?

The truth is  
that God gave  
language.

*Crat.* I believe, Socrates, the true account of the matter to be, that a power more than human gave things their first names, and that the names which are thus given are necessarily their true names.

Then how  
came the  
inspired giver  
of language  
to contradict  
himself?

*Soc.* Then how came the giver of the names, if he was an inspired being or God, to contradict himself? For were we not saying just now that he made some names expressive of rest and others of motion? Were we mistaken?

*Crat.* But I suppose one of the two not to be names at all.

*Soc.* And which, then, did he make, my good friend; those which are expressive of rest, or those which are expressive of motion? This is a point which, as I said before, cannot be determined by counting them.

*Crat.* No; not in that way, Socrates.

and how can  
we distinguish  
between the  
true and false  
in language?

*Soc.* But if this is a battle of names, some of them asserting that they are like the truth, others contending that *they* are, how or by what criterion are we to decide between them? For there are no other names to which appeal can be made, but obviously recourse must be had to another standard which, without employing names, will make clear which of the two are right; and this must be a standard which shows the truth of things.

*Crat.* I agree.

We must  
know things  
without  
words.

*Soc.* But if that is true, Cratylus, then I suppose that things may be known without names?

*Crat.* Clearly.

*Soc.* But how would you expect to know them? What other way can there be of knowing them, except the true and natural way, through their affinities, when they are akin to each other, and through themselves? For that which is

other and different from them must signify something other and different from them. *Cratylus.*

*Crat.* What you are saying is, I think, true.

SOCRATES,  
CRATYLUS.

439 *Soc.* Well, but reflect; have we not several times acknowledged that names rightly given are the likenesses and images of the things which they name?

*Crat.* Yes.

*Soc.* Let us suppose that to any extent you please you can learn things through the medium of names, and suppose also that you can learn them from the things themselves — which is likely to be the nobler and clearer way; to learn of the image, whether the image and the truth of which the image is the expression have been rightly conceived, or to learn of the truth whether the truth and the image of it have been duly executed?

Which is the nobler way — to study things in names or in themselves?

*Crat.* I should say that we must learn of the truth.

*Soc.* How real existence is to be studied or discovered is, I suspect, beyond you and me. But we may admit so much, that the knowledge of things is not to be derived from names. No; they must be studied and investigated in themselves.

*Crat.* Clearly, Socrates.

*Soc.* There is another point. I should not like us to be imposed upon by the appearance of such a multitude of names, all tending in the same direction. I myself do not deny that the givers of names did really give them under the idea that all things were in motion and flux; which was their sincere but, I think, mistaken opinion. And having fallen into a kind of whirlpool themselves, they are carried round, and want to drag us in after them. There is a matter, master Cratylus, about which I often dream, and should like to ask your opinion: Tell me, whether there is or is not any absolute beauty or good, or any other absolute existence?

But are there things in themselves?

*Crat.* Certainly, Socrates, I think so.

*Soc.* Then let us seek the true beauty: not asking whether a face is fair, or anything of that sort, for all such things appear to be in a flux; but let us ask whether the true beauty is not always beautiful.

*Crat.* Certainly.

*Cratylus.*SOCRATES,  
CRATYLUS.Not if all is in  
a state of flux  
and transition.

*Soc.* And can we rightly speak of a beauty which is always passing away, and is first this and then that; must not the same thing be born and retire and vanish while the word is in our mouths?

*Crat.* Undoubtedly.

*Soc.* Then how can that be a real thing which is never in the same state? for obviously things which are the same cannot change while they remain the same; and if they are always the same and in the same state, and never depart from their original form, they can never change or be moved.

*Crat.* Certainly they cannot.

*Soc.* Nor yet can they be known by any one; for at the 440 moment that the observer approaches, then they become other and of another nature, so that you cannot get any further in knowing their nature or state, for you cannot know that which has no state.

*Crat.* True.

*Soc.* Nor can we reasonably say, Cratylus, that there is knowledge at all, if everything is in a state of transition and there is nothing abiding; for knowledge too cannot continue to be knowledge unless continuing always to abide and exist. But if the very nature of knowledge changes, at the time when the change occurs there will be no knowledge; and if the transition is always going on, there will always be no knowledge, and, according to this view, there will be no one to know and nothing to be known: but if that which knows and that which is known exists ever, and the beautiful and the good and every other thing also exist, then I do not think that they can resemble a process or flux, as we were just now supposing. Whether there is this eternal nature in things, or whether the truth is what Heracleitus and his followers and many others say, is a question hard to determine; and no man of sense will like to put himself or the education of his mind in the power of names: neither will he so far trust names or the givers of names as to be confident in any knowledge which condemns himself and other existences to an unhealthy state of unreality; he will not believe that all things leak like a pot, or imagine that the world is a man who has a running at the nose. This may be true, Cratylus, but is also very likely to be untrue;

and therefore I would not have you be too easily persuaded of it. Reflect well and like a man, and do not easily accept such a doctrine; for you are young and of an age to learn. And when you have found the truth, come and tell me.

*Cratylus.*

SOCRATES,  
CRATYLUS.

*Crat.* I will do as you say, though I can assure you, Socrates, that I have been considering the matter already, and the result of a great deal of trouble and consideration is that I incline to Heracleitus.

*Soc.* Then, another day, my friend, when you come back, you shall give me a lesson; but at present, go into the country, as you are intending, and Hermogenes shall set you on your way.

*Crat.* Very good, Socrates; I hope, however, that you will continue to think about these things yourself.



PHAEDRUS.





## INTRODUCTION.

THE *Phaedrus* is closely connected with the *Symposium*, and may be regarded either as introducing or following it. The two Dialogues together contain the whole philosophy of Plato on the nature of love, which in the *Republic* and in the later writings of Plato is only introduced playfully or as a figure of speech. But in the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium* love and philosophy join hands, and one is an aspect of the other. The spiritual and emotional part is elevated into the ideal, to which in the *Symposium* mankind are described as looking forward, and which in the *Phaedrus*, as well as in the *Phaedo*, they are seeking to recover from a former state of existence. Whether the chief subject of the Dialogue is love or rhetoric, or the union of the two, or the relation of philosophy to love and to art in general, and to the human soul, will be hereafter considered. And perhaps we may arrive at some conclusion such as the following — that the dialogue is not strictly confined to a single subject, but passes from one to another with the natural freedom of conversation.

*Phaedrus.*

INTRODUC-  
TION.

**Steph.** *Phaedrus* has been spending the morning with *Lysias*, the  
227 celebrated rhetorician, and is going to refresh himself by taking a  
walk outside the wall, when he is met by *Socrates*, who professes  
that he will not leave him until he has delivered up the speech  
228 with which *Lysias* has regaled him, and which he is carrying  
about in his mind, or more probably in a book hidden under his  
cloak, and is intending to study as he walks. The imputation is  
not denied, and the two agree to direct their steps out of the  
public way along the stream of the *Ilissus* towards a plane-tree  
which is seen in the distance. There, lying down amidst pleasant  
sounds and scents, they will read the speech of *Lysias*. The  
229 country is a novelty to *Socrates*, who never goes out of the town;

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and hence he is full of admiration for the beauties of nature, which he seems to be drinking in for the first time.

As they are on their way, Phaedrus asks the opinion of Socrates respecting the local tradition of Boreas and Oreithyia. Socrates, after a satirical allusion to the 'rationalizers' of his day, replies that he has no time for these 'nice' interpretations of mythology, and he pities any one who has. When you once begin there is no end of them, and they spring from an uncritical philosophy after all. 'The proper study of mankind is man;' and he is a far more complex and wonderful being than the serpent Typho. Socrates as yet does not know himself; and why should he care to know about unearthly monsters? Engaged in such conversation, they arrive at the plane-tree; when they have found a convenient resting-place, Phaedrus pulls out the speech and reads:— 230

The speech consists of a foolish paradox which is to the effect that the non-lover ought to be accepted rather than the lover— 231 because he is more rational, more agreeable, more enduring, less suspicious, less hurtful, less boastful, less engrossing, and because there are more of them, and for a great many other reasons which are equally unmeaning. Phaedrus is captivated with the beauty of the periods, and wants to make Socrates say that nothing was or ever could be written better. Socrates does not think much of the matter, but then he has only attended to the form, and in that he has detected several repetitions and other marks of haste. He cannot agree with Phaedrus in the extreme value which he sets upon this performance, because he is afraid of doing injustice to Anacreon and Sappho and other great writers, and is almost inclined to think that he himself, or rather some power residing within him, could make a speech better than that of Lysias on the same theme, and also different from his, if he may be allowed the use of a few commonplaces which all speakers must equally employ. 236

Phaedrus is delighted at the prospect of having another speech, and promises that he will set up a golden statue of Socrates at Delphi, if he keeps his word. Some raillery ensues, and at length Socrates, conquered by the threat that he shall never again hear a speech of Lysias unless he fulfils his promise, veils his face and begins. 237

First, invoking the Muses and assuming ironically the person of

the non-lover (who is a lover all the same), he will enquire into the nature and power of love. For this is a necessary preliminary to the other question—How is the non-lover to be distinguished from the lover? In all of us there are two principles—a better and a worse—reason and desire, which are generally at war with one another; and the victory of the rational is called temperance, and the victory of the irrational intemperance or excess. The latter takes many forms and has many bad names—gluttony, drunkenness, and the like. But of all the irrational desires or excesses the greatest is that which is led away by the desire of a kindred nature to the enjoyment of personal beauty. And this is the master power of love.

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238 Here Socrates fancies that he detects in himself an unusual flow of eloquence—this newly-found gift he can only attribute to the inspiration of the place, which appears to be dedicated to the nymphs. Starting again from the philosophical basis which has been laid down, he proceeds to show how many advantages the non-lover has over the lover. The one encourages softness and effeminacy and exclusiveness; he cannot endure any superiority in his beloved; he will train him in luxury, he will keep him out of society, he will deprive him of parents, friends, money, knowledge, and of every other good, that he may have him all to himself. Then again his ways are not ways of pleasantness; he is mighty disagreeable; ‘crabbed age and youth cannot live together.’ At every hour of the night and day he is intruding upon him; there is the same old withered face and the remainder to match—and he is always repeating, in season or out of season, the praises or dispraises of his beloved, which are bad enough when he is sober, and published all over the world when he is drunk. At length his love ceases; he is converted into an enemy, and the spectacle may be seen of the lover running away from the beloved, who pursues him with vain reproaches, and demands his reward which the other refuses to pay. Too late the beloved learns, after all his pains and disagreeables, that ‘As wolves love lambs so lovers love their loves.’ (Cp. Charm. 155 D.) Here is the end; the ‘other’ or ‘non-lover’ part of the speech had better be understood, for if in the censure of the lover Socrates has broken out in verse, what will he not do in his praise of the non-lover? He has said his say and is preparing to go away.

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Phaedrus.

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Phaedrus begs him to remain, at any rate until the heat of noon has passed; he would like to have a little more conversation before they go. Socrates, who has risen, recognizes the oracular sign which forbids him to depart until he has done penance. His conscience has been awakened, and like Stesichorus when he had reviled the lovely Helen he will sing a palinode for having blasphemed the majesty of love. His palinode takes the form of a myth. 243

Socrates begins his tale with a glorification of madness, which he divides into four kinds: first, there is the art of divination or prophecy — this, in a vein similar to that pervading the Cratylus and Ion, he connects with madness by an etymological explanation (*μαντική*, *μανικῇ*) — compare *οἰονοιστική*, *οἰωνιστική*, ‘’tis all one reckoning, save the phrase is a little variations’); secondly, there is the art of purification by mysteries; thirdly, poetry or the inspiration of the Muses (cp. Ion 533 foll.), without which no man can enter their temple. All this shows that madness is one of heaven’s blessings, and may sometimes be a great deal better than sense. There is also a fourth kind of madness — that of love — which cannot be explained without enquiring into the nature of the soul. 244 245

All soul is immortal, for she is the source of all motion both in herself and in others. Her form may be described in a figure as a composite nature made up of a charioteer and a pair of winged steeds. The steeds of the gods are immortal, but ours are one mortal and the other immortal. The immortal soul soars upwards into the heavens, but the mortal drops her plumes and settles upon the earth. 246

Now the use of the wing is to rise and carry the downward element into the upper world — there to behold beauty, wisdom, goodness, and the other things of God by which the soul is nourished. On a certain day Zeus the lord of heaven goes forth in a winged chariot; and an array of gods and demi-gods and of human souls in their train, follows him. There are glorious and blessed sights in the interior of heaven, and he who will may freely behold them. The great vision of all is seen at the feast of the gods, when they ascend the heights of the empyrean — all but Hestia, who is left at home to keep house. The chariots of the gods glide readily upwards and stand upon the outside; the 247

revolution of the spheres carries them round, and they have a vision of the world beyond. But the others labour in vain; for the mortal steed, if he has not been properly trained, keeps them down and sinks them towards the earth. Of the world which is beyond the heavens, who can tell? There is an essence formless, colourless, intangible, perceived by the mind only, dwelling in the region of true knowledge. The divine mind in her revolution enjoys this fair prospect, and beholds justice, temperance, and knowledge in their everlasting essence. When fulfilled with the sight of them she returns home, and the charioteer puts up the horses in their stable, and gives them ambrosia to eat and nectar to drink. This is the life of the gods; the human soul tries to reach the same heights, but hardly succeeds; and sometimes the head of the charioteer rises above, and sometimes sinks below, the fair vision, and he is at last obliged, after much contention, to turn away and leave the plain of truth. But if the soul has followed in the train of her god and once beheld truth she is preserved from harm, and is carried round in the next revolution of the spheres; and if always following, and always seeing the truth, is then for ever unharmed. If, however, she drops her wings and falls to the earth, then she takes the form of man, and the soul which has seen most of the truth passes into a philosopher or lover; that which has seen truth in the second degree, into a king or warrior; the third, into a politician or money-maker; the fourth, into a gymnast; the fifth, into a prophet or mystic; the sixth, into a poet or imitator; the seventh, into a husbandman or craftsman; the eighth, into a sophist or demagogue; the ninth, into a tyrant. All these are states of probation, wherein he who lives righteously is improved, and he who lives unrighteously deteriorates. After death comes the judgment; the bad depart to houses of correction under the earth, the good to places of joy in heaven. When a thousand years have elapsed the souls meet together and choose the lives which they will lead for another period of existence. The soul which three times in succession has chosen the life of a philosopher or of a lover who is not without philosophy receives her wings at the close of the third millennium; the remainder have to complete a cycle of ten thousand years before their wings are restored to them. Each time there is full liberty of choice. The soul of a man may descend into a

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*Phaedrus.*

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beast, and return again into the form of man. But the form of man will only be taken by the soul which has once seen truth and acquired some conception of the universal: — this is the recollection of the knowledge which she attained when in the company of the Gods. And men in general recall only with difficulty the things of another world, but the mind of the philosopher has a better remembrance of them. For when he beholds the visible beauty of earth his enraptured soul passes in thought to those glorious sights of justice and wisdom and temperance and truth which she once gazed upon in heaven. Then she celebrated holy mysteries and beheld blessed apparitions shining in pure light, herself pure, and not as yet entombed in the body. And still, like a bird eager to quit its cage, she flutters and looks upwards, and is therefore deemed mad. Such a recollection of past days she receives through sight, the keenest of our senses, because beauty, alone of the ideas, has any representation on earth: wisdom is invisible to mortal eyes. But the corrupted nature, blindly excited by this vision of beauty, rushes on to enjoy, and would fain wallow like a brute beast in sensual pleasures. Whereas the true mystic, who has seen the many sights of bliss, when he beholds a god-like form or face is amazed with delight, and if he were not afraid of being thought mad he would fall down and worship. Then the stiffened wing begins to relax and grow again; desire which has been imprisoned pours over the soul of the lover; the germ of the wing unfolds, and stings, and pangs of birth, like the cutting of teeth, are everywhere felt. (Cp. *Symp.* 206 foll.) Father and mother, and goods and laws and proprieties are nothing to him; his beloved is his physician, who can alone cure his pain. An apocryphal sacred writer says that the power which thus works in him is by mortals called love, but the immortals call him dove, or the winged one, in order to represent the force of his wings — such at any rate is his nature. Now the characters of lovers depend upon the god whom they followed in the other world; and they choose their loves in this world accordingly. The followers of Ares are fierce and violent; those of Zeus seek out some philosophical and imperial nature; the attendants of Here find a royal love; and in like manner the followers of every god seek a love who is like their god; and to him they communicate the nature which they

have received from their god. The manner in which they take their love is as follows: — *Phaedrus.*

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I told you about the charioteer and his two steeds, the one a noble animal who is guided by word and admonition only, the other an ill-looking villain who will hardly yield to blow or spur. Together all three, who are a figure of the soul, approach the vision of love. And now a fierce conflict begins. The ill-conditioned steed rushes on to enjoy, but the charioteer, who beholds the beloved with awe, falls back in adoration, and forces both the steeds on their haunches; again the evil steed rushes forwards and pulls shamelessly. The conflict grows more and more severe; and at last the charioteer, throwing himself backwards, forces the bit out of the clenched teeth of the brute, and pulling harder than ever at the reins, covers his tongue and jaws with blood, and forces him to rest his legs and haunches with pain upon the ground. When this has happened several times, the villain is tamed and humbled, and from that time forward the soul of the lover follows the beloved in modesty and holy fear. And now their bliss is consummated; the same image of love dwells in the breast of either; and if they have self-control, they pass their lives in the greatest happiness which is attainable by man—they continue masters of themselves, and conquer in one of the three heavenly victories. But if they choose the lower life of ambition they may still have a happy destiny, though inferior, because they have not the approval of the whole soul. At last they leave the body and proceed on their pilgrim's progress, and those who have once begun can never go back. When the time comes they receive their wings and fly away, and the lovers have the same wings.

Socrates concludes: —

These are the blessings of love, and thus have I made my recantation in finer language than before: I did so in order to please *Phaedrus*. If I said what was wrong at first, please to attribute my error to *Lysias*, who ought to study philosophy instead of rhetoric, and then he will not mislead his disciple *Phaedrus*.

*Phaedrus* is afraid that he will lose conceit of *Lysias*, and that *Lysias* will be out of conceit with himself, and leave off making speeches, for the politicians have been deriding him. *Socrates* is

*Phaedrus.*

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of opinion that there is small danger of this; the politicians are themselves the great rhetoricians of the age, who desire to attain 258  
immortality by the authorship of laws. And therefore there is nothing with which they can reproach Lysias in being a writer; but there may be disgrace in being a bad one.

And what is good or bad writing or speaking? While the sun is hot in the sky above us, let us ask that question; since by rational conversation man lives, and not by the indulgence of bodily pleasures. And the grasshoppers who are chirruping 259  
around may carry our words to the Muses, who are their patronesses; for the grasshoppers were human beings themselves in a world before the Muses, and when the Muses came they died of hunger for the love of song. And they carry to them in heaven the report of those who honour them on earth. 260

The first rule of good speaking is to know and speak the truth; as a Spartan proverb says, 'true art is truth'; whereas rhetoric is 261  
an art of enchantment, which makes things appear good and evil, like and unlike, as the speaker pleases. Its use is not confined, as people commonly suppose, to arguments in the law courts and speeches in the assembly; it is rather a part of the art of disputation, under which are included both the rules of Gorgias and the eristic of Zeno. But it is not wholly devoid of truth. Superior knowledge enables us to deceive another by the help of resemblances, and to escape from such a deception when employed against ourselves. We see therefore that even in rhetoric an element of truth is required. For if we do not know the truth, 262  
we can neither make the gradual departures from truth by which men are most easily deceived, nor guard ourselves against deception.

Socrates then proposes that they shall use the two speeches as 263  
illustrations of the art of rhetoric; first distinguishing between the debatable and undisputed class of subjects. In the debatable class there ought to be a definition of all disputed matters. But 264  
there was no such definition in the speech of Lysias; nor is there any order or connection in his words any more than in a nursery rhyme. With this he compares the regular divisions of the other 265  
speech, which was his own (and yet not his own, for the local deities must have inspired him). Although only a playful composition, it will be found to embody two principles: first, that of

- 266 synthesis or the comprehension of parts in a whole; secondly, *Phaedrus*.  
analysis, or the resolution of the whole into parts. These are the  
processes of division and generalization which are so dear to the  
dialectician, that king of men. They are effected by dialectic, and  
not by rhetoric, of which the remains are but scanty after order  
and arrangement have been subtracted. There is nothing left  
but a heap of 'ologies' and other technical terms invented by  
267 Polus, Theodorus, Evenus, Tisias, Gorgias, and others, who have  
rules for everything, and who teach how to be short or long at  
pleasure. Prodicus showed his good sense when he said that  
there was a better thing than either to be short or long, which  
was to be of convenient length.
- 268 Still, notwithstanding the absurdities of Polus and others,  
rhetoric has great power in public assemblies. This power,  
however, is not given by any technical rules, but is the gift of  
genius. The real art is always being confused by rhetoricians  
269 with the preliminaries of the art. The perfection of oratory is  
like the perfection of anything else; natural power must be aided  
by art. But the art is not that which is taught in the schools of  
rhetoric; it is nearer akin to philosophy. Pericles, for instance, who  
270 was the most accomplished of all speakers, derived his eloquence  
not from rhetoric but from the philosophy of nature which he  
learnt of Anaxagoras. True rhetoric is like medicine, and the  
271 rhetorician has to consider the natures of men's souls as the  
physician considers the natures of their bodies. Such and such  
persons are to be affected in this way, such and such others in  
that; and he must know the times and the seasons for saying this  
272 or that. This is not an easy task, and this, if there be such an art,  
is the art of rhetoric.
- 273 I know that there are some professors of the art who maintain  
probability to be stronger than truth. But we maintain that  
probability is engendered by likeness of the truth which can only  
be attained by the knowledge of it, and that the aim of the good  
274 man should not be to please or persuade his fellow-servants, but to  
please his good masters who are the gods. Rhetoric has a fair  
beginning in this.

Enough of the art of speaking; let us now proceed to consider  
the true use of writing. There is an old Egyptian tale of Theuth,  
the inventor of writing, showing his invention to the god Thamus,

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who told him that he would only spoil men's memories and take away their understandings. From this tale, of which young Athens will probably make fun, may be gathered the lesson that writing is inferior to speech. For it is like a picture, which can give no answer to a question, and has only a deceitful likeness of a living creature. It has no power of adaptation, but uses the same words for all. It is not a legitimate son of knowledge, but a bastard, and when an attack is made upon this bastard neither parent nor any one else is there to defend it. The husbandman will not seriously incline to sow his seed in such a hot-bed or garden of Adonis; he will rather sow in the natural soil of the human soul which has depth of earth; and he will anticipate the inner growth of the mind, by writing only, if at all, as a remedy against the forgetfulness of age. The natural process will be far nobler, and will bring forth fruit in the minds of others as well as in his own.

The conclusion of the whole matter is just this,—that until a man knows the truth, and the manner of adapting the truth to the natures of other men, he cannot be a good orator; also, that the living is better than the written word, and that the principles of justice and truth when delivered by word of mouth are the legitimate offspring of a man's own bosom, and their lawful descendants take up their abode in others. Such an orator as he is who is possessed of them, you and I would fain become. And to all composers in the world, poets, orators, legislators, we hereby announce that if their compositions are based upon these principles, then they are not only poets, orators, legislators, but philosophers. All others are mere flatterers and putters together of words. This is the message which Phaedrus undertakes to carry to Lysias from the local deities, and Socrates himself will carry a similar message to his favourite Isocrates, whose future distinction as a great rhetorician he prophesies. The heat of the day has passed, and after offering up a prayer to Pan and the nymphs, Socrates and Phaedrus depart.

INTRODUCTION.

There are two principal controversies which have been raised about the *Phaedrus*; the first relates to the subject, the second to the date of the *Dialogue*.

There seems to be a notion that the work of a great artist



like Plato cannot fail in unity, and that the unity of a dialogue requires a single subject. But the conception of unity really applies in very different degrees and ways to different kinds of art; to a statue, for example, far more than to any kind of literary composition, and to some species of literature far more than to others. Nor does the dialogue appear to be a style of composition in which the requirement of unity is most stringent; nor should the idea of unity derived from one sort of art be hastily transferred to another. The double titles of several of the Platonic Dialogues are a further proof that the severer rule was not observed by Plato. The Republic is divided between the search after justice and the construction of the ideal state; the Parmenides between the criticism of the Platonic ideas and of the Eleatic one or being; the Gorgias between the art of speaking and the nature of the good; the Sophist between the detection of the Sophist and the correlation of ideas. The Theaetetus, the Politicus, and the Philebus have also digressions which are but remotely connected with the main subject.

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Thus the comparison of Plato's other writings, as well as the reason of the thing, lead us to the conclusion that we must not expect to find one idea pervading a whole work, but one, two, or more, as the invention of the writer may suggest, or his fancy wander. If each dialogue were confined to the development of a single idea, this would appear on the face of the dialogue, nor could any controversy be raised as to whether the Phaedrus treated of love or rhetoric. But the truth is that Plato subjects himself to no rule of this sort. Like every great artist he gives unity of form to the different and apparently distracting topics which he brings together. He works freely and is not to be supposed to have arranged every part of the dialogue before he begins to write. He fastens or weaves together the frame of his discourse loosely and imperfectly, and which is the warp and which is the woof cannot always be determined.

The subjects of the Phaedrus (exclusive of the short introductory passage about mythology which is suggested by the local tradition) are first the false or conventional art of rhetoric; secondly, love or the inspiration of beauty and knowledge, which is described as madness; thirdly, dialectic or the art of composition and division; fourthly, the true rhetoric, which is based



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upon dialectic, and is neither the art of persuasion nor knowledge of the truth alone, but the art of persuasion founded on knowledge of truth and knowledge of character; fifthly, the superiority of the spoken over the written word. The continuous thread which appears and reappears throughout is rhetoric; this is the ground into which the rest of the Dialogue is worked, here and there embroidered with fine words which are not in Socrates' manner, as he says, 'in order to please Phaedrus.' The speech of Lysias which has thrown Phaedrus into an ecstasy is adduced as an example of the false rhetoric; the first speech of Socrates, though an improvement, partakes of the same character; his second speech, which is full of that higher element said to have been learned of Anaxagoras by Pericles, and which in the midst of poetry does not forget order, is an illustration of the higher or true rhetoric. This higher rhetoric is based upon dialectic, and dialectic is a sort of inspiration akin to love (cp. *Symp.* 210 foll.); in these two aspects of philosophy the technicalities of rhetoric are absorbed. And so the example becomes also the deeper theme of discourse. The true knowledge of things in heaven and earth is based upon enthusiasm or love of the ideas going before us and ever present to us in this world and in another; and the true order of speech or writing proceeds accordingly. Love, again, has three degrees: first, of interested love corresponding to the conventionalities of rhetoric; secondly, of disinterested or mad love, fixed on objects of sense, and answering, perhaps, to poetry; thirdly, of disinterested love directed towards the unseen, answering to dialectic or the science of the ideas. Lastly, the art of rhetoric in the lower sense is found to rest on a knowledge of the natures and characters of men, which Socrates at the commencement of the Dialogue has described as his own peculiar study.

Thus amid discord a harmony begins to appear; there are many links of connection which are not visible at first sight. At the same time the *Phaedrus*, although one of the most beautiful of the Platonic Dialogues, is also more irregular than any other. For insight into the world, for sustained irony, for depth of thought, there is no Dialogue superior, or perhaps equal to it. Nevertheless the form of the work has tended to obscure some of Plato's higher aims.

The first speech is composed 'in that balanced style in which the wise love to talk' (Symp. 185 C). The characteristics of rhetoric are insipidity, mannerism, and monotonous parallelism of clauses. There is more rhythm than reason; the creative power of imagination is wanting.

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'Tis Greece, but living Greece no more.'

Plato has seized by anticipation the spirit which hung over Greek literature for a thousand years afterwards. Yet doubtless there were some who, like Phaedrus, felt a delight in the harmonious cadence and the pedantic reasoning of the rhetoricians newly imported from Sicily, which had ceased to be awakened in them by really great works, such as the odes of Anacreon or Sappho or the orations of Pericles. That the first speech was really written by Lysias is improbable. Like the poem of Solon, or the story of Thamus and Theuth, or the funeral oration of Aspasia (if genuine), or the pretence of Socrates in the *Cratylus* that his knowledge of philology is derived from Euthyphro, the invention is really due to the imagination of Plato, and may be compared to the parodies of the Sophists in the *Protagoras*. Numerous fictions of this sort occur in the *Dialogues*, and the gravity of Plato has sometimes imposed upon his commentators. The introduction of a considerable writing of another would seem not to be in keeping with a great work of art, and has no parallel elsewhere in Plato.

In the second speech Socrates is exhibited as beating the rhetoricians at their own weapons; he 'an unpractised man and they masters of the art.' True to his character, he must, however, profess that the speech which he makes is not his own, for he knows nothing of himself. (Cp. Symp. 201 D.) Regarded as a rhetorical exercise, the superiority of his speech seems to consist chiefly in a better arrangement of the topics; he begins with a definition of love, and he gives weight to his words by going back to general maxims; a lesser merit is the greater liveliness of Socrates, which hurries him into verse and relieves the monotony of the style.

But Plato had doubtless a higher purpose than to exhibit Socrates as the rival or superior of the Athenian rhetoricians. Even in the speech of Lysias there is a germ of truth, and

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this is further developed in the parallel oration of Socrates. First, passionate love is overthrown by the sophistical or interested, and then both yield to that higher view of love which is afterwards revealed to us. The extreme of commonplace is contrasted with the most ideal and imaginative of speculations. Socrates, half in jest and to satisfy his own wild humour, takes the disguise of Lysias, but he is also in profound earnest and in a deeper vein of irony than usual. Having improvised his own speech, which is based upon the model of the preceding, he condemns them both. Yet the condemnation is not to be taken seriously, for he is evidently trying to express an aspect of the truth. To understand him, we must make abstraction of morality and of the Greek manner of regarding the relation of the sexes. In this, as in his other discussions about love, what Plato says of the loves of men must be transferred to the loves of women before we can attach any serious meaning to his words. Had he lived in our times he would have made the transposition himself. But seeing in his own age the impossibility of woman being the intellectual helpmate or friend of man (except in the rare instances of a Diotima or an Aspasia), seeing that, even as to personal beauty, her place was taken by young mankind instead of womankind, he tries to work out the problem of love without regard to the distinctions of nature. And full of the evils which he recognized as flowing from the spurious form of love, he proceeds with a deep meaning, though partly in joke, to show that the 'non-lover's' love is better than the 'lover's.'

We may raise the same question in another form: Is marriage preferable with or without love? 'Among ourselves,' as we may say, a little parodying the words of Pausanias in the Symposium, 'there would be one answer to this question: the practice and feeling of some foreign countries appears to be more doubtful.' Suppose a modern Socrates, in defiance of the received notions of society and the sentimental literature of the day, alone against all the writers and readers of novels, to suggest this enquiry, would not the younger 'part of the world be ready to take off its coat and run at him might and main?' (Rep. v. 474.) Yet, if like Peisthæterus in Aristophanes, he could persuade the 'birds' to hear him, retiring a little behind a rampart, not of pots

and dishes, but of unreadable books, he might have something to say for himself. Might he not argue, 'that a rational being should not follow the dictates of passion in the most important act of his or her life'? Who would willingly enter into a contract at first sight, almost without thought, against the advice and opinion of his friends, at a time when he acknowledges that he is not in his right mind? And yet they are praised by the authors of romances, who reject the warnings of their friends or parents, rather than those who listen to them in such matters. Two inexperienced persons, ignorant of the world and of one another, how can they be said to choose? — they draw lots, whence also the saying, 'marriage is a lottery.' Then he would describe their way of life after marriage; how they monopolize one another's affections to the exclusion of friends and relations: how they pass their days in unmeaning fondness or trivial conversation; how the inferior of the two drags the other down to his or her level; how the cares of a family 'breed meanness in their souls.' In the fulfilment of military or public duties, they are not helpers but hinderers of one another: they cannot undertake any noble enterprise, such as makes the names of men and women famous, from domestic considerations. Too late their eyes are opened; they were taken unawares and desire to part company. Better, he would say, a 'little love at the beginning,' for heaven might have increased it; but now their foolish fondness has changed into mutual dislike. In the days of their honeymoon they never understood that they must provide against offences, that they must have interests, that they must learn the art of living as well as loving. Our misogynist will not appeal to Anacreon or Sappho for a confirmation of his view, but to the universal experience of mankind. How much nobler, in conclusion, he will say, is friendship, which does not receive unmeaning praises from novelists and poets, is not exacting or exclusive, is not impaired by familiarity, is much less expensive, is not so likely to take offence, seldom changes, and may be dissolved from time to time without the assistance of the courts. Besides, he will remark that there is a much greater choice of friends than of wives — you may have more of them and they will be far more improving to your mind. They will not keep you dawdling at home, or dancing attendance upon them; or

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withdraw you from the great world and stirring scenes of life and action which would make a man of you.

In such a manner, turning the seamy side outwards, a modern Socrates might describe the evils of married and domestic life. They are evils which mankind in general have agreed to conceal, partly because they are compensated by greater goods. Socrates or Archilochus would soon have to sing a palinode for the injustice done to lovely Helen, or some misfortune worse than blindness might befall them. Then they would take up their parable again and say: — that there were two loves, a higher and a lower, holy and unholy, a love of the mind and a love of the body.

'Let me not to the marriage of true minds  
Admit impediments. Love is not love  
Which alters when it alteration finds.

\* \* \* \* \*

Love 's not time's fool, though rosy lips and cheeks  
Within his bending sickle's compass come;  
Love alters not with his brief hours and weeks,  
But bears it out even to the edge of doom.'

But this true love of the mind cannot exist between two souls, until they are purified from the grossness of earthly passion: they must pass through a time of trial and conflict first; in the language of religion they must be converted or born again. Then they would see the world transformed into a scene of heavenly beauty; a divine idea would accompany them in all their thoughts and actions. Something too of the recollections of childhood might float about them still; they might regain that old simplicity which had been theirs in other days at their first entrance on life. And although their love of one another was ever present to them, they would acknowledge also a higher love of duty and of God, which united them. And their happiness would depend upon their preserving in them this principle — not losing the ideals of justice and holiness and truth, but renewing them at the fountain of light. When they have attained to this exalted state, let them marry (something too may be conceded to the animal nature of man): or live together in holy and innocent friendship. The poet might describe in eloquent words the nature of such a union; how after many struggles the true love was found: how the two passed their lives together in the service of God and man; how



their characters were reflected upon one another, and seemed to grow more like year by year; how they read in one another's eyes the thoughts, wishes, actions of the other; how they saw each other in God; how in a figure they grew wings like doves, and were 'ready to fly away together and be at rest.' And lastly, he might tell how, after a time at no long intervals, first one and then the other fell asleep, and 'appeared to the unwise' to die, but were reunited in another state of being, in which they saw justice and holiness and truth, not according to the imperfect copies of them which are found in this world, but justice absolute in existence absolute, and so of the rest. And they would hold converse not only with each other, but with blessed souls everywhere; and would be employed in the service of God, every soul fulfilling his own nature and character, and would see into the wonders of earth and heaven, and trace the works of creation to their author.

So, partly in jest but also 'with a certain degree of seriousness,' we may appropriate to ourselves the words of Plato. The use of such a parody, though very imperfect, is to transfer his thoughts to our sphere of religion and feeling, to bring him nearer to us and us to him. Like the Scriptures, Plato admits of endless applications, if we allow for the difference of times and manners; and we lose the better half of him when we regard his Dialogues merely as literary compositions. Any ancient work which is worth reading has a practical and speculative as well as a literary interest. And in Plato, more than in any other Greek writer, the local and transitory is inextricably blended with what is spiritual and eternal. Socrates is necessarily ironical; for he has to withdraw from the received opinions and beliefs of mankind. We cannot separate the transitory from the permanent; nor can we translate the language of irony into that of plain reflection and common sense. But we can imagine the mind of Socrates in another age and country; and we can interpret him by analogy with reference to the errors and prejudices which prevail among ourselves. To return to the *Phaedrus*:—

Both speeches are strongly condemned by Socrates as sinful and blasphemous towards the god Love, and as worthy only of some haunt of sailors to which good manners were unknown.

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The meaning of this and other wild language to the same effect, which is introduced by way of contrast to the formality of the two speeches (Socrates has a sense of relief when he has escaped from the trammels of rhetoric), seems to be that the two speeches proceed upon the supposition that love is and ought to be interested, and that no such thing as a real or disinterested passion, which would be at the same time lasting, could be conceived. 'But did I call this "love"? O God, forgive my blasphemy. This is not love. Rather it is the love of the world. But there is another kingdom of love, a kingdom not of this world, divine, eternal. And this other love I will now show you in a mystery.'

Then follows the famous myth, which is a sort of parable, and like other parables ought not to receive too minute an interpretation. In all such allegories there is a great deal which is merely ornamental, and the interpreter has to separate the important from the unimportant. Socrates himself has given the right clue when, in using his own discourse afterwards as the text for his examination of rhetoric, he characterizes it as a 'partly true and tolerably credible mythus' (265 C), in which amid poetical figures, order and arrangement were not forgotten.

The soul is described in magnificent language as the self-moved and the source of motion in all other things. This is the philosophical theme or proem of the whole. But ideas must be given through something, and under the pretext that to realize the true nature of the soul would be not only tedious but impossible, we at once pass on to describe the souls of gods as well as men under the figure of two winged steeds and a charioteer. No connection is traced between the soul as the great motive power and the triple soul which is thus imaged. There is no difficulty in seeing that the charioteer represents the reason, or that the black horse is the symbol of the sensual or concupiscent element of human nature. The white horse also represents rational impulse, but the description in 253, 'a lover of honour and modesty and temperance, and a follower of true glory,' though similar, does not at once recall the 'spirit' (*θυμὸς*) of the Republic. The two steeds really correspond in a figure more nearly to the appetitive and moral or semi-rational soul of Aristotle. And thus, for the first time perhaps in the history of philosophy, we have represented to us the threefold division of psychology. The

image of the charioteer and the steeds has been compared with a similar image which occurs in the verses of Parmenides; but it is important to remark that the horses of Parmenides have no allegorical meaning, and that the poet is only describing his own approach in a chariot to the regions of light and the house of the goddess of truth.

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The triple soul has had a previous existence, in which following in the train of some god, from whom she derived her character, she beheld partially and imperfectly the vision of absolute truth. All her after existence, passed in many forms of men and animals, is spent in regaining this. The stages of the conflict are many and various; and she is sorely let and hindered by the animal desires of the inferior or concupiscent steed. Again and again she beholds the flashing beauty of the beloved. But before that vision can be finally enjoyed the animal desires must be subjected.

The moral or spiritual element in man is represented by the immortal steed which, like *θυμὸς* in the Republic, always sides with the reason. Both are dragged out of their course by the furious impulses of desire. In the end something is conceded to the desires, after they have been finally humbled and overpowered. And yet the way of philosophy, or perfect love of the unseen, is total abstinence from bodily delights. 'But all men cannot receive this saying': in the lower life of ambition they may be taken off their guard and stoop to folly unawares, and then, although they do not attain to the highest bliss, yet if they have once conquered they may be happy enough.

The language of the Meno and the Phaedo as well as of the Phaedrus seems to show that at one time of his life Plato was quite serious in maintaining a former state of existence. His mission was to realize the abstract; in that, all good and truth, all the hopes of this and another life seemed to centre. To him abstractions, as we call them, were another kind of knowledge—an inner and unseen world, which seemed to exist far more truly than the fleeting objects of sense which were without him. When we are once able to imagine the intense power which abstract ideas exercised over the mind of Plato, we see that there was no more difficulty to him in realizing the eternal existence of them and of the human minds which were

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associated with them, in the past and future than in the present. The difficulty was not how they could exist, but how they could fail to exist. In the attempt to regain this 'saving' knowledge of the ideas, the sense was found to be as great an enemy as the desires; and hence two things which to us seem quite distinct are inextricably blended in the representation of Plato.

Thus far we may believe that Plato was serious in his conception of the soul as a motive power, in his reminiscence of a former state of being, in his elevation of the reason over sense and passion, and perhaps in his doctrine of transmigration. Was he equally serious in the rest? For example, are we to attribute his tripartite division of the soul to the gods? Or is this merely assigned to them by way of parallelism with men? The latter is the more probable; for the horses of the gods are both white, i. e. their every impulse is in harmony with reason; their dualism, on the other hand, only carries out the figure of the chariot. Is he serious, again, in regarding love as 'a madness'? That seems to arise out of the antithesis to the former conception of love. At the same time he appears to intimate here, as in the *Ion*, *Apology*, *Meno*, and elsewhere, that there is a faculty in man, whether to be termed in modern language genius, or inspiration, or imagination, or idealism, or communion with God, which cannot be reduced to rule and measure. Perhaps, too, he is ironically repeating the common language of mankind about philosophy, and is turning their jest into a sort of earnest. (Cp. *Phaedo* 61 B; *Symp.* 218 B.) Or is he serious in holding that each soul bears the character of a god? He may have had no other account to give of the differences of human characters to which he afterwards refers. Or, again, in his absurd derivation of *μαντική* and *οἰωνιστική* and *ἡμερος* (cp. *Cratylus*)? It is characteristic of the irony of Socrates to mix up sense and nonsense in such a way that no exact line can be drawn between them. And allegory helps to increase this sort of confusion.

As is often the case in the parables and prophecies of Scripture, the meaning is allowed to break through the figure, and the details are not always consistent. When the charioteers and their steeds stand upon the dome of heaven they behold the intangible

invisible essences which are not objects of sight. This is because the force of language can no further go. Nor can we dwell much on the circumstance, that at the completion of ten thousand years all are to return to the place from whence they came; because he represents their return as dependent on their own good conduct in the successive stages of existence. Nor again can we attribute anything to the accidental inference which would also follow, that even a tyrant may live righteously in the condition of life to which fate has called him ('he aiblins might, I dinna ken'). But to suppose this would be at variance with Plato himself and with Greek notions generally. He is much more serious in distinguishing men from animals by their recognition of the universal which they have known in a former state, and in denying that this gift of reason can ever be obliterated or lost. In the language of some modern theologians he might be said to maintain the 'final perseverance' of those who have entered on their pilgrim's progress. Other intimations of a 'metaphysic' or 'theology' of the future may also be discerned in him: (1) The moderate predestinarianism which here, as in the Republic, acknowledges the element of chance in human life, and yet asserts the freedom and responsibility of man; (2) The recognition of a moral as well as an intellectual principle in man under the image of an immortal steed; (3) The notion that the divine nature exists by the contemplation of ideas of virtue and justice — or, in other words, the assertion of the essentially moral nature of God; (4) Again, there is the hint that human life is a life of aspiration only, and that the true ideal is not to be found in art; (5) There occurs the first trace of the distinction between necessary and contingent matter; (6) The conception of the soul itself as the motive power and reason of the universe.

The conception of the philosopher, or the philosopher and lover in one, as a sort of madman, may be compared with the Republic and Theaetetus, in both of which the philosopher is regarded as a stranger and monster upon the earth. The whole myth, like the other myths of Plato, describes in a figure things which are beyond the range of human faculties, or inaccessible to the knowledge of the age. That philosophy should be represented as the inspiration of love is a conception that

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will become more familiar to us in the Symposium, and is the expression partly of Plato's enthusiasm for the idea, and is also an indication of the real power exercised by the passion of friendship over the mind of the Greek. The master in the art of love knew that there was a mystery in these feelings and their associations, and especially in the contrast of the sensible and permanent which is afforded by them; and he sought to explain this, as he explained universal ideas, by a reference to a former state of existence. The capriciousness of love is also derived by him from an attachment to some god in a former world. The singular remark that the beloved is more affected than the lover at the final consummation of their love, seems likewise to hint at a psychological truth.

It is difficult to exhaust the meanings of a work like the *Phaedrus*, which indicates so much more than it expresses; and is full of inconsistencies and ambiguities which were not perceived by Plato himself. For example, when he is speaking of the soul does he mean the human or the divine soul? and are they both equally self-moving and constructed on the same threefold principle? We should certainly be disposed to reply that self-motion is to be attributed to God only; and on the other hand, as has been already implied (p. 412), that the appetitive and passionate elements have no place in His nature. So we should infer from the reason of the thing, but there is no indication in Plato's own writings that this was his meaning. Or, again, when he explains the different characters of men by referring them back to the nature of the God whom they served in a former state of existence, we are inclined to ask whether he is serious: Is he not rather using a mythological figure, here as elsewhere, to draw a veil over things which are beyond the limits of mortal knowledge? Once more, in speaking of beauty is he really thinking of some external form such as might have been expressed in the works of Phidias or Praxiteles; and not rather of an imaginary beauty, of a sort which extinguishes rather than stimulates vulgar love (254 E),—a heavenly beauty like that which flashed from time to time before the eyes of Dante or Bunyan? Surely the latter. But it would be idle to reconcile all the details of the passage: it is a picture, not



a system, and a picture which is for the greater part an allegory, and an allegory which allows the meaning to come through. The image of the charioteer and his steeds is placed side by side with the absolute forms of justice, temperance, and the like, which are abstract ideas only, and which are seen with the eye of the soul in her heavenly journey. The first impression of such a passage, in which no attempt is made to separate the substance from the form, is far truer than an elaborate philosophical analysis.

It is too often forgotten that the whole of the second discourse of Socrates is only an allegory, or figure of speech. For this reason, it is unnecessary to enquire whether the love of which Plato speaks is the love of men or of women. It is really a general idea which includes both, and in which the sensual element, though not wholly eradicated, is reduced to order and measure. We must not attribute a meaning to every fanciful detail. Nor is there any need to call up revolting associations, which as a matter of good taste should be banished, and which were far enough away from the mind of Plato. These and similar passages should be interpreted by the *Laws*, book viii. 836. Nor is there anything in the *Symposium*, 219, or in the *Charmides*, 155 D, in reality inconsistent with the sterner rule which Plato lays down in the *Laws*. At the same time it is not to be denied that love and philosophy are described by Socrates in figures of speech which would not be used in Christian times; or that nameless vices were prevalent at Athens and in other Greek cities; or that friendships between men were a more sacred tie, and had a more important social and educational influence than among ourselves. (See note on *Symposium*, sub fin.)

In the *Phaedrus*, as well as in the *Symposium*, there are two kinds of love, a lower and a higher, the one answering to the natural wants of the animal, the other rising above them and contemplating with religious awe the forms of justice, temperance, holiness, yet finding them also 'too dazzling bright for mortal eye,' and shrinking from them in amazement. The opposition between these two kinds of love may be compared to the opposition between the flesh and the spirit in the *Epistles* of St. Paul. It would be unmeaning to suppose that Plato, in describing the spiritual combat, in which the rational soul is

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finally victor and master of both the steeds, condescends to allow any indulgence of unnatural lusts.

Two other thoughts about love are suggested by this passage. First of all, love is represented here, as in the Symposium, as one of the great powers of nature, which takes many forms and two principal ones, having a predominant influence over the lives of men. And these two, though opposed, are not absolutely separated the one from the other. Plato, with his great knowledge of human nature, was well aware how easily one is transformed into the other, or how soon the noble but fleeting aspiration may return into the nature of the animal, while the lower instinct which is latent always remains. The intermediate sentimentalism, which has exercised so great an influence on the literature of modern Europe, had no place in the classical times of Hellas; the higher love, of which Plato speaks, is the subject, not of poetry or fiction, but of philosophy.

Secondly, there seems to be indicated a natural yearning of the human mind that the great ideas of justice, temperance, wisdom, should be expressed in some form of visible beauty, like the absolute purity and goodness which Christian art has sought to realize in the person of the Madonna. But although human nature has often attempted to represent outwardly what can be only 'spiritually discerned,' men feel that in pictures and images, whether painted or carved, or described in words only, we have not the substance but the shadow of the truth which is in heaven. There is no reason to suppose that in the fairest works of Greek art, Plato ever conceived himself to behold an image, however faint, of ideal truths. 'Not in that way was wisdom seen' (250 D).

We may now pass on to the second part of the Dialogue, which is a criticism on the first. Rhetoric is assailed on various grounds: first, as desiring to persuade, without a knowledge of the truth; and secondly, as ignoring the distinction between certain and probable matter. The three speeches are then passed in review: the first of them has no definition of the nature of love, and no order in the topics (being in these respects far inferior to the second); while the third of them is found (though a fancy of the hour) to be framed upon real

dialectical principles. But dialectic is not rhetoric; nothing on that subject is to be found in the endless treatises of rhetoric, however prolific in hard names. When Plato has sufficiently put them to the test of ridicule he touches, as with the point of a needle, the real error, which is the confusion of preliminary knowledge with creative power. No attainments will provide the speaker with genius; and the sort of attainments which can alone be of any value are the higher philosophy and the power of psychological analysis, which is given by dialectic, but not by the rules of the rhetoricians.

In this latter portion of the Dialogue there are many texts which may help us to speak and to think. The names dialectic and rhetoric are passing out of use; we hardly examine seriously into their nature and limits, and probably the arts both of speaking and of conversation have been unduly neglected by us. But the mind of Socrates pierces through the differences of times and countries into the essential nature of man; and his words apply equally to the modern world and to the Athenians of old. Would he not have asked of us, or rather is he not asking of us, Whether we have ceased to prefer appearances to reality? Let us take a survey of the professions to which he refers and try them by his standard. Is not all literature passing into criticism, just as Athenian literature in the age of Plato was degenerating into sophistry and rhetoric? We can discourse and write about poems and paintings, but we seem to have lost the gift of creating them. Can we wonder that few of them 'come sweetly from nature,' while ten thousand reviewers (*μάλα μνρίοι*) are engaged in dissecting them? Young men, like Phaedrus, are enamoured of their own literary clique and have but a feeble sympathy with the master-minds of former ages. They recognize 'a *poetical* necessity in the writings of their favourite author, even when he boldly wrote off just what came in his head.' They are beginning to think that Art is enough, just at the time when Art is about to disappear from the world. And would not a great painter, such as Michael Angelo, or a great poet, such as Shakespeare, returning to earth, 'courteously rebuke' us—would he not say that we are putting 'in the place of Art the preliminaries of Art,' confusing Art the expression of mind and truth with Art the composition

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of colours and forms; and perhaps he might more severely chastise some of us for trying to invent 'a new shudder' instead of bringing to the birth living and healthy creations? These he would regard as the signs of an age wanting in original power.

Turning from literature and the arts to law and politics, again we fall under the lash of Socrates. For do we not often make 'the worse appear the better cause,' and do not 'both parties sometimes agree to tell lies'? Is not pleading 'an art of speaking unconnected with the truth'? There is another text of Socrates which must not be forgotten in relation to this subject. In the endless maze of English law is there any 'dividing the whole into parts or reuniting the parts into a whole'—any semblance of an organized being 'having hands and feet and other members'? Instead of a system there is the Chaos of Anaxagoras (*ὁμοῦ πάντα χρίματα*) and no Mind or Order. Then again in the noble art of politics, who thinks of first principles and of true ideas? We avowedly follow not the truth but the will of the many (cp. Rep. 493). Is not legislation too a sort of literary effort, and might not statesmanship be described as the 'art of enchanting' the house? While there are some politicians who have no knowledge of the truth, but only of what is likely to be approved by 'the many who sit in judgment,' there are others who can give no form to their ideal, neither having learned 'the art of persuasion,' nor having any insight into the 'characters of men.' Once more, has not medical science become a professional routine, which many 'practise without being able to say who were their instructors'—the application of a few drugs taken from a book instead of a life-long study of the natures and constitutions of human beings? Do we see as clearly as Hippocrates 'that the nature of the body can only be understood as a whole'? (270 C; cp. Charm. 156 E.) And are not they held to be the wisest physicians who have the greatest distrust of their art? What would Socrates think of our newspapers, of our theology? Perhaps he would be afraid to speak of them; — the one *vox populi*, the other *vox Dei*, he might hesitate to attack them; or he might trace a fanciful connexion between them, and ask doubtfully, whether they are not equally inspired? He would remark that we are always searching for a belief and deploring our unbelief, seeming to prefer popular opinions unverified and contradictory to unpopular truths which

are assured to us by the most certain proofs: that our preachers are in the habit of praising God 'without regard to truth and falsehood, attributing to Him every species of greatness and glory, saying that He is all this and the cause of all that, in order that we may exhibit Him as the fairest and best of all' (Symp. 198), without any consideration of His real nature and character or of the laws by which He governs the world—seeking for a 'private judgment' and not for the truth or 'God's judgment.' What would he say of the Church, which we praise in like manner, 'meaning ourselves' (258 A), without regard to history or experience? Might he not ask, whether we 'care more for the truth of religion, or for the speaker and the country from which the truth comes'? or, whether the 'select wise' are not 'the many' after all? (Symp. 194 C.) So we may fill up the sketch of Socrates, lest, as Phaedrus says, the argument should be too 'abstract and barren of illustrations.' (Cp. Symp., Apol., Euthyphro.)

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He next proceeds with enthusiasm to define the royal art of dialectic as the power of dividing a whole into parts and of uniting the parts in a whole, and which may also be regarded (cp. Soph.) as the process of the mind talking with herself. The latter view has probably led Plato to the paradox that speech is superior to writing, in which he may seem also to be doing an injustice to himself. For the two cannot be fairly compared in the manner which Plato suggests. The contrast of the living and dead word, and the example of Socrates, which he has represented in the form of the Dialogue, seem to have misled him. For speech and writing have really different functions; the one is more transitory, more diffuse, more elastic and capable of adaptation to moods and times; the other is more permanent, more concentrated, and is uttered not to this or that person or audience, but to all the world. In the Politicus (294 foll.) the paradox is carried further; the mind or will of the king is preferred to the written law; he is supposed to be the Law personified, the ideal made Life.

Yet in both these statements there is also contained a truth; they may be compared with one another, and also with the other famous paradox, that 'knowledge cannot be taught.' Socrates means to say, that what is truly written is written in the soul,

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just as what is truly taught grows up in the soul from within and is not forced upon it from without. When planted in a congenial soil the little seed becomes a tree, and 'the birds of the air build their nests in the branches.' There is an echo of this in the prayer at the end of the Dialogue, 'Give me beauty in the inward soul, and may the inward and outward man be at one.' We may further compare the words of St. Paul, 'Written not on tables of stone, but on fleshly tables of the heart;' and again, 'Ye are my epistles known and read of all men.' There may be a use in writing as a preservative against the forgetfulness of old age, but to live is higher far, to be ourselves the book, or the epistle, the truth embodied in a person, the Word made flesh. Something like this we may believe to have passed before Plato's mind when he affirmed that speech was superior to writing. So in other ages, weary of literature and criticism, of making many books, of writing articles in reviews, some have desired to live more closely in communion with their fellow-men, to speak heart to heart, to speak and act only, and not to write, following the example of Socrates and of Christ. . . .

Some other touches of inimitable grace and art and of the deepest wisdom may be also noted; such as the prayer or 'collect' which has just been cited, 'Give me beauty,' etc.; or 'the great name which belongs to God alone' (278); or 'the saying of wiser men than ourselves that a man of sense should try to please not his fellow-servants, but his good and noble masters' (274), like St. Paul again; or the description of the 'heavenly originals' at p. 250. . . .

The chief criteria for determining the date of the Dialogue are (1) the ages of Lysias and Isocrates; (2) the character of the work.

Lysias was born in the year 458; Isocrates in the year 436, about seven years before the birth of Plato. The first of the two great rhetoricians is described as in the zenith of his fame; the second is still young and full of promise. Now it is argued that this must have been written in the youth of Isocrates, when the promise was not yet fulfilled. And thus we should have to assign the Dialogue to a year not later than 406, when Isocrates was thirty and Plato twenty-three years of age, and while Socrates himself was still alive.



Those who argue in this way seem not to reflect how easily Plato can 'invent tales of Egypt or of any other country,' and how careless he is of historical truth or probability. Who would suspect that the wise Critias, the virtuous Charmides, had ended their lives among the thirty tyrants? Who would imagine that Lysias, who is here assailed by Socrates, is the son of his old friend Cephalus? or that Isocrates himself is the enemy of Plato and his school? No arguments can be drawn from the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the characters of Plato. (Else, perhaps, it might be further argued that, judging from their extant remains, insipid rhetoric is far more characteristic of Isocrates than of Lysias.) But Plato makes use of names which have often hardly any connexion with the historical characters to whom they belong. In this instance the comparative favour shown to Isocrates may possibly be accounted for by the circumstance of his belonging to the aristocratical, as Lysias to the democratical party.

Few persons will be inclined to suppose, in the superficial manner of some ancient critics, that a dialogue which treats of love must necessarily have been written in youth. As little weight can be attached to the argument that Plato must have visited Egypt before he wrote the story of Theuth and Thamus. For there is no real proof that he ever went to Egypt; and even if he did, he might have known or invented Egyptian traditions before he went there. The late date of the *Phaedrus* will have to be established by other arguments than these: the maturity of the thought, the perfection of the style, the insight, the relation to the other Platonic Dialogues, seem to contradict the notion that it could have been the work of a youth of twenty or twenty-three years of age. The cosmological notion of the mind as the *primum mobile*, and the admission of impulse into the immortal nature, also afford grounds for assigning a later date. (Cp. *Tim.*, *Soph.*, *Laws.*) Add to this that the picture of Socrates, though in some lesser particulars,—e. g. his going without sandals, his habit of remaining within the walls, his emphatic declaration that his study is human nature,—an exact resemblance, is in the main the Platonic and not the real Socrates. Can we suppose 'the young man to have told such lies' about his master while he was still alive? Moreover, when two Dialogues are so closely connected as the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*, there is great improbability in



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supposing that one of them was written at least twenty years after the other. The conclusion seems to be, that the Dialogue was written at some comparatively late but unknown period of Plato's life, after he had deserted the purely Socratic point of view, but before he had entered on the more abstract speculations of the Sophist or the Philebus. Taking into account the divisions of the soul, the doctrine of transmigration, the contemplative nature of the philosophic life, and the character of the style, we shall not be far wrong in placing the Phaedrus in the neighbourhood of the Republic; remarking only that allowance must be made for the poetical element in the Phaedrus, which, while falling short of the Republic in definite philosophic results, seems to have glimpses of a truth beyond.

Two short passages, which are unconnected with the main subject of the Dialogue, may seem to merit a more particular notice: (1) the *locus classicus* about mythology; (2) the tale of the grasshoppers.

The first passage is remarkable as showing that Plato was entirely free from what may be termed the Euhemerism of his age. For there were Euhemerists in Hellas long before Euhemerus. Early philosophers, like Anaxagoras and Metrodorus, had found in Homer and mythology hidden meanings. Plato, with a truer instinct, rejects these attractive interpretations; he regards the inventor of them as 'unfortunate;' and they draw a man off from the knowledge of himself. There is a latent criticism, and also a poetical sense in Plato, which enable him to discard them, and yet in another way to make use of poetry and mythology as a vehicle of thought and feeling. What would he have said of the discovery of Christian doctrines in these old Greek legends? While acknowledging that such interpretations are 'very nice,' would he not have remarked that they are found in all sacred literatures? They cannot be tested by any criterion of truth, or used to establish any truth; they add nothing to the sum of human knowledge; they are — what we please, and if employed as 'peacemakers' between the new and old are liable to serious misconstruction, as he elsewhere remarks (Rep. ii. 378 E). And therefore he would have 'bid Farewell to them; the study of them would take up too much of his time; and he has not as yet learned the true nature of religion.' The 'sophistical'

interest of Phaedrus, the little touch about the two versions of the story, the ironical manner in which these explanations are set aside — ‘the common opinion about them is enough for me’ — the allusion to the serpent Typho may be noted in passing; also the general agreement between the tone of this speech and the remark of Socrates which follows afterwards, ‘I am a diviner, but a poor one.’

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The tale of the grasshoppers is naturally suggested by the surrounding scene. They are also the representatives of the Athenians as children of the soil. Under the image of the lively chirruping grasshoppers who inform the Muses in heaven about those who honour them on earth, Plato intends to represent an Athenian audience (*τεττίγεσσιν ἐοικότες*). The story is introduced, apparently, to mark a change of subject, and also, like several other allusions which occur in the course of the Dialogue, in order to preserve the scene in the recollection of the reader.

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No one can duly appreciate the dialogues of Plato, especially the Phaedrus, Symposium, and portions of the Republic, who has not a sympathy with mysticism. To the uninitiated, as he would himself have acknowledged, they will appear to be the dreams of a poet who is disguised as a philosopher. There is a twofold difficulty in apprehending this aspect of the Platonic writings. First, we do not immediately realize that under the marble exterior of Greek literature was concealed a soul thrilling with spiritual emotion. Secondly, the forms or figures which the Platonic philosophy assumes, are not like the images of the prophet Isaiah, or of the Apocalypse, familiar to us in the days of our youth. By mysticism we mean, not the extravagance of an erring fancy, but the concentration of reason in feeling, the enthusiastic love of the good, the true, the one, the sense of the infinity of knowledge and of the marvel of the human faculties. When feeding upon such thoughts the ‘wing of the soul’ is renewed and gains strength; she is raised above ‘the manikins of earth’ and their opinions, waiting in wonder to know, and working with reverence to find out what God in this or in another life may reveal to her.

## *On the decline of Greek Literature.*

*Phaedrus.*

ONE of the main purposes of Plato in the *Phaedrus* is to satirize Rhetoric, or rather the Professors of Rhetoric who swarmed at Athens in the fourth century before Christ. As in the opening of the Dialogue he ridicules the interpreters of mythology; as in the *Protagoras* he mocks at the Sophists; as in the *Euthydemus* he makes fun of the word-splitting Eristics; as in the *Cratylus* he ridicules the fancies of Etymologers; as in the *Meno* and *Gorgias* and some other dialogues he makes reflections and casts sly imputations upon the higher classes at Athens; so in the *Phaedrus*, chiefly in the latter part, he aims his shafts at the rhetoricians. The profession of rhetoric was the greatest and most popular in Athens, necessary 'to a man's salvation,' or at any rate to his attainment of wealth or power; but Plato finds nothing wholesome or genuine in the purpose of it. It is a veritable 'sham,' having no relation to fact, or to truth of any kind. It is antipathetic to him not only as a philosopher, but also as a great writer. He cannot abide the tricks of the rhetoricians, or the pedantries and mannerisms which they introduce into speech and writing. He sees clearly how far removed they are from the ways of simplicity and truth, and how ignorant of the very elements of the art which they are professing to teach. The thing which is most necessary of all, the knowledge of human nature, is hardly if at all considered by them. The true rules of composition, which are very few, are not to be found in their voluminous systems. Their pretentiousness, their omniscience, their large fortunes, their impatience of argument, their indifference to first principles, their stupidity, their progresses through Hellas accompanied by a troop of their disciples — these things were very distasteful to Plato, who esteemed genius far above art, and was quite sensible of the interval which separated them (*Phaedr.* 269 D). It is the interval which separates

Sophists and rhetoricians from ancient famous men and women *Phædrus.* such as Homer and Hesiod, Anacreon and Sappho, Æschylus and Sophocles; and the Platonic Socrates is afraid that, if he approves the former, he will be disowned by the latter (235 B). The spirit of rhetoric was soon to overspread all Hellas; and Plato with prophetic insight may have seen, from afar, the great literary waste or dead level, or interminable marsh, in which Greek literature was soon to disappear. A similar vision of the decline of the Greek drama and of the contrast of the old literature and the new was present to the mind of Aristophanes after the death of the three great tragedians (*Frogs*, l. 93 ff.). After about a hundred, or at most two hundred years if we exclude Homer, the genius of Hellas had ceased to flower or blossom. The dreary waste which follows, beginning with the Alexandrian writers and even before them in the platitudes of Isocrates and his school, spreads over much more than a thousand years. And from this decline the Greek language and literature, unlike the Latin, which has come to life in new forms and been developed into the great European languages, never recovered.

This monotony of literature, without merit, without genius and without character, is a phenomenon which deserves more attention than it has hitherto received; it is a phenomenon unique in the literary history of the world. How could there have been so much cultivation, so much diligence in writing, and so little mind or real creative power? Why did a thousand years invent nothing better than Sibylline books, Orphic poems, Byzantine imitations of classical histories, Christian reproductions of Greek plays, novels like the silly and obscene romances of Longus and Heliodorus, innumerable forged epistles, a great many epigrams, biographies of the meanest and most meagre description, a sham philosophy which was the bastard progeny of the union between Hellas and the East? Only in Plutarch, in Lucian, in Longinus, in the Roman emperors Marcus Aurelius and Julian, in some of the Christian fathers, are there any traces of good sense or originality, or any power of arousing the interest of later ages. And when new books ceased to be written, why did hosts of grammarians and interpreters flock in, who never attain to any sound notion either of grammar or interpretation? Why did the physical sciences

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never arrive at any true knowledge or make any real progress? Why did poetry droop and languish? Why did history degenerate into fable? Why did words lose their power of expression? Why were ages of external greatness and magnificence attended by all the signs of decay in the human mind which are possible?

To these questions many answers may be given, which if not the true causes, are at least to be reckoned among the symptoms of the decline. There is the want of method in physical science, the want of criticism in history, the want of simplicity or delicacy in poetry, the want of political freedom, which is the true atmosphere of public speaking, in oratory. The ways of life were luxurious and commonplace. Philosophy had become extravagant, eclectic, abstract, devoid of any real content. At length it ceased to exist. It had spread words like plaster over the whole field of knowledge. It had grown ascetic on one side, mystical on the other. Neither of these tendencies was favourable to literature. There was no sense of beauty either in language or in art. The Greek world became vacant, barbaric, oriental. No one had anything new to say, or any conviction of truth. The age had no remembrance of the past, no power of understanding what other ages thought and felt. The Catholic faith had degenerated into dogma and controversy. For more than a thousand years not a single writer of first-rate, or even of second-rate, reputation has a place in the innumerable rolls of Greek literature.

If we seek to go deeper, we can still only describe the outward nature of the clouds or darkness which were spread over the heavens during so many ages without relief or light. We may say that this, like several other long periods in the history of the human race, was destitute, or deprived of the moral qualities which are the root of literary excellence. It had no life or aspiration, no national or political force, no desire for consistency, no love of knowledge for its own sake. It did not attempt to pierce the mists which surrounded it. It did not propose to itself to go forward and scale the heights of knowledge, but to go backwards and seek at the beginning what can only be found towards the end. It was lost in doubt and ignorance. It rested upon tradition and authority. It had none of the higher play of fancy which creates poetry; and where there is no true poetry,



neither can there be any good prose. It had no great characters, *Phædrus.* and therefore it had no great writers. It was incapable of distinguishing between words and things. It was so hopelessly below the ancient standard of classical Greek art and literature that it had no power of understanding or of valuing them. It is doubtful whether any Greek author was justly appreciated in antiquity except by his own contemporaries; and this neglect of the great classical authors of the past led to the disappearance of the larger part of them, while the Greek fathers were mostly preserved. There is no reason to suppose that, in the century before the taking of Constantinople, much more was in existence than the scholars of the Renaissance carried away with them to Italy.

The character of Greek literature sank lower as time went on. It consisted more and more of compilations, of scholia, of extracts, of commentaries, forgeries, imitations. The commentator or interpreter had no conception of his author as a whole, and very little of the context of any passage which he was explaining. The least things were preferred by him to the greatest. The question of a reading, or a grammatical form, or an accent, or the uses of a word, took the place of the aim or subject of the book. He had no sense of the beauties of an author, and very little light is thrown by him on real difficulties. He interprets past ages by his own. The greatest classical writers are the least appreciated by him. This seems to be the reason why so many of them have perished, why great historians like Philistus hardly exist even in fragments, why the lyric poets have almost wholly disappeared; why, out of the eighty or ninety tragedies of Æschylus and Sophocles, only seven of each have been preserved. Such an age of sciolism and scholasticism may possibly once more get the better of the literary world. There are those who prophesy that the signs of such a day are again appearing among us, and that at the end of the present century no writer of the first class will be still alive. They think that the Muse of Literature may transfer herself to other countries less dried up or worn out than our own. They seem to see the withering effect of criticism on original genius. No one can doubt that such a decay or decline of literature and of art seriously affects the manners and character of a nation. It takes away half the joys and refinements of life; it increases its dulness and grossness.



*Phaedrus.*

Hence it becomes a matter of great interest to consider how, if at all, such a degeneracy may be averted. Is there any elixir which can restore life and youth to the literature of a nation, or at any rate which can prevent it becoming unmanned and enfeebled?

First there is the progress of education. It is possible, and even probable, that the extension of the means of knowledge over a wider area and to persons living under new conditions may lead to many new combinations of thought and language. But, as yet, experience does not favour the realization of such a hope or promise. It may be truly answered that at present the training of teachers and the methods of education are very imperfect, and therefore that we cannot judge of the future by the present. When more of our youth are trained in the best literatures, and in the best parts of them, their minds may be expected to have a larger growth. They will have more interests, more thoughts, more material for conversation; they will have a higher standard and begin to think for themselves. The number of persons who will have the opportunity of receiving the highest education through the cheap press, and by the help of high schools and colleges, may increase tenfold. It is likely that in every thousand persons there is at least one who is far above the average in natural capacity, but the seed which is in him dies for want of cultivation. It has never had any stimulus to grow, or any field in which to blossom and produce fruit. Here is a great reservoir or treasure-house of human intelligence out of which new waters may flow and cover the earth. If at any time the great men of the world should die out, and originality or genius appear to suffer a partial eclipse, there is a boundless hope in the multitude of intelligences for future generations. They may bring gifts to men such as the world has never received before. They may begin at a higher point and yet take with them all the results of the past. The co-operation of many may have effects not less striking, though different in character from those which the creative genius of a single man, such as Bacon or Newton, formerly produced. There is also great hope to be derived, not merely from the extension of education over a wider area, but from the continuance of it during many generations. Educated parents will have children fit to receive education; and these again will

grow up under circumstances far more favourable to the growth of intelligence than any which have hitherto existed in our own or in former ages. *Phaedrus.*

Even if we were to suppose no more men of genius to be produced, the great writers of ancient or of modern times will remain to furnish abundant materials of education to the coming generation. Now that every nation holds communication with every other, we may truly say in a fuller sense than formerly that 'the thoughts of men are widened with the process of the suns.' They will not be 'cribbed, cabined, and confined' within a province or an island. The East will provide elements of culture to the West as well as the West to the East. The religions and literatures of the world will be open books, which he who wills may read. The human race may not be always ground down by bodily toil, but may have greater leisure for the improvement of the mind. The increasing sense of the greatness and infinity of nature will tend to awaken in men larger and more liberal thoughts. The love of mankind may be the source of a greater development of literature than nationality has ever been. There may be a greater freedom from prejudice and party; we may better understand the whereabouts of truth, and therefore there may be more success and fewer failures in the search for it. Lastly, in the coming ages we shall carry with us the recollection of the past, in which are necessarily contained many seeds of revival and renaissance in the future. So far is the world from becoming exhausted, so groundless is the fear that literature will ever die out.



# PHAEDRUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES.

PHAEDRUS.

SCENE:— Under a plane-tree, by the banks of the Ilissus.

Steph. 227 *Socrates.* My dear Phaedrus, whence come you, and whither are you going?

*Phaedrus.* I have come from Lysias the son of Cephalus, and I am going to take a walk outside the wall, for I have been sitting with him the whole morning; and our common friend Acumenus tells me that it is much more refreshing to walk in the open air than to be shut up in a cloister.

*Soc.* There he is right. Lysias then, I suppose, was in the town?

*Phaedr.* Yes, he was staying with Epicrates, here at the house of Morychus; that house which is near the temple of Olympian Zeus.

*Soc.* And how did he entertain you? Can I be wrong in supposing that Lysias gave you a feast of discourse?

*Phaedr.* You shall hear, if you can spare time to accompany me.

*Soc.* And should I not deem the conversation of you and Lysias 'a thing of higher import,' as I may say in the words of Pindar, 'than any business'?

*Phaedr.* Will you go on?

*Soc.* And will you go on with the narration?

*Phaedr.* My tale, Socrates, is one of your sort, for love was the theme which occupied us—love after a fashion: Lysias has been writing about a fair youth who was being tempted, but not by a lover; and this was the point: he

*Phaedrus.*

SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.

Phaedrus, who has just left Lysias the orator, is about to take a walk in the country, when he meets Socrates.

The theme of Lysias was a paradox about love.

*Phaedrus.*  
*SOCRATES,*  
*PHAEDRUS.*

ingeniously proved that the non-lover should be accepted rather than the lover.

*Soc.* O that is noble of him ! I wish that he would say the poor man rather than the rich, and the old man rather than the young one ;— then he would meet the case of me and of many a man ; his words would be quite refreshing, and he would be a public benefactor. For my part, I do so long to hear his speech, that if you walk all the way to Megara, and when you have reached the wall come back, as Herodicus recommends, without going in, I will keep you company.

*Phaedr.* What do you mean, my good Socrates? How can you imagine that my unpractised memory can do justice 22 to an elaborate work, which the greatest rhetorician of the age spent a long time in composing. Indeed, I cannot ; I would give a great deal if I could.

The ways of  
 Phaedrus are  
 well known to  
 Socrates,

*Soc.* I believe that I know Phaedrus about as well as I know myself, and I am very sure that the speech of Lysias was repeated to him, not once only, but again and again ;— he insisted on hearing it many times over and Lysias was very willing to gratify him ; at last, when nothing else would do, he got hold of the book, and looked at what he most wanted to see,— this occupied him during the whole morning ;— and then when he was tired with sitting, he went out to take a walk, not until, by the dog, as I believe, he had simply learned by heart the entire discourse, unless it was unusually long, and he went to a place outside the wall that he might practise his lesson. There he saw a certain lover of discourse who had a similar weakness ;— he saw and rejoiced ; now thought he, ‘ I shall have a partner in my revels.’ And he invited him to come and walk with him. But when the lover of discourse begged that he would repeat the tale, he gave himself airs and said, ‘ No I cannot,’ as if he were indisposed ; although, if the hearer had refused, he would sooner or later have been compelled by him to listen whether he would or no. Therefore, Phaedrus, bid him do at once what he will soon do whether bidden or not.

*Phaedr.* I see that you will not let me off until I speak in some fashion or other ; verily therefore my best plan is to speak as I best can.

*Soc.* A very true remark, that of yours.

*Phaedr.* I will do as I say; but believe me, Socrates, I did not learn the very words—O no; nevertheless I have a general notion of what he said, and will give you a summary of the points in which the lover differed from the non-lover. Let me begin at the beginning.

*Phaedrus.*

SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.

*Soc.* Yes, my sweet one; but you must first of all show what you have in your left hand under your cloak, for that roll, as I suspect, is the actual discourse. Now, much as I love you, I would not have you suppose that I am going to have your memory exercised at my expense, if you have Lysias himself here.

who observes  
that he has got  
the roll hidden  
under his  
cloak.

*Phaedr.* Enough; I see that I have no hope of practising  
229 my art upon you. But if I am to read, where would you please to sit?

*Soc.* Let us turn aside and go by the Ilissus; we will sit down at some quiet spot.

*Phaedr.* I am fortunate in not having my sandals, and as you never have any, I think that we may go along the brook and cool our feet in the water; this will be the easiest way, and at midday and in the summer is far from being unpleasant.

*Soc.* Lead on, and look out for a place in which we can sit down.

*Phaedr.* Do you see that tallest plane-tree in the distance?

*Soc.* Yes.

*Phaedr.* There are shade and gentle breezes, and grass on which we may either sit or lie down.

*Soc.* Move forward.

*Phaedr.* I should like to know, Socrates, whether the place is not somewhere here at which Boreas is said to have carried off Orithyia from the banks of the Ilissus?

On the way to  
the Ilissus  
Phaedrus asks  
the opinion of  
Socrates re-  
specting the  
truth of a  
local legend.

*Soc.* Such is the tradition.

*Phaedr.* And is this the exact spot? The little stream is delightfully clear and bright; I can fancy that there might be maidens playing near.

*Soc.* I believe that the spot is not exactly here, but about a quarter of a mile lower down, where you cross to the temple of Artemis, and there is, I think, some sort of an altar of Boreas at the place.

*Phaedr.* I have never noticed it; but I beseech you to tell me, Socrates, do you believe this tale?



*Phaedrus.*SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.

Socrates desires to know himself before he enquires into the newly found philosophy of mythology.

*Soc.* The wise are doubtful, and I should not be singular if, like them, I too doubted. I might have a rational explanation that Orithyia was playing with Pharmacia, when a northern gust carried her over the neighbouring rocks; and this being the manner of her death, she was said to have been carried away by Boreas. There is a discrepancy, however, about the locality; according to another version of the story she was taken from the Areopagus, and not from this place. Now I quite acknowledge that these allegories are very nice, but he is not to be envied who has to invent them; much labour and ingenuity will be required of him; and when he has once begun, he must go on and rehabilitate Hippocentaurs and chimeras dire. Gorgons and winged steeds flow in apace, and numberless other inconceivable and portentous natures. And if he is sceptical about them, and would fain reduce them one after another to the rules of probability, this sort of crude philosophy will take up a great deal of time. Now I have no leisure for such enquiries; shall I tell you why? I must first know myself, as the Delphian inscription says; to be curious about that which is not my concern, while I am still in ignorance of my own self, would be ridiculous. And therefore I bid farewell to all this; the common opinion is enough for me. For, as I was saying, I want to know not about this, but about myself: am I a monster more complicated and swollen with passion than the serpent Typho, or a creature of a gentler and simpler sort, to whom Nature has given a diviner and lowlier destiny? But let me ask you, friend: have we not reached the plane-tree to which you were conducting us? 230

*Phaedr.* Yes, this is the tree.

Socrates, who is an inhabitant of the city, is charmed with the sights and sounds of the country which are so new to him.

*Soc.* By Herè, a fair resting-place, full of summer sounds and scents. Here is this lofty and spreading plane-tree, and the agnus castus high and clustering, in the fullest blossom and the greatest fragrance; and the stream which flows beneath the plane-tree is deliciously cold to the feet. Judging from the ornaments and images, this must be a spot sacred to Achelous and the Nymphs. How delightful is the breeze:—so very sweet; and there is a sound in the air shrill and summerlike which makes answer to the chorus of the cicadae. But the greatest charm of all is the grass, like

a pillow gently sloping to the head. My dear Phaedrus, you have been an admirable guide.

*Phaedrus.*

SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.

*Phaedr.* What an incomprehensible being you are, Socrates: when you are in the country, as you say, you really are like some stranger who is led about by a guide. Do you ever cross the border? I rather think that you never venture even outside the gates.

*Soc.* Very true, my good friend; and I hope that you will excuse me when you hear the reason, which is, that I am a lover of knowledge, and the men who dwell in the city are my teachers, and not the trees or the country. Though I do indeed believe that you have found a spell with which to draw me out of the city into the country, like a hungry cow before whom a bough or a bunch of fruit is waved. For only hold up before me in like manner a book, and you may lead me all round Attica, and over the wide world. And now having arrived, I intend to lie down, and do you choose any posture in which you can read best. Begin.

He is a lover of knowledge and of mankind, and therefore can only be drawn out of the city by the help of a book.

*Phaedr.* Listen. You know how matters stand with me; and how, as I conceive, this affair may be arranged for the advantage of both of us. And I maintain that I ought not to fail in my suit, because I am not your lover: for lovers repent of the kindnesses which they have shown when their passion ceases, but to the non-lovers who are free and not under any compulsion, no time of repentance ever comes; for they confer their benefits according to the measure of their ability, in the way which is most conducive to their own interest. Then again, lovers consider how by reason of their love they have neglected their own concerns and rendered service to others: and when to these benefits conferred they add on the troubles which they have endured, they think that they have long ago made to the beloved a very ample return. But the non-lover has no such tormenting recollections; he has never neglected his affairs or quarrelled with his relations; he has no troubles to add up or excuses to invent; and being well rid of all these evils, why should he not freely do what will gratify the beloved? If you say that the lover is more to be esteemed, because his love is thought to be greater; for he is willing to say and do what is hateful to other men, in order to please his beloved;

The non-lover should be preferred to the lover, because he is more his own master, less exacting, more likely to keep another's secrets, less fickle, less suspected, less jealous, less exclusive;

*Phaedrus.*

LYSIAS.

and there are  
more non-  
lovers than  
lovers.

—that, if true, is only a proof that he will prefer any future love to his present, and will injure his old love at the pleasure of the new. And how, in a matter of such infinite importance, can a man be right in trusting himself to one who is afflicted with a malady which no experienced person would attempt to cure, for the patient himself admits that he is not in his right mind, and acknowledges that he is wrong in his mind, but says that he is unable to control himself? And if he came to his right mind, would he ever imagine that the desires were good which he conceived when in his wrong mind? Once more, there are many more non-lovers than lovers; and if you choose the best of the lovers, you will not have many to choose from; but if from the non-lovers, the choice will be larger, and you will be far more likely to find among them a person who is worthy of your friendship. If public opinion be your dread, and you would avoid reproach, in all probability the lover, who is always thinking that other men are as emulous of him as he is of 232 them, will boast to some one<sup>1</sup> of his successes, and make a show of them openly in the pride of his heart;—he wants others to know that his labour has not been lost; but the non-lover is more his own master, and is desirous of solid good, and not of the opinion of mankind. Again, the lover may be generally noted or seen following the beloved (this is his regular occupation), and whenever they are observed to exchange two words they are supposed to meet about some affair of love either past or in contemplation; but when non-lovers meet, no one asks the reason why, because people know that talking to another is natural, whether friendship or mere pleasure be the motive. Once more, if you fear the fickleness of friendship, consider that in any other case a quarrel might be a mutual calamity; but now, when you have given up what is most precious to you, you will be the greater loser, and therefore, you will have more reason in being afraid of the lover, for his vexations are many, and he is always fancying that every one is leagued against him. Wherefore also he debarb his beloved from society; he will not have you intimate with the wealthy, lest they should

<sup>1</sup> Reading τῷ λέγειν; cf. infra, τῷ διαλέγεσθαι.

233 exceed him in wealth, or with men of education, lest they should be his superiors in understanding; and he is equally afraid of anybody's influence who has any other advantage over himself. If he can persuade you to break with them, you are left without a friend in the world; or if, out of a regard to your own interest, you have more sense than to comply with his desire, you will have to quarrel with him. But those who are non-lovers, and whose success in love is the reward of their merit, will not be jealous of the companions of their beloved, and will rather hate those who refuse to be his associates, thinking that their favourite is slighted by the latter and benefited by the former; for more love than hatred may be expected to come to him out of his friendship with others. Many lovers too have loved the person of a youth before they knew his character or his belongings; so that when their passion has passed away, there is no knowing whether they will continue to be his friends; whereas, in the case of non-lovers who were always friends, the friendship is not lessened by the favours granted; but the recollection of these remains with them, and is an earnest of good things to come. Further, I say that you are likely to be improved by me, whereas the lover will spoil you. For they praise your words and actions in a wrong way; partly, because they are afraid of offending you, and also, their judgment is weakened by passion. Such are the feats which love exhibits; he makes things painful to the disappointed which give no pain to others; he compels the successful lover to praise what ought not to give him pleasure, and therefore the beloved is to be pitied rather than envied. But if you listen to me, in the first place, I, in my intercourse with you, shall not merely regard present enjoyment, but also future advantage, being not mastered by love, but my own master; nor for small causes taking violent dislikes, but even when the cause is great, slowly laying up little wrath—unintentional offences I shall forgive, and intentional ones I shall try to prevent; and these are the marks of a friendship which will last. Do you think that a lover only can be a firm friend? reflect:—if this were true, we should set small value on sons, or fathers, or mothers; nor should we ever have loyal friends, for our

*Phaedrus.*  
LYSIAS.

The non-lover will improve, the lover will spoil, the object of his affections.

The non-lover is the firmer friend; he is less of a beggar and

*Phaedrus.*LYSIAS,  
SOCRATES.more of a  
giver; his love  
is more lasting  
and is never  
censured.

love of them arises not from passion, but from other associations. Further, if we ought to shower favours on those who are the most eager suitors,—on that principle, we ought always to do good, not to the most virtuous, but to the most needy; for they are the persons who will be most relieved, and will therefore be the most grateful; and when you make a feast you should invite not your friend, but the beggar and the empty soul; for they will love you, and attend you, and come about your doors, and will be the best pleased, and the most grateful, and will invoke many a blessing on your head. Yet surely you ought not to be granting favours to those who besiege you with prayer, but to those who are best able to reward you; nor to the lover only, but to those who are worthy of love; nor to those who will enjoy the bloom of your youth, but to those who will share their possessions with you in age; nor to those who, having succeeded, will glory in their success to others, but to those who will be modest and tell no tales; nor to those who care about you for a moment only, but to those who will continue your friends through life; nor to those who, when their passion is over, will pick a quarrel with you, but rather to those who, when the charm of youth has left you, will show their own virtue. Remember what I have said; and consider yet this further point: friends admonish the lover under the idea that his way of life is bad, but no one of his kindred ever yet censured the non-lover, or thought that he was ill-advised about his own interests.

‘Perhaps you will ask me whether I propose that you should indulge every non-lover. To which I reply that not even the lover would advise you to indulge all lovers, for the indiscriminate favour is less esteemed by the rational recipient, and less easily hidden by him who would escape the censure of the world. Now love ought to be for the advantage of both parties, and for the injury of neither.

‘I believe that I have said enough; but if there is anything more which you desire or which in your opinion needs to be supplied, ask and I will answer.’

Now, Socrates, what do you think? Is not the discourse excellent, more especially in the matter of the language?

*Soc.* Yes, quite admirable; the effect on me was ravishing.



And this I owe to you, Phaedrus, for I observed you while reading to be in an ecstasy, and thinking that you are more experienced in these matters than I am, I followed your example, and, like you, my divine darling, I became inspired with a phrenzy.

*Phaedr.* Indeed, you are pleased to be merry.

*Soc.* Do you mean that I am not in earnest?

*Phaedr.* Now don't talk in that way, Socrates, but let me have your real opinion; I adjure you, by Zeus, the god of friendship, to tell me whether you think that any Hellene could have said more or spoken better on the same subject.

*Soc.* Well, but are you and I expected to praise the sentiments of the author, or only the clearness, and roundness, and finish, and tournure of the language? As to the first  
235 I willingly submit to your better judgment, for I am not worthy to form an opinion, having only attended to the rhetorical manner; and I was doubting whether this could have been defended even by Lysias himself; I thought, though I speak under correction, that he repeated himself two or three times, either from want of words or from want of pains; and also, he appeared to me ostentatiously to exult in showing how well he could say the same thing<sup>1</sup> in two or three ways.

*Phaedr.* Nonsense, Socrates; what you call repetition was the especial merit of the speech; for he omitted no topic of which the subject rightly allowed, and I do not think that any one could have spoken better or more exhaustively.

*Soc.* There I cannot go along with you. Ancient sages, men and women, who have spoken and written of these things, would rise up in judgment against me, if out of complaisance I assented to you.

*Phaedr.* Who are they, and where did you hear anything better than this?

*Soc.* I am sure that I must have heard; but at this moment I do not remember from whom; perhaps from Sappho the fair, or Anacreon the wise; or, possibly, from a prose writer. Why do I say so? Why, because I perceive that my bosom is full, and that I could make another speech

*Phaedrus.*

SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.

Socrates has no great opinion of the speech. At first the effect on him was ravishing, but only because he saw that Phaedrus was ravished. Of the matter he will submit to Phaedrus's judgement; of the manner he does not think much.

He has heard many a better speech, and thinks that he could make one

<sup>1</sup> Reading ταῦτά.



*Phaedrus.*

SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.

himself, not  
entirely dif-  
ferent, for  
this or any  
speech must  
have some  
good topics  
which are  
common-  
places.

as good as that of Lysias, and different. Now I am certain that this is not an invention of my own, who am well aware that I know nothing, and therefore I can only infer that I have been filled through the ears, like a pitcher, from the waters of another, though I have actually forgotten in my stupidity who was my informant.

*Phaedr.* That is grand:—but never mind where you heard the discourse or from whom; let that be a mystery not to be divulged even at my earnest desire. Only, as you say, promise <sup>1</sup> to make another and better oration, equal in length and entirely new, on the same subject; and I, like the nine Archons, will promise to set up a golden image at Delphi, not only of myself, but of you, and as large as life.

*Soc.* You are a dear golden ass if you suppose me to mean that Lysias has altogether missed the mark, and that I can make a speech from which all his arguments are to be excluded. The worst of authors will say something which is to the point. Who, for example, could speak on this thesis of yours without praising the discretion of the non-lover 236 and blaming the indiscretion of the lover? These are the commonplaces of the subject which must come in (for what else is there to be said?) and must be allowed and excused; the only merit is in the arrangement of them, for there can be none in the invention; but when you leave the commonplaces, then there may be some originality.

One at least  
of Lysias'  
common-  
places is  
not to be  
excluded.

*Phaedr.* I admit that there is reason in what you say, and I too will be reasonable, and will allow you to start with the premiss that the lover is more disordered in his wits than the non-lover; if in what remains you make a longer and better speech than Lysias, and use other arguments, then I say again, that a statue you shall have of beaten gold, and take your place by the colossal offerings of the Cypselids at Olympia.

*Soc.* How profoundly in earnest is the lover, because to tease him I lay a finger upon his love! And so, Phaedrus, you really imagine that I am going to improve upon the ingenuity of Lysias?

*Phaedr.* There I have you as you had me, and you must

<sup>1</sup> Reading ὑπόσχεσ εἰπεῖν.

just speak 'as you best can.' Do not let us exchange 'tu quoque' as in a farce, or compel me to say to you as you said to me, 'I know Socrates as well as I know myself, and he was wanting to speak, but he gave himself airs.' Rather I would have you consider that from this place we stir not until you have unbosomed yourself of the speech; for here are we all alone, and I am stronger, remember, and younger than you:— 'Wherefore perpend,' and do not compel me to use violence.

*Phaedrus.*

SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.

Fair play.  
Phaedrus is determined to extort a speech from Socrates, as Socrates has already extorted the speech of Lysias from himself.

*Soc.* But, my sweet Phaedrus, how ridiculous it would be of me to compete with Lysias in an extempore speech! He is a master in his art and I am an untaught man.

*Phaedr.* You see how matters stand; and therefore let there be no more pretences; for, indeed, I know the word that is irresistible.

*Soc.* Then don't say it.

*Phaedr.* Yes, but I will; and my word shall be an oath. 'I say, or rather swear'—but what god will be the witness of my oath?— 'By this plane-tree I swear, that unless you repeat the discourse here in the face of this very plane-tree, I will never tell you another; never let you have word of another!'

*Soc.* Villain! I am conquered; the poor lover of discourse has no more to say.

*Phaedr.* Then why are you still at your tricks?

*Soc.* I am not going to play tricks now that you have taken the oath, for I cannot allow myself to be starved.

*Phaedr.* Proceed.

237 *Soc.* Shall I tell you what I will do?

*Phaedr.* What?

*Soc.* I will veil my face and gallop through the discourse as fast as I can, for if I see you I shall feel ashamed and not know what to say.

*Phaedr.* Only go on and you may do anything else which you please.

*Soc.* Come, O ye Muses, melodious, as ye are called, whether you have received this name from the character of your strains, or because the Melians<sup>1</sup> are a musical race,

<sup>1</sup> In the original, *λίγειαί Λίγυες*.



*Phaedrus.*

SOCRATES.

help, O help me in the tale which my good friend here desires me to rehearse, in order that his friend whom he always deemed wise may seem to him to be wiser now than ever.

Before we can determine whether the non-lover or lover is to be preferred we must enquire into the nature of love.

Once upon a time there was a fair boy, or, more properly speaking, a youth; he was very fair and had a great many lovers; and there was one special cunning one, who had persuaded the youth that he did not love him, but he really loved him all the same; and one day when he was paying his addresses to him, he used this very argument—that he ought to accept the non-lover rather than the lover; his words were as follows:—

‘All good counsel begins in the same way; a man should know what he is advising about, or his counsel will come to nought. But people imagine that they know about the nature of things, when they don’t know about them, and, not having come to an understanding at first because they think that they know, they end, as might be expected, in contradicting one another and themselves. Now you and I must not be guilty of this fundamental error which we condemn in others; but as our question is whether the lover or non-lover is to be preferred, let us first of all agree in defining the nature and power of love, and then, keeping our eyes upon the definition and to this appealing, let us further enquire whether love brings advantage or disadvantage.

There are two principles in man, rational desire and irrational: the latter is the power of love.

‘Every one sees that love is a desire, and we know also that non-lovers desire the beautiful and good. Now in what way is the lover to be distinguished from the non-lover? Let us note that in every one of us there are two guiding and ruling principles which lead us whither they will; one is the natural desire of pleasure, the other is an acquired opinion which aspires after the best; and these two are sometimes in harmony and then again at war, and sometimes the one, sometimes the other conquers. When opinion by the help of reason leads us to the best, the conquering principle is called temperance; but when desire, which is 238 devoid of reason, rules in us and drags us to pleasure, that power of misrule is called excess. Now excess has many names, and many members, and many forms, and any of

these forms when very marked gives a name, neither honourable nor creditable, to the bearer of the name. The desire of eating, for example, which gets the better of the higher reason and the other desires, is called gluttony, and he who is possessed by it is called a glutton; the tyrannical desire of drink, which inclines the possessor of the desire to drink, has a name which is only too obvious, and there can be as little doubt by what name any other appetite of the same family would be called;—it will be the appropriate name of that desire which from time to time predominates. And now I think that you will perceive the drift of my discourse; but as every spoken word is in a manner plainer than the unspoken, I had better say further that the irrational desire which overcomes the tendency of opinion towards right, and is led away to the enjoyment of beauty, and especially of personal beauty, by the desires which are her own kindred—that supreme desire, I say, which by leading<sup>1</sup> conquers and by the force of passion is reinforced, from this very force, receiving a name, is called love (*ἐρρωμένως ἔρως*).

*Phaedrus.*

SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.

And now, dear Phaedrus, I shall pause for an instant to ask whether you do not think me, as I appear to myself, inspired?

Socrates attributes to inspiration the flow of words which is so unusual with him.

*Phaedr.* Yes, Socrates, you seem to have a very unusual flow of words.

*Soc.* Listen to me, then, in silence; for surely the place is holy; so that you must not wonder, if, as I proceed, I appear to be in a divine fury, for already I am getting into dithyrambics.

*Phaedr.* Nothing can be truer.

*Soc.* The responsibility rests with you. But hear what follows, and perhaps the fit may be averted; all is in their hands above. I will go on talking to my youth. Listen:—

Thus, my friend, we have declared and defined the nature of the subject. Keeping the definition in view, let us now enquire what advantage or disadvantage is likely to ensue from the lover or the non-lover to him who accepts their advances.

He who is the victim of his passions and the slave of pleasure will of course desire to make his beloved as agreeable to himself as possible. Now to him who has a mind diseased

<sup>1</sup> Reading ἀγωγῇ.

*Phaedrus.*

SOCRATES.

The lover desires to secure the inferiority and suberviency of the beloved.

He will banish from him society and philosophy.

He will choose an effeminate person for his beloved, and train him to be more effeminate.

anything is agreeable which is not opposed to him, but that which is equal or superior is hateful to him, and therefore the lover will not brook any superiority or equality on the part of his beloved; he is always employed in reducing him to inferiority. And the ignorant is the inferior of the wise, the coward of the brave, the slow of speech of the speaker, the dull of the clever. These, and not these only, are the mental defects of the beloved;—defects which, when implanted by nature, are necessarily a delight to the lover, and, when not implanted, he must contrive to implant them in him, if he would not be deprived of his fleeting joy. And therefore he cannot help being jealous, and will debar his beloved from the advantages of society which would make a man of him, and especially from that society which would have given him wisdom, and thereby he cannot fail to do him great harm. That is to say, in his excessive fear lest he should come to be despised in his eyes he will be compelled to banish from him divine philosophy; and there is no greater injury which he can inflict upon him than this. He will contrive that his beloved shall be wholly ignorant, and in everything shall look to him; he is to be the delight of the lover's heart, and a curse to himself. Verily, a lover is a profitable guardian and associate for him in all that relates to his mind.

Let us next see how his master, whose law of life is pleasure and not good, will keep and train the body of his servant. Will he not choose a beloved who is delicate rather than sturdy and strong? One brought up in shady bowers and not in the bright sun, a stranger to manly exercises and the sweat of toil, accustomed only to a soft and luxurious diet, instead of the hues of health having the colours of paint and ornament, and the rest of a piece?—such a life as any one can imagine and which I need not detail at length. But I may sum up all that I have to say in a word, and pass on. Such a person in war, or in any of the great crises of life, will be the anxiety of his friends and also of his lover, and certainly not the terror of his enemies; which nobody can deny.

And now let us tell what advantage or disadvantage the beloved will receive from the guardianship and society of



his lover in the matter of his property; this is the next point to be considered. The lover will be the first to see what, indeed, will be sufficiently evident to all men, that he desires above all things to deprive his beloved of his dearest and best and holiest possessions, father, mother, kindred, friends, of all whom he thinks may be hinderers or reprovers of their most sweet converse; he will even cast a jealous eye upon his gold and silver or other property, because these make him a less easy prey, and when caught less manageable; hence he is of necessity displeased at his possession of them and rejoices at their loss; and he would like him to be wifeless, childless, homeless, as well; and the longer the better, for the longer he is all this, the longer he will enjoy him.

There are some sort of animals, such as flatterers, who are dangerous and mischievous enough, and yet nature has mingled a temporary pleasure and grace in their composition. You may say that a courtesan is hurtful, and disapprove of such creatures and their practices, and yet for the time they are very pleasant. But the lover is not only hurtful to his love; he is also an extremely disagreeable companion. The old proverb says that 'birds of a feather flock together'; I suppose that equality of years inclines them to the same pleasures, and similarity begets friendship; yet you may have more than enough even of this; and verily constraint is always said to be grievous. Now the lover is not only unlike his beloved, but he forces himself upon him. For he is old and his love is young, and neither day nor night will he leave him if he can help; necessity and the sting of desire drive him on, and allure him with the pleasure which he receives from seeing, hearing, touching, perceiving him in every way. And therefore he is delighted to fasten upon him and to minister to him. But what pleasure or consolation can the beloved be receiving all this time? Must he not feel the extremity of disgust when he looks at an old shrivelled face and the remainder to match, which even in a description is disagreeable, and quite detestable when he is forced into daily contact with his lover; moreover he is jealously watched and guarded against everything and everybody, and has to hear misplaced

*Phaedrus.*

SOCRATES.

He will deprive him of friends, parents, kinsmen, and of every other good.

The flatterer and the courtesan may be pleasant, although pernicious, but the old withered lover must always be detestable to the object of his affections.



*Phædrus.*

SOCRATES.

and exaggerated praises of himself, and censures equally inappropriate, which are intolerable when the man is sober, and, besides being intolerable, are published all over the world in all their indelicacy and wearisomeness when he is drunk.

The lover,  
having effected  
the ruin of  
his beloved  
in body and  
mind, runs  
away without  
paying.

And not only while his love continues is he mischievous and unpleasant, but when his love ceases he becomes a perfidious enemy of him on whom he showered his oaths and prayers and promises, and yet could hardly prevail upon him to tolerate the tedium of his company even from motives of interest. The hour of payment arrives, and now he is the servant of another master; instead of love and infatuation, wisdom and temperance are his bosom's lords; but the beloved has not discovered the change which has taken place in him, when he asks for a return and recalls to his recollection former sayings and doings; he believes himself to be speaking to the same person, and the other, not having the courage to confess the truth, and not knowing how to fulfil the oaths and promises which he made when under the dominion of folly, and having now grown wise and temperate, does not want to do as he did or to be as he was before. And so he runs away and is constrained to be a defaulter; the oyster-shell<sup>1</sup> has fallen with the other side uppermost—he changes pursuit into flight, while the other is compelled to follow him with passion and imprecation, not knowing that he ought never from the first to have accepted a demented lover instead of a sensible non-lover; and that in making such a choice he was giving himself up to a faithless, morose, envious, disagreeable being, hurtful to his estate, hurtful to his bodily health, and still more hurtful to the cultivation of his mind, than which there neither is nor ever will be anything more honoured in the eyes both of gods and men. Consider this, fair youth, and know that in the friendship of the lover there is no real kindness; he has an appetite and wants to feed upon you:

'As wolves love lambs so lovers love their loves.'

But I told you so, I am speaking in verse, and therefore I had better make an end; enough.

<sup>1</sup> In allusion to a game in which two parties fled or pursued according as an oyster-shell which was thrown into the air fell with the dark or light side uppermost.

*Phaedr.* I thought that you were only half-way and were going to make a similar speech about all the advantages of accepting the non-lover. Why do you not proceed?

*Soc.* Does not your simplicity observe that I have got out of dithyrambics into heroics, when only uttering a censure on the lover? And if I am to add the praises of the non-lover what will become of me? Do you not perceive that I am already overtaken by the Nymphs to whom you have mischievously exposed me? And therefore I will only add that the non-lover has all the advantages in which the lover is accused of being deficient. And now I will say no more; there has been enough of both of them. Leaving the tale to its fate, I will cross the river and make the best of my way home, lest a worse thing be inflicted upon me by you.

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*Phaedr.* Not yet, Socrates; not until the heat of the day has passed; do you not see that the hour is almost noon? there is the midday sun standing still, as people say, in the meridian. Let us rather stay and talk over what has been said, and then return in the cool.

*Soc.* Your love of discourse, Phaëdrus, is superhuman, simply marvellous, and I do not believe that there is any one of your contemporaries who has either made or in one way or another has compelled others to make an equal number of speeches. I would except Simmias the Theban, but all the rest are far behind you. And now I do verily believe that you have been the cause of another.

*Phaedr.* That is good news. But what do you mean?

*Soc.* I mean to say that as I was about to cross the stream the usual sign was given to me,—that sign which always forbids, but never bids, me to do anything which I am going to do; and I thought that I heard a voice saying in my ear that I had been guilty of impiety, and that I must not go away until I had made an atonement. Now I am a diviner, though not a very good one, but I have enough religion for my own use, as you might say of a bad writer—his writing is good enough for him; and I am beginning to see that I was in error. O my friend, how prophetic is the human soul! At the time I had a sort of misgiving, and, like Ibycus, ‘I was troubled; I feared that I might be buying honour from

*Phaëdrus.*

SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.

Enough:—  
What is said  
in dispraise of  
the lover may  
be converted  
into praise of  
the non-lover.

The divine  
sign forbids  
Socrates to  
depart; he is  
sensible that  
he has been  
guilty of  
impiety.

*Phædrus.*  
*SOCRATES,*  
*PHAEDRUS.*

men at the price of sinning against the gods.' Now I recognize my error.

*Phædr.* What error?

*Soc.* That was a dreadful speech which you brought with you, and you made me utter one as bad.

*Phædr.* How so?

*Soc.* It was foolish, I say,—to a certain extent, impious; can anything be more dreadful?

*Phædr.* Nothing, if the speech was really such as you describe.

*Soc.* Well, and is not Eros the son of Aphrodite, and a god?

*Phædr.* So men say.

The two  
 speeches were  
 a blasphemy  
 against the  
 God of love.  
 Socrates  
 therefore be-  
 fore any evil  
 happens to  
 him will  
 make a  
 recantation.

*Soc.* But that was not acknowledged by Lysias in his speech, nor by you in that other speech which you by a charm drew from my lips. For if love be, as he surely is, a divinity, he cannot be evil. Yet this was the error of both the speeches. There was also a simplicity about them which was refreshing; having no truth or honesty in them, nevertheless they pretended to be something, hoping to succeed in deceiving the manikins of earth and gain celebrity among them. Wherefore I must have a purgation. And I bethink me of an ancient purgation of mythological error which was devised, not by Homer, for he never had the wit to discover why he was blind, but by Stesichorus, who was a philosopher and knew the reason why; and therefore, when he lost his eyes, for that was the penalty which was inflicted upon him for reviling the lovely Helen, he at once purged himself. And the purgation was a recantation, which began thus,—

'False is that word of mine—the truth is that thou didst not embark in ships, nor ever go to the walls of Troy;'

and when he had completed his poem, which is called 'the recantation,' immediately his sight returned to him. Now I will be wiser than either Stesichorus or Homer, in that I am going to make my recantation for reviling love before I suffer; and this I will attempt, not as before, veiled and ashamed, but with forehead bold and bare.

*Phædr.* Nothing could be more agreeable to me than to hear you say so.

*Soc.* Only think, my good Phaedrus, what an utter want of delicacy was shown in the two discourses; I mean, in my own and in that which you recited out of the book. Would not any one who was himself of a noble and gentle nature, and who loved or ever had loved a nature like his own, when we tell of the petty causes of lovers' jealousies, and of their exceeding animosities, and of the injuries which they do to their beloved, have imagined that our ideas of love were taken from some haunt of sailors to which good manners were unknown — he would certainly never have admitted the justice of our censure?

*Phaedrus.*

*SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.*

The love which they described was of a very mean and ignoble sort.

*Phaedr.* I dare say not, Socrates.

*Soc.* Therefore, because I blush at the thought of this person, and also because I am afraid of Love himself, I desire to wash the brine out of my ears with water from the spring; and I would counsel Lysias not to delay, but to write another discourse, which shall prove that 'ceteris paribus' the lover ought to be accepted rather than the non-lover.

*Phaedr.* Be assured that he shall. You shall speak the praises of the lover, and Lysias shall be compelled by me to write another discourse on the same theme.

*Soc.* You will be true to your nature in that, and therefore I believe you.

*Phaedr.* Speak, and fear not.

*Soc.* But where is the fair youth whom I was addressing before, and who ought to listen now; lest, if he hear me not, he should accept a non-lover before he knows what he is doing?

*Phaedr.* He is close at hand, and always at your service.

*Soc.* Know then, fair youth, that the former discourse was the word of Phaedrus, the son of Vain Man, who dwells in the city of Myrrhina (Myrrhinusius). And this which I am about to utter is the recantation of Stesichorus the son of Godly Man (Euphemus), who comes from the town of Desire (Himera), and is to the following effect: 'I told a lie when I said' that the beloved ought to accept the non-lover when he might have the lover, because the one is sane, and the other mad. It might be so if madness were simply an evil; but there is also a madness which is a

The second discourse of Socrates:—the purport of this is to show that love is a madness of the noble sort.

Phaedrus.

SOCRATES.

This madness  
is of four  
kinds:—

1. Prophecy  
is madness, as  
is proved by  
considerations  
of philology.

divine gift, and the source of the chiefest blessings granted to men. For prophecy is a madness, and the prophetess at Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona when out of their senses have conferred great benefits on Hellas, both in public and private life, but when in their senses few or none. And I might also tell you how the Sibyl and other inspired persons have given to many an one many an intimation of the future which has saved them from falling. But it would be tedious to speak of what every one knows.

There will be more reason in appealing to the ancient inventors of names<sup>1</sup>, who would never have connected prophecy (*μαντική*), which foretells the future and is the noblest of arts, with madness (*μανικῇ*), or called them both by the same name, if they had deemed madness to be a disgrace or dishonour;—they must have thought that there was an inspired madness which was a noble thing; for the two words, *μαντική* and *μανικῇ*, are really the same, and the letter τ is only a modern and tasteless insertion. And this is confirmed by the name which was given by them to the rational investigation of futurity, whether made by the help of birds or of other signs—this, for as much as it is an art which supplies from the reasoning faculty mind (*νοῦς*) and information (*ἱστορία*) to human thought (*οἴησις*), they originally termed *οἰονοιστική*, but the word has been lately altered and made sonorous by the modern introduction of the letter Omega (*οἰονοιστική* and *οἰωνοιστική*), and in proportion as prophecy (*μαντική*) is more perfect and august than augury, both in name and fact, in the same proportion, as the ancients testify, is madness superior to a sane mind (*σωφροσύνη*), for the one is only of human, but the other of divine origin. Again, where plagues and mightiest woes have bred in certain families, owing to some ancient blood-guiltiness, there madness has entered with holy prayers and rites, and by inspired utterances found a way of deliverance for those who are in need; and he who has part in this gift, and is truly possessed and duly out of his mind, is by the use of purifications and mysteries made whole and exempt from evil, future as well as present, and has a release from the

2. The inspiration which purges away ancient wrath.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Cratylus 388 foll.



245 calamity which was afflicting him. The third kind is the madness of those who are possessed by the Muses; which taking hold of a delicate and virgin soul, and there inspiring frenzy, awakens lyrical and all other numbers; with these adorning the myriad actions of ancient heroes for the instruction of posterity. But he who, having no touch of the Muses' madness in his soul, comes to the door and thinks that he will get into the temple by the help of art—he, I say, and his poetry are not admitted; the sane man disappears and is nowhere when he enters into rivalry with the madman.

I might tell of many other noble deeds which have sprung from inspired madness. And therefore, let no one frighten or flutter us by saying that the temperate friend is to be chosen rather than the inspired, but let him further show that love is not sent by the gods for any good to lover or beloved; if he can do so we will allow him to carry off the palm. And we, on our part, will prove in answer to him that the madness of love is the greatest of heaven's blessings, and the proof shall be one which the wise will receive, and the witling disbelieve. But first of all, let us view the affections and actions of the soul divine and human, and try to ascertain the truth about them. The beginning of our proof is as follows:—

<sup>1</sup> The soul through all her being is immortal, for that which is ever in motion is immortal; but that which moves another and is moved by another, in ceasing to move ceases also to live. Only the self-moving, never leaving itself, never ceases to move, and is the fountain and beginning of motion to all that moves besides. Now, the beginning is unbegotten, for that which is begotten has a beginning; but the beginning is begotten of nothing, for if it were begotten of something, then the begotten would not come from a beginning. But if unbegotten, it must also be indestructible; for if beginning were destroyed, there could be no beginning out of anything, nor anything out of a beginning; and all things must have a beginning. And therefore the self-moving is the beginning of motion; and this can neither be destroyed nor

*Phædrus.*

SOCRATES.

3. Poetry is madness.

4. Love is madness.

Soul is self-moving, and therefore immortal and unbegotten.

<sup>1</sup> Translated by Cicero (*Tusc. Quæst. s. 24*).



*Phaedrus.*

SOCRATES.

begotten, else the whole heavens and all creation would collapse and stand still, and never again have motion or birth. But if the self-moving is proved to be immortal, he who affirms that self-motion is the very idea and essence of the soul will not be put to confusion. For the body which is moved from without is soulless; but that which is moved from within has a soul, such motion being inherent in the soul. But if this is true, must not the soul be the self-moving, and therefore of necessity unbegotten and immortal? Enough of the soul's immortality. 246

The soul described under the image of two winged horses and a charioteer.

Of the nature of the soul, though her true form be ever a theme of large and more than mortal discourse, let me speak briefly, and in a figure. And let the figure be composite—a pair of winged horses and a charioteer. Now the winged horses and the charioteers of the gods are all of them noble and of noble descent, but those of other races are mixed; the human charioteer drives his in a pair; and one of them is noble and of noble breed, and the other is ignoble and of ignoble breed; and the driving of them of necessity gives a great deal of trouble to him. I will endeavour to explain to you in what way the mortal differs from the immortal creature. The soul in her totality has the care of inanimate being everywhere, and traverses the whole heaven in divers forms appearing;—when perfect and fully winged she soars upward, and orders the whole world; whereas the imperfect soul, losing her wings and drooping in her flight at last settles on the solid ground—there, finding a home, she receives an earthly frame which appears to be self-moved, but is really moved by her power; and this composition of soul and body is called a living and mortal creature. For immortal no such union can be reasonably believed to be; although fancy, not having seen nor surely known the nature of God, may imagine an immortal creature having both a body and also a soul which are united throughout all time. Let that, however, be as God wills, and be spoken of acceptably to him. And now let us ask the reason why the soul loses her wings!

The wing is the element of earth which soars upward.

The wing is the corporeal element which is most akin to the divine, and which by nature tends to soar aloft and carry that which gravitates downwards into the upper

region, which is the habitation of the gods. The divine is beauty, wisdom, goodness, and the like; and by these the wing of the soul is nourished, and grows apace; but when fed upon evil and foulness and the opposite of good, wastes and falls away. Zeus, the mighty lord, holding the reins of a winged chariot, leads the way in heaven, ordering all and taking care of all; and there follows him the array of gods and demi-gods, marshalled in eleven bands; Hestia alone abides at home in the house of heaven; of the rest they who are reckoned among the princely twelve march in their appointed order. They see many blessed sights in the inner heaven, and there are many ways to and fro, along which the blessed gods are passing, every one doing his own work; he may follow who will and can, for jealousy has no place in the celestial choir. But when they go to banquet and festival, then they move up the steep to the top of the vault of heaven. The chariots of the gods in even poise, obeying the rein, glide rapidly; but the others labour, for the vicious steed goes heavily, weighing down the charioteer to the earth when his steed has not been thoroughly trained:—and this is the hour of agony and extremest conflict for the soul. For the immortals, when they are at the end of their course, go forth and stand upon the outside of heaven, and the revolution of the spheres carries them round, and they behold the things beyond. But of the heaven which is above the heavens, what earthly poet ever did or ever will sing worthily? It is such as I will describe; for I must dare to speak the truth, when truth is my theme. There abides the very being with which true knowledge is concerned; the colourless, formless, intangible essence, visible only to mind, who is the pilot of the soul. The divine intelligence, being nurtured upon mind and pure knowledge, and the intelligence of every soul which is capable of receiving the food proper to it, rejoices at beholding reality, and once more gazing upon truth, is replenished and made glad, until the revolution of the worlds brings her round again to the same place. In the revolution she beholds justice, and temperance, and knowledge absolute, not in the form of generation or of relation, which men call existence, but knowledge absolute in existence absolute; and

*Phædrus.*

SOCRATES.

The great festival of the Gods, which is celebrated in the outer heavens: mortals feebly follow.

The revolution of the worlds in which the soul beholds all truth.

*Phaedrus.*

SOCRATES.

beholding the other true existences in like manner, and feasting upon them, she passes down into the interior of the heavens and returns home; and there the charioteer putting up his horses at the stall, gives them ambrosia to eat and nectar to drink.

Such is the life of the gods; but of other souls, that which follows God best and is likeliest to him lifts the head of the charioteer into the outer world, and is carried round in the revolution, troubled indeed by the steeds, and with difficulty beholding true being; while another only rises and falls, and sees, and again fails to see by reason of the unruliness of the steeds. The rest of the souls are also longing after the upper world and they all follow, but not being strong enough they are carried round below the surface, plunging, treading on one another, each striving to be first; and there is confusion and perspiration and the extremity of effort; and many of them are lamed or have their wings broken through the ill-driving of the charioteers; and all of them after a fruitless toil, not having attained to the mysteries of true being, go away, and feed upon opinion. The reason why the souls exhibit this exceeding eagerness to behold the plain of truth is that pasturage is found there, which is suited to the highest part of the soul; and the wing on which the soul soars is nourished with this. And there is a law of Destiny, that the soul which attains any vision of truth in company with a god is preserved from harm until the next period, and if attaining always is always unharmed. But when she is unable to follow, and fails to behold the truth, and through some ill-hap sinks beneath the double load of forgetfulness and vice, and her wings fall from her and she drops to the ground, then the law ordains that this soul shall at her first birth pass, not into any other animal, but only into man; and the soul which has seen most of truth shall come to the birth as a philosopher, or artist, or some musical and loving nature; that which has seen truth in the second degree shall be some righteous king or warrior chief; the soul which is of the third class shall be a politician, or economist, or trader; the fourth shall be a lover of gymnastic toils, or a physician; the fifth shall lead the life of a prophet or hierophant; to the sixth the

The trouble  
of other souls  
in the upper  
world.

They drop to  
earth and  
pass into men  
of different  
character ac-  
cording to  
their nature.

character of a poet or some other imitative artist will be assigned; to the seventh the life of an artisan or husbandman; to the eighth that of a sophist or demagogue; to the ninth that of a tyrant;—all these are states of probation, in which he who does righteously improves, and he who does unrighteously, deteriorates his lot.

*Phaedrus.*

SOCRATES.

249 Ten thousand years must elapse before the soul of each one can return to the place whence she came, for she cannot grow her wings in less; only the soul of a philosopher, guileless and true, or the soul of a lover, who is not devoid of philosophy, may acquire wings in the third of the recurring periods of a thousand years;—these, if they choose this higher life three times in succession, have wings given them, and go away at the end of three thousand years. But the other souls<sup>1</sup> receive judgment when they have completed their first life, and after the judgment they go, some of them to the houses of correction which are under the earth, and are punished; others to some place in heaven whither they are lightly borne by justice, and there they live in a manner worthy of the life which they led here when in the form of men. And at the end of the first thousand years the good souls and also the evil souls both come to draw lots and choose their second life, and they may take any which they please. The soul of a man may pass into the life of a beast, or from the beast return again into the man. But the soul which has never seen the truth will not pass into the human form. For a man must have intelligence of universals, and be able to proceed from the many particulars of sense to one conception of reason;—this is the recollection of those things which our soul once saw while following God, when, regardless of that which we now call being, she raised her head up towards the true being. And therefore the mind of the philosopher alone has wings; and this is just, for he is always, according to the measure of his abilities, clinging in recollection to those things in which God abides, and in which abiding He is Divine. And he who employs

The common soul can only grow wings in ten thousand years; the philosopher or philosopher-lover acquires them in three thousand.

The judgment.

The souls of those who have never seen general notions will never pass into men.

<sup>1</sup> The philosopher alone is not subject to judgment (*κρίσις*), for he has never lost the vision of truth.

*Phaedrus.*

SOCRATES.

aright these memories is ever being initiated into perfect mysteries and alone becomes truly perfect. But, as he forgets earthly interests and is rapt in the divine, the vulgar deem him mad, and rebuke him; they do not see that he is inspired.

— Thus far I have been speaking of the fourth and last kind of madness, which is imputed to him who, when he sees the beauty of earth, is transported with the recollection of the true beauty; he would like to fly away, but he cannot; he is like a bird fluttering and looking upward and careless of the world below; and he is therefore thought to be mad. And I have shown this of all inspirations to be the noblest and highest and the offspring of the highest to him who has or shares in it, and that he who loves the beautiful is called a lover because he partakes of it. For, as has been already said, every soul of man has in the way of nature beheld true being; this was the condition of her passing into the form of man. But all souls do not easily recall the things of the other world; they may have seen them for a short time only, or they may have been unfortunate in their earthly lot, and, having had their hearts turned to unrighteousness through some corrupting influence, they may have lost the memory of the holy things which once they saw. Few only retain an adequate remembrance of them; and they, when they behold here any image of that other world, are rapt in amazement; but they are ignorant of what this rapture means, because they do not clearly perceive. For there is no light of justice or temperance or any of the higher ideas which are precious to souls in the earthly copies of them: they are seen through a glass dimly; and there are few who, going to the images, behold in them the realities, and these only with difficulty. There was a time when with the rest of the happy band they saw beauty shining in brightness,—we philosophers following in the train of Zeus, others in company with other gods; and then we beheld the beatific vision and were initiated into a mystery which may be truly called most blessed, celebrated by us in our state of innocence, before we had any experience of evils to come, when we were admitted to the sight of apparitions innocent and simple and calm and happy, which we beheld shining in

The true light  
is the recollec-  
tion of the  
past.

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pure light, pure ourselves and not yet enshrined in that living tomb which we carry about, now that we are imprisoned in the body, like an oyster in his shell. Let me linger over the memory of scenes which have passed away.

*Phædrus.*

*SOCRATES.*

We find beauty here on earth, but of wisdom there is no visible image.

— But of beauty, I repeat again that we saw her there shining in company with the celestial forms; and coming to earth we find her here too, shining in clearness through the clearest aperture of sense. For sight is the most piercing of our bodily senses; though not by that is wisdom seen; her loveliness would have been transporting if there had been a visible image of her, and the other ideas, if they had visible counterparts, would be equally lovely. But this is the privilege of beauty, that being the loveliest she is also the most palpable to sight. Now he who is not newly initiated or who has become corrupted, does not easily rise out of this world to the sight of true beauty in the other; he looks only at her earthly namesake, and instead of being awed at the sight of her, he is given over to pleasure, and like a brutish  
251 beast he rushes on to enjoy and beget; he consorts with wantonness, and is not afraid or ashamed of pursuing pleasure in violation of nature. But he whose initiation is recent, and who has been the spectator of many glories in the other world, is amazed when he sees any one having a god-like face or any bodily form which is the expression of divine beauty; and at first a shudder runs through him, and again the old awe steals over him; then looking upon the face of his beloved as of a god he reverences him, and if he were not afraid of being thought a downright madman, he would sacrifice to his beloved as to the image of a god; then while he gazes on him there is a sort of reaction, and the shudder passes into an unusual heat and perspiration; for, as he receives the effluence of beauty through the eyes, the wing moistens and he warms. And as he warms, the parts out of which the wing grew, and which had been hitherto closed and rigid, and had prevented the wing from shooting forth, are melted, and as nourishment streams upon him, the lower end of the wing begins to swell and grow from the root upwards; and the growth extends under the whole soul — for once the whole was winged. During this process

The recollection of the true beauty quickly fades, but is renewed with a sort of ecstasy at the sight of the higher beauties of earth.



*Phædrus.*

SOCRATES.

the whole soul is in a state of ebullition and effervescence. And as in the cutting of teeth there is an irritation and tickling of the gums at the time of growing them, so when the soul begins to grow wings she bubbles up, and there is a feeling of uneasiness and tickling; and when the beauty of the beloved meets her eye, and she receives the sensible warm motion of particles which flow towards her, therefore called emotion (*ἔμπερος*), and is refreshed and warmed by them, she ceases from her pain with joy. But when she is parted from her beloved and her moisture fails, then the orifices of the passage out of which the wing shoots dry up and close, and intercept the germ of the wing; which, being shut up with the emotion, throbbing as with the pulsations of an artery, pricks the aperture which is nearest, until at length the entire soul is pierced and maddened and pained, and at the recollection of beauty is again delighted. And from the mingling of the two feelings the soul is oppressed at the strangeness of her condition, and is in a great strait and excitement, and in her madness can neither sleep by night nor abide in her place by day. And wherever she thinks that she will behold the beautiful one, thither in her desire she runs. And when she has seen him, and bathed in the waters of desire, her constraint is loosened, and she is refreshed, and has no more pangs and pains; and this is the sweetest of all pleasures at the time, and is

the reason why the soul of the lover will never forsake his beautiful one, whom he esteems above all; he has forgotten mother and brethren and companions, and he thinks nothing of the neglect and loss of his property; the rules and proprieties of life, on which he formerly prided himself, he now despises, and is ready to sleep like a servant, wherever he is allowed, as near as he can to his desired one, who is the object of his worship, and the physician who can alone assuage the greatness of his pain. And this state, my dear imaginary youth to whom I am talking, is by men called Love, and among the gods has a name at which you, in your simplicity, may be inclined to mock; there are two lines in the apocryphal writings of Homer in which the name occurs. One of them is rather outrageous, and not altogether metrical. They are as follows:—

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'Fruitio dei.'

'Mortals call him fluttering love,  
But the immortals call him winged one,  
Because the growing of wings<sup>1</sup> is a necessity to him.'

*Phædrus.*

SOCRATES.

You may believe this, but not unless you like. At any rate the loves of lovers and their causes are such as I have described.

The souls attending choose each a Deity who is suitable to their own nature.

Now the lover who is taken to be the attendant of Zeus is better able to bear the winged god, and can endure a heavier burden; but the attendants and companions of Ares, when under the influence of love, if they fancy that they have been at all wronged, are ready to kill and put an end to themselves and their beloved. And he who follows in the train of any other god, while he is unspoiled and the impression lasts, honours and imitates him, as far as he is able; and after the manner of his God he behaves in his intercourse with his beloved and with the rest of the world during the first period of his earthly existence. Every one chooses his love from the ranks of beauty according to his character, and this he makes his god, and fashions and adorns as a sort of image which he is to fall down and worship. The followers of Zeus desire that their beloved should have a soul like him; and therefore they seek out some one of a philosophical and imperial nature, and when they have found him and loved him, they do all they can to confirm such a nature in him, and if they have no experience of such a disposition hitherto, they learn of any one who can teach them, and themselves follow in the same way. And they have the less  
253 difficulty in finding the nature of their own god in themselves, because they have been compelled to gaze intensely on him; their recollection clings to him, and they become possessed of him, and receive from him their character and disposition, so far as man can participate in God. The qualities of their god they attribute to the beloved, wherefore they love him all the more, and if, like the Bacchic Nymphs, they draw inspiration from Zeus, they pour out their own fountain upon him, wanting to make him as like as possible to their own god. But those who are the followers of Herè seek a royal love, and when they have found him they do just the same with him; and in like manner the followers of Apollo,

They walk in the ways of their god.

<sup>1</sup> Or, reading *πτερόφοιτον*, 'the movement of wings.'

*Phaedrus.*

SOCRATES.

and of every other god walking in the ways of their god, seek a love who is to be made like him whom they serve, and when they have found him, they themselves imitate their god, and persuade their love to do the same, and educate him into the manner and nature of the god as far as they each can; for no feelings of envy or jealousy are entertained by them towards their beloved, but they do their utmost to create in him the greatest likeness of themselves and of the god whom they honour. Thus fair and blissful to the beloved is the desire of the inspired lover, and the initiation of which I speak into the mysteries of true love, if he be captured by the lover and their purpose is effected. Now the beloved is taken captive in the following manner:—

The characters of the two steeds.

At the beginning of this tale, I divided each soul into three—two horses and a charioteer; and one of the horses was good and the other bad: the division may remain, but I have not yet explained in what the goodness or badness of either consists, and to that I will now proceed. The right-hand horse is upright and cleanly made; he has a lofty neck and an aquiline nose; his colour is white, and his eyes dark; he is a lover of honour and modesty and temperance, and the follower of true glory; he needs no touch of the whip, but is guided by word and admonition only. The other is a crooked lumbering animal, put together anyhow; he has a short thick neck; he is flat-faced and of a dark colour, with grey and blood-shot eyes; the mate of insolence and pride, shag-eared and deaf, hardly yielding to whip and spur. Now when the charioteer beholds the vision of love, and has his whole soul warmed through sense, and is full of the prickings and ticklings of desire, the obedient steed, then as always under the govern-

bids them. And now they are at the spot and behold the flashing beauty of the beloved; which when the charioteer sees, his memory is carried to the true beauty, whom he beholds in company with Modesty like an image placed upon a holy pedestal. He sees her, but he is afraid and falls backwards in adoration, and by his fall is compelled to pull back the reins with such violence as to bring both the steeds on their haunches, the one willing and unresisting, the unruly one very unwilling; and when they have gone back a little, the one is overcome with shame and wonder, and his whole soul is bathed in perspiration; the other, when the pain is over which the bridle and the fall had given him, having with difficulty taken breath, is full of wrath and reproaches, which he heaps upon the charioteer and his fellow-steed, for want of courage and manhood, declaring that they have been false to their agreement and guilty of desertion. Again they refuse, and again he urges them on, and will scarce yield to their prayer that he would wait until another time. When the appointed hour comes, they make as if they had forgotten, and he reminds them, fighting and neighing and dragging them on, until at length he on the same thoughts intent, forces them to draw near again. And when they are near he stoops his head and puts up his tail, and takes the bit in his teeth and pulls shamelessly. Then the charioteer is worse off than ever; he falls back like a racer at the barrier, and with a still more violent wrench drags the bit out of the teeth of the wild steed and covers his abusive tongue and jaws with blood, and forces his legs and haunches to the ground and punishes him sorely. And when this has happened several times and the villain has ceased from his wanton way, he is tamed and humbled, and follows the will of the charioteer, and when he sees the beautiful one he is ready to die of fear. And from that time forward the soul of the lover follows the beloved in modesty and holy fear.

*Phaedrus.*

SOCRATES.

At the vision of beauty the ill-conditioned steed rushes on to enjoy, but is restrained by his companion and by the charioteer.

The conflict grows worse and worse.

255 And so the beloved who, like a god, has received every true and loyal service from his lover, not in pretence but in reality, being also himself of a nature friendly to his admirer<sup>1</sup>, if in former days he has blushed to own his passion

<sup>1</sup> Omitting εἰς ταῦτόν ἀγεί τὴν φίλιαν.

*Phaedrus.*

SOCRATES.

The perfect  
communion  
of the good.

and turned away his lover, because his youthful companions or others slanderously told him that he would be disgraced, now as years advance, at the appointed age and time, is led to receive him into communion. For fate which has ordained that there shall be no friendship among the evil has also ordained that there shall ever be friendship among the good. And the beloved when he has received him into communion and intimacy, is quite amazed at the good-will of the lover; he recognises that the inspired friend is worth all other friends or kinsmen; they have nothing of friendship in them worthy to be compared with his. And when this feeling continues and he is nearer to him and embraces him, in gymnastic exercises and at other times of meeting, then the fountain of that stream, which Zeus when he was in love with Ganymede named Desire, overflows upon the lover, and some enters into his soul, and some when he is filled flows out again; and as a breeze or an echo rebounds from the smooth rocks and returns whence it came, so does the stream of beauty, passing through the eyes which are the windows of the soul, come back to the beautiful one; there arriving and quickening the passages of the wings, watering them and inclining them to grow, and filling the soul of the beloved also with love. And thus he loves, but he knows not what; he does not understand and cannot explain his own state; he appears to have caught the infection of blindness from another; the lover is his mirror in whom he is beholding himself, but he is not aware of this. When he is with the lover, both cease from their pain, but when he is away then he longs as he is longed for, and has love's image, love for love (*Anteros*) lodging in his breast, which he calls and believes to be not love but friendship only, and his desire is as the desire of the other, but weaker; he wants to see him, touch him, kiss, embrace him, and probably not long afterwards his desire is accomplished. When they meet, the wanton steed of the lover has a word to say to the charioteer; he would like to have a little pleasure in return for many pains, but the wanton steed of the beloved says not a word, for he is bursting with passion which he understands not;—he throws his arms round the lover and embraces him as his dearest friend; and, when they are side by side, he is

The reflection  
of the beloved  
in the lover.Some satisfac-  
tion of sensual  
pleasure also  
granted.



not in a state in which he can refuse the lover anything, if he ask him; although his fellow-steed and the charioteer oppose him with the arguments of shame and reason. After this their happiness depends upon their self-control; if the better elements of the mind which lead to order and philosophy prevail, then they pass their life here in happiness and harmony — masters of themselves and orderly — enslaving the vicious and emancipating the virtuous elements of the soul; and when the end comes, they are light and winged for flight, having conquered in one of the three heavenly or truly Olympian victories; nor can human discipline or divine inspiration confer any greater blessing on man than this. If, on the other hand, they leave philosophy and lead the lower life of ambition, then probably, after wine or in some other careless hour, the two wanton animals take the two souls when off their guard and bring them together, and they accomplish that desire of their hearts which to the many is bliss; and this having once enjoyed they continue to enjoy, yet rarely because they have not the approval of the whole soul. They too are dear, but not so dear to one another as the others, either at the time of their love or afterwards. They consider that they have given and taken from each other the most sacred pledges, and they may not break them and fall into enmity. At last they pass out of the body, unwinged, but eager to soar, and thus obtain no mean reward of love and madness. For those who have once begun the heavenward pilgrimage may not go down again to darkness and the journey beneath the earth, but they live in light always; happy companions in their pilgrimage, and when the time comes at which they receive their wings they have the same plumage because of their love.

*Phaedrus.*

SOCRATES.

The harmony of life.

The life of philosophy and the lower life of ambition.

The end of their pilgrimage.

Thus great are the heavenly blessings which the friendship of a lover will confer upon you, my youth. Whereas the attachment of the non-lover, which is alloyed with a worldly prudence and has worldly and niggardly ways of doling out benefits, will breed in your soul those vulgar qualities which the populace applaud, will send you bowling round the earth during a period of nine thousand years, and leave you a fool in the world below.

And thus, dear Eros, I have made and paid my recantation,



*Phaedrus.*SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.The poetical  
form is only  
intended to  
please Phae-  
drus.

as well and as fairly as I could; more especially in the matter of the poetical figures which I was compelled to use, because Phaedrus would have them<sup>1</sup>. And now forgive the past and accept the present, and be gracious and merciful to me, and do not in thine anger deprive me of sight, or take from me the art of love which thou hast given me, but grant that I may be yet more esteemed in the eyes of the fair. And if Phaedrus or I myself said anything rude in our first speeches, blame Lysias, who is the father of the brat, and let us have no more of his progeny; bid him study philosophy, like his brother Polemarchus; and then his lover Phaedrus will no longer halt between two opinions, but will dedicate himself wholly to love and to philosophical discourses.

The speech  
is far finer  
than that of  
Lysias, who  
will be out of  
conceit with  
himself.

*Phaedr.* I join in the prayer, Socrates, and say with you, if this be for my good, may your words come to pass. But why did you make your second oration so much finer than the first? I wonder why. And I begin to be afraid that I shall lose conceit of Lysias, and that he will appear tame in comparison, even if he be willing to put another as fine and as long as yours into the field, which I doubt. For quite lately one of our politicians was abusing him on this very account; and called him a 'speech-writer' again and again. So that a feeling of pride may probably induce him to give up writing speeches.

*Soc.* What a very amusing notion! But I think, my young man, that you are much mistaken in your friend if you imagine that he is frightened at a little noise; and, possibly, you think that his assailant was in earnest?

*Phaedr.* I thought, Socrates, that he was. And you are aware that the greatest and most influential statesmen are ashamed of writing speeches and leaving them in a written form, lest they should be called Sophists by posterity.

The politi-  
cians are fond  
of writing.

*Soc.* You seem to be unconscious, Phaedrus, that the 'sweet elbow'<sup>2</sup> of the proverb is really the long arm of the Nile. And you appear to be equally unaware of the fact that

<sup>1</sup> See 234 C.<sup>2</sup> A proverb, like 'the grapes are sour,' applied to pleasures which cannot be had, meaning sweet things which, like the elbow, are out of the reach of the mouth. The promised pleasure turns out to be a long and tedious affair.

this sweet elbow of theirs is also a long arm. For there is nothing of which our great politicians are so fond as of writing speeches and bequeathing them to posterity. And they add their admirers' names at the top of the writing, out of gratitude to them.

*Phaedrus.*

SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.

They are  
always re-  
hearsing their  
own praises  
in the form  
of laws.

258 *Phaedr.* What do you mean? I do not understand.

*Soc.* Why, do you not know that when a politician writes, he begins with the names of his approvers?

*Phaedr.* How so?

*Soc.* Why, he begins in this manner: 'Be it enacted by the senate, the people, or both, on the motion of a certain person,' who is our author; and so putting on a serious face, he proceeds to display his own wisdom to his admirers in what is often a long and tedious composition. Now what is that sort of thing but a regular piece of authorship?

*Phaedr.* True.

*Soc.* And if the law is finally approved, then the author leaves the theatre in high delight; but if the law is rejected and he is done out of his speech-making, and not thought good enough to write, then he and his party are in mourning.

*Phaedr.* Very true.

*Soc.* So far are they from despising, or rather so highly do they value the practice of writing.

*Phaedr.* No doubt.

*Soc.* And when the king or orator has the power, as Lycurgus or Solon or Darius had, of attaining an immortality of authorship in a state, is he not thought by posterity, when they see his compositions, and does he not think himself, while he is yet alive, to be a god?

They become  
like gods.

*Phaedr.* Very true.

*Soc.* Then do you think that any one of this class, however ill-disposed, would reproach Lysias with being an author?

*Phaedr.* Not upon your view; for according to you he would be casting a slur upon his own favourite pursuit.

*Soc.* Any one may see that there is no disgrace in the mere fact of writing.

*Phaedr.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* The disgrace begins when a man writes not well, but badly.

*Phaedrus.**Phaedr.* Clearly.SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.

*Soc.* And what is well and what is badly — need we ask Lysias, or any other poet or orator, who ever wrote or will write either a political or any other work, in metre or out of metre, poet or prose writer, to teach us this?

What motive  
is higher than  
the love of  
discourse?

*Phaedr.* Need we? For what should a man live if not for the pleasures of discourse? Surely not for the sake of bodily pleasures, which almost always have previous pain as a condition of them, and therefore are rightly called slavish.

The grass-  
hoppers will  
laugh at us if  
we sleep.

*Soc.* There is time enough. And I believe that the grasshoppers chirruping after their manner in the heat of the sun over our heads are talking to one another and looking down at us. What would they say if they saw that we, like the many, are not conversing, but slumbering at mid-day, lulled by their voices, too indolent to think? Would they not have a right to laugh at us? They might imagine that we were slaves, who, coming to rest at a place of resort of theirs, like sheep lie asleep at noon around the well. But if they see us discoursing, and like Odysseus sailing past them, deaf to their siren voices, they may perhaps, out of respect, give us of the gifts which they receive from the gods that they may impart them to men. 259

*Phaedr.* What gifts do you mean? I never heard of any.

The grass-  
hoppers were  
originally men  
who died from  
the love of  
song.

*Soc.* A lover of music like yourself ought surely to have heard the story of the grasshoppers, who are said to have been human beings in an age before the Muses. And when the Muses came and song appeared they were ravished with delight; and singing always, never thought of eating and drinking, until at last in their forgetfulness they died. And now they live again in the grasshoppers; and this is the return which the Muses make to them — they neither hunger, nor thirst, but from the hour of their birth are always singing, and never eating or drinking; and when they die they go and inform the Muses in heaven who honours them on earth. They win the love of Terpsichore for the dancers by their report of them; of Erato for the lovers, and of the other Muses for those who do them honour, according to the several ways of honouring them; — of Calliope the eldest Muse and of Urania who is next to her, for the philosophers, of whose music the grasshoppers make report to

them; for these are the Muses who are chiefly concerned with heaven and thought, divine as well as human, and they have the sweetest utterance. For many reasons, then, we ought always to talk and not to sleep at mid-day.

*Phaedr.* Let us talk.

*Soc.* Shall we discuss the rules of writing and speech as we were proposing?

*Phaedr.* Very good.

*Soc.* In good speaking should not the mind of the speaker know the truth of the matter about which he is going to speak?

260 *Phaedr.* And yet, Socrates, I have heard that he who would be an orator has nothing to do with true justice, but only with that which is likely to be approved by the many who sit in judgment; nor with the truly good or honourable, but only with opinion about them, and that from opinion comes persuasion, and not from the truth.

Does the orator require to have knowledge?

*Soc.* The words of the wise are not to be set aside; for there is probably something in them; and therefore the meaning of this saying is not hastily to be dismissed.

*Phaedr.* Very true.

*Soc.* Let us put the matter thus:—Suppose that I persuaded you to buy a horse and go to the wars. Neither of us knew what a horse was like, but I knew that you believed a horse to be of tame animals the one which has the longest ears.

Of course. Or else he will put good for evil, just as he might put a horse in the place of an ass.

*Phaedr.* That would be ridiculous.

*Soc.* There is something more ridiculous coming:—Suppose, further, that in sober earnest I, having persuaded you of this, went and composed a speech in honour of an ass, whom I entitled a horse, beginning: 'A noble animal and a most useful possession, especially in war, and you may get on his back and fight, and he will carry baggage or anything.'

*Phaedr.* How ridiculous!

*Soc.* Ridiculous! Yes; but is not even a ridiculous friend better than a cunning enemy?

*Phaedr.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And when the orator instead of putting an ass in the place of a horse, puts good for evil, being himself as ignorant of their true nature as the city on which he imposes

*Phaedrus.*SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.

is ignorant; and having studied the notions of the multitude, falsely persuades them not about 'the shadow of an ass,' which he confounds with a horse, but about good which he confounds with evil,—what will be the harvest which rhetoric will be likely to gather after the sowing of that seed?

*Phaedr.* The reverse of good.

*Soc.* But perhaps rhetoric has been getting too roughly handled by us, and she might answer: What amazing nonsense you are talking! As if I forced any man to learn to speak in ignorance of the truth! Whatever my advice may be worth, I should have told him to arrive at the truth first, and then come to me. At the same time I boldly assert that mere knowledge of the truth will not give you the art of persuasion.

The mere knowledge of the truth not enough to give the art of persuasion. But neither is the art of persuasion separable from the truth.

*Phaedr.* There is reason in the lady's defence of herself.

*Soc.* Quite true; if only the other arguments which remain to be brought up bear her witness that she is an art at all. But I seem to hear them arraying themselves on the opposite side, declaring that she speaks falsely, and that rhetoric is a mere routine and trick, not an art. Lo! a Spartan appears, and says that there never is nor ever will be a real art of speaking which is divorced from the truth.

*Phaedr.* And what are these arguments, Socrates? Bring them out that we may examine them. 261

*Soc.* Come out, fair children, and convince Phaedrus, who is the father of similar beauties, that he will never be able to speak about anything as he ought to speak unless he have a knowledge of philosophy. And let Phaedrus answer you.

*Phaedr.* Put the question.

*Soc.* Is not rhetoric, taken generally, a universal art of enchanting the mind by arguments; which is practised not only in courts and public assemblies, but in private houses also, having to do with all matters, great as well as small, good and bad alike, and is in all equally right, and equally to be esteemed—that is what you have heard?

The rhetorician can produce any impression which he pleases, in any place or upon any occasion.

*Phaedr.* Nay, not exactly that; I should say rather that I have heard the art confined to speaking and writing in law-suits, and to speaking in public assemblies—not extended farther.

*Soc.* Then I suppose that you have only heard of the



rhetoric of Nestor and Odysseus, which they composed in their leisure hours when at 'Troy, and never of the rhetoric of Palamedes?

*Phaedrus.*

SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.

*Phaedr.* No more than of Nestor and Odysseus, unless Gorgias is your Nestor, and Thrasymachus or Theodorus your Odysseus.

Gorgias and Thrasy-  
machus or Theo-  
dorus in the  
disguise of  
Nestor and  
Odysseus.

*Soc.* Perhaps that is my meaning. But let us leave them. And do you tell me, instead, what are plaintiff and defendant doing in a law-court — are they not contending?

*Phaedr.* Exactly so.

*Soc.* About the just and unjust — that is the matter in dispute?

*Phaedr.* Yes.

*Soc.* And a professor of the art will make the same thing appear to the same persons to be at one time just, at another time, if he is so inclined, to be unjust?

*Phaedr.* Exactly.

*Soc.* And when he speaks in the assembly, he will make the same things seem good to the city at one time, and at another time the reverse of good?

*Phaedr.* That is true.

*Soc.* Have we not heard of the Eleatic Palamedes (Zeno), who has an art of speaking by which he makes the same things appear to his hearers like and unlike, one and many, at rest and in motion?

Zeno the  
Eleatic.

*Phaedr.* Very true.

*Soc.* The art of disputation, then, is not confined to the courts and the assembly, but is one and the same in every use of language; this is the art, if there be such an art, which is able to find a likeness of everything to which a likeness can be found, and draws into the light of day the likenesses and disguises which are used by others?

The deceiver  
must know  
the truth  
because he  
has to find a  
likeness of the  
truth; he  
must learn to  
deceive by  
degrees.

*Phaedr.* How do you mean?

*Soc.* Let me put the matter thus: When will there be more chance of deception — when the difference is large or small?

262 *Phaedr.* When the difference is small.

*Soc.* And you will be less likely to be discovered in passing by degrees into the other extreme than when you go all at once?



*Phaedrus.**Phædr.* Of course.

SOCRATES,

PHAEDRUS.

*Soc.* He, then, who would deceive others, and not be deceived, must exactly know the real likenesses and differences of things?

*Phædr.* He must.

*Soc.* And if he is ignorant of the true nature of any subject, how can he detect the greater or less degree of likeness in other things to that of which by the hypothesis he is ignorant?

*Phædr.* He cannot.

*Soc.* And when men are deceived and their notions are at variance with realities, it is clear that the error slips in through resemblances?

*Phædr.* Yes, that is the way.

*Soc.* Then he who would be a master of the art must understand the real nature of everything; or he will never know either how to make the gradual departure from truth into the opposite of truth which is effected by the help of resemblances, or how to avoid it?

*Phædr.* He will not.

*Soc.* He then, who being ignorant of the truth aims at appearances, will only attain an art of rhetoric which is ridiculous and is not an art at all?

*Phædr.* That may be expected.

*Soc.* Shall I propose that we look for examples of art and want of art, according to our notion of them, in the speech of Lysias which you have in your hand, and in my own speech?

*Phædr.* Nothing could be better; and indeed I think that our previous argument has been too abstract and wanting in illustrations.

*Soc.* Yes; and the two speeches happen to afford a very good example of the way in which the speaker who knows the truth may, without any serious purpose, steal away the hearts of his hearers. This piece of good-fortune I attribute to the local deities; and, perhaps, the prophets of the Muses who are singing over our heads may have imparted their inspiration to me. For I do not imagine that I have any rhetorical art of my own.

*Phædr.* Granted; if you will only please to get on.

Illustrations  
of skill and  
want of skill  
from the  
speech of  
Lysias.

*Soc.* Suppose that you read me the first words of Lysias' speech. *Phaedrus.*  
SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.

*Phaedr.* 'You know how matters stand with me, and how, as I conceive, they might be arranged for our common interest; and I maintain that I ought not to fail in my suit, because I am not your lover. For lovers repent ——'

263 *Soc.* Enough:—Now, shall I point out the rhetorical error of those words?

*Phaedr.* Yes.

*Soc.* Every one is aware that about some things we are agreed, whereas about other things we differ. The rhetorician should distinguish things such as iron and silver, about which we are agreed, from things such as justice and goodness, about which we are disagreed.

*Phaedr.* I think that I understand you; but will you explain yourself?

*Soc.* When any one speaks of iron and silver, is not the same thing present in the minds of all?

*Phaedr.* Certainly.

*Soc.* But when any one speaks of justice and goodness we part company and are at odds with one another and with ourselves?

*Phaedr.* Precisely.

*Soc.* Then in some things we agree, but not in others?

*Phaedr.* That is true.

*Soc.* In which are we more likely to be deceived, and in which has rhetoric the greater power?

*Phaedr.* Clearly, in the uncertain class.

*Soc.* Then the rhetorician ought to make a regular division, and acquire a distinct notion of both classes, as well of that in which the many err, as of that in which they do not err?

*Phaedr.* He who made such a distinction would have an excellent principle.

*Soc.* Yes; and in the next place he must have a keen eye for the observation of particulars in speaking, and not make a mistake about the class to which they are to be referred.

*Phaedr.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Now to which class does love belong—to the debatable or to the undisputed class? Love belongs to the debatable class.

*Phaedr.* To the debatable, clearly; for if not, do you think that love would have allowed you to say as you did,

*Phaedrus.*

that he is an evil both to the lover and the beloved, and also the greatest possible good?

SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.

*Soc.* Capital. But will you tell me whether I defined love at the beginning of my speech? for, having been in an ecstasy, I cannot well remember.

*Phaedr.* Yes, indeed; that you did, and no mistake.

Lysias should  
have begun,  
as I did, by  
defining love.

*Soc.* Then I perceive that the Nymphs of Achelous and Pan the son of Hermes, who inspired me, were far better rhetoricians than Lysias the son of Cephalus. Alas! how inferior to them he is! But perhaps I am mistaken; and Lysias at the commencement of his lover's speech did insist on our supposing love to be something or other which he fancied him to be, and according to this model he fashioned and framed the remainder of his discourse. Suppose we read his beginning over again:

*Phaedr.* If you please; but you will not find what you want.

*Soc.* Read, that I may have his exact words.

*Phaedr.* 'You know how matters stand with me, and how, as I conceive, they might be arranged for our common 264 interest; and I maintain I ought not to fail in my suit because I am not your lover, for lovers repent of the kindnesses which they have shown, when their love is over.'

He begins  
at the end.

*Soc.* Here he appears to have done just the reverse of what he ought; for he has begun at the end, and is swimming on his back through the flood to the place of starting. His address to the fair youth begins where the lover would have ended. Am I not right, sweet Phaedrus?

*Phaedr.* Yes, indeed, Socrates; he does begin at the end.

No order or  
arrangement  
of parts in his  
discourse.

*Soc.* Then as to the other topics—are they not thrown down anyhow? Is there any principle in them? Why should the next topic follow next in order, or any other topic? I cannot help fancying in my ignorance that he wrote off boldly just what came into his head, but I dare say that you would recognize a rhetorical necessity in the succession of the several parts of the composition?

*Phaedr.* You have too good an opinion of me if you think that I have any such insight into his principles of composition.

*Soc.* At any rate, you will allow that every discourse

ought to be a living creature, having a body of its own and a head and feet; there should be a middle, beginning, and end, adapted to one another and to the whole?

*Phaedr.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Can this be said of the discourse of Lysias? See whether you can find any more connexion in his words than in the epitaph which is said by some to have been inscribed on the grave of Midas the Phrygian.

*Phaedr.* What is there remarkable in the epitaph?

*Soc.* It is as follows:—

‘I am a maiden of bronze and lie on the tomb of Midas;  
So long as water flows and tall trees grow,  
So long here on this spot by his sad tomb abiding,  
I shall declare to passers-by that Midas sleeps below.’

*Phaedrus.*

SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.

Every discourse should be a living creature, having a body, head, and feet.

The discourse of Lysias had no more arrangement than the silliest of epitaphs.

Now in this rhyme whether a line comes first or comes last, as you will perceive, makes no difference.

*Phaedr.* You are making fun of that oration of ours.

*Soc.* Well, I will say no more about your friend’s speech lest I should give offence to you; although I think that it might furnish many other examples of what a man ought rather to avoid. But I will proceed to the other speech,  
265 which, as I think, is also suggestive to students of rhetoric.

*Phaedr.* In what way?

*Soc.* The two speeches, as you may remember, were unlike; the one argued that the lover and the other that the non-lover ought to be accepted.

*Phaedr.* And right manfully.

*Soc.* You should rather say ‘madly;’ and madness was the argument of them, for, as I said, ‘love is a madness.’

*Phaedr.* Yes.

*Soc.* And of madness there were two kinds; one produced by human infirmity, the other was a divine release of the soul from the yoke of custom and convention.

*Phaedr.* True.

*Soc.* The divine madness was subdivided into four kinds, prophetic, initiatory, poetic, erotic, having four gods presiding over them; the first was the inspiration of Apollo, the second that of Dionysus, the third that of the Muses, the fourth that of Aphrodite and Eros. In the description of the last kind of madness, which was also said to be the best, we

Four subdivisions of madness—prophetic, initiatory, poetic, erotic.

*Phaedrus.*SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.

spoke of the affection of love in a figure, into which we introduced a tolerably credible and possibly true though partly erring myth, which was also a hymn in honour of Love, who is your lord and also mine, Phaedrus, and the guardian of fair children, and to him we sung the hymn in measured and solemn strain.

*Phaedr.* I know that I had great pleasure in listening to you.

*Soc.* Let us take this instance and note how the transition was made from blame to praise.

*Phaedr.* What do you mean?

The myth was a creation of fancy, yet true principles were involved in it: (1) unity of particulars in a single note; (2) natural division into species.

*Soc.* I mean to say that the composition was mostly playful. Yet in these chance fancies of the hour were involved two principles of which we should be too glad to have a clearer description if art could give us one.

*Phaedr.* What are they?

*Soc.* First, the comprehension of scattered particulars in one idea; as in our definition of love, which whether true or false certainly gave clearness and consistency to the discourse, the speaker should define his several notions and so make his meaning clear.

*Phaedr.* What is the other principle, Socrates?

*Soc.* The second principle is that of division into species according to the natural formation, where the joint is, not breaking any part as a bad carver might. Just as our two discourses, alike assumed, first of all, a single form of unreason; and then, as the body which from being one becomes double and may be divided into a left side and right side, each having parts right and left of the same name — after this manner the speaker proceeded to divide the parts of the left side and did not desist until he found in them an evil or left-handed love which he justly reviled; and the other discourse leading us to the madness which lay on the right side, found another love, also having the same name, but divine, which the speaker held up before us and applauded and affirmed to be the author of the greatest benefits.

*Phaedr.* Most true.

The dialectician is concerned with the one and many.

*Soc.* I am myself a great lover of these processes of division and generalization; they help me to speak and to think. And if I find any man who is able to see 'a One and



Many' in nature, him I follow, and 'walk in his footsteps as if he were a god.' And those who have this art, I have hitherto been in the habit of calling dialecticians; but God knows whether the name is right or not. And I should like to know what name you would give to your or to Lysias' disciples, and whether this may not be that famous art of rhetoric which Thrasymachus and others teach and practise? Skilful speakers they are, and impart their skill to any who is willing to make kings of them and to bring gifts to them.

*Phaedrus.*

SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.

*Phaedr.* Yes, they are royal men; but their art is not the same with the art of those whom you call, and rightly, in my opinion, dialecticians:—Still we are in the dark about rhetoric.

He is not to be confused with the rhetorician.

*Soc.* What do you mean? The remains of it, if there be anything remaining which can be brought under rules of art, must be a fine thing; and, at any rate, is not to be despised by you and me. But how much is left?

Still rhetoric when separated from dialectic must be a valuable art.

*Phaedr.* There is a great deal surely to be found in books of rhetoric?

*Soc.* Yes; thank you for reminding me:—There is the exordium, showing how the speech should begin, if I remember rightly; that is what you mean—the niceties of the art?

*Phaedr.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then follows the statement of facts, and upon that witnesses; thirdly, proofs; fourthly, probabilities are to come; the great Byzantian word-maker also speaks, if I am not mistaken, of confirmation and further confirmation.

*Phaedr.* You mean the excellent Theodorus.

Theodorus.

267 *Soc.* Yes; and he tells how refutation or further refutation is to be managed, whether in accusation or defence. I ought also to mention the illustrious Parian, Evenus, who first invented insinuations and indirect praises; and also indirect censures, which according to some he put into verse to help the memory. But shall I 'to dumb forgetfulness consign' Tisias and Gorgias, who are not ignorant that probability is superior to truth, and who by force of argument make the little appear great and the great little, disguise the new in old fashions and the old in new fashions, and have discovered forms for everything, either short or going on to infinity. I remember Prodicus laughing when

Evenus.

Tisias and  
Gorgias.



*Phaedrus.*

I told him of this; he said that he had himself discovered the true rule of art, which was to be neither long nor short, but of a convenient length.

SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.

Prodicus.

*Phaedr.* Well done, Prodicus!

Hippias.

*Soc.* Then there is Hippias the Elean stranger, who probably agrees with him.

*Phaedr.* Yes.

Polus.

*Soc.* And there is also Polus, who has treasuries of diplomacy, and gnomology, and eikonology, and who teaches in them the names of which Licymnius made him a present; they were to give a polish.

Licymnius.

Protagoras.

*Phaedr.* Had not Protagoras something of the same sort?

Thrasymachus again.

*Soc.* Yes, rules of correct diction and many other fine precepts; for the 'sorrows of a poor old man,' or any other pathetic case, no one is better than the Chalcedonian giant; he can put a whole company of people into a passion and out of one again by his mighty magic, and is first-rate at inventing or disposing of any sort of calumny on any grounds or none. All of them agree in asserting that a speech should end in a recapitulation, though they do not all agree to use the same word.

*Phaedr.* You mean that there should be a summing up of the arguments in order to remind the hearers of them.

*Soc.* I have now said all that I have to say of the art of rhetoric: have you anything to add?

*Phaedr.* Not much; nothing very important.

*Soc.* Leave the unimportant and let us bring the really 268 important question into the light of day, which is: What power has this art of rhetoric, and when?

*Phaedr.* A very great power in public meetings.Rhetoric a  
superficial art.

*Soc.* It has. But I should like to know whether you have the same feeling as I have about the rhetoricians? To me there seem to be a great many holes in their web.

*Phaedr.* Give an example.

*Soc.* I will. Suppose a person to come to your friend Eryximachus, or to his father Acumenus, and to say to him: 'I know how to apply drugs which shall have either a heating or a cooling effect, and I can give a vomit and also a purge, and all that sort of thing; and knowing all this, as I do, I claim to be a physician and to make physicians by

imparting this knowledge to others,'—what do you suppose that they would say? *Phaedrus.*

*Phaedr.* They would be sure to ask him whether he knew 'to whom' he would give his medicines, and 'when,' and 'how much.'

*Soc.* And suppose that he were to reply: 'No; I know nothing of all that; I expect the patient who consults me to be able to do these things for himself'?

*Phaedr.* They would say in reply that he is a madman or a pedant who fancies that he is a physician because he has read something in a book, or has stumbled on a prescription or two, although he has no real understanding of the art of medicine.

*Soc.* And suppose a person were to come to Sophocles or Euripides and say that he knows how to make a very long speech about a small matter, and a short speech about a great matter, and also a sorrowful speech, or a terrible, or threatening speech, or any other kind of speech, and in teaching this fancies that he is teaching the art of tragedy—?

*Phaedr.* They too would surely laugh at him if he fancies that tragedy is anything but the arranging of these elements in a manner which will be suitable to one another and to the whole.

*Soc.* But I do not suppose that they would be rude or abusive to him: Would they not treat him as a musician would a man who thinks that he is a harmonist because he knows how to pitch the highest and lowest note; happening to meet such an one he would not say to him savagely, 'Fool, you are mad!' But like a musician, in a gentle and harmonious tone of voice, he would answer: 'My good friend, he who would be a harmonist must certainly know this, and yet he may understand nothing of harmony if he has not got beyond your stage of knowledge, for you only know the preliminaries of harmony and not harmony itself.'

*Phaedr.* Very true.

269 *Soc.* And will not Sophocles say to the display of the would-be tragedian, that this is not tragedy but the preliminaries of tragedy? and will not Acumenus say the same of medicine to the would-be physician?

*Phaedr.* Quite true.

*Soc.* And if Adrastus the mellifluous or Pericles heard of

What would Sophocles or Euripides say to the professors of rhetoric?

They would say to him in the most courteous manner and in the sweetest tone of voice, 'You only know the alphabet of your art.'

*Phaedrus.*SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.

We should not be too hard on the rhetorician for teaching only part of his art.

The perfection of oratory is partly a gift of nature. But it may be improved by art. This art, however, is not the art of Thrasymachus, but partakes of the nature of philosophy.

these wonderful arts, brachylogies and eikonologies and all the hard names which we have been endeavouring to draw into the light of day, what would they say? Instead of losing temper and applying uncomplimentary epithets, as you and I have been doing, to the authors of such an imaginary art, their superior wisdom would rather censure us, as well as them. 'Have a little patience, Phaedrus and Socrates, they would say; you should not be in such a passion with those who from some want of dialectical skill are unable to define the nature of rhetoric, and consequently suppose that they have found the art in the preliminary conditions of it, and when these have been taught by them to others, fancy that the whole art of rhetoric has been taught by them; but as to using the several instruments of the art effectively, or making the composition a whole,—an application of it such as this is they consider to be an easy thing which their disciples may make for themselves.'

*Phaedr.* I quite admit, Socrates, that the art of rhetoric which these men teach and of which they write is such as you describe—there I agree with you. But I still want to know where and how the true art of rhetoric and persuasion is to be acquired.

*Soc.* The perfection which is required of the finished orator is, or rather must be, like the perfection of anything else, partly given by nature, but may also be assisted by art. If you have the natural power and add to it knowledge and practice, you will be a distinguished speaker; if you fall short in either of these, you will be to that extent defective. But the art, as far as there is an art, of rhetoric does not lie in the direction of Lysias or Thrasymachus.

*Phaedr.* In what direction then?

*Soc.* I conceive Pericles to have been the most accomplished of rhetoricians.

*Phaedr.* What of that?

*Soc.* All the great arts require discussion and high speculation about the truths of nature; hence come loftiness of thought and completeness of execution. And this, as I conceive, was the quality which, in addition to his natural gifts, Pericles acquired from his intercourse with Anaxagoras whom he happened to know. He was thus imbued with the

higher philosophy, and attained the knowledge of Mind and the negative of Mind, which were favourite themes of Anaxagoras, and applied what suited his purpose to the art of speaking. Phaedrus.  
SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.

*Phaedr.* Explain.

*Soc.* Rhetoric is like medicine.

*Phaedr.* How so?

*Soc.* Why, because medicine has to define the nature of the body and rhetoric of the soul — if we would proceed, not empirically but scientifically, in the one case to impart health and strength by giving medicine and food, in the other to implant the conviction or virtue which you desire, by the right application of words and training.

*Phaedr.* There, Socrates, I suspect that you are right.

*Soc.* And do you think that you can know the nature of the soul intelligently without knowing the nature of the whole?

*Phaedr.* Hippocrates the Asclepiad says that the nature even of the body can only be understood as a whole<sup>1</sup>.

*Soc.* Yes, friend, and he was right:—still, we ought not to be content with the name of Hippocrates, but to examine and see whether his argument agrees with his conception of nature.

*Phaedr.* I agree.

*Soc.* Then consider what truth as well as Hippocrates says about this or about any other nature. Ought we not to consider first whether that which we wish to learn and to teach is a simple or multiform thing, and if simple, then to enquire what power it has of acting or being acted upon in relation to other things, and if multiform, then to number the forms; and see first in the case of one of them, and then in the case of all of them, what is that power of acting or being acted upon which makes each and all of them to be what they are? First there must be an analysis of the soul.

*Phaedr.* You may very likely be right, Socrates.

*Soc.* The method which proceeds without analysis is like the groping of a blind man. Yet, surely, he who is an artist ought not to admit of a comparison with the blind, or deaf. The rhetorician, who teaches his pupil to speak scientifically, will particularly set forth the nature of that being to which he addresses his speeches; and this, I conceive, to be the soul.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Charmides, 156 C.

*Phaedrus.**Phaedr.* Certainly.

SOCRATES,

PHAEDRUS.

*Soc.* His whole effort is directed to the soul; for in that 271  
he seeks to produce conviction.

*Phaedr.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then clearly, Thrasymachus or any one else who teaches rhetoric in earnest will give an exact description of the nature of the soul; which will enable us to see whether she be single and same, or, like the body, multiform. That is what we should call showing the nature of the soul.

*Phaedr.* Exactly.

*Soc.* He will explain, secondly, the mode in which she acts or is acted upon.

*Phaedr.* True.

*Soc.* Thirdly, having classified men and speeches, and their kinds and affections, and adapted them to one another, he will tell the reasons of his arrangement, and show why one soul is persuaded by a particular form of argument, and another not.

*Phaedr.* You have hit upon a very good way.

*Soc.* Yes, that is the true and only way in which any subject can be set forth or treated by rules of art, whether in speaking or writing. But the writers of the present day, at whose feet you have sat, craftily conceal the nature of the soul which they know quite well. Nor, until they adopt our method of reading and writing, can we admit that they write by rules of art?

*Phaedr.* What is our method?

*Soc.* I cannot give you the exact details; but I should like to tell you generally, as far as is in my power, how a man ought to proceed according to rules of art.

*Phaedr.* Let me hear.

*Soc.* Oratory is the art of enchanting the soul, and therefore he who would be an orator has to learn the differences of human souls—they are so many and of such a nature, and from them come the differences between man and man. Having proceeded thus far in his analysis, he will next divide speeches into their different classes:—‘Such and such persons,’ he will say, ‘are affected by this or that kind of speech in this or that way,’ and he will tell you why. The pupil must have a good theoretical notion of them first, and

Then the  
rhetorician  
must show  
by what  
means the  
soul affects  
or is affected,  
and why one  
soul in one  
way and  
another in  
another.

Oratory is  
the art of  
enchanting  
the soul, and  
therefore the  
orator must  
learn the  
differences of  
human souls  
by reflection  
and experi-  
ence.



272 then he must have experience of them in actual life, and be able to follow them with all his senses about him, or he will never get beyond the precepts of his masters. But when he understands what persons are persuaded by what arguments, and sees the person about whom he was speaking in the abstract actually before him, and knows that it is he, and can say to himself, 'This is the man or this is the character who ought to have a certain argument applied to him in order to convince him of a certain opinion;'—he who knows all this, and knows also when he should speak and when he should refrain, and when he should use pithy sayings, pathetic appeals, sensational effects, and all the other modes of speech which he has learned;—when, I say, he knows the times and seasons of all these things, then, and not till then, he is a perfect master of his art; but if he fail in any of these points, whether in speaking or teaching or writing them, and yet declares that he speaks by rules of art, he who says 'I don't believe you' has the better of him. Well, the teacher will say, is this, Phaedrus and Socrates, your account of the so-called art of rhetoric, or am I to look for another?

*Phaedrus.*

SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.

Knowledge  
of individual  
character  
necessary  
to the  
rhetorician.

*Phaedr.* He must take this, Socrates, for there is no possibility of another, and yet the creation of such an art is not easy.

*Soc.* Very true; and therefore let us consider this matter in every light, and see whether we cannot find a shorter and easier road; there is no use in taking a long rough round-about way if there be a shorter and easier one. And I wish that you would try and remember whether you have heard from Lysias or any one else anything which might be of service to us.

*Phaedr.* If trying would avail, then I might; but at the moment I can think of nothing.

*Soc.* Suppose I tell you something which somebody who knows told me.

*Phaedr.* Certainly.

*Soc.* May not 'the wolf,' as the proverb says, 'claim a hearing'?

*Phaedr.* Do you say what can be said for him.

*Soc.* He will argue that there is no use in putting a solemn face on these matters, or in going round and round, until you

But 'the  
wolf' says  
that in



*Phaedrus.*SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.courts of  
law no one  
cares about  
truth.

arrive at first principles; for, as I said at first, when the question is of justice and good, or is a question in which men are concerned who are just and good, either by nature or habit, he who would be a skilful rhetorician has no need of truth — for that in courts of law men literally care nothing about truth, but only about conviction: and this is based on probability, to which he who would be a skilful orator should therefore give his whole attention. And they say also that there are cases in which the actual facts, if they are improbable, ought to be withheld, and only the probabilities should be told either in accusation or defence, and that always in speaking, the orator should keep probability in view, and say good-bye to the truth. And the observance of this principle 273 throughout a speech furnishes the whole art.

*Phaedr.* That is what the professors of rhetoric do actually say, Socrates. I have not forgotten that we have quite briefly touched upon this matter<sup>1</sup> already; with them the point is all-important.

*Soc.* I dare say that you are familiar with Tisias. Does he not define probability to be that which the many think?

*Phaedr.* Certainly, he does.

*Soc.* I believe that he has a clever and ingenious case of this sort:— He supposes a feeble and valiant man to have assaulted a strong and cowardly one, and to have robbed him of his coat or of something or other; he is brought into court, and then Tisias says that both parties should tell lies: the coward should say that he was assaulted by more men than one; the other should prove that they were alone, and should argue thus: 'How could a weak man like me have assaulted a strong man like him?' The complainant will not like to confess his own cowardice, and will therefore invent some other lie which his adversary will thus gain an opportunity of refuting. And there are other devices of the same kind which have a place in the system. Am I not right, Phaedrus?

*Phaedr.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Bless me, what a wonderfully mysterious art is this which Tisias or some other gentleman, in whatever name or country he rejoices, has discovered. Shall we say a word to him or not?

<sup>1</sup> Cp. 259 E.

According to Tisias, either party should tell a lie of a sort which the other would be unwilling or unable to refute.

*Phaedr.* What shall we say to him?

*Phaedrus.*

SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.

To him we  
reply that a  
man should  
learn to say  
what is ac-  
ceptable to  
God. This  
is the true  
beginning of  
rhetoric.

*Soc.* Let us tell him that, before he appeared, you and I were saying that the probability of which he speaks was engendered in the minds of the many by the likeness of the truth, and we had just been affirming that he who knew the truth would always know best how to discover the resemblances of the truth. If he has anything else to say about the art of speaking we should like to hear him; but if not, we are satisfied with our own view, that unless a man estimates the various characters of his hearers and is able to divide all things into classes and to comprehend them under single ideas, he will never be a skilful rhetorician even within the limits of human power. And this skill he will not attain without a great deal of trouble, which a good man ought to undergo, not for the sake of speaking and acting before men, but in order that he may be able to say what is acceptable to God and always to act acceptably to Him as far as in him  
274 lies; for there is a saying of wiser men than ourselves, that a man of sense should not try to please his fellow-servants (at least this should not be his first object) but his good and noble masters; and therefore if the way is long and circuitous, marvel not at this, for, where the end is great, there we may take the longer road, but not for lesser ends such as yours. Truly, the argument may say, Tisias, that if you do not mind going so far, rhetoric has a fair beginning here.

*Phaedr.* I think, Socrates, that this is admirable, if only practicable.

*Soc.* But even to fail in an honourable object is honourable.

*Phaedr.* True.

*Soc.* Enough appears to have been said by us of a true and false art of speaking.

*Phaedr.* Certainly.

*Soc.* But there is something yet to be said of propriety and impropriety of writing.

*Phaedr.* Yes.

*Soc.* Do you know how you can speak or act about rhetoric in a manner which will be acceptable to God?

*Phaedr.* No, indeed. Do you?

*Soc.* I have heard a tradition of the ancients, whether true or not they only know; although if we had found the truth

*Phaedrus.*

SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.

The ingenuity  
of the god  
Theuth, who  
was the in-  
ventor of let-  
ters, rebuked  
by King  
Thamus,  
also called  
Ammon.

ourselves, do you think that we should care much about the opinions of men?

*Phaedr.* Your question needs no answer; but I wish that you would tell me what you say that you have heard.

*Soc.* At the Egyptian city of Naucratis, there was a famous old god, whose name was Theuth; the bird which is called the Ibis is sacred to him, and he was the inventor of many arts, such as arithmetic and calculation and geometry and astronomy and draughts and dice, but his great discovery was the use of letters. Now in those days the god Thamus was the king of the whole country of Egypt; and he dwelt in that great city of Upper Egypt which the Hellenes call Egyptian Thebes, and the god himself is called by them Ammon. To him came Theuth and showed his inventions, desiring that the other Egyptians might be allowed to have the benefit of them; he enumerated them, and Thamus enquired about their several uses, and praised some of them and censured others, as he approved or disapproved of them. It would take a long time to repeat all that Thamus said to Theuth in praise or blame of the various arts. But when they came to letters, This, said Theuth, will make the Egyptians wiser and give them better memories; it is a specific both for the memory and for the wit. Thamus replied: O most ingenious Theuth, the parent or inventor of an art is not always the best judge of the utility or inutility of his own inventions to the users of them. And in this instance, you who are the father of letters, from a paternal love of your own children have been led to attribute to them a quality which they cannot have; for this discovery of yours will create forgetfulness in the learners' souls, because they will not use their memories; they will trust to the external written characters and not remember of themselves. The specific which you have discovered is an aid not to memory, but to reminiscence, and you give your disciples not truth, but only the semblance of truth; they will be hearers of many things and will have learned nothing; they will appear to be omniscient and will generally know nothing; they will be tiresome company, having the show of wisdom without the reality. 275

*Phaedr.* Yes, Socrates, you can easily invent tales of Egypt, or of any other country.

*Soc.* There was a tradition in the temple of Dodona that oaks first gave prophetic utterances. The men of old, unlike in their simplicity to young philosophy, deemed that if they heard the truth even from 'oak or rock,' it was enough for them; whereas you seem to consider not whether a thing is or is not true, but who the speaker is and from what country the tale comes.

*Phaedrus.*

SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.

The scepticism of  
Phaedrus  
reproved by  
Socrates.

*Phaedr.* I acknowledge the justice of your rebuke; and I think that the Theban is right in his view about letters.

*Soc.* He would be a very simple person, and quite a stranger to the oracles of Themis or Ammon, who should leave in writing or receive in writing any art under the idea that the written word would be intelligible or certain; or who deemed that writing was at all better than knowledge and recollection of the same matters?

Writing far  
inferior to  
recollection.

*Phaedr.* That is most true.

*Soc.* I cannot help feeling, Phaedrus, that writing is unfortunately like painting; for the creations of the painter have the attitude of life, and yet if you ask them a question they preserve a solemn silence. And the same may be said of speeches. You would imagine that they had intelligence, but if you want to know anything and put a question to one of them, the speaker always gives one unvarying answer. And when they have been once written down they are tumbled about anywhere among those who may or may not understand them, and know not to whom they should reply, to whom not; and, if they are maltreated or abused, they have no parent to protect them; and they cannot protect or defend themselves.

Writing is  
like painting:  
it is silent  
ever, and  
cannot, unlike  
speech, be  
adapted to  
individuals.

*Phaedr.* That again is most true.

*Soc.* Is there not another kind of word or speech far better than this, and having far greater power — a son of the  
276 same family, but lawfully begotten?

But there is  
another kind  
of writing  
graven on  
the tablets of  
the mind.

*Phaedr.* Whom do you mean, and what is his origin?

*Soc.* I mean an intelligent word graven in the soul of the learner, which can defend itself, and knows when to speak and when to be silent.

*Phaedr.* You mean the living word of knowledge which has a soul, and of which the written word is properly no more than an image?

*Soc.* Yes, of course that is what I mean. And now may

*Phaedrus.*

SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.

What man of sense would plant seeds in an artificial garden, to bring forth fruit or flowers in eight days, and not in deeper and more fitting soil?

I be allowed to ask you a question: Would a husbandman, who is a man of sense, take the seeds, which he values and which he wishes to bear fruit, and in sober seriousness plant them during the heat of summer, in some garden of Adonis, that he may rejoice when he sees them in eight days appearing in beauty? at least he would do so, if at all, only for the sake of amusement and pastime. But when he is in earnest he sows in fitting soil, and practises husbandry, and is satisfied if in eight months the seeds which he has sown arrive at perfection?

*Phaedr.* Yes, Socrates, that will be his way when he is in earnest; he will do the other, as you say, only in play.

*Soc.* And can we suppose that he who knows the just and good and honourable has less understanding, than the husbandman, about his own seeds?

*Phaedr.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Then he will not seriously incline to 'write' his thoughts 'in water' with pen and ink, sowing words which can neither speak for themselves nor teach the truth adequately to others?

*Phaedr.* No, that is not likely.

*Soc.* No, that is not likely — in the garden of letters he will sow and plant, but only for the sake of recreation and amusement; he will write them down as memorials to be treasured against the forgetfulness of old age, by himself, or by any other old man who is treading the same path. He will rejoice in beholding their tender growth; and while others are refreshing their souls with banqueting and the like, this will be the pastime in which his days are spent.

*Phaedr.* A pastime, Socrates, as noble as the other is ignoble, the pastime of a man who can be amused by serious talk, and can discourse merrily about justice and the like.

*Soc.* True, Phaedrus. But nobler far is the serious pursuit of the dialectician, who, finding a congenial soul, by the help of science sows and plants therein words which are able to help themselves and him who planted them, and are not unfruitful, but have in them a seed which others brought up in different soils render immortal, making the possessors of it happy to the utmost extent of human happiness. 277

As a pastime he may plant his fair thoughts in the garden,

but his serious aim will be to implant them in his own and other noble natures.



*Phaedr.* Far nobler, certainly.

*Phaedrus.*

*Soc.* And now, Phaedrus, having agreed upon the premises we may decide about the conclusion.

SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.

*Phaedr.* About what conclusion?

*Soc.* About Lysias, whom we censured, and his art of writing, and his discourses, and the rhetorical skill or want of skill which was shown in them — these are the questions which we sought to determine, and they brought us to this point. And I think that we are now pretty well informed about the nature of art and its opposite.

*Phaedr.* Yes, I think with you; but I wish that you would repeat what was said.

*Soc.* Until a man knows the truth of the several particulars of which he is writing or speaking, and is able to define them as they are, and having defined them again to divide them until they can be no longer divided, and until in like manner he is able to discern the nature of the soul, and discover the different modes of discourse which are adapted to different natures, and to arrange and dispose them in such a way that the simple form of speech may be addressed to the simpler nature, and the complex and composite to the more complex nature — until he has accomplished all this, he will be unable to handle arguments according to rules of art, as far as their nature allows them to be subjected to art, either for the purpose of teaching or persuading; — such is the view which is implied in the whole preceding argument.

The conclusion:— A man must be able to know and define and denote the subjects of which he is speaking, and to discern the natures of those whom he is addressing.

*Phaedr.* Yes, that was our view, certainly.

*Soc.* Secondly, as to the censure which was passed on the speaking or writing of discourses, and how they might be rightly or wrongly censured — did not our previous argument show —?

*Phaedr.* Show what?

*Soc.* That whether Lysias or any other writer that ever was or will be, whether private man or statesman, proposes laws and so becomes the author of a political treatise, fancying that there is any great certainty and clearness in his performance, the fact of his so writing is only a disgrace to him, whatever men may say. For not to know the nature of justice and injustice, and good and evil, and not to be able to distinguish the dream from the reality, cannot in truth be

The legislator or statesman must know the nature of justice or injustice, good and evil. To Lysias or to any



*Phaedrus.*SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.man igno-  
rance of all  
these things  
is a disgrace.But if there  
is any one  
who has faith  
in oral in-  
struction and  
in the remi-  
niscence of  
ideas,—with  
him we  
sympathize,  
and pray that  
we may  
become like  
him.Poets, orators,  
legislators,  
if their com-  
positions are  
based on  
truth, are  
worthy to be  
called philoso-  
phers.

otherwise than disgraceful to him, even though he have the applause of the whole world.

*Phaedr.* Certainly.

*Soc.* But he who thinks that in the written word there is necessarily much which is not serious, and that neither poetry nor prose, spoken or written, is of any great value, if, like the compositions of the rhapsodes, they are only recited in order to be believed, and not with any view to criticism or instruction; and who thinks that even the best of writings are but a reminiscence of what we know, and that only in principles of justice and goodness and nobility taught and communicated orally for the sake of instruction and graven in the soul, which is the true way of writing, is there clearness and perfection and seriousness, and that such principles are a man's own and his legitimate offspring;—being, in the first place, the word which he finds in his own bosom; secondly, the brethren and descendants and relations of his idea which have been duly implanted by him in the souls of others;—and who cares for them and no others—this is the right sort of man; and you and I, Phaedrus, would pray that we may become like him. 278

*Phaedr.* That is most assuredly my desire and prayer.

*Soc.* And now the play is played out; and of rhetoric enough. Go and tell Lysias that to the fountain and school of the Nymphs we went down, and were bidden by them to convey a message to him and to other composers of speeches—to Homer and other writers of poems, whether set to music or not; and to Solon and others who have composed writings in the form of political discourses which they would term laws—to all of them we are to say that if their compositions are based on knowledge of the truth, and they can defend or prove them, when they are put to the test, by spoken arguments, which leave their writings poor in comparison of them, then they are to be called, not only poets, orators, legislators, but are worthy of a higher name, befitting the serious pursuit of their life.

*Phaedr.* What name would you assign to them?

*Soc.* Wise, I may not call them; for that is a great name which belongs to God alone,—lovers of wisdom or philosophers is their modest and befitting title.

*Phaedr.* Very suitable.

*Phaedrus.*

*Soc.* And he who cannot rise above his own compilations and compositions, which he has been long patching and piecing, adding some and taking away some, may be justly called poet or speech-maker or law-maker.

SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.

*Phaedr.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Now go and tell this to your companion.

Give this as  
our message  
to Lysias.

*Phaedr.* But there is also a friend of yours who ought not to be forgotten.

*Soc.* Who is he?

279 *Phaedr.* Isocrates the fair:—What message will you send to him, and how shall we describe him?

*Soc.* Isocrates is still young, Phaedrus; but I am willing to hazard a prophecy concerning him.

Another  
message to  
Isocrates,  
which is ex-  
pressed in  
terms of  
the highest  
praise.

*Phaedr.* What would you prophesy?

*Soc.* I think that he has a genius which soars above the orations of Lysias, and that his character is cast in a finer mould. My impression of him is that he will marvellously improve as he grows older, and that all former rhetoricians will be as children in comparison of him. And I believe that he will not be satisfied with rhetoric, but that there is in him a divine inspiration which will lead him to things higher still. For he has an element of philosophy in his nature. This is the message of the gods dwelling in this place, and which I will myself deliver to Isocrates, who is my delight; and do you give the other to Lysias, who is yours.

*Phaedr.* I will; and now as the heat is abated let us depart.

*Soc.* Should we not offer up a prayer first of all to the local deities?

*Phaedr.* By all means.

*Soc.* Beloved Pan, and all ye other gods who haunt this place, give me beauty in the inward soul; and may the outward and inward man be at one. May I reckon the wise to be the wealthy, and may I have such a quantity of gold as a temperate man and he only can bear and carry.—Anything more? The prayer, I think, is enough for me.

*Phaedr.* Ask the same for me, for friends should have all things in common.

*Soc.* Let us go.



ION.



## INTRODUCTION.

THE *Ion* is the shortest, or nearly the shortest, of all the writings which bear the name of Plato, and is not authenticated by any early external testimony. The grace and beauty of this little work supply the only, and perhaps a sufficient, proof of its genuineness. The plan is simple; the dramatic interest consists entirely in the contrast between the irony of Socrates and the transparent vanity and childlike enthusiasm of the rhapsode *Ion*. The theme of the Dialogue may possibly have been suggested by the passage of Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (iv. 2, 10) in which the rhapsodists are described by Euthydemus as 'very precise about the exact words of Homer, but very idiotic themselves.' (Cp. Aristotle, *Met.* xiii. chap. 6. § 7.)

*Ion.*  
INTRODUC-  
TION.

**Steph.** *Ion* the rhapsode has just come to Athens; he has been exhibiting in Epidaurus at the festival of Asclepius, and is intending to exhibit at the festival of the Panathenaea. Socrates admires and envies the rhapsode's art; for he is always well dressed and in good company — in the company of good poets and of Homer, who is the prince of them. In the course of conversation the admission is elicited from *Ion* that his skill is restricted to Homer, and that he knows nothing of inferior poets, such as Hesiod and Archilochus; — he brightens up and is wide awake when Homer is being recited, but is apt to go to sleep at the recitations of any other poet. 'And yet, surely, he who knows the superior ought to know the inferior also; — he who can judge of the good speaker is able to judge of the bad. And poetry is a whole; and he who judges of poetry by rules of art ought to be able to judge of all poetry.' This is confirmed by the analogy of sculpture, painting, flute-playing, and the other arts. The argument is at last brought home to the mind of *Ion*, who asks how this

ANALYSIS.



*Ion.* contradiction is to be solved. The solution given by Socrates is as follows : —

ANALYSIS.

The rhapsode is not guided by rules of art, but is an inspired person who derives a mysterious power from the poet; and the poet, in like manner, is inspired by the God. The poets and their interpreters may be compared to a chain of magnetic rings suspended from one another, and from a magnet. The magnet is the Muse, and the ring which immediately follows is the poet himself; from him are suspended other poets; there is a chain of rhapsodes and actors, who also hang from the Muses, but are let down at the side; and the last ring of all is the spectator. The poet is the inspired interpreter of the God, and this is the reason why some poets, like Homer, are restricted to a single theme, or, like Tynnichus, are famous for a single poem; and the rhapsode is the inspired interpreter of the poet, and for a similar reason some rhapsodes, like Ion, are the interpreters of single poets. 534

Ion is delighted at the notion of being inspired, and acknowledges that he is beside himself when he is performing; — his eyes rain tears and his hair stands on end. Socrates is of opinion that a man must be mad who behaves in this way at a festival when he is surrounded by his friends and there is nothing to trouble him. Ion is confident that Socrates would never think him mad if he could only hear his embellishments of Homer. Socrates asks whether he can speak well about everything in Homer. ‘Yes, indeed he can.’ ‘What about things of which he has no knowledge?’ Ion answers that he can interpret anything in Homer. But, rejoins Socrates, when Homer speaks of the arts, as for example, of chariot-driving, or of medicine, or of prophecy, or of navigation — will he, or will the charioteer or physician or prophet or pilot be the better judge? Ion is compelled to admit that every man will judge of his own particular art better than the rhapsode. He still maintains, however, that he understands the art of the general as well as any one. ‘Then why in this city of Athens, in which men of merit are always being sought after, is he not at once appointed a general?’ Ion replies that he is a foreigner, and the Athenians and Spartans will not appoint a foreigner to be their general. ‘No, that is not the real reason; there are many 537 541

examples to the contrary. But Ion has long been playing tricks with the argument; like Proteus, he transforms himself into a variety of shapes, and is at last about to run away in the disguise of a general. Would he rather be regarded as inspired or dishonest?' Ion, who has no suspicion of the irony of Socrates, eagerly embraces the alternative of inspiration.

*Ion.*

ANALYSIS.

The *Ion*, like the other earlier Platonic Dialogues, is a mixture of jest and earnest, in which no definite result is obtained, but some Socratic or Platonic truths are allowed dimly to appear.

INTRODUCTION.

The elements of a true theory of poetry are contained in the notion that the poet is inspired. Genius is often said to be unconscious, or spontaneous, or a gift of nature: that 'genius is akin to madness' is a popular aphorism of modern times. The greatest strength is observed to have an element of limitation. Sense or passion are too much for the 'dry light' of intelligence which mingles with them and becomes discoloured by them. Imagination is often at war with reason and fact. The concentration of the mind on a single object, or on a single aspect of human nature, overpowers the orderly perception of the whole. Yet the feelings too bring truths home to the minds of many who in the way of reason would be incapable of understanding them. Reflections of this kind may have been passing before Plato's mind when he describes the poet as inspired, or when, as in the *Apology* (22 B foll.), he speaks of poets as the worst critics of their own writings—anybody taken at random from the crowd is a better interpreter of them than they are of themselves. They are sacred persons, 'winged and holy things' who have a touch of madness in their composition (*Phaedr.* 245 A), and should be treated with every sort of respect (*Rep.* iii. 398 A), but not allowed to live in a well-ordered state. Like the Statesmen in the *Meno* (p. 99), they have a divine instinct, but they are narrow and confused; they do not attain to the clearness of ideas, or to the knowledge of poetry or of any other art as a whole.

In the *Protagoras* (316 D foll.) the ancient poets are recognized by Protagoras himself as the original sophists; and this family resemblance may be traced in the *Ion*. The rhapsode belongs to the realm of imitation and of opinion: he professes to have all knowledge, which is derived by him from Homer, just as the

*Ion.*INTRODUC-  
TION.

sophist professes to have all wisdom, which is contained in his art of rhetoric. Even more than the sophist he is incapable of appreciating the commonest logical distinctions; he cannot explain the nature of his own art; his great memory contrasts with his inability to follow the steps of the argument. And in his highest moments of inspiration he has an eye to his own gains (535 E).

The old quarrel between philosophy and poetry, which in the Republic leads to their final separation, is already working in the mind of Plato, and is embodied by him in the contrast between Socrates and Ion. Yet here, as in the Republic, Socrates shows a sympathy with the poetic nature. Also, the manner in which Ion is affected by his own recitations affords a lively illustration of the power which, in the Republic (iii. 394), Socrates attributes to dramatic performances over the mind of the performer. His allusion to his embellishments of Homer, in which he declares himself to have surpassed Metrodorus of Lampsacus and Stesimbrotus of Thasos, seems to show that, like them, he belonged to the allegorical school of interpreters. The circumstance that nothing more is known of him may be adduced in confirmation of the argument that this truly Platonic little work is not a forgery of later times.

# ION.

## PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES. ION.

**Steph.** *Socrates.* WELCOME, ION. Are you from your native city  
530 of Ephesus?

*Ion.*

SOCRATES,  
ION.

Socrates  
meets Ion the  
Rhapsode.

*Ion.* No, Socrates; but from Epidaurus, where I attended the festival of Asclepius.

*Soc.* And do the Epidaurians have contests of rhapsodes at the festival?

*Ion.* O yes; and of all sorts of musical performers.

*Soc.* And were you one of the competitors — and did you succeed?

*Ion.* I obtained the first prize of all, Socrates.

*Soc.* Well done; and I hope that you will do the same for us at the Panathenaea.

*Ion.* And I will, please heaven.

*Soc.* I often envy the profession of a rhapsode, Ion; for you have always to wear fine clothes, and to look as beautiful as you can is a part of your art. Then, again, you are obliged to be continually in the company of many good poets; and especially of Homer, who is the best and most divine of them; and to understand him, and not merely learn his words by rote, is a thing greatly to be envied. And no man can be a rhapsode who does not understand the meaning of the poet. For the rhapsode ought to interpret the mind of the poet to his hearers, but how can he interpret him well unless he knows what he means? All this is greatly to be envied.

How enviable  
is the profes-  
sion of a rhap-  
sode! He is  
always finely  
dressed and  
he lives in  
good company  
among poets,  
of whom he is  
the interpreter  
to men.

*Ion.* Very true, Socrates; interpretation has certainly been the most laborious part of my art; and I believe myself able

*Ion.*SOCRATES,  
ION.Ion devotes  
himself to the  
exclusive in-  
terpretation  
of Homer.

to speak about Homer better than any man; and that neither Metrodorus of Lampsacus, nor Stesimbrotus of Thasos, nor Glaucón, nor any one else who ever was, had as good ideas about Homer as I have, or as many.

*Soc.* I am glad to hear you say so, Ion; I see that you will not refuse to acquaint me with them.

*Ion.* Certainly, Socrates; and you really ought to hear how exquisitely I render Homer. I think that the Homeridae should give me a golden crown.

*Soc.* I shall take an opportunity of hearing your embellishments of him at some other time. But just now I should like to ask you a question: Does your art extend to Hesiod and Archilochus, or to Homer only? 531

*Ion.* To Homer only; he is in himself quite enough.

*Soc.* Are there any things about which Homer and Hesiod agree?

*Ion.* Yes; in my opinion there are a good many.

*Soc.* And can you interpret better what Homer says, or what Hesiod says, about these matters in which they agree?

*Ion.* I can interpret them equally well, Socrates, where they agree.

*Soc.* But what about matters in which they do not agree?—for example, about divination, of which both Homer and Hesiod have something to say,—

*Ion.* Very true:

*Soc.* Would you or a good prophet be a better interpreter of what these two poets say about divination, not only when they agree, but when they disagree?

*Ion.* A prophet.

*Soc.* And if you were a prophet, would you not be able to interpret them when they disagree as well as when they agree?

*Ion.* Clearly.

*Soc.* But how did you come to have this skill about Homer only, and not about Hesiod or the other poets? Does not Homer speak of the same themes which all other poets handle? Is not war his great argument? and does he not speak of human society and of intercourse of men, good and bad, skilled and unskilled, and of the gods conversing with one another and with mankind, and about what happens in

heaven and in the world below, and the generations of gods and heroes? Are not these the themes of which Homer sings?

*Ion.*  
*SOCRATES,*  
*ION.*

*Ion.* Very true, Socrates.

*Soc.* And do not the other poets sing of the same?

*Ion.* Yes, Socrates; but not in the same way as Homer.

*Soc.* What, in a worse way?

*Ion.* Yes, in a far worse.

*Soc.* And Homer in a better way?

*Ion.* He is incomparably better.

*Soc.* And yet surely, my dear friend Ion, in a discussion about arithmetic, where many people are speaking, and one speaks better than the rest, there is somebody who can judge which of them is the good speaker?

But Socrates argues that he who knows Homer, who is the better, will know Archilochus and Hesiod, who are the inferiors.

*Ion.* Yes.

*Soc.* And he who judges of the good will be the same as he who judges of the bad speakers?

*Ion.* The same.

*Soc.* And he will be the arithmetician?

*Ion.* Yes.

*Soc.* Well, and in discussions about the wholesomeness of food, when many persons are speaking, and one speaks better than the rest, will he who recognizes the better speaker be a different person from him who recognizes the worse, or the same?

*Ion.* Clearly the same.

*Soc.* And who is he, and what is his name?

*Ion.* The physician.

*Soc.* And speaking generally, in all discussions in which the subject is the same and many men are speaking, will not  
532 he who knows the good know the bad speaker also? For if he does not know the bad, neither will he know the good when the same topic is being discussed.

*Ion.* True.

*Soc.* Is not the same person skilful in both?

*Ion.* Yes.

*Soc.* And you say that Homer and the other poets, such as Hesiod and Archilochus, speak of the same things, although not in the same way; but the one speaks well and the other not so well?



*Ion.**Ion.* Yes; and I am right in saying so.SOCRATES,  
*ION.**Soc.* And if you knew the good speaker, you would also know the inferior speakers to be inferior?*Ion.* That is true.*Soc.* Then, my dear friend, can I be mistaken in saying that Ion is equally skilled in Homer and in other poets, since he himself acknowledges that the same person will be a good judge of all those who speak of the same things; and that almost all poets do speak of the same things?

'Why then is Ion all alive when Homer is spoken of, but goes to sleep at the mention of any other poet?'—  
Because he has no knowledge of poetry as a whole.

*Ion.* Why then, Socrates, do I lose attention and go to sleep and have absolutely no ideas of the least value, when any one speaks of any other poet; but when Homer is mentioned, I wake up at once and am all attention and have plenty to say?*Soc.* The reason, my friend, is obvious. No one can fail to see that you speak of Homer without any art or knowledge. If you were able to speak of him by rules of art, you would have been able to speak of all other poets; for poetry is a whole.*Ion.* Yes.*Soc.* And when any one acquires any other art as a whole, the same may be said of them. Would you like me to explain my meaning, Ion?*Ion.* Yes, indeed, Socrates; I very much wish that you would: for I love to hear you wise men talk.*Soc.* O that we were wise, Ion, and that you could truly call us so; but you rhapsodes and actors, and the poets whose verses you sing, are wise; whereas I am a common man, who only speak the truth. For consider what a very commonplace and trivial thing is this which I have said—a thing which any man might say: that when a man has acquired a knowledge of a whole art, the enquiry into good and bad is one and the same. Let us consider this matter; is not the art of painting a whole?*Ion.* Yes.*Soc.* And there are and have been many painters good and bad?*Ion.* Yes.*Soc.* And did you ever know any one who was skilful in pointing out the excellences and defects of Polygnotus the

The analogy  
of the other  
arts.

533 son of Aglaophon, but incapable of criticizing other painters ; *Ion.*  
and when the work of any other painter was produced, went *SOCRATES,*  
to sleep and was at a loss, and had no ideas ; but when he *ION.*  
had to give his opinion about Polygnotus, or whoever the  
painter might be, and about him only, woke up and was  
attentive and had plenty to say?

*Ion.* No indeed, I have never known such a person.

*Soc.* Or did you ever know of any one in sculpture, who  
was skilful in expounding the merits of Daedalus the son of  
Metion, or of Epeius the son of Panopeus, or of Theodorus  
the Samian, or of any individual sculptor ; but when the  
works of sculptors in general were produced, was at a loss  
and went to sleep and had nothing to say?

*Ion.* No indeed ; no more than the other.

*Soc.* And if I am not mistaken, you never met with any one  
among flute-players or harp-players or singers to the harp or  
rhapsodes who was able to discourse of Olympus or Thamyras  
or Orpheus, or Phemius the rhapsode of Ithaca, but was at a  
loss when he came to speak of Ion of Ephesus, and had no  
notion of his merits or defects?

*Ion.* I cannot deny what you say, Socrates. Nevertheless  
I am conscious in my own self, and the world agrees with me  
in thinking that I do speak better and have more to say about  
Homer than any other man. But I do not speak equally well  
about others — tell me the reason of this.

*Soc.* I perceive, Ion ; and I will proceed to explain to you  
what I imagine to be the reason of this. The gift which you  
possess of speaking excellently about Homer is not an art,  
but, as I was just saying, an inspiration ; there is a divinity  
moving you, like that contained in the stone which Euripides  
calls a magnet, but which is commonly known as the stone of  
Heraclea. This stone not only attracts iron rings, but also  
imparts to them a similar power of attracting other rings ;  
and sometimes you may see a number of pieces of iron and  
rings suspended from one another so as to form quite a long  
chain : and all of them derive their power of suspension from  
the original stone. In like manner the Muse first of all  
inspires men herself ; and from these inspired persons a chain  
of other persons is suspended, who take the inspiration. For  
all good poets, epic as well as lyric, compose their beautiful

The gift of  
speaking well  
about Homer  
is an inspira-  
tion which  
exercises a  
magnetic  
power. All  
good poets  
are inspired.

*Ion.*SOCRATES,  
ION.

They have no  
rules of art,  
and are there-  
fore unable to  
utter strains of  
more than  
one kind.

Tynnichus  
composed a  
single poem  
only.

poems not by art, but because they are inspired and possessed. And as the Corybantian revellers when they dance are not in their right mind, so the lyric poets are not in their right mind when they are composing their beautiful strains: but when falling under the power of music and metre they are inspired and possessed; like Bacchic maidens who draw milk and honey from the rivers when they are under the influence of Dionysus but not when they are in their right mind. And the soul of the lyric poet does the same, as they themselves say; for they tell us that they bring songs from honeyed fountains, culling them out of the gardens and dells of the Muses; they, like the bees, winging their way from flower to flower. And this is true. For the poet is a light and winged and holy thing, and there is no invention in him until he has been inspired and is out of his senses, and the mind is no longer in him: when he has not attained to this state, he is powerless and is unable to utter his oracles. Many are the noble words in which poets speak concerning the actions of men; but like yourself when speaking about Homer, they do not speak of them by any rules of art: they are simply inspired to utter that to which the Muse impels them, and that only; and when inspired, one of them will make dithyrambs, another hymns of praise, another choral strains, another epic or iambic verses — and he who is good at one is not good at any other kind of verse: for not by art does the poet sing, but by power divine. Had he learned by rules of art, he would have known how to speak not of one theme only, but of all; and therefore God takes away the minds of poets, and uses them as his ministers, as he also uses diviners and holy prophets, in order that we who hear them may know them to be speaking not of themselves who utter these priceless words in a state of unconsciousness, but that God himself is the speaker, and that through them he is conversing with us. And Tynnichus the Chalcidian affords a striking instance of what I am saying: he wrote nothing that any one would care to remember but the famous pæan which is in every one's mouth, one of the finest poems ever written, simply an invention of the Muses, as he himself says. For in this way the God would seem to indicate to us and not allow us to doubt that these beautiful poems are not human, or the work of man, but divine and the

work of God; and that the poets are only the interpreters of the Gods by whom they are severally possessed. Was not this the lesson which the God intended to teach when by the  
535 mouth of the worst of poets he sang the best of songs? Am I not right, Ion?

*Ion.*  
*SOCRATES,*  
*ION.*

*Ion.* Yes, indeed, Socrates, I feel that you are; for your words touch my soul, and I am persuaded that good poets by a divine inspiration interpret the things of the Gods to us.

*Soc.* And you rhapsodists are the interpreters of the poets?

*Ion.* There again you are right.

*Soc.* Then you are the interpreters of interpreters?

*Ion.* Precisely.

*Soc.* I wish you would frankly tell me, Ion, what I am going to ask of you: When you produce the greatest effect upon the audience in the recitation of some striking passage, such as the apparition of Odysseus leaping forth on the floor, recognized by the suitors and casting his arrows at his feet, or the description of Achilles rushing at Hector, or the sorrows of Andromache, Hecuba, or Priam,—are you in your right mind? Are you not carried out of yourself, and does not your soul in an ecstasy seem to be among the persons or places of which you are speaking, whether they are in Ithaca or in Troy or whatever may be the scene of the poem?

*Ion himself is not in his right mind when he produces the greatest effect.*

*Ion.* That proof strikes home to me, Socrates. For I must frankly confess that at the tale of pity my eyes are filled with tears, and when I speak of horrors, my hair stands on end and my heart throbs.

*Soc.* Well, Ion, and what are we to say of a man who at a sacrifice or festival, when he is dressed in holiday attire, and has golden crowns upon his head, of which nobody has robbed him, appears weeping or panic-stricken in the presence of more than twenty thousand friendly faces, when there is no one despoiling or wronging him;—is he in his right mind or is he not?

*Ion.* No indeed, Socrates, I must say that, strictly speaking, he is not in his right mind.

*Soc.* And are you aware that you produce similar effects on most of the spectators?

*Ion.* Only too well; for I look down upon them from the stage, and behold the various emotions of pity, wonder, stern-

*Ion.*SOCRATES,  
ION.

ness, stamped upon their countenances when I am speaking; and I am obliged to give my very best attention to them; for if I make them cry I myself shall laugh, and if I make them laugh I myself shall cry when the time of payment arrives.

*Soc.* Do you know that the spectator is the last of the rings which, as I am saying, receive the power of the original magnet from one another? The rhapsode like yourself and the actor are intermediate links, and the poet himself is the first 536 of them. Through all these the God sways the souls of men in any direction which he pleases, and makes one man hang down from another. Thus there is a vast chain of dancers and masters and under-masters of choruses, who are suspended, as if from the stone, at the side of the rings which hang down from the Muse. And every poet has some Muse from whom he is suspended, and by whom he is said to be possessed, which is nearly the same thing; for he is taken hold of. And from these first rings, which are the poets, depend others, some deriving their inspiration from Orpheus, others from Musaeus; but the greater number are possessed and held by Homer. Of whom, Ion, you are one, and are possessed by Homer; and when any one repeats the words of another poet you go to sleep, and know not what to say; but when any one recites a strain of Homer you wake up in a moment, and your soul leaps within you, and you have plenty to say; for not by art or knowledge about Homer do you say what you say, but by divine inspiration and by possession; just as the Corybantian revellers too have a quick perception of that strain only which is appropriated to the God by whom they are possessed, and have plenty of dances and words for that, but take no heed of any other. And you, Ion, when the name of Homer is mentioned have plenty to say, and have nothing to say of others. You ask, 'Why is this?' The answer is that you praise Homer not by art but by divine inspiration.

*Ion.* That is good, Socrates; and yet I doubt whether you will ever have eloquence enough to persuade me that I praise Homer only when I am mad and possessed; and if you could hear me speak of him I am sure you would never think this to be the case.

*Soc.* I should like very much to hear you, but not until

The rings  
which hang  
from the  
Muse.



you have answered a question which I have to ask. On what part of Homer do you speak well? — not surely about every part.

*Ion.*  
SOCRATES,  
ION.

*Ion.* There is no part, Socrates, about which I do not speak well: of that I can assure you.

*Ion knows every part of Homer.*

*Soc.* Surely not about things in Homer of which you have no knowledge?

*Ion.* And what is there in Homer of which I have no knowledge?

*Soc.* Why, does not Homer speak in many passages about arts? For example, about driving; if I can only remember the lines I will repeat them.

*Ion.* I remember, and will repeat them.

*Soc.* Tell me then, what Nestor says to Antilochus, his son, where he bids him be careful of the turn at the horse-race in honour of Patroclus.

*Ion.* 'Bend gently,' he says, 'in the polished chariot to the left of them, and urge the horse on the right hand with whip and voice; and slacken the rein. And when you are at the goal, let the left horse draw near, yet so that the nave of the well-wrought wheel may not even seem to touch the extremity; and avoid catching the stone<sup>1</sup>.'

*Soc.* Enough. Now, Ion, will the charioteer or the physician be the better judge of the propriety of these lines?

*Ion.* The charioteer, clearly.

*Soc.* And will the reason be that this is his art, or will there be any other reason?

*Ion.* No, that will be the reason.

*Soc.* And every art is appointed by God to have knowledge of a certain work; for that which we know by the art of the pilot we do not know by the art of medicine?

*Ion.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Nor do we know by the art of the carpenter that which we know by the art of medicine?

*Ion.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* And this is true of all the arts; — that which we know with one art we do not know with the other? But let me ask a prior question: You admit that there are differences of arts?

<sup>1</sup> Il. xxiii. 335.



*Ion.**Ion.* Yes.SOCRATES,  
*ION.*

*Soc.* You would argue, as I should, that when one art is of one kind of knowledge and another of another, they are different?

*Ion.* Yes.

*Soc.* Yes, surely; for if the subject of knowledge were the same, there would be no meaning in saying that the arts were different,—if they both gave the same knowledge. For example, I know that here are five fingers, and you know the same. And if I were to ask whether I and you became acquainted with this fact by the help of the same art of arithmetic, you would acknowledge that we did?

*Ion.* Yes.

Every art has a distinct subject; and he who has no knowledge of an art can form no judgment of it.

*Soc.* Tell me, then, what I was intending to ask you,— 538 whether this holds universally? Must the same art have the same subject of knowledge, and different arts other subjects of knowledge?

*Ion.* That is my opinion, Socrates.

*Soc.* Then he who has no knowledge of a particular art will have no right judgment of the sayings and doings of that art?

*Ion.* Very true.

*Soc.* Then which will be a better judge of the lines which you were reciting from Homer, you or the charioteer?

*Ion.* The charioteer.

*Soc.* Why, yes, because you are a rhapsode and not a charioteer.

*Ion.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the art of the rhapsode is different from that of the charioteer?

*Ion.* Yes.

*Soc.* And if a different knowledge, then a knowledge of different matters?

*Ion.* True.

*Soc.* You know the passage in which Hecamede, the concubine of Nestor, is described as giving to the wounded Machaon a posset, as he says,

‘Made with Pramnian wine; and she grated cheese of goat’s milk with a grater of bronze, and at his side placed an onion which gives a relish to drink<sup>1</sup>.’

<sup>1</sup> Il. xi. 638, 630.

Now would you say that the art of the rhapsode or the art of medicine was better able to judge of the propriety of these lines?

*Ion.* The art of medicine.

*Soc.* And when Homer says,

‘And she descended into the deep like a leaden plummet, which, set in the horn of ox that ranges in the fields, rushes along carrying death among the ravenous fishes<sup>1</sup>,’—

will the art of the fisherman or of the rhapsode be better able to judge whether these lines are rightly expressed or not?

*Ion.* Clearly, Socrates, the art of the fisherman.

*Soc.* Come now, suppose that you were to say to me: ‘Since you, Socrates, are able to assign different passages in Homer to their corresponding arts, I wish that you would tell me what are the passages of which the excellence ought to be judged by the prophet and prophetic art’; and you will see how readily and truly I shall answer you. For there are many such passages, particularly in the *Odyssee*; as, for example, the passage in which Theoclymenus the prophet of the house of Melampus says to the suitors:—

539 . ‘Wretched men! what is happening to you? Your heads and your faces and your limbs underneath are shrouded in night; and the voice of lamentation bursts forth, and your cheeks are wet with tears. And the vestibule is full, and the court is full, of ghosts descending into the darkness of Erebus, and the sun has perished out of heaven, and an evil mist is spread abroad<sup>2</sup>.’

And there are many such passages in the *Iliad* also; as for example in the description of the battle near the rampart, where he says:—

‘As they were eager to pass the ditch, there came to them an omen: a soaring eagle, holding back the people on the left, bore a huge bloody dragon in his talons, still living and panting; nor had he yet resigned the strife, for he bent back and smote the bird which carried him on the breast by the neck, and he in pain let him fall from him to the ground into the midst of the multitude. And the eagle, with a cry, was borne afar on the wings of the wind<sup>3</sup>.’

These are the sort of things which I should say that the prophet ought to consider and determine.

*Ion.* And you are quite right, Socrates, in saying so.

*Soc.* Yes, Ion, and you are right also. And as I have

<sup>1</sup> Il. xxiv. 80.

<sup>2</sup> Od. xx. 351.

<sup>3</sup> Il. xii. 200.

*Ion.*  
SOCRATES,  
ION.  
  
For example,  
the rhapsode  
can form no  
judgment of  
the art of  
medicine, or  
of the fisher-  
man's or of  
the prophetic  
art.

*Ion.*

SOCRATES,

ION.

selected from the Iliad and Odyssee for you passages which describe the office of the prophet and the physician and the fisherman, do you, who know Homer so much better than I do, Ion, select for me passages which relate to the rhapsode and the rhapsode's art, and which the rhapsode ought to examine and judge of better than other men.

*Ion.* All passages, I should say, Socrates.

*Soc.* Not all, Ion, surely. Have you already forgotten what you were saying? A rhapsode ought to have a better memory.

*Ion.* Why, what am I forgetting?

540

*Soc.* Do you not remember that you declared the art of the rhapsode to be different from the art of the charioteer?

*Ion.* Yes, I remember.

*Soc.* And you admitted that being different they would have different subjects of knowledge?

*Ion.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then upon your own showing the rhapsode, and the art of the rhapsode, will not know everything?

*Ion.* I should exclude certain things, Socrates.

*Soc.* You mean to say that you would exclude pretty much the subjects of the other arts. As he does not know all of them, which of them will he know?

*Ion.* He will know what a man and what a woman ought to say, and what a freeman and what a slave ought to say, and what a ruler and what a subject.

*Soc.* Do you mean that a rhapsode will know better than the pilot what the ruler of a sea-tossed vessel ought to say?

*Ion.* No; the pilot will know best.

*Soc.* Or will the rhapsode know better than the physician what the ruler of a sick man ought to say?

*Ion.* He will not.

*Soc.* But he will know what a slave ought to say?

*Ion.* Yes.

*Soc.* Suppose the slave to be a cowherd; the rhapsode will know better than the cowherd what he ought to say in order to soothe the infuriated cows?

*Ion.* No, he will not.

*Soc.* But he will know what a spinning-woman ought to say about the working of wool?

Ion is still of opinion that the rhapsode can form a better general judgment of the proprieties of character:

*Ion.* No.

*Ion.*

SOCRATES,  
ION.

not of what a slave or a cow-herd ought to say, but of what a general ought to say, and accidentally of what the professors of other arts would say.

*Soc.* At any rate he will know what a general ought to say when exhorting his soldiers?

*Ion.* Yes, that is the sort of thing which the rhapsode will be sure to know.

*Soc.* Well, but is the art of the rhapsode the art of the general?

*Ion.* I am sure that I should know what a general ought to say.

*Soc.* Why, yes, Ion, because you may possibly have a knowledge of the art of the general as well as of the rhapsode; and you may also have a knowledge of horsemanship as well as of the lyre: and then you would know when horses were well or ill managed. But suppose I were to ask you: By the help of which art, Ion, do you know whether horses are well managed, by your skill as a horseman or as a performer on the lyre — what would you answer?

*Ion.* I should reply, by my skill as a horseman.

*Soc.* And if you judged of performers on the lyre, you would admit that you judged of them as a performer on the lyre, and not as a horseman?

*Ion.* Yes.

*Soc.* And in judging of the general's art, do you judge of it as a general or a rhapsode?

*Ion.* To me there appears to be no difference between them.

541 *Soc.* What do you mean? Do you mean to say that the art of the rhapsode and of the general is the same?

*Ion.* Yes, one and the same.

*Soc.* Then he who is a good rhapsode is also a good general?

*Ion.* Certainly, Socrates.

*Soc.* And he who is a good general is also a good rhapsode?

*Ion.* No; I do not say that.

*Soc.* But you do say that he who is a good rhapsode is also a good general.

*Ion.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And you are the best of Hellenic rhapsodes?

*Ion.* Far the best, Socrates.

Ion is made to admit that he, being the best of rhapsodes, is also the best of generals.

*Ion.**Soc.* And are you the best general, Ion?SOCRATES,  
ION.*Ion.* To be sure, Socrates; and Homer was my master.But why then  
is he not  
employed?*Soc.* But then, Ion, what in the name of goodness can be the reason why you, who are the best of generals as well as the best of rhapsodes in all Hellas, go about as a rhapsode when you might be a general? Do you think that the Hellenes want a rhapsode with his golden crown, and do not want a general?*Ion.* Why, Socrates, the reason is, that my countrymen, the Ephesians, are the servants and soldiers of Athens, and do not need a general; and you and Sparta are not likely to have me, for you think that you have enough generals of your own.*Soc.* My good Ion, did you never hear of Apollodorus of Cyzicus?*Ion.* Who may he be?*Soc.* One who, though a foreigner, has often been chosen their general by the Athenians: and there is Phanosthenes of Andros, and Heraclides of Clazomenae, whom they have also appointed to the command of their armies and to other offices, although aliens, after they had shown their merit. And will they not choose Ion the Ephesian to be their general, and honour him, if he prove himself worthy? Were not the Ephesians originally Athenians, and Ephesus is no mean city? But, indeed, Ion, if you are correct in saying that by art and knowledge you are able to praise Homer, you do not deal fairly with me, and after all your professions of knowing many glorious things about Homer, and promises that you would exhibit them, you are only a deceiver, and so far from exhibiting the art of which you are a master, will not, even after my repeated entreaties, explain to me the nature of it. You have literally as many forms as Proteus; and now you go all manner of ways, twisting and turning, and, like Proteus, become all manner of people at once, and at last slip away from me in the disguise of a general, in order that you may escape exhibiting your Homeric lore. And if 542  
you have art, then, as I was saying, in falsifying your promise that you would exhibit Homer, you are not dealing fairly with me. But if, as I believe, you have no art, but speak all these beautiful words about Homer unconsciously under hisIon is either a  
rogue, or he is  
an inspired  
person.

inspiring influence, then I acquit you of dishonesty, and shall only say that you are inspired. Which do you prefer to be thought, dishonest or inspired?

*Ion.*

SOCRATES,  
ION.

*Ion.* There is a great difference, Socrates, between the two alternatives; and inspiration is by far the nobler.

Ion accepts  
the latter of  
the two  
alternatives.

*Soc.* Then, Ion, I shall assume the nobler alternative; and attribute to you in your praises of Homer inspiration, and not art.





# SYMPOSIUM.



## INTRODUCTION.

OF all the works of Plato the *Symposium* is the most perfect in form, and may be truly thought to contain more than any commentator has ever dreamed of; or, as Goethe said of one of his own writings, more than the author himself knew. For in philosophy as in prophecy glimpses of the future may often be conveyed in words which could hardly have been understood or interpreted at the time when they were uttered (cp. *Symp.* 210 foll., 223 D)—which were wiser than the writer of them meant, and could not have been explained by him if he had been interrogated about them. Yet Plato was not a mystic, nor in any degree affected by the Eastern influences which afterwards overspread the Alexandrian world. He was not an enthusiast or a sentimentalist, but one who aspired only to see reasoned truth, and whose thoughts are clearly expressed in his language. There is no foreign element either of Egypt or of Asia to be found in his writings. And more than any other Platonic work the *Symposium* is Greek both in style and subject, having a beauty ‘as of a statue,’ while the companion Dialogue of the *Phaedrus* is marked by a sort of Gothic irregularity. More too than in any other of his Dialogues, Plato is emancipated from former philosophies. The genius of Greek art seems to triumph over the traditions of Pythagorean, Eleatic, or Megarian systems, and ‘the old quarrel of poetry and philosophy’ has at least a superficial reconciliation. (*Rep.* x. 607 B.)

*Symposium.*

INTRODUC-  
TION.

**Steph.** An unknown person who had heard of the discourses in praise  
**172** of love spoken by Socrates and others at the banquet of Agathon is desirous of having an authentic account of them, which he thinks that he can obtain from Apollodorus, the same excitable,

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or rather 'mad' friend of Socrates, who is afterwards introduced in the *Phaedo*. He had imagined that the discourses were recent. There he is entirely mistaken: but they are still fresh in the memory of his informant, who had just been repeating them to Glaucon, and is quite prepared to have another rehearsal of them in a walk from the Piraeus to Athens. Although he had not been present himself, he had heard them from the best authority. Aristodemus, who is described as having been in past times a humble but inseparable attendant of Socrates, had reported them to him (cp. *Xen. Mem.* i. 4). 173

The narrative which he had heard was as follows:—

Aristodemus meeting Socrates in holiday attire, is invited by him to a banquet at the house of Agathon, who had been sacrificing in thanksgiving for his tragic victory on the day previous. But no sooner has he entered the house than he finds that he is alone; Socrates has stayed behind in a fit of abstraction, and does not appear until the banquet is half over. On his appearing he and the host jest a little; the question is then asked by Pausanias, one of the guests, 'What shall they do about drinking? as they had been all well drunk on the day before, and drinking on two successive days is such a bad thing.' This is confirmed by the authority of Eryximachus the physician, who further proposes that instead of listening to the flute-girl and her 'noise' they shall make speeches in honour of love, one after another, going from left to right in the order in which they are reclining at the table. All of them agree to this proposal, and Phaedrus, who is the 'father' of the idea, which he has previously communicated to Eryximachus, begins as follows:— 174 175 176 177

He descants first of all upon the antiquity of love, which is proved by the authority of the poets; secondly upon the benefits which love gives to man. The greatest of these is the sense of honour and dishonour. The lover is ashamed to be seen by the beloved doing or suffering any cowardly or mean act. And a state or army which was made up only of lovers and their loves would be invincible. For love will convert the veriest coward into an inspired hero. 178 179

And there have been true loves not only of men but of women also. Such was the love of Alcestis, who dared to die for her husband, and in recompense of her virtue was allowed to come

again from the dead. But Orpheus, the miserable harper, who went down to Hades alive, that he might bring back his wife, was mocked with an apparition only, and the gods afterwards contrived his death as the punishment of his cowardliness. The love of Achilles, like that of Alcestis, was courageous and true; for he was willing to avenge his lover Patroclus, although he knew that  
 180 his own death would immediately follow: and the gods, who honour the love of the beloved above that of the lover, rewarded him, and sent him to the islands of the blest.

Pausanias, who was sitting next, then takes up the tale: — He says that Phaedrus should have distinguished the heavenly love from the earthly, before he praised either. For there are two loves, as there are two Aphrodites — one the daughter of Uranus, who has no mother and is the elder and wiser goddess, and the other, the daughter of Zeus and Dione, who is popular and common.  
 181 The first of the two loves has a noble purpose, and delights only in the intelligent nature of man, and is faithful to the end, and has no shadow of wantonness or lust. The second is the coarser kind of love, which is a love of the body rather than of the  
 182 soul, and is of women and boys as well as of men. Now the actions of lovers vary, like every other sort of action, according to the manner of their performance. And in different countries there is a difference of opinion about male loves. Some, like the Boeotians, approve of them; others, like the Ionians, and most of the barbarians, disapprove of them; partly because they are aware of the political dangers which ensue from them, as may be seen in the instance of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. At Athens and Sparta there is an apparent contradiction about them. For at times they are encouraged, and then the lover is allowed  
 183 to play all sorts of fantastic tricks; he may swear and forswear himself (and 'at lovers' perjuries they say Jove laughs'); he may be a servant, and lie on a mat at the door of his love, without any loss of character; but there are also times when elders look grave and guard their young relations, and personal remarks are made. The truth is that some of these loves are disgraceful and  
 184 others honourable. The vulgar love of the body which takes wing and flies away when the bloom of youth is over, is disgraceful, and so is the interested love of power or wealth; but the love of the noble mind is lasting. The lover should be



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tested, and the beloved should not be too ready to yield. The rule in our country is that the beloved may do the same service to the lover in the way of virtue which the lover may do to him.

A voluntary service to be rendered for the sake of virtue and wisdom is permitted among us; and when these two customs — one the love of youth, the other the practice of virtue and philosophy — meet in one, then the lovers may lawfully unite. Nor is there any disgrace to a disinterested lover in being deceived: but the interested lover is doubly disgraced, for if he loses his love he loses his character; whereas the noble love of the other remains the same, although the object of his love is unworthy: for nothing can be nobler than love for the sake of virtue. This is that love of the heavenly goddess which is of great price to individuals and cities, making them work together for their improvement. 185

The turn of Aristophanes comes next; but he has the hiccough, and therefore proposes that Eryximachus the physician shall cure him or speak in his turn. Eryximachus is ready to do both, and after prescribing for the hiccough, speaks as follows:— 186

He agrees with Pausanias in maintaining that there are two kinds of love; but his art has led him to the further conclusion that the empire of this double love extends over all things, and is to be found in animals and plants as well as in man. In the human body also there are two loves; and the art of medicine shows which is the good and which is the bad love, and persuades the body to accept the good and reject the bad, and reconciles conflicting elements and makes them friends. Every art, gymnastic and husbandry as well as medicine, is the reconciliation of opposites; and this is what Heraclitus meant, when he spoke of a harmony of opposites: but in strictness he should rather have spoken of a harmony which succeeds opposites, for an agreement of disagreements there cannot be. Music too is concerned with the principles of love in their application to harmony and rhythm. In the abstract, all is simple, and we are not troubled with the twofold love; but when they are applied in education with their accompaniments of song and metre, then the discord begins. Then the old tale has to be repeated of fair Urania and the coarse Polyhymnia, who must be indulged sparingly, just as in my own art of medicine care must be taken that the taste of the epicure 187

be gratified without inflicting upon him the attendant penalty of disease. *Symposium.*

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- 188 There is a similar harmony or disagreement in the course of the seasons and in the relations of moist and dry, hot and cold, hoar frost and blight; and diseases of all sorts spring from the excesses or disorders of the element of love. The knowledge of these elements of love and discord in the heavenly bodies is termed astronomy, in the relations of men towards gods and parents is called divination. For divination is the peacemaker of gods and men, and works by a knowledge of the tendencies of merely human loves to piety and impiety. Such is the power of love; and that love which is just and temperate has the greatest power, and is the source of all our happiness and friendship with the gods and with one another. I dare say that I have omitted to
- 189 mention many things which you, Aristophanes, may supply, as I perceive that you are cured of the hiccough.

Aristophanes is the next speaker:—

- He professes to open a new vein of discourse, in which he begins by treating of the origin of human nature. The sexes were originally three, men, women, and the union of the two; and they were made round—having four hands, four feet, two
- 190 faces on a round neck, and the rest to correspond. Terrible was their strength and swiftness; and they were essaying to scale heaven and attack the gods. Doubt reigned in the celestial councils; the gods were divided between the desire of quelling the pride of man and the fear of losing the sacrifices. At last Zeus hit upon an expedient. Let us cut them in two, he said; then they will only have half their strength, and we shall have twice as many sacrifices. He spake, and split them as you might split an egg with an hair; and when this was done, he told Apollo to give their faces a twist and re-arrange their persons, taking out
- 191 the wrinkles and tying the skin in a knot about the navel. The two halves went about looking for one another, and were ready to die of hunger in one another's arms. Then Zeus invented an adjustment of the sexes, which enabled them to marry and go their way to the business of life. Now the characters of men differ accordingly as they are derived from the original man or the original woman, or the original man-woman. Those who come from the man-woman are lascivious and adulterous; those

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who come from the woman form female attachments; those who 192  
 are a section of the male follow the male and embrace him, and in  
 him all their desires centre. The pair are inseparable and live  
 together in pure and manly affection; yet they cannot tell what  
 they want of one another. But if Hephaestus were to come to  
 them with his instruments and propose that they should be  
 melted into one and remain one here and hereafter, they would  
 acknowledge that this was the very expression of their want.  
 For love is the desire of the whole, and the pursuit of the whole  
 is called love. There was a time when the two sexes were 193  
 only one, but now God has halved them,—much as the Lacedae-  
 monians have cut up the Arcadians,—and if they do not behave  
 themselves he will divide them again, and they will hop  
 about with half a nose and face in basso relievo. Wherefore let  
 us exhort all men to piety, that we may obtain the goods of which,  
 love is the author, and be reconciled to God, and find our own  
 true loves, which rarely happens in this world. And now I must  
 beg you not to suppose that I am alluding to Pausanias and  
 Agathon (cp. *Protag.* 315 E), for my words refer to all mankind  
 everywhere.

Some raillery ensues first between Aristophanes and Eryxi-  
 machus, and then between Agathon, who fears a few select 194  
 friends more than any number of spectators at the theatre, and  
 Socrates, who is disposed to begin an argument. This is speedily  
 repressed by Phaedrus, who reminds the disputants of their  
 tribute to the god. Agathon's speech follows:—

He will speak of the god first and then of his gifts: He is 195  
 the fairest and blesseddest and best of the gods, and also the  
 youngest, having had no existence in the old days of Iapetus  
 and Cronos when the gods were at war. The things that were  
 done then were done of necessity and not of love. For love is  
 young and dwells in soft places,—not like Ate in Homer, walking  
 on the skulls of men, but in their hearts and souls, which are soft  
 enough. He is all flexibility and grace, and his habitation is 196  
 among the flowers, and he cannot do or suffer wrong; for all men  
 serve and obey him of their own free will, and where there is  
 love there is obedience, and where obedience, there is justice;  
 for none can be wronged of his own free will. And he is tem-  
 perate as well as just, for he is the ruler of the desires, and if he

rules them he must be temperate. Also he is courageous, for he is the conqueror of the lord of war. And he is wise too; for he is  
 197 a poet, and the author of poesy in others. He created the animals; he is the inventor of the arts; all the gods are his subjects; he is the fairest and best himself, and the cause of what is fairest and best in others; he makes men to be of one mind at a banquet, filling them with affection and emptying them of disaffection; the pilot, helper, defender, saviour of men, in whose footsteps let every man follow, chanting a strain of love. Such is the dis-  
 198 course, half playful, half serious, which I dedicate to the god.

The turn of Socrates comes next. He begins by remarking satirically that he has not understood the terms of the original agreement, for he fancied that they meant to speak the true praises of love, but now he finds that they only say what is good  
 199 of him, whether true or false. He begs to be absolved from speaking falsely, but he is willing to speak the truth, and proposes to begin by questioning Agathon. The result of his questions may be summed up as follows:—

200 Love is of something, and that which love desires is not that which love is or has; for no man desires that which he is or has.  
 201 And love is of the beautiful, and therefore has not the beautiful. And the beautiful is the good, and therefore, in wanting and desiring the beautiful, love also wants and desires the good. Socrates professes to have asked the same questions and to have obtained the same answers from Diotima, a wise woman of Mantinea, who, like Agathon, had spoken first of love and then of his  
 202 works. Socrates, like Agathon, had told her that Love is a mighty god and also fair, and she had shown him in return that Love was neither, but in a mean between fair and foul, good and evil, and not a god at all, but only a great demon or intermediate power (cp. the speech of Eryximachus, 186 D) who  
 203 conveys to the gods the prayers of men, and to men the commands of the gods.

Socrates asks: Who are his father and mother? To this Diotima replies that he is the son of Plenty and Poverty, and partakes of the nature of both, and is full and starved by turns. Like his mother he is poor and squalid, lying on mats at doors (cp. the speech of Pausanias, 183 A); like his father he is bold and strong, and full of arts and resources. Further, he is in a

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mean between ignorance and knowledge: — in this he resembles 204  
the philosopher who is also in a mean between the wise and  
the ignorant. Such is the nature of Love, who is not to be  
confused with the beloved.

But Love desires the beautiful; and then arises the question,  
What does he desire of the beautiful? He desires, of course, the  
possession of the beautiful; — but what is given by that? For the  
beautiful let us substitute the good, and we have no difficulty in  
seeing the possession of the good to be happiness, and Love to be 205  
the desire of happiness, although the meaning of the word has  
been too often confined to one kind of love. And Love desires  
not only the good, but the everlasting possession of the good.  
Why then is there all this flutter and excitement about love? 206  
Because all men and women at a certain age are desirous of  
bringing to the birth. And love is not of beauty only, but of  
birth in beauty; this is the principle of immortality in a mortal  
creature. When beauty approaches, then the conceiving power  
is benign and diffuse; when foulness, she is averted and morose. 207

But why again does this extend not only to men but also to  
animals? Because they too have an instinct of immortality.  
Even in the same individual there is a perpetual succession as  
well of the parts of the material body as of the thoughts and  
desires of the mind; nay, even knowledge comes and goes. 208  
There is no sameness of existence, but the new mortality is  
always taking the place of the old. This is the reason why  
parents love their children — for the sake of immortality; and  
this is why men love the immortality of fame. For the creative  
soul creates not children, but conceptions of wisdom and virtue, 209  
such as poets and other creators have invented. And the noblest  
creations of all are those of legislators, in honour of whom tem-  
ples have been raised. Who would not sooner have begotten  
these children of the mind than the ordinary human ones? <sup>1</sup>

I will now initiate you, she said, into the greater mysteries; 210  
for he who would proceed in due course should love first one  
fair form, and then many, and learn the connexion of them; and  
from beautiful bodies he should proceed to beautiful minds, and

<sup>1</sup>Cp. Bacon's Essays, 8: — 'Certainly the best works and of greatest merit  
for the public have proceeded from the unmarried or childless men; which  
both in affection and means have married and endowed the public.'



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the beauty of laws and institutions, until he perceives that all beauty is of one kindred; and from institutions he should go on to the sciences, until at last the vision is revealed to him of a single science of universal beauty, and then he will behold the everlasting nature which is the cause of all, and will be near the  
 211 end. In the contemplation of that supreme being of love he will be purified of earthly leaven, and will behold beauty, not with the bodily eye, but with the eye of the mind, and will bring forth true  
 212 creations of virtue and wisdom, and be the friend of God and heir of immortality.

Such, Phaedrus, is the tale which I heard from the stranger of Mantinea, and which you may call the encomium of love, or what you please.

The company applaud the speech of Socrates, and Aristophanes is about to say something, when a band of revellers breaks into the court, and the voice of Alcibiades is heard asking  
 213 for Agathon. He is led in drunk, and welcomed by Agathon, whom he has come to crown with a garland. He is placed on a couch at his side, but suddenly, on recognizing Socrates, he starts up, and a sort of conflict is carried on between them, which Agathon is requested to appease. Alcibiades then insists  
 214 that they shall drink, and has a large wine-cooler filled, which he first empties himself, and then fills again and passes on to Socrates. He is informed of the nature of the entertainment; and is ready to join, if only in the character of a drunken and disappointed lover he may be allowed to sing the praises of Socrates:—

215 He begins by comparing Socrates first to the busts of Silenus, which have images of the gods inside them; and, secondly, to Marsyas the flute-player. For Socrates produces the same effect with the voice which Marsyas did with the flute. He is the great  
 216 speaker and enchanter who ravishes the souls of men; the conqueror of hearts too, as he has convinced Alcibiades, and made  
 217 him ashamed of his mean and miserable life. Socrates at one time seemed about to fall in love with him; and he thought that he would thereby gain a wonderful opportunity of receiving  
 218 lessons of wisdom. He narrates the failure of his design. He  
 219 has suffered agonies from him, and is at his wit's end. He then proceeds to mention some other particulars of the life of Socrates;



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how they were at Potidaea together, where Socrates showed 220  
 his superior powers of enduring cold and fatigue; how on one  
 occasion he had stood for an entire day and night absorbed in  
 reflection amid the wonder of the spectators; how on another  
 occasion he had saved Alcibiades' life; how at the battle of  
 Delium, after the defeat, he might be seen stalking about like 221  
 a pelican, rolling his eyes as Aristophanes had described him  
 in the *Clouds*. He is the most wonderful of human beings, and  
 absolutely unlike any one but a satyr. Like the satyr in his 222  
 language too; for he uses the commonest words as the outward  
 mask of the divinest truths.

When Alcibiades has done speaking, a dispute begins between  
 him and Agathon and Socrates. Socrates piques Alcibiades by  
 a pretended affection for Agathon. Presently a band of revellers 223  
 appears, who introduce disorder into the feast; the sober part  
 of the company, Eryximachus, Phaedrus, and others, withdraw;  
 and Aristodemus, the follower of Socrates, sleeps during the  
 whole of a long winter's night. When he wakes at cockcrow  
 the revellers are nearly all asleep. Only Socrates, Aristophanes,  
 and Agathon hold out; they are drinking from a large goblet,  
 which they pass round, and Socrates is explaining to the two  
 others, who are half-asleep, that the genius of tragedy is the same  
 as that of comedy, and that the writer of tragedy ought to be a  
 writer of comedy also. And first Aristophanes drops, and then,  
 as the day is dawning, Agathon. Socrates, having laid them to  
 rest, takes a bath and goes to his daily avocations until the  
 evening. Aristodemus follows.

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If it be true that there are more things in the *Symposium* of  
 Plato than any commentator has dreamed of, it is also true that  
 many things have been imagined which are not really to be found  
 there. Some writings hardly admit of a more distinct inter-  
 pretation than a musical composition; and every reader may  
 form his own accompaniment of thought or feeling to the strain  
 which he hears. The *Symposium* of Plato is a work of this  
 character, and can with difficulty be rendered in any words but  
 the writer's own. There are so many half-lights and cross-  
 lights, so much of the colour of mythology, and of the manner  
 of sophistry adhering — rhetoric and poetry, the playful and the

serious, are so subtly intermingled in it, and vestiges of old philosophy so curiously blend with germs of future knowledge, that agreement among interpreters is not to be expected. The expression 'poema magis putandum quam comicorum poetarum,' which has been applied to all the writings of Plato, is especially applicable to the Symposium.

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The power of love is represented in the Symposium as running through all nature and all being: at one end descending to animals and plants, and attaining to the highest vision of truth at the other. In an age when man was seeking for an expression of the world around him, the conception of love greatly affected him. One of the first distinctions of language and of mythology was that of gender; and at a later period the ancient physicist, anticipating modern science, saw, or thought that he saw, a sex in plants; there were elective affinities among the elements, marriages of earth and heaven. (Aesch. Frag. Dan. 38.) Love became a mythic personage, whom philosophy, borrowing from poetry, converted into an efficient cause of creation. The traces of the existence of love, as of number and figure, were everywhere discerned; and in the Pythagorean list of opposites male and female were ranged side by side with odd and even, finite and infinite.

But Plato seems also to be aware that there is a mystery of love in man as well as in nature, extending beyond the mere immediate relation of the sexes. He is conscious that the highest and noblest things in the world are not easily severed from the sensual desires, or may even be regarded as a spiritualized form of them. We may observe that Socrates himself is not represented as originally unimpassioned, but as one who has overcome his passions; the secret of his power over others partly lies in his passionate but self-controlled nature. In the Phaedrus and Symposium love is not merely the feeling usually so called, but the mystical contemplation of the beautiful and the good. The same passion which may wallow in the mire is capable of rising to the loftiest heights — of penetrating the inmost secret of philosophy. The highest love is the love not of a person, but of the highest and purest abstraction. This abstraction is the far-off heaven on which the eye of the mind is fixed in fond amazement. The unity of truth, the consistency of the warring elements of the

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world, the enthusiasm for knowledge when first beaming upon mankind, the relativity of ideas to the human mind, and of the human mind to ideas, the faith in the invisible, the adoration of the eternal nature, are all included, consciously or unconsciously, in Plato's doctrine of love.

The successive speeches in praise of love are characteristic of the speakers, and contribute in various degrees to the final result; they are all designed to prepare the way for Socrates, who gathers up the threads anew, and skims the highest points of each of them. But they are not to be regarded as the stages of an idea, rising above one another to a climax. They are fanciful, partly facetious performances, 'yet also having a certain measure of seriousness' (197 E), which the successive speakers dedicate to the god. All of them are rhetorical and poetical rather than dialectical, but glimpses of truth appear in them. When Eryximachus says that the principles of music are simple in themselves, but confused in their application, he touches lightly upon a difficulty which has troubled the moderns as well as the ancients in music, and may be extended to the other applied sciences. That confusion begins in the concrete, was the natural feeling of a mind dwelling in the world of ideas. When Pausanias remarks that personal attachments are inimical to despots, the experience of Greek history confirms the truth of his remark. When Aristophanes declares that love is the desire of the whole, he expresses a feeling not unlike that of the German philosopher, who says that 'philosophy is home sickness.' When Agathon says that no man 'can be wronged of his own free will,' he is alluding playfully to a serious problem of Greek philosophy (cp. Arist. Nic. Ethics, v. 9). So naturally does Plato mingle jest and earnest, truth and opinion in the same work.

The characters — of Phaedrus, who has been the cause of more philosophical discussions than any other man, with the exception of Simmias the Theban (Phaedrus 242 B); of Aristophanes, who disguises under comic imagery a serious purpose; of Agathon, who in later life is satirized by Aristophanes in the *Thesmophoriazusae*, for his effeminate manners and the feeble rhythms of his verse; of Alcibiades, who is the same strange contrast of great powers and great vices, which meets us in history — are drawn to the life; and we may suppose the less-known characters

of Pausanias and Eryximachus to be also true to the traditional recollection of them (cp. Phaedr. 268 A, Protag. 315 C, D; and compare Symp. 214 B with Phaedr. 227 A). We may also remark that Aristodemus is called 'the little' in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, i. 4 (cp. Symp. 173 B).

The speeches have been said to follow each other in pairs: Phaedrus and Pausanias being the ethical, Eryximachus and Aristophanes the physical speakers, while in Agathon and Socrates poetry and philosophy blend together. The speech of Phaedrus is also described as the mythological, that of Pausanias as the political, that of Eryximachus as the scientific, that of Aristophanes as the artistic (!), that of Socrates as the philosophical. But these and similar distinctions are not found in Plato; — they are the points of view of his critics, and seem to impede rather than to assist us in understanding him.

When the turn of Socrates comes round he cannot be allowed to disturb the arrangement made at first. With the leave of Phaedrus he asks a few questions, and then he throws his argument into the form of a speech (cp. Gorg. 505 E, Protag. 353 B). But his speech is really the narrative of a dialogue between himself and Diotima. And as at a banquet good manners would not allow him to win a victory either over his host or any of the guests, the superiority which he gains over Agathon is ingeniously represented as having been already gained over himself by her. The artifice has the further advantage of maintaining his accustomed profession of ignorance (cp. Menex. 236 fol.). Even his knowledge of the mysteries of love, to which he lays claim here and elsewhere (Lys. 204 C), has been imparted to him by Diotima.

The speeches are attested to us by the very best authority. The madman Apollodorus, who for three years past has made a daily study of the actions of Socrates — to whom the world is summed up in the words 'Great is Socrates' — he has heard them from another 'madman,' Aristodemus, who was the 'shadow' of Socrates in days of old, like him going about barefooted, and who had been present at the time. 'Would you desire better witness?' The extraordinary narrative of Alcibiades is ingeniously represented as admitted by Socrates, whose silence when he is invited to contradict gives consent to the narrator. We may observe, by the way, (1) how the very appearance of Aristodemus

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by himself is a sufficient indication to Agathon that Socrates has been left behind; also, (2) how the courtesy of Agathon anticipates the excuse which Socrates was to have made on Aristodemus' behalf for coming uninvited; (3) how the story of the fit or trance of Socrates is confirmed by the mention which Alcibiades makes of a similar fit of abstraction occurring when he was serving with the army at Potidaea; like (4) the drinking powers of Socrates and his love of the fair, which receive a similar attestation in the concluding scene; or the attachment of Aristodemus, who is not forgotten when Socrates takes his departure. (5) We may notice the manner in which Socrates himself regards the first five speeches, not as true, but as fanciful and exaggerated encomiums of the god Love; (6) the satirical character of them, shown especially in the appeals to mythology, and in the reasons which are given by Zeus for reconstructing the frame of man, or by the Boeotians and Eleans for encouraging male loves; (7) the ruling passion of Socrates for dialectics, who will argue with Agathon instead of making a speech, and will only speak at all upon the condition that he is allowed to speak the truth. We may note also the touch of Socratic irony, (8) which admits of a wide application and reveals a deep insight into the world: — that in speaking of holy things and persons there is a general understanding that you should praise them, not that you should speak the truth about them — this is the sort of praise which Socrates is unable to give. Lastly, (9) we may remark that the banquet is a real banquet after all, at which love is the theme of discourse, and huge quantities of wine are drunk (214 A, 223 B).

The discourse of Phaedrus is half-mythical, half-ethical; and he himself, true to the character which is given him in the Dialogue bearing his name, is half-sophist, half-enthusiast. He is the critic of poetry also, who compares Homer and Aeschylus in the insipid and irrational manner of the schools of the day, characteristically reasoning about the probability of matters which do not admit of reasoning. He starts from a noble text: 'That without the sense of honour and dishonour neither states nor individuals ever do any good or great work.' But he soon passes on to more common-place topics. The antiquity of love, the blessing of having a lover, the incentive which love offers to daring deeds,



the examples of Alcestis and Achilles, are the chief themes of his discourse. The love of women is regarded by him as almost on an equality with that of men; and he makes the singular remark that the gods favour the return of love which is made by the beloved more than the original sentiment, because the lover is of a nobler and diviner nature.

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There is something of a sophistical ring in the speech of Phaedrus, which recalls the first speech in imitation of Lysias, occurring in the Dialogue called the Phaedrus. This is still more marked in the speech of Pausanias which follows; and which is at once hyperlogical in form and also extremely confused and pedantic. Plato is attacking the logical feebleness of the sophists and rhetoricians, through their pupils, not forgetting by the way to satirize the monotonous and unmeaning rhythms which Prodicus and others were introducing into Attic prose (185 D, cp. Protag. 337). Of course, he is 'playing both sides of the game,' as in the Gorgias and Phaedrus; but it is not necessary in order to understand him that we should discuss the 'fairness of his mode of proceeding. The love of Pausanias for Agathon has already been touched upon in the Protagoras (315 D), and is alluded to by Aristophanes (193 B). Hence he is naturally the upholder of male loves, which, like all the other affections or actions of men, he regards as varying according to the manner of their performance. Like the sophists and like Plato himself, though in a different sense, he begins his discussion by an appeal to mythology, and distinguishes between the elder and younger love. The value which he attributes to such loves as motives to virtue and philosophy is at variance with modern and Christian notions, but is in accordance with Hellenic sentiment. The opinion of Christendom has not altogether condemned passionate friendships between persons of the same sex, but has certainly not encouraged them, because though innocent in themselves in a few temperaments they are liable to degenerate into fearful evil. Pausanias is very earnest in the defence of such loves; and he speaks of them as generally approved among Hellenes and disapproved by barbarians. His speech is 'more words than matter,' and might have been composed by a pupil of Lysias or of Prodicus, although there is no hint given that Plato is specially referring to them. As



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Eryximachus says, 'he makes a fair beginning, but a lame ending.'

Plato transposes the two next speeches, as in the Republic he would transpose the virtues (iv. 430 D) and the mathematical sciences (vii. 528 A). This is done partly to avoid monotony, partly for the sake of making Aristophanes 'the cause of wit in others,' and also in order to bring the comic and tragic poet into juxtaposition, as if by accident. A suitable 'expectation' of Aristophanes is raised by the ludicrous circumstance of his having the hiccough, which is appropriately cured by his substitute, the physician Eryximachus. To Eryximachus Love is the good physician; he sees everything as an intelligent physicist, and, like many professors of his art in modern times, attempts to reduce the moral to the physical; or recognizes one law of love which pervades them both. There are loves and strifes of the body as well as of the mind. Like Hippocrates the Asclepiad, he is a disciple of Heracleitus, whose conception of the harmony of opposites he explains in a new way as the harmony after discord; to his common sense, as to that of many moderns as well as ancients, the identity of contradictories is an absurdity. His notion of love may be summed up as the harmony of man with himself in soul as well as body, and of all things in heaven and earth with one another.

Aristophanes is ready to laugh and make laugh before he opens his mouth, just as Socrates, true to his character, is ready to argue before he begins to speak. He expresses the very genius of the old comedy, its coarse and forcible imagery, and the licence of its language in speaking about the gods. He has no sophistical notions about love, which is brought back by him to its common-sense meaning of love between intelligent beings. His account of the origin of the sexes has the greatest (comic) probability and verisimilitude. Nothing in Aristophanes is more truly Aristophanic than the description of the human monster whirling round on four arms and four legs, eight in all, with incredible rapidity. Yet there is a mixture of earnestness in this jest; three serious principles seem to be insinuated: — first, that man cannot exist in isolation; he must be reunited if he is to be perfected: secondly, that love is the mediator and reconciler of poor, divided human nature: thirdly, that the loves of this world are an

indistinct anticipation of an ideal union which is not yet realized. *Symposium.*

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The speech of Agathon is conceived in a higher strain, and receives the real, if half-ironical, approval of Socrates. It is the speech of the tragic poet and a sort of poem, like tragedy, moving among the gods of Olympus, and not among the elder or Orphic deities. In the idea of the antiquity of love he cannot agree; love is not of the olden time, but present and youthful ever. The speech may be compared with that speech of Socrates in the *Phaedrus* (239 A, B) in which he describes himself as talking dithyrambs. It is at once a preparation for Socrates and a foil to him. The rhetoric of Agathon elevates the soul to 'sunlit heights,' but at the same time contrasts with the natural and necessary eloquence of Socrates. Agathon contributes the distinction between love and the works of love, and also hints incidentally that love is always of beauty, which Socrates afterwards raises into a principle. While the consciousness of discord is stronger in the comic poet Aristophanes, Agathon, the tragic poet, has a deeper sense of harmony and reconciliation, and speaks of Love as the creator and artist.

All the earlier speeches embody common opinions coloured with a tinge of philosophy. They furnish the material out of which Socrates proceeds to form his discourse, starting, as in other places, from mythology and the opinions of men. From *Phaedrus* he takes the thought that love is stronger than death; from Pausanias, that the true love is akin to intellect and political activity; from Eryximachus, that love is a universal phenomenon and the great power of nature; from Aristophanes, that love is the child of want, and is not merely the love of the congenial or of the whole, but (as he adds) of the good; from Agathon, that love is of beauty, not however of beauty only, but of birth in beauty. As it would be out of character for Socrates to make a lengthened harangue, the speech takes the form of a dialogue between Socrates and a mysterious woman of foreign extraction. She elicits the final truth from one who knows nothing, and who, speaking by the lips of another, and himself a despiser of rhetoric, is proved also to be the most consummate of rhetoricians (cp. *Menexenus* 249 D).

The last of the six discourses begins with a short argument

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which overthrows not only Agathon but all the preceding speakers by the help of a distinction which has escaped them. Extravagant praises have been ascribed to Love as the author of every good; no sort of encomium was too high for him, whether deserved and true or not. But Socrates has no talent for speaking anything but the truth, and if he is to speak the truth of Love he must honestly confess that he is not a good at all: for love is of the good, and no man can desire that which he has. This piece of dialectics is ascribed to Diotima, who has already urged upon Socrates the argument which he urges against Agathon. That the distinction is a fallacy is obvious; it is almost acknowledged to be so by Socrates himself. For he who has beauty or good may desire more of them; and he who has beauty or good in himself may desire beauty and good in others. The fallacy seems to arise out of a confusion between the abstract ideas of good and beauty, which do not admit of degrees, and their partial realization in individuals.

But Diotima, the prophetess of Mantinea, whose sacred and superhuman character raises her above the ordinary proprieties of women, has taught Socrates far more than this about the art and mystery of love. She has taught him that love is another aspect of philosophy. The same want in the human soul which is satisfied in the vulgar by the procreation of children, may become the highest aspiration of intellectual desire. As the Christian might speak of hungering and thirsting after righteousness; or of divine loves under the figure of human (cp. Eph. v. 32, 'This is a great mystery, but I speak concerning Christ and the church'); as the mediaeval saint might speak of the 'fruitio Dei;' as Dante saw all things contained in his love of Beatrice, so Plato would have us absorb all other loves and desires in the love of knowledge. Here is the beginning of Neoplatonism, or rather, perhaps, a proof (of which there are many) that the so-called mysticism of the East was not strange to the Greek of the fifth century before Christ. The first tumult of the affections was not wholly subdued; there were longings of a creature

Moving about in worlds not realized,

which no art could satisfy. To most men reason and passion appear to be antagonistic both in idea and fact. The union of

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the greatest comprehension of knowledge and the burning intensity of love is a contradiction in nature, which may have existed in a far-off primeval age in the mind of some Hebrew prophet or other Eastern sage, but has now become an imagination only. Yet this 'passion of the reason' is the theme of the Symposium of Plato. And as there is no impossibility in supposing that 'one king, or son of a king, may be a philosopher,' so also there is a probability that there may be some few—perhaps one or two in a whole generation—in whom the light of truth may not lack the warmth of desire. And if there be such natures, no one will be disposed to deny that 'from them flow most of the benefits of individuals and states;' and even from imperfect combinations of the two elements in teachers or statesmen great good may often arise.

Yet there is a higher region in which love is not only felt, but satisfied, in the perfect beauty of eternal knowledge, beginning with the beauty of earthly things, and at last reaching a beauty in which all existence is seen to be harmonious and one. The limited affection is enlarged, and enabled to behold the ideal of all things. And here the highest summit which is reached in the Symposium is seen also to be the highest summit which is attained in the Republic, but approached from another side; and there is 'a way upwards and downwards,' which is the same and not the same in both. The ideal beauty of the one is the ideal good of the other; regarded not with the eye of knowledge, but of faith and desire; and they are respectively the source of beauty and the source of good in all other things. And by the steps of a 'ladder reaching to heaven' we pass from images of visible beauty (*εἰκόνες*), and from the hypotheses of the Mathematical sciences, which are not yet based upon the idea of good, through the concrete to the abstract, and, by different paths arriving, behold the vision of the eternal (cp. Symp. 211 ὥσπερ ἐπαναβαθμοῖς τισιν: Rep. vi. 511 A, B οὐδὲν ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς; also Phaedrus 247 ff.). Under one aspect 'the idea is love'; under another, 'truth.' In both the lover of wisdom is the 'spectator of all time and of all existence.' This is a 'mystery' in which Plato also obscurely intimates the union of the spiritual and fleshly, the interpenetration of the moral and intellectual faculties.

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The divine image of beauty which resides within Socrates has been revealed; the Silenus, or outward man, has now to be exhibited. The description of Socrates follows immediately after the speech of Socrates; one is the complement of the other. At the height of divine inspiration, when the force of nature can no further go, by way of contrast to this extreme idealism, Alcibiades, accompanied by a troop of revellers and a flute-girl, staggers in, and being drunk is able to tell of things which he would have been ashamed to make known if he had been sober. The state of his affections towards Socrates, unintelligible to us and perverted as they appear, affords an illustration of the power ascribed to the loves of man in the speech of Pausanias. He does not suppose his feelings to be peculiar to himself: there are several other persons in the company who have been equally in love with Socrates, and like himself have been deceived by him. The singular part of this confession is the combination of the most degrading passion with the desire of virtue and improvement. Such an union is not wholly untrue to human nature, which is capable of combining good and evil in a degree beyond what we can easily conceive. In imaginative persons, especially, the God and beast in man seem to part asunder more than is natural in a well-regulated mind. The Platonic Socrates (for of the real Socrates this may be doubted; cp. his public rebuke of Critias for his shameful love of Euthydemus in Xenophon, *Memorabilia* i. 2, 29, 30) does not regard the greatest evil of Greek life as a thing not to be spoken of; but it has a ridiculous element (Plato's *Symp.* 214), and is a subject for irony, no less than for moral reprobation (cp. Plato's *Symp.* 218 D, E). It is also used as a figure of speech which no one interpreted literally (cp. *Xen. Symp.* 4. 57). Nor does Plato feel any repugnance, such as would be felt in modern times, at bringing his great master and hero into connexion with nameless crimes. He is contented with representing him as a saint, who has won 'the Olympian victory' over the temptations of human nature. The fault of taste, which to us is so glaring and which was recognized by the Greeks of a later age (Athenaeus xi. 114), was not perceived by Plato himself. We are still more surprised to find that the philosopher is incited to take the first step in his upward progress



(Symp. 210 A) by the beauty of young men and boys, which was alone capable of inspiring the modern feeling of romance in the Greek mind. The passion of love took the spurious form of an enthusiasm for the ideal of beauty—a worship as of some godlike image of an Apollo or Antinous. But the love of youth when not depraved was a love of virtue and modesty as well as of beauty, the one being the expression of the other; and in certain Greek states, especially at Sparta and Thebes, the honourable attachment of a youth to an elder man was a part of his education. The ‘army of lovers and their beloved who would be invincible if they could be united by such a tie’ (Symp. 178 ff.), is not a mere fiction of Plato’s, but seems actually to have existed at Thebes in the days of Epaminondas and Pelopidas, if we may believe writers cited anonymously by Plutarch, *Pelop. Vit.* 18, 19. It is observable that Plato never in the least degree excuses the depraved love of the body (cp. *Charm.* 155; *Rep.* v. 468 B, C; *Laws* viii. 841 ff.; *Symp.* 211 D; and once more Xenophon, *Mem.* i. 2, 29, 30), nor is there any Greek writer of mark who condones or approves such connexions. But owing partly to the puzzling nature of the subject (182 A, B) these friendships are spoken of by Plato in a manner different from that customary among ourselves. To most of them we should hesitate to ascribe, any more than to the attachment of Achilles and Patroclus in Homer, an immoral or licentious character. There were many, doubtless, to whom the love of the fair mind was the noblest form of friendship (*Rep.* iii. 402 D), and who deemed the friendship of man with man to be higher than the love of woman, because altogether separated from the bodily appetites. The existence of such attachments may be reasonably attributed to the inferiority and seclusion of woman, and the want of a real family or social life and parental influence in Hellenic cities; and they were encouraged by the practice of gymnastic exercises, by the meetings of political clubs, and by the tie of military companionship. They were also an educational institution: a young person was specially entrusted by his parents to some elder friend who was expected by them to train their son in manly exercises and in virtue. It is not likely that a Greek parent committed him to a lover, any more than we should to a schoolmaster, in the expectation that he would be corrupted by him, but rather in the hope that his morals



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TION.


would be better cared for than was possible in a great household of slaves.

It is difficult to adduce the authority of Plato either for or against such practices or customs, because it is not always easy to determine whether he is speaking of 'the heavenly and philosophical love, or of the coarse Polyhymnia: ' and he often refers to them (e. g. in the *Symposium*) half in jest, yet 'with a certain degree of seriousness' (Cp. *Laws*, viii. 836 foll.). We observe that they entered into one part of Greek literature, but not into another, and that the larger part is free from such associations. Indecency was an element of the ludicrous in the old Greek Comedy, as it has been in other ages and countries. But effeminate love was always condemned as well as ridiculed by the Comic poets; and in the New Comedy the allusions to such topics have disappeared. They seem to have been no longer tolerated by the greater refinement of the age. False sentiment is found in the Lyric and Elegiac poets; and in mythology 'the greatest of the Gods' (*Rep.* iii. 388 B) is not exempt from evil imputations. But the morals of a nation are not to be judged of wholly by its literature. Hellas was not necessarily more corrupted in the days of the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, or of Plato and the Orators, than England in the time of Fielding and Smollett, or France in the nineteenth century. No one supposes certain French novels to be a representation of ordinary French life. And the greater part of Greek literature, beginning with Homer and including the tragedians, philosophers, and, with the exception of the Comic poets (whose business was to raise a laugh by whatever means), all the greater writers of Hellas who have been preserved to us, are free from the taint of indecency.

Some general considerations occur to our mind when we begin to reflect on this subject. (1) That good and evil are linked together in human nature, and have often existed side by side in the world and in man to an extent hardly credible. We cannot distinguish them, and are therefore unable to part them; as in the parable 'they grow together unto the harvest:' it is only a rule of external decency by which society can divide them. Nor should we be right in inferring from the prevalence of any one vice or corruption that a state or individual was demoralized in their whole character. Not only has the corruption

of the best been sometimes thought to be the worst, but it may be remarked that this very excess of evil has been the stimulus to good (cp. Plato, *Laws* xii. 951 B, where he says that in the most corrupt cities individuals are to be found beyond all praise). (2) It may be observed that evils which admit of degrees can seldom be rightly estimated, because under the same name actions of the most different degrees of culpability may be included. No charge is more easily set going than the imputation of secret wickedness (which cannot be either proved or disproved and often cannot be defined) when directed against a person of whom the world, or a section of it, is predisposed to think evil. And it is quite possible that the malignity of Greek scandal, aroused by some personal jealousy or party enmity, may have converted the innocent friendship of a great man for a noble youth into a connexion of another kind. Such accusations were brought against several of the leading men of Hellas, e. g. Cimon, Alcibiades, Critias, Demosthenes, Epaminondas: several of the Roman emperors were assailed by similar weapons which have been used even in our own day against statesmen of the highest character. (3) While we know that in this matter there is a great gulf fixed between Greek and Christian Ethics, yet, if we would do justice to the Greeks, we must also acknowledge that there was a greater outspokenness among them than among ourselves about the things which nature hides, and that the more frequent mention of such topics is not to be taken as the measure of the prevalence of offences, or as a proof of the general corruption of society. It is likely that every religion in the world has used words or practised rites in one age, which have become distasteful or repugnant to another. We cannot, though for different reasons, trust the representations, either of Comedy or Satire; and still less of Christian Apologists. (4) We observe that at Thebes and Lacedaemon the attachment of an elder friend to a beloved youth was often deemed to be a part of his education; and was encouraged by his parents — it was only shameful if it degenerated into licentiousness. Such we may believe to have been the tie which united Asopychus and Cephisodorus with the great Epaminondas in whose companionship they fell (*Plutarch, Amat.* 117; *Athenaeus* on the authority of Theopompus, xiii. 605). (5) A small matter: there appears to be a difference of custom

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TION.



Symposium.

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among the Greeks and among ourselves, as between ourselves and continental nations at the present time, in modes of salutation. We must not suspect evil in the hearty kiss or embrace of a male friend 'returning from the army at Potidaea' any more than in a similar salutation when practised by members of the same family. But those who make these admissions, and who regard, not without pity, the victims of such illusions in our own day, whose life has been blasted by them, may be none the less resolved that the natural and healthy instincts of mankind shall alone be tolerated *ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πόλει*; and that the lesson of manliness which we have inherited from our fathers shall not degenerate into sentimentalism or effeminacy. The possibility of an honourable connexion of this kind seems to have died out with Greek civilization. Among the Romans, and also among barbarians, such as the Celts and Persians, there is no trace of such attachments existing in any noble or virtuous form.

(Compare Hoeck's *Creta*, vol. 3. p. 106 ff, and the admirable and exhaustive article of Meier in *Ersch and Grueber's Cyclopaedia*, vol. 16, on this subject; *Plutarch, Amatores*; *Athenaeus*, xiii. 605; *Lysias, contra Simonem*; *Aeschines, contra Timarchum*.)

The character of Alcibiades in the Symposium is hardly less remarkable than that of Socrates, and agrees with the picture given of him in the first of the two Dialogues which are called by his name, and also with the slight sketch of him in the *Protagoras*. He is the impersonation of lawlessness — 'the lion's whelp, who ought not to be reared in the city,' yet not without a certain generosity which gained the hearts of men, — strangely fascinated by Socrates, and possessed of a genius which might have been either the destruction or salvation of Athens. The dramatic interest of the character is heightened by the recollection of his after history. He seems to have been present to the mind of Plato in the description of the democratic man of the Republic (viii. 560; cp. also Alcibiades 1).

There is no criterion of the date of the Symposium, except that which is furnished by the allusion to the division of Arcadia after the destruction of Mantinea. This took place in the year B. C. 384, which is the forty-fourth year of Plato's life. The Symposium cannot therefore be regarded as a youthful work. As

Mantineia was restored in the year 369, the composition of the Dialogue will probably fall between 384 and 369. Whether the recollection of the event is more likely to have been renewed at the destruction or restoration of the city, rather than at some intermediate period, is a consideration not worth raising.

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The Symposium is connected with the Phaedrus both in style and subject; they are the only Dialogues of Plato in which the theme of love is discussed at length. In both of them philosophy is regarded as a sort of enthusiasm or madness; Socrates is himself 'a prophet new inspired' with Bacchanalian revelry, which, like his philosophy, he characteristically pretends to have derived not from himself but from others. The Phaedo also presents some points of comparison with the Symposium. For there, too, philosophy might be described as 'dying for love;' and there are not wanting many touches of humour and fancy, which remind us of the Symposium (64 B, 85 B, 99 A). But while the Phaedo and Phaedrus look backwards and forwards to past and future states of existence, in the Symposium there is no break between this world and another; and we rise from one to the other by a regular series of steps or stages, proceeding from the particulars of sense to the universal of reason, and from one universal to many, which are finally reunited in a single science (cp. Rep. vi. 511 B). At first immortality means only the succession of existences; even knowledge comes and goes. Then follows, in the language of the mysteries, a higher and a higher degree of initiation; at last we arrive at the perfect vision of beauty, not relative or changing, but eternal and absolute; not bounded by this world, or in or out of this world, but an aspect of the divine, extending over all things, and having no limit of space or time: this is the highest knowledge of which the human mind is capable. Plato does not go on to ask whether the individual is absorbed in the sea of light and beauty or retains his personality. Enough for him to have attained the true beauty or good, without enquiring precisely into the relation in which human beings stood to it. That the soul has such a reach of thought, and is capable of partaking of the eternal nature, seems to imply that she too is eternal (cp. Phaedrus, 245 foll.). But Plato does not distinguish the eternal in man from the eternal in the world or in God. He is willing to rest in the contemplation

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TION.

of the idea, which to him is the cause of all things (Rep. vi. 508 E), and has no strength to go further.

The Symposium of Xenophon, in which Socrates describes himself as a pander, and also discourses of the difference between sensual and sentimental love, likewise offers several interesting points of comparison. But the suspicion which hangs over other writings of Xenophon, and the numerous minute references to the Phaedrus and Symposium, as well as to some of the other writings of Plato, throw a doubt on the genuineness of the work. The Symposium of Xenophon, if written by him at all, would certainly show that he wrote against Plato, and was acquainted with his works. Of this hostility there is no trace in the Memorabilia. Such a rivalry is more characteristic of an imitator than of an original writer. The (so-called) Symposium of Xenophon may therefore have no more title to be regarded as genuine than the confessedly spurious Apology.

There are no means of determining the relative order in time of the Phaedrus, Symposium, Phaedo. The order which has been adopted in this translation rests on no other principle than the desire to bring together in a series the memorials of the life of Socrates.

# SYMPOSIUM.

## PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

APOLLODORUS, *who repeats to his companion the dialogue which he had heard from Aristodemus, and had already once narrated to Glaucon.*  
PHAEDRUS.

PAUSANIAS.  
ERYXIMACHUS.  
ARISTOPHANES.  
AGATHON.  
SOCRATES.  
ALCIBIADES.  
A TROOP OF REVELLERS.

SCENE: — The House of Agathon.

Steph. CONCERNING the things about which you ask to be informed

<sup>172</sup> I believe that I am not ill-prepared with an answer. For the day before yesterday I was coming from my own home at Phalerum to the city, and one of my acquaintance, who had caught a sight of me from behind, calling out playfully in the distance, said: Apollodorus, O thou Phalerian<sup>1</sup> man, halt! So I did as I was bid; and then he said, I was looking for you, Apollodorus, only just now, that I might ask you about the speeches in praise of love, which were delivered by Socrates, Alcibiades, and others, at Agathon's supper. Phoenix, the son of Philip, told another person who told me of them; his narrative was very indistinct, but he said that you knew, and I wish that you would give me an account of them. Who, if not you, should be the reporter of the words of your friend? And first tell me, he said, were you present at this meeting?

Your informant, Glaucon, I said, must have been very

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APOLLODO-  
RUS,  
GLAUCON.

The speeches  
delivered at  
the banquet  
of Agathon.

<sup>1</sup> Probably a play of words on φαλαρὸς, 'bald-headed.'



*Symposium.*GLAUCON,  
APOLLODO-  
RUS.

indistinct indeed, if you imagine that the occasion was recent; or that I could have been of the party.

Why, yes, he replied, I thought so.

Impossible: I said. Are you ignorant that for many years Agathon has not resided at Athens; and not three have elapsed since I became acquainted with Socrates, and have made it my daily business to know all that he says and does. 173  
There was a time when I was running about the world, fancying myself to be well employed, but I was really a most wretched being, no better than you are now. I thought that I ought to do anything rather than be a philosopher.

Well, he said, jesting apart, tell me when the meeting occurred.

The banquet  
took place  
many years  
ago when  
Agathon won  
his first prize.

In our boyhood, I replied, when Agathon won the prize with his first tragedy, on the day after that on which he and his chorus offered the sacrifice of victory.

Then it must have been a long while ago, he said; and who told you — did Socrates?

The speeches  
had been  
preserved by  
Aristodemus.

No indeed, I replied, but the same person who told Phoenix; — he was a little fellow, who never wore any shoes, Aristodemus, of the deme of Cydathenaeum. He had been at Agathon's feast; and I think that in those days there was no one who was a more devoted admirer of Socrates. Moreover, I have asked Socrates about the truth of some parts of his narrative, and he confirmed them. Then, said Glaucon, let us have the tale over again; is not the road to Athens just made for conversation? And so we walked, and talked of the discourses on love; and therefore, as I said at first, I am not ill-prepared to comply with your request, and will have another rehearsal of them if you like. For to speak or to hear others speak of philosophy always gives me the greatest pleasure, to say nothing of the profit. But when I hear another strain, especially that of you rich men and traders, such conversation displeases me; and I pity you who are my companions, because you think that you are doing something when in reality you are doing nothing. And I dare say that you pity me in return, whom you regard as an unhappy creature, and very probably you are right. But I certainly know of you what you only think of me — there is the difference.

*Companion.* I see, Apollodorus, that you are just the same — always speaking evil of yourself, and of others; and I do believe that you pity all mankind, with the exception of Socrates, yourself first of all, true in this to your old name, which, however deserved, I know not how you acquired, of Apollodorus the madman; for you are always raging against yourself and everybody but Socrates.

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COMPANION,  
APOLLODO-  
RUS.

*Apollodorus.* Yes, friend, and the reason why I am said to be mad, and out of my wits, is just because I have these notions of myself and you; no other evidence is required.

*Com.* No more of that, Apollodorus; but let me ask you again to repeat the conversation.

*Apoll.* Well, the tale of love was on this wise:— But per-  
174 haps I had better begin at the beginning, and endeavour to give you the exact words of Aristodemus:

He said that he met Socrates fresh from the bath and sandalled; and as the sight of the sandals was unusual, he asked him whither he was going that he had been converted into such a beau:—

Aristodemus  
the narrator  
had gone to  
the banquet  
on the in-  
vitation of  
Socrates.

To a banquet at Agathon's, he replied, whose invitation to his sacrifice of victory I refused yesterday, fearing a crowd, but promising that I would come to-day instead; and so I have put on my finery, because he is such a fine man. What say you to going with me unasked?

I will do as you bid me, I replied.

Follow then, he said, and let us demolish the proverb:—

‘To the feasts of inferior men the good unbidden go;’

instead of which our proverb will run:—

‘To the feasts of the good the good unbidden go;’

and this alteration may be supported by the authority of Homer himself, who not only demolishes but literally outrages the proverb. For, after picturing Agamemnon as the most valiant of men, he makes Menelaus, who is but a faint-hearted warrior, come unbidden<sup>1</sup> to the banquet of Agamemnon, who is feasting and offering sacrifices, not the better to the worse, but the worse to the better.

Homer vio-  
lates his  
own rule.

I rather fear, Socrates, said Aristodemus, lest this may still

<sup>1</sup> Iliad ii. 408, and xvii. 588.

*Symposium.*  
ARISTODE-  
MUS,  
AGATHON.

be my case; and that, like Menelaus in Homer, I shall be the inferior person, who

• ‘To the feasts of the wise unbidden goes.’

But I shall say that I was bidden of you, and then you will have to make an excuse.

‘Two going together,’

he replied, in Homeric fashion, one or other of them may invent an excuse by the way <sup>1</sup>.

This was the style of their conversation as they went along. Socrates dropped behind in a fit of abstraction, and desired Aristodemus, who was waiting, to go on before him. When he reached the house of Agathon he found the doors wide open, and a comical thing happened. A servant coming out met him, and led him at once into the banqueting-hall in which the guests were reclining, for the banquet was about to begin. Welcome, Aristodemus, said Agathon, as soon as he appeared—you are just in time to sup with us; if you come on any other matter put it off, and make one of us, as I was looking for you yesterday and meant to have asked you, if I could have found you. But what have you done with Socrates?

Aristodemus is welcome on his own account, but where is his inseparable companion?

I turned round, but Socrates was nowhere to be seen; and I had to explain that he had been with me a moment before, and that I came by his invitation to the supper.

You were quite right in coming, said Agathon; but where is he himself?

He was behind me just now, as I entered, he said, and I cannot think what has become of him. 175

Go and look for him, boy, said Agathon, and bring him in; and do you, Aristodemus, meanwhile take the place by Eryximachus.

The servant then assisted him to wash, and he lay down, and presently another servant came in and reported that our friend Socrates had retired into the portico of the neighbouring house. ‘There he is fixed,’ said he, ‘and when I call to him he will not stir.’

<sup>1</sup> Iliad x. 224.

How strange, said Agathon; then you must call him again, and keep calling him. *Symposium.*

Let him alone, said my informant; he has a way of stopping anywhere and losing himself without any reason. I believe that he will soon appear; do not therefore disturb him. AGATHON, ARISTODEMUS, SOCRATES.

Well, if you think so, I will leave him, said Agathon. And then, turning to the servants, he added, 'Let us have supper without waiting for him. Serve up whatever you please, for there is no one to give you orders; hitherto I have never left you to yourselves. But on this occasion imagine that you are our hosts, and that I and the company are your guests; treat us well, and then we shall commend you.' After this, supper was served, but still no Socrates; and during the meal Agathon several times expressed a wish to send for him, but Aristodemus objected; and at last when the feast was about half over—for the fit, as usual, was not of long duration—Socrates entered. Agathon, who was reclining alone at the end of the table, begged that he would take the place next to him; that 'I may touch you,' he said, 'and have the benefit of that wise thought which came into your mind in the portico, and is now in your possession; for I am certain that you would not have come away until you had found what you sought.'

*At length Socrates enters: the compliments which pass between him and Agathon.*

How I wish, said Socrates, taking his place as he was desired, that wisdom could be infused by touch, out of the fuller into the emptier man, as water runs through wool out of a fuller cup into an emptier one; if that were so, how greatly should I value the privilege of reclining at your side! For you would have filled me full with a stream of wisdom plenteous and fair; whereas my own is of a very mean and questionable sort, no better than a dream. But yours is bright and full of promise, and was manifested forth in all the splendour of youth the day before yesterday, in the presence of more than thirty thousand Hellenes.

You are mocking, Socrates, said Agathon, and ere long you and I will have to determine who bears off the palm of wisdom—of this Dionysus shall be the judge; but at present you are better occupied with supper.

176 Socrates took his place on the couch, and supped with the  
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*Symposium.*

PAUSANIAS,  
ARISTOPHANES,  
ERYXIMACHUS,  
AGATHON,  
PHAEDRUS.

The good  
advice of  
Pausanias.

Men who  
drank hard  
yesterday  
should avoid  
drinking  
to-day.

rest; and then libations were offered, and after a hymn had been sung to the god, and there had been the usual ceremonies, they were about to commence drinking, when Pausanias said, And now, my friends, how can we drink with least injury to ourselves? I can assure you that I feel severely the effect of yesterday's potations, and must have time to recover; and I suspect that most of you are in the same predicament, for you were of the party yesterday. Consider then: How can the drinking be made easiest?

I entirely agree, said Aristophanes, that we should, by all means, avoid hard drinking, for I was myself one of those who were yesterday drowned in drink.

I think that you are right, said Eryximachus, the son of Acumenus; but I should still like to hear one other person speak: Is Agathon able to drink hard?

I am not equal to it, said Agathon.

Then, said Eryximachus, the weak heads like myself, Aristodemus, Phaedrus, and others who never can drink, are fortunate in finding that the stronger ones are not in a drinking mood. (I do not include Socrates, who is able either to drink or to abstain, and will not mind, whichever we do.) Well, as none of the company seem disposed to drink much, I may be forgiven for saying, as a physician, that drinking deep is a bad practice, which I never follow, if I can help, and certainly do not recommend to another, least of all to any one who still feels the effects of yesterday's carouse.

I always do what you advise, and especially what you prescribe as a physician, rejoined Phaedrus the Myrrhinusian, and the rest of the company, if they are wise, will do the same.

It was agreed that drinking was not to be the order of the day, but that they were all to drink only so much as they pleased.

Then, said Eryximachus, as you are all agreed that drinking is to be voluntary, and that there is to be no compulsion, I move, in the next place, that the flute-girl, who has just made her appearance, be told to go away and play to herself, or, if she likes, to the women who are within<sup>1</sup>. To-day let us have conversation instead; and, if you will

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Protag. 347.

177 allow me, I will tell you what sort of conversation. This proposal having been accepted, Eryximachus proceeded as follows:—

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ERYXIMACHUS,  
SOCRATES.

I will begin, he said, after the manner of Melanippe in Euripides,

‘Not mine the word’

which I am about to speak, but that of Phaedrus. For often he says to me in an indignant tone:—‘What a strange thing it is, Eryximachus, that, whereas other gods have poems and hymns made in their honour, the great and glorious god, Love, has no encomiast among all the poets who are so many. There are the worthy sophists too—the excellent Prodicus for example, who have descanted in prose on the virtues of Heracles and other heroes; and, what is still more extraordinary, I have met with a philosophical work in which the utility of salt has been made the theme of an eloquent discourse; and many other like things have had a like honour bestowed upon them. And only to think that there should have been an eager interest created about them, and yet that to this day no one has ever dared worthily to hymn Love’s praises! So entirely has this great deity been neglected.’ Now in this Phaedrus seems to me to be quite right, and therefore I want to offer him a contribution; also I think that at the present moment we who are here assembled cannot do better than honour the god Love. If you agree with me, there will be no lack of conversation; for I mean to propose that each of us in turn, going from left to right, shall make a speech in honour of Love. Let him give us the best which he can; and Phaedrus, because he is sitting first on the left hand, and because he is the father of the thought, shall begin.

Eryximachus descants upon the neglect of the poets to hymn love’s praises.

No one will vote against you, Eryximachus, said Socrates. How can I oppose your motion, who profess to understand nothing but matters of love; nor, I presume, will Agathon and Pausanias; and there can be no doubt of Aristophanes, whose whole concern is with Dionysus and Aphrodite; nor will any one disagree of those whom I see around me. The proposal, as I am aware, may seem rather hard upon us whose place is last; but we shall be contented if we hear

It is agreed to make a succession of speeches in his honour.



*Symposium.*SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS.

some good speeches first. Let Phaedrus begin the praise of Love, and good luck to him. All the company expressed their assent, and desired him to do as Socrates bade him.

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Aristodemus did not recollect all that was said, nor do I recollect all that he related to me; but I will tell you what I thought most worthy of remembrance, and what the chief speakers said.

Phaedrus began by affirming that Love is a mighty god, and wonderful among gods and men, but especially wonderful in his birth. For he is the eldest of the gods, which is an honour to him; and a proof of his claim to this honour is, that of his parents there is no memorial; neither poet nor prose-writer has ever affirmed that he had any. As Hesiod says:—

‘First Chaos came, and then broad-bosomed Earth,  
The everlasting seat of all that is,  
And Love.’

In other words, after Chaos, the Earth and Love, these two, came into being. Also Parmenides sings of their Generation, saying,

‘First of the powers of heaven, he fashioned Love.’

Love is the  
eldest of the  
gods, and the  
source of the  
greatest good.

For an hon-  
ourable love  
is the best  
incentive to  
virtue.

And Acusilaus agrees with Hesiod. Thus numerous are the witnesses who acknowledge Love to be the eldest of the gods. And not only is he the eldest, he is also the source of the greatest benefits to us. For I know not any greater blessing to a young man who is beginning life than a virtuous lover, or to the lover than a beloved youth. For the principle which ought to be the guide of men who would nobly live—that principle, I say, neither kindred, nor honour, nor wealth, nor any other motive is able to implant so well as love. Of what am I speaking? Of the sense of honour and dishonour, without which neither states nor individuals ever do any good or great work. And I say that a lover who is detected in doing any dishonourable act, or submitting through cowardice when any dishonour is done to him by another, will be more pained at being detected by his beloved than at being seen by his father, or by his companions, or by any one else. The beloved too, when he is found in any disgraceful situation, has the same feeling about his lover. And if there were only some way of contriving

that a state, or an army should be made up of lovers and their loves<sup>1</sup>, they would be the very best governors of their own city, abstaining from all dishonour, and emulating one another in honour; and when fighting at each other's side, although a mere handful, they would overcome the world. For what lover would not choose rather to be seen by all mankind than by his beloved, either when abandoning his post or throwing away his arms? He would be ready to die a thousand deaths rather than endure this. Or who would desert his beloved or fail him in the hour of danger? The veriest coward would become an inspired hero, equal to the bravest, at such a time; Love would inspire him. That courage which, as Homer says, the god breathes into the souls of some heroes, Love of his own nature infuses into the lover.

*Symposium.*  
PHAEDRUS.

Love will make men dare to die for their beloved — love alone; and women as well as men. Of this, Alcestis, the daughter of Pelias, is a monument to all Hellas; for she was willing to lay down her life on behalf of her husband, when no one else would, although he had a father and mother; but the tenderness of her love so far exceeded theirs, that she made them seem to be strangers in blood to their own son, and in name only related to him; and so noble did this action of hers appear to the gods, as well as to men, that among the many who have done virtuously she is one of the very few to whom, in admiration of her noble action, they have granted the privilege of returning alive to earth; such exceeding honour is paid by the gods to the devotion and virtue of love. But Orpheus, the son of Oeagrus, the harper, they sent empty away, and presented to him an apparition only of her whom he sought, but herself they would not give up, because he showed no spirit; he was only a harp-player, and did not dare like Alcestis to die for love, but was contriving how he might enter Hades alive; moreover, they afterwards caused him to suffer death at the hands of women, as the punishment of his cowardliness. Very different was the reward of the true love of Achilles towards his lover Patroclus — his lover and not his love (the notion that Patroclus was the beloved one is a foolish error

Love has made men and women dare to die for their beloved. The examples of Alcestis and Achilles.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. v. 468 D.

*Symposium.*PHAEDRUS,  
PAUSANIAS.

into which Aeschylus has fallen, for Achilles was surely the fairer of the two, fairer also than all the other heroes; and, as Homer informs us, he was still beardless, and younger (far). And greatly as the gods honour the virtue of love, still the return of love on the part of the beloved to the lover is more admired and valued and rewarded by them, for the lover is more divine; because he is inspired by God. Now Achilles was quite aware, for he had been told by his mother, that he might avoid death and return home, and live to a good old age, if he abstained from slaying Hector. Nevertheless he gave his life to revenge his friend, and dared to die, not only in his defence, but after he was dead. Wherefore the gods honoured him even above Alcestis, and sent him to the Islands of the Blest. These are my reasons for affirming that Love is the eldest and noblest and mightiest of the gods, and the chiefest author and giver of virtue in life, and of happiness after death. 180

This, or something like this, was the speech of Phaedrus; and some other speeches followed which Aristodemus did not remember; the next which he repeated was that of Pausanias. Phaedrus, he said, the argument has not been set before us, I think, quite in the right form;—we should not be called upon to praise Love in such an indiscriminate manner. If there were only one Love, then what you said would be well enough; but since there are more Loves than one, you should have begun by determining which of them was to be the theme of our praises. I will amend this defect; and first of all I will tell you which Love is deserving of praise, and then try to hymn the praiseworthy one in a manner worthy of him. For we all know that Love is inseparable from Aphrodite, and if there were only one Aphrodite there would be only one Love; but as there are two goddesses there must be two Loves. And am I not right in asserting that there are two goddesses? The elder one, having no mother, who is called the heavenly Aphrodite—she is the daughter of Uranus; the younger, who is the daughter of Zeus and Dione—her we call common; and the Love who is her fellow-worker is rightly named common, as the other love is called heavenly. All the gods ought to have praise given to them, but not without distinction of their natures; and

The spiritual  
and the  
common love  
derived re-  
spectively  
from the  
heavenly and  
the earthly  
Aphrodite.

181 therefore I must try to distinguish the characters of the two Loves. Now actions vary according to the manner of their performance. Take, for example, that which we are now doing, drinking, singing and talking — these actions are not in themselves either good or evil, but they turn out in this or that way according to the mode of performing them; and when well done they are good, and when wrongly done they are evil; and in like manner not every love, but only that which has a noble purpose, is noble and worthy of praise. The Love who is the offspring of the common Aphrodite is essentially common, and has no discrimination, being such as the meaner sort of men feel, and is apt to be of women as well as of youths, and is of the body rather than of the soul — the most foolish beings are the objects of this love which desires only to gain an end, but never thinks of accomplishing the end nobly, and therefore does good and evil quite indiscriminately. The goddess who is his mother is far younger than the other, and she was born of the union of the male and female, and partakes of both. But the offspring of the heavenly Aphrodite is derived from a mother in whose birth the female has no part, — she is from the male only; this is that love which is of youths, and the goddess being older, there is nothing of wantonness in her. Those who are inspired by this love turn to the male, and delight in him who is the more valiant and intelligent nature; any one may recognise the pure enthusiasts in the very character of their attachments. For they love not boys, but intelligent beings whose reason is beginning to be developed, much about the time at which their beards begin to grow. And in choosing young men to be their companions, they mean to be faithful to them, and pass their whole life in company with them, not to take them in their inexperience, and deceive them, and play the fool with them, or run away from one to another of them. But the love of young boys should be forbidden by law, because their future is uncertain; they may turn out good or bad, either in body or soul, and much noble enthusiasm may be thrown away upon them; in this matter the good are a law to themselves, and the coarser sort of lovers ought to be restrained by force, as we restrain or  
182 attempt to restrain them from fixing their affections on

*Symposium.*

PAUSANIAS.

The higher love is of the male, which may be a divine inspiration, and which may also be grossly abused.

*Symposium*

PAUSANIAS.

The feeling  
about male  
loves differs in  
the different  
states of  
Hellas.

women of free birth. These are the persons who bring a reproach on love; and some have been led to deny the lawfulness of such attachments because they see the impropriety and evil of them; for surely nothing that is decorously and lawfully done can justly be censured. Now here and in Lacedaemon the rules about love are perplexing, but in most cities they are simple and easily intelligible; in Elis and Boeotia, and in countries having no gifts of eloquence, they are very straightforward; the law is simply in favour of these connexions, and no one, whether young or old, has anything to say to their discredit; the reason being, as I suppose, that they are men of few words in those parts, and therefore the lovers do not like the trouble of pleading their suit. In Ionia and other places, and generally in countries which are subject to the barbarians, the custom is held to be dishonourable; loves of youths share the evil repute in which philosophy and gymnastics are held, because they are inimical to tyranny; for the interests of rulers require that their subjects should be poor in spirit<sup>1</sup>, and that there should be no strong bond of friendship or society among them, which love, above all other motives, is likely to inspire, as our Athenian tyrants learned by experience; for the love of Aristogeiton and the constancy of Harmodius had a strength which undid their power. And, therefore, the ill-repute into which these attachments have fallen is to be ascribed to the evil condition of those who make them to be ill-reputed; that is to say, to the self-seeking of the governors and the cowardice of the governed; on the other hand, the indiscriminate honour which is given to them in some countries is attributable to the laziness of those who hold this opinion of them. In our own country a far better principle prevails, but, as I was saying, the explanation of it is rather perplexing. For, observe that open loves are held to be more honourable than secret ones, and that the love of the noblest and highest, even if their persons are less beautiful than others, is especially honourable. Consider, too, how great is the encouragement which all the world gives to the lover; neither is he supposed to be doing anything dishonourable; but if he succeeds he is praised, and if he fail he is blamed.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Arist. Politics, v. 11. § 15.



183 And in the pursuit of his love the custom of mankind allows him to do many strange things, which philosophy would bitterly censure if they were done from any motive of interest, or wish for office or power. He may pray, and entreat, and supplicate, and swear, and lie on a mat at the door, and endure a slavery worse than that of any slave — in any other case friends and enemies would be equally ready to prevent him, but now there is no friend who will be ashamed of him and admonish him, and no enemy will charge him with meanness or flattery; the actions of a lover have a grace which ennobles them; and custom has decided that they are highly commendable and that there is no loss of character in them; and, what is strangest of all, he only may swear and forswear himself (so men say), and the gods will forgive his transgression, for there is no such thing as a lover's oath. Such is the entire liberty which gods and men have allowed the lover, according to the custom which prevails in our part of the world. From this point of view a man fairly argues that in Athens to love and to be loved is held to be a very honourable thing. But when parents forbid their sons to talk with their lovers, and place them under a tutor's care, who is appointed to see to these things, and their companions and equals cast in their teeth anything of the sort which they may observe, and their elders refuse to silence the reprovers and do not rebuke them — any one who reflects on all this will, on the contrary, think that we hold these practices to be most disgraceful. But, as I was saying at first, the truth as I imagine is, that whether such practices are honourable or whether they are dishonourable is not a simple question; they are honourable to him who follows them honourably, dishonourable to him who follows them dishonourably. There is dishonour in yielding to the evil, or in an evil manner; but there is honour in yielding to the good, or in an honourable manner. Evil is the vulgar lover who loves the body rather than the soul, inasmuch as he is not even stable, because he loves a thing which is in itself unstable, and therefore when the bloom of youth which he was desiring is over, he takes wing and flies away, in spite of all his words and promises; whereas the love of the noble disposition is life-long, for it becomes one with the

*Symposium.*

PAUSANIAS.

Custom allows the lover to do strange things.

The true love is the love of the soul, which has no regard to beauty or money or power, and which when



*Symposium.*PAUSANIAS.<sup>o</sup>

tested by  
time is  
found to be  
enduring.

everlasting. The custom of our country would have both of them proven well and truly, and would have us yield to the one sort of lover and avoid the other, and therefore encourages some to pursue, and others to fly; testing both the lover and beloved in contests and trials, until they show to which of the two classes they respectively belong. And this is the reason why, in the first place, a hasty attachment is held to be dishonourable, because time is the true test of this as of most other things; and secondly there is a dishonour in being overcome by the love of money, or of wealth, or of political power, whether a man is frightened into surrender by the loss of them, or, having experienced the benefits of money and political corruption, is unable to rise above the seductions of them. For none of these things are of a permanent or lasting nature; not to mention that no generous friendship ever sprang from them. There remains, then, only one way of honourable attachment which custom allows in the beloved, and this is the way of virtue; for as we admitted that any service which the lover does to him is not to be accounted flattery or a dishonour to himself, so the beloved has one way only of voluntary service which is not dishonourable, and this is virtuous service.

For we have a custom, and according to our custom any one who does service to another under the idea that he will be improved by him either in wisdom, or in some other particular of virtue—such a voluntary service, I say, is not to be regarded as a dishonour, and is not open to the charge of flattery. And these two customs, one the love of youth, and the other the practice of philosophy and virtue in general, ought to meet in one, and then the beloved may honourably indulge the lover. For when the lover and beloved come together, having each of them a law, and the lover thinks that he is right in doing any service which he can to his gracious loving one; and the other that he is right in showing any kindness which he can to him who is making him wise and good; the one capable of communicating wisdom and virtue, the other seeking to acquire them with a view to education and wisdom; when the two laws of love are fulfilled and meet in one—then, and then only, may the beloved yield with honour to the lover. Nor when love is of

Love is  
fellow-service;  
and the love  
of youth and  
the practice  
of philosophy  
should meet  
in one.

185 this disinterested sort is there any disgrace in being deceived, but in every other case there is equal disgrace in being or not being deceived. For he who is gracious to his lover under the impression that he is rich, and is disappointed of his gains because he turns out to be poor, is disgraced all the same: for he has done his best to show that he would give himself up to any one's 'uses base' for the sake of money; but this is not honourable. And on the same principle he who gives himself to a lover because he is a good man, and in the hope that he will be improved by his company, shows himself to be virtuous, even though the object of his affection turn out to be a villain, and to have no virtue; and if he is deceived he has committed a noble error. For he has proved that for his part he will do anything for anybody with a view to virtue and improvement, than which there can be nothing nobler. Thus noble in every case is the acceptance of another for the sake of virtue. This is that love which is the love of the heavenly goddess, and is heavenly, and of great price to individuals and cities, making the lover and the beloved alike eager in the work of their own improvement. But all other loves are the offspring of the other, who is the common goddess. To you, Phaedrus, I offer this my contribution in praise of love, which is as good as I could make extempore.

*Symposium.*

PAUSANIAS,  
ARISTODE-  
MUS,  
ARISTO-  
PHANES,  
ERYXIMA-  
CHUS.

Pāusāniās cāme to ă pāuse — this is the balanced way in which I have been taught by the wise to speak; and Aristodemus said that the turn of Aristophanes was next, but either he had eaten too much, or from some other cause he had the hiccough, and was obliged to change turns with Eryximachus the physician, who was reclining on the couch below him. Eryximachus, he said, you ought either to stop my hiccough, or to speak in my turn until I have left off.

Aristophanes  
has the hic-  
cough, and  
Eryxima-  
chus speaks  
in his turn.

I will do both, said Eryximachus: I will speak in your turn, and do you speak in mine; and while I am speaking let me recommend you to hold your breath, and if after you have done so for some time the hiccough is no better, then gargle with a little water; and if it still continues, tickle your nose with something and sneeze; and if you sneeze once or twice, even the most violent hiccough is sure

*Symposium.*ERYXIMA-  
CHUS.Medicine is  
the know-  
ledge of the  
loves and  
desires of the  
body, which  
are twofold.Harmony is  
the recon-  
ciliation, not  
of opposite  
elements, but  
of elements  
which dis-  
agreed once,

to go. I will do as you prescribe, said Aristophanes, and now get on.

Eryximachus spoke as follows: Seeing that Pausanias made a fair beginning, and but a lame ending, I must endeavour to supply his deficiency. I think that he has rightly distinguished two kinds of love. But my art further informs me that the double love is not merely an affection of the soul of man towards the fair, or towards anything, but is to be found in the bodies of all animals and in productions of the earth, and I may say in all that is; such is the conclusion which I seem to have gathered from my own art of medicine, whence I learn how great and wonderful and universal is the deity of love, whose empire extends over all things, divine as well as human. And from medicine I will begin that I may do honour to my art. There are in the human body these two kinds of love, which are confessedly different and unlike, and being unlike, they have loves and desires which are unlike; and the desire of the healthy is one, and the desire of the diseased is another; and as Pausanias was just now saying that to indulge good men is honourable, and bad men dishonourable: — so too in the body the good and healthy elements are to be indulged, and the bad elements and the elements of disease are not to be indulged, but discouraged. And this is what the physician has to do, and in this the art of medicine consists: for medicine may be regarded generally as the knowledge of the loves and desires of the body, and how to satisfy them or not; and the best physician is he who is able to separate fair love from foul, or to convert one into the other; and he who knows how to eradicate and how to implant love, whichever is required, and can reconcile the most hostile elements in the constitution and make them loving friends, is a skilful practitioner. Now the most hostile are the most opposite, such as hot and cold, bitter and sweet, moist and dry, and the like. And my ancestor, Asclepius, knowing how to implant friendship and accord in these elements, was the creator of our art, as our friends the poets here tell us, and I believe them; and not only medicine in every branch, but the arts of gymnastic and husbandry are under his dominion. Any one who pays the least attention to the subject will also perceive that in music there is the same

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reconciliation of opposites; and I suppose that this must have been the meaning of Heracleitus, although his words are not accurate; for he says that The One is united by disunion, like the harmony of the bow and the lyre. Now there is an absurdity in saying that harmony is discord or is composed of elements which are still in a state of discord. But what he probably meant was, that harmony is composed of differing notes of higher or lower pitch which disagreed once, but are now reconciled by the art of music; for if the higher and lower notes still disagreed, there could be no harmony,—clearly not. For harmony is a symphony, and symphony is an agreement; but an agreement of disagreements while they disagree there cannot be; you cannot harmonize that which disagrees. In like manner rhythm is compounded of elements short and long, once differing and now in accord; which accordance, as in the former instance, medicine, so in all these other cases, music implants, making love and unison to grow up among them; and thus music, too, is concerned with the principles of love in their application to harmony and rhythm. Again, in the essential nature of harmony and rhythm there is no difficulty in discerning love which has not yet become double. But when you want to use them in actual life, either in the composition of songs or in the correct performance of airs or metres composed already, which latter is called education, then the difficulty begins, and the good artist is needed. Then the old tale has to be repeated of fair and heavenly love — the love of Urania the fair and heavenly muse, and of the duty of accepting the temperate, and those who are as yet intemperate only that they may become temperate, and of preserving their love; and again, of the vulgar Polyhymnia, who must be used with circumspection that the pleasure be enjoyed, but may not generate licentiousness; just as in my own art it is a great matter so to regulate the desires of the epicure that he may gratify his tastes without the attendant evil of disease. Whence I infer that in music, in medicine, in all other things human as well as divine, both loves ought to be noted as far as may be, for they are both present.

*Symposium.*

ERYXIMA-  
CHUS.

and are now  
harmonized.

The course of the seasons is also full of both these principles; and when, as I was saying, the elements of hot and

*Symposium.*ERYXIMA-  
CHUS,  
ARISTO-  
PHANES.The presence  
of the true  
and false  
love may be  
discerned in  
men and  
animals, and  
in the seasons  
of the year.

cold, moist and dry, attain the harmonious love of one another and blend in temperance and harmony, they bring to men, animals, and plants health and plenty, and do them no harm; whereas the wanton love, getting the upper hand, and affecting the seasons of the year, is very destructive and injurious, being the source of pestilence, and bringing many other kinds of diseases on animals and plants; for hoar-frost and hail and blight spring from the excesses and disorders of these elements of love, which to know in relation to the revolutions of the heavenly bodies and the seasons of the year is termed astronomy. Furthermore all sacrifices and the whole province of divination, which is the art of communion between gods and men — these, I say, are concerned only with the preservation of the good and the cure of the evil love. For all manner of impiety is likely to ensue if, instead of accepting and honouring and reverencing the harmonious love in all his actions, a man honours the other love, whether in his feelings towards gods or parents, towards the living or the dead. Wherefore the business of divination is to see to these loves and to heal them, and divination is the peacemaker of gods and men, working by a knowledge of the religious or irreligious tendencies which exist in human loves. Such is the great and mighty, or rather omnipotent force of love in general. And the love, more especially, which is concerned with the good, and which is perfected in company with temperance and justice, whether among gods or men, has the greatest power, and is the source of all our happiness and harmony, and makes us friends with the gods who are above us, and with one another. I dare say that I too have omitted several things which might be said in praise of Love, but this was not intentional, and you, Aristophanes, may now supply the omission or take some other line of commendation; for I perceive that you are rid of the hiccough.

Yes, said Aristophanes, who followed, the hiccough is 189 gone; not, however, until I applied the sneezing; and I wonder whether the harmony of the body has a love of such noises and ticklings, for I no sooner applied the sneezing than I was cured.

Eryximachus said: Beware, friend Aristophanes; although you are going to speak, you are making fun of me; and



I shall have to watch your speech and see whether I cannot have a laugh at you, when you might speak in peace.

*Symposium.*

You are quite right, said Aristophanes, laughing. I will unsay my words; but do you please not to watch me, as I fear that in the speech which I am about to make, instead of others laughing with me, which is to the manner born of our muse and would be all the better, I shall only be laughed at by them.

ERYXIMA-  
CHUS,  
ARISTO-  
PHANES.

Do you expect to shoot your bolt and escape, Aristophanes? Well, perhaps if you are very careful and bear in mind that you will be called to account, I may be induced to let you off.

Aristophanes professed to open another vein of discourse; he had a mind to praise Love in another way, unlike that either of Pausanias or Eryximachus. Mankind, he said, judging by their neglect of him, have never, as I think, at all understood the power of Love. For if they had understood him they would surely have built noble temples and altars, and offered solemn sacrifices in his honour; but this is not done, and most certainly ought to be done: since of all the gods he is the best friend of men, the helper and the healer of the ills which are the great impediment to the happiness of the race. I will try to describe his power to you, and you shall teach the rest of the world what I am teaching you. In the first place, let me treat of the nature of man and what has happened to it; for the original human nature was not like the present, but different. The sexes were not two as they are now, but originally three in number; there was man, woman, and the union of the two, having a name corresponding to this double nature, which had once a real existence, but is now lost, and the word 'Androgynous' is only preserved as a term of reproach. In the second place, the primeval man was round, his back and sides forming a circle; and he had four hands and four feet, one head with  
190 two faces, looking opposite ways, set on a round neck and precisely alike; also four ears, two privy members, and the remainder to correspond. He could walk upright as men now do, backwards or forwards as he pleased, and he could also roll over and over at a great pace, turning on his four hands and four feet, eight in all, like tumblers going over

Aristophanes promises to treat of love in a new manner.

The original human nature unlike the present.

The three sexes; their form and origin.



*Symposium.*ARISTO-  
PHANES.Their re-  
bellious spirit.Various  
operations  
are performed  
on them by  
the command  
of Zeus.

and over with their legs in the air; this was when he wanted to run fast. Now the sexes were three, and such as I have described them; because the sun, moon, and earth are three; and the man was originally the child of the sun, the woman of the earth, and the man-woman of the moon, which is made up of sun and earth, and they were all round and moved round and round like their parents. Terrible was their might and strength, and the thoughts of their hearts were great, and they made an attack upon the gods; of them is told the tale of Otys and Ephialtes who, as Homer says, dared to scale heaven, and would have laid hands upon the gods. Doubt reigned in the celestial councils. Should they kill them and annihilate the race with thunderbolts, as they had done the giants, then there would be an end of the sacrifices and worship which men offered to them; but, on the other hand, the gods could not suffer their insolence to be unrestrained. At last, after a good deal of reflection, Zeus discovered a way. He said: 'Methinks I have a plan which will humble their pride and improve their manners; men shall continue to exist, but I will cut them in two and then they will be diminished in strength and increased in numbers; this will have the advantage of making them more profitable to us. They shall walk upright on two legs, and if they continue insolent and will not be quiet, I will split them again and they shall hop about on a single leg.' He spoke and cut men in two, like a sorb-apple which is halved for pickling, or as you might divide an egg with a hair; and as he cut them one after another, he bade Apollo give the face and the half of the neck a turn in order that the man might contemplate the section of himself: he would thus learn a lesson of humility. Apollo was also bidden to heal their wounds and compose their forms. So he gave a turn to the face and pulled the skin from the sides all over that which in our language is called the belly, like the purses which draw in, and he made one mouth at the centre, which he fastened in a knot (the same which is called the navel); he also moulded the breast and took out most of the wrinkles, 191  
much as a shoemaker might smooth leather upon a last; he left a few, however, in the region of the belly and navel, as a memorial of the primeval state. After the division the

two parts of man, each desiring his other half, came together, and throwing their arms about one another, entwined in mutual embraces, longing to grow into one, they were on the point of dying from hunger and self-neglect, because they did not like to do anything apart; and when one of the halves died and the other survived, the survivor sought another mate, man or woman as we call them,—being the sections of entire men or women,—and clung to that. They were being destroyed, when Zeus in pity of them invented a new plan: he turned the parts of generation round to the front, for this had not been always their position, and they sowed the seed no longer as hitherto like grasshoppers in the ground, but in one another; and after the transposition the male generated in the female in order that by the mutual embraces of man and woman they might breed, and the race might continue; or if man came to man they might be satisfied, and rest, and go their ways to the business of life: so ancient is the desire of one another which is implanted in us, reuniting our original nature, making one of two, and healing the state of man. Each of us when separated, having one side only, like a flat fish, is but the indenture of a man, and he is always looking for his other half. Men who are a section of that double nature which was once called Androgynous are lovers of women; adulterers are generally of this breed, and also adulterous women who lust after men: the women who are a section of the woman do not care for men, but have female attachments; the female companions are of this sort. But they who are a section of the male follow the male, and while they are young, being slices of the original man, they hang about men and embrace them, and they are themselves the best of boys and youths, because they have the most manly nature. Some indeed assert that they are shameless, but this is not true; for they do not act thus from any want of shame, but because they are valiant and manly, and have a manly countenance, and they embrace that which is like them. And these when they grow up become our statesmen, and these only, which is a great proof of the truth of what I am saying. When they reach manhood they are lovers of youth, and are not naturally inclined to marry or beget children,—if at all, they do so

*Symposium.*

ARISTO-  
PHANES.

The two halves wander about longing after one another.

The characters of men and women depend upon the nature from which they were originally severed.

*Symposium.*ARISTO-  
PHANES.The strong  
presentiment  
which lovers  
have of they  
know not  
what.

only in obedience to the law; but they are satisfied if they may be allowed to live with one another unwedded; and such a nature is prone to love and ready to return love, always embracing that which is akin to him. And when one of them meets with his other half, the actual half of himself, whether he be a lover of youth or a lover of another sort, the pair are lost in an amazement of love and friendship and intimacy, and one will not be out of the other's sight, as I may say, even for a moment: these are the people who pass their whole lives together; yet they could not explain what they desire of one another. For the intense yearning which each of them has towards the other does not appear to be the desire of lover's intercourse, but of something else which the soul of either evidently desires and cannot tell, and of which she has only a dark and doubtful presentiment. Suppose Hephaestus, with his instruments, to come to the pair who are lying side by side and to say to them, 'What do you two people want of one another?' they would be unable to explain. And suppose further, that when he saw their perplexity he said: 'Do you desire to be wholly one; always day and night to be in one another's company? for if this is what you desire, I am ready to melt you into one and let you grow together, so that being two you shall become one, and while you live live a common life as if you were a single man, and after your death in the world below still be one departed soul instead of two—I ask whether this is what you lovingly desire, and whether you are satisfied to attain this?'—there is not a man of them who when he heard the proposal would deny or would not acknowledge that this meeting and melting into one another, this becoming one instead of two, was the very expression of his ancient need<sup>1</sup>. And the reason is that human nature was originally one and we were a whole, and the desire and pursuit of the whole is called love. 193

There was a time, I say, when we were one, but now because of the wickedness of mankind God has dispersed us, as the Arcadians were dispersed into villages by the Lacedaemonians<sup>2</sup>. And if we are not obedient to the gods, there is a danger that we shall be split up again and go about

Mankind  
have been  
divided al-  
ready; but  
worse may  
yet befall  
them unless<sup>1</sup> Cp. Arist. Pol. ii. 4, § 6.<sup>2</sup> Cp. Arist. Pol. ii. 2, § 3.

in basso-relievo, like the profile figures having only half a nose which are sculptured on monuments, and that we shall be like tallies. Wherefore let us exhort all men to piety, that we may avoid evil, and obtain the good, of which Love is to us the lord and minister; and let no one oppose him—he is the enemy of the gods who opposes him. For if we are friends of the God and at peace with him we shall find our own true loves, which rarely happens in this world at present. I am serious, and therefore I must beg Eryximachus not to make fun or to find any allusion in what I am saying to Pausanias and Agathon, who, as I suspect, are both of the manly nature, and belong to the class which I have been describing. But my words have a wider application—they include men and women everywhere; and I believe that if our loves were perfectly accomplished, and each one returning to his primeval nature had his original true love, then our race would be happy. And if this would be best of all, the best in the next degree and under present circumstances must be the nearest approach to such an union; and that will be the attainment of a congenial love. Wherefore, if we would praise him who has given to us the benefit, we must praise the god Love, who is our greatest benefactor, both leading us in this life back to our own nature, and giving us high hopes for the future, for he promises that if we are pious, he will restore us to our original state, and heal us and make us happy and blessed. This, Eryximachus, is my discourse of love, which, although different to yours, I must beg you to leave unassailed by the shafts of your ridicule, in order that each may have his turn; each, or rather either, for Agathon and Socrates are the only ones left.

Indeed, I am not going to attack you, said Eryximachus, for I thought your speech charming, and did I not know that Agathon and Socrates are masters in the art of love, I should be really afraid that they would have nothing to say, after the world of things which have been said already. But, for all that, I am not without hopes.

194 Socrates said: You played your part well, Eryximachus; but if you were as I am now, or rather as I shall be when Agathon has spoken, you would, indeed, be in a great strait.

*Symposium.*

ARISTOPHANES,  
ERYXIMACHUS,  
SOCRATES.

they worship  
the Gods;  
they may be  
not halved  
only, but  
quartered.

Aristophanes  
deprecates  
ridicule.

*Symposium.*SOCRATES,  
AGATHON,  
PHAEDRUS.

You want to cast a spell over me, Socrates, said Agathon, in the hope that I may be disconcerted at the expectation raised among the audience that I shall speak well.

I should be strangely forgetful, Agathon, replied Socrates, of the courage and magnanimity which you showed when your own compositions were about to be exhibited, and you came upon the stage with the actors and faced the vast theatre altogether undismayed, if I thought that your nerves could be fluttered at a small party of friends.

Do you think, Socrates, said Agathon, that my head is so full of the theatre as not to know how much more formidable to a man of sense a few good judges are than many fools?

Nay, replied Socrates, I should be very wrong in attributing to you, Agathon, that or any other want of refinement. And I am quite aware that if you happened to meet with any whom you thought wise, you would care for their opinion much more than for that of the many. But then we, having been a part of the foolish many in the theatre, cannot be regarded as the select wise; though I know that if you chanced to be in the presence, not of one of ourselves, but of some really wise man, you would be ashamed of disgracing yourself before him — would you not?

Yes, said Agathon.

But before the many you would not be ashamed, if you thought that you were doing something disgraceful in their presence?

Socrates is  
not allowed  
to talk.

Here Phaedrus interrupted them, saying: Do not answer him, my dear Agathon; for if he can only get a partner with whom he can talk, especially a good-looking one, he will no longer care about the completion of our plan. Now I love to hear him talk; but just at present I must not forget the encomium on Love which I ought to receive from him and from every one. When you and he have paid your tribute to the god, then you may talk.

Very good, Phaedrus, said Agathon; I see no reason why I should not proceed with my speech, as I shall have many other opportunities of conversing with Socrates. Let me say first how I ought to speak, and then speak:—

The previous speakers, instead of praising the god Love, or unfolding his nature, appear to have congratulated mankind



195 on the benefits which he confers upon them. But I would rather praise the god first, and then speak of his gifts; this is always the right way of praising everything. May I say without impiety or offence, that of all the blessed gods he is the most blessed because he is the fairest and best? And he is the fairest: for, in the first place, he is the youngest, and of his youth he is himself the witness, fleeing out of the way of age, who is swift enough, swifter truly than most of us like:—Love hates him and will not come near him; but youth and love live and move together—like to like, as the proverb says. Many things were said by Phaedrus about Love in which I agree with him; but I cannot agree that he is older than Iapetus and Cronos:—not so; I maintain him to be the youngest of the gods, and youthful ever. The ancient doings among the gods of which Hesiod and Parmenides spoke, if the tradition of them be true, were done of Necessity and not of Love; had Love been in those days, there would have been no chaining or mutilation of the gods, or other violence, but peace and sweetness, as there is now in heaven, since the rule of Love began. Love is young and also tender; he ought to have a poet like Homer to describe his tenderness, as Homer says of Ate, that she is a goddess and tender:—

‘ Her feet are tender, for she sets her steps,  
Not on the ground but on the heads of men: ’

herein is an excellent proof of her tenderness,—that she walks not upon the hard but upon the soft. Let us adduce a similar proof of the tenderness of Love; for he walks not upon the earth, nor yet upon the skulls of men, which are not so very soft, but in the hearts and souls of both gods and men, which are of all things the softest: in them he walks and dwells and makes his home. Not in every soul without exception, for where there is hardness he departs, where there is softness there he dwells; and nestling always with his feet and in all manner of ways in the softest of soft places, how can he be other than the softest of all things?

196 Of a truth he is the tenderest as well as the youngest, and also he is of flexile form; for if he were hard and without flexure he could not enfold all things, or wind his way into and out of every soul of man undiscovered. And a proof of

*Symposium.*

AGATHON.

The god Love should be praised on his own account, and not for the benefits which he confers upon mankind.

Love is not old, but young and tender;

flexile;



*Symposium.*

AGATHON.

fair;

just;

temperate;

courageous;

wise;

a poet too,  
anda maker of  
poets;an artist,  
and creator  
of order;

his flexibility and symmetry of form is his grace, which is universally admitted to be in an especial manner the attribute of Love; ungrace and love are always at war with one another. The fairness of his complexion is revealed by his habitation among the flowers; for he dwells not amid bloomless or fading beauties, whether of body or soul or aught else, but in the place of flowers and scents, there he sits and abides. Concerning the beauty of the god I have said enough; and yet there remains much more which I might say. Of his virtue I have now to speak: his greatest glory is that he can neither do nor suffer wrong to or from any god or any man; for he suffers not by force if he suffers; force comes not near him, neither when he acts does he act by force. For all men in all things serve him of their own free will, and where there is voluntary agreement, there, as the laws which are the lords of the city say, is justice. And not only is he just but exceedingly temperate, for Temperance is the acknowledged ruler of the pleasures and desires, and no pleasure ever masters Love; he is their master and they are his servants; and if he conquers them he must be temperate indeed. As to courage, even the God of War is no match for him; he is the captive and Love is the lord, for love, the love of Aphrodite, masters him, as the tale runs; and the master is stronger than the servant. And if he conquers the bravest of all others, he must be himself the bravest. Of his courage and justice and temperance I have spoken, but I have yet to speak of his wisdom; and according to the measure of my ability I must try to do my best. In the first place he is a poet (and here, like Eryximachus, I magnify my art), and he is also the source of poesy in others, which he could not be if he were not himself a poet. And at the touch of him every one becomes a poet,<sup>1</sup> even though he had no music in him before<sup>1</sup>; this also is a proof that Love is a good poet and accomplished in all the fine arts; for no one can give to another that which he has not himself, or teach that of which he has no knowledge. Who will deny that the creation of the animals is his doing? Are they not all the works of his wisdom, born and begotten of him? And as to the artists, do we not know that he only of them whom love inspires has the

<sup>1</sup> A fragment of the Sthenoboea of Euripides.

light of fame? — he whom Love touches not walks in darkness. The arts of medicine and archery and divination were discovered by Apollo, under the guidance of love and desire; so that he too is a disciple of Love. Also the melody of the Muses, the metallurgy of Hephaestus, the weaving of Athene, the empire of Zeus over gods and men, are all due to Love, who was the inventor of them. And so Love set in order the empire of the gods — the love of beauty, as is evident, for with deformity Love has no concern. In the days of old, as I began by saying, dreadful deeds were done among the gods, for they were ruled by Necessity; but now since the birth of Love, and from the Love of the beautiful, has sprung every good in heaven and earth. Therefore, Phaedrus, I say of Love that he is the fairest and best in himself, and the cause of what is fairest and best in all other things. And there comes into my mind a line of poetry in which he is said to be the god who

*Symposium.*

AGATHON,  
SOCRATES.

a peacemaker:

‘ Gives peace on earth and calms the stormy deep,  
Who stills the winds and bids the sufferer sleep.’

This is he who empties men of disaffection and fills them with affection, who makes them to meet together at banquets such as these: in sacrifices, feasts, dances, he is our lord — who sends courtesy and sends away discourtesy, who gives kindness ever and never gives unkindness; the friend of the good, the wonder of the wise, the amazement of the gods; desired by those who have no part in him, and precious to those who have the better part in him; parent of delicacy, luxury, desire, fondness, softness, grace; regardful of the good, regardless of the evil: in every word, work, wish, fear — saviour, pilot, comrade, helper; glory of gods and men, leader best and brightest: in whose footsteps let every man follow, sweetly singing in his honour and joining in that sweet strain with which love charms the souls of gods and men. Such is the speech, Phaedrus, half-playful, yet having a certain measure of seriousness, which, according to my ability, I dedicate to the god.

a saviour:

best and  
brightest.

198 When Agathon had done speaking, Aristodemus said that there was a general cheer; the young man was thought to have spoken in a manner worthy of himself, and of the god. And Socrates, looking at Eryximachus, said: Tell me, son of

*Symposium.*SOCRATES,  
ERYXIMA-  
CHUS.

Acumenus, was there not reason in my fears? and was I not a true prophet when I said that Agathon would make a wonderful oration, and that I should be in a strait?

The part of the prophecy which concerns Agathon, replied Eryximachus, appears to me to be true; but not the other part — that you will be in a strait.

Socrates tries to excuse himself from the agreement to take part on the ground that he never understood the nature of the compact. They have attributed to love an imaginary greatness and goodness; but he can only praise truly.

Why, my dear friend, said Socrates, must not I or any one be in a strait who has to speak after he has heard such a rich and varied discourse? I am especially struck with the beauty of the concluding words — who could listen to them without amazement? When I reflected on the immeasurable inferiority of my own powers, I was ready to run away for shame, if there had been a possibility of escape. For I was reminded of Gorgias, and at the end of his speech I fancied that Agathon was shaking at me the Gorginian or Gorgonian head of the great master of rhetoric, which was simply to turn me and my speech into stone, as Homer says<sup>1</sup>, and strike me dumb. And then I perceived how foolish I had been in consenting to take my turn with you in praising love, and saying that I too was a master of the art, when I really had no conception how anything ought to be praised. For in my simplicity I imagined that the topics of praise should be true, and that this being presupposed, out of the true the speaker was to choose the best and set them forth in the best manner. And I felt quite proud, thinking that I knew the nature of true praise, and should speak well. Whereas I now see that the intention was to attribute to Love every species of greatness and glory, whether really belonging to him or not, without regard to truth or falsehood — that was no matter; for the original proposal seems to have been not that each of you should really praise Love, but only that you should appear to praise him. And so you attribute to Love every imaginable form of praise which can be gathered anywhere; and you say that 'he is all this,' and 'the cause of all that,' making him appear the fairest and best of all to those 199 who know him not, for you cannot impose upon those who know him. And a noble and solemn hymn of praise have you rehearsed. But as I misunderstood the nature of the praise when I said that I would take my turn, I must beg to

<sup>1</sup> *Odyssey*, xi. 632.

be absolved from the promise which I made in ignorance, and which (as Euripides would say <sup>1</sup>) was a promise of the lips and not of the mind. Farewell then to such a strain: for I do not praise in that way; no, indeed, I cannot. But if you like to hear the truth about love, I am ready to speak in my own manner, though I will not make myself ridiculous by entering into any rivalry with you. Say then, Phaedrus, whether you would like to have the truth about love, spoken in any words and in any order which may happen to come into my mind at the time. Will that be agreeable to you?

*Symposium.*

SOCRATES,  
PHAEDRUS,  
AGATHON.

Aristodemus said that Phaedrus and the company bid him speak in any manner which he thought best. Then, he added, let me have your permission first to ask Agathon a few more questions, in order that I may take his admissions as the premisses of my discourse.

He is allowed  
to take his  
own course.

I grant the permission, said Phaedrus: put your questions. Socrates then proceeded as follows:—

In the magnificent oration which you have just uttered, I think that you were right, my dear Agathon, in proposing to speak of the nature of Love first and afterwards of his works—that is a way of beginning which I very much approve. And as you have spoken so eloquently of his nature, may I ask you further, Whether love is the love of something or of nothing? And here I must explain myself: I do not want you to say that love is the love of a father or the love of a mother—that would be ridiculous; but to answer as you would, if I asked is a father a father of something? to which you would find no difficulty in replying, of a son or daughter: and the answer would be right.

Love is of  
something  
and desires  
something  
which he does  
not possess  
in himself.

Very true, said Agathon.

And you would say the same of a mother?

He assented.

Yet let me ask you one more question in order to illustrate my meaning: Is not a brother to be regarded essentially as a brother of something?

Certainly, he replied.

That is, of a brother or sister?

Yes, he said.

<sup>1</sup> Eurip. Hippolytus, l. 612.

*Symposium.*

SOCRATES,

AGATHON.

And now, said Socrates, I will ask about Love:— Is Love of something or of nothing?

Of something, surely, he replied.

200

Keep in mind what this is, and tell me what I want to know — whether Love desires that of which love is.

Yes, surely.

And does he possess, or does he not possess, that which he loves and desires?

Probably not, I should say.

Love, therefore, is not good or great, but desires to be good or great.

Nay, replied Socrates, I would have you consider whether ‘necessarily’ is not rather the word. The inference that he who desires something is in want of something, and that he who desires nothing is in want of nothing, is in my judgment, Agathon, absolutely and necessarily true. What do you think?

I agree with you, said Agathon.

Very good. Would he who is great, desire to be great, or he who is strong, desire to be strong?

That would be inconsistent with our previous admissions.

True. For he who is anything cannot want to be that which he is?

Very true.

A seeming exception; of course we admit that a man may desire the continuance or increase of that which he has.

And yet, added Socrates, if a man being strong desired to be strong, or being swift desired to be swift, or being healthy desired to be healthy, in that case he might be thought to desire something which he already has or is. I give the example in order that we may avoid misconception. For the possessors of these qualities, Agathon, must be supposed to have their respective advantages at the time, whether they choose or not; and who can desire that which he has? Therefore, when a person says, I am well and wish to be well, or I am rich and wish to be rich, and I desire simply to have what I have — to him we shall reply: ‘You, my friend, having wealth and health and strength, want to have the continuance of them; for at this moment, whether you choose or no, you have them. And when you say, I desire that which I have and nothing else, is not your meaning that you want to have what you now have in the future?’ He must agree with us — must he not?

He must, replied Agathon.



Then, said Socrates, he desires that what he has at present may be preserved to him in the future, which is equivalent to saying that he desires something which is non-existent to him, and which as yet he has not got:

Very true, he said.

Then he and every one who desires, desires that which he has not already, and which is future and not present, and which he has not, and is not, and of which he is in want;—these are the sort of things which love and desire seek?

Very true, he said.

Then now, said Socrates, let us recapitulate the argument. First, is not love of something, and of something too which is wanting to a man?

201 Yes, he replied.

Remember further what you said in your speech, or if you do not remember I will remind you: you said that the love of the beautiful set in order the empire of the gods, for that of deformed things there is no love—did you not say something of that kind?

Yes, said Agathon.

Yes, my friend, and the remark was a just one. And if this is true, Love is the love of beauty and not of deformity?

He assented.

And the admission has been already made that Love is of something which a man wants and has not?

True, he said.

Then Love wants and has not beauty?

Certainly, he replied.

And would you call that beautiful which wants and does not possess beauty?

Certainly not.

Then would you still say that love is beautiful?

Agathon replied: I fear that I did not understand what I was saying.

You made a very good speech, Agathon, replied Socrates; but there is yet one small question which I would fain ask:

—Is not the good also the beautiful?

Yes.

Then in wanting the beautiful, love wants also the good?

*Symposium.*

SOCRATES,  
AGATHON.

Recapitu-  
lation of the  
argument.

The conclu-  
sion is, that  
love is not  
beautiful  
but is of  
the beautiful,  
and that the  
beautiful is  
the good.



*Symposium.*SOCRATES,  
AGATHON.The argu-  
ment was  
communi-  
cated to  
Socrates by  
Diotima.Love is not  
to be es-  
teemed foul  
and evil be-  
cause he is  
not fair and  
good;

I cannot refute you, Socrates, said Agathon:— Let us assume that what you say is true.

Say rather, beloved Agathon, that you cannot refute the truth; for Socrates is easily refuted.

And now, taking my leave of you, I will rehearse a tale of love which I heard from Diotima of Mantinea<sup>1</sup>, a woman wise in this and in many other kinds of knowledge, who in the days of old, when the Athenians offered sacrifice before the coming of the plague, delayed the disease ten years. She was my instructress in the art of love, and I shall repeat to you what she said to me, beginning with the admissions made by Agathon, which are nearly if not quite the same which I made to the wise woman when she questioned me: I think that this will be the easiest way, and I shall take both parts myself as well as I can<sup>2</sup>. As you, Agathon, suggested<sup>3</sup>, I must speak first of the being and nature of Love, and then of his works. First I said to her in nearly the same words which he used to me, that Love was a mighty god, and likewise fair; and she proved to me as I proved to him that, by my own showing, Love was neither fair nor good. 'What do you mean, Diotima,' I said, 'is love then evil and foul?' 'Hush,' she cried; 'must that be foul which is not fair?' 'Certainly,' I said. 'And is that which is not wise, ignorant?' 202 do you not see that there is a mean between wisdom and ignorance?' 'And what may that be?' I said. 'Right opinion,' she replied; 'which, as you know, being incapable of giving a reason, is not knowledge (for how can knowledge be devoid of reason? nor again, ignorance, for neither can ignorance attain the truth), but is clearly something which is a mean between ignorance and wisdom.' 'Quite true,' I replied. 'Do not then insist,' she said, 'that what is not fair is of necessity foul, or what is not good evil; or infer that because love is not fair and good he is therefore foul and evil; for he is in a mean between them.' 'Well,' I said, 'Love is surely admitted by all to be a great god.' 'By those who know or by those who do not know?' 'By all.' 'And how, Socrates,' she said with a smile, 'can Love be acknowledged to be a great god by those who say that he is

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Aspasia in I. Alcibiades.<sup>2</sup> Cp. Gorgias, 505 E.<sup>3</sup> Supra, 195 A.

not a god at all?' 'And who are they?' I said. 'You and I are two of them,' she replied. 'How can that be?' I said. 'It is quite intelligible,' she replied; 'for you yourself would acknowledge that the gods are happy and fair — of course you would — would you dare to say that any god was not?' 'Certainly not,' I replied. 'And you mean by the happy, those who are the possessors of things good or fair?' 'Yes.' 'And you admitted that Love, because he was in want, desires those good and fair things of which he is in want?' 'Yes, I did.' 'But how can he be a god who has no portion in what is either good or fair?' 'Impossible.' 'Then you see that you also deny the divinity of Love.'

*Symposium.*  
SOCRATES.

but, on the other hand, he is not a god who does not possess the good and the fair.

'What then is Love?' I asked; 'Is he mortal?' 'No.' 'What then?' 'As in the former instance, he is neither mortal nor immortal, but in a mean between the two.' 'What is he, Diotima?' 'He is a great spirit (*δαίμων*), and like all spirits he is intermediate between the divine and the mortal.' 'And what,' I said, 'is his power?' 'He interprets,' she replied, 'between gods and men, conveying and taking across to the gods the prayers and sacrifices of men, and to men the commands and replies of the gods; he is the mediator who spans the chasm which divides them, and therefore in him all is bound together, and through him the arts of the prophet and the priest, their sacrifices and mysteries and charms, and all prophecy and incantation, find their way. For God mingles not with man; but through Love all the intercourse and converse of God with man, whether awake or asleep, is carried on. The wisdom which understands this is spiritual; all other wisdom, such as that of arts and handicrafts, is mean and vulgar. Now these spirits or intermediate powers are many and diverse, and one of them is Love.' 'And who,' I said, 'was his father, and who his mother?' 'The tale,' she said, 'will take time; nevertheless I will tell you. On the birthday of Aphrodite there was a feast of the gods, at which the god Poros or Plenty, who is the son of Metis or Discretion, was one of the guests. When the feast was over, Penia or Poverty, as the manner is on such occasions, came about the doors to beg. Now Plenty, who was the worse for nectar (there was no wine in those days), went into the garden of Zeus and fell

He is a great spirit who mediates between gods and men:

the son of Plenty and Poverty;

*Symposium.*

SOCRATES.

a shoeless,  
houseless,  
ill-favoured  
vagabond,  
who is always  
conspiring  
against the  
fair and good;

not wise, but  
a lover of  
wisdom.

into a heavy sleep; and Poverty considering her own straitened circumstances, plotted to have a child by him, and accordingly she lay down at his side and conceived Love, who partly because he is naturally a lover of the beautiful, and because Aphrodite is herself beautiful, and also because he was born on her birthday, is her follower and attendant. And as his parentage is, so also are his fortunes. In the first place he is always poor, and anything but tender and fair, as the many imagine him; and he is rough and squalid, and has no shoes, nor a house to dwell in; on the bare earth exposed he lies under the open heaven, in the streets, or at the doors of houses, taking his rest; and like his mother he is always in distress. Like his father too, whom he also partly resembles, he is always plotting against the fair and good; he is bold, enterprising, strong, a mighty hunter, always weaving some intrigue or other, keen in the pursuit of wisdom, fertile in resources; a philosopher at all times, terrible as an enchanter, sorcerer, sophist. He is by nature neither mortal nor immortal, but alive and flourishing at one moment when he is in plenty, and dead at another moment, and again alive by reason of his father's nature. But that which is always flowing in is always flowing out, and so he is never in want and never in wealth; and, further, he is in a mean between ignorance and knowledge. The truth of the matter is this: No god is a philosopher or seeker after wisdom, for he is wise already; nor does any man who is wise seek after wisdom. Neither do the ignorant seek after wisdom. For herein is the evil of ignorance, that he who is neither good nor wise is nevertheless satisfied with himself: he has no desire for that of which he feels no want.' 'But who then, Diotima,' I said, 'are the lovers of wisdom, if they are neither the wise nor the foolish?' 'A child may answer that question,' she replied; 'they are those who are in a mean between the two; Love is one of them. For wisdom is a most beautiful thing, and Love is of the beautiful; and therefore Love is also a philosopher or lover of wisdom, and being a lover of wisdom is in a mean between the wise and the ignorant. And of this too his birth is the cause; for his father is wealthy and wise, and his mother poor and foolish. Such, my dear Socrates, is the nature of the spirit

Love. The error in your conception of him was very natural, and as I imagine from what you say, has arisen out of a confusion of love and the beloved, which made you think that love was all beautiful. For the beloved is the truly beautiful, and delicate, and perfect, and blessed; but the principle of love is of another nature, and is such as I have described.

*Symposium.*

SOCRATES.

I said: 'O thou stranger woman, thou sayest well; but, assuming Love to be such as you say, what is the use of him to men?' 'That, Socrates,' she replied, 'I will attempt to unfold: of his nature and birth I have already spoken; and you acknowledge that love is of the beautiful. But some one will say: Of the beautiful in what, Socrates and Diotima? — or rather let me put the question more clearly, and ask: When a man loves the beautiful, what does he desire?' I answered her 'That the beautiful may be his.' 'Still,' she said, 'the answer suggests a further question: What is given by the possession of beauty?' 'To what you have asked,' I replied, 'I have no answer ready.' 'Then,' she said, 'let me put the word "good" in the place of the beautiful, and repeat the question once more: If he who loves loves the good, what is it then that he loves?' 'The possession of the good,' I said. 'And what does he gain who possesses the good?' 'Happiness,' I replied; 'there is less difficulty in answering that question.' 'Yes,' she said, 'the happy are made happy by the acquisition of good things. Nor is there any need to ask why a man desires happiness; the answer is already final.' 'You are right,' I said. 'And is this wish and this desire common to all? and do all men always desire their own good, or only some men? — what say you?' 'All men,' I replied; 'the desire is common to all.' 'Why, then,' she rejoined, 'are not all men, Socrates, said to love, but only some of them? whereas you say that all men are always loving the same things.' 'I myself wonder,' I said, 'why this is.' 'There is nothing to wonder at,' she replied; 'the reason is that one part of love is separated off and receives the name of the whole, but the other parts have other names.' 'Give an illustration,' I said. She answered me as follows: 'There is poetry, which, as you know, is complex and manifold. All creation or passage of non-being into being is poetry or making, and the processes of all art are creative;

Love is of the beautiful, but in what?

Of the possession of the beautiful, which is also the possession of the good, which is happiness.

Yet love is not commonly used in this general sense.

*Symposium.*

SOCRATES.

and the masters of arts are all poets or makers.' 'Very true.' 'Still,' she said, 'you know that they are not called poets, but have other names; only that portion of the art which is separated off from the rest, and is concerned with music and metre, is termed poetry, and they who possess poetry in this sense of the word are called poets.' 'Very true,' I said. 'And the same holds of love. For you may say generally that all desire of good and happiness is only the great and subtle power of love; but they who are drawn towards him by any other path, whether the path of money-making or gymnastics or philosophy, are not called lovers—the name of the whole is appropriated to those whose affection takes one form only—they alone are said to love, or to be lovers.' 'I dare say,' I replied, 'that you are right.' 'Yes,' she added, 'and you hear people say that lovers are seeking for their other half; but I say that they are seeking neither for the half of themselves, nor for the whole, unless the half or the whole be also a good. And they will cut off their own hands and feet and cast them away, if they are evil; for they love not what is their own, unless perchance there be some one who calls what belongs to him the good, and what belongs to another the evil. For there is nothing which men love but the good. Is there anything?' 'Certainly, I should say, that there is nothing.' 'Then,' she said, 'the simple truth is, that men love the good.' 'Yes,' I said. 'To which must be added that they love the possession of the good?' 'Yes, that must be added.' 'And not only the possession, but the everlasting possession of the good?' 'That must be added too.' 'Then love,' she said, 'may be described generally as the love of the everlasting possession of the good?' 'That is most true.'

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Love is birth,  
is creation; is  
the divine  
power of  
conception or  
parturition;

{ Then if this be the nature of love, can you tell me further,' she said, 'what is the manner of the pursuit? what are they doing who show all this eagerness and heat which is called love? and what is the object which they have in view? Answer me.' 'Nay, Diotima,' I replied, 'if I had known, I should not have wondered at your wisdom, neither should I have come to learn from you about this very matter.' 'Well,' she said, 'I will teach you:—The object which they have in view



is birth in beauty, whether of body or soul.' ('I do not understand you,' I said; 'the oracle requires an explanation.' 'I will make my meaning clearer,' she replied.) 'I mean to say, that all men are bringing to the birth in their bodies and in their souls. There is a certain age at which human nature is desirous of procreation — procreation which must be in beauty and not in deformity; and this procreation is the union of man and woman, and is a divine thing; for conception and generation are an immortal principle in the mortal creature, and in the inharmonious they can never be. But the deformed is always inharmonious with the divine, and the beautiful harmonious. Beauty, then, is the destiny or goddess of parturition who presides at birth, and therefore, when approaching beauty, the conceiving power is propitious, and diffusive, and benign, and begets and bears fruit: (at the sight of ugliness she frowns and contracts and has a sense of pain, and turns away, and shrivels up, and not without a pang refrains from conception.) And this is the reason why, when the hour of conception arrives, and the teeming nature is full, there is such a flutter and ecstasy about beauty whose approach is the alleviation of the pain of travail. For love, Socrates, is not, as you imagine, the love of the beautiful only.' 'What then?' 'The love of generation and of birth in beauty.' ('Yes,' I said. 'Yes, indeed,' she replied. 'But why of generation?') 'Because to the mortal creature, generation is a sort of eternity and immortality,' she replied; 'and if, as has been already admitted, love is of the everlasting possession of the good, all men will necessarily desire immortality together with good: Wherefore love is of immortality.'

*Symposium.*  
SOCRATES.

is not the love of the beautiful only, but of birth in beauty.

All this she taught me at various times when she spoke of love. And I remember her once saying to me, 'What is the cause, Socrates, of love, and the attendant desire? See you not how all animals, birds, as well as beasts, in their desire of procreation, are in agony when they take the infection of love, which begins with the desire of union; whereto is added the care of offspring, on whose behalf the weakest are ready to battle against the strongest even to the uttermost, and to die for them, and will let themselves be tormented with hunger or suffer anything in order to maintain their young. Man may be supposed to act thus from reason; but why should animals

Whence arises the great power of love in men and animals?



*Symposium.*

SOCRATES.

have these passionate feelings? Can you tell me why?' Again I replied that I did not know. She said to me: 'And do you expect ever to become a master in the art of love, if you do not know this?' 'But I have told you already, Diotima, that my ignorance is the reason why I come to you; for I am conscious that I want a teacher; tell me then the cause of this and of the other mysteries of love.' 'Marvel not,' she said, 'if you believe that love is of the immortal, as we have several times acknowledged; for here again, and on the same principle too, the mortal nature is seeking as far as is possible to be everlasting and immortal: and this is only to be attained by generation, because generation always leaves behind a new existence in the place of the old. Nay even in the life of the same individual there is succession and not absolute unity: a man is called the same, and yet in the short interval which elapses between youth and age, and in which every animal is said to have life and identity, he is undergoing a perpetual process of loss and reparation — hair, flesh, bones, blood, and the whole body are always changing. Which is true not only of the body, but also of the soul, whose habits, tempers, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, fears, never remain the same in any one of us, but are always coming and going; and equally true of knowledge, and what is still more surprising to us mortals, not only do the sciences in general spring up and decay, so that in respect of them we are never the same; but each of them individually experiences a like change. For what is implied in the word "recollection," but the departure of knowledge, which is ever being forgotten, and is renewed and preserved by recollection, and appears to be the same although in reality new, according to that law of succession by which all mortal things are preserved, not absolutely the same, but by substitution, the old worn-out mortality leaving another new and similar existence behind — unlike the divine, which is always the same and not another? And in this way, Socrates, the mortal body, or mortal anything, partakes of immortality; but the immortal in another way. Marvel not then at the love which all men have of their offspring; for that universal love and interest is for the sake of immortality.'

I was astonished at her words, and said: 'Is this really

The mortal nature is always changing and generating, body and soul alike;

the sciences come and go, and are preserved by recollection; and all human things, unlike the divine, are made immortal by a law of succession.

true, O thou wise Diotima?' And she answered with all the authority of an accomplished sophist: 'Of that, Socrates, you may be assured;—think only of the ambition of men, and you will wonder at the senselessness of their ways, unless you consider how they are stirred by the love of an immortality of fame. They are ready to run risks of all kinds and greater far than they would have run for their children, and to spend money and undergo any sort of toil, and even to die, for the sake of leaving behind them a name which shall be eternal. Do you imagine that Alcestis would have died to save Admetus, or Achilles to avenge Patroclus, or your own Codrus in order to preserve the kingdom for his sons, if they had not imagined that the memory of their virtues, which still survives among us, would be immortal? Nay,' she said, 'I am persuaded that all men do all things, and the better they are the more they do them, in hope of the glorious fame of immortal virtue; for they desire the immortal.

209 // 'Those who are pregnant in the body only, betake themselves to women and beget children—this is the character of their love; their offspring, as they hope, will preserve their memory and give them the blessedness and immortality which they desire in the future. But souls which are pregnant—for there certainly are men who are more creative in their souls than in their bodies—conceive that which is proper for the soul to conceive or contain. And what are these conceptions?—wisdom and virtue in general. And such creators are poets, and all artists who are deserving of the name inventor. But the greatest and fairest sort of wisdom by far is that which is concerned with the ordering of states and families, and which is called temperance and justice. And he who in youth has the seed of these implanted in him and is himself inspired, when he comes to maturity desires to beget and generate. He wanders about seeking beauty that he may beget offspring—for in deformity he will beget nothing—and naturally embraces the beautiful rather than the deformed body; above all when he finds a fair and noble and well-nurtured soul, he embraces the two in one person, and to such an one he is full of speech about virtue and the nature and pursuits of a good man; and he tries to educate him; and at the touch of the beautiful which is ever

*Symposium.*

SOCRATES.

The struggles and sufferings of human life are all of them animated by the desire of immortality.

The creations of the soul,—conceptions of wisdom and virtue, the works of poets and legislators,—are fairer far than any mortal children.

*Symposium.*

SOCRATES.

present to his memory, even when absent, he brings forth that which he had conceived long before, and in company with him tends that which he brings forth; and they are married by a far nearer tie and have a closer friendship than those who beget mortal children, for the children who are their common offspring are fairer and more immortal. Who, when he thinks of Homer and Hesiod and other great poets, would not rather have their children than ordinary human ones? Who would not emulate them in the creation of children such as theirs, which have preserved their memory and given them everlasting glory? Or who would not have such children as Lycurgus left behind him to be the saviours, not only of Lacedaemon, but of Hellas, as one may say? There is Solon, too, who is the revered father of Athenian laws; and many others there are in many other places, both among Hellenes and barbarians, who have given to the world many noble works, and have been the parents of virtue of every kind; and many temples have been raised in their honour for the sake of children such as theirs; which were never raised in honour of any one, for the sake of his mortal children.

He who would be truly initiated should pass from the concrete to the abstract, from the individual to the universal, from the universal to the universe of truth and beauty.

‘These are the lesser mysteries of love, into which even you, Socrates, may enter; to the greater and more hidden 210 ones which are the crown of these, and to which, if you pursue them in a right spirit, they will lead, I know not whether you will be able to attain. But I will do my utmost to inform you, and do you follow if you can. For he who would proceed aright in this matter should begin in youth to visit beautiful forms; and first, if he be guided by his instructor aright, to love one such form only — out of that he should create fair thoughts; and soon he will of himself perceive that the beauty of one form is akin to the beauty of another; and then if beauty of form in general is his pursuit, how foolish would he be not to recognize that the beauty in every form is one and the same! And when he perceives this he will abate his violent love of the one, which he will despise and deem a small thing, and will become a lover of all beautiful forms; in the next stage he will consider that the beauty of the mind is more honourable than the beauty of the outward form. So that if a virtuous soul have but a little comeliness, he will be


content to love and tend him, and will search out and bring to the birth thoughts which may improve the young, until he is compelled to contemplate and see the beauty of institutions and laws, and to understand that the beauty of them all is of one family, and that personal beauty is a trifle; and after laws and institutions he will go on to the sciences, that he may see their beauty, being not like a servant in love with the beauty of one youth or man or institution, himself a slave mean and narrow-minded, but drawing towards and contemplating the vast sea of beauty, he will create many fair and noble thoughts and notions in boundless love of wisdom; until on that shore he grows and waxes strong, and at last the vision is revealed to him of a single science, which is the science of beauty everywhere. To this I will proceed; please to give me your very best attention:

*Symposium.*  
SOCRATES.

211 'He who has been instructed thus far in the things of love, and who has learned to see the beautiful in due order and succession, when he comes toward the end will suddenly perceive a nature of wondrous beauty (and this, Socrates, is the final cause of all our former toils) — a nature which in the first place is everlasting, not growing and decaying, or waxing and waning; secondly, not fair in one point of view and foul in another, or at one time or in one relation or at one place fair, at another time or in another relation or at another place foul, as if fair to some and foul to others, or in the likeness of a face or hands or any other part of the bodily frame, or in any form of speech or knowledge, or existing in any other being, as for example, in an animal, or in heaven, or in earth, or in any other place; but beauty absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting, which without diminution and without increase, or any change, is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all other things. He who from these ascending under the influence of true love, begins to perceive that beauty, is not far from the end. And the true order of going, or being led by another, to the things of love, is to begin from the beauties of earth and mount upwards for the sake of that other beauty, using these as steps only, and from one going on to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair practices, and from fair practices to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of

He should view beauty, not relatively but absolutely; and he should pass by stepping-stones from earth to heaven.

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*Symposium.*SOCRATES,   
ARISTO-  
PHANES,  
AGATHON.

absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is. This, my dear Socrates,' said the stranger of Mantinea, 'is that life above all others which man should live, in the contemplation of beauty absolute; a beauty which if you once beheld, you would see not to be after the measure of gold, and garments, and fair boys and youths, whose presence now entrances you; and you and many a one would be content to live seeing them only and conversing with them without meat or drink, if that were possible — you only want to look at them and to be with them. But what if man had eyes to see the true beauty — the divine beauty, I mean, pure and clear and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mortality and all the colours and vanities of human life — thither looking, and holding converse with the true beauty simple and divine? Remember how in that communion only, 212 beholding beauty with the eye of the mind, he will be enabled to bring forth, not images of beauty, but realities (for he has hold not of an image but of a reality), and bringing forth and nourishing true virtue to become the friend of God and be immortal, if mortal man may. Would that be an ignoble life?'

Such, Phaedrus — and I speak not only to you, but to all of you — were the words of Diotima; and I am persuaded of their truth. And being persuaded of them, I try to persuade others, that in the attainment of this end human nature will not easily find a helper better than love. And therefore, also, I say that every man ought to honour him as I myself honour him, and walk in his ways, and exhort others to do the same, and praise the power and spirit of love according to the measure of my ability now and ever.

The words which I have spoken, you, Phaedrus, may call an encomium of love, or anything else which you please.

When Socrates had done speaking, the company applauded, and Aristophanes was beginning to say something in answer to the allusion which Socrates had made to his own speech<sup>1</sup>, when suddenly there was a great knocking at the door of the house, as of revellers, and the sound of a flute-girl was heard. Agathon told the attendants to go

A noise is  
heard as of  
revellers, and

<sup>1</sup> p. 205 E.



and see who were the intruders. 'If they are friends of ours,' he said, 'invite them in, but if not, say that the drinking is over.' A little while afterwards they heard the voice of Alcibiades resounding in the court; he was in a great state of intoxication, and kept roaring and shouting 'Where is Agathon? Lead me to Agathon,' and at length, supported by the flute-girl and some of his attendants, he found his way to them. 'Hail, friends,' he said, appearing at the door crowned with a massive garland of ivy and violets, his head flowing with ribands. 'Will you have a very drunken man as a companion of your revels? Or shall I crown Agathon, which was my intention in coming, and go away? For I was unable to come yesterday, and therefore I am here to-day, carrying on my head these ribands, that taking them from my own head, I may crown the head of this fairest and wisest of men, as I may be allowed to call him. Will you laugh at me because I am  
213 drunk? Yet I know very well that I am speaking the truth, although you may laugh. But first tell me; if I come in shall we have the understanding of which I spoke<sup>1</sup>? Will you drink with me or not?'

The company were vociferous in begging that he would take his place among them, and Agathon specially invited him. Thereupon he was led in by the people who were with him; and as he was being led, intending to crown Agathon, he took the ribands from his own head and held them in front of his eyes; he was thus prevented from seeing Socrates, who made way for him, and Alcibiades took the vacant place between Agathon and Socrates, and in taking the place he embraced Agathon and crowned him. Take off his sandals, said Agathon, and let him make a third on the same couch.

By all means; but who makes the third partner in our revels? said Alcibiades, turning round and starting up as he caught sight of Socrates. By Heracles, he said, what is this? here is Socrates always lying in wait for me, and always, as his way is, coming out at all sorts of unsuspected places: and now, what have you to say for yourself, and why are you lying here, where I perceive that you have

<sup>1</sup> Supra 212 D. Will you have a very drunken man? etc.

*Symposium.*

AGATHON,  
ALCIBIADES.

Alcibiades is led in drunk and bearing a crown, which he places on the head of Agathon.

Alcibiades takes the vacant place between Agathon and Socrates.

He insinuates that Agathon is the beloved of Socrates.



*Symposium.*

SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES,  
ERYXIMACHUS.

He begins to  
be violent,  
and Socrates  
claims the  
protection of  
Agathon.

contrived to find a place, not by a joker or lover of jokes, like Aristophanes, but by the fairest of the company?

Socrates turned to Agathon and said: I must ask you to protect me, Agathon; for the passion of this man has grown quite a serious matter to me. Since I became his admirer I have never been allowed to speak to any other fair one, or so much as to look at them. If I do, he goes wild with envy and jealousy, and not only abuses me but can hardly keep his hands off me, and at this moment he may do me some harm. Please to see to this, and either reconcile me to him, or, if he attempts violence, protect me, as I am in bodily fear of his mad and passionate attempts.

He crowns  
Socrates  
as well as  
Agathon.

There can never be reconciliation between you and me, said Alcibiades; but for the present I will defer your chastisement. And I must beg you, Agathon, to give me back some of the ribands that I may crown the marvellous head of this universal despot — I would not have him complain of me for crowning you, and neglecting him, who in conversation is the conqueror of all mankind; and this not only once, as you were the day before yesterday, but always. Whereupon, taking some of the ribands, he crowned Socrates, and again reclined.

A new spirit  
passes over  
the dream.

Then he said: You seem, my friends, to be sober, which is a thing not to be endured; you must drink — for that was the agreement under which I was admitted — and I elect myself master of the feast until you are well drunk. Let us have a large goblet, Agathon, or rather, he said, addressing the attendant, bring me that wine-cooler. The wine-cooler which had caught his eye was a vessel holding more than two quarts — this he filled and emptied, and bade the attendant fill it again for Socrates. Observe, my friends, said Alcibiades, that this ingenious trick of mine will have no effect on Socrates, for he can drink any quantity of wine and not be at all nearer being drunk. Socrates drank the cup which the attendant filled for him. 214

Socrates'  
powers of  
drinking.

Eryximachus said: What is this, Alcibiades? Are we to have neither conversation nor singing over our cups; but simply to drink as if we were thirsty?

Alcibiades replied: Hail, worthy son of a most wise and worthy sire!

The same to you, said Eryximachus; but what shall we do? *Symposium.*

That I leave to you, said Alcibiades.

SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES,  
ERYXIMACHUS.

‘The wise physician skilled our wounds to heal<sup>1</sup>’

shall prescribe and we will obey. What do you want?

Well, said Eryximachus, before you appeared we had passed a resolution that each one of us in turn should make a speech in praise of love, and as good a one as he could: the turn was passed round from left to right; and as all of us have spoken, and you have not spoken but have well drunken, you ought to speak, and then impose upon Socrates any task which you please, and he on his right hand neighbour, and so on.

That is good, Eryximachus, said Alcibiades; and yet the comparison of a drunken man’s speech with those of sober men is hardly fair; and I should like to know, sweet friend, whether you really believe what Socrates was just now saying; for I can assure you that the very reverse is the fact, and that if I praise any one but himself in his presence, whether God or man, he will hardly keep his hands off me.

For shame, said Socrates.

Hold your tongue, said Alcibiades, for by Poseidon, there is no one else whom I will praise when you are of the company.

Well then, said Eryximachus, if you like praise Socrates.

What do you think, Eryximachus? said Alcibiades: shall I attack him and inflict the punishment before you all?

What are you about? said Socrates; are you going to raise a laugh at my expense? Is that the meaning of your praise?

I am going to speak the truth, if you will permit me.

I not only permit, but exhort you to speak the truth.

Then I will begin at once, said Alcibiades, and if I say anything which is not true, you may interrupt me if you will, and say ‘that is a lie,’ though my intention is to speak the truth. But you must not wonder if I speak any how as things come into my mind; for the fluent and orderly

<sup>1</sup> From Pope’s Homer, Il. xi. 514.

*Symposium.*

ALCIBIADES.

enumeration of all your singularities is not a task which is easy to a man in my condition.

Socrates is like the busts of Silenus, which conceal within them images of gods; like Marsyas too, for his face is that of a Satyr, and his words, even when half-uttered or imperfectly repeated, exercise a greater charm over men than the melodies which Marsyas taught to Olympus.

Greater than Pericles, and the true and only orator.

And now, my boys, I shall praise Socrates in a figure 215 which will appear to him to be a caricature, and yet I speak, not to make fun of him, but only for the truth's sake. I say, that he is exactly like the busts of Silenus, which are set up in the statuaries' shops, holding pipes and flutes in their mouths; and they are made to open in the middle, and have images of gods inside them. I say also that he is like Marsyas the satyr. You yourself will not deny, Socrates, that your face is like that of a satyr. Aye, and there is a resemblance in other points too. For example, you are a bully, as I can prove by witnesses, if you will not confess. And are you not a flute-player? That you are, and a performer far more wonderful than Marsyas. He indeed with instruments used to charm the souls of men by the power of his breath, and the players of his music do so still: for the melodies of Olympus<sup>1</sup> are derived from Marsyas who taught them, and these, whether they are played by a great master or by a miserable flute-girl, have a power which no others have; they alone possess the soul and reveal the wants of those who have need of gods and mysteries, because they are divine. But you produce the same effect with your words only, and do not require the flute: that is the difference between you and him. When we hear any other speaker, even a very good one, he produces absolutely no effect upon us, or not much, whereas the mere fragments of you and your words, even at second-hand, and however imperfectly repeated, amaze and possess the souls of every man, woman, and child who comes within hearing of them. And if I were not afraid that you would think me hopelessly drunk, I would have sworn as well as spoken to the influence which they have always had and still have over me. For my heart leaps within me more than that of any Corybantian reveller, and my eyes rain tears when I hear them. And I observe that many others are affected in the same manner. I have heard Pericles and other great orators, and I thought that they spoke well, but I never had any similar feeling; my soul was not stirred

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Arist. Pol. viii. 5. 16.

by them, nor was I angry at the thought of my own slavish state. But this Marsyas has often brought me to such a  
 216 pass, that I have felt as if I could hardly endure the life which I am leading (this, Socrates, you will admit); and I am conscious that if I did not shut my ears against him, and fly as from the voice of the siren, my fate would be like that of others,—he would transfix me, and I should grow old sitting at his feet. For he makes me confess that I ought not to live as I do, neglecting the wants of my own soul, and busying myself with the concerns of the Athenians; therefore I hold my ears and tear myself away from him. And he is the only person who ever made me ashamed, which you might think not to be in my nature, and there is no one else who does the same. For I know that I cannot answer him or say that I ought not to do as he bids, but when I leave his presence the love of popularity gets the better of me. And therefore I run away and fly from him, and when I see him I am ashamed of what I have confessed to him. Many a time have I wished that he were dead, and yet I know that I should be much more sorry than glad, if he were to die: so that I am at my wit's end.

*Symposium.*  
 ALCIBIADES.

He would have reformed Alcibiades himself if the love of popularity in him had not been too strong.

His love of the fair.

And this is what I and many others have suffered from the flute-playing of this satyr. Yet hear me once more while I show you how exact the image is, and how marvellous his power. For let me tell you; none of you know him; but I will reveal him to you; having begun, I must go on. See you how fond he is of the fair? He is always with them and is always being smitten by them, and then again he knows nothing and is ignorant of all things — such is the appearance which he puts on. Is he not like a Silenus in this? To be sure he is: his outer mask is the carved head of the Silenus; but, O my companions in drink, when he is opened, what temperance there is residing within! Know you that beauty and wealth and honour, at which the many wonder, are of no account with him, and are utterly despised by him: he regards not at all the persons who are gifted with them; mankind are nothing to him; all his life is spent in mocking and flouting at them. But when I opened him, and looked within at his serious purpose, I saw in him divine and golden  
 217 images of such fascinating beauty that I was ready to do

His outer form only is like the outward

*Symposium.*

ALCIBIADES.

form of Silenus; within are images of fascinating beauty.

in a moment whatever Socrates commanded: they may have escaped the observation of others, but I saw them. Now I fancied that he was seriously enamoured of my beauty, and I thought that I should therefore have a grand opportunity of hearing him tell what he knew, for I had a wonderful opinion of the attractions of my youth. In the prosecution of this design, when I next went to him, I sent away the attendant who usually accompanied me (I will confess the whole truth, and beg you to listen; and if I speak falsely, do you, Socrates, expose the falsehood). Well, he and I were alone together, and I thought that when there was nobody with us, I should hear him speak the language which lovers use to their loves when they are by themselves, and I was delighted. Nothing of the sort; he conversed as usual, and spent the day with me and then went away. Afterwards I challenged him to the palaestra; and he wrestled and closed with me several times when there was no one present; I fancied that I might succeed in this manner. Not a bit; I made no way with him. Lastly, as I had failed hitherto, I thought that I must take stronger measures and attack him boldly, and, as I had begun, not give him up, but see how matters stood between him and me. So I invited him to sup with me, just as if he were a fair youth, and I a designing lover. He was not easily persuaded to come; he did, however, after a while accept the invitation, and when he came the first time, he wanted to go away at once as soon as supper was over, and I had not the face to detain him. The second time, still in pursuance of my design, after we had supped, I went on conversing far into the night, and when he wanted to go away, I pretended that the hour was late and that he had much better remain. So he lay down on the couch next to me, the same on which he had supped, and there was no one but ourselves sleeping in the apartment. All this may be told without shame to any one. But what follows I could hardly tell you if I were sober. Yet as the proverb says, 'In vino veritas,' whether with boys, or without them<sup>1</sup>; and therefore I must speak. Nor, again, should I be justified in concealing the lofty

<sup>1</sup> In allusion to the two proverbs, *οἶνος καὶ παῖδες ἀληθεῖς*, and *οἶνος καὶ ἀλήθεια*.



actions of Socrates when I come to praise him. Moreover I have felt the serpent's sting; and he who has suffered, as they say, is willing to tell his fellow-sufferers only, as they  
 218 alone will be likely to understand him, and will not be extreme in judging of the sayings or doings which have been wrung from his agony. For I have been bitten by a more than viper's tooth; I have known in my soul, or in my heart, or in some other part, that worst of pangs, more violent in ingenuous youth than any serpent's tooth, the pang of philosophy, which will make a man say or do anything. And you whom I see around me, Phaedrus and Agathon and Eryximachus and Pausanias and Aristodemus and Aristophanes, all of you, and I need not say Socrates himself, have had experience of the same madness and passion in your longing after wisdom. Therefore listen and excuse my doings then and my sayings now. But let the attendants and other profane and unmannered persons close up the doors of their ears.

*Symposium.*  
 ALCEBIADES.

When the lamp was put out and the servants had gone away, I thought that I must be plain with him and have no more ambiguity. So I gave him a shake, and I said: 'Socrates, are you asleep?' 'No,' he said. 'Do you know what I am meditating?' 'What are you meditating?' he said. 'I think,' I replied, 'that of all the lovers whom I have ever had you are the only one who is worthy of me, and you appear to be too modest to speak. Now I feel that I should be a fool to refuse you this or any other favour, and therefore I come to lay at your feet all that I have and all that my friends have, in the hope that you will assist me in the way of virtue, which I desire above all things, and in that path I do not believe I shall ever have a more efficient helper than yourself. And I should certainly have more reason to be ashamed of what wise men would say if I were to refuse a favour to such as you, than of what the world, who are mostly fools, would say of me if I granted it.' To these words he replied in the ironical manner which is so characteristic of him:—'Alcibiades, my friend, you have indeed an elevated aim if what you say is true, and if there really is in me any power by which you may become better; truly you must see in me some rare beauty of a kind infinitely higher than any which I see in you.

The behaviour  
 of Socrates,  
 and his rejection  
 of the  
 advances of  
 Alcibiades.



*Symposium.*

ALCIBIADES.

And therefore, if you mean to share with me and to exchange beauty for beauty, you will have greatly the advantage of me; you will gain true beauty in return for appearance — like Diomedes, gold in exchange for brass. But look again, sweet friend, and see whether you are not deceived in me. The mind begins to grow critical when the bodily eye fails, and it will be a long time before you get old.' Hearing this, I said: 'I have told you my purpose, which is quite serious, and do you consider what you think best for you and me.' 'That is good,' he said; 'at some other time then we will consider and act as seems best about this and about other matters.' Whereupon, I fancied that he was smitten, and that the words which I had uttered like arrows had wounded him, and so without waiting to hear more I got up, and throwing my coat about him crept under his threadbare cloak, as the time of year was winter, and there I lay during the whole night having this wonderful monster in my arms. This again, Socrates, will not be denied by you. And yet, notwithstanding all, he was so superior to my solicitations, so contemptuous and derisive and disdainful of my beauty — which really, as I fancied, had some attractions — hear, O judges; for judges you shall be of the haughty virtue of Socrates — nothing more happened, but in the morning when I awoke (let all the gods and goddesses be my witnesses) I arose as from the couch of a father or an elder brother.

What do you suppose must have been my feelings, after this rejection, at the thought of my own dishonour? And yet I could not help wondering at his natural temperance and self-restraint and manliness. I never imagined that I could have met with a man such as he is in wisdom and endurance. And therefore I could not be angry with him or renounce his company, any more than I could hope to win him. For I well knew that if Ajax could not be wounded by steel, much less he by money; and my only chance of captivating him by my personal attractions had failed. So I was at my wit's end; no one was ever more hopelessly enslaved by another. All this happened before he and I went on the expedition to Potidaea; there we messed together, and I had the opportunity of observing his extraordinary power of sustaining fatigue. His endurance was simply marvellous when, being

The wonderful endurance of Socrates when he and Alcibiades served together at Potidaea.

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cut off from our supplies, we were compelled to go without food — on such occasions, which often happen in time of war, he was superior not only to me but to everybody; there was no one to be compared to him. Yet at a festival he was the only person who had any real powers of enjoyment; though not willing to drink, he could if compelled beat us all at that, — wonderful to relate! no human being had ever seen Socrates drunk; and his powers, if I am not mistaken, will be tested before long. His fortitude in enduring cold was also surprising. There was a severe frost, for the winter in that region is really tremendous, and everybody else either remained indoors, or if they went out had on an amazing quantity of clothes, and were well shod, and had their feet swathed in felt and fleeces: in the midst of this, Socrates with his bare feet on the ice and in his ordinary dress marched better than the other soldiers who had shoes, and they looked daggers at him because he seemed to despise them.

I have told you one tale, and now I must tell you another, which is worth hearing,

‘Of the doings and sufferings of the enduring man’

while he was on the expedition. One morning he was thinking about something which he could not resolve; he would not give it up, but continued thinking from early dawn until noon — there he stood fixed in thought; and at noon attention was drawn to him, and the rumour ran through the wondering crowd that Socrates had been standing and thinking about something ever since the break of day. At last, in the evening after supper, some Ionians out of curiosity (I should explain that this occurred not in winter but in summer), brought out their mats and slept in the open air that they might watch him and see whether he would stand all night. There he stood until the following morning; and with the return of light he offered up a prayer to the sun, and went his way<sup>1</sup>. I will also tell, if you please — and indeed I am bound to tell — of his courage in battle; for who but he saved my life? Now this was the engagement in which I received the prize of valour: for I was wounded and he would not leave me, but he rescued me and my arms; and

*Symposium.*

ALCIBIADES.

The long fits of abstraction to which he was subject.

How he saved the life of Alcibiades, and ought to have received the prize of

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, 175 B.

*Symposium.*

ALCIBIADES.

valour which  
was conferred  
on Alcibiades  
on account of  
his rank.

His coolness  
in battle; his  
absolute un-  
likeness to  
any other  
man.

he ought to have received the prize of valour which the generals wanted to confer on me partly on account of my rank, and I told them so (this, again, Socrates will not impeach or deny), but he was more eager than the generals that I and not he should have the prize. There was another occasion on which his behaviour was very remarkable — in the flight of the army after the battle of Delium, where he served among the heavy-armed, — I had a better opportunity of seeing him than at Potidaea, for I was myself on horseback, and therefore comparatively out of danger. He and Laches were retreating, for the troops were in flight, and I met them and told them not to be discouraged, and promised to remain with them; and there you might see him, Aristophanes, as you describe <sup>1</sup>, just as he is in the streets of Athens, stalking like a pelican, and rolling his eyes, calmly contemplating enemies as well as friends, and making very intelligible to anybody, even from a distance, that whoever attacked him would be likely to meet with a stout resistance; and in this way he and his companion escaped — for this is the sort of man who is never touched in war; those only are pursued who are running away headlong. I particularly observed how superior he was to Laches in presence of mind. Many are the marvels which I might narrate in praise of Socrates; most of his ways might perhaps be paralleled in another man, but his absolute unlikeness to any human being that is or ever has been is perfectly astonishing. You may imagine Brasidas and others to have been like Achilles; or you may imagine Nestor and Antenor to have been like Pericles; and the same may be said of other famous men, but of this strange being you will never be able to find any likeness, however remote, either among men who now are or who ever have been — other than that which I have already suggested of Silenus and the satyrs; and they represent in a figure not only himself, but his words. For, although I forgot to mention this to you before, his words are like the images of Silenus which open; they are ridiculous when you first hear them; he clothes himself in language that is like the skin of the wanton satyr — for his talk is of pack-asses and smiths and cobblers and curriers,

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<sup>1</sup> Aristoph. Clouds, 362.

and he is always repeating the same things in the same words<sup>1</sup>, so that any ignorant or inexperienced person might  
 222 feel disposed to laugh at him; but he who opens the bust and sees what is within will find that they are the only words which have a meaning in them, and also the most divine, abounding in fair images of virtue, and of the widest comprehension, or rather extending to the whole duty of a good and honourable man.

*Symposium.*

SOCRATES,  
 ALCIBIADES,  
 AGATHON.

He is the  
 Satyr without  
 and the God  
 within.

This, friends, is my praise of Socrates. I have added my blame of him for his ill-treatment of me; and he has ill-treated not only me, but Charmides the son of Glaucon, and Euthydemus the son of Diocles, and many others in the same way — beginning as their lover he has ended by making them pay their addresses to him. Wherefore I say to you, Agathon, 'Be not deceived by him; learn from me and take warning, and do not be a fool and learn by experience, as the proverb says.'

When Alcibiades had finished, there was a laugh at his outspokenness; for he seemed to be still in love with Socrates. You are sober, Alcibiades, said Socrates, or you would never have gone so far about to hide the purpose of your satyr's praises, for all this long story is only an ingenious circumlocution, of which the point comes in by the way at the end; you want to get up a quarrel between me and Agathon, and your notion is that I ought to love you and nobody else, and that you and you only ought to love Agathon. But the plot of this Satyric or Silenic drama has been detected, and you must not allow him, Agathon, to set us at variance.

The purport  
 of Alcibiades'  
 speech, ac-  
 cording to  
 Socrates, was  
 only to get  
 up a quarrel  
 between him  
 and Agathon.

I believe you are right, said Agathon, and I am disposed to think that his intention in placing himself between you and me was only to divide us; but he shall gain nothing by that move; for I will go and lie on the couch next to you.

Agathon  
 changes his  
 place that he  
 may be nearer  
 Socrates and  
 not so near  
 Alcibiades.

Yes, yes, replied Socrates, by all means come here and lie on the couch below me.

Alas, said Alcibiades, how I am fooled by this man; he is determined to get the better of me at every turn. I do beseech you, allow Agathon to lie between us.

Certainly not, said Socrates; as you praised me, and I in

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Gorg. 490, 491, 517.

*Symposium.*SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES,  
AGATHON.

turn ought to praise my neighbour on the right, he will be out of order in praising me again when he ought rather to be praised by me, and I must entreat you to consent to this, and not be jealous, for I have a great desire to praise the youth. 223

Hurrah! cried Agathon, I will rise instantly, that I may be praised by Socrates.

The usual way, said Alcibiades; where Socrates is, no one else has any chance with the fair; and now how readily has he invented a specious reason for attracting Agathon to himself.

Another band  
of revellers  
enters, and  
the company  
drink largely,  
the wiser part  
withdrawing.

Agathon arose in order that he might take his place on the couch by Socrates, when suddenly a band of revellers entered, and spoiled the order of the banquet. Some one who was going out, having left the door open, they had found their way in, and made themselves at home; great confusion ensued, and every one was compelled to drink large quantities of wine. Aristodemus said that Eryximachus, Phaedrus, and others went away — he himself fell asleep, and as the nights were long took a good rest: he was awakened towards daybreak by a crowing of cocks, and when he awoke, the others were either asleep, or had gone away; there remained only Socrates, Aristophanes, and Agathon, who were drinking out of a large goblet which they passed round, and Socrates was discoursing to them. Aristodemus was only half awake, and he did not hear the beginning of the discourse; the chief thing which he remembered was Socrates compelling the other two to acknowledge that the genius of comedy was the same with that of tragedy, and that the true artist in tragedy was an artist in comedy also. To this they were constrained to assent, being drowsy, and not quite following the argument. And first of all Aristophanes dropped off, then, when the day was already dawning, Agathon. Socrates, having laid them to sleep, rose to depart; Aristodemus, as his manner was, following him. At the Lyceum he took a bath, and passed the day as usual. In the evening he retired to rest at his own home.

On the following morning  
Socrates  
is still awake,  
and is maintaining the  
thesis that  
the genius of  
comedy is  
the same as  
that of tragedy.







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
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
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









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




THE  
DIALOGUES OF PLATO  
*JOWETT*

VOL. II.





THE  
DIALOGUES OF PLATO

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

WITH ANALYSES AND INTRODUCTIONS

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IN FIVE VOLUMES: VOL. II.

*A. P. DuRoi*

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# MENO.

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## INTRODUCTION.

- Steph.** THIS Dialogue begins abruptly with a question of Meno, who  
70 asks 'whether virtue can be taught.' Socrates replies that he  
71 does not as yet know what virtue is, and has never known any  
one who did. 'Then he cannot have met Gorgias when he was  
at Athens.' Yes, Socrates had met him, but he has a bad  
memory, and has forgotten what Gorgias said. Will Meno tell  
him his own notion, which is probably not very different from  
72 that of Gorgias? 'O yes—nothing easier: there is the virtue  
of a man, of a woman, of an old man, and of a child; there is  
a virtue of every age and state of life, all of which may be easily  
described.'
- 73 Socrates reminds Meno that this is only an enumeration of the  
virtues and not a definition of the notion which is common to  
them all. In a second attempt Meno defines virtue to be 'the  
power of command.' But to this, again, exceptions are taken.  
For there must be a virtue of those who obey, as well as of those  
who command; and the power of command must be justly or not  
unjustly exercised. Meno is very ready to admit that justice is  
virtue: 'Would you say virtue or a virtue, for there are other  
74 virtues, such as courage, temperance, and the like; just as round  
is a figure, and black and white are colours, and yet there are  
other figures and other colours. Let Meno take the examples  
of figure and colour, and try to define them.' Meno confesses  
his inability, and after a process of interrogation, in which So-  
75 crates explains to him the nature of a 'simile in multis,' Socrates  
himself defines figure as 'the accompaniment of colour.' But  
some one may object that he does not know the meaning of the  
word 'colour;' and if he is a candid friend, and not a mere  
disputant, Socrates is willing to furnish him with a simpler and

*Meno.*

ANALYSIS.



*Meno.*

ANALYSIS.

more philosophical definition, into which no disputed word is allowed to intrude: 'Figure is the limit of form.' Meno imperiously insists that he must still have a definition of colour. 76 Some raillery follows; and at length Socrates is induced to reply, 'that colour is the effluence of form, sensible, and in due proportion to the sight. This definition is exactly suited to the taste of Meno, who welcomes the familiar language of Gorgias and Empedocles. Socrates is of opinion that the more abstract or dialectical definition of figure is far better.

Now that Meno has been made to understand the nature of a general definition, he answers in the spirit of a Greek gentleman, and in the words of a poet, 'that virtue is to delight in 77 things honourable, and to have the power of getting them.' This is a nearer approximation than he has yet made to a complete definition, and, regarded as a piece of proverbial or popular morality, is not far from the truth. But the objection is urged, 'that the honourable is the good,' and as every one equally desires the good, the point of the definition is contained in the words, 78 'the power of getting them.' 'And they must be got justly or with justice.' The definition will then stand thus: 'Virtue is the power of getting good with justice.' But justice is a part of 79 virtue, and therefore virtue is the getting of good with a part of virtue. The definition repeats the word defined.

Meno complains that the conversation of Socrates has the effect 80 of a torpedo's shock upon him. When he talks with other persons he has plenty to say about virtue; in the presence of Socrates, his thoughts desert him. Socrates replies that he is only the cause of perplexity in others, because he is himself perplexed. He proposes to continue the enquiry. But how, asks Meno, can he enquire either into what he knows or into what he does not know? This is a sophistical puzzle, which, 81 as Socrates remarks, saves a great deal of trouble to him who accepts it. But the puzzle has a real difficulty latent under it, to which Socrates will endeavour to find a reply. The difficulty is the origin of knowledge: —

He has heard from priests and priestesses, and from the poet Pindar, of an immortal soul which is born again and again in successive periods of existence, returning into this world when she has paid the penalty of ancient crime, and, having wandered

over all places of the upper and under world, and seen and known all things at one time or other, is by association out of one thing capable of recovering all. For nature is of one kindred; and

*Meno.*

ANALYSIS.

82 every soul has a seed or germ which may be developed into all knowledge. The existence of this latent knowledge is further proved by the interrogation of one of Meno's slaves, who, in the skilful hands of Socrates, is made to acknowledge some elementary relations of geometrical figures. The theorem that 83- the square of the diagonal is double the square of the side — that 85 famous discovery of primitive mathematics, in honour of which the legendary Pythagoras is said to have sacrificed a hecatomb — is elicited from him. The first step in the process of teaching has made him conscious of his own ignorance. He has had the 'torpedo's shock' given him, and is the better for the operation. 86 But whence had the uneducated man this knowledge? He had never learnt geometry in this world; nor was it born with him; he must therefore have had it when he was not a man. And as he always either was or was not a man, he must have always had it. (Cp. *Phaedo*, 73 B.)

After Socrates has given this specimen of the true nature of teaching, the original question of the teachableness of virtue is renewed. Again he professes a desire to know 'what virtue is'

87 first. But he is willing to argue the question, as mathematicians say, under an hypothesis. He will assume that if virtue is know- 88 ledge, then virtue can be taught. (This was the stage of the argument at which the Protagoras concluded.)

Socrates has no difficulty in showing that virtue is a good, and that goods, whether of body or mind, must be under the direction of knowledge. Upon the assumption just made, then, 89 virtue is teachable. But where are the teachers? There are none to be found. This is extremely discouraging. Virtue is no sooner discovered to be teachable, than the discovery follows that it is not taught. Virtue, therefore, is and is not teachable.

90 In this dilemma an appeal is made to Anytus, a respectable and well-to-do citizen of the old school, and a family friend of Meno, 91 who happens to be present. He is asked 'whether Meno shall 92 go to the Sophists and be taught.' The suggestion throws him into a rage. 'To whom, then, shall Meno go?' asks Socrates. To 93 any Athenian gentleman — to the great Athenian statesmen of past

*Meno*

ANALYSIS.

times. Socrates replies here, as elsewhere (Laches 179 C foll.; Prot. 319 foll.), that Themistocles, Pericles, and other great men, 94 had sons to whom they would surely, if they could have done so, have imparted their own political wisdom; but no one ever heard that these sons of theirs were remarkable for anything except riding and wrestling and similar accomplishments. Anytus is angry at the imputation which is cast on his favourite statesmen, and on a class to which he supposes himself to belong (cp. 95 A); he breaks off with a significant hint. The mention of 95 another opportunity of talking with him (99 E), and the suggestion that Meno may do the Athenian people a service by pacifying him (100), are evident allusions to the trial of Socrates.

Socrates returns to the consideration of the question 'whether virtue is teachable,' which was denied on the ground that there are no teachers of it: (for the Sophists are bad teachers, and the 96 rest of the world do not profess to teach). But there is another point which we failed to observe, and in which Gorgias has never instructed Meno, nor Prodicus Socrates. This is the nature of right opinion. For virtue may be under the guidance of right 97 opinion as well as of knowledge; and right opinion is for practical purposes as good as knowledge, but is incapable of being taught, and is also liable, like the images of Daedalus, to 'walk off,' 98 because not bound by the tie of the cause. This is the sort of instinct which is possessed by statesmen, who are not wise or knowing persons, but only inspired or divine. The higher virtue, 99 which is identical with knowledge, is an ideal only. If the statesman had this knowledge, and could teach what he knew, he would be like Tiresias in the world below,—'he alone has wisdom, 100 but the rest flit like shadows.'

INTRODUC-  
TION.

This Dialogue is an attempt to answer the question, Can virtue be taught? No one would either ask or answer such a question in modern times. But in the age of Socrates it was only by an effort that the mind could rise to a general notion of virtue as distinct from the particular virtues of courage, liberality, and the like. And when a hazy conception of this ideal was attained, it was only by a further effort that the question of the teachableness of virtue could be resolved.

The answer which is given by Plato is paradoxical enough,



and seems rather intended to stimulate than to satisfy enquiry. *Meno.*  
Virtue is knowledge, and therefore virtue can be taught. But INTRODUC-  
virtue is not taught, and therefore in this higher and ideal sense TION.  
there is no virtue and no knowledge. The teaching of the Sophists is confessedly inadequate, and Meno, who is their pupil, is ignorant of the very nature of general terms. He can only produce out of their armoury the sophism, 'that you can neither enquire into what you know nor into what you do not know;' to which Socrates replies by his theory of reminiscence.

To the doctrine that virtue is knowledge, Plato has been constantly tending in the previous Dialogues. But the new truth is no sooner found than it vanishes away. 'If there is knowledge, there must be teachers; and where are the teachers?' There is no knowledge in the higher sense of systematic, connected, reasoned knowledge, such as may one day be attained, and such as Plato himself seems to see in some far off vision of a single science. And there are no teachers in the higher sense of the word; that is to say, no real teachers who will arouse the spirit of enquiry in their pupils, and not merely instruct them in rhetoric or impart to them ready-made information for a fee of 'one' or of 'fifty drachms.' Plato is desirous of deepening the notion of education, and therefore he asserts the paradox that there are no educators. This paradox, though different in form, is not really different from the remark which is often made in modern times by those who would depreciate either the methods of education commonly employed, or the standard attained — that 'there is no true education among us.'

There remains still a possibility which must not be overlooked. Even if there be no true knowledge, as is proved by 'the wretched state of education,' there may be right opinion, which is a sort of guessing or divination resting on no knowledge of causes, and incommunicable to others. This is the gift which our statesmen have, as is proved by the circumstance that they are unable to impart their knowledge to their sons. Those who are possessed of it cannot be said to be men of science or philosophers, but they are inspired and divine.

There may be some trace of irony in this curious passage, which forms the concluding portion of the Dialogue. But Plato certainly does not mean to intimate that the supernatural or divine is the

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true basis of human life. To him knowledge, if only attainable in this world, is of all things the most divine. Yet, like other philosophers, he is willing to admit that 'probability is the guide of life<sup>1</sup>;' and he is at the same time desirous of contrasting the wisdom which governs the world with a higher wisdom. There are many instincts, judgments, and anticipations of the human mind which cannot be reduced to rule, and of which the grounds cannot always be given in words. A person may have some skill or latent experience which he is able to use himself and is yet unable to teach others, because he has no principles, and is incapable of collecting or arranging his ideas. He has practice, but not theory; art, but not science. This is a true fact of psychology, which is recognized by Plato in this passage. But he is far from saying, as some have imagined, that inspiration or divine grace is to be regarded as higher than knowledge. He would not have preferred the poet or man of action to the philosopher, or the virtue of custom to the virtue based upon ideas.

Also here, as in the *Ion* and *Phaedrus*, Plato appears to acknowledge an unreasoning element in the higher nature of man. The philosopher only has knowledge, and yet the statesman and the poet are inspired. There may be a sort of irony in regarding in this way the gifts of genius. But there is no reason to suppose that he is deriding them, any more than he is deriding the phenomena of love or of enthusiasm in the *Symposium*, or of oracles in the *Apology*, or of divine intimations when he is speaking of the daemonium of Socrates. He recognizes the lower form of right opinion, as well as the higher one of science, in the spirit of one who desires to include in his philosophy every aspect of human life; just as he recognizes the existence of popular opinion as a fact, and the Sophists as the expression of it.

This Dialogue probably contains the first intimation of the doctrine of reminiscence and of the immortality of the soul.<sup>2</sup> The proof is very slight even slighter than in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*. Because men had abstract ideas in a previous state, they must have always had them, and their souls therefore must have always existed (86 A). For they must always have been either

<sup>1</sup> Butler's Analogy.<sup>2</sup> Cp. *infra* p. 12, *ad fin.*

men or not men. The fallacy of the latter words is transparent. And Socrates himself appears to be conscious of their weakness; for he adds immediately afterwards, 'I have said some things of which I am not altogether confident.' (Cp. *Phaedo* 114 D, 115 D.) It may be observed, however, that the fanciful notion of pre-existence is combined with a true but partial view of the origin and unity of knowledge, and of the association of ideas. Knowledge is prior to any particular knowledge, and exists not in the previous state of the individual, but of the race. It is potential, not actual, and can only be appropriated by strenuous exertion.

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The idealism of Plato is here presented in a less developed form than in the *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus*. Nothing is said of the pre-existence of ideas of justice, temperance, and the like. Nor is Socrates positive of anything but the duty of enquiry (86 B). The doctrine of reminiscence too is explained more in accordance with fact and experience as arising out of the affinities of nature (*ἀτε τῆς φύσεως ὅλης συγγενούς οὔσης*). Modern philosophy says that all things in nature are dependent on one another; the ancient philosopher had the same truth latent in his mind when he affirmed that out of one thing all the rest may be recovered. The subjective was converted by him into an objective; the mental phenomenon of the association of ideas (cp. *Phaedo* 73 foll.) became a real chain of existences. The germs of two valuable principles of education may also be gathered from the 'words of priests and priestesses:': (1) that true knowledge is a knowledge of causes (cp. Aristotle's theory of *ἐπιστήμη*); and (2) that the process of learning consists not in what is brought to the learner, but in what is drawn out of him.

Some lesser points of the dialogue may be noted, such as (1) the acute observation that Meno prefers the familiar definition, which is embellished with poetical language, to the better and truer one (76 D); or (2) the shrewd reflection, which may admit of an application to modern as well as to ancient teachers, that the Sophists having made large fortunes, this must surely be a criterion of their powers of teaching, for that no man could get a living by shoemaking who was not a good shoemaker (91 C); or (3) the remark, conveyed almost in a word, that the verbal sceptic saved the labour of thought and enquiry *οὐδὲν δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ ζητήσεως*, 80 E). Characteristic also of the temper of the Socratic



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enquiry is, (4) the proposal to discuss the teachableness of virtue under an hypothesis, after the manner of the mathematicians (87 A); and (5) the repetition of the favourite doctrine which occurs so frequently in the earlier and more Socratic Dialogues, and gives a colour to all of them—that mankind only desire evil through ignorance (77, 78 foll.); (6) the experiment of eliciting from the slave-boy the mathematical truth which is latent in him, and (7) the remark (84 B) that he is all the better for knowing his ignorance.

The character of Meno, like that of Critias, has no relation to the actual circumstances of his life. Plato is silent about his treachery to the Ten Thousand Greeks, which Xenophon has recorded, as he is also silent about the crimes of Critias. He is a Thessalian Alcibiades, rich and luxurious—a spoilt child of fortune, and is described as the hereditary friend of the great king. Like Alcibiades he is inspired with an ardent desire of knowledge, and is equally willing to learn of Socrates and of the Sophists. He may be regarded as standing in the same relation to Gorgias as Hippocrates in the Protagoras to the other great Sophist. He is the sophisticated youth on whom Socrates tries his cross-examining powers just as in the Charmides, the Lysis, and the Euthydemus, ingenuous boyhood is made the subject of a similar experiment. He is treated by Socrates in a half-playful manner suited to his character; at the same time he appears not quite to understand the process to which he is being subjected. For he is exhibited as ignorant of the very elements of dialectics, in which the Sophists have failed to instruct their disciple. His definition of virtue as ‘the power and desire of attaining things honourable,’ like the first definition of justice in the Republic, is taken from a poet. His answers have a sophistical ring, and at the same time show the sophistical incapacity to grasp a general notion.

Anytus is the type of the narrow-minded man of the world, who is indignant at innovation, and equally detests the popular teacher and the true philosopher. He seems, like Aristophanes, to regard the new opinions, whether of Socrates or the Sophists, as fatal to Athenian greatness. He is of the same class as Callicles in the Gorgias, but of a different variety; the immoral and sophistical doctrines of Callicles are not attributed to him. The moderation with which he is described is remarkable, if he be the accuser of

Socrates, as is apparently indicated by his parting words. Perhaps Plato may have been desirous of showing that the accusation of Socrates was not to be attributed to badness or malevolence, but rather to a tendency in men's minds. Or he may have been regardless of the historical truth of the characters of his dialogue, as in the case of Meno and Critias. Like Chaerephon (Apol. 21) the real Anytus was a democrat, and had joined Thrasybulus in the conflict with the Thirty.

The Protagoras arrived at a sort of hypothetical conclusion, that if 'virtue is knowledge, it can be taught.' In the Euthydemus, Socrates himself offered an example of the manner in which the true teacher may draw out the mind of youth; this was in contrast to the quibbling follies of the Sophists. In the Meno the subject is more developed; the foundations of the enquiry are laid deeper, and the nature of knowledge is more distinctly explained. There is a progression by antagonism of two opposite aspects of philosophy. But at the moment when we approach nearest, the truth doubles upon us and passes out of our reach. We seem to find that the ideal of knowledge is irreconcilable with experience. In human life there is indeed the profession of knowledge, but right opinion is our actual guide. There is another sort of progress from the general notions of Socrates, who asked simply, 'what is friendship?' 'what is temperance?' 'what is courage?' as in the Lysis, Charmides, Laches, to the transcendentalism of Plato, who, in the second stage of his philosophy, sought to find the nature of knowledge in a prior and future state of existence.

The difficulty in framing general notions which has appeared in this and in all the previous Dialogues recurs in the Gorgias and Theaetetus as well as in the Republic. In the Gorgias too the statesmen reappear, but in stronger opposition to the philosopher. They are no longer allowed to have a divine insight, but, though acknowledged to have been clever men and good speakers, are denounced as 'blind leaders of the blind.' The doctrine of the immortality of the soul is also carried further, being made the foundation not only of a theory of knowledge, but of a doctrine of rewards and punishments. In the Republic the relation of knowledge to virtue is described in a manner more consistent with modern distinctions. The existence of the virtues without the possession of knowledge in the higher or philosophical sense is

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admitted to be possible. Right opinion is again introduced in the Theaetetus as an account of knowledge, but is rejected on the ground that it is irrational (as here, because it is not bound by the tie of the cause), and also because the conception of false opinion is given up as hopeless. The doctrines of Plato are necessarily different at different times of his life, as new distinctions are realized, or new stages of thought attained by him. We are not therefore justified, in order to take away the appearance of inconsistency, in attributing to him hidden meanings or remote allusions.

There are no external criteria by which we can determine the date of the *Meno*. There is no reason to suppose that any of the Dialogues of Plato were written before the death of Socrates; the *Meno*, which appears to be one of the earliest of them, is proved to have been of a later date by the allusion of Anytus (94 E, 95 A. Cp. also 80 B, 100 B).

We cannot argue that Plato was more likely to have written, as he has done, of *Meno* before than after his miserable death; for we have already seen, in the examples of Charmides and Critias, that the characters in Plato are very far from resembling the same characters in history. The repulsive picture which is given of him in the *Anabasis* of Xenophon (ii. 6), where he also appears as the friend of Aristippus 'and a fair youth having lovers,' has no other trait of likeness to the *Meno* of Plato.

The place of the *Meno* in the series is doubtfully indicated by internal evidence. The main character of the Dialogue is Socrates; but to the 'general definitions' of Socrates is added the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence. The problems of virtue and knowledge have been discussed in the *Lysis*, *Laches*, *Charmides*, and *Protagoras*; the puzzle about knowing and learning has already appeared in the *Euthydemus*. The doctrines of immortality and pre-existence are carried further in the *Phaedrus* and *Phaedo*; the distinction between opinion and knowledge is more fully developed in the *Theaetetus*. The lessons of Prodicus, whom he facetiously calls his master, are still running in the mind of Socrates. Unlike the later Platonic Dialogues, the *Meno* arrives at no conclusion. Hence we are led to place the Dialogue at some point of time later than the *Protagoras*, and earlier than the *Phaedrus* and *Gorgias*. The place which is assigned to it in



this work is due mainly to the desire to bring together in a single volume all the Dialogues which contain allusions to the trial and death of Socrates.

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*On the Ideas of Plato.*

Plato's doctrine of ideas has attained an imaginary clearness and definiteness which is not to be found in his own writings. The popular account of them is partly derived from one or two passages in his Dialogues interpreted without regard to their poetical environment. It is due also to the misunderstanding of him by the Aristotelian school; and the erroneous notion has been further narrowed and has become fixed by the realism of the schoolmen. This popular view of the Platonic ideas may be summed up in some such formula as the following: 'Truth consists not in particulars, but in universals, which have a place in the mind of God, or in some far-off heaven. These were revealed to men in a former state of existence, and are recovered by reminiscence (*ἀνάμνησις*) or association from sensible things. The sensible things are not realities, but shadows only, in relation to the truth.' These unmeaning propositions are hardly suspected to be a caricature of a great theory of knowledge, which Plato in various ways and under many figures of speech is seeking to unfold. Poetry has been converted into dogma; and it is not remarked that the Platonic ideas are to be found only in about a third of Plato's writings and are not confined to him. The forms which they assume are numerous, and if taken literally, inconsistent with one another. At one time we are in the clouds of mythology, at another among the abstractions of mathematics or metaphysics; we pass imperceptibly from one to the other. Reason and fancy are mingled in the same passage. The ideas are sometimes described as many, coextensive with the universals of sense and also with the first principles of ethics; or again they are absorbed into the single idea of good, and subordinated to it. They are not more certain than facts, but they are equally certain (*Phaedo* 100 A). They are both personal and impersonal. They are abstract terms: they are also the causes of things; and they are even transformed into the demons or spirits by whose help God made the world. And the idea of good (*Rep.* vi. 505 ff.) may without violence be converted

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into the Supreme Being, who 'because He was good' created all things (Tim. 29 E).

It would be a mistake to try and reconcile these differing modes of thought. They are not to be regarded seriously as having a distinct meaning. They are parables, prophecies, myths, symbols, revelations, aspirations after an unknown world. They derive their origin from a deep religious and contemplative feeling, and also from an observation of curious mental phenomena. They gather up the elements of the previous philosophies, which they put together in a new form. Their great diversity shows the tentative character of early endeavours to think. They have not yet settled down into a single system. Plato uses them, though he also criticises them; he acknowledges that both he and others are always talking about them, especially about the Idea of Good; and that they are not peculiar to himself (Phaedo 100 B; Rep. vi. 505; Soph. 248 ff.). But in his later writings he seems to have laid aside the old forms of them. As he proceeds he makes for himself new modes of expression more akin to the Aristotelian logic.

Yet amid all these varieties and incongruities, there is a common meaning or spirit which pervades his writings, both those in which he treats of the ideas and those in which he is silent about them. This is the spirit of idealism, which in the history of philosophy has had many names and taken many forms, and has in a measure influenced those who seemed to be most averse to it. It has often been charged with inconsistency and fancifulness, and yet has had an elevating effect on human nature, and has exercised a wonderful charm and interest over a few spirits who have been lost in the thought of it. It has been banished again and again, but has always returned. It has attempted to leave the earth and soar heavenwards, but soon has found that only in experience could any solid foundation of knowledge be laid. It has degenerated into pantheism, but has again emerged. No other knowledge has given an equal stimulus to the mind. It is the science of sciences, which are also ideas, and under either aspect require to be defined. They can only be thought of in due proportion when conceived in relation to one another. They are the glasses through which the kingdoms of science are seen, but at a distance. All the greatest minds, except when living in an age of reaction against them, have unconsciously fallen under their power.

The account of the Platonic ideas in the *Meno* is the simplest and clearest, and we shall best illustrate their nature by giving this first and then comparing the manner in which they are described elsewhere, e. g. in the *Phaedrus*, *Phaedo*, *Republic*; to which may be added the criticism of them in the *Parmenides*, the personal form which is attributed to them in the *Timaeus*, the logical character which they assume in the *Sophist* and *Philebus*, and the allusion to them in the *Laws* (xii. 964). In the *Cratylus* they dawn upon him with the freshness of a newly-discovered thought (439).

The *Meno* (81 ff.) goes back to a former state of existence, in which men did and suffered good and evil, and received the reward or punishment of them until their sin was purged away and they were allowed to return to earth. This is a tradition of the olden time, to which priests and poets bear witness. The souls of men returning to earth bring back a latent memory of ideas, which were known to them in a former state. The recollection is awakened into life and consciousness by the sight of the things which resemble them on earth. The soul evidently possesses such innate ideas before she has had time to acquire them. This is proved by an experiment tried on one of *Meno's* slaves, from whom *Socrates* elicits truths of arithmetic and geometry, which he had never learned in this world. He must therefore have brought them with him from another.

The notion of a previous state of existence is found in the verses of *Empedocles* and in the fragments of *Heracleitus*. It was the natural answer to two questions, 'Whence came the soul? What is the origin of evil?' and prevailed far and wide in the East. It found its way into *Hellas* probably through the medium of *Orphic* and *Pythagorean* rites and mysteries. It was easier to think of a former than of a future life, because such a life has really existed for the race though not for the individual, and all men come into the world, if not 'trailing clouds of glory,' at any rate able to enter into the inheritance of the past. In the *Phaedrus* (245 ff.), as well as in the *Meno*, it is this former rather than a future life on which *Plato* is disposed to dwell. There the Gods, and men following in their train, go forth to contemplate the heavens, and are borne round in the revolutions of them. There they see the divine forms of justice, temperance, and the like, in their unchangeable beauty, but not without an effort more

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than human. The soul of man is likened to a charioteer and two steeds, one mortal, the other immortal. The charioteer and the mortal steed are in fierce conflict; at length the animal principle is finally overpowered, though not extinguished, by the combined energies of the passionate and rational elements. This is one of those passages in Plato which, partaking both of a philosophical and poetical character, is necessarily indistinct and inconsistent. The magnificent figure under which the nature of the soul is described has not much to do with the popular doctrine of the ideas. Yet there is one little trait in the description which shows that they are present to Plato's mind, namely, the remark that the soul, which had seen truths in the form of the universal (248 C, 249 C), cannot again return to the nature of an animal.

In the *Phaedo*, as in the *Meno*, the origin of ideas is sought for in a previous state of existence. There was no time when they could have been acquired in this life, and therefore they must have been recovered from another. The process of recovery is no other than the ordinary law of association, by which in daily life the sight of one thing or person recalls another to our minds, and by which in scientific enquiry from any part of knowledge we may be led on to infer the whole. It is also argued that ideas, or rather ideals, must be derived from a previous state of existence because they are more perfect than the sensible forms of them which are given by experience (74 ff.). But in the *Phaedo* the doctrine of ideas is subordinate to the proof of the immortality of the soul. 'If the soul existed in a previous state, then it will exist in a future state, for a law of alternation pervades all things.' And, 'If the ideas exist, then the soul exists; if not, not.' It is to be observed, both in the *Meno* and the *Phaedo*, that Socrates expresses himself with diffidence. He speaks in the *Phaedo* (114 D, 115 D) of the words with which he has comforted himself and his friends, and will not be too confident that the description which he has given of the soul and her mansions is exactly true, but he 'ventures to think that something of the kind is true.' And in the *Meno*, after dwelling upon the immortality of the soul, he adds, 'Of some things which I have said I am not altogether confident' (cp. 86 C, and *Apology*, pp. 40 ff.; *Gorgias* 527 B). From this class of uncertainties he exempts the difference between truth and appearance, of which he is absolutely convinced (98 B).

In the *Republic* the ideas are spoken of in two ways, which though not contradictory are different. In the tenth book (596 ff.) they are represented as the genera or general ideas under which individuals having a common name are contained. For example, there is the bed which the carpenter makes, the picture of the bed which is drawn by the painter, the bed existing in nature of which God is the author. Of the latter all visible beds are only the shadows or reflections. This and similar illustrations or explanations are put forth, not for their own sake, or as an exposition of Plato's theory of ideas, but with a view of showing that poetry and the mimetic arts are concerned with an inferior part of the soul and a lower kind of knowledge. On the other hand, in the 6th and 7th books of the *Republic* we reach the highest and most perfect conception, which Plato is able to attain, of the nature of knowledge. The ideas are now finally seen to be one as well as many, causes as well as ideas, and to have a unity which is the idea of good and the cause of all the rest. They seem, however, to have lost their first aspect of universals under which individuals are contained, and to have been converted into forms of another kind, which are inconsistently regarded from the one side as images or ideals of justice, temperance, holiness and the like; from the other as hypotheses, or mathematical truths or principles.

In the *Timaeus*, which in the series of Plato's works immediately follows the *Republic*, though probably written some time afterwards, no mention occurs of the doctrine of ideas. Geometrical forms and arithmetical ratios furnish the laws according to which the world is created. But though the conception of the ideas as genera or species is forgotten or laid aside, the distinction of the visible and intellectual is as firmly maintained as ever (30, 37). The *idea* of good likewise disappears and is superseded by the conception of a personal God, who works according to a final cause or principle of goodness which he himself is. No doubt is expressed by Plato, either in the *Timaeus* or in any other dialogue, of the truths which he conceives to be the first and highest. It is not the existence of God or the idea of good which he approaches in a tentative or hesitating manner, but the investigations of physiology. These he regards, not seriously, as a part of philosophy, but as an innocent recreation (*Tim.* 59 D).

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Passing on to the *Parmenides* (128–136), we find in that dialogue not an exposition or defence of the doctrine of ideas, but an assault upon them, which is put into the mouth of the veteran *Parmenides*, and might be ascribed to Aristotle himself, or to one of his disciples. The doctrine which is assailed takes two or three forms, but fails in any of them to escape the dialectical difficulties which are urged against it. It is admitted that there are ideas of all things, but the manner in which individuals partake of them, whether of the whole or of the part, and in which they become like them, or how ideas can be either within or without the sphere of human knowledge, or how the human and divine can have any relation to each other, is held to be incapable of explanation. And yet, if there are no universal ideas, what becomes of philosophy? (*Parmenides* 130–135). In the *Sophist* the theory of ideas is spoken of as a doctrine held not by Plato, but by another sect of philosophers, called ‘the Friends of Ideas,’ probably the Megarians, who were very distinct from him, if not opposed to him (*Sophist* 242 ff.). Nor in what may be termed Plato’s abridgement of the history of philosophy (*Soph.* 241 ff.), is any mention made such as we find in the first book of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, of the derivation of such a theory or of any part of it from the Pythagoreans, the Eleatics, the Heracleiteans, or even from Socrates. In the *Philebus*, probably one of the latest of the Platonic Dialogues, the conception of a personal or semi-personal deity expressed under the figure of mind, the king of all, who is also the cause, is retained. The one and many of the *Phaedrus* and *Theaetetus* is still working in the mind of Plato, and the correlation of ideas, not of ‘all with all,’ but of ‘some with some,’ is asserted and explained. But they are spoken of in a different manner, and are not supposed to be recovered from a former state of existence. The metaphysical conception of truth passes into a psychological one, which is continued in the *Laws*, and is the final form of the Platonic philosophy, so far as can be gathered from his own writings (see especially *Laws* v. 727 ff.). In the *Laws* he harps once more on the old string, and returns to general notions: — these he acknowledges to be many, and yet he insists that they are also one. The guardian must be made to recognize the truth, for which he has contended long ago in the *Protagoras*, that the virtues are four,



but they are also in some sense one (Laws xii. pp. 965-966; cp. *Meno*. Protagoras 329).

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So various, and if regarded on the surface only, inconsistent, are the statements of Plato respecting the doctrine of ideas. If we attempted to harmonize or to combine them, we should make out of them, not a system, but the caricature of a system. They are the ever-varying expression of Plato's Idealism. The terms used in them are in their substance and general meaning the same, although they seem to be different. They pass from the subject to the object, from earth (diesseits) to heaven (jenseits), without regard to the gulf which later theology and philosophy have made between them. They are also intended to supplement or explain each other. They relate to a subject of which Plato himself would have said that 'he was not confident of the precise form of his own statements, but was strong in the belief that something of the kind was true.' It is the spirit, not the letter, in which they agree—the spirit which places the divine above the human, the spiritual above the material, the one above the many, the mind before the body.

The stream of ancient philosophy in the Alexandrian and Roman times widens into a lake or sea, and then disappears underground to reappear after many ages in a distant land. It begins to flow again under new conditions, at first confined between high and narrow banks, but finally spreading over the continent of Europe. It is and is not the same with ancient philosophy. There is a great deal in modern philosophy which is inspired by ancient. There is much in ancient philosophy which was 'born out of due time' and before men were capable of understanding it. To the fathers of modern philosophy, their own thoughts appeared to be new and original, but they carried with them an echo or shadow of the past, coming back by recollection from an elder world. Of this the enquirers of the seventeenth century, who to themselves appeared to be working out independently the enquiry into all truth, were unconscious. They stood in a new relation to theology and natural philosophy, and for a time maintained towards both an attitude of reserve and separation. Yet the similarities between modern and ancient thought are greater far than the differences. All philosophy, even that part of it which is

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said to be based upon experience, is really ideal ; and ideas are not only derived from facts, but they are also prior to them and extend far beyond them, just as the mind is prior to the senses.

Early Greek speculation culminates in the ideas of Plato, or rather in the single idea of good. His followers, and perhaps he himself, having arrived at this elevation, instead of going forwards went backwards from philosophy to psychology, from ideas to numbers. But what we perceive to be the real meaning of them, an explanation of the nature and origin of knowledge, will always continue to be one of the first problems of philosophy.

Plato also left behind him a most potent instrument, the forms of logic — arms ready for use, but not yet taken out of their armoury. They were the late birth of the early Greek philosophy, and were the only part of it which has had an uninterrupted hold on the mind of Europe. Philosophies come and go ; but the detection of fallacies, the framing of definitions, the invention of methods still continue to be the main elements of the reasoning process.

Modern philosophy, like ancient, begins with very simple conceptions. It is almost wholly a reflection on self. It might be described as a quickening into life of old words and notions latent in the semi-barbarous Latin, and putting a new meaning into them. Unlike ancient philosophy, it has been unaffected by impressions derived from outward nature : it arose within the limits of the mind itself. From the time of Descartes to Hume and Kant it has had little or nothing to do with facts of science. On the other hand, the ancient and mediaeval logic retained a continuous influence over it, and a form like that of mathematics was easily impressed upon it ; the principle of ancient philosophy which is most apparent in it is scepticism ; we must doubt nearly every traditional or received notion, that we may hold fast one or two. The being of God in a personal or impersonal form was a mental necessity to the first thinkers of modern times : from this alone all other ideas could be deduced. There had been an obscure presentiment of 'cogito, ergo sum' more than 2000 years previously. The Eleatic notion that being and thought were the same was revived in a new form by Descartes. But now it gave birth to consciousness and self-reflection : it awakened the 'ego' in human nature. The mind naked and abstract has no

other certainty but the conviction of its own existence. 'I think, therefore I am;' and this thought is God thinking in me, who has also communicated to the reason of man his own attributes of thought and extension—these are truly imparted to him because God is true (cp. Rep. ii. 382 ff.). It has been often remarked that Descartes, having begun by dismissing all presuppositions, introduces several: he passes almost at once from scepticism to dogmatism. It is more important for the illustration of Plato to observe that he, like Plato, insists that God is true and incapable of deception (Rep. ii. 382)—that he proceeds from general ideas, that many elements of mathematics may be found in him. A certain influence of mathematics both on the form and substance of their philosophy is discernible in both of them. After making the greatest opposition between thought and extension, Descartes, like Plato, supposes them to be reunited for a time, not in their own nature but by a special divine act (cp. Phaedrus 246 C), and he also supposes all the parts of the human body to meet in the pineal gland, that alone affording a principle of unity in the material frame of man. It is characteristic of the first period of modern philosophy, that having begun (like the Presocratics) with a few general notions, Descartes first falls absolutely under their influence, and then quickly discards them. At the same time he is less able to observe facts, because they are too much magnified by the glasses through which they are seen. The common logic says 'the greater the extension, the less the comprehension,' and we may put the same thought in another way and say of abstract or general ideas, that the greater the abstraction of them, the less are they capable of being applied to particular and concrete natures.

Not very different from Descartes in his relation to ancient philosophy is his successor Spinoza, who lived in the following generation. The system of Spinoza is less personal and also less dualistic than that of Descartes. In this respect the difference between them is like that between Xenophanes and Parmenides. The teaching of Spinoza might be described generally as the Jewish religion reduced to an abstraction and taking the form of the Eleatic philosophy. Like Parmenides, he is overpowered and intoxicated with the idea of Being or God. The greatness of both philosophies consists in the immensity of a thought which

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excludes all other thoughts; their weakness is the necessary separation of this thought from actual existence and from practical life. In neither of them is there any clear opposition between the inward and outward world. The substance of Spinoza has two attributes, which alone are cognizable by man, thought and extension; these are in extreme opposition to one another, and also in inseparable identity. They may be regarded as the two aspects or expressions under which God or substance is unfolded to man. Here a step is made beyond the limits of the Eleatic philosophy. The famous theorem of Spinoza, 'Omnis determinatio est negatio,' is already contained in the 'negation is relation' of Plato's Sophist. The grand description of the philosopher in Republic vi, as the spectator of all time and all existence, may be paralleled with another famous expression of Spinoza, 'Contemplatio rerum sub specie eternitatis.' According to Spinoza finite objects are unreal, for they are conditioned by what is alien to them, and by one another. Human beings are included in the number of them. Hence there is no reality in human action and no place for right and wrong. Individuality is accident. The boasted freedom of the will is only a consciousness of necessity. Truth, he says, is the direction of the reason towards the infinite, in which all things repose; and herein lies the secret of man's well-being. In the exaltation of the reason or intellect, in the denial of the voluntariness of evil (Timaeus 86 C, D; Laws, ix. 86o), Spinoza approaches nearer to Plato than in his conception of an infinite substance. As Plato, following Socrates, said that virtue is knowledge, so Spinoza would have maintained that knowledge alone is good, and what contributes to knowledge, useful. Both are equally far from any real experience or observation of nature. And the same difficulty is found in both when we seek to apply their ideas to life and practice. There is a gulf fixed between the infinite substance and finite objects or individuals of Spinoza, just as there is between the ideas of Plato and the world of sense.

Removed from Spinoza by less than a generation is the philosopher Leibnitz, who after deepening and intensifying the opposition between mind and matter, reunites them by his preconcerted harmony (cp. again Phaedrus 246 C). To him all the particles of matter are living beings which reflect on one another, and in the least of them the whole is contained. Here we

catch a reminiscence both of the *ὁμοιομερῇ* or similar particles of Anaxagoras, and of the world-animal of the Timaeus.

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In Bacon and Locke we have another development in which the mind of man is supposed to receive knowledge by a new method and to work by observation and experience. But we may remark that it is the idea of experience, rather than experience itself, with which the mind is filled. It is a symbol of knowledge rather than the reality which is vouchsafed to us. The Organon of Bacon is not much nearer to actual facts than the Organon of Aristotle or the Platonic idea of good. Many of the old rags and ribbons which defaced the garment of philosophy have been stripped off, but some of them still adhere. A crude conception of the ideas of Plato survives in the 'forms' of Bacon. And on the other hand, there are many passages of Plato in which the importance of the investigation of facts is as much insisted upon as by Bacon. Both are almost equally superior to the illusions of language, and are constantly crying out against them, as against other idols.

Locke cannot be truly regarded as the author of sensationalism any more than of idealism. His system is based upon experience, but with him experience includes reflection as well as sense. His analysis and construction of ideas has no foundation in fact; it is only the dialectic of the mind 'talking to herself.' The philosophy of Berkeley is but the use of one word instead of two, which have the same meaning with it. For objects of sense he would substitute sensations. He imagines himself to have changed the relation of the human mind towards God and nature; they remain the same as before, though he has drawn the imaginary line by which they are divided at a different point. He has annihilated the outward world, but it instantly reappears governed by the same laws and described under the same names.

A like remark applies to David Hume, of whose philosophy the central principle is the denial of the relation of cause and effect. He would deprive men of a familiar term which they can ill afford to lose; but he seems not to have observed that this alteration is merely verbal and does not in any degree affect the nature of things. Still less did he remark that he was arguing from the necessary imperfection of language against the most certain facts. And here, again, we may find a parallel with the

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ancients. He goes beyond facts in his scepticism, as they did in their idealism. Like the ancient Sophists, he relegates the more important principles of ethics to custom and probability. But crude and unmeaning as this philosophy is, it exercised a great influence on his successors, not unlike that which Locke exercised upon Berkeley and Berkeley upon Hume himself. All three were both sceptical and ideal in almost equal degrees. Neither they nor their predecessors had any true conception of language or of the history of philosophy. Hume's paradox has been forgotten by the world, and did not any more than the scepticism of the ancients require to be seriously refuted. Like some other philosophical paradoxes, it would have been better left to die out. It certainly could not be refuted by a philosophy such as Kant's, in which, no less than in the previously mentioned systems, the history of the human mind and the nature of language are almost wholly ignored, and the certainty of objective knowledge is transferred to the subject; while absolute truth is reduced to a figment, more abstract and narrow than Plato's ideas, of 'thing in itself,' to which, if we reason strictly, no predicate can be applied.

The question which Plato has raised respecting the origin and nature of ideas belongs to the infancy of philosophy; in modern times it would no longer be asked. Their origin is only their history, so far as we know it; there can be no other. We may trace them in language, in philosophy, in mythology, in poetry, but we cannot argue *à priori* about them. We may attempt to shake them off, but they are always returning, and in every sphere of science and human action are tending to go beyond facts. They are thought to be innate, because they have been familiar to us all our lives, and we can no longer dismiss them from our mind. Many of them express relations of terms to which nothing exactly or nothing at all *in rerum naturâ* corresponds. We are not such free agents in the use of them as we sometimes imagine. Fixed ideas have taken the most complete possession of some thinkers who have been most determined to renounce them, and have been vehemently affirmed when they could be least explained and were incapable of proof. The world has often been led away by a word to which no distinct meaning could be attached. Abstractions such as 'authority,' 'equality,' 'utility,' 'liberty,' 'pleasure,' 'experience,' 'consciousness,' 'chance,' 'sub-



stance,' 'matter,' 'atom,' and a heap of other metaphysical and theological terms, are the source of quite as much error and illusion and have as little relation to actual facts as the 'ideas' of Plato. Few students of theology or philosophy have sufficiently reflected how quickly the bloom of a philosophy passes away; or how hard it is for one age to understand the writings of another; or how nice a judgment is required of those who are seeking to express the philosophy of one age in the terms of another. The 'eternal truths' of which metaphysicians speak have hardly ever lasted more than a generation. In our own day schools or systems of philosophy which have once been famous have died before the founders of them. We are still, as in Plato's age, groping about for a new method more comprehensive than any of those which now prevail; and also more permanent. And we seem to see at a distance the promise of such a method, which can hardly be any other than the method of idealized experience, having roots which strike far down into the history of philosophy. It is a method which does not divorce the present from the past, or the part from the whole, or the abstract from the concrete, or theory from fact, or the divine from the human, or one science from another, but labours to connect them. Along such a road we have proceeded a few steps, sufficient, perhaps, to make us reflect on the want of method which prevails in our own day. In another age, all the branches of knowledge, whether relating to God or man or nature, will become the knowledge of 'the revelation of a single science' (Symp. 210, 211), and all things, like the stars in heaven, will shed their light upon one another.

*Meno.*

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TION.



# MENO.

## PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

MENO.

A SLAVE OF MENO.

SOCRATES.

ANYTUS.

*Meno.* CAN you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is acquired by teaching or by practice; or if neither by teaching nor by practice, then whether it comes to man by nature, or in what other way?

*Meno.*

SOCRATES,  
MENO.

*Socrates.* O Meno, there was a time when the Thessalians were famous among the other Hellenes only for their riches and their riding; but now, if I am not mistaken, they are equally famous for their wisdom, especially at Larisa, which is the native city of your friend Aristippus. And this is Gorgias' doing; for when he came there, the flower of the Aleuadae, among them your admirer Aristippus, and the other chiefs of the Thessalians, fell in love with his wisdom. And he has taught you the habit of answering questions in a grand and bold style, which becomes those who know, and is the style in which he himself answers all comers; and any

Meno asks  
Socrates  
'How virtue  
can be ac-  
quired?'  
Before giving  
an answer  
Socrates must  
enquire  
'What is  
virtue?'

*Steph.* Hellenes who likes may ask him anything. How different is

7<sup>1</sup> our lot! my dear Meno. Here at Athens there is a dearth of the commodity, and all wisdom seems to have emigrated from us to you. I am certain that if you were to ask any Athenian whether virtue was natural or acquired, he would laugh in your face, and say: 'Stranger, you have far too good an opinion of me, if you think that I can answer your question. For I literally do not know what virtue is, and much less whether it is acquired by teaching or not.' And I myself, Meno, living as I do in this region of poverty, am as poor as the rest of the world; and I confess with



*Meno.*SOCRATES,  
MENO.

shame that I know literally nothing about virtue; and when I do not know the 'quid' of anything how can I know the 'quale'? How, if I knew nothing at all of Meno, could I tell if he was fair, or the opposite of fair; rich and noble, or the reverse of rich and noble? Do you think that I could?

*Men.* No, indeed. But are you in earnest, Socrates, in saying that you do not know what virtue is? And am I to carry back this report of you to Thessaly?

He does not  
know, and  
never met  
with any one  
who did.

*Soc.* Not only that, my dear boy, but you may say further that I have never known of any one else who did, in my judgment.

*Men.* Then you have never met Gorgias when he was at Athens?

*Soc.* Yes, I have.

*Men.* And did you not think that he knew?

*Soc.* I have not a good memory, Meno, and therefore I cannot now tell what I thought of him at the time. And I dare say that he did know, and that you know what he said: please, therefore, to remind me of what he said; or, if you would rather, tell me your own view; for I suspect that you and he think much alike.

*Men.* Very true.

*Soc.* Then as he is not here, never mind him, and do you tell me: By the gods, Meno, be generous, and tell me what you say that virtue is; for I shall be truly delighted to find that I have been mistaken, and that you and Gorgias do really have this knowledge; although I have been just saying that I have never found anybody who had.

Meno de-  
scribes the  
different kinds  
of virtue, but  
is unable to  
give a com-  
mon notion of  
them.

*Men.* There will be no difficulty, Socrates, in answering your question. Let us take first the virtue of a man—he should know how to administer the state, and in the administration of it to benefit his friends and harm his enemies; and he must also be careful not to suffer harm himself. A woman's virtue, if you wish to know about that, may also be easily described: her duty is to order her house, and keep what is indoors, and obey her husband. Every age, every condition of life, young or old, male or female, bond or free, has a different virtue: there are virtues numberless, and no lack of definitions of them; for virtue is relative

to the actions and ages of each of us in all that we do. And the same may be said of vice, Socrates<sup>1</sup>.

*Soc.* How fortunate I am, Meno! When I ask you for one virtue, you present me with a swarm of them<sup>2</sup>, which are in your keeping. Suppose that I carry on the figure of the swarm, and ask of you, What is the nature of the bee? and you answer that there are many kinds of bees, and I reply: But do bees differ as bees, because there are many and different kinds of them; or are they not rather to be distinguished by some other quality, as for example beauty, size, or shape? How would you answer me?

*Men.* I should answer that bees do not differ from one another, as bees.

*Soc.* And if I went on to say: That is what I desire to know, Meno; tell me what is the quality in which they do not differ, but are all alike;—would you be able to answer?

*Men.* I should.

*Soc.* And so of the virtues, however many and different they may be, they have all a common nature which makes them virtues; and on this he who would answer the question, 'What is virtue?' would do well to have his eye fixed: Do you understand?/

*Men.* I am beginning to understand; but I do not as yet take hold of the question as I could wish.

*Soc.* When you say, Meno, that there is one virtue of a man, another of a woman, another of a child, and so on, does this apply only to virtue, or would you say the same of health, and size, and strength? Or is the nature of health always the same, whether in man or woman?

*Men.* I should say that health is the same, both in man and woman.

*Soc.* And is not this true of size and strength? If a woman is strong, she will be strong by reason of the same form and of the same strength subsisting in her which there is in the man. I mean to say that strength, as strength, whether of man or woman, is the same. Is there any difference?

*Meno.*

SOCRATES,  
MENO.

Meno, not without difficulty and by help of many illustrations, is made to understand the nature of common notions.

Health and strength,

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Arist. Pol. i. 13, § 10.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Theaet. 146 D.

*Meno.**Men.* I think not.SOCRATES,  
MENO.

*Soc.* And will not virtue, as virtue, be the same, whether 73  
in a child or in a grown-up person, in a woman or in a  
man?

and virtue  
and temper-  
ance and  
justice are  
the same both  
in men and  
women.

*Men.* I cannot help feeling, Socrates, that this case is  
different from the others.

*Soc.* But why? Were you not saying that the virtue of a  
man was to order a state, and the virtue of a woman was to  
order a house?

*Men.* I did say so.

*Soc.* And can either house or state or anything be well  
ordered without temperance and without justice?

*Men.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Then they who order a state or a house temperately  
or justly order them with temperance and justice?

*Men.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then both men and women, if they are to be good  
men and women, must have the same virtues of temperance  
and justice?

*Men.* True.

*Soc.* And can either a young man or an elder one be good,  
if they are intemperate and unjust?

*Men.* They cannot.

*Soc.* They must be temperate and just?

*Men.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then all men are good in the same way, and by parti-  
cipation in the same virtues?

*Men.* Such is the inference.

*Soc.* And they surely would not have been good in the  
same way, unless their virtue had been the same?

*Men.* They would not.

*Soc.* Then now that the sameness of all virtue has been  
proven, try and remember what you and Gorgias say that  
virtue is.

*Men.* Will you have one definition of them all?

*Soc.* That is what I am seeking.

*Men.* If you want to have one definition of them all, I know  
not what to say, but that virtue is the power of governing  
mankind.

*Soc.* And does this definition of virtue include all virtue?

Then what  
is virtue?  
Gorgias and  
Meno reply,  
'The power  
of governing  
mankind.'



Is virtue the same in a child and in a slave, Meno? Can the child govern his father, or the slave his master; and would he who governed be any longer a slave?

*Meno.*

SOCRATES,  
MENO.

But this cannot apply to all persons.

*Men.* I think not, Socrates.

*Soc.* No, indeed; there would be small reason in that. Yet once more, fair friend; according to you, virtue is 'the power of governing;' but do you not add 'justly and not unjustly'?

*Men.* Yes, Socrates; I agree there; for justice is virtue.

*Soc.* Would you say 'virtue,' Meno, or 'a virtue'?

*Men.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* I mean as I might say about anything; that a round, for example, is 'a figure' and not simply 'figure,' and I should adopt this mode of speaking, because there are other figures.

*Men.* Quite right; and that is just what I am saying about virtue — that there are other virtues as well as justice.

74 *Soc.* What are they? tell me the names of them, as I would tell you the names of the other figures if you asked me.

*Men.* Courage and temperance and wisdom and magnanimity are virtues; and there are many others.

Meno names the virtues, but is unable to get at the common notion of them.

*Soc.* Yes, Meno; and again we are in the same case: in searching after one virtue we have found many, though not in the same way as before; but we have been unable to find the common virtue which runs through them all.

*Men.* Why, Socrates, even now I am not able to follow you in the attempt to get at one common notion of virtue as of other things.

*Soc.* No wonder; but I will try to get nearer if I can, for you know that all things have a common notion. Suppose now that some one asked you the question which I asked before: Meno, he would say, what is figure? And if you answered 'roundness,' he would reply to you, in my way of speaking, by asking whether you would say that roundness is 'figure' or 'a figure;' and you would answer 'a figure.'

*Men.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And for this reason — that there are other figures?

*Men.* Yes.

*Soc.* And if he proceeded to ask, What other figures are there? you would have told him.

*Meno.*

*Men.* I should.

SOCRATES,  
MENO.

*Soc.* And if he similarly asked what colour is, and you answered whiteness, and the questioner rejoined, Would you say that whiteness is colour or a colour? you would reply, A colour, because there are other colours as well.

*Men.* I should.

*Soc.* And if he had said, Tell me what they are?—you would have told him of other colours which are colours just as much as whiteness.

*Men.* Yes.

He has a  
similar diffi-  
culty about  
the nature  
of Figure.

*Soc.* And suppose that he were to pursue the matter in my way, he would say: Ever and anon we are landed in particulars, but this is not what I want; tell me then, since you call them by a common name, and say that they are all figures, even when opposed to one another, what is that common nature which you designate as figure — which contains straight as well as round, and is no more one than the other — that would be your mode of speaking?

*Men.* Yes.

*Soc.* And in speaking thus, you do not mean to say that the round is round any more than straight, or the straight any more straight than round?

*Men.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* You only assert that the round figure is not more a figure than the straight, or the straight than the round?

*Men.* Very true.

*Soc.* To what then do we give the name of figure? Try and answer. Suppose that when a person asked you this question either about figure or colour, you were to reply, Man, I do not understand what you want, or know what you are saying; he would look rather astonished and say: Do you not understand that I am looking for the 'simile in multis'? And then he might put the question in another form: Meno, he might say, what is that 'simile in multis' which you call figure, and which includes not only round and straight figures, but all? Could you not answer that question, Meno? I wish that you would try; the attempt will be good practice with a view to the answer about virtue.

*Men.* I would rather that you should answer, Socrates.

*Soc.* Shall I indulge you?

*Men.* By all means.

*Soc.* And then you will tell me about virtue?

*Men.* I will.

*Soc.* Then I must do my best, for there is a prize to be won.

*Men.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Well, I will try and explain to you what figure is. What do you say to this answer?—Figure is the only thing which always follows colour. Will you be satisfied with it, as I am sure that I should be, if you would let me have a similar definition of virtue?

*Meno.*

SOCRATES,  
MENO.

Figure is  
defined by  
Socrates  
to be that  
which always  
follows colour.

*Men.* But, Socrates, it is such a simple answer.

*Soc.* Why simple?

*Men.* Because, according to you, figure is that which always follows colour.

(*Soc.* Granted).

*Men.* But if a person were to say that he does not know what colour is, any more than what figure is—what sort of answer would you have given him?

*Soc.* I should have told him the truth. And if he were a philosopher of the eristic and antagonistic sort, I should say to him: You have my answer, and if I am wrong, your business is to take up the argument and refute me. But if we were friends, and were talking as you and I are now, I should reply in a milder strain and more in the dialectician's vein; that is to say, I should not only speak the truth, but I should make use of premisses which the person interrogated would be willing to admit. And this is the way in which I shall endeavour to approach you. You will acknowledge, will you not, that there is such a thing as an end, or termination, or extremity?—all which words I use in the same sense, although I am aware that Prodicus might draw distinctions about them: but still you, I am sure, would speak of a thing as ended or terminated—that is all which I am saying—not anything very difficult.

*Men.* Yes, I should; and I believe that I understand your meaning.

76 *Soc.* And you would speak of a surface and also of a solid, as for example in geometry.

*Men.* Yes.

*Soc.* Well then, you are now in a condition to understand



*Meno.*SOCRATES,  
MENO.And now,  
what is  
colour?

my definition of figure. I define figure to be that in which the solid ends; or, more concisely, the limit of solid.

*Men.* And now, Socrates, what is colour?

*Soc.* You are outrageous, Meno, in thus plaguing a poor old man to give you an answer, when you will not take the trouble of remembering what is Gorgias' definition of virtue.

*Men.* When you have told me what I ask, I will tell you, Socrates.

- *Soc.* A man who was blindfolded has only to hear you talking, and he would know that you are a fair creature and have still many lovers.

*Men.* Why do you think so?

- *Soc.* Why, because you always speak in imperatives: like all beauties when they are in their prime, you are tyrannical; and also, as I suspect, you have found out that I have a weakness for the fair, and therefore to humour you I must answer.

*Men.* Please do.

*Soc.* Would you like me to answer you after the manner of Gorgias, which is familiar to you?

*Men.* I should like nothing better.

*Soc.* Do not he and you and Empedocles say that there are certain effluences of existence?

*Men.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And passages into which and through which the effluences pass?

*Men.* Exactly.

*Soc.* And some of the effluences fit into the passages, and some of them are too small or too large?

*Men.* True.

*Soc.* And there is such a thing as sight?

*Men.* Yes.

*Soc.* And now, as Pindar says, 'read my meaning: '— colour is an effluence of form, commensurate with sight, and palpable to sense.

*Men.* That, Socrates, appears to me to be an admirable answer.

*Soc.* Why, yes, because it happens to be one which you have been in the habit of hearing: and your wit will have

Meno,  
Gorgias, and  
Empedocles  
are all agreed  
that colour  
is an effluence  
of existence,  
proportioned  
to certain  
passages.

discovered, I suspect, that you may explain in the same way the nature of sound and smell, and of many other similar phenomena.

*Meno.*

SOCRATES,  
MENO.

*Men.* Quite true.

*Soc.* The answer, Meno, was in the orthodox solemn vein, and therefore was more acceptable to you than the other answer about figure.

*Men.* Yes.

*Soc.* And yet, O son of Alexidemus, I cannot help thinking that the other was the better; and I am sure that you would be of the same opinion, if you would only stay and be initiated, and were not compelled, as you said yesterday, to go away before the mysteries.

*Men.* But I will stay, Socrates, if you will give me many  
77 such answers.

*Soc.* Well then, for my own sake as well as for yours, I will do my very best; but I am afraid that I shall not be able to give you very many as good: and now, in your turn, you are to fulfil your promise, and tell me what virtue is in the universal; and do not make a singular into a plural, as the facetious say of those who break a thing, but deliver virtue to me whole and sound, and not broken into a number of pieces: I have given you the pattern.

Virtue, according to Meno, is the desire of the honourable and the good. His definition is analysed by Socrates.

*Men.* Well then, Socrates, virtue, as I take it, is when he, who desires the honourable, is able to provide it for himself; so the poet says, and I say too —

‘Virtue is the desire of things honourable and the power of attaining them.’ 7

*Soc.* And does he who desires the honourable also desire the good?

*Men.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then are there some who desire the evil and others who desire the good? Do not all men, my dear sir, desire good?

*Men.* I think not.

*Soc.* There are some who desire evil?

*Men.* Yes.

*Soc.* Do you mean that they think the evils which they desire, to be good; or do they know that they are evil and yet desire them?

*Meno**Men.* Both, I think.SOCRATES,  
MENO.*Soc.* And do you really imagine, Meno, that a man knows evils to be evils and desires them notwithstanding?*Men.* Certainly I do.*Soc.* And desire is of possession?*Men.* Yes, of possession.Men desire  
evil, but not  
what they  
think to be  
evil.*Soc.* And does he think that the evils will do good to him who possesses them, or does he know that they will do him harm?*Men.* There are some who think that the evils will do them good, and others who know that they will do them harm.*Soc.* And, in your opinion, do those who think that they will do them good know that they are evils?*Men.* Certainly not.*Soc.* Is it not obvious that those who are ignorant of their nature do not desire them; but they desire what they suppose to be goods although they are really evils; and if they are mistaken and suppose the evils to be goods they really desire goods?*Men.* Yes, in that case.*Soc.* Well, and do those who, as you say, desire evils, and think that evils are hurtful to the possessor of them, know that they will be hurt by them?*Men.* They must know it.*Soc.* And must they not suppose that those who are hurt 78 are miserable in proportion to the hurt which is inflicted upon them?*Men.* How can it be otherwise?*Soc.* But are not the miserable ill-fated?*Men.* Yes, indeed.*Soc.* And does any one desire to be miserable and ill-fated?*Men.* I should say not, Socrates.*Soc.* But if there is no one who desires to be miserable, there is no one, Meno, who desires evil; for what is misery but the desire and possession of evil?*Men.* That appears to be the truth, Socrates, and I admit that nobody desires evil.*Soc.* And yet, were you not saying just now that virtue is the desire and power of attaining good?*Men.* Yes, I did say so.

*Soc.* But if this be affirmed, then the desire of good is common to all, and one man is no better than another in that respect?

*Meno.*

SOCRATES,  
MENO.

*Men.* True.

*Soc.* And if one man is not better than another in desiring good, he must be better in the power of attaining it?

The desire of good is really common to all of them.

*Men.* Exactly.

*Soc.* Then, according to your definition, virtue would appear to be the power of attaining good?

Virtue is the power of attaining good with justice.

*Men.* I entirely approve, Socrates, of the manner in which you now view this matter.

*Soc.* Then let us see whether what you say is true from another point of view; for very likely you may be right:—You affirm virtue to be the power of attaining goods?

*Men.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the goods which you mean are such as health and wealth and the possession of gold and silver, and having office and honour in the state — those are what you would call goods?

*Men.* Yes, I should include all those.

*Soc.* Then, according to Meno, who is the hereditary friend of the great king, virtue is the power of getting silver and gold; and would you add that they must be gained piously, justly, or do you deem this to be of no consequence? And is any mode of acquisition, even if unjust or dishonest, equally to be deemed virtue?

*Men.* Not virtue, Socrates, but vice.

*Soc.* Then justice or temperance or holiness, or some other part of virtue, as would appear, must accompany the acquisition, and without them the mere acquisition of good will not be virtue.

*Men.* Why, how can there be virtue without these?

*Soc.* And the non-acquisition of gold and silver in a dishonest manner for oneself or another, or in other words the want of them, may be equally virtue?

*Men.* True.

*Soc.* Then the acquisition of such goods is no more virtue than the non-acquisition and want of them, but whatever is accompanied by justice or honesty is virtue, and whatever is devoid of justice is vice.



*Meno.**Men.* It cannot be otherwise, in my judgment.SOCRATES,  
MENO.*Soc.* And were we not saying just now that justice, temperance, and the like, were each of them a part of virtue?But this definition repeats the thing defined:—  
virtue=the power of attaining good with a part of virtue.*Men.* Yes.*Soc.* And so, Meno, this is the way in which you mock me.*Men.* Why do you say that, Socrates?*Soc.* Why, because I asked you to deliver virtue into my hands whole and unbroken, and I gave you a pattern according to which you were to frame your answer; and you have forgotten already, and tell me that virtue is the power of attaining good justly, or with justice; and justice you acknowledge to be a part of virtue.*Men.* Yes.*Soc.* Then it follows from your own admissions, that virtue is doing what you do with a part of virtue; for justice and the like are said by you to be parts of virtue.*Men.* What of that?

But if we do not know the nature of virtue as a whole, how can we know what a part of virtue is?

*Soc.* What of that! Why, did not I ask you to tell me the nature of virtue as a whole? And you are very far from telling me this; but declare every action to be virtue which is done with a part of virtue; as though you had told me and I must already know the whole of virtue, and this too when frittered away into little pieces. And, therefore, my dear Meno, I fear that I must begin again and repeat the same question: What is virtue? for otherwise, I can only say, that every action done with a part of virtue is virtue; what else is the meaning of saying that every action done with justice is virtue? Ought I not to ask the question over again; for can any one who does not know virtue know a part of virtue?*Men.* No; I do not say that he can.*Soc.* Do you remember how, in the example of figure, we rejected any answer given in terms which were as yet unexplained or unadmitted?*Men.* Yes, Socrates; and we were quite right in doing so.*Soc.* But then, my friend, do not suppose that we can explain to any one the nature of virtue as a whole through some unexplained portion of virtue, or anything at all in that fashion; we should only have to ask over again the old question, What is virtue? Am I not right?

*Men.* I believe that you are.

*Soc.* Then begin again, and answer me, What, according to you and your friend Gorgias, is the definition of virtue?

*Men.* O Socrates, I used to be told, before I knew you, that  
80 you were always doubting yourself and making others doubt ; and now you are casting your spells over me, and I am simply getting bewitched and enchanted, and am at my wits' end. And if I may venture to make a jest upon you, you seem to me both in your appearance and in your power over others to be very like the flat torpedo fish, who torpifies those who come near him and touch him, as you have now torpified me, I think. For my soul and my tongue are really torpid, and I do not know how to answer you ; and though I have been delivered of an infinite variety of speeches about virtue before now, and to many persons — and very good ones they were, as I thought — at this moment I cannot even say what virtue is. And I think that you are very wise in not voyaging and going away from home, for if you did in other places as you do in Athens, you would be cast into prison as a magician.

*Soc.* You are a rogue, Meno, and had all but caught me.

*Men.* What do you mean, Socrates?

*Soc.* I can tell why you made a simile about me.

*Men.* Why?

• *Soc.* In order that I might make another simile about you. For I know that all pretty young gentlemen like to have pretty similes made about them — as well they may — but I shall not return the compliment. As to my being a torpedo, if the torpedo is torpid as well as the cause of torpidity in others, then indeed I am a torpedo, but not otherwise ; for I perplex others, not because I am clear, but because I am utterly perplexed myself. And now I know not what virtue is, and you seem to be in the same case, although you did once perhaps know before you touched me. However, I have no objection to join with you in the enquiry.

*Men.* And how will you enquire, Socrates, into that which you do not know? What will you put forth as the subject of enquiry? And if you find what you want, how will you ever know that this is the thing which you did not know?

*Soc.* I know, Meno, what you mean ; but just see what a tiresome dispute you are introducing. You argue that

*Meno.*

SOCRATES,  
MENO.

Meno compares Socrates to a torpedo whose touch has taken away his sense and speech.

Socrates is the cause of dulness in others because he is himself dull.

How can you enquire about what



Meno.

SOCRATES,  
MENO.

you do not  
know, and  
if you know  
why should  
you enquire?

a man cannot enquire either about that which he knows, or about that which he does not know; for if he knows, he has no need to enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does not know the very subject about which he is to enquire<sup>1</sup>.

*Men.* Well, Socrates, and is not the argument sound? 81

*Soc.* I think not.

*Men.* Why not?

*Soc.* I will tell you why: I have heard from certain wise men and women who spoke of things divine that —

*Men.* What did they say?

*Soc.* They spoke of a glorious truth, as I conceive.

*Men.* What was it? and who were they?

*Soc.* Some of them were priests and priestesses, who had studied how they might be able to give a reason of their profession: there have been poets also, who spoke of these things by inspiration, like Pindar, and many others who were inspired. And they say — mark, now, and see whether their words are true — they say that the soul of man is immortal, and at one time has an end, which is termed dying, and at another time is born again, but is never destroyed. And the moral is, that a man ought to live always in perfect holiness. *‘For in the ninth year Persephone sends the souls of those from whom she has received the penalty of ancient crime back again from beneath into the light of the sun above, and these are they who become noble kings and mighty men and great in wisdom and are called saintly heroes in after ages<sup>2</sup>.’* The soul, then, as being immortal, and having been born again many times, and having seen all things that exist, whether in this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all; and it is no wonder that she should be able to call to remembrance all that she ever knew about virtue, and about everything; for as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all things, there is no difficulty in her eliciting or as men say learning, out of a single recollection all the rest, if a man is strenuous and does not faint; for all enquiry and all learning is but recollection. And therefore we ought not to listen to this sophistical argument about the impossibility of enquiry: for it will make us idle, and is sweet only to the

The ancient poets tell us that the soul of man is immortal and has a recollection of all that she has ever known in former states of being.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Aristot. Post. Anal. I. i. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Pindar, Frag. 98 (Boeckh).

sluggard; but the other saying will make us active and inquisitive. In that confiding, I will gladly enquire with you into the nature of virtue.

*Meno.*  
SOCRATES,  
MENO,  
MENO'S  
SLAVE.

*Men.* Yes, Socrates; but what do you mean by saying that we do not learn, and that what we call learning is only a process of recollection? Can you teach me how this is?

*Soc.* I told you, Meno, just now that you were a rogue, and now you ask whether I can teach you, when I am saying that  
82 there is no teaching, but only recollection; and thus you imagine that you will involve me in a contradiction.

*Men.* Indeed, Socrates, I protest that I had no such intention. I only asked the question from habit; but if you can prove to me that what you say is true, I wish that you would.

*Soc.* It will be no easy matter, but I will try to please you to the utmost of my power. Suppose that you call one of your numerous attendants, that I may demonstrate on him.

A Greek slave is introduced, from whom certain mathematical conclusions which he has never learned are elicited by Socrates.

*Men.* Certainly. Come hither, boy.

*Soc.* He is Greek, and speaks Greek, does he not?

*Men.* Yes, indeed; he was born in the house.

*Soc.* Attend now to the questions which I ask him, and observe whether he learns of me or only remembers.

*Men.* I will.

*Soc.* Tell me, boy, do you know that a figure like this is a square?

*Boy.* I do.

*Soc.* And you know that a square figure has these four lines equal?

*Boy.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And these lines which I have drawn through the middle of the square are also equal?

*Boy.* Yes.

*Soc.* A square may be of any size?

*Boy.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And if one side of the figure be of two feet, and the other side be of two feet, how much will the whole be? Let me explain: if in one direction the space was of two feet, and in the other direction of one foot, the whole would be of two feet taken once?

*Boy.* Yes.

*Meno.*

*Soc.* But since this side is also of two feet, there are twice two feet?

SOCRATES,

MENO,

MENO'S

SLAVE.

*Boy.* There are.

*Soc.* Then the square is of twice two feet?

*Boy.* Yes.

*Soc.* And how many are twice two feet? count and tell me.

*Boy.* Four, Socrates.

*Soc.* And might there not be another square twice as large as this, and having like this the lines equal?

*Boy.* Yes.

*Soc.* And of how many feet will that be?

*Boy.* Of eight feet.

*Soc.* And now try and tell me the length of the line which forms the side of that double square: this is two feet — what will that be?

*Boy.* Clearly, Socrates, it will be double.

He is partly  
guessing.

*Soc.* Do you observe, Meno, that I am not teaching the boy anything, but only asking him questions; and now he fancies that he knows how long a line is necessary in order to produce a figure of eight square feet; does he not?

*Men.* Yes.

*Soc.* And does he really know?

*Men.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* He only guesses that because the square is double, the line is double.

*Men.* True.

*Soc.* Observe him while he recalls the steps in regular order. (*To the Boy.*) Tell me, boy, do you assert that a double space comes from a double line? Remember that I am not speaking of an oblong, but of a figure equal every way, and twice the size of this — that is to say of eight feet; and I want to know whether you still say that a double square comes from a double line?

*Boy.* Yes.

*Soc.* But does not this line become doubled if we add another such line here?

*Boy.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And four such lines will make a space containing eight feet?

*Boy.* Yes.

*Soc.* Let us describe such a figure: Would you not say *Meno.*  
that this is the figure of eight feet?

*Boy.* Yes.

*Soc.* And are there not these four divisions in the figure,  
each of which is equal to the figure of four feet?

*Boy.* True.

*Soc.* And is not that four times four?


*Boy.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And four times is not double?

*Boy.* No, indeed.

*Soc.* But how much?

*Boy.* Four times as much.



*Soc.* Therefore the double line, boy,

has given a space, not twice, but four times as much.

*Boy.* True.

*Soc.* Four times four are sixteen — are they not?

*Boy.* Yes.

*Soc.* What line would give you a space of eight feet, as  
this gives one of sixteen feet;—do you see?

*Boy.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the space of four feet is made from this half  
line?

*Boy.* Yes.

*Soc.* Good; and is not a space of eight feet twice the  
size of this, and half the size of the other?

*Boy.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Such a space, then, will be made out of a line greater  
than this one, and less than that one?

*Boy.* Yes; I think so.

*Soc.* Very good; I like to hear you say what you think.  
And now tell me, is not this a line of two feet and that of  
four?

*Boy.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then the line which forms the side of eight feet  
ought to be more than this line of two feet, and less than  
the other of four feet?

*Boy.* It ought.

*Soc.* Try and see if you can tell me how much it will be.

*Boy.* Three feet.

*Soc.* Then if we add a half to this line of two, that will be

SOCRATES,  
MENO'S  
SLAVE.

He has now  
learned to  
realize his  
own ignor-  
ance, and  
therefore  
will endea-  
vour to  
remedy it.



*Meno.*

SOCRATES,

MENO,

MENO'S

SLAVE.

the line of three. Here are two and there is one; and on the other side, here are two also and there is one: and that makes the figure of which you speak?

*Boy.* Yes.

*Soc.* But if there are three feet this way and three feet that way, the whole space will be three times three feet?

*Boy.* That is evident.

*Soc.* And how much are three times three feet?

*Boy.* Nine.

*Soc.* And how much is the double of four?

*Boy.* Eight.

*Soc.* Then the figure of eight is not made out of a line of three?

*Boy.* No.

*Soc.* But from what line? — tell me exactly; and if you 84 would rather not reckon, try and show me the line.

*Boy.* Indeed, Socrates, I do not know.

*Soc.* Do you see, Meno, what advances he has made in his power of recollection? He did not know at first, and he does not know now, what is the side of a figure of eight feet: but then he thought that he knew, and answered confidently as if he knew, and had no difficulty; now he has a difficulty, and neither knows nor fancies that he knows.

*Meno.* True.

*Soc.* Is he not better off in knowing his ignorance?

*Meno.* I think that he is.

*Soc.* If we have made him doubt, and given him the 'torpedo's shock,' have we done him any harm?

*Meno.* I think not.

*Soc.* We have certainly, as would seem, assisted him in some degree to the discovery of the truth; and now he will wish to remedy his ignorance, but then he would have been ready to tell all the world again and again that the double space should have a double side.

*Meno.* True.

*Soc.* But do you suppose that he would ever have enquired into or learned what he fancied that he knew, though he was really ignorant of it, until he had fallen into perplexity under the idea that he did not know, and had desired to know?

*Men.* I think not, Socrates.

*Soc.* Then he was the better for the torpedo's touch?

*Men.* I think so.

*Soc.* Mark now the farther development. I shall only ask him, and not teach him, and he shall share the enquiry with me: and do you watch and see if you find me telling or explaining anything to him, instead of eliciting his opinion. Tell me, boy, is not this a square of four feet which I have drawn?

*Boy.* Yes.

*Soc.* And now I add another square equal to the former one?

*Boy.* Yes.

*Soc.* And a third, which is equal to either of them?

*Boy.* Yes.

*Soc.* Suppose that we fill up the vacant corner?

*Boy.* Very good.

*Soc.* Here, then, there are four equal spaces?

*Boy.* Yes.

*Soc.* And how many times larger is this space than this other?

*Boy.* Four times.

*Soc.* But it ought to have been twice only, as you will remember.

*Boy.* True.

*Soc.* And does not this line, reaching from corner to corner,  
85 bisect each of these spaces?

*Boy.* Yes.

*Soc.* And are there not here four equal lines which contain this space?

*Boy.* There are.

*Soc.* Look and see how much this space is.

*Boy.* I do not understand.

*Soc.* Has not each interior line cut off half of the four spaces?

*Boy.* Yes.

*Soc.* And how many such spaces are there in this section?

*Boy.* Four.

*Soc.* And how many in this?

*Boy.* Two.

*Meno.*

SOCRATES,

MENO,

MENO'S

SLAVE.

The boy  
arrives at  
another true  
conclusion:

which is, that  
the square of  
the diagonal  
is double the  
square of the  
side.



*Meno.**Soc.* And four is how many times two?

SOCRATES,

*Boy.* Twice.

MENO,

*Soc.* And this space is of how many feet?

MENO'S

*Boy.* Of eight feet.

SLAVE.

*Soc.* And from what line do you get this figure?*Boy.* From this.*Soc.* That is, from the line which extends from corner to corner of the figure of four feet?*Boy.* Yes.*Soc.* And that is the line which the learned call the diagonal. And if this is the proper name, then you, Meno's slave, are prepared to affirm that the double space is the square of the diagonal?*Boy.* Certainly, Socrates.*Soc.* What do you say of him, Meno? Were not all these answers given out of his own head?*Meno.* Yes, they were all his own.*Soc.* And yet, as we were just now saying, he did not know?*Meno.* True.*Soc.* But still he had in him those notions of his — had he not?*Meno.* Yes.*Soc.* Then he who does not know may still have true notions of that which he does not know?*Meno.* He has.

At present he  
is in a dream;  
he will soon  
grow clearer.

*Soc.* And at present these notions have just been stirred up in him, as in a dream; but if he were frequently asked the same questions, in different forms, he would know as well as any one at last?*Meno.* I dare say.*Soc.* Without any one teaching him he will recover his knowledge for himself, if he is only asked questions?*Meno.* Yes.*Soc.* And this spontaneous recovery of knowledge in him is recollection?*Meno.* True.*Soc.* And this knowledge which he now has must he not either have acquired or always possessed?*Meno.* Yes.

*Soc.* But if he always possessed this knowledge he would always have known; or if he has acquired the knowledge he could not have acquired it in this life, unless he has been taught geometry; for he may be made to do the same with all geometry and every other branch of knowledge. Now, has any one ever taught him all this? You must know about him, if, as you say, he was born and bred in your house.

*Meno.*

SOCRATES,  
MENO.

Either this knowledge was acquired by him in a former state of existence, or was always known to him.

*Men.* And I am certain that no one ever did teach him.

*Soc.* And yet he has the knowledge?

*Men.* The fact, Socrates, is undeniable.

*Soc.* But if he did not acquire the knowledge in this life,  
86 then he must have had and learned it at some other time?

*Men.* Clearly he must.

*Soc.* Which must have been the time when he was not a man?

*Men.* Yes.

*Soc.* And if there have been always true thoughts in him, both at the time when he was and was not a man, which only need to be awakened into knowledge by putting questions to him, his soul must have always possessed this knowledge, for he always either was or was not a man?

*Men.* Obviously.

*Soc.* And if the truth of all things always existed in the soul, then the soul is immortal. Wherefore be of good cheer, and try to recollect what you do not know, or rather what you do not remember,

*Men.* I feel, somehow, that I like what you are saying.

*Soc.* And I, Meno, like what I am saying. Some things I have said of which I am not altogether confident. But that we shall be better and braver and less helpless if we think that we ought to enquire, than we should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there was no knowing and no use in seeking to know what we do not know;—that is a theme upon which I am ready to fight, in word and deed, to the utmost of my power.

Better to enquire than to fancy that there is no such thing as enquiry and no use in it.

*Men.* There again, Socrates, your words seem to me excellent.

*Soc.* Then, as we are agreed that a man should enquire about that which he does not know, shall you and I make an effort to enquire together into the nature of virtue?

*Meno.*SOCRATES,  
MENO.

Socrates cannot enquire whether virtue can be taught until he knows what virtue is, except upon an hypothesis, such as geometers sometimes employ; e. g. can a triangle of given area be inscribed in a given circle, if when the side of it is produced this or that consequence follows? [The hypothesis appears to be rather trivial and to have no mathematical value.]

Upon the hypothesis 'that virtue is knowledge,' can it be taught?

*Men.* By all means, Socrates. And yet I would much rather return to my original question, Whether in seeking to acquire virtue we should regard it as a thing to be taught, or as a gift of nature, or as coming to men in some other way?

*Soc.* Had I the command of you as well as of myself, Meno, I would not have enquired whether virtue is given by instruction or not, until we had first ascertained 'what it is.' But as you think only of controlling me who am your slave, and never of controlling yourself,—such being your notion of freedom, I must yield to you, for you are irresistible. And therefore I have now to enquire into the qualities of a thing of which I do not as yet know the nature. At any rate, will you condescend a little, and allow the question 'Whether virtue is given by instruction, or in any other way,' to be argued upon hypothesis? As the geometer, when he is asked <sup>1</sup> whether 87 a certain triangle is capable of being inscribed in a certain circle <sup>1</sup>, will reply: 'I cannot tell you as yet; but I will offer a hypothesis which may assist us in forming a conclusion: If the figure be such that <sup>2</sup> when you have produced a given side of it <sup>2</sup>, the given area of the triangle falls short by an area <sup>3</sup> corresponding to the part produced <sup>3</sup>, then one consequence follows, and if this is impossible then some other; and therefore I wish to assume a hypothesis before I tell you whether this triangle is capable of being inscribed in the circle:'—that is a geometrical hypothesis. And we too, as we know not the nature and qualities of virtue, must ask, whether virtue is or is not taught, under a hypothesis: as thus, if virtue is of such a class of mental goods, will it be taught or not? Let the first hypothesis be that virtue is or is not knowledge,—in that case will it be taught or not? or, as we were just now saying, 'remembered'? For there is no use in disputing about the name. But is virtue taught or not? or rather, does not every one see that knowledge alone is taught?

*Men.* I agree.

*Soc.* Then if virtue is knowledge, virtue will be taught?

*Men.* Certainly.

<sup>1</sup> Or, whether a certain area is capable of being inscribed as a triangle in a certain circle.

<sup>2</sup> Or, when you apply it to the given line, i. e. the diameter of the circle (*αἰρού*).

<sup>3</sup> Or, similar to the area so applied.



*Soc.* Then now we have made a quick end of this question : *Meno.*  
if virtue is of such a nature, it will be taught ; and if not, not?

SOCRATES,  
MENO.

*Men.* Certainly.

*Soc.* The next question is, whether virtue is knowledge or 'Of course.'  
of another species?

*Men.* Yes, that appears to be the question which comes  
next in order.

*Soc.* Do we not say that virtue is a good?—This is a hypothesis which is not set aside. *But is virtue knowledge?*

*Men.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Now, if there be any sort of good which is distinct from knowledge, virtue may be that good ; but if knowledge embraces all good, then we shall be right in thinking that virtue is knowledge? *Virtue is a good, and profitable: and all profitable things are either profitable or the reverse according as they are or are not under the guidance of knowledge.*

*Men.* True.

*Soc.* And virtue makes us good?

*Men.* Yes.

*Soc.* And if we are good, then we are profitable ; for all good things are profitable?

*Men.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then virtue is profitable?

*Men.* That is the only inference.

*Soc.* Then now let us see what are the things which severally profit us. Health and strength, and beauty and wealth—these, and the like of these, we call profitable?

*Men.* True.

88 *Soc.* And yet these things may also sometimes do us harm : would you not think so?

*Men.* Yes.

*Soc.* And what is the guiding principle which makes them profitable or the reverse? Are they not profitable when they are rightly used, and hurtful when they are not rightly used?

*Men.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Next, let us consider the goods of the soul: they are temperance, justice, courage, quickness of apprehension, memory, magnanimity, and the like?

*Men.* Surely.

*Soc.* And such of these as are not knowledge, but of another sort, are sometimes profitable and sometimes hurtful ; as, for example, courage wanting prudence, which is only

*Meno.*SOCRATES,  
MENO.

a sort of confidence? When a man has no sense he is harmed by courage, but when he has sense he is profited?

*Men.* True.

*Soc.* And the same may be said of temperance and quickness of apprehension; whatever things are learned or done with sense are profitable, but when done without sense they are hurtful?

*Men.* Very true.

*Soc.* And in general, all that the soul attempts or endures, when under the guidance of wisdom, ends in happiness; but when she is under the guidance of folly, in the opposite?

*Men.* That appears to be true.

And so all  
virtue must  
be a sort of  
wisdom or  
knowledge.

*Soc.* If then virtue is a quality of the soul, and is admitted to be profitable, it must be wisdom or prudence, since none of the things of the soul are either profitable or hurtful in themselves, but they are all made profitable or hurtful by the addition of wisdom or of folly; and therefore if virtue is profitable, virtue must be a sort of wisdom or prudence?

*Men.* I quite agree.

*Soc.* And the other goods, such as wealth and the like, of which we were just now saying that they are sometimes good and sometimes evil, do not they also become profitable or hurtful, accordingly as the soul guides and uses them rightly or wrongly; just as the things of the soul herself are benefited when under the guidance of wisdom and harmed by folly?

*Men.* True.

*Soc.* And the wise soul guides them rightly, and the foolish soul wrongly?

*Men.* Yes.

*Soc.* And is not this universally true of human nature? All other things hang upon the soul, and the things of the soul herself hang upon wisdom, if they are to be good; and so wisdom is inferred to be that which profits — and virtue, as we say, is profitable? 89

*Men.* Certainly.

Virtue is  
either wholly  
or partly  
wisdom.

*Soc.* And thus we arrive at the conclusion that virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom?

*Men.* I think that what you are saying, Socrates, is very true.

*Soc.* But if this is true, then the good are not by nature good? *Meno.*

*Men.* I think not.

*Soc.* If they had been, there would assuredly have been discerners of characters among us who would have known our future great men; and on their showing we should have adopted them, and when we had got them, we should have kept them in the citadel out of the way of harm, and set a stamp upon them far rather than upon a piece of gold, in order that no one might tamper with them; and when they grew up they would have been useful to the state? *If this is true, virtue must be taught; but then where are the teachers?*

*Men.* Yes, Socrates, that would have been the right way.

*Soc.* But if the good are not by nature good, are they made good by instruction?

*Men.* There appears to be no other alternative, Socrates. On the supposition that virtue is knowledge, there can be no doubt that virtue is taught.

*Soc.* Yes, indeed; but what if the supposition is erroneous?

*Men.* I certainly thought just now that we were right.

*Soc.* Yes, Meno; but a principle which has any soundness should stand firm not only just now, but always.

*Men.* Well; and why are you so slow of heart to believe that knowledge is virtue?

*Soc.* I will try and tell you why, Meno. I do not retract the assertion that if virtue is knowledge it may be taught; but I fear that I have some reason in doubting whether virtue is knowledge: for consider now and say whether virtue, and not only virtue but anything that is taught, must not have teachers and disciples?

*Men.* Surely.

*Soc.* And conversely, may not the art of which neither teachers nor disciples exist be assumed to be incapable of being taught?

*Men.* True; but do you think that there are no teachers of virtue?

*Soc.* I have certainly often enquired whether there were any, and taken great pains to find them, and have never succeeded; and many have assisted me in the search, and they were the persons whom I thought the most likely to know.  
90 Here at the moment when he is wanted we fortunately

Can Anytus tell us who they are?



*Meno.*

SOCRATES,

ANYTUS.

have sitting by us Anytus, the very person of whom we should make enquiry; to him then let us repair. In the first place, he is the son of a wealthy and wise father, Anthemion, who acquired his wealth, not by accident or gift, like Ismenias the Theban (who has recently made himself as rich as Polycrates), but by his own skill and industry, and who is a well-conditioned, modest man, not insolent, or overbearing, or annoying; moreover, this son of his has received a good education, as the Athenian people certainly appear to think, for they choose him to fill the highest offices. And these are the sort of men from whom you are likely to learn whether there are any teachers of virtue, and who they are. Please, Anytus, to help me and your friend Meno in answering our question, Who are the teachers? Consider the matter thus: If we wanted Meno to be a good physician, to whom should we send him? Should we not send him to the physicians?

*Any.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Or if we wanted him to be a good cobbler, should we not send him to the cobblers?

*Any.* Yes.*Soc.* And so forth?*Any.* Yes.

The arts are taught by the professors of them. And have we not heard of those who profess to teach virtue at a fixed price?

*Soc.* Let me trouble you with one more question. When we say that we should be right in sending him to the physicians if we wanted him to be a physician, do we mean that we should be right in sending him to those who profess the art, rather than to those who do not, and to those who demand payment for teaching the art, and profess to teach it to any one who will come and learn? And if these were our reasons, should we not be right in sending him?

*Any.* Yes.

*Soc.* And might not the same be said of flute-playing, and of the other arts? Would a man who wanted to make another a flute-player refuse to send him to those who profess to teach the art for money, and be plaguing other persons to give him instruction, who are not professed teachers and who never had a single disciple in that branch of knowledge which he wishes him to acquire — would not such conduct be the height of folly?

*Any.* Yes, by Zeus, and of ignorance too.

*Meno.*

91 *Soc.* Very good. And now you are in a position to advise with me about my friend Meno. He has been telling me, Anytus, that he desires to attain that kind of wisdom and virtue by which men order the state or the house, and honour their parents, and know when to receive and when to send away citizens and strangers, as a good man should. Now, to whom should he go in order that he may learn this virtue? Does not the previous argument imply clearly that we should send him to those who profess and avouch that they are the common teachers of all Hellas, and are ready to impart instruction to any one who likes, at a fixed price?

SOCRATES,  
ANYTUS.

*Any.* Whom do you mean, Socrates?

*Soc.* You surely know, do you not, Anytus, that these are the people whom mankind call Sophists?

*Any.* By Heracles, Socrates, forbear! I only hope that no friend or kinsman or acquaintance of mine, whether citizen or stranger, will ever be so mad as to allow himself to be corrupted by them; for they are a manifest pest and corrupting influence to those who have to do with them.

Anytus inveighs against the corrupting influence of the Sophists.

*Soc.* What, Anytus? Of all the people who profess that they know how to do men good, do you mean to say that these are the only ones who not only do them no good, but positively corrupt those who are entrusted to them, and in return for this disservice have the face to demand money? Indeed, I cannot believe you; for I know of a single man, Protagoras, who made more out of his craft than the illustrious Pheidias, who created such noble works, or any ten other statuaries. How could that be? A mender of old shoes, or patcher up of clothes, who made the shoes or clothes worse than he received them, could not have remained thirty days undetected, and would very soon have starved; whereas during more than forty years, Protagoras was corrupting all Hellas, and sending his disciples from him worse than he received them, and he was never found out. For, if I am not mistaken, he was about seventy years old at his death, forty of which were spent in the practice of his profession; and during all that time he had a good reputation, which to this day he retains: and not only Protagoras, but many others are well spoken of; some who lived before him, and others who

Why surely they cannot really be corrupters? See what fortunes they make, and what an excellent reputation many of them bear!

*Meno.*SOCRATES,  
ANYTUS.

are still living. Now, when you say that they deceived and 92  
corrupted the youth, are they to be supposed to have corrupted them consciously or unconsciously? Can those who were deemed by many to be the wisest men of Hellas have been out of their minds?

The wisest  
men in Hellas  
could not have  
been out of  
their minds?  
No:—the people  
who gave  
their money to  
them were out  
of their minds.

*Any.* Out of their minds! No, Socrates; the young men who gave their money to them were out of their minds, and their relations and guardians who entrusted their youth to the care of these men were still more out of their minds, and most of all, the cities who allowed them to come in, and did not drive them out, citizen and stranger alike.

*Soc.* Has any of the Sophists wronged you, Anytus? What makes you so angry with them?

*Any.* No, indeed, neither I nor any of my belongings has ever had, nor would I suffer them to have, anything to do with them.

*Soc.* Then you are entirely unacquainted with them?

*Any.* And I have no wish to be acquainted.

How can  
Anytus know  
that they are  
bad, if he does  
not know  
them at all?

*Soc.* Then, my dear friend, how can you know whether a thing is good or bad of which you are wholly ignorant?

*Any.* Quite well; I am sure that I know what manner of men these are, whether I am acquainted with them or not.

Then who will  
teach Meno  
virtue?

*Soc.* You must be a diviner, Anytus, for I really cannot make out, judging from your own words, how, if you are not acquainted with them, you know about them. But I am not enquiring of you who are the teachers who will corrupt Meno (let them be, if you please, the Sophists); I only ask you to tell him who there is in this great city who will teach him how to become eminent in the virtues which I was just now describing. He is the friend of your family, and you will oblige him.

*Any.* Why do you not tell him yourself?

*Soc.* I have told him whom I supposed to be the teachers of these things; but I learn from you that I am utterly at fault, and I dare say that you are right. And now I wish that you, on your part, would tell me to whom among the Athenians he should go. Whom would you name?

Any Athenian  
gentleman  
who has  
learned

*Any.* Why single out individuals? Any Athenian gentleman, taken at random, if he will mind him, will do far more good to him than the Sophists.



93 *Soc.* And did those gentlemen grow of themselves; and without having been taught by any one, were they nevertheless able to teach others that which they had never learned themselves?

*Any.* I imagine that they learned of the previous generation of gentlemen. Have there not been many good men in this city?

*Soc.* Yes, certainly, Anytus; and many good statesmen also there always have been and there are still, in the city of Athens. But the question is whether they were also good teachers of their own virtue;—not whether there are, or have been, good men in this part of the world, but whether virtue can be taught, is the question which we have been discussing. Now, do we mean to say that the good men of our own and of other times knew how to impart to others that virtue which they had themselves; or is virtue a thing incapable of being communicated or imparted by one man to another? That is the question which I and Meno have been arguing. Look at the matter in your own way: Would you not admit that Themistocles was a good man?

*Any.* Certainly; no man better.

*Soc.* And must not he then have been a good teacher, if any man ever was a good teacher, of his own virtue?

*Any.* Yes, certainly,—if he wanted to be so.

*Soc.* But would he not have wanted? He would, at any rate, have desired to make his own son a good man and a gentleman; he could not have been jealous of him, or have intentionally abstained from imparting to him his own virtue. Did you never hear that he made his son Cleophantus a famous horseman; and had him taught to stand upright on horseback and hurl a javelin, and to do many other marvellous things; and in anything which could be learned from a master he was well trained? Have you not heard from our elders of him?

*Any.* I have.

*Soc.* Then no one could say that his son showed any want of capacity?

*Any.* Very likely not.

*Soc.* But did any one, old or young, ever say in your hearing that Cleophantus, son of Themistocles, was a wise or good man, as his father was?

*Meno.*

SOCRATES,  
ANYTUS.

of a previous  
generation of  
gentlemen.

Good men  
may not have  
been good  
teachers.  
There never  
was a better  
man than  
Themistocles;  
but he did not  
make much of  
his own son.

*Meno.**Any.* I have certainly never heard any one say so.SOCRATES,  
ANYTUS.He had him  
taught accom-  
plishments  
because there  
was no one to  
teach virtue.*Soc.* And if virtue could have been taught, would his father Themistocles have sought to train him in these minor accomplishments, and allowed him who, as you must remember, was his own son, to be no better than his neighbours in those qualities in which he himself excelled?*Any.* Indeed, indeed, I think not.*Soc.* Here was a teacher of virtue whom you admit to be among the best men of the past. Let us take another,—Aristides, the son of Lysimachus: would you not acknowledge that he was a good man? 94*Any.* To be sure I should.Aristides was  
also a good  
man, and  
Pericles and  
Thucydides:  
—they made  
their sons  
good horse-  
men, and  
wrestlers, and  
the like, but  
they did not  
have them  
taught to be  
good, because  
virtue cannot  
be taught.*Soc.* And did not he train his son Lysimachus better than any other Athenian in all that could be done for him by the help of masters? But what has been the result? Is he a bit better than any other mortal? He is an acquaintance of yours, and you see what he is like. There is Pericles, again, magnificent in his wisdom; and he, as you are aware, had two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus.*Any.* I know.*Soc.* And you know, also, that he taught them to be unrivalled horsemen, and had them trained in music and gymnastics and all sorts of arts—in these respects they were on a level with the best—and had he no wish to make good men of them? Nay, he must have wished it. But virtue, as I suspect, could not be taught. And that you may not suppose the incompetent teachers to be only the meaner sort of Athenians and few in number, remember again that Thucydides had two sons, Melesias and Stephanus, whom, besides giving them a good education in other things, he trained in wrestling, and they were the best wrestlers in Athens: one of them he committed to the care of Xanthias, and the other of Eudorus, who had the reputation of being the most celebrated wrestlers of that day. Do you remember them?*Any.* I have heard of them.*Soc.* Now, can there be a doubt that Thucydides, whose children were taught things for which he had to spend money, would have taught them to be good men, which would have cost him nothing, if virtue could have been taught? Will you reply that he was a mean man, and had not many friends

among the Athenians and allies? Nay, but he was of a great family, and a man of influence at Athens and in all Hellas, and, if virtue could have been taught, he would have found out some Athenian or foreigner who would have made good men of his sons, if he could not himself spare the time from cares of state. Once more, I suspect, friend Anytus, that virtue is not a thing which can be taught?

*Meno.*

SOCRATES,  
ANYTUS,  
MENO.

*Any.* Socrates, I think that you are too ready to speak evil of men: and, if you will take my advice, I would recommend you to be careful. Perhaps there is no city in which it is not easier to do men harm than to do them good, and  
95 this is certainly the case at Athens, as I believe that you know.

Anytus gives  
an angry  
warning to  
Socrates.

*Soc.* O Meno, I think that Anytus is in a rage. And he may well be in a rage, for he thinks, in the first place, that I am defaming these gentlemen; and in the second place, he is of opinion that he is one of them himself. But some day he will know what is the meaning of defamation, and if he ever does, he will forgive me. Meanwhile I will return to you, Meno; for I suppose that there are gentlemen in your region too?

*Men.* Certainly there are.

*Soc.* And are they willing to teach the young? and do they profess to be teachers? and do they agree that virtue is taught?

*Men.* No indeed, Socrates, they are anything but agreed; you may hear them saying at one time that virtue can be taught, and then again the reverse.

The Thessa-  
lian gentry  
are not agreed  
about the  
possibility  
of teaching  
virtue.

*Soc.* Can we call those teachers who do not acknowledge the possibility of their own vocation?

*Men.* I think not, Socrates.

*Soc.* And what do you think of these Sophists, who are the only professors? Do they seem to you to be teachers of virtue?

*Men.* I often wonder, Socrates, that Gorgias is never heard promising to teach virtue: and when he hears others promising he only laughs at them; but he thinks that men should be taught to speak.

Gorgias  
professes to  
teach rhetoric,  
but laughs at  
those who  
pretend to  
teach virtue.

*Soc.* Then do you not think that the Sophists are teachers?

*Men.* I cannot tell you, Socrates; like the rest of the world,



*Meno.*

I am in doubt, and sometimes I think that they are teachers and sometimes not.

SOCRATES,

MENO.

*Soc.* And are you aware that not you only and other politicians have doubts whether virtue can be taught or not, but that Theognis the poet says the very same thing?

*Men.* Where does he say so?

*Soc.* In these elegiac verses<sup>1</sup>:—

Theognis  
implies in one  
passage that  
virtue can,  
and in another  
that it cannot,  
be taught.

‘ Eat and drink and sit with the mighty, and make yourself agreeable to them; for from the good you will learn what is good, but if you mix with the bad you will lose the intelligence which you already have.’

Do you observe that here he seems to imply that virtue can be taught?

*Men.* Clearly.

*Soc.* But in some other verses he shifts about and says<sup>2</sup>:—

‘ If understanding could be created and put into a man, then they’ [who were able to perform this feat] ‘ would have obtained great rewards.’

And again:—

‘ Never would a bad son have sprung from a good sire, for he would have heard the voice of instruction; but not by teaching will you ever make a bad man into a good one.’ 96

And this, as you may remark, is a contradiction of the other.

*Men.* Clearly.

How can they  
be teachers  
who are so  
inconsistent  
with them-  
selves?

*Soc.* And is there anything else of which the professors are affirmed not only not to be teachers of others, but to be ignorant themselves, and bad at the knowledge of that which they are professing to teach? or is there anything about which even the acknowledged ‘ gentlemen’ are sometimes saying that ‘ this thing can be taught,’ and sometimes the opposite? Can you say that they are teachers in any true sense whose ideas are in such confusion?

*Men.* I should say, certainly not.

*Soc.* But if neither the Sophists nor the gentlemen are teachers, clearly there can be no other teachers?

*Men.* No.

*Soc.* And if there are no teachers, neither are there disciples?

*Men.* Agreed.

<sup>1</sup> Theog. 33 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Theog. 435 ff.

*Soc.* And we have admitted that a thing cannot be taught of which there are neither teachers nor disciples?

*Men.* We have.

*Soc.* And there are no teachers of virtue to be found anywhere?

*Men.* There are not.

*Soc.* And if there are no teachers, neither are there scholars?

*Men.* That, I think, is true.

*Soc.* Then virtue cannot be taught?

*Men.* Not if we are right in our view. But I cannot believe, Socrates, that there are no good men: And if there are, how did they come into existence?

*Soc.* I am afraid, Meno, that you and I are not good for much, and that Gorgias has been as poor an educator of you as Prodicus has been of me. Certainly we shall have to look to ourselves, and try to find some one who will help in some way or other to improve us. This I say, because I observe that in the previous discussion none of us remarked that right and good action is possible to man under other guidance than that of knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*);—and indeed if this be denied, there is no seeing how there can be any good men at all.

*Men.* How do you mean, Socrates?

*Soc.* I mean that good men are necessarily useful or profitable. Were we not right in admitting this? It must be so.

*Men.* Yes.

*Soc.* And in supposing that they will be useful only if they are true guides to us of action—there we were also right?

*Men.* Yes.

*Soc.* But when we said that a man cannot be a good guide unless he have knowledge (*φρόνησις*), in this we were wrong.

*Men.* What do you mean by the word 'right'?

*Soc.* I will explain. If a man knew the way to Larisa, or anywhere else, and went to the place and led others thither, would he not be a right and good guide?

*Men.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And a person who had a right opinion about the way, but had never been and did not know, might be a good guide also, might he not?

*Meno.*

SOCRATES,  
MENO.

If there are no teachers and no scholars, virtue cannot be taught.

But were we not mistaken in our view? There may be another guide to good action as well as knowledge,

*Meno.**Men.* Certainly.SOCRATES,  
MENO.*Soc.* And while he has true opinion about that which the other knows, he will be just as good a guide if he thinks the truth, as he who knows the truth?*Men.* Exactly.Right opinion  
is as good a  
guide to action  
as knowledge.*Soc.* Then true opinion is as good a guide to correct action as knowledge; and that was the point which we omitted in our speculation about the nature of virtue, when we said that knowledge only is the guide of right action; whereas there is also right opinion.*Men.* True.*Soc.* Then right opinion is not less useful than knowledge?*Men.* The difference, Socrates, is only that he who has knowledge will always be right; but he who has right opinion will sometimes be right, and sometimes not.*Soc.* What do you mean? Can he be wrong who has right opinion, so long as he has right opinion?*Men.* I admit the cogency of your argument, and therefore, Socrates, I wonder that knowledge should be preferred to right opinion — or why they should ever differ.*Soc.* And shall I explain this wonder to you?*Men.* Do tell me.*Soc.* You would not wonder if you had ever observed the images of Daedalus<sup>1</sup>; but perhaps you have not got them in your country?*Men.* What have they to do with the question?*Soc.* Because they require to be fastened in order to keep them, and if they are not fastened they will play truant and run away.*Men.* Well, what of that?But right  
opinions are  
apt to walk  
away, like the  
images of  
Daedalus.*Soc.* I mean to say that they are not very valuable possessions if they are at liberty, for they will walk off like runaway slaves; but when fastened, they are of great value, for they are really beautiful works of art. Now this is an illustration of the nature of true opinions: while they abide 98 with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul, and do not remain long, and therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause; and this fastening of them, friend Meno,<sup>1</sup> Cp. Euthyphro 11 B.



is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call it. But when they are bound, in the first place, they have the nature of knowledge; and, in the second place, they are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more honourable and excellent than true opinion, because fastened by a chain.

*Meno.*

SOCRATES,  
MENO.

*Men.* What you are saying, Socrates, seems to be very like the truth.

*Soc.* I too speak rather in ignorance; I only conjecture. And yet that knowledge differs from true opinion is no matter of conjecture with me. There are not many things which I profess to know, but this is most certainly one of them.

*Men.* Yes, Socrates; and you are quite right in saying so.

*Soc.* And am I not also right in saying that true opinion leading the way perfects action quite as well as knowledge?

*Men.* There again, Socrates, I think that you are right.

*Soc.* Then right opinion is not a whit inferior to knowledge, or less useful in action; nor is the man who has right opinion inferior to him who has knowledge?

*Men.* True.

*Soc.* And surely the good man has been acknowledged by us to be useful?

*Men.* Yes.

*Soc.* Seeing then that men become good and useful to states, not only because they have knowledge, but because they have right opinion, and that neither knowledge nor right opinion is given to man by nature or acquired by him — (do you imagine either of them to be given by nature?

*Men.* Not I.)

*Soc.* Then if they are not given by nature, neither are the good by nature good?

*Men.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* And nature being excluded, then came the question whether virtue is acquired by teaching?

*Men.* Yes.

*Soc.* If virtue was wisdom [or knowledge], then, as we thought, it was taught?

*Men.* Yes.

*Soc.* And if it was taught it was wisdom?

*Men.* Certainly.

*Meno.*SOCRATES,  
MENO.*Soc.* And if there were teachers, it might be taught; and if there were no teachers, not?*Men.* True.*Soc.* But surely we acknowledged that there were no teachers of virtue?*Men.* Yes.*Soc.* Then we acknowledged that it was not taught, and was not wisdom?*Men.* Certainly.*Soc.* And yet we admitted that it was a good?*Men.* Yes.*Soc.* And the right guide is useful and good?*Men.* Certainly.

If virtue and knowledge cannot be taught, the only right guides of men are true opinions.

*Soc.* And the only right guides are knowledge and true opinion — these are the guides of man; for things which happen by chance are not under the guidance of man: but the guides of man are true opinion and knowledge.*Men.* I think so too.*Soc.* But if virtue is not taught, neither is virtue knowledge.*Men.* Clearly not.*Soc.* Then of two good and useful things, one, which is knowledge, has been set aside, and cannot be supposed to be our guide in political life.*Men.* I think not.*Soc.* And therefore not by any wisdom, and not because they were wise, did Themistocles and those others of whom Anytus spoke govern states. This was the reason why they were unable to make others like themselves — because their virtue was not grounded on knowledge.*Men.* That is probably true, Socrates.

Right opinion is in politics what divination is in religion; diviners, prophets, poets, statesmen, may all be truly called 'divine men.'

*Soc.* But if not by knowledge, the only alternative which remains is that statesmen must have guided states by right opinion, which is in politics what divination is in religion; for diviners and also prophets say many things truly, but they know not what they say.*Men.* So I believe.*Soc.* And may we not, Meno, truly call those men 'divine' who, having no understanding, yet succeed in many a grand deed and word?*Men.* Certainly.



*Soc.* Then we shall also be right in calling divine those whom we were just now speaking of as diviners and prophets, including the whole tribe of poets. Yes, and statesmen above all may be said to be divine and illumined, being inspired and possessed of God, in which condition they say many grand things, not knowing what they say.

*Men.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the women too, Meno, call good men divine — do they not? and the Spartans, when they praise a good man, say 'that he is a divine man.'

*Men.* And I think, Socrates, that they are right; although very likely our friend Anytus may take offence at the word.

*Soc.* I do not care; as for Anytus, there will be another opportunity of talking with him. To sum up our enquiry — the result seems to be, if we are at all right in our view, that virtue is neither natural nor acquired, but an instinct given by God to the virtuous. Nor is the instinct accompanied by reason, unless there may be supposed to be among statesmen some one who is capable of educating statesmen. And if there be such an one, he may be said to be among the living what Homer says that Tiresias was among the dead, 'he alone has understanding; but the rest are flitting shades;' and he and his virtue in like manner will be a reality among shadows.

*Men.* That is excellent, Socrates.

*Soc.* Then, Meno, the conclusion is that virtue comes to the virtuous by the gift of God. But we shall never know the certain truth until, before asking how virtue is given, we enquire into the actual nature of virtue. I fear that I must go away, but do you, now that you are persuaded yourself, persuade our friend Anytus. And do not let him be so exasperated; if you can conciliate him, you will have done good service to the Athenian people.

*Meno.*

*SOCRATES,*

*MENO.*

Virtue comes  
by the gift of  
God.



# EUTHYPHRO.



## INTRODUCTION.

IN the *Meno*, Anytus had parted from Socrates with the significant words: 'That in any city, and particularly in the city of Athens, it is easier to do men harm than to do them good' (94 E); and Socrates was anticipating another opportunity of talking with him (99 E). In the *Euthyphro*, Socrates is awaiting his trial for impiety. But before the trial begins, Plato would like to put the world on their trial, and convince them of ignorance in that very matter touching which Socrates is accused. An incident which may perhaps really have occurred in the family of Euthyphro, a learned Athenian diviner and soothsayer, furnishes the occasion of the discussion.

*Euthyphro.*

INTRODUC-  
TION.

**Steph.** This Euthyphro and Socrates are represented as meeting in the  
2 porch of the King Archon. (Cp. *Theaet.* sub fin.) Both have  
legal business in hand. Socrates is defendant in a suit for impiety  
3 which Meletus has brought against him (it is remarked by the  
way that he is not a likely man himself to have brought a suit  
against another); and Euthyphro too is plaintiff in an action for  
4 murder, which he has brought against his own father. The latter  
has originated in the following manner:—A poor dependant of  
the family had slain one of their domestic slaves in Naxos. The  
guilty person was bound and thrown into a ditch by the command  
of Euthyphro's father, who sent to the interpreters of religion  
at Athens to ask what should be done with him. Before the  
messenger came back the criminal had died from hunger and  
exposure.

ANALYSIS.

This is the origin of the charge of murder which Euthyphro brings against his father. Socrates is confident that before he could have undertaken the responsibility of such a prosecution,



*Euthyphro.*

ANALYSIS.

he must have been perfectly informed of the nature of piety and impiety; and as he is going to be tried for impiety himself, he thinks that he cannot do better than learn of Euthyphro (who will be admitted by everybody, including the judges, to be an unimpeachable authority) what piety is, and what is impiety. What then is piety?

Euthyphro, who, in the abundance of his knowledge, is very willing to undertake all the responsibility, replies: That piety is doing as I do, prosecuting your father (if he is guilty) on a charge of murder; doing as the gods do—as Zeus did to Cronos, and Cronos to Uranus.

Socrates has a dislike to these tales of mythology, and he fancies that this dislike of his may be the reason why he is charged with impiety. 'Are they really true?' 'Yes, they are;' and Euthyphro will gladly tell Socrates some more of them. But Socrates would like first of all to have a more satisfactory answer to the question, 'What is piety?' 'Doing as I do, charging a father with murder,' may be a single instance of piety, but can hardly be regarded as a general definition.

Euthyphro replies, that 'Piety is what is dear to the gods, and impiety is what is not dear to them.' But may there not be differences of opinion, as among men, so also among the gods? Especially, about good and evil, which have no fixed rule; and these are precisely the sort of differences which give rise to quarrels. And therefore what may be dear to one god may not be dear to another, and the same action may be both pious and impious; e. g. your chastisement of your father, Euthyphro, may be dear or pleasing to Zeus (who inflicted a similar chastisement on his own father), but not equally pleasing to Cronos or Uranus (who suffered at the hands of their sons).

Euthyphro answers that there is no difference of opinion, either among gods or men, as to the propriety of punishing a murderer. Yes, rejoins Socrates, when they know him to be a murderer; but you are assuming the point at issue. If all the circumstances of the case are considered, are you able to show that your father was guilty of murder, or that all the gods are agreed in approving of our prosecution of him? And must you not allow that what is hated by one god may be liked by another? Waiving this last,

however, Socrates proposes to amend the definition, and say that 'what all the gods love is pious, and what they all hate is impious.' To this Euthyphro agrees.

Euthyphro.

ANALYSIS.

- 10 Socrates proceeds to analyze the new form of the definition. He shows that in other cases the act precedes the state; e. g. the act of being carried, loved, &c. precedes the state of being carried, loved, &c., and therefore that which is dear to the gods is dear to the gods because it is first loved of them, not loved of them because it is dear to them. But the pious or holy is loved by the gods because it is pious or holy, which is equivalent to saying, that it is loved by them because it is dear to them. Here
- 11 then appears to be a contradiction,—Euthyphro has been giving an attribute or accident of piety only, and not the essence. Euthyphro acknowledges himself that his explanations seem to walk away or go round in a circle, like the moving figures of Daedalus, the ancestor of Socrates, who has communicated his art to his descendants.
- 12 Socrates, who is desirous of stimulating the indolent intelligence of Euthyphro, raises the question in another manner: 'Is all the pious just?' 'Yes.' 'Is all the just pious?' 'No.' 'Then what part of justice is piety?' Euthyphro replies that piety is that part of justice which 'attends' to the gods, as there is another
- 13 part of justice which 'attends' to men. But what is the meaning of 'attending' to the gods? The word 'attending,' when applied to dogs, horses, and men, implies that in some way they are made better. But how do pious or holy acts make the gods any better? Euthyphro explains that he means by pious acts, acts of service or ministration. Yes; but the ministrations of the husbandman, the physician, and the builder have an end. To what end do
- 14 we serve the gods, and what do we help them to accomplish? Euthyphro replies, that all these difficult questions cannot be resolved in a short time; and he would rather say simply that piety is knowing how to please the gods in word and deed, by prayers and sacrifices. In other words, says Socrates, piety is 'a
- 15 science of asking and giving'—asking what we want and giving what they want; in short, a mode of doing business between gods and men. But although they are the givers of all good, how can we give them any good in return? 'Nay, but we give them honour.' Then we give them not what is beneficial, but what is

*Euthyphro.*

ANALYSIS.

pleasing or dear to them; and this is the point which has been already disproved.

Socrates, although weary of the subterfuges and evasions of Euthyphro, remains unshaken in his conviction that he must know the nature of piety, or he would never have prosecuted his old father. He is still hoping that he will condescend to instruct him. But Euthyphro is in a hurry and cannot stay. And Socrates' last hope of knowing the nature of piety before he is prosecuted for impiety has disappeared. As in the Euthydemus the irony is carried on to the end. 16

INTRODUC-  
TION.

The Euthyphro is manifestly designed to contrast the real nature of piety and impiety with the popular conceptions of them. But when the popular conceptions of them have been overthrown, Socrates does not offer any definition of his own: as in the Laches and Lysis, he prepares the way for an answer to the question which he has raised; but true to his own character, refuses to answer himself.

Euthyphro is a religionist, and is elsewhere spoken of, if he be the same person, as the author of a philosophy of names, by whose 'prancing steeds' Socrates in the Cratylus is carried away (p. 396). He has the conceit and self-confidence of a Sophist; no doubt that he is right in prosecuting his father has ever entered into his mind. Like a Sophist too, he is incapable either of framing a general definition or of following the course of an argument. His wrong-headedness, one-sidedness, narrowness, positiveness, are characteristic of his priestly office. His failure to apprehend an argument may be compared to a similar defect which is observable in the rhapsode Ion. But he is not a bad man, and he is friendly to Socrates, whose familiar sign he recognizes with interest. Though unable to follow him he is very willing to be led by him, and eagerly catches at any suggestion which saves him from the trouble of thinking. Moreover he is the enemy of Meletus, who, as he says, is availing himself of the popular dislike to innovations in religion in order to injure Socrates; at the same time he is amusingly confident that he has weapons in his own armoury which would be more than a match for him. He is quite sincere in his prosecution of his father, who has accidentally been guilty of homicide, and is not wholly free from blame. To purge



away the crime appears to him in the light of a duty, whoever may be the criminal. *Euthyphro.*

INTRODUC-  
TION.

Thus begins the contrast between the religion of the letter, or of the narrow and unenlightened conscience, and the higher notion of religion which Socrates vainly endeavours to elicit from him. 'Piety is doing as I do' is the idea of religion which first occurs to him, and to many others who do not say what they think with equal frankness. For men are not easily persuaded that any other religion is better than their own; or that other nations, e. g. the Greeks in the time of Socrates, were equally serious in their religious beliefs and difficulties. The chief difference between us and them is, that they were slowly learning what we are in process of forgetting. Greek mythology hardly admitted of the distinction between accidental homicide and murder: that the pollution of blood was the same in both cases is also the feeling of the Athenian diviner. He had not as yet learned the lesson, which philosophy was teaching, that Homer and Hesiod, if not banished from the state, or whipped out of the assembly, as Heracleitus more rudely proposed, at any rate were not to be appealed to as authorities in religion; and he is ready to defend his conduct by the examples of the gods. These are the very tales which Socrates cannot abide; and his dislike of them, as he suspects, has branded him with the reputation of impiety. Here is one answer to the question, 'Why Socrates was put to death,' suggested by the way. Another is conveyed in the words, 'The Athenians do not care about any man being thought wise until he begins to make other men wise; and then for some reason or other they are angry:' which may be said to be the rule of popular toleration in most other countries, and not at Athens only. In the course of the argument (7 A, B) Socrates remarks that the controversial nature of morals and religion arises out of the difficulty of verifying them. There is no measure or standard to which they can be referred.

The next definition, 'Piety is that which is loved of the gods,' is shipwrecked on a refined distinction between the state and the act, corresponding respectively to the adjective (*φίλον*) and the participle (*φιλούμενον*), or rather perhaps to the participle and the verb (*φιλούμενον* and *φιλείται*). The act is prior to the state (as in Aristotle the *ἐνέργεια* precedes the *δύναμις*); and the state of

*Euthyphro.*INTRODUC-  
TION.

being loved is preceded by the act of being loved. But piety or holiness is preceded by the act of being pious, not by the act of being loved; and therefore piety and the state of being loved are different. Through such subtleties of dialectic Socrates is working his way into a deeper region of thought and feeling. He means to say that the words 'loved of the gods' express an attribute only, and not the essence of piety.

Then follows the third and last definition, 'Piety is a part of justice.' Thus far Socrates has proceeded in placing religion on a moral foundation. He is seeking to realize the harmony of religion and morality, which the great poets Æschylus, Sophocles, and Pindar had unconsciously anticipated, and which is the universal want of all men. To this the soothsayer adds the ceremonial element, 'attending upon the gods.' When further interrogated by Socrates as to the nature of this 'attention to the gods,' he replies, that piety is an affair of business, a science of giving and asking, and the like. Socrates points out the anthropomorphism of these notions. (Cp. Symp. 202 E; Rep. ii. 365 E; Statesman 290 C, D.) But when we expect him to go on and show that the true service of the gods is the service of the spirit and the co-operation with them in all things true and good, he stops short; this was a lesson which the soothsayer could not have been made to understand, and which every one must learn for himself.

There seem to be altogether three aims or interests in this little Dialogue: (1) the dialectical development of the idea of piety; (2) the antithesis of true and false religion, which is carried to a certain extent only; (3) the defence of Socrates.

The subtle connection with the Apology and the Crito; the holding back of the conclusion, as in the Charmides, Lysis, Laches, Protagoras, and other Dialogues; and deep insight into the religious world; the dramatic power and play of the two characters; the inimitable irony, are reasons for believing that the Euthyphro is a genuine Platonic writing. The spirit in which the popular representations of mythology are denounced recalls Republic II (378 ff.) The virtue of piety has been already mentioned as one of five in the Protagoras, but is not reckoned among the four cardinal virtues of Republic IV (428 ff.). The figure of Daedalus (15 C) has occurred in the Meno (97 D); that



of Proteus (15 D) in the Euthydemus (288 B) and Io (541 E). The kingly science has already appeared in the Euthydemus, and will reappear in the Republic and Statesman. But neither from these nor any other indications of similarity or difference, and still less from arguments respecting the suitableness of this little work to aid Socrates at the time of his trial or the reverse, can any evidence of the date be obtained.

*Euthyphro.*

INTRODUC-  
TION.



# EUTHYPHRO.

## PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES.

EUTHYPHRO.

SCENE :— The Porch of the King Archon.

**Steph.** *Euthyphro.* WHY have you left the Lyceum, Socrates? *Euthyphro.*

<sup>2</sup> and what are you doing in the Porch of the King Archon? *SOCRATES,*  
Surely you cannot be concerned in a suit before the King, *EUTHYPHRO.*  
like myself?

*Socrates.* Not in a suit, Euthyphro; impeachment is the word which the Athenians use.

*Euth.* What! I suppose that some one has been prosecuting you, for I cannot believe that you are the prosecutor of another.

*Euthyphro*  
and *Socrates*  
meet at the  
Porch of the  
King Archon.  
Both have  
legal business  
on hand.

*Soc.* Certainly not.

*Euth.* Then some one else has been prosecuting you?

*Soc.* Yes.

*Euth.* And who is he?

*Soc.* A young man who is little known, Euthyphro; and I hardly know him: his name is Meletus, and he is of the deme of Pitthis. Perhaps you may remember his appearance; he has a beak, and long straight hair, and a beard which is ill grown.

*Euth.* No, I do not remember him, Socrates. But what is the charge which he brings against you?

*Soc.* What is the charge? Well, a very serious charge, which shows a good deal of character in the young man, and for which he is certainly not to be despised. He says he knows how the youth are corrupted and who are their corruptors. I fancy that he must be a wise man, and seeing that I am the reverse of a wise man, he has found me out,

Meletus has  
brought a  
charge against  
Socrates.

*Euthyphro.*SOCRATES,  
EUTHYPHRO.

and is going to accuse me of corrupting his young friends. And of this our mother the state is to be the judge. Of all our political men he is the only one who seems to me to begin in the right way, with the cultivation of virtue in youth; like a good husbandman, he makes the young shoot his first care, and clears away us who are the destroyers of them. This is only the first step; he will afterwards attend to the elder branches; and if he goes on as he has begun, he will be a very great public benefactor. 3

*Euth.* I hope that he may; but I rather fear, Socrates, that the opposite will turn out to be the truth. My opinion is that in attacking you he is simply aiming a blow at the foundation of the state. But in what way does he say that you corrupt the young?

The nature of  
the charge  
against  
Socrates.

*Soc.* He brings a wonderful accusation against me, which at first hearing excites surprise: he says that I am a poet or maker of gods, and that I invent new gods and deny the existence of old ones; this is the ground of his indictment.

*Euth.* I understand, Socrates; he means to attack you about the familiar sign which occasionally, as you say, comes to you. He thinks that you are a neologian, and he is going to have you up before the court for this. He knows that such a charge is readily received by the world, as I myself know too well; for when I speak in the assembly about divine things, and foretell the future to them, they laugh at me and think me a madman. Yet every word that I say is true. But they are jealous of us all; and we must be brave and go at them.

*Soc.* Their laughter, friend Euthyphro, is not a matter of much consequence. For a man may be thought wise; but the Athenians, I suspect, do not much trouble themselves about him until he begins to impart his wisdom to others; and then for some reason or other, perhaps, as you say, from jealousy, they are angry.

*Euth.* I am never likely to try their temper in this way.

*Soc.* I dare say not, for you are reserved in your behaviour, and seldom impart your wisdom. But I have a benevolent habit of pouring out myself to everybody, and would even pay for a listener, and I am afraid that the Athenians may think me too talkative. Now if, as I was saying, they would

only laugh at me, as you say that they laugh at you, the time might pass gaily enough in the court; but perhaps they may be in earnest, and then what the end will be you soothsayers only can predict.

*Euthyphro.*

*SOCRATES,  
EUTHYPHRO.*

*Euth.* I dare say that the affair will end in nothing, Socrates, and that you will win your cause; and I think that I shall win my own.

*Soc.* And what is your suit, Euthyphro? are you the pursuer or the defendant?

*Euth.* I am the pursuer.

*Soc.* Of whom?

4 *Euth.* You will think me mad when I tell you.

*Soc.* Why, has the fugitive wings?

*Euth.* Nay, he is not very volatile at his time of life.

*Soc.* Who is he?

*Euth.* My father.

*Soc.* Your father! my good man?

*Euth.* Yes.

*Soc.* And of what is he accused?

*Euth.* Of murder, Socrates.

*Soc.* By the powers, Euthyphro! how little does the common herd know of the nature of right and truth. A man must be an extraordinary man, and have made great strides in wisdom, before he could have seen his way to bring such an action.

*The irony of  
Socrates.*

*Euth.* Indeed, Socrates, he must.

*Soc.* I suppose that the man whom your father murdered was one of your relatives — clearly he was; for if he had been a stranger you would never have thought of prosecuting him.

*Euthyphro is  
under a sacred  
obligation to  
prosecute a  
homicide,  
even if he be  
his own father.*

*Euth.* I am amused, Socrates, at your making a distinction between one who is a relation and one who is not a relation; for surely the pollution is the same in either case, if you knowingly associate with the murderer when you ought to clear yourself and him by proceeding against him. The real question is whether the murdered man has been justly slain. If justly, then your duty is to let the matter alone; but if unjustly, then even if the murderer lives under the same roof with you and eats at the same table, proceed against him. Now the man who is dead was a poor dependant of mine who worked for us as a field labourer on our farm in Naxos, and



*Euthyphro.*SOCRATES,  
EUTHYPHRO.

one day in a fit of drunken passion he got into a quarrel with one of our domestic servants and slew him. My father bound him hand and foot and threw him into a ditch, and then sent to Athens to ask of a diviner what he should do with him. Meanwhile he never attended to him and took no care about him, for he regarded him as a murderer; and thought that no great harm would be done even if he did die. Now this was just what happened. For such was the effect of cold and hunger and chains upon him, that before the messenger returned from the diviner, he was dead. And my father and family are angry with me for taking the part of the murderer and prosecuting my father. They say that he did not kill him, and that if he did, the dead man was but a murderer, and I ought not to take any notice, for that a son is impious who prosecutes a father. Which shows, Socrates, how little they know what the gods think about piety and impiety.

*Soc.* Good heavens, Euthyphro! and is your knowledge of religion and of things pious and impious so very exact, that, supposing the circumstances to be as you state them, you are not afraid lest you too may be doing an impious thing in bringing an action against your father?

*Euth.* The best of Euthyphro, and that which distinguishes him, Socrates, from other men, is his exact knowledge of all such matters. What should I be good for without it? 5

Socrates, who is accused of false theology, thinks that he cannot do better than become the disciple of so great a theologian as Euthyphro.

*Soc.* Rare friend! I think that I cannot do better than be your disciple. Then before the trial with Meletus comes on I shall challenge him, and say that I have always had a great interest in religious questions, and now, as he charges me with rash imaginations and innovations in religion, I have become your disciple. You, Meletus, as I shall say to him, acknowledge Euthyphro to be a great theologian, and sound in his opinions; and if you approve of him you ought to approve of me, and not have me into court; but if you disapprove, you should begin by indicting him who is my teacher, and who will be the ruin, not of the young, but of the old; that is to say, of myself whom he instructs, and of his old father whom he admonishes and chastises. And if Meletus refuses to listen to me, but will go on, and will not shift the indictment from me to you, I cannot do better than repeat this challenge in the court.

*Euth.* Yes, indeed, Socrates; and if he attempts to indict me I am mistaken if I do not find a flaw in him; the court shall have a great deal more to say to him than to me.

*Soc.* And I, my dear friend, knowing this, am desirous of becoming your disciple. For I observe that no one appears to notice you—not even this Meletus; but his sharp eyes have found me out at once, and he has indicted me for impiety. And therefore, I adjure you to tell me the nature of piety and impiety, which you said that you knew so well, and of murder, and of other offences against the gods. What are they? Is not piety in every action always the same? and impiety, again—is it not always the opposite of piety, and also the same with itself, having, as impiety, one notion which includes whatever is impious?

*Euth.* To be sure, Socrates.

*Soc.* And what is piety, and what is impiety?

*Euth.* Piety is doing as I am doing; that is to say, prosecuting any one who is guilty of murder, sacrilege, or of any similar crime—whether he be your father or mother, or whoever he may be—that makes no difference; and not to prosecute them is impiety. And please to consider, Socrates, what a notable proof I will give you of the truth of my words, a proof which I have already given to others:—of the principle, I mean, that the impious, whoever he may be, ought not to go unpunished. For do not men regard  
6 Zeus as the best and most righteous of the gods?—and yet they admit that he bound his father (Cronos) because he wickedly devoured his sons, and that he too had punished his own father (Uranus) for a similar reason, in a nameless manner. And yet when I proceed against my father, they are angry with me. So inconsistent are they in their way of talking when the gods are concerned, and when I am concerned.

*Soc.* May not this be the reason, Euthyphro, why I am charged with impiety—that I cannot away with these stories about the gods? and therefore I suppose that people think me wrong. But, as you who are well informed about them approve of them, I cannot do better than assent to your superior wisdom. What else can I say, confessing as I do, that I know nothing about them? Tell me, for

*Euthyphro.*

SOCRATES,  
EUTHYPHRO.

He asks,  
'What is  
piety?'

Piety is doing  
as I am doing;  
—like Zeus, I  
am proceed-  
ing against  
my father.

Does Euthy-  
phro believe  
these amazing  
stories about  
the gods?

*Euthyphro.*

the love of Zeus, whether you really believe that they are true.

SOCRATES,  
EUTHYPHRO.

*Euth.* Yes, Socrates; and things more wonderful still, of which the world is in ignorance.

*Soc.* And do you really believe that the gods fought with one another, and had dire quarrels, battles, and the like, as the poets say, and as you may see represented in the works of great artists? The temples are full of them; and notably the robe of Athene, which is carried up to the Acropolis at the great Panathenaea, is embroidered with them. Are all these tales of the gods true, Euthyphro?

Yes, and  
things more  
amazing still.

*Euth.* Yes, Socrates; and, as I was saying, I can tell you, if you would like to hear them, many other things about the gods which would quite amaze you.

*Soc.* I dare say; and you shall tell me them at some other time when I have leisure. But just at present I would rather hear from you a more precise answer, which you have not as yet given, my friend, to the question, What is 'piety'? When asked, you only replied, Doing as you do, charging your father with murder.

*Euth.* And what I said was true, Socrates.

*Soc.* No doubt, Euthyphro; but you would admit that there are many other pious acts?

*Euth.* There are.

*Soc.* Remember that I did not ask you to give me two or three examples of piety, but to explain the general idea which makes all pious things to be pious. Do you not recollect that there was one idea which made the impious impious, and the pious pious?

*Euth.* I remember.

*Soc.* Tell me what is the nature of this idea, and then I shall have a standard to which I may look, and by which I may measure actions, whether yours or those of any one else, and then I shall be able to say that such and such an action is pious, such another impious.

*Euth.* I will tell you, if you like.

*Soc.* I should very much like.

*Euth.* Piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is that which is not dear to them.

*Soc.* Very good, Euthyphro; you have now given me the 7

A more  
correct defini-  
tion:—Piety  
is that which  
is dear to the  
gods.



sort of answer which I wanted. But whether what you say is true or not I cannot as yet tell, although I make no doubt that you will prove the truth of your words.

*Euthyphro.*

SOCRATES,  
EUTHYPHRO.

*Euth.* Of course.

*Soc.* Come, then, and let us examine what we are saying. That thing or person which is dear to the gods is pious, and that thing or person which is hateful to the gods is impious, these two being the extreme opposites of one another. Was not that said?

*Euth.* It was.

*Soc.* And well said?

*Euth.* Yes, Socrates, I thought so; it was certainly said.

*Soc.* And further, Euthyphro, the gods were admitted to have enmities and hatreds and differences?

*Euth.* Yes, that was also said.

*Soc.* And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger? Suppose, for example, that you and I, my good friend, differ about a number; do differences of this sort make us enemies and set us at variance with one another? Do we not go at once to arithmetic, and put an end to them by a sum?

Differences about numbers and figures create no ill-will because they can be settled by a sum or by a weighing machine, but enmities about the just and unjust are the occasions of quarrels, both among gods and men.

*Euth.* True.

*Soc.* Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly end the difference by measuring?

*Euth.* Very true.

*Soc.* And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting to a weighing machine?

*Euth.* To be sure.

*Soc.* But what differences are there which cannot be thus decided, and which therefore make us angry and set us at enmity with one another? I dare say the answer does not occur to you at the moment, and therefore I will suggest that these enmities arise when the matters of difference are the just and unjust, good and evil, honourable and dishonourable. Are not these the points about which men differ, and about which when we are unable satisfactorily to decide our differences, you and I and all of us quarrel, when we do quarrel<sup>1</sup>?

*Euth.* Yes, Socrates, the nature of the differences about which we quarrel is such as you describe.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. I Alcib. III I foll.

*Euthyphro.*SOCRATES,  
EUTHYPHRO.

*Soc.* And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when they occur, are of a like nature?

*Euth.* Certainly they are.

*Soc.* They have differences of opinion, as you say, about good and evil, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable: there would have been no quarrels among them, if there had been no such differences — would there now?

*Euth.* You are quite right.

*Soc.* Does not every man love that which he deems noble and just and good, and hate the opposite of them?

*Euth.* Very true.

*Soc.* But, as you say, people regard the same things, some as just and others as unjust,—about these they dispute; and so there arise wars and fightings among them.

*Euth.* Very true.

*Soc.* Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by the gods, and are both hateful and dear to them?

*Euth.* True.

*Soc.* And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro, will be pious and also impious?

*Euth.* So I should suppose.

*Soc.* Then, my friend, I remark with surprise that you have not answered the question which I asked. For I certainly did not ask you to tell me what action is both pious and impious: but now it would seem that what is loved by the gods is also hated by them. And therefore, Euthyphro, in thus chastising your father you may very likely be doing what is agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos or Uranus, and what is acceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to Herè, and there may be other gods who have similar differences of opinion.

*Euth.* But I believe, Socrates, that all the gods would be agreed as to the propriety of punishing a murderer: there would be no difference of opinion about that.

*Soc.* Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did you ever hear any one arguing that a murderer or any sort of evil-doer ought to be let off?

*Euth.* I should rather say that these are the questions which they are always arguing, especially in courts of law:

Men and gods  
alike love the  
things which  
they deem  
noble and just,  
but they are  
not agreed  
what these  
are.



they commit all sorts of crimes, and there is nothing which they will not do or say in their own defence. *Euthyphro.*

*Soc.* But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet say that they ought not to be punished? *SOCRATES,*  
*EUTHYPHRO.*

*Euth.* No; they do not.

*Soc.* Then there are some things which they do not venture to say and do: for they do not venture to argue that the guilty are to be unpunished, but they deny their guilt, do they not?

*Euth.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then they do not argue that the evil-doer should not be punished, but they argue about the fact of who the evil-doer is, and what he did and when?

*Euth.* True.

*Soc.* And the gods are in the same case, if as you assert they quarrel about just and unjust, and some of them say while others deny that injustice is done among them. For surely neither God nor man will ever venture to say that the doer of injustice is not to be punished? *Neither God nor man will say that the doer of evil is not to be punished, but they are doubtful about particular acts.*

*Euth.* That is true, Socrates, in the main.

*Soc.* But they join issue about the particulars — gods and men alike; and, if they dispute at all, they dispute about some act which is called in question, and which by some is affirmed to be just, by others to be unjust. Is not that true? *What proof is there that all the gods approve of the prosecution of your father?*

*Euth.* Quite true.

9 *Soc.* Well then, my dear friend Euthyphro, do tell me, for my better instruction and information, what proof have you that in the opinion of all the gods a servant who is guilty of murder, and is put in chains by the master of the dead man, and dies because he is put in chains before he who bound him can learn from the interpreters of the gods what he ought to do with him, dies unjustly; and that on behalf of such an one a son ought to proceed against his father and accuse him of murder. How would you show that all the gods absolutely agree in approving of his act? Prove to me that they do, and I will applaud your wisdom as long as I live.

*Euth.* It will be a difficult task; but I could make the matter very clear indeed to you.

*Soc.* I understand; you mean to say that I am not so quick of apprehension as the judges: for to them you will be sure to prove that the act is unjust, and hateful to the gods.

*Euthyphro.**Euth.* Yes indeed, Socrates ; at least if they will listen to me.

SOCRATES,

EUTHYPHRO.

*Soc.* But they will be sure to listen if they find that you are a good speaker. There was a notion that came into my mind while you were speaking ; I said to myself : ' Well, and what if Euthyphro does prove to me that all the gods regarded the death of the serf as unjust, how do I know anything more of the nature of piety and impiety ? for granting that this action may be hateful to the gods, still piety and impiety are not adequately defined by these distinctions, for that which is hateful to the gods has been shown to be also pleasing and dear to them.' And therefore, Euthyphro, I do not ask you to prove this ; I will suppose, if you like, that all the gods condemn and abominate such an action. But I will amend the definition so far as to say that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they love pious or holy ; and what some of them love and others hate is both or neither. Shall this be our definition of piety and impiety ?

Let us say  
then that what  
all the gods  
approve is  
pious and  
holy.

*Euth.* Why not, Socrates ?

*Soc.* Why not ! certainly, as far as I am concerned, Euthyphro, there is no reason why not. But whether this admission will greatly assist you in the task of instructing me as you promised, is a matter for you to consider.

*Euth.* Yes, I should say that what all the gods love is pious and holy, and the opposite which they all hate, impious.

*Soc.* Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or simply to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of others ? What do you say ?

*Euth.* We should enquire ; and I believe that the statement will stand the test of enquiry.

But does the  
state follow  
the act, or the  
act the state ?

*Soc.* We shall know better, my good friend, in a little while. The point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods. 10

*Euth.* I do not understand your meaning, Socrates.

*Soc.* I will endeavour to explain : we speak of carrying and we speak of being carried, of leading and being led, seeing and being seen. You know that in all such cases there is a difference, and you know also in what the difference lies ?

*Euth.* I think that I understand.

*Soc.* And is not that which is beloved distinct from that which loves? *Euthyphro.*

*Euth.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Well; and now tell me, is that which is carried in this state of carrying because it is carried, or for some other reason?

*Euth.* No; that is the reason.

*Soc.* And the same is true of what is led and of what is seen?

*Euth.* True.

*Soc.* And a thing is not seen because it is visible, but conversely, visible because it is seen; nor is a thing led because it is in the state of being led, or carried because it is in the state of being carried, but the converse of this. And now I think, Euthyphro, that my meaning will be intelligible; and my meaning is, that any state of action or passion implies previous action or passion. It does not become because it is becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes; neither does it suffer because it is in a state of suffering, but it is in a state of suffering because it suffers. Do you not agree?

*Euth.* Yes.

*Soc.* Is not that which is loved in some state either of becoming or suffering?

*Euth.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the same holds as in the previous instances; the state of being loved follows the act of being loved, and not the act the state.

*Euth.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro: is not piety, according to your definition, loved by all the gods?

*Euth.* Yes.

*Soc.* Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason?

*Euth.* No, that is the reason.

*Soc.* It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?

*Euth.* Yes.

*Soc.* And that which is dear to the gods is loved by them, and is in a state to be loved of them because it is loved of them?

The latter is the truer account, and therefore we can only say that what is loved by all the gods is in a state to be loved by them; but holiness has a wider meaning than this.



*Euthyphro.**Euth.* Certainly.SOCRATES,  
EUTHYPHRO.

*Soc.* Then that which is dear to the gods, Euthyphro, is not holy, nor is that which is holy loved of God, as you affirm; but they are two different things.

*Euth.* How do you mean, Socrates?

*Soc.* I mean to say that the holy has been acknowledged by us to be loved of God because it is holy, not to be holy because it is loved.

*Euth.* Yes.

*Soc.* But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them because it is loved by them, not loved by them because it is dear to them.

*Euth.* True.

*Soc.* But, friend Euthyphro, if that which is holy is the same with that which is dear to God, and is loved because it is holy, then that which is dear to God would have been I I loved as being dear to God; but if that which is dear to God is dear to him because loved by him, then that which is holy would have been holy because loved by him. But now you see that the reverse is the case, and that they are quite different from one another. For one (*θεοφιλὲς*) is of a kind to be loved because it is loved, and the other (*ὅσιον*) is loved because it is of a kind to be loved. Thus you appear to me, Euthyphro, when I ask you what is the essence of holiness, to offer an attribute only, and not the essence — the attribute of being loved by all the gods. But you still refuse to explain to me the nature of holiness. And therefore, if you please, I will ask you not to hide your treasure, but to tell me once more what holiness or piety really is, whether dear to the gods or not (for that is a matter about which we will not quarrel); and what is impiety?

What is the  
essential  
meaning of  
holiness or  
piety?

*Euth.* I really do not know, Socrates, how to express what I mean. For somehow or other our arguments, on whatever ground we rest them, seem to turn round and walk away from us.

*Soc.* Your words, Euthyphro, are like the handiwork of my ancestor Daedalus: and if I were the sayer or propounder of them, you might say that my arguments walk away and will not remain fixed where they are placed because I am a descendant of his. But now, since these notions are your

own, you must find some other gibe, for they certainly, as you yourself allow, show an inclination to be on the move.

*Euthyphro.*

SOCRATES,  
EUTHYPHRO.

*Euth.* Nay, Socrates, I shall still say that you are the Daedalus who sets arguments in motion; not I, certainly, but you make them move or go round, for they would never have stirred, as far as I am concerned.

*Soc.* Then I must be a greater than Daedalus: for whereas he only made his own inventions to move, I move those of other people as well. And the beauty of it is, that I would rather not. For I would give the wisdom of Daedalus, and the wealth of Tantalus, to be able to detain them and keep them fixed. But enough of this. As I perceive that you are lazy, I will myself endeavour to show you how you might instruct me in the nature of piety; and I hope that you will not grudge your labour. Tell me, then,—Is not that which is pious necessarily just?

*Euth.* Yes.

*Soc.* And is, then, all which is just pious? or, is that which is pious all just, but that which is just, only in part and not all, pious?

All which is  
pious is just:  
—is therefore  
all which is  
just pious?

*Euth.* I do not understand you, Socrates.

*Soc.* And yet I know that you are as much wiser than I am, as you are younger. But, as I was saying, revered friend, the abundance of your wisdom makes you lazy. Please to exert yourself, for there is no real difficulty in understanding me. What I mean I may explain by an illustration of what I do not mean. The poet (Stasinus) sings —

‘Of Zeus, the author and creator of all these things,

You will not tell: for where there is fear there is also reverence.’

Now I disagree with this poet. Shall I tell you in what respect?

*Euth.* By all means.

*Soc.* I should not say that where there is fear there is also reverence; for I am sure that many persons fear poverty and disease, and the like evils, but I do not perceive that they reverence the objects of their fear.

*Euth.* Very true.

*Soc.* But where reverence is, there is fear; for he who has a feeling of reverence and shame about the commission of any action, fears and is afraid of an ill reputation.

We may say,  
e. g., that  
wherever there  
is reverence  
there will be  
fear, but not  
that wherever  
there is fear  
there will be  
reverence.



*Euthyphro.**Euth.* No doubt.SOCRATES,  
EUTHYPHRO.

*Soc.* Then we are wrong in saying that where there is fear there is also reverence; and we should say, where there is reverence there is also fear. But there is not always reverence where there is fear; for fear is a more extended notion, and reverence is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of number, and number is a more extended notion than the odd. I suppose that you follow me now?

*Euth.* Quite well.

*Soc.* That was the sort of question which I meant to raise when I asked whether the just is always the pious, or the pious always the just; and whether there may not be justice where there is not piety; for justice is the more extended notion of which piety is only a part. Do you dissent?

*Euth.* No, I think that you are quite right.

*Soc.* Then, if piety is a part of justice, I suppose that we should enquire what part? If you had pursued the enquiry in the previous cases: for instance, if you had asked me what is an even number, and what part of number the even is, I should have had no difficulty in replying, a number which represents a figure having two equal sides. Do you not agree?

*Euth.* Yes, I quite agree.

Piety or holiness is that part of justice which attends upon the gods.

*Soc.* In like manner, I want you to tell me what part of justice is piety or holiness, that I may be able to tell Meletus not to do me injustice, or indict me for impiety, as I am now adequately instructed by you in the nature of piety or holiness, and their opposites.

*Euth.* Piety or holiness, Socrates, appears to me to be that part of justice which attends to the gods, as there is the other part of justice which attends to men.

*Soc.* That is good, Euthyphro; yet still there is a little point about which I should like to have further information, What is the meaning of 'attention'? For attention can hardly be used in the same sense when applied to the gods as when applied to other things. For instance, horses are said to require attention, and not every person is able to attend to them, but only a person skilled in horsemanship. Is it not so?

*Euth.* Certainly.

*Soc.* I should suppose that the art of horsemanship is the art of attending to horses? *Euthyphro.*

*Euth.* Yes.

SOCRATES,  
EUTHYPHRO.

*Soc.* Nor is every one qualified to attend to dogs, but only the huntsman?

*Euth.* True.

*Soc.* And I should also conceive that the art of the huntsman is the art of attending to dogs?

*Euth.* Yes.

*Soc.* As the art of the oxherd is the art of attending to oxen?

*Euth.* Very true.

*Soc.* In like manner holiness or piety is the art of attending to the gods?—that would be your meaning, Euthyphro?

*Euth.* Yes.

*Soc.* And is not attention always designed for the good or benefit of that to which the attention is given? As in the case of horses, you may observe that when attended to by the horseman's art they are benefited and improved, are they not?

Attention to others is designed to benefit and improve them. But how are the gods benefited or improved by the holy acts of men?

*Euth.* True.

*Soc.* As the dogs are benefited by the huntsman's art, and the oxen by the art of the oxherd, and all other things are tended or attended for their good and not for their hurt?

*Euth.* Certainly, not for their hurt.

*Soc.* But for their good?

*Euth.* Of course.

*Soc.* And does piety or holiness, which has been defined to be the art of attending to the gods, benefit or improve them? Would you say that when you do a holy act you make any of the gods better?

*Euth.* No, no; that was certainly not what I meant.

*Soc.* And I, Euthyphro, never supposed that you did. I asked you the question about the nature of the attention, because I thought that you did not.

*Euth.* You do me justice, Socrates; that is not the sort of attention which I mean.

*Soc.* Good: but I must still ask what is this attention to the gods which is called piety?

The attention to the gods called piety is

*Euth.* It is such, Socrates, as servants show to their masters.

*Euthyphro.**Soc.* I understand — a sort of ministration to the gods.SOCRATES,  
EUTHYPHRO.*Euth.* Exactly.such as  
servants show  
their masters.*Soc.* Medicine is also a sort of ministration or service, having in view the attainment of some object — would you not say of health?*Euth.* I should.*Soc.* Again, there is an art which ministers to the ship-builder with a view to the attainment of some result?*Euth.* Yes, Socrates, with a view to the building of a ship.*Soc.* As there is an art which ministers to the house-builder with a view to the building of a house?*Euth.* Yes.But in what  
way do men  
help the work  
of God?*Soc.* And now tell me, my good friend, about the art which ministers to the gods: what work does that help to accomplish? For you must surely know if, as you say, you are of all men living the one who is best instructed in religion.*Euth.* And I speak the truth, Socrates.*Soc.* Tell me then, oh tell me — what is that fair work which the gods do by the help of our ministrations?*Euth.* Many and fair, Socrates, are the works which they do.*Soc.* Why, my friend, and so are those of a general. But 14  
the chief of them is easily told. Would you not say that victory in war is the chief of them?*Euth.* Certainly.*Soc.* Many and fair, too, are the works of the husbandman, if I am not mistaken; but his chief work is the production of food from the earth?*Euth.* Exactly.*Soc.* And of the many and fair things done by the gods, which is the chief or principal one?*Euth.* I have told you already, Socrates, that to learn all these things accurately will be very tiresome. Let me simply say that piety or holiness is learning how to please the gods in word and deed, by prayers and sacrifices. Such piety is the salvation of families and states, just as the impious, which is displeasing to the gods, is their ruin and destruction.*Soc.* I think that you could have answered in much fewer words the chief question which I asked, Euthyphro, if you had chosen. But I see plainly that you are not disposed to



instruct me — clearly not: else why, when we reached the point, did you turn aside? Had you only answered me I should have truly learned of you by this time the nature of piety. Now, as the asker of a question is necessarily dependent on the answerer, whither he leads I must follow; and can only ask again, what is the pious, and what is piety? Do you mean that they are a sort of science of praying and sacrificing?

*Euthyphro.*

SOCRATES,  
EUTHYPHRO.

*Euth.* Yes, I do.

*Soc.* And sacrificing is giving to the gods, and prayer is asking of the gods?

*Euth.* Yes, Socrates.

*Soc.* Upon this view, then, piety is a science of asking and giving?

*Euth.* You understand me capitally, Socrates.

*Soc.* Yes, my friend; the reason is that I am a votary of your science, and give my mind to it, and therefore nothing which you say will be thrown away upon me. Please then to tell me, what is the nature of this service to the gods? Do you mean that we prefer requests and give gifts to them?

*Euth.* Yes, I do.

*Soc.* Is not the right way of asking to ask of them what we want?

*Euth.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And the right way of giving is to give to them in return what they want of us. There would be no meaning in an art which gives to any one that which he does not want.

Men give to the gods, and the gods give to men; they do business with one another.

*Euth.* Very true, Socrates.

*Soc.* Then piety, Euthyphro, is an art which gods and men have of doing business with one another?

*Euth.* That is an expression which you may use, if you like.

*Soc.* But I have no particular liking for anything but the truth. I wish, however, that you would tell me what benefit accrues to the gods from our gifts. There is no doubt about  
15 what they give to us; for there is no good thing which they do not give; but how we can give any good thing to them in return is far from being equally clear. If they give every-

*Euthyphro.*

SOCRATES,

EUTHYPHRO.

thing and we give nothing, that must be an affair of business in which we have very greatly the advantage of them.

*Euth.* And do you imagine, Socrates, that any benefit accrues to the gods from our gifts?

*Soc.* But if not, Euthyphro, what is the meaning of gifts which are conferred by us upon the gods?

*Euth.* What else, but tributes of honour; and, as I was just now saying, what pleases them?

*Soc.* Piety, then, is pleasing to the gods, but not beneficial or dear to them?

*Euth.* I should say that nothing could be dearer.

*Soc.* Then once more the assertion is repeated that piety is dear to the gods?

*Euth.* Certainly.

Again, the  
argument  
walks away.

*Soc.* And when you say this, can you wonder at your words not standing firm, but walking away? Will you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them walk away, not perceiving that there is another and far greater artist than Daedalus who makes them go round in a circle, and he is yourself; for the argument, as you will perceive, comes round to the same point. Were we not saying that the holy or pious was not the same with that which is loved of the gods? Have you forgotten?

*Euth.* I quite remember.

*Soc.* And are you not saying that what is loved of the gods is holy; and is not this the same as what is dear to them—do you see?

*Euth.* True.

*Soc.* Then either we were wrong in our former assertion; or, if we were right then, we are wrong now.

*Euth.* One of the two must be true.

Nevertheless,  
Socrates is  
confident that  
Euthyphro  
knows the  
truth, but will  
not tell him.

*Soc.* Then we must begin again and ask, What is piety? That is an enquiry which I shall never be weary of pursuing as far as in me lies; and I entreat you not to scorn me, but to apply your mind to the utmost, and tell me the truth. For, if any man knows, you are he; and therefore I must detain you, like Proteus, until you tell. If you had not certainly known the nature of piety and impiety, I am confident that you would never, on behalf of a serf, have charged your aged father with murder. You would not have run



such a risk of doing wrong in the sight of the gods, and you would have had too much respect for the opinions of men. I am sure, therefore, that you know the nature of piety and impiety. Speak out then, my dear Euthyphro, and do not hide your knowledge.

*Euth.* Another time, Socrates; for I am in a hurry, and must go now.

*Soc.* Alas! my companion, and will you leave me in despair? I was hoping that you would instruct me in the nature of piety and impiety; and then I might have cleared myself of Meletus and his indictment. I would have told  
16 him that I had been enlightened by Euthyphro, and had given up rash innovations and speculations, in which I indulged only through ignorance, and that now I am about to lead a better life.

*Euthyphro.*

SOCRATES,  
EUTHYPHRO.

Euthyphro is  
in a hurry to  
depart, and  
finally leaves  
Socrates to his  
fate.



# APOLOGY.



## INTRODUCTION.

IN what relation the *Apology* of Plato stands to the real defence of Socrates, there are no means of determining. It certainly agrees in tone and character with the description of Xenophon, who says in the *Memorabilia* (iv. 4, 4) that Socrates might have been acquitted 'if in any moderate degree he would have conciliated the favour of the dicasts;' and who informs us in another passage (iv. 8, 4), on the testimony of Hermogenes, the friend of Socrates, that he had no wish to live; and that the divine sign refused to allow him to prepare a defence, and also that Socrates himself declared this to be unnecessary, on the ground that all his life long he had been preparing against that hour. For the speech breathes throughout a spirit of defiance, 'ut non supplex aut reus sed magister aut dominus videretur esse iudicium' (Cic. de Orat. i. 54); and the loose and desultory style is an imitation of the 'accustomed manner' in which Socrates spoke in 'the agora and among the tables of the money-changers.' The allusion in the *Crito* (45 B) may, perhaps, be adduced as a further evidence of the literal accuracy of some parts (37 C, D). But in the main it must be regarded as the ideal of Socrates, according to Plato's conception of him, appearing in the greatest and most public scene of his life, and in the height of his triumph, when he is weakest, and yet his mastery over mankind is greatest, and his habitual irony acquires a new meaning and a sort of tragic pathos in the face of death. The facts of his life are summed up, and the features of his character are brought out as if by accident in the course of the defence. The conversational manner, the seeming want of arrangement, the ironical simplicity, are found to result in a perfect work of art, which is the portrait of Socrates.

Yet some of the topics may have been actually used by Socrates; and the recollection of his very words may have rung

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in the ears of his disciple. The *Apology* of Plato may be compared generally with those speeches of Thucydides in which he has embodied his conception of the lofty character and policy of the great Pericles, and which at the same time furnish a commentary on the situation of affairs from the point of view of the historian. So in the *Apology* there is an ideal rather than a literal truth; much is said which was not said, and is only Plato's view of the situation. Plato was not, like Xenophon, a chronicler of facts; he does not appear in any of his writings to have aimed at literal accuracy. He is not therefore to be supplemented from the *Memorabilia* and *Symposium* of Xenophon, who belongs to an entirely different class of writers. The *Apology* of Plato is not the report of what Socrates said, but an elaborate composition, quite as much so in fact as one of the *Dialogues*. And we may perhaps even indulge in the fancy that the actual defence of Socrates was as much greater than the Platonic defence as the master was greater than the disciple. But in any case, some of the words used by him must have been remembered, and some of the facts recorded must have actually occurred. It is significant that Plato is said to have been present at the defence (*Apol.* 38 B), as he is also said to have been absent at the last scene in the *Phaedo* (59 B). Is it fanciful to suppose that he meant to give the stamp of authenticity to the one and not to the other? — especially when we consider that these two passages are the only ones in which Plato makes mention of himself. The circumstance that Plato was to be one of his sureties for the payment of the fine which he proposed has the appearance of truth. More suspicious is the statement that Socrates received the first impulse to his favourite calling of cross-examining the world from the Oracle of Delphi; for he must already have been famous before Chaerephon went to consult the Oracle (*Riddell*, i. p. xvi), and the story is of a kind which is very likely to have been invented. On the whole we arrive at the conclusion that the *Apology* is true to the character of Socrates, but we cannot show that any single sentence in it was actually spoken by him. It breathes the spirit of Socrates, but has been cast anew in the mould of Plato.

There is not much in the other *Dialogues* which can be compared with the *Apology*. The same recollection of his master may have been present to the mind of Plato when depicting the

sufferings of the Just in the Republic (ii. 361 foll., vi. 500 A). The Crito may also be regarded as a sort of appendage to the Apology, in which Socrates, who has defied the judges, is nevertheless represented as scrupulously obedient to the laws. The idealization of the sufferer is carried still further in the Gorgias (476 foll.), in which the thesis is maintained, that 'to suffer is better than to do evil;' and the art of rhetoric is described as only useful for the purpose of self-accusation. The parallelisms which occur in the so-called Apology of Xenophon are not worth noticing, because the writing in which they are contained is manifestly spurious. The statements of the Memorabilia (i. 2; iv. 8) respecting the trial and death of Socrates agree generally with Plato; but they have lost the flavour of Socratic irony in the narrative of Xenophon.

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TION.

The Apology or Platonic defence of Socrates is divided into three parts: 1st. The defence properly so called; 2nd. The shorter address in mitigation of the penalty; 3rd. The last words of prophetic rebuke and exhortation.

**Steph.** The first part commences with an apology for his colloquial

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<sup>17</sup> style; he is, as he has always been, the enemy of rhetoric, and knows of no rhetoric but truth; he will not falsify his character by making a speech. Then he proceeds to divide his accusers into two classes; first, there is the nameless accuser—public opinion. All the world from their earliest years had heard that he was a corrupter of youth, and had seen him caricatured in the Clouds of Aristophanes. Secondly, there are the professed accusers, who are but the mouth-piece of the others. The accusations of both might be summed up in a formula. The first say, 'Socrates is an evil-doer and a curious person, searching into things under the earth and above the heaven; and making the worse appear the better cause, and teaching all this to others.' The second, 'Socrates is an evil-doer and corrupter of the youth, who does not receive the gods whom the state receives, but introduces other new divinities.' These last words appear to have been the actual indictment (cp. Xen. Mem. i. 1); and the previous formula, which is a summary of public opinion, assumes the same legal style.

<sup>19</sup> The answer begins by clearing up a confusion. In the representations of the Comic poets, and in the opinion of the multitude,

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he had been identified with the teachers of physical science and with the Sophists. But this was an error. For both of them he professes a respect in the open court, which contrasts with his manner of speaking about them in other places. (Cp. for Anaxagoras, *Phaedo* 98 B, *Laws* xii. 967; for the Sophists, *Meno* 95 D, *Rep.* vi. 492, *Tim.* 19 E, *Theaet.* 154 E, *Soph.* 265 foll., etc.) But at the same time he shows that he is not one of them. Of natural philosophy he knows nothing; not that he despises such pursuits, but the fact is that he is ignorant of them, and never says a word about them. Nor is he paid for giving instruction—that is another mistaken notion:—he has nothing to teach. But he commends 20 Evenus for teaching virtue at such a ‘moderate’ rate as five minae. Something of the ‘accustomed irony,’ which may perhaps be expected to sleep in the ear of the multitude, is lurking here.

He then goes on to explain the reason why he is in such an evil name. That had arisen out of a peculiar mission which he had taken upon himself. The enthusiastic Chaerephon (probably in 21 anticipation of the answer which he received) had gone to Delphi and asked the oracle if there was any man wiser than Socrates; and the answer was, that there was no man wiser. What could be the meaning of this—that he who knew nothing, and knew that he knew nothing, should be declared by the oracle to be the wisest of men? Reflecting upon the answer, he determined to refute it by finding ‘a wiser;’ and first he went to the politicians, and then to the poets, and then to the craftsmen, but 22 always with the same result—he found that they knew nothing, or hardly anything more than himself; and that the little advantage which in some cases they possessed was more than counter-balanced by their conceit of knowledge. He knew nothing, and knew that he knew nothing: they knew little or nothing, and imagined that they knew all things. Thus he had passed his 23 life as a sort of missionary in detecting the pretended wisdom of mankind; and this occupation had quite absorbed him and taken him away both from public and private affairs. Young men of the richer sort had made a pastime of the same pursuit, ‘which was not unamusing.’ And hence bitter enmities had arisen; the professors of knowledge had revenged themselves by calling him a villainous corrupter of youth, and by repeating



the commonplaces about atheism and materialism and sophistry, *Apology.*  
 24 which are the stock-accusations against all philosophers when *ANALYSIS.*  
 there is nothing else to be said of them.

The second accusation he meets by interrogating Meletus, who is present and can be interrogated. ‘If he is the corrupter, who is the improver of the citizens?’ (Cp. *Meno* 91 C.) ‘All men  
 25 everywhere.’ But how absurd, how contrary to analogy is this! How inconceivable too, that he should make the citizens worse when he has to live with them. This surely cannot be intentional;  
 26 and if unintentional, he ought to have been instructed by Meletus, and not accused in the court.

But there is another part of the indictment which says that he teaches men not to receive the gods whom the city receives, and has other new gods. ‘Is that the way in which he is supposed to corrupt the youth?’ ‘Yes, it is.’ ‘Has he only new gods, or none at all?’ ‘None at all.’ ‘What, not even the sun and moon?’

‘No; why, he says that the sun is a stone, and the moon earth.’ That, replies Socrates, is the old confusion about Anaxagoras; the Athenian people are not so ignorant as to attribute to the influence of Socrates notions which have found their way into the drama, and may be learned at the theatre. Socrates undertakes  
 27 to show that Meletus (rather unjustifiably) has been compounding a riddle in this part of the indictment: ‘There are no gods, but Socrates believes in the existence of the sons of gods, which is absurd.’

28 Leaving Meletus, who has had enough words spent upon him, he returns to the original accusation. The question may be asked, Why will he persist in following a profession which leads him to death? Why?—because he must remain at his post where the god has placed him, as he remained at Potidaea, and Amphipolis, and Delium, where the generals placed him. Besides, he is  
 29 not so overwise as to imagine that he knows whether death is a good or an evil; and he is certain that desertion of his duty  
 30 is an evil. Anytus is quite right in saying that they should never have indicted him if they meant to let him go. For he will certainly obey God rather than man; and will continue to preach to all men of all ages the necessity of virtue and improvement; and if they refuse to listen to him he will still persevere and reprove them. This is his way of corrupting the youth, which he will not

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cease to follow in obedience to the god, even if a thousand deaths await him.

He is desirous that they should let him live — not for his own sake, but for theirs; because he is their heaven-sent friend (and they will never have such another), or, as he may be ludicrously described, he is the gadfly who stirs the generous steed into motion. Why then has he never taken part in public affairs? Because the familiar divine voice has hindered him; if he had been a public man, and had fought for the right, as he would certainly have fought against the many, he would not have lived, and could therefore have done no good. Twice in public matters he has risked his life for the sake of justice — once at the trial of the generals; and again in resistance to the tyrannical commands of the Thirty.

But, though not a public man, he has passed his days in instructing the citizens without fee or reward — this was his mission. Whether his disciples have turned out well or ill, he cannot justly be charged with the result, for he never promised to teach them anything. They might come if they liked, and they might stay away if they liked: and they did come, because they found an amusement in hearing the pretenders to wisdom detected. If they have been corrupted, their elder relatives (if not themselves) might surely come into court and witness against him, and there is an opportunity still for them to appear. But their fathers and brothers all appear in court (including 'this' Plato), to witness on his behalf; and if their relatives are corrupted, at least they are uncorrupted; 'and they are my witnesses. For they know that I am speaking the truth, and that Meletus is lying.'

This is about all that he has to say. He will not entreat the judges to spare his life; neither will he present a spectacle of weeping children, although he, too, is not made of 'rock or oak.' Some of the judges themselves may have complied with this practice on similar occasions, and he trusts that they will not be angry with him for not following their example. But he feels that such conduct brings discredit on the name of Athens: he feels, too, that the judge has sworn not to give away justice; and he cannot be guilty of the impiety of asking the judge to break his oath, when he is himself being tried for impiety.



As he expected, and probably intended, he is convicted. And *Apology.*  
 now the tone of the speech, instead of being more conciliatory, *ANALYSIS.*  
 becomes more lofty and commanding. Anytus proposes death  
 as the penalty: and what counter-proposition shall he make?  
 He, the benefactor of the Athenian people, whose whole life has  
 been spent in doing them good, should at least have the Olympic  
 victor's reward of maintenance in the Prytaneum. Or why  
 37 should he propose any counter-penalty when he does not know  
 whether death, which Anytus proposes, is a good or an evil?  
 and he is certain that imprisonment is an evil, exile is an evil.  
 Loss of money might be no evil, but then he has none to give;  
 38 perhaps he can make up a mina. Let that be the penalty, or,  
 if his friends wish, thirty minae; for which they will be excellent  
 securities.

[*He is condemned to death.*]

He is an old man already, and the Athenians will gain nothing  
 but disgrace by depriving him of a few years of life. Perhaps he  
 could have escaped, if he had chosen to throw down his arms and  
 entreat for his life. But he does not at all repent of the manner  
 of his defence; he would rather die in his own fashion than live  
 39 in theirs. For the penalty of unrighteousness is swifter than  
 death; that penalty has already overtaken his accusers as death  
 will soon overtake him.

And now, as one who is about to die, he will prophesy to them.  
 They have put him to death in order to escape the necessity of  
 giving an account of their lives. But his death 'will be the seed'  
 of many disciples who will convince them of their evil ways, and  
 will come forth to reprove them in harsher terms, because they  
 are younger and more inconsiderate.

40 He would like to say a few words, while there is time, to those  
 who would have acquitted him. He wishes them to know that  
 the divine sign never interrupted him in the course of his de-  
 fence; the reason of which, as he conjectures, is that the death to  
 which he is going is a good and not an evil. For either death is  
 a long sleep, the best of sleeps, or a journey to another world in  
 which the souls of the dead are gathered together, and in which  
 41 there may be a hope of seeing the heroes of old — in which, too,

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there are just judges; and as all are immortal, there can be no fear of any one suffering death for his opinions.

Nothing evil can happen to the good man either in life or death, and his own death has been permitted by the gods, because it was better for him to depart; and therefore he forgives his judges because they have done him no harm, although they never meant to do him any good.

He has a last request to make to them — that they will trouble 42 his sons as he has troubled them, if they appear to prefer riches to virtue, or to think themselves something when they are nothing.

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TION.

‘Few persons will be found to wish that Socrates should have defended himself otherwise,’ — if, as we must add, his defence was that with which Plato has provided him. But leaving this question, which does not admit of a precise solution, we may go on to ask what was the impression which Plato in the *Apology* intended to give of the character and conduct of his master in the last great scene? Did he intend to represent him (1) as employing sophistries; (2) as designedly irritating the judges? Or are these sophistries to be regarded as belonging to the age in which he lived and to his personal character, and this apparent haughtiness as flowing from the natural elevation of his position?

For example, when he says that it is absurd to suppose that one man is the corrupter and all the rest of the world the improvers of the youth; or, when he argues that he never could have corrupted the men with whom he had to live; or, when he proves his belief in the gods because he believes in the sons of gods, is he serious or jesting? It may be observed that these sophisms all occur in his cross-examination of Meletus, who is easily foiled and mastered in the hands of the great dialectician. Perhaps he regarded these answers as good enough for his accuser, of whom he makes very light. Also there is a touch of irony in them, which takes them out of the category of sophistry. (Cp. *Euthyph.* 2.)

That the manner in which he defends himself about the lives of his disciples is not satisfactory, can hardly be denied. Fresh in

the memory of the Athenians, and detestable as they deserved to be to the newly restored democracy, were the names of Alcibiades, Critias, Charmides. It is obviously not a sufficient answer that Socrates had never professed to teach them anything, and is therefore not justly chargeable with their crimes. Yet the defence, when taken out of this ironical form, is doubtless sound: that his teaching had nothing to do with their evil lives. Here, then, the sophistry is rather in form than in substance, though we might desire that to such a serious charge Socrates had given a more serious answer.

Truly characteristic of Socrates is another point in his answer, which may also be regarded as sophistical. He says that 'if he has corrupted the youth, he must have corrupted them involuntarily.' But if, as Socrates argues, all evil is involuntary, then all criminals ought to be admonished and not punished. In these words the Socratic doctrine of the involuntariness of evil is clearly intended to be conveyed. Here again, as in the former instance, the defence of Socrates is untrue practically, but may be true in some ideal or transcendental sense. The commonplace reply, that if he had been guilty of corrupting the youth their relations would surely have witnessed against him, with which he concludes this part of his defence, is more satisfactory.

Again, when Socrates argues that he must believe in the gods because he believes in the sons of gods, we must remember that this is a refutation not of the original indictment, which is consistent enough—'Socrates does not receive the gods whom the city receives, and has other new divinities'—but of the interpretation put upon the words by Meletus, who has affirmed that he is a downright atheist. To this Socrates fairly answers, in accordance with the ideas of the time, that a downright atheist cannot believe in the sons of gods or in divine things. The notion that demons or lesser divinities are the sons of gods is not to be regarded as ironical or sceptical. He is arguing '*ad hominem*' according to the notions of mythology current in his age. Yet he abstains from saying that he believed in the gods whom the State approved. He does not defend himself, as Xenophon has defended him, by appealing to his practice of religion. Probably he neither wholly believed, nor disbelieved, in the existence of the popular gods; he had no means of knowing



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about them. According to Plato (cp. *Phaedo* 118 B; *Symp.* 220 D), as well as Xenophon (*Mem.* i. 1, 30), he was punctual in the performance of the least religious duties; and he must have believed in his own oracular sign, of which he seemed to have an internal witness. But the existence of Apollo or Zeus, or the other gods whom the State approves, would have appeared to him both uncertain and unimportant in comparison of the duty of self-examination, and of those principles of truth and right which he deemed to be the foundation of religion. (Cp. *Phaedr.* 230; *Euthyph.* 6, 7; *Rep.* ii. 373 ff.)

The second question, whether Plato meant to represent Socrates as braving or irritating his judges, must also be answered in the negative. His irony, his superiority, his audacity, 'regarding not the person of man,' necessarily flow out of the loftiness of his situation. He is not acting a part upon a great occasion, but he is what he has been all his life long, 'a king of men.' He would rather not appear insolent, if he could avoid it (*οὐχ ὥς ἀνθαδιζόμενος τοῦτο λέγω*). Neither is he desirous of hastening his own end, for life and death are simply indifferent to him. But such a defence as would be acceptable to his judges and might procure an acquittal, it is not in his nature to make. He will not say or do anything that might pervert the course of justice; he cannot have his tongue bound even 'in the throat of death.' With his accusers he will only fence and play, as he had fenced with other 'improvers of youth,' answering the Sophist according to his sophistry all his life long. He is serious when he is speaking of his own mission, which seems to distinguish him from all other reformers of mankind, and originates in an accident. The dedication of himself to the improvement of his fellow-citizens is not so remarkable as the ironical spirit in which he goes about doing good only in vindication of the credit of the oracle, and in the vain hope of finding a wiser man than himself. Yet this singular and almost accidental character of his mission agrees with the divine sign which, according to our notions, is equally accidental and irrational, and is nevertheless accepted by him as the guiding principle of his life. Socrates is nowhere represented to us as a freethinker or sceptic. There is no reason to doubt his sincerity when he speculates on the possibility of seeing and knowing the heroes of the Trojan war in another world. On

the other hand, his hope of immortality is uncertain; — he also conceives of death as a long sleep (in this respect differing from the *Phaedo*), and at last falls back on resignation to the divine will, and the certainty that no evil can happen to the good man either in life or death. His absolute truthfulness seems to hinder him from asserting positively more than this; and he makes no attempt to veil his ignorance in mythology and figures of speech. The gentleness of the first part of the speech contrasts with the aggravated, almost threatening, tone of the conclusion. He characteristically remarks that he will not speak as a rhetorician, that is to say, he will not make a regular defence such as Lysias or one of the orators might have composed for him, or, according to some accounts, did compose for him. But he first procures himself a hearing by conciliatory words. He does not attack the Sophists; for they were open to the same charges as himself; they were equally ridiculed by the Comic poets, and almost equally hateful to Anytus and Meletus. Yet incidentally the antagonism between Socrates and the Sophists is allowed to appear. He is poor and they are rich; his profession that he teaches nothing is opposed to their readiness to teach all things; his talking in the market-place to their private instructions; his tarry-at-home life to their wandering from city to city. The tone which he assumes towards them is one of real friendliness, but also of concealed irony. Towards Anaxagoras, who had disappointed him in his hopes of learning about mind and nature, he shows a less kindly feeling, which is also the feeling of Plato in other passages (*Laws* xii. 967 B). But Anaxagoras had been dead thirty years, and was beyond the reach of persecution.

It has been remarked that the prophecy of a new generation of teachers who would rebuke and exhort the Athenian people in harsher and more violent terms was, as far as we know, never fulfilled. No inference can be drawn from this circumstance as to the probability of the words attributed to him having been actually uttered. They express the aspiration of the first martyr of philosophy, that he would leave behind him many followers, accompanied by the not unnatural feeling that they would be fiercer and more inconsiderate in their words when emancipated from his control.

The above remarks must be understood as applying with any

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degree of certainty to the Platonic Socrates only. For, although these or similar words may have been spoken by Socrates himself, we cannot exclude the possibility, that like so much else, *e. g.* the wisdom of Critias, the poem of Solon, the virtues of Charmides, they may have been due only to the imagination of Plato. The arguments of those who maintain that the *Apology* was composed during the process, resting on no evidence, do not require a serious refutation. Nor are the reasonings of Schleiermacher, who argues that the Platonic defence is an exact or nearly exact reproduction of the words of Socrates, partly because Plato would not have been guilty of the impiety of altering them, and also because many points of the defence might have been improved and strengthened, at all more conclusive. (See English Translation, p. 137.) What effect the death of Socrates produced on the mind of Plato, we cannot certainly determine; nor can we say how he would or must have written under the circumstances. We observe that the enmity of Aristophanes to Socrates does not prevent Plato from introducing them together in the *Symposium* engaged in friendly intercourse. Nor is there any trace in the *Dialogues* of an attempt to make Anytus or Meletus personally odious in the eyes of the Athenian public.

## APOLOGY.

**Steph.** How you, O Athenians, have been affected by my accusers, *Apology.*  
<sup>17</sup> I cannot tell; but I know that they almost made me forget *SOCRATES.*  
who I was — so persuasively did they speak; and yet they Socrates begs  
have hardly uttered a word of truth. But of the many false- to be allowed  
hoods told by them, there was one which quite amazed me; — to speak in his  
I mean when they said that you should be upon your guard accustomed  
and not allow yourselves to be deceived by the force of my manner.  
eloquence. To say this, when they were certain to be detected  
as soon as I opened my lips and proved myself to be anything  
but a great speaker, did indeed appear to me most shameless  
— unless by the force of eloquence they mean the force of  
truth; for if such is their meaning, I admit that I am eloquent.  
But in how different a way from theirs! Well, as I was  
saying, they have scarcely spoken the truth at all; but from me  
you shall hear the whole truth: not, however, delivered after  
their manner in a set oration duly ornamented with words and  
phrases. No, by heaven! but I shall use the words and argu-  
ments which occur to me at the moment; for I am confident  
in the justice of my cause<sup>1</sup>: at my time of life I ought not to  
be appearing before you, O men of Athens, in the character  
of a juvenile orator — let no one expect it of me. And I must  
beg of you to grant me a favour: — If I defend myself in my  
accustomed manner, and you hear me using the words which  
I have been in the habit of using in the agora, at the tables of  
the money-changers, or anywhere else, I would ask you not to  
be surprised, and not to interrupt me on this account. For  
I am more than seventy years of age, and appearing now for  
the first time in a court of law, I am quite a stranger to the

<sup>1</sup> Or, I am certain that I am right in taking this course.

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SOCRATES.

The judges  
must excuse  
Socrates if he  
defends him-  
self in his own  
fashion.

language of the place ; and therefore I would have you regard me as if I were really a stranger, whom you would excuse if 18  
he spoke in his native tongue, and after the fashion of his country :— Am I making an unfair request of you? Never mind the manner, which may or may not be good ; but think only of the truth of my words, and give heed to that : let the speaker speak truly and the judge decide justly.

And first, I have to reply to the older charges and to my first accusers, and then I will go on to the later ones. For of old I have had many accusers, who have accused me falsely to you during many years ; and I am more afraid of them than of Anytus and his associates, who are dangerous, too, in their own way. But far more dangerous are the others, who began when you were children, and took possession of your minds with their falsehoods, telling of one Socrates, a wise man, who speculated about the heaven above, and searched into the earth beneath, and made the worse appear the better cause. The disseminators of this tale are the accusers whom I dread ; for their hearers are apt to fancy that such enquirers do not believe in the existence of the gods. And they are many, and their charges against me are of ancient date, and they were made by them in the days when you were more impressible than you are now—in childhood, or it may have been in youth—and the cause when heard went by default, for there was none to answer. And hardest of all, I do not know and cannot tell the names of my accusers ; unless in the chance case of a Comic poet. All who from envy and malice have persuaded you—some of them having first convinced themselves—all this class of men are most difficult to deal with ; for I cannot have them up here, and cross-examine them, and therefore I must simply fight with shadows in my own defence, and argue when there is no one who answers. I will ask you then to assume with me, as I was saying, that my opponents are of two kinds ; one recent, the other ancient : and I hope that you will see the propriety of my answering the latter first, for these accusations you heard long before the others, and much oftener.

He has to  
meet two sorts  
of accusers.

Well, then, I must make my defence, and endeavour to clear 19  
away in a short time, a slander which has lasted a long time. May I succeed, if to succeed be for my good and yours, or



likely to avail me in my cause! The task is not an easy one; *Apology.*  
I quite understand the nature of it. And so leaving the event *SOCRATES.*  
with God, in obedience to the law I will now make my defence.

I will begin at the beginning, and ask what is the accusation  
which has given rise to the slander of me, and in fact has  
encouraged Meletus to prefer this charge against me. Well,  
what do the slanderers say? They shall be my prosecutors,  
and I will sum up their words in an affidavit: 'Socrates is an  
evil-doer, and a curious person, who searches into things  
under the earth and in heaven, and he makes the worse  
appear the better cause; and he teaches the aforesaid doc-  
trines to others.' Such is the nature of the accusation: it is  
just what you have yourselves seen in the comedy of Aristo-  
phanes<sup>1</sup>, who has introduced a man whom he calls Socrates,  
going about and saying that he walks in air, and talking a  
deal of nonsense concerning matters of which I do not pre-  
tend to know either much or little — not that I mean to speak  
disparagingly of any one who is a student of natural philo-  
sophy. I should be very sorry if Meletus could bring so grave  
a charge against me. But the simple truth is, O Athenians,  
that I have nothing to do with physical speculations. Very  
many of those here present are witnesses to the truth of this,  
and to them I appeal. Speak, then, you who have heard me,  
and tell your neighbours whether any of you have ever known  
me hold forth in few words or in many upon such matters.  
. . . You hear their answer. And from what they say of  
this part of the charge you will be able to judge of the truth  
of the rest.

There is the  
accusation of  
the theatres;  
which declares  
that he is a  
student of  
natural  
philosophy.

As little foundation is there for the report that I am a  
teacher, and take money; this accusation has no more truth  
in it than the other. Although, if a man were really able to  
instruct mankind, to receive money for giving instruction  
would, in my opinion, be an honour to him. There is  
Gorgias of Leontium, and Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias  
of Elis, who go the round of the cities, and are able to  
persuade the young men to leave their own citizens by whom  
they might be taught for nothing, and come to them whom  
they not only pay, but are thankful if they may be allowed to

There is the  
report that he  
is a Sophist  
who receives  
money.

<sup>1</sup> Aristoph., Clouds, 225 ff.

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SOCRATES.

The ironical  
question  
which Socra-  
tes put to  
Callias.

pay them. There is at this time a Parian philosopher residing in Athens, of whom I have heard; and I came to hear of him in this way:—I came across a man who has spent a world of money on the Sophists, Callias, the son of Hipponicus, and knowing that he had sons, I asked him: ‘Callias,’ I said, ‘if your two sons were foals or calves, there would be no difficulty in finding some one to put over them; we should hire a trainer of horses, or a farmer probably, who would improve and perfect them in their own proper virtue and excellence; but as they are human beings, whom are you thinking of placing over them? Is there any one who understands human and political virtue? You must have thought about the matter, for you have sons; is there any one?’ ‘There is,’ he said. ‘Who is he?’ said I; ‘and of what country? and what does he charge?’ ‘Evenus the Parian,’ he replied; ‘he is the man, and his charge is five minae.’ Happy is Evenus, I said to myself, if he really has this wisdom, and teaches at such a moderate charge. Had I the same, I should have been very proud and conceited; but the truth is that I have no knowledge of the kind.

I dare say, Athenians, that some one among you will reply, ‘Yes, Socrates, but what is the origin of these accusations which are brought against you; there must have been something strange which you have been doing? All these rumours and this talk about you would never have arisen if you had been like other men: tell us, then, what is the cause of them, for we should be sorry to judge hastily of you.’ Now I regard this as a fair challenge, and I will endeavour to explain to you the reason why I am called wise and have such an evil fame. Please to attend then. And although some of you may think that I am joking, I declare that I will tell you the entire truth. Men of Athens, this reputation of mine has come of a certain sort of wisdom which I possess. If you ask me what kind of wisdom, I reply, wisdom such as may perhaps be attained by man, for to that extent I am inclined to believe that I am wise; whereas the persons of whom I was speaking have a superhuman wisdom, which I may fail to describe, because I have it not myself; and he who says that I have, speaks falsely, and is taking away my character. And here, O men of Athens, I must beg you not to interrupt me, even if I seem

The accusa-  
tions against  
me have arisen  
out of a sort of  
wisdom which  
I practise.



to say something extravagant. For the word which I will speak is not mine. I will refer you to a witness who is worthy of credit; that witness shall be the God of Delphi—he will tell you about my wisdom, if I have any, and of what sort it is. You must have known Chaerephon; he was early  
 21 a friend of mine, and also a friend of yours, for he shared in the recent exile of the people, and returned with you. Well, Chaerephon, as you know, was very impetuous in all his doings, and he went to Delphi and boldly asked the oracle to tell him whether—as I was saying, I must beg you not to interrupt—he asked the oracle to tell him whether any one was wiser than I was, and the Pythian prophetess answered, that there was no man wiser. Chaerephon is dead himself; but his brother, who is in court, will confirm the truth of what I am saying.

Why do I mention this? Because I am going to explain to you why I have such an evil name. When I heard the answer, I said to myself, What can the god mean? and what is the interpretation of his riddle? for I know that I have no wisdom, small or great. What then can he mean when he says that I am the wisest of men? And yet he is a god, and cannot lie; that would be against his nature. After long consideration, I thought of a method of trying the question. I reflected that if I could only find a man wiser than myself, then I might go to the god with a refutation in my hand. I should say to him, 'Here is a man who is wiser than I am; but you said that I was the wisest.' Accordingly I went to one who had the reputation of wisdom, and observed him—his name I need not mention; he was a politician whom I selected for examination—and the result was as follows: When I began to talk with him, I could not help thinking that he was not really wise, although he was thought wise by many, and still wiser by himself; and thereupon I tried to explain to him that he thought himself wise, but was not really wise; and the consequence was that he hated me, and his enmity was shared by several who were present and heard me. So I left him, saying to myself, as I went away: Well, although I do not suppose that either of us knows anything really beautiful and good, I am better off than he is,—for he knows nothing, and thinks that he knows; I neither

*Apology.*

SOCRATES.

My practice of it arose out of a declaration of the Delphian Oracle that I was the wisest of men.

I went about searching after a man who was wiser than myself: at first among the politicians; then among the philosophers; and found that I had an advantage over them, because I had no conceit of knowledge.

*Apology.*

SOCRATES.

know nor think that I know. In this latter particular, then, I seem to have slightly the advantage of him. Then I went to another who had still higher pretensions to wisdom, and my conclusion was exactly the same. Whereupon I made another enemy of him, and of many others besides him.

Then I went to one man after another, being not unconscious of the enmity which I provoked, and I lamented and feared this: but necessity was laid upon me,—the word of God, I thought, ought to be considered first. And I said to myself, Go I must to all who appear to know, and find out the meaning of the oracle. And I swear to you, Athenians, 22 by the dog I swear!—for I must tell you the truth—the result of my mission was just this: I found that the men most in repute were all but the most foolish; and that others less esteemed were really wiser and better. I will tell you the tale of my wanderings and of the ‘Herculean’ labours, as I may call them, which I endured only to find at last the oracle irrefutable. After the politicians, I went to the poets; tragic, dithyrambic, and all sorts. And there, I said to myself, you will be instantly detected; now you will find out that you are more ignorant than they are. Accordingly, I took them some of the most elaborate passages in their own writings, and asked what was the meaning of them—thinking that they would teach me something. Will you believe me? I am almost ashamed to confess the truth, but I must say that there is hardly a person present who would not have talked better about their poetry than they did themselves. Then I knew that not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration; they are like diviners or soothsayers who also say many fine things, but do not understand the meaning of them. The poets appeared to me to be much in the same case; and I further observed that upon the strength of their poetry they believed themselves to be the wisest of men in other things in which they were not wise. So I departed, conceiving myself to be superior to them for the same reason that I was superior to the politicians.

I found that the poets were the worst possible interpreters of their own writings.

The artisans had some real knowledge, but they had also a con-

At last I went to the artisans, for I was conscious that I knew nothing at all, as I may say, and I was sure that they knew many fine things; and here I was not mistaken, for they did know many things of which I was ignorant, and in

this they certainly were wiser than I was. But I observed that even the good artisans fell into the same error as the poets;—because they were good workmen they thought that they also knew all sorts of high matters, and this defect in them overshadowed their wisdom; and therefore I asked myself on behalf of the oracle, whether I would like to be as I was, neither having their knowledge nor their ignorance, or like them in both; and I made answer to myself and to the oracle that I was better off as I was.

23 This inquisition has led to my having many enemies of the worst and most dangerous kind, and has given occasion also to many calumnies. And I am called wise, for my hearers always imagine that I myself possess the wisdom which I find wanting in others: but the truth is, O men of Athens, that God only is wise; and by his answer he intends to show that the wisdom of men is worth little or nothing; he is not speaking of Socrates, he is only using my name by way of illustration, as if he said, He, O men, is the wisest, who, like Socrates, knows that his wisdom is in truth worth nothing. And so I go about the world, obedient to the god, and search and make enquiry into the wisdom of any one, whether citizen or stranger, who appears to be wise; and if he is not wise, then in vindication of the oracle I show him that he is not wise; and my occupation quite absorbs me, and I have no time to give either to any public matter of interest or to any concern of my own, but I am in utter poverty by reason of my devotion to the god.

There is another thing:—young men of the richer classes, who have not much to do, come about me of their own accord; they like to hear the pretenders examined, and they often imitate me, and proceed to examine others; there are plenty of persons, as they quickly discover, who think that they know something, but really know little or nothing; and then those who are examined by them instead of being angry with themselves are angry with me: This confounded Socrates, they say; this villainous misleader of youth!—and then if somebody asks them, Why, what evil does he practise or teach? they do not know, and cannot tell; but in order that they may not appear to be at a loss, they

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ceit that they knew things which were beyond them

The oracle was intended to apply, not to Socrates, but to all men who know that their wisdom is worth nothing.

There are my imitators who go about detecting pretenders, and the enmity which they arouse falls upon me.



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MELETUS.

repeat the ready-made charges which are used against all philosophers about teaching things up in the clouds and under the earth, and having no gods, and making the worse appear the better cause; for they do not like to confess that their pretence of knowledge has been detected—which is the truth; and as they are numerous and ambitious and energetic, and are drawn up in battle array and have persuasive tongues, they have filled your ears with their loud and inveterate calumnies. And this is the reason why my three accusers, Meletus and Anytus and Lycon, have set upon me; Meletus, who has a quarrel with me on behalf of the poets; Anytus, on behalf of the craftsmen and politicians; Lycon, on behalf of the rhetoricians: and as I said <sup>24</sup> at the beginning, I cannot expect to get rid of such a mass of calumny all in a moment. And this, O men of Athens, is the truth and the whole truth; I have concealed nothing, I have dissembled nothing. And yet, I know that my plainness of speech makes them hate me, and what is their hatred but a proof that I am speaking the truth?—Hence has arisen the prejudice against me; and this is the reason of it, as you will find out either in this or in any future enquiry.

The second  
class of  
accusers.

I have said enough in my defence against the first class of my accusers; I turn to the second class. They are headed by Meletus, that good man and true lover of his country, as he calls himself. Against these, too, I must try to make a defence:—Let their affidavit be read: it contains something of this kind: It says that Socrates is a doer of evil, who corrupts the youth; and who does not believe in the gods of the state, but has other new divinities of his own. Such is the charge; and now let us examine the particular counts. He says that I am a doer of evil, and corrupt the youth; but I say, O men of Athens, that Meletus is a doer of evil, in that he pretends to be in earnest when he is only in jest, and is so eager to bring men to trial from a pretended zeal and interest about matters in which he really never had the smallest interest. And the truth of this I will endeavour to prove to you.

Come hither, Meletus, and let me ask a question of you. You think a great deal about the improvement of youth?

Yes, I do.

Tell the judges, then, who is their improver; for you must know, as you have taken the pains to discover their corrupter, and are citing and accusing me before them. Speak, then, and tell the judges who their improver is.—Observe, Meletus, that you are silent, and have nothing to say. But is not this rather disgraceful, and a very considerable proof of what I was saying, that you have no interest in the matter? Speak up, friend, and tell us who their improver is.

The laws.

But that, my good sir, is not my meaning. I want to know who the person is, who, in the first place, knows the laws.

The judges, Socrates, who are present in court.

What, do you mean to say, Meletus, that they are able to instruct and improve youth?

Certainly they are.

What, all of them, or some only and not others?

All of them.

By the goddess Herè, that is good news! There are plenty of improvers, then. And what do you say of the  
25 audience,—do they improve them?

Yes, they do.

And the senators?

Yes, the senators improve them.

But perhaps the members of the assembly corrupt them?—  
or do they too improve them?

They improve them.

Then every Athenian improves and elevates them; all with the exception of myself; and I alone am their corrupter? Is that what you affirm?

That is what I stoutly affirm.

I am very unfortunate if you are right. But suppose I ask you a question: How about horses? Does one man do them harm and all the world good? Is not the exact opposite the truth? One man is able to do them good, or at least not many;—the trainer of horses, that is to say, does them good, and others who have to do with them rather injure them? Is not that true, Meletus, of horses, or of any other animals? Most assuredly it is; whether you and Anytus

*Apology.*

SOCRATES,  
MELETUS.

All men are  
discovered to  
be improvers  
of youth with  
the single  
exception of  
Socrates.

But this rather  
unfortunate  
fact does not  
accord with  
the analogy of  
the animals.



*Apology.*SOCRATES,  
MELETUS.

say yes or no. Happy indeed would be the condition of youth if they had one corrupter only, and all the rest of the world were their improvers. But you, Meletus, have sufficiently shown that you never had a thought about the young: your carelessness is seen in your not caring about the very things which you bring against me.

And now, Meletus, I will ask you another question — by Zeus I will: Which is better, to live among bad citizens, or among good ones? Answer, friend, I say; the question is one which may be easily answered. Do not the good do their neighbours good, and the bad do them evil?

Certainly.

And is there any one who would rather be injured than benefited by those who live with him? Answer, my good friend, the law requires you to answer — does any one like to be injured?

Certainly not.

And when you accuse me of corrupting and deteriorating the youth, do you allege that I corrupt them intentionally or unintentionally?

Intentionally, I say.

But you have just admitted that the good do their neighbours good, and the evil do them evil. Now, is that a truth which your superior wisdom has recognized thus early in life, and am I, at my age, in such darkness and ignorance as not to know that if a man with whom I have to live is corrupted by me, I am very likely to be harmed by him; and yet I corrupt him, and intentionally, too — so you say, although neither I nor any other human being is ever likely to be convinced by you. But either I do not corrupt them, or I corrupt them unintentionally; and on either view of the case you lie. If my offence is unintentional, the law has no cognizance of unintentional offences: you ought to have taken me privately, and warned and admonished me; for if I had been better advised, I should have left off doing what I only did unintentionally — no doubt I should; but you would have nothing to say to me and refused to teach me. And now you bring me up in this court, which is a place not of instruction, but of punishment.

It will be very clear to you, Athenians, as I was saying,

When I do harm to my neighbour I must do harm to myself: and therefore I cannot be supposed to injure them intentionally.

that Meletus has no care at all, great or small, about the matter. But still I should like to know, Meletus, in what I am affirmed to corrupt the young. I suppose you mean, as I infer from your indictment, that I teach them not to acknowledge the gods which the state acknowledges, but some other new divinities or spiritual agencies in their stead. These are the lessons by which I corrupt the youth, as you say.

*Apology.*

SOCRATES,  
MELETUS.

Yes, that I say emphatically.

Then, by the gods, Meletus, of whom we are speaking, tell me and the court, in somewhat plainer terms, what you mean! for I do not as yet understand whether you affirm that I teach other men to acknowledge some gods, and therefore that I do believe in gods, and am not an entire atheist — this you do not lay to my charge,—but only you say that they are not the same gods which the city recognizes — the charge is that they are different gods. Or, do you mean that I am an atheist simply, and a teacher of atheism?

Socrates is declared by Meletus to be an atheist and to corrupt the religion of the young.

I mean the latter — that you are a complete atheist.

What an extraordinary statement! Why do you think so, Meletus? Do you mean that I do not believe in the god-head of the sun or moon, like other men?

I assure you, judges, that he does not: for he says that the sun is stone, and the moon earth.

Friend Meletus, you think that you are accusing Anaxagoras: and you have but a bad opinion of the judges, if you fancy them illiterate to such a degree as not to know that these doctrines are found in the books of Anaxagoras the Clazomenian, which are full of them. And so, forsooth, the youth are said to be taught them by Socrates, when there are not unfrequently exhibitions of them at the theatre<sup>1</sup> (price of admission one drachma at the most); and they might pay their money, and laugh at Socrates if he pretends to father these extraordinary views. And so, Meletus, you really think that I do not believe in any god?

Meletus has confounded Socrates with Anaxagoras;

I swear by Zeus that you believe absolutely in none at all.

Nobody will believe you, Meletus, and I am pretty sure that you do not believe yourself. I cannot help thinking,

and he has contradicted himself in the indictment.

<sup>1</sup> Probably in allusion to Aristophanes who caricatured, and to Euripides who borrowed the notions of Anaxagoras, as well as to other dramatic poets.

*Apology.*SOCRATES,  
MELETUS.

men of Athens, that Meletus is reckless and impudent, and that he has written this indictment in a spirit of mere wantonness and youthful bravado. Has he not compounded a riddle, thinking to try me? He said to himself:—I shall see whether the wise Socrates will discover my facetious contradiction, or whether I shall be able to deceive him and the rest of them. For he certainly does appear to me to contradict himself in the indictment as much as if he said that Socrates is guilty of not believing in the gods, and yet of believing in them—but this is not like a person who is in earnest. 27

XV  
I should like you, O men of Athens, to join me in examining what I conceive to be his inconsistency; and do you, Meletus, answer. And I must remind the audience of my request that they would not make a disturbance if I speak in my accustomed manner:

How can  
Socrates be-  
lieve in divine  
agencies and  
not believe  
in gods?

Did ever man, Meletus, believe in the existence of human things, and not of human beings? . . . I wish, men of Athens, that he would answer, and not be always trying to get up an interruption. Did ever any man believe in horsemanship, and not in horses? or in flute-playing, and not in flute-players? No, my friend; I will answer to you and to the court, as you refuse to answer for yourself. There is no man who ever did. But now please to answer the next question: Can a man believe in spiritual and divine agencies, and not in spirits or demigods?

He cannot.

How lucky I am to have extracted that answer, by the assistance of the court! But then you swear in the indictment that I teach and believe in divine or spiritual agencies (new or old, no matter for that); at any rate, I believe in spiritual agencies,—so you say and swear in the affidavit; and yet if I believe in divine beings, how can I help believing in spirits or demigods;—must I not? To be sure I must; and therefore I may assume that your silence gives consent. Now what are spirits or demigods? are they not either gods or the sons of gods?

Certainly they are.

But this is what I call the facetious riddle invented by you: the demigods or spirits are gods, and you say first that



I do not believe in gods, and then again that I do believe in gods; that is, if I believe in demigods. For if the demigods are the illegitimate sons of gods, whether by the nymphs or by any other mothers, of whom they are said to be the sons—what human being will ever believe that there are no gods if they are the sons of gods? You might as well affirm the existence of mules, and deny that of horses and asses. Such nonsense, Meletus, could only have been intended by you to make trial of me. You have put this into the indictment because you had nothing real of which to accuse me. But no one who has a particle of understanding will ever be convinced by you that the same men can believe in divine and superhuman things, and yet not believe that  
 28 there are gods and demigods and heroes.

I have said enough in answer to the charge of Meletus: any elaborate defence is unnecessary; but I know only too well how many are the enmities which I have incurred, and this is what will be my destruction if I am destroyed;—not Meletus, nor yet Anytus, but the envy and detraction of the world, which has been the death of many good men, and will probably be the death of many more; there is no danger of my being the last of them.

Some one will say: And are you not ashamed, Socrates, of a course of life which is likely to bring you to an untimely end? To him I may fairly answer: There you are mistaken: a man who is good for anything ought not to calculate the chance of living or dying; he ought only to consider whether in doing anything he is doing right or wrong—acting the part of a good man or of a bad. Whereas, upon your view, the heroes who fell at Troy were not good for much, and the son of Thetis above all, who altogether despised danger in comparison with disgrace; and when he was so eager to slay Hector, his goddess mother said to him, that if he avenged his companion Patroclus, and slew Hector, he would die himself—‘Fate,’ she said, in these or the like words, ‘waits for you next after Hector;’ he, receiving this warning, utterly despised danger and death, and instead of fearing them, feared rather to live in dishonour, and not to avenge his friend. ‘Let me die forthwith,’ he replies, ‘and be avenged of my enemy, rather than abide here by the beaked

*Apology.*

SOCRATES.

Let no man  
 fear death or  
 fear anything  
 but disgrace.

*Apology.*

SOCRATES.

ships, a laughing-stock and a burden of the earth.' Had Achilles any thought of death and danger? For wherever a man's place is, whether the place which he has chosen or that in which he has been placed by a commander, there he ought to remain in the hour of danger; he should not think of death or of anything but of disgrace. And this, O men of Athens, is a true saying.

Socrates,  
who has often  
faced death  
in battle, will  
not make any  
condition in  
order to save  
his own life;  
for he does  
not know  
whether  
death is a  
good or an  
evil.

Strange, indeed, would be my conduct, O men of Athens, if I who, when I was ordered by the generals whom you chose to command me at Potidaea and Amphipolis and Delium, remained where they placed me, like any other man, facing death — if now, when, as I conceive and imagine, God orders me to fulfil the philosopher's mission of searching into myself and other men, I were to desert my post through fear of death, or any other fear; that would indeed be strange, and I might justly be arraigned in court for denying the existence of the gods, if I disobeyed the oracle because I was afraid of death, fancying that I was wise when I was not wise. For the fear of death is indeed the pretence of wisdom, and not real wisdom, being a pretence of knowing the unknown; and no one knows whether death, which men in their fear apprehend to be the greatest evil, may not be the greatest good. Is not this ignorance of a disgraceful sort, the ignorance which is the conceit that a man knows what he does not know? And in this respect only I believe myself to differ from men in general, and may perhaps claim to be wiser than they are: — that whereas I know but little of the world below, I do not suppose that I know: but I do know that injustice and disobedience to a better, whether God or man, is evil and dishonourable, and I will never fear or avoid a possible good rather than a certain evil. And therefore if you let me go now, and are not convinced by Anytus, who said that since I had been prosecuted I must be put to death; (or if not that I ought never to have been prosecuted at all); and that if I escape now, your sons will all be utterly ruined by listening to my words — if you say to me, Socrates, this time we will not mind Anytus, and you shall be let off, but upon one condition, that you are not to enquire and speculate in this way any more, and that if you are caught doing so again you shall die; — if this was the 29



condition on which you let me go, I should reply: Men of Athens, I honour and love you; but I shall obey God rather than you, and while I have life and strength I shall never cease from the practice and teaching of philosophy, exhorting any one whom I meet and saying to him after my manner: You, my friend,—a citizen of the great and mighty and wise city of Athens,—are you not ashamed of heaping up the greatest amount of money and honour and reputation, and caring so little about wisdom and truth and the greatest improvement of the soul, which you never regard or heed at all? And if the person with whom I am arguing, says: Yes, but I do care; then I do not leave him or let him go at once; but I proceed to interrogate and examine and cross-examine him, and if I think that he has no virtue in him, but only says that he has, I reproach him with undervaluing the  
30 greater, and overvaluing the less. And I shall repeat the same words to every one whom I meet, young and old, citizen and alien, but especially to the citizens, inasmuch as they are my brethren. For know that this is the command of God; and I believe that no greater good has ever happened in the state than my service to the God. For I do nothing but go about persuading you all, old and young alike, not to take thought for your persons or your properties, but first and chiefly to care about the greatest improvement of the soul. I tell you that virtue is not given by money, but that from virtue comes money and every other good of man, public as well as private. This is my teaching, and if this is the doctrine which corrupts the youth, I am a mischievous person. But if any one says that this is not my teaching, he is speaking an untruth. Wherefore, O men of Athens, I say to you, do as Anytus bids or not as Anytus bids, and either acquit me or not; but whichever you do, understand that I shall never alter my ways, not even if I have to die many times.

*Apology.*

SOCRATES.

He must always be a preacher of philosophy.

'Necessity is laid upon me:' 'I must obey God rather than man.'

Men of Athens, do not interrupt, but hear me; there was an understanding between us that you should hear me to the end: I have something more to say, at which you may be inclined to cry out; but I believe that to hear me will be good for you, and therefore I beg that you will not cry out. I would have you know, that if you kill such an one as I am,

*Apology.*

SOCRATES.

Neither you  
nor Meletus  
can ever  
injure me.

you will injure yourselves more than you will injure me. Nothing will injure me, not Meletus nor yet Anytus — they cannot, for a bad man is not permitted to injure a better than himself. I do not deny that Anytus may, perhaps, kill him, or drive him into exile, or deprive him of civil rights; and he may imagine, and others may imagine, that he is inflicting a great injury upon him: but there I do not agree. For the evil of doing as he is doing — the evil of unjustly taking away the life of another — is greater far.

I am the  
gadfly of the  
Athenian people,  
given to them by God,  
and they will  
never have  
another, if  
they kill me.

And now, Athenians, I am not going to argue for my own sake, as you may think, but for yours, that you may not sin against the God by condemning me, who am his gift to you. For if you kill me you will not easily find a successor to me, who, if I may use such a ludicrous figure of speech, am a sort of gadfly, given to the state by God; and the state is a great and noble steed who is tardy in his motions owing to his very size, and requires to be stirred into life. I am that gadfly which God has attached to the state, and all day long 31 and in all places am always fastening upon you, arousing and persuading and reproaching you. You will not easily find another like me, and therefore I would advise you to spare me. I dare say that you may feel out of temper (like a person who is suddenly awakened from sleep), and you think that you might easily strike me dead as Anytus advises, and then you would sleep on for the remainder of your lives, unless God in his care of you sent you another gadfly. When I say that I am given to you by God, the proof of my mission is this:—if I had been like other men, I should not have neglected all my own concerns or patiently seen the neglect of them during all these years, and have been doing yours, coming to you individually like a father or elder brother, exhorting you to regard virtue; such conduct, I say, would be unlike human nature. If I had gained anything, or if my exhortations had been paid, there would have been some sense in my doing so; but now, as you will perceive, not even the impudence of my accusers dares to say that I have ever exacted or sought pay of any one; of that they have no witness. And I have a sufficient witness to the truth of what I say — my poverty.

Some one may wonder why I go about in private giving

advice and busying myself with the concerns of others, but do not venture to come forward in public and advise the state. I will tell you why. You have heard me speak at sundry times and in divers places of an oracle or sign which comes to me, and is the divinity which Meletus ridicules in the indictment. This sign, which is a kind of voice, first began to come to me when I was a child; it always forbids but never commands me to do anything which I am going to do. This is what deters me from being a politician. And rightly, as I think. For I am certain, O men of Athens, that if I had engaged in politics, I should have perished long ago, and done no good either to you or to myself. And do not be offended at my telling you the truth: for the truth is, that no man who goes to war with you or any other multitude, honestly striving against the many lawless and unrighteous deeds which are done in a state, will save his life; he who will fight for the right, if he would live even for a brief space, must have a private station and not a public one.

32

I can give you convincing evidence of what I say, not words only, but what you value far more — actions. Let me relate to you a passage of my own life which will prove to you that I should never have yielded to injustice from any fear of death, and that 'as I should have refused to yield' I must have died at once. I will tell you a tale of the courts, not very interesting perhaps, but nevertheless true. The only office of state which I ever held, O men of Athens, was that of senator: the tribe Antiochis, which is my tribe, had the presidency at the trial of the generals who had not taken up the bodies of the slain after the battle of Arginusae; and you proposed to try them in a body, contrary to law, as you all thought afterwards; but at the time I was the only one of the Prytanes who was opposed to the illegality, and I gave my vote against you; and when the orators threatened to impeach and arrest me, and you called and shouted, I made up my mind that I would run the risk, having law and justice with me, rather than take part in your injustice because I feared imprisonment and death. This happened in the days of the democracy. But when the oligarchy of the Thirty was in power, they sent for me and four others into the rotunda, and bade us bring Leon the Salaminian from Salamis, as they

*Apology.*

SOCRATES.

The internal sign always forbade him to engage in politics; and if he had done so, he would have perished long ago.

He had shown that he would sooner die than commit injustice at the trial of the generals and under the tyranny of the Thirty.



*Apology.*

SOCRATES.

wanted to put him to death. This was a specimen of the sort of commands which they were always giving with the view of implicating as many as possible in their crimes; and then I showed, not in word only but in deed, that, if I may be allowed to use such an expression, I cared not a straw for death, and that my great and only care was lest I should do an unrighteous or unholy thing. For the strong arm of that oppressive power did not frighten me into doing wrong; and when we came out of the rotunda the other four went to Salamis and fetched Leon, but I went quietly home. For which I might have lost my life, had not the power of the Thirty shortly afterwards come to an end. And many will witness to my words.

Now do you really imagine that I could have survived all these years, if I had led a public life, supposing that like a good man I had always maintained the right and had made justice, as I ought, the first thing? No indeed, men of Athens, neither I nor any other man. But I have been 33 always the same in all my actions, public as well as private, and never have I yielded any base compliance to those who are slanderously termed my disciples, or to any other. Not that I have any regular disciples. But if any one likes to come and hear me while I am pursuing my mission, whether he be young or old, he is not excluded. Nor do I converse only with those who pay; but any one, whether he be rich or poor, may ask and answer me and listen to my words; and whether he turns out to be a bad man or a good one, neither result can be justly imputed to me; for I never taught or professed to teach him anything. And if any one says that he has ever learned or heard anything from me in private which all the world has not heard, let me tell you that he is lying.

But I shall be asked, Why do people delight in continually conversing with you? I have told you already, Athenians, the whole truth about this matter: they like to hear the cross-examination of the pretenders to wisdom; there is amusement in it. Now this duty of cross-examining other men has been imposed upon me by God; and has been signified to me by oracles, visions, and in every way in which the will of divine power was ever intimated to any one. This is true, O Athenians; or, if not true, would be soon refuted. If I am or

He is always talking to the citizens, but he teaches nothing; he takes no pay and has no secrets.

have been corrupting the youth, those of them who are now grown up and have become sensible that I gave them bad advice in the days of their youth should come forward as accusers, and take their revenge; or if they do not like to come themselves, some of their relatives, fathers, brothers, or other kinsmen, should say what evil their families have suffered at my hands. Now is their time. Many of them I see in the court. There is Crito, who is of the same age and of the same deme with myself, and there is Critobulus his son, whom I also see. Then again there is Lysanias of Sphettus, who is the father of Aeschines — he is present; and also there is Antiphon of Cephissus, who is the father of Epigenes; and there are the brothers of several who have associated with me. There is Nicostratus the son of Theosdotides, and the brother of Theodotus (now Theodotus himself is dead, and therefore he, at any rate, will not seek to stop him); and there is Paralus the son of Demodocus, who had a brother Theages; 34 and Adeimantus the son of Ariston, whose brother Plato is present; and Aeantodorus, who is the brother of Apollodorus, whom I also see. I might mention a great many others, some of whom Meletus should have produced as witnesses in the course of his speech; and let him still produce them, if he has forgotten — I will make way for him. And let him say, if he has any testimony of the sort which he can produce. Nay, Athenians, the very opposite is the truth. For all these are ready to witness on behalf of the corrupter, of the injurer of their kindred, as Meletus and Anytus call me; not the corrupted youth only — there might have been a motive for that — but their uncorrupted elder relatives. Why should they too support me with their testimony? Why, indeed, except for the sake of truth and justice, and because they know that I am speaking the truth, and that Meletus is a liar.

Well, Athenians, this and the like of this is all the defence which I have to offer. Yet a word more. Perhaps there may be some one who is offended at me, when he calls to mind how he himself on a similar, or even a less serious occasion, prayed and entreated the judges with many tears, and how he produced his children in court, which was a moving spectacle, together with a host of relations and friends; whereas I, who am probably in danger of my life,

*Apology.*

SOCRATES.

The parents and kinsmen of those whom he is supposed to have corrupted do not come forward and testify against him.



*Apology.*

SOCRATES.

He is flesh  
and blood, but  
he will not  
appeal to the  
pity of his  
judges: or  
make a scene  
in the court  
such as he  
has often wit-  
nessed.

will do none of these things. The contrast may occur to his mind, and he may be set against me, and vote in anger because he is displeased at me on this account. Now if there be such a person among you,—mind, I do not say that there is,—to him I may fairly reply: My friend, I am a man, and like other men, a creature of flesh and blood, and not ‘of wood or stone,’ as Homer says; and I have a family, yes, and sons, O Athenians, three in number, one almost a man, and two others who are still young; and yet I will not bring any of them hither in order to petition you for an acquittal. And why not? Not from any self-assertion or want of respect for you. Whether I am or am not afraid of death is another question, of which I will not now speak. But, having regard to public opinion, I feel that such conduct would be discreditable to myself, and to you, and to the whole state. One who has reached my years, and who has a name for wisdom, ought not to demean himself. Whether this opinion of me be deserved or not, at any rate the world has decided that Socrates is in some way superior to other men. And if those among you who are said to be superior in wisdom and courage, and any other virtue, demean themselves in this way, how shameful is their conduct! I have seen men of reputation, when they have been condemned, behaving in the strangest manner: they seemed to fancy that they were going to suffer something dreadful if they died, and that they could be immortal if you only allowed them to live; and I think that such are a dishonour to the state, and that any stranger coming in would have said of them that the most eminent men of Athens, to whom the Athenians themselves give honour and command, are no better than women. And I say that these things ought not to be done by those of us who have a reputation; and if they are done, you ought not to permit them; you ought rather to show that you are far more disposed to condemn the man who gets up a doleful scene and makes the city ridiculous, than him who holds his peace.

35

The judge  
should not be  
influenced by  
his feelings,  
but convinced  
by reason.

But, setting aside the question of public opinion, there seems to be something wrong in asking a favour of a judge, and thus procuring an acquittal, instead of informing and convincing him. For his duty is, not to make a present of justice, but to give judgment; and he has sworn that he will judge

according to the laws, and not according to his own good pleasure; and we ought not to encourage you, nor should you allow yourselves to be encouraged, in this habit of perjury — there can be no piety in that. Do not then require me to do what I consider dishonourable and impious and wrong, especially now, when I am being tried for impiety on the indictment of Meletus. For if, O men of Athens, by force of persuasion and entreaty I could overpower your oaths, then I should be teaching you to believe that there are no gods, and in defending should simply convict myself of the charge of not believing in them. But that is not so — far otherwise. For I do believe that there are gods, and in a sense higher than that in which any of my accusers believe in them. And to you and to God I commit my cause, to be determined by you as is best for you and me.

*Apology.*

SOCRATES.

36 There are many reasons why I am not grieved, O men of Athens, at the vote of condemnation. I expected it, and am only surprised that the votes are so nearly equal; for I had thought that the majority against me would have been far larger; but now, had thirty votes gone over to the other side, I should have been acquitted. And I may say, I think, that I have escaped Meletus. I may say more; for without the assistance of Anytus and Lycon, any one may see that he would not have had a fifth part of the votes, as the law requires, in which case he would have incurred a fine of a thousand drachmae.

And so he proposes death as the penalty. And what shall I propose on my part, O men of Athens? Clearly that which is my due. And what is my due? What return shall be made to the man who has never had the wit to be idle during his whole life; but has been careless of what the many care for — wealth, and family interests, and military offices, and speaking in the assembly, and magistracies, and plots, and parties. Reflecting that I was really too honest a man to be a politician and live, I did not go where I could do no good to you or to myself; but where I could do the greatest good privately to every one of you, thither I went, and sought to persuade every man among you that he must look to him-

Socrates all his life long has been seeking to do the greatest good to the Athenians.

*Apology.*

SOCRATES.

Should he not  
be rewarded  
with main-  
tenance in the  
Prytaneum?

self, and seek virtue and wisdom before he looks to his private interests, and look to the state before he looks to the interests of the state; and that this should be the order which he observes in all his actions. What shall be done to such an one? Doubtless some good thing, O men of Athens, if he has his reward; and the good should be of a kind suitable to him. What would be a reward suitable to a poor man who is your benefactor, and who desires leisure that he may instruct you? There can be no reward so fitting as maintenance in the Prytaneum, O men of Athens, a reward which he deserves far more than the citizen who has won the prize at Olympia in the horse or chariot race, whether the chariots were drawn by two horses or by many. For I am in want, and he has enough; and he only gives you the appearance of happiness, and I give you the reality. And if I am to estimate the penalty fairly, I should say that maintenance in the Pry- 37  
taneum is the just return.

The con-  
sciousness of  
innocence  
gives him  
confidence.

Perhaps you think that I am braving you in what I am saying now, as in what I said before about the tears and prayers. But this is not so. I speak rather because I am convinced that I never intentionally wronged any one, although I cannot convince you—the time has been too short; if there were a law at Athens, as there is in other cities, that a capital cause should not be decided in one day, then I believe that I should have convinced you. But I cannot in a moment refute great slanders; and, as I am convinced that I never wronged another, I will assuredly not wrong myself. I will not say of myself that I deserve any evil, or propose any penalty. Why should I? Because I am afraid of the penalty of death which Meletus proposes? When I do not know whether death is a good or an evil, why should I propose a penalty which would certainly be an evil? Shall I say imprisonment? And why should I live in prison, and be the slave of the magistrates of the year—of the Eleven? Or shall the penalty be a fine, and imprisonment until the fine is paid? There is the same objection. I should have to lie in prison, for money I have none, and cannot pay. And if I say exile (and this may possibly be the penalty which you will affix), I must indeed be blinded by the love of life, if I am so irrational as to expect that when you, who are my own

He has not  
deserved im-  
prisonment.

And if he is  
exiled, how  
wretched will  
be his fate!



citizens, cannot endure my discourses and words, and have found them so grievous and odious that you will have no more of them, others are likely to endure me. No indeed, men of Athens, that is not very likely. And what a life should I lead, at my age, wandering from city to city, ever changing my place of exile, and always being driven out! For I am quite sure that wherever I go, there, as here, the young men will flock to me; and if I drive them away, their elders will drive me out at their request; and if I let them come, their fathers and friends will drive me out for their sakes.

*Apology.*

SOCRATES.

He cannot be silent, and he will be driven from city to city.

38 Some one will say: Yes, Socrates, but cannot you hold your tongue, and then you may go into a foreign city, and no one will interfere with you? Now I have great difficulty in making you understand my answer to this. For if I tell you that to do as you say would be a disobedience to the God, and therefore that I cannot hold my tongue, you will not believe that I am serious; and if I say again that daily to discourse about virtue, and of those other things about which you hear me examining myself and others, is the greatest good of man, and that the unexamined life is not worth living, you are still less likely to believe me. Yet I say what is true, although a thing of which it is hard for me to persuade you. Also, I have never been accustomed to think that I deserve to suffer any harm. Had I money I might have estimated the offence at what I was able to pay, and not have been much the worse. But I have none, and therefore I must ask you to proportion the fine to my means. Well, perhaps I could afford a mina, and therefore I propose that penalty: Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus, my friends here, bid me say thirty minae, and they will be the sureties. Let thirty minae be the penalty; for which sum they will be ample security to you.

Money he has none, or he would propose a fine. His friends bid him offer 30 minae on their security.

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Not much time will be gained, O Athenians, in return for the evil name which you will get from the detractors of the city, who will say that you killed Socrates, a wise man; for they will call me wise, even although I am not wise, when

They will be accused of killing a wise man.

*Apology.*

SOCRATES.

Why could  
they not  
wait a few  
years?

they want to reproach you. If you had waited a little while, your desire would have been fulfilled in the course of nature. For I am far advanced in years, as you may perceive, and not far from death. I am speaking now not to all of you, but only to those who have condemned me to death. And I have another thing to say to them: You think that I was convicted because I had no words of the sort which would have procured my acquittal—I mean, if I had thought fit to leave nothing undone or unsaid. Not so; the deficiency which led to my conviction was not of words—certainly not. But I had not the boldness or impudence or inclination to address you as you would have liked me to do, weeping and wailing and lamenting, and saying and doing many things which you have been accustomed to hear from others, and which, as I maintain, are unworthy of me. I thought at the time that I ought not to do anything common or mean when in danger: nor do I now repent of the style of my defence; I would rather die having spoken after my manner, than speak in your manner and live. For neither in war nor yet at law ought I or any man to use every way of escaping death. 39 Often in battle there can be no doubt that if a man will throw away his arms, and fall on his knees before his pursuers, he may escape death; and in other dangers there are other ways of escaping death, if a man is willing to say and do anything. The difficulty, my friends, is not to avoid death, but to avoid unrighteousness; for that runs faster than death. I am old and move slowly, and the slower runner has overtaken me, and my accusers are keen and quick, and the faster runner, who is unrighteousness, has overtaken them. And now I depart hence condemned by you to suffer the penalty of death,—they too go their ways condemned by the truth to suffer the penalty of villainy and wrong; and I must abide by my award—let them abide by theirs. I suppose that these things may be regarded as fated,—and I think that they are well.

And now, O men who have condemned me, I would fain prophesy to you; for I am about to die, and in the hour of death men are gifted with prophetic power. And I prophesy to you who are my murderers, that immediately after my departure punishment far heavier than you have inflicted on



me will surely await you. Me you have killed because you wanted to escape the accuser, and not to give an account of your lives. But that will not be as you suppose: far otherwise. For I say that there will be more accusers of you than there are now; accusers whom hitherto I have restrained: and as they are younger they will be more inconsiderate with you, and you will be more offended at them. If you think that by killing men you can prevent some one from censuring your evil lives, you are mistaken; that is not a way of escape which is either possible or honourable; the easiest and the noblest way is not to be disabling others, but to be improving yourselves. This is the prophecy which I utter before my departure to the judges who have condemned me.

*Apology.*

SOCRATES.

They are about to slay Socrates because he has been their accuser: other accusers will rise up and denounce them more vehemently.

40 Friends, who would have acquitted me, I would like also to talk with you about the thing which has come to pass, while the magistrates are busy, and before I go to the place at which I must die. Stay then a little, for we may as well talk with one another while there is time. You are my friends, and I should like to show you the meaning of this event which has happened to me. O my judges — for you I may truly call judges — I should like to tell you of a wonderful circumstance. Hitherto the divine faculty of which the internal oracle is the source has constantly been in the habit of opposing me even about trifles, if I was going to make a slip or error in any matter; and now as you see there has come upon me that which may be thought, and is generally believed to be, the last and worst evil. But the oracle made no sign of opposition, either when I was leaving my house in the morning, or when I was on my way to the court, or while I was speaking, at anything which I was going to say; and yet I have often been stopped in the middle of a speech, but now in nothing I either said or did touching the matter in hand has the oracle opposed me. What do I take to be the explanation of this silence? I will tell you. It is an intimation that what has happened to me is a good, and that those of us who think that death is an evil are in error. For the customary sign would surely have opposed me had I been going to evil and not to good.

He believes that what is happening to him will be good, because the internal oracle gives no sign of opposition.

Let us reflect in another way, and we shall see that there is great reason to hope that death is a good; for one of two things — either death is a state of nothingness and utter

Death either a good or nothing:

*Apology.*

SOCRATES.

= a profound sleep.

How blessed  
to have a just  
judgment  
passed on us;  
to converse  
with Homer  
and Hesiod;  
to see the  
heroes of  
Troy, and to  
continue the  
search after  
knowledge  
in another  
world!

unconsciousness, or, as men say, there is a change and migration of the soul from this world to another. Now if you suppose that there is no consciousness, but a sleep like the sleep of him who is undisturbed even by dreams, death will be an unspeakable gain. For if a person were to select the night in which his sleep was undisturbed even by dreams, and were to compare with this the other days and nights of his life, and then were to tell us how many days and nights he had passed in the course of his life better and more pleasantly than this one, I think that any man, I will not say a private man, but even the great king will not find many such days or nights, when compared with the others. Now if death be of such a nature, I say that to die is gain; for eternity is then only a single night. But if death is the journey to another place, and there, as men say, all the dead abide, what good, O my friends and judges, can be greater than this? If indeed when the pilgrim arrives in the world below, he is delivered from the professors of justice in this world, and finds the true judges who are said to give judgment there, Minos and Rhadamanthus and Aeacus and Triptolemus, and other sons of God who were righteous in their own life, that pilgrimage will be worth making. What would not a man give if he might converse with Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer? Nay, if this be true, let me die again and again. I myself, too, shall have a wonderful interest in there meeting and conversing with Palamedes, and Ajax the son of Telamon, and any other ancient hero who has suffered death through an unjust judgment; and there will be no small pleasure, as I think, in comparing my own sufferings with theirs. Above all, I shall then be able to continue my search into true and false knowledge; as in this world, so also in the next; and I shall find out who is wise, and who pretends to be wise, and is not. What would not a man give, O judges, to be able to examine the leader of the great Trojan expedition; or Odysseus or Sisyphus, or numberless others, men and women too! What infinite delight would there be in conversing with them and asking them questions! In another world they do not put a man to death for asking questions: assuredly not. For besides

being happier than we are, they will be immortal, if what is said is true. *Apology.*

SOCRATES.

Wherefore, O judges, be of good cheer about death, and know of a certainty, that no evil can happen to a good man, either in life or after death. He and his are not neglected by the gods; nor has my own approaching end happened by mere chance. But I see clearly that the time had arrived when it was better for me to die and be released from trouble; wherefore the oracle gave no sign. For which reason, also, I am not angry with my condemners, or with my accusers; they have done me no harm, although they did not mean to do me any good; and for this I may gently blame them.

Still I have a favour to ask of them. When my sons are grown up, I would ask you, O my friends, to punish them; and I would have you trouble them, as I have troubled you, if they seem to care about riches, or anything, more than about virtue; or if they pretend to be something when they are really nothing,—then reprove them, as I have reproved you, for not caring about that for which they ought to care, and thinking that they are something when they are really  
42 nothing. And if you do this, both I and my sons will have received justice at your hands.

Do to my sons  
as I have done  
to you.

The hour of departure has arrived, and we go our ways—I to die, and you to live. Which is better God only knows.



CRITO.





## INTRODUCTION.

THE *Crito* seems intended to exhibit the character of Socrates in one light only, not as the philosopher, fulfilling a divine mission and trusting in the will of heaven, but simply as the good citizen, who having been unjustly condemned is willing to give up his life in obedience to the laws of the state. . . .

*Crito.*

INTRODUC-  
TION.

**Steph.** The days of Socrates are drawing to a close; the fatal ship  
43 has been seen off Sunium, as he is informed by his aged friend  
and contemporary Crito, who visits him before the dawn has  
broken; he himself has been warned in a dream that on the  
44 third day he must depart. Time is precious, and Crito has come  
early in order to gain his consent to a plan of escape. This  
can be easily accomplished by his friends, who will incur no  
45 danger in making the attempt to save him, but will be disgraced  
for ever if they allow him to perish. He should think of his  
duty to his children, and not play into the hands of his enemies.  
Money is already provided by Crito as well as by Simmias and  
46 others, and he will have no difficulty in finding friends in  
Thessaly and other places.

ANALYSIS.

Socrates is afraid that Crito is but pressing upon him the opinions of the many: whereas, all his life long he has followed the dictates of reason only and the opinion of the one wise or skilled man. There was a time when Crito himself had allowed the propriety of this. And although some one will say 'the many can kill us,' that makes no difference; but a good life, in other words, a just and honourable life, is alone to be valued. All considerations of loss of reputation or injury to his children should be dismissed: the only question is whether he would be

*Crito.*

ANALYSIS.

right in attempting to escape. Crito, who is a disinterested 47  
 person not having the fear of death before his eyes, shall answer  
 this for him. Before he was condemned they had often held dis-  
 cussions, in which they agreed that no man should either do evil, 48  
 or return evil for evil, or betray the right. Are these principles  
 to be altered because the circumstances of Socrates are altered?  
 Crito admits that they remain the same. Then is his escape con- 49  
 sistent with the maintenance of them? To this Crito is unable or  
 unwilling to reply.

Socrates proceeds: — Suppose the Laws of Athens to come 50  
 and remonstrate with him: they will ask ‘Why does he seek  
 to overturn them?’ and if he replies, ‘they have injured him,’  
 will not the Laws answer, ‘Yes, but was that the agreement?  
 Has he any objection to make to them which would justify him in 51  
 overturning them? Was he not brought into the world and edu-  
 cated by their help, and are they not his parents? He might 52  
 have left Athens and gone where he pleased, but he has lived  
 there for seventy years more constantly than any other citizen.’  
 Thus he has clearly shown that he acknowledged the agreement,  
 which he cannot now break without dishonour to himself and  
 danger to his friends. Even in the course of the trial he might  
 have proposed exile as the penalty, but then he declared that he  
 preferred death to exile. And whither will he direct his foot-  
 steps? In any well-ordered state the Laws will consider him as 53  
 an enemy. Possibly in a land of misrule like Thessaly he may be  
 welcomed at first, and the unseemly narrative of his escape will  
 be regarded by the inhabitants as an amusing tale. But if he  
 offends them he will have to learn another sort of lesson. Will  
 he continue to give lectures in virtue? That would hardly be  
 decent. And how will his children be the gainers if he takes  
 them into Thessaly, and deprives them of Athenian citizenship? 54  
 Or if he leaves them behind, does he expect that they will be  
 better taken care of by his friends because he is in Thessaly?  
 Will not true friends care for them equally whether he is alive  
 or dead?

Finally, they exhort him to think of justice first, and of life  
 and children afterwards. He may now depart in peace and  
 innocence, a sufferer and not a doer of evil. But if he breaks  
 agreements, and returns evil for evil, they will be angry with him

while he lives; and their brethren the Laws of the world below will receive him as an enemy. Such is the mystic voice which is always murmuring in his ears.

*Crito.*

ANALYSIS.

That Socrates was not a good citizen was a charge made against him during his lifetime, which has been often repeated in later ages. The crimes of Alcibiades, Critias, and Charmides, who had been his pupils, were still recent in the memory of the now restored democracy. The fact that he had been neutral in the death-struggle of Athens was not likely to conciliate popular good-will. Plato, writing probably in the next generation, undertakes the defence of his friend and master in this particular, not to the Athenians of his day, but to posterity and the world at large.

INTRODUC-  
TION.

Whether such an incident ever really occurred as the visit of Crito and the proposal of escape is uncertain: Plato could easily have invented far more than that (Phaedr. 275 B); and in the selection of Crito, the aged friend, as the fittest person to make the proposal to Socrates, we seem to recognize the hand of the artist. Whether any one who has been subjected by the laws of his country to an unjust judgment is right in attempting to escape, is a thesis about which casuists might disagree. Shelley (Prose Works, p. 78) is of opinion that Socrates 'did well to die,' but not for the 'sophistical' reasons which Plato has put into his mouth. And there would be no difficulty in arguing that Socrates should have lived and preferred to a glorious death the good which he might still be able to perform. 'A rhetorician would have had much to say upon that point' (50 B). It may be observed however that Plato never intended to answer the question of casuistry, but only to exhibit the ideal of patient virtue which refuses to do the least evil in order to avoid the greatest, and to show his master maintaining in death the opinions which he had professed in his life. Not 'the world,' but the 'one wise man,' is still the paradox of Socrates in his last hours. He must be guided by reason, although her conclusions may be fatal to him. The remarkable sentiment that the many can do neither good nor evil is true, if taken in the sense, which he means, of moral evil; in his own words, 'they cannot make a man wise or foolish.'

*Crito.*INTRODUC-  
TION.

This little dialogue is a perfect piece of dialectic, in which granting the 'common principle' (49 D), there is no escaping from the conclusion. It is anticipated at the beginning by the dream of Socrates and the parody of Homer. The personification of the Laws, and of their brethren the Laws in the world below, is one of the noblest and boldest figures of speech which occur in Plato.



# CRITO.

## PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES.

CRITO.

SCENE:—The Prison of Socrates.

- Steph.** *Socrates.* WHY have you come at this hour, Crito? it must  
43 be quite early?  
*Crito.* Yes, certainly.  
*Soc.* What is the exact time?  
*Cr.* The dawn is breaking.  
*Soc.* I wonder that the keeper of the prison would let  
you in.  
*Cr.* He knows me, because I often come, Socrates; more-  
over, I have done him a kindness.  
*Soc.* And are you only just arrived?  
*Cr.* No, I came some time ago.  
*Soc.* Then why did you sit and say nothing, instead of at  
once awakening me?  
*Cr.* I should not have liked myself, Socrates, to be in such  
great trouble and unrest as you are — indeed I should not: I  
have been watching with amazement your peaceful slumbers;  
and for that reason I did not awake you, because I wished to  
minimize the pain. I have always thought you to be of a  
happy disposition; but never did I see anything like the easy,  
tranquil manner in which you bear this calamity.  
*Soc.* Why, Crito, when a man has reached my age he ought  
not to be repining at the approach of death.  
*Cr.* And yet other old men find themselves in similar mis-  
fortunes, and age does not prevent them from repining.

*Crito.*

SOCRATES,  
CRITO.

Crito appears  
at break of  
dawn in the  
prison of  
Socrates,  
whom he  
finds asleep.

*Crito.*SOCRATES,  
CRITO.The ship from  
Delos is  
expected.

*Soc.* That is true. But you have not told me why you come at this early hour.

*Cr.* I come to bring you a message which is sad and painful; not, as I believe, to yourself, but to all of us who are your friends, and saddest of all to me.

*Soc.* What? Has the ship come from Delos, on the arrival of which I am to die?

*Cr.* No, the ship has not actually arrived, but she will probably be here to-day, as persons who have come from Sunium tell me that they left her there; and therefore to-morrow, Socrates, will be the last day of your life.

*Soc.* Very well, Crito; if such is the will of God, I am willing; but my belief is that there will be a delay of a day.

*Cr.* Why do you think so?

*Soc.* I will tell you. I am to die on the day after the arrival of the ship.

*Cr.* Yes; that is what the authorities say.

*Soc.* But I do not think that the ship will be here until to-morrow; this I infer from a vision which I had last night, or rather only just now, when you fortunately allowed me to sleep.

*Cr.* And what was the nature of the vision?

*Soc.* There appeared to me the likeness of a woman, fair and comely, clothed in bright raiment, who called to me and said: O Socrates,

‘The third day hence to fertile Phthia shalt thou go<sup>1</sup>.’

*Cr.* What a singular dream, Socrates!

*Soc.* There can be no doubt about the meaning, Crito, I think.

*Cr.* Yes; the meaning is only too clear. But, oh! my beloved Socrates, let me entreat you once more to take my advice and escape. For if you die I shall not only lose a friend who can never be replaced, but there is another evil: people who do not know you and me will believe that I might have saved you if I had been willing to give money, but that I did not care. Now, can there be a worse disgrace than this — that I should be thought to value money more than the

<sup>1</sup> Homer, Il. ix. 363.

A vision of a fair woman who prophesies in the language of Homer that Socrates will die on the third day.

life of a friend? For the many will not be persuaded that I wanted you to escape, and that you refused.

*Crito.*

SOCRATES,  
CRITO.

*Soc.* But why, my dear Crito, should we care about the opinion of the many? Good men, and they are the only persons who are worth considering, will think of these things truly as they occurred.

*Cr.* But you see, Socrates, that the opinion of the many must be regarded, for what is now happening shows that they can do the greatest evil to any one who has lost their good opinion.

Crito by a variety of arguments tries to induce Socrates to make his escape. The means will be easily provided and without danger to any one.

*Soc.* I only wish it were so, Crito; and that the many could do the greatest evil; for then they would also be able to do the greatest good — and what a fine thing this would be! But in reality they can do neither; for they cannot make a man either wise or foolish; and whatever they do is the result of chance.

*Cr.* Well, I will not dispute with you; but please to tell me, Socrates, whether you are not acting out of regard to me and your other friends: are you not afraid that if you escape from prison we may get into trouble with the informers for having stolen you away, and lose either the whole or a great part of  
45 our property; or that even a worse evil may happen to us? Now, if you fear on our account, be at ease; for in order to save you, we ought surely to run this, or even a greater risk; be persuaded, then, and do as I say.

*Soc.* Yes, Crito, that is one fear which you mention, but by no means the only one.

*Cr.* Fear not — there are persons who are willing to get you out of prison at no great cost; and as for the informers, they are far from being exorbitant in their demands — a little money will satisfy them. My means, which are certainly ample, are at your service, and if you have a scruple about spending all mine, here are strangers who will give you the use of theirs; and one of them, Simmias the Theban, has brought a large sum of money for this very purpose; and Cebes and many others are prepared to spend their money in helping you to escape. I say, therefore, do not hesitate on our account, and do not say, as you did in the court<sup>1</sup>, that you

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Apol. 37 C, D.



*Crito.*SOCRATES,  
CRITO.

He is not  
justified in  
throwing  
away his  
life; he will  
be deserting  
his children,  
and will bring  
the reproach  
of cowardice  
on his friends.

will have a difficulty in knowing what to do with yourself anywhere else. For men will love you in other places to which you may go, and not in Athens only; there are friends of mine in Thessaly, if you like to go to them, who will value and protect you, and no Thessalian will give you any trouble. Nor can I think that you are at all justified, Socrates, in betraying your own life when you might be saved; in acting thus you are playing into the hands of your enemies, who are hurrying on your destruction. And further I should say that you are deserting your own children; for you might bring them up and educate them; instead of which you go away and leave them, and they will have to take their chance; and if they do not meet with the usual fate of orphans, there will be small thanks to you. No man should bring children into the world who is unwilling to persevere to the end in their nurture and education. But you appear to be choosing the easier part, not the better and manlier, which would have been more becoming in one who professes to care for virtue in all his actions, like yourself. And indeed, I am ashamed not only of you, but of us who are your friends, when I reflect that the whole business will be attributed entirely to our want of courage. The trial need never have come on, or might have been managed differently; and this last act, or crowning folly, will seem to have occurred through our negligence and cowardice, who might have saved you, if we had been good for 46 anything; and you might have saved yourself, for there was no difficulty at all. See now, Socrates, how sad and discreditable are the consequences, both to us and you. Make up your mind then, or rather have your mind already made up, for the time of deliberation is over, and there is only one thing to be done, which must be done this very night, and if we delay at all will be no longer practicable or possible; I beseech you therefore, Socrates, be persuaded by me, and do as I say.

Socrates is  
one of those  
who must  
be guided  
by reason.

*Soc.* Dear Crito, your zeal is invaluable, if a right one; but if wrong, the greater the zeal the greater the danger; and therefore we ought to consider whether I shall or shall not do as you say. For I am and always have been one of those natures who must be guided by reason, whatever the reason may be which upon reflection appears to me to be the best;

and now that this chance has befallen me, I cannot repudiate my own words: the principles which I have hitherto honoured and revered I still honour, and unless we can at once find other and better principles, I am certain not to agree with you; no, not even if the power of the multitude could inflict many more imprisonments, confiscations, deaths, frightening us like children with hobgoblin terrors<sup>1</sup>. What will be the fairest way of considering the question? Shall I return to your old argument about the opinions of men?—we were saying that some of them are to be regarded, and others not. Now were we right in maintaining this before I was condemned? And has the argument which was once good now proved to be talk for the sake of talking—mere childish nonsense? That is what I want to consider with your help, Crito:—whether, under my present circumstances, the argument appears to be in any way different or not; and is to be allowed by me or disallowed. That argument, which, as I believe, is maintained by many persons of authority, was to the effect, as I was saying, that the opinions of some men are to be regarded, and of other men not to be regarded. Now  
47 you, Crito, are not going to die to-morrow—at least, there is no human probability of this—and therefore you are disinterested and not liable to be deceived by the circumstances in which you are placed. Tell me then, whether I am right in saying that some opinions, and the opinions of some men only, are to be valued, and that other opinions, and the opinions of other men, are not to be valued. I ask you whether I was right in maintaining this?

*Crito.*

SOCRATES,  
CRITO.

Ought he to follow the opinion of the many or of the few, of the wise or of the unwise?

*Cr.* Certainly.

*Soc.* The good are to be regarded, and not the bad?

*Cr.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the opinions of the wise are good, and the opinions of the unwise are evil?

*Cr.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And what was said about another matter? Is the pupil who devotes himself to the practice of gymnastics supposed to attend to the praise and blame and opinion of every man, or of one man only—his physician or trainer, whoever he may be?

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Apol. 30 C.



*Crito.**Cr.* Of one man only.SOCRATES,  
CRITO.*Soc.* And he ought to fear the censure and welcome the praise of that one only, and not of the many?*Cr.* Clearly so.*Soc.* And he ought to act and train, and eat and drink in the way which seems good to his single master who has understanding, rather than according to the opinion of all other men put together?*Cr.* True.*Soc.* And if he disobeys and disregards the opinion and approval of the one, and regards the opinion of the many who have no understanding, will he not suffer evil?*Cr.* Certainly he will.*Soc.* And what will the evil be, whither tending and what affecting, in the disobedient person?*Cr.* Clearly, affecting the body; that is what is destroyed by the evil.The opinion  
of the one  
wise man is to  
be followed.*Soc.* Very good; and is not this true, Crito, of other things which we need not separately enumerate? In questions of just and unjust, fair and foul, good and evil, which are the subjects of our present consultation, ought we to follow the opinion of the many and to fear them; or the opinion of the one man who has understanding? ought we not to fear and reverence him more than all the rest of the world: and if we desert him shall we not destroy and injure that principle in us which may be assumed to be improved by justice and deteriorated by injustice;—there is such a principle?*Cr.* Certainly there is, Socrates.*Soc.* Take a parallel instance:—if, acting under the advice of those who have no understanding, we destroy that which is improved by health and is deteriorated by disease, would life be worth having? And that which has been destroyed is—the body?*Cr.* Yes.*Soc.* Could we live, having an evil and corrupted body?*Cr.* Certainly not.*Soc.* And will life be worth having, if that higher part of man be destroyed, which is improved by justice and depraved by injustice? Do we suppose that principle, whatever it

48 may be in man, which has to do with justice and injustice, to be inferior to the body? *Crito.*

*Cr.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* More honourable than the body?

*Cr.* Far more.

*Soc.* Then, my friend, we must not regard what the many say of us: but what he, the one man who has understanding of just and unjust, will say, and what the truth will say. And therefore you begin in error when you advise that we should regard the opinion of the many about just and unjust, good and evil, honourable and dishonourable.—‘Well,’ some one will say, ‘but the many can kill us.’

No matter what the many say of us.

*Cr.* Yes, Socrates; that will clearly be the answer.

*Soc.* And it is true: but still I find with surprise that the old argument is unshaken as ever. And I should like to know whether I may say the same of another proposition — that not life, but a good life, is to be chiefly valued?

Not life, but a good life, to be chiefly valued.

*Cr.* Yes, that also remains unshaken.

*Soc.* And a good life is equivalent to a just and honourable one — that holds also?

*Cr.* Yes, it does.

*Soc.* From these premisses I proceed to argue the question whether I ought or ought not to try and escape without the consent of the Athenians: and if I am clearly right in escaping, then I will make the attempt; but if not, I will abstain. The other considerations which you mention, of money and loss of character and the duty of educating one’s children, are, I fear, only the doctrines of the multitude, who would be as ready to restore people to life, if they were able, as they are to put them to death — and with as little reason. But now, since the argument has thus far prevailed, the only question which remains to be considered is, whether we shall do rightly either in escaping or in suffering others to aid in our escape and paying them in money and thanks, or whether in reality we shall not do rightly; and if the latter, then death or any other calamity which may ensue on my remaining here must not be allowed to enter into the calculation.

Admitting these principles, ought I to try and escape or not?

*Cr.* I think that you are right, Socrates; how then shall we proceed?

*Crito.*SOCRATES,  
CRITO.

*Soc.* Let us consider the matter together, and do you either refute me if you can, and I will be convinced; or else cease, my dear friend, from repeating to me that I ought to escape against the wishes of the Athenians: for I highly value your attempts to persuade me to do so, but I may not be persuaded against my own better judgment. And now please to consider my first position, and try how you can 49 best answer me.

*Cr.* I will.

May we some-  
times do evil  
that good  
may come?

*Soc.* Are we to say that we are never intentionally to do wrong, or that in one way we ought and in another way we ought not to do wrong, or is doing wrong always evil and dishonourable, as I was just now saying, and as has been already acknowledged by us? Are all our former admissions which were made within a few days to be thrown away? And have we, at our age, been earnestly discoursing with one another all our life long only to discover that we are no better than children? Or, in spite of the opinion of the many, and in spite of consequences whether better or worse, shall we insist on the truth of what was then said, that injustice is always an evil and dishonour to him who acts unjustly? Shall we say so or not?

*Cr.* Yes.*Soc.* Then we must do no wrong?*Cr.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Nor when injured injure in return, as the many imagine; for we must injure no one at all<sup>1</sup>?

*Cr.* Clearly not.*Soc.* Again, Crito, may we do evil?*Cr.* Surely not, Socrates.

May we  
render evil  
for evil?

*Soc.* And what of doing evil in return for evil, which is the morality of the many — is that just or not?

*Cr.* Not just.

*Soc.* For doing evil to another is the same as injuring him?

*Cr.* Very true.

*Soc.* Then we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil to any one, whatever evil we may have suffered from him.

<sup>1</sup> e. g. cp. Rep. i. 335 E.



But I would have you consider, Crito, whether you really mean what you are saying. For this opinion has never been held, and never will be held, by any considerable number of persons; and those who are agreed and those who are not agreed upon this point have no common ground, and can only despise one another when they see how widely they differ. Tell me, then, whether you agree with and assent to my first principle, that neither injury nor retaliation nor warding off evil by evil is ever right. And shall that be the premiss of our argument? Or do you decline and dissent from this? For so I have ever thought, and continue to think; but, if you are of another opinion, let me hear what you have to say. If, however, you remain of the same mind as formerly, I will proceed to the next step.

*Crito.*

SOCRATES,  
CRITO.

Or is evil  
always to be  
deemed evil?  
Are you of the  
same mind  
as formerly  
about all this?

*Cr.* You may proceed, for I have not changed my mind.

*Crito assents.*

*Soc.* Then I will go on to the next point, which may be put in the form of a question:—Ought a man to do what he admits to be right, or ought he to betray the right?

Then ought  
Socrates to  
desert or not?

*Cr.* He ought to do what he thinks right.

*Soc.* But if this is true, what is the application? In  
50 leaving the prison against the will of the Athenians, do I wrong any? or rather do I not wrong those whom I ought least to wrong? Do I not desert the principles which were acknowledged by us to be just — what do you say?

*Cr.* I cannot tell, Socrates; for I do not know.

*Soc.* Then consider the matter in this way:—Imagine that I am about to play truant (you may call the proceeding by any name which you like), and the laws and the government come and interrogate me: ‘Tell us, Socrates,’ they say; ‘what are you about? are you not going by an act of yours to overturn us — the laws, and the whole state, as far as in you lies? Do you imagine that a state can subsist and not be overthrown, in which the decisions of law have no power, but are set aside and trampled upon by individuals?’ What will be our answer, Crito, to these and the like words? Any one, and especially a rhetorician, will have a good deal to say on behalf of the law which requires a sentence to be carried out. He will argue that this law should not be set aside; and shall we reply, ‘Yes; but the state has injured us and given an unjust sentence.’ Suppose I say that?

The Laws  
come and  
argue with  
him.—Can a  
State exist in  
which law is  
set aside?

*Crito.**Cr.* Very good, Socrates.SOCRATES,  
CRITO.Has he any  
fault to find  
with them?

*Soc.* 'And was that our agreement with you?' the law would answer; 'or were you to abide by the sentence of the state?' And if I were to express my astonishment at their words, the law would probably add: 'Answer, Socrates, instead of opening your eyes — you are in the habit of asking and answering questions. Tell us,—What complaint have you to make against us which justifies you in attempting to destroy us and the state? In the first place did we not bring you into existence? Your father married your mother by our aid and begat you. Say whether you have any objection to urge against those of us who regulate marriage?' None, I should reply. 'Or against those of us who after birth regulate the nurture and education of children, in which you also were trained? Were not the laws, which have the charge of education, right in commanding your father to train you in music and gymnastic?' Right, I should reply. 'Well then, since you were brought into the world and nurtured and educated by us, can you deny in the first place that you are our child and slave, as your fathers were before you? And if this is true you are not on equal terms with us; nor can you think that you have a right to do to us what we are doing to you. Would you have any right to strike or revile or do any other evil to your father or your master, if you had one, because you have been struck or reviled by him, or received some other evil at his hands?—you would not say this? And because we think right to 51 destroy you, do you think that you have any right to destroy us in return, and your country as far as in you lies? Will you, O professor of true virtue, pretend that you are justified in this? Has a philosopher like you failed to discover that our country is more to be valued and higher and holier far than mother or father or any ancestor, and more to be regarded in the eyes of the gods and of men of understanding? also to be soothed, and gently and reverently entreated when angry, even more than a father, and either to be persuaded, or if not persuaded, to be obeyed? And when we are punished by her, whether with imprisonment or stripes, the punishment is to be endured in silence; and if she lead us to wounds or death in battle, thither we follow as is right;

No man has  
any right to  
strike a blow  
at his country  
any more than  
at his father  
or mother.



neither may any one yield or retreat or leave his rank, but whether in battle or in a court of law, or in any other place, he must do what his city and his country order him; or he must change their view of what is just: and if he may do no violence to his father or mother, much less may he do violence to his country.' What answer shall we make to this, Crito? Do the laws speak truly, or do they not?

*Cr.* I think that they do.

*Soc.* Then the laws will say: 'Consider, Socrates, if we are speaking truly that in your present attempt you are going to do us an injury. For, having brought you into the world, and nurtured and educated you, and given you and every other citizen a share in every good which we had to give, we further proclaim to any Athenian by the liberty which we allow him, that if he does not like us when he has become of age and has seen the ways of the city, and made our acquaintance, he may go where he pleases and take his goods with him. None of us laws will forbid him or interfere with him. Any one who does not like us and the city, and who wants to emigrate to a colony or to any other city, may go where he likes, retaining his property. But he who has experience of the manner in which we order justice and administer the state, and still remains, has entered into an implied contract that he will do as we command him. And he who disobeys us is, as we maintain, thrice wrong; first, because in disobeying us he is disobeying his parents; secondly, because we are the authors of his education; thirdly, because he has made an agreement with us that he

52 will duly obey our commands; and he neither obeys them nor convinces us that our commands are unjust; and we do not rudely impose them, but give him the alternative of obeying or convincing us;—that is what we offer, and he does neither.

'These are the sort of accusations to which, as we were saying, you, Socrates, will be exposed if you accomplish your intentions; you, above all other Athenians.' Suppose now I ask, why I rather than anybody else? they will justly retort upon me that I above all other men have acknowledged the agreement. 'There is clear proof,' they will say, 'Socrates, that we and the city were not dis-

*Crito.*

*SOCRATES,*  
*CRITO.*

The Laws  
argue that he  
has made an  
implied agree-  
ment with  
them which  
he is not at  
liberty to  
break at his  
pleasure.

*Crito.*SOCRATES,  
CRITO.

pleasing to you. Of all Athenians you have been the most constant resident in the city, which, as you never leave, you may be supposed to love<sup>1</sup>. For you never went out of the city either to see the games, except once when you went to the Isthmus, or to any other place unless when you were on military service; nor did you travel as other men do. Nor had you any curiosity to know other states or their laws: your affections did not go beyond us and our state; we were your special favourites, and you acquiesced in our government of you; and here in this city you begat your children, which is a proof of your satisfaction. Moreover, you might in the course of the trial, if you had liked, have fixed the penalty at banishment; the state which refuses to let you go now would have let you go then. But you pretended that you preferred death to exile<sup>2</sup>, and that you were not unwilling to die. And now you have forgotten these fine sentiments, and pay no respect to us the laws, of whom you are the destroyer; and are doing what only a miserable slave would do, running away and turning your back upon the compacts and agreements which you made as a citizen. And first of all answer this very question: Are we right in saying that you agreed to be governed according to us in deed, and not in word only? Is that true or not?' How shall we answer, Crito? Must we not assent?

*Cr.* We cannot help it, Socrates.

This agreement he is now going to break.

*Soc.* Then will they not say: 'You, Socrates, are breaking the covenants and agreements which you made with us at your leisure, not in any haste or under any compulsion or deception, but after you have had seventy years to think of them, during which time you were at liberty to leave the city, if we were not to your mind, or if our covenants appeared to you to be unfair. You had your choice, and might have gone either to Lacedaemon or Crete, both which states are often praised by you for their good government, or to some other Hellenic or foreign state. Whereas you, 53 above all other Athenians, seemed to be so fond of the state, or, in other words, of us her laws (and who would care about a state which has no laws?), that you never stirred out of her;

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Phaedr. 230 C.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Apol. 37 D.

the halt, the blind, the maimed were not more stationary in her than you were. And now you run away and forsake your agreements. Not so, Socrates, if you will take our advice; do not make yourself ridiculous by escaping out of the city.

*Crito.*

SOCRATES.

'For just consider, if you transgress and err in this sort of way, what good will you do either to yourself or to your friends? That your friends will be driven into exile and deprived of citizenship, or will lose their property, is tolerably certain; and you yourself, if you fly to one of the neighbouring cities, as, for example, Thebes or Megara, both of which are well governed, will come to them as an enemy, Socrates, and their government will be against you, and all patriotic citizens will cast an evil eye upon you as a subverter of the laws, and you will confirm in the minds of the judges the justice of their own condemnation of you. For he who is a corrupter of the laws is more than likely to be a corrupter of the young and foolish portion of mankind. Will you then flee from well-ordered cities and virtuous men? and is existence worth having on these terms? Or will you go to them without shame, and talk to them, Socrates? And what will you say to them? What you say here about virtue and justice and institutions and laws being the best things among men? Would that be decent of you? Surely not. But if you go away from well-governed states to Crito's friends in Thessaly, where there is great disorder and licence, they will be charmed to hear the tale of your escape from prison, set off with ludicrous particulars of the manner in which you were wrapped in a goatskin or some other disguise, and metamorphosed as the manner is of runaways; but will there be no one to remind you that in your old age you were not ashamed to violate the most sacred laws from a miserable desire of a little more life? Perhaps not, if you keep them in a good temper; but if they are out of temper you will hear many degrading things; you will live, but how?—as the flatterer of all men, and the servant of all men; and doing what?—eating and drinking in Thessaly, having gone abroad in order that you may get a dinner. And where will be your fine sentiments

54 about justice and virtue? Say that you wish to live for the

If he does he will injure his friends and will disgrace himself.



*Crito.*SOCRATES,  
CRITO.

sake of your children—you want to bring them up and educate them—will you take them into Thessaly and deprive them of Athenian citizenship? Is this the benefit which you will confer upon them? Or are you under the impression that they will be better cared for and educated here if you are still alive, although absent from them; for your friends will take care of them? Do you fancy that if you are an inhabitant of Thessaly they will take care of them, and if you are an inhabitant of the other world that they will not take care of them? Nay; but if they who call themselves friends are good for anything, they will—to be sure they will.

Let him think  
of justice first,  
and of life and  
children after-  
wards.

‘Listen, then, Socrates, to us who have brought you up. Think not of life and children first, and of justice afterwards, but of justice first, that you may be justified before the princes of the world below. For neither will you nor any that belong to you be happier or holier or juster in this life, or happier in another, if you do as Crito bids. Now you depart in innocence, a sufferer and not a doer of evil; a victim, not of the laws but of men. But if you go forth, returning evil for evil, and injury for injury, breaking the covenants and agreements which you have made with us, and wronging those whom you ought least of all to wrong, that is to say, yourself, your friends, your country, and us, we shall be angry with you while you live, and our brethren, the laws in the world below, will receive you as an enemy; for they will know that you have done your best to destroy us. Listen, then, to us and not to Crito.’

The mystic  
voice.

This, dear Crito, is the voice which I seem to hear murmuring in my ears, like the sound of the flute in the ears of the mystic; that voice, I say, is humming in my ears, and prevents me from hearing any other. And I know that anything more which you may say will be vain. Yet speak, if you have anything to say.

*Cr.* I have nothing to say, Socrates.

*Soc.* Leave me then, Crito, to fulfil the will of God, and to follow whither he leads.

PHAEDO.





## INTRODUCTION.

Steph. AFTER an interval of some months or years, and at Phlius, a  
57 town of Peloponnesus, the tale of the last hours of Socrates is  
narrated to Echecrates and other Phliasians by Phaedo the  
'beloved disciple.' The Dialogue necessarily takes the form of a  
58 narrative, because Socrates has to be described acting as well as  
speaking. The minutest particulars of the event are interesting  
to distant friends, and the narrator has an equal interest in them.

*Phaedo.*

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During the voyage of the sacred ship to and from Delos, which  
has occupied thirty days, the execution of Socrates has been  
deferred. (Cp. Xen. Mem. iv. 8. 2.) The time has been passed by  
59 him in conversation with a select company of disciples. But now  
the holy season is over, and the disciples meet earlier than usual  
in order that they may converse with Socrates for the last time.  
Those who were present, and those who might have been  
expected to be present, are mentioned by name. There are  
Simmias and Cebes (Crito 45 B), two disciples of Philolaus whom  
Socrates 'by his enchantments has attracted from Thebes' (Mem.  
iii. 11. 17), Crito the aged friend, the attendant of the prison, who  
is as good as a friend—these take part in the conversation.  
There are present also, Hermogenes, from whom Xenophon  
derived his information about the trial of Socrates (Mem. iv. 8. 4),  
the 'madman' Apollodorus (Symp. 173 D), Euclid and Terpsion  
from Megara (cp. Theaet. sub init.), Ctesippus, Antisthenes,  
Menexenus, and some other less-known members of the Socratic  
circle, all of whom are silent auditors. Aristippus, Cleombrotus,  
60 and Plato are noted as absent. Almost as soon as the friends of  
Socrates enter the prison Xanthippè and her children are sent  
home in the care of one of Crito's servants. Socrates himself has  
just been released from chains, and is led by this circumstance to

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make the natural remark that 'pleasure follows pain.' (Observe that Plato is preparing the way for his doctrine of the alternation of opposites.) 'Aesop would have represented them in a fable as a creature with two bodies and a single head.' The mention of Aesop reminds Cebes of a question which had been asked by Evenus the poet (cp. *Apol.* 20 A): 'Why Socrates, who was not a poet, while in prison had been putting Aesop into verse?'—'Because several times in his life he had been warned in dreams that 61 he should practise music; and as he was about to die and was not certain of what was meant, he wished to fulfil the admonition in the letter as well as in the spirit, by writing verses as well as by cultivating philosophy. Tell this to Evenus; and say that I would have him follow me in death.' 'He is not at all the sort of man to comply with your request, Socrates.' 'Why, is he not a philosopher?' 'Yes.' 'Then he will be willing to die, although he will not take his own life, for that is held to be unlawful.'

Cebes asks why suicide is thought not to be right, if death is to 62 be accounted a good? Well, (1) according to one explanation, because man is a prisoner, who must not open the door of his prison and run away—this is the truth in a 'mystery.' Or (2) rather, because he is not his own property, but a possession of the gods, and has no right to make away with that which does not belong to him. But why, asks Cebes, if he is a possession of the gods, should he wish to die and leave them? for he is under their protection; and surely he cannot take better care of himself than they take of him. Simmias explains that Cebes is really 63 referring to Socrates, whom they think too unmoved at the prospect of leaving the gods and his friends. Socrates answers that he is going to other gods who are wise and good, and perhaps to better friends; and he professes that he is ready to defend himself against the charge of Cebes. The company shall be his judges, and he hopes that he will be more successful in convincing them than he had been in convincing the court.

The philosopher desires death—which the wicked world will 64 insinuate that he also deserves: and perhaps he does, but not in any sense which they are capable of understanding. Enough of them: the real question is, What is the nature of that death which he desires? Death is the separation of soul and body—and the philosopher desires such a separation. He would like to

be freed from the dominion of bodily pleasures and of the senses, *Phædo.*  
 65 which are always perturbing his mental vision. He wants to get ANALYSIS.  
 rid of eyes and ears, and with the light of the mind only to  
 behold the light of truth. All the evils and impurities and neces-  
 66 sities of men come from the body. And death separates him from  
 these corruptions, which in life he cannot wholly lay aside. Why  
 67 then should he repine when the hour of separation arrives?  
 Why, if he is dead while he lives, should he fear that other death,  
 68 through which alone he can behold wisdom in her purity?

Besides, the philosopher has notions of good and evil unlike  
 those of other men. For they are courageous because they are  
 69 afraid of greater dangers, and temperate because they desire  
 greater pleasures. But he disdains this balancing of pleasures  
 and pains, which is the exchange of commerce and not of virtue.  
 All the virtues, including wisdom, are regarded by him only as  
 purifications of the soul. And this was the meaning of the  
 founders of the mysteries when they said, 'Many are the wand-  
 bearers but few are the mystics.' (Cp. Matt. xxii. 14: 'Many are  
 called, but few are chosen.') And in the hope that he is one of  
 these mystics, Socrates is now departing. This is his answer to  
 any one who charges him with indifference at the prospect of  
 leaving the gods and his friends.

70 Still, a fear is expressed that the soul upon leaving the body  
 may vanish away like smoke or air. Socrates in answer appeals  
 first of all to the old Orphic tradition that the souls of the dead  
 are in the world below, and that the living come from them.  
 This he attempts to found on a philosophical assumption that  
 71 all opposites—e. g. less, greater; weaker, stronger; sleeping,  
 waking; life, death—are generated out of each other. Nor can  
 the process of generation be only a passage from living to dying,  
 72 for then all would end in death. The perpetual sleeper (En-  
 dymion) would be no longer distinguished from the rest of  
 mankind. The circle of nature is not complete unless the living  
 come from the dead as well as pass to them.

The Platonic doctrine of reminiscence is then adduced as a  
 confirmation of the pre-existence of the soul. Some proofs of  
 73 this doctrine are demanded. One proof given is the same as that  
 of the Meno (82 foll.), and is derived from the latent knowledge of  
 mathematics, which may be elicited from an unlearned person



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when a diagram is presented to him. Again, there is a power of association, which from seeing Simmias may remember Cebes, or from seeing a picture of Simmias may remember Simmias. The 74 lyre may recall the player of the lyre, and equal pieces of wood or stone may be associated with the higher notion of absolute equality. But here observe that material equalities fall short of the conception of absolute equality with which they are compared, and which is the measure of them. And the measure or standard must be prior to that which is measured, the idea of 75 equality prior to the visible equals. And if prior to them, then prior also to the perceptions of the senses which recall them, and therefore either given before birth or at birth. But all men have 76 not this knowledge, nor have any without a process of reminiscence; which is a proof that it is not innate or given at birth, unless indeed it was given and taken away at the same instant. But if not given to men in birth, it must have been given before birth — this is the only alternative which remains. And if we had ideas in a former state, then our souls must have existed and must have had intelligence in a former state. The pre-existence 77 of the soul stands or falls with the doctrine of ideas.

It is objected by Simmias and Cebes that these arguments only prove a former and not a future existence. Socrates answers this objection by recalling the previous argument, in which he had shown that the living come from the dead. But the fear that the soul at departing may vanish into air (especially if there is a wind blowing at the time) has not yet been charmed away. He pro- 78 ceeds: When we fear that the soul will vanish away, let us ask ourselves what is that which we suppose to be liable to dissolution? Is it the simple or the compound, the unchanging or the changing, the invisible idea or the visible object of sense? Clearly the latter and not the former; and therefore not the soul, 79 which in her own pure thought is unchangeable, and only when using the senses descends into the region of change. Again, the soul commands, the body serves: in this respect too the soul is 80 akin to the divine, and the body to the mortal. And in every point of view the soul is the image of divinity and immortality, and the body of the human and mortal. And whereas the body is liable to speedy dissolution, the soul is almost if not quite indissoluble. (Cp. Tim. 41 A.) Yet even the body may be preserved



for ages by the embalmer's art: how unlikely, then, that the soul will perish and be dissipated into air while on her way to the good and wise God! She has been gathered into herself, holding

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81 aloof from the body, and practising death all her life long, and she is now finally released from the errors and follies and passions of men, and for ever dwells in the company of the gods.

But the soul which is polluted and engrossed by the corporeal, and has no eye except that of the senses, and is weighed down by the bodily appetites, cannot attain to this abstraction. In her fear of the world below she lingers about the sepulchre, loath to leave the body which she loved, a ghostly apparition, saturated with sense, and therefore visible. At length entering into some

82 animal of a nature congenial to her former life of sensuality or violence, she takes the form of an ass, a wolf or a kite. And of these earthly souls the happiest are those who have practised virtue without philosophy; they are allowed to pass into gentle and social natures, such as bees and ants. (Cp. Rep. x. 619 C, Meno 100 A.) But only the philosopher who departs pure is permitted to enter the company of the gods. (Cp. Phaedrus 249.) This is the reason why he abstains from fleshly lusts, and not because he fears loss or disgrace, which is the motive of other

83 men. He too has been a captive, and the willing agent of his own captivity. But philosophy has spoken to him, and he has heard her voice; she has gently entreated him, and brought him out of the 'miry clay,' and purged away the mists of passion and the illusions of sense which envelope him; his soul has escaped from the influence of pleasures and pains, which are like nails

84 fastening her to the body. To that prison-house she will not return; and therefore she abstains from bodily pleasures—not from a desire of having more or greater ones, but because she knows that only when calm and free from the dominion of the body can she behold the light of truth.

Simmias and Cebes remain in doubt; but they are unwilling to raise objections at such a time. Socrates wonders at their reluctance. Let them regard him rather as the swan, who,

85 having sung the praises of Apollo all his life long, sings at his death more lustily than ever. (Cp. 60 D.) Simmias acknowledges that there is cowardice in not probing truth to the bottom. 'And if truth divine and inspired is not to be had, then let a man

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take the best of human notions, and upon this frail bark let him sail through life.' He proceeds to state his difficulty: It has 86 been argued that the soul is invisible and incorporeal, and therefore immortal, and prior to the body. But is not the soul acknowledged to be a harmony, and has she not the same relation to the body, as the harmony — which like her is invisible — has to the lyre? And yet the harmony does not survive the lyre. Cebes has also an objection, which like Simmias he expresses in a figure. He is willing to admit that the soul is more 87 lasting than the body. But the more lasting nature of the soul does not prove her immortality; for after having worn out many bodies in a single life, and many more in successive births and deaths, she may at last perish, or, as Socrates afterwards restates the objection, the very act of birth may be the beginning of her death, and her last body may survive her, just as the coat of an old weaver is left behind him after he is dead, although a man is 88 more lasting than his coat. And he who would prove the immortality of the soul, must prove not only that the soul outlives one or many bodies, but that she outlives them all.

The audience, like the chorus in a play, for a moment interpret the feelings of the actors; there is a temporary depression, and 89 then the enquiry is resumed. It is a melancholy reflection that arguments, like men, are apt to be deceivers; and those who have been often deceived become distrustful both of arguments and of friends. But this unfortunate experience should not make us either haters of men or haters of arguments. The want of 90 health and truth is not in the argument, but in ourselves. Socrates, who is about to die, is sensible of his own weakness; 91 he desires to be impartial, but he cannot help feeling that he has too great an interest in the truth of the argument. And therefore he would have his friends examine and refute him, if they think that he is in error.

At his request Simmias and Cebes repeat their objections. They do not go to the length of denying the pre-existence of 92 ideas. Simmias is of opinion that the soul is a harmony of the body. But the admission of the pre-existence of ideas, and therefore of the soul, is at variance with this. (Cp. a parallel difficulty in Theaet. 203, 204.) For a harmony is an effect, 93 whereas the soul is not an effect, but a cause; a harmony follows,

but the soul leads; a harmony admits of degrees, and the soul has no degrees. Again, upon the supposition that the soul is a harmony, why is one soul better than another? Are they more or less harmonized, or is there one harmony within another?

- 94 But the soul does not admit of degrees, and cannot therefore be more or less harmonized. Further, the soul is often engaged in resisting the affections of the body, as Homer describes Odysseus  
95 'rebuking his heart.' Could he have written this under the idea that the soul is a harmony of the body? Nay rather, are we not contradicting Homer and ourselves in affirming anything of the sort?

- The goddess Harmonia, as Socrates playfully terms the argument of Simmias, has been happily disposed of; and now an answer has to be given to the Theban Cadmus. Socrates re-  
96 capitulates the argument of Cebes, which, as he remarks, involves the whole question of natural growth or causation; about this he proposes to narrate his own mental experience. When he was young he had puzzled himself with physics: he had enquired into the growth and decay of animals, and the origin of thought, until at last he began to doubt the self-evident fact that growth is the result of eating and drinking; and so he arrived at the conclusion that he was not meant for such enquiries. Nor was he less perplexed with notions of comparison and number. At first he had imagined himself to understand differences of greater and less, and to know that ten is two more than eight, and the like. But now those very notions appeared to him to contain a  
97 contradiction. For how can one be divided into two? or two be compounded into one? These are difficulties which Socrates cannot answer. Of generation and destruction he knows nothing. But he has a confused notion of another method in which matters of this sort are to be investigated. (Cp. Rep. iv. 435 D; vii. 533 A; Charm. 170 foll.)

- Then he heard some one reading out of a book of Anaxagoras, that mind is the cause of all things. And he said to himself: If mind is the cause of all things, surely mind must dispose them all  
98 for the best. The new teacher will show me this 'order of the best' in man and nature. How great had been his hopes and how great his disappointment! For he found that his new friend was anything but consistent in his use of mind as a cause, and that he

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soon introduced winds, waters, and other eccentric notions. (Cp. Arist. *Metaph.* i. 4, 5.) It was as if a person had said that Socrates is sitting here because he is made up of bones and muscles, 99 instead of telling the true reason — that he is here because the Athenians have thought good to sentence him to death, and he has thought good to await his sentence. Had his bones and muscles been left by him to their own ideas of right, they would long ago have taken themselves off. But surely there is a great confusion of the cause and condition in all this. And this confusion also leads people into all sorts of erroneous theories about the position and motions of the earth. None of them know how much stronger than any Atlas is the power of the best. But this 'best' is still undiscovered; and in enquiring after the cause, we can only hope to attain the second best.

Now there is a danger in the contemplation of the nature of things, as there is a danger in looking at the sun during an eclipse, 100 unless the precaution is taken of looking only at the image reflected in the water, or in a glass. (Cp. *Laws* x. 897 D; *Rep.* vii. 516 foll.) 'I was afraid,' says Socrates, 'that I might injure the eye of the soul. I thought that I had better return to the old and safe method of ideas. Though I do not mean to say that he who contemplates existence through the medium of ideas sees only through a glass darkly, any more than he who contemplates actual effects.'

If the existence of ideas is granted to him, Socrates is of opinion that he will then have no difficulty in proving the immortality of the soul. He will only ask for a further admission: — that beauty is the cause of the beautiful, greatness the cause of the great, smallness of the small, and so on of other things. This is a safe 101 and simple answer, which escapes the contradictions of greater and less (greater by reason of that which is smaller!), of addition and subtraction, and the other difficulties of relation. These subtleties he is for leaving to wiser heads than his own; he prefers to test ideas by the consistency of their consequences, and, if asked to give an account of them, goes back to some higher idea or hypothesis which appears to him to be the best, until at last he arrives at a resting-place. (*Rep.* vi. 510 foll.; *Phil.* 16 foll.)

The doctrine of ideas, which has long ago received the assent of 102 the Socratic circle, is now affirmed by the Phliasian auditor to command the assent of any man of sense. The narrative is con-

tinued; Socrates is desirous of explaining how opposite ideas may appear to co-exist but do not really co-exist in the same thing or person. For example, Simmias may be said to have greatness and also smallness, because he is greater than Socrates and less than Phaedo. And yet Simmias is not really great and also small, but only when compared to Phaedo and Socrates. I use the illustration, says Socrates, because I want to show you not only that ideal opposites exclude one another, but also the opposites in us: I, for example, having the attribute of smallness remain small, and cannot become great: the smallness which is in me drives out

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103 greatness.

One of the company here remarked that this was inconsistent with the old assertion that opposites generated opposites. But that, replies Socrates, was affirmed, not of opposite ideas either in us or in nature, but of opposition in the concrete — not of life and death, but of individuals living and dying. When this objection has been removed, Socrates proceeds: This doctrine of the mutual exclusion of opposites is not only true of the opposites themselves, but of things which are inseparable from them. For example, cold and heat are opposed; and fire, which is inseparable from heat, cannot co-exist with cold, or snow, which is inseparable from cold, with heat. Again, the number three excludes the number four, because three is an odd number and four is an even

104 number, and the odd is opposed to the even. Thus we are able to proceed a step beyond 'the safe and simple answer.' We may say, not only that the odd excludes the even, but that the number

105 three, which participates in oddness, excludes the even. And in like manner, not only does life exclude death, but the soul, of which life is the inseparable attribute, also excludes death. And that of which life is the inseparable attribute is by the force of the

106 terms imperishable. If the odd principle were imperishable, then the number three would not perish but remove, on the approach of the even principle. But the immortal is imperishable; and therefore the soul on the approach of death does not perish but removes.

107 Thus all objections appear to be finally silenced. And now the application has to be made: If the soul is immortal, 'what manner of persons ought we to be?' having regard not only to time but to eternity. For death is not the end of all, and the wicked is not



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released from his evil by death ; but every one carries with him into the world below that which he is or has become, and that only.

For after death the soul is carried away to judgment, and when she has received her punishment returns to earth in the course of ages. The wise soul is conscious of her situation, and follows the attendant angel who guides her through the windings of the world below ; but the impure soul wanders hither and thither without companion or guide, and is carried at last to her own place, as the pure soul is also carried away to hers. 'In order that you may understand this, I must first describe to you the nature and conformation of the earth.'

Now the whole earth is a globe placed in the centre of the heavens, and is maintained there by the perfection of balance. That which we call the earth is only one of many small hollows, wherein collect the mists and waters and the thick lower air ; but the true earth is above, and is in a finer and subtler element. And if, like birds, we could fly to the surface of the air, in the same manner that fishes come to the top of the sea, then we should behold the true earth and the true heaven and the true stars. Our earth is everywhere corrupted and corroded ; and even the land, which is fairer than the sea, for that is a mere chaos or waste of water and mud and sand, has nothing to show in comparison of the other world. But the heavenly earth is of divers colours, sparkling with jewels brighter than gold and whiter than any snow, having flowers and fruits innumerable. And the inhabitants dwell some on the shore of the sea of air, others in 'islets of the blest,' and they hold converse with the gods, and behold the sun, moon and stars as they truly are, and their other blessedness is of a piece with this.

The hollows on the surface of the globe vary in size and shape from that which we inhabit : but all are connected by passages and perforations in the interior of the earth. And there is one huge chasm or opening called Tartarus, into which streams of fire and water and liquid mud are ever flowing ; of these small portions find their way to the surface and form seas and rivers and volcanoes. There is a perpetual inhalation and exhalation of the air rising and falling as the waters pass into the depths of the earth and return again, in their course forming lakes and rivers,

but never descending below the centre of the earth; for on either side the rivers flowing either way are stopped by a precipice. These rivers are many and mighty, and there are four principal ones, Oceanus, Acheron, Pyriphlegethon, and Cocytus. Oceanus is the river which encircles the earth; Acheron takes an opposite direction, and after flowing under the earth through desert places, at last reaches the Acherusian lake,—this is the river at which the souls of the dead await their return to earth. Pyriphlegethon is a stream of fire, which coils round the earth and flows into the depths of Tartarus. The fourth river, Cocytus, is that which is called by the poets the Stygian river, and passes into and forms the lake Styx, from the waters of which it gains new and strange powers. This river, too, falls into Tartarus.

The dead are first of all judged according to their deeds, and those who are incurable are thrust into Tartarus, from which they never come out. Those who have only committed venial sins are first purified of them, and then rewarded for the good which they have done. Those who have committed crimes, great indeed, but not unpardonable, are thrust into Tartarus, but are cast forth at the end of a year by way of Pyriphlegethon or Cocytus, and these carry them as far as the Acherusian lake, where they call upon their victims to let them come out of the rivers into the lake. And if they prevail, then they are let out and their sufferings cease: if not, they are borne unceasingly into Tartarus and back again, until they at last obtain mercy. The pure souls also receive their reward, and have their abode in the upper earth, and a select few in still fairer 'mansions.'

Socrates is not prepared to insist on the literal accuracy of this description, but he is confident that something of the kind is true. He who has sought after the pleasures of knowledge and rejected the pleasures of the body, has reason to be of good hope at the approach of death; whose voice is already speaking to him, and who will one day be heard calling all men.

The hour has come at which he must drink the poison, and not much remains to be done. How shall they bury him? That is a question which he refuses to entertain, for they are burying, not him, but his dead body. His friends had once been sureties that he would remain, and they shall now be sureties that he has run away. Yet he would not die without the customary ceremonies of

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washing and burial. Shall he make a libation of the poison? In 117  
 the spirit he will, but not in the letter. One request he utters in  
 the very act of death, which has been a puzzle to after ages. With  
 a sort of irony he remembers that a trifling religious duty is still 118  
 unfulfilled, just as above (60 E) he desires before he departs to  
 compose a few verses in order to satisfy a scruple about a dream  
 — unless, indeed, we suppose him to mean, that he was now  
 restored to health, and made the customary offering to Asclepius  
 in token of his recovery.

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1. The doctrine of the immortality of the soul has sunk deep  
 into the heart of the human race; and men are apt to rebel against  
 any examination of the nature or grounds of their belief. They  
 do not like to acknowledge that this, as well as the other 'eternal  
 ideas' of man, has a history in time, which may be traced in Greek  
 poetry or philosophy, and also in the Hebrew Scriptures. They  
 convert feeling into reasoning, and throw a network of dialectics  
 over that which is really a deeply-rooted instinct. In the same  
 temper which Socrates reproves in himself (91 B) they are disposed  
 to think that even fallacies will do no harm, for they will die with  
 them, and while they live they will gain by the delusion. And  
 when they consider the numberless bad arguments which have  
 been pressed into the service of theology, they say, like the com-  
 panions of Socrates, 'What argument can we ever trust again?'  
 But there is a better and higher spirit to be gathered from the  
*Phaedo*, as well as from the other writings of Plato, which says  
 that first principles should be most constantly reviewed (*Phaedo*  
 107 B, and *Crat.* 436), and that the highest subjects demand of us  
 the greatest accuracy (*Rep.* vi. 504 E); also that we must not  
 become misologists because arguments are apt to be deceivers.

2. In former ages there was a customary rather than a reasoned  
 belief in the immortality of the soul. It was based on the  
 authority of the Church, on the necessity of such a belief to  
 morality and the order of society, on the evidence of an historical  
 fact, and also on analogies and figures of speech which filled up  
 the void or gave an expression in words to a cherished instinct.  
 The mass of mankind went on their way busy with the affairs of  
 this life, hardly stopping to think about another. But in our own



day the question has been reopened, and it is doubtful whether the belief which in the first ages of Christianity was the strongest motive of action can survive the conflict with a scientific age in which the rules of evidence are stricter and the mind has become more sensitive to criticism. It has faded into the distance by a natural process as it was removed further and further from the historical fact on which it has been supposed to rest. Arguments derived from material things such as the seed and the ear of corn or transitions in the life of animals from one state of being to another (the chrysalis and the butterfly) are not 'in pari materia' with arguments from the visible to the invisible, and are therefore felt to be no longer applicable. The evidence to the historical fact seems to be weaker than was once supposed: it is not consistent with itself, and is based upon documents which are of unknown origin. The immortality of man must be proved by other arguments than these if it is again to become a living belief. We must ask ourselves afresh why we still maintain it, and seek to discover a foundation for it in the nature of God and in the first principles of morality.

3. At the outset of the discussion we may clear away a confusion. We certainly do not mean by the immortality of the soul the immortality of fame, which whether worth having or not can only be ascribed to a very select class of the whole race of mankind, and even the interest in these few is comparatively short-lived. To have been a benefactor to the world, whether in a higher or a lower sphere of life and thought, is a great thing: to have the reputation of being one, when men have passed out of the sphere of earthly praise or blame, is hardly worthy of consideration. The memory of a great man, so far from being immortal, is really limited to his own generation:—so long as his friends or his disciples are alive, so long as his books continue to be read, so long as his political or military successes fill a page in the history of his country. The praises which are bestowed upon him at his death hardly last longer than the flowers which are strewed upon his coffin or the 'immortelles' which are laid upon his tomb. Literature makes the most of its heroes, but the true man is well aware that far from enjoying an immortality of fame, in a generation or two, or even in a much shorter time, he will be forgotten and the world will get on without him.

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4. Modern philosophy is perplexed at this whole question, which is sometimes fairly given up and handed over to the realm of faith. The perplexity should not be forgotten by us when we attempt to submit the *Phædo* of Plato to the requirements of logic. For what idea can we form of the soul when separated from the body? Or how can the soul be united with the body and still be independent? Is the soul related to the body as the ideal to the real, or as the whole to the parts, or as the subject to the object, or as the cause to the effect, or as the end to the means? Shall we say with Aristotle, that the soul is the *entelechy* or form of an organized living body? or with Plato, that she has a life of her own? Is the Pythagorean image of the harmony, or that of the monad, the truer expression? Is the soul related to the body as sight to the eye, or as the boatman to his boat? (Arist. *de Anim.* ii. 1, 11, 12.) And in another state of being is the soul to be conceived of as vanishing into infinity, hardly possessing an existence which she can call her own, as in the pantheistic system of Spinoza? or as an individual informing another body and entering into new relations, but retaining her own character? (Cp. *Gorgias*, 524 B, C.) Or is the opposition of soul and body a mere illusion, and the true self neither soul nor body, but the union of the two in the 'I' which is above them? And is death the assertion of this individuality in the higher nature, and the falling away into nothingness of the lower? Or are we vainly attempting to pass the boundaries of human thought? The body and the soul seem to be inseparable, not only in fact, but in our conceptions of them; and any philosophy which too closely unites them, or too widely separates them, either in this life or in another, disturbs the balance of human nature. No thinker has perfectly adjusted them, or been entirely consistent with himself in describing their relation to one another. Nor can we wonder that Plato in the infancy of human thought should have confused mythology and philosophy, or have mistaken verbal arguments for real ones.

5. Again, believing in the immortality of the soul, we must still ask the question of Socrates, 'What is that which we suppose to be immortal?' Is it the personal and individual element in us, or the spiritual and universal? Is it the principle of knowledge or of goodness, or the union of the two? Is it the mere force of life which is determined to be, or the consciousness of self which



cannot be got rid of, or the fire of genius which refuses to be extinguished? Or is there a hidden being which is allied to the Author of all existence, who is because he is perfect, and to whom our ideas of perfection give us a title to belong? Whatever answer is given by us to these questions, there still remains the necessity of allowing the permanence of evil, if not for ever, at any rate for a time, in order that the wicked 'may not have too good a bargain.' For the annihilation of evil at death, or the eternal duration of it, seem to involve equal difficulties in the moral government of the universe. Sometimes we are led by our feelings, rather than by our reason, to think of the good and wise only as existing in another life. Why should the mean, the weak, the idiot, the infant, the herd of men who have never in any proper sense the use of reason, reappear with blinking eyes in the light of another world? But our second thought is that the hope of humanity is a common one, and that all or none will be partakers of immortality. Reason does not allow us to suppose that we have any greater claims than others, and experience may often reveal to us unexpected flashes of the higher nature in those whom we had despised. Why should the wicked suffer any more than ourselves? had we been placed in their circumstances should we have been any better than they? The worst of men are objects of pity rather than of anger to the philanthropist; must they not be equally such to divine benevolence? Even more than the good they have need of another life; not that they may be punished, but that they may be educated. These are a few of the reflections which arise in our minds when we attempt to assign any form to our conceptions of a future state.

There are some other questions which are disturbing to us because we have no answer to them. What is to become of the animals in a future state? Have we not seen dogs more faithful and intelligent than men, and men who are more stupid and brutal than any animals? Does their life cease at death, or is there some 'better thing reserved' also for them? They may be said to have a shadow or imitation of morality, and imperfect moral claims upon the benevolence of man and upon the justice of God. We cannot think of the least or lowest of them, the insect, the bird, the inhabitants of the sea or the desert, as having any place in a future world, and if not all, why should those who are specially

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attached to man be deemed worthy of any exceptional privilege? When we reason about such a subject, almost at once we degenerate into nonsense. It is a passing thought which has no real hold on the mind. We may argue for the existence of animals in a future state from the attributes of God, or from texts of Scripture ('Are not two sparrows sold for one farthing?' &c.), but the truth is that we are only filling up the void of another world with our own fancies. Again, we often talk about the origin of evil, that great bugbear of theologians, by which they frighten us into believing any superstition. What answer can be made to the old commonplace, 'Is not God the author of evil, if he knowingly permitted, but could have prevented it?' Even if we assume that the inequalities of this life are rectified by some transposition of human beings in another, still the existence of the very least evil if it could have been avoided, seems to be at variance with the love and justice of God. And so we arrive at the conclusion that we are carrying logic too far, and that the attempt to frame the world according to a rule of divine perfection is opposed to experience and had better be given up. The case of the animals is our own. We must admit that the Divine Being, although perfect himself, has placed us in a state of life in which we may work together with him for good, but we are very far from having attained to it.

6. Again, ideas must be given through something; and we are always prone to argue about the soul from analogies of outward things which may serve to embody our thoughts, but are also partly delusive. For we cannot reason from the natural to the spiritual, or from the outward to the inward. The progress of physiological science, without bringing us nearer to the great secret, has tended to remove some erroneous notions respecting the relations of body and mind, and in this we have the advantage of the ancients. But no one imagines that any seed of immortality is to be discerned in our mortal frames. Most people have been content to rest their belief in another life on the agreement of the more enlightened part of mankind, and on the inseparable connection of such a doctrine with the existence of a God — also in a less degree on the impossibility of doubting about the continued existence of those whom we love and reverence in this world. And after all has been said, the figure, the analogy, the argument, are felt to be only approximations in different forms to an

expression of the common sentiment of the human heart. That we shall live again is far more certain than that we shall take any particular form of life.

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7. When we speak of the immortality of the soul, we must ask further what we mean by the word immortality. For of the duration of a living being in countless ages we can form no conception; far less than a three years' old child of the whole of life. The naked eye might as well try to see the furthest star in the infinity of heaven. Whether time and space really exist when we take away the limits of them may be doubted; at any rate the thought of them when unlimited is so overwhelming to us as to lose all distinctness. Philosophers have spoken of them as forms of the human mind, but what is the mind without them? As then infinite time, or an existence out of time, which are the only possible explanations of eternal duration, are equally inconceivable to us, let us substitute for them a hundred or a thousand years after death, and ask not what will be our employment in eternity, but what will happen to us in that definite portion of time; or what is now happening to those who passed out of life a hundred or a thousand years ago. Do we imagine that the wicked are suffering torments, or that the good are singing the praises of God, during a period longer than that of a whole life, or of ten lives of men? Is the suffering physical or mental? And does the worship of God consist only of praise, or of many forms of service? Who are the wicked, and who are the good, whom we venture to divide by a hard and fast line; and in which of the two classes should we place ourselves and our friends? May we not suspect that we are making differences of kind, because we are unable to imagine differences of degree? — putting the whole human race into heaven or hell for the greater convenience of logical division? Are we not at the same time describing them both in superlatives, only that we may satisfy the demands of rhetoric? What is that pain which does not become deadened after a thousand years? or what is the nature of that pleasure or happiness which never wearies by monotony? Earthly pleasures and pains are short in proportion as they are keen; of any others which are both intense and lasting we have no experience, and can form no idea. The words or figures of speech which we use are not consistent with themselves. For are we not imagining



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Heaven under the similitude of a church, and Hell as a prison, or perhaps a madhouse or chamber of horrors? And yet to beings constituted as we are, the monotony of singing psalms would be as great an infliction as the pains of hell, and might be even pleasantly interrupted by them. Where are the actions worthy of rewards greater than those which are conferred on the greatest benefactors of mankind? And where are the crimes which according to Plato's merciful reckoning,— more merciful, at any rate, than the eternal damnation of so-called Christian teachers,— for every ten years in this life deserve a hundred of punishment in the life to come? We should be ready to die of pity if we could see the least of the sufferings which the writers of *Infernos* and *Purgatorios* have attributed to the damned. Yet these joys and terrors seem hardly to exercise an appreciable influence over the lives of men. The wicked man when old, is not, as Plato supposes (*Rep.* i. 330 D, E), more agitated by the terrors of another world when he is nearer to them, nor the good in an ecstasy at the joys of which he is soon to be the partaker. Age numbs the sense of both worlds; and the habit of life is strongest in death. Even the dying mother is dreaming of her lost children as they were forty or fifty years before, 'pattering over the boards,' not of reunion with them in another state of being. Most persons when the last hour comes are resigned to the order of nature and the will of God. They are not thinking of Dante's *Inferno* or *Paradiso*, or of the *Pilgrim's Progress*. Heaven and hell are not realities to them, but words or ideas; the outward symbols of some great mystery, they hardly know what. Many noble poems and pictures have been suggested by the traditional representations of them, which have been fixed in forms of art and can no longer be altered. Many sermons have been filled with descriptions of celestial or infernal mansions. But hardly even in childhood did the thought of heaven and hell supply the motives of our actions, or at any time seriously affect the substance of our belief.

8. Another life must be described, if at all, in forms of thought and not of sense. To draw pictures of heaven and hell, whether in the language of Scripture or any other, adds nothing to our real knowledge, but may perhaps disguise our ignorance. The truest conception which we can form of a future life is a state of progress or education — a progress from evil to good, from ignorance to

knowledge. To this we are led by the analogy of the present life, in which we see different races and nations of men, and different men and women of the same nation, in various states or stages of cultivation; some more and some less developed, and all of them capable of improvement under favourable circumstances. There are punishments too of children when they are growing up inflicted by their parents, of elder offenders which are imposed by the law of the land, of all men at all times of life, which are attached by the laws of nature to the performance of certain actions. All these punishments are really educational; that is to say, they are not intended to retaliate on the offender, but to teach him a lesson. Also there is an element of chance in them, which is another name for our ignorance of the laws of nature. There is evil too inseparable from good (cp. *Lysis* 220 E); not always punished here, as good is not always rewarded. It is capable of being indefinitely diminished; and as knowledge increases, the element of chance may more and more disappear.

For we do not argue merely from the analogy of the present state of this world to another, but from the analogy of a probable future to which we are tending. The greatest changes of which we have had experience as yet are due to our increasing knowledge of history and of nature. They have been produced by a few minds appearing in three or four favoured nations, in a comparatively short period of time. May we be allowed to imagine the minds of men everywhere working together during many ages for the completion of our knowledge? May not the science of physiology transform the world? Again, the majority of mankind have really experienced some moral improvement; almost every one feels that he has tendencies to good, and is capable of becoming better. And these germs of good are often found to be developed by new circumstances, like stunted trees when transplanted to a better soil. The differences between the savage and the civilized man, or between the civilized man in old and new countries, may be indefinitely increased. The first difference is the effect of a few thousand, the second of a few hundred years. We congratulate ourselves that slavery has become industry; that law and constitutional government have superseded despotism and violence; that an ethical religion has taken the place of Fetichism. There may yet come a time when the many may be

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as well off as the few; when no one will be weighed down by excessive toil; when the necessity of providing for the body will not interfere with mental improvement; when the physical frame may be strengthened and developed; and the religion of all men may become a reasonable service.

Nothing therefore, either in the present state of man or in the tendencies of the future, as far as we can entertain conjecture of them, would lead us to suppose that God governs us vindictively in this world, and therefore we have no reason to infer that he will govern us vindictively in another. The true argument from analogy is not, 'This life is a mixed state of justice and injustice, of great waste, of sudden casualties, of disproportionate punishments, and therefore the like inconsistencies, irregularities, injustices are to be expected in another;' but 'This life is subject to law, and is in a state of progress, and therefore law and progress may be believed to be the governing principles of another.' All the analogies of this world would be against unmeaning punishments inflicted a hundred or a thousand years after an offence had been committed. Suffering there might be as a part of education, but not hopeless or protracted; as there might be a retrogression of individuals or of bodies of men, yet not such as to interfere with a plan for the improvement of the whole (cp. *Laws*, x. 903).

9. But some one will say: That we cannot reason from the seen to the unseen, and that we are creating another world after the image of this, just as men in former ages have created gods in their own likeness. And we, like the companions of Socrates, may feel discouraged at hearing our favourite 'argument from analogy' thus summarily disposed of. Like himself, too, we may adduce other arguments in which he seems to have anticipated us, though he expresses them in different language. For we feel that the soul partakes of the ideal and invisible; and can never fall into the error of confusing the external circumstances of man with his higher self; or his origin with his nature. It is as repugnant to us as it was to him to imagine that our moral ideas are to be attributed only to cerebral forces. The value of a human soul, like the value of a man's life to himself, is inestimable, and cannot be reckoned in earthly or material things. The human being alone has the consciousness of truth and justice and love, which is the

consciousness of God. And the soul becoming more conscious of these, becomes more conscious of her own immortality.

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10. The last ground of our belief in immortality, and the strongest, is the perfection of the divine nature. The mere fact of the existence of God does not tend to show the continued existence of man. An evil God or an indifferent God might have had the power, but not the will, to preserve us. He might have regarded us as fitted to minister to his service by a succession of existences, —like the animals, without attributing to each soul an incomparable value. But if he is perfect, he must will that all rational beings should partake of that perfection which he himself is. In the words of the Timæus, he is good, and therefore he desires that all other things should be as like himself as possible. And the manner in which he accomplishes this is by permitting evil, or rather degrees of good, which are otherwise called evil. For all progress is good relatively to the past, and yet may be comparatively evil when regarded in the light of the future. Good and evil are relative terms, and degrees of evil are merely the negative aspect of degrees of good. Of the absolute goodness of any finite nature we can form no conception; we are all of us in process of transition from one degree of good or evil to another. The difficulties which are urged about the origin or existence of evil are mere dialectical puzzles, standing in the same relation to Christian philosophy as the puzzles of the Cynics and Megarians to the philosophy of Plato. They arise out of the tendency of the human mind to regard good and evil both as relative and absolute; just as the riddles about motion are to be explained by the double conception of space or matter, which the human mind has the power of regarding either as continuous or discrete.

In speaking of divine perfection, we mean to say that God is just and true and loving, the author of order and not of disorder, of good and not of evil. Or rather, that he is justice, that he is truth, that he is love, that he is order, that he is the very progress of which we were speaking; and that wherever these qualities are present, whether in the human soul or in the order of nature, there is God. We might still see him everywhere, if we had not been mistakenly seeking for him apart from us, instead of in us; away from the laws of nature, instead of in them. And we become united to him not by mystical absorption, but by

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partaking, whether consciously or unconsciously, of that truth and justice and love which he himself is.

Thus the belief in the immortality of the soul rests at last on the belief in God. If there is a good and wise God, then there is a progress of mankind towards perfection; and if there is no progress of men towards perfection, then there is no good and wise God. We cannot suppose that the moral government of God of which we see the beginnings in the world and in ourselves will cease when we pass out of life.

11. Considering the 'feebleness of the human faculties and the uncertainty of the subject,' we are inclined to believe that the fewer our words the better. At the approach of death there is not much said; good men are too honest to go out of the world professing more than they know. There is perhaps no important subject about which, at any time, even religious people speak so little to one another. In the fulness of life the thought of death is mostly awakened by the sight or recollection of the death of others rather than by the prospect of our own. We must also acknowledge that there are degrees of the belief in immortality, and many forms in which it presents itself to the mind. Some persons will say no more than that they trust in God, and that they leave all to Him. It is a great part of true religion not to pretend to know more than we do. Others when they quit this world are comforted with the hope 'That they will see and know their friends in heaven.' But it is better to leave them in the hands of God and to be assured that 'no evil shall touch them.' There are others again to whom the belief in a divine personality has ceased to have any longer a meaning; yet they are satisfied that the end of all is not here, but that something still remains to us, 'and some better thing for the good than for the evil.' They are persuaded, in spite of their theological nihilism, that the ideas of justice and truth and holiness and love are realities. They cherish an enthusiastic devotion to the first principles of morality. Through these they see, or seem to see, darkly, and in a figure, that the soul is immortal.

But besides differences of theological opinion which must ever prevail about things unseen, the hope of immortality is weaker or stronger in men at one time of life than at another; it even



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varies from day to day. It comes and goes; the mind, like the sky, is apt to be overclouded. Other generations of men may have sometimes lived under an 'eclipse of faith,' to us the total disappearance of it might be compared to the 'sun falling from heaven.' And we may sometimes have to begin again and acquire the belief for ourselves; or to win it back again when it is lost. It is really weakest in the hour of death. For Nature, like a kind mother or nurse, lays us to sleep without frightening us; physicians, who are the witnesses of such scenes, say that under ordinary circumstances there is no fear of the future. Often, as Plato tells us, death is accompanied 'with pleasure.' (Tim. 81 D.) When the end is still uncertain, the cry of many a one has been, 'Pray, that I may be taken.' The last thoughts even of the best men depend chiefly on the accidents of their bodily state. Pain soon overpowers the desire of life; old age, like the child, is laid to sleep almost in a moment. The long experience of life will often destroy the interest which mankind have in it. So various are the feelings with which different persons draw near to death; and still more various the forms in which imagination clothes it. For this alternation of feeling cp. the Old Testament,—Psalm vi. 5, xvi. 10, xc.; Isaiah xxxviii. 18; Eccles. viii. 8 ff., iii. 19, iv. 2.

12. When we think of God and of man in his relation to God; of the imperfection of our present state and yet of the progress which is observable in the history of the world and of the human mind; of the depth and power of our moral ideas which seem to partake of the very nature of God Himself; when we consider the contrast between the physical laws to which we are subject and the higher law which raises us above them and is yet a part of them; when we reflect on our capacity of becoming the 'spectators of all time and all existence,' and of framing in our own minds the ideal of a perfect Being; when we see how the human mind in all the higher religions of the world, including Buddhism, notwithstanding some aberrations, has tended towards such a belief—we have reason to think that our destiny is different from that of animals; and though we cannot altogether shut out the childish fear that the soul upon leaving the body may 'vanish into thin air,' we have still, so far as the nature of the subject admits, a hope of immortality with which we comfort ourselves on sufficient grounds. The denial of the belief takes the heart out of human

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life ; it lowers men to the level of the material. As Goethe also says, 'He is dead even in this world who has no belief in another.'

13. It is well also that we should sometimes think of the forms of thought under which the idea of immortality is most naturally presented to us. It is clear that to our minds the risen soul can no longer be described, as in a picture, by the symbol of a creature half-bird, half-human, nor in any other form of sense. The multitude of angels, as in Milton, singing the Almighty's praises, are a noble image, and may furnish a theme for the poet or the painter, but they are no longer an adequate expression of the kingdom of God which is within us. Neither is there any mansion, in this world or another, in which the departed can be imagined to dwell and carry on their occupations. When this earthly tabernacle is dissolved, no other habitation or building can take them in : it is in the language of ideas only that we speak of them.

First of all there is the thought of rest and freedom from pain ; they have gone home, as the common saying is, and the cares of this world touch them no more. Secondly, we may imagine them as they were at their best and brightest, humbly fulfilling their daily round of duties — selfless, childlike, unaffected by the world ; when the eye was single and the whole body seemed to be full of light ; when the mind was clear and saw into the purposes of God. Thirdly, we may think of them as possessed by a great love of God and man, working out His will at a further stage in the heavenly pilgrimage. And yet we acknowledge that these are the things which eye hath not seen nor ear heard and therefore it hath not entered into the heart of man in any sensible manner to conceive them. Fourthly, there may have been some moments in our own lives when we have risen above ourselves, or been conscious of our truer selves, in which the will of God has superseded our wills, and we have entered into communion with Him, and been partakers for a brief season of the Divine truth and love, in which like Christ we have been inspired to utter the prayer, 'I in them, and thou in me, that we may be all made perfect in one.' These precious moments, if we have ever known them, are the nearest approach which we can make to the idea of immortality.

14. Returning now to the earlier stage of human thought which



is represented by the writings of Plato, we find that many of the same questions have already arisen: there is the same tendency to materialism; the same inconsistency in the application of the idea of mind; the same doubt whether the soul is to be regarded as a cause or as an effect; the same falling back on moral convictions. In the *Phaedo* the soul is conscious of her divine nature, and the separation from the body which has been commenced in this life is perfected in another. Beginning in mystery, Socrates, in the intermediate part of the Dialogue, attempts to bring the doctrine of a future life into connection with his theory of knowledge. In proportion as he succeeds in this, the individual seems to disappear in a more general notion of the soul; the contemplation of ideas 'under the form of eternity' takes the place of past and future states of existence. His language may be compared to that of some modern philosophers, who speak of eternity, not in the sense of perpetual duration of time, but as an ever-present quality of the soul. Yet at the conclusion of the Dialogue, having 'arrived at the end of the intellectual world' (*Rep.* vii. 532 B), he replaces the veil of mythology, and describes the soul and her attendant genius in the language of the mysteries or of a disciple of Zoroaster. Nor can we fairly demand of Plato a consistency which is wanting among ourselves, who acknowledge that another world is beyond the range of human thought, and yet are always seeking to represent the mansions of heaven or hell in the colours of the painter, or in the descriptions of the poet or rhetorician.

15. The doctrine of the immortality of the soul was not new to the Greeks in the age of Socrates, but, like the unity of God, had a foundation in the popular belief. The old Homeric notion of a gibbering ghost flitting away to Hades; or of a few illustrious heroes enjoying the isles of the blest; or of an existence divided between the two; or the Hesiodic, of righteous spirits, who become guardian angels,—had given place in the mysteries and the Orphic poets to representations, partly fanciful, of a future state of rewards and punishments. (*Laws* ix. 870.) The reticence of the Greeks on public occasions and in some part of their literature respecting this 'underground' religion, is not to be taken as a measure of the diffusion of such beliefs. If Pericles in the funeral oration is silent on the consolations of immortality, the poet Pindar and the tragedians on the other hand constantly

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assume the continued existence of the dead in an upper or under world. Darius and Laius are still alive; Antigone will be dear to her brethren after death; the way to the palace of Cronos is found by those who 'have thrice departed from evil.' The tragedy of the Greeks is not 'rounded' by this life, but is deeply set in decrees of fate and mysterious workings of powers beneath the earth. In the caricature of Aristophanes there is also a witness to the common sentiment. The Ionian and Pythagorean philosophies arose, and some new elements were added to the popular belief. The individual must find an expression as well as the world. Either the soul was supposed to exist in the form of a magnet, or of a particle of fire, or of light, or air, or water; or of a number or of a harmony of number; or to be or have, like the stars, a principle of motion (Arist. de Anim. i. 1, 2, 3). At length Anaxagoras, hardly distinguishing between life and mind, or between mind human and divine, attained the pure abstraction; and this, like the other abstractions of Greek philosophy, sank deep into the human intelligence. The opposition of the intelligible and the sensible, and of God to the world, supplied an analogy which assisted in the separation of soul and body. If ideas were separable from phenomena, mind was also separable from matter; if the ideas were eternal, the mind that conceived them was eternal too. As the unity of God was more distinctly acknowledged, the conception of the human soul became more developed. The succession, or alternation of life and death, had occurred to Heracleitus. The Eleatic Parmenides had stumbled upon the modern thesis, that 'thought and being are the same.' The Eastern belief in transmigration defined the sense of individuality; and some, like Empedocles, fancied that the blood which they had shed in another state of being was crying against them, and that for thirty thousand years they were to be 'fugitives and vagabonds upon the earth.' The desire of recognizing a lost mother or love or friend in the world below (Phaedo 68) was a natural feeling which, in that age as well as in every other, has given distinctness to the hope of immortality. Nor were ethical considerations wanting, partly derived from the necessity of punishing the greater sort of criminals, whom no avenging power of this world could reach. The voice of conscience, too, was heard reminding the good man that he was not altogether innocent.

(Rep. i. 330.) To these indistinct longings and fears an expression was given in the mysteries and Orphic poets: a 'heap of books' (Rep. ii. 364 E), passing under the names of Musaeus and Orpheus in Plato's time, were filled with notions of an under-world.

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16. Yet after all the belief in the individuality of the soul after death had but a feeble hold on the Greek mind. Like the personality of God, the personality of man in a future state was not inseparably bound up with the reality of his existence. For the distinction between the personal and impersonal, and also between the divine and human, was far less marked to the Greek than to ourselves. And as Plato readily passes from the notion of the good to that of God, he also passes almost imperceptibly to himself and his reader from the future life of the individual soul to the eternal being of the absolute soul. There has been a clearer statement and a clearer denial of the belief in modern times than is found in early Greek philosophy, and hence the comparative silence on the whole subject which is often remarked in ancient writers, and particularly in Aristotle. For Plato and Aristotle are not further removed in their teaching about the immortality of the soul than they are in their theory of knowledge.

17. Living in an age when logic was beginning to mould human thought, Plato naturally cast his belief in immortality into a logical form. And when we consider how much the doctrine of ideas was also one of words, it is not surprising that he should have fallen into verbal fallacies: early logic is always mistaking the truth of the form for the truth of the matter. It is easy to see that the alternation of opposites is not the same as the generation of them out of each other; and that the generation of them out of each other, which is the first argument in the *Phaedo*, is at variance with their mutual exclusion of each other, whether in themselves or in us, which is the last. For even if we admit the distinction which he draws at p. 103, between the opposites and the things which have the opposites, still individuals fall under the latter class; and we have to pass out of the region of human hopes and fears to a conception of an abstract soul which is the impersonation of the ideas. Such a conception, which in Plato himself is but half expressed, is unmeaning to us, and relative only to a particular stage in the history of thought. The doctrine of reminiscence is also a



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fragment of a former world, which has no place in the philosophy of modern times. But Plato had the wonders of psychology just opening to him, and he had not the explanation of them which is supplied by the analysis of language and the history of the human mind. The question, 'Whence come our abstract ideas?' he could only answer by an imaginary hypothesis. Nor is it difficult to see that his crowning argument is purely verbal, and is but the expression of an instinctive confidence put into a logical form: — 'The soul is immortal because it contains a principle of imperishableness.' Nor does he himself seem at all to be aware that nothing is added to human knowledge by his 'safe and simple answer,' that beauty is the cause of the beautiful; and that he is merely reasserting the Eleatic being 'divided by the Pythagorean numbers,' against the Heracleitean doctrine of perpetual generation. The answer to the 'very serious question' of generation and destruction is really the denial of them. For this he would substitute, as in the Republic, a system of ideas, tested, not by experience, but by their consequences, and not explained by actual causes, but by a higher, that is, a more general notion. Consistency with themselves is the only test which is to be applied to them. (Rep. vi. 510 foll., and Phædo 101 foll.)

18. To deal fairly with such arguments, they should be translated as far as possible into their modern equivalents. 'If the ideas of men are eternal, their souls are eternal, and if not the ideas, then not the souls.' Such an argument stands nearly in the same relation to Plato and his age, as the argument from the existence of God to immortality among ourselves. 'If God exists, then the soul exists after death; and if there is no God, there is no existence of the soul after death.' For the ideas are to his mind the reality, the truth, the principle of permanence, as well as of intelligence and order in the world. When Simmias and Cebes say that they are more strongly persuaded of the existence of ideas than they are of the immortality of the soul, they represent fairly enough the order of thought in Greek philosophy. And we might say in the same way that we are more certain of the existence of God than we are of the immortality of the soul, and are led by the belief in the one to a belief in the other. The parallel, as Socrates would say, is not perfect, but agrees in as far as the mind in either case is regarded as dependent on some-

thing above and beyond herself. The analogy may even be pressed a step further: 'We are more certain of our ideas of truth and right than we are of the existence of God, and are led on in the order of thought from one to the other.' Or more correctly: 'The existence of right and truth is the existence of God, and can never for a moment be separated from Him.'

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19. The main argument of the *Phaedo* is derived from the existence of eternal ideas of which the soul is a partaker; the other argument of the alternation of opposites is replaced by this. And there have not been wanting philosophers of the idealist school who have imagined that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul is a theory of knowledge, and that in what has preceded Plato is accommodating himself to the popular belief. Such a view can only be elicited from the *Phaedo* by what may be termed the transcendental method of interpretation, and is obviously inconsistent with the *Gorgias* and the *Republic*. Those who maintain it are immediately compelled to renounce the shadow which they have grasped, as a play of words only. But the truth is, that Plato in his argument for the immortality of the soul has collected many elements of proof or persuasion, ethical and mythological as well as dialectical, which are not easily to be reconciled with one another; and he is as much in earnest about his doctrine of retribution, which is repeated in all his more ethical writings, as about his theory of knowledge. And while we may fairly translate the dialectical into the language of Hegel, and the religious and mythological into the language of Dante or Bunyan, the ethical speaks to us still in the same voice, and appeals to a common feeling.

20. Two arguments of this ethical character occur in the *Phaedo*. The first may be described as the aspiration of the soul after another state of being. Like the Oriental or Christian mystic, the philosopher is seeking to withdraw from impurities of sense, to leave the world and the things of the world, and to find his higher self. Plato recognizes in these aspirations the foretaste of immortality; as Butler and Addison in modern times have argued, the one from the moral tendencies of mankind, the other from the progress of the soul towards perfection. In using this argument Plato has certainly confused the soul which has left the body, with the soul of the good and wise. (Cp. *Rep.* x.



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611 C.) Such a confusion was natural, and arose partly out of the antithesis of soul and body. The soul in her own essence, and the soul 'clothed upon' with virtues and graces, were easily interchanged with one another, because on a subject which passes expression the distinctions of language can hardly be maintained.

21. The other ethical proof of the immortality of the soul is derived from the necessity of retribution. The wicked would be too well off if their evil deeds came to an end. It is not to be supposed that an Ardiaeus, an Archelaus, an Ismenias could ever have suffered the penalty of their crimes in this world. The manner in which this retribution is accomplished Plato represents under the figures of mythology. Doubtless he felt that it was easier to improve than to invent, and that in religion especially the traditional form was required in order to give verisimilitude to the myth. The myth too is far more probable to that age than to ours, and may fairly be regarded as 'one guess among many' about the nature of the earth, which he cleverly supports by the indications of geology. Not that he insists on the absolute truth of his own particular notions: 'no man of sense will be confident in such matters; but he will be confident that something of the kind is true' (114 D). As in other passages (Gorg. 527 A, Tim. 29 D; cp. Crito, 107 B), he wins belief for his fictions by the moderation of his statements; he does not, like Dante or Swedenborg, allow himself to be deceived by his own creations.

The Dialogue must be read in the light of the situation. And first of all we are struck by the calmness of the scene. Like the spectators at the time, we cannot pity Socrates; his mien and his language are so noble and fearless. He is the same that he ever was, but milder and gentler, and he has in no degree lost his interest in dialectics; he will not forego the delight of an argument in compliance with the jailer's intimation that he should not heat himself with talking. At such a time he naturally expresses the hope of his life, that he has been a true mystic and not a mere routineer or wand-bearer: and he refers to passages of his personal history. To his old enemies the Comic poets, and to the proceedings on the trial, he alludes playfully; but he

vividly remembers the disappointment which he felt in reading the books of Anaxagoras. The return of Xanthippè and his children indicates that the philosopher is not 'made of oak or rock.' Some other traits of his character may be noted; for example, the courteous manner in which he inclines his head to the last objector, or the ironical touch, 'Me already, as the tragic poet would say, the voice of fate calls;' or the depreciation of the arguments with which 'he comforted himself and them;' or his fear of 'misology;' or his references to Homer; or the playful smile with which he 'talks like a book' about greater and less; or the allusion to the possibility of finding another teacher among barbarous races (cp. *Polit.* 262 D); or the mysterious reference to another science (mathematics?) of generation and destruction for which he is vainly feeling. There is no change in him; only now he is invested with a sort of sacred character, as the prophet or priest of Apollo the God of the festival, in whose honour he first of all composes a hymn, and then like the swan pours forth his dying lay. Perhaps the extreme elevation of Socrates above his own situation, and the ordinary interests of life (compare his *jeu d'esprit* about his burial, in which for a moment he puts on the 'Silenus mask'), create in the mind of the reader an impression stronger than could be derived from arguments that such a one has in him 'a principle which does not admit of death.'

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The other persons of the Dialogue may be considered under two heads: (1) private friends; (2) the respondents in the argument.

First there is Crito, who has been already introduced to us in the *Euthydemus* and the *Crito*; he is the equal in years of Socrates, and stands in quite a different relation to him from his younger disciples. He is a man of the world who is rich and prosperous (cp. the jest in the *Euthydemus*, 304 C), the best friend of Socrates, who wants to know his commands, in whose presence he talks to his family, and who performs the last duty of closing his eyes. It is observable too that, as in the *Euthydemus*, Crito shows no aptitude for philosophical discussions. Nor among the friends of Socrates must the jailer be forgotten, who seems to have been introduced by Plato in order to show the impression made by the extraordinary man on the common.

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The gentle nature of the man is indicated by his weeping at the announcement of his errand and then turning away, and also by the words of Socrates to his disciples: 'How charming the man is! since I have been in prison he has been always coming to me, and is as good as could be to me.' We are reminded too that he has retained this gentle nature amid scenes of death and violence by the contrasts which he draws between the behaviour of Socrates and of others when about to die.

Another person who takes no part in the philosophical discussion is the excitable Apollodorus, the same who, in the Symposium, of which he is the narrator, is called 'the madman,' and who testifies his grief by the most violent emotions. Phaedo is also present, the 'beloved disciple' as he may be termed, who is described, if not 'leaning on his bosom,' as seated next to Socrates, who is playing with his hair. He too, like Apollodorus, takes no part in the discussion, but he loves above all things to hear and speak of Socrates after his death. The calmness of his behaviour, veiling his face when he can no longer restrain his tears, contrasts with the passionate outcries of the other. At a particular point the argument is described as falling before the attack of Simmias. A sort of despair is introduced in the minds of the company. The effect of this is heightened by the description of Phaedo, who has been the eye-witness of the scene, and by the sympathy of his Phliasian auditors who are beginning to think 'that they too can never trust an argument again.' And the intense interest of the company is communicated not only to the first auditors, but to us who in a distant country read the narrative of their emotions after more than two thousand years have passed away.

The two principal interlocutors are Simmias and Cebes, the disciples of Philolaus the Pythagorean philosopher of Thebes. Simmias is described in the Phaedrus (242 B) as fonder of an argument than any man living; and Cebes, although finally persuaded by Socrates, is said to be the most incredulous of human beings. It is Cebes who at the commencement of the Dialogue asks why 'suicide is held to be unlawful,' and who first supplies the doctrine of recollection in confirmation of the pre-existence of the soul. It is Cebes who urges that the pre-existence does not necessarily involve the future existence of



the soul, as is shown by the illustration of the weaver and his coat. Simmias, on the other hand, raises the question about harmony and the lyre, which is naturally put into the mouth of a Pythagorean disciple. It is Simmias, too, who first remarks on the uncertainty of human knowledge, and only at last concedes to the argument such a qualified approval as is consistent with the feebleness of the human faculties. Cebes is the deeper and more consecutive thinker, Simmias more superficial and rhetorical; they are distinguished in much the same manner as Adeimantus and Glaucon in the Republic.

Other persons, Menexenus, Ctesippus, Lysis, are old friends; Evenus has been already satirized in the Apology; Aeschines and Epigenes were present at the trial; Euclid and Terpsion will reappear in the Introduction to the Theaetetus, Hermogenes has already appeared in the Cratylus. No inference can fairly be drawn from the absence of Aristippus, nor from the omission of Xenophon, who at the time of Socrates' death was in Asia. The mention of Plato's own absence seems like an expression of sorrow, and may, perhaps, be an indication that the report of the conversation is not to be taken literally.

The place of the Dialogue in the series is doubtful. The doctrine of ideas is certainly carried beyond the Socratic point of view; in no other of the writings of Plato is the theory of them so completely developed. Whether the belief in immortality can be attributed to Socrates or not is uncertain; the silence of the Memorabilia, and of the earlier Dialogues of Plato, is an argument to the contrary. Yet in the Cyropaedia Xenophon (viii. 7, 19 foll.) has put language into the mouth of the dying Cyrus which recalls the *Phaedo*, and may have been derived from the teaching of Socrates. It may be fairly urged that the greatest religious interest of mankind could not have been wholly ignored by one who passed his life in fulfilling the commands of an oracle, and who recognized a Divine plan in man and nature. (Xen. Mem. i, 4.) And the language of the Apology and of the *Crito* confirms this view.

The *Phaedo* is not one of the Socratic Dialogues of Plato; nor, on the other hand, can it be assigned to that later stage of the Platonic writings at which the doctrine of ideas appears to be forgotten. It belongs rather to the intermediate period of the Platonic

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philosophy, which roughly corresponds to the *Phaedrus*, *Gorgias*, *Republic*, *Theaetetus*. Without pretending to determine the real time of their composition, the *Symposium*, *Meno*, *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, *Phaedo* may be conveniently read by us in this order as illustrative of the life of Socrates. Another chain may be formed of the *Meno*, *Phaedrus*, *Phaedo*, in which the immortality of the soul is connected with the doctrine of ideas. In the *Meno* the theory of ideas is based on the ancient belief in transmigration, which reappears again in the *Phaedrus* as well as in the *Republic* and *Timaeus*, and in all of them is connected with a doctrine of retribution. In the *Phaedrus* the immortality of the soul is supposed to rest on the conception of the soul as a principle of motion, whereas in the *Republic* the argument turns on the natural continuance of the soul, which, if not destroyed by her own proper evil, can hardly be destroyed by any other. The soul of man in the *Timaeus* (42 foll.) is derived from the Supreme Creator, and either returns after death to her kindred star, or descends into the lower life of an animal. The *Apology* expresses the same view as the *Phaedo*, but with less confidence; there the probability of death being a long sleep is not excluded. The *Theaetetus* also describes, in a digression, the desire of the soul to fly away and be with God — ‘and to fly to him is to be like him’ (176 B). The *Symposium* may be observed to resemble as well as to differ from the *Phaedo*. While the first notion of immortality is only in the way of natural procreation or of posthumous fame and glory, the higher revelation of beauty, like the good in the *Republic*, is the vision of the eternal idea. So deeply rooted in Plato’s mind is the belief in immortality; so various are the forms of expression which he employs.

As in several other Dialogues, there is more of system in the *Phaedo* than appears at first sight. The succession of arguments is based on previous philosophies; beginning with the mysteries and the Heracleitean alternation of opposites, and proceeding to the Pythagorean harmony and transmigration; making a step by the aid of Platonic reminiscence, and a further step by the help of the *νοῦς* of Anaxagoras; until at last we rest in the conviction that the soul is inseparable from the ideas, and belongs to the world of the invisible and unknown. Then, as in the *Gorgias* or *Republic*, the curtain falls, and the veil of mythology descends upon the



argument. After the confession of Socrates that he is an interested party, and the acknowledgment that no man of sense will think the details of his narrative true, but that something of the kind is true, we return from speculation to practice. He is himself more confident of immortality than he is of his own arguments; and the confidence which he expresses is less strong than that which his cheerfulness and composure in death inspire in us.

Difficulties of two kinds occur in the *Phaedo*—one kind to be explained out of contemporary philosophy, the other not admitting of an entire solution. (1) The difficulty which Socrates says that he experienced in explaining generation and corruption; the assumption of hypotheses which proceed from the less general to the more general, and are tested by their consequences; the puzzle about greater and less; the resort to the method of ideas, which to us appear only abstract terms,—these are to be explained out of the position of Socrates and Plato in the history of philosophy. They were living in a twilight between the sensible and the intellectual world, and saw no way of connecting them. They could neither explain the relation of ideas to phenomena, nor their correlation to one another. The very idea of relation or comparison was embarrassing to them. Yet in this intellectual uncertainty they had a conception of a proof from results, and of a moral truth, which remained unshaken amid the questionings of philosophy. (2) The other is a difficulty which is touched upon in the *Republic* as well as in the *Phaedo*, and is common to modern and ancient philosophy. Plato is not altogether satisfied with his safe and simple method of ideas. He wants to have proved to him by facts that all things are for the best, and that there is one mind or design which pervades them all. But this ‘power of the best’ he is unable to explain; and therefore takes refuge in universal ideas. And are not we at this day seeking to discover that which Socrates in a glass darkly foresaw?

Some resemblances to the Greek drama may be noted in all the Dialogues of Plato. The *Phaedo* is the tragedy of which Socrates is the protagonist and Simmias and Cebes the secondary performers, standing to them in the same relation as to Glaucon and Adeimantus in the *Republic*. No Dialogue has a greater unity of subject and feeling. Plato has certainly fulfilled the condition of Greek, or rather of all art, which requires that scenes of death and

*Phaedo.*INTRODUC-  
TION.

*Phaedo.*INTRODUC-  
TION.

suffering should be clothed in beauty. The gathering of the friends at the commencement of the Dialogue, the dismissal of Xanthippè, whose presence would have been out of place at a philosophical discussion, but who returns again with her children to take a final farewell, the dejection of the audience at the temporary overthrow of the argument, the picture of Socrates playing with the hair of Phaedo, the final scene in which Socrates alone retains his composure — are masterpieces of art. And the chorus at the end might have interpreted the feeling of the play: 'There can no evil happen to a good man in life or death.'

'The art of concealing art' is nowhere more perfect than in those writings of Plato which describe the trial and death of Socrates. Their charm is their simplicity, which gives them verisimilitude; and yet they touch, as if incidentally, and because they were suitable to the occasion, on some of the deepest truths of philosophy. There is nothing in any tragedy, ancient or modern, nothing in poetry or history (with one exception), like the last hours of Socrates in Plato. The master could not be more fitly occupied at such a time than in discoursing of immortality; nor the disciples more divinely consoled. The arguments, taken in the spirit and not in the letter, are our arguments; and Socrates by anticipation may be even thought to refute some 'eccentric notions' current in our own age. For there are philosophers among ourselves who do not seem to understand how much stronger is the power of intelligence, or of the best, than of Atlas, or mechanical force. How far the words attributed to Socrates were actually uttered by him we forbear to ask; for no answer can be given to this question. And it is better to resign ourselves to the feeling of a great work, than to linger among critical uncertainties.

# PHAEDO.

## PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

PHAEDO, *who is the narrator*

*of the Dialogue to*

*Echecrates of Phlius.*

SOCRATES.

ATTENDANT OF THE PRISON.

APOLLODORUS.

SIMMIAS.

CEBES.

CRITO.

SCENE:—The Prison of Socrates.

PLACE OF THE NARRATION:—Phlius.

Steph. *Echecrates.* WERE you yourself, Phaedo, in the prison with *Phaedo.*

57 Socrates on the day when he drank the poison?

ECHECRATES,  
PHAEDO.

*Phaedo.* Yes, Echecrates, I was.

*Ech.* I should so like to hear about his death. What did he say in his last hours? We were informed that he died by taking poison, but no one knew anything more; for no Phliasian ever goes to Athens now, and it is a long time since any stranger from Athens has found his way hither; so that we had no clear account.

58 *Phaed.* Did you not hear of the proceedings at the trial?

*Ech.* Yes; some one told us about the trial, and we could not understand why, having been condemned, he should have been put to death, not at the time, but long afterwards. What was the reason of this?

*Phaed.* An accident, Echecrates: the stern of the ship which the Athenians send to Delos happened to have been crowned on the day before he was tried.

The death of  
Socrates was  
deferred by  
the holy sea-  
son of the mis-  
sion to Delos.

*Ech.* What is this ship?

*Phaed.* It is the ship in which, according to Athenian tradition, Theseus went to Crete when he took with him the



*Phaedo.*ECHECRATES,  
PHAEDO.

fourteen youths, and was the saviour of them and of himself. And they are said to have vowed to Apollo at the time, that if they were saved they would send a yearly mission to Delos. Now this custom still continues, and the whole period of the voyage to and from Delos, beginning when the priest of Apollo crowns the stern of the ship, is a holy season, during which the city is not allowed to be polluted by public executions; and when the vessel is detained by contrary winds, the time spent in going and returning is very considerable. As I was saying, the ship was crowned on the day before the trial, and this was the reason why Socrates lay in prison and was not put to death until long after he was condemned.

*Ech.* What was the manner of his death, Phaedo? What was said or done? And which of his friends were with him? Or did the authorities forbid them to be present — so that he had no friends near him when he died?

*Phaed.* No; there were several of them with him.

Phaedo is requested by Echecrates to give an account of the death of Socrates.

*Ech.* If you have nothing to do, I wish that you would tell me what passed, as exactly as you can.

*Phaed.* I have nothing at all to do, and will try to gratify your wish. To be reminded of Socrates is always the greatest delight to me, whether I speak myself or hear another speak of him.

*Ech.* You will have listeners who are of the same mind with you, and I hope that you will be as exact as you can.

He describes his noble and fearless demeanour.

*Phaed.* I had a singular feeling at being in his company. For I could hardly believe that I was present at the death of a friend, and therefore I did not pity him, Echecrates; he died so fearlessly, and his words and bearing were so noble and gracious, that to me he appeared blessed. I thought that in going to the other world he could not be without a divine call, and that he would be happy, if any man ever 59 was, when he arrived there; and therefore I did not pity him as might have seemed natural at such an hour. But I had not the pleasure which I usually feel in philosophical discourse (for philosophy was the theme of which we spoke). I was pleased, but in the pleasure there was also a strange admixture of pain; for I reflected that he was soon to die, and

this double feeling was shared by us all; we were laughing and weeping by turns, especially the excitable Apollodorus — you know the sort of man?

*Phaedo.*

ECHECRATES,  
PHAEDO.

*Ech.* Yes.

*Phaed.* He was quite beside himself; and I and all of us were greatly moved.

*Ech.* Who were present?

*Phaed.* Of native Athenians there were, besides Apollodorus, Critobulus and his father Crito, Hermogenes, Epigenes, Aeschines, Antisthenes; likewise Ctesippus of the deme of Paeania, Menexenus, and some others; Plato, if I am not mistaken, was ill.

The Socratic  
circle: — the  
absence of  
Plato is  
noted.

*Ech.* Were there any strangers?

*Phaed.* Yes, there were; Simmias the Theban, and Cebes, and Phaedondes; Euclid and Terpsion, who came from Megara.

*Ech.* And was Aristippus there, and Cleombrotus?

*Phaed.* No, they were said to be in Aegina.

*Ech.* Any one else?

*Phaed.* I think that these were nearly all.

*Ech.* Well, and what did you talk about?

*Phaed.* I will begin at the beginning, and endeavour to repeat the entire conversation. On the previous days we had been in the habit of assembling early in the morning at the court in which the trial took place, and which is not far from the prison. There we used to wait talking with one another until the opening of the doors (for they were not opened very early); then we went in and generally passed the day with Socrates. On the last morning we assembled sooner than usual, having heard on the day before when we quitted the prison in the evening that the sacred ship had come from Delos; and so we arranged to meet very early at the accustomed place. On our arrival the jailer who answered the door, instead of admitting us, came out and told us to stay until he called us. 'For the Eleven,' he said, 'are now with Socrates; they are taking off his chains, and giving orders that he is to die to-day.' He soon returned and said that we might come in. On entering we found Socrates just released from chains, and Xanthippè, whom you know, sitting by him, and holding his child in her arms.

The meeting  
at the prison.

The friends  
are denied  
admission  
while the  
Eleven are  
with Socrates.



*Phædo.*SOCRATES,  
CEBES.

Socrates,  
whose chains  
have now  
been taken  
off, is led by  
the feeling of  
relief to re-  
mark on the  
curious man-  
ner in which  
pleasure and  
pain are  
always con-  
joined.

When she saw us she uttered a cry and said, as women will: 'O Socrates, this is the last time that either you will converse with your friends, or they with you.' Socrates turned to Crito and said: 'Crito, let some one take her home.' Some of Crito's people accordingly led her away, crying out and beating herself. And when she was gone, Socrates, sitting up on the couch, bent and rubbed his leg, saying, as he was rubbing: How singular is the thing called pleasure, and how curiously related to pain, which might be thought to be the opposite of it; for they are never present to a man at the same instant, and yet he who pursues either is generally compelled to take the other; their bodies are two, but they are joined by a single head. And I cannot help thinking that if Aesop had remembered them, he would have made a fable about God trying to reconcile their strife, and how, when he could not, he fastened their heads together; and this is the reason why when one comes the other follows: as I know by my own experience now, when after the pain in my leg which was caused by the chain pleasure appears to succeed.

Upon this Cebes said: I am glad, Socrates, that you have mentioned the name of Aesop. For it reminds me of a question which has been asked by many, and was asked of me only the day before yesterday by Evenus the poet—he will be sure to ask it again, and therefore if you would like me to have an answer ready for him, you may as well tell me what I should say to him:—he wanted to know why you, who never before wrote a line of poetry, now that you are in prison are turning Aesop's fables into verse, and also composing that hymn in honour of Apollo.

Having been  
told in a  
dream that he  
should com-  
pose music, in  
order to satisfy  
a scruple  
about the  
meaning of  
the dream  
he has been

Tell him, Cebes, he replied, what is the truth—that I had no idea of rivalling him or his poems; to do so, as I knew, would be no easy task. But I wanted to see whether I could purge away a scruple which I felt about the meaning of certain dreams. In the course of my life I have often had intimations in dreams 'that I should compose music.' The same dream came to me sometimes in one form, and sometimes in another, but always saying the same or nearly the same words: 'Cultivate and make music,' said the dream. And hitherto I had imagined that this was only intended to

61 exhort and encourage me in the study of philosophy, which has been the pursuit of my life, and is the noblest and best of music. The dream was bidding me do what I was already doing, in the same way that the competitor in a race is bidden by the spectators to run when he is already running. But I was not certain of this; for the dream might have meant music in the popular sense of the word, and being under sentence of death, and the festival giving me a respite, I thought that it would be safer for me to satisfy the scruple, and, in obedience to the dream, to compose a few verses before I departed. And first I made a hymn in honour of the god of the festival, and then considering that a poet, if he is really to be a poet, should not only put together words, but should invent stories, and that I have no invention, I took some fables of Aesop, which I had ready at hand and which I knew — they were the first I came upon — and turned them into verse. Tell this to Evenus, Cebes, and bid him be of good cheer; say that I would have him come after me if he be a wise man, and not tarry; and that to-day I am likely to be going, for the Athenians say that I must.

Simmius said: What a message for such a man! having been a frequent companion of his I should say that, as far as I know him, he will never take your advice unless he is obliged.

Why, said Socrates,—is not Evenus a philosopher?

I think that he is, said Simmius.

Then he, or any man who has the spirit of philosophy, will be willing to die; but he will not take his own life, for that is held to be unlawful.

Here he changed his position, and put his legs off the couch on to the ground, and during the rest of the conversation he remained sitting.

Why do you say, enquired Cebes, that a man ought not to take his own life, but that the philosopher will be ready to follow the dying?

Socrates replied: And have you, Cebes and Simmius, who are the disciples of Philolaus, never heard him speak of this?

Yes, but his language was obscure, Socrates.

My words, too, are only an echo; but there is no reason why I should not repeat what I have heard: and indeed, as

*Phædo.*

SOCRATES,  
SIMMIAS,  
CEBES.

writing verses  
while he was  
in prison.

Evenus the  
poet had been  
curious to  
know why he  
had done so,  
and Socrates  
gives him the  
explanation,  
bidding him  
be of good  
cheer, and  
come after  
him. 'But  
he will not  
come.'

Socrates  
replies that  
a philosopher  
like Evenus  
should be  
ready to

*Phædo.*SOCRATES,  
SIMMIAS,  
CEBES.die, though  
he must not  
take his  
own life.This inci-  
dental re-  
mark leads to  
a discussion  
on suicide.Man is a  
prisoner who  
has no right  
to run away;  
and he is also  
a possession  
of the gods  
and must  
not rob his  
masters.And why  
should he  
wish to leave  
the best of  
services?

I am going to another place, it is very meet for me to be thinking and talking of the nature of the pilgrimage which I am about to make. What can I do better in the interval between this and the setting of the sun?

Then tell me, Socrates, why is suicide held to be unlawful? as I have certainly heard Philolaus, about whom you were just now asking, affirm when he was staying with us at Thebes; and there are others who say the same, although I have never understood what was meant by any of them.

Do not lose heart, replied Socrates, and the day may come 62 when you will understand. I suppose that you wonder why, when other things which are evil may be good at certain times and to certain persons, death is to be the only exception, and why, when a man is better dead, he is not permitted to be his own benefactor, but must wait for the hand of another.

Fery true, said Cebes, laughing gently and speaking in his native Boeotian.

I admit the appearance of inconsistency in what I am saying; but there may not be any real inconsistency after all. There is a doctrine whispered in secret that man is a prisoner who has no right to open the door and run away; this is a great mystery which I do not quite understand. Yet I too believe that the gods are our guardians, and that we men are a possession of theirs. Do you not agree?

Yes, I quite agree, said Cebes.

And if one of your own possessions, an ox or an ass, for example, took the liberty of putting himself out of the way when you had given no intimation of your wish that he should die, would you not be angry with him, and would you not punish him if you could?

Certainly, replied Cebes.

Then, if we look at the matter thus, there may be reason in saying that a man should wait, and not take his own life until God summons him, as he is now summoning me.

Yes, Socrates, said Cebes, there seems to be truth in what you say. And yet how can you reconcile this seemingly true belief that God is our guardian and we his possessions, with the willingness to die which you were just now attributing to the philosopher? That the wisest of men should be willing



to leave a service in which they are ruled by the gods who are the best of rulers, is not reasonable; for surely no wise man thinks that when set at liberty he can take better care of himself than the gods take of him. A fool may perhaps think so—he may argue that he had better run away from his master, not considering that his duty is to remain to the end, and not to run away from the good, and that there would be no sense in his running away. The wise man will want to be ever with him who is better than himself. Now this, Socrates, is the reverse of what was just now said; for upon this view the wise man should sorrow and the fool rejoice at passing out of life.

*Phædo.*

SOCRATES,  
SIMMIAS,  
CEBES.

63 The earnestness of Cebes seemed to please Socrates. Here, said he, turning to us, is a man who is always enquiring, and is not so easily convinced by the first thing which he hears.

And certainly, added Simmias, the objection which he is now making does appear to me to have some force. For what can be the meaning of a truly wise man wanting to fly away and lightly leave a master who is better than himself? And I rather imagine that Cebes is referring to you; he thinks that you are too ready to leave us, and too ready to leave the gods whom you acknowledge to be our good masters.

You yourself, Socrates, are too ready to run away.

Yes, replied Socrates; there is reason in what you say. And so you think that I ought to answer your indictment as if I were in a court?

We should like you to do so, said Simmias.

Then I must try to make a more successful defence before you than I did before the judges. For I am quite ready to admit, Simmias and Cebes, that I ought to be grieved at death, if I were not persuaded in the first place that I am going to other gods who are wise and good (of which I am as certain as I can be of any such matters), and secondly (though I am not so sure of this last) to men departed, better than those whom I leave behind; and therefore I do not grieve as I might have done, for I have good hope that there is yet something remaining for the dead, and as has been said of old, some far better thing for the good than for the evil.

Socrates replies that he is going to other gods who are wise and good.

*Phædo.*SOCRATES,  
SIMMIAS,  
CRITO.

But do you mean to take away your thoughts with you, Socrates? said Simmias. Will you not impart them to us? — for they are a benefit in which we too are entitled to share. Moreover, if you succeed in convincing us, that will be an answer to the charge against yourself.

I will do my best, replied Socrates. But you must first let me hear what Crito wants; he has long been wishing to say something to me.

Only this, Socrates, replied Crito:—the attendant who is to give you the poison has been telling me, and he wants me to tell you, that you are not to talk much; talking, he says, increases heat, and this is apt to interfere with the action of the poison; persons who excite themselves are sometimes obliged to take a second or even a third dose.

Then, said Socrates, let him mind his business and be prepared to give the poison twice or even thrice if necessary; that is all.

I knew quite well what you would say, replied Crito; but I was obliged to satisfy him.

Never mind him, he said.

The true philosopher is always dying:—why then should he avoid the death which he desires?

And now, O my judges, I desire to prove to you that the real philosopher has reason to be of good cheer when he is about to die, and that after death he may hope to obtain the greatest good in the other world. And how this may be, Simmias and Cebes, I will endeavour to explain. For I deem that the true votary of philosophy is likely to be misunderstood by other men; they do not perceive that he is always pursuing death and dying; and if this be so, and he has had the desire of death all his life long, why when his time comes should he repine at that which he has been always pursuing and desiring? 64

‘How the world will laugh when they hear this!’

Simmias said laughingly: Though not in a laughing humour, you have made me laugh, Socrates; for I cannot help thinking that the many when they hear your words will say how truly you have described philosophers, and our people at home will likewise say that the life which philosophers desire is in reality death, and that they have found them out to be deserving of the death which they desire.

Yes, they do not understand

And they are right, Simmias, in thinking so, with the exception of the words ‘they have found them out;’ for they



have not found out either what is the nature of that death which the true philosopher deserves, or how he deserves or desires death. But enough of them:—let us discuss the matter among ourselves. Do we believe that there is such a thing as death?

To be sure, replied Simmias.

Is it not the separation of soul and body? And to be dead is the completion of this; when the soul exists in herself, and is released from the body and the body is released from the soul, what is this but death?

Just so, he replied.

There is another question, which will probably throw light on our present enquiry if you and I can agree about it:—Ought the philosopher to care about the pleasures—if they are to be called pleasures—of eating and drinking?

Certainly not, answered Simmias.

And what about the pleasures of love—should he care for them?

By no means.

And will he think much of the other ways of indulging the body, for example, the acquisition of costly raiment, or sandals, or other adornments of the body? Instead of caring about them, does he not rather despise anything more than nature needs? What do you say?

I should say that the true philosopher would despise them.

Would you not say that he is entirely concerned with the soul and not with the body? He would like, as far as he can, to get away from the body and to turn to the soul.

Quite true.

In matters of this sort philosophers, above all other men, 65 may be observed in every sort of way to dissever the soul from the communion of the body.

Very true.

Whereas, Simmias, the rest of the world are of opinion that to him who has no sense of pleasure and no part in bodily pleasure, life is not worth having; and that he who is indifferent about them is as good as dead.

That is also true.

What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of knowledge?—is the body, if invited to share in the enquiry,

*Phædo.*

SOCRATES,  
SIMMIAS.

the nature of  
death, or why  
the philoso-  
pher desires or  
deserves it.

Life is best  
when the soul  
is most freed  
from the con-  
cerns of the  
body, and is  
alone and by  
herself.

*Phaedo.*SOCRATES,  
SIMMIAS.

The senses are  
untrustworthy  
guides: they  
mislead the  
soul in the  
search for  
truth.

a hinderer or a helper? I mean to say, have sight and hearing any truth in them? Are they not, as the poets are always telling us, inaccurate witnesses? and yet, if even they are inaccurate and indistinct, what is to be said of the other senses?—for you will allow that they are the best of them?

Certainly, he replied.

Then when does the soul attain truth?—for in attempting to consider anything in company with the body she is obviously deceived.

True.

Then must not true existence be revealed to her in thought, if at all?

Yes.

And thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself and none of these things trouble her—neither sounds nor sights nor pain nor any pleasure,—when she takes leave of the body, and has as little as possible to do with it, when she has no bodily sense or desire, but is aspiring after true being?

Certainly.

And therefore  
the philoso-  
pher runs  
away from the  
body.

And in this the philosopher dishonours the body; his soul runs away from his body and desires to be alone and by herself?

That is true.

Another argu-  
ment. The  
absolute truth  
of justice,  
beauty, and  
other ideas is  
not perceived  
by the senses,  
which only  
introduce a  
disturbing  
element.

Well, but there is another thing, Simmias: Is there or is there not an absolute justice?

Assuredly there is.

And an absolute beauty and absolute good?

Of course.

But did you ever behold any of them with your eyes?

Certainly not.

Or did you ever reach them with any other bodily sense?—and I speak not of these alone, but of absolute greatness, and health, and strength, and of the essence or true nature of everything. Has the reality of them ever been perceived by you through the bodily organs? or rather, is not the nearest approach to the knowledge of their several natures made by him who so orders his intellectual vision as to have the most exact conception of the essence of each thing which he considers?

Certainly.

*Phædo.*

And he attains to the purest knowledge of them who goes to each with the mind alone, not introducing or intruding in the act of thought sight or any other sense together with  
 66 reason, but with the very light of the mind in her own clear-  
 ness searches into the very truth of each; he who has got  
 rid, as far as he can, of eyes and ears and, so to speak, of the  
 whole body, these being in his opinion distracting elements  
 which when they infect the soul hinder her from acquiring  
 truth and knowledge — who, if not he, is likely to attain to the  
 knowledge of true being?

SOCRATES,  
 SIMMIAS.

What you say has a wonderful truth in it, Socrates, replied  
 Simmias.

And when real philosophers consider all these things, will  
 they not be led to make a reflection which they will express  
 in words something like the following? ‘Have we not found,’  
 they will say, ‘a path of thought which seems to bring us and  
 our argument to the conclusion, that while we are in the  
 body, and while the soul is infected with the evils of the body,  
 our desire will not be satisfied? and our desire is of the truth.  
 For the body is a source of endless trouble to us by reason of  
 the mere requirement of food; and is liable also to diseases  
 which overtake and impede us in the search after true being:  
 it fills us full of loves, and lusts, and fears, and fancies of all  
 kinds, and endless foolery, and in fact, as men say, takes  
 away from us the power of thinking at all. Whence come  
 wars, and fightings, and factions? whence but from the body  
 and the lusts of the body? Wars are occasioned by the love  
 of money, and money has to be acquired for the sake and in  
 the service of the body; and by reason of all these impedi-  
 ments we have no time to give to philosophy; and, last and  
 worst of all, even if we are at leisure and betake ourselves to  
 some speculation, the body is always breaking in upon us,  
 causing turmoil and confusion in our enquiries, and so  
 amazing us that we are prevented from seeing the truth.  
 It has been proved to us by experience that if we would have  
 pure knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body —  
 the soul in herself must behold things in themselves: and  
 then we shall attain the wisdom which we desire, and of  
 which we say that we are lovers; not while we live, but after

The soul in  
 herself must  
 perceive  
 things in  
 themselves.



*Phædo.*SOCRATES,  
SIMMIAS.

death; for if while in company with the body, the soul cannot have pure knowledge, one of two things follows—either knowledge is not to be attained at all, or, if at all, after death. For then, and not till then, the soul will be parted 67 from the body and exist in herself alone. In this present life, I reckon that we make the nearest approach to knowledge when we have the least possible intercourse or communion with the body, and are not surfeited with the bodily nature, but keep ourselves pure until the hour when God himself is pleased to release us. And thus having got rid of the foolishness of the body we shall be pure and hold converse with the pure, and know of ourselves the clear light everywhere, which is no other than the light of truth.' For the impure are not permitted to approach the pure. These are the sort of words, Simmias, which the true lovers of knowledge cannot help saying to one another, and thinking. You would agree; would you not?

Undoubtedly, Socrates.

But, O my friend, if this be true, there is great reason to hope that, going whither I go, when I have come to the end of my journey, I shall attain that which has been the pursuit of my life. And therefore I go on my way rejoicing, and not I only, but every other man who believes that his mind has been made ready and that he is in a manner purified.

Certainly, replied Simmias.

Purification is  
the separation  
of the soul  
from the  
body.

And what is purification but the separation of the soul from the body, as I was saying before; the habit of the soul gathering and collecting herself into herself from all sides out of the body; the dwelling in her own place alone, as in another life, so also in this, as far as she can;—the release of the soul from the chains of the body?

Very true, he said.

And this separation and release of the soul from the body is termed death?

To be sure, he said.

And the true philosophers, and they only, are ever seeking to release the soul. Is not the separation and release of the soul from the body their especial study?

That is true.

And, as I was saying at first, there would be a ridiculous

contradiction in men studying to live as nearly as they can in a state of death, and yet repining when it comes upon them.

*Phædo.*

SOCRATES,  
SIMMIAS.

Clearly.

68 And the true philosophers, Simmias, are always occupied in the practice of dying, wherefore also to them least of all men is death terrible. Look at the matter thus:—if they have been in every way the enemies of the body, and are wanting to be alone with the soul, when this desire of theirs is granted, how inconsistent would they be if they trembled and repined, instead of rejoicing at their departure to that place where, when they arrive, they hope to gain that which in life they desired — and this was wisdom — and at the same time to be rid of the company of their enemy. Many a man has been willing to go to the world below animated by the hope of seeing there an earthly love, or wife, or son, and conversing with them. And will he who is a true lover of wisdom, and is strongly persuaded in like manner that only in the world below he can worthily enjoy her, still repine at death? Will he not depart with joy? Surely he will, O my friend, if he be a true philosopher. For he will have a firm conviction that there, and there only, he can find wisdom in her purity. And if this be true, he would be very absurd, as I was saying, if he were afraid of death.

And therefore the true philosopher who has been always trying to disengage himself from the body will rejoice in death.

He would indeed, replied Simmias.

And when you see a man who is repining at the approach of death, is not his reluctance a sufficient proof that he is not a lover of wisdom, but a lover of the body, and probably at the same time a lover of either money or power, or both?

Quite so, he replied.

And is not courage, Simmias, a quality which is specially characteristic of the philosopher?

Certainly.

There is temperance again, which even by the vulgar is supposed to consist in the control and regulation of the passions, and in the sense of superiority to them — is not temperance a virtue belonging to those only who despise the body, and who pass their lives in philosophy?

He alone possesses the true secret of virtue, which in ordinary men is merely based on a calculation of lesser and greater evils.

Most assuredly.

For the courage and temperance of other men, if you will consider them, are really a contradiction.



*Phædo.*

How so?

SOCRATES,  
SIMMIAS.

Well, he said, you are aware that death is regarded by men in general as a great evil.

Very true, he said.

And do not courageous men face death because they are afraid of yet greater evils?

That is quite true.

Ordinary  
men are  
courageous  
only from  
cowardice;  
temperate  
from intem-  
perance.

Then all but the philosophers are courageous only from fear, and because they are afraid; and yet that a man should be courageous from fear, and because he is a coward, is surely a strange thing.

Very true.

And are not the temperate exactly in the same case? They are temperate because they are intemperate — which might seem to be a contradiction, but is nevertheless the sort of thing which happens with this foolish temperance. For there are pleasures which they are afraid of losing; and in their desire to keep them, they abstain from some pleasures, because they are overcome by others; and although to be conquered by pleasure is called by men intemperance, to them the conquest of pleasure consists in being conquered by pleasure. And that is what I mean by saying that, in a sense, they are made temperate through intemperance. 69

Such appears to be the case.

True virtue is  
inseparable  
from wisdom.

Yet the exchange of one fear or pleasure or pain for another fear or pleasure or pain, and of the greater for the less, as if they were coins, is not the exchange of virtue. O my blessed Simmias, is there not one true coin for which all things ought to be exchanged?—and that is wisdom; and only in exchange for this, and in company with this, is anything truly bought or sold, whether courage or temperance or justice. And is not all true virtue the companion of wisdom, no matter what fears or pleasures or other similar goods or evils may or may not attend her? But the virtue which is made up of these goods, when they are severed from wisdom and exchanged with one another, is a shadow of virtue only, nor is there any freedom or health or truth in her; but in the true exchange there is a purging away of all these things, and temperance, and justice, and courage, and wisdom herself are the purgation of them. The founders of

the mysteries would appear to have had a real meaning, and were not talking nonsense when they intimated in a figure long ago that he who passes unsanctified and uninitiated into the world below will lie in a slough, but that he who arrives there after initiation and purification will dwell with the gods. For 'many,' as they say in the mysteries, 'are the thyrsus-bearers, but few are the mystics,'—meaning, as I interpret the words, 'the true philosophers.' In the number of whom, during my whole life, I have been seeking, according to my ability, to find a place;—whether I have sought in a right way or not, and whether I have succeeded or not, I shall truly know in a little while, if God will, when I myself arrive in the other world—such is my belief. And therefore I maintain that I am right, Simmias and Cebes, in not grieving or repining at parting from you and my masters in this world, for I believe that I shall equally find good masters and friends in another world. But most men do not believe this saying; if then I succeed in convincing you by my defence better than I did the Athenian judges, it will be well.

*Phædo.*

SOCRATES,  
CEBES.

The thyrsus-  
bearers and  
the mystics.

70 Cebes answered: I agree, Socrates, in the greater part of what you say. But in what concerns the soul, men are apt to be incredulous; they fear that when she has left the body her place may be nowhere, and that on the very day of death she may perish and come to an end—immediately on her release from the body, issuing forth dispersed like smoke or air and in her flight vanishing away into nothingness. If she could only be collected into herself after she has obtained release from the evils of which you were speaking, there would be good reason to hope, Socrates, that what you say is true. But surely it requires a great deal of argument and many proofs to show that when the man is dead his soul yet exists, and has any force or intelligence.

Fears are entertained lest the soul when she dies should be scattered to the winds.

True, Cebes, said Socrates; and shall I suggest that we converse a little of the probabilities of these things?

I am sure, said Cebes, that I should greatly like to know your opinion about them.

I reckon, said Socrates, that no one who heard me now, not even if he were one of my old enemies, the Comic poets, could accuse me of idle talking about matters in which I

The discussion suited to the occasion.

*Phaedo.*

SOCRATES,

CEBES.

have no concern :— If you please, then, we will proceed with the enquiry.

Suppose we consider the question whether the souls of men after death are or are not in the world below. There comes into my mind an ancient doctrine which affirms that they go from hence into the other world, and returning hither, are born again from the dead. Now if it be true that the living come from the dead, then our souls must exist in the other world, for if not, how could they have been born again? And this would be conclusive, if there were any real evidence that the living are only born from the dead ; but if this is not so, then other arguments will have to be adduced.

Very true, replied Cebes.

All things  
which have  
opposites are  
generated out  
of opposites.

Then let us consider the whole question, not in relation to man only, but in relation to animals generally, and to plants, and to everything of which there is generation, and the proof will be easier. Are not all things which have opposites generated out of their opposites? I mean such things as good and evil, just and unjust—and there are innumerable other opposites which are generated out of opposites. And I want to show that in all opposites there is of necessity a similar alternation ; I mean to say, for example, that anything which becomes greater must become greater after being less.

True.

And that which becomes less must have been once greater and then have become less.

71

Yes.

And the weaker is generated from the stronger, and the swifter from the slower.

Very true.

And the worse is from the better, and the more just is from the more unjust.

Of course.

And is this true of all opposites? and are we convinced that all of them are generated out of opposites?

Yes.

And there are  
intermediate  
processes

And in this universal opposition of all things, are there not also two intermediate processes which are ever going on, from one to the other opposite, and back again ; where there is a



greater and a less there is also an intermediate process of increase and diminution, and that which grows is said to wax, and that which decays to wane?

Yes, he said.

And there are many other processes, such as division and composition, cooling and heating, which equally involve a passage into and out of one another. And this necessarily holds of all opposites, even though not always expressed in words—they are really generated out of one another, and there is a passing or process from one to the other of them?

Very true, he replied.

Well, and is there not an opposite of life, as sleep is the opposite of waking?

True, he said.

And what is it?

Death, he answered.

And these, if they are opposites, are generated the one from the other, and have their two intermediate processes also?

Of course.

Now, said Socrates, I will analyze one of the two pairs of opposites which I have mentioned to you, and also its intermediate processes, and you shall analyze the other to me. One of them I term sleep, the other waking. The state of sleep is opposed to the state of waking, and out of sleeping waking is generated, and out of waking, sleeping; and the process of generation is in the one case falling asleep, and in the other waking up. Do you agree?

I entirely agree.

Then, suppose that you analyze life and death to me in the same manner. Is not death opposed to life?

Yes.

And they are generated one from the other?

Yes.

What is generated from the living?

The dead.

And what from the dead?

I can only say in answer—the living.

Then the living, whether things or persons, Cebes, are generated from the dead?

*Phaedo.*

SOCRATES,  
CEBES.

or passages  
into and out  
of one another,  
such as in-  
crease and  
diminution,  
division and  
composition,  
and the like.

Life is op-  
posed to  
death, as  
waking is to  
sleeping, and  
in like man-  
ner they are  
generated  
from one  
another.

*Phædo.*

That is clear, he replied.

SOCRATES,  
CEBES.

Then the inference is that our souls exist in the world below?

That is true.

✓ And one of the two processes or generations is visible — for surely the act of dying is visible?

Surely, he said.

What then is to be the result? Shall we exclude the opposite process? and shall we suppose nature to walk on one leg only? Must we not rather assign to death some corresponding process of generation?

Certainly, he replied.

And what is that process?

Return to life.

✓ And return to life, if there be such a thing, is the birth of the dead into the world of the living?

72

Quite true.

Then here is a new way by which we arrive at the conclusion that the living come from the dead, just as the dead come from the living; and this, if true, affords a most certain proof that the souls of the dead exist in some place out of which they come again.

Yes, Socrates, he said; the conclusion seems to flow necessarily out of our previous admissions.

If there were  
no compensa-  
tion or return  
in nature, all  
things would  
pass into the  
state of death.

And that these admissions were not unfair, Cebes, he said, may be shown, I think, as follows: If generation were in a straight line only, and there were no compensation or circle in nature, no turn or return of elements into their opposites, then you know that all things would at last have the same form and pass into the same state, and there would be no more generation of them.

What do you mean? he said.

The sleeping  
Endymion  
would be  
unmeaning  
in a world  
of sleepers.

A simple thing enough, which I will illustrate by the case of sleep, he replied. You know that if there were no alternation of sleeping and waking, the tale of the sleeping Endymion would in the end have no meaning, because all other things would be asleep too, and he would not be distinguishable from the rest. Or if there were composition only, and no division of substances, then the chaos of Anaxagoras would come again. And in like manner, my



dear Cebes, if all things which partook of life were to die, and after they were dead remained in the form of death, and did not come to life again, all would at last die, and nothing would be alive — what other result could there be? For if the living spring from any other things, and they too die, must not all things at last be swallowed up in death? <sup>1</sup>

*Phaedo.*

SOCRATES,  
CEBES,  
SIMMIAS.

There is no escape, Socrates, said Cebes; and to me your argument seems to be absolutely true.

Yes, he said, Cebes, it is and must be so, in my opinion; and we have not been deluded in making these admissions; but I am confident that there truly is such a thing as living again, and that the living spring from the dead, and that the souls of the dead are in existence, and that the good souls have a better portion than the evil.

73 • Cebes added: Your favourite doctrine, Socrates, that knowledge is simply recollection, if true, also necessarily implies a previous time in which we have learned that which we now recollect. But this would be impossible unless our soul had been in some place before existing in the form of man; here then is another proof of the soul's immortality.

The doctrine of recollection implies a previous existence.

But tell me, Cebes, said Simmias, interposing, what arguments are urged in favour of this doctrine of recollection. I am not very sure at the moment that I remember them.

One excellent proof, said Cebes, is afforded by questions. If you put a question to a person in a right way, he will give a true answer of himself, but how could he do this unless there were knowledge and right reason already in him? And this is most clearly shown when he is taken to a diagram or to anything of that sort <sup>2</sup>.

You put a question to a person, and he answers out of his own mind.

But if, said Socrates, you are still incredulous, Simmias, I would ask you whether you may not agree with me when you look at the matter in another way;— I mean, if you are still incredulous as to whether knowledge is recollection?

Incredulous I am not, said Simmias; but I want to have this doctrine of recollection brought to my own recollection, and, from what Cebes has said, I am beginning to recollect and be convinced: but I should still like to hear what you were going to say.

This is what I would say, he replied:— We should agree,

<sup>1</sup> But cp. Rep. x. 611 A.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Meno 83 ff.

*Phædo.*SOCRATES,  
SIMMIAS.

A person may  
recollect what  
he has never  
seen together  
with what he  
has seen.  
How is this?

Recollection  
is the know-  
ledge of some  
person or  
thing derived  
from some  
other person  
or thing which  
may be either  
like or unlike  
them.

if I am not mistaken, that what a man recollects he must have known at some previous time.

Very true.

And what is the nature of this knowledge or recollection? I mean to ask, Whether a person who, having seen or heard or in any way perceived anything, knows not only that, but has a conception of something else which is the subject, not of the same but of some other kind of knowledge, may not be fairly said to recollect that of which he has the conception?

What do you mean?

I mean what I may illustrate by the following instance:—The knowledge of a lyre is not the same as the knowledge of a man?

True.

And yet what is the feeling of lovers when they recognise a lyre, or a garment, or anything else which the beloved has been in the habit of using? Do not they, from knowing the lyre, form in the mind's eye an image of the youth to whom the lyre belongs? And this is recollection. In like manner any one who sees Simmias may remember Cebes; and there are endless examples of the same thing.

Endless, indeed, replied Simmias.

And recollection is most commonly a process of recovering that which has been already forgotten through time and inattention.

Very true, he said.

Well; and may you not also from seeing the picture of a horse or a lyre remember a man? and from the picture of Simmias, you may be led to remember Cebes;

True.

Or you may also be led to the recollection of Simmias himself?

Quite so.

And in all these cases, the recollection may be derived from things either like or unlike?

It may be.

And when the recollection is derived from like things, then another consideration is sure to arise, which is—whether the likeness in any degree falls short or not of that which is recollected?

Very true, he said.

And shall we proceed a step further, and affirm that there is such a thing as equality, not of one piece of wood or stone with another, but that, over and above this, there is absolute equality? Shall we say so?

Say so, yes, replied Simmias, and swear to it, with all the confidence in life.

And do we know the nature of this absolute essence?

To be sure, he said.

And whence did we obtain our knowledge? Did we not see equalities of material things, such as pieces of wood and stones, and gather from them the idea of an equality which is different from them? For you will acknowledge that there is a difference. Or look at the matter in another way:— Do not the same pieces of wood or stone appear at one time equal, and at another time unequal?

That is certain.

But are real equals ever unequal? or is the idea of equality the same as of inequality?

Impossible, Socrates.

Then these (so-called) equals are not the same with the idea of equality?

I should say, clearly not, Socrates.

And yet from these equals, although differing from the idea of equality, you conceived and attained that idea?

Very true, he said.

Which might be like, or might be unlike them?

Yes.

But that makes no difference: whenever from seeing one thing you conceived another, whether like or unlike, there must surely have been an act of recollection?

Very true.

But what would you say of equal portions of wood and stone, or other material equals? and what is the impression produced by them? Are they equals in the same sense in which absolute equality is equal? or do they fall short of this perfect equality in a measure?

Yes, he said, in a very great measure too.

And must we not allow, that when I or any one, looking at any object, observes that the thing which he sees aims at

*Phaedo.*

SOCRATES,  
SIMMIAS.

The imperfect equality of pieces of wood or stone suggests the perfect idea of equality.

But if the material equals when



*Phædo.*SOCRATES,  
SIMMIAS.

compared to  
the ideal  
equality fall  
short of it, the  
ideal equality  
with which  
they are com-  
pared must be  
prior to them,  
though only  
known  
through the  
medium of  
them.

being some other thing, but falls short of, and cannot be, that other thing, but is inferior, he who makes this observation must have had a previous knowledge of that to which the other, although similar, was inferior?

Certainly.

And has not this been our own case in the matter of equals and of absolute equality?

Precisely.

Then we must have known equality previously to the time when we first saw the material equals, and reflected that all these apparent equals strive to attain absolute equality, but fall short of it? 75

Very true.

And we recognize also that this absolute equality has only been known, and can only be known, through the medium of sight or touch, or of some other of the senses, which are all alike in this respect?

Yes, Socrates, as far as the argument is concerned, one of them is the same as the other.

From the senses then is derived the knowledge that all sensible things aim at an absolute equality, of which they fall short?

Yes.

Then before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way, we must have had a knowledge of absolute equality, or we could not have referred to that standard the equals which are derived from the senses?—for to that they all aspire, and of that they fall short.

No other inference can be drawn from the previous statements.

And did we not see and hear and have the use of our other senses as soon as we were born?

Certainly.

Then we must have acquired the knowledge of equality at some previous time?

Yes.

That is to say, before we were born, I suppose?

True.

And if we acquired this knowledge before we were born, and were born having the use of it, then we also knew before

That higher  
sense of  
equality must  
have been  
known to us  
before we  
were born,  
was forgotten  
at birth, and

we were born and at the instant of birth not only the equal or the greater or the less, but all other ideas; for we are not speaking only of equality, but of beauty, goodness, justice, holiness, and of all which we stamp with the name of essence in the dialectical process, both when we ask and when we answer questions. Of all this we may certainly affirm that we acquired the knowledge before birth?

*Phaedo.*

SOCRATES,  
SIMMIAS.

was recovered  
by the use of  
the senses.

We may.

But if, after having acquired, we have not forgotten what in each case we acquired, then we must always have come into life having knowledge, and shall always continue to know as long as life lasts — for knowing is the acquiring and retaining knowledge and not forgetting. Is not forgetting, Simmias, just the losing of knowledge?

Quite true, Socrates.

But if the knowledge which we acquired before birth was lost by us at birth, and if afterwards by the use of the senses we recovered what we previously knew, will not the process which we call learning be a recovering of the knowledge which is natural to us, and may not this be rightly termed recollection?

What is called learning therefore is only a recollection of ideas which we possessed in a previous state.

Very true.

76 So much is clear — that when we perceive something, either by the help of sight, or hearing, or some other sense, from that perception we are able to obtain a notion of some other thing like or unlike which is associated with it but has been forgotten. Whence, as I was saying, one of two alternatives follows:—either we had this knowledge at birth, and continued to know through life; or, after birth, those who are said to learn only remember, and learning is simply recollection.

Yes, that is quite true, Socrates.

And which alternative, Simmias, do you prefer? Had we the knowledge at our birth, or did we recollect the things which we knew previously to our birth?

I cannot decide at the moment.

At any rate you can decide whether he who has knowledge will or will not be able to render an account of his knowledge? What do you say?

Certainly, he will.



*Phaedo.*

SOCRATES,

SIMMIAS.

But do you think that every man is able to give an account of these very matters about which we are speaking?

Would that they could, Socrates, but I rather fear that to-morrow, at this time, there will no longer be any one alive who is able to give an account of them such as ought to be given.

Then you are not of opinion, Simmias, that all men know these things?

Certainly not.

They are in process of recollecting that which they learned before?

Certainly.

But when did our souls acquire this knowledge?— not since we were born as men?

Certainly not.

And therefore, previously?

Yes.

But if so, our souls must have existed before they were in the form of man; or if not the souls, then not the ideas.

Then, Simmias, our souls must also have existed without bodies before they were in the form of man, and must have had intelligence.

Unless indeed you suppose, Socrates, that these notions are given us at the very moment of birth; for this is the only time which remains.

Yes, my friend, but if so, when do we lose them? for they are not in us when we are born—that is admitted. Do we lose them at the moment of receiving them, or if not at what other time?

No, Socrates, I perceive that I was unconsciously talking nonsense.

Then may we not say, Simmias, that if, as we are always repeating, there is an absolute beauty, and goodness, and an absolute essence of all things; and if to this, which is now discovered to have existed in our former state, we refer all our sensations, and with this compare them, finding these ideas to be pre-existent and our inborn possession — then our souls must have had a prior existence, but if not, there would be no force in the argument? There is the same proof that these ideas must have existed before we were born, as that our souls existed before we were born; and if not the ideas, then not the souls.

77 Yes, Socrates; I am convinced that there is precisely the same necessity for the one as for the other; and the argument retreats successfully to the position that the existence of the soul before birth cannot be separated from the existence of the essence of which you speak. For there is nothing which to my mind is so patent as that beauty, goodness, and the other notions of which you were just now speaking, have a most real and absolute existence; and I am satisfied with the proof.

Well, but is Cebes equally satisfied? for I must convince him too.

I think, said Simmias, that Cebes is satisfied: although he is the most incredulous of mortals, yet I believe that he is sufficiently convinced of the existence of the soul before birth. But that after death the soul will continue to exist is not yet proven even to my own satisfaction. I cannot get rid of the feeling of the many to which Cebes was referring—the feeling that when the man dies the soul will be dispersed, and that this may be the extinction of her. For admitting that she may have been born elsewhere, and framed out of other elements, and was in existence before entering the human body, why after having entered in and gone out again may she not herself be destroyed and come to an end?

Very true, Simmias, said Cebes; about half of what was required has been proven; to wit, that our souls existed before we were born:—that the soul will exist after death as well as before birth is the other half of which the proof is still wanting, and has to be supplied; when that is given the demonstration will be complete.

But that proof, Simmias and Cebes, has been already given, said Socrates, if you put the two arguments together—I mean this and the former one, in which we admitted that everything living is born of the dead. For if the soul exists before birth, and in coming to life and being born can be born only from death and dying, must she not after death continue to exist, since she has to be born again?—Surely the proof which you desire has been already furnished. Still I suspect that you and Simmias would be glad to probe the argument further. Like children, you are haunted with

*Phaedo.*

SOCRATES,  
SIMMIAS,  
CEBES.

Simmias and Cebes are agreed in thinking that the previous existence of the soul is sufficiently proved, but not the future existence.

But if the soul passes from death to birth, she must exist after death as well as before birth.

*Phaedo.*SOCRATES,  
CEBES.

a fear that when the soul leaves the body, the wind may really blow her away and scatter her; especially if a man should happen to die in a great storm and not when the sky is calm.

Cebes answered with a smile: Then, Socrates, you must argue us out of our fears—and yet, strictly speaking, they are not our fears, but there is a child within us to whom death is a sort of hobgoblin: him too we must persuade not to be afraid when he is alone in the dark.

The fear that  
the soul will  
vanish into  
air must be  
charmed  
away.

Socrates said: Let the voice of the charmer be applied daily until you have charmed away the fear.

And where shall we find a good charmer of our fears, 78  
Socrates, when you are gone?

Hellas, he replied, is a large place, Cebes, and has many good men, and there are barbarous races not a few: seek for him among them all, far and wide, sparing neither pains nor money; for there is no better way of spending your money. And you must seek among yourselves too; for you will not find others better able to make the search.

The search, replied Cebes, shall certainly be made. And now, if you please, let us return to the point of the argument at which we digressed.

By all means, replied Socrates; what else should I please?

Very good.

What is the  
element which  
is liable to be  
scattered?—  
Not the  
simple and  
unchange-  
able, but the  
composite and  
changing.

Must we not, said Socrates, ask ourselves what that is which, as we imagine, is liable to be scattered, and about which we fear? and what again is that about which we have no fear? And then we may proceed further to enquire whether that which suffers dispersion is or is not of the nature of soul—our hopes and fears as to our own souls will turn upon the answers to these questions.

Very true, he said.

Now the compound or composite may be supposed to be naturally capable, as of being compounded, so also of being dissolved; but that which is uncompounded, and that only, must be, if anything is, indissoluble.

Yes; I should imagine so, said Cebes.

And the uncompounded may be assumed to be the same



and unchanging, whereas the compound is always changing and never the same.

*Phaedo.*

SOCRATES,  
CEBES.

The soul and the ideas belong to the class of the unchanging, which is also the unseen.

I agree, he said.

Then now let us return to the previous discussion. Is that idea or essence, which in the dialectical process we define as essence or true existence—whether essence of equality, beauty, or anything else—are these essences, I say, liable at times to some degree of change? or are they each of them always what they are, having the same simple self-existent and unchanging forms, not admitting of variation at all, or in any way, or at any time?

They must be always the same, Socrates, replied Cebes.

And what would you say of the many beautiful—whether men or horses or garments or any other things which are named by the same names and may be called equal or beautiful,—are they all unchanging and the same always, or quite the reverse? May they not rather be described as almost always changing and hardly ever the same, either with themselves or with one another?

The latter, replied Cebes; they are always in a state of change.

79 And these you can touch and see and perceive with the senses, but the unchanging things you can only perceive with the mind—they are invisible and are not seen?

That is very true, he said.

Well then, added Socrates, let us suppose that there are two sorts of existences—one seen, the other unseen.

Let us suppose them.

The seen is the changing, and the unseen is the unchanging?

That may be also supposed.

And, further, is not one part of us body, another part soul?

To be sure.

And to which class is the body more alike and akin?

Clearly to the seen—no one can doubt that.

And is the soul seen or not seen?

Not by man, Socrates.

And what we mean by 'seen' and 'not seen' is that which is or is not visible to the eye of man?

*Phaedo.*

Yes, to the eye of man.

SOCRATES,

And is the soul seen or not seen?

CEBES.

Not seen.

Unseen then?

Yes.

Then the soul is more like to the unseen, and the body to the seen?

That follows necessarily, Socrates.

The soul which is unseen, when she makes use of the bodily senses, is dragged down into the region of the changeable, and must return into herself before she can attain to true wisdom.

And were we not saying long ago that the soul when using the body as an instrument of perception, that is to say, when using the sense of sight or hearing or some other sense (for the meaning of perceiving through the body is perceiving through the senses) — were we not saying that the soul too is then dragged by the body into the region of the changeable, and wanders and is confused; the world spins round her, and she is like a drunkard, when she touches change?

Very true.

But when returning into herself she reflects, then she passes into the other world, the region of purity, and eternity, and immortality, and unchangeableness, which are her kindred, and with them she ever lives, when she is by herself and is not let or hindered; then she ceases from her erring ways, and being in communion with the unchanging is unchanging. And this state of the soul is called wisdom?

That is well and truly said, Socrates, he replied.

And to which class is the soul more nearly alike and akin, as far as may be inferred from this argument, as well as from the preceding one?

The soul is of the nature of the unchangeable, the body of the changing; the soul rules, the body serves; the soul is in the likeness of the divine, the body of the mortal.

I think, Socrates, that, in the opinion of every one who follows the argument, the soul will be infinitely more like the unchangeable — even the most stupid person will not deny that.

And the body is more like the changing?

Yes.

Yet once more consider the matter in another light: When the soul and the body are united, then nature orders the soul to rule and govern, and the body to obey and serve. Now which of these two functions is akin to the divine? and which to the mortal? Does not the divine appear to



you to be that which naturally orders and rules, and the mortal to be that which is subject and servant?

*Phædo.*

SOCRATES,

CEBES.

True.

And which does the soul resemble?

The soul resembles the divine, and the body the mortal — there can be no doubt of that, Socrates.

Then reflect, Cebes: of all which has been said is not this the conclusion?—that the soul is in the very likeness of the divine, and immortal, and intellectual, and uniform, and indissoluble, and unchangeable; and that the body is in the very likeness of the human, and mortal, and unintellectual, and multiform, and dissoluble, and changeable. Can this, my dear Cebes, be denied?

It cannot.

But if it be true, then is not the body liable to speedy dissolution? and is not the soul almost or altogether indissoluble?

Certainly.

And do you further observe, that after a man is dead, the body, or visible part of him, which is lying in the visible world, and is called a corpse, and would naturally be dissolved and decomposed and dissipated, is not dissolved or decomposed at once, but may remain for some time, nay even for a long time, if the constitution be sound at the time of death, and the season of the year favourable? For the body when shrunk and embalmed, as the manner is in Egypt, may remain almost entire through infinite ages; and even in decay, there are still some portions, such as the bones and ligaments, which are practically indestructible:—Do you agree?

Even from the body something may be learned about the soul; for the corpse of a man lasts for some time, and when embalmed, in a manner for ever.

Yes.

And is it likely that the soul, which is invisible, in passing to the place of the true Hades, which like her is invisible, and pure, and noble, and on her way to the good and wise God, whither, if God will, my soul is also soon to go,—that the soul, I repeat, if this be her nature and origin, will be blown away and destroyed immediately on quitting the body, as the many say? That can never be, my dear Simmias and Cebes. The truth rather is, that the soul which is pure at departing and draws after her no bodily

How unlikely then that the soul should at once pass away!

*Phædo.*SOCRATES,  
CEBES.

taint, having never voluntarily during life had connection with the body, which she is ever avoiding, herself gathered into herself;—and making such abstraction her perpetual study—which means that she has been a true disciple of philosophy; and therefore has in fact been always engaged in the practice of dying? For is not philosophy the study of death?—

Certainly—

Rather when  
free from  
bodily impurity  
she departs  
to the seats of  
the blessed.

That soul, I say, herself invisible, departs to the invisible world—to the divine and immortal and rational: thither arriving, she is secure of bliss and is released from the error and folly of men, their fears and wild passions and all other human ills, and for ever dwells, as they say of the initiated, in company with the gods<sup>1</sup>. Is not this true, Cebes?

Yes, said Cebes, beyond a doubt.

But the soul which has been polluted, and is impure at the time of her departure, and is the companion and servant of the body always, and is in love with and fascinated by the body and by the desires and pleasures of the body, until she is led to believe that the truth only exists in a bodily form, which a man may touch and see and taste, and use for the purposes of his lusts,—the soul, I mean, accustomed to hate and fear and avoid the intellectual principle, which to the bodily eye is dark and invisible, and can be attained only by philosophy;—do you suppose that such a soul will depart pure and unalloyed?

Impossible, he replied.

She is held fast by the corporeal, which the continual association and constant care of the body have wrought into her nature.

Very true.

But the souls  
of the wicked  
are dragged  
down by  
the corporeal  
element.

And this corporeal element, my friend, is heavy and weighty and earthy, and is that element of sight by which a soul is depressed and dragged down again into the visible world, because she is afraid of the invisible and of the world below—prowling about tombs and sepulchres, near which, as they tell us, are seen certain ghostly apparitions of souls

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Apol. 40 E.

which have not departed pure, but are cloyed with sight and therefore visible<sup>1</sup>.

*Phædo.*

SOCRATES,  
CEBES.

That is very likely, Socrates.

Yes, that is very likely, Cebes; and these must be the souls, not of the good, but of the evil, which are compelled to wander about such places in payment of the penalty of their former evil way of life; and they continue to wander until through the craving after the corporeal which never leaves them, they are imprisoned finally in another body. And they may be supposed to find their prisons in the same natures which they have had in their former lives.

What natures do you mean, Socrates?

What I mean is that men who have followed after gluttony, and wantonness, and drunkenness, and have had no thought of avoiding them, would pass into asses and animals of that  
82 sort. What do you think?

They wander into the bodies of the animals or of birds which are of a like nature with themselves.

I think such an opinion to be exceedingly probable.

And those who have chosen the portion of injustice, and tyranny, and violence, will pass into wolves, or into hawks and kites;—whither else can we suppose them to go?

Yes, said Cebes; with such natures, beyond question.

And there is no difficulty, he said, in assigning to all of them places answering to their several natures and propensities?

There is not, he said.

Some are happier than others; and the happiest both in themselves and in the place to which they go are those who have practised the civil and social virtues which are called

<sup>1</sup> Compare Milton, *Comus*, 463 foll. :—

‘ But when lust,  
By unchaste looks, loose gestures, and foul talk,  
But most by lewd and lavish act of sin,  
Lets in defilement to the inward parts,  
The soul grows clotted by contagion,  
Imbodies, and imbrutes, till she quite lose,  
The divine property of her first being.  
Such are those thick and gloomy shadows damp  
Oft seen in charnel vaults and sepulchres,  
Lingering, and sitting by a new made grave,  
As loath to leave the body that it lov’d,  
And linked itself by carnal sensuality  
To a degenerate and degraded state.’



*Phaedo.*SOCRATES,  
CEBES.

temperance and justice, and are acquired by habit and attention without philosophy and mind <sup>1</sup>.

Why are they the happiest?

Because they may be expected to pass into some gentle and social kind which is like their own, such as bees or wasps or ants, or back again into the form of man, and just and moderate men may be supposed to spring from them.

Very likely.

No one who has not studied philosophy and who is not entirely pure at the time of his departure is allowed to enter the company of the Gods, but the lover of knowledge only. And this is the reason, Simmias and Cebes, why the true votaries of philosophy abstain from all fleshly lusts, and hold out against them and refuse to give themselves up to them,—not because they fear poverty or the ruin of their families, like the lovers of money, and the world in general; nor like the lovers of power and honour, because they dread the dishonour or disgrace of evil deeds.

No, Socrates, that would not become them, said Cebes.

No indeed, he replied; and therefore they who have any care of their own souls, and do not merely live moulding and fashioning the body, say farewell to all this; they will not walk in the ways of the blind: and when philosophy offers them purification and release from evil, they feel that they ought not to resist her influence, and whither she leads they turn and follow.

What do you mean, Socrates?

The new  
consciousness  
which is  
awakened by  
philosophy.

I will tell you, he said. The lovers of knowledge are conscious that the soul was simply fastened and glued to the body — until philosophy received her, she could only view real existence through the bars of a prison, not in and through herself; she was wallowing in the mire of every sort of ignorance, and by reason of lust had become the principal accomplice in her own captivity. This was her original 83 state; and then, as I was saying, and as the lovers of knowledge are well aware, philosophy, seeing how terrible was her confinement, of which she was to herself the cause, received and gently comforted her and sought to release her, pointing out that the eye and the ear and the other senses

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. x. 619 C.

are full of deception, and persuading her to retire from them, and abstain from all but the necessary use of them, and be gathered up and collected into herself, bidding her trust in herself and her own pure apprehension of pure existence, and to mistrust whatever comes to her through other channels and is subject to variation; for such things are visible and tangible, but what she sees in her own nature is intelligible and invisible. And the soul of the true philosopher thinks that she ought not to resist this deliverance, and therefore abstains from pleasures and desires and pains and fears, as far as she is able; reflecting that when a man has great joys or sorrows or fears or desires, he suffers from them, not merely the sort of evil which might be anticipated — as for example, the loss of his health or property which he has sacrificed to his lusts — but an evil greater far, which is the greatest and worst of all evils, and one of which he never thinks.

*Phædo.*

SOCRATES,  
CEBES.

The philosopher considers not only the consequences of pleasures and pains, but, what is far worse, the false lights in which they show objects.

What is it, Socrates? said Cebes.

The evil is that when the feeling of pleasure or pain is most intense, every soul of man imagines the objects of this intense feeling to be then plainest and truest: but this is not so, they are really the things of sight.

Very true.

And is not this the state in which the soul is most enthralled by the body?

How so?

Why, because each pleasure and pain is a sort of nail which nails and rivets the soul to the body, until she becomes like the body, and believes that to be true which the body affirms to be true; and from agreeing with the body and having the same delights she is obliged to have the same habits and haunts, and is not likely ever to be pure at her departure to the world below, but is always infected by the body; and so she sinks into another body and there germinates and grows, and has therefore no part in the communion of the divine and pure and simple.

Most true, Socrates, answered Cebes.

And this, Cebes, is the reason why the true lovers of knowledge are temperate and brave; and not for the reason which the world gives.

84 Certainly not.



*Phædo*SOCRATES,  
CEBES,  
SIMMIAS.The soul  
which has  
been emanci-  
pated from  
pleasures and  
pains will not  
be blown away  
at death.

Certainly not! The soul of a philosopher will reason in quite another way; she will not ask philosophy to release her in order that when released she may deliver herself up again to the thralldom of pleasures and pains, doing a work only to be undone again, weaving instead of unweaving her Penelope's web. But she will calm passion, and follow reason, and dwell in the contemplation of her, beholding the true and divine (which is not matter of opinion), and thence deriving nourishment. Thus she seeks to live while she lives, and after death she hopes to go to her own kindred and to that which is like her, and to be freed from human ills. Never fear, Simmias and Cebes, that a soul which has been thus nurtured and has had these pursuits, will at her departure from the body be scattered and blown away by the winds and be nowhere and nothing.

Simmias and  
Cebes have  
their doubts,  
but think that  
this is not the  
time to ex-  
press them.

When Socrates had done speaking, for a considerable time there was silence; he himself appeared to be meditating, as most of us were, on what had been said; only Cebes and Simmias spoke a few words to one another. And Socrates observing them asked what they thought of the argument, and whether there was anything wanting? For, said he, there are many points still open to suspicion and attack, if any one were disposed to sift the matter thoroughly. Should you be considering some other matter I say no more, but if you are still in doubt do not hesitate to say exactly what you think, and let us have anything better which you can suggest; and if you think that I can be of any use, allow me to help you.

Simmias said: I must confess, Socrates, that doubts did arise in our minds, and each of us was urging and inciting the other to put the question which we wanted to have answered but which neither of us liked to ask, fearing that our importunity might be troublesome at such a time.

Socrates re-  
bukes their  
want of confi-  
dence in him.

Socrates replied with a smile: O Simmias, what are you saying? I am not very likely to persuade other men that I do not regard my present situation as a misfortune, if I cannot even persuade you that I am no worse off now than at any other time in my life. Will you not allow that I have as much of the spirit of prophecy in me as the swans? For they, when they perceive that they must die, having sung all

What is the  
meaning of  
the swans'  
singing?

85 their life long, do then sing more lustily than ever, rejoicing in the thought that they are about to go away to the god whose ministers they are. But men, because they are themselves afraid of death, slanderously affirm of the swans that they sing a lament at the last, not considering that no bird sings when cold, or hungry, or in pain, not even the nightingale, nor the swallow, nor yet the hoopoe; which are said indeed to tune a lay of sorrow, although I do not believe this to be true of them any more than of the swans. But because they are sacred to Apollo, they have the gift of prophecy, and anticipate the good things of another world; wherefore they sing and rejoice in that day more than ever they did before. And I too, believing myself to be the consecrated servant of the same God, and the fellow-servant of the swans, and thinking that I have received from my master gifts of prophecy which are not inferior to theirs, would not go out of life less merrily than the swans. Never mind then, if this be your only objection, but speak and ask anything which you like, while the eleven magistrates of Athens allow.

Very good, Socrates, said Simmias; then I will tell you my difficulty, and Cebes will tell you his. I feel myself (and I daresay that you have the same feeling), how hard or rather impossible is the attainment of any certainty about questions such as these in the present life. And yet I should deem him a coward who did not prove what is said about them to the uttermost, or whose heart failed him before he had examined them on every side. For he should persevere until he has achieved one of two things: either he should discover, or be taught the truth about them; or, if this be impossible, I would have him take the best and most irrefragable of human theories, and let this be the raft upon which he sails through life—not without risk, as I admit, if he cannot find some word of God which will more surely and safely carry him. And now, as you bid me, I will venture to question you, and then I shall not have to reproach myself hereafter with not having said at the time what I think. For when I consider the matter, either alone or with Cebes, the argument does certainly appear to me, Socrates, to be not sufficient.

*Phædo.*

SOCRATES,  
SIMMIAS,  
CEBES.

They do not lament, as men suppose, at their approaching death: but they rejoice because they are going to the God, whose servants they are.

Socrates, who is their fellow-servant, will not leave the world less cheerily.

Simmias insists that they must probe truth to the bottom.

*Phædo.*SOCRATES,  
SIMMIAS.

The harmony  
does not sur-  
vive the lyre;  
how then can  
the soul,  
which is also  
a harmony,  
survive the  
body?

Socrates answered: I dare say, my friend, that you may be right, but I should like to know in what respect the argument is insufficient.

In this respect, replied Simmias:—Suppose a person to use the same argument about harmony and the lyre—might he not say that harmony is a thing invisible, incorporeal, perfect, divine, existing in the lyre which is harmonized, but that the lyre and the strings are matter and material, composite, earthy, and akin to mortality? And when some one breaks the lyre, or cuts and rends the strings, then he who takes this view would argue as you do, and on the same analogy, that the harmony survives and has not perished—you cannot imagine, he would say, that the lyre without the strings, and the broken strings themselves which are mortal remain, and yet that the harmony, which is of heavenly and immortal nature and kindred, has perished—perished before the mortal. The harmony must still be somewhere, and the wood and strings will decay before anything can happen to that. The thought, Socrates, must have occurred to your own mind that such is our conception of the soul; and that when the body is in a manner strung and held together by the elements of hot and cold, wet and dry, then the soul is the harmony or due proportionate admixture of them. But if so, whenever the strings of the body are unduly loosened or overstrained through disease or other injury, then the soul, though most divine, like other harmonies of music or works of art, of course perishes at once; although the material remains of the body may last for a considerable time, until they are either decayed or burnt. And if any one maintains that the soul, being the harmony of the elements of the body, is first to perish in that which is called death, how shall we answer him? 86

Socrates looked fixedly at us as his manner was, and said with a smile: Simmias has reason on his side; and why does not some one of you who is better able than myself answer him? for there is force in his attack upon me. But perhaps, before we answer him, we had better also hear what Cebes has to say that we may gain time for reflection, and when they have both spoken, we may either assent to them, if there is truth in what they say, or if not, we will maintain



our position. Please to tell me then, Cebes, he said, what was the difficulty which troubled you?

*Phaedo.*

SOCRATES,  
CEBES.

87 Cebes said: I will tell you. My feeling is that the argument is where it was, and open to the same objections which were urged before; for I am ready to admit that the existence of the soul before entering into the bodily form has been very ingeniously, and, if I may say so, quite sufficiently proven; but the existence of the soul after death is still, in my judgment, unproven. Now my objection is not the same as that of Simmias; for I am not disposed to deny that the soul is stronger and more lasting than the body, being of opinion that in all such respects the soul very far excels the body. Well then, says the argument to me, why do you remain unconvinced?—When you see that the weaker continues in existence after the man is dead, will you not admit that the more lasting must also survive during the same period of time? Now I will ask you to consider whether the objection, which, like Simmias, I will express in a figure, is of any weight. The analogy which I will adduce is that of an old weaver, who dies, and after his death somebody says:—He is not dead, he must be alive;—see, there is the coat which he himself wove and wore, and which remains whole and undecayed. And then he proceeds to ask of some one who is incredulous, whether a man lasts longer, or the coat which is in use and wear; and when he is answered that a man lasts far longer, thinks that he has thus certainly demonstrated the survival of the man, who is the more lasting, because the less lasting remains. But that, Simmias, as I would beg you to remark, is a mistake; any one can see that he who talks thus is talking nonsense. For the truth is, that the weaver aforesaid, having woven and worn many such coats, outlived several of them; and was outlived by the last; but a man is not therefore proved to be slighter and weaker than a coat. Now the relation of the body to the soul may be expressed in a similar figure; and any one may very fairly say in like manner that the soul is lasting, and the body weak and shortlived in comparison. He may argue in like manner that every soul wears out many bodies, especially if a man live many years. While he is alive the body deliquesces and decays, and the soul always weaves another

A weaver may  
outlive many  
coats and  
himself be  
outlived by  
the last:

so the soul  
which has  
passed  
through many  
bodies may in  
the end be  
worn out.

*Phaedo.*SOCRATES,  
CEBES,  
ECHECRATES.

garment and repairs the waste. But of course, whenever the soul perishes, she must have on her last garment, and this will survive her; and then at length, when the soul is dead, the body will show its native weakness, and quickly decompose and pass away. I would therefore rather not rely on the argument from superior strength to prove the continued existence of the soul after death. For granting 88 even more than you affirm to be possible, and acknowledging not only that the soul existed before birth, but also that the souls of some exist, and will continue to exist after death, and will be born and die again and again, and that there is a natural strength in the soul which will hold out and be born many times — nevertheless, we may be still inclined to think that she will weary in the labours of successive births, and may at last succumb in one of her deaths and utterly perish; and this death and dissolution of the body which brings destruction to the soul may be unknown to any of us, for no one of us can have had any experience of it: and if so, then I maintain that he who is confident about death has but a foolish confidence, unless he is able to prove that the soul is altogether immortal and imperishable. But if he cannot prove the soul's immortality, he who is about to die will always have reason to fear that when the body is disunited, the soul also may utterly perish.

The despair  
of the audi-  
ence at  
hearing the  
overthrow of  
the argument.

All of us, as we afterwards remarked to one another, had an unpleasant feeling at hearing what they said. When we had been so firmly convinced before, now to have our faith shaken seemed to introduce a confusion and uncertainty, not only into the previous argument, but into any future one: either we were incapable of forming a judgment, or there were no grounds of belief.

*Ech.* There I feel with you — by heaven I do, Phaedo, and when you were speaking, I was beginning to ask myself the same question: What argument can I ever trust again? For what could be more convincing than the argument of Socrates, which has now fallen into discredit? That the soul is a harmony is a doctrine which has always had a wonderful attraction for me, and, when mentioned, came back to me at once, as my own original conviction. And now I must begin again and find another argument which will assure me that when



the man is dead the soul survives. Tell me, I implore you, how did Socrates proceed? Did he appear to share the unpleasant feeling which you mention? or did he calmly meet the attack? And did he answer forcibly or feebly? Narrate what passed as exactly as you can.

*Phaedo.*

SOCRATES,  
PHAEDO,  
ECHECRATES.

89 *Phaed.* Often, Echecrates, I have wondered at Socrates, but never more than on that occasion. That he should be able to answer was nothing, but what astonished me was, first, the gentle and pleasant and approving manner in which he received the words of the young men, and then his quick sense of the wound which had been inflicted by the argument, and the readiness with which he healed it. He might be compared to a general rallying his defeated and broken army, urging them to accompany him and return to the field of argument.

The wonderful manner in which Socrates soothes his disappointed hearers and rehabilitates the argument.

*Ech.* What followed?

*Phaed.* You shall hear, for I was close to him on his right hand, seated on a sort of stool, and he on a couch which was a good deal higher. He stroked my head, and pressed the hair upon my neck—he had a way of playing with my hair; and then he said: To-morrow, Phaedo, I suppose that these fair locks of yours will be severed.

Yes, Socrates, I suppose that they will, I replied.

Not so, if you will take my advice:

What shall I do with them? I said.

To-day, he replied, and not to-morrow, if this argument dies and we cannot bring it to life again, you and I will both shave our locks: and if I were you, and the argument got away from me, and I could not hold my ground against Simmias and Cebes, I would myself take an oath, like the Argives, not to wear hair any more until I had renewed the conflict and defeated them.

Yes, I said; but Heracles himself is said not to be a match for two.

Summon me then, he said, and I will be your Iolaus until the sun goes down.

I summon you rather, I rejoined, not as Heracles summoning Iolaus, but as Iolaus might summon Heracles.

That will do as well, he said. But first let us take care that we avoid a danger.

*Phaedo.*

Of what nature? I said.

SOCRATES,  
PHAEDO.The danger  
of becoming  
haters of ideas  
greater than  
of becoming  
haters of men.

Lest we become misologists, he replied: no worse thing can happen to a man than this. For as there are misanthropists or haters of men, there are also misologists or haters of ideas, and both spring from the same cause, which is ignorance of the world. Misanthropy arises out of the too great confidence of inexperience;—you trust a man and think him altogether true and sound and faithful, and then in a little while he turns out to be false and knavish; and then another and another, and when this has happened several times to a man, especially when it happens among those whom he deems to be his own most trusted and familiar friends, and he has often quarrelled with them, he at last hates all men, and believes that no one has any good in him at all. You must have observed this trait of character?

I have.

There are few  
very bad or  
very good  
men; (al-  
though bad  
arguments  
may be more  
numerous  
than bad  
men); the  
main point is  
that he who  
has been often  
deceived by  
either is apt to  
lose faith in  
them.

And is not the feeling discreditable? Is it not obvious that such an one having to deal with other men, was clearly without any experience of human nature; for experience would have taught him the true state of the case, that few are the good and few the evil, and that the great majority are in the interval between them. 90

What do you mean? I said.

I mean, he replied, as you might say of the very large and very small—that nothing is more uncommon than a very large or very small man; and this applies generally to all extremes, whether of great and small, or swift and slow, or fair and foul, or black and white: and whether the instances you select be men or dogs or anything else, few are the extremes, but many are in the mean between them. Did you never observe this?

Yes, I said, I have.

And do you not imagine, he said, that if there were a competition in evil, the worst would be found to be very few?

Yes, that is very likely, I said.

Yes, that is very likely, he replied; although in this respect arguments are unlike men—there I was led on by you to say more than I had intended; but the point of comparison was, that when a simple man who has no skill in dialectics believes an argument to be true which he afterwards

imagines to be false, whether really false or not, and then another and another, he has no longer any faith left, and great disputers, as you know, come to think at last that they have grown to be the wisest of mankind; for they alone perceive the utter unsoundness and instability of all arguments, or indeed, of all things, which, like the currents in the Euripus, are going up and down in never-ceasing ebb and flow.

That is quite true, I said.

Yes, Phaedo, he replied, and how melancholy, if there be such a thing as truth or certainty or possibility of knowledge — that a man should have lighted upon some argument or other which at first seemed true and then turned out to be false, and instead of blaming himself and his own want of wit, because he is annoyed, should at last be too glad to transfer the blame from himself to arguments in general: and for ever afterwards should hate and revile them, and lose truth and the knowledge of realities.

Yes, indeed, I said; that is very melancholy.

Let us then, in the first place, he said, be careful of allowing or of admitting into our souls the notion that there is no health or soundness in any arguments at all. Rather say that we have not yet attained to soundness in ourselves, and that we must struggle manfully and do our best to gain health of mind — you and all other men having regard to the whole of your future life, and I myself in the prospect of death. For  
91 at this moment I am sensible that I have not the temper of a philosopher; like the vulgar, I am only a partisan. Now the partisan, when he is engaged in a dispute, cares nothing about the rights of the question, but is anxious only to convince his hearers of his own assertions. And the difference between him and me at the present moment is merely this — that whereas he seeks to convince his hearers that what he says is true, I am rather seeking to convince myself; to convince my hearers is a secondary matter with me. And do but see how much I gain by the argument. For if what I say is true, then I do well to be persuaded of the truth; but if there be nothing after death, still, during the short time that remains, I shall not distress my friends with lamentations, and my ignorance will not last, but will die with me,

*Phaedo.*

SOCRATES,  
PHAEDO.

Socrates, who is soon to die, has too much at stake on the argument to be a fair judge. Simmias and Cebes must help him to consider the matter impartially.



*Phaedo.*SOCRATES,  
CEBES,  
SIMMIAS.

and therefore no harm will be done. This is the state of mind, Simmias and Cebes, in which I approach the argument. And I would ask you to be thinking of the truth and not of Socrates: agree with me, if I seem to you to be speaking the truth; or if not, withstand me might and main, that I may not deceive you as well as myself in my enthusiasm, and like the bee, leave my sting in you before I die.

Simmias and Cebes are inclined to fear that the soul may perish before the body, but they still hold to the doctrine of reminiscence.

And now let us proceed, he said. And first of all let me be sure that I have in my mind what you were saying. Simmias, if I remember rightly, has fears and misgivings whether the soul, although a fairer and diviner thing than the body, being as she is in the form of harmony, may not perish first. On the other hand, Cebes appeared to grant that the soul was more lasting than the body, but he said that no one could know whether the soul, after having worn out many bodies, might not perish herself and leave her last body behind her; and that this is death, which is the destruction not of the body but of the soul, for in the body the work of destruction is ever going on. Are not these, Simmias and Cebes, the points which we have to consider?

They both agreed to this statement of them.

He proceeded: And did you deny the force of the whole preceding argument, or of a part only?

Of a part only, they replied.

And what did you think, he said, of that part of the argument in which we said that knowledge was recollection, and hence inferred that the soul must have previously existed somewhere else before she was enclosed in the body? 92

Cebes said that he had been wonderfully impressed by that part of the argument, and that his conviction remained absolutely unshaken. Simmias agreed, and added that he himself could hardly imagine the possibility of his ever thinking differently.

The elements of harmony are prior to harmony, but the body is not prior to the soul.

But, rejoined Socrates, you will have to think differently, my Theban friend, if you still maintain that harmony is a compound, and that the soul is a harmony which is made out of strings set in the frame of the body; for you will surely never allow yourself to say that a harmony is prior to the elements which compose it.

Never, Socrates.

*Phædo.*

But do you not see that this is what you imply when you say that the soul existed before she took the form and body of man, and was made up of elements which as yet had no existence? For harmony is not like the soul, as you suppose; but first the lyre, and the strings, and the sounds exist in a state of discord, and then harmony is made last of all, and perishes first. And how can such a notion of the soul as this agree with the other?

SOCRATES,  
SIMMIAS.

Not at all, replied Simmias.

And yet, he said, there surely ought to be harmony in a discourse of which harmony is the theme?

There ought, replied Simmias.

But there is no harmony, he said, in the two propositions that knowledge is recollection, and that the soul is a harmony. Which of them will you retain?

I think, he replied, that I have a much stronger faith, Socrates, in the first of the two, which has been fully demonstrated to me, than in the latter, which has not been demonstrated at all, but rests only on probable and plausible grounds; and is therefore believed by the many. I know too well that these arguments from probabilities are impostors, and unless great caution is observed in the use of them, they are apt to be deceptive—in geometry, and in other things too. But the doctrine of knowledge and recollection has been proven to me on trustworthy grounds: and the proof was that the soul must have existed before she came into the body, because to her belongs the essence of which the very name implies existence. Having, as I am convinced, rightly accepted this conclusion, and on sufficient grounds, I must, as I suppose, cease to argue or allow others to argue that the soul is a harmony.

Simmias acknowledges that his argument does not harmonize with the proposition that knowledge is recollection.

93 Let me put the matter, Simmias, he said, in another point of view: Do you imagine that a harmony or any other composition can be in a state other than that of the elements, out of which it is compounded?

Certainly not.

Or do or suffer anything other than they do or suffer?

He agreed.

Then a harmony does not, properly speaking, lead the



*Phaedo.*SOCRATES,  
SIMMIAS.

parts or elements which make up the harmony, but only follows them.

He assented.

For harmony cannot possibly have any motion, or sound, or other quality which is opposed to its parts.

That would be impossible, he replied.

And does not the nature of every harmony depend upon the manner in which the elements are harmonized?

I do not understand you, he said.

Harmony  
admits of  
degrees, but  
in the soul  
there are no  
degrees;

I mean to say that a harmony admits of degrees, and is more of a harmony, and more completely a harmony, when more truly and fully harmonized, to any extent which is possible; and less of a harmony, and less completely a harmony, when less truly and fully harmonized.

True.

But does the soul admit of degrees? or is one soul in the very least degree more or less, or more or less completely, a soul than another?

Not in the least.

Yet surely of two souls, one is said to have intelligence and virtue, and to be good, and the other to have folly and vice, and to be an evil soul: and this is said truly?

Yes, truly.

and therefore  
there cannot  
be a soul or  
harmony  
within a soul.

But what will those who maintain the soul to be a harmony say of this presence of virtue and vice in the soul?—will they say that here is another harmony, and another discord, and that the virtuous soul is harmonized, and herself being a harmony has another harmony within her, and that the vicious soul is inharmonical and has no harmony within her?

I cannot tell, replied Simmias; but I suppose that something of the sort would be asserted by those who say that the soul is a harmony.

And we have already admitted that no soul is more a soul than another; which is equivalent to admitting that harmony is not more or less harmony, or more or less completely a harmony?

Quite true.

And that which is not more or less a harmony is not more or less harmonized?

True.

And that which is not more or less harmonized cannot have more or less of harmony, but only an equal harmony?

*Phaedo.*

Yes, an equal harmony.

SOCRATES,

SIMMIAS.

Then one soul not being more or less absolutely a soul than another, is not more or less harmonized?

Exactly.

And therefore has neither more nor less of discord, nor yet of harmony?

She has not.

And having neither more nor less of harmony or of discord, one soul has no more vice or virtue than another, if vice be discord and virtue harmony?

Not at all more.

94 Or speaking more correctly, Simmias, the soul, if she is a harmony, will never have any vice; because a harmony, being absolutely a harmony, has no part in the inharmonical.

No.

And therefore a soul which is absolutely a soul has no vice?

If the soul is a harmony, all souls must be equally good.

How can she have, if the previous argument holds?

Then, if all souls are equally by their nature souls, all souls of all living creatures will be equally good?

I agree with you, Socrates, he said.

And can all this be true, think you? he said; for these are the consequences which seem to follow from the assumption that the soul is a harmony?

It cannot be true.

Once more, he said, what ruler is there of the elements of human nature other than the soul, and especially the wise soul? Do you know of any?

Indeed, I do not.

And is the soul in agreement with the affections of the body? or is she at variance with them? For example, when the body is hot and thirsty, does not the soul incline us against drinking? and when the body is hungry, against eating? And this is only one instance out of ten thousand of the opposition of the soul to the things of the body.

Very true.

But we have already acknowledged that the soul, being a harmony, can never utter a note at variance with the tensions

*Phædo.*SOCRATES,  
SIMMIAS,  
CEBES.

and relaxations and vibrations and other affections of the strings out of which she is composed; she can only follow, she cannot lead them?

It must be so, he replied.

The soul  
leads and  
does not  
follow. She  
constrains and  
reprimands  
the passions.

And yet do we not now discover the soul to be doing the exact opposite — leading the elements of which she is believed to be composed; almost always opposing and coercing them in all sorts of ways throughout life, sometimes more violently with the pains of medicine and gymnastic; then again more gently; now threatening, now admonishing the desires, passions, fears, as if talking to a thing which is not herself, as Homer in the *Odyssee* represents *Odysseus* doing in the words —

‘ He beat his breast, and thus reproached his heart :  
Endure, my heart; far worse hast thou endured! ’

Do you think that Homer wrote this under the idea that the soul is a harmony capable of being led by the affections of the body, and not rather of a nature which should lead and master them — herself a far diviner thing than any harmony?

Yes, Socrates, I quite think so.

Then, my friend, we can never be right in saying that the soul is a harmony, for we should contradict the divine 95  
Homer, and contradict ourselves.

True, he said.

Thus much, said Socrates, of *Harmonia*, your Theban goddess, who has graciously yielded to us; but what shall I say, Cebes, to her husband *Cadmus*, and how shall I make peace with him?

I think that you will discover a way of propitiating him, said Cebes; I am sure that you have put the argument with *Harmonia* in a manner that I could never have expected. For when *Simmius* was mentioning his difficulty, I quite imagined that no answer could be given to him, and therefore I was surprised at finding that his argument could not sustain the first onset of yours, and not impossibly the other, whom you call *Cadmus*, may share a similar fate.

Nay, my good friend, said Socrates, let us not boast, lest some evil eye should put to flight the word which I am about to speak. That, however, may be left in the hands of those



above; while I draw near in Homeric fashion, and try the mettle of your words. Here lies the point:—You want to have it proven to you that the soul is imperishable and immortal, and the philosopher who is confident in death appears to you to have but a vain and foolish confidence, if he believes that he will fare better in the world below than one who has led another sort of life, unless he can prove this: and you say that the demonstration of the strength and divinity of the soul, and of her existence prior to our becoming men, does not necessarily imply her immortality. Admitting the soul to be longlived, and to have known and done much in a former state, still she is not on that account immortal; and her entrance into the human form may be a sort of disease which is the beginning of dissolution, and may at last, after the toils of life are over, end in that which is called death. And whether the soul enters into the body once only or many times, does not, as you say, make any difference in the fears of individuals. For any man, who is not devoid of sense, must fear, if he has no knowledge and can give no account of the soul's immortality. This, or something like this, I suspect to be your notion, Cebes; and I designedly recur to it in order that nothing may escape us, and that you may, if you wish, add or subtract anything.

*Phædo.*

SOCRATES,  
CEBES.

Recapitulation of the  
argument of  
Cebes.

But, said Cebes, as far as I see at present, I have nothing to add or subtract: I mean what you say that I mean.

Socrates paused awhile, and seemed to be absorbed in reflection. At length he said: You are raising a tremendous question, Cebes, involving the whole nature of  
96 generation and corruption, about which, if you like, I will give you my own experience; and if anything which I say is likely to avail towards the solution of your difficulty you may make use of it.

I should very much like, said Cebes, to hear what you have to say.

Then I will tell you, said Socrates. When I was young, Cebes, I had a prodigious desire to know that department of philosophy which is called the investigation of nature; to know the causes of things, and why a thing is and is created or destroyed appeared to me to be a lofty profession; and I was always agitating myself with the con-

The speculations of Socrates about physics made him forget the commonest things.

*Phædo.*SOCRATES,  
CEBES.

sideration of questions such as these:—Is the growth of animals the result of some decay which the hot and cold principle contracts, as some have said? Is the blood the element with which we think, or the air, or the fire? or perhaps nothing of the kind—but the brain may be the originating power of the perceptions of hearing and sight and smell, and memory and opinion may come from them, and science may be based on memory and opinion when they have attained fixity. And then I went on to examine the corruption of them, and then to the things of heaven and earth, and at last I concluded myself to be utterly and absolutely incapable of these enquiries, as I will satisfactorily prove to you. For I was fascinated by them to such a degree that my eyes grew blind to things which I had seemed to myself, and also to others, to know quite well; I forgot what I had before thought self-evident truths; e. g. such a fact as that the growth of man is the result of eating and drinking; for when by the digestion of food flesh is added to flesh and bone to bone, and whenever there is an aggregation of congenial elements, the lesser bulk becomes larger and the small man great. Was not that a reasonable notion?

Yes, said Cebes, I think so.

Difficulty of  
explaining  
relative  
notions.

Well; but let me tell you something more. There was a time when I thought that I understood the meaning of greater and less pretty well; and when I saw a great man standing by a little one, I fancied that one was taller than the other by a head; or one horse would appear to be greater than another horse: and still more clearly did I seem to perceive that ten is two more than eight, and that two cubits are more than one; because two is the double of one.

And what is now your notion of such matters? said Cebes.

I should be far enough from imagining, he replied, that I knew the cause of any of them, by heaven I should; for I cannot satisfy myself that, when one is added to one, the one to which the addition is made becomes two, or that the two 97 units added together make two by reason of the addition. I cannot understand how, when separated from the other, each of them was one and not two, and now, when they are brought together, the mere juxtaposition or meeting of them should be the cause of their becoming two: neither can I



understand how the division of one is the way to make two ; *Phædo.*  
for then a different cause would produce the same effect,— as *SOCRATES.*  
in the former instance the addition and juxtaposition of one  
to one was the cause of two, in this the separation and sub-  
traction of one from the other would be the cause. Nor am  
I any longer satisfied that I understand the reason why one  
or anything else is either generated or destroyed or is at all,  
but I have in my mind some confused notion of a new  
method, and can never admit the other.

Then I heard some one reading, as he said, from a book *The great*  
of Anaxagoras, that mind was the disposer and cause of all, *expectations*  
and I was delighted at this notion, which appeared quite *which So-*  
admirable, and I said to myself: If mind is the disposer, *crates had*  
mind will dispose all for the best, and put each particular in *from the*  
the best place ; and I argued that if any one desired to find *doctrine of*  
out the cause of the generation or destruction or existence of *Anaxagoras,*  
anything, he must find out what state of being or doing or *that all was*  
suffering was best for that thing, and therefore a man had only *Mind.*  
to consider the best for himself and others, and then he  
would also know the worse, since the same science com-  
prehended both. And I rejoiced to think that I had found in  
Anaxagoras a teacher of the causes of existence such as I de-  
sired, and I imagined that he would tell me first whether the  
earth is flat or round ; and whichever was true, he would  
proceed to explain the cause and the necessity of this being  
so, and then he would teach me the nature of the best and  
show that this was best ; and if he said that the earth was in  
the centre, he would further explain that this position was  
the best, and I should be satisfied with the explanation  
98 given, and not want any other sort of cause. And I thought  
that I would then go on and ask him about the sun and moon  
and stars, and that he would explain to me their comparative  
swiftness, and their returnings and various states, active and  
passive, and how all of them were for the best. For I could  
not imagine that when he spoke of mind as the disposer of  
them, he would give any other account of their being as they  
are, except that this was best ; and I thought that when he  
had explained to me in detail the cause of each and the  
cause of all, he would go on to explain to me what was best  
for each and what was good for all. These hopes I would

*Phædo.*

SOCRATES.

The greatness  
of his disap-  
pointment.

not have sold for a large sum of money, and I seized the books and read them as fast as I could in my eagerness to know the better and the worse.

What expectations I had formed, and how grievously was I disappointed! As I proceeded, I found my philosopher altogether forsaking mind or any other principle of order, but having recourse to air, and ether, and water, and other eccentricities. I might compare him to a person who began by maintaining generally that mind is the cause of the actions of Socrates, but who, when he endeavoured to explain the causes of my several actions in detail, went on to show that I sit here because my body is made up of bones and muscles; and the bones, as he would say, are hard and have joints which divide them, and the muscles are elastic, and they cover the bones, which have also a covering or environment of flesh and skin which contains them; and as the bones are lifted at their joints by the contraction or relaxation of the muscles, I am able to bend my limbs, and this is why I am sitting here in a curved posture — that is what he would say; and he would have a similar explanation of my talking to you, which he would attribute to sound, and air, and hearing, and he would assign ten thousand other causes of the same sort, forgetting to mention the true cause, which is, that the Athenians have thought fit to condemn me, and accordingly I have thought it better and more right to remain here and undergo my sentence; for I am inclined to think that these muscles and bones of mine would have gone 99 off long ago to Megara or Boeotia — by the dog they would, if they had been moved only by their own idea of what was best, and if I had not chosen the better and nobler part, instead of playing truant and running away, of enduring any punishment which the state inflicts. There is surely a strange confusion of causes and conditions in all this. It may be said, indeed, that without bones and muscles and the other parts of the body I cannot execute my purposes. But to say that I do as I do because of them, and that this is the way in which mind acts, and not from the choice of the best, is a very careless and idle mode of speaking. I wonder that they cannot distinguish the cause from the condition, which the many, feeling about in the dark, are always mistaking

and misnaming. And thus one man makes a vortex all round, and steadies the earth by the heaven; another gives the air as a support to the earth, which is a sort of broad trough. Any power which in arranging them as they are arranges them for the best never enters into their minds; and instead of finding any superior strength in it, they rather expect to discover another Atlas of the world who is stronger and more everlasting and more containing than the good;—of the obligatory and containing power of the good they think nothing; and yet this is the principle which I would fain learn if any one would teach me. But as I have failed either to discover myself, or to learn of any one else, the nature of the best, I will exhibit to you, if you like, what I have found to be the second best mode of enquiring into the cause.

*Phaedo.*

SOCRATES,  
CEBES.

I should very much like to hear, he replied.

Socrates proceeded:—I thought that as I had failed in the contemplation of true existence, I ought to be careful that I did not lose the eye of my soul; as people may injure their bodily eye by observing and gazing on the sun during an eclipse, unless they take the precaution of only looking at the image reflected in the water, or in some similar medium. So in my own case, I was afraid that my soul might be blinded altogether if I looked at things with my eyes or tried to apprehend them by the help of the senses. And I thought that I had better have recourse to the world of mind and seek there the truth of existence. I dare say that the simile is not perfect—for I am very far from admitting that he who contemplates existences through the medium of thought, sees them only 'through a glass darkly,' any more than he who considers them in action and operation. However, this was the method which I adopted: I first assumed some principle which I judged to be the strongest, and then I affirmed as true whatever seemed to agree with this, whether relating to the cause or to anything else; and that which disagreed I regarded as untrue. But I should like to explain my meaning more clearly, as I do not think that you as yet understand me.

The eye of  
the soul.

The abstract  
as plain or  
plainer than  
the concrete.

No indeed, replied Cebes, not very well.

There is nothing new, he said, in what I am about to tell you; but only what I have been always and everywhere



*Phædo.*SOCRATES,  
CEBES.If the ideas  
have an abso-  
lute existence  
the soul is  
immortal.

repeating in the previous discussion and on other occasions :  
I want to show you the nature of that cause which has  
occupied my thoughts. I shall have to go back to those  
familiar words which are in the mouth of every one, and first  
of all assume that there is an absolute beauty and goodness  
and greatness, and the like ; grant me this, and I hope to be  
able to show you the nature of the cause, and to prove the  
immortality of the soul.

Cebes said : You may proceed at once with the proof, for  
I grant you this.

Well, he said, then I should like to know whether you  
agree with me in the next step ; for I cannot help thinking,  
if there be anything beautiful other than absolute beauty  
should there be such, that it can be beautiful only in so far  
as it partakes of absolute beauty — and I should say the same  
of everything. Do you agree in this notion of the cause?

Yes, he said, I agree.

All things  
exist by  
participation  
in general  
ideas.

He proceeded : I know nothing and can understand  
nothing of any other of those wise causes which are alleged ;  
and if a person says to me that the bloom of colour, or form,  
or any such thing is a source of beauty, I leave all that,  
which is only confusing to me, and simply and singly, and  
perhaps foolishly, hold and am assured in my own mind that  
nothing makes a thing beautiful but the presence and par-  
ticipation of beauty in whatever way or manner obtained ;  
for as to the manner I am uncertain, but I stoutly contend  
that by beauty all beautiful things become beautiful. This  
appears to me to be the safest answer which I can give,  
either to myself or to another, and to this I cling, in the per-  
suasion that this principle will never be overthrown, and that  
to myself or to any one who asks the question, I may safely  
reply, That by beauty beautiful things become beautiful. Do  
you not agree with me?

I do.

And that by greatness only great things become great and  
greater greater, and by smallness the less become less?

True.

We thus  
escape certain  
contradictions  
of relation.

Then if a person were to remark that A is taller by a head  
than B, and B less by a head than A, you would refuse to  
admit his statement, and would stoutly contend that what 101

you mean is only that the greater is greater by, and by reason of, greatness, and the less is less only by, and by reason of, smallness; and thus you would avoid the danger of saying that the greater is greater and the less less by the measure of the head, which is the same in both, and would also avoid the monstrous absurdity of supposing that the greater man is greater by reason of the head, which is small. You would be afraid to draw such an inference, would you not?

*Phaedo.*SOCRATES,  
CEBES.

Indeed, I should, said Cebes, laughing.

In like manner you would be afraid to say that ten exceeded eight by, and by reason of, two; but would say by, and by reason of, number; or you would say that two cubits exceed one cubit not by a half, but by magnitude?—for there is the same liability to error in all these cases.

Very true, he said.

Again, would you not be cautious of affirming that the addition of one to one, or the division of one, is the cause of two? And you would loudly asseverate that you know of no way in which anything comes into existence except by participation in its own proper essence, and consequently, as far as you know, the only cause of two is the participation in duality—this is the way to make two, and the participation in one is the way to make one. You would say: I will let alone puzzles of division and addition—wiser heads than mine may answer them; inexperienced as I am, and ready to start, as the proverb says, at my own shadow, I cannot afford to give up the sure ground of a principle. And if any one assails you there, you would not mind him, or answer him, until you had seen whether the consequences which follow agree with one another or not, and when you are further required to give an explanation of this principle, you would go on to assume a higher principle, and a higher, until you found a resting-place in the best of the higher; but you would not confuse the principle and the consequences in your reasoning, like the Eristics—at least if you wanted to discover real existence. Not that this confusion signifies to them, who never care or think about the matter at all, for they have the wit to be well pleased with themselves however



*Phaedo.*

SOCRATES,

SIMMIAS,

CEBES,

ECHECRATES,

PHAEDO.

great may be the turmoil of their ideas. But you, if you are 102  
a philosopher, will certainly do as I say.

What you say is most true, said Simmias and Cebes, both  
speaking at once.

*Ech.* Yes, Phaedo; and I do not wonder at their assent-  
ing. Any one who has the least sense will acknowledge the  
wonderful clearness of Socrates' reasoning.

*Phaed.* Certainly, Echecrates; and such was the feeling  
of the whole company at the time.

*Ech.* Yes, and equally of ourselves, who were not of the  
company, and are now listening to your recital. But what  
followed?

*Phaed.* After all this had been admitted, and they had  
agreed that ideas exist, and that other things participate in  
them and derive their names from them, Socrates, if I  
remember rightly, said:—

This is your way of speaking; and yet when you say that  
Simmias is greater than Socrates and less than Phaedo, do  
you not predicate of Simmias both greatness and smallness?

Yes, I do.

But still you allow that Simmias does not really exceed  
Socrates, as the words may seem to imply, because he is  
Simmias, but by reason of the size which he has; just as  
Simmias does not exceed Socrates because he is Simmias,  
any more than because Socrates is Socrates, but because  
he has smallness when compared with the greatness of  
Simmias?

True.

And if Phaedo exceeds him in size, this is not because  
Phaedo is Phaedo, but because Phaedo has greatness rela-  
tively to Simmias, who is comparatively smaller?

That is true.

And therefore Simmias is said to be great, and is also  
said to be small, because he is in a mean between them,  
exceeding the smallness of the one by his greatness, and  
allowing the greatness of the other to exceed his smallness.  
He added, laughing, I am speaking like a book, but I  
believe that what I am saying is true.

Simmias assented.

I speak as I do because I want you to agree with me in

There may  
still remain  
the contradic-  
tion of the  
same person  
being both  
greater and  
less, but this is  
only because  
he has great-  
ness or small-  
ness relatively  
to another  
person.

thinking, not only that absolute greatness will never be great and also small, but that greatness in us or in the concrete will never admit the small or admit of being exceeded: instead of this, one of two things will happen, either the greater will fly or retire before the opposite, which is the less, or at the approach of the less has already ceased to exist; but will not, if allowing or admitting of smallness, be changed by that; even as I, having received and admitted smallness when compared with Simmias, remain just as I was, and am the same small person. And as the idea of greatness cannot condescend ever to be or become small, in like manner the smallness in us cannot be or become great; nor can any other opposite which remains the same ever  
 103 be or become its own opposite, but either passes away or perishes in the change.

That, replied Cebes, is quite my notion.

Hereupon one of the company, though I do not exactly remember which of them, said: In heaven's name, is not this the direct contrary of what was admitted before—that out of the greater came the less and out of the less the greater, and that opposites were simply generated from opposites; but now this principle seems to be utterly denied.

Socrates inclined his head to the speaker and listened. I like your courage, he said, in reminding us of this. But you do not observe that there is a difference in the two cases. For then we were speaking of opposites in the concrete, and now of the essential opposite which, as is affirmed, neither in us nor in nature can ever be at variance with itself: then, my friend, we were speaking of things in which opposites are inherent and which are called after them, but now about the opposites which are inherent in them and which give their name to them; and these essential opposites will never, as we maintain, admit of generation into or out of one another. At the same time, turning to Cebes, he said: Are you at all disconcerted, Cebes, at our friend's objection?

No, I do not feel so, said Cebes; and yet I cannot deny that I am often disturbed by objections.

Then we are agreed after all, said Socrates, that the opposite will never in any case be opposed to itself?

*Phaedo.*

SOCRATES,  
CEBES.

The idea of greatness can never be small; and the greatness in us drives out smallness.

Yet the greater comes from the less, and the less from the greater.

Distinguish:—The things in which the opposites inhere generate into and out of one another: never the opposites themselves.

*Phaedo.*

To that we are quite agreed, he replied.

SOCRATES,  
CEDES.Snow may be  
converted into  
water at the  
approach of  
heat, but not  
cold into heat.

Yet once more let me ask you to consider the question from another point of view, and see whether you agree with me:—There is a thing which you term heat, and another thing which you term cold?

Certainly.

But are they the ~~same~~ as fire and snow?

Most assuredly not.

Heat is a thing different from fire, and cold is not the same with snow?

Yes.

And yet you will surely admit, that when snow, as was before said, is under the influence of heat, they will not remain snow and heat; but at the advance of the heat, the snow will either retire or perish?

Very true, he replied.

And the fire too at the advance of the cold will either retire or perish; and when the fire is under the influence of the cold, they will not remain as before, fire and cold.

That is true, he said.

And in some cases the name of the idea is not only attached to the idea in an eternal connection, but anything else which, not being the idea, exists only in the form of the idea, may also lay claim to it. I will try to make this clearer by an example:—The odd number is always called by the name of odd?

Very true.

But is this the only thing which is called odd? Are there not other things which have their own name, and yet are 104 called odd, because, although not the same as oddness, they are never without oddness?—that is what I mean to ask—whether numbers such as the number three are not of the class of odd. And there are many other examples: would you not say, for example, that three may be called by its proper name, and also be called odd, which is not the same with three? and this may be said not only of three but also of five, and of every alternate number—each of them without being oddness is odd; and in the same way two and four, and the other series of alternate numbers, has every number even, without being evenness. Do you agree?



Of course.

Then now mark the point at which I am aiming:—not only do essential opposites exclude one another, but also concrete things, which, although not in themselves opposed, contain opposites; these, I say, likewise reject the idea which is opposed to that which is contained in them, and when it approaches them they either perish or withdraw. For example; Will not the number three endure annihilation or anything sooner than be converted into an even number, while remaining three?

Very true, said Cebes.

And yet, he said, the number two is certainly not opposed to the number three?

It is not.

Then not only do opposite ideas repel the advance of one another, but also there are other natures which repel the approach of opposites.

Very true, he said.

Suppose, he said, that we endeavour, if possible, to determine what these are.

By all means.

Are they not, Cebes, such as compel the things of which they have possession, not only to take their own form, but also the form of some opposite?

What do you mean?

I mean, as I was just now saying, and as I am sure that you know, that those things which are possessed by the number three must not only be three in number, but must also be odd.

Quite true.

And on this oddness, of which the number three has the impress, the opposite idea will never intrude?

No.

And this impress was given by the odd principle?

Yes.

And to the odd is opposed the even?

True.

Then the idea of the even number will never arrive at three?

No.

*Phaedo.*

SOCRATES,  
CEBES.

Not only essential opposites, but some concrete things which contain opposites, exclude each other.

That is to say the opposites which give an impress to other things.

*Phaedo.*

Then three has no part in the even?

SOCRATES,  
CEBES.

None.

Then the triad or number three is uneven?

Very true.

Natures may not be opposed, and yet may not admit of opposites; e. g. three is not opposed to two, and yet does not admit the even any more than two admits of the odd.

To return then to my distinction of natures which are not opposed, and yet do not admit opposites — as, in the instance given, three, although not opposed to the even, does not any the more admit of the even, but always brings the opposite into play on the other side; or as two does not receive the odd, or fire the cold — from these examples (and there are many more of them) perhaps you may be able to arrive at the general conclusion, that not only opposites will not receive opposites, but also that nothing which brings the opposite will admit the opposite of that which it brings, in that to which it is brought. And here let me recapitulate — for there is no harm in repetition. The number five will not admit the nature of the even, any more than ten, which is the double of five, will admit the nature of the odd. The double has another opposite, and is not strictly opposed to the odd, but nevertheless rejects the odd altogether. Nor again will parts in the ratio 3 : 2, nor any fraction in which there is a half, nor again in which there is a third, admit the notion of the whole, although they are not opposed to the whole: You will agree? 105

Yes, he said, I entirely agree and go along with you in that.

The merely verbal truth may be replaced by a higher one.

And now, he said, let us begin again; and do not you answer my question in the words in which I ask it: let me have not the old safe answer of which I spoke at first, but another equally safe, of which the truth will be inferred by you from what has been just said. I mean that if any one asks you 'what that is, of which the inherence makes the body hot,' you will reply not heat (this is what I call the safe and stupid answer), but fire, a far superior answer, which we are now in a condition to give. Or if any one asks you 'why a body is diseased,' you will not say from disease, but from fever; and instead of saying that oddness is the cause of odd numbers, you will say that the monad is the cause of them: and so of things in general, as I dare say that you will understand sufficiently without my adding any further examples.



Yes, he said, I quite understand you.

Tell me, then, what is that of which the inherence will render the body alive?

The soul, he replied.

And is this always the case?

Yes, he said, of course.

Then whatever the soul possesses, to that she comes bearing life?

Yes, certainly.

And is there any opposite to life?

There is, he said.

And what is that?

Death.

Then the soul, as has been acknowledged, will never receive the opposite of what she brings.

Impossible, replied Cebes.

And now, he said, what did we just now call that principle which repels the even?

The odd.

And that principle which repels the musical or the just?

The unmusical, he said, and the unjust.

And what do we call that principle which does not admit of death?

The immortal, he said.

And does the soul admit of death?

No.

Then the soul is immortal?

Yes, he said.

And may we say that this has been proven?

Yes, abundantly proven, Socrates, he replied.

106 Supposing that the odd were imperishable, must not three be imperishable? Illustrations.

Of course.

And if that which is cold were imperishable, when the warm principle came attacking the snow, must not the snow have retired whole and unmelted—for it could never have perished, nor could it have remained and admitted the heat?

True, he said.

Again, if the uncooling or warm principle were imperishable, the fire when assailed by cold would not have perished

*Phædo.*

SOCRATES,  
CEBES.

We may now say, not life makes alive, but the soul makes alive; and the soul has a life-giving power which does not admit of death and is therefore immortal.

*Phædo.*SOCRATES,  
CEBES.

or have been extinguished, but would have gone away unaffected?

Certainly, he said.

And the same may be said of the immortal: if the immortal is also imperishable, the soul when attacked by death cannot perish; for the preceding argument shows that the soul will not admit of death, or ever be dead, any more than three or the odd number will admit of the even, or fire, or the heat in the fire, of the cold. Yet a person may say: 'But although the odd will not become even at the approach of the even, why may not the odd perish and the even take the place of the odd?' Now to him who makes this objection, we cannot answer that the odd principle is imperishable; for this has not been acknowledged, but if this had been acknowledged, there would have been no difficulty in contending that at the approach of the even the odd principle and the number three took their departure; and the same argument would have held good of fire and heat and any other thing.

Very true.

The immortal is imperishable, and therefore the soul is imperishable.

And the same may be said of the immortal: if the immortal is also imperishable, then the soul will be imperishable as well as immortal; but if not, some other proof of her imperishableness will have to be given.

No other proof is needed, he said; for if the immortal, being eternal, is liable to perish, then nothing is imperishable.

Yes, replied Socrates, and yet all men will agree that God, and the essential form of life, and the immortal in general, will never perish.

Yes, all men, he said — that is true; and what is more, gods, if I am not mistaken, as well as men.

Seeing then that the immortal is indestructible, must not the soul, if she is immortal, be also imperishable?

Most certainly.

Then when death attacks a man, the mortal portion of him may be supposed to die, but the immortal retires at the approach of death and is preserved safe and sound?

True.

At death the soul retires into another world.

Then, Cebes, beyond question, the soul is immortal and imperishable, and our souls will truly exist in another world! 107

I am convinced, Socrates, said Cebes, and have nothing more to object; but if my friend Simmias, or any one else, has any further objection to make, he had better speak out, and not keep silence, since I do not know to what other season he can defer the discussion, if there is anything which he wants to say or to have said.

*Phædo.*

SOCRATES,  
CEBES,  
SIMMIAS.

But I have nothing more to say, replied Simmias; nor can I see any reason for doubt after what has been said. But I still feel and cannot help feeling uncertain in my own mind, when I think of the greatness of the subject and the feebleness of man.

Yes, Simmias, replied Socrates, that is well said: and I may add that first principles, even if they appear certain, should be carefully considered; and when they are satisfactorily ascertained, then, with a sort of hesitating confidence in human reason, you may, I think, follow the course of the argument; and if that be plain and clear, there will be no need for any further enquiry.

Very true.

But then, O my friends, he said, if the soul is really immortal, what care should be taken of her, not only in respect of the portion of time which is called life, but of eternity! And the danger of neglecting her from this point of view does indeed appear to be awful. If death had only been the end of all, the wicked would have had a good bargain in dying, for they would have been happily quit not only of their body, but of their own evil together with their souls. But now, inasmuch as the soul is manifestly immortal, there is no release or salvation from evil except the attainment of the highest virtue and wisdom. For the soul when on her progress to the world below takes nothing with her but nurture and education; and these are said greatly to benefit or greatly to injure the departed, at the very beginning of his journey thither.

‘Wherefore, seeing all these things, what manner of persons ought we to be?’

For after death, as they say, the genius of each individual, to whom he belonged in life, leads him to a certain place in which the dead are gathered together, whence after judgment has been given they pass into the world below, following the guide, who is appointed to conduct them from this world to the other: and when they have there received their

The attendant genius of each brings him after death to the judgment.



*Phædo.*SOCRATES,  
SIMMIAS.The different  
destinies of  
pure and im-  
pure souls.Description  
of the divers  
regions of  
earth.

due and remained their time, another guide brings them back again after many revolutions of ages. Now this way to the other world is not, as Aeschylus says in the *Telephus*, a single and straight path — if that were so no guide would be needed, for no one could miss it; but there are many partings of the road, and windings, as I infer from the rites and sacrifices which are offered to the gods below in places where three ways meet on earth. The wise and orderly soul follows in the straight path and is conscious of her surroundings; but the soul which desires the body, and which, as I was relating before, has long been fluttering about the lifeless frame and the world of sight, is after many struggles and many sufferings hardly and with violence carried away by her attendant genius; and when she arrives at the place where the other souls are gathered, if she be impure and have done impure deeds, whether foul murders or other crimes which are the brothers of these, and the works of brothers in crime — from that soul every one flees and turns away; no one will be her companion, no one her guide, but alone she wanders in extremity of evil until certain times are fulfilled, and when they are fulfilled, she is borne irresistibly to her own fitting habitation; as every pure and just soul which has passed through life in the company and under the guidance of the gods has also her own proper home.

Now the earth has divers wonderful regions, and is indeed in nature and extent very unlike the notions of geographers, as I believe on the authority of one who shall be nameless.

What do you mean, Socrates? said Simmias. I have myself heard many descriptions of the earth, but I do not know, and I should very much like to know, in which of these you put faith.

And I, Simmias, replied Socrates, if I had the art of Glaucus would tell you; although I know not that the art of Glaucus could prove the truth of my tale, which I myself should never be able to prove, and even if I could, I fear, Simmias, that my life would come to an end before the argument was completed. I may describe to you, however, the form and regions of the earth according to my conception of them.

That, said Simmias, will be enough.

Well then, he said, my conviction is, that the earth is a round body in the centre of the heavens, and therefore has  
109 no need of air or of any similar force to be a support, but is kept there and hindered from falling or inclining any way by the equability of the surrounding heaven and by her own equipoise. For that which, being in equipoise, is in the centre of that which is equably diffused, will not incline any way in any degree, but will always remain in the same state and not deviate. And this is my first notion.

Which is surely a correct one, said Simmias.

Also I believe that the earth is very vast, and that we who dwell in the region extending from the river Phasis to the Pillars of Heracles inhabit a small portion only about the sea, like ants or frogs about a marsh, and that there are other inhabitants of many other like places; for everywhere on the face of the earth there are hollows of various forms and sizes, into which the water and the mist and the lower air collect. But the true earth is pure and situated in the pure heaven — there are the stars also; and it is the heaven which is commonly spoken of by us as the ether, and of which our own earth is the sediment gathering in the hollows beneath. But we who live in these hollows are deceived into the notion that we are dwelling above on the surface of the earth; which is just as if a creature who was at the bottom of the sea were to fancy that he was on the surface of the water, and that the sea was the heaven through which he saw the sun and the other stars, he having never come to the surface by reason of his feebleness and sluggishness, and having never lifted up his head and seen, nor ever heard from one who had seen, how much purer and fairer the world above is than his own. And such is exactly our case: for we are dwelling in a hollow of the earth, and fancy that we are on the surface; and the air we call the heaven, in which we imagine that the stars move. But the fact is, that owing to our feebleness and sluggishness we are prevented from reaching the surface of the air: for if any man could arrive at the exterior limit, or take the wings of a bird and come to the top, then like a fish who puts his head out of the water and sees this world, he would see a world beyond; and, if the nature of man could sustain the sight, he would acknowledge that this other world was the

*Phaedo.*

SOCRATES,  
SIMMIAS.

The earth is a round body kept in her place by equipoise and the equability of the surrounding element.

Mankind lives only in a small portion of the earth at a distance from the surface.

If, like fishes who now and then put their heads out of the water, we could rise to the top of the atmo-



*Phaedo.*SOCRATES,  
SIMMIAS.sphere, we  
should behold  
the true  
heaven and  
the true earth.

place of the true heaven and the true light and the true earth.

For our earth, and the stones, and the entire region which  
surrounds us, are spoilt and corroded, as in the sea all things  
are corroded by the brine, neither is there any noble or  
perfect growth, but caverns only, and sand, and an endless  
slough of mud; and even the shore is not to be compared to  
the fairer sights of this world. And still less is this our world  
to be compared with the other. Of that upper earth which is  
under the heaven, I can tell you a charming tale, Simmias,  
which is well worth hearing.

And we, Socrates, replied Simmias, shall be charmed to  
listen to you.

The upper  
earth is in  
every respect  
far fairer than  
the lower.  
There is gold  
and purple,  
and pure light,  
and trees and  
flowers love-  
lier far than  
our own, and  
all the stones  
are more  
precious than  
our precious  
stones.

The tale, my friend, he said, is as follows:—In the first  
place, the earth, when looked at from above, is in appear-  
ance streaked like one of those balls which have leather  
coverings in twelve pieces, and is decked with various  
colours, of which the colours used by painters on earth are  
in a manner samples. But there the whole earth is made  
up of them, and they are brighter far and clearer than ours:  
there is a purple of wonderful lustre, also the radiance of  
gold, and the white which is in the earth is whiter than any  
chalk or snow. Of these and other colours the earth is  
made up, and they are more in number and fairer than the  
eye of man has ever seen; the very hollows (of which I was  
speaking) filled with air and water have a colour of their  
own, and are seen like light gleaming amid the diversity of  
the other colours, so that the whole presents a single and  
continuous appearance of variety in unity. And in this fair  
region everything that grows—trees, and flowers, and fruits  
—are in a like degree fairer than any here; and there are  
hills, having stones in them in a like degree smoother, and  
more transparent, and fairer in colour than our highly-  
valued emeralds and sardonyxes and jaspers, and other  
gems, which are but minute fragments of them: for there all  
the stones are like our precious stones, and fairer still<sup>1</sup>. The  
reason is, that they are pure, and not, like our precious  
stones, infected or corroded by the corrupt briny elements  
which coagulate among us, and which breed foulness and  
disease both in earth and stones, as well as in animals and

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rev., esp. c. xxi. v. 18 ff.

plants. They are the jewels of the upper earth, which also shines with gold and silver and the like, and they are set in the light of day and are large and abundant and in all places, making the earth a sight to gladden the beholder's eye. And there are animals and men, some in a middle region, others dwelling about the air as we dwell about the sea; others in islands which the air flows round, near the continent; and in a word, the air is used by them as the water and the sea are by us, and the ether is to them what the air is to us. Moreover, the temperament of their seasons is such that they have no disease, and live much longer than we do, and have sight and hearing and smell, and all the other senses, in far greater perfection, in the same proportion that air is purer than water or the ether than air. Also they have temples and sacred places in which the gods really dwell, and they hear their voices and receive their answers, and are conscious of them and hold converse with them; and they see the sun, moon, and stars as they truly are, and their other blessedness is of a piece with this.

*Phædo.*

SOCRATES.

The blessed gods dwell there and hold converse with the inhabitants.

Such is the nature of the whole earth, and of the things which are around the earth; and there are divers regions in the hollows on the face of the globe everywhere, some of them deeper and more extended than that which we inhabit, others deeper but with a narrower opening than ours, and some are shallower and also wider. All have numerous perforations, and there are passages broad and narrow in the interior of the earth, connecting them with one another; and there flows out of and into them, as into basins, a vast tide of water, and huge subterranean streams of perennial rivers, and springs hot and cold, and a great fire, and great rivers of fire, and streams of liquid mud, thin or thick (like the rivers of mud in Sicily, and the lava streams which follow them), and the regions about which they happen to flow are filled up with them. And there is a swinging or see-saw in the interior of the earth which moves all this up and down, and is due to the following cause:—There is a chasm which is the vastest of them all, and pierces right through the whole earth; this is that chasm which Homer describes in the words,—

Description of the interior of the earth and of the subterranean seas and rivers.

‘Far off, where is the inmost depth beneath the earth;’

*Phaedo.*

SOCRATES.

and which he in other places, and many other poets, have called Tartarus. And the see-saw is caused by the streams flowing into and out of this chasm, and they each have the nature of the soil through which they flow. And the reason why the streams are always flowing in and out, is that the watery element has no bed or bottom, but is swinging and surging up and down, and the surrounding wind and air do the same; they follow the water up and down, hither and thither, over the earth—just as in the act of respiration the air is always in process of inhalation and exhalation;—and the wind swinging with the water in and out produces fearful and irresistible blasts: when the waters retire with a rush into the lower parts of the earth, as they are called, they flow through the earth in those regions, and fill them up like water raised by a pump, and then when they leave those regions and rush back hither, they again fill the hollows here, and when these are filled, flow through subterranean channels and find their way to their several places, forming seas, and lakes, and rivers, and springs. Thence they again enter the earth, some of them making a long circuit into many lands, others going to a few places and not so distant; and again fall into Tartarus, some at a point a good deal lower than that at which they rose, and others not much lower, but all in some degree lower than the point from which they came. And some burst forth again on the opposite side, and some on the same side, and some wind round the earth with one or many folds like the coils of a serpent, and descend as far as they can, but always return and fall into the chasm. The rivers flowing in either direction can descend only to the centre and no further, for opposite to the rivers is a precipice.

Oceanus,  
Acheron,  
Pyriphlegethon, and  
Styx (or  
Cocytus).

Now these rivers are many, and mighty, and diverse, and there are four principal ones, of which the greatest and outermost is that called Oceanus, which flows round the earth in a circle; and in the opposite direction flows Acheron, which passes under the earth through desert places into the Acherusian lake: this is the lake to the shores of which the souls of the many go when they are dead, and after waiting an appointed time, which is to some a longer and to some a shorter time, they are sent back to be born again as animals. 113



The third river passes out between the two, and near the place of outlet pours into a vast region of fire, and forms a lake larger than the Mediterranean Sea, boiling with water and mud; and proceeding muddy and turbid, and winding about the earth, comes, among other places, to the extremities of the Acherusian lake, but mingles not with the waters of the lake, and after making many coils about the earth plunges into Tartarus at a deeper level. This is that Pyriphlegethon, as the stream is called, which throws up jets of fire in different parts of the earth. The fourth river goes out on the opposite side, and falls first of all into a wild and savage region, which is all of a dark blue colour, like lapis lazuli; and this is that river which is called the Stygian river, and falls into and forms the Lake Styx, and after falling into the lake and receiving strange powers in the waters, passes under the earth, winding round in the opposite direction, and comes near the Acherusian lake from the opposite side to Pyriphlegethon. And the water of this river too mingles with no other, but flows round in a circle and falls into Tartarus over against Pyriphlegethon; and the name of the river, as the poets say, is Cocytus.

*Phædo.*

SOCRATES.

Such is the nature of the other world; and when the dead arrive at the place to which the genius of each severally guides them, first of all, they have sentence passed upon them, as they have lived well and piously or not. And those who appear to have lived neither well nor ill, go to the river Acheron, and embarking in any vessels which they may find, are carried in them to the lake, and there they dwell and are purified of their evil deeds, and having suffered the penalty of the wrongs which they have done to others, they are absolved, and receive the rewards of their good deeds, each of them according to his deserts. But those who appear to be incurable by reason of the greatness of their crimes—who have committed many and terrible deeds of sacrilege, murders foul and violent, or the like—such are hurled into Tartarus which is their suitable destiny, and they never come out. Those again who have committed crimes, which, although great, are not irremediable—who in a moment of anger, for example, have done some violence to a father or a mother, and have

*The judgment  
of the dead.*

*Phædo.*

SOCRATES.

repented for the remainder of their lives, or, who have taken 114  
 the life of another under the like extenuating circumstances  
 — these are plunged into Tartarus, the pains of which they  
 are compelled to undergo for a year, but at the end of the  
 year the wave casts them forth — mere homicides by way of  
 Cocytus, parricides and matricides by Pyriphlegethon — and  
 they are borne to the Acherusian lake, and there they lift up  
 their voices and call upon the victims whom they have slain  
 or wronged, to have pity on them, and to be kind to them,  
 and let them come out into the lake. And if they prevail,  
 then they come forth and cease from their troubles; but if  
 not, they are carried back again into Tartarus and from  
 thence into the rivers unceasingly, until they obtain mercy  
 from those whom they have wronged: for that is the sen-  
 tence inflicted upon them by their judges. Those too who  
 have been pre-eminent for holiness of life are released from  
 this earthly prison, and go to their pure home which is  
 above, and dwell in the purer earth; and of these, such as  
 have duly purified themselves with philosophy live hence-  
 forth altogether without the body, in mansions fairer still,  
 which may not be described, and of which the time would  
 fail me to tell.

Wherefore, Simmias, seeing all these things, what ought  
 not we to do that we may obtain virtue and wisdom in this  
 life? Fair is the prize, and the hope great!

These de-  
 scriptions are  
 not true to the  
 letter, but  
 something like  
 them is true.

A man of sense ought not to say, nor will I be very con-  
 fident, that the description which I have given of the soul and  
 her mansions is exactly true. But I do say that, inasmuch  
 as the soul is shown to be immortal, he may venture to  
 think, not improperly or unworthily, that something of the  
 kind is true. The venture is a glorious one, and he ought to  
 comfort himself with words like these, which is the reason  
 why I lengthen out the tale. Wherefore, I say, let a man be  
 of good cheer about his soul, who having cast away the  
 pleasures and ornaments of the body as alien to him and  
 working harm rather than good, has sought after the pleasures  
 of knowledge; and has arrayed the soul, not in some foreign  
 attire, but in her own proper jewels, temperance, and justice,  
 and courage, and nobility, and truth — in these adorned she 115  
 is ready to go on her journey to the world below, when her



hour comes. You, Simmias and Cebes, and all other men, will depart at some time or other. Me already, as a tragic poet would say, the voice of fate calls. Soon I must drink the poison; and I think that I had better repair to the bath first, in order that the women may not have the trouble of washing my body after I am dead.

*Phædo.*

SOCRATES,  
CRITO.

When he had done speaking, Crito said: And have you any commands for us, Socrates — anything to say about your children, or any other matter in which we can serve you?

Nothing particular, Crito, he replied: only, as I have always told you, take care of yourselves; that is a service which you may be ever rendering to me and mine and to all of us, whether you promise to do so or not. But if you have no thought for yourselves, and care not to walk according to the rule which I have prescribed for you, not now for the first time, however much you may profess or promise at the moment, it will be of no avail.

We will do our best, said Crito: And in what way shall we bury you?

In any way that you like; but you must get hold of me, and take care that I do not run away from you. Then he turned to us, and added with a smile:— I cannot make Crito believe that I am the same Socrates who have been talking and conducting the argument; he fancies that I am the other Socrates whom he will soon see, a dead body — and he asks, How shall he bury me? And though I have spoken many words in the endeavour to show that when I have drunk the poison I shall leave you and go to the joys of the blessed,— these words of mine, with which I was comforting you and myself, have had, as I perceive, no effect upon Crito. And therefore I want you to be surety for me to him now, as at the trial he was surety to the judges for me: but let the promise be of another sort; for he was surety for me to the judges that I would remain, and you must be my surety to him that I shall not remain, but go away and depart; and then he will suffer less at my death, and not be grieved when he sees my body being burned or buried. I would not have him sorrow at my hard lot, or say at the burial, Thus we lay out Socrates, or, Thus we follow him to the grave or bury him; for false words are not only evil in

The dead  
body which  
remains is  
not the true  
Socrates.

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CRITO,  
THE JAILER.

themselves, but they infect the soul with evil. Be of good cheer then, my dear Crito, and say that you are burying my body only, and do with that whatever is usual, and what you think best. 116

He takes  
leave of his  
family.

When he had spoken these words, he arose and went into a chamber to bathe; Crito followed him and told us to wait. So we remained behind, talking and thinking of the subject of discourse, and also of the greatness of our sorrow; he was like a father of whom we were being bereaved, and we were about to pass the rest of our lives as orphans. When he had taken the bath his children were brought to him — (he had two young sons and an elder one); and the women of his family also came, and he talked to them and gave them a few directions in the presence of Crito; then he dismissed them and returned to us.

The humanity  
of the jailer.

Now the hour of sunset was near, for a good deal of time had passed while he was within. When he came out, he sat down with us again after his bath, but not much was said. Soon the jailer, who was the servant of the Eleven, entered and stood by him, saying:— To you, Socrates, whom I know to be the noblest and gentlest and best of all who ever came to this place, I will not impute the angry feelings of other men, who rage and swear at me, when, in obedience to the authorities, I bid them drink the poison — indeed, I am sure that you will not be angry with me; for others, as you are aware, and not I, are to blame. And so fare you well, and try to bear lightly what must needs be — you know my errand. Then bursting into tears he turned away and went out.

Crito would  
detain  
Socrates a  
little while.

Socrates looked at him and said: I return your good wishes, and will do as you bid. Then turning to us, he said, How charming the man is: since I have been in prison he has always been coming to see me, and at times he would talk to me, and was as good to me as could be, and now see how generously he sorrows on my account. We must do as he says, Crito; and therefore let the cup be brought, if the poison is prepared: if not, let the attendant prepare some.

Yet, said Crito, the sun is still upon the hill-tops, and I know that many a one has taken the draught late, and after the announcement has been made to him, he has eaten and

drunk, and enjoyed the society of his beloved; do not hurry — there is time enough.

*Phædo.*

SOCRATES,  
CRITO,  
THE JAILER.

117 Socrates said: Yes, Crito, and they of whom you speak are right in so acting, for they think that they will be gainers by the delay; but I am right in not following their example, for I do not think that I should gain anything by drinking the poison a little later; I should only be ridiculous in my own eyes for sparing and saving a life which is already forfeit. Please then to do as I say, and not to refuse me.

Socrates  
thinks that  
there is  
nothing to be  
gained by  
delay

The poison  
is brought.

He drinks  
the poison.

The company  
of friends  
are unable  
to control  
themselves.

Says  
Socrates, 'A  
man should  
die in peace.'

Crito made a sign to the servant, who was standing by; and he went out, and having been absent for some time, returned with the jailer carrying the cup of poison. Socrates said: You, my good friend, who are experienced in these matters, shall give me directions how I am to proceed. The man answered: You have only to walk about until your legs are heavy, and then to lie down, and the poison will act. At the same time he handed the cup to Socrates, who in the easiest and gentlest manner, without the least fear or change of colour or feature, looking at the man with all his eyes, Echecrates, as his manner was, took the cup and said: What do you say about making a libation out of this cup to any god? May I, or not? The man answered: We only prepare, Socrates, just so much as we deem enough. I understand, he said: but I may and must ask the gods to prosper my journey from this to the other world — even so — and so be it according to my prayer. Then raising the cup to his lips, quite readily and cheerfully he drank off the poison. And hitherto most of us had been able to control our sorrow; but now when we saw him drinking, and saw too that he had finished the draught, we could no longer forbear, and in spite of myself my own tears were flowing fast; so that I covered my face and wept, not for him, but at the thought of my own calamity in having to part from such a friend. Nor was I the first; for Crito, when he found himself unable to restrain his tears, had got up, and I followed; and at that moment, Apollodorus, who had been weeping all the time, broke out in a loud and passionate cry which made cowards of us all. Socrates alone retained his calmness: What is this strange outcry? he said. I sent away the women mainly in order that they might not misbehave in this way, for I have been



*Phaedo.*SOCRATES,  
CRITO,  
PHAEDO.

told that a man should die in peace. Be quiet then, and have patience. When we heard his words we were ashamed, and refrained our tears; and he walked about until, as he said, his legs began to fail, and then he lay on his back, according to the directions, and the man who gave him the poison now and then looked at his feet and legs; and after a while he pressed his foot hard, and asked him if he could feel; and he said, No; and then his leg, and so upwards and upwards, and showed us that he was cold and stiff. And he felt them himself, and said: When the poison reaches the heart, that will be the end. He was beginning to grow cold about the groin, when he uncovered his face, for he had covered himself up, and said — they were his last words — he said: Crito, I owe a cock to Asclepius; will you remember to pay the debt? The debt shall be paid, said Crito; is there anything else? There was no answer to this question; but in a minute or two a movement was heard, and the attendants uncovered him; his eyes were set, and Crito closed his eyes and mouth. 118

The debt to  
Asclepius.

Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend; concerning whom I may truly say, that of all the men of his time whom I have known, he was the wisest and justest and best.

GORGIAS.





## INTRODUCTION.

IN several of the dialogues of Plato, doubts have arisen among his interpreters as to which of the various subjects discussed in them is the main thesis. The speakers have the freedom of conversation; no severe rules of art restrict them, and sometimes we are inclined to think, with one of the *dramatis personae* in the *Theaetetus* (177 C), that the digressions have the greater interest. Yet in the most irregular of the dialogues there is also a certain natural growth or unity; the beginning is not forgotten at the end, and numerous allusions and references are interspersed, which form the loose connecting links of the whole. We must not neglect this unity, but neither must we attempt to confine the Platonic dialogue on the Procrustean bed of a single idea. (Cp. Introduction to the *Phaedrus*.)

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Two tendencies seem to have beset the interpreters of Plato in this matter. First, they have endeavoured to hang the dialogues upon one another by the slightest threads; and have thus been led to opposite and contradictory assertions respecting their order and sequence. The mantle of Schleiermacher has descended upon his successors, who have applied his method with the most various results. The value and use of the method has been hardly, if at all, examined either by him or them. Secondly, they have extended almost indefinitely the scope of each separate dialogue; in this way they think that they have escaped all difficulties, not seeing that what they have gained in generality they have lost in truth and distinctness. Metaphysical conceptions easily pass into one another; and the simpler notions of antiquity, which we can only realize by an effort, imperceptibly blend with the more familiar theories of modern philosophers. An eye for proportion is needed (his own art of measuring) in the study of Plato, as well as of other great artists. We may readily admit that the moral antithesis of

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good and pleasure, or the intellectual antithesis of knowledge and opinion, being an appearance, are never far off in a Platonic discussion. But because they are in the background, we should not bring them into the foreground, or expect to discern them equally in all the dialogues.

There may be some advantage in drawing out a little the main outlines of the building; but the use of this is limited, and may be easily exaggerated. We may give Plato too much system, and alter the natural form and connection of his thoughts. Under the idea that his dialogues are finished works of art, we may find a reason for everything, and lose the highest characteristic of art, which is simplicity. Most great works receive a new light from a new and original mind. But whether these new lights are true or only suggestive, will depend on their agreement with the spirit of Plato, and the amount of direct evidence which can be urged in support of them. When a theory is running away with us, criticism does a friendly office in counselling moderation, and recalling us to the indications of the text.

✓ Like the *Phaedrus*, the *Gorgias* has puzzled students of Plato by the appearance of two or more subjects. Under the cover of rhetoric higher themes are introduced; the argument expands into a general view of the good and evil of man. After making an ineffectual attempt to obtain a sound definition of his art from Gorgias, Socrates assumes the existence of a universal art of flattery or simulation having several branches; — this is the genus of which rhetoric is only one, and not the highest species. To flattery is opposed the true and noble art of life which he who possesses seeks always to impart to others, and which at last triumphs, if not here, at any rate in another world. These two aspects of life and knowledge appear to be the two leading ideas of the dialogue. The true and the false in individuals and states, in the treatment of the soul as well as of the body, are conceived under the forms of true and false art.. In the development of this opposition there arise various other questions, such as the two famous paradoxes of Socrates (paradoxes as they are to the world in general, ideals as they may be more worthily called): (1) that to do is worse than to suffer evil; and (2) that when a man has done evil he had better be punished than unpunished; to which may be added (3) a third Socratic paradox or ideal, that bad men do what

they think best, but not what they desire, for the desire of all is towards the good. That pleasure is to be distinguished from good is proved by the simultaneousness of pleasure and pain, and by the possibility of the bad having in certain cases pleasures as great as those of the good, or even greater. Not merely rhetoricians, but poets, musicians, and other artists, the whole tribe of statesmen, past as well as present, are included in the class of flatterers. The true and false finally appear before the judgment-seat of the gods below.

The dialogue naturally falls into three divisions, to which the three characters of Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles respectively correspond; and the form and manner change with the stages of the argument. Socrates is deferential towards Gorgias, playful and yet cutting in dealing with the youthful Polus, ironical and sarcastic in his encounter with Callicles. In the first division the question is asked — What is rhetoric? To this there is no answer given, for Gorgias is soon made to contradict himself by Socrates, and the argument is transferred to the hands of his disciple Polus, who rushes to the defence of his master. The answer has at last to be given by Socrates himself, but before he can even explain his meaning to Polus, he must enlighten him upon the great subject of shams or flatteries. When Polus finds his favourite art reduced to the level of cookery, he replies that at any rate rhetoricians, like despots, have great power. Socrates denies that they have any real power, and hence arise the three paradoxes already mentioned. Although they are strange to him, Polus is at last convinced of their truth; at least, they seem to him to follow legitimately from the premises. Thus the second act of the dialogue closes. Then Callicles appears on the scene, at first maintaining that pleasure is good, and that might is right, and that law is nothing but the combination of the many weak against the few strong. When he is confuted he withdraws from the argument, and leaves Socrates to arrive at the conclusion by himself. The conclusion is that there are two kinds of statesmanship, a higher and a lower — that which makes the people better, and that which only flatters them, and he exhorts Callicles to choose the higher. The dialogue terminates with a mythus of a final judgment, in which there will be no more flattery or disguise, and no further use for the teaching of rhetoric.

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The characters of the three interlocutors also correspond to the parts which are assigned to them. Gorgias is the great rhetorician, now advanced in years, who goes from city to city displaying his talents, and is celebrated throughout Greece. Like all the Sophists in the dialogues of Plato, he is vain and boastful, yet he has also a certain dignity, and is treated by Socrates with considerable respect. But he is no match for him in dialectics. Although he has been teaching rhetoric all his life, he is still incapable of defining his own art. When his ideas begin to clear up, he is unwilling to admit that rhetoric can be wholly separated from justice and injustice, and this lingering sentiment of morality, or regard for public opinion, enables Socrates to detect him in a contradiction. Like Protagoras, he is described as of a generous nature; he expresses his approbation of Socrates' manner of approaching a question; he is quite 'one of Socrates' sort, ready to be refuted as well as to refute,' and very eager that Callicles and Socrates should have the game out. He knows by experience that rhetoric exercises great influence over other men, but he is unable to explain the puzzle how rhetoric can teach everything and know nothing.

2. Polus is an impetuous youth, a runaway 'colt,' as Socrates describes him, who wanted originally to have taken the place of Gorgias under the pretext that the old man was tired, and now avails himself of the earliest opportunity to enter the lists. He is said to be the author of a work on rhetoric (462 C), and is again mentioned in the *Phaedrus* (267 B), as the inventor of balanced or double forms of speech (cp. *Gorg.* 448 C, 467 C; *Symp.* 185 C). At first he is violent and ill-mannered, and is angry at seeing his master overthrown. But in the judicious hands of Socrates he is soon restored to good-humour, and compelled to assent to the required conclusion. Like Gorgias, he is overthrown because he compromises; he is unwilling to say that to do is fairer or more honourable than to suffer injustice. Though he is fascinated by the power of rhetoric, and dazzled by the splendour of success, he is not insensible to higher arguments. Plato may have felt that there would be an incongruity in a youth maintaining the cause of injustice against the world. He has never heard the other side of the question, and he listens to the paradoxes, as they appear to him, of Socrates with evident astonishment. He can hardly understand the meaning of Archelaus being miserable, or of rhetoric



being only useful in self-accusation. When the argument with him has fairly run out, *Gorgias.*

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Callicles, in whose house they are assembled, is introduced on the stage: he is with difficulty convinced that Socrates is in earnest; for if these things are true, then, as he says with real emotion, the foundations of society are upside down. In him another type of character is represented; he is neither sophist nor philosopher, but man of the world, and an accomplished Athenian gentleman. He might be described in modern language as a cynic or materialist, a lover of power and also of pleasure, and unscrupulous in his means of attaining both. There is no desire on his part to offer any compromise in the interests of morality; nor is any concession made by him. Like Thrasymachus in the Republic, though he is not of the same weak and vulgar class, he consistently maintains that might is right. His great motive of action is political ambition; in this he is characteristically Greek. Like Anytus in the Meno, he is the enemy of the Sophists; but favours the new art of rhetoric, which he regards as an excellent weapon of attack and defence. He is a despiser of mankind as he is of philosophy, and sees in the laws of the state only a violation of the order of nature, which intended that the stronger should govern the weaker (cp. Rep. ii. 358-360). Like other men of the world who are of a speculative turn of mind, he generalizes the bad side of human nature, and has easily brought down his principles to his practice. Philosophy and poetry alike supply him with distinctions suited to his view of human life. He has a good will to Socrates, whose talents he evidently admires, while he censures the puerile use which he makes of them. He expresses a keen intellectual interest in the argument. Like Anytus, again, he has a sympathy with other men of the world; the Athenian statesmen of a former generation, who showed no weakness and made no mistakes, such as Miltiades, Themistocles, Pericles, are his favourites. His ideal of human character is a man of great passions and great powers, which he has developed to the utmost, and which he uses in his own enjoyment and in the government of others. Had Critias been the name instead of Callicles, about whom we know nothing from other sources, the opinions of the man would have seemed to reflect the history of his life. ✓

And now the combat deepens. In Callicles, far more than in any 3.

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sophist or rhetorician, is concentrated the spirit of evil against which Socrates is contending, the spirit of the world, the spirit of the many contending against the one wise man, of which the Sophists, as he describes them in the Republic, are the imitators rather than the authors, being themselves carried away by the great tide of public opinion. Socrates approaches his antagonist warily from a distance, with a sort of irony which touches with a light hand both his personal vices (probably in allusion to some scandal of the day) and his servility to the populace. At the same time, he is in most profound earnest, as Chaerephon remarks. Callicles soon loses his temper, but the more he is irritated, the more provoking and matter of fact does Socrates become. A repartee of his which appears to have been really made to the 'omniscient' Hippias, according to the testimony of Xenophon (Mem. iv. 4, 6, 10), is introduced (490 E). He is called by Callicles a popular declaimer, and certainly shows that he has the power, in the words of Gorgias, of being 'as long as he pleases,' or 'as short as he pleases' (cp. Protag. 336 D). Callicles exhibits great ability in defending himself and attacking Socrates, whom he accuses of trifling and word-splitting; he is scandalized (p. 494) that the legitimate consequences of his own argument should be stated in plain terms; after the manner of men of the world, he wishes to preserve the decencies of life. But he cannot consistently maintain the bad sense of words; and getting confused between the abstract notions of better, superior, stronger, he is easily turned round by Socrates, and only induced to continue the argument by the authority of Gorgias. Once, when Socrates is describing the manner in which the ambitious citizen has to identify himself with the people, he partially recognizes the truth of his words.

The Socrates of the Gorgias may be compared with the Socrates of the Protagoras and Meno. As in other dialogues, he is the enemy of the Sophists and rhetoricians; and also of the statesmen, whom he regards as another variety of the same species. His behaviour is governed by that of his opponents; the least forwardness or egotism on their part is met by a corresponding irony on the part of Socrates. He must speak, for philosophy will not allow him to be silent. He is indeed more ironical and provoking than in any other of Plato's writings: for he is 'fooled to the top of his bent' by the worldliness of Callicles. But he is also more deeply

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in earnest. He rises higher than even in the *Phaedo* and *Crito*: at first enveloping his moral convictions in a cloud of dust and dialectics, he ends by losing his method, his life, himself, in them. As in the *Protagoras* and *Phaedrus*, throwing aside the veil of irony, he makes a speech, but, true to his character, not until his adversary has refused to answer any more questions. The presentiment of his own fate is hanging over him. He is aware that Socrates, the single real teacher of politics, as he ventures to call himself, cannot safely go to war with the whole world, and that in the courts of earth he will be condemned. But he will be justified in the world below. Then the position of Socrates and Callicles will be reversed; all those things 'unfit for ears polite' which Callicles has prophesied as likely to happen to him in this life, the insulting language, the box on the ears, will recoil upon his assailant. (Compare *Rep.* x. 613, D, E, and the similar reversal of the position of the lawyer and the philosopher in the *Theaetetus*, 173-176.)

There is an interesting allusion to his own behaviour at the trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusae, which he ironically attributes to his ignorance of the manner in which a vote of the assembly should be taken (473 E). This is said to have happened 'last year' (B. C. 406), and therefore the assumed date of the dialogue has been fixed at 405 B. C., when Socrates would already have been an old man. The date is clearly marked, but is scarcely reconcilable with another indication of time, viz. the 'recent' usurpation of Archelaus, which occurred in the year 413 (470 D); and still less with the 'recent' death (503 B) of Pericles, who really died twenty-four years previously (429 B. C.) and is afterwards reckoned among the statesmen of a past age (cp. 517 A); or with the mention of Nicias, who died in 413, and is nevertheless spoken of as a living witness (472 A, B). But we shall hereafter have reason to observe, that although there is a general consistency of times and persons in the Dialogues of Plato, a precise dramatic date is an invention of his commentators (Preface to *Republic*, p. ix).

The conclusion of the Dialogue is remarkable, (1) for the truly characteristic declaration of Socrates (p. 509 A) that he is ignorant of the true nature and bearing of these things, while he affirms at the same time that no one can maintain any other view without



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being ridiculous. The profession of ignorance reminds us of the earlier and more exclusively Socratic Dialogues. But neither in them, nor in the *Apology*, nor in the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon, does Socrates express any doubt of the fundamental truths of morality. He evidently regards this 'among the multitude of questions' which agitate human life 'as the principle which alone remains unshaken' (527 B). He does not insist here, any more than in the *Phaedo*, on the literal truth of the myth, but only on the soundness of the doctrine which is contained in it, that doing wrong is worse than suffering, and that a man should be rather than seem; for the next best thing to a man's being just is that he should be corrected and become just; also that he should avoid all flattery, whether of himself or of others; and that rhetoric should be employed for the maintenance of the right only. The revelation of another life is a recapitulation of the argument in a figure.

(2) Socrates makes the singular remark, that he is himself the only true politician of his age. In other passages, especially in the *Apology*, he disclaims being a politician at all. There he is convinced that he or any other good man who attempted to resist the popular will would be put to death before he had done any good to himself or others. Here he anticipates such a fate for himself, from the fact that he is 'the only man of the present day who performs his public duties at all' (521 D). The two points of view are not really inconsistent, but the difference between them is worth noticing: Socrates is and is not a public man. Not in the ordinary sense, like Alcibiades or Pericles, but in a higher one; and this will sooner or later entail the same consequences on him. He cannot be a private man if he would; neither can he separate morals from politics. Nor is he unwilling to be a politician, although he foresees the dangers which await him; but he must first become a better and wiser man, for he as well as Callicles is in a state of perplexity and uncertainty (527 D, E). And yet there is an inconsistency: for should not Socrates too have taught the citizens better than to put him to death (519)?

And now, as he himself says (506 D), we will 'resume the argument from the beginning.'

ANALYSIS.

Socrates, who is attended by his inseparable disciple, Chaere-

Steph. phon, meets Callicles in the streets of Athens. He is informed  
 447 that he has just missed an exhibition of Gorgias, which he  
 regrets, because he was desirous, not of hearing Gorgias display  
 his rhetoric, but of interrogating him concerning the nature of his  
 art. Callicles proposes that they shall go with him to his own  
 house, where Gorgias is staying. There they find the great  
 448 rhetorician and his younger friend and disciple Polus.

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*Soc.* Put the question to him, Chaerephon. *Ch.* What question?  
*Soc.* Who is he?—such a question as would elicit from a man the  
 answer, ‘I am a cobbler.’ Polus suggests that Gorgias may be  
 tired, and desires to answer for him. ‘Who is Gorgias?’ asks  
 Chaerephon, imitating the manner of his master Socrates. ‘One of  
 the best of men, and a proficient in the best and noblest of experi-  
 mental arts,’ etc., replies Polus, in rhetorical and balanced phrases.  
 Socrates is dissatisfied at the length and unmeaningness of the  
 answer; he tells the disconcerted volunteer that he has mistaken  
 the quality for the nature of the art, and remarks to Gorgias, that  
 Polus has learnt how to make a speech, but not how to answer a  
 question. He wishes that Gorgias would answer him. Gorgias is  
 willing enough, and replies to the question asked by Chaerephon,  
 —that he is a rhetorician, and in Homeric language, ‘boasts  
 449 himself to be a good one.’ At the request of Socrates he promises  
 to be brief; for ‘he can be as long as he pleases, and as short as  
 he pleases.’ Socrates would have him bestow his length on  
 others, and proceeds to ask him a number of questions, which are  
 answered by him to his own great satisfaction, and with a brevity  
 which excites the admiration of Socrates. The result of the  
 discussion may be summed up as follows:—

450 Rhetoric treats of discourse; but music and medicine, and  
 other particular arts, are also concerned with discourse; in what  
 way then does rhetoric differ from them? Gorgias draws a  
 distinction between the arts which deal with words, and the arts  
 which have to do with external actions. Socrates extends this  
 distinction further, and divides all productive arts into two  
 classes: (1) arts which may be carried on in silence; and (2) arts  
 which have to do with words, or in which words are coextensive  
 with action, such as arithmetic, geometry, rhetoric. But still  
 451 Gorgias could hardly have meant to say that arithmetic was the  
 same as rhetoric. Even in the arts which are concerned with



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words there are differences. What then distinguishes rhetoric from the other arts which have to do with words? 'The words which rhetoric uses relate to the best and greatest of human things.' But tell me, Gorgias, what are the best? 'Health first, beauty next, wealth third,' in the words of the old song, or how would you rank them? The arts will come to you in a body, each 452 claiming precedence and saying that her own good is superior to that of the rest — How will you choose between them? 'I should say, Socrates, that the art of persuasion, which gives freedom to all men, and to individuals power in the state, is the greatest 453 good.' But what is the exact nature of this persuasion?—is the persevering retort: You could not describe Zeuxis as a painter, or even as a painter of figures, if there were other painters of figures; neither can you define rhetoric simply as an art of persuasion, because there are other arts which persuade, such as arithmetic, which is an art of persuasion about odd and even numbers. Gorgias is made to see the necessity of a further limitation, and he now defines rhetoric as the art of persuading in 454 the law courts, and in the assembly, about the just and unjust. But still there are two sorts of persuasion: one which gives knowledge, and another which gives belief without knowledge; and knowledge is always true, but belief may be either true or 455 false,—there is therefore a further question: which of the two sorts of persuasion does rhetoric effect in courts of law and assemblies? Plainly that which gives belief and not that which gives knowledge; for no one can impart a real knowledge of such matters to a crowd of persons in a few minutes. And there is another point to be considered:—when the assembly meets to advise about walls or docks or military expeditions, the rhetorician is not taken into counsel, but the architect, or the general. How would Gorgias explain this phenomenon? All who intend to become disciples, of whom there are several in the company, and not Socrates only, are eagerly asking:—About what then will rhetoric teach us to persuade or advise the state?

Gorgias illustrates the nature of rhetoric by adducing the example of Themistocles, who persuaded the Athenians to build their docks and walls, and of Pericles, whom Socrates himself has heard speaking about the middle wall of the Piraeus. He adds 456 that he has exercised a similar power over the patients of his

brother Herodicus. He could be chosen a physician by the assembly if he pleased, for no physician could compete with a rhetorician in popularity and influence. He could persuade the multitude of anything by the power of his rhetoric; not that the rhetorician ought to abuse this power any more than a boxer  
 457 should abuse the art of self-defence. Rhetoric is a good thing, but, like all good things, may be unlawfully used. Neither is the teacher of the art to be deemed unjust because his pupils are unjust and make a bad use of the lessons which they have learned from him.

Socrates would like to know before he replies, whether Gorgias will quarrel with him if he points out a slight inconsistency into which he has fallen, or whether he, like himself, is one who loves  
 458 to be refuted. Gorgias declares that he is quite one of his sort, but fears that the argument may be tedious to the company. The company cheer, and Chaerephon and Callicles exhort them to proceed. Socrates gently points out the supposed inconsistency into which Gorgias appears to have fallen, and which he is inclined to think may arise out of a misapprehension of his own.  
 459 The rhetorician has been declared by Gorgias to be more persuasive to the ignorant than the physician, or any other expert. And he is said to be ignorant, and this ignorance of his is regarded by Gorgias as a happy condition, for he has escaped the trouble of learning. But is he as ignorant of just and unjust as he  
 460 is of medicine or building? Gorgias is compelled to admit that if he did not know them previously he must learn them from his teacher as a part of the art of rhetoric. But he who has learned carpentry is a carpenter, and he who has learned music is a musician, and he who has learned justice is just. The rhetorician then must be a just man, and rhetoric is a just thing. But Gorgias has already admitted the opposite of this, viz. that rhetoric may be abused, and that the rhetorician may act unjustly. How is the  
 461 inconsistency to be explained?

The fallacy of this argument is twofold; for in the first place, a man may know justice and not be just — here is the old confusion of the arts and the virtues; — nor can any teacher be expected to counteract wholly the bent of natural character; and secondly, a man may have a degree of justice, but not sufficient to prevent him from ever doing wrong. Polus is naturally

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exasperated at the sophism, which he is unable to detect; of course, he says, the rhetorician, like every one else, will admit that he knows justice (how can he do otherwise when pressed by the interrogations of Socrates?), but he thinks that great want of manners is shown in bringing the argument to such a pass. Socrates ironically replies, that when old men trip, the young set 462 them on their legs again; and he is quite willing to retract, if he can be shown to be in error, but upon one condition, which is that Polus studies brevity. Polus is in great indignation at not being allowed to use as many words as he pleases in the free state of Athens. Socrates retorts, that yet harder will be his own case, if he is compelled to stay and listen to them. After some altercation they agree (cp. Protag. 338), that Polus shall ask and Socrates answer.

2. 'What is the art of Rhetoric?' says Polus. Not an art at all, replies Socrates, but a thing which in your book you affirm to have created art. Polus asks, 'What thing?' and Socrates answers, An experience or routine of making a sort of delight or gratification. 'But is not rhetoric a fine thing?' I have not yet told you what rhetoric is. Will you ask me another question — What is cookery? 'What is cookery?' An experience or routine of making a sort of delight or gratification. Then they are the same, or rather fall under the same class, and rhetoric 463 has still to be distinguished from cookery. 'What is rhetoric?' asks Polus once more. A part of a not very creditable whole, which may be termed flattery, is the reply. 'But what part?' A shadow of a part of politics. This, as might be expected, is wholly unintelligible, both to Gorgias and Polus; and, in order 464 to explain his meaning to them, Socrates draws a distinction between shadows or appearances and realities; e. g. there is real health of body or soul, and the appearance of them; real arts and sciences, and the simulations of them. Now the soul and body have two arts waiting upon them, first the art of politics, which attends on the soul, having a legislative part and a judicial part; and another art attending on the body, which has no generic name, but may also be described as having two divisions, one of which is medicine and the other gymnastic. Corresponding with these four arts or sciences there are four shams or simulations of them, mere experiences, as they may be termed, because they



give no reason of their own existence. The art of dressing up is the sham or simulation of gymnastic, the art of cookery, of medicine; rhetoric is the simulation of justice, and sophistic of legislation. They may be summed up in an arithmetical formula:—

Tiring : gymnastic : : cookery : medicine : : sophistic : legislation.

And,

Cookery : medicine : : rhetoric : the art of justice.

And this is the true scheme of them, but when measured only by the gratification which they procure, they become jumbled together and return to their aboriginal chaos. Socrates apologizes for the length of his speech, which was necessary to the explanation of the subject, and begs Polus not unnecessarily to retaliate on him.

‘Do you mean to say that the rhetoricians are esteemed flatterers?’ They are not esteemed at all. ‘Why, have they not great power, and can they not do whatever they desire?’ They have no power, and they only do what they think best, and never what they desire; for they never attain the true object of desire, which is the good. ‘As if you, Socrates, would not envy the possessor of despotic power, who can imprison, exile, kill any one whom he pleases.’ But Socrates replies that he has no wish to put any one to death; he who kills another, even justly, is not to be envied, and he who kills him unjustly is to be pitied; it is better to suffer than to do injustice. He does not consider that going about with a dagger and putting men out of the way, or setting a house on fire, is real power. To this Polus assents, on the ground that such acts would be punished, but he is still of opinion that evil-doers, if they are unpunished, may be happy enough. He instances Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, the usurper of Macedonia. Does not Socrates think him happy?—Socrates would like to know more about him; he cannot pronounce even the great king to be happy, unless he knows his mental and moral condition. Polus explains that Archelaus was a slave, being the son of a woman who was the slave of Alcetas, brother of Perdiccas king of Macedon—and he, by every species of crime, first murdering his uncle and cousin and then his half-brother, obtained the kingdom. This was very wicked, and yet all the world, including Socrates, would like to have his place. Socrates dismisses the appeal to numbers; Polus, if he will, may summon all the rich

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men of Athens, Nicias and his brothers, Aristocrates, the house of Pericles, or any other great family — this is the kind of evidence which is adduced in courts of justice, where truth depends upon numbers. But Socrates employs proof of another sort; his appeal is to one witness only,— that is to say, the person with whom he is speaking; him he will convict out of his own mouth. And he is prepared to show, after his manner, that Archelaus cannot be a wicked man and yet happy.

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The evil-doer is deemed happy if he escapes, and miserable if he suffers punishment; but Socrates thinks him less miserable if he suffers than if he escapes. Polus is of opinion that such a paradox as this hardly deserves refutation, and is at any rate sufficiently refuted by the fact. Socrates has only to compare the lot of the successful tyrant who is the envy of the world, and of the wretch who, having been detected in a criminal attempt against the state, is crucified or burnt to death. Socrates replies, that if they are both criminal they are both miserable, but that the unpunished is the more miserable of the two. At this Polus laughs outright, which leads Socrates to remark that laughter is a new species of refutation. Polus replies, that he is already refuted; for if he will take the votes of the company, he will find that no one agrees with 474 him. To this Socrates rejoins, that he is not a public man, and (referring to his own conduct at the trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusae) is unable to take the suffrages of any company, as he had shown on a recent occasion; he can only deal with one witness at a time, and that is the person with whom he is arguing. But he is certain that in the opinion of any man to do is worse than to suffer evil.

Polus, though he will not admit this, is ready to acknowledge that to do evil is considered the more foul or dishonourable of the two. • But what is fair and what is foul; whether the terms are applied to bodies, colours, figures, laws, habits, studies, must they not be defined with reference to pleasure and utility? Polus 475 assents to this latter doctrine, and is easily persuaded that the fouler of two things must exceed either in pain or in hurt. But the doing cannot exceed the suffering of evil in pain, and therefore must exceed in hurt. Thus doing is proved by the testimony of Polus himself to be worse or more hurtful than suffering.

There remains the other question: Is a guilty man better off



476 when he is punished or when he is unpunished? Socrates replies, *Gorgias.*  
 that what is done justly is suffered justly: if the act is just, the *ANALYSIS.*  
 effect is just; if to punish is just, to be punished is just, and there-  
 fore fair, and therefore beneficent; and the benefit is that the soul  
 477 is improved. There are three evils from which a man may suffer,  
 and which affect him in estate, body, and soul;—these are, poverty,  
 disease, injustice; and the foulest of these is injustice, the evil of  
 the soul, because that brings the greatest hurt. And there are  
 478 three arts which heal these evils—trading, medicine, justice—and  
 the fairest of these is justice. Happy is he who has never com-  
 479 mitted injustice, and happy in the second degree he who has been  
 healed by punishment. And therefore the criminal should himself  
 480 go to the judge as he would to the physician, and purge away his  
 crime. Rhetoric will enable him to display his guilt in proper  
 colours, and to sustain himself and others in enduring the necessary  
 481 penalty. And similarly if a man has an enemy, he will desire not  
 to punish him, but that he shall go unpunished and become worse  
 and worse, taking care only that he does no injury to himself.  
 These are at least conceivable uses of the art, and no others have  
 been discovered by us.

Here Callicles, who has been listening in silent amazement, asks  
 Chaerephon whether Socrates is in earnest, and on receiving the  
 assurance that he is, proceeds to ask the same question of Socrates  
 himself. For if such doctrines are true, life must have been turned  
upside down, and all of us are doing the opposite of what we ought  
 to be doing.

Socrates replies in a style of playful irony, that before men can  
 understand one another they must have some common feeling.  
 And such a community of feeling exists between himself and  
 Callicles, for both of them are lovers, and they have both a pair of  
 482 loves; the beloved of Callicles are the Athenian Demos and Demos  
 the son of Pyrilampes; the beloved of Socrates are Alcibiades  
 and philosophy. The peculiarity of Callicles is that he can never  
 contradict his loves; he changes as his Demos changes in all his  
 opinions; he watches the countenance of both his loves, and  
 repeats their sentiments, and if any one is surprised at his sayings  
 and doings, the explanation of them is, that he is not a free agent,  
 but must always be imitating his two loves. And this is the ex-  
 planation of Socrates' peculiarities also. He is always repeating

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what his mistress, Philosophy, is saying to him, who, unlike his other love, Alcibiades, is ever the same, ever true. Callicles must refute her, or he will never be at unity with himself; and discord in life is far worse than the discord of musical sounds.

3. Callicles answers, that Gorgias was overthrown because, as Polus said, in compliance with popular prejudice he had admitted that if his pupil did not know justice the rhetorician must teach him; and Polus has been similarly entangled, because his modesty led him to admit that to suffer is more honourable than to do injustice. By custom 'yes,' but not by nature, says Callicles. And Socrates is 483 always playing between the two points of view, and putting one in the place of the other. In this very argument, what Polus only meant in a conventional sense has been affirmed by him to be a law of nature. For convention says that 'injustice is dishonourable,' but nature says that 'might is right.' And we are always taming down the nobler spirits among us to the conventional level. But sometimes a great man will rise up and reassert his original rights, trampling under foot all our formularies, and then the light 484 of natural justice shines forth. Pindar says, 'Law, the king of all, does violence with high hand;' as is indeed proved by the example of Heracles, who drove off the oxen of Geryon and never paid for them.

This is the truth, Socrates, as you will be convinced, if you leave philosophy and pass on to the real business of life. A little philosophy is an excellent thing; too much is the ruin of a man. He who has not 'passed his metaphysics' before he has grown up to manhood will never know the world. Philosophers are ridiculous when they take to politics, and I dare say that politicians are equally ridiculous when they take to philosophy: 'Every man,' as Euripides says, 'is fondest of that in which he is best.' Philosophy 485 is graceful in youth, like the lisp of infancy, and should be cultivated as a part of education; but when a grown-up man lisps or studies philosophy, I should like to beat him. None of those over-refined natures ever come to any good; they avoid the busy haunts of men, and skulk in corners, whispering to a few admiring youths, and never giving utterance to any noble sentiments.

For you, Socrates, I have a regard, and therefore I say to you, as Zethus says to Amphion in the play, that you have 'a noble soul 486 disguised in a puerile exterior.' And I would have you consider

the danger which you and other philosophers incur. For you would not know how to defend yourself if any one accused you in a law-court, — there you would stand, with gaping mouth and dizzy brain, and might be murdered, robbed, boxed on the ears with impunity. Take my advice, then, and get a little common sense; leave to others these frivolities; walk in the ways of the wealthy and be wise.

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487 Socrates professes to have found in Callicles the philosopher's touchstone; and he is certain that any opinion in which they both agree must be the very truth. Callicles has all the three qualities which are needed in a critic — knowledge, good-will, frankness; Gorgias and Polus, although learned men, were too modest, and their modesty made them contradict themselves. But Callicles is well-educated; and he is not too modest to speak out (of this he has already given proof), and his good-will is shown both by his own profession and by his giving the same caution against philosophy to Socrates, which Socrates remembers hearing him give  
488 long ago to his own clique of friends. He will pledge himself to retract any error into which he may have fallen, and which Callicles may point out. But he would like to know first of all what he and Pindar mean by natural justice. Do they suppose that the rule of justice is the rule of the stronger or of the better? 'There is no difference.' Then are not the many superior to the one, and the opinions of the many better? And their opinion is that justice is equality, and that to do is more dishonourable than to suffer wrong.  
489 And as they are the superior or stronger, this opinion of theirs must be in accordance with natural as well as conventional justice. 'Why will you continue splitting words? Have I not told you that the superior is the better?' But what do you mean by the better? Tell me that, and please to be a little milder in your language, if  
490 you do not wish to drive me away. 'I mean the worthier, the wiser.' You mean to say that one man of sense ought to rule over ten thousand fools? 'Yes, that is my meaning.' Ought the physician then to have a larger share of meats and drinks? or the weaver to have more coats, or the cobbler larger shoes, or the  
491 farmer more seed? 'You are always saying the same things, Socrates.' Yes, and on the same subjects too; but you are never saying the same things. For, first, you defined the superior to be the stronger, and then the wiser, and now something else; — what



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*do* you mean? 'I mean men of political ability, who ought to govern and to have more than the governed.' Than themselves? 'What do you mean?' I mean to say that every man is his own governor. 'I see that you mean those dolts, the temperate. But my doctrine is, that a man should let his desires grow, and take the means of satisfying them. To the many this is impossible, 492 and therefore they combine to prevent him. But if he is a king, and has power, how base would he be in submitting to them! To invite the common herd to be lord over him, when he might have the enjoyment of all things! For the truth is, Socrates, that luxury and self-indulgence are virtue and happiness; all the rest is mere talk.'

Socrates compliments Callicles on his frankness in saying what other men only think. According to his view, those who want nothing are not happy. 'Why,' says Callicles, 'if they were, stones and the dead would be happy.' Socrates in reply is led into a half-serious, half-comic vein of reflection. 'Who knows,' as Euripides says, 'whether life may not be death, and death life?' Nay, there are philosophers who maintain that even in life we are 493 dead, and that the body (*σῶμα*) is the tomb (*σῆμα*) of the soul. And some ingenious Sicilian has made an allegory, in which he represents fools as the uninitiated, who are supposed to be carrying water to a vessel, which is full of holes, in a similarly holey sieve, and this sieve is their own soul. The idea is fanciful, but nevertheless is a figure of a truth which I want to make you acknowledge, viz. that the life of contentment is better than the life of indulgence. Are you disposed to admit that? 'Far otherwise.' Then hear another parable. The life of self-contentment and self-indulgence may be represented respectively by two men, who are filling jars with streams of wine, honey, milk,—the jars of the one are sound, and the jars of the other leaky; the first fills his jars, and has no more trouble with them; the second is always filling 494 them, and would suffer extreme misery if he desisted. Are you of the same opinion still? 'Yes, Socrates, and the figure expresses what I mean. For true pleasure is a perpetual stream, flowing in and flowing out. To be hungry and always eating, to be thirsty and always drinking, and to have all the other desires and to satisfy them, that, as I admit, is my idea of happiness.' And to be itching and always scratching? 'I do not deny that there may be

happiness even in that.' And to indulge unnatural desires, if they are abundantly satisfied? Callicles is indignant at the introduction of such topics. But he is reminded by Socrates that they are introduced, not by him, but by the maintainer of the identity of pleasure and good. Will Callicles still maintain this? 'Yes, for the sake of consistency, he will.' The answer does not satisfy Socrates, who fears that he is losing his touchstone. A profession of seriousness on the part of Callicles reassures him, and they proceed with the argument. Pleasure and good are the same, but knowledge and courage are not the same either with pleasure or good, or with one another. Socrates disproves the first of these statements by showing that two opposites cannot coexist, but must alternate with one another—to be well and ill together is impossible. But pleasure and pain are simultaneous, and the cessation of them is simultaneous; e. g. in the case of drinking and thirsting, whereas good and evil are not simultaneous, and do not cease simultaneously, and therefore pleasure cannot be the same as good.

Callicles has already lost his temper, and can only be persuaded to go on by the interposition of Gorgias. Socrates, having already guarded against objections by distinguishing courage and knowledge from pleasure and good, proceeds:—The good are good by the presence of good, and the bad are bad by the presence of evil. And the brave and wise are good, and the cowardly and foolish are bad. And he who feels pleasure is good, and he who feels pain is bad, and both feel pleasure and pain in nearly the same degree, and sometimes the bad man or coward in a greater degree. Therefore the bad man or coward is as good as the brave or may be even better.

Callicles endeavours now to avert the inevitable absurdity by affirming that he and all mankind admitted some pleasures to be good and others bad. The good are the beneficial, and the bad are the hurtful, and we should choose the one and avoid the other. But this, as Socrates observes, is a return to the old doctrine of himself and Polus, that all things should be done for the sake of the good.

Callicles assents to this, and Socrates, finding that they are agreed in distinguishing pleasure from good, returns to his old division of empirical habits, or shams, or flatteries, which study

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pleasure only, and the arts which are concerned with the higher interests of soul and body. Does Callicles agree to this division? Callicles will agree to anything, in order that he may get through the argument. Which of the arts then are flatteries? Flute-playing, harp-playing, choral exhibitions, the dithyrambics of Cinesias are all equally condemned on the ground that they give pleasure only; and Meles the harp-player, who was the father of Cinesias, failed even in that. The stately muse of Tragedy is bent upon pleasure, and not upon improvement. Poetry in general is only a rhetorical address to a mixed audience of men, women, and children. And the orators are very far from speaking with a view to what is best; their way is to humour the assembly as if they were children. 502

Callicles replies, that this is only true of some of them; others have a real regard for their fellow-citizens. Granted; then there are two species of oratory; the one a flattery, another which has a real regard for the citizens. But where are the orators among whom you find the latter? Callicles admits that there are none remaining, but there were such in the days when Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades, and the great Pericles were still alive. Socrates replies that none of these were true artists, setting before themselves the duty of bringing order out of disorder. The good man and true orator has a settled design, running through his life, to which he conforms all his words and actions; he desires to implant justice and eradicate injustice, to implant all virtue and eradicate all vice in the minds of his citizens. He is the physician who will not allow the sick man to indulge his appetites with a variety of meats and drinks, but insists on his exercising self-restraint. And this is good for the soul, and better than the unrestrained indulgence which Callicles was recently approving. 503 504 505

Here Callicles, who had been with difficulty brought to this point, turns restive, and suggests that Socrates shall answer his own questions. 'Then,' says Socrates, 'one man must do for two;' and though he had hoped to have given Callicles an 'Amphion' in return for his 'Zethus,' he is willing to proceed; at the same time, he hopes that Callicles will correct him, if he falls into error. He recapitulates the advantages which he has already won: — 506

The pleasant is not the same as the good — Callicles and I are

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agreed about that,—but pleasure is to be pursued for the sake of the good, and the good is that of which the presence makes us good; we and all things good have acquired some virtue or other. And virtue, whether of body or soul, of things or persons, is not attained by accident, but is due to order and harmonious arrangement. And the soul which has order is better than the soul which is without order, and is therefore temperate and is therefore good, and the intemperate is bad. And he who is temperate is also just and brave and pious, and has attained the perfection of goodness and therefore of happiness, and the intemperate whom you approve is the opposite of all this and is wretched. He therefore who would be happy must pursue temperance and avoid intemperance, and if possible escape the necessity of punishment, but if he have done wrong he must endure punishment. In this way states and individuals should seek to attain harmony, which, as the wise tell us, is the bond of heaven and earth, of gods and men. Callicles has never discovered the power of geometrical proportion in both worlds; he would have men aim at disproportion and excess. But if he be wrong in this, and if self-control is the true secret of happiness, then the paradox is true that the only use of rhetoric is in self-accusation, and Polus was right in saying that to do wrong is worse than to suffer wrong, and Gorgias was right in saying that the rhetorician must be a just man. And you were wrong in taunting me with my defenceless condition, and in saying that I might be accused or put to death or boxed on the ears with impunity. For I may repeat once more, that to strike is worse than to be stricken — to do than to suffer. What I said then is now made fast in adamantine bonds. I myself know not the true nature of these things, but I know that no one can deny my words and not be ridiculous. To do wrong is the greatest of evils, and to suffer wrong is the next greatest evil. He who would avoid the last must be a ruler, or the friend of a ruler; and to be the friend he must be the equal of the ruler, and must also resemble him. Under his protection he will suffer no evil, but will he also do no evil? Nay, will he not rather do all the evil which he can and escape? And in this way the greatest of all evils will befall him. ‘But this imitator of the tyrant,’ rejoins Callicles, ‘will kill any one who does not similarly imitate him.’ Socrates replies that he is not deaf, and that he has heard that repeated

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many times, and can only reply, that a bad man will kill a good one. 'Yes, and that is the provoking thing.' Not provoking to a man of sense who is not studying the arts which will preserve him from danger; and this, as you say, is the use of rhetoric in courts of justice. But how many other arts are there which also save men from death, and are yet quite humble in their pretensions—such as the art of swimming, or the art of the pilot? Does not the pilot do men at least as much service as the rhetorician, and yet for the voyage from Aegina to Athens he does not charge more than two obols, and when he disembarks is quite unassuming in his demeanour? The reason is that he is not certain 512 whether he has done his passengers any good in saving them from death, if one of them is diseased in body, and still more if he is diseased in mind—who can say? The engineer too will often save whole cities, and yet you despise him, and would not allow your son to marry his daughter, or his son to marry yours. But what reason is there in this? For if virtue only means the saving of life, whether your own or another's, you have no right to despise him or any practiser of saving arts. But is not virtue something different from saving and being saved? I would have 513 you rather consider whether you ought not to disregard length of life, and think only how you can live best, leaving all besides to the will of Heaven. For you must not expect to have influence either with the Athenian Demos or with Demos the son of Pyrilampes, unless you become like them. What do you say to this?

'There is some truth in what you are saying, but I do not entirely believe you.'

That is because you are in love with Demos. But let us have a little more conversation. You remember the two processes—one which was directed to pleasure, the other which was directed to making men as good as possible. And those who have the care of the city should make the citizens as good as possible. But who 514 would undertake a public building, if he had never had a teacher of the art of building, and had never constructed a building before? or who would undertake the duty of state-physician, if he had never cured either himself or any one else? Should we not examine him before we entrusted him with the office? And as Callicles is about to enter public life, should we not examine him? Whom has he made better? For we have already admitted that 515



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this is the statesman's proper business. And we must ask the same question about Pericles, and Cimon, and Miltiades, and Themistocles. Whom did they make better? Nay, did not Pericles make the citizens worse? For he gave them pay, and at first he was very popular with them, but at last they condemned him to death. Yet surely he would be a bad tamer of animals who, having received them gentle, taught them to kick and butt, and man is an animal; and Pericles who had the charge of man only made him wilder, and more savage and unjust, and therefore he could not have been a good statesman. The same tale might be repeated about Cimon, Themistocles, Miltiades. But the charioteer who keeps his seat at first is not thrown out when he gains greater experience and skill. The inference is, that the statesmen of a past age were no better than those of our own. They may have been cleverer constructors of docks and harbours, but they did not improve the character of the citizens. I have told you again and again (and I purposely use the same images) that the soul, like the body, may be treated in two ways—there is the meaner and the higher art. You seemed to understand what I said at the time, but when I ask you who were the really good statesmen, you answer—as if I asked you who were the good trainers, and you answered, Thearion, the baker, Mithoecus, the author of the Sicilian cookery-book, Sarambus, the vintner. And you would be affronted if I told you that these are a parcel of cooks who make men fat only to make them thin. And those whom they have fattened applaud them, instead of finding fault with them, and lay the blame of their subsequent disorders on their physicians. In this respect, Callicles, you are like them; you applaud the statesmen of old, who pandered to the vices of the citizens, and filled the city with docks and harbours, but neglected virtue and justice. And when the fit of illness comes, the citizens who in like manner applauded Themistocles, Pericles, and others, will lay hold of you and my friend Alcibiades, and you will suffer for the misdeeds of your predecessors. The old story is always being repeated—‘after all his services, the ungrateful city banished him, or condemned him to death.’ As if the statesman should not have taught the city better! He surely cannot blame the state for having unjustly used him, any more than the sophist or teacher can find fault with his pupils if they cheat him. And the sophist

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and orator are in the same case; although you admire rhetoric and despise sophistic, whereas sophistic is really the higher of the two. The teacher of the arts takes money, but the teacher of virtue or politics takes no money, because this is the only kind of service which makes the disciple desirous of requiting his teacher.

Socrates concludes by finally asking, to which of the two modes of serving the state Callicles invites him: — ‘to the inferior and ministerial one,’ is the ingenuous reply. That is the only way of 521  
avoiding death, replies Socrates; and he has heard often enough, and would rather not hear again, that the bad man will kill the good. But he thinks that such a fate is very likely reserved for him, because he remarks that he is the only person who teaches the true art of politics. And very probably, as in the case which 522  
he described to Polus, he may be the physician who is tried by a jury of children. He cannot say that he has procured the citizens any pleasure, and if any one charges him with perplexing them, or with reviling their elders, he will not be able to make them understand that he has only been actuated by a desire for their good. And therefore there is no saying what his fate may be. ‘And do you think that a man who is unable to help himself is in a good condition?’ Yes, Callicles, if he have the true self-help, which is never to have said or done any wrong to himself or others. If I had not this kind of self-help, I should be ashamed; but if I die for want of your flattering rhetoric, I shall die in peace. For death is no evil, but to go to the world below laden with offences is the worst of evils. In proof of which I will tell you a tale: —

Under the rule of Cronos, men were judged on the day of their 523  
death, and when judgment had been given upon them they departed — the good to the islands of the blest, the bad to the house of vengeance. But as they were still living, and had their clothes on at the time when they were being judged, there was favouritism, and Zeus, when he came to the throne, was obliged to alter the mode of procedure, and try them after death, having first sent down Prometheus to take away from them the foreknowledge of death. Minos, Rhadamanthus, and Aeacus were appointed to be the 524  
judges; Rhadamanthus for Asia, Aeacus for Europe, and Minos was to hold the court of appeal. Now death is the separation of soul and body, but after death soul and body alike retain their characteristics; the fat man, the dandy, the branded slave, are all



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525 distinguishable. Some prince or potentate, perhaps even the great king himself, appears before Rhadamanthus, and he instantly detects him, though he knows not who he is; he sees the scars of perjury and iniquity, and sends him away to the house of torment.

For there are two classes of souls who undergo punishment — the curable and the incurable. The curable are those who are benefited by their punishment; the incurable are such as Archelaus, who benefit others by becoming a warning to them. The latter class are generally kings and potentates; meaner persons, happily for themselves, have not the same power of doing injustice. Sisyphus and Tityus, not Thersites, are supposed by Homer to be undergoing everlasting punishment. Not that there is anything to prevent a great man from being a good one, as is shown by the famous example of Aristides, the son of Lysimachus. But to Rhadamanthus the souls are only known as good or bad; they are stripped of their dignities and preferments; he despatches the bad to Tartarus, labelled either as curable or incurable, and looks with love and admiration on the soul of some just one, whom he sends to the islands of the blest. Similar is the practice of Aeacus; and Minos overlooks them, holding a golden sceptre, as Odysseus in Homer saw him

'Wielding a sceptre of gold, and giving laws to the dead.'

527 My wish for myself and my fellow-men is, that we may present our souls undefiled to the judge in that day; my desire in life is to be able to meet death. And I exhort you, and retort upon you the reproach which you cast upon me,— that you will stand before the judge, gaping, and with dizzy brain, and any one may box you on the ear, and do you all manner of evil.

Perhaps you think that this is an old wives' fable. But you, who are the three wisest men in Hellas, have nothing better to say, and no one will ever show that to do is better than to suffer evil. A man should study to be, and not merely to seem. If he is bad, he should become good, and avoid all flattery, whether of the many or of the few.

Follow me, then; and if you are looked down upon, that will do you no harm. And when we have practised virtue, we will betake ourselves to politics, but not until we are delivered from the shameful state of ignorance and uncertainty in which we are at

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present. Let us follow in the way of virtue and justice, and not in the way to which you, Callicles, invite us; for that way is nothing worth.

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We will now consider in order some of the principal points of the dialogue. Having regard (1) to the age of Plato and the ironical character of his writings, we may compare him with himself and with other great teachers, and we may note in passing the objections of his critics. And then (2) casting one eye upon him, we may cast another upon ourselves, and endeavour to draw out the great lessons which he teaches for all time, stripped of the accidental form in which they are enveloped.

(1) In the *Gorgias*, as in nearly all the other dialogues of Plato, we are made aware that formal logic has as yet no existence. The old difficulty of framing a definition recurs. The illusive analogy of the arts and the virtues also continues. The ambiguity of several words, such as nature, custom, the honourable, the good, is not cleared up. The Sophists are still floundering about the distinction of the real and seeming. Figures of speech are made the basis of arguments. The possibility of conceiving a universal art or science, which admits of application to a particular subject-matter, is a difficulty which remains unsolved, and has not altogether ceased to haunt the world at the present day (cp. *Charmides*, 166 ff.). The defect of clearness is also apparent in Socrates himself, unless we suppose him to be practising on the simplicity of his opponent, or rather perhaps trying an experiment in dialectics. Nothing can be more fallacious than the contradiction which he pretends to have discovered in the answers of *Gorgias* (see *Analysis*). The advantages which he gains over *Polus* are also due to a false antithesis of pleasure and good, and to an erroneous assertion that an agent and a patient may be described by similar predicates; — a mistake which Aristotle partly shares and partly corrects in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, V. i. 4; xi. 2. Traces of a ‘robust sophistry’ are likewise discernible in his argument with Callicles (pp. 490, 496, 516).

(2) Although Socrates professes to be convinced by reason only, yet the argument is often a sort of dialectical fiction, by which he conducts himself and others to his own ideal of life and action. And we may sometimes wish that we could have

suggested answers to his antagonists, or pointed out to them the rocks which lay concealed under the ambiguous terms good, pleasure, and the like. But it would be as useless to examine his arguments by the requirements of modern logic, as to criticise this ideal from a merely utilitarian point of view. If we say that the ideal is generally regarded as unattainable, and that mankind will by no means agree in thinking that the criminal is happier when punished than when unpunished, any more than they would agree to the stoical paradox that a man may be happy on the rack, Plato has already admitted that the world is against him. Neither does he mean to say that Archelaus is tormented by the stings of conscience; or that the sensations of the impaled criminal are more agreeable than those of the tyrant drowned in luxurious enjoyment. Neither is he speaking, as in the Protagoras, of virtue as a calculation of pleasure, an opinion which he afterwards repudiates in the Phædo. What then is his meaning? His meaning we shall be able to illustrate best by parallel notions, which, whether justifiable by logic or not, have always existed among mankind. We must remind the reader that Socrates himself implies that he will be understood or appreciated by very few.

He is speaking not of the consciousness of happiness, but of the idea of happiness. When a martyr dies in a good cause, when a soldier falls in battle, we do not suppose that death or wounds are without pain, or that their physical suffering is always compensated by a mental satisfaction. Still we regard them as happy, and we would a thousand times rather have their death than a shameful life. Nor is this only because we believe that they will obtain an immortality of fame, or that they will have crowns of glory in another world, when their enemies and persecutors will be proportionably tormented. Men are found in a few instances to do what is right, without reference to public opinion or to consequences. And we regard them as happy on this ground only, much as Socrates' friends in the opening of the Phædo are described as regarding him; or as was said of another, 'they looked upon his face as upon the face of an angel.' We are not concerned to justify this idealism by the standard of utility or public opinion, but merely to point out the existence of such a sentiment in the better part of human nature.

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The idealism of Plato is founded upon this sentiment. He would maintain that in some sense or other truth and right are alone to be sought, and that all other goods are only desirable as means towards these. He is thought to have erred in 'considering the agent only, and making no reference to the happiness of others, as affected by him.' But the happiness of others or of mankind, if regarded as an end, is really quite as ideal and almost as paradoxical to the common understanding as Plato's conception of happiness. For the greatest happiness of the greatest number may mean also the greatest pain of the individual which will procure the greatest pleasure of the greatest number. Ideas of utility, like those of duty and right, may be pushed to unpleasant consequences. Nor can Plato in the *Gorgias* be deemed purely self-regarding, considering that Socrates expressly mentions the duty of imparting the truth when discovered to others. Nor must we forget that the side of ethics which regards others is by the ancients merged in politics. Both in Plato and Aristotle, as well as in the Stoics, the social principle, though taking another form, is really far more prominent than in most modern treatises on ethics.

The idealizing of suffering is one of the conceptions which have exercised the greatest influence on mankind. Into the theological import of this, or into the consideration of the errors to which the idea may have given rise, we need not now enter. All will agree that the ideal of the Divine Sufferer, whose words the world would not receive, the man of sorrows of whom the Hebrew prophets spoke, has sunk deep into the heart of the human race. It is a similar picture of suffering goodness which Plato desires to pourtray, not without an allusion to the fate of his master Socrates. He is convinced that, somehow or other, such an one must be happy in life or after death. In the *Republic*, he endeavours to show that his happiness would be assured here in a well-ordered state. But in the actual condition of human things the wise and good are weak and miserable ; such an one is like a man fallen among wild beasts, exposed to every sort of wrong and obloquy.

Plato, like other philosophers, is thus led on to the conclusion, that if 'the ways of God' to man are to be 'justified,' the hopes of another life must be included. If the question could have been

put to him, whether a man dying in torments was happy still, even if, as he suggests in the *Apology* (40 C), 'death be only a long sleep,' we can hardly tell what would have been his answer. There have been a few, who, quite independently of rewards and punishments or of posthumous reputation, or any other influence of public opinion, have been willing to sacrifice their lives for the good of others. It is difficult to say how far in such cases an unconscious hope of a future life, or a general faith in the victory of good in the world, may have supported the sufferers. But this extreme idealism is not in accordance with the spirit of Plato. He supposes a day of retribution, in which the good are to be rewarded and the wicked punished (522 E). Though, as he says in the *Phaedo*, no man of sense will maintain that the details of the stories about another world are true, he will insist that something of the kind is true, and will frame his life with a view to this unknown future. Even in the *Republic* he introduces a future life as an afterthought, when the superior happiness of the just has been established on what is thought to be an immutable foundation. At the same time he makes a point of determining his main thesis independently of remoter consequences (x. 612 A).

(3) Plato's theory of punishment is partly vindictive, partly corrective. In the *Gorgias*, as well as in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*, a few great criminals, chiefly tyrants, are reserved as examples. But most men have never had the opportunity of attaining this pre-eminence of evil. They are not incurable, and their punishment is intended for their improvement. They are to suffer because they have sinned; like sick men, they must go to the physician and be healed. On this representation of Plato's the criticism has been made, that the analogy of disease and injustice is partial only, and that suffering, instead of improving men, may have just the opposite effect.

Like the general analogy of the arts and the virtues, the analogy of disease and injustice, or of medicine and justice, is certainly imperfect. But ideas must be given through something; the nature of the mind which is unseen can only be represented under figures derived from visible objects. If these figures are suggestive of some new aspect under which the mind may be considered, we cannot find fault with them for not exactly coinciding with the ideas represented. They partake of the

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imperfect nature of language, and must not be construed in too strict a manner. That Plato sometimes reasons from them as if they were not figures but realities, is due to the defective logical analysis of his age.

Nor does he distinguish between the suffering which improves and the suffering which only punishes and deters. He applies to the sphere of ethics a conception of punishment which is really derived from criminal law. He does not see that such punishment is only negative, and supplies no principle of moral growth or development. He is not far off the higher notion of an education of man to be begun in this world, and to be continued in other stages of existence, which is further developed in the Republic. And Christian thinkers, who have ventured out of the beaten track in their meditations on the 'last things,' have found a ray of light in his writings. But he has not explained how or in what way punishment is to contribute to the improvement of mankind. He has not followed out the principle which he affirms in the Republic (ii. 380), that 'God is the author of evil only with a view to good,' and that 'they were the better for being punished.' Still his doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments may be compared favourably with that perversion of Christian doctrine which makes the everlasting punishment of human beings depend on a brief moment of time, or even on the accident of an accident. And he has escaped the difficulty which has often beset divines, respecting the future destiny of the meaner sort of men (Thersites and the like), who are neither very good nor very bad, by not counting them worthy of eternal damnation.

We do Plato violence in pressing his figures of speech or chains of argument; and not less so in asking questions which were beyond the horizon of his vision, or did not come within the scope of his design. The main purpose of the Gorgias is not to answer questions about a future world, but to place in antagonism the true and false life, and to contrast the judgments and opinions of men with judgment according to the truth. Plato may be accused of representing a superhuman or transcendental virtue in the description of the just man in the Gorgias, or in the companion portrait of the philosopher in the Theaetetus; and at the same time may be thought to be condemning a state of the

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world which always has existed and always will exist among men. But such ideals act powerfully on the imagination of mankind. And such condemnations are not mere paradoxes of philosophers, but the natural rebellion of the higher sense of right in man against the ordinary conditions of human life. The greatest statesmen have fallen very far short of the political ideal, and are therefore justly involved in the general condemnation.

Subordinate to the main purpose of the dialogue are some other questions, which may be briefly considered:—

*a.* The antithesis of good and pleasure, which as in other dialogues is supposed to consist in the permanent nature of the one compared with the transient and relative nature of the other. Good and pleasure, knowledge and sense, truth and opinion, essence and generation, virtue and pleasure, the real and the apparent, the infinite and finite, harmony or beauty and discord, dialectic and rhetoric or poetry, are so many pairs of opposites, which in Plato easily pass into one another, and are seldom kept perfectly distinct. And we must not forget that Plato's conception of pleasure is the Heracleitean flux transferred to the sphere of human conduct. There is some degree of unfairness in opposing the principle of good, which is objective, to the principle of pleasure, which is subjective. For the assertion of the permanence of good is only based on the assumption of its objective character. Had Plato fixed his mind, not on the ideal nature of good, but on the subjective consciousness of happiness, that would have been found to be as transient and precarious as pleasure.

*b.* The arts or sciences, when pursued without any view to truth, or the improvement of human life, are called flatteries. They are all alike dependent upon the opinion of mankind, from which they are derived. To Plato the whole world appears to be sunk in error, based on self-interest. To this is opposed the one wise man hardly professing to have found truth, yet strong in the conviction that a virtuous life is the only good, whether regarded with reference to this world or to another. Statesmen, Sophists, rhetoricians, poets, are alike brought up for judgment. They are the parodies of wise men, and their arts are the parodies of true arts and sciences. All that they call science is merely the result

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of that study of the tempers of the Great Beast, which he describes in the Republic.

c. Various other points of contact naturally suggest themselves between the *Gorgias* and other dialogues, especially the Republic, the *Philebus*, and the *Protagoras*. There are closer resemblances both of spirit and language in the Republic than in any other dialogue, the verbal similarity tending to show that they were written at the same period of Plato's life. For the Republic supplies that education and training of which the *Gorgias* suggests the necessity. The theory of the many weak combining against the few strong in the formation of society (which is indeed a partial truth), is similar in both of them, and is expressed in nearly the same language. The sufferings and fate of the just man, the powerlessness of evil, and the reversal of the situation in another life, are also points of similarity. The poets, like the rhetoricians, are condemned because they aim at pleasure only, as in the Republic they are expelled the State, because they are imitators, and minister to the weaker side of human nature. That poetry is akin to rhetoric may be compared with the analogous notion, which occurs in the *Protagoras*, that the ancient poets were the Sophists of their day. In some other respects the *Protagoras* rather offers a contrast than a parallel. The character of *Protagoras* may be compared with that of *Gorgias*, but the conception of happiness is different in the two dialogues; being described in the former, according to the old Socratic notion, as deferred or accumulated pleasure, while in the *Gorgias*, and in the *Phaedo*, pleasure and good are distinctly opposed.

This opposition is carried out from a speculative point of view in the *Philebus*. There neither pleasure nor wisdom are allowed to be the chief good, but pleasure and good are not so completely opposed as in the *Gorgias*. For innocent pleasures, and such as have no antecedent pains, are allowed to rank in the class of goods. The allusion to *Gorgias*' definition of rhetoric (*Philebus*, 58 A, B; cp. *Gorg.* 452 D, E), as the art of persuasion, of all arts the best, for to it all things submit, not by compulsion, but of their own free will — marks a close and perhaps designed connection between the two dialogues. In both the ideas of measure, order, harmony, are the connecting links between the beautiful and the good.



In general spirit and character, that is, in irony and antagonism to public opinion, the *Gorgias* most nearly resembles the *Apology*, *Crito*, and portions of the *Republic*, and like the *Philebus*, though from another point of view, may be thought to stand in the same relation to Plato's theory of morals which the *Theaetetus* bears to his theory of knowledge.

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*d.* A few minor points still remain to be summed up: (1) The extravagant irony in the reason which is assigned for the pilot's modest charge (p. 512); and in the proposed use of rhetoric as an instrument of self-condemnation (p. 480); and in the mighty power of geometrical equality in both worlds (p. 508). (2) The reference of the mythus to the previous discussion should not be overlooked: the fate reserved for incurable criminals such as Archelaus (p. 525); the retaliation of the box on the ears (p. 527); the nakedness of the souls and of the judges who are stript of the clothes or disguises which rhetoric and public opinion have hitherto provided for them (p. 523; cp. Swift's notion that the universe is a suit of clothes, *Tale of a Tub*, section 2). The fiction seems to have involved Plato in the necessity of supposing that the soul retained a sort of corporeal likeness after death (p. 524). (3) The appeal to the authority of Homer, who says that Odysseus saw Minos in his court 'holding a golden sceptre,' which gives verisimilitude to the tale (p. 526).

It is scarcely necessary to repeat that Plato is playing 'both sides of the game,' and that in criticising the characters of *Gorgias* and *Polus*, we are not passing any judgment on historical individuals, but only attempting to analyze the '*dramatis personae*' as they were conceived by him. Neither is it necessary to enlarge upon the obvious fact that Plato is a dramatic writer, whose real opinions cannot always be assumed to be those which he puts into the mouth of Socrates, or any other speaker who appears to have the best of the argument; or to repeat the observation that he is a poet as well as a philosopher; or to remark that he is not to be tried by a modern standard, but interpreted with reference to his place in the history of thought and the opinion of his time.

It has been said that the most characteristic feature of the *Gorgias* is the assertion of the right of dissent, or private judgment. But this mode of stating the question is really opposed both to the spirit of Plato and of ancient philosophy generally. For Plato is

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not asserting any abstract right or duty of toleration, or advantage to be derived from freedom of thought; indeed, in some other parts of his writings (e. g. *Laws*, x), he has fairly laid himself open to the charge of intolerance. No speculations had as yet arisen respecting the 'liberty of prophesying;' and Plato is not affirming any abstract right of this nature: but he is asserting the duty and right of the one wise and true man to dissent from the folly and falsehood of the many. At the same time he acknowledges the natural result, which he hardly seeks to avert, that he who speaks the truth to a multitude, regardless of consequences, will probably share the fate of Socrates.

The irony of Plato sometimes veils from us the height of idealism to which he soars. When declaring truths which the many will not receive, he puts on an armour which cannot be pierced by them. The weapons of ridicule are taken out of their hands and the laugh is turned against themselves. The disguises which Socrates assumes are like the parables of the New Testament, or the oracles of the Delphian God; they half conceal, half reveal, his meaning. The more he is in earnest, the more ironical he becomes; and he is never more in earnest or more ironical than in the *Gorgias*. He hardly troubles himself to answer seriously the objections of Gorgias and Polus, and therefore he sometimes appears to be careless of the ordinary requirements of logic. Yet in the highest sense he is always logical and consistent with himself. The form of the argument may be paradoxical; the substance is an appeal to the higher reason. He is uttering truths before they can be understood, as in all ages the words of philosophers, when they are first uttered, have found the world unprepared for them. A further misunderstanding arises out of the wildness of his humour; he is supposed not only by Callicles, but by the rest of mankind, to be jesting when he is profoundly serious. At length he makes even Polus (p. 468) in earnest. Finally, he drops the argument, and heedless any longer of the forms of dialectic, he loses himself in a sort of triumph, while at the same time he retaliates upon his adversaries. From this confusion of jest and earnest, we may now return to the ideal truth, and draw out in a simple form the main theses of the dialogue.



i. First Thesis :—

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It is a greater evil to do than to suffer injustice.

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Compare the New Testament —

‘It is better to suffer for well doing than for evil doing.’ — 1 Pet. iii. 17.

And the Sermon on the Mount —

‘Blessed are they that are persecuted for righteousness’ sake.’ — Matt. v. 10.

The words of Socrates are more abstract than the words of Christ, but they equally imply that the only real evil is moral evil. The righteous may suffer or die, but they have their reward; and even if they had no reward, would be happier than the wicked. The world, represented by Polus, is ready, when they are asked, to acknowledge that injustice is dishonourable, and for their own sakes men are willing to punish the offender (cp. Rep. ii. 360 D). But they are not equally willing to acknowledge that injustice, even if successful, is essentially evil, and has the nature of disease and death. Especially when crimes are committed on the great scale — the crimes of tyrants, ancient or modern — after a while, seeing that they cannot be undone, and have become a part of history, mankind are disposed to forgive them, not from any magnanimity or charity, but because their feelings are blunted by time, and ‘to forgive is convenient to them.’ The tangle of good and evil can no longer be unravelled; and although they know that the end cannot justify the means, they feel also that good has often come out of evil. But Socrates would have us pass the same judgment on the tyrant now and always; though he is surrounded by his satellites, and has the applauses of Europe and Asia ringing in his ears; though he is the civilizer or liberator of half a continent, he is, and always will be, the most miserable of men. The greatest consequences for good or for evil cannot alter a hair’s breadth the morality of actions which are right or wrong in themselves. This is the standard which Socrates holds up to us. Because politics, and perhaps human life generally, are of a mixed nature we must not allow our principles to sink to the level of our practice.

And so of private individuals — to them, too, the world occasionally speaks of the consequences of their actions: — if they are lovers of pleasure, they will ruin their health; if they are false or

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dishonest, they will lose their character. But Socrates would speak to them, not of what will be, but of what is — of the present consequence of lowering and degrading the soul. And all higher natures, or perhaps all men everywhere, if they were not tempted by interest or passion, would agree with him — they would rather be the victims than the perpetrators of an act of treachery or of tyranny. Reason tells them that death comes sooner or later to all, and is not so great an evil as an unworthy life, or rather, if rightly regarded, not an evil at all, but to a good man the greatest good. For in all of us there are slumbering ideals of truth and right, which may at any time awaken and develop a new life in us.

Second Thesis :—

*It is better to suffer for wrong doing than not to suffer.*

There might have been a condition of human life in which the penalty followed at once, and was proportioned to the offence. Moral evil would then be scarcely distinguishable from physical ; mankind would avoid vice as they avoid pain or death. But nature, with a view of deepening and enlarging our characters, has for the most part hidden from us the consequences of our actions, and we can only foresee them by an effort of reflection. To awaken in us this habit of reflection is the business of early education, which is continued in maturer years by observation and experience. The spoilt child is in later life said to be unfortunate — he had better have suffered when he was young, and been saved from suffering afterwards. But is not the sovereign equally unfortunate whose education and manner of life are always concealing from him the consequences of his own actions, until at length they are revealed to him in some terrible downfall, which may, perhaps, have been caused not by his own fault? Another illustration is afforded by the pauper and criminal classes, who scarcely reflect at all, except on the means by which they can compass their immediate ends. We pity them, and make allowances for them ; but we do not consider that the same principle applies to human actions generally. Not to have been found out in some dishonesty or folly, regarded from a moral or religious point of view, is the greatest of misfortunes. The success of our evil doings is a proof that the gods have ceased to strive with us,

and have given us over to ourselves. There is nothing to remind us of our sins, and therefore nothing to correct them. Like our sorrows, they are healed by time ;

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‘While rank corruption, mining all within,  
Infects unseen.’

The ‘accustomed irony’ of Socrates adds a corollary to the argument:—‘Would you punish your enemy, you should allow him to escape unpunished’—this is the true retaliation. (Compare the obscure verse of Proverbs, xxv. 21, 22, ‘Therefore if thine enemy hunger, feed him,’ etc., quoted in Romans xii. 20.)

Men are not in the habit of dwelling upon the dark side of their own lives: they do not easily see themselves as others see them. They are very kind and very blind to their own faults; the rhetoric of self-love is always pleading with them on their own behalf. Adopting a similar figure of speech, Socrates would have them use rhetoric, not in defence but in accusation of themselves. As they are guided by feeling rather than by reason, to their feelings the appeal must be made. They must speak to themselves; they must argue with themselves; they must paint in eloquent words the character of their own evil deeds. To any suffering which they have deserved, they must persuade themselves to submit. Under the figure there lurks a real thought, which, expressed in another form, admits of an easy application to ourselves. For do not we too accuse as well as excuse ourselves? And we call to our aid the rhetoric of prayer and preaching, which the mind silently employs while the struggle between the better and the worse is going on within us. And sometimes we are too hard upon ourselves, because we want to restore the balance which self-love has overthrown or disturbed; and then again we may hear a voice as of a parent consoling us. In religious diaries a sort of drama is often enacted by the consciences of men ‘accusing or else excusing them.’ For all our life long we are talking with ourselves:—What is thought but speech (Soph. 263 E)? What is feeling but rhetoric? And if rhetoric is used on one side only we shall be always in danger of being deceived. And so the words of Socrates, which at first sounded paradoxical, come home to the experience of all of us.

Third Thesis:—

We do not what we will, but what we wish.



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Socrates would teach us a lesson which we are slow to learn — that good intentions, and even benevolent actions, when they are not prompted by wisdom, are of no value. We believe something to be for our good which we afterwards find out not to be for our good. The consequences may be inevitable, for they may follow an invariable law, yet they may often be the very opposite of what is expected by us. When we increase pauperism by almsgiving; when we tie up property without regard to changes of circumstances; when we say hastily what we deliberately disapprove; when we do in a moment of passion what upon reflection we regret; when from any want of self-control we give another an advantage over us — we are doing not what we will, but what we wish. All actions of which the consequences are not weighed and foreseen, are of this impotent and paralytic sort; and the author of them has ‘the least possible power’ while seeming to have the greatest. For he is actually bringing about the reverse of what he intended. And yet the book of nature is open to him, in which he who runs may read if he will exercise ordinary attention; every day offers him experiences of his own and of other men’s characters, and he passes them unheeded by. The contemplation of the consequences of actions, and the ignorance of men in regard to them, seems to have led Soçrates to his famous thesis: — ‘Virtue is knowledge;’ which is not so much an error or paradox as a half truth, seen first in the twilight of ethical philosophy, but also the half of the truth which is especially needed in the present age. For as the world has grown older men have been too apt to imagine a right and wrong apart from consequences; while a few, on the other hand, have sought to resolve them wholly into their consequences. But Socrates, or Plato for him, neither divides nor identifies them; though the time has not yet arrived either for utilitarian or transcendental systems of moral philosophy, he recognizes the two elements which seem to lie at the basis of morality<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Compare the following: ‘Now, and for us, it is a time to Hellenize and to praise knowing; for we have Hebraized too much and have overvalued doing. But the habits and discipline received from Hebraism remain for our race an eternal possession. And as humanity is constituted, one must never assign them the second rank to-day without being ready to restore them to the first to-morrow.’ Sir William W. Hunter, Preface to Orissa.

Fourth Thesis :—

To be and not to seem is the end of life.

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The Greek in the age of Plato admitted praise to be one of the chief incentives to moral virtue, and to most men the opinion of their fellows is a leading principle of action. Hence a certain element of seeming enters into all things; all or almost all desire to appear better than they are, that they may win the esteem or admiration of others. A man of ability can easily feign the language of piety or virtue; and there is an unconscious as well as a conscious hypocrisy which, according to Socrates, is the worst of the two. Again, there is the sophistry of classes and professions. There are the different opinions about themselves and one another which prevail in different ranks of society. There is the bias given to the mind by the study of one department of human knowledge to the exclusion of the rest; and stronger far the prejudice engendered by a pecuniary or party interest in certain tenets. There is the sophistry of law, the sophistry of medicine, the sophistry of politics, the sophistry of theology. All of these disguises wear the appearance of the truth; some of them are very ancient, and we do not easily disengage ourselves from them; for we have inherited them, and they have become a part of us. The sophistry of an ancient Greek sophist is nothing compared with the sophistry of a religious order, or of a church in which during many ages falsehood has been accumulating, and everything has been said on one side, and nothing on the other. The conventions and customs which we observe in conversation, and the opposition of our interests when we have dealings with one another ('the buyer saith, it is nought — it is nought,' etc.), are always obscuring our sense of truth and right. The sophistry of human nature is far more subtle than the deceit of any one man. Few persons speak freely from their own natures, and scarcely any one dares to think for himself: most of us imperceptibly fall into the opinions of those around us, which we partly help to make. A man who would shake himself loose from them, requires great force of mind; he hardly knows where to begin in the search after truth. On every side he is met by the world, which is not an abstraction of theologians, but the most real of all things, being another name for ourselves



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when regarded collectively and subjected to the influences of society.

Then comes Socrates, impressed as no other man ever was, with the unreality and untruthfulness of popular opinion, and tells mankind that they must be and not seem. How are they to be? At any rate they must have the spirit and desire to be. If they are ignorant, they must acknowledge their ignorance to themselves; if they are conscious of doing evil, they must learn to do well; if they are weak, and have nothing in them which they can call themselves, they must acquire firmness and consistency; if they are indifferent, they must begin to take an interest in the great questions which surround them. They must try to be what they would fain appear in the eyes of their fellow-men. A single individual cannot easily change public opinion; but he can be true and innocent, simple and independent; he can know what he does, and what he does not know; and though not without an effort, he can form a judgment of his own, at least in common matters. In his most secret actions he can show the same high principle (cp. Rep. viii. 554 D) which he shows when supported and watched by public opinion. And on some fitting occasion, on some question of humanity or truth or right, even an ordinary man, from the natural rectitude of his disposition, may be found to take up arms against a whole tribe of politicians and lawyers, and be too much for them.

Who is the true and who the false statesman? —

The true statesman is he who brings order out of disorder; who first organizes and then administers the government of his own country; and having made a nation, seeks to reconcile the national interests with those of Europe and of mankind. He is not a mere theorist, nor yet a dealer in expedients; the whole and the parts grow together in his mind; while the head is conceiving, the hand is executing. Although obliged to descend to the world, he is not of the world. His thoughts are fixed not on power or riches or extension of territory, but on an ideal state, in which all the citizens have an equal chance of health and life, and the highest education is within the reach of all, and the moral and intellectual qualities of every individual are freely developed, and 'the idea of good' is the animating principle of the whole. Not the attainment of freedom alone, or of order alone, but how to

unite freedom with order is the problem which he has to solve. *Gorgias.*

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The statesman who places before himself these lofty aims has undertaken a task which will call forth all his powers. He must control himself before he can control others; he must know mankind before he can manage them. He has no private likes or dislikes; he does not conceal personal enmity under the disguise of moral or political principle: such meannesses, into which men too often fall unintentionally, are absorbed in the consciousness of his mission, and in his love for his country and for mankind. He will sometimes ask himself what the next generation will say of him; not because he is careful of posthumous fame, but because he knows that the result of his life as a whole will then be more fairly judged. He will take time for the execution of his plans; not hurrying them on when the mind of a nation is unprepared for them; but like the Ruler of the Universe Himself, working in the appointed time, for he knows that human life, 'if not long in comparison with eternity' (Rep. vi. 498 D), is sufficient for the fulfilment of many great purposes. He knows, too, that the work will be still going on when he is no longer here; and he will sometimes, especially when his powers are failing, think of that other 'city of which the pattern is in heaven' (Rep. ix. 592 B).

The false politician is the serving-man of the state. In order to govern men he becomes like them; their 'minds are married in conjunction;' they 'bear themselves' like vulgar and tyrannical masters, and he is their obedient servant. The true politician, if he would rule men, must make them like himself; he must 'educate his party' until they cease to be a party; he must breathe into them the spirit which will hereafter give form to their institutions. Politics with him are not a mechanism for seeming what he is not, or for carrying out the will of the majority. Himself a representative man, he is the representative not of the lower but of the higher elements of the nation. There is a better (as well as a worse) public opinion of which he seeks to lay hold; as there is also a deeper current of human affairs in which he is borne up when the waves nearer the shore are threatening him. He acknowledges that he cannot take the world by force — two or three moves on the political chessboard are all that he can foresee — two

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or three weeks or months are granted to him in which he can provide against a coming struggle. But he knows also that there are permanent principles of politics which are always tending to the well-being of states — better administration, better education, the reconciliation of conflicting elements, increased security against external enemies. These are not ‘of to-day or yesterday,’ but are the same in all times, and under all forms of government. Then when the storm descends and the winds blow, though he knows not beforehand the hour of danger, the pilot, not like Plato’s captain in the Republic, half-blind and deaf, but with penetrating eye and quick ear, is ready to take command of the ship and guide her into port.

The false politician asks not what is true, but what is the opinion of the world — not what is right, but what is expedient. The only measures of which he approves are the measures which will pass. He has no intention of fighting an uphill battle; he keeps the roadway of politics. He is unwilling to incur the persecution and enmity which political convictions would entail upon him. He begins with popularity, and in fair weather sails gallantly along. But unpopularity soon follows him. For men expect their leaders to be better and wiser than themselves: to be their guides in danger, their saviours in extremity; they do not really desire them to obey all the ignorant impulses of the popular mind; and if they fail them in a crisis they are disappointed. Then, as Socrates says, the cry of ingratitude is heard, which is most unreasonable; for the people, who have been taught no better, have done what might be expected of them, and their statesmen have received justice at their hands.

The true statesman is aware that he must adapt himself to times and circumstances. He must have allies if he is to fight against the world; he must enlighten public opinion; he must accustom his followers to act together. Although he is not the mere executor of the will of the majority, he must win over the majority to himself. He is their leader and not their follower, but in order to lead he must also follow. He will neither exaggerate nor undervalue the power of a statesman, neither adopting the ‘laissez faire’ nor the ‘paternal government’ principle; but he will, whether he is dealing with children in politics, or with full-grown men, seek to do for the people what the government can do for them, and what,



from imperfect education or deficient powers of combination, they cannot do for themselves. He knows that if he does too much for them they will do nothing; and that if he does nothing for them they will in some states of society be utterly helpless. For the many cannot exist without the few; if the material force of a country is from below, wisdom and experience are from above. It is not a small part of human evils which kings and governments make or cure. The statesman is well aware that a great purpose carried out consistently during many years will at last be executed. He is playing for a stake which may be partly determined by some accident, and therefore he will allow largely for the unknown element of politics. But the game being one in which chance and skill are combined, if he plays long enough he is certain of victory. He will not be always consistent, for the world is changing; and though he depends upon the support of a party, he will remember that he is the minister of the whole. He lives not for the present, but for the future, and he is not at all sure that he will be appreciated either now or then. For he may have the existing order of society against him, and may not be remembered by a distant posterity.

There are always discontented idealists in politics who, like Socrates in the *Gorgias*, find fault with all statesmen past as well as present, not excepting the greatest names of history. Mankind have an uneasy feeling that they ought to be better governed than they are. Just as the actual philosopher falls short of the one wise man, so does the actual statesman fall short of the ideal. And so partly from vanity and egotism, but partly also from a true sense of the faults of eminent men, a temper of dissatisfaction and criticism springs up among those who are ready enough to acknowledge the inferiority of their own powers. No matter whether a statesman makes high professions or none at all—they are reduced sooner or later to the same level. And sometimes the more unscrupulous man is better esteemed than the more conscientious, because he has not equally deceived expectations. Such sentiments may be unjust, but they are widely spread; we constantly find them recurring in reviews and newspapers, and still oftener in private conversation.

We may further observe that the art of government, while in some respects tending to improve, has in others a tendency to

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degenerate, as institutions become more popular. Governing for the people cannot easily be combined with governing by the people: the interests of classes are too strong for the ideas of the statesman who takes a comprehensive view of the whole. According to Socrates the true governor will find ruin or death staring him in the face, and will only be induced to govern from the fear of being governed by a worse man than himself (*Rep.* i. 347 C). And in modern times, though the world has grown milder, and the terrible consequences which Plato foretells no longer await an English statesman, any one who is not actuated by a blind ambition will only undertake from a sense of duty a work in which he is most likely to fail; and even if he succeed, will rarely be rewarded by the gratitude of his own generation.

Socrates, who is not a politician at all, tells us that he is the only real politician of his time. Let us illustrate the meaning of his words by applying them to the history of our own country. He would have said that not Pitt or Fox, or Canning or Sir R. Peel, are the real politicians of their time, but Locke, Hume, Adam Smith, Bentham, Ricardo. These during the greater part of their lives occupied an inconsiderable space in the eyes of the public. They were private persons; nevertheless they sowed in the minds of men seeds which in the next generation have become an irresistible power. 'Herein is that saying true, One soweth and another reapeth.' We may imagine with Plato an ideal statesman in whom practice and speculation are perfectly harmonized; for there is no necessary opposition between them. But experience shows that they are commonly divorced — the ordinary politician is the interpreter or executor of the thoughts of others, and hardly ever brings to the birth a new political conception. One or two only in modern times, like the Italian statesman Cavour, have created the world in which they moved. The philosopher is naturally unfitted for political life; his great ideas are not understood by the many; he is a thousand miles away from the questions of the day. Yet perhaps the lives of thinkers, as they are stiller and deeper, are also happier than the lives of those who are more in the public eye. They have the promise of the future, though they are regarded as dreamers and visionaries by their own contemporaries. And when they are no longer here, those who would have been ashamed of them during their lives claim kindred



with them, and are proud to be called by their names. (Cp. *Gorgias*. Thucyd. vi. 16.)

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Who is the true poet?

Plato expels the poets from his Republic because they are allied to sense; because they stimulate the emotions; because they are thrice removed from the ideal truth. And in a similar spirit he declares in the *Gorgias* that the stately muse of tragedy is a votary of pleasure and not of truth. In modern times we almost ridicule the idea of poetry admitting of a moral. The poet and the prophet, or preacher, in primitive antiquity are one and the same; but in later ages they seem to fall apart. The great art of novel writing, that peculiar creation of our own and the last century, which, together with the sister art of review writing, threatens to absorb all literature, has even less of seriousness in her composition. Do we not often hear the novel writer censured for attempting to convey a lesson to the minds of his readers?

Yet the true office of a poet or writer of fiction is not merely to give amusement, or to be the expression of the feelings of mankind, good or bad, or even to increase our knowledge of human nature. There have been poets in modern times, such as Goethe or Wordsworth, who have not forgotten their high vocation of teachers; and the two greatest of the Greek dramatists owe their sublimity to their ethical character. The noblest truths, sung of in the purest and sweetest language, are still the proper material of poetry. The poet clothes them with beauty, and has a power of making them enter into the hearts and memories of men. He has not only to speak of themes above the level of ordinary life, but to speak of them in a deeper and tenderer way than they are ordinarily felt, so as to awaken the feeling of them in others. The old he makes young again; the familiar principle he invests with a new dignity; he finds a noble expression for the common-places of morality and politics. He uses the things of sense so as to indicate what is beyond; he raises us through earth to heaven. He expresses what the better part of us would fain say, and the half-conscious feeling is strengthened by the expression. He is his own critic, for the spirit of poetry and of criticism are not divided in him. His mission is not to disguise men from themselves, but to reveal to them their own nature, and make them better acquainted with the world around them. True poetry is the remembrance of youth,

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of love, the embodiment in words of the happiest and holiest moments of life, of the noblest thoughts of man, of the greatest deeds of the past. The poet of the future may return to his greater calling of the prophet or teacher; indeed, we hardly know what may not be effected for the human race by a better use of the poetical and imaginative faculty. The reconciliation of poetry, as of religion, with truth, may still be possible. Neither is the element of pleasure to be excluded. For when we substitute a higher pleasure for a lower we raise men in the scale of existence. Might not the novelist, too, make an ideal, or rather many ideals of social life, better than a thousand sermons? Plato, like the Puritans, is too much afraid of poetic and artistic influences. But he is not without a true sense of the noble purposes to which art may be applied (Rep. iii. 401).

Modern poetry is often a sort of plaything, or, in Plato's language, a flattery, a sophistry, or sham, in which, without any serious purpose, the poet lends wings to his fancy and exhibits his gifts of language and metre. Such an one seeks to gratify the taste of his readers; he has the '*savoir faire*,' or trick of writing, but he has not the higher spirit of poetry. He has no conception that true art should bring order out of disorder (504 A); that it should make provision for the soul's highest interest (501 C); that it should be pursued only with a view to 'the improvement of the citizens' (502, 503). He ministers to the weaker side of human nature (Rep. x. 603-605); he idealizes the sensual; he sings the strain of love in the latest fashion; instead of raising men above themselves he brings them back to the 'tyranny of the many masters,' from which all his life long a good man has been praying to be delivered. And often, forgetful of measure and order, he will express not that which is truest, but that which is strongest. Instead of a great and nobly-executed subject, perfect in every part, some fancy of a heated brain is worked out with the strangest incongruity. He is not the master of his words, but his words—perhaps borrowed from another—the faded reflection of some French or German or Italian writer, have the better of him. Though we are not going to banish the poets, how can we suppose that such utterances have any healing or life-giving influence on the minds of men?

'Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter: ' Art then

must be true, and politics must be true, and the life of man must be true and not a seeming or sham. In all of them order has to be brought out of disorder, truth out of error and falsehood. This is what we mean by the greatest improvement of man. And so, having considered in what way 'we can best spend the appointed time, we leave the result with God' (512 E). Plato does not say that God will order all things for the best (cp. *Phaedo*, 97 C), but he indirectly implies that the evils of this life will be corrected in another. And as we are very far from the best imaginable world at present, Plato here, as in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*, supposes a purgatory or place of education for mankind in general, and for a very few a Tartarus or hell. The myth which terminates the dialogue is not the revelation, but rather, like all similar descriptions, whether in the Bible or Plato, the veil of another life. For no visible thing can reveal the invisible. Of this Plato, unlike some commentators on Scripture, is fully aware. Neither will he dogmatize about the manner in which we are 'born again' (*Rep.* vi. 498 D). Only he is prepared to maintain the ultimate triumph of truth and right, and declares that no one, not even the wisest of the Greeks, can affirm any other doctrine without being ridiculous.

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There is a further paradox of ethics, in which pleasure and pain are held to be indifferent, and virtue at the time of action and without regard to consequences is happiness. From this elevation or exaggeration of feeling Plato seems to shrink: he leaves it to the Stoics in a later generation to maintain that when impaled or on the rack the philosopher may be happy (cp. *Rep.* ii. 361 ff.). It is observable that in the *Republic* he raises this question, but it is not really discussed; the veil of the ideal state, the shadow of another life, are allowed to descend upon it and it passes out of sight. The martyr or sufferer in the cause of right or truth is often supposed to die in raptures, having his eye fixed on a city which is in heaven. But if there were no future, might he not still be happy in the performance of an action which was attended only by a painful death? He himself may be ready to thank God that he was thought worthy to do Him the least service, without looking for a reward; the joys of another life may not have been present to his mind at all. Do we suppose that the mediaeval



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saint, St. Bernard, St. Francis, St. Catharine of Sienna, or the Catholic priest who lately devoted himself to death by a lingering disease that he might solace and help others, was thinking of the 'sweets' of heaven? No; the work was already heaven to him and enough. Much less will the dying patriot be dreaming of the praises of man or of an immortality of fame: the sense of duty, of right, and trust in God will be sufficient, and as far as the mind can reach, in that hour. If he were certain that there were no life to come, he would not have wished to speak or act otherwise than he did in the cause of truth or of humanity. Neither, on the other hand, will he suppose that God has forsaken him or that the future is to be a mere blank to him. The greatest act of faith, the only faith which cannot pass away, is his who has not known, but yet has believed. A very few among the sons of men have made themselves independent of circumstances, past, present, or to come. He who has attained to such a temper of mind has already present with him eternal life; he needs no arguments to convince him of immortality; he has in him already a principle stronger than death. He who serves man without the thought of reward is deemed to be a more faithful servant than he who works for hire. May not the service of God, which is the more disinterested, be in like manner the higher? And although only a very few in the course of the world's history—Christ himself being one of them—have attained to such a noble conception of God and of the human soul, yet the ideal of them may be present to us, and the remembrance of them be an example to us, and their lives may shed a light on many dark places both of philosophy and theology.

*The Myths of Plato.*

The myths of Plato are a phenomenon unique in literature. There are four longer ones: these occur in the *Phaedrus* (244–256), *Phaedo* (110–115), *Gorgias* (523–527), and *Republic* (x. 614–621). That in the *Republic* is the most elaborate and finished of them. Three of these greater myths, namely those contained in the *Phaedo*, the *Gorgias* and the *Republic*, relate to the destiny of human souls in a future life. The magnificent myth in the

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Phaedrus treats of the immortality, or rather the eternity of the soul, in which is included a former as well as a future state of existence. To these may be added, (1) the myth, or rather fable, occurring in the Statesman (268–274), in which the life of innocence is contrasted with the ordinary life of man and the consciousness of evil: (2) the legend of the Island of Atlantis, an imaginary history, which is a fragment only, commenced in the Timaeus (21–26) and continued in the Critias: (3) the much less artistic fiction of the foundation of the Cretan colony which is introduced in the preface to the Laws (iii. 702), but soon falls into the background: (4) the beautiful but rather artificial tale of Prometheus and Epimetheus narrated in his rhetorical manner by Protagoras in the dialogue called after him (320–328): (5) the speech at the beginning of the Phaedrus (231–234), which is a parody of the orator Lysias; the rival speech of Socrates and the recantation of it (237–241). To these may be added (6) the tale of the grasshoppers, and (7) the tale of Thamus and of Theuth, both in the Phaedrus (259 and 274–5): (8) the parable of the Cave (Rep. vii. *ad init.*), in which the previous argument is recapitulated, and the nature and degrees of knowledge having been previously set forth in the abstract are represented in a picture: (9) the fiction of the earth-born men (Rep. iii. 414; cp. Laws ii. 664), in which by the adaptation of an old tradition Plato makes a new beginning for his society: (10) the myth of Aristophanes respecting the division of the sexes, Sym. 189: (11) the parable of the noble captain, the pilot, and the mutinous sailors (Rep. vi. 488), in which is represented the relation of the better part of the world, and of the philosopher, to the mob of politicians: (12) the ironical tale of the pilot who plies between Athens and Aegina charging only a small payment for saving men from death, the reason being that he is uncertain whether to live or die is better for them (Gorg. 511): (13) the treatment of freemen and citizens by physicians and of slaves by their apprentices,—a somewhat laboured figure of speech intended to illustrate the two different ways in which the laws speak to men (Laws iv. 720). There also occur in Plato continuous images; some of them extend over several pages, appearing and reappearing at intervals: such as the bees stinging and stingless (paupers and thieves) in the Eighth Book of the Republic (554), who are generated in the transition from timocracy to oligarchy:



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the sun, which is to the visible world what the idea of good is to the intellectual, in the Sixth Book of the Republic (508-9): the composite animal, having the form of a man, but containing under a human skin a lion and a many-headed monster (Rep. ix. 588-9): the great beast (vi. 493), i. e. the populace: and the wild beast within us, meaning the passions which are always liable to break out (ix. 571): the animated comparisons of the degradation of philosophy by the arts to the dishonoured maiden (vi. 495-6), and of the tyrant to the parricide, who 'beats his father, having first taken away his arms' (viii. 569): the dog, who is your only philosopher (ii. 376 B): the grotesque and rather paltry image of the argument wandering about without a head (Laws vi. 752), which is repeated, not improved, from the Gorgias (509 D): the argument personified as veiling her face (Rep. vi. 503 A), as engaged in a chase (iv. 427 C), as breaking upon us in a first, second and third wave (v. 457 C, 472 A, 473 C): — on these figures of speech the changes are rung many times over. It is observable that nearly all these parables or continuous images are found in the Republic; that which occurs in the Theaetetus (149 ff.), of the midwifery of Socrates, is perhaps the only exception. To make the list complete, the mathematical figure of the number of the state (Rep. viii. 546), or the numerical interval which separates king from tyrant (ix. 587-8), should not be forgotten.

The myth in the Gorgias is one of those descriptions of another life, which, like the Sixth Aeneid of Virgil, appear to contain reminiscences of the mysteries. It is a vision of the rewards and punishments which await good and bad men after death. It supposes the body to continue, and to be in another world what it has become in this. It includes a Paradiso, Purgatorio, and Inferno, like the sister myths of the Phaedo and the Republic. The Inferno is reserved for great criminals only. The argument of the dialogue is frequently referred to, and the meaning breaks through so as rather to destroy the liveliness and consistency of the picture. The structure of the fiction is very slight, the chief point or moral being that in the judgments of another world there is no possibility of concealment: Zeus has taken from men the power of foreseeing death, and brings together the souls both of them and their judges naked and undisguised at the judgment-seat. Both are exposed to view, stripped of the veils and clothes

which might prevent them from seeing into or being seen by one another.

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The myth of the *Phaedo* is of the same type, but it is more cosmological, and also more poetical. The beautiful and ingenious fancy occurs to Plato that the upper atmosphere is an earth and heaven in one, a glorified earth, fairer and purer than that in which we dwell. As the fishes live in the ocean, mankind are living in a lower sphere, out of which they put their heads for a moment or two and behold a world beyond. The earth which we inhabit is a sediment of the coarser particles which drop from the world above, and is to that heavenly earth what the desert and the shores of the ocean are to us. A part of the myth consists of description of the interior of the earth, which gives the opportunity of introducing several mythological names and of providing places of torment for the wicked. There is no clear distinction of soul and body; the spirits beneath the earth are spoken of as souls only, yet they retain a sort of shadowy form when they cry for mercy on the shores of the lake; and the philosopher alone is said to have got rid of the body. All the three myths in Plato which relate to the world below have a place for repentant sinners, as well as other homes or places for the very good and very bad. It is a natural reflection which is made by Plato elsewhere, that the two extremes of human character are rarely met with, and that the generality of mankind are between them. Hence a place must be found for them. In the myth of the *Phaedo* they are carried down the river *Acheron* to the *Acherusian lake*, where they dwell, and are purified of their evil deeds, and receive the rewards of their good. There are also incurable sinners, who are cast into *Tartarus*, there to remain as the penalty of atrocious crimes; these suffer everlastingly. And there is another class of hardly-curable sinners who are allowed from time to time to approach the shores of the *Acherusian lake*, where they cry to their victims for mercy; which if they obtain they come out into the lake and cease from their torments.

Neither this, nor any of the three greater myths of Plato, nor perhaps any allegory or parable relating to the unseen world, is consistent with itself. The language of philosophy mingles with that of mythology; abstract ideas are transformed into persons, figures of speech into realities. These myths may be compared

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with the Pilgrim's Progress of Bunyan, in which discussions of theology are mixed up with the incidents of travel, and mythological personages are associated with human beings: they are also garnished with names and phrases taken out of Homer, and with other fragments of Greek tradition.

The myth of the Republic is more subtle and also more consistent than either of the two others. It has a greater verisimilitude than they have, and is full of touches which recall the experiences of human life. It will be noticed by an attentive reader that the twelve days during which Er lay in a trance after he was slain coincide with the time passed by the spirits in their pilgrimage. It is a curious observation, not often made, that good men who have lived in a well-governed city (shall we say in a religious and respectable society?) are more likely to make mistakes in their choice of life than those who have had more experience of the world and of evil. It is a more familiar remark that we constantly blame others when we have only ourselves to blame; and the philosopher must acknowledge, however reluctantly, that there is an element of chance in human life with which it is sometimes impossible for man to cope. That men drink more of the waters of forgetfulness than is good for them is a poetical description of a familiar truth. We have many of us known men who, like Odysseus, have wearied of ambition and have only desired rest. We should like to know what became of the infants 'dying almost as soon as they were born' (x. 615 B), but Plato only raises, without satisfying, our curiosity. The two companies of souls, ascending and descending at either chasm of heaven and earth, and conversing when they come out into the meadow, the majestic figures of the judges sitting in heaven, the voice heard by Ardiaeus, are features of the great allegory which have an indescribable grandeur and power. The remark already made respecting the inconsistency of the two other myths must be extended also to this: it is at once an orrery, or model of the heavens, and a picture of the Day of Judgment.

The three myths are unlike anything else in Plato. There is an Oriental, or rather an Egyptian element in them, and they have an affinity to the mysteries and to the Orphic modes of worship. To a certain extent they are un-Greek; at any rate there is hardly anything like them in other Greek writings which



have a serious purpose; in spirit they are mediaeval. They are akin to what may be termed the underground religion in all ages and countries. They are presented in the most lively and graphic manner, but they are never insisted on as true; it is only affirmed that nothing better can be said about a future life. Plato seems to make use of them when he has reached the limits of human knowledge; or, to borrow an expression of his own, when he is standing on the outside of the intellectual world. They are very simple in style; a few touches bring the picture home to the mind, and make it present to us. They have also a kind of authority gained by the employment of sacred and familiar names, just as mere fragments of the words of Scripture, put together in any form and applied to any subject, have a power of their own. They are a substitute for poetry and mythology; and they are also a reform of mythology. The moral of them may be summed up in a word or two: After death the Judgment; and 'there is some better thing remaining for the good than for the evil.'

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All literature gathers into itself many elements of the past: for example, the tale of the earth-born men in the Republic appears at first sight to be an extravagant fancy, but it is restored to propriety when we remember that it is based on a legendary belief. The art of making stories of ghosts and apparitions credible is said to consist in the manner of telling them. The effect is gained by many literary and conversational devices, such as the previous raising of curiosity, the mention of little circumstances, simplicity, picturesqueness, the naturalness of the occasion, and the like. This art is possessed by Plato in a degree which has never been equalled.

The myth in the Phaedrus is even greater than the myths which have been already described, but is of a different character. It treats of a former rather than of a future life. It represents the conflict of reason aided by passion or righteous indignation on the one hand, and of the animal lusts and instincts on the other. The soul of man has followed the company of some god, and seen truth in the form of the universal before it was born in this world. Our present life is the result of the struggle which was then carried on. This world is relative to a former world, as it is often projected into a future. We ask the question, Where were men before

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birth? as we likewise enquire, What will become of them after death? The first question is unfamiliar to us, and therefore seems to be unnatural; but if we survey the whole human race, it has been as influential and as widely spread as the other. In the *Phaedrus* it is really a figure of speech in which the 'spiritual combat' of this life is represented. The majesty and power of the whole passage — especially of what may be called the theme or proem (beginning 'The mind through all her being is immortal') — can only be rendered very inadequately in another language.

The myth in the *Statesman* relates to a former cycle of existence, in which men were born of the earth, and by the reversal of the earth's motion had their lives reversed and were restored to youth and beauty: the dead came to life, the old grew middle-aged, and the middle-aged young; the youth became a child, the child an infant, the infant vanished into the earth. The connection between the reversal of the earth's motion and the reversal of human life is of course verbal only, yet Plato, like theologians in other ages, argues from the consistency of the tale to its truth. The new order of the world was immediately under the government of God; it was a state of innocence in which men had neither wants nor cares, in which the earth brought forth all things spontaneously, and God was to man what man now is to the animals. There were no great estates, or families, or private possessions, nor any traditions of the past, because men were all born out of the earth. This is what Plato calls the 'reign of Cronos;' and in like manner he connects the reversal of the earth's motion with some legend of which he himself was probably the inventor.

The question is then asked, under which of these two cycles of existence was man the happier, — under that of Cronos, which was a state of innocence, or that of Zeus, which is our ordinary life? For a while Plato balances the two sides of the serious controversy, which he has suggested in a figure. The answer depends on another question: What use did the children of Cronos make of their time? They had boundless leisure and the faculty of discoursing, not only with one another, but with the animals. Did they employ these advantages with a view to philosophy, gathering from every nature some addition to their store of knowledge? or, Did they pass their time in eating and drinking and telling stories to one another and to the beasts? — in either case there would be no



difficulty in answering. But then, as Plato rather mischievously adds, 'Nobody knows what they did,' and therefore the doubt must remain undetermined.

*Gorgias.*INTRODUC-  
TION.

To the first there succeeds a second epoch. After another natural convulsion, in which the order of the world and of human life is once more reversed, God withdraws his guiding hand, and man is left to the government of himself. The world begins again, and arts and laws are slowly and painfully invented. A secular age succeeds to a theocratical. In this fanciful tale Plato has dropped, or almost dropped, the garb of mythology. He suggests several curious and important thoughts, such as the possibility of a state of innocence, the existence of a world without traditions, and the difference between human and divine government. He has also carried a step further his speculations concerning the abolition of the family and of property, which he supposes to have no place among the children of Cronos any more than in the ideal state.

It is characteristic of Plato and of his age to pass from the abstract to the concrete, from poetry to reality. Language is the expression of the seen, and also of the unseen, and moves in a region between them. A great writer knows how to strike both these chords, sometimes remaining within the sphere of the visible, and then again comprehending a wider range and soaring to the abstract and universal. Even in the same sentence he may employ both modes of speech not improperly or inharmoniously. It is useless to criticise the broken metaphors of Plato, if the effect of the whole is to create a picture not such as can be painted on canvas, but which is full of life and meaning to the reader. A poem may be contained in a word or two, which may call up not one but many latent images; or half reveal to us by a sudden flash the thoughts of many hearts. Often the rapid transition from one image to another is pleasing to us: on the other hand, any single figure of speech if too often repeated, or worked out too much at length, becomes prosy and monotonous. In theology and philosophy we necessarily include both 'the moral law within and the starry heaven above,' and pass from one to the other (cp. for examples Psalm xviii. 1-25, xix. 1-9, etc.). Whether such a use of language is puerile or noble depends upon the genius of the writer or speaker, and the familiarity of the associations employed.

*Gorgias.*INTRODUC-  
TION.

In the myths and parables of Plato the ease and grace of conversation is not forgotten: they are spoken, not written words, stories which are told to a living audience, and so well told that we are more than half-inclined to believe them (cp. Phaedrus 274). As in conversation too, the striking image or figure of speech is not forgotten, but is quickly caught up, and alluded to again and again; as it would still be in our own day in a genial and sympathetic society. The descriptions of Plato have a greater life and reality than is to be found in any modern writing. This is due to their homeliness and simplicity. Plato can do with words just as he pleases; to him they are indeed 'more plastic than wax' (Rep. ix. 588 D). We are in the habit of opposing speech and writing, poetry and prose. But he has discovered a use of language in which they are united; which gives a fitting expression to the highest truths; and in which the trifles of courtesy and the familiarities of daily life are not overlooked.

# GORGIAS.

## PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

CALLICLES.

SOCRATES.

CHAEREPHON.

GORGIAS.

POLUS.

SCENE:—The house of Callicles.

Steph. *Callicles.* THE wise man, as the proverb says, is late for a  
447 fray, but not for a feast. *Gorgias.*

*Socrates.* And are we late for a feast?

*Cal.* Yes, and a delightful feast; for Gorgias has just been exhibiting to us many fine things.

*Soc.* It is not my fault, Callicles; our friend Chaerephon is to blame; for he would keep us loitering in the Agora.

*Chaerephon.* Never mind, Socrates; the misfortune of which I have been the cause I will also repair; for Gorgias is a friend of mine, and I will make him give the exhibition again either now, or, if you prefer, at some other time.

*Cal.* What is the matter, Chaerephon — does Socrates want to hear Gorgias?

*Chaer.* Yes, that was our intention in coming.

*Cal.* Come into my house, then; for Gorgias is staying with me, and he shall exhibit to you.

*Soc.* Very good, Callicles; but will he answer our questions? for I want to hear from him what is the nature of his art, and what it is which he professes and teaches; he may, as you [Chaerephon] suggest, defer the exhibition to some other time.

*Cal.* There is nothing like asking him, Socrates; and indeed to answer questions is a part of his exhibition, for he

SOCRATES,  
CALLICLES,  
CHAEREPHON.

*Gorgias.*

was saying only just now, that any one in my house might put any question to him, and that he would answer.

SOCRATES,

GORGIAS,

CHAEREPHON,

POLUS.

*Soc.* How fortunate! will you ask him, Chaerephon —?

*Chaer.* What shall I ask him?

*Soc.* Ask him who he is.

*Chaer.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* I mean such a question as would elicit from him, if he had been a maker of shoes, the answer that he is a cobbler. Do you understand?

*Chaer.* I understand, and will ask him: Tell me, Gorgias, is our friend Callicles right in saying that you undertake to answer any questions which you are asked?

*Gorgias.* Quite right, Chaerephon: I was saying as much only just now; and I may add, that many years have elapsed 448 since any one has asked me a new one.

*Chaer.* Then you must be very ready, Gorgias.

*Gor.* Of that, Chaerephon, you can make trial.

Polus offers to take the place of Gorgias in the argument.

*Polus.* Yes, indeed, and if you like, Chaerephon, you may make trial of me too, for I think that Gorgias, who has been talking a long time, is tired.

*Chaer.* And do you, Polus, think that you can answer better than Gorgias?

*Pol.* What does that matter if I answer well enough for you?

*Chaer.* Not at all:— and you shall answer if you like.

*Pol.* Ask:—

*Chaer.* My question is this: If Gorgias had the skill of his brother Herodicus, what ought we to call him? Ought he not to have the name which is given to his brother?

*Pol.* Certainly.

*Chaer.* Then we should be right in calling him a physician?

*Pol.* Yes.

The question is asked, 'What is Gorgias?'

*Chaer.* And if he had the skill of Aristophon the son of Aglaophon, or of his brother Polygnotus, what ought we to call him?

*Pol.* Clearly, a painter.

*Chaer.* But now what shall we call him — what is the art in which he is skilled?

*Pol.* O Chaerephon, there are many arts among mankind



which are experimental, and have their origin in experience, for experience makes the days of men to proceed according to art, and inexperience according to chance, and different persons in different ways are proficient in different arts, and the best persons in the best arts. And our friend Gorgias is one of the best, and the art in which he is a proficient is the noblest.

*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES,  
GORGAS,  
POLUS.

Answer:—  
Gorgias is  
one of the  
best profi-  
cients in the  
noblest art.

*Soc.* Polus has been taught how to make a capital speech, Gorgias; but he is not fulfilling the promise which he made to Chaerephon.

*Gor.* What do you mean, Socrates?

*Soc.* I mean that he has not exactly answered the question which he was asked.

*Gor.* Then why not ask him yourself?

*Soc.* But I would much rather ask you, if you are disposed to answer: for I see, from the few words which Polus has uttered, that he has attended more to the art which is called rhetoric than to dialectic.

*Pol.* What makes you say so, Socrates?

*Soc.* Because, Polus, when Chaerephon asked you what was the art which Gorgias knows, you praised it as if you were answering some one who found fault with it, but you never said what the art was.

This is no  
answer.

*Pol.* Why, did I not say that it was the noblest of arts?

*Soc.* Yes, indeed, but that was no answer to the question: nobody asked what was the quality, but what was the nature, of the art, and by what name we were to describe Gorgias.

449 And I would still beg you briefly and clearly, as you answered Chaerephon when he asked you at first, to say what this art is, and what we ought to call Gorgias: Or rather, Gorgias, let me turn to you, and ask the same question,—what are we to call you, and what is the art which you profess?

*Gor.* Rhetoric, Socrates, is my art.

*Soc.* Then I am to call you a rhetorician?

*Gor.* Yes, Socrates, and a good one too, if you would call me that which, in Homeric language, 'I boast myself to be.'

Better:—  
Gorgias is a  
rhetorician  
and a teacher  
of rhetoric.

*Soc.* I should wish to do so.

*Gor.* Then pray do.



*Gorgias.*SOCRATES,  
GORGIAS.

*Soc.* And are we to say that you are able to make other men rhetoricians?

*Gor.* Yes, that is exactly what I profess to make them, not only at Athens, but in all places.

*Soc.* And will you continue to ask and answer questions, Gorgias, as we are at present doing, and reserve for another occasion the longer mode of speech which Polus was attempting? Will you keep your promise, and answer shortly the questions which are asked of you?

*Gor.* Some answers, Socrates, are of necessity longer; but I will do my best to make them as short as possible; for a part of my profession is that I can be as short as any one.

*Soc.* That is what is wanted, Gorgias; exhibit the shorter method now, and the longer one at some other time.

*Gor.* Well, I will; and you will certainly say, that you never heard a man use fewer words.

*Soc.* Very good then; as you profess to be a rhetorician, and a maker of rhetoricians, let me ask you, with what is rhetoric concerned: I might ask with what is weaving concerned, and you would reply (would you not?), with the making of garments?

*Gor.* Yes.

*Soc.* And music is concerned with the composition of melodies?

*Gor.* It is.

*Soc.* By Herè, Gorgias, I admire the surpassing brevity of your answers.

*Gor.* Yes, Socrates, I do think myself good at that.

*Soc.* I am glad to hear it; answer me in like manner about rhetoric: with what is rhetoric concerned?

*Gor.* With discourse.

*Soc.* What sort of discourse, Gorgias?—such discourse as would teach the sick under what treatment they might get well?

*Gor.* No.

*Soc.* Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse?

*Gor.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* And yet rhetoric makes men able to speak?

*Gor.* Yes.

And rhetoric  
is concerned  
with dis-  
course.

*Soc.* And to understand that about which they speak?

*Gorgias.*

*Gor.* Of course.

*SOCRATES,  
GORGIAS.*

450 *Soc.* But does not the art of medicine, which we were just now mentioning, also make men able to understand and speak about the sick?

*Gor.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then medicine also treats of discourse?

*Gor.* Yes.

*Soc.* Of discourse concerning diseases?

*Gor.* Just so.

*Soc.* And does not gymnastic also treat of discourse concerning the good or evil condition of the body?

*Gor.* Very true.

*Soc.* And the same, Gorgias, is true of the other arts:—all of them treat of discourse concerning the subjects with which they severally have to do.

*But so are all  
the other arts.*

*Gor.* Clearly.

*Soc.* Then why, if you call rhetoric the art which treats of discourse, and all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not call them arts of rhetoric?

*Gor.* Because, Socrates, the knowledge of the other arts has only to do with some sort of external action, as of the hand; but there is no such action of the hand in rhetoric which works and takes effect only through the medium of discourse. And therefore I am justified in saying that rhetoric treats of discourse.

*Soc.* I am not sure whether I entirely understand you, but I dare say I shall soon know better; please to answer me a question:—you would allow that there are arts?

*Gor.* Yes.

*Soc.* As to the arts generally, they are for the most part concerned with doing, and require little or no speaking; in painting, and statuary, and many other arts, the work may proceed in silence; and of such arts I suppose you would say that they do not come within the province of rhetoric.

*Gor.* You perfectly conceive my meaning, Socrates.

*Soc.* But there are other arts which work wholly through the medium of language, and require either no action or very little, as, for example, the arts of arithmetic, of calculation, of geometry, and of playing draughts; in some of these speech

*You mean  
to say that  
rhetoric  
belongs to  
that class of  
arts which*

*Gorgias.*SOCRATES,  
GORGIAS.is chiefly con-  
cerned with  
words.

is pretty nearly co-extensive with action, but in most of them the verbal element is greater — they depend wholly on words for their efficacy and power: and I take your meaning to be that rhetoric is an art of this latter sort?

*Gor.* Exactly.

*Soc.* And yet I do not believe that you really mean to call any of these arts rhetoric; although the precise expression which you used was, that rhetoric is an art which works and takes effect only through the medium of discourse; and an adversary who wished to be captious might say, 'And so, Gorgias, you call arithmetic rhetoric.' But I do not think that you really call arithmetic rhetoric any more than geometry would be so called by you.

And yet you  
would not call  
arithmetic  
rhetoric.

451

*Gor.* You are quite right, Socrates, in your apprehension of my meaning.

*Soc.* Well, then, let me now have the rest of my answer:— seeing that rhetoric is one of those arts which works mainly by the use of words, and there are other arts which also use words, tell me what is that quality in words with which rhetoric is concerned:— Suppose that a person asks me about some of the arts which I was mentioning just now; he might say, 'Socrates, what is arithmetic?' and I should reply to him, as you replied to me, that arithmetic is one of those arts which take effect through words. And then he would proceed to ask: 'Words about what?' and I should reply, Words about odd and even numbers, and how many there are of each. And if he asked again: 'What is the art of calculation?' I should say, That also is one of the arts which is concerned wholly with words. And if he further said, 'Concerned with what?' I should say, like the clerks in the assembly, 'as aforesaid' of arithmetic, but with a difference, the difference being that the art of calculation considers not only the quantities of odd and even numbers, but also their numerical relations to themselves and to one another. And suppose, again, I were to say that astronomy is only words — he would ask, 'Words about what, Socrates?' and I should answer, that astronomy tells us about the motions of the stars and sun and moon, and their relative swiftness.

Illustrations.

*Gor.* You would be quite right, Socrates.*Soc.* And now let us have from you, Gorgias, the truth



about rhetoric: which you would admit (would you not?) to be one of those arts which act always and fulfil all their ends through the medium of words?

*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES,  
GORGIAS.

*Gor.* True.

*Soc.* Words which do what? I should ask. To what class of things do the words which rhetoric uses relate?

Rhetoric has  
to do with  
words: about  
the greatest  
and best of  
human things.

*Gor.* To the greatest, Socrates, and the best of human things.

*Soc.* That again, Gorgias, is ambiguous; I am still in the dark: for which are the greatest and best of human things? I dare say that you have heard men singing at feasts the old drinking song, in which the singers enumerate the goods of life, first health, beauty next, thirdly, as the writer of the song says, wealth honestly obtained.

452 *Gor.* Yes, I know the song; but what is your drift?

*Soc.* I mean to say, that the producers of those things which the author of the song praises, that is to say, the physician, the trainer, the money-maker, will at once come to you, and first the physician will say: 'O Socrates, Gorgias is deceiving you, for my art is concerned with the greatest good of men and not his.' And when I ask, Who are you? he will reply, 'I am a physician.' What do you mean? I shall say. Do you mean that your art produces the greatest good? 'Certainly,' he will answer, 'for is not health the greatest good? What greater good can men have, Socrates?' And after him the trainer will come and say, 'I too, Socrates, shall be greatly surprised if Gorgias can show more good of his art than I can show of mine.' To him again I shall say, Who are you, honest friend, and what is your business? 'I am a trainer,' he will reply, 'and my business is to make men beautiful and strong in body.' When I have done with the trainer, there arrives the money-maker, and he, as I expect, will utterly despise them all. 'Consider, Socrates,' he will say, 'whether Gorgias or any one else can produce any greater good than wealth.' Well, you and I say to him, and are you a creator of wealth? 'Yes,' he replies. And who are you? 'A money-maker.' And do you consider wealth to be the greatest good of man? 'Of course,' will be his reply. And we shall rejoin: Yes; but our friend Gorgias contends that his

But which  
are they?

*Gorgias.*SOCRATES,  
GORGIAS.

art produces a greater good than yours. And then he will be sure to go on and ask, 'What good? Let Gorgias answer.' Now I want you, Gorgias, to imagine that this question is asked of you by them and by me; What is that which, as you say, is the greatest good of man, and of which you are the creator? Answer us.

Freedom and  
power,

*Gor.* That good, Socrates, which is truly the greatest, being that which gives to men freedom in their own persons, and to individuals the power of ruling over others in their several states.

*Soc.* And what would you consider this to be?

and the word  
which gives  
them.

*Gor.* What is there greater than the word which persuades the judges in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the assembly, or at any other political meeting?—if you have the power of uttering this word, you will have the physician your slave, and the trainer your slave, and the money-maker of whom you talk will be found to gather treasures, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak and to persuade the multitude.

*Soc.* Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very accurately explained what you conceive to be the art of rhetoric; and you mean to say, if I am not mistaken, that rhetoric is the 453  
artificer of persuasion, having this and no other business, and that this is her crown and end. Do you know any other effect of rhetoric over and above that of producing persuasion?

Rhetoric is  
the art of  
persuading,  
says Gorgias.

*Gor.* No: the definition seems to me very fair, Socrates; for persuasion is the chief end of rhetoric.

*Soc.* Then hear me, Gorgias, for I am quite sure that if there ever was a man who entered on the discussion of a matter from a pure love of knowing the truth, I am such a one, and I should say the same of you.

*Gor.* What is coming, Socrates?

*Soc.* I will tell you: I am very well aware that I do not know what, according to you, is the exact nature, or what are the topics of that persuasion of which you speak, and which is given by rhetoric; although I have a suspicion about both the one and the other. And I am going to ask — what is this power of persuasion which is given by rhetoric, and about what? But why, if I have a suspicion, do I ask



instead of telling you? Not for your sake, but in order that the argument may proceed in such a manner as is most likely to set forth the truth. And I would have you observe, that I am right in asking this further question: If I asked, 'What sort of a painter is Zeuxis?' and you said, 'The painter of figures,' should I not be right in asking, 'What kind of figures, and where do you find them?'

*Gorgias.*

*SOCRATES,  
GORGIAS.*

*Gor.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And the reason for asking this second question would be, that there are other painters besides, who paint many other figures?

*Gor.* True.

*Soc.* But if there had been no one but Zeuxis who painted them, then you would have answered very well?

*Gor.* Quite so.

*Soc.* Now I want to know about rhetoric in the same way; — is rhetoric the only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts have the same effect? I mean to say — Does he who teaches anything persuade men of that which he teaches or not?

But so is arithmetic, so is painting.

*Gor.* He persuades, Socrates,—there can be no mistake about that.

*Soc.* Again, if we take the arts of which we were just now speaking:—do not arithmetic and the arithmeticians teach us the properties of number?

*Gor.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And therefore persuade us of them?

*Gor.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then arithmetic as well as rhetoric is an artificer of persuasion?

*Gor.* Clearly.

454 *Soc.* And if any one asks us what sort of persuasion, and about what,—we shall answer, persuasion which teaches the quantity of odd and even; and we shall be able to show that all the other arts of which we were just now speaking are artificers of persuasion, and of what sort, and about what.

*Gor.* Very true.

*Soc.* Then rhetoric is not the only artificer of persuasion?

*Gor.* True.

*Soc.* Seeing, then, that not only rhetoric works by per-

Gorgias.

SOCRATES,

GORGAS.

Of what  
persuasion  
is rhetoric  
the artificer?

suation, but that other arts do the same, as in the case of the painter, a question has arisen which is a very fair one: Of what persuasion is rhetoric the artificer, and about what? — is not that a fair way of putting the question?

Gor. I think so.

Soc. Then, if you approve the question, Gorgias, what is the answer?

Gor. I answer, Socrates, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion in courts of law and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about the just and unjust.

Soc. And that, Gorgias, was what I was suspecting to be your notion; yet I would not have you wonder if by-and-by I am found repeating a seemingly plain question; for I ask not in order to confute you, but as I was saying that the argument may proceed consecutively, and that we may not get the habit of anticipating and suspecting the meaning of one another's words; I would have you develope your own views in your own way, whatever may be your hypothesis.

Gor. I think that you are quite right, Socrates.

Soc. Then let me raise another question; there is such a thing as 'having learned'?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And there is also 'having believed'?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And is the 'having learned' the same as 'having believed,' and are learning and belief the same things?

Gor. In my judgment, Socrates, they are not the same.

Soc. And your judgment is right, as you may ascertain in this way:—If a person were to say to you, 'Is there, Gorgias, a false belief as well as a true?'—you would reply, if I am not mistaken, that there is.

Gor. Yes.

Soc. Well, but is there a false knowledge as well as a true?

Gor. No.

Soc. No, indeed; and this again proves that knowledge and belief differ.

Gor. Very true.

Soc. And yet those who have learned as well as those who have believed are persuaded?

Knowledge  
and belief are  
not the same  
things; for  
there may be a  
false belief, but  
not a false  
knowledge.

+

Gor. Just so.

Gorgias.

Soc. Shall we then assume two sorts of persuasion,—one which is the source of belief without knowledge, as the other is of knowledge?

SOCRATES,  
GORGIAS.

Gor. By all means.

Soc. And which sort of persuasion does rhetoric create in courts of law and other assemblies about the just and unjust, the sort of persuasion which gives belief without knowledge, or that which gives knowledge?

455 Gor. Clearly, Socrates, that which only gives belief.

Soc. Then rhetoric, as would appear, is the artificer of a persuasion which creates belief about the just and unjust, but gives no instruction about them?

'And rhetoric is only the creator of a belief, but gives no instruction.

Gor. True.

Soc. And the rhetorician does not instruct the courts of law or other assemblies about things just and unjust, but he creates belief about them; for no one can be supposed to instruct such a vast multitude about such high matters in a short time?

Gor. Certainly not.

Soc. Come, then, and let us see what we really mean about rhetoric; for I do not know what my own meaning is as yet. When the assembly meets to elect a physician or a shipwright or any other craftsman, will the rhetorician be taken into counsel? Surely not. For at every election he ought to be chosen who is most skilled; and, again, when walls have to be built or harbours or docks to be constructed, not the rhetorician but the master workman will advise; or when generals have to be chosen and an order of battle arranged, or a position taken, then the military will advise and not the rhetoricians: what do you say, Gorgias? Since you profess to be a rhetorician and a maker of rhetoricians, I cannot do better than learn the nature of your art from you. And here let me assure you that I have your interest in view as well as my own. For likely enough some one or other of the young men present might desire to become your pupil, and in fact I see some, and a good many too, who have this wish, but they would be too modest to question you. And therefore when you are interrogated by me, I would have you imagine that you are interrogated by them. 'What is the

Neither is the rhetorician taken into counsel when anything has to be done.



*Gorgias.*SOCRATES,  
GORGIAS.But, says  
Gorgias, he  
will persuade  
people to  
do it.

use of coming to you, Gorgias?' they will say — 'about what will you teach us to advise the state?—about the just and unjust only, or about those other things also which Socrates has just mentioned?' How will you answer them?

*Gor.* I like your way of leading us on, Socrates, and I will endeavour to reveal to you the whole nature of rhetoric. You must have heard, I think, that the docks and the walls of the Athenians and the plan of the harbour were devised in accordance with the counsels, partly of Themistocles, and partly of Pericles, and not at the suggestion of the builders.

*Soc.* Such is the tradition, Gorgias, about Themistocles; and I myself heard the speech of Pericles when he advised us about the middle wall.

*Gor.* And you will observe, Socrates, that when a decision 456 has to be given in such matters the rhetoricians are the advisers; they are the men who win their point.

*Soc.* I had that in my admiring mind, Gorgias, when I asked what is the nature of rhetoric, which always appears to me, when I look at the matter in this way, to be a marvel of greatness.

*Gor.* A marvel, indeed, Socrates, if you only knew how rhetoric comprehends and holds under her sway all the inferior arts. Let me offer you a striking example of this. On several occasions I have been with my brother Herodicus or some other physician to see one of his patients, who would not allow the physician to give him medicine, or apply the knife or hot iron to him; and I have persuaded him to do for me what he would not do for the physician just by the use of rhetoric. And I say that if a rhetorician and a physician were to go to any city, and had there to argue in the Ecclesia or any other assembly as to which of them should be elected state-physician, the physician would have no chance; but he who could speak would be chosen if he wished; and in a contest with a man of any other profession the rhetorician more than any one would have the power of getting himself chosen, for he can speak more persuasively to the multitude than any of them, and on any subject. Such is the nature and power of the art of rhetoric! And yet, Socrates, rhetoric should be used like any other competitive art, not against everybody,—the

The rhetori-  
cian more than  
a match for a  
man of any  
other profes-  
sion.

rhetorician ought not to abuse his strength any more than a pugilist or pancratiast or other master of fence;—because he has powers which are more than a match either for friend or enemy, he ought not therefore to strike, stab, or slay his friends. Suppose a man to have been trained in the palestra and to be a skilful boxer,—he in the fulness of his strength goes and strikes his father or mother or one of his familiars or friends; but that is no reason why the trainers or fencing-masters should be held in detestation or banished from the city;—surely not. For they taught their art for a good purpose, to be used against enemies and evil-doers, in self-defence not in aggression, and others have perverted their instructions, and turned to a bad use their own strength and skill. But not on this account are the teachers bad, neither is the art in fault, or bad in itself; I should rather say that those who make a bad use of the art are to blame. And the same argument holds good of rhetoric; for the rhetorician can speak against all men and upon any subject,—in short, he can persuade the multitude better than any other man of anything which he pleases, but he should not therefore seek to defraud the physician or any other artist of his reputation merely because he has the power; he ought to use rhetoric fairly, as he would also use his athletic powers. And if after having become a rhetorician he makes a bad use of his strength and skill, his instructor surely ought not on that account to be held in detestation or banished. For he was intended by his teacher to make a good use of his instructions, but he abuses them. And therefore he is the person who ought to be held in detestation, banished, and put to death, and not his instructor.

*Soc.* You, Gorgias, like myself, have had great experience of disputations, and you must have observed, I think, that they do not always terminate in mutual edification, or in the definition by either party of the subjects which they are discussing; but disagreements are apt to arise—somebody says that another has not spoken truly or clearly; and then they get into a passion and begin to quarrel, both parties conceiving that their opponents are arguing from personal feeling only and jealousy of themselves, not from any interest in the question at issue. And sometimes they will

Gorgias.

SOCRATES,  
GORGAS.

His pupils  
may make a  
bad use of his  
instructions,  
but he is not  
to be blamed  
for this.

If Gorgias,  
like Socrates,  
is one of those  
who rejoice in  
being refuted,  
he would like  
to cross-  
examine him;  
if not, not.



*Gorgias.*SOCRATES,  
GORGIAS,  
CHAEREPHON,  
CALICLES.

go on abusing one another until the company at last are quite vexed at themselves for ever listening to such fellows. Why do I say this? Why, because I cannot help feeling that you are now saying what is not quite consistent or accordant with what you were saying at first about rhetoric. And I am afraid to point this out to you, lest you should think that I have some animosity against you, and that I speak, not for the sake of discovering the truth, but from jealousy of you. Now if you are one of my sort, I should like to cross-examine you, but if not I will let you alone. And what is my sort? 458 you will ask. I am one of those who are very willing to be refuted if I say anything which is not true, and very willing to refute any one else who says what is not true, and quite as ready to be refuted as to refute; for I hold that this is the greater gain of the two, just as the gain is greater of being cured of a very great evil than of curing another. For I imagine that there is no evil which a man can endure so great as an erroneous opinion about the matters of which we are speaking; and if you claim to be one of my sort, let us have the discussion out, but if you would rather have done, no matter;—let us make an end of it.

*Gor.* I should say, Socrates, that I am quite the man whom you indicate; but, perhaps, we ought to consider the audience, for, before you came, I had already given a long exhibition, and if we proceed the argument may run on to a great length. And therefore I think that we should consider whether we may not be detaining some part of the company when they are wanting to do something else.

Delight of the  
audience at  
the prospect of  
an argument.

*Chaer.* You hear the audience cheering, Gorgias and Socrates, which shows their desire to listen to you; and for myself, Heaven forbid that I should have any business on hand which would take me away from a discussion so interesting and so ably maintained.

*Cal.* By the gods, Chaerephon, although I have been present at many discussions, I doubt whether I was ever so much delighted before, and therefore if you go on discoursing all day I shall be the better pleased.

*Soc.* I may truly say, Calicles, that I am willing, if Gorgias is.

*Gor.* After all this, Socrates, I should be disgraced if I

refused, especially as I have promised to answer all comers; in accordance with the wishes of the company, then, do you begin, and ask of me any question which you like.

*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES,  
GORGIAS.

*Soc.* Let me tell you then, Gorgias, what surprises me in your words; though I dare say that you may be right, and I may have misunderstood your meaning. You say that you can make any man, who will learn of you, a rhetorician?

*Gor.* Yes.

*Soc.* Do you mean that you will teach him to gain the ears of the multitude on any subject, and this not by instruction  
459 but by persuasion?

*Gor.* Quite so.

*Soc.* You were saying, in fact, that the rhetorician will have greater powers of persuasion than the physician even in a matter of health?

*Gor.* Yes, with the multitude,—that is.

*Soc.* You mean to say, with the ignorant; for with those who know he cannot be supposed to have greater powers of persuasion.

The rhetorician has greater powers of persuasion with the mob than e. g. the physician.

*Gor.* Very true.

*Soc.* But if he is to have more power of persuasion than the physician, he will have greater power than he who knows?

*Gor.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Although he is not a physician:—is he?

*Gor.* No.

*Soc.* And he who is not a physician must, obviously, be ignorant of what the physician knows.

*Gor.* Clearly.

*Soc.* Then, when the rhetorician is more persuasive than the physician, the ignorant is more persuasive with the ignorant than he who has knowledge?—is not that the inference?

*Gor.* In the case supposed:—yes.

*Soc.* And the same holds of the relation of rhetoric to all the other arts; the rhetorician need not know the truth about things; he has only to discover some way of persuading the ignorant that he has more knowledge than those who know?

The more ignorant therefore will have more power than he who knows.

*Gor.* Yes, Socrates, and is not this a great comfort?—not to have learned the other arts, but the art of rhetoric only,

*Gorgias.*SOCRATES,  
GORGIAS.

And is the  
rhetorician as  
ignorant of  
good and evil,  
just and un-  
just, as about  
special arts;  
or will Gorgias  
teach him  
these things  
first?

and yet to be in no way inferior to the professors of them?

*Soc.* Whether the rhetorician is or is not inferior on this account is a question which we will hereafter examine if the enquiry is likely to be of any service to us; but I would rather begin by asking, whether he is or is not as ignorant of the just and unjust, base and honourable, good and evil, as he is of medicine and the other arts; I mean to say, does he really know anything of what is good and evil, base or honourable, just or unjust in them; or has he only a way with the ignorant of persuading them that he not knowing is to be esteemed to know more about these things than some one else who knows? Or must the pupil know these things and come to you knowing them before he can acquire the art of rhetoric? If he is ignorant, you who are the teacher of rhetoric will not teach him—it is not your business; but you will make him seem to the multitude to know them, when he does not know them; and seem to be a good man, when he is not. Or will you be unable to teach him rhetoric 460 at all, unless he knows the truth of these things first? What is to be said about all this? By heaven, Gorgias, I wish that you would reveal to me the power of rhetoric, as you were saying that you would.

He must be  
taught.

*Gor.* Well, Socrates, I suppose that if the pupil does chance not to know them, he will have to learn of me these things as well.

✓ *Soc.* Say no more, for there you are right; and so he whom you make a rhetorician must either know the nature of the just and unjust already, or he must be taught by you.

*Gor.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Well, and is not he who has learned carpentering a carpenter?

*Gor.* Yes.

*Soc.* And he who has learned music a musician?

*Gor.* Yes.

*Soc.* And he who has learned medicine is a physician, in like manner? He who has learned anything whatever is that which his knowledge makes him.

*Gor.* Certainly.



*Soc.* And in the same way, he who has learned what is just is just? *Gorgias.*

*Gor.* To be sure.

*Soc.* And he who is just may be supposed to do what is just?

*Gor.* Yes.

*Soc.* And must not<sup>1</sup> the just man always desire to do what is just?

*Gor.* That is clearly the inference.

*Soc.* Surely, then, the just man will never consent to do injustice?

*Gor.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* And according to the argument the rhetorician must be a just man?

*Gor.* Yes.

*Soc.* And will therefore never be willing to do injustice?

*Gor.* Clearly not.

*Soc.* But do you remember saying just now that the trainer is not to be accused or banished if the pugilist makes a wrong use of his pugilistic art; and in like manner, if the rhetorician makes a bad and unjust use of his rhetoric, that is not to be laid to the charge of his teacher, who is not to be banished, but the wrong-doer himself who made a bad use of his rhetoric — he is to be banished — was not that said?

*Gor.* Yes, it was.

*Soc.* But now we are affirming that the aforesaid rhetorician will never have done injustice at all?

*Gor.* True.

*Soc.* And at the very outset, Gorgias, it was said that rhetoric treated of discourse, not [like arithmetic] about odd and even, but about just and unjust? Was not this said?

*Gor.* Yes.

*Soc.* I was thinking at the time, when I heard you saying so, that rhetoric, which is always discoursing about justice, could not possibly be an unjust thing. But when you added, shortly afterwards, that the rhetorician might make a bad use of rhetoric I noted with surprise the inconsistency into which you had fallen; and I said, that if you thought, as I did, that

SOCRATES,  
GORGAS.

He who has learned what is just, is admitted to be just and to act justly. But if so, the rhetorician, having learned what is just, must act justly, and can never therefore make an ill use of rhetoric.

<sup>1</sup> Omitting the words τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι and δὲ in next clause.

*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES,

POLUS.

there was a gain in being refuted, there would be an advantage in going on with the question, but if not, I would leave off. And in the course of our investigations, as you will see yourself, the rhetorician has been acknowledged to be incapable of making an unjust use of rhetoric, or of willingness to do injustice. By the dog, Gorgias, there will be a great deal of discussion, before we get at the truth of all this.

The paradoxes of Socrates arouse the ire of Polus.

*Polus.* And do even you, Socrates, seriously believe what you are now saying about rhetoric? What! because Gorgias was ashamed to deny that the rhetorician knew the just and the honourable and the good, and admitted that to any one who came to him ignorant of them he could teach them, and then out of this admission there arose a contradiction — the thing which you so dearly love, and to which not he, but you, brought the argument by your captious questions — [do you seriously believe that there is any truth in all this?] For will any one ever acknowledge that he does not know, or cannot teach, the nature of justice? The truth is, that there is great want of manners in bringing the argument to such a pass.

Socrates is willing enough to receive his correction, if he will only be brief.

*Soc.* Illustrious Polus, the reason why we provide ourselves with friends and children is, that when we get old and stumble, a younger generation may be at hand to set us on our legs again in our words and in our actions: and now, if I and Gorgias are stumbling, here are you who should raise us up; and I for my part engage to retract any error into which you may think that I have fallen — upon one condition:

*Pol.* What condition?

*Soc.* That you contract, Polus, the prolixity of speech in which you indulged at first.

'Am I to be deprived of speech in a free state?'

*Pol.* What! do you mean that I may not use as many words as I please?

'Am I to be compelled to listen?'

*Soc.* Only to think, my friend, that having come on a visit to Athens, which is the most free-spoken state in Hellas, you when you got there, and you alone, should be deprived of the power of speech — that would be hard indeed. But then consider my case: — shall not I be very hardly used, if, when you are making a long oration, and refusing to answer what you are asked, I am compelled to stay and listen to you, and may not go away? I say rather, if you have a real interest in the



argument, or, to repeat my former expression, have any desire to set it on its legs, take back any statement which you please; and in your turn ask and answer, like myself and Gorgias — refute and be refuted: for I suppose that you would claim to know what Gorgias knows — would you not?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* And you, like him, invite any one to ask you about anything which he pleases, and you will know how to answer him?

*Pol.* To be sure.

*Soc.* And now, which will you do, ask or answer?

*Pol.* I will ask; and do you answer me, Socrates, the same question which Gorgias, as you suppose, is unable to answer: What is rhetoric?

*Soc.* Do you mean what sort of an art?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* To say the truth, Polus, it is not an art at all, in my opinion.

*Pol.* Then what, in your opinion, is rhetoric?

*Soc.* A thing which, as I was lately reading in a book of yours, you say created art.

*Pol.* What thing?

*Soc.* I should say a sort of experience.

*Pol.* Does rhetoric seem to you to be an experience?

*Soc.* That is my view, but you may be of another mind.

*Pol.* An experience in what?

*Soc.* An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification.

*Pol.* And if able to gratify others, must not rhetoric be a fine thing?

*Soc.* What are you saying, Polus? Why do you ask me whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, when I have not as yet told you what rhetoric is?

*Pol.* Did I not hear you say that rhetoric was a sort of experience?

*Soc.* Will you, who are so desirous to gratify others, afford a slight gratification to me?

*Pol.* I will.

*Soc.* Will you ask me, what sort of an art is cookery?

*Pol.* What sort of an art is cookery?

*Gorgias.*

*SOCRATES,  
POLUS.*

Socrates in his answer contrives to give Polus a lesson.

Gorgias.

*Soc.* Not an art at all, Polus.

SOCRATES,

*Pol.* What then?

POLUS,

*Soc.* I should say an experience.

GORGAS.

*Pol.* In what? I wish that you would explain to me.

He puts

rhetoric and  
cooking in the  
same class;

*Soc.* An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification, Polus.

*Pol.* Then are cooking and rhetoric the same?

*Soc.* No, they are only different parts of the same profession.

*Pol.* Of what profession?

*Soc.* I am afraid that the truth may seem discourteous; and I hesitate to answer, lest Gorgias should imagine that I am making fun of his own profession. For whether or no this is that art of rhetoric which Gorgias practises I 463 really cannot tell:—from what he was just now saying, nothing appeared of what he thought of his art, but the rhetoric which I mean is a part of a not very creditable whole.

*Gor.* A part of what, Socrates? Say what you mean, and never mind me.

and that class  
is flattery.

*Soc.* In my opinion then, Gorgias, the whole of which rhetoric is a part is not an art at all, but the habit of a bold and ready wit, which knows how to manage mankind: this habit I sum up under the word 'flattery'; and it appears to me to have many other parts, one of which is cooking, which may seem to be an art, but, as I maintain, is only an experience or routine and not an art:—another part is rhetoric, and the art of attiring and sophistry are two others: thus there are four branches, and four different things answering to them. And Polus may ask, if he likes, for he has not as yet been informed, what part of flattery is rhetoric: he did not see that I had not yet answered him when he proceeded to ask a further question: Whether I do not think rhetoric a fine thing? But I shall not tell him whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, until I have first answered, 'What is rhetoric?' For that would not be right, Polus; but I shall be happy to answer, if you will ask me, What part of flattery is rhetoric?

*Pol.* I will ask, and do you answer? What part of flattery is rhetoric?

*Soc.* Will you understand my answer? Rhetoric, according to my view, is the ghost or counterfeit of a part of politics.

*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES,  
POLUS,  
GORGAS.

*Pol.* And noble or ignoble?

*Soc.* Ignoble, I should say, if I am compelled to answer, for I call what is bad ignoble:—though I doubt whether you understand what I was saying before.

Rhetoric is the shadow of a part of politics.

*Gor.* Indeed, Socrates, I cannot say that I understand myself.

*Soc.* I do not wonder, Gorgias; for I have not as yet explained myself, and our friend Polus, colt by name and colt by nature, is apt to run away<sup>1</sup>.

*Gor.* Never mind him, but explain to me what you mean by saying that rhetoric is the counterfeit of a part of politics.

'But what in the world does this mean?'

*Soc.* I will try, then, to explain my notion of rhetoric, and 464 if I am mistaken, my friend Polus shall refute me. We may assume the existence of bodies and of souls?

*Gor.* Of course.

*Soc.* You would further admit that there is a good condition of either of them?

*Gor.* Yes.

*Soc.* Which condition may not be really good, but good only in appearance? I mean to say, that there are many persons who appear to be in good health, and whom only a physician or trainer will discern at first sight not to be in good health.

Returning to first principles, Socrates assumes the existence of souls and bodies which may or may not be in a good condition, real or apparent.

*Gor.* True.

*Soc.* And this applies not only to the body, but also to the soul: in either there may be that which gives the appearance of health and not the reality?

*Gor.* Yes, certainly.

*Soc.* And now I will endeavour to explain to you more clearly what I mean: The soul and body being two, have two arts corresponding to them: there is the art of politics attending on the soul; and another art attending on the body, of which I know no single name, but which may be described as having two divisions, one of them gymnastic, and the other medicine. And in politics there is a legislative

To the soul corresponds the art of politics which has two parts, legislation and justice, and to the body cor-

<sup>1</sup> There is an untranslatable play on the name 'Polus,' which means 'a colt.'



*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES.

responds another nameless art of training which has two parts, medicine and gymnastic; and these four have four shams corresponding to them.

part, which answers to gymnastic, as justice does to medicine; and the two parts run into one another, justice having to do with the same subject as legislation, and medicine with the same subject as gymnastic, but with a difference. Now, seeing that there are these four arts, two attending on the body and two on the soul for their highest good; flattery knowing, or rather guessing their natures, has distributed herself into four shams or simulations of them; she puts on the likeness of some one or other of them, and pretends to be that which she simulates, and having no regard for men's highest interests, is ever making pleasure the bait of the unwary, and deceiving them into the belief that she is of the highest value to them. Cookery simulates the disguise of medicine, and pretends to know what food is the best for the body; and if the physician and the cook had to enter into a competition in which children were the judges, or men who had no more sense than children, as to which of them best understands the goodness or badness of food, the physician would be starved to death. A flattery I deem this to be and of an ignoble sort, Polus, for to you 465 I am now addressing myself, because it aims at pleasure without any thought of the best. An art I do not call it, but only an experience, because it is unable to explain or to give a reason of the nature of its own applications. And I do not call any irrational thing an art; but if you dispute my words, I am prepared to argue in defence of them.

Cookery, then, I maintain to be a flattery which takes the form of medicine; and tiring, in like manner, is a flattery which takes the form of gymnastic, and is knavish, false, ignoble, illiberal, working deceitfully by the help of lines, and colours, and enamels, and garments, and making men affect a spurious beauty to the neglect of the true beauty which is given by gymnastic.

I would rather not be tedious, and therefore I will only say, after the manner of the geometricians, (for I think that by this time you will be able to follow,)

as tiring : gymnastic :: cookery : medicine ;

or rather,

as tiring : gymnastic :: sophistry : legislation ;

The shams are cooking, dressing up, sophistry, rhetoric.

and

as cookery : medicine :: rhetoric : justice.

Gorgias.

SOCRATES,  
POLUS.

And this, I say, is the natural difference between the rhetorician and the sophist, but by reason of their near connection, they are apt to be jumbled up together, neither do they know what to make of themselves, nor do other men know what to make of them. For if the body presided over itself, and were not under the guidance of the soul, and the soul did not discern and discriminate between cookery and medicine, but the body was made the judge of them, and the rule of judgment was the bodily delight which was given by them, then the word of Anaxagoras, that word with which you, friend Polus, are so well acquainted, would prevail far and wide: 'Chaos' would come again, and cookery, health, and medicine would mingle in an indiscriminate mass. And now I have told you my notion of rhetoric, which is, in relation to the soul, what cookery is to the body. I may have been inconsistent in making a long speech, when I would not allow you to discourse at length. But I think that I may be excused, because you did not understand me, and could make no use of my answer when I spoke shortly, and there-  
466 fore I had to enter into an explanation. And if I show an equal inability to make use of yours, I hope that you will speak at equal length; but if I am able to understand you, let me have the benefit of your brevity, as is only fair: And now you may do what you please with my answer.

Socrates excuses himself for the length at which he has spoken.

*Pol.* What do you mean? do you think that rhetoric is flattery?

*Soc.* Nay, I said a part of flattery; if at your age, Polus, you cannot remember, what will you do by-and-by, when you get older?

*Pol.* And are the good rhetoricians meanly regarded in states, under the idea that they are flatterers?

*Soc.* Is that a question or the beginning of a speech?

*Pol.* I am asking a question.

*Soc.* Then my answer is, that they are not regarded at all.

*Pol.* How not regarded? Have they not very great power in states? Polus cannot be made to understand that rhetoricians have

*Soc.* Not if you mean to say that power is a good to the possessor.



*Gorgias.**Pol.* And that is what I do mean to say.SOCRATES,  
POLUS.*Soc.* Then, if so, I think that they have the least power of all the citizens.no real power  
in a state,  
because they  
do not do  
what they ul-  
timately will,  
but only what  
they think  
best.*Pol.* What! are they not like tyrants? They kill and despoil and exile any one whom they please.*Soc.* By the dog, Polus, I cannot make out at each deliverance of yours, whether you are giving an opinion of your own, or asking a question of me.*Pol.* I am asking a question of you.*Soc.* Yes, my friend, but you ask two questions at once.*Pol.* How two questions?*Soc.* Why, did you not say just now that the rhetoricians are like tyrants, and that they kill and despoil or exile any one whom they please?*Pol.* I did.*Soc.* Well then, I say to you that here are two questions in one, and I will answer both of them. And I tell you, Polus, that rhetoricians and tyrants have the least possible power in states, as I was just now saying; for they do literally nothing which they will, but only what they think best.*Pol.* And is not that a great power?*Soc.* Polus has already said the reverse.*Pol.* Said the reverse! nay, that is what I assert.*Soc.* No, by the great — what do you call him? — not you, for you say that great power is a good to him who has the power.*Pol.* I do.*Soc.* And would you maintain that if a fool does what he thinks best, this is a good, and would you call this great power?*Pol.* I should not.For a fool and  
a flatterer  
cannot know  
what is good.*Soc.* Then you must prove that the rhetorician is not a fool, and that rhetoric is an art and not a flattery — and so you will have refuted me; but if you leave me unrefuted, why, the rhetoricians who do what they think best in states, and the tyrants, will have nothing upon which to congratulate themselves, if, as you say, power be indeed a good, admitting at the same time that what is done without sense is an evil. 467*Pol.* Yes; I admit that.

*Soc.* How then can the rhetoricians or the tyrants have great power in states, unless Polus can refute Socrates, and prove to him that they do as they will?

*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES,  
POLUS.

*Pol.* This fellow —

*Soc.* I say that they do not do as they will;— now refute me.

*Pol.* Why, have you not already said that they do as they think best?

*Soc.* And I say so still.

*Pol.* Then surely they do as they will?

*Soc.* I deny it.

*Pol.* But they do what they think best?

*Soc.* Aye.

*Pol.* That, Socrates, is monstrous and absurd.

*Soc.* Good words, good Polus, as I may say in your own peculiar style; but if you have any questions to ask of me, either prove that I am in error or give the answer yourself.

*Pol.* Very well, I am willing to answer that I may know what you mean.

*Soc.* Do men appear to you to will that which they do, or to will that further end for the sake of which they do a thing? when they take medicine, for example, at the bidding of a physician, do they will the drinking of the medicine which is painful, or the health for the sake of which they drink?

*Pol.* Clearly, the health.

*Soc.* And when men go on a voyage or engage in business, they do not will that which they are doing at the time; for who would desire to take the risk of a voyage or the trouble of business?— But they will, to have the wealth for the sake of which they go on a voyage.

*Pol.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And is not this universally true? If a man does something for the sake of something else, he wills not that which he does, but that for the sake of which he does it.

A man cannot will unless he knows the ultimate good for the sake of which he acts.

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* And are not all things either good or evil, or intermediate and indifferent?

*Pol.* To be sure, Socrates.

*Gorgias.*SOCRATES,  
POLUS.

*Soc.* Wisdom and health and wealth and the like you would call goods, and their opposites evils?

*Pol.* I should.

*Soc.* And the things which are neither good nor evil, and 468 which partake sometimes of the nature of good and at other times of evil, or of neither, are such as sitting, walking, running, sailing; or, again, wood, stones, and the like:—these are the things which you call neither good nor evil?

*Pol.* Exactly so.

*Soc.* Are these indifferent things done for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the indifferent?

*Pol.* Clearly, the indifferent for the sake of the good.

*Soc.* When we walk we walk for the sake of the good, and under the idea that it is better to walk, and when we stand we stand equally for the sake of the good?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* And when we kill a man we kill him or exile him or despoil him of his goods, because, as we think, it will conduce to our good?

*Pol.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Men who do any of these things do them for the sake of the good?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* And did we not admit that in doing something for the sake of something else, we do not will those things which we do, but that other thing for the sake of which we do them?

*Pol.* Most true.

*Soc.* Then we do not will simply to kill a man or to exile him or to despoil him of his goods, but we will to do that which conduces to our good, and if the act is not conducive to our good we do not will it; for we will, as you say, that which is our good, but that which is neither good nor evil, or simply evil, we do not will. Why are you silent, Polus? Am I not right?

*Pol.* You are right.

*Soc.* Hence we may infer, that if any one, whether he be a tyrant or a rhetorician, kills another or exiles another or deprives him of his property, under the idea that the act is for his own interests when really not for his own interests, he may be said to do what seems best to him?



*Pol.* Yes.

*Gorgias.*

*Soc.* But does he do what he wills if he does what is evil? Why do you not answer?

SOCRATES,  
POLUS.

*Pol.* Well, I suppose not.

No man does  
what he wills  
who does  
what is evil.

*Soc.* Then if great power is a good as you allow, will such a one have great power in a state?

*Pol.* He will not.

*Soc.* Then I was right in saying that a man may do what seems good to him in a state, and not have great power, and not do what he wills?

*Pol.* As though you, Socrates, would not like to have the power of doing what seemed good to you in the state, rather than not; you would not be jealous when you saw any one killing or despoiling or imprisoning whom he pleased, Oh, no!

469 *Soc.* Justly or unjustly, do you mean?

*Pol.* In either case is he not equally to be envied?

*Soc.* Forbear, Polus!

*Pol.* Why 'forbear'?

*Soc.* Because you ought not to envy wretches who are not to be envied, but only to pity them.

*Pol.* And are those of whom I spoke wretches?

*Soc.* Yes, certainly they are.

*Pol.* And so you think that he who slays any one whom he pleases, and justly slays him, is pitiable and wretched?

He who  
makes a bad  
use of power  
is not to be  
envied, but  
pitied.

*Soc.* No, I do not say that of him: but neither do I think that he is to be envied.

*Pol.* Were you not saying just now that he ~~is~~ wretched?

*Soc.* Yes, my friend, if he killed another unjustly, in which case he is also to be pitied; and he is not to be envied if he killed him justly.

*Pol.* At any rate you will allow that he who is unjustly put to death is wretched, and to be pitied?

*Soc.* Not so much, Polus, as he who kills him, and not so much as he who is justly killed.

*Pol.* How can that be, Socrates?

*Soc.* That may very well be, inasmuch as doing injustice is the greatest of evils.

*Pol.* But is it the greatest? Is not suffering injustice a greater evil?

*Gorgias.**Soc.* Certainly not.SOCRATES,  
POLUS.*Pol.* Then would you rather suffer than do injustice?Better to  
suffer than to  
do injustice.*Soc.* I should not like either, but if I must choose between them, I would rather suffer than do.*Pol.* Then you would not wish to be a tyrant?*Soc.* Not if you mean by tyranny what I mean.*Pol.* I mean, as I said before, the power of doing whatever seems good to you in a state, killing, banishing, doing in all things as you like.A tyrant has  
no real power  
any more  
than a man  
who runs out  
into the  
Agora  
carrying a  
dagger.*Soc.* Well then, illustrious friend, when I have said my say, do you reply to me. Suppose that I go into a crowded Agora, and take a dagger under my arm. Polus, I say to you, I have just acquired rare power, and become a tyrant; for if I think that any of these men whom you see ought to be put to death, the man whom I have a mind to kill is as good as dead; and if I am disposed to break his head or tear his garment, he will have his head broken or his garment torn in an instant. Such is my great power in this city. And if you do not believe me, and I show you the dagger, you would probably reply: Socrates, in that sort of way any one may have great power — he may burn any house which he pleases, and the docks and triremes of the Athenians, and all their other vessels, whether public or private — but can you believe that this mere doing as you think best is great power?*Pol.* Certainly not such doing as this.*Soc.* But can you tell me why you disapprove of such a power? 470*Pol.* I can.*Soc.* Why then?*Pol.* Why, because he who did as you say would be certain to be punished.*Soc.* And punishment is an evil?*Pol.* Certainly.*Soc.* And you would admit once more, my good sir, that great power is a benefit to a man if his actions turn out to his advantage, and that this is the meaning of great power; and if not, then his power is an evil and is no power. But let us look at the matter in another way:—do we not acknowledge that the things of which we were speaking, the infliction of



death, and exile, and the deprivation of property are some-  
times a good and sometimes not a good?

*Pol.* Certainly.

*Soc.* About that you and I may be supposed to agree?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* Tell me, then, when do you say that they are good and when that they are evil — what principle do you lay down?

*Pol.* I would rather, Socrates, that you should answer as well as ask that question.

*Soc.* Well, Polus, since you would rather have the answer from me, I say that they are good when they are just, and evil when they are unjust.

*Pol.* You are hard of refutation, Socrates, but might not a child refute that statement?

*Soc.* Then I shall be very grateful to the child, and equally grateful to you if you will refute me and deliver me from my foolishness. And I hope that refute me you will, and not weary of doing good to a friend.

*Pol.* Yes, Socrates, and I need not go far or appeal to antiquity; events which happened only a few days ago are enough to refute you, and to prove that many men who do wrong are happy.

*Soc.* What events?

*Pol.* You see, I presume, that Archelaus the son of Perdiccas is now the ruler of Macedonia?

*Soc.* At any rate I hear that he is.

*Pol.* And do you think that he is happy or miserable?

*Soc.* I cannot say, Polus, for I have never had any acquaintance with him.

*Pol.* And cannot you tell at once, and without having an acquaintance with him, whether a man is happy?

*Soc.* Most certainly not.

*Pol.* Then clearly, Socrates, you would say that you did not even know whether the great king was a happy man?

*Soc.* And I should speak the truth; for I do not know how he stands in the matter of education and justice.

*Pol.* What! and does all happiness consist in this?

*Soc.* Yes, indeed, Polus, that is my doctrine; the men and

*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES,  
POLUS.

Even what we commonly call the evils of life may be goods in disguise.

Is the great king happy?

*Gorgias.*SOCRATES,  
POLUS.

women who are gentle and good are also happy, as I maintain, and the unjust and evil are miserable.

*Pol.* Then, according to your doctrine, the said Archelaus 471  
is miserable?

*Soc.* Yes, my friend, if he is wicked.

Polus attempts to prove the happiness of the unjust by the story of Archelaus, who has lately by many crimes gained the throne of Macedonia.

*Pol.* That he is wicked I cannot deny; for he had no title at all to the throne which he now occupies, he being only the son of a woman who was the slave of Alcetas the brother of Perdiccas; he himself therefore in strict right was the slave of Alcetas; and if he had meant to do rightly he would have remained his slave, and then, according to your doctrine, he would have been happy. But now he is unspeakably miserable, for he has been guilty of the greatest crimes: in the first place he invited his uncle and master, Alcetas, to come to him, under the pretence that he would restore to him the throne which Perdiccas had usurped, and after entertaining him and his son Alexander, who was his own cousin, and nearly of an age with him, and making them drunk, he threw them into a waggon and carried them off by night, and slew them, and got both of them out of the way; and when he had done all this wickedness he never discovered that he was the most miserable of all men, and was very far from repenting: shall I tell you how he showed his remorse? he had a younger brother, a child of seven years old, who was the legitimate son of Perdiccas, and to him of right the kingdom belonged; Archelaus, however, had no mind to bring him up as he ought and restore the kingdom to him; that was not his notion of happiness; but not long afterwards he threw him into a well and drowned him, and declared to his mother Cleopatra that he had fallen in while running after a goose, and had been killed. And now as he is the greatest criminal of all the Macedonians, he may be supposed to be the most miserable and not the happiest of them, and I dare say that there are many Athenians, and you would be at the head of them, who would rather be any other Macedonian than Archelaus!

Socrates sees no force in such arguments.

*Soc.* I praised you at first, Polus, for being a rhetorician rather than a reasoner. And this, as I suppose, is the sort of argument with which you fancy that a child might refute me, and by which I stand refuted when I say that the unjust

man is not happy. But, my good friend, where is the refutation? I cannot admit a word which you have been saying.

*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES,  
POLUS.

*Pol.* That is because you will not; for you surely must think as I do.

*Soc.* Not so, my simple friend, but because you will refute me after the manner which rhetoricians practise in courts of law. For there the one party think that they refute the other when they bring forward a number of witnesses of good repute in proof of their allegations, and their adversary has only a single one or none at all. But this kind of proof is of no value where truth is the aim; a man may often be sworn down by a multitude of false witnesses who have a great air of respectability. And in this argument nearly every one, Athenian and stranger alike, would be on your side, if you should bring witnesses in disproof of my statement;—you may, if you will, summon Nicias the son of Niceratus, and let his brothers, who gave the row of tripods which stand in the precincts of Dionysus, come with him; or you may summon Aristocrates, the son of Scellius, who is the giver of that famous offering which is at Delphi; summon, if you will, the whole house of Pericles, or any other great Athenian family whom you choose;—they will all agree with you: I only am left alone and cannot agree, for you do not convince me; although you produce many false witnesses against me, in the hope of depriving me of my inheritance, which is the truth. But I consider that nothing worth speaking of will have been effected by me unless I make you the one witness of my words; nor by you, unless you make me the one witness of yours; no matter about the rest of the world. For there are two ways of refutation, one which is yours and that of the world in general; but mine is of another sort—let us compare them, and see in what they differ. For, indeed, we are at issue about matters which to know is honourable and not to know disgraceful; to know or not to know happiness and misery—that is the chief of them. And what knowledge can be nobler? or what ignorance more disgraceful than this? And therefore I will begin by asking you whether you do not think that a man who is unjust and doing injustice can be happy, seeing that you think

The multitude of witnesses are nothing to him. He must convince his opponent and himself by argument.



*Gorgias.*SOCRATES,  
POLUS.

According to Polus the unjust man may be happy if he is unpunished: Socrates maintains that he is more happy, or less unhappy, if he meets with retribution.

Archelaus unjust, and yet happy? May I assume this to be your opinion?

*Pol.* Certainly.

*Soc.* But I say that this is an impossibility — here is one point about which we are at issue: — very good. And do you mean to say also that if he meets with retribution and punishment he will still be happy?

*Pol.* Certainly not; in that case he will be most miserable.

*Soc.* On the other hand, if the unjust be not punished, then, according to you, he will be happy?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* But in my opinion, Polus, the unjust or doer of unjust actions is miserable in any case, — more miserable, however, if he be not punished and does not meet with retribution, and less miserable if he be punished and meets with retribution at the hands of gods and men.

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*Pol.* You are maintaining a strange doctrine, Socrates.

*Soc.* I shall try to make you agree with me, O my friend, for as a friend I regard you. Then these are the points at issue between us — are they not? I was saying that to do is worse than to suffer injustice?

*Pol.* Exactly so.

*Soc.* And you said the opposite?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* I said also that the wicked are miserable, and you refuted me?

*Pol.* By Zeus I did.

*Soc.* In your own opinion, Polus.

*Pol.* Yes, and I rather suspect that I was in the right.

*Soc.* You further said that the wrong-doer is happy if he be unpunished?

*Pol.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And I affirm that he is most miserable, and that those who are punished are less miserable — are you going to refute this proposition also?

*Pol.* A proposition which is harder of refutation than the other, Socrates.

*Soc.* Say rather, Polus, impossible; for who can refute the truth?

*Pol.* What do you mean? If a man is detected in an

✓ unjust attempt to make himself a tyrant, and when detected is racked, mutilated, has his eyes burned out, and after having had all sorts of great injuries inflicted on him, and having seen his wife and children suffer the like, is at last impaled or tarred and burned alive, will he be happier than if he escape and become a tyrant, and continue all through life doing what he likes and holding the reins of government, the envy and admiration both of citizens and strangers? Is that the paradox which, as you say, cannot be refuted?

Soc. There again, noble Polus, you are raising hobgoblins instead of refuting me; just now you were calling witnesses against me. But please to refresh my memory a little; did you say — ‘in an unjust attempt to make himself a tyrant’?

Pol. Yes, I did.

Soc. Then I say that neither of them will be happier than the other,—neither he who unjustly acquires a tyranny, nor he who suffers in the attempt, for of two miserables one cannot be the happier, but that he who escapes and becomes a tyrant is the more miserable of the two. Do you laugh, Polus? Well, this is a new kind of refutation,—when any one says anything, instead of refuting him to laugh at him.

Pol. But do you not think, Socrates, that you have been sufficiently refuted, when you say that which no human being will allow? Ask the company.

474 Soc. O Polus, I am not a public man, and only last year, when my tribe were serving as Prytanes, and it became my duty as their president to take the votes, there was a laugh at me, because I was unable to take them. And as I failed then, you must not ask me to count the suffrages of the company now; but if, as I was saying, you have no better argument than numbers, let me have a turn, and do you make trial of the sort of proof which, as I think, is required; for I shall produce one witness only of the truth of my words, and he is the person with whom I am arguing; his suffrage I know how to take; but with the many I have nothing to do, and do not even address myself to them. May I ask then whether you will answer in turn and have your words put to the proof? For I certainly think that I and you and every man do really believe, that to do is a greater evil than to suffer injustice: and not to be punished than to be punished.

Gorgias.

SOCRATES,  
POLUS.

What nonsense!  
Do you mean that the man who expires among tor-  
tures is  
happier  
than the  
successful  
tyrant?

Neither is  
to be called  
happy if both  
are wicked.

Why refute  
what nobody  
believes?  
Ask the  
company.

Socrates  
never could  
count heads.  
[This is his  
description  
of one of  
the noblest  
actions of  
his life.]

Say rather,  
why affirm  
what every  
body knows?



*Gorgias.*SOCRATES,  
POLUS

*Pol.* And I should say neither I, nor any man: would you yourself, for example, suffer rather than do injustice?

*Soc.* Yes, and you, too; I or any man would.

*Pol.* Quite the reverse; neither you, nor I, nor any man.

*Soc.* But will you answer?

*Pol.* To be sure, I will; for I am curious to hear what you can have to say.

Polus, while denying that to do injustice is worse than to suffer, acknowledges it to be more disgraceful. Hence the shipwreck of his argument.

*Soc.* Tell me, then, and you will know, and let us suppose that I am beginning at the beginning: which of the two, Polus, in your opinion, is the worst?—to do injustice or to suffer?

*Pol.* I should say that suffering was worst.

*Soc.* And which is the greater disgrace?—Answer.

*Pol.* To do.

*Soc.* And the greater disgrace is the greater evil?

*Pol.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* I understand you to say, if I am not mistaken, that the honourable is not the same as the good, or the disgraceful as the evil?

*Pol.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Let me ask a question of you: When you speak of beautiful things, such as bodies, colours, figures, sounds, institutions, do you not call them beautiful in reference to some standard: bodies, for example, are beautiful in proportion as they are useful, or as the sight of them gives pleasure to the spectators; can you give any other account of personal beauty?

*Pol.* I cannot.

*Soc.* And you would say of figures or colours generally that they were beautiful, either by reason of the pleasure which they give, or of their use, or of both?

*Pol.* Yes, I should.

*Soc.* And you would call sounds and music beautiful for the same reason?

*Pol.* I should.

*Soc.* Laws and institutions also have no beauty in them except in so far as they are useful or pleasant or both?

*Pol.* I think not.

*Soc.* And may not the same be said of the beauty of knowledge?

*Pol.* To be sure, Socrates; and I very much approve of your measuring beauty by the standard of pleasure and utility.

*Soc.* And deformity or disgrace may be equally measured by the opposite standard of pain and evil?

*Pol.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then when of two beautiful things one exceeds in beauty, the measure of the excess is to be taken in one or both of these; that is to say, in pleasure or utility or both?

*Pol.* Very true.

*Soc.* And of two deformed things, that which exceeds in deformity or disgrace, exceeds either in pain or evil — must it not be so?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* But then again, what was the observation which you just now made, about doing and suffering wrong? Did you not say, that suffering wrong was more evil, and doing wrong more disgraceful?

*Pol.* I did.

*Soc.* Then, if doing wrong is more disgraceful than suffering, the more disgraceful must be more painful and must exceed in pain or in evil or both: does not that also follow?

*Pol.* Of course.

*Soc.* First, then, let us consider whether the doing of injustice exceeds the suffering in the consequent pain: Do the injurers suffer more than the injured?

*Pol.* No, Socrates; certainly not.

*Soc.* Then they do not exceed in pain?

*Pol.* No.

*Soc.* But if not in pain, then not in both?

*Pol.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Then they can only exceed in the other?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* That is to say, in evil?

*Pol.* True.

*Soc.* Then doing injustice will have an excess of evil, and will therefore be a greater evil than suffering injustice?

*Pol.* Clearly.

*Soc.* But have not you and the world already agreed that to do injustice is more disgraceful than to suffer?

*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES,  
POLUS.

All things may be measured by the standard of pleasure and utility or of pain and evil.

If to do is, as Polus admits, more disgraceful than to endure wrong, it must also be more evil.

*Gorgias.**Pol.* Yes.

SOCRATES,

*Soc.* And that is now discovered to be more evil?

POLUS.

*Pol.* True.

*Soc.* And would you prefer a greater evil or a greater dishonour to a less one? Answer, Polus, and fear not; for you will come to no harm if you nobly resign yourself into the healing hand of the argument as to a physician without shrinking, and either say 'Yes' or 'No' to me.

*Pol.* I should say 'No.'*Soc.* Would any other man prefer a greater to a less evil?

*Pol.* No, not according to this way of putting the case, Socrates.

Polus is  
refuted out  
of his own  
mouth.

*Soc.* Then I said truly, Polus, that neither you, nor I, nor any man, would rather do than suffer injustice; for to do injustice is the greater evil of the two.

*Pol.* That is the conclusion.

The next  
question:  
Is it better  
for the guilty  
to suffer or  
not to suffer  
punishment?

*Soc.* You see, Polus, when you compare the two kinds of refutations, how unlike they are. All men, with the exception of myself, are of your way of thinking; but your single assent and witness are enough for me,— I have no need of any other; I take your suffrage, and am regardless of the rest. Enough of this, and now let us proceed to the next question; which is, Whether the greatest of evils to a guilty man is to suffer punishment, as you supposed, or whether to escape punishment is not a greater evil, as I supposed. Consider:—You would say that to suffer punishment is another name for being justly corrected when you do wrong? 476

*Pol.* I should.

*Soc.* And would you not allow that all just things are honourable in so far as they are just? Please to reflect, and tell me your opinion.

*Pol.* Yes, Socrates, I think that they are.

*Soc.* Consider again:—Where there is an agent, must there not also be a patient?

*Pol.* I should say so.

*Soc.* And will not the patient suffer that which the agent does, and will not the suffering have the quality of the action? I mean, for example, that if a man strikes, there must be something which is stricken?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* And if the striker strikes violently or quickly, that which is struck will be struck violently or quickly?

*Pol.* True.

*Gorgias.*

*SOCRATES,*

*POLUS.*

*Soc.* And the suffering to him who is stricken is of the same nature as the act of him who strikes?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* And if a man burns, there is something which is burned?

*Pol.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And if he burns in excess or so as to cause pain, the thing burned will be burned in the same way?

*Pol.* Truly.

*Soc.* And if he cuts, the same argument holds — there will be something cut?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* And if the cutting be great or deep or such as will cause pain, the cut will be of the same nature?

*Pol.* That is evident.

*Soc.* Then you would agree generally to the universal proposition which I was just now asserting: that the affection of the patient answers to the act of the agent?

*Pol.* I agree.

*Soc.* Then, as this is admitted, let me ask whether being punished is suffering or acting?

*Pol.* Suffering, Socrates; there can be no doubt of that.

*Soc.* And suffering implies an agent?

*Pol.* Certainly, Socrates; and he is the punisher.

*Soc.* And he who punishes rightly, punishes justly?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* And therefore he acts justly?

*Pol.* Justly.

*Soc.* Then he who is punished and suffers retribution, suffers justly?

*Pol.* That is evident.

*Soc.* And that which is just has been admitted to be honourable?

*Pol.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then the punisher does what is honourable, and the punished suffers what is honourable?

*Pol.* True.

Since the affection of the patient answers to the act of the agent, it follows that he who is punished justly suffers justly, and therefore honourably,



*Gorgias.*SOCRATES,  
POLUS.

*Soc.* And if what is honourable, then what is good, for the honourable is either pleasant or useful?

477

*Pol.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then he who is punished suffers what is good?

*Pol.* That is true.

*Soc.* Then he is benefited?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* Do I understand you to mean what I mean by the term 'benefited'? I mean, that if he be justly punished his soul is improved.

*Pol.* Surely.

*Soc.* Then he who is punished is delivered from the evil of his soul?

*Pol.* Yes.

and is delivered from the greatest of all evils, the evil of the soul, which, being the most disgraceful, is also the most painful or hurtful.

*Soc.* And is he not then delivered from the greatest evil? Look at the matter in this way:—In respect of a man's estate, do you see any greater evil than poverty?

*Pol.* There is no greater evil.

*Soc.* Again, in a man's bodily frame, you would say that the evil is weakness and disease and deformity?

*Pol.* I should.

*Soc.* And do you not imagine that the soul likewise has some evil of her own?

*Pol.* Of course.

*Soc.* And this you would call injustice and ignorance and cowardice, and the like?

*Pol.* Certainly.

*Soc.* So then, in mind, body, and estate, which are three, you have pointed out three corresponding evils—injustice, disease, poverty?

*Pol.* True.

*Soc.* And which of the evils is the most disgraceful?—Is not the most disgraceful of them injustice, and in general the evil of the soul?

*Pol.* By far the most.

*Soc.* And if the most disgraceful, then also the worst?

*Pol.* What do you mean, Socrates?

*Soc.* I mean to say, that what is most disgraceful has been already admitted to be most painful or hurtful, or both.

*Pol.* Certainly.



*Soc.* And now injustice and all evil in the soul has been admitted by us to be most disgraceful?

*Gorgias.*

*Pol.* It has been admitted.

SOCRATES,  
POLUS.

*Soc.* And most disgraceful either because most painful and causing excessive pain, or most hurtful, or both?

*Pol.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And therefore to be unjust and intemperate, and cowardly and ignorant, is more painful than to be poor and sick?

*Pol.* Nay, Socrates; the painfulness does not appear to me to follow from your premises.

Polus  
stumbles at  
the notion  
which he  
has already  
admitted,  
that the evil  
of the soul is  
more painful  
than that of  
the body.

*Soc.* Then, if, as you would argue, not more painful, the evil of the soul is of all evils the most disgraceful; and the excess of disgrace must be caused by some preternatural greatness, or extraordinary hurtfulness of the evil.

*Pol.* Clearly.

*Soc.* And that which exceeds most in hurtfulness will be the greatest of evils?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then injustice and intemperance, and in general the depravity of the soul, are the greatest of evils?

*Pol.* That is evident.

*Soc.* Now, what art is there which delivers us from poverty? Does not the art of making money?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* And what art frees us from disease? Does not the art of medicine?

*Pol.* Very true.

478 *Soc.* And what from vice and injustice? If you are not able to answer at once, ask yourself whither we go with the sick, and to whom we take them.

*Pol.* To the physicians, Socrates.

*Soc.* And to whom do we go with the unjust and intemperate?

*Pol.* To the judges, you mean.

*Soc.* — Who are to punish them?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* And do not those who rightly punish others, punish them in accordance with a certain rule of justice?

*Pol.* Clearly.

*Gorgias.*SOCRATES,  
POLUS.

*Soc.* Then the art of money-making frees a man from poverty; medicine from disease; and justice from intemperance and injustice?

*Pol.* That is evident.

*Soc.* Which, then, is the best of these three?

*Pol.* Will you enumerate them?

*Soc.* Money-making, medicine, and justice.

*Pol.* Justice, Socrates, far excels the two others.

*Soc.* And justice, if the best, gives the greatest pleasure or advantage or both?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* But is the being healed a pleasant thing, and are those who are being healed pleased?

*Pol.* I think not.

*Soc.* A useful thing, then?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* Yes, because the patient is delivered from a great evil; and this is the advantage of enduring the pain — that you get well?

*Pol.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And would he be the happier man in his bodily condition, who is healed, or who never was out of health?

*Pol.* Clearly he who was never out of health.

*Soc.* Yes; for happiness surely does not consist in being delivered from evils, but in never having had them.

*Pol.* True.

*Soc.* And suppose the case of two persons who have some evil in their bodies, and that one of them is healed and delivered from evil, and another is not healed, but retains the evil — which of them is the most miserable?

*Pol.* Clearly he who is not healed.

*Soc.* And was not punishment said by us to be a deliverance from the greatest of evils, which is vice?

*Pol.* True.

*Soc.* And justice punishes us, and makes us more just, and is the medicine of our vice?

*Pol.* True.

*Soc.* He, then, has the first place in the scale of happiness who has never had vice in his soul; for this has been shown to be the greatest of evils.

Punishment is the deliverance from evil, and he who is punished, like him who is healed, is happier than he who is not punished or not healed.

Happiest of all is he who is just;

*Pol.* Clearly.

*Soc.* And he has the second place, who is delivered from vice?

*Pol.* True.

*Soc.* That is to say, he who receives admonition and rebuke and punishment?

*Pol.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then he lives worst, who, having been unjust, has no deliverance from injustice?

*Pol.* Certainly.

479 *Soc.* That is, he lives worst who commits the greatest crimes, and who, being the most unjust of men, succeeds in escaping rebuke or correction or punishment; and this, as you say, has been accomplished by Archelaus and other tyrants and rhetoricians and potentates<sup>1</sup>?

*Pol.* True.

*Soc.* May not their way of proceeding, my friend, be compared to the conduct of a person who is afflicted with the worst of diseases and yet contrives not to pay the penalty to the physician for his sins against his constitution, and will not be cured, because, like a child, he is afraid of the pain of being burned or cut:—Is not that a parallel case?

*Pol.* Yes, truly.

*Soc.* He would seem as if he did not know the nature of health and bodily vigour; and if we are right, Polus, in our previous conclusions, they are in a like case who strive to evade justice, which they see to be painful, but are blind to the advantage which ensues from it, not knowing how far more miserable a companion a diseased soul is than a diseased body; a soul, I say, which is corrupt and unrighteous and unholy. And hence they do all that they can to avoid punishment and to avoid being released from the greatest of evils; they provide themselves with money and friends, and cultivate to the utmost their powers of persuasion. But if we, Polus, are right, do you see what follows, or shall we draw out the consequences in form?

*Pol.* If you please.

*Soc.* Is it not a fact that injustice, and the doing of injustice, is the greatest of evils?

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. ix. 579, 580.

*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES,  
POLUS.

happy in the second degree he who is delivered from injustice by punishment, most deluded and most unhappy of all he who lives on, enjoying the fruit of his crimes.



*Gorgias.**Pol.* That is quite clear.SOCRATES,  
POLUS.*Soc.* And further, that to suffer punishment is the way to be released from this evil?*Pol.* True.*Soc.* And not to suffer, is to perpetuate the evil?*Pol.* Yes.*Soc.* To do wrong, then, is second only in the scale of evils; but to do wrong and not to be punished, is first and greatest of all?*Pol.* That is true.Archelaus  
then is more  
miserable  
than his  
victims.*Soc.* Well, and was not this the point in dispute, my friend? You deemed Archelaus happy, because he was a very great criminal and unpunished: I, on the other hand, maintained that he or any other who like him has done wrong and has not been punished, is, and ought to be, the most miserable of all men; and that the doer of injustice is more miserable than the sufferer; and he who escapes punishment, more miserable than he who suffers.—Was not that what I said?*Pol.* Yes.*Soc.* And it has been proved to be true?*Pol.* Certainly.*Soc.* Well, Polus, but if this is true, where is the great use of rhetoric? If we admit what has been just now said, every man ought in every way to guard himself against doing wrong, for he will thereby suffer great evil? 480*Pol.* True.Injustice, if  
not removed,  
will become  
the cancer of  
the soul.*Soc.* And if he, or any one about whom he cares, does wrong, he ought of his own accord to go where he will be immediately punished; he will run to the judge, as he would to the physician, in order that the disease of injustice may not be rendered chronic and become the incurable cancer of the soul; must we not allow this consequence, Polus, if our former admissions are to stand:—is any other inference consistent with them?*Pol.* To that, Socrates, there can be but one answer.The only use  
of rhetoric is  
that it enables  
a man to*Soc.* Then rhetoric is of no use to us, Polus, in helping a man to excuse his own injustice, or that of his parents or friends, or children or country; but may be of use to any one who holds that instead of excusing he ought to accuse—



himself above all, and in the next degree his family or any of his friends who may be doing wrong; he should bring to light the iniquity and not conceal it, that so the wrong-doer may suffer and be made whole; and he should even force himself and others not to shrink, but with closed eyes like brave men to let the physician operate with knife or searing iron, not regarding the pain, in the hope of attaining the good and the honourable; let him who has done things worthy of stripes, allow himself to be scourged, if of bonds, to be bound, if of a fine, to be fined, if of exile, to be exiled, if of death, to die, himself being the first to accuse himself and his own relations, and using rhetoric to this end, that his and their unjust actions may be made manifest, and that they themselves may be delivered from injustice, which is the greatest evil. Then, Polus, rhetoric would indeed be useful. Do you say 'Yes' or 'No' to that?

*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES,  
POLUS,  
CALLICLES.

expose his  
own injustice  
and to petition  
for speedy  
punishment.

*Pol.* To me, Socrates, what you are saying appears very strange, though probably in agreement with your premises.

*Soc.* Is not this the conclusion, if the premises are not disproven?

*Pol.* Yes; it certainly is.

*Soc.* And from the opposite point of view, if indeed it be our duty to harm another, whether an enemy or not — I except the case of self-defence — then I have to be upon my guard — but if my enemy injures a third person, then in every sort of way, by word as well as deed, I should try to prevent his being punished, or appearing before the judge; and if he appears, I should contrive that he should escape, and not suffer punishment: if he has stolen a sum of money, let him keep what he has stolen and spend it on him and his, regardless of religion and justice; and if he have done things worthy of death, let him not die, but rather be immortal in his wickedness; or, if this is not possible, let him at any rate be allowed to live as long as he can. For such purposes, Polus, rhetoric may be useful, but is of small if of any use to him who is not intending to commit injustice; at least, there was no such use discovered by us in the previous discussion.

A slighter and  
secondary use  
of rhetoric in  
self-defence  
against an  
enemy, or in  
preventing  
the punish-  
ment of an  
enemy.

*Cal.* Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest, or is he joking?

*Gorgias.*SOCRATES,  
CALLIAS,  
CHÆREPHON.Callicles asks  
in amazement  
whether  
Socrates really  
means what  
he says.I am only  
repeating the  
words of  
philosophy,  
whose lover I  
am. For as  
you love the  
Athenian  
people and  
their name-  
sake Demus,  
so I have two  
loves, philo-  
sophy and  
Alcibiades.✓  
The son of  
Cleinias is  
inconstant,  
but philo-  
sophy is ever  
the same: she  
it is whom  
you have to  
refute: I am  
only her  
mouthpiece.*Chær.* I should say, Callicles, that he is in most profound earnest; but you may as well ask him.*Cal.* By the gods, and I will. Tell me, Socrates, are you in earnest, or only in jest? For if you are in earnest, and what you say is true, is not the whole of human life turned upside down; and are we not doing, as would appear, in everything the opposite of what we ought to be doing?*Soc.* O Callicles, if there were not some community of feelings among mankind, however varying in different persons — I mean to say, if every man's feelings were peculiar to himself and were not shared by the rest of his species — I do not see how we could ever communicate our impressions to one another. I make this remark because I perceive that you and I have a common feeling. For we are lovers both, and both of us have two loves apiece:— I am the lover of Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, and of philosophy; and you of the Athenian Demus, and of Demus the son of Pylilampes. Now, I observe that you, with all your cleverness, do not venture to contradict your favourite in any word or opinion of his; but as he changes you change, backwards and forwards. When the Athenian Demus denies anything that you are saying in the assembly, you go over to his opinion; and you do the same with Demus, the fair young son of Pylilampes. For you have not the power to resist the words and ideas of your loves; and if a person were to express surprise at the strangeness of what you say from time to time when under their influence, you would probably reply to 482 him, if you were honest, that you cannot help saying what your loves say unless they are prevented; and that you can only be silent when they are. Now you must understand that my words are an echo too, and therefore you need not wonder at me; but if you want to silence me, silence philosophy, who is my love, for she is always telling me what I am now telling you, my friend; neither is she capricious like my other love, for the son of Cleinias says one thing to-day and another thing to-morrow, but philosophy is always true. She is the teacher at whose words you are now wondering, and you have heard her yourself. Her you must refute, and either show, as I was saying, that to do injustice and to escape punishment is not the worst of all evils; or, if you leave her

word unrefuted, by the dog the god of Egypt, I declare, O Callicles, that Callicles will never be at one with himself, but that his whole life will be a discord. And yet, my friend, I would rather that my lyre should be inharmonious, and that there should be no music in the chorus which I provided; aye, or that the whole world should be at odds with me, and oppose me, rather than that I myself should be at odds with myself, and contradict myself.

*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES,  
CALLICLES.

*Cal.* O Socrates, you are a regular declaimer, and seem to be running riot in the argument. And now you are declaiming in this way because Polus has fallen into the same error himself of which he accused Gorgias:—for he said that when Gorgias was asked by you, whether, if some one came to him who wanted to learn rhetoric, and did not know justice, he would teach him justice, Gorgias in his modesty replied that he would, because he thought that mankind in general would be displeased if he answered ‘No;’ and then in consequence of this admission, Gorgias was compelled to contradict himself, that being just the sort of thing in which you delight. Whereupon Polus laughed at you, deservedly, as I think; but now he has himself fallen into the same trap. I cannot say very much for his wit when he conceded to you that to do is more dishonourable than to suffer injustice, for this was the admission which led to his being entangled by you; and because he was too modest to say what he thought, he had his mouth stopped. For the truth is, Socrates, that you, who pretend to be engaged in the pursuit of truth, are appealing now to the popular and vulgar notions of right, which are not natural, but only conventional. Convention and nature are generally at variance with one another: and hence, if a person is too modest to say what he thinks, he is compelled to contradict himself; and you, in your ingenuity perceiving the advantage to be thereby gained, slyly ask of him who is arguing conventionally a question which is to be determined by the rule of nature; and if he is talking of the rule of nature, you slip away to custom: as, for instance, you did in this very discussion about doing and suffering injustice. When Polus was speaking of the conventionally dishonourable, you assailed him from the point of view of nature; for by the rule

Polus was  
vanquished  
because he  
refused to  
take a bold  
line.

Callicles  
would return  
to the rule of  
nature in the  
lower sense  
of the term.



*Gorgias.*

CALLICLES.

Convention  
was only in-  
troduced by  
the weak  
majority in  
order to pro-  
tect them-  
selves against  
the few strong.

of nature, to suffer injustice is the greater disgrace because the greater evil; but conventionally, to do evil is the more disgraceful. For the suffering of injustice is not the part of a man, but of a slave, who indeed had better die than live; since when he is wronged and trampled upon, he is unable to help himself, or any other about whom he cares. The reason, as I conceive, is that the makers of laws are the majority who are weak; and they make laws and distribute praises and censures with a view to themselves and to their own interests; and they terrify the stronger sort of men, and those who are able to get the better of them, in order that they may not get the better of them; and they say, that dishonesty is shameful and unjust; meaning, by the word injustice, the desire of a man to have more than his neighbours; for knowing their own inferiority, I suspect that they are too glad of equality. } And therefore the endeavour to have more than the many, is conventionally said to be shameful and unjust, and is called injustice<sup>1</sup>, whereas nature herself intimates that it is just for the better to have more than the worse, the more powerful than the weaker; and in many ways she shows, among men as well as among animals, and indeed among whole cities and races, that justice consists in the superior ruling over and having more than the inferior. For on what principle of justice did Xerxes invade Hellas, or his father the Scythians? (not to speak of numberless other examples). Nay, but these are the men who act according to nature; yes, by Heaven, and according to the law of nature: not, perhaps, according to that artificial law, which we invent and impose upon our fellows, of whom we take the best and strongest from their youth upwards, and tame them like young lions,—charming them with the sound 484 of the voice, and saying to them, that with equality they must be content, and that the equal is the honourable and the just. But if there were a man who had sufficient force, he would shake off and break through, and escape from all this; he would trample under foot all our formulas and spells and charms, and all our laws which are against nature: the slave would rise in rebellion and be lord over us, and the light of natural justice would shine forth. And this I take to be the

A man of  
courage  
would easily  
break down  
the guards of  
convention.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. ii. 359.



sentiment of Pindar, when he says in his poem, that

*Gorgias.*

‘ Law is the king of all, of mortals as well as of immortals ; ’

*CALLICLES.*

this, as he says,

‘ Makes might to be right, doing violence with highest hand ; as I infer from the deeds of Heracles, for without buying them — ’<sup>1</sup>

*Pindar.*

— I do not remember the exact words, but the meaning is, that without buying them, and without their being given to him, he carried off the oxen of Geryon, according to the law of natural right, and that the oxen and other possessions of the weaker and inferior properly belong to the stronger and superior. And this is true, as you may ascertain, if you will leave philosophy and go on to higher things: for philosophy, Socrates, if pursued in moderation and at the proper age, is an elegant accomplishment, but too much philosophy is the ruin of human life. Even if a man has good parts, still, if he carries philosophy into later life, he is necessarily ignorant of all those things which a gentleman and a person of honour ought to know ; he is inexperienced in the laws of the State, and in the language which ought to be used in the dealings of man with man, whether private or public, and utterly ignorant of the pleasures and desires of mankind and of human character in general. And people of this sort, when they betake themselves to politics or business, are as ridiculous as I imagine the politicians to be, when they make their appearance in the arena of philosophy. For, as Euripides says,

A little philosophy not a bad thing in youth.

‘ Every man shines in that and pursues that, and devotes the greatest portion of the day to that in which he most excels<sup>2</sup>, ’

*Euripides.*

485 but anything in which he is inferior, he avoids and depreciates, and praises the opposite from partiality to himself, and because he thinks that he will thus praise himself. The true principle is to unite them. Philosophy, as a part of education, is an excellent thing, and there is no disgrace to a man while he is young in pursuing such a study ; but when he is more advanced in years, the thing becomes ridiculous, and I feel towards philosophers as I do towards those who lisp and imitate children. For I love to see a little child, who is not

<sup>1</sup> *Fragm. Incert. 151 (Böckh).*    <sup>2</sup> *Antiope, fragm. 20 (Dindorf).*

*Gorgias*

CALLICLES.

But the study  
should not be  
continued into  
later life.

of an age to speak plainly, lisping at his play; there is an appearance of grace and freedom in his utterance, which is natural to his childish years. But when I hear some small creature carefully articulating its words, I am offended; the sound is disagreeable, and has to my ears the twang of slavery. So when I hear a man lisping, or see him playing like a child, his behaviour appears to me ridiculous and unmanly and worthy of stripes. And I have the same feeling about students of philosophy; when I see a youth thus engaged,—the study appears to me to be in character, and becoming a man of a liberal education, and him who neglects philosophy I regard as an inferior man, who will never aspire to anything great or noble. But if I see him continuing the study in later life, and not leaving off, I should like to beat him, Socrates; for, as I was saying, such a one, even though he have good natural parts, becomes effeminate. He flies from the busy centre and the market-place, in which, as the poet says, men become distinguished; he creeps into a corner for the rest of his life, and talks in a whisper with three or four admiring youths, but never speaks out like a freeman in a satisfactory manner. Now I, Socrates, am very well inclined towards you, and my feeling may be compared with that of Zethus towards Amphion, in the play of Euripides, whom I was mentioning just now: for I am disposed to say to you much what Zethus said to his brother, that you, Socrates, are careless about the things of which you ought to be careful; and that you

‘Who have a soul so noble, are remarkable for a puerile exterior;  
Neither in a court of justice could you state a case, or give any reason  
or proof,  
Or offer valiant counsel on another’s behalf.’

486

And you must not be offended, my dear Socrates, for I am speaking out of good-will towards you, if I ask whether you are not ashamed of being thus defenceless; which I affirm to be the condition not of you only but of all those who will carry the study of philosophy too far. For suppose that some one were to take you, or any one of your sort, off to prison, declaring that you had done wrong when you had done no wrong, you must allow that you would not know what to do:—there you would stand giddy and gaping, and

not having a word to say ; and when you went up before the Court, even if the accuser were a poor creature and not good for much, you would die if he were disposed to claim the penalty of death. And yet, Socrates, what is the value of

*Gorgias.*

*SOCRATES,  
CALLICLES.*

‘ An art which converts a man of sense into a fool,’

who is helpless, and has no power to save either himself or others, when he is in the greatest danger and is going to be despoiled by his enemies of all his goods, and has to live, simply deprived of his rights of citizenship?—he being a man who, if I may use the expression, may be boxed on the ears with impunity. Then, my good friend, take my advice, and refute no more :

‘ Learn the philosophy of business, and acquire the reputation of wisdom.  
But leave to others these niceties,’

whether they are to be described as follies or absurdities :

‘ For they will only  
Give you poverty for the inmate of your dwelling.’

Cease, then, emulating these paltry splitters of words, and emulate only the man of substance and honour, who is well to do.

*Soc.* If my soul, Callicles, were made of gold, should I not rejoice to discover one of those stones with which they test gold, and the very best possible one to which I might bring my soul ; and if the stone and I agreed in approving of her training, then I should know that I was in a satisfactory state, and that no other test was needed by me.

*Callicles  
the desired  
touchstone  
of Socrates.*

*Cal.* What is your meaning, Socrates?

*Soc.* I will tell you ; I think that I have found in you the desired touchstone.

*Cal.* Why?

*Soc.* Because I am sure that if you agree with me in any of the opinions which my soul forms, I have at last found the truth indeed. For I consider that if a man is to make a  
487 complete trial of the good or evil of the soul, he ought to have three qualities—knowledge, good-will, outspokenness, which are all possessed by you. Many whom I meet are unable to make trial of me, because they are not wise as you are ; others are wise, but they will not tell me the truth, because



*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES.

Other men  
have not the  
knowledge or  
frankness or  
good-will  
which is  
required; and  
they are too  
modest. His  
sincerity is  
shown by his  
consistency.

they have not the same interest in me which you have; and these two strangers, Gorgias and Polus, are undoubtedly wise men and my very good friends, but they are not outspoken enough, and they are too modest. Why, their modesty is so great that they are driven to contradict themselves, first one and then the other of them, in the face of a large company, on matters of the highest moment. But you have all the qualities in which these others are deficient, having received an excellent education; to this many Athenians can testify. And you are my friend. Shall I tell you why I think so? I know that you, Callicles, and Tisander of Aphidnae, and Andron the son of Androtion, and Nausicydes of the deme of Cholargos, studied together: there were four of you, and I once heard you advising with one another as to the extent to which the pursuit of philosophy should be carried, and, as I know, you came to the conclusion that the study should not be pushed too much into detail. You were cautioning one another not to be overwise; you were afraid that too much wisdom might unconsciously to yourselves be the ruin of you. And now when I hear you giving the same advice to me which you then gave to your most intimate friends, I have a sufficient evidence of your real good-will to me. And of the frankness of your nature and freedom from modesty I am assured by yourself, and the assurance is confirmed by your last speech. Well then, the inference in the present case clearly is, that if you agree with me in an argument about any point, that point will have been sufficiently tested by us, and will not require to be submitted to any further test. For you could not have agreed with me, either from lack of knowledge or from superfluity of modesty, nor yet from a desire to deceive me, for you are my friend, as you tell me yourself. And therefore when you and I are agreed, the result will be the attainment of perfect truth. Now there is no nobler enquiry, Callicles, than that which you censure me for making,—What ought the character of a man to be, and what his pursuits, and how far is he to go, both in maturer years and in youth? For be assured that if I err in my own conduct I do not err intentionally, 488 but from ignorance. Do not then desist from advising me, now that you have begun, until I have learned clearly what



this is which I am to practise, and how I may acquire it. And if you find me assenting to your words, and hereafter not doing that to which I assented, call me 'dolt,' and deem me unworthy of receiving further instruction. Once more, then, tell me what you and Pindar mean by natural justice: Do you not mean that the superior should take the property of the inferior by force; that the better should rule the worse, the noble have more than the mean? Am I not right in my recollection?

*Cal.* Yes; that is what I was saying, and so I still aver.

*Soc.* And do you mean by the better the same as the superior? for I could not make out what you were saying at the time — whether you meant by the superior the stronger, and that the weaker must obey the stronger, as you seemed to imply when you said that great cities attack small ones in accordance with natural right, because they are superior and stronger, as though the superior and stronger and better were the same; or whether the better may be also the inferior and weaker, and the superior the worse, or whether better is to be defined in the same way as superior:—this is the point which I want to have cleared up. Are the superior and better and stronger the same or different?

*Cal.* I say unequivocally that they are the same.

*Soc.* Then the many are by nature superior to the one, against whom, as you were saying, they make the laws?

*Cal.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then the laws of the many are the laws of the superior?

*Cal.* Very true.

*Soc.* Then they are the laws of the better; for the superior class are far better, as you were saying?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And since they are superior, the laws which are made by them are by nature good?

*Cal.* Yes.

489 *Soc.* And are not the many of opinion, as you were lately saying, that justice is equality, and that to do is more disgraceful than to suffer injustice?—is that so or not? Answer, Callicles, and let no modesty be found to come in the way<sup>1</sup>;

<sup>1</sup> Cp. what is said of Gorgias by Callicles at p. 482.

*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES,  
CALICLES. -

But still he  
would ask,  
What Calicles  
means by the  
superior?

He means the  
better and  
stronger, and  
therefore the  
many who  
make the laws,  
which are  
noble because  
they are made  
by the better.

And the many  
are also of  
opinion that  
to do

*Gorgias.*SOCRATES,  
CALLICLES.is more disgraceful than  
to suffer  
injustice.

do the many think, or do they not think thus?—I must beg of you to answer, in order that if you agree with me I may fortify myself by the assent of so competent an authority.

*Cal.* Yes; the opinion of the many is what you say.

*Soc.* Then not only custom but nature also affirms that to do is more disgraceful than to suffer injustice, and that justice is equality; so that you seem to have been wrong in your former assertion, when accusing me you said that nature and custom are opposed, and that I, knowing this, was dishonestly playing between them, appealing to custom when the argument is about nature, and to nature when the argument is about custom?

‘Of course I  
don’t mean  
the mob.’

*Cal.* This man will never cease talking nonsense. At your age, Socrates, are you not ashamed to be catching at words and chuckling over some verbal slip? do you not see—have I not told you already, that by superior I mean better: do you imagine me to say, that if a rabble of slaves and nondescripts, who are of no use except perhaps for their physical strength, get together, their ipsissima verba are laws?

*Soc.* Ho! my philosopher, is that your line?

*Cal.* Certainly.

*Soc.* I was thinking, Callicles, that something of the kind must have been in your mind, and that is why I repeated the question,—What is the superior? I wanted to know clearly what you meant; for you surely do not think that two men are better than one, or that your slaves are better than you because they are stronger? Then please to begin again, and tell me who the better are, if they are not the stronger; and I will ask you, great Sir, to be a little milder in your instructions, or I shall have to run away from you.

*Cal.* You are ironical.

Then once  
more,—Who  
are the better?

*Soc.* No, by the hero Zethus, Callicles, by whose aid you were just now saying (486 A) many ironical things against me, I am not:—tell me, then, whom you mean by the better?

*Cal.* I mean the more excellent.

*Soc.* Do you not see that you are yourself using words which have no meaning and that you are explaining nothing?—will you tell me whether you mean by the better and superior the wiser, or if not, whom?

490 *Cal.* Most assuredly, I do mean the wiser.

*Gorgias.*

*Soc.* Then according to you, one wise man may often be superior to ten thousand fools, and he ought to rule them, and they ought to be his subjects, and he ought to have more than they should. This is what I believe that you mean (and you must not suppose that I am word-catching), if you allow that the one is superior to the ten thousand?

SOCRATES,  
CALLICLES.

The wiser:  
the one wise  
among ten  
thousand  
fools,—he  
ought to rule.

*Cal.* Yes; that is what I mean, and that is what I conceive to be natural justice — that the better and wiser should rule and have more than the inferior.

*Soc.* Stop there, and let me ask you what you would say in this case: Let us suppose that we are all together as we are now; there are several of us, and we have a large common store of meats and drinks, and there are all sorts of persons in our company having various degrees of strength and weakness, and one of us, being a physician, is wiser in the matter of food than all the rest, and he is probably stronger than some and not so strong as others of us — will he not, being wiser, be also better than we are, and our superior in this matter of food?

But this is  
contrary to  
the analogy of  
the other arts.

*Cal.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Either, then, he will have a larger share of the meats and drinks, because he is better, or he will have the distribution of all of them by reason of his authority, but he will not expend or make use of a larger share of them on his own person, or if he does, he will be punished;—his share will exceed that of some, and be less than that of others, and if he be the weakest of all, he being the best of all will have the smallest share of all, Callicles:—am I not right, my friend?

*Cal.* You talk about meats and drinks and physicians and other nonsense; I am not speaking of them.

Callicles is  
disgusted at  
the common-  
place parallels  
of Socrates.

*Soc.* Well, but do you admit that the wiser is the better?  
Answer 'Yes' or 'No.'

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And ought not the better to have a larger share?

*Cal.* Not of meats and drinks.

*Soc.* I understand: then, perhaps, of coats — the skilfullest weaver ought to have the largest coat, and the greatest



*Gorgias.*SOCRATES,  
CALICLES.

number of them, and go about clothed in the best and finest of them?

*Cal.* Fudge about coats!

*Soc.* Then the skilfullest and best in making shoes ought to have the advantage in shoes; the shoemaker, clearly, should walk about in the largest shoes, and have the greatest number of them?

*Cal.* Fudge about shoes! What nonsense are you talking?

*Soc.* Or, if this is not your meaning, perhaps you would say that the wise and good and true husbandman should actually have a larger share of seeds, and have as much seed as possible for his own land?

*Cal.* How you go on, always talking in the same way, Socrates!

*Soc.* Yes, Calicles, and also about the same things.

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*Cal.* Yes, by the Gods, you are literally always talking of cobblers and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if this had to do with our argument.

*Soc.* But why will you not tell me in what a man must be superior and wiser in order to claim a larger share; will you neither accept a suggestion, nor offer one?

*Cal.* I have already told you. In the first place, I mean by superiors not cobblers or cooks, but wise politicians who understand the administration of a state, and who are not only wise, but also valiant and able to carry out their designs, and not the men to faint from want of soul.

*Soc.* See now, most excellent Calicles, how different my charge against you is from that which you bring against me, for you reproach me with always saying the same; but I reproach you with never saying the same about the same things, for at one time you were defining the better and the superior to be the stronger, then again as the wiser, and now you bring forward a new notion; the superior and the better are now declared by you to be the more courageous: I wish, my good friend, that you would tell me, once for all, whom you affirm to be the better and superior, and in what they are better?

*Cal.* I have already told you that I mean those who are wise and courageous in the administration of a state—they

Socrates is  
accused of  
always saying  
the same  
things: he  
accuses  
Calicles of  
never saying  
the same about  
the same.



ought to be the rulers of their states, and justice consists in their having more than their subjects.

*Gorgias.*

*Soc.* But whether rulers or subjects will they or will they not have more than themselves, my friend?

SOCRATES,  
CALLICLES.

*Cal.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* I mean that every man is his own ruler; but perhaps you think that there is no necessity for him to rule himself; he is only required to rule others?

*Cal.* What do you mean by his 'ruling over himself'?

*Soc.* A simple thing enough; just what is commonly said, that a man should be temperate and master of himself, and ruler of his own pleasures and passions.

*Cal.* What innocence! you mean those fools,—the temperate?

*Soc.* Certainly:—any one may know that to be my meaning.

*Cal.* Quite so, Socrates; and they are really fools, for how can a man be happy who is the servant of anything? On the contrary, I plainly assert, that he who would truly live ought to allow his desires to wax to the uttermost, and not to chastise them; but when they have grown to their greatest he should have courage and intelligence to minister to them and to satisfy all his longings. And this I affirm to be natural justice and nobility. To this however the many cannot attain; and they blame the strong man because they are ashamed of their own weakness, which they desire to conceal, and hence they say that intemperance is base. As I have remarked already, they enslave the nobler natures, and being unable to satisfy their pleasures, they praise temperance and justice out of their own cowardice. ¶ For if a man had been originally the son of a king, or had a nature capable of acquiring an empire or a tyranny or sovereignty, what could be more truly base or evil than temperance—to a man like him, I say, who might freely be enjoying every good, and has no one to stand in his way, and yet has admitted custom and reason and the opinion of other men to be lords over him?—must not he be in a miserable plight whom the reputation of justice and temperance hinders from giving more to his friends than to his enemies, even though he be a ruler in his city? Nay, Socrates, for you profess to

Callicles re-asserts his doctrine that the esteem in which virtue and justice are held is due only to men's fear for themselves. No man who has the power to — enjoy himself practises self-control.

*Gorgias.*SOCRATES,  
CALICLES.

be a votary of the truth, and the truth is this:—that luxury and intemperance and licence, if they be provided with means, are virtue and happiness—all the rest is a mere bauble, agreements contrary to nature, foolish talk of men, nothing worth<sup>1</sup>.

*Soc.* There is a noble freedom, Calicles, in your way of approaching the argument; for what you say is what the rest of the world think, but do not like to say. And I must beg of you to persevere, that the true rule of human life may become manifest. Tell me, then:—you say, do you not, that in the rightly-developed man the passions ought not to be controlled, but that we should let them grow to the utmost and somehow or other satisfy them, and that this is virtue?

*Cal.* Yes; I do.

*Soc.* Then those who want nothing are not truly said to be happy?

*Cal.* No indeed, for then stones and dead men would be the happiest of all.

*Soc.* But surely life according to your view is an awful thing; and indeed I think that Euripides may have been right in saying,

‘Who knows if life be not death and death life;’

No; the true death, as Pythagorean philosophy tells us, is to pour water out of a vessel full of holes into a colander full of holes.

and that we are very likely dead; I have heard a philosopher 493 say that at this moment we are actually dead, and that the body (*σῶμα*) is our tomb (*σῆμα*<sup>2</sup>), and that the part of the soul which is the seat of the desires is liable to be tossed about by words and blown up and down: and some ingenious person, probably a Sicilian or an Italian, playing with the word, invented a tale in which he called the soul—because of its believing and make-believe nature—a vessel<sup>3</sup>, and the ignorant he called the uninitiated or leaky, and the place in the souls of the uninitiated in which the desires are seated, being the intemperate and incontinent part, he compared to a vessel full of holes, because it can never be satisfied. He is not of your way of thinking, Calicles, for he declares, that of all the souls in Hades, meaning the invisible world (*ἄειδής*), these uninitiated or leaky persons are the most miserable,

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. i. 348.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Phaedr. 250 C.

<sup>3</sup> An untranslatable pun,—διὰ τὸ πιθανόν τε καὶ πιστικὸν ὠνόμασε πῖθον.

and that they pour water into a vessel which is full of holes out of a colander which is similarly perforated. The colander, as my informer assures me, is the soul, and the soul which he compares to a colander is the soul of the ignorant, which is likewise full of holes, and therefore incontinent, owing to a bad memory and want of faith. These notions are strange enough, but they show the principle which, if I can, I would fain prove to you; that you should change your mind, and, instead of the intemperate and insatiate life, choose that which is orderly and sufficient and has a due provision for daily needs. Do I make any impression on you, and are you coming over to the opinion that the orderly are happier than the intemperate? Or do I fail to persuade you, and, however many tales I rehearse to you, do you continue of the same opinion still?

*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES,  
CALLICLES.

*Cal.* The latter, Socrates, is more like the truth.

*Soc.* Well, I will tell you another image, which comes out of the same school:—Let me request you to consider how far you would accept this as an account of the two lives of the temperate and intemperate in a figure:—There are two men, both of whom have a number of casks; the one man has his casks sound and full, one of wine, another of honey, and a third of milk, besides others filled with other liquids, and the streams which fill them are few and scanty, and he can only obtain them with a great deal of toil and difficulty; but when his casks are once filled he has no need to feed them any more, and has no further trouble with them or care about them. The other, in like manner, can procure streams, though not without difficulty; but his vessels are leaky and unsound, and night and day he is compelled to be filling—  
94 them, and if he pauses for a moment, he is in an agony of pain. Such are their respective lives:—And now would you say that the life of the intemperate is happier than that of the temperate? Do I not convince you that the opposite is the truth?

The temperate man is the sound, the intemperate the leaky vessel.

*Cal.* You do not convince me, Socrates, for the one who has filled himself has no longer any pleasure left; and this, as I was just now saying, is the life of a stone: he has neither joy nor sorrow after he is once filled; but the pleasure depends on the superabundance of the influx.

The life of desire and pleasure is not to be compared to a full vessel, but



*Gorgias.*SOCRATES,  
CALLICLES.to an ever-  
running  
stream.

*Soc.* But the more you pour in, the greater the waste ; and the holes must be large for the liquid to escape.

*Cal.* Certainly.

*Soc.* The life which you are now depicting is not that of a dead man, or of a stone, but of a cormorant ; you mean that he is to be hungering and eating ?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And he is to be thirsting and drinking ?

*Cal.* Yes, that is what I mean ; he is to have all his desires about him, and to be able to live happily in the gratification of them.

*Soc.* Capital, excellent ; go on as you have begun, and have no shame ; I, too, must disencumber myself of shame : and first, will you tell me whether you include itching and scratching, provided you have enough of them and pass your life in scratching, in your notion of happiness ?

*Cal.* What a strange being you are, Socrates ! a regular mob-orator.

*Soc.* That was the reason, Callicles, why I scared Polus and Gorgias, until they were too modest to say what they thought ; but you will not be too modest and will not be scared, for you are a brave man. And now, answer my question.

*Cal.* I answer, that even the scratcher would live pleasantly.

*Soc.* And if pleasantly, then also happily ?

*Cal.* To be sure.

*Soc.* But what if the itching is not confined to the head ? Shall I pursue the question ? And here, Callicles, I would have you consider how you would reply if consequences are pressed upon you, especially if in the last resort you are asked, whether the life of a catamite is not terrible, foul, miserable ? Or would you venture to say, that they too are happy, if they only get enough of what they want ?

*Cal.* Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of introducing such topics into the argument ?

*Soc.* Well, my fine friend, but am I the introducer of these topics, or he who says without any qualification that all who feel pleasure in whatever manner are happy, and who admits of no distinction between good and bad pleasures ? And I 495

Callicles  
professes a  
virtuous in-  
dignation at  
the very men-  
tion of the  
consequences  
of his own  
doctrine.



would still ask, whether you say that pleasure and good are *Gorgias.*  
the same, or whether there is some pleasure which is not a *SOCRATES,*  
good? *CALLICLES.*

*Cal.* Well, then, for the sake of consistency, I will say that they are the same.

*Soc.* You are breaking the original agreement, Callicles, and will no longer be a satisfactory companion in the search after truth, if you say what is contrary to your real opinion.

*Cal.* Why, that is what you are doing too, Socrates.

*Soc.* Then we are both doing wrong. Still, my dear friend, I would ask you to consider whether pleasure, from whatever source derived, is the good; for, if this be true, then the disagreeable consequences which have been darkly intimated must follow, and many others.

*Cal.* That, Socrates, is only your opinion.

*Soc.* And do you, Callicles, seriously maintain what you are saying?

*Cal.* Indeed I do.

*Soc.* Then, as you are in earnest, shall we proceed with the argument?

*Cal.* By all means<sup>1</sup>.

*Soc.* Well, if you are willing to proceed, determine this question for me:—There is something, I presume, which you would call knowledge?

*Cal.* There is.

*Soc.* And were you not saying just now, that some courage implied knowledge?

*Cal.* I was.

*Soc.* And you were speaking of courage and knowledge as two things different from one another?

*Cal.* Certainly I was.

*Soc.* And would you say that pleasure and knowledge are the same, or not the same?

*Cal.* Not the same, O man of wisdom.

*Soc.* And would you say that courage differed from pleasure?

*Cal.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Well, then, let us remember that Callicles, the Acharnian, says that pleasure and good are the same; but that

Callicles, having admitted that pleasure and good are the same, is led to make the further admission that pleasure and knowledge and courage are different.

<sup>1</sup> Or, 'I am in profound earnest.'

*Gorgias.*SOCRATES,  
CALLICLES.

knowledge and courage are not the same, either with one another, or with the good.

*Cal.* And what does our friend Socrates, of Foxton, say — does he assent to this, or not?

*Soc.* He does not assent; neither will Callicles, when he sees himself truly. You will admit, I suppose, that good and evil fortune are opposed to each other?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And if they are opposed to each other, then, like health and disease, they exclude one another; a man cannot have them both, or be without them both, at the same time?

*Cal.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* Take the case of any bodily affection:—a man may have the complaint in his eyes which is called ophthalmia?

*Cal.* To be sure.

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*Soc.* But he surely cannot have the same eyes well and sound at the same time?

*Cal.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* And when he has got rid of his ophthalmia, has he got rid of the health of his eyes too? Is the final result, that he gets rid of them both together?

*Cal.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* That would surely be marvellous and absurd?

*Cal.* Very.

A man may  
have good and  
evil by turns,  
but not at the  
same time.

*Soc.* I suppose that he is affected by them, and gets rid of them in turns?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And he may have strength and weakness in the same way, by fits?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* Or swiftness and slowness?

*Cal.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And does he have and not have good and happiness, and their opposites, evil and misery, in a similar alternation<sup>1</sup>?

*Cal.* Certainly he has.

*Soc.* If then there be anything which a man has and has not at the same time, clearly that cannot be good and evil — do we agree? Please not to answer without consideration.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. iv. 436.

*Cal.* I entirely agree.

*Gorgias.*

*Soc.* Go back now to our former admissions.— Did you say that to hunger, I mean the mere state of hunger, was pleasant or painful?

SOCRATES,  
CALLICLES.

*Cal.* I said painful, but that to eat when you are hungry is pleasant.

*Soc.* I know; but still the actual hunger is painful: am I not right?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And thirst, too, is painful?

*Cal.* Yes, very.

*Soc.* Need I adduce any more instances, or would you agree that all wants or desires are painful?

*Cal.* I agree, and therefore you need not adduce any more instances.

*Soc.* Very good. And you would admit that to drink, when you are thirsty, is pleasant?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And in the sentence which you have just uttered, the word 'thirsty' implies pain?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the word 'drinking' is expressive of pleasure, and of the satisfaction of the want?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* There is pleasure in drinking?

*Cal.* Certainly.

*Soc.* When you are thirsty?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And in pain?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* Do you see the inference:— that pleasure and pain are simultaneous, when you say that being thirsty, you drink? For are they not simultaneous, and do they not affect at the same time the same part, whether of the soul or the body?— which of them is affected cannot be supposed to be of any consequence: Is not this true?

But he may  
have pleasure  
and pain at  
the same time.

*Cal.* It is.

*Soc.* You said also, that no man could have good and evil fortune at the same time?

*Cal.* Yes, I did.

*Gorgias.*SOCRATES,  
CALICLES,  
GORGIAS.Therefore  
pleasure and  
pain are not  
the same as  
good and evil.

*Soc.* But you admitted, that when in pain a man might also have pleasure? 497

*Cal.* Clearly.

*Soc.* Then pleasure is not the same as good fortune, or pain the same as evil fortune, and therefore the good is not the same as the pleasant?

*Cal.* I wish I knew, Socrates, what your quibbling means.

*Soc.* You know, Calicles, but you affect not to know.

*Cal.* Well, get on, and don't keep fooling: then you will know what a wiseacre you are in your admonition of me.

*Soc.* Does not a man cease from his thirst and from his pleasure in drinking at the same time?

*Cal.* I do not understand what you are saying.

*Gor.* Nay, Calicles, answer, if only for our sakes;—we should like to hear the argument out.

*Cal.* Yes, Gorgias, but I must complain of the habitual trifling of Socrates; he is always arguing about little and unworthy questions.

*Gor.* What matter? Your reputation, Calicles, is not at stake. Let Socrates argue in his own fashion.

*Cal.* Well, then, Socrates, you shall ask these little peddling questions, since Gorgias wishes to have them.

*Soc.* I envy you, Calicles, for having been initiated into the great mysteries before you were initiated into the lesser. I thought that this was not allowable. But to return to our argument:—Does not a man cease from thirsting and from the pleasure of drinking at the same moment?

*Cal.* True.

*Soc.* And if he is hungry, or has any other desire, does he not cease from the desire and the pleasure at the same moment?

*Cal.* Very true.

*Soc.* Then he ceases from pain and pleasure at the same moment?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* But he does not cease from good and evil at the same moment, as you have admitted:—do you still adhere to what you said?

*Cal.* Yes, I do; but what is the inference?

*Soc.* Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not



the same as the pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful; there is a cessation of pleasure and pain at the same moment; but not of good and evil, for they are different. How then can pleasure be the same as good, or pain as evil? And I would have you look at the matter in another light, which could hardly, I think, have been considered by you when you identified them: Are not the good good because they have good present with them, as the beautiful are those who have beauty present with them?

*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES,  
CALLICLES.

Another  
point  
of view.

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And do you call the fools and cowards good men? For you were saying just now that the courageous and the wise are the good — would you not say so?

*Cal.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And did you never see a foolish child rejoicing?

*Cal.* Yes, I have.

*Soc.* And a foolish man too?

*Cal.* Yes, certainly; but what is your drift?

98 *Soc.* Nothing particular, if you will only answer.

*Cal.* Yes, I have.

*Soc.* And did you ever see a sensible man rejoicing or sorrowing?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* Which rejoice and sorrow most — the wise or the foolish?

*Cal.* They are much upon a par, I think, in that respect.

*Soc.* Enough: And did you ever see a coward in battle?

*Cal.* To be sure.

*Soc.* And which rejoiced most at the departure of the enemy, the coward or the brave?

*Cal.* I should say 'most' of both; or at any rate, they rejoiced about equally.

*Soc.* No matter; then the cowards, and not only the brave, rejoice?

*Cal.* Greatly.

*Soc.* And the foolish; so it would seem?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And are only the cowards pained at the approach of their enemies, or are the brave also pained?

*Cal.* Both are pained.

*Gorgias.**Soc.* And are they equally pained?

SOCRATES,

*Cal.* I should imagine that the cowards are more pained.

CALLICLES.

*Soc.* And are they not better pleased at the enemy's departure?*Cal.* I dare say.

Good is in  
proportion to  
pleasure, and  
the bad are  
often as much  
or more  
pleased than  
the good.

*Soc.* Then are the foolish and the wise and the cowards and the brave all pleased and pained, as you were saying, in nearly equal degree; but are the cowards more pleased and pained than the brave?*Cal.* Yes.*Soc.* But surely the wise and brave are the good, and the foolish and the cowardly are the bad?*Cal.* Yes.*Soc.* Then the good and the bad are pleased and pained in a nearly equal degree?*Cal.* Yes.*Soc.* Then are the good and bad good and bad in a nearly equal degree, or have the bad the advantage both in good and evil? [i. e. in having more pleasure and more pain.]*Cal.* I really do not know what you mean.*Soc.* Why, do you not remember saying that the good were good because good was present with them, and the evil because evil; and that pleasures were goods and pains evils?*Cal.* Yes, I remember.*Soc.* And are not these pleasures or goods present to those who rejoice — if they do rejoice?*Cal.* Certainly.*Soc.* Then those who rejoice are good when goods are present with them?*Cal.* Yes.*Soc.* And those who are in pain have evil or sorrow present with them?*Cal.* Yes.*Soc.* And would you still say that the evil are evil by reason of the presence of evil?*Cal.* I should.*Soc.* Then those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain evil?*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* The degrees of good and evil vary with the degrees of pleasure and of pain? *Gorgias.*

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* Have the wise man and the fool, the brave and the coward, joy and pain in nearly equal degrees? or would you say that the coward has more?

*Cal.* I should say that he has.

*Soc.* Help me then to draw out the conclusion which follows from our admissions; for it is good to repeat and  
99 review what is good twice and thrice over, as they say. Both the wise man and the brave man we allow to be good?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the foolish man and the coward to be evil?

*Cal.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And he who has joy is good?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And he who is in pain is evil?

*Cal.* Certainly.

*Soc.* The good and evil both have joy and pain, but, perhaps, the evil has more of them?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then must we not infer, that the bad man is as good and bad as the good, or, perhaps, even better?—is not this a further inference which follows equally with the preceding from the assertion that the good and the pleasant are the same:—can this be denied, Callicles?

Therefore the bad man is as good as the good, or perhaps even better.

*Cal.* I have been listening and making admissions to you, Socrates; and I remark that if a person grants you anything in play, you, like a child, want to keep hold and will not give it back. But do you really suppose that I or any other human being denies that some pleasures are good and others bad?

*Soc.* Alas, Callicles, how unfair you are! you certainly treat me as if I were a child, sometimes saying one thing, and then another, as if you were meaning to deceive me. And yet I thought at first that you were my friend, and would not have deceived me if you could have helped. But I see that I was mistaken; and now I suppose that I must make the best of a bad business, as they said of old, and take what I can get out of you.—Well, then, as I understand you to

Socrates begins again with some obvious truisms.

*Gorgias*

SOCRATES,

CALICLES.

say, I may assume that some pleasures are good and others evil?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* The beneficial are good, and the hurtful are evil?

*Cal.* To be sure.

*Soc.* And the beneficial are those which do some good, and the hurtful are those which do some evil?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* Take, for example, the bodily pleasures of eating and drinking, which we were just now mentioning — you mean to say that those which promote health, or any other bodily excellence, are good, and their opposites evil?

*Cal.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And in the same way there are good pains and there are evil pains?

*Cal.* To be sure.

*Soc.* And ought we not to choose and use the good pleasures and pains?

*Cal.* Certainly.

*Soc.* But not the evil?

*Cal.* Clearly.

*Soc.* Because, if you remember, Polus and I have agreed that all our actions are to be done for the sake of the good; — and will you agree with us in saying, that the good is the end of all our actions, and that all our actions are to be done for the sake of the good, and not the good for the sake of 500 them?— will you add a third vote to our two?

*Cal.* I will.

*Soc.* Then pleasure, like everything else, is to be sought for the sake of that which is good, and not that which is good for the sake of pleasure?

*Cal.* To be sure.

*Soc.* But can every man choose what pleasures are good and what are evil, or must he have art or knowledge of them in detail?

*Cal.* He must have art.

✓ *Soc.* Let me now remind you of what I was saying to Gorgias and Polus; I was saying, as you will not have forgotten, that there were some processes which aim only at pleasure, and know nothing of a better and worse, and there



are other processes which know good and evil. And I considered that cookery, which I do not call an art, but only an experience, was of the former class, which is concerned with pleasure, and that the art of medicine was of the class which is concerned with the good. And now, by the god of friendship, I must beg you, Callicles, not to jest, or to imagine that I am jesting with you; do not answer at random and contrary to your real opinion;—for you will observe that we are arguing about the way of human life; and to a man who has any sense at all, what question can be more serious than this?—whether he should follow after that way of life to which you exhort me, and act what you call the manly part of speaking in the assembly, and cultivating rhetoric, and engaging in public affairs, according to the principles now in vogue; or whether he should pursue the life of philosophy;—and in what the latter way differs from the former. But perhaps we had better first try to distinguish them, as I did before, and when we have come to an agreement that they are distinct, we may proceed to consider in what they differ from one another, and which of them we should choose. Perhaps, however, you do not even now understand what I mean?

*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES,  
CALLICLES.

*Cal.* No, I do not.

*Soc.* Then I will explain myself more clearly: seeing that you and I have agreed that there is such a thing as good, and that there is such a thing as pleasure, and that pleasure is not the same as good, and that the pursuit and process of acquisition of the one, that is pleasure, is different from the pursuit and process of acquisition of the other, which is good—I wish that you would tell me whether you agree with me thus far or not—do you agree?

*Cal.* I do.

*Soc.* Then I will proceed, and ask whether you also agree with me, and whether you think that I spoke the truth when I further said to Gorgias and Polus that cookery in my opinion is only an experience, and not an art at all; and that whereas medicine is an art, and attends to the nature and constitution of the patient, and has principles of action and reason in each case, cookery in attending upon pleasure never regards either the nature or reason of that pleasure to

Socrates repeats his distinction between true arts and flat-teries or shams,

*Gorgias.*SOCRATES,  
CALLICLES.

which she devotes herself, but goes straight to her end, nor ever considers or calculates anything, but works by experience and routine, and just preserves the recollection of what she has usually done when producing pleasure. And first, I would have you consider whether I have proved what I was saying, and then whether there are not other similar processes which have to do with the soul—some of them processes of art, making a provision for the soul's highest interest—others despising the interest, and, as in the previous case, considering only the pleasure of the soul, and how this may be acquired, but not considering what pleasures are good or bad, and having no other aim but to afford gratification, whether good or bad. In my opinion, Callicles, there are such processes, and this is the sort of thing which I term flattery, whether concerned with the body or the soul, or whenever employed with a view to pleasure and without any consideration of good and evil. And now I wish that you would tell me whether you agree with us in this notion, or whether you differ.

to which  
Callicles pre-  
tends to give  
assent.

*Cal.* I do not differ; on the contrary, I agree; for in that way I shall soonest bring the argument to an end, and shall oblige my friend Gorgias.

*Soc.* And is this notion true of one soul, or of two or more?

*Cal.* Equally true of two or more.

*Soc.* Then a man may delight a whole assembly, and yet have no regard for their true interests?

*Cal.* Yes.

There are arts  
which delight  
mankind but  
which never  
consider the  
soul's higher  
interest.

*Soc.* Can you tell me the pursuits which delight mankind—or rather, if you would prefer, let me ask, and do you answer, which of them belong to the pleasurable class, and which of them not? In the first place, what say you of flute-playing? Does not that appear to be an art which seeks only pleasure, Callicles, and thinks of nothing else?

*Cal.* I assent.

*Soc.* And is not the same true of all similar arts, as, for example, the art of playing the lyre at festivals?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And what do you say of the choral art and of dithyrambic poetry?—are not they of the same nature? Do you

imagine that Cinesias the son of Meles cares about what will tend to the moral improvement of his hearers, or about what will give pleasure to the multitude?

*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES,  
CALLICLES.

*Cal.* There can be no mistake about Cinesias, Socrates.

*Soc.* And what do you say of his father, Meles the harp-player? Did he perform with any view to the good of his hearers? Could he be said to regard even their pleasure? For his singing was an infliction to his audience. And of harp-playing and dithyrambic poetry in general, what would you say? Have they not been invented wholly for the sake of pleasure?

*Cal.* That is my notion of them.

*Soc.* And as for the Muse of Tragedy, that solemn and august personage—what are her aspirations? Is all her aim and desire only to give pleasure to the spectators, or does she fight against them and refuse to speak of their pleasant vices, and willingly proclaim in word and song truths welcome and unwelcome?—which in your judgment is her character?

*Cal.* There can be no doubt, Socrates, that Tragedy has her face turned towards pleasure and the gratification of the audience.

*Soc.* And is not that the sort of thing, Callicles, which we were just now describing as flattery?

*Cal.* Quite true.

*Soc.* Well now, suppose that we strip all poetry of song and rhythm and metre, there will remain speech<sup>1</sup>?

*Cal.* To be sure.

*Soc.* And this speech is addressed to a crowd of people?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then poetry is a sort of rhetoric?

*Cal.* True.

*Soc.* And do not the poets in the theatres seem to you to be rhetoricians?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then now we have discovered a sort of rhetoric which is addressed to a crowd of men, women, and children, freemen and slaves. And this is not much to our taste, for we have described it as having the nature of flattery.

Poetry is of  
the nature of  
flattery.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. iii. 392 foll.



*Gorgias.*SOCRATES,  
CALLICLES.

Oratory, too,  
as practised  
regards the  
interest of the  
speaker rather  
than the good  
of the people.

There might  
be a higher  
style of  
oratory; and  
Callicles  
thinks that  
such really  
existed in the  
great days of  
old, the days  
of Miltiades  
and Themis-  
tocles and  
Pericles.

Yet even these  
famous men  
had no ideal  
or standard.

*Cal.* Quite true.

*Soc.* Very good. And what do you say of that other rhetoric which addresses the Athenian assembly and the assemblies of freemen in other states? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to aim at what is best, and do they seek to improve the citizens by their speeches, or are they too, like the rest of mankind, bent upon giving them pleasure, forgetting the public good in the thought of their own interest, playing with the people as with children, and trying to amuse them, but never considering whether they are better or worse for this?

*Cal.* I must distinguish. There are some who have a real 503 care of the public in what they say, while others are such as you describe.

*Soc.* I am contented with the admission that rhetoric is of two sorts; one, which is mere flattery and disgraceful declamation; the other, which is noble and aims at the training and improvement of the souls of the citizens, and strives to say what is best, whether welcome or unwelcome, to the audience; but have you ever known such a rhetoric; or if you have, and can point out any rhetorician who is of this stamp, who is he?

*Cal.* But, indeed, I am afraid that I cannot tell you of any such among the orators who are at present living.

*Soc.* Well, then, can you mention any one of a former generation, who may be said to have improved the Athenians, who found them worse and made them better, from the day that he began to make speeches? for, indeed, I do not know of such a man.

*Cal.* What! did you never hear that Themistocles was a good man, and Cimon and Miltiades and Pericles, who is just lately dead, and whom you heard yourself?

*Soc.* Yes, Callicles, they were good men; if, as you said at first, true virtue consists only in the satisfaction of our own desires and those of others; but if not, and if, as we were afterwards compelled to acknowledge, the satisfaction of some desires makes us better, and of others, worse, and we ought to gratify the one and not the other, and there is an art in distinguishing them,—can you tell me of any of these statesmen who did distinguish them?



*Cal.* No, indeed, I cannot.

*Soc.* Yet, surely, Callicles, if you look you will find such a one. Suppose that we just calmly consider whether any of these was such as I have described. Will not the good man, who says whatever he says with a view to the best, speak with a reference to some standard and not at random; just as all other artists, whether the painter, the builder, the shipwright, or any other look all of them to their own work, and do not select and apply at random what they apply, but strive to give a definite form to it? The artist disposes all things in order, and compels the one part to harmonize and accord with the other part, until he has constructed a regular and systematic whole; and this is true of all artists, and in the same way the trainers and physicians, of whom we spoke before, give order and regularity to the body: do you deny this?

*Cal.* No; I am ready to admit it.

*Soc.* Then the house in which order and regularity prevail is good; that in which there is disorder, evil?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the same is true of a ship?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the same may be said of the human body?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And what would you say of the soul? Will the good soul be that in which disorder is prevalent, or that in which there is harmony and order?

*Cal.* The latter follows from our previous admissions.

*Soc.* What is the name which is given to the effect of harmony and order in the body?

*Cal.* I suppose that you mean health and strength?

*Soc.* Yes, I do; and what is the name which you would give to the effect of harmony and order in the soul? Try and discover a name for this as well as for the other.

*Cal.* Why not give the name yourself, Socrates?

*Soc.* Well, if you had rather that I should, I will; and you shall say whether you agree with me, and if not, you shall refute and answer me. 'Healthy,' as I conceive, is the name which is given to the regular order of the body,

*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES,  
CALLICLES.

Some standard  
needed other  
than a man's  
interest.

Order is good,  
disorder evil,  
in a ship, in a  
human body,  
in a human  
soul.

*Gorgias.*SOCRATES,  
CALLICLES.From order  
and law  
spring tem-  
perance and  
justice.The true  
rhetorician  
will seek to  
implant these  
virtues, to im-  
plant justice  
and take  
away  
injustice.The body of  
the sick and  
the soul of the  
wicked must  
be chastised  
and improved.

whence comes health and every other bodily excellence: is that true or not?

*Cal.* True.

*Soc.* And 'lawful' and 'law' are the names which are given to the regular order and action of the soul, and these make men lawful and orderly:—and so we have temperance and justice: have we not?

*Cal.* Granted.

*Soc.* And will not the true rhetorician who is honest and understands his art have his eye fixed upon these, in all the words which he addresses to the souls of men, and in all his actions, both in what he gives and in what he takes away? Will not his aim be to implant justice in the souls of his citizens and take away injustice, to implant temperance and take away intemperance, to implant every virtue and take away every vice? Do you not agree?

*Cal.* I agree.

*Soc.* For what use is there, Callicles, in giving to the body of a sick man who is in a bad state of health a quantity of the most delightful food or drink or any other pleasant thing, which may be really as bad for him as if you gave him 505 nothing, or even worse if rightly estimated. Is not that true?

*Cal.* I will not say No to it.

*Soc.* For in my opinion there is no profit in a man's life if his body is in an evil plight—in that case his life also is evil: am I not right?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* When a man is in health the physicians will generally allow him to eat when he is hungry and drink when he is thirsty, and to satisfy his desires as he likes, but when he is sick they hardly suffer him to satisfy his desires at all: even you will admit that?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And does not the same argument hold of the soul, my good sir? While she is in a bad state and is senseless and intemperate and unjust and unholy, her desires ought to be controlled, and she ought to be prevented from doing anything which does not tend to her own improvement.

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* Such treatment will be better for the soul herself?

*Gorgias.*

*Cal.* To be sure.

*SOCRATES,  
CALICLES.*

*Soc.* And to restrain her from her appetites is to chastise her?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then restraint or chastisement is better for the soul than intemperance or the absence of control, which you were just now preferring?

*Cal.* I do not understand you, Socrates, and I wish that you would ask some one who does.

*Soc.* Here is a gentleman who cannot endure to be improved or to subject himself to that very chastisement of which the argument speaks!

Calicles does not wish to be improved.

*Cal.* I do not heed a word of what you are saying, and have only answered hitherto out of civility to Gorgias.

*Soc.* What are we to do, then? Shall we break off in the middle?

*Cal.* You shall judge for yourself.

*Soc.* Well, but people say that 'a tale should have a head and not break off in the middle,' and I should not like to have the argument going about without a head<sup>1</sup>; please then to go on a little longer, and put the head on.

*Cal.* How tyrannical you are, Socrates! I wish that you and your argument would rest, or that you would get some one else to argue with you.

*Soc.* But who else is willing?—I want to finish the argument.

*Cal.* Cannot you finish without my help, either talking straight on, or questioning and answering yourself?

*Soc.* Must I then say with Epicharmus, 'Two men spoke before, but now one shall be enough'? I suppose that there is absolutely no help. And if I am to carry on the enquiry by myself, I will first of all remark that not only I but all of us should have an ambition to know what is true and what is false in this matter, for the discovery of the truth is a common good. And now I will proceed to argue according to my own notion. But if any of you think that I arrive at conclusions which are untrue you must interpose and refute me, for I do not speak from any knowledge of what I am

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Laws vi. 752 A.



Gorgias.

SOCRATES,

GORGAS,

CALLICLES.

saying, I am an enquirer like yourselves, and therefore, if my opponent says anything which is of force, I shall be the first to agree with him. I am speaking on the supposition that the argument ought to be completed; but if you think otherwise let us leave off and go our ways.

*Gor.* I think, Socrates, that we should not go our ways until you have completed the argument; and this appears to me to be the wish of the rest of the company; I myself should very much like to hear what more you have to say.

*Soc.* I too, Gorgias, should have liked to continue the argument with Callicles, and then I might have given him an 'Amphion' in return for his 'Zethus'<sup>1</sup>; but since you, Callicles, are unwilling to continue, I hope that you will listen, and interrupt me if I seem to you to be in error. And if you refute me, I shall not be angry with you as you are with me, but I shall inscribe you as the greatest of benefactors on the tablets of my soul.

*Cal.* My good fellow, never mind me, but get on.

The pleasant not the same as the good, and is to be sought only for the sake of the good: and we are good when good is present in us, and good is the effect of order and truth and art.

*Soc.* Listen to me, then, while I recapitulate the argument:—Is the pleasant the same as the good? Not the same. Callicles and I are agreed about that. And is the pleasant to be pursued for the sake of the good? or the good for the sake of the pleasant? The pleasant is to be pursued for the sake of the good. And that is pleasant at the presence of which we are pleased, and that is good at the presence of which we are good? To be sure. And we are good, and all good things whatever are good when some virtue is present in us or them? That, Callicles, is my conviction. But the virtue of each thing, whether body or soul, instrument or creature, when given to them in the best way comes to them not by chance but as the result of the order and truth and art which are imparted to them: Am I not right? I maintain that I am. And is not the virtue of each thing dependent on order or arrangement? Yes, I say. And that which makes a thing good is the proper order inhering in each thing? Such is my view. And is not the soul which has an order of her own better than that which has no order? Certainly. And the soul which has order is orderly? Of course. And that which is orderly is temperate? Assuredly. And the 507

<sup>1</sup> p. 485.



temperate soul is good? No other answer can I give, Callicles dear; have you any?

*Cal.* Go on, my good fellow.

*Soc.* Then I shall proceed to add, that if the temperate soul is the good soul, the soul which is in the opposite condition, that is, the foolish and intemperate, is the bad soul. Very true.

And will not the temperate man do what is proper, both in relation to the gods and to men;—for he would not be temperate if he did not? Certainly he will do what is proper. In his relation to other men he will do what is just; and in his relation to the gods he will do what is holy; and he who does what is just and holy must be just and holy? Very true. And must he not be courageous? for the duty of a temperate man is not to follow or to avoid what he ought not, but what he ought, whether things or men or pleasures or pains, and patiently to endure when he ought; and therefore, Callicles, the temperate man, being, as we have described, also just and courageous and holy, cannot be other than a perfectly good man, nor can the good man do otherwise than well and perfectly whatever he does; and he who does well must of necessity be happy and blessed, and the evil man who does evil, miserable: now this latter is he whom you were applauding—the intemperate who is the opposite of the temperate. Such is my position, and these things I affirm to be true. And if they are true, then I further affirm that he who desires to be happy must pursue and practise temperance and run away from intemperance as fast as his legs will carry him: he had better order his life so as not to need punishment; but if either he or any of his friends, whether private individual or city, are in need of punishment, then justice must be done and he must suffer punishment, if he would be happy. This appears to me to be the aim which a man ought to have, and towards which he ought to direct all the energies both of himself and of the state, acting so that he may have temperance and justice present with him and be happy, not suffering his lusts to be unrestrained, and in the never-ending desire to satisfy them leading a robber's life. Such a one is the friend neither of God nor man, for he is incapable of communion, and he who is incapable of

*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES,  
CALLICLES.

The temperate soul is the good soul, just in relation to men, and holy in relation to gods, and is therefore happy; and the intemperate is the reverse of all this.

*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES.

If it be admitted that virtue is happiness and vice misery, then what Socrates said about the use of rhetoric in self-accusation turns out to be true.

communion is also incapable of friendship. And philosophers tell us, Callicles, that communion and friendship and orderliness and temperance and justice bind together heaven and earth and gods and men, and that this universe is therefore called *Cosmos* or order, not disorder or misrule, my friend. But although you are a philosopher you seem to me never to have observed that geometrical equality is mighty, both among gods and men; you think that you ought to cultivate inequality or excess, and do not care about geometry.—Well, then, either the principle that the happy are made happy by the possession of justice and temperance, and the miserable miserable by the possession of vice, must be refuted, or, if it is granted, what will be the consequences? All the consequences which I drew before, Callicles, and about which you asked me whether I was in earnest when I said that a man ought to accuse himself and his son and his friend if he did anything wrong, and that to this end he should use his rhetoric—all those consequences are true. And that which you thought that Polus was led to admit out of modesty is true, viz. that, to do injustice, if more disgraceful than to suffer, is in that degree worse; and the other position, which, according to Polus, Gorgias admitted out of modesty, that he who would truly be a rhetorician ought to be just and have a knowledge of justice, has also turned out to be true.

And now, these things being as we have said, let us proceed in the next place to consider whether you are right in throwing in my teeth that I am unable to help myself or any of my friends or kinsmen, or to save them in the extremity of danger, and that I am in the power of another like an outlaw to whom any one may do what he likes,—he may box my ears, which was a brave saying of yours; or take away my goods or banish me, or even do his worst and kill me; a condition which, as you say, is the height of disgrace. My answer to you is one which has been already often repeated, but may as well be repeated once more. I tell you, Callicles, that to be boxed on the ears wrongfully is not the worst evil which can befall a man, nor to have my purse or my body cut open, but that to smite and slay me and mine wrongfully is far more disgraceful and more evil;

aye, and to despoil and enslave and pillage, or in any way at all to wrong me and mine, is far more disgraceful and evil to the doer of the wrong than to me who am the sufferer.

*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES,  
CALICLES.

509 These truths, which have been already set forth as I state them in the previous discussion, would seem now to have been fixed and riveted by us, if I may use an expression which is certainly bold, in words which are like bonds of iron and adamant; and unless you or some other still more enterprising hero shall break them, there is no possibility of denying what I say. For my position has always been, that I myself am ignorant how these things are, but that I have never met any one who could say otherwise, any more than you can, and not appear ridiculous. This is my position still, and if what I am saying is true, and injustice is the greatest of evils to the doer of injustice, and yet there is if possible a greater than this greatest of evils<sup>1</sup>, in an unjust man not suffering retribution, what is that defence of which the want will make a man truly ridiculous? Must not the defence be one which will avert the greatest of human evils? And will not the worst of all defences be that with which a man is unable to defend himself or his family or his friends?—and next will come that which is unable to avert the next greatest evil; thirdly that which is unable to avert the third greatest evil; and so of other evils. As is the greatness of evil so is the honour of being able to avert them in their several degrees, and the disgrace of not being able to avert them. Am I not right, Calicles?

The greatest evil to do injustice, but there is a greater still, not to be punished for doing injustice.

*Cal.* Yes, quite right.

*Soc.* Seeing then that there are these two evils, the doing injustice and the suffering injustice — and we affirm that to do injustice is a greater, and to suffer injustice a lesser evil — by what devices can a man succeed in obtaining the two advantages, the one of not doing and the other of not suffering injustice? must he have the power, or only the will to obtain them? I mean to ask whether a man will escape injustice if he has only the will to escape, or must he have provided himself with the power?

*Cal.* He must have provided himself with the power; that is clear.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Republic, 9. 578 ff.



*Gorgias.*SOCRATES,  
CALLICLES.

*Soc.* And what do you say of doing injustice? Is the will only sufficient, and will that prevent him from doing injustice, or must he have provided himself with power and art; and if he have not studied and practised, will he be unjust still? Surely you might say, Callicles, whether you think that Polus and I were right in admitting the conclusion that no one does wrong voluntarily, but that all do wrong against their will?

*Cal.* Granted, Socrates, if you will only have done.

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*Soc.* Then, as would appear, power and art have to be provided in order that we may do no injustice?

*Cal.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And what art will protect us from suffering injustice, if not wholly, yet as far as possible? I want to know whether you agree with me; for I think that such an art is the art of one who is either a ruler or even tyrant himself, or the equal and companion of the ruling power.

*Cal.* Well said, Socrates; and please to observe how ready I am to praise you when you talk sense.

*Soc.* Think and tell me whether you would approve of another view of mine: To me every man appears to be most the friend of him who is most like to him—like to like, as ancient sages say: Would you not agree to this?

*Cal.* I should.

*Soc.* But when the tyrant is rude and uneducated, he may be expected to fear any one who is his superior in virtue, and will never be able to be perfectly friendly with him.

*Cal.* That is true.

*Soc.* Neither will he be the friend of any one who is greatly his inferior, for the tyrant will despise him, and will never seriously regard him as a friend.

*Cal.* That again is true.

*Soc.* Then the only friend worth mentioning, whom the tyrant can have, will be one who is of the same character, and has the same likes and dislikes, and is at the same time willing to be subject and subservient to him; he is the man who will have power in the state, and no one will injure him with impunity:—is not that so?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And if a young man begins to ask how he may be-

The tyrant naturally hates both his superiors and inferiors: he likes only those who resemble him in character.



come great and formidable, this would seem to be the way — he will accustom himself, from his youth upward, to feel sorrow and joy on the same occasions as his master, and will contrive to be as like him as possible?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And in this way he will have accomplished, as you and your friends would say, the end of becoming a great man and not suffering injury?

*Cal.* Very true.

*Soc.* But will he also escape from doing injury? Must not the very opposite be true, if he is to be like the tyrant in his injustice, and to have influence with him? Will he not rather contrive to do as much wrong as possible, and not be punished?

*Cal.* True.

*Soc.* And by the imitation of his master and by the power which he thus acquires will not his soul become bad and corrupted, and will not this be the greatest evil to him?

*Cal.* You always contrive somehow or other, Socrates, to invert everything: do you not know that he who imitates the tyrant will, if he has a mind, kill him who does not imitate him and take away his goods?

*Soc.* Excellent Callicles, I am not deaf, and I have heard that a great many times from you and from Polus and from nearly every man in the city, but I wish that you would hear me too. I dare say that he will kill him if he has a mind — the bad man will kill the good and true.

*Cal.* And is not that just the provoking thing?

*Soc.* Nay, not to a man of sense, as the argument shows: do you think that all our cares should be directed to prolonging life to the uttermost, and to the study of those arts which secure us from danger always; like that art of rhetoric which saves men in courts of law, and which you advise me to cultivate?

*Cal.* Yes, truly, and very good advice too.

*Soc.* Well, my friend, but what do you think of swimming; is that an art of any great pretensions?

*Cal.* No, indeed.

*Soc.* And yet surely swimming saves a man from death, and there are occasions on which he must know how to swim.


*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES,  
CALLICLES.

And the way to be a great man and not to suffer injury is to become like him. And there can be no greater evil to him than this.

But how provoking that the bad man should slay the good!

Nay, but we should not always study the arts which save us from death;— the art of swimming, the art of the pilot, &c.



*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES.

The pilot demands a very moderate payment as the fare of a passenger from Athens to Aegina, because he is not certain whether salvation from death be a good or an evil.

And if you despise the swimmers, I will tell you of another and greater art, the art of the pilot, who not only saves the souls of men, but also their bodies and properties from the extremity of danger, just like rhetoric. Yet his art is modest and unpretending: it has no airs or pretences of doing anything extraordinary, and, in return for the same salvation which is given by the pleader, demands only two obols, if he brings us from Aegina to Athens, or for the longer voyage from Pontus or Egypt, at the utmost two drachmae, when he has saved, as I was just now saying, the passenger and his wife and children and goods, and safely disembarked them at the Piraeus,—this is the payment which he asks in return for so great a boon; and he who is the master of the art, and has done all this, gets out and walks about on the sea-shore by his ship in an unassuming way. For he is able to reflect and is aware that he cannot tell which of his fellow-passengers he has benefited, and which of them he has injured in not allowing them to be drowned. He knows that they are just the same when he has disembarked them as when they embarked, 512 and not a whit better either in their bodies or in their souls; and he considers that if a man who is afflicted by great and incurable bodily diseases is only to be pitied for having escaped, and is in no way benefited by him in having been saved from drowning, much less he who has great and incurable diseases, not of the body, but of the soul, which is the more valuable part of him; neither is life worth having nor of any profit to the bad man, whether he be delivered from the sea, or the law-courts, or any other devourer;—and so he reflects that such a one had better not live, for he cannot live well<sup>1</sup>.

The engineer, too:—how much better than the pleader!

And this is the reason why the pilot, although he is our saviour, is not usually conceited, any more than the engineer, who is not at all behind either the general, or the pilot, or any one else, in his saving power, for he sometimes saves whole cities. Is there any comparison between him and the pleader? And if he were to talk, Callicles, in your grandiose style, he would bury you under a mountain of words, declaring and insisting that we ought all of us to be engineers, and that no other profession is worth thinking about;

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. iii. 407 E.

he would have plenty to say. Nevertheless you despise him and his art, and sneeringly call him an engine-maker, and you will not allow your daughters to marry his son, or marry your son to his daughters. And yet, on your principle, what justice or reason is there in your refusal? What right have you to despise the engine-maker, and the others whom I was just now mentioning? I know that you will say, 'I am better, and better born.' But if the better is not what I say, and virtue consists only in a man saving himself and his, whatever may be his character, then your censure of the engine-maker, and of the physician, and of the other arts of salvation, is ridiculous. O my friend! I want you to see that the noble and the good may possibly be something different from saving and being saved:—May not he who is truly a man cease to care about living a certain time?—he knows, as women say, that no man can escape fate, and therefore he is not fond of life; he leaves all that with God, and considers in what way he can best spend his appointed term;—whether by assimilating himself to the constitution under which he lives, as you at this moment have to consider how you may become as like as possible to the Athenian people, if you mean to be in their good graces, and to have power in the state; whereas I want you to think and see whether this is for the interest of either of us;—I would not have us risk that which is dearest on the acquisition of this power, like the Thessalian enchantresses, who, as they say, bring down the moon from heaven at the risk of their own perdition. But if you suppose that any man will show you the art of becoming great in the city, and yet not conforming yourself to the ways of the city, whether for better or worse, then I can only say that you are mistaken, Callicles; for he who would deserve to be the true natural friend of the Athenian Demus, aye, or of Pylampes' darling who is called after them, must be by nature like them, and not an imitator only. He, then, who will make you most like them, will make you as you desire, a statesman and orator: for every man is pleased when he is spoken to in his own language and spirit, and dislikes any other. But perhaps you, sweet Callicles, may be of another mind. What do you say?

*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES,  
CALLICLES.

He too is another of your saviours; but you despise him, whereas you ought to esteem him highly.

I want you to consider whether you can possibly become great among the people unless you become like them.

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*Cal.* Somehow or other your words, Socrates, always



*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES,  
CALLICLES.

Callicles inclines for an instant to the Gospel of Socrates, but the love of the world and of popularity overcomes him.

Two processes of training; one having a view to pleasure, the other to good.

And we must train our citizens with a view to their good; and, as in other arts, we must show that we can be trusted to improve them.

appear to me to be good words; and yet, like the rest of the world, I am not quite convinced by them<sup>1</sup>.

*Soc.* The reason is, Callicles, that the love of Demus which abides in your soul is an adversary to me; but I dare say that if we recur to these same matters, and consider them more thoroughly, you may be convinced for all that. Please, then, to remember that there are two processes of training all things, including body and soul; in the one, as we said, we treat them with a view to pleasure, and in the other with a view to the highest good, and then we do not indulge but resist them: was not that the distinction which we drew?

*Cal.* Very true.

*Soc.* And the one which had pleasure in view was just a vulgar flattery:—was not that another of our conclusions?

*Cal.* Be it so; if you will have it.

*Soc.* And the other had in view the greatest improvement of that which was ministered to, whether body or soul?

*Cal.* Quite true.

*Soc.* And must we not have the same end in view in the treatment of our city and citizens? Must we not try and make them as good as possible? For we have already discovered that there is no use in imparting to them any other good, unless the mind of those who are to have the good, whether money, or office, or any other sort of power, be gentle and good. Shall we say that? 514

*Cal.* Yes, certainly, if you like.

*Soc.* Well, then, if you and I, Callicles, were intending<sup>2</sup> to set about some public business, and were advising one another to undertake buildings, such as walls, docks or temples of the largest size, ought we not to examine ourselves, first, as to whether we know or do not know the art of building, and who taught us?—would not that be necessary, Callicles?

*Cal.* True.

*Soc.* In the second place, we should have to consider whether we had ever constructed any private house, either of our own or for our friends, and whether this building of ours was a success or not; and if upon consideration we found that we had had good and eminent masters, and had been

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Symp. 216: 1 Alcib. 135.

<sup>2</sup> Reading with the majority of MSS. πράξοντες.



successful in constructing many fine buildings, not only with their assistance, but without them, by our own unaided skill — in that case prudence would not dissuade us from proceeding to the construction of public works. But if we had no master to show, and only a number of worthless buildings or none at all, then, surely, it would be ridiculous in us to attempt public works, or to advise one another to undertake them. Is not this true?

*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES,  
CALLICLES.

*Cal.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And does not the same hold in all other cases? If you and I were physicians, and were advising one another that we were competent to practise as state-physicians, should I not ask about you, and would you not ask about me, Well, but how about Socrates himself, has he good health? and was any one else ever known to be cured by him, whether slave or freeman? And I should make the same enquiries about you. And if we arrived at the conclusion that no one, whether citizen or stranger, man or woman, had ever been any the better for the medical skill of either of us, then, by Heaven, Callicles, what an absurdity to think that we or any human being should be so silly as to set up as state-physicians and advise others like ourselves to do the same, without having first practised in private, whether successfully or not, and acquired experience of the art! Is not this, as they say, to begin with the big jar when you are learning the potter's art; which is a foolish thing?

515 *Cal.* True.

*Soc.* And now, my friend, as you are already beginning to be a public character, and are admonishing and reproaching me for not being one, suppose that we ask a few questions of one another. Tell me, then, Callicles, how about making any of the citizens better? Was there ever a man who was once vicious, or unjust, or intemperate, or foolish, and became by the help of Callicles good and noble? Was there ever such a man, whether citizen or stranger, slave or freeman? Tell me, Callicles, if a person were to ask these questions of you, what would you answer? Whom would you say that you had improved by your conversation? There may have been good deeds of this sort which were done by you

And now,  
Callicles, what  
are you who  
are a public  
character doing  
for the  
improvement  
of the citizens?

*Gorgias.*

as a private person, before you came forward in public.  
Why will you not answer?

SOCRATES,  
CALLICLES.

*Cal.* You are contentious, Socrates.

Calicles  
makes no  
answer.

*Soc.* Nay, I ask you, not from a love of contention, but because I really want to know in what way you think that affairs should be administered among us — whether, when you come to the administration of them, you have any other aim but the improvement of the citizens? Have we not already admitted many times over that such is the duty of a public man? Nay, we have surely said so; for if you will not answer for yourself I must answer for you. But if this is what the good man ought to effect for the benefit of his own state, allow me to recall to you the names of those whom you were just now mentioning, Pericles, and Cimon, and Miltiades, and Themistocles, and ask whether you still think that they were good citizens.

Or how did  
Pericles and  
the great of  
old benefit the  
citizens?

*Cal.* I do.

*Soc.* But if they were good, then clearly each of them must have made the citizens better instead of worse?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And, therefore, when Pericles first began to speak in the assembly, the Athenians were not so good as when he spoke last?

*Cal.* Very likely.

*Soc.* Nay, my friend, 'likely' is not the word; for if he was a good citizen, the inference is certain.

*Cal.* And what difference does that make?

*Soc.* None; only I should like further to know whether the Athenians are supposed to have been made better by Pericles, or, on the contrary, to have been corrupted by him; for I hear that he was the first who gave the people pay, and made them idle and cowardly, and encouraged them in the love of talk and of money.

Pericles cor-  
rupted them  
by giving  
them pay.

*Cal.* You heard that, Socrates, from the laconising set who bruise their ears.

He made  
them worse  
instead of  
better, for  
they all but  
put him to  
death.

*Soc.* But what I am going to tell you now is not mere hearsay, but well known both to you and me: that at first, Pericles was glorious and his character unimpeached by any verdict of the Athenians — this was during the time when 516 they were not so good — yet afterwards, when they had been

made good and gentle by him, at the very end of his life they convicted him of theft, and almost put him to death, clearly under the notion that he was a malefactor.

*Gorgias.*  
*SOCRATES,*  
*CALLICLES.*

*Cal.* Well, but how does that prove Pericles' badness?

*Soc.* Why, surely, you would say that he was a bad manager of asses or horses or oxen, who had received them originally neither kicking nor butting nor biting him, and implanted in them all these savage tricks? Would he not be a bad manager of any animals who received them gentle, and made them fiercer than they were when he received them? What do you say?

*Cal.* I will do you the favour of saying 'yes.'

*Soc.* And will you also do me the favour of saying whether man is an animal?

*Cal.* Certainly he is.

*Soc.* And was not Pericles a shepherd of men?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* And if he was a good political shepherd, ought not the animals who were his subjects, as we were just now acknowledging, to have become more just, and not more unjust?

*Cal.* Quite true.

*Soc.* And are not just men gentle, as Homer says?—or are you of another mind?

*Cal.* I agree.

*Soc.* And yet he really did make them more savage than he received them, and their savageness was shown towards himself; which he must have been very far from desiring.

*Cal.* Do you want me to agree with you?

*Soc.* Yes, if I seem to you to speak the truth.

*Cal.* Granted then.

*Soc.* And if they were more savage, must they not have been more unjust and inferior?

*Cal.* Granted again.

*Soc.* Then upon this view, Pericles was not a good statesman?

*Cal.* That is, upon your view.

*Soc.* Nay, the view is yours, after what you have admitted. Take the case of Cimon again. Did not the very persons whom he was serving ostracize him, in order that they might

Cimon was  
ostracised;



*Gorgias.*SOCRATES,  
CALLICLES.Themistocles  
was exiled;  
Miltiades was  
nearly thrown  
from the rock.

not hear his voice for ten years? and they did just the same to Themistocles, adding the penalty of exile; and they voted that Miltiades, the hero of Marathon, should be thrown into the pit of death, and he was only saved by the Prytanis. And yet, if they had been really good men, as you say, these things would never have happened to them. For the good charioteers are not those who at first keep their place, and then, when they have broken-in their horses, and themselves become better charioteers, are thrown out—that is not the way either in charioteering or in any profession.—What do you think?

*Cal.* I should think not.The older  
statesmen no  
better than  
the existing  
ones.

*Soc.* Well, but if so, the truth is as I have said already, 517 that in the Athenian State no one has ever shown himself to be a good statesman—you admitted that this was true of our present statesmen, but not true of former ones, and you preferred them to the others; yet they have turned out to be no better than our present ones; and therefore, if they were rhetoricians, they did not use the true art of rhetoric or of flattery, or they would not have fallen out of favour.

*Cal.* But surely, Socrates, no living man ever came near any one of them in his performances.

✓ The older  
statesmen not  
able really to  
elevate the  
state to a  
higher level,  
but more  
capable of  
gratifying its  
desires.

*Soc.* O, my dear friend, I say nothing against them regarded as the serving-men of the State; and I do think that they were certainly more serviceable than those who are living now, and better able to gratify the wishes of the State; but as to transforming those desires and not allowing them to have their way, and using the powers which they had, whether of persuasion or of force, in the improvement of their fellow-citizens, which is the prime object of the truly good citizen, I do not see that in these respects they were a whit superior to our present statesmen, although I do admit that they were more clever at providing ships and walls and docks, and all that. You and I have a ridiculous way, for during the whole time that we are arguing, we are always going round and round to the same point, and constantly misunderstanding one another. If I am not mistaken, you have admitted and acknowledged more than once, that there are two kinds of operations which have to do with the body,



and two which have to do with the soul: one of the two is ministerial, and if our bodies are hungry provides food for them, and if they are thirsty gives them drink, or if they are cold supplies them with garments, blankets, shoes, and all that they crave. I use the same images as before intentionally, in order that you may understand me the better. The purveyor of the articles may provide them either wholesale or retail, or he may be the maker of any of them,—the baker, or the cook, or the weaver, or the shoemaker, or the currier; and in so doing, being such as he is, he is naturally supposed by himself and every one to minister to the body. For none of them know that there is another art—an art of gymnastic and medicine which is the true minister of the body, and ought to be the mistress of all the rest, and to use their results according to the knowledge which she has and they have not, of the real good or bad effects of meats and drinks on the body. All other arts which have to do with the body are servile and menial and illiberal; and gymnastic and medicine are, as they ought to be, their mistresses. Now, when I say that all this is equally true of the soul, you seem at first to know and understand and assent to my words, and then a little while afterwards you come repeating, Has not the State had good and noble citizens? and when I ask you who they are, you reply, seemingly quite in earnest, as if I had asked, Who are or have been good trainers?—and you had replied, Thearion, the baker, Mithoecus, who wrote the Sicilian cookery-book, Sarambus, the vintner: these are ministers of the body, first-rate in their art; for the first makes admirable loaves, the second excellent dishes, and the third capital wine;—to me these appear to be the exact parallel of the statesmen whom you mention. Now you would not be altogether pleased if I said to you, My friend, you know nothing of gymnastics; those of whom you are speaking to me are only the ministers and purveyors of luxury, who have no good or noble notions of their art, and may very likely be filling and fattening men's bodies and gaining their approval, although the result is that they lose their original flesh in the long run, and become thinner than they were before; and yet they, in their simplicity, will not attribute their diseases and

*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES.

You might as well say that the cook or the baker is a good trainer as that they were great statesmen.

*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES.

loss of flesh to their entertainers; but when in after years the unhealthy surfeit brings the attendant penalty of disease, he who happens to be near them at the time, and offers them advice, is accused and blamed by them, and if they could they would do him some harm; while they proceed to eulogize the men who have been the real authors of the mischief. And that, Callicles, is just what you are now doing. You praise the men who feasted the citizens and satisfied their desires, and people say that they have made the city great, not seeing that the swollen and ulcerated condition of the State is to be attributed to these elder statesmen; for they have filled the city full of harbours and docks and walls and revenues and all that, and have left no room for justice and temperance. And when the crisis of the disorder comes, 519 the people will blame the advisers of the hour, and applaud Themistocles and Cimon and Pericles, who are the real authors of their calamities; and if you are not careful they may assail you and my friend Alcibiades, when they are losing not only their new acquisitions, but also their original possessions; not that you are the authors of these misfortunes of theirs, although you may perhaps be accessories to them. A great piece of work is always being made, as I see and am told, now as of old, about our statesmen. When the State treats any of them as malefactors, I observe that there is a great uproar and indignation at the supposed wrong which is done to them; 'after all their many services to the State, that they should unjustly perish,'—so the tale runs. But the cry is all a lie; for no statesman ever could be unjustly put to death by the city of which he is the head. The case of the professed statesman is, I believe, very much like that of the professed sophist; for the sophists, although they are wise men, are nevertheless guilty of a strange piece of folly; professing to be teachers of virtue, they will often accuse their disciples of wronging them, and defrauding them of their pay, and showing no gratitude for their services. Yet what can be more absurd than that men who have become just and good, and whose injustice has been taken away from them, and who have had justice implanted in them by their teachers, should act unjustly by reason of the injustice which is not in them? Can anything be more

The statesman like the Sophist; neither has any right to accuse their followers of wronging them; they should have taught them better.

irrational, my friend, than this? You, Callicles, compel me to be a mob-orator, because you will not answer.

*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES,

CALLICLES.

*Cal.* And you are the man who cannot speak unless there is some one to answer?

*Soc.* I suppose that I can; just now, at any rate, the speeches which I am making are long enough because you refuse to answer me. But I adjure you by the god of friendship, my good sir, do tell me whether there does not appear to you to be a great inconsistency in saying that you have made a man good, and then blaming him for being bad?

*Cal.* Yes, it appears so to me.

*Soc.* Do you never hear our professors of education speaking in this inconsistent manner?

*Cal.* Yes, but why talk of men who are good for nothing?

*Soc.* I would rather say, why talk of men who profess to be rulers, and declare that they are devoted to the improvement of the city, and nevertheless upon occasion declaim against the utter vileness of the city:—do you think that there is any difference between one and the other? My good friend, the sophist and the rhetorician, as I was saying to Polus, are the same, or nearly the same; but you ignorantly fancy that rhetoric is a perfect thing, and sophistry a thing to be despised; whereas the truth is, that sophistry is as much superior to rhetoric as legislation is to the practice of law, or gymnastic to medicine. The orators and sophists, as I am inclined to think, are the only class who cannot complain of the mischief ensuing to themselves from that which they teach others, without in the same breath accusing themselves of having done no good to those whom they profess to benefit. Is not this a fact?

Sophistry is much superior to rhetoric.

*Cal.* Certainly it is.

*Soc.* If they were right in saying that they make men better, then they are the only class who can afford to leave their remuneration to those who have been benefited by them. Whereas if a man has been benefited in any other way, if, for example, he has been taught to run by a trainer, he might possibly defraud him of his pay, if the trainer left the matter to him, and made no agreement with him that he should receive money as soon as he had given him the

He who teaches honesty ought to teach his pupils to pay him for the lesson.



*Gorgias.*SOCRATES,  
CALLICLES.

utmost speed; for not because of any deficiency of speed do men act unjustly, but by reason of injustice.

*Cal.* Very true.

*Soc.* And he who removes injustice can be in no danger of being treated unjustly: he alone can safely leave the honorarium to his pupils, if he be really able to make them good — am I not right<sup>1</sup>?

*Cal.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then we have found the reason why there is no dishonour in a man receiving pay who is called in to advise about building or any other art?

*Cal.* Yes, we have found the reason.

*Soc.* But when the point is, how a man may become best himself, and best govern his family and state, then to say that you will give no advice gratis is held to be dishonourable?

*Cal.* True.

*Soc.* And why? Because only such benefits call forth a desire to requite them, and there is evidence that a benefit has been conferred when the benefactor receives a return; otherwise not. Is this true?

*Cal.* It is.

Callicles advises Socrates to be the servant of the state, and not run the risk of popular enmity.

*Soc.* Then to which service of the State do you invite me? determine for me. Am I to be the physician of the State who will strive and struggle to make the Athenians as good as possible; or am I to be the servant and flatterer of the State? Speak out, my good friend, freely and fairly as you did at first and ought to do again, and tell me your entire mind. 521

*Cal.* I say then that you should be the servant of the State.

*Soc.* The flatterer? well, sir, that is a noble invitation.

*Cal.* The Mysian, Socrates, or what you please. For if you refuse, the consequences will be —

*Soc.* Do not repeat the old story — that he who likes will kill me and get my money; for then I shall have to repeat the old answer, that he will be a bad man and will kill the good, and that the money will be of no use to him, but that

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Protag. 328.



he will wrongly use that which he wrongly took, and if wrongly, basely, and if basely, hurtfully.

*Gorgias.*

*Cal.* How confident you are, Socrates, that you will never come to harm! you seem to think that you are living in another country, and can never be brought into a court of justice, as you very likely may be brought by some miserable and mean person.

SOCRATES,  
CALLICLES.

*Soc.* Then I must indeed be a fool, Callicles, if I do not know that in the Athenian State any man may suffer anything. And if I am brought to trial and incur the dangers of which you speak, he will be a villain who brings me to trial — of that I am very sure, for no good man would accuse the innocent. Nor shall I be surprised if I am put to death. Shall I tell you why I anticipate this?

Socrates has no fear of popular enmity, but is quite aware that he will incur it, because he is the only true politician of his time,

*Cal.* By all means.

*Soc.* I think that I am the only or almost the only Athenian living who practises the true art of politics; I am the only politician of my time. Now, seeing that when I speak my words are not uttered with any view of gaining favour, and that I look to what is best and not to what is most pleasant, having no mind to use those arts and graces which you recommend, I shall have nothing to say in the justice court. And you might argue with me, as I was arguing with Polus:—I shall be tried just as a physician would be tried in a court of little boys at the indictment of the cook. What would he reply under such circumstances, if some one were to accuse him, saying, ‘O my boys, many evil things has this man done to you: he is the death of you, especially of the younger ones among you, cutting and burning and starving and suffocating you, until you know not what to do; he gives you the bitterest potions, and compels you to hunger and thirst. How unlike the variety of meats and sweets on which I feasted you!’ What do you suppose that the physician would be able to reply when he found himself in such a predicament? If he told the truth he could only say, ‘All these evil things, my boys, I did for your health,’ and then would there not just be a clamour among a jury like that? How they would cry out!

*Cal.* I dare say.

*Soc.* Would he not be utterly at a loss for a reply?



*Gorgias.**Cal.* He certainly would.SOCRATES,  
CALICLES.and he has  
no defence  
against men  
such as his  
opponents:

*Soc.* And I too shall be treated in the same way, as I well know, if I am brought before the court. For I shall not be able to rehearse to the people the pleasures which I have procured for them, and which, although I am not disposed to envy either the procurers or enjoyers of them, are deemed by them to be benefits and advantages. And if any one says that I corrupt young men, and perplex their minds, or that I speak evil of old men, and use bitter words towards them, whether in private or public, it is useless for me to reply, as I truly might:—‘All this I do for the sake of justice, and with a view to your interest, my judges, and to nothing else.’ And therefore there is no saying what may happen to me.

*Cal.* And do you think, Socrates, that a man who is thus defenceless is in a good position?

that is to say,  
he has the  
defence of  
truth, but not  
such a de-  
fence as men  
ordinarily  
produce.

*Soc.* Yes, Calicles, if he have that defence, which as you have often acknowledged he should have—if he be his own defence, and have never said or done anything wrong, either in respect of gods or men; and this has been repeatedly acknowledged by us to be the best sort of defence. And if any one could convict me of inability to defend myself or others after this sort, I should blush for shame, whether I was convicted before many, or before a few, or by myself alone; and if I died from want of ability to do so, that would indeed grieve me. But if I died because I have no powers of flattery or rhetoric, I am very sure that you would not find me repining at death. For no man who is not an utter fool and coward is afraid of death itself, but he is afraid of doing wrong. For to go to the world below having one’s soul full of injustice is the last and worst of all evils. And in proof of what I say, if you have no objection, I should like to tell you a story.

*Cal.* Very well, proceed; and then we shall have done.

The philo-  
sopher has no  
reason to  
dread death,  
as Socrates  
will prove  
by a rela-  
tion of what

*Soc.* Listen, then, as story-tellers say, to a very pretty 523 tale, which I dare say that you may be disposed to regard as a fable only, but which, as I believe, is a true tale, for I mean to speak the truth. Homer tells us<sup>1</sup>, how Zeus and Poseidon and Pluto divided the empire which they inherited from their father. Now in the days of Cronos there existed

<sup>1</sup> Il. xv. 187. foll.

a law respecting the destiny of man, which has always been, and still continues to be in Heaven,—that he who has lived all his life in justice and holiness shall go, when he is dead, to the Islands of the Blessed, and dwell there in perfect happiness out of the reach of evil; but that he who has lived unjustly and impiously shall go to the house of vengeance and punishment, which is called Tartarus. And in the time of Cronos, and even quite lately in the reign of Zeus, the judgment was given on the very day on which the men were to die; the judges were alive, and the men were alive; and the consequence was that the judgments were not well given. Then Pluto and the authorities from the Islands of the Blessed came to Zeus, and said that the souls found their way to the wrong places. Zeus said: ‘I shall put a stop to this; the judgments are not well given, because the persons who are judged have their clothes on, for they are alive; and there are many who, having evil souls, are apparelled in fair bodies, or encased in wealth or rank, and, when the day of judgment arrives, numerous witnesses come forward and testify on their behalf that they have lived righteously. The judges are awed by them, and they themselves too have their clothes on when judging; their eyes and ears and their whole bodies are interposed as a veil before their own souls. All this is a hindrance to them; there are the clothes of the judges and the clothes of the judged.—What is to be done? I will tell you:—In the first place, I will deprive men of the foreknowledge of death, which they possess at present: this power which they have Prometheus has already received my orders to take from them: in the second place, they shall be entirely stripped before they are judged, for they shall be judged when they are dead; and the judge too shall be naked, that is to say, dead—he with his naked soul shall pierce into the other naked souls; and they shall die suddenly and be deprived of all their kindred, and leave their brave attire strewn upon the earth—conducted in this manner, the judgment will be just. I knew all about the matter before any of you, and therefore I have made my sons judges; two from Asia, Minos and Rhadamanthus, and one from Europe, 24 Aeacus. And these, when they are dead, shall give judgment in the meadow at the parting of the ways, whence the

*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES.

happens in the world below.

Before the days of Zeus, the judgments of another world too much resembled the judgments of this.

Zeus takes measures for the correction and improvement of them.



*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES.

two roads lead, one to the Islands of the Blessed, and the other to Tartarus. Rhadamanthus shall judge those who come from Asia, and Aeacus those who come from Europe. And to Minos I shall give the primacy, and he shall hold a court of appeal, in case either of the two others are in any doubt:—then the judgment respecting the last journey of men will be as just as possible.’

As the body  
is, so is the  
soul after  
death; they  
both retain  
the traces of  
what they  
were in life,

From this tale, Callicles, which I have heard and believe, I draw the following inferences:—Death, if I am right, is in the first place the separation from one another of two things, soul and body; nothing else. And after they are separated they retain their several natures, as in life; the body keeps the same habit, and the results of treatment or accident are distinctly visible in it: for example, he who by nature or training or both, was a tall man while he was alive, will remain as he was, after he is dead; and the fat man will remain fat; and so on; and the dead man, who in life had a fancy to have flowing hair, will have flowing hair. And if he was marked with the whip and had the prints of the scourge, or of wounds in him when he was alive, you might see the same in the dead body; and if his limbs were broken or misshapen when he was alive, the same appearance would be visible in the dead. And in a word, whatever was the habit of the body during life would be distinguishable after death, either perfectly, or in a great measure and for a certain time. And I should imagine that this is equally true of the soul, Callicles; when a man is stripped of the body, all the natural or acquired affections of the soul are laid open to view.—

and they are  
punished ac-  
cordingly.

And when they come to the judge, as those from Asia come to Rhadamanthus, he places them near him and inspects them quite impartially, not knowing whose the soul is: perhaps he may lay hands on the soul of the great king, or of some other king or potentate, who has no soundness in him, but his soul is marked with the whip, and is full of the prints and scars of perjuries and crimes with which each action has stained him, and he is all crooked with falsehood and im- posture, and has no straightness, because he has lived with- out truth. Him Rhadamanthus beholds, full of all deformity and disproportion, which is caused by licence and luxury and insolence and incontinence, and despatches him igno-



miniously to his prison, and there he undergoes the punishment which he deserves.

Now the proper office of punishment is twofold: he who is rightly punished ought either to become better and profit by it, or he ought to be made an example to his fellows, that they may see what he suffers, and fear and become better. Those who are improved when they are punished by gods and men, are those whose sins are curable; and they are improved, as in this world so also in another, by pain and suffering; for there is no other way in which they can be delivered from their evil. But they who have been guilty of the worst crimes, and are incurable by reason of their crimes, are made examples; for, as they are incurable, the time has passed at which they can receive any benefit. They get no good themselves, but others get good when they behold them enduring for ever the most terrible and painful and fearful sufferings as the penalty of their sins — there they are, hanging up as examples, in the prison-house of the world below, a spectacle and a warning to all unrighteous men who come thither. And among them, as I confidently affirm, will be found Archelaus, if Polus truly reports of him, and any other tyrant who is like him. Of these fearful examples, most, as I believe, are taken from the class of tyrants and kings and potentates and public men, for they are the authors of the greatest and most impious crimes, because they have the power. And Homer witnesses to the truth of this; for they are always kings and potentates whom he has described as suffering everlasting punishment in the world below: such were Tantalus and Sisyphus and Tityus. But no one ever described Thersites, or any private person who was a villain, as suffering everlasting punishment, or as incurable. For to commit the worst crimes, as I am inclined to think, was not in his power, and he was happier than those who had the power. No, Callicles, the very bad men come from the class of those who have power<sup>1</sup>. And yet in that very class there may arise good men, and worthy of all admiration they are, for where there is great power to do wrong, to live and to die justly is a hard thing, and greatly to be praised, and few there are who attain to this. Such good and true men,

*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES.

The proper office of punishment is either to improve or to deter.

The meaner sort of men are incapable of great crimes.

Great men have sometimes been good men; but power is apt to corrupt them.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. x. 615 E.

*Gorgias.*

SOCRATES.

however, there have been, and will be again, at Athens and in other states, who have fulfilled their trust righteously ; and there is one who is quite famous all over Hellas, Aristides, the son of Lysimachus. But, in general, great men are also bad, my friend.

The impartiality of the judges in another world.

As I was saying, Rhadamanthus, when he gets a soul of the bad kind, knows nothing about him, neither who he is, nor who his parents are ; he knows only that he has got hold of a villain ; and seeing this, he stamps him as curable or incurable, and sends him away to Tartarus, whither he goes and receives his proper recompense. Or, again, he looks with admiration on the soul of some just one who has lived in holiness and truth ; he may have been a private man or not ; and I should say, Callicles, that he is most likely to have been a philosopher who has done his own work, and not troubled himself with the doings of other men in his lifetime ; him Rhadamanthus sends to the Islands of the Blessed. Aeacus does the same ; and they both have sceptres, and judge ; but Minos alone has a golden sceptre and is seated looking on, as Odysseus in Homer<sup>1</sup> declares that he saw him :

‘ Holding a sceptre of gold, and giving laws to the dead.’

Now I, Callicles, am persuaded of the truth of these things, and I consider how I shall present my soul whole and undefiled before the judge in that day. Renouncing the honours at which the world aims, I desire only to know the truth, and to live as well as I can, and, when I die, to die as well as I can. And, to the utmost of my power, I exhort all other men to do the same. And, in return for your exhortation of me, I exhort you also to take part in the great combat, which is the combat of life, and greater than every other earthly conflict. And I retort your reproach of me, and say, that you will not be able to help yourself when the day of trial and judgment, of which I was speaking, comes upon you ; you will go before the judge, the son of Aegina, and, when he has got you in his grip and is carrying you off, you will gape and your head will swim round, just as mine would in the courts of this world, and very likely some one will

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<sup>1</sup> Odyss. xi. 569.

shamefully box you on the ears, and put upon you any sort of insult. *Gorgias.*

SOCRATES.

Perhaps this may appear to you to be only an old wife's tale, which you will condemn. And there might be reason in your condemning such tales, if by searching we could find out anything better or truer: but now you see that you and Polus and Gorgias, who are the three wisest of the Greeks of our day, are not able to show that we ought to live any life which does not profit in another world as well as in this. And of all that has been said, nothing remains unshaken but the saying, that to do injustice is more to be avoided than to suffer injustice, and that the reality and not the appearance of virtue is to be followed above all things, as well in public as in private life; and that when any one has been wrong in anything, he is to be chastised, and that the next best thing to a man being just is that he should become just, and be chastised and punished; also that he should avoid all flattery of himself as well as of others, of the few or of the many: and rhetoric and any other art should be used by him, and all his actions should be done always, with a view to justice.

Follow me then, and I will lead you where you will be happy in life and after death, as the argument shows. And never mind if some one despises you as a fool, and insults you, if he has a mind; let him strike you, by Zeus, and do you be of good cheer, and do not mind the insulting blow, for you will never come to any harm in the practice of virtue, if you are a really good and true man. When we have practised virtue together, we will apply ourselves to politics, if that seems desirable, or we will advise about whatever else may seem good to us, for we shall be better able to judge then. In our present condition we ought not to give ourselves airs, for even on the most important subjects we are always changing our minds; so utterly stupid are we! Let us, then, take the argument as our guide, which has revealed to us that the best way of life is to practise justice and every virtue in life and death. This way let us go; and in this exhort all men to follow, not in the way to which you trust and in which you exhort me to follow you; for that way, Callicles, is nothing worth.





## APPENDIX I.



## APPENDIX I.

IT seems impossible to separate by any exact line the genuine writings of Plato from the spurious. The only external evidence to them which is of much value is that of Aristotle; for the Alexandrian catalogues of a century later include manifest forgeries. Even the value of the Aristotelian authority is a good deal impaired by the uncertainty concerning the date and authorship of the writings which are ascribed to him. And several of the citations of Aristotle omit the name of Plato, and some of them omit the name of the dialogue from which they are taken. Prior, however, to the enquiry about the writings of a particular author, general considerations which equally affect all evidence to the genuineness of ancient writings are the following: Shorter works are more likely to have been forged, or to have received an erroneous designation, than longer ones; and some kinds of composition, such as epistles or panegyric orations, are more liable to suspicion than others; those, again, which have a taste of sophistry in them, or the ring of a later age, or the slighter character of a rhetorical exercise, or in which a motive or some affinity to spurious writings can be detected, or which seem to have originated in a name or statement really occurring in some classical author, are also of doubtful credit; while there is no instance of any ancient writing proved to be a forgery, which combines excellence with length. A really great and original writer would have no object in fathering his works on Plato; and to the forger or imitator, the 'literary hack' of Alexandria and Athens, the Gods did not grant originality or genius. Further, in attempting to balance the evidence for and against a Platonic dialogue, we must not forget that the form of the Platonic writing was common to several of his contemporaries. Aeschines, Euclid,

APPENDIX I.

## APPENDIX I

Phaedo, Antisthenes, and in the next generation Aristotle, are all said to have composed dialogues; and mistakes of names are very likely to have occurred. Greek literature in the third century before Christ was almost as voluminous as our own, and without the safeguards of regular publication, or printing, or binding, or even of distinct titles. An unknown writing was naturally attributed to a known writer whose works bore the same character; and the name once appended easily obtained authority. A tendency may also be observed to blend the works and opinions of the master with those of his scholars. To a later Platonist, the difference between Plato and his imitators was not so perceptible as to ourselves. The *Memorabilia* of Xenophon and the *Dialogues* of Plato are but a part of a considerable Socratic literature which has passed away. And we must consider how we should regard the question of the genuineness of a particular writing, if this lost literature had been preserved to us.

These considerations lead us to adopt the following criteria of genuineness: (1) That is most certainly Plato's which Aristotle attributes to him by name, which (2) is of considerable length, of (3) great excellence, and also (4) in harmony with the general spirit of the Platonic writings. But the testimony of Aristotle cannot always be distinguished from that of a later age (see above); and has various degrees of importance. Those writings which he cites without mentioning Plato, under their own names, e. g. the *Hippias*, the *Funeral Oration*, the *Phaedo*, etc., have an inferior degree of evidence in their favour. They may have been supposed by him to be the writings of another, although in the case of really great works, e. g. the *Phaedo*, this is not credible; those again which are quoted but not named, are still more defective in their external credentials. There may be also a possibility that Aristotle was mistaken, or may have confused the master and his scholars in the case of a short writing; but this is inconceivable about a more important work, e. g. the *Laws*, especially when we remember that he was living at Athens, and a frequenter of the groves of the Academy, during the last twenty years of Plato's life. Nor must we forget that in all his numerous citations from the Platonic writings he never attributes any passage found in the extant dialogues to any one but Plato. And



lastly, we may remark that one or two great writings, such as the *Parmenides* and the *Politicus*, which are wholly devoid of Aristotelian (1) credentials may be fairly attributed to Plato, on the ground of (2) length, (3) excellence, and (4) accordance with the general spirit of his writings. Indeed the greater part of the evidence for the genuineness of ancient Greek authors may be summed up under two heads only: (1) excellence; and (2) uniformity of tradition — a kind of evidence, which though in many cases sufficient, is of inferior value.

Proceeding upon these principles we appear to arrive at the conclusion that nineteen-twentieths of all the writings which have ever been ascribed to Plato, are undoubtedly genuine. There is another portion of them, including the *Epistles*, the *Epinomis*, the dialogues rejected by the ancients themselves, namely, the *Axiarchus*, *De justo*, *De virtute*, *Demodocus*, *Sisyphus*, *Eryxias*, which on grounds, both of internal and external evidence, we are able with equal certainty to reject. But there still remains a small portion of which we are unable to affirm either that they are genuine or spurious. They may have been written in youth, or possibly like the works of some painters, may be partly or wholly the compositions of pupils; or they may have been the writings of some contemporary transferred by accident to the more celebrated name of Plato, or of some Platonist in the next generation who aspired to imitate his master. Not that on grounds either of language or philosophy we should lightly reject them. Some difference of style, or inferiority of execution, or inconsistency of thought, can hardly be considered decisive of their spurious character. For who always does justice to himself, or who writes with equal care at all times? Certainly not Plato, who exhibits the greatest differences in dramatic power, in the formation of sentences, and in the use of words, if his earlier writings are compared with his later ones, say the *Protagoras* or *Phaedrus* with the *Laws*. Or who can be expected to think in the same manner during a period of authorship extending over above fifty years, in an age of great intellectual activity, as well as of political and literary transition? Certainly not Plato, whose earlier writings are separated from his later ones by as wide an interval of philosophical speculation as that which separates his later writings from Aristotle.

## APPENDIX I.

The dialogues which have been translated in the first Appendix, and which appear to have the next claim to genuineness among the Platonic writings, are the Lesser Hippias, the Menexenus or Funeral Oration, the First Alcibiades. Of these, the Lesser Hippias and the Funeral Oration are cited by Aristotle; the first in the *Metaphysics*, iv. 29, 5, the latter in the *Rhetoric*, iii. 14, 11. Neither of them are expressly attributed to Plato, but in his citation of both of them he seems to be referring to passages in the extant dialogues. From the mention of 'Hippias' in the singular by Aristotle, we may perhaps infer that he was unacquainted with a second dialogue bearing the same name. Moreover, the mere existence of a Greater and Lesser Hippias, and of a First and Second Alcibiades, does to a certain extent throw a doubt upon both of them. Though a very clever and ingenious work, the Lesser Hippias does not appear to contain anything beyond the power of an imitator, who was also a careful student of the earlier Platonic writings, to invent. The motive or leading thought of the dialogue may be detected in *Xen. Mem.* iv. 2, 21, and there is no similar instance of a 'motive' which is taken from Xenophon in an undoubted dialogue of Plato. On the other hand, the upholders of the genuineness of the dialogue will find in the Hippias a true Socratic spirit; they will compare the *Ion* as being akin both in subject and treatment; they will urge the authority of Aristotle; and they will detect in the treatment of the Sophist, in the satirical reasoning upon Homer, in the *reductio ad absurdum* of the doctrine that vice is ignorance, traces of a Platonic authorship. In reference to the last point we are doubtful, as in some of the other dialogues, whether the author is asserting or overthrowing the paradox of Socrates, or merely following the argument 'whither the wind blows.' That no conclusion is arrived at is also in accordance with the character of the earlier dialogues. The resemblances or imitations of the *Gorgias*, *Protagoras*, and *Euthydemus*, which have been observed in the Hippias, cannot with certainty be adduced on either side of the argument. On the whole, more may be said in favour of the genuineness of the Hippias than against it.

The Menexenus or Funeral Oration is cited by Aristotle, and is interesting as supplying an example of the manner in which the orators praised 'the Athenians among the Athenians,' falsifying

persons and dates, and casting a veil over the gloomier events of Athenian history. It exhibits an acquaintance with the funeral oration of Thucydides, and was, perhaps, intended to rival that great work. If genuine, the proper place of the *Menexenus* would be at the end of the *Phaedrus*. The satirical opening and the concluding words bear a great resemblance to the earlier dialogues; the oration itself is professedly a mimetic work, like the speeches in the *Phaedrus*, and cannot therefore be tested by a comparison of the other writings of Plato. The funeral oration of Pericles is expressly mentioned in the *Phaedrus*, and this may have suggested the subject, in the same manner that the Cleitophon appears to be suggested by the slight mention of Cleitophon and his attachment to Thrasyarchus in the *Republic*, cp. 465 A; and the Theages by the mention of Theages in the *Apology* and *Republic*; or as the Second Alcibiades seems to be founded upon the text of Xenophon, *Mem.* i. 3, 1. A similar taste for parody appears not only in the *Phaedrus*, but in the *Protagoras*, in the *Symposium*, and to a certain extent in the *Parmenides*.

To these two doubtful writings of Plato I have added the First Alcibiades, which, of all the disputed dialogues of Plato, has the greatest merit, and is somewhat longer than any other of them, though not verified by the testimony of Aristotle, and in many respects at variance with the *Symposium* in the description of the relations of Socrates and Alcibiades. Like the Lesser Hippias and the *Menexenus*, it is to be compared to the earlier writings of Plato. The motive of the piece may, perhaps, be found in that passage of the *Symposium* in which Alcibiades describes himself as self-convicted by the words of Socrates (216 B, C). For the disparaging manner in which Schleiermacher has spoken of this dialogue there seems to be no sufficient foundation. At the same time, the lesson imparted is simple, and the irony more transparent than in the undoubted dialogues of Plato. We know, too, that Alcibiades was a favourite thesis, and that at least five or six dialogues bearing this name passed current in antiquity, and are attributed to contemporaries of Socrates and Plato. (1) In the entire absence of real external evidence (for the catalogues of the Alexandrian librarians cannot be regarded as trustworthy); and (2) in the absence of the highest marks either of poetical or philosophical excellence; and (3) considering that we have express



APPENDIX I. testimony to the existence of contemporary writings bearing the name of Alcibiades, we are compelled to suspend our judgment on the genuineness of the extant dialogue.

Neither at this point, nor at any other, do we propose to draw an absolute line of demarcation between genuine and spurious writings of Plato. They fade off imperceptibly from one class to another. There may have been degrees of genuineness in the dialogues themselves, as there are certainly degrees of evidence by which they are supported. The traditions of the oral discourses both of Socrates and Plato may have formed the basis of semi-Platonic writings; some of them may be of the same mixed character which is apparent in Aristotle and Hippocrates, although the form of them is different. But the writings of Plato, unlike the writings of Aristotle, seem never to have been confused with the writings of his disciples: this was probably due to their definite form, and to their inimitable excellence. The three dialogues which we have offered in the Appendix to the criticism of the reader may be partly spurious and partly genuine; they may be altogether spurious;—that is an alternative which must be frankly admitted. Nor can we maintain of some other dialogues, such as the *Parmenides*, and the *Sophist*, and *Politicus*, that no considerable objection can be urged against them, though greatly overbalanced by the weight (chiefly) of internal evidence in their favour. Nor, on the other hand, can we exclude a bare possibility that some dialogues which are usually rejected, such as the *Greater Hippias* and the *Cleitophon*, may be genuine. The nature and object of these semi-Platonic writings require more careful study and more comparison of them with one another, and with forged writings in general, than they have yet received, before we can finally decide on their character. We do not consider them all as genuine until they can be proved to be spurious, as is often maintained and still more often implied in this and similar discussions; but should say of some of them, that their genuineness is neither proven nor disproven until further evidence about them can be adduced. And we are as confident that the *Epistles* are spurious, as that the *Republic*, the *Timaeus*, and the *Laws* are genuine.

On the whole, not a twentieth part of the writings which pass under the name of Plato, if we exclude the works rejected by the



ancients themselves and two or three other plausible inventions, can be fairly doubted by those who are willing to allow that a considerable change and growth may have taken place in his philosophy (see above). That twentieth debatable portion scarcely in any degree affects our judgment of Plato, either as a thinker or a writer, and though suggesting some interesting questions to the scholar and critic, is of little importance to the general reader.



LESSER HIPPIAS.





## INTRODUCTION.

THE Lesser Hippias may be compared with the earlier dialogues of Plato, in which the contrast of Socrates and the Sophists is most strongly exhibited. Hippias, like Protagoras and Gorgias, though civil, is vain and boastful: he knows all things; he can make anything, including his own clothes; he is a manufacturer of poems and declamations, and also of seal-rings, shoes, strigils; his girdle, which he has woven himself, is of a finer than Persian quality. He is a vainer, lighter nature than the two great Sophists (cp. Protag. 314, 337), but of the same character with them, and equally impatient of the short cut-and-thrust method of Socrates, whom he endeavours to draw into a long oration. At last, he gets tired of being defeated at every point by Socrates, and is with difficulty induced to proceed (compare Thrasy-machus, Protagoras, Callicles, and others, to whom the same reluctance is ascribed).

*Lesser  
Hippias.*

INTRODUC-  
TION.

Steph. Hippias like Protagoras has common sense on his side, when  
-363 he argues, citing passages of the Iliad in support of his view, that  
Homer intended Achilles to be the bravest, Odysseus the wisest  
of the Greeks. But he is easily overthrown by the superior  
dialectics of Socrates, who pretends to show that Achilles is not  
369 true to his word, and that no similar inconsistency is to be found  
in Odysseus. Hippias replies that Achilles unintentionally, but  
370 Odysseus intentionally, speaks falsehood. But is it better to do  
wrong intentionally or unintentionally? Socrates, relying on the  
analogy of the arts, maintains the former, Hippias the latter of the  
-372 two alternatives. . . . All this is quite conceived in the spirit of Plato,  
who is very far from making Socrates always argue on the side of  
truth. The over-reasoning on Homer, which is of course satirical,  
is also in the spirit of Plato. Poetry turned logic is even more

ANALYSIS.

*Lesser  
Hippias.*

ANALYSIS.

ridiculous than 'rhetoric turned logic,' and equally fallacious. There were reasoners in ancient as well as in modern times, who could never receive the natural impression of Homer, or of any other book which they read. The argument of Socrates, in which he picks out the apparent inconsistencies and discrepancies in the speech and actions of Achilles, and the final paradox, 'that he who is true is also false,' reminds us of the interpretation by Socrates of Simonides in the *Protagoras*, and of similar reasonings in the first book of the *Republic*. The discrepancies which Socrates discovers in the words of Achilles are perhaps as great as those discovered by some of the modern separatists of the-376 Homeric poems. . . .

At last, Socrates having caught Hippias in the toils of the voluntary and involuntary, is obliged to confess that he is wandering about in the same labyrinth; he makes the reflection on himself which others would make upon him (cp. *Protagoras*, sub fin.). He does not wonder that he should be in a difficulty, but he wonders at Hippias, and he becomes sensible of the gravity of the situation, when ordinary men like himself can no longer go to the wise and be taught by them.

INTRODUC-  
TION.

It may be remarked as bearing on the genuineness of this dialogue: (1) that the manners of the speakers are less subtle and refined than in the other dialogues of Plato; (2) that the sophistry of Socrates is more palpable and unblushing, and also more unmeaning; (3) that many turns of thought and style are found in it which appear also in the other dialogues:—whether resemblances of this kind tell in favour of or against the genuineness of an ancient writing, is an important question which will have to be answered differently in different cases. For that a writer may repeat himself is as true as that a forger may imitate; and Plato elsewhere, either of set purpose or from forgetfulness, is full of repetitions. The parallelisms of the *Lesser Hippias*, as already remarked, are not of the kind which necessarily imply that the dialogue is the work of a forger. The parallelisms of the *Greater Hippias* with the other dialogues, and the allusion to the *Lesser* 285, 286 A, B (where Hippias sketches the programme of his next lecture, and invites Socrates to attend and bring any friends with him who may be competent judges), are more than suspicious:—

*Lesser  
Hippias.*

INTRODUC-  
TION.

they are of a very poor sort, such as we cannot suppose to have been due to Plato himself. The Greater Hippias more resembles the Euthydemus than any other dialogue; but is immeasurably inferior to it. The Lesser Hippias seems to have more merit than the Greater, and to be more Platonic in spirit. The character of Hippias is the same in both dialogues, but his vanity and boasting are even more exaggerated in the Greater Hippias. His art of memory is specially mentioned in both. He is an inferior type of the same species as Hippodamus of Miletus (Arist. Pol. II. 8, § 1). Some passages in which the Lesser Hippias may be advantageously compared with the undoubtedly genuine dialogues of Plato are the following: — Less. Hipp. 369 B: cp. Rep. vi. 487 (Socrates' cunning in argument): || ib. D, E: cp. Laches 188 (Socrates' feeling about arguments): || 372 B, C: cp. Rep. i. 338 B (Socrates not unthankful): || 373 B: cp. Rep. i. 340 D (Socrates dishonest in argument).

The Lesser Hippias, though inferior to the other dialogues, may be reasonably believed to have been written by Plato, on the ground (1) of considerable excellence; (2) of uniform tradition beginning with Aristotle and his school. That the dialogue falls below the standard of Plato's other works, or that he has attributed to Socrates an unmeaning paradox (perhaps with the view of showing that he could beat the Sophists at their own weapons; or that he could 'make the worse appear the better cause'; or merely as a dialectical experiment) — are not sufficient reasons for doubting the genuineness of the work.





# LESSER HIPPIAS.

## PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

EUDICUS, SOCRATES, HIPPIAS.

**Steph.** *Eudicus.* WHY are you silent, Socrates, after the magnificent display which Hippias has been making? Why do you not either refute his words, if he seems to you to have been wrong in any point, or join with us in commending him? There is the more reason why you should speak, because we are now alone, and the audience is confined to those who may fairly claim to take part in a philosophical discussion.

*Lesser  
Hippias.*

SOCRATES,  
EUDICUS,  
HIPPIAS.

*Socrates.* I should greatly like, Eudicus, to ask Hippias the meaning of what he was saying just now about Homer. I have heard your father, Apemantus, declare that the Iliad of Homer is a finer poem than the Odyssey in the same degree that Achilles was a better man than Odysseus; Odysseus, he would say, is the central figure of the one poem and Achilles of the other. Now, I should like to know, if Hippias has no objection to tell me, what he thinks about these two heroes, and which of them he maintains to be the better; he has already told us in the course of his exhibition many things of various kinds about Homer and divers other poets.

The Iliad of  
Homer a finer  
work than the  
Odyssey, be-  
cause Achilles,  
the hero of  
the poem, is  
greater than  
Odysseus.

*Eud.* I am sure that Hippias will be delighted to answer anything which you would like to ask; tell me, Hippias, if Socrates asks you a question, will you answer him?

*Hippias.* Indeed, Eudicus, I should be strangely inconsistent if I refused to answer Socrates, when at each Olympic festival, as I went up from my house at Elis to the temple of

*Lesser  
Hippias.*

SOCRATES,  
HIPPIAS.

Olympia, where all the Hellenes were assembled, I continually professed my willingness to perform any of the exhibitions which I had prepared, and to answer any questions which any one had to ask.

*Soc.* Truly, Hippias, you are to be congratulated, if at every Olympic festival you have such an encouraging opinion of your own wisdom when you go up to the temple. I doubt whether any muscular hero would be so fearless and confident in offering his body to the combat at Olympia, as you are in offering your mind. 364

*Hip.* And with good reason, Socrates; for since the day when I first entered the lists at Olympia I have never found any man who was my superior in anything<sup>1</sup>.

*Soc.* What an ornament, Hippias, will the reputation of your wisdom be to the city of Elis and to your parents! But to return: what say you of Odysseus and Achilles? Which is the better of the two? and in what particular does either surpass the other? For when you were exhibiting and there was company in the room, though I could not follow you, I did not like to ask what you meant, because a crowd of people were present, and I was afraid that the question might interrupt your exhibition. But now that there are not so many of us, and my friend Eudicus bids me ask, I wish you would tell me what you were saying about these two heroes, so that I may clearly understand; how did you distinguish them?

Achilles the  
bravest,  
Nestor the  
wisest, and  
Odysseus the  
wiliest of the  
Greeks at  
Troy.

*Hip.* I shall have much pleasure, Socrates, in explaining to you more clearly than I could in public my views about these and also about other heroes. I say that Homer intended Achilles to be the bravest of the men who went to Troy, Nestor the wisest, and Odysseus the wiliest.

*Soc.* O rare Hippias, will you be so good as not to laugh, if I find a difficulty in following you, and repeat my questions several times over? Please to answer me kindly and gently.

*Hip.* I should be greatly ashamed of myself, Socrates, if I, who teach others and take money of them, could not, when I was asked by you, answer in a civil and agreeable manner.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Gorgias 448 A.

*Soc.* Thank you: the fact is, that I seemed to understand what you meant when you said that the poet intended Achilles to be the bravest of men, and also that he intended Nestor to be the wisest; but when you said that he meant Odysseus to be the wiliest, I must confess that I could not understand what you were saying. Will you tell me, and then I shall perhaps understand you better; has not Homer made Achilles wily?

*Lesser  
Hippias.*  
*SOCRATES,  
HIPPIAS.*

*Hip.* Certainly not, Socrates; he is the most straightforward of mankind, and when Homer introduces them talking with one another in the passage called the Prayers, Achilles is supposed by the poet to say to Odysseus:—

65 ‘Son of Laertes, sprung from heaven,’ crafty Odysseus, I will speak out plainly the word which I intend to carry out in act, and which will, I believe, be accomplished. For I hate him like the gates of death who thinks one thing and says another. But I will speak that which shall be accomplished.’

Now, in these verses he clearly indicates the character of the two men; he shows Achilles to be true and simple, and Odysseus to be wily and false; for he supposes Achilles to be addressing Odysseus in these lines.

*Soc.* Now, Hippias, I think that I understand your meaning; when you say that Odysseus is wily, you clearly mean that he is false?

*Wily means  
false:*

*Hip.* Exactly so, Socrates; it is the character of Odysseus, as he is represented by Homer in many passages both of the Iliad and Odyssey.

*Soc.* And Homer must be presumed to have meant that the true man is not the same as the false?

*Hip.* Of course, Socrates.

*Soc.* And is that your own opinion, Hippias?

*Hip.* Certainly; how can I have any other?

*Soc.* Well, then, as there is no possibility of asking Homer what he meant in these verses of his, let us leave him; but as you show a willingness to take up his cause, and your opinion agrees with what you declare to be his, will you answer on behalf of yourself and him?

*Hip.* I will; ask shortly anything which you like.

*Soc.* Do you say that the false, like the sick, have no power to do things, or that they have the power to do things?



*Lesser  
Hippias.*

SOCRATES,  
HIPPIAS.

And the  
false have  
the power  
of deceiving  
mankind ;  
they are  
prudent and  
knowing and  
wise, and  
have the  
ability to  
speak falsely.

*Hip.* I should say that they have power to do many things, and in particular to deceive mankind.

*Soc.* Then, according to you, they are both powerful and wily, are they not? •

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* And are they wily, and do they deceive by reason of their simplicity and folly, or by reason of their cunning and a certain sort of prudence?

*Hip.* By reason of their cunning and prudence, most certainly.

*Soc.* Then they are prudent, I suppose?

*Hip.* So they are — very.

*Soc.* And if they are prudent, do they know or do they not know what they do?

*Hip.* Of course, they know very well ; and that is why they do mischief to others.

*Soc.* And having this knowledge, are they ignorant, or are they wise?

*Hip.* Wise, certainly ; at least, in so far as they can deceive.

*Soc.* Stop, and let us recall to mind what you are saying ; 366  
are you not saying that the false are powerful and prudent and knowing and wise in those things about which they are false?

*Hip.* To be sure.

*Soc.* And the true differ from the false — the true and the false are the very opposite of each other?

*Hip.* That is my view.

*Soc.* Then, according to your view, it would seem that the false are to be ranked in the class of the powerful and wise?

*Hip.* Assuredly.

*Soc.* And when you say that the false are powerful and wise in so far as they are false, do you mean that they have or have not the power of uttering their falsehoods if they like?

*Hip.* I mean to say that they have the power.

*Soc.* In a word, then, the false are they who are wise and have the power to speak falsely?

*Hip.* Yes.



*Soc.* Then a man who has not the power of speaking falsely and is ignorant cannot be false?

*Lesser  
Hippias.*

*Hip.* You are right.

*SOCRATES,  
HIPPIAS.*

*Soc.* And every man has power who does that which he wishes at the time when he wishes. I am not speaking of any special case in which he is prevented by disease or something of that sort, but I am speaking generally, as I might say of you, that you are able to write my name when you like. Would you not call a man able who could do that?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* And tell me, Hippias, are you not a skilful calculator and arithmetician?

*Hip.* Yes, Socrates, assuredly I am.

*Soc.* And if some one were to ask you what is the sum of 3 multiplied by 700, you would tell him the true answer in a moment, if you pleased?

*Hip.* Certainly I should.

*Soc.* Is not that because you are the wisest and ablest of men in these matters?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* And being as you are the wisest and ablest of men in these matters of calculation, are you not also the best?

*Hip.* To be sure, Socrates, I am the best.

*Soc.* And therefore you would be the most able to tell the truth about these matters, would you not?

*Hip.* Yes, I should.

*Soc.* And could you speak falsehoods about them equally well? I must beg, Hippias, that you will answer me with the same frankness and magnanimity which has hitherto characterized you. If a person were to ask you what is the sum of 3 multiplied by 700, would not you be the best and most consistent teller of a falsehood, having always the power of speaking falsely as you have of speaking truly, about these same matters, if you wanted to tell a falsehood, and not to answer truly? Would the ignorant man be better able to tell a falsehood in matters of calculation than you would be, if you chose? Might he not sometimes stumble upon the truth, when he wanted to tell a lie, because he did not know, whereas you who are the wise man, if you wanted to tell a lie would always and consistently lie?

They must truly know that about which they falsely speak or they will fall into the error of speaking the truth by mistake.

*Lesser*  
*Hippias.*

SOCRATES,  
HIPPIAS.

*Hip.* Yes; there you are quite right.

*Soc.* Does the false man tell lies about other things, but not about number, or when he is making a calculation?

*Hip.* To be sure; he would tell as many lies about number as about other things.

*Soc.* Then may we further assume, Hippias, that there are men who are false about calculation and number?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* Who can they be? For you have already admitted that he who is false must have the ability to be false: you said, as you will remember, that he who is unable to be false will not be false?

*Hip.* Yes, I remember; it was so said.

*Soc.* And were you not yourself just now shown to be best able to speak falsely about calculation?

*Hip.* Yes; that was another thing which was said.

*Soc.* And are you not likewise said to speak truly about calculation?

*Hip.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then the same person is able to speak both falsely and truly about calculation? And that person is he who is good at calculation — the arithmetician?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* Who, then, Hippias, is discovered to be false at calculation? Is he not the good man? For the good man is the able man, and he is the true man.

*Hip.* That is evident.

*Soc.* Do you not see, then, that the same man is false and also true about the same matters? And the true man is not a whit better than the false; for indeed he is the same with him and not the very opposite, as you were just now imagining.

*Hip.* Not in that instance, clearly.

*Soc.* Shall we examine other instances?

*Hip.* Certainly, if you are disposed.

*Soc.* Are you not also skilled in geometry?

*Hip.* I am.

*Soc.* Well, and does not the same hold in that science also? Is not the same person best able to speak falsely or to speak truly about diagrams; and he is — the geometrician?

Therefore the same man must be true if he is to be truly false, in astronomy, in geometry, and in all the sciences.

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* He and no one else is good at it?

*Hip.* Yes, he and no one else.

*Soc.* Then the good and wise geometer has this double power in the highest degree; and if there be a man who is false about diagrams the good man will be he, for he is able to be false; whereas the bad is unable, and for this reason is not false, as has been admitted.

*Hip.* True.

*Soc.* Once more — let us examine a third case; that of the astronomer, in whose art, again, you, Hippias, profess to be a still greater proficient than in the preceding — do you not?

368 *Hip.* Yes, I am.

*Soc.* And does not the same hold of astronomy?

*Hip.* True, Socrates.

*Soc.* And in astronomy, too, if any man be able to speak falsely he will be the good astronomer, but he who is not able will not speak falsely, for he has no knowledge.

*Hip.* Clearly not.

*Soc.* Then in astronomy also, the same man will be true and false?

*Hip.* It would seem so.

*Soc.* And now, Hippias, consider the question at large about all the sciences, and see whether the same principle does not always hold. I know that in most arts you are the wisest of men, as I have heard you boasting in the agora at the tables of the money-changers, when you were setting forth the great and enviable stores of your wisdom; and you said that upon one occasion, when you went to the Olympic games, all that you had on your person was made by yourself. You began with your ring, which was of your own workmanship, and you said that you could engrave rings; and you had another seal which was also of your own workmanship, and a strigil and an oil flask, which you had made yourself; you said also that you had made the shoes which you had on your feet, and the cloak and the short tunic; but what appeared to us all most extraordinary and a proof of singular art, was the girdle of your tunic, which, you said, was as fine as the most costly Persian fabric, and of your own weaving; moreover, you told us that you had brought

*Lesser  
Hippias.*

SOCRATES,  
HIPPIAS.

Socrates compliments Hippias on his skill in engraving gems, in making clothes and shoes and the finest fabrics, in writing poetry and prose of the most varied kind, and on the art of memory which he has invented.



*Lesser  
Hippias.*

SOCRATES,  
HIPPIAS.

with you poems, epic, tragic, and dithyrambic, as well as prose writings of the most various kinds; and you said that your skill was also pre-eminent in the arts which I was just now mentioning, and in the true principles of rhythm and harmony and of orthography; and if I remember rightly, there were a great many other accomplishments in which you excelled. I have forgotten to mention your art of memory, which you regard as your special glory, and I dare say that I have forgotten many other things; but, as I was saying, only look to your own arts — and there are plenty of them — and to those of others; and tell me, having regard to the admissions which you and I have made, whether you discover any department of art or any description of wisdom or cunning, whichever name you use, in which the true and false are different and not the same: tell me, if you can, of any. But 369 you cannot.

*Hip.* Not without consideration, Socrates.

*Soc.* Nor will consideration help you, Hippias, as I believe; but then if I am right, remember what the consequence will be.

*Hip.* I do not know what you mean, Socrates.

Yet he who knows and remembers all things can call to mind no instance in which the false is not also true, although he was saying just now that Achilles is true and Odysseus false.

*Soc.* I suppose that you are not using your art of memory, doubtless because you think that such an accomplishment is not needed on the present occasion. I will therefore remind you of what you were saying: were you not saying that Achilles was a true man, and Odysseus false and wily?

*Hip.* I was.

*Soc.* And now do you perceive that the same person has turned out to be false as well as true? If Odysseus is false he is also true, and if Achilles is true he is also false, and so the two men are not opposed to one another, but they are alike.

*Hip.* O Socrates, you are always weaving the meshes of an argument, selecting the most difficult point, and fastening upon details instead of grappling with the matter in hand as a whole. Come now, and I will demonstrate to you, if you will allow me, by many satisfactory proofs, that Homer has made Achilles a better man than Odysseus, and a truthful man too; and that he has made the other crafty, and a teller of many untruths, and inferior to Achilles. And then, if you please,



you shall make a speech on the other side, in order to prove that Odysseus is the better man; and this may be compared to mine, and then the company will know which of us is the better speaker.

*Lesser  
Hippias.*

SOCRATES,  
HIPPIAS.

*Soc.* O Hippias, I do not doubt that you are wiser than I am. But I have a way, when anybody else says anything, of giving close attention to him, especially if the speaker appears to me to be a wise man. Having a desire to understand, I question him, and I examine and analyse and put together what he says, in order that I may understand; but if the speaker appears to me to be a poor hand, I do not interrogate him, or trouble myself about him, and you may know by this who they are whom I deem to be wise men, for you will see that when I am talking with a wise man, I am very attentive to what he says; and I ask questions of him, in order that I may learn, and be improved by him. And I could not help remarking while you were speaking, that when you recited the verses in which Achilles, as you argued, attacks Odysseus as a deceiver, that you must be strangely mistaken, because Odysseus, the man of wiles, is never found to tell a lie; but 370 Achilles is found to be wily on your own showing. At any rate he speaks falsely; for first he utters these words, which you just now repeated,—

Socrates pays Hippias the compliment which he always pays to a wise man, of attending to him. He proves by example that Achilles, the true man, is always uttering falsehoods, Odysseus, the false man, never.

‘He is hateful to me even as the gates of death who thinks one thing and says another:’—

And then he says, a little while afterwards, he will not be persuaded by Odysseus and Agamemnon, neither will he remain at Troy; but, says he,—

‘To-morrow, when I have offered sacrifices to Zeus and all the Gods, having loaded my ships well, I will drag them down into the deep; and then you shall see, if you have a mind, and if such things are a care to you, early in the morning my ships sailing over the fishy Hellespont, and my men eagerly plying the oar; and, if the illustrious shaker of the earth gives me a good voyage, on the third day I shall reach the fertile Phthia.’

And before that, when he was reviling Agamemnon, he said,—

‘And now to Phthia I will go, since to return home in the beaked ships is far better, nor am I inclined to stay here in dishonour and amass wealth and riches for you.’

*Lesser*  
*Hippias.*

SOCRATES,  
HIPPIAS.

But although on that occasion, in the presence of the whole army, he spoke after this fashion, and on the other occasion to his companions, he appears never to have made any preparation or attempt to draw down the ships, as if he had the least intention of sailing home; so nobly regardless was he of the truth. Now I, Hippias, originally asked you the question, because I was in doubt as to which of the two heroes was intended by the poet to be the best, and because I thought that both of them were the best, and that it would be difficult to decide which was the better of them, not only in respect of truth and falsehood, but of virtue generally, for even in this matter of speaking the truth they are much upon a par.

Aye, but the  
falsehood of  
Achilles is  
accidental;  
that of  
Odysseus  
intentional.

*Hip.* There you are wrong, Socrates; for in so far as Achilles speaks falsely, the falsehood is obviously unintentional. He is compelled against his will to remain and rescue the army in their misfortune. But when Odysseus speaks falsely he is voluntarily and intentionally false.

*Soc.* You, sweet Hippias, like Odysseus, are a deceiver yourself.

*Hip.* Certainly not, Socrates; what makes you say so? 371

*Soc.* Because you say that Achilles does not speak falsely from design, when he is not only a deceiver, but besides being a braggart, in Homer's description of him is so cunning, and so far superior to Odysseus in lying and pretending, that he dares to contradict himself, and Odysseus does not find him out; at any rate he does not appear to say anything to him which would imply that he perceived his falsehood.

*Hip.* What do you mean, Socrates?

*Soc.* Did you not observe that afterwards, when he is speaking to Odysseus, he says that he will sail away with the early dawn; but to Ajax he tells quite a different story?

*Hip.* Where is that?

*Soc.* Where he says,—

‘I will not think about bloody war until the son of warlike Priam, illustrious Hector, comes to the tents and ships of the Myrmidons, slaughtering the Argives, and burning the ships with fire; and about my tent and dark ship, I suspect that Hector, although eager for the battle, will nevertheless stay his hand.’

Now, do you really think, Hippias, that the son of Thetis,

who had been the pupil of the sage Cheiron, had such a bad memory, or would have carried the art of lying to such an extent (when he had been assailing liars in the most violent terms only the instant before) as to say to Odysseus that he would sail away, and to Ajax that he would remain, and that he was not rather practising upon the simplicity of Odysseus, whom he regarded as an ancient, and thinking that he would get the better of him by his own cunning and falsehood?

*Lesser  
Hippias.*

SOCRATES,  
HIPPIAS.

*Hip.* No, I do not agree with you, Socrates; but I believe that Achilles is induced to say one thing to Ajax, and another to Odysseus in the innocence of his heart, whereas Odysseus, whether he speaks falsely or truly, speaks always with a purpose.

*Soc.* Then Odysseus would appear after all to be better than Achilles?

That proves  
Odysseus to  
be better than  
Achilles.

*Hip.* Certainly not, Socrates.

*Soc.* Why, were not the voluntary liars only just now shown to be better than the involuntary?

*Hip.* And how, Socrates, can those who intentionally err, and voluntarily and designedly commit iniquities, be better  
372 than those who err and do wrong involuntarily? Surely there is a great excuse to be made for a man telling a falsehood, or doing an injury or any sort of harm to another in ignorance. And the laws are obviously far more severe on those who lie or do evil, voluntarily, than on those who do evil involuntarily.

*Soc.* You see, Hippias, as I have already told you, how pertinacious I am in asking questions of wise men. And I think that this is the only good point about me, for I am full of defects, and always getting wrong in some way or other. My deficiency is proved to me by the fact that when I meet one of you who are famous for wisdom, and to whose wisdom all the Hellenes are witnesses, I am found out to know nothing. For speaking generally, I hardly ever have the same opinion about anything which you have, and what proof of ignorance can be greater than to differ from wise men? But I have one singular good quality, which is my salvation; I am not ashamed to learn, and I ask and enquire, and am very grateful to those who answer me, and never fail to give them my grateful thanks; and when I learn a thing I

Socrates is  
convinced of  
his own igno-  
rance because  
he never  
agrees with  
wise men.  
But he is will-  
ing to learn,



*Lesser*  
*Hippias.*

SOCRATES,  
HIPPIAS,  
EUDICUS.

never deny my teacher, or pretend that the lesson is a discovery of my own; but I praise his wisdom, and proclaim what I have learned from him. And now I cannot agree in what you are saying, but I strongly disagree. Well, I know that this is my own fault, and is a defect in my character, but I will not pretend to be more than I am; and my opinion, Hippias, is the very contrary of what you are saying. For I maintain that those who hurt or injure mankind, and speak falsely and deceive, and err voluntarily, are better far than those who do wrong involuntarily. Sometimes, however, I am of the opposite opinion; for I am all abroad in my ideas about this matter, a condition obviously occasioned by ignorance. And just now I happen to be in a crisis of my disorder at which those who err voluntarily appear to me better than those who err involuntarily. My present state of mind is due to our previous argument, which inclines me to believe that in general those who do wrong involuntarily are worse than those who do wrong voluntarily, and therefore I hope that you will be good to me, and not refuse to heal me; for you will do me a much greater benefit if you cure my soul of ignorance, than you would if you were to cure my body of disease. I must, however, tell you beforehand, that if you make a long oration to me you will not cure me, for I shall not be able to follow you; but if you will answer me, as you did just now, you will do me a great deal of good, and I do not think that you will be any the worse yourself. And I have some claim upon you also, O son of Apemantus, for you incited me to converse with Hippias; and now, if Hippias will not answer me, you must entreat him on my behalf.

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and he desires  
to be cured  
by Hippias of  
his ignorance  
in as few  
words as  
possible.

*Eud.* But I do not think, Socrates, that Hippias will require any entreaty of mine; for he has already said that he will refuse to answer no man.—Did you not say so, Hippias?

*Hip.* Yes, I did; but then, Eudicus, Socrates is always troublesome in an argument, and appears to be dishonest<sup>1</sup>.

*Soc.* Excellent Hippias, I do not do so intentionally (if I did, it would show me to be a wise man and a master of wiles, as you would argue), but unintentionally, and therefore you must pardon me; for, as you say, he who is unintentionally dishonest should be pardoned.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Gorgias 499, 505; Rep. vi. 487.



*Eud.* Yes, Hippias, do as he says; and for our sake, and also that you may not belie your profession, answer whatever Socrates asks you.

*Lesser  
Hippias.*

SOCRATES,  
HIPPIAS,  
EUDICUS.

*Hip.* I will answer, as you request me; and do you ask whatever you like.

*Soc.* I am very desirous, Hippias, of examining this question, as to which are the better — those who err voluntarily or involuntarily? And if you will answer me, I think that I can put you in the way of approaching the subject: You would admit, would you not, that there are good runners?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* And there are bad runners?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* And he who runs well is a good runner, and he who runs ill is a bad runner?

*Hip.* Very true.

*Soc.* And he who runs slowly runs ill, and he who runs quickly runs well?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then in a race, and in running, swiftness is a good, and slowness is an evil quality?

*Hip.* To be sure.

*Soc.* Which of the two then is a better runner? He who runs slowly voluntarily, or he who runs slowly involuntarily?

*Hip.* He who runs slowly voluntarily.

*Soc.* And is not running a species of doing?

*Hip.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And if a species of doing, a species of action?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then he who runs badly does a bad and dishonourable action in a race?

*Hip.* Yes; a bad action, certainly.

*Soc.* And he who runs slowly runs badly?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then the good runner does this bad and disgraceful action voluntarily, and the bad involuntarily?

*Hip.* That is to be inferred.

*Soc.* Then he who involuntarily does evil actions, is worse in a race than he who does them voluntarily?

*Hip.* Yes, in a race.

Socrates by  
citation of  
instances  
not 'in pari  
materia'  
proves that  
it is better  
to do evil  
intentionally;

e. g. in  
running,

*Lesser  
Hippias*SOCRATES,  
HIPPIAS.

in wrestling,

*Soc.* Well; but at a wrestling match — which is the better 374  
wrestler, he who falls voluntarily or involuntarily?

*Hip.* He who falls voluntarily, doubtless.

*Soc.* And is it worse or more dishonourable at a wrestling  
match, to fall, or to throw another?

*Hip.* To fall.

*Soc.* Then, at a wrestling match, he who voluntarily does  
base and dishonourable actions is a better wrestler than he  
who does them involuntarily?

*Hip.* That appears to be the truth.

*Soc.* And what would you say of any other bodily exercise  
— is not he who is better made able to do both that which is  
strong and that which is weak — that which is fair and that  
which is foul? — so that when he does bad actions with the  
body, he who is better made does them voluntarily, and he  
who is worse made does them involuntarily.

*Hip.* Yes, that appears to be true about strength.

in the action  
of the body,

*Soc.* And what do you say about grace, Hippias? Is not  
he who is better made able to assume evil and disgraceful  
figures and postures voluntarily, as he who is worse made  
assumes them involuntarily?

*Hip.* True.

*Soc.* Then voluntary ungracefulness comes from excellence  
of the bodily frame, and involuntary from the defect of the  
bodily frame?

*Hip.* True.

in singing,

*Soc.* And what would you say of an unmusical voice;  
would you prefer the voice which is voluntarily or involun-  
tarily out of tune?

*Hip.* That which is voluntarily out of tune.

*Soc.* The involuntary is the worse of the two?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* And would you choose to possess goods or evils?

*Hip.* Goods.

in the use of  
the feet,

*Soc.* And would you rather have feet which are voluntarily  
or involuntarily lame?

*Hip.* Feet which are voluntarily lame.

*Soc.* But is not lameness a defect or deformity?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* And is not blinking a defect in the eyes?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Lesser  
Hippias.*

*Soc.* And would you rather always have eyes with which you might voluntarily blink and not see, or with which you might involuntarily blink?

SOCRATES,  
HIPPIAS.

*Hip.* I would rather have eyes which voluntarily blink.

eyes,

*Soc.* Then in your own case you deem that which voluntarily acts ill, better than that which involuntarily acts ill?

*Hip.* Yes, certainly, in cases such as you mention.

*Soc.* And does not the same hold of ears, nostrils, mouth, and of all the senses—those which involuntarily act ill are not to be desired, as being defective; and those which voluntarily act ill are to be desired as being good?

ears,

*Hip.* I agree.

*Soc.* And what would you say of instruments;—which are the better sort of instruments to have to do with?—those with which a man acts ill voluntarily or involuntarily? For example, had a man better have a rudder with which he will steer ill, voluntarily or involuntarily?

of instru-  
ments.

*Hip.* He had better have a rudder with which he will steer ill voluntarily.

*Soc.* And does not the same hold of the bow and the lyre, the flute and all other things?

*Hip.* Very true.

*Soc.* And would you rather have a horse of such a temper that you may ride him ill voluntarily or involuntarily?

375 *Hip.* I would rather have a horse which I could ride ill voluntarily.

It is true also  
of animals,

*Soc.* That would be the better horse?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then with a horse of better temper, vicious actions would be produced voluntarily; and with a horse of bad temper involuntarily?

*Hip.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And that would be true of a dog, or of any other animal?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* And is it better to possess the mind of an archer who voluntarily or involuntarily misses the mark?

in the practice  
of archery,

*Hip.* Of him who voluntarily misses.

*Lesser  
Hippias.*

SOCRATES,  
HIPPIAS.

*Soc.* This would be the better mind for the purposes of archery?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then the mind which involuntarily errs is worse than the mind which errs voluntarily?

*Hip.* Yes, certainly, in the use of the bow.

of medicine,

*Soc.* And what would you say of the art of medicine;—has not the mind which voluntarily works harm to the body, more of the healing art?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then in the art of medicine the voluntary is better than the involuntary?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* Well, and in lute-playing and in flute-playing, and in all arts and sciences, is not that mind the better which voluntarily does what is evil and dishonourable, and goes wrong, and is not the worse that which does so involuntarily?

*Hip.* That is evident.

in the charac-  
ters of slaves.

*Soc.* And what would you say of the characters of slaves? Should we not prefer to have those who voluntarily do wrong and make mistakes, and are they not better in their mistakes than those who commit them involuntarily?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* And should we not desire to have our own minds in the best state possible?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* And will our minds be better if they do wrong and make mistakes voluntarily or involuntarily?

Hippias  
revolts at the  
conclusion.

*Hip.* O, Socrates, it would be a monstrous thing to say that those who do wrong voluntarily are better than those who do wrong involuntarily!

*Soc.* And yet that appears to be the only inference.

*Hip.* I do not think so.

Socrates  
recapitulates  
the argument.

*Soc.* But I imagined, Hippias, that you did. Please to answer once more: Is not justice a power, or knowledge, or both? Must not justice, at all events, be one of these?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* But if justice is a power of the soul, then the soul which has the greater power is also the more just; for that



which has the greater power, my good friend, has been proved by us to be the better.

*Lesser  
Hippias.*

*Hip.* Yes, that has been proved.

*SOCRATES,  
HIPPIAS.*

*Soc.* And if justice is knowledge, then the wiser will be the juster soul, and the more ignorant the more unjust?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* But if justice be power as well as knowledge — then will not the soul which has both knowledge and power be the more just, and that which is the more ignorant be the more unjust? Must it not be so?

*Hip.* Clearly.

*Soc.* And is not the soul which has the greater power and wisdom also better, and better able to do both good and evil in every action?

*Hip.* Certainly.

376 *Soc.* The soul, then, which acts ill, acts voluntarily by power and art — and these either one or both of them are elements of justice?

*Hip.* That seems to be true.

*Soc.* And to do injustice is to do ill, and not to do injustice is to do well?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* And will not the better and abler soul when it does wrong, do wrong voluntarily, and the bad soul involuntarily?

*Hip.* Clearly.

*Soc.* And the good man is he who has the good soul, and the bad man is he who has the bad?

*Hip.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then the good man will voluntarily do wrong, and the bad man involuntarily, if the good man is he who has the good soul?

*Hip.* Which he certainly has.

*Soc.* Then, Hippias, he who voluntarily does wrong and disgraceful things, if there be such a man, will be the good man?

*Hip.* There I cannot agree with you.

*Soc.* Nor can I agree with myself, Hippias; and yet that seems to be the conclusion which, as far as we can see at present, must follow from our argument. As I was saying

Hippias, who has admitted the previous deductions, rebels at the final one. Socrates is himself dissatisfied. What remains if Socrates

*Lesser*  
*Hippias.*

SOCRATES.

and a wiser  
than Socrates  
are alike in  
doubt?

before, I am all abroad, and being in perplexity am always changing my opinion. Now, that I or any ordinary man should wander in perplexity is not surprising; but if you wise men also wander, and we cannot come to you and rest from our wandering, the matter begins to be serious both to us and to you.

ALCIBIADES I.





## INTRODUCTION.

THE First Alcibiades is a conversation between Socrates and Alcibiades. Socrates is represented in the character which he attributes to himself in the Apology of a know-nothing who detects the conceit of knowledge in others. The two have met already in the Protagoras and in the Symposium; in the latter dialogue, as in this, the relation between them is that of a lover and his beloved. But the narrative of their loves is told differently in different places; for in the Symposium Alcibiades is depicted as the impassioned but rejected lover; here, as coldly receiving the advances of Socrates, who, for the best of purposes, lies in wait for the aspiring and ambitious youth.

*Alcibiades I.*

INTRODUC-  
TION.

Steph. Alcibiades, who is described as a very young man, is about to enter on public life, having an inordinate opinion of himself, and an extravagant ambition. Socrates, 'who knows what is in man,' astonishes him by a revelation of his designs. But has he the knowledge which is necessary for carrying them out? He is going to persuade the Athenians — about what? Not about any particular art, but about politics — when to fight and when to make peace. Now, men should fight and make peace on just grounds, and therefore the question of justice and injustice must enter into peace and war; and he who advises the Athenians must know the difference between them. Does Alcibiades know? If he does, he must either have been taught by some master, or he must have discovered the nature of them himself. If he has had a master, Socrates would like to be informed who he is, that he may go and learn of him also. Alcibiades admits that he has never learned. Then has he enquired for himself? He may have, if he was ever aware of a time when he was ignorant. But he never was ignorant; for when he played with other boys at dice,

ANALYSIS.

*Alcibiades I.*

ANALYSIS.

he charged them with cheating, and this implied a knowledge of just and unjust. According to his own explanation, he had learned of the multitude. Why, he asks, should he not learn of them the nature of justice, as he has learned the Greek language of them? To this Socrates answers, that they can teach Greek, but they 111 cannot teach justice; for they are agreed about the one, but they are not agreed about the other: and therefore Alcibiades, who 112 has admitted that if he knows he must either have learned from a master or have discovered for himself the nature of justice, is convicted out of his own mouth. 113

Alcibiades rejoins, that the Athenians debate not about what is just, but about what is expedient; and he asserts that the two principles of justice and expediency are opposed. Socrates, by a 114 series of questions, compels him to admit that the just and the expedient coincide. Alcibiades is thus reduced to the humiliating-117 conclusion that he knows nothing of politics, even if, as he says, they are concerned with the expedient.

However, he is no worse than other Athenian statesmen; and he will not need training, for others are as ignorant as he is. He is reminded that he has to contend, not only with his own countrymen, but with their enemies — with the Spartan kings and-120 with the great king of Persia; and he can only attain this higher aim of ambition by the assistance of Socrates. Not that Socrates himself professes to have attained the truth, but the questions which he asks bring others to a knowledge of themselves, and this is the first step in the practice of virtue.

The dialogue continues:—We wish to become as good as-124 possible. But to be good in what? Alcibiades replies — ‘Good in transacting business.’ But what business? ‘The business of the 125 most intelligent men at Athens.’ The cobbler is intelligent in shoemaking, and is therefore good in that; he is not intelligent, and therefore not good, in weaving. Is he good in the sense which Alcibiades means, who is also bad? ‘I mean,’ replies Alcibiades, ‘the man who is able to command in the city.’ But to command what — horses or men? and if men, under what circumstances? ‘I mean to say, that he is able to command men living in social and political relations.’ And what is their aim? ‘The better preservation of the city.’ But when is a city better? 126 ‘When there is unanimity, such as exists between husband and

127 wife.' Then, when husbands and wives perform their own special duties, there can be no unanimity between them; nor can a city be well ordered when each citizen does his own work only. Alcibiades, having stated first that goodness consists in the unanimity of the citizens, and then in each of them doing his own separate work, is brought to the required point of self-contradiction, leading him to confess his own ignorance.

But he is not too old to learn, and may still arrive at the truth, if he is willing to be cross-examined by Socrates. He must know himself; that is to say, not his body, or the things of the body, but his mind, or truer self. The physician knows the body, and the tradesman knows his own business, but they do not necessarily know themselves. Self-knowledge can be obtained only by looking into the mind and virtue of the soul, which is the diviner part of a man, as we see our own image in another's eye. And if we do not know ourselves, we cannot know what belongs to ourselves or belongs to others, and are unfit to take a part in political affairs. Both for the sake of the individual and of the state, we ought to aim at justice and temperance, not at wealth or power. The evil and unjust should have no power,—they should be the slaves of better men than themselves. None but the virtuous are deserving of freedom.

And are you, Alcibiades, a freeman? 'I feel that I am not; but I hope, Socrates, that by your aid I may become free, and from this day forward I will never leave you.'

The Alcibiades has several points of resemblance to the undoubted dialogues of Plato. The process of interrogation is of the same kind with that which Socrates practises upon the youthful Cleinias in the Euthydemus; and he characteristically attributes to Alcibiades the answers which he has elicited from him. The definition of good is narrowed by successive questions, and virtue is shown to be identical with knowledge. Here, as elsewhere, Socrates awakens the consciousness not of sin but of ignorance. Self-humiliation is the first step to knowledge, even of the commonest things. No man knows how ignorant he is, and no man can arrive at virtue and wisdom who has not once in his life, at least, been convicted of error. The process by which the soul is elevated is not unlike that which religious writers describe under

Alcibiades I.

ANALYSIS.

INTRODUCTION.



*Alcibiades I.*INTRODUC-  
TION.

the name of 'conversion,' if we substitute the sense of ignorance for the consciousness of sin.

In some respects the dialogue differs from any other Platonic composition. The aim is more directly ethical and hortatory; the process by which the antagonist is undermined is simpler than in other Platonic writings, and the conclusion more decided. There is a good deal of humour in the manner in which the pride of Alcibiades, and of the Greeks generally, is supposed to be taken down by the Spartan and Persian queens; and the dialogue has considerable dialectical merit. But we have a difficulty in supposing that the same writer, who has given so profound and complex a notion of the characters both of Alcibiades and Socrates in the Symposium, should have treated them in so thin and superficial a manner in the Alcibiades, or that he would have ascribed to the ironical Socrates the rather unmeaning boast that Alcibiades could not attain the objects of his ambition without his help (105 D foll.); or that he should have imagined that a mighty nature like his could have been reformed by a few not very conclusive words of Socrates. For the arguments by which Alcibiades is reformed are not convincing; the writer of the dialogue, whoever he was, arrives at his idealism by crooked and tortuous paths, in which many pitfalls are concealed. The anachronism of making Alcibiades about twenty years old during the life of his uncle, Pericles, may be noted; and the repetition of the favourite observation, which occurs also in the Laches and Protagoras, that great Athenian statesmen, like Pericles, failed in the education of their sons. There is none of the undoubted dialogues of Plato in which there is so little dramatic verisimilitude.



# ALCIBIADES I.

## PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

ALCIBIADES, SOCRATES.

**Steph.** *Socrates.* I DARE SAY that you may be surprised to find, *Alcibiades I.*  
**103** O son of Cleinias, that I, who am your first lover, not having *SOCRATES,*  
spoken to you for many years, when the rest of the world *ALCIBIADES.*  
were wearying you with their attentions, am the last of your  
lovers who still speaks to you. The cause of my silence has  
been that I was hindered by a power more than human, of  
which I will some day explain to you the nature; this im-  
pediment has now been removed; I therefore here present  
myself before you, and I greatly hope that no similar  
hindrance will again occur. Meanwhile, I have observed  
that your pride has been too much for the pride of your  
admirers; they were numerous and high-spirited, but they  
have all run away, overpowered by your superior force of  
**104** character; not one of them remains. And I want you to  
understand the reason why you have been too much for  
them. You think that you have no need of them or of any  
other man, for you have great possessions and lack nothing,  
beginning with the body, and ending with the soul. In the  
first place, you say to yourself that you are the fairest and  
tallest of the citizens, and this every one who has eyes may  
see to be true; in the second place, that you are among the  
noblest of them, highly connected both on the father's and  
the mother's side, and sprung from one of the most dis-  
tinguished families in your own state, which is the greatest in  
Hellas, and having many friends and kinsmen of the best  
sort, who can assist you when in need; and there is one

The pride of  
Alcibiades has  
been too much  
for his lovers.

*Alcibiades I.*SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

potent relative, who is more to you than all the rest, Pericles the son of Xanthippus, whom your father left guardian of you, and of your brother, and who can do as he pleases not only in this city, but in all Hellas, and among many and mighty barbarous nations. Moreover, you are rich; but I must say that you value yourself least of all upon your possessions. And all these things have lifted you up; you have overcome your lovers, and they have acknowledged that you were too much for them. Have you not remarked their absence? And now I know that you wonder why I, unlike the rest of them, have not gone away, and what can be my motive in remaining.

*Alcibiades.* Perhaps, Socrates, you are not aware that I was just going to ask you the very same question — What do you want? And what is your motive in annoying me, and always, wherever I am, making a point of coming<sup>1</sup>? I do really wonder what you mean, and should greatly like to know.

*Soc.* Then if, as you say, you desire to know, I suppose that you will be willing to hear, and I may consider myself to be speaking to an auditor who will remain, and will not run away?

*Al.* Certainly, let me hear.

*Soc.* You had better be careful, for I may very likely be as unwilling to end as I have hitherto been to begin.

*Al.* Proceed, my good man, and I will listen.

*Soc.* I will proceed; and, although no lover likes to speak with one who has no feeling of love in him<sup>2</sup>, I will make an effort, and tell you what I meant: My love, Alcibiades, which I hardly like to confess, would long ago have passed away, as I flatter myself, if I saw you loving your good things, or thinking that you ought to pass life in the enjoyment of them. But I shall reveal other thoughts of yours, which you keep to yourself; whereby you will know that I have always had my eye on you. Suppose that at this moment some God came to you and said: Alcibiades, will you live as you are, or die in an instant if you are forbidden to make any further acquisition?—I verily believe that you would choose death. And I will tell you the hope in which you are at present

Alcibiades  
a lover, not  
of pleasure,  
but of am-  
bition; and  
he requires  
the help of  
Socrates  
for the  
accomplish-  
ment of his  
designs.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Symp. 213 C.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Symp. 217 E ff.

living: Before many days have elapsed, you think that you will come before the Athenian assembly, and will prove to them that you are more worthy of honour than Pericles, or any other man that ever lived, and having proved this, you will have the greatest power in the state. When you have gained the greatest power among us, you will go on to other Hellenic states, and not only to Hellenes, but to all the barbarians who inhabit the same continent with us. And if the God were then to say to you again: Here in Europe is to be your seat of empire, and you must not cross over into Asia or meddle with Asiatic affairs, I do not believe that you would choose to live upon these terms; but the world, as I may say, must be filled with your power and name — no man less than Cyrus and Xerxes is of any account with you. Such I know to be your hopes — I am not guessing only — and very likely you, who know that I am speaking the truth, will reply, Well, Socrates, but what have my hopes to do with the explanation which you promised of your unwillingness to leave me? And that is what I am now going to tell you, sweet son of Cleinias and Dinomachè. The explanation is, that all these designs of yours cannot be accomplished by you without my help; so great is the power which I believe myself to have over you and your concerns; and this I conceive to be the reason why the God has hitherto forbidden me to converse with you, and I have been long expecting his permission. For, as you hope to prove your own great value to the state, and having proved it, to attain at once to absolute power, so do I indulge a hope that I shall have the supreme power over you, if I am able to prove my own great value to you, and to show you that neither guardian, nor kinsman, nor any one is able to deliver into your hands the power which you desire, but I only, God being my helper. When you were young<sup>1</sup> and your hopes were not yet matured, I should have wasted my time, and therefore, as I conceive, the God forbade me to converse with you; but now, having his permission, I will speak, for now you will listen to me.

*Alcibiades I.*  
SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

And this is the reason why Socrates has clung to him; he is hoping when Alcibiades has become the ruler of Athens to rule over him.

*Al.* Your silence, Socrates, was always a surprise to me. I never could understand why you followed me about, and

Alcibiades does not

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Symp. 181 E.



*Alcibiades I.*SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.deny the  
impeachment.

now that you have begun to speak again, I am still more amazed. Whether I think all this or not, is a matter about which you seem to have already made up your mind, and therefore my denial will have no effect upon you. But granting, if I must, that you have perfectly divined my purposes, why is your assistance necessary to the attainment of them? Can you tell me why?

*Soc.* You want to know whether I can make a long speech, such as you are in the habit of hearing; but that is not my way. I think, however, that I can prove to you the truth of what I am saying, if you will grant me one little favour.

*Al.* Yes, if the favour which you mean be not a troublesome one.

*Soc.* Will you be troubled at having questions to answer?

*Al.* Not at all.

*Soc.* Then please to answer.

*Al.* Ask me.

*Soc.* Have you not the intention which I attribute to you?

*Al.* I will grant anything you like, in the hope of hearing what more you have to say.

*Soc.* You do, then, mean, as I was saying, to come forward in a little while in the character of an adviser of the Athenians? And suppose that when you are ascending the bema, I pull you by the sleeve and say, Alcibiades, you are getting up to advise the Athenians—do you know the matter about which they are going to deliberate, better than they?—How would you answer?

*Al.* I should reply, that I was going to advise them about a matter which I do know better than they.

*Soc.* Then you are a good adviser about the things which you know?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And do you know anything but what you have learned of others, or found out yourself?

*Al.* That is all.

*Soc.* And would you have ever learned or discovered anything, if you had not been willing either to learn of others or to examine yourself?

*Al.* I should not.

Alcibiades  
is willing to  
answer  
questions.He is going  
to advise the  
Athenians  
about matters  
which he  
knows better  
than they.



*Soc.* And would you have been willing to learn or to examine what you supposed that you knew?

*Alcibiades I*

*SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.*

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Then there was a time when you thought that you did not know what you are now supposed to know?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* I think that I know tolerably well the extent of your acquirements; and you must tell me if I forget any of them: according to my recollection, you learned the arts of writing, of playing on the lyre, and of wrestling; the flute you never would learn; this is the sum of your accomplishments, unless there were some which you acquired in secret; and I think that secrecy was hardly possible, as you could not have come out of your door, either by day or night, without my seeing you.

But when did  
he ever learn  
about these  
matters?

*Al.* Yes, that was the whole of my schooling.

107 *Soc.* And are you going to get up in the Athenian assembly, and give them advice about writing?

*Al.* No, indeed.

*Soc.* Or about the touch of the lyre?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* And they are not in the habit of deliberating about wrestling, in the assembly?

*Al.* Hardly.

*Soc.* Then what are the deliberations in which you propose to advise them? Surely not about building?

*Al.* No.

*Soc.* For the builder will advise better than you will about that?

*Al.* He will.

*Soc.* Nor about divination?

*Al.* No.

*Soc.* About that again the diviner will advise better than you will?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* Whether he be little or great, good or ill-looking, noble or ignoble — makes no difference.

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* A man is a good adviser about anything, not because he has riches, but because he has knowledge?

*Alcibiades I.*SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.*Al.* Assuredly.*Soc.* Whether their counsellor is rich or poor, is not a matter which will make any difference to the Athenians when they are deliberating about the health of the citizens; they only require that he should be a physician.*Al.* Of course.*Soc.* Then what will be the subject of deliberation about which you will be justified in getting up and advising them?*Al.* About their own concerns, Socrates.*Soc.* You mean about shipbuilding, for example, when the question is what sort of ships they ought to build?*Al.* No, I should not advise them about that.*Soc.* I suppose, because you do not understand shipbuilding:—is that the reason?*Al.* It is.*Soc.* Then about what concerns of theirs will you advise them?*Al.* About war, Socrates, or about peace, or about any other concerns of the state.*Soc.* You mean, when they deliberate with whom they ought to make peace, and with whom they ought to go to war, and in what manner?*Al.* Yes.*Soc.* And they ought to go to war with those against whom it is better to go to war?*Al.* Yes.*Soc.* And when it is better?*Al.* Certainly.*Soc.* And for as long a time as is better?*Al.* Yes.*Soc.* But suppose the Athenians to deliberate with whom they ought to close in wrestling, and whom they should grasp by the hand, would you, or the master of gymnastics, be a better adviser of them?*Al.* Clearly, the master of gymnastics.*Soc.* And can you tell me on what grounds the master of gymnastics would decide, with whom they ought or ought not to close, and when and how? To take an instance: Would he not say that they should wrestle with those against whom it is best to wrestle?

He will advise them about war and peace, and with whom they had better go to war, and when and how long.

*Al.* Yes.

108 *Soc.* And as much as is best?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And at such times as are best?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Again; you sometimes accompany the lyre with the song and dance?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* When it is well to do so?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And as much as is well?

*Al.* Just so.

*Soc.* And as you speak of an excellence or art of the best in wrestling, and of an excellence in playing the lyre, I wish you would tell me what this latter is;—the excellence of wrestling I call gymnastic, and I want to know what you call the other.

*Al.* I do not understand you.

*Soc.* Then try to do as I do; for the answer which I gave is universally right, and when I say right, I mean according to rule.

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And was not the art of which I spoke gymnastic?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And I called the excellence in wrestling gymnastic?

*Al.* You did.

*Soc.* And I was right?

*Al.* I think that you were.

*Soc.* Well, now,—for you should learn to argue prettily — let me ask you in return to tell me, first, what is that art of which playing and singing, and stepping properly in the dance, are parts,—what is the name of the whole? I think that by this time you must be able to tell.

Alcibiades  
should learn  
to argue  
nicely.

*Al.* Indeed I cannot.

*Soc.* Then let me put the matter in another way: what do you call the Goddesses who are the patronesses of art?

*Al.* The Muses do you mean, Socrates?

*Soc.* Yes, I do; and what is the name of the art which is called after them?

*Alcibiades I.*SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.What is the  
meaning of  
'the better,'  
'the more  
excellent.'*Al.* I suppose that you mean music.*Soc.* Yes, that is my meaning; and what is the excellence of the art of music, as I told you truly that the excellence of wrestling was gymnastic — what is the excellence of music — to be what?*Al.* To be musical, I suppose.*Soc.* Very good; and now please to tell me what is the excellence of war and peace; as the more musical was the more excellent, or the more gymnastical was the more excellent, tell me, what name do you give to the more excellent in war and peace?*Al.* But I really cannot tell you.*Soc.* But if you were offering advice to another and said to him — This food is better than that, at this time and in this quantity, and he said to you — What do you mean, Alcibiades, by the word 'better'? you would have no difficulty in replying that you meant 'more wholesome,' although you do not profess to be a physician: and when the subject is one of which you profess to have knowledge, and about which you are ready to get up and advise as if you knew, are you not ashamed, when you are asked, not to be able to answer the question? Is it not disgraceful?*Al.* Very.*Soc.* Well, then, consider and try to explain what is the meaning of 'better,' in the matter of making peace and going to war with those against whom you ought to go to war? To what does the word refer?*Al.* I am thinking, and I cannot tell.*Soc.* But you surely know what are the charges which we bring against one another, when we arrive at the point of making war, and what name we give them?*Al.* Yes, certainly; we say that deceit or violence has been employed, or that we have been defrauded.*Soc.* And how does this happen? Will you tell me how? For there may be a difference in the manner.*Al.* Do you mean by 'how,' Socrates, whether we suffered these things justly or unjustly?*Soc.* Exactly.*Al.* There can be no greater difference than between just and unjust.The term  
better, when  
applied to  
food, means  
more whole-  
some.



*Soc.* And would you advise the Athenians to go to war with the just or with the unjust? *Alcibiades I.*

*Al.* That is an awkward question; for certainly, even if a person did intend to go to war with the just, he would not admit that they were just. SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

*Soc.* He would not go to war, because it would be unlawful?

*Al.* Neither lawful nor honourable.

*Soc.* Then you, too, would address them on principles of justice?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* What, then, is justice but that better, of which I spoke, in going to war or not going to war with those against whom we ought or ought not, and when we ought or ought not to go to war? In going to  
war or not  
going to war,  
the better is  
the more just.

*Al.* Clearly.

*Soc.* But how is this, friend Alcibiades? Have you forgotten that you do not know this, or have you been to the schoolmaster without my knowledge, and has he taught you to discern the just from the unjust? Who is he? I wish you would tell me, that I may go and learn of him — you shall introduce me.

*Al.* You are mocking, Socrates.

*Soc.* No, indeed; I most solemnly declare to you by Zeus, who is the God of our common friendship, and whom I never will forswear, that I am not; tell me, then, who this instructor is, if he exists. But where did  
Alcibiades  
acquire this  
notion of just  
and unjust?

*Al.* But, perhaps, he does not exist; may I not have acquired the knowledge of just and unjust in some other way?

*Soc.* Yes; if you have discovered them.

*Al.* But do you not think that I could discover them?

*Soc.* I am sure that you might, if you enquired about them.

*Al.* And do you not think that I would enquire?

*Soc.* Yes; if you thought that you did not know them.

*Al.* And was there not a time when I did so think?

*Soc.* Very good; and can you tell me how long it is since you thought that you did not know the nature of the just and the unjust? What do you say to a year ago? Were you then in a state of conscious ignorance and enquiry?

*Alcibiades I.*SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

or did you think that you knew? And please to answer truly, that our discussion may not be in vain.

*Al.* Well, I thought that I knew.

*Soc.* And two years ago, and three years ago, and four years ago, you knew all the same?

*Al.* I did.

*Soc.* And more than four years ago you were a child — were you not?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And then I am quite sure that you thought you knew.

*Al.* Why are you so sure?

He always  
had them.

*Soc.* Because I often heard you when a child, in your teacher's house, or elsewhere, playing at dice or some other game with the boys, not hesitating at all about the nature of the just and unjust; but very confident — crying and shouting that one of the boys was a rogue and a cheat, and had been cheating. Is it not true?

*Al.* But what was I to do, Socrates, when anybody cheated me?

*Soc.* And how can you say, 'What was I to do'? if at the time you did not know whether you were wronged or not?

*Al.* To be sure I knew; I was quite aware that I was being cheated.

*Soc.* Then you suppose yourself even when a child to have known the nature of just and unjust?

*Al.* Certainly; and I did know then.

*Soc.* And when did you discover them — not, surely, at the time when you thought that you knew them?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* And when did you think that you were ignorant — if you consider, you will find that there never was such a time?

*Al.* Really, Socrates, I cannot say.

*Soc.* Then you did not learn them by discovering them?

*Al.* Clearly not.

*Soc.* But just before you said that you did not know them by learning; now, if you have neither discovered nor learned them, how and whence do you come to know them?

*Al.* I suppose that I was mistaken in saying that I knew them through my own discovery of them; whereas, in truth, I learned them in the same way that other people learn.

*Soc.* So you said before, and I must again ask, of whom? Do tell me.

*Al.* Of the many.

*Soc.* Do you take refuge in them? I cannot say much for your teachers.

*Al.* Why, are they not able to teach?

*Soc.* They could not teach you how to play at draughts, which you would acknowledge (would you not) to be a much smaller matter than justice?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And can they teach the better who are unable to teach the worse?

*Al.* I think that they can; at any rate, they can teach many far better things than to play at draughts.

III *Soc.* What things?

*Al.* Why, for example, I learned to speak Greek of them, and I cannot say who was my teacher, or to whom I am to attribute my knowledge of Greek, if not to those good-for-nothing teachers, as you call them.

*Soc.* Why, yes, my friend; and the many are good enough teachers of Greek, and some of their instructions in that line may be justly praised.

*Al.* Why is that?

*Soc.* Why, because they have the qualities which good teachers ought to have.

*Al.* What qualities?

*Soc.* Why, you know that knowledge is the first qualification of any teacher?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And if they know, they must agree together and not differ?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And would you say that they knew the things about which they differ?

*Al.* No.

*Soc.* Then how can they teach them?

*Al.* They cannot.

*Soc.* Well, but do you imagine that the many would differ about the nature of wood and stone? are they not agreed if you ask them what they are? and do they not run to fetch

*Alcibiades I.*

*SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.*

He learned  
them of the  
many,

as he learned  
Greek;—of  
those who  
knew it.

Yes: the  
many can  
teach things  
about



*Alcibiades I.*SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

the same thing, when they want a piece of wood or a stone?  
And so in similar cases, which I suspect to be pretty nearly  
all that you mean by speaking Greek.

*Al.* True.which they  
are agreed.

*Soc.* These, as we were saying, are matters about which  
they are agreed with one another and with themselves; both  
individuals and states use the same words about them; they  
do not use some one word and some another.

*Al.* They do not.

*Soc.* Then they may be expected to be good teachers of  
these things?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And if we want to instruct any one in them, we shall  
be right in sending him to be taught by our friends the  
many?

*Al.* Very true.

*Soc.* But if we wanted further to know not only which  
are men and which are horses, but which men or horses  
have powers of running, would the many still be able to  
inform us?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* And you have a sufficient proof that they do not know  
these things and are not the best teachers of them, inasmuch  
as they are never agreed about them?

*Al.* Yes.But could the  
many teach  
things about  
which they are  
disagreed?

*Soc.* And suppose that we wanted to know not only what  
men are like, but what healthy or diseased men are like —  
would the many be able to teach us?

*Al.* They would not.

*Soc.* And you would have a proof that they were bad  
teachers of these matters, if you saw them at variance?

*Al.* I should.And one of  
these things is  
justice.

*Soc.* Well, but are the many agreed with themselves, or  
with one another, about the justice or injustice of men and  
things? 112

*Al.* Assuredly not, Socrates.

*Soc.* There is no subject about which they are more at  
variance?

*Al.* None.

*Soc.* I do not suppose that you ever saw or heard of men



quarrelling over the principles of health and disease to such an extent as to go to war and kill one another for the sake of them?

*Alcibiades I.*

SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

Did not a question of justice cause the war between the Trojans and Achaeans, and between the Athenians and Lacedaemonians?

*Al.* No, indeed.

*Soc.* But of the quarrels about justice and injustice, even if you have never seen them, you have certainly heard from many people, including Homer; for you have heard of the Iliad and Odyssey?

*Al.* To be sure, Socrates.

*Soc.* A difference of just and unjust is the argument of those poems?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* Which difference caused all the wars and deaths of Trojans and Achaeans, and the deaths of the suitors of Penelope in their quarrel with Odysseus.

*Al.* Very true.

*Soc.* And when the Athenians and Lacedaemonians and Boeotians fell at Tanagra, and afterwards in the battle of Coronea, at which your father Cleinias met his end, the question was one of justice — this was the sole cause of the battles, and of their deaths.

*Al.* Very true.

*Soc.* But can they be said to understand that about which they are quarrelling to the death?

And yet they did not know what they were fighting about?

*Al.* Clearly not.

*Soc.* And yet those whom you thus allow to be ignorant are the teachers to whom you are appealing.

*Al.* Very true.

*Soc.* But how are you ever likely to know the nature of justice and injustice, about which you are so perplexed, if you have neither learned them of others nor discovered them yourself?

*Al.* From what you say, I suppose not.

*Soc.* See, again, how inaccurately you speak, Alcibiades!

*Al.* In what respect?

*Soc.* In saying that I say so.

*Al.* Why, did you not say that I know nothing of the just and unjust?

*Soc.* No; I did not.

*Al.* Did I, then?

*Alcibiades I.**Soc.* Yes.SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.*Al.* How was that?*Soc.* Let me explain. Suppose I were to ask you which is the greater number, two or one; you would reply 'two'?*Al.* I should.*Soc.* And by how much greater?*Al.* By one.*Soc.* Which of us now says that two is more than one?*Al.* I do.*Soc.* Did not I ask, and you answer the question?*Al.* Yes.*Soc.* Then who is speaking? I who put the question, or 113  
you who answer me?*Al.* I am.The answerer,  
not the ques-  
tioner, has  
been drawing  
these infer-  
ences.*Soc.* Or suppose that I ask and you tell me the letters which make up the name Socrates, which, of us is the speaker?*Al.* I am.*Soc.* Now let us put the case generally: whenever there is a question and answer, who is the speaker,—the questioner or the answerer?*Al.* I should say, Socrates, that the answerer was the speaker.*Soc.* And have I not been the questioner all through?*Al.* Yes.*Soc.* And you the answerer?*Al.* Just so.*Soc.* Which of us, then, was the speaker?*Al.* The inference is, Socrates, that I was the speaker.*Soc.* Did not some one say that Alcibiades, the fair son of Cleinias, not understanding about just and unjust, but thinking that he did understand, was going to the assembly to advise the Athenians about what he did not know? Was not that said?*Al.* Very true.How can you  
teach what  
you do not  
know?*Soc.* Then, Alcibiades, the result may be expressed in the language of Euripides. I think that you have heard all this 'from yourself, and not from me'; nor did I say this, which you erroneously attribute to me, but you yourself, and what you said was very true. For indeed, my dear fellow, the

design which you meditate of teaching what you do not know, and have not taken any pains to learn, is downright insanity.

*Alcibiades I.*

SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

*Al.* But, Socrates, I think that the Athenians and the rest of the Hellenes do not often advise as to the more just or unjust; for they see no difficulty in them, and therefore they leave them, and consider which course of action will be most expedient; for there is a difference between justice and expediency. Many persons have done great wrong and profited by their injustice; others have done rightly and come to no good.

But the expedient, not the just, is the subject about which men commonly debate.

*Soc.* Well, but granting that the just and the expedient are ever so much opposed, you surely do not imagine that you know what is expedient for mankind, or why a thing is expedient?

*Al.* Why not, Socrates?—But I am not going to be asked again from whom I learned, or when I made the discovery.

Alcibiades insists that he will not have the old argument over again.

*Soc.* What a way you have! When you make a mistake which might be refuted by a previous argument, you insist on having a new and different refutation; the old argument is a worn-out garment which you will no longer put on, but some one must produce another which is clean and new. Now I shall disregard this move of yours, and shall ask over again, — Where did you learn and how do you know the nature of the expedient, and who is your teacher? All this I comprehend in a single question, and now you will manifestly be in the old difficulty, and will not be able to show that you know the expedient, either because you learned or because you discovered it yourself. But, as I perceive that you are dainty, and dislike the taste of a stale argument, I will enquire no further into your knowledge of what is expedient or what is not expedient for the Athenian people, and simply request you to say why you do not explain whether justice and expediency are the same or different? And if you like you may examine me as I have examined you, or, if you would rather, you may carry on the discussion by yourself.

*Al.* But I am not certain, Socrates, whether I shall be able to discuss the matter with you.

*Soc.* Then imagine, my dear fellow, that I am the demus



*Alcibiades I.*SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

and the ecclesia; for in the ecclesia, too, you will have to persuade men individually.

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And is not the same person able to persuade one individual singly and many individuals of the things which he knows? The grammarian, for example, can persuade one and he can persuade many about letters.

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* And about number, will not the same person persuade one and persuade many?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And this will be he who knows number, or the arithmetician?

*Al.* Quite true.

*Soc.* And cannot you persuade one man about that of which you can persuade many?

*Al.* I suppose so.

*Soc.* And that of which you can persuade either is clearly what you know?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the only difference between one who argues as we are doing, and the orator who is addressing an assembly, is that the one seeks to persuade a number, and the other an individual, of the same things.

*Al.* I suppose so.

*Soc.* Well, then, since the same person who can persuade a multitude can persuade individuals, try conclusions upon me, and prove to me that the just is not always expedient.

*Al.* You take liberties, Socrates.

*Soc.* I shall take the liberty of proving to you the opposite of that which you will not prove to me.

*Al.* Proceed.

*Soc.* Answer my questions — that is all.

*Al.* Nay, I should like you to be the speaker.

*Soc.* What, do you not wish to be persuaded?

*Al.* Certainly I do.

*Soc.* And can you be persuaded better than out of your own mouth?

*Al.* I think not.

*Soc.* Then you shall answer; and if you do not hear the

He who can persuade many can persuade one. Alcibiades should therefore be able to persuade Socrates.



words, that the just is the expedient, coming from your own lips, never believe another man again.

*Alcibiades I.*

SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

*Al.* I won't; but answer I will, for I do not see how I can come to any harm.

115 *Soc.* A true prophecy! Let me begin then by enquiring of you whether you allow that the just is sometimes expedient and sometimes not?

A man may do what is expedient and not just, but he cannot do what is honourable and not just and good.

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And sometimes honourable and sometimes not?

*Al.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* I am asking if you ever knew any one who did what was dishonourable and yet just?

*Al.* Never.

*Soc.* All just things are honourable?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And are honourable things sometimes good and sometimes not good, or are they always good?

*Al.* I rather think, Socrates, that some honourable things are evil.

*Soc.* And are some dishonourable things good?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* You mean in such a case as the following:— In time of war, men have been wounded or have died in rescuing a companion or kinsman, when others who have neglected the duty of rescuing them have escaped in safety?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* And to rescue another under such circumstances is honourable, in respect of the attempt to save those whom we ought to save; and this is courage?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* But evil in respect of death and wounds?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the courage which is shown in the rescue is one thing, and the death another?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then the rescue of one's friends is honourable in one point of view, but evil in another?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* And if honourable, then also good: Will you consider now whether I may not be right, for you were acknowledging

*Alcibiades I.* that the courage which is shown in the rescue is honourable?  
*SOCRATES,* Now is this courage good or evil? Look at the matter  
*ALCIBIADES.* thus: which would you rather choose, good or evil?

*Al.* Good.

*Soc.* And the greatest goods you would be most ready to choose, and would least like to be deprived of them?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* What would you say of courage? At what price would you be willing to be deprived of courage?

*Al.* I would rather die than be a coward.

*Soc.* Then you think that cowardice is the worst of evils?

*Al.* I do.

*Soc.* As bad as death, I suppose?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And life and courage are the extreme opposites of death and cowardice?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And they are what you would most desire to have, and their opposites you would least desire?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Is this because you think life and courage the best, and death and cowardice the worst?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And you would term the rescue of a friend in battle honourable, in as much as courage does a good work?

*Al.* I should.

*Soc.* But evil because of the death which ensues?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Might we not describe their different effects as follows:— You may call either of them evil in respect of the evil which is the result, and good in respect of the good which is the result of either of them?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And they are honourable in so far as they are good, and dishonourable in so far as they are evil?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* Then when you say that the rescue of a friend in battle is honourable and yet evil, that is equivalent to saying that the rescue is good and yet evil?

*Al.* I believe that you are right, Socrates.

But good may contain an element of evil. Good and evil are to be judged of by their consequences.

*Soc.* Nothing honourable, regarded as honourable, is evil ; nor anything base, regarded as base, good.

*Al.* Clearly not.

*Soc.* Look at the matter yet once more in a further light : he who acts honourably acts well?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And he who acts well is happy?

*Al.* Of course.

*Soc.* And the happy are those who obtain good?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* And they obtain good by acting well and honourably?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then acting well is a good?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And happiness is a good?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then the good and the honourable are again identified.

*Al.* Manifestly.

*Soc.* Then, if the argument holds, what we find to be honourable we shall also find to be good?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And is the good expedient or not?

*Al.* Expedient.

*Soc.* Do you remember our admissions about the just?

*Al.* Yes ; if I am not mistaken, we said that those who acted justly must also act honourably.

*Soc.* And the honourable is the good?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the good is expedient?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then, Alcibiades, the just is expedient?

*Al.* I should infer so.

*Soc.* And all this I prove out of your own mouth, for I ask and you answer?

*Al.* I must acknowledge it to be true.

*Soc.* And having acknowledged that the just is the same as the expedient, are you not (let me ask) prepared to ridicule any one who, pretending to understand the principles of justice and injustice, gets up to advise the noble

*Alcibiades 1.*

SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

The honourable is identified with the good, and the good is the expedient,

and therefore the just which is the honourable is also the expedient. All this has been proved by Alcibiades himself.

*Alcibiades I.*  
*SOCRATES,*  
*ALCIBIADES.*

Yet he still  
 finds himself  
 in a per-  
 plexity,

Athenians or the ignoble Peparethians, that the just may be the evil?

*Al.* I solemnly declare, Socrates, that I do not know what I am saying. Verily, I am in a strange state, for when you put questions to me I am of different minds in successive instants.

*Soc.* And are you not aware of the nature of this perplexity, my friend?

*Al.* Indeed I am not.

*Soc.* Do you suppose that if some one were to ask you whether you have two eyes or three, or two hands or four, or anything of that sort, you would then be of different minds in successive instants?

*Al.* I begin to distrust myself, but still I do not suppose 117 that I should.

*Soc.* You would feel no doubt; and for this reason—because you would know?

*Al.* I suppose so.

*Soc.* And the reason why you involuntarily contradict yourself is clearly that you are ignorant?

*Al.* Very likely.

and this is  
 because he  
 thinks that he  
 knows, but if  
 he knew that  
 he were igno-  
 rant he would  
 be in no per-  
 plexity.

*Soc.* And if you are perplexed in answering about just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable, good and evil, expedient and inexpedient, the reason is that you are ignorant of them, and therefore in perplexity. Is not that clear?

*Al.* I agree.

*Soc.* But is this always the case, and is a man necessarily perplexed about that of which he has no knowledge?

*Al.* Certainly he is.

*Soc.* And do you know how to ascend into heaven?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* And in this case, too, is your judgment perplexed?

*Al.* No.

*Soc.* Do you see the reason why, or shall I tell you?

*Al.* Tell me.

*Soc.* The reason is, that you not only do not know, my friend, but you do not think that you know.

*Al.* There again; what do you mean?



*Soc.* Ask yourself; are you in any perplexity about things of which you are ignorant? You know, for example, that you know nothing about the preparation of food.

*Alcibiades I.*

SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

*Al.* Very true.

*Soc.* And do you think and perplex yourself about the preparation of food: or do you leave that to some one who understands the art?

*Al.* The latter.

*Soc.* Or if you were on a voyage, would you bewilder yourself by considering whether the rudder is to be drawn inwards or outwards, or do you leave that to the pilot, and do nothing?

*Al.* It would be the concern of the pilot.

*Soc.* Then you are not perplexed about what you do not know, if you know that you do not know it?

*Al.* I imagine not.

*Soc.* Do you not see, then, that mistakes in life and practice are likewise to be attributed to the ignorance which has conceit of knowledge?

*Al.* Once more, what do you mean?

*Soc.* I suppose that we begin to act when we think that we know what we are doing?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* But when people think that they do not know, they entrust their business to others?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And so there is a class of ignorant persons who do not make mistakes in life, because they trust others about things of which they are ignorant?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* Who, then, are the persons who make mistakes? They cannot, of course, be those who know?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* But if neither those who know, nor those who know that they do not know, make mistakes, there remain those only who do not know and think that they know.

*Al.* Yes, only those.

*Soc.* Then this is ignorance of the disgraceful sort which is mischievous?

*Al.* Yes.

The people  
who make  
mistakes are  
neither those  
who know,  
nor those who  
do not know,  
but those who  
think that  
they know and  
do not know.

*Alcibiades I.*SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

*Soc.* And most mischievous and most disgraceful when having to do with the greatest matters?

*Al.* By far.

*Soc.* And can there be any matters greater than the just, the honourable, the good, and the expedient?

*Al.* There cannot be.

*Soc.* And these, as you were saying, are what perplex you?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* But if you are perplexed, then, as the previous argument has shown, you are not only ignorant of the greatest matters, but being ignorant you fancy that you know them?

*Al.* I fear that you are right.

And you, like other statesmen, rush into politics without being trained. Pericles, alone of them all, associated with the philosophers.

*Soc.* And now see what has happened to you, Alcibiades! I hardly like to speak of your evil case, but as we are alone I will: My good friend, you are wedded to ignorance of the most disgraceful kind, and of this you are convicted, not by me, but out of your own mouth and by your own argument; wherefore also you rush into politics before you are educated. Neither is your case to be deemed singular. For I might say the same of almost all our statesmen, with the exception, perhaps, of your guardian, Pericles.

*Al.* Yes, Socrates; and Pericles is said not to have got his wisdom by the light of nature, but to have associated with several of the philosophers; with Pythocleides, for example, and with Anaxagoras, and now in advanced life with Damon, in the hope of gaining wisdom.

*Soc.* Very good; but did you ever know a man wise in anything who was unable to impart his particular wisdom? For example, he who taught you letters was not only wise, but he made you and any others whom he liked wise.

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And you, whom he taught, can do the same?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* And in like manner the harper and gymnastic-master?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* When a person is enabled to impart knowledge to another, he thereby gives an excellent proof of his own understanding of any matter.

*Al.* I agree.

*Soc.* Well, and did Pericles make any one wise; did he begin by making his sons wise?

*Al.* But, Socrates, if the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, what has that to do with the matter?

*Soc.* Well, but did he make your brother, Cleinias, wise?

*Al.* Cleinias is a madman; there is no use in talking of him.

*Soc.* But if Cleinias is a madman and the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, what reason can be given why he neglects you, and lets you be as you are?

*Al.* I believe that I am to blame for not listening to him.

*Soc.* But did you ever hear of any other Athenian or foreigner, bond or free, who was deemed to have grown  
119 wiser in the society of Pericles,—as I might cite Pythodorus, the son of Isolochus, and Callias, the son of Calliades, who have grown wiser in the society of Zeno, for which privilege they have each of them paid him the sum of a hundred minae<sup>1</sup> to the increase of their wisdom and fame.

*Al.* I certainly never did hear of any one.

*Soc.* Well, and in reference to your own case, do you mean to remain as you are, or will you take some pains about yourself?

*Al.* With your aid, Socrates, I will. And indeed, when I hear you speak, the truth of what you are saying strikes home to me, and I agree with you, for our statesmen, all but a few, do appear to be quite uneducated.

*Soc.* What is the inference?

*Al.* Why, that if they were educated they would be trained athletes, and he who means to rival them ought to have knowledge and experience when he attacks them; but now, as they have become politicians without any special training, why should I have the trouble of learning and practising? For I know well that by the light of nature I shall get the better of them.

*Soc.* My dear friend, what a sentiment! And how unworthy of your noble form and your high estate!

*Al.* What do you mean, Socrates; why do you say so?

*Soc.* I am grieved when I think of our mutual love.

*Al.* At what?

*Alcibiades I.*

SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

And even he could not teach his own sons, or your brother Cleinias, nor did any one ever grow wiser in his society.

But if other statesmen are uneducated, what need has Alcibiades of education?

The lover is pained at hearing from the lips of Alcibiades

<sup>1</sup> About £406.



*Alcibiades I.*SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.so unworthy  
a sentiment.  
He should  
have a higher  
ambition than  
this.*Soc.* At your fancying that the contest on which you are entering is with people here.*Al.* Why, what others are there?*Soc.* Is that a question which a magnanimous soul should ask?*Al.* Do you mean to say that the contest is not with these?*Soc.* And suppose that you were going to steer a ship into action, would you only aim at being the best pilot on board? Would you not, while acknowledging that you must possess this degree of excellence, rather look to your antagonists, and not, as you are now doing, to your fellow combatants? You ought to be so far above these latter, that they will not even dare to be your rivals; and, being regarded by you as inferiors, will do battle for you against the enemy; this is the kind of superiority which you must establish over them, if you mean to accomplish any noble action really worthy of yourself and of the state.*Al.* That would certainly be my aim.*Soc.* Verily, then, you have good reason to be satisfied, if you are better than the soldiers; and you need not, when you are their superior and have your thoughts and actions fixed upon them, look away to the generals of the enemy.*Al.* Of whom are you speaking, Socrates?His rivals  
should be the  
Spartan and  
Persian kings,  
not any  
chance per-  
sons.*Soc.* Why, you surely know that our city goes to war 120  
now and then with the Lacedaemonians and with the great king?*Al.* True enough.*Soc.* And if you meant to be the ruler of this city, would you not be right in considering that the Lacedaemonian and Persian king were your true rivals?*Al.* I believe that you are right.*Soc.* Oh no, my friend, I am quite wrong, and I think that you ought rather to turn your attention to Midias the quail-breeder and others like him, who manage our politics; in whom, as the women would remark, you may still see the slaves' cut of hair, cropping out in their minds as well as on their pates; and they come with their barbarous lingo to flatter us and not to rule us. To these, I say, you should look, and then you need not trouble yourself about your own fitness to contend in such a noble arena: there is no reason



why you should either learn what has to be learned, or practise what has to be practised, and only when thoroughly prepared enter on a political career.

*Alcibiades 1.*

SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

*Al.* There, I think, Socrates, that you are right; I do not suppose, however, that the Spartan generals or the great king are really different from anybody else.

*Soc.* But, my dear friend, do consider what you are saying.

*Al.* What am I to consider?

*Soc.* In the first place, will you be more likely to take care of yourself, if you are in a wholesome fear and dread of them, or if you are not?

*Al.* Clearly, if I have such a fear of them.

*Soc.* And do you think that you will sustain any injury if you take care of yourself?

*Al.* No, I shall be greatly benefited.

*Soc.* And this is one very important respect in which that notion of yours is bad.

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* In the next place, consider that what you say is probably false.

*Al.* How so?

*Soc.* Let me ask you whether better natures are likely to be found in noble races or not in noble races?

*Al.* Clearly in noble races.

*Soc.* Are not those who are well born and well bred most likely to be perfect in virtue?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then let us compare our antecedents with those of the Lacedaemonian and Persian kings; are they inferior to us in descent? Have we not heard that the former are sprung from Heracles, and the latter from Achaemenes, and that the race of Heracles and the race of Achaemenes go back to Perseus, son of Zeus?

We too have our pride of birth, but how inferior are we to those who are descended from Zeus through a line of kings!

121 *Al.* Why, so does mine go back to Eurysaces, and he to Zeus!

*Soc.* And mine, noble Alcibiades, to Daedalus, and he to Hephaestus, son of Zeus. But, for all that, we are far inferior to them. For they are descended 'from Zeus,' through a line of kings—either kings of Argos and Lacedaemon, or kings of Persia, a country which the descendants

*Alcibiades I.*  
SOCRATES.

The wealth  
and dignity of  
the Spartan  
kings is great,  
but it is as  
nothing com-  
pared with  
that of the  
Persians.

The birth of  
the Persian  
princes is a  
world-famous  
event, and the  
utmost pains  
is taken with  
their educa-  
tion, which is  
entrusted to  
great and  
noble persons.

of Achaemenes have always possessed, besides being at various times sovereigns of Asia, as they now are; whereas, we and our fathers were but private persons. How ridiculous would you be thought if you were to make a display of your ancestors and of Salamis the island of Eurysaces, or of Aegina, the habitation of the still more ancient Aeacus, before Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes. You should consider how inferior we are to them both in the derivation of our birth and in other particulars. Did you never observe how great is the property of the Spartan kings? And their wives are under the guardianship of the Ephori, who are public officers and watch over them, in order to preserve as far as possible the purity of the Heracleid blood. Still greater is the difference among the Persians; for no one entertains a suspicion that the father of a prince of Persia can be any one but the king. Such is the awe which invests the person of the queen, that any other guard is needless. And when the heir of the kingdom is born, all the subjects of the king feast; and the day of his birth is for ever afterwards kept as a holiday and time of sacrifice by all Asia; whereas, when you and I were born, Alcibiades, as the comic poet says, the neighbours hardly knew of the important event. After the birth of the royal child, he is tended, not by a good-for-nothing woman-nurse, but by the best of the royal eunuchs, who are charged with the care of him, and especially with the fashioning and right formation of his limbs, in order that he may be as shapely as possible; which being their calling, they are held in great honour. And when the young prince is seven years old he is put upon a horse and taken to the riding-masters, and begins to go out hunting. And at fourteen years of age he is handed over to the royal schoolmasters, as they are termed: these are four chosen men, reputed to be the best among the Persians of a certain age; and one of them is the wisest, another the justest, a third the most temperate, and a fourth the most valiant. The first instructs him in the magianism of Zoroaster, the son of Oromasus, which is the worship of 122 the Gods, and teaches him also the duties of his royal office; the second, who is the justest, teaches him always to speak the truth; the third, or most temperate, forbids him to allow

any pleasure to be lord over him, that he may be accustomed to be a freeman and king indeed,—lord of himself first, and not a slave; the most valiant trains him to be bold and fearless, telling him that if he fears he is to deem himself a slave; whereas Pericles gave you, Alcibiades, for a tutor Zopyrus the Thracian, a slave of his who was past all other work. I might enlarge on the nurture and education of your rivals, but that would be tedious; and what I have said is a sufficient sample of what remains to be said. I have only to remark, by way of contrast, that no one cares about your birth or nurture or education, or, I may say, about that of any other Athenian, unless he has a lover who looks after him. And if you cast an eye on the wealth, the luxury, the garments with their flowing trains, the anointings with myrrh, the multitudes of attendants, and all the other bravery of the Persians, you will be ashamed when you discern your own inferiority; or if you look at the temperance and orderliness and ease and grace and magnanimity and courage and endurance and love of toil and desire of glory and ambition of the Lacedaemonians—in all these respects you will see that you are but a child in comparison of them. Even in the matter of wealth, if you value yourself upon that, I must reveal to you how you stand; for if you form an estimate of the wealth of the Lacedaemonians, you will see that our possessions fall far short of theirs. For no one here can compete with them either in the extent and fertility of their own and the Messenian territory, or in the number of their slaves, and especially of the Helots, or of their horses, or of the animals which feed on the Messenian pastures. But I have said enough of this: and as to gold and silver, there is more of them in Lacedaemon than in all the rest of Hellas, for during many generations gold has been always flowing in to them from the whole Hellenic world, and often from the barbarian also, and never going

123 out, as in the fable of Aesop the fox said to the lion, 'The prints of the feet of those going in are distinct enough;' but who ever saw the trace of money going out of Lacedaemon? and therefore you may safely infer that the inhabitants are the richest of the Hellenes in gold and silver, and that their kings are the richest of them, for they have a larger share of

*Alcibiades I.*

SOCRATES.

When Alcibiades was born nobody knew or cared, and his education was handed over to a worn-out slave of his guardian's.



*Alcibiades I.*  
SOCRATES.

The country called the 'queen's girdle,' the 'queen's veil,' and the like.

The queen of Persia or of Sparta, if they heard that a youth of twenty, without resources and without education, was going to attack their son or husband, would deem him mad.

these things, and they have also a tribute paid to them which is very considerable. Yet the Spartan wealth, though great in comparison of the wealth of the other Hellenes, is as nothing in comparison of that of the Persians and their kings. Why, I have been informed by a credible person who went up to the king [at Susa], that he passed through a large tract of excellent land, extending for nearly a day's journey, which the people of the country called the queen's girdle, and another, which they called her veil; and several other fair and fertile districts, which were reserved for the adornment of the queen, and are named after her several habiliments. Now, I cannot help thinking to myself, What if some one were to go to Amestris, the wife of Xerxes and mother of Artaxerxes, and say to her, There is a certain Dinomachè, whose whole wardrobe is not worth fifty minae—and that will be more than the value—and she has a son who is possessed of a three-hundred acre patch at Erchia, and he has a mind to go to war with your son—would she not wonder to what this Alcibiades trusts for success in the conflict? 'He must rely,' she would say to herself, 'upon his training and wisdom—these are the things which Hellenes value.' And if she heard that this Alcibiades who is making the attempt is not as yet twenty years old, and is wholly uneducated, and when his lover tells him that he ought to get education and training first, and then go and fight the king, he refuses, and says that he is well enough as he is, would she not be amazed, and ask, 'On what, then, does the youth rely?' And if we replied: He relies on his beauty, and stature, and birth, and mental endowments, she would think that we were mad, Alcibiades, when she compared the advantages which you possess with those of her own people. And I believe that even Lampido, the daughter of Leotychides, the wife of Archidamus and mother of Agis, all of whom were kings, would have the same feeling; if, in your present uneducated state, you were to turn your thoughts against her son, she too would be equally astonished. But how disgraceful, that we should not have as high a notion of what is required in us as our enemies' wives and mothers have of the qualities which are required in their assailants! O my friend, be persuaded by me, and hear the Delphian



inscription, 'Know thyself'—not the men whom you think, but these kings are our rivals, and we can only overcome them by pains and skill. And if you fail in the required qualities, you will fail also in becoming renowned among Hellenes and Barbarians, which you seem to desire more than any other man ever desired anything.

*Al.* I entirely believe you; but what are the sort of pains which are required, Socrates,—can you tell me?

*Soc.* Yes, I can; but we must take counsel together concerning the manner in which both of us may be most improved. For what I am telling you of the necessity of education applies to myself as well as to you; and there is only one point in which I have an advantage over you.

*Al.* What is that?

*Soc.* I have a guardian who is better and wiser than your guardian, Pericles.

*Al.* Who is he, Socrates?

*Soc.* God, Alcibiades, who up to this day has not allowed me to converse with you; and he inspires in me the faith that I am especially designed to bring you to honour.

*Al.* You are jesting, Socrates.

*Soc.* Perhaps; at any rate, I am right in saying that all men greatly need pains and care, and you and I above all men.

*Al.* You are not far wrong about me.

*Soc.* And certainly not about myself.

*Al.* But what can we do?

*Soc.* There must be no hesitation or cowardice, my friend.

*Al.* That would not become us, Socrates.

*Soc.* No, indeed, and we ought to take counsel together: for do we not wish to be as good as possible?

*Al.* We do.

*Soc.* In what sort of virtue?

*Al.* Plainly, in the virtue of good men.

*Soc.* Who are good in what?

*Al.* Those, clearly, who are good in the management of affairs.

*Soc.* What sort of affairs? Equestrian affairs?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Alcibiades I.*

*SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.*

*I too need  
education;  
and God,  
who is my  
guardian,  
inspires me  
with the  
belief that I  
shall bring  
you to honour.*

*We must  
take counsel  
together,  
(not about  
equestrian  
or naval  
affairs), but*

*Alcibiades I.*SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

*Soc.* You mean that about them we should have recourse to horsemen?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Well; naval affairs?

*Al.* No.

*Soc.* You mean that we should have recourse to sailors about them?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then what affairs? And who do them?

*Al.* The affairs which occupy Athenian gentlemen.

about the  
things which  
occupy the  
minds of wise  
men.

*Soc.* And when you speak of gentlemen, do you mean the wise or the unwise?

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*Al.* The wise.

*Soc.* And a man is good in respect of that in which he is wise?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And evil in respect of that in which he is unwise?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* The shoemaker, for example, is wise in respect of the making of shoes?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then he is good in that?

*Al.* He is.

*Soc.* But in respect of the making of garments he is unwise?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then in that he is bad?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then upon this view of the matter the same man is good and also bad?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* But would you say that the good are the same as the bad?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Then whom do you call the good?

*Al.* I mean by the good those who are able to rule in the city.

And the wise  
are those who  
take counsel  
for the better  
order and

*Soc.* Not, surely, over horses?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* But over men?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* When they are sick?

*Al.* No.

*Soc.* Or on a voyage?

*Al.* No.

*Soc.* Or reaping the harvest?

*Al.* No.

*Soc.* When they are doing something or nothing?

*Al.* When they are doing something, I should say.

*Soc.* I wish that you would explain to me what this something is.

*Al.* When they are having dealings with one another, and using one another's services, as we citizens do in our daily life.

*Soc.* Those of whom you speak are ruling over men who are using the services of other men? Illustrations.

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Are they ruling over the signal-men who give the time to the rowers?

*Al.* No; they are not.

*Soc.* That would be the office of the pilot?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* But, perhaps you mean that they rule over flute-players who lead the singers and use the services of the dancers?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* That would be the business of the teacher of the chorus?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then what is the meaning of being able to rule over men who use other men?

*Al.* I mean that they rule over men who have common rights of citizenship, and dealings with one another.

*Soc.* And what sort of an art is this? Suppose that I ask you again, as I did just now, What art makes men know how to rule over their fellow-sailors,—how would you answer?

*Al.* The art of the pilot.

*Soc.* And, if I may recur to another old instance, what art enables them to rule over their fellow-singers?

*Alcibiades I.*

SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

improvement  
of the city.

*Alcibiades I.*SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

*Al.* The art of the teacher of the chorus, which you were just now mentioning.

*Soc.* And what do you call the art of fellow-citizens?

*Al.* I should say, good counsel, Socrates.

*Soc.* And is the art of the pilot evil counsel?

*Al.* No.

*Soc.* But good counsel?

*Al.* Yes, that is what I should say,— good counsel, of which 126 the aim is the preservation of the voyagers.

*Soc.* True. And what is the aim of that other good counsel of which you speak?

*Al.* The aim is the better order and preservation of the city.

*Soc.* And what is that of which the absence or presence improves and preserves the order of the city? Suppose you were to ask me, what is that of which the presence or absence improves or preserves the order of the body? I should reply, the presence of health and the absence of disease. You would say the same?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And if you were to ask me the same question about the eyes, I should reply in the same way, 'the presence of sight and the absence of blindness;' or about the ears, I should reply, that they were improved and were in better case, when deafness was absent, and hearing was present in them.

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* And what would you say of a state? What is that by the presence or absence of which the state is improved and better managed and ordered?

*Al.* I should say, Socrates:— the presence of friendship and the absence of hatred and division.

*Soc.* And do you mean by friendship agreement or disagreement?

*Al.* Agreement.

*Soc.* What art makes cities agree about numbers?

*Al.* Arithmetic.

*Soc.* And private individuals?

*Al.* The same.

*Soc.* And what art makes each individual agree with himself?

And this improvement is given by friendship and agreement,



*Al.* The same.

*Alcibiades I.*

*Soc.* And what art makes each of us agree with himself about the comparative length of the span and of the cubit? Does not the art of measure?

*SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.*

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Individuals are agreed with one another about this; and states, equally?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the same holds of the balance?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* But what is the other agreement of which you speak, and about what? what art can give that agreement? And does that which gives it to the state give it also to the individual, so as to make him consistent with himself and with another?

*Al.* I should suppose so.

*Soc.* But what is the nature of the agreement?—answer, and faint not.

*Al.* I mean to say that there should be such friendship and agreement as exists between an affectionate father and mother and their son, or between brothers, or between husband and wife.

such as exists between the members of a family, however they may differ in their qualities and accomplishments.

*Soc.* But can a man, Alcibiades, agree with a woman about the spinning of wool, which she understands and he does not?

*Al.* No, truly.

*Soc.* Nor has he any need, for spinning is a female accomplishment.

*Al.* Yes.

127 *Soc.* And would a woman agree with a man about the science of arms, which she has never learned?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* I suppose that the use of arms would be regarded by you as a male accomplishment?

*Al.* It would.

*Soc.* Then, upon your view, women and men have two sorts of knowledge?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then in their knowledge there is no agreement of women and men?

*Al.* There is not.

*Alcibiades I.*SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.*Soc.* Nor can there be friendship, if friendship is agreement?*Al.* Plainly not.*Soc.* Then women are not loved by men when they do their own work?*Al.* I suppose not.*Soc.* Nor men by women when they do their own work?*Al.* No.If everybody  
is doing his  
own business,  
how can this  
promote  
friendship?And yet when  
individuals  
are doing each  
his own work,  
they are doing  
what is just.*Soc.* Nor are states well administered, when individuals do their own work?*Al.* I should rather think, Socrates, that the reverse is the truth<sup>1</sup>.*Soc.* What! do you mean to say that states are well administered when friendship is absent, the presence of which, as we were saying, alone secures their good order?*Al.* But I should say that there is friendship among them, for this very reason, that the two parties respectively do their own work.*Soc.* That was not what you were saying before; and what do you mean now by affirming that friendship exists when there is no agreement? How can there be agreement about matters which the one party knows, and of which the other is in ignorance?*Al.* Impossible.*Soc.* And when individuals are doing their own work, are they doing what is just or unjust?*Al.* What is just, certainly.*Soc.* And when individuals do what is just in the state, is there no friendship among them?*Al.* I suppose that there must be, Socrates.*Soc.* Then what do you mean by this friendship or agreement about which we must be wise and discreet in order that we may be good men? I cannot make out where it exists or among whom; according to you, the same persons may sometimes have it, and sometimes not.*Al.* But, indeed, Socrates, I do not know what I am saying; and I have long been, unconsciously to myself, in a most disgraceful state.*Soc.* Nevertheless, cheer up; at fifty, if you had discovered<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. i. 332 foll.

your deficiency, you would have been too old, and the time for taking care of yourself would have passed away, but yours is just the age at which the discovery should be made.

*Alcibiades I.*  
*SOCRATES,*  
*ALCIBIADES.*

*Al.* And what should he do, Socrates, who would make the discovery?

*Soc.* Answer questions, Alcibiades; and that is a process which, by the grace of God, if I may put any faith in my oracle, will be very improving to both of us.

The way to clear up difficulties is to answer questions. Alcibiades is willing to have recourse to this method of improvement.

*Al.* If I can be improved by answering, I will answer.

128 *Soc.* And first of all, that we may not peradventure be deceived by appearances, fancying, perhaps, that we are taking care of ourselves when we are not, what is the meaning of a man taking care of himself? and when does he take care? Does he take care of himself when he takes care of what belongs to him?

*Al.* I should think so.

*Soc.* When does a man take care of his feet? Does he not take care of them when he takes care of that which belongs to his feet?

*Al.* I do not understand.

*Soc.* Let me take the hand as an illustration; does not a ring belong to the finger, and to the finger only?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the shoe in like manner to the foot?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And when we take care of our shoes, do we not take care of our feet?

*Al.* I do not comprehend, Socrates.

*Soc.* But you would admit, Alcibiades, that to take proper care of a thing is a correct expression?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And taking proper care means improving?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And what is the art which improves our shoes?

*Al.* Shoemaking.

*Soc.* Then by shoemaking we take care of our shoes?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And do we by shoemaking take care of our feet, or by some other art which improves the feet?

*Al.* By some other art.

*Alcibiades I.*  
 SOCRATES,  
 ALCIBIADES.

*Soc.* And the same art improves the feet which improves the rest of the body?

*Al.* Very true.

*Soc.* Which is gymnastic?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then by gymnastic we take care of our feet, and by shoemaking of that which belongs to our feet?

*Al.* Very true.

*Soc.* And by gymnastic we take care of our hands, and by the art of graving rings of that which belongs to our hands?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And by gymnastic we take care of the body, and by the art of weaving and the other arts we take care of the things of the body?

*Al.* Clearly.

*Soc.* Then the art which takes care of each thing is different from that which takes care of the belongings of each thing?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* Then in taking care of what belongs to you, you do not take care of yourself?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* For the art which takes care of our belongings appears not to be the same as that which takes care of ourselves?

*Al.* Clearly not.

*Soc.* And now let me ask you what is the art with which we take care of ourselves?

*Al.* I cannot say.

*Soc.* At any rate, thus much has been admitted, that the art is not one which makes any of our possessions, but which makes ourselves better?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* But should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if we did not know a shoe?

*Al.* Impossible.

*Soc.* Nor should we know what art makes a ring better, if we did not know a ring?

*Al.* That is true.

*Soc.* And can we ever know what art makes a man better, if we do not know what we are ourselves?

It has been shown by examples that a man does not take care of himself, when he only takes care of what belongs to him.

A man must know himself



*Al.* Impossible.

*Soc.* And is self-knowledge such an easy thing, and was he to be lightly esteemed who inscribed the text on the temple at Delphi? Or is self-knowledge a difficult thing, which few are able to attain?

*Al.* At times I fancy, Socrates, that anybody can know himself; at other times the task appears to be very difficult.

*Soc.* But whether easy or difficult, Alcibiades, still there is no other way; knowing what we are, we shall know how to take care of ourselves, and if we are ignorant we shall not know.

*Al.* That is true.

*Soc.* Well, then, let us see in what way the self-existent can be discovered by us; that will give us a chance of discovering our own existence, which otherwise we can never know.

*Al.* You say truly.

*Soc.* Come, now, I beseech you, tell me with whom you are conversing?—with whom but with me?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* As I am, with you?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* That is to say, I, Socrates, am talking?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And Alcibiades is my hearer?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And I in talking use words?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And talking and using words have, I suppose, the same meaning?

*Al.* To be sure.

*Soc.* And the user is not the same as the thing which he uses?

*Al.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* I will explain; the shoemaker, for example, uses a square tool, and a circular tool, and other tools for cutting?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* But the tool is not the same as the cutter and user of the tool?

*Al.* Of course not.

*Alcibiades I.*

SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

before he can  
improve him-  
self or know  
what belongs  
to him.

*Alcibiades I.*SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

*Soc.* And in the same way the instrument of the harper is to be distinguished from the harper himself?

*Al.* It is.

*Soc.* Now the question which I asked was whether you conceive the user to be always different from that which he uses?

*Al.* I do.

*Soc.* Then what shall we say of the shoemaker? Does he cut with his tools only or with his hands?

*Al.* With his hands as well.

*Soc.* He uses his hands too?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And does he use his eyes in cutting leather?

*Al.* He does.

He is distinct  
from what he  
uses; and  
therefore dis-  
tinct from his  
own body.

*Soc.* And we admit that the user is not the same with the things which he uses?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then the shoemaker and the harper are to be distinguished from the hands and feet which they use?

*Al.* Clearly.

*Soc.* And does not a man use the whole body?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And that which uses is different from that which is used?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* Then a man is not the same as his own body?

*Al.* That is the inference.

*Soc.* What is he, then?

*Al.* I cannot say.

*Soc.* Nay, you can say that he is the user of the body.

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the user of the body is the soul?

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*Al.* Yes, the soul.

*Soc.* And the soul rules?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Let me make an assertion which will, I think, be universally admitted.

*Al.* What is it?

*Soc.* That man is one of three things.

*Al.* What are they?

But he must  
be one of three  
things:—

*Soc.* Soul, body, or both together forming a whole.

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* But did we not say that the actual ruling principle of the body is man?

*Al.* Yes, we did.

*Soc.* And does the body rule over itself?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* It is subject, as we were saying?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then that is not the principle which we are seeking?

*Al.* It would seem not.

*Soc.* But may we say that the union of the two rules over the body, and consequently that this is man?

*Al.* Very likely.

*Soc.* The most unlikely of all things; for if one of the members is subject, the two united cannot possibly rule.

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* But since neither the body, nor the union of the two, is man, either man has no real existence, or the soul is man?

*Al.* Just so.

*Soc.* Is anything more required to prove that the soul is man?

*Al.* Certainly not; the proof is, I think, quite sufficient.

*Soc.* And if the proof, although not perfect, be sufficient, we shall be satisfied;—more precise proof will be supplied when we have discovered that which we were led to omit, from a fear that the enquiry would be too much protracted.

*Al.* What was that?

*Soc.* What I meant, when I said that absolute existence must be first considered; but now, instead of absolute existence, we have been considering the nature of individual existence, and this may, perhaps, be sufficient; for surely there is nothing which may be called more properly ourselves than the soul?

*Al.* There is nothing.

*Soc.* Then we may truly conceive that you and I are conversing with one another, soul to soul?

*Al.* Very true.

*Soc.* And that is just what I was saying before—that I, Socrates, am not arguing or talking with the face of

*Alcibiades I.*

*SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.*

Soul, body, or  
the union of  
the two.

What is the  
ruling  
principle in  
him? Clearly  
the soul.

There remains  
a question of  
absolute ex-  
istence, which  
has not been  
considered by  
us, or rather is  
being con-  
sidered by us  
when we  
speak of the  
soul.

You and I  
are talking  
soul to soul.

*Alcibiades I.*SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

Alcibiades, but with the real Alcibiades; or in other words, with his soul.

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* Then he who bids a man know himself, would have him know his soul?

*Al.* That appears to be true.

But if the soul  
is the man, he  
who knows  
only the arts  
which concern  
man does not  
know himself.

*Soc.* He whose knowledge only extends to the body, 131 knows the things of a man, and not the man himself?

*Al.* That is true.

*Soc.* Then neither the physician regarded as a physician, nor the trainer regarded as a trainer, knows himself?

*Al.* He does not.

*Soc.* The husbandmen and the other craftsmen are very far from knowing themselves, for they would seem not even to know their own belongings? When regarded in relation to the arts which they practise they are even further removed from self-knowledge, for they only know the belongings of the body, which minister to the body.

*Al.* That is true.

*Soc.* Then if temperance is the knowledge of self, in respect of his art none of them is temperate?

*Al.* I agree.

*Soc.* And this is the reason why their arts are accounted vulgar, and are not such as a good man would practise?

*Al.* Quite true.

*Soc.* Again, he who cherishes his body cherishes not himself, but what belongs to him?

*Al.* That is true.

*Soc.* But he who cherishes his money, cherishes neither himself nor his belongings, but is in a stage yet further removed from himself?

*Al.* I agree.

*Soc.* Then the money-maker has really ceased to be occupied with his own concerns?

*Al.* True.

The lover of  
the soul is the  
true lover.

*Soc.* And if any one has fallen in love with the person of Alcibiades, he loves not Alcibiades, but the belongings of Alcibiades?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* But he who loves your soul is the true lover?



*Al.* That is the necessary inference.

*Alcibiades I.*

*Soc.* The lover of the body goes away when the flower of youth fades?

SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* But he who loves the soul goes not away, as long as the soul follows after virtue?

He only remains and goes not away, so long as the soul of his beloved follows after virtue.

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And I am the lover who goes not away, but remains with you, when you are no longer young and the rest are gone?

*Al.* Yes, Socrates; and therein you do well, and I hope that you will remain.

*Soc.* Then you must try to look your best.

*Al.* I will.

*Soc.* The fact is, that there is only one lover of Alcibiades the son of Cleinias; there neither is nor ever has been seemingly any other; and he is his darling,—Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete.

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* And did you not say, that if I had not spoken first, you were on the point of coming to me, and enquiring why I only remained?

*Al.* That is true.

132 *Soc.* The reason was that I loved you for your own sake, whereas other men love what belongs to you; and your beauty, which is not you, is fading away, just as your true self is beginning to bloom. And I will never desert you, if you are not spoiled and deformed by the Athenian people; for the danger which I most fear is that you will become a lover of the people and will be spoiled by them. Many a noble Athenian has been ruined in this way. For the demus of the great-hearted Erechtheus is of a fair countenance, but you should see him naked; wherefore observe the caution which I give you.

And Socrates will never desert Alcibiades so long as he is not spoiled by the Athenian people.

*Al.* What caution?

*Soc.* Practise yourself, sweet friend, in learning what you ought to know, before you enter on politics; and then you will have an antidote which will keep you out of harm's way.

*Al.* Good advice, Socrates, but I wish that you would explain to me in what way I am to take care of myself.

*Soc.* Have we not made an advance? for we are at any

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ALCIBIADES.

rate tolerably well agreed as to what we are, and there is no longer any danger, as we once feared, that we might be taking care not of ourselves, but of something which is not ourselves.

*Al.* That is true.

*Soc.* And the next step will be to take care of the soul, and look to that?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Leaving the care of our bodies and of our properties to others?

*Al.* Very good.

He who  
would take  
care of himself  
must first of  
all know him-  
self.

*Soc.* But how can we have a perfect knowledge of the things of the soul?—For if we know them, then I suppose we shall know ourselves. Can we really be ignorant of the excellent meaning of the Delphian inscription, of which we were just now speaking?

*Al.* What have you in your thoughts, Socrates?

*Soc.* I will tell you what I suspect to be the meaning and lesson of that inscription. Let me take an illustration from sight, which I imagine to be the only one suitable to my purpose.

*Al.* What do you mean?

The eye  
which would  
see itself must  
look into the  
pupil of  
another,  
which is the  
divinest part  
of the eye,  
and will then  
behold itself.

*Soc.* Consider; if some one were to say to the eye, 'See thyself,' as you might say to a man, 'Know thyself,' what is the nature and meaning of this precept? Would not his meaning be:—That the eye should look at that in which it would see itself?

*Al.* Clearly.

*Soc.* And what are the objects in looking at which we see ourselves?

*Al.* Clearly, Socrates, in looking at mirrors and the like.

*Soc.* Very true; and is there not something of the nature of a mirror in our own eyes?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Did you ever observe that the face of the person looking into the eye of another is reflected as in a mirror; and in the visual organ which is over against him, and which is called the pupil, there is a sort of image of the person looking? 133

*Al.* That is quite true.

*Soc.* Then the eye, looking at another eye, and at that in the eye which is most perfect, and which is the instrument of vision, will there see itself?

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*SOCRATES,*  
*ALCIBIADES.*

*Al.* That is evident.

*Soc.* But looking at anything else either in man or in the world, and not to what resembles this, it will not see itself?

*Al.* Very true.

*Soc.* Then if the eye is to see itself, it must look at the eye, and at that part of the eye where sight which is the virtue of the eye resides?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* And if the soul, my dear Alcibiades, is ever to know herself, must she not look at the soul; and especially at that part of the soul in which her virtue resides, and to any other which is like this?

And the soul which would know herself must look especially at that part of herself in which she resembles the divine.

*Al.* I agree, Socrates.

*Soc.* And do we know of any part of our souls more divine than that which has to do with wisdom and knowledge?

*Al.* There is none.

*Soc.* Then this is that part of the soul which resembles the divine; and he who looks at this and at the whole class of things divine, will be most likely to know himself?

*Al.* Clearly.

*Soc.* And self-knowledge we agree to be wisdom?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* But if we have no self-knowledge and no wisdom, can we ever know our own good and evil?

*Al.* How can we, Socrates?

*Soc.* You mean, that if you did not know Alcibiades, there would be no possibility of your knowing that what belonged to Alcibiades was really his?

*Al.* It would be quite impossible.

*Soc.* Nor should we know that we were the persons to whom anything belonged, if we did not know ourselves?

*Al.* How could we?

*Soc.* And if we did not know our own belongings, neither should we know the belongings of our belongings?

*Al.* Clearly not.

*Soc.* Then we were not altogether right in acknowledging just now that a man may know what belongs to him and yet

He who knows not himself and his belongings, will not know others and their belongings,



*Alcibiades I.*  
*SOCRATES,*  
*ALCIBIADES.*

not know himself; nay, rather he cannot even know the belongings of his belongings; for the discernment of the things of self, and of the things which belong to the things of self, appear all to be the business of the same man, and of the same art.

*Al.* So much may be supposed.

*Soc.* And he who knows not the things which belong to himself, will in like manner be ignorant of the things which belong to others?

*Al.* Very true.

and therefore  
 he will not  
 know the  
 affairs of  
 states.

*Soc.* And if he knows not the affairs of others, he will not know the affairs of states?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Then such a man can never be a statesman?

*Al.* He cannot.

*Soc.* Nor an economist?

*Al.* He cannot.

*Soc.* He will not know what he is doing?

134

*Al.* He will not.

*Soc.* And will not he who is ignorant fall into error?

*Al.* Assuredly.

And, if he  
 knows not  
 what he is  
 doing, he will  
 be miserable  
 and will make  
 others miser-  
 able.

*Soc.* And if he falls into error will he not fail both in his public and private capacity?

*Al.* Yes, indeed.

*Soc.* And failing, will he not be miserable?

*Al.* Very.

*Soc.* And what will become of those for whom he is acting?

*Al.* They will be miserable also.

*Soc.* Then he who is not wise and good cannot be happy?

*Al.* He cannot.

*Soc.* The bad, then, are miserable?

*Al.* Yes, very.

*Soc.* And if so, not he who has riches, but he who has wisdom, is delivered from his misery?

*Al.* Clearly.

*Soc.* Cities, then, if they are to be happy, do not want walls, or triremes, or docks, or numbers, or size, Alcibiades, without virtue<sup>1</sup>?

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Arist. Pol. vii. 1. § 5.



*Al.* Indeed they do not.

*Soc.* And you must give the citizens virtue, if you mean to administer their affairs rightly or nobly?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* But can a man give that which he has not?

*Al.* Impossible.

*Soc.* Then you or any one who means to govern and superintend, not only himself and the things of himself, but the state and the things of the state, must in the first place acquire virtue.

*Al.* That is true.

*Soc.* You have not therefore to obtain power or authority, in order to enable you to do what you wish for yourself and the state, but justice and wisdom.

*Al.* Clearly.

*Soc.* You and the state, if you act wisely and justly, will act according to the will of God?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* As I was saying before, you will look only at what is bright and divine, and act with a view to them?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* In that mirror you will see and know yourselves and your own good?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And so you will act rightly and well?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* In which case, I will be security for your happiness.

*Al.* I accept the security.

*Soc.* But if you act unrighteously, your eye will turn to the dark and godless, and being in darkness and ignorance of yourselves, you will probably do deeds of darkness.

*Al.* Very possibly.

35 *Soc.* For if a man, my dear Alcibiades, has the power to do what he likes, but has no understanding, what is likely to be the result, either to him as an individual or to the state — for example, if he be sick and is able to do what he likes, not having the mind of a physician — having moreover tyrannical power, and no one daring to reprove him, what will happen to him? Will he not be likely to have his constitution ruined?

*Alcibiades 1.*

SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

He must give  
the citizens  
wisdom and  
justice, and  
he cannot  
give what he  
has not got.

If he acts  
wisely and  
justly he will  
act according  
to the will of  
God.

In the mirror  
of the divine  
he will see his  
own good and  
will act rightly  
and be happy.

*Alcibiades I.*SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.*Al.* That is true.*Soc.* Or again, in a ship, if a man having the power to do what he likes, has no intelligence or skill in navigation, do you see what will happen to him and to his fellow-sailors?*Al.* Yes; I see that they will all perish.*Soc.* And in like manner, in a state, and where there is any power and authority which is wanting in virtue, will not misfortune, in like manner, ensue?*Al.* Certainly.Not power,  
but virtue,  
should be the  
aim both of  
individuals  
and of states:  
and he only is  
a freeman  
who has  
virtue.*Soc.* Not tyrannical power, then, my good Alcibiades, should be the aim either of individuals or states, if they would be happy, but virtue.*Al.* That is true.*Soc.* And before they have virtue, to be commanded by a superior is better for men as well as for children<sup>1</sup>?*Al.* That is evident.*Soc.* And that which is better is also nobler?*Al.* True.*Soc.* And what is nobler is more becoming?*Al.* Certainly.*Soc.* Then to the bad man slavery is more becoming, because better?*Al.* True.*Soc.* Then vice is only suited to a slave?*Al.* Yes.*Soc.* And virtue to a freeman?*Al.* Yes.*Soc.* And, O my friend, is not the condition of a slave to be avoided?*Al.* Certainly, Socrates.*Soc.* And are you now conscious of your own state? And do you know whether you are a freeman or not?*Al.* I think that I am very conscious indeed of my own state.*Soc.* And do you know how to escape out of a state which I do not even like to name to my beauty?*Al.* Yes, I do.*Soc.* How?*Al.* By your help, Socrates.<sup>1</sup> Cp. Arist. Pol. i. 5. § 7.

*Soc.* That is not well said, Alcibiades.

*Alcibiades I.*

*Al.* What ought I to have said?

*SOCRATES,*

*Soc.* By the help of God.

*ALCIBIADES.*

*Al.* I agree; and I further say, that our relations are likely to be reversed. From this day forward, I must and will follow you as you have followed me; I will be the disciple, and you shall be my master.

*Soc.* O that is rare! My love breeds another love: and so like the stork I shall be cherished by the bird whom I have hatched.

*Al.* Strange, but true; and henceforward I shall begin to think about justice.

*Soc.* And I hope that you will persist; although I have fears, not because I doubt you; but I see the power of the state, which may be too much for both of us.





MENEXENUS.



## INTRODUCTION.

THE *Menexenus* has more the character of a rhetorical exercise than any other of the Platonic works. The writer seems to have wished to emulate Thucydides, and the far slighter work of Lysias. In his rivalry with the latter, to whom in the *Phaedrus* Plato shows a strong antipathy, he is entirely successful, but he is not equal to Thucydides. The *Menexenus*, though not without real Hellenic interest, falls very far short of the rugged grandeur and political insight of the great historian. The fiction of the speech having been invented by Aspasia is well sustained, and is in the manner of Plato, notwithstanding the anachronism which puts into her mouth an allusion to the peace of Antalcidas, an event occurring forty years after the date of the supposed oration. But Plato, like Shakespeare, is careless of such anachronisms, which are not supposed to strike the mind of the reader. The effect produced by these grandiloquent orations on Socrates, who does not recover after having heard one of them for three days and more, is truly Platonic.

Such discourses, if we may form a judgment from the three which are extant (for the so-called Funeral Oration of Demosthenes is a bad and spurious imitation of Thucydides and Lysias), conformed to a regular type. They began with Gods and ancestors, and the legendary history of Athens, to which succeeded an almost equally fictitious account of later times. The Persian war usually formed the centre of the narrative; in the age of Isocrates and Demosthenes the Athenians were still living on the glories of Marathon and Salamis. The *Menexenus* veils in panegyric the weak places of Athenian history. The war of Athens and Boeotia is a war of liberation; the Athenians gave back the Spartans taken at Sphacteria out of kindness — indeed, the only fault of the city was too great kindness to their enemies, who were more honoured than the friends of others (cp. Thucyd. ii. 41, which seems to contain the

*Menexenus.*  
INTRODUC-  
TION.

*Menexenus.*  
INTRODUC-  
TION.

germ of the idea); we democrats are the aristocracy of virtue, and the like. These are the platitudes and falsehoods in which history is disguised. The taking of Athens is hardly mentioned.

The author of the *Menexenus*, whether Plato or not, is evidently intending to ridicule the practice, and at the same time to show that he can beat the rhetoricians in their own line, as in the *Phaedrus* he may be supposed to offer an example of what Lysias might have said, and of how much better he might have written in his own style. The orators had recourse to their favourite *loci communes*, one of which, as we find in Lysias, was the shortness of the time allowed them for preparation. But Socrates points out that they had them always ready for delivery, and that there was no difficulty in improvising any number of such orations. To praise the Athenians among the Athenians was easy,—to praise them among the Lacedaemonians would have been a much more difficult task. Socrates himself has turned rhetorician, having learned of a woman, Aspasia, the mistress of Pericles; and any one whose teachers had been far inferior to his own—say, one who had learned from Antiphon the Rhamnusian—would be quite equal to the task of praising men to themselves. When we remember that Antiphon is described by Thucydides as the best pleader of his day, the satire on him and on the whole tribe of rhetoricians is transparent.

The ironical assumption of Socrates, that he must be a good orator because he had learnt of Aspasia, is not coarse, as Schleiermacher supposes, but is rather to be regarded as fanciful. Nor can we say that the offer of Socrates to dance naked out of love for Menexenus, is any more un-Platonic than the threat of physical force which Phaedrus uses towards Socrates (286 C). Nor is there any real vulgarity in the fear which Socrates expresses that he will get a beating from his mistress, Aspasia: this is the natural exaggeration of what might be expected from an imperious woman. Socrates is not to be taken seriously in all that he says, and Plato, both in the *Symposium* and elsewhere, is not slow to admit a sort of Aristophanic humour. How a great original genius like Plato might or might not have written, what was his conception of humour, or what limits he would have prescribed to himself, if any, in drawing the picture of the Silenus Socrates, are problems which no critical instinct can determine.



On the other hand, the dialogue has several Platonic traits, whether original or imitated may be uncertain. Socrates, when he departs from his character of a 'know nothing' and delivers a speech, generally pretends that what he is speaking is not his own composition. Thus in the Cratylus he is run away with (410 E); in the Phaedrus he has heard somebody say something (235 C) — is inspired by the *genius loci* (238 D); in the Symposium he derives his wisdom from Diotima of Mantinea, and the like. But he does not impose on Menexenus by his dissimulation. Without violating the character of Socrates, Plato, who knows so well how to give a hint, or some one writing in his name, intimates clearly enough that the speech in the Menexenus like that in the Phaedrus is to be attributed to Socrates. The address of the dead to the living at the end of the oration may also be compared to the numerous addresses of the same kind which occur in Plato, in whom the dramatic element is always tending to prevail over the rhetorical. The remark has been often made, that in the Funeral Oration of Thucydides there is no allusion to the existence of the dead. But in the Menexenus a future state is clearly, although not strongly, asserted.

Whether the Menexenus is a genuine writing of Plato, or an imitation only, remains uncertain. In either case, the thoughts are partly borrowed from the Funeral Oration of Thucydides; and the fact that they are so, is not in favour of the genuineness of the work. Internal evidence seems to leave the question of authorship in doubt. There are merits and there are defects which might lead to either conclusion. The form of the greater part of the work makes the enquiry difficult; the introduction and the finale certainly wear the look either of Plato or of an extremely skilful imitator. The excellence of the forgery may be fairly adduced as an argument that it is not a forgery at all. In this uncertainty the express testimony of Aristotle, who quotes, in the Rhetoric,<sup>1</sup> the well-known words, 'It is easy to praise the Athenians among the Athenians,' from the Funeral Oration, may perhaps turn the balance in its favour. It must be remembered also that the work was famous in antiquity, and is included in the Alexandrian catalogues of Platonic writings.

<sup>1</sup>i. 9, 30; iii. 14, 11.



# MENEXENUS.

## PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES and MENEXENUS.

Steph. *Socrates.* WHENCE come you, Menexenus? Are you from *Menexenus.*  
234 the Agora?

*Menexenus.* Yes, Socrates; I have been at the Council.

SOCRATES,  
MENEXENUS.

*Soc.* And what might you be doing at the Council? And yet I need hardly ask, for I see that you, believing yourself to have arrived at the end of education and of philosophy, and to have had enough of them, are mounting upwards to things higher still, and, though rather young for the post, are intending to govern us elder men, like the rest of your family, which has always provided some one who kindly took care of us.

*Men.* Yes, Socrates, I shall be ready to hold office, if you allow and advise that I should, but not if you think otherwise. I went to the council chamber because I heard that the Council was about to choose some one who was to speak over the dead. For you know that there is to be a public funeral?

*Soc.* Yes, I know. And whom did they choose?

*Men.* No one; they delayed the election until to-morrow, but I believe that either Archinus or Dion will be chosen.

*Soc.* O Menexenus! death in battle is certainly in many respects a noble thing. The dead man gets a fine and costly funeral, although he may have been poor, and an elaborate speech is made over him by a wise man who has long ago prepared what he has to say, although he who is praised may not have been good for much. The speakers praise him for what he has done and for what he has not done — that is the

The gain of  
dying in  
battle.

*Menexenus.*SOCRATES,  
MENEXENUS.The effect  
upon Socrates  
of panegyrical  
oratory.

beauty of them — and they steal away our souls with their embellished words; in every conceivable form they praise the city; and they praise those who died in war, and all our ancestors who went before us; and they praise ourselves also who are still alive, until I feel quite elevated by their laudations, and I stand listening to their words, Menexenus, and become enchanted by them, and all in a moment I imagine myself to have become a greater and nobler and finer man than I was before. And if, as often happens, there are any foreigners who accompany me to the speech, I become suddenly conscious of having a sort of triumph over them, and they seem to experience a corresponding feeling of admiration at me, and at the greatness of the city, which appears to them, when they are under the influence of the speaker, more wonderful than ever. This consciousness of dignity lasts me more than three days, and not until the fourth or fifth day do I come to my senses and know where I am; in the meantime I have been living in the Islands of the Blest. Such is the art of our rhetoricians, and in such manner does the sound of their words keep ringing in my ears.

Socrates  
always mak-  
ing fun of the  
rhetoricians.

*Men.* You are always making fun of the rhetoricians, Socrates; this time, however, I am inclined to think that the speaker who is chosen will not have much to say, for he has been called upon to speak at a moment's notice, and he will be compelled almost to improvise.

*Soc.* But why, my friend, should he not have plenty to say? Every rhetorician has speeches ready made; nor is there any difficulty in improvising that sort of stuff. Had the orator to praise Athenians among Peloponnesians, or Peloponnesians among Athenians, he would be a good rhetorician who could succeed and gain credit. But there is no difficulty in a man's winning applause when he is contending for fame among the persons whom he is praising.

*Men.* Do you think not, Socrates?

*Soc.* Certainly 'not.'

Could  
Socrates him-  
self make a  
funeral ora-  
tion?

*Men.* Do you think that you could speak yourself if there should be a necessity, and if the Council were to choose you?

*Soc.* That I should be able to speak is no great wonder, Menexenus, considering that I have an excellent mistress in the art of rhetoric,—she who has made so many good



speakers, and one who was the best among all the Hellenes — Pericles, the son of Xanthippus.

*Men.* And who is she? I suppose that you mean Aspasia.

*Soc.* Yes, I do; and besides her I had Connus, the son of Metrobius, as a master, and he was my master in music, as she was in rhetoric. No wonder that a man who has received such an education should be a finished speaker; even the pupil of very inferior masters, say, for example, one who had learned music of Lamprus, and rhetoric of Antiphon the Rhamnusian, might make a figure if he were to praise the Athenians among the Athenians.

*Men.* And what would you be able to say if you had to speak?

*Soc.* Of my own wit, most likely nothing; but yesterday I heard Aspasia composing a funeral oration about these very dead. For she had been told, as you were saying, that the Athenians were going to choose a speaker, and she repeated to me the sort of speech which he should deliver, partly improvising and partly from previous thought, putting together fragments of the funeral oration which Pericles spoke, but which, as I believe, she composed.

*Men.* And can you remember what Aspasia said?

*Soc.* I ought to be able, for she taught me, and she was ready to strike me because I was always forgetting.

*Men.* Then why will you not rehearse what she said?

*Soc.* Because I am afraid that my mistress may be angry with me if I publish her speech.

*Men.* Nay, Socrates, let us have the speech, whether Aspasia's or any one else's, no matter. I hope that you will oblige me.

*Soc.* But I am afraid that you will laugh at me if I continue the games of youth in old age.

*Men.* Far otherwise, Socrates; let us by all means have the speech.

*Soc.* Truly I have such a disposition to oblige you, that if you bid me dance naked I should not like to refuse, since we are alone. Listen then: If I remember rightly, she began as follows, with the mention of the dead<sup>1</sup>:—

There is a tribute of deeds and of words. The departed

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 35-46.

*Menexenus.*

SOCRATES,  
MENEXENUS.

Yes; for he is  
a pupil of  
Aspasia.

The funeral  
oration com-  
posed by  
Aspasia.

*Menexenus.*

SOCRATES.

have already had the first, when going forth on their destined journey they were attended on their way by the state and by their friends; the tribute of words remains to be given to them, as is meet and by law ordained. For noble words are a memorial and a crown of noble actions, which are given to the doers of them by the hearers. A word is needed which will duly praise the dead and gently admonish the living, exhorting the brethren and descendants of the departed to imitate their virtue, and consoling their fathers and mothers and the survivors, if any, who may chance to be alive of the previous generation. What sort of a word will this be, and how shall we rightly begin the praises of these brave men? In their life they rejoiced their own friends with their valour, and their death they gave in exchange for the salvation of the living. And I think that we should praise them in the order in which nature made them good, for they were good because they were sprung from good fathers. Wherefore let us first of all praise the goodness of their birth; secondly, their nurture and education; and then let us set forth how noble their actions were, and how worthy of the education which they had received. 237

The departed  
were the  
children of  
the soil;

And first as to their birth. Their ancestors were not strangers, nor are these their descendants sojourners only, whose fathers have come from another country; but they are the children of the soil, dwelling and living in their own land. And the country which brought them up is not like other countries, a stepmother to her children, but their own true mother; she bore them and nourished them and received them, and in her bosom they now repose. It is meet and right, therefore, that we should begin by praising the land which is their mother, and that will be a way of praising their noble birth.

and their  
country is  
dear to the  
Gods, who  
contended  
for the posses-  
sion of her.

The country is worthy to be praised, not only by us, but by all mankind; first, and above all, as being dear to the Gods. This is proved by the strife and contention of the Gods respecting her. And ought not the country which the Gods praise to be praised by all mankind? The second praise which may be fairly claimed by her, is that at the time when the whole earth was sending forth and creating diverse animals, tame and wild, she our mother was free and

pure from savage monsters, and out of all animals selected and brought forth man, who is superior to the rest in understanding, and alone has justice and religion. And a great proof that she brought forth the common ancestors of us and of the departed, is that she provided the means of support for her offspring. For as a woman proves her motherhood by giving milk to her young ones (and she who has no fountain of milk is not a mother), so did this our land prove that she was the mother of men, for in those days she alone and first of all brought forth wheat and barley for human food, which is the best and noblest sustenance for man, whom she regarded as her true offspring. And these are truer proofs of motherhood in a country than in a woman, for the woman in her conception and generation is but the imitation of the earth, and not the earth of the woman. And of the fruit of the earth she gave a plenteous supply, not only to her own, but to others also; and afterwards she made the olive to spring up to be a boon to her children, and to help them in their toils. And when she had herself nursed them and brought them up to manhood, she gave them Gods to be their rulers and teachers, whose names are well known, and need not now be repeated. They are the Gods who first ordered our lives, and instructed us in the arts for the supply of our daily needs, and taught us the acquisition and use of arms for the defence of the country.

Thus born into the world and thus educated, the ancestors of the departed lived and made themselves a government, which I ought briefly to commemorate. For government is the nurture of man, and the government of good men is good, and of bad men bad. And I must show that our ancestors were trained under a good government, and for this reason they were good, and our contemporaries are also good, among whom our departed friends are to be reckoned. Then as now, and indeed always, from that time to this, speaking generally, our government was an aristocracy — a form of government which receives various names, according to the fancies of men, and is sometimes called democracy, but is really an aristocracy or government of the best which has the approval of the many. For kings we have always had, first hereditary and then elected, and authority is mostly in the

*Menexenus.*

SOCRATES.

She first brought forth man, and proved her true motherhood by providing food for her own offspring.

The Gods were the rulers of primitive men, and gave them arts.

We have a good government, which is sometimes called a democracy, but is really an aristocracy, for the best rule with the consent of the many.



*Menexenus.*

SOCRATES.

The principle  
of our gov-  
ernment is  
equality; the  
only supe-  
riority is that  
of virtue and  
wisdom.

hands of the people, who dispense offices and power to those who appear to be most deserving of them. Neither is a man rejected from weakness or poverty or obscurity of origin, nor honoured by reason of the opposite, as in other states, but there is one principle — he who appears to be wise and good is a governor and ruler. The basis of this our government is equality of birth; for other states are made up of all sorts and unequal conditions of men, and therefore their governments are unequal; there are tyrannies and there are oligarchies, in which the one party are slaves and the other masters. But we and our citizens are brethren, the children all of one mother, and we do not think it right to be one another's masters or servants; but the natural equality of birth compels us to seek for legal equality, and to recognize no superiority except in the reputation of virtue and wisdom. 239

And so their and our fathers, and these, too, our brethren, being nobly born and having been brought up in all freedom, did both in their public and private capacity many noble deeds famous over the whole world. They were the deeds of men who thought that they ought to fight both against Hellenes for the sake of Hellenes on behalf of freedom, and against barbarians in the common interest of Hellas. Time would fail me to tell of their defence of their country against the invasion of Eumolpus and the Amazons, or of their defence of the Argives against the Cadmeians, or of the Heracleids against the Argives; besides, the poets have already declared in song to all mankind their glory, and therefore any commemoration of their deeds in prose which we might attempt would hold a second place. They already have their reward, and I say no more of them; but there are other worthy deeds of which no poet has worthily sung, and which are still wooing the poet's muse. Of these I am bound to make honourable mention, and shall invoke others to sing of them also in lyric and other strains, in a manner becoming the actors. And first I will tell how the Persians, lords of Asia, were enslaving Europe, and how the children of this land, who were our fathers, held them back. Of these I will speak first, and praise their valour, as is meet and fitting. He who would rightly estimate them should place himself in thought at that time, when the whole of Asia was subject to the third king of

The greatness  
of Persia.



Persia. The first king, Cyrus, by his valour freed the Persians, who were his countrymen, and subjected the Medes, who were their lords, and he ruled over the rest of Asia, as far as Egypt; and after him came his son, who ruled all the accessible part of Egypt and Libya; the third king was Darius, who extended the land boundaries of the empire to  
240 Scythia, and with his fleet held the sea and the islands. None presumed to be his equal; the minds of all men were enthralled by him — so many and mighty and warlike nations had the power of Persia subdued. Now Darius had a quarrel against us and the Eretrians, because, as he said, we had conspired against Sardis, and he sent 500,000 men in transports and vessels of war, and 300 ships, and Datis as commander, telling him to bring the Eretrians and Athenians to the king, if he wished to keep his head on his shoulders. He sailed against the Eretrians, who were reputed to be amongst the noblest and most warlike of the Hellenes of that day, and they were numerous, but he conquered them all in three days; and when he had conquered them, in order that no one might escape, he searched the whole country after this manner: his soldiers, coming to the borders of Eretria and spreading from sea to sea, joined hands and passed through the whole country, in order that they might be able to tell the king that no one had escaped them. And from Eretria they went to Marathon with a like intention, expecting to bind the Athenians in the same yoke of necessity in which they had bound the Eretrians. Having effected one-half of their purpose, they were in the act of attempting the other, and none of the Hellenes dared to assist either the Eretrians or the Athenians, except the Lacedaemonians, and they arrived a day too late for the battle; but the rest were panic-stricken and kept quiet, too happy in having escaped for a time. He who has present to his mind that conflict will know what manner of men they were who received the onset of the barbarians at Marathon, and chastened the pride of the whole of Asia, and by the victory which they gained over the barbarians first taught other men that the power of the Persians was not invincible, but that hosts of men and the multitude of riches alike yield to valour. And I assert that those men are the fathers not only of ourselves, but of our liberties and of the liberties of

*Menexenus.*

SOCRATES.

Yet at Marathon the army of Darius was overcome by the Athenians almost single-handed.

*Menexenus.*

SOCRATES.

The men of Marathon should have the first place: those who followed in the war were their disciples, except the men who defeated the Persians at Salamis and first made proof of them at sea; these have the second place.

And the third place is to be assigned to those who fought at Plataea.

Eurymedon;  
Cyprus;  
Egypt.

all who are on the continent, for that was the action to which the Hellenes looked back when they ventured to fight for their own safety in the battles which ensued: they became disciples of the men of Marathon. To them, therefore, I assign in my speech the first place, and the second to those 241 who fought and conquered in the sea fights at Salamis and Artemisium; for of them, too, one might have many things to say — of the assaults which they endured by sea and land, and how they repelled them. I will mention only that act of theirs which appears to me to be the noblest, and which followed that of Marathon and came nearest to it; for the men of Marathon only showed the Hellenes that it was possible to ward off the barbarians by land, the many by the few; but there was no proof that they could be defeated by ships, and at sea the Persians retained the reputation of being invincible in numbers and wealth and skill and strength. This is the glory of the men who fought at sea, that they dispelled the second terror which had hitherto possessed the Hellenes, and so made the fear of numbers, whether of ships or men, to cease among them. And so the soldiers of Marathon and the sailors of Salamis became the schoolmasters of Hellas; the one teaching and habituating the Hellenes not to fear the barbarians at sea, and the others not to fear them by land. Third in order, for the number and valour of the combatants, and third in the salvation of Hellas, I place the battle of Plataea. And now the Lacedaemonians as well as the Athenians took part in the struggle; they were all united in this greatest and most terrible conflict of all; wherefore their virtues will be celebrated in times to come, as they are now celebrated by us. But at a later period many Hellenic tribes were still on the side of the barbarians, and there was a report that the great king was going to make a new attempt upon the Hellenes, and therefore justice requires that we should also make mention of those who crowned the previous work of our salvation, and drove and purged away all barbarians from the sea. These were the men who fought by sea at the river Eurymedon, and who went on the expedition to Cyprus, and who sailed to Egypt and divers other places; and they should be gratefully remembered by us, because they compelled the king in fear for himself to

look to his own safety instead of plotting the destruction of  
Hellas.

*Menexenus.*

SOCRATES.

242

And so the war against the barbarians was fought out to the end by the whole city on their own behalf, and on behalf of their countrymen. There was peace, and our city was held in honour; and then, as prosperity makes men jealous, there succeeded a jealousy of her, and jealousy begat envy, and so she became engaged against her will in a war with the Hellenes. On the breaking out of war, our citizens met the Lacedaemonians at Tanagra, and fought for the freedom of the Boeotians; the issue was doubtful, and was decided by the engagement which followed. For when the Lacedaemonians had gone on their way, leaving the Boeotians, whom they were aiding, on the third day after the battle of Tanagra, our countrymen conquered at Oenophyta, and righteously restored those who had been unrighteously exiled. And they were the first after the Persian war who fought on behalf of liberty in aid of Hellenes against Hellenes; they were brave men, and freed those whom they aided, and were the first too who were honourably interred in this sepulchre by the state. Afterwards there was a mighty war, in which all the Hellenes joined, and devastated our country, which was very ungrateful of them; and our countrymen, after defeating them in a naval engagement and taking their leaders, the Spartans, at Sphagia, when they might have destroyed them, spared their lives, and gave them back, and made peace, considering that they should war with their fellow-countrymen only until they gained a victory over them, and not because of the private anger of the state destroy the common interest of Hellas; but that with barbarians they should war to the death. Worthy of praise are they also who waged this war, and are here interred; for they proved, if any one doubted the superior prowess of the Athenians in the former war with the barbarians, that their doubts had no foundation — showing by their victory in the civil war with Hellas, in which they subdued the other chief state of the Hellenes, that they could conquer single-handed those with whom they had been allied in the war against the barbarians. After the peace there followed a third war, which was of a terrible and desperate nature, and in this many brave men who are here interred lost their lives — many of them had

Tanagra;  
Oenophyta.

Sphacteria.

The Sicilian  
expedition.



*Menexenus.* won victories in Sicily, whither they had gone over the seas 243  
*SOCRATES.* to fight for the liberties of the Leontines, to whom they were bound by oaths; but, owing to the distance, the city was unable to help them, and they lost heart and came to misfortune; of whom their very enemies give a higher praise for temperance and valour than friends do of most other men. Many also fell in naval engagements at the Hellespont, after having  
*Cyzicus.* in one day taken all the ships of the enemy, and defeated them in other naval engagements. And what I call the terrible and desperate nature of the war, is that the other Hellenes, in their extreme animosity towards the city, should have entered into negotiations with their bitterest enemy, the king of Persia, whom they, together with us, had expelled:—  
*Hellas betrayed to the Persian.* him, without us, they again brought back, barbarian against Hellenes, and all the hosts, both of Hellenes and barbarians, were united against Athens. And then shone forth the power and valour of our city. Her enemies had supposed that she was exhausted by the war, and our ships were blockaded at Mitylene. But the citizens themselves embarked, and came to the rescue with sixty other ships, and their valour was confessed of all men, for they conquered their enemies and delivered their friends. And yet by some evil fortune they were left to perish at sea, and therefore are <sup>1</sup> not interred here. Ever to be remembered and honoured are they, for by their valour not only that sea-fight was won for us, but the entire war was decided by them, and through them the city gained the reputation of being invincible, even though attacked by all mankind. And that reputation was a true one, for the  
*Arginusae.* defeat which came upon us was our own doing. We were never conquered by others, and to this day we are still unconquered by them; but we were our own conquerors, and received defeat at our own hands. Afterwards there was quiet and peace abroad, but there sprang up war at home; and, if men are destined to have civil war, no one could have desired that his city should take the disorder in a milder form. How joyful and natural was the reconciliation of those who came from the Piraeus and those who came from the city; with what moderation did they order the war against the tyrants in Eleusis, and in a manner how unlike what the other  
*The taking of the city is obscurely intimated.*  
*The great reconciliation of kindred.*

<sup>1</sup> Reading *οὐ κείνται*, or taking *οὐκ* before *ἀναπεθέντες* with *κείνται*.



244 Hellenes expected! And the reason of this gentleness was the veritable tie of blood, which created among them a friendship as of kinsmen, faithful not in word only, but in deed. And we ought also to remember those who then fell by one another's hands, and on such occasions as these to reconcile them with sacrifices and prayers, praying to those who have power over them, that they may be reconciled even as we are reconciled. For they did not attack one another out of malice or enmity, but they were unfortunate. And that such was the fact we ourselves are witnesses, who are of the same race with them, and have mutually received and granted forgiveness of what we have done and suffered. After this there was perfect peace, and the city had rest; and her feeling was that she forgave the barbarians, who had severely suffered at her hands and severely retaliated, but that she was indignant at the ingratitude of the Hellenes, when she remembered how they had received good from her and returned evil, having made common cause with the barbarians, depriving her of the ships which had once been their salvation, and dismantling our walls, which had preserved their own from falling. She thought that she would no longer defend the Hellenes, when enslaved either by one another or by the barbarians, and did accordingly. This was our feeling, while the Lacedaemonians were thinking that we who were the champions of liberty had fallen, and that their business was to subject the remaining Hellenes. And why should I say more? for the events of which I am speaking happened not long ago and we can all of us remember how the chief peoples of Hellas, Argives and Boeotians and Corinthians, came to feel the need of us, and, what is the greatest miracle of all, the Persian king himself was driven to such extremity as to come round to the opinion, that from this city, of which he was the destroyer, and from no other, his salvation would proceed.

And if a person desired to bring a deserved accusation against our city, he would find only one charge which he could justly urge—that she was too compassionate and too favourable to the weaker side. And in this instance she was not able to hold out or keep her resolution of refusing aid to  
245 her injurers when they were being enslaved, but she was softened, and did in fact send out aid, and delivered the

*Menexenus.*

SOCRATES.

Change in the relation of the Athenians (1) to the other Hellenes; (2) to the Persian king.

*Menexenus.*

SOCRATES.

Hellenes from slavery, and they were free until they afterwards enslaved themselves. Whereas, to the great king she refused to give the assistance of the state, for she could not forget the trophies of Marathon and Salamis and Plataea; but she allowed exiles and volunteers to assist him, and they were his salvation. And she herself, when she was compelled, entered into the war, and built walls and ships, and fought with the Lacedaemonians on behalf of the Parians. Now the king fearing this city and wanting to stand aloof, when he saw the Lacedaemonians growing weary of the war at sea, asked of us, as the price of his alliance with us and the other allies, to give up the Hellenes in Asia, whom the Lacedaemonians had previously handed over to him, he thinking that we should refuse, and that then he might have a pretence for withdrawing from us. About the other allies he was mistaken, for the Corinthians and Argives and Boeotians, and the other states, were quite willing to let them go, and swore and covenanted, that, if he would pay them money, they would make over to him the Hellenes of the continent, and we alone refused to give them up and swear. Such was the natural nobility of this city, so sound and healthy was the spirit of freedom among us, and the instinctive dislike of the barbarian, because we are pure Hellenes, having no admixture of barbarism in us. For we are not like many others, descendants of Pelops or Cadmus or Egyptus or Danaus, who are by nature barbarians, and yet pass for Hellenes, and dwell in the midst of us; but we are pure Hellenes, uncontaminated by any foreign element, and therefore the hatred of the foreigner has passed unadulterated into the life-blood of the city. And so, notwithstanding our noble sentiments, we were again isolated, because we were unwilling to be guilty of the base and unholy act of giving up Hellenes to barbarians. And we were in the same case as when we were subdued before; but, by the favour of Heaven, we managed better, for we ended the war without the loss of our ships or walls or colonies; the enemy was only too glad to be quit of us. Yet in this war we lost many brave men, such as were those who fell owing to the ruggedness of the ground at the battle of Corinth, or by treason at Lechaem. Brave men, too, were those who

delivered the Persian king, and drove the Lacedaemonians  
46 from the sea. I remind you of them, and you must  
celebrate them together with me, and do honour to their  
memories.

*Menexenus.*

SOCRATES.

Such were the actions of the men who are here interred, and of others who have died on behalf of their country; many and glorious things I have spoken of them, and there are yet many more and more glorious things remaining to be told — many days and nights would not suffice to tell of them. Let them not be forgotten, and let every man remind their descendants that they also are soldiers who must not desert the ranks of their ancestors, or from cowardice fall behind. Even as I exhort you this day, and in all future time, whenever I meet with any of you, shall continue to remind and exhort you, O ye sons of heroes, that you strive to be the bravest of men. And I think that I ought now to repeat what your fathers desired to have said to you who are their survivors, when they went out to battle, in case anything happened to them. I will tell you what I heard them say, and what, if they had only speech, they would fain be saying, judging from what they then said. And you must imagine that you hear them saying what I now repeat to you:—

‘Sons, the event proves that your fathers were brave men; for we might have lived dishonourably, but have preferred to die honourably rather than bring you and your children into disgrace, and rather than dishonour our own fathers and forefathers; considering that life is not life to one who is a dishonour to his race, and that to such a one neither men nor Gods are friendly, either while he is on the earth or after death in the world below. Remember our words, then, and whatever is your aim let virtue be the condition of the attainment of your aim, and know that without this all possessions and pursuits are dishonourable and evil. For neither does wealth bring honour to the owner, if he be a coward; of such a one the wealth belongs to another, and not to himself. Nor does beauty and strength of body, when dwelling in a base and cowardly man, appear comely, but the reverse of comely, making the possessor more conspicuous, and manifesting forth his cowardice. And all



*Menexenus*

SOCRATES.

knowledge, when separated from justice and virtue, is seen to be cunning and not wisdom; wherefore make this your first and last and constant and all-absorbing aim, to exceed, 247 if possible, not only us but all your ancestors in virtue; and know that to excel you in virtue only brings us shame, but that to be excelled by you is a source of happiness to us. And we shall most likely be defeated, and you will most likely be victors in the contest, if you learn so to order your lives as not to abuse or waste the reputation of your ancestors, knowing that to a man who has any self-respect, nothing is more dishonourable than to be honoured, not for his own sake, but on account of the reputation of his ancestors. The honour of parents is a fair and noble treasure to their posterity, but to have the use of a treasure of wealth and honour, and to leave none to your successors, because you have neither money nor reputation of your own, is alike base and dishonourable. And if you follow our precepts you will be received by us as friends, when the hour of destiny brings you hither; but if you neglect our words and are disgraced in your lives, no one will welcome or receive you. This is the message which is to be delivered to our children.

‘Some of us have fathers and mothers still living, and we would urge them, if, as is likely, we shall die, to bear the calamity as lightly as possible, and not to condole with one another; for they have sorrows enough, and will not need any one to stir them up. While we gently heal their wounds, let us remind them that the Gods have heard the chief part of their prayers; for they prayed, not that their children might live for ever, but that they might be brave and renowned. And this, which is the greatest good, they have attained. A mortal man cannot expect to have everything in his own life turning out according to his will; and they, if they bear their misfortunes bravely, will be truly deemed brave fathers of the brave. But if they give way to their sorrows, either they will be suspected of not being our parents, or we of not being such as our panegyrists declare. Let not either of the two alternatives happen, but rather let them be our chief and true panegyrists, who show in their lives that they are true men, and had men for their sons.



248 Of old the saying, "Nothing too much," appeared to be, and really was, well said. For he whose happiness rests with himself, if possible, wholly, and if not, as far as is possible, — who is not hanging in suspense on other men, or changing with the vicissitude of their fortune, — has his life ordered for the best. He is the temperate and valiant and wise; and when his riches come and go, when his children are given and taken away, he will remember the proverb — "Neither rejoicing overmuch nor grieving overmuch," for he relies upon himself. And such we would have our parents to be — that is our word and wish, and as such we now offer ourselves, neither lamenting overmuch, nor fearing overmuch, if we are to die at this time. And we entreat our fathers and mothers to retain these feelings throughout their future life, and to be assured that they will not please us by sorrowing and lamenting over us. But, if the dead have any knowledge of the living, they will displease us most by making themselves miserable and by taking their misfortunes too much to heart, and they will please us best if they bear their loss lightly and temperately. For our life will have the noblest end which is vouchsafed to man, and should be glorified rather than lamented. And if they will direct their minds to the care and nurture of our wives and children, they will soonest forget their misfortunes, and live in a better and nobler way, and be dearer to us.

*Menexenus.*

SOCRATES.

'This is all that we have to say to our families: and to the state we would say — Take care of our parents and of our sons: let her worthily cherish the old age of our parents, and bring up our sons in the right way. But we know that she will of her own accord take care of them, and does not need any exhortation of ours.'

This, O ye children and parents of the dead, is the message which they bid us deliver to you, and which I do deliver with the utmost seriousness. And in their name I beseech you, the children, to imitate your fathers, and you, parents, to be of good cheer about yourselves; for we will nourish your age, and take care of you both publicly and privately in any place in which one of us may meet one of you who are the parents of the dead. And the care of you which the city shows, you know yourselves; for she has made provision by

*Menexenus.*SOCRATES,  
MENEXENUS.

law concerning the parents and children of those who die in war; the highest authority is specially entrusted with the duty of watching over them above all other citizens, and they will see that your fathers and mothers have no wrong done to them. The city herself shares in the education of the children, desiring as far as it is possible that their orphanhood may not be felt by them; while they are children she is a parent to them, and when they have arrived at man's estate she sends them to their several duties, in full armour clad; and bringing freshly to their minds the ways of their fathers, she places in their hands the instruments of their fathers' virtues; for the sake of the omen, she would have them from the first begin to rule over their own houses arrayed in the strength and arms of their fathers. And as for the dead, she never ceases honouring them, celebrating in common for all rites which become the property of each; and in addition to this, holding gymnastic and equestrian contests, and musical festivals of every sort. She is to the dead in the place of a son and heir, and to their sons in the place of a father, and to their parents and elder kindred in the place of a guardian — ever and always caring for them. Considering this, you ought to bear your calamity the more gently; for thus you will be most endeared to the dead and to the living, and your sorrows will heal and be healed. And now do you and all, having lamented the dead in common according to the law, go your ways.

You have heard, Menexenus, the oration of Aspasia the Milesian.

This speech,  
Socrates, was  
not composed  
by Aspasia,  
but by your-  
self.

*Men.* Truly, Socrates, I marvel that Aspasia, who is only a woman, should be able to compose such a speech; she must be a rare one.

*Soc.* Well, if you are incredulous, you may come with me and hear her.

*Men.* I have often met Aspasia, Socrates, and know what she is like.

*Soc.* Well, and do you not admire her, and are you not grateful for her speech?

*Men.* Yes, Socrates, I am very grateful to her or to him who told you, and still more to you who have told me.

*Soc.* Very good. But you must take care not to tell of me, *Menexenus.*  
and then at some future time I will repeat to you many other  
excellent political speeches of hers. *SOCRATES,*  
*MENEXENUS.*

*Men.* Fear not; only let me hear them, and I will keep  
the secret.

*Soc.* Then I will keep my promise.





APPENDIX II.

ALCIBIADES II.

ERYXIAS.



## APPENDIX II.

THE two dialogues which are translated in the second appendix APPENDIX II. are not mentioned by Aristotle, or by any early authority, and have no claim to be ascribed to Plato. They are examples of Platonic dialogues to be assigned probably to the second or third generation after Plato, when his writings were well known at Athens and Alexandria. They exhibit considerable originality, and are remarkable for containing several thoughts of the sort which we suppose to be modern rather than ancient, and which therefore have a peculiar interest for us. The Second Alcibiades shows that the difficulties about prayer which have perplexed Christian theologians were not unknown among the followers of Plato. The Eryxias was doubted by the ancients themselves: yet it may claim the distinction of being, among all Greek or Roman writings, the one which anticipates in the most striking manner the modern science of political economy and gives an abstract form to some of its principal doctrines.

For the translation of these two dialogues I am indebted to my friend and secretary, Mr. Knight.

That the Dialogue which goes by the name of the Second Alcibiades is a genuine writing of Plato will not be maintained by any modern critic, and was hardly believed by the ancients themselves. The dialectic is poor and weak. There is no power over language, or beauty of style; and there is a certain abruptness and *ἀγρουκία* in the conversation, which is very un-Platonic. The best passage is probably that about the poets, p. 147:—the remark that the poet, who is of a reserved disposition, is uncommonly difficult to understand, and the ridiculous interpretation of Homer, are entirely in the spirit of Plato (cp. Protag. 339 foll.; Ion 534; Apol. 22 D). The characters are ill-drawn. Socrates

APPENDIX II. assumes the 'superior person' and preaches too much, while Alcibiades is stupid and heavy-in-hand. There are traces of Stoic influence in the general tone and phraseology of the Dialogue (cp. 138 B, ὅπως μὴ λήσκει τις . . . κακά: 139 C, ὅτι πᾶς ἀφρων μαίνεται): and the writer seems to have been acquainted with the 'Laws' of Plato (cp. Laws 3. 687, 688; 7. 801; 11. 931 B). An incident from the Symposium (213 E) is rather clumsily introduced (151 A), and two somewhat hackneyed quotations (Symp. 174 D, Gorg. 484 E) recur at 140 A and 146 A. The reference to the death of Archelaus as having occurred 'quite lately' (141 D) is only a fiction, probably suggested by the Gorgias, 470 D, where the story of Archelaus is told, and a similar phrase occurs,—τὰ γὰρ ἐχθὲς καὶ πρόην γεγονότα ταῦτα, κ.τ.λ. There are several passages which are either corrupt or extremely ill-expressed (see pp. 144, 145, 146, 147, 150). But there is a modern interest in the subject of the dialogue; and it is a good example of a short spurious work, which may be attributed to the second or third century before Christ.



# ALCIBIADES II.

## PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES and ALCIBIADES.

Steph.  
138

*Soc.* ARE you going, Alcibiades, to offer prayer to Zeus?

*Alcibiades II.*

*Al.* Yes, Socrates, I am.

SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

*Soc.* You seem to be troubled and to cast your eyes on the ground, as though you were thinking about something.

*Al.* Of what do you suppose that I am thinking?

*Soc.* Of the greatest of all things, as I believe. Tell me, do you not suppose that the Gods sometimes partly grant and partly reject the requests which we make in public and private, and favour some persons and not others?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Do you not imagine, then, that a man ought to be very careful, lest perchance without knowing it he implore great evils for himself, deeming that he is asking for good, especially if the Gods are in the mood to grant whatever he may request? There is the story of Oedipus, for instance, who prayed that his children might divide their inheritance between them by the sword: he did not, as he might have done, beg that his present evils might be averted, but called down new ones. And was not his prayer accomplished, and did not many and terrible evils thence arise, upon which I need not dilate?

The danger of  
a prayer  
which is ill-  
advised.

*Al.* Yes, Socrates, but you are speaking of a madman: surely you do not think that any one in his senses would venture to make such a prayer?

*Soc.* Madness, then, you consider to be the opposite of discretion?

*Al.* Of course.

*Alcibiades II.*SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

*Soc.* And some men seem to you to be discreet, and others the contrary?

*Al.* They do.

*Soc.* Well, then, let us discuss who these are. We acknowledge that some are discreet, some foolish, and that some are mad?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And again, there are some who are in health?

*Al.* There are.

*Soc.* While others are ailing?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And they are not the same?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Nor are there any who are in neither state?

*Al.* No.

*Soc.* A man must either be sick or be well?

*Al.* That is my opinion.

Alcibiades  
first denies  
and after-  
wards admits

*Soc.* Very good: and do you think the same about discretion and want of discretion?

*Al.* How do you mean?

*Soc.* Do you believe that a man must be either in or out of his senses; or is there some third or intermediate condition, in which he is neither one nor the other?

*Al.* Decidedly not.

*Soc.* He must be either sane or insane?

*Al.* So I suppose.

*Soc.* Did you not acknowledge that madness was the opposite of discretion?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And that there is no third or middle term between discretion and indiscretion?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* And there cannot be two opposites to one thing?

*Al.* There cannot.

*Soc.* Then madness and want of sense are the same?

*Al.* That appears to be the case.

*Soc.* We shall be in the right, therefore, Alcibiades, if we say that all who are senseless are mad. For example, if among persons of your own age or older than yourself there are some who are senseless,—as there certainly are,—they are

mad. For tell me, by heaven, do you not think that in the city the wise are few, while the foolish, whom you call mad, are many?

*Al.* I do.

*Soc.* But how could we live in safety with so many crazy people? Should we not long since have paid the penalty at their hands, and have been struck and beaten and endured every other form of ill-usage which madmen are wont to inflict? Consider, my dear friend: may it not be quite otherwise?

*Al.* Why, Socrates, how is that possible? I must have been mistaken.

*Soc.* So it seems to me. But perhaps we may consider the matter thus:—

*Al.* How?

*Soc.* I will tell you. We think that some are sick; do we not?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And must every sick person either have the gout, or be in a fever, or suffer from ophthalmia? Or do you believe that a man may labour under some other disease, even although he has none of these complaints? Surely, they are not the only maladies which exist?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* And is every kind of ophthalmia a disease?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And every disease ophthalmia?

*Al.* Surely not. But I scarcely understand what I mean myself.

140 *Soc.* Perhaps, if you give me your best attention, 'two of us' looking together, we may find what we seek.

*Al.* I am attending, Socrates, to the best of my power.

*Soc.* We are agreed, then, that every form of ophthalmia is a disease, but not every disease ophthalmia?

*Al.* We are.

*Soc.* And so far we seem to be right. For every one who suffers from a fever is sick; but the sick, I conceive, do not all have fever or gout or ophthalmia, although each of these is a disease, which, according to those whom we call physicians, may require a different treatment. They are not all alike,

*Alcibiades II.*

SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

that differences of kind do not exclude differences of degree.

The sick may have many kinds of sickness;

*Alcibiades II.* nor do they produce the same result, but each has its own effect, and yet they are all diseases. May we not take an illustration from the artizans?

SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* There are cobblers and carpenters and sculptors and others of all sorts and kinds, whom we need not stop to enumerate. All have their distinct employments and all are workmen, although they are not all of them cobblers or carpenters or sculptors.

*Al.* No, indeed.

so there are  
different kinds  
of want of  
sense.

*Soc.* And in like manner men differ in regard to want of sense. Those who are most out of their wits we call 'madmen,' while we term those who are less far gone 'stupid' or 'idiotic,' or, if we prefer gentler language, describe them as 'romantic' or 'simple-minded,' or, again, as 'innocent' or 'inexperienced' or 'foolish.' You may even find other names, if you seek for them; but by all of them lack of sense is intended. They only differ as one art appeared to us to differ from another or one disease from another. Or what is your opinion?

*Al.* I agree with you.

*Soc.* Then let us return to the point at which we digressed. We said at first that we should have to consider who were the wise and who the foolish. For we acknowledged that there are these two classes? Did we not?

*Al.* To be sure.

*Soc.* And you regard those as sensible who know what ought to be done or said?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* The senseless are those who do not know this?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* The latter will say or do what they ought not without their own knowledge?

*Al.* Exactly.

Men often,  
like Oedipus,  
pray unad-  
visedly.

*Soc.* Oedipus, as I was saying, Alcibiades, was a person of this sort. And even now-a-days you will find many who [have offered inauspicious prayers], although, unlike him, they were not in anger nor thought that they were asking evil. He neither sought, nor supposed that he sought for good, but others have had quite the contrary notion. I be- 141



lieve that if the God whom you are about to consult should appear to you, and, in anticipation of your request, enquired whether you would be contented to become tyrant of Athens, and if this seemed in your eyes a small and mean thing, should add to it the dominion of all Hellas; and seeing that even then you would not be satisfied unless you were ruler of the whole of Europe, should promise, not only that, but, if you so desired, should proclaim to all mankind in one and the same day that Alcibiades, son of Cleinias, was tyrant:—in such a case, I imagine, you would depart full of joy, as one who had obtained the greatest of goods.

*Alcibiades II.*

SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

*Al.* And not only I, Socrates, but any one else who should meet with such luck.

*Soc.* Yet you would not accept the dominion and lordship of all the Hellenes and all the barbarians in exchange for your life?

*Al.* Certainly not: for then what use could I make of them?

*Soc.* And would you accept them if you were likely to use them to a bad and mischievous end?

*Al.* I would not.

*Soc.* You see that it is not safe for a man either rashly to accept whatever is offered him, or himself to request a thing, if he is likely to suffer thereby or immediately to lose his life. And yet we could tell of many who, having long desired and diligently laboured to obtain a tyranny, thinking that thus they would procure an advantage, have nevertheless fallen victims to designing enemies. You must have heard of what happened only the other day, how Archelaus of Macedonia was slain by his beloved<sup>1</sup>, whose love for the tyranny was not less than that of Archelaus for him. The tyrannicide expected by his crime to become tyrant and afterwards to have a happy life; but when he had held the tyranny three or four days, he was in his turn conspired against and slain. Or look at certain of our own citizens,—and of their actions we have been not hearers, but eyewitnesses,—who have desired to obtain military command: of

Archelaus and  
his beloved.

142 those who have gained their object, some are even to this day

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Aristotle, *Pol.* v. 10, § 17.

*Alcibiades II.*SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

Men never  
refuse the  
goods of  
fortune, how-  
ever great the  
evils which  
may attend  
them.

exiles from the city, while others have lost their lives. And even they who seem to have fared best, have not only gone through many perils and terrors during their office, but after their return home they have been beset by informers worse than they once were by their foes, insomuch that several of them have wished that they had remained in a private station rather than have had the glories of command. If, indeed, such perils and terrors were of profit to the commonwealth, there would be reason in undergoing them; but the very contrary is the case. Again, you will find persons who have prayed for offspring, and when their prayers were heard, have fallen into the greatest pains and sufferings. For some have begotten children who were utterly bad, and have therefore passed all their days in misery, while the parents of good children have undergone the misfortune of losing them, and have been so little happier than the others that they would have preferred never to have had children rather than to have had them and lost them. And yet, although these and the like examples are manifest and known of all, it is rare to find any one who has refused what has been offered him, or, if he were likely to gain aught by prayer, has refrained from making his petition. The mass of mankind would not decline to accept a tyranny, or the command of an army, or any of the numerous things which cause more harm than good: but rather, if they had them not, would have prayed to obtain them. And often in a short space of time they change their tone, and wish their old prayers unsaid. Wherefore also I suspect that men are entirely wrong when they blame the gods as the authors of the ills which befall them<sup>1</sup>: 'their own presumption,' or folly (whichever is the right word) —

'Has brought these unmeasured woes upon them<sup>2</sup>.'

He must have been a wise poet, Alcibiades, who, seeing as I believe, his friends foolishly praying for and doing things which would not really profit them, offered up a common prayer in behalf of them all:—

'King Zeus, grant us good whether prayed for or unsought by us; 143  
But that which we ask amiss, do thou avert<sup>3</sup>.'

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. x. 619 C.

<sup>2</sup> Hom. Odyss. i. 32.

<sup>3</sup> The author of these lines, which are probably of Pythagorean origin, is unknown. They are found also in the Anthology (Anth. Pal. 10. 108).

In my opinion, I say, the poet spoke both well and prudently; but if you have anything to say in answer to him, speak out.

*Alcibiades II.*

SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

*Al.* It is difficult, Socrates, to oppose what has been well said. And I perceive how many are the ills of which ignorance is the cause, since, as would appear, through ignorance we not only do, but what is worse, pray for the greatest evils. No man would imagine that he would do so; he would rather suppose that he was quite capable of praying for what was best: to call down evil seems more like a curse than a prayer.

*Soc.* But perhaps, my good friend, some one who is wiser than either you or I will say that we have no right to blame ignorance thus rashly, unless we can add what ignorance we mean and of what, and also to whom and how it is respectively a good or an evil?

*Al.* How do you mean? Can ignorance possibly be better than knowledge for any person in any conceivable case?

*Soc.* So I believe:—you do not think so?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* And yet surely I may not suppose that you would ever wish to act towards your mother as they say that Orestes and Alcmaeon and others have done towards their parent.

Orestes and  
Alcmaeon.

*Al.* Good words, Socrates, prithee.

*Soc.* You ought not to bid him use auspicious words, who says that you would not be willing to commit so horrible a deed, but rather him who affirms the contrary, if the act appear to you unfit even to be mentioned. Or do you think that Orestes, had he been in his senses and knew what was best for him to do, would ever have dared to venture on such a crime?

Ignorance of  
the best is  
bad: igno-  
rance of the  
bad good.

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Nor would any one else, I fancy?

*Al.* No.

*Soc.* That ignorance is bad then, it would appear, which is of the best and does not know what is best?

*Al.* So I think, at least.

*Soc.* And both to the person who is ignorant and everybody else?



*Alcibiades II.**Al.* Yes.SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

*Soc.* Let us take another case. Suppose that you were suddenly to get into your head that it would be a good thing to kill Pericles, your kinsman and guardian, and were to seize a sword and, going to the doors of his house, were to enquire if he were at home, meaning to slay only him and no one else:—the servants reply, 'Yes': (Mind, I do not mean that you would really do such a thing; but there is nothing, you think, to prevent a man who is ignorant of the best, having occasionally the whim that what is worst is best? 144

*Al.* No.)

*Soc.*—If, then, you went indoors, and seeing him, did not know him, but thought that he was some one else, would you venture to slay him?

*Al.* Most decidedly not <sup>1</sup> [it seems to me] <sup>1</sup>.

*Soc.* For you designed to kill, not the first who offered, but Pericles himself?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And if you made many attempts, and each time failed to recognize Pericles, you would never attack him?

*Al.* Never.

*Soc.* Well, but if Orestes in like manner had not known his mother, do you think that he would ever have laid hands upon her?

*Al.* No.

*Soc.* He did not intend to slay the first woman he came across, nor any one else's mother, but only his own?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* Ignorance, then, is better for those who are in such a frame of mind, and have such ideas?

*Al.* Obviously.

*Soc.* You acknowledge that for some persons in certain cases the ignorance of some things is a good and not an evil, as you formerly supposed?

*Al.* I do.

*Soc.* <sup>2</sup>And there is still another case which will also perhaps appear strange to you, if you will consider it? <sup>2</sup>

*Al.* What is that, Socrates?<sup>1</sup> These words are omitted in several MSS.<sup>2</sup> The reading is here uncertain.

A man might be prevented from committing murder by ignorance of the person whom he was going to murder.



*Soc.* It may be, in short, that the possession of all the sciences, if unaccompanied by the knowledge of the best, will more often than not injure the possessor. Consider the matter thus:—Must we not, when we intend either to do or say anything, suppose that we know or ought to know that which we propose so confidently to do or say?

*Al.* Yes, in my opinion.

*Soc.* We may take the orators for an example, who from  
145 time to time advise us about war and peace, or the building of walls and the construction of harbours, whether they understand the business in hand, or only think that they do. Whatever the city, in a word, does to another city, or in the management of her own affairs, all happens by the counsel of the orators.

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* But now see what follows, if I can <sup>1</sup>[make it clear to you]<sup>1</sup>. You would distinguish the wise from the foolish?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* The many are foolish, the few wise?

*Al.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And you use both the terms, 'wise' and 'foolish,' in reference to something?

*Al.* I do.

*Soc.* Would you call a person wise who can give advice, but does not know whether or when it is better to carry out the advice? Examples.

*Al.* Decidedly not.

*Soc.* Nor again, I suppose, a person who knows the art of war, but does not know whether it is better to go to war or for how long?

*Al.* No.

*Soc.* Nor, once more, a person who knows how to kill another or to take away his property or to drive him from his native land, but not when it is better to do so or for whom it is better?

*Al.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* But he who understands anything of the kind and has at the same time the knowledge of the best course of action:—and the best and the useful are surely the same?—

<sup>1</sup> Some words appear to have dropped out here.

*Alcibiades II.*

SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

All knowledge if unaccompanied by a knowledge of the best is hurtful.

*Alcibiades II.**Al.* Yes.SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.*Soc.*—Such an one, I say, we should call wise and a useful adviser both of himself and of the city. What do you think?*Al.* I agree.*Soc.* And if any one knows how to ride or to shoot with the bow or to box or to wrestle, or to engage in any other sort of contest or to do anything whatever which is in the nature of an art,—what do you call him who knows what is best according to that art? Do you not speak of one who knows what is best in riding as a good rider?*Al.* Yes.*Soc.* And in a similar way you speak of a good boxer or a good flute-player or a good performer in any other art?*Al.* True.*Soc.* But is it necessary that the man who is clever in any of these arts should be wise also in general? Or is there a difference between the clever artist and the wise man?*Al.* All the difference in the world.

A state would be bad which was composed only of skilful artists and clever politicians, but where no one had the knowledge of the best.

*Soc.* And what sort of a state do you think that would be which was composed of good archers and flute-players and athletes and masters in other arts, and besides them of those others about whom we spoke, who knew how to go to war and how to kill, as well as of orators puffed up with political pride, but in which not one of them all had this knowledge of the best, and there was no one who could tell when it was better to apply any of these arts or in regard to whom? 146*Al.* I should call such a state bad, Socrates.*Soc.* You certainly would when you saw each of them rivalling the other and esteeming that of the greatest importance in the state,‘Wherein he himself most excelled<sup>1</sup>.’

—I mean that which was best in any art, while he was entirely ignorant of what was best for himself and for the state, because, as I think, he trusts to opinion which is devoid of intelligence. In such a case should we not be right if we said that the state would be full of anarchy and lawlessness?

<sup>1</sup> Euripides, *Antiope*, fr. 20 (Dindorf).

*Al.* Decidedly.

*Alcibiades II.*

*Soc.* But ought we not then, think you, either to fancy that we know or really to know, what we confidently propose to do or say?

SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* And if a person does that which he knows or supposes that he knows, and the result is beneficial, he will act advantageously both for himself and for the state?

*Al.* True.

*Soc.* And if he do the contrary, both he and the state will suffer?

*Al.* Yes.

*Soc.* Well, and are you of the same mind as before?

*Al.* I am.

*Soc.* But were you not saying that you would call the many unwise and the few wise?

*Al.* I was.

*Soc.* And have we not come back to our old assertion that the many fail to obtain the best because they trust to opinion which is devoid of intelligence?

*Al.* That is the case.

*Soc.* It is good, then, for the many, if they particularly desire to do that which they know or suppose that they know, neither to know nor to suppose that they know, in cases where if they carry out their ideas in action they will be losers rather than gainers?

*Al.* What you say is very true.

*Soc.* Do you not see that I was really speaking the truth when I affirmed that the possession of any other kind of knowledge was more likely to injure than to benefit the possessor, unless he had also the knowledge of the best?

*Al.* I do now, if I did not before, Socrates.

*Soc.* The state or the soul, therefore, which wishes to have a right existence must hold firmly to this knowledge, just as the sick man clings to the physician, or the passenger depends for safety on the pilot. And if the soul does not set sail until she have obtained this she will be all the safer in the voyage through life. But when she rushes in pursuit of wealth or bodily strength or anything else, not having the knowledge of the best, so much the more is she likely to

The soul  
requires this  
knowledge of  
the best before  
she sets sail  
on the voyage  
of life.



*Alcibiades II.*SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

meet with misfortune. And he who has the love of learning<sup>1</sup>, and is skilful in many arts, and does not possess the knowledge of the best, but is under some other guidance, will make, as he deserves, a sorry voyage:—he will, I believe, hurry through the brief space of human life, pilotless in mid-ocean, and the words will apply to him in which the poet blamed his enemy:—

‘ . . . . Full many a thing he knew;  
But knew them all badly<sup>2</sup>.’

*Al.* How in the world, Socrates, do the words of the poet apply to him? They seem to me to have no bearing on the point whatever.

The poets  
spoke in  
riddles a  
hidden truth.

*Soc.* Quite the contrary, my sweet friend: only the poet is talking in riddles after the fashion of his tribe. For all poetry has by nature an enigmatical character, and it is by no means everybody who can interpret it. And if, moreover, the spirit of poetry happen to seize on a man who is of a begrudging temper and does not care to manifest his wisdom but keeps it to himself as far as he can, it does indeed require an almost superhuman wisdom to discover what the poet would be at. You surely do not suppose that Homer, the wisest and most divine of poets, was unaware of the impossibility of knowing a thing badly: for it was no less a person than he who said of Margites that ‘he knew many things, but knew them all badly.’ The solution of the riddle is this, I imagine:—By ‘badly’ Homer meant ‘bad’ and ‘knew’ stands for ‘to know.’ Put the words together;—the metre will suffer, but the poet’s meaning is clear;—‘Margites knew all these things, but it was bad for him to know them.’ And, obviously, if it was bad for him to know so many things, he must have been a good-for-nothing, unless the argument has played us false.

*Al.* But I do not think that it has, Socrates: at least, if the argument is fallacious, it would be difficult for me to find another which I could trust.

*Soc.* And you are right in thinking so.

*Al.* Well, that is my opinion.

<sup>1</sup> Or, reading *πολυμάθειαν*, ‘abundant learning.’

<sup>2</sup> A fragment from the pseudo-Homeric poem, ‘Margites.’



*Soc.* But tell me, by Heaven:—you must see now the nature and greatness of the difficulty in which you, like others, have your part. For you change about in all directions, and never come to rest anywhere: what you once most strongly inclined to suppose, you put aside again and quite alter your mind. If the God to whose shrine you are going should appear at this moment, and ask before you made your prayer, ‘Whether you would desire to have one of the things which we mentioned at first, or whether he should leave you to make your own request:’—what in either case, think you, would be the best way to take advantage of the opportunity?

*Al.* Indeed, Socrates, I could not answer you without consideration. It seems to me to be a wild thing<sup>1</sup> to make such a request; a man must be very careful lest he pray for evil under the idea that he is asking for good, when shortly after he may have to recall his prayer, and, as you were saying, demand the opposite of what he at first requested.

*Soc.* And was not the poet whose words I originally quoted wiser than we are, when he bade us [pray God] to defend us from evil even though we asked for it?

*Al.* I believe that you are right.

*Soc.* The Lacedaemonians, too, whether from admiration of the poet or because they have discovered the idea for themselves, are wont to offer the prayer alike in public and private, that the Gods will give unto them the beautiful as well as the good:—no one is likely to hear them make any further petition. And yet up to the present time they have not been less fortunate than other men; or if they have sometimes met with misfortune, the fault has not been due to their prayer. For surely, as I conceive, the Gods have power either to grant our requests, or to send us the contrary of what we ask.

And now I will relate to you a story which I have heard from certain of our elders. It chanced that when the Athenians and Lacedaemonians were at war, our city lost every battle by land and sea and never gained a victory.

<sup>1</sup> The Homeric word *μάργος* is said to be here employed in allusion to the quotation from the ‘Margites’ which Socrates has just made; but it is not used in the sense which it has in Homer.

*Alcibiades II.*

SOCRATES.  
ALCIBIADES.

Alcibiades is too unstable to be able to trust his own prayers.

*Alcibiades II.*

SOCRATES.

The Athenians being annoyed and perplexed how to find a remedy for their troubles, decided to send and enquire at the shrine of Ammon. Their envoys were also to ask, 'Why the Gods always granted the victory to the Lacedaemonians?' 'We,' (they were to say,) 'offer them more and finer sacrifices than any other Hellenic state, and adorn their temples with gifts, as nobody else does; moreover, we make the most solemn and costly processions to them every year, and spend more money in their service than all the rest of the Hellenes put together. But the Lacedaemonians 149 take no thought of such matters, and pay so little respect to the Gods that they have a habit of sacrificing blemished animals to them, and in various ways are less zealous than we are, although their wealth is quite equal to ours.' When they had thus spoken, and had made their request to know what remedy they could find against the evils which troubled them, the prophet made no direct answer,—clearly because he was not allowed by the God to do so;—but he summoned them to him and said: 'Thus saith Ammon to the Athenians: "The silent worship of the Lacedaemonians pleaseth me better than all the offerings of the other Hellenes."' Such were the words of the God, and nothing more. He seems to have meant by 'silent worship' the prayer of the Lacedaemonians, which is indeed widely different from the usual requests of the Hellenes. For they either bring to the altar bulls with gilded horns or make offerings to the Gods, and beg at random for what they need, good or bad. When, therefore, the Gods hear them using words of ill omen they reject these costly processions and sacrifices of theirs. And we ought, I think, to be very careful and consider well what we should say and what leave unsaid. Homer, too, will furnish us with similar stories. For he tells us how the Trojans in making their encampment,

'Offered up whole hecatombs to the immortals,'

and how the 'sweet savour' was borne 'to the heavens by the winds;

'But the blessed Gods were averse and received it not.  
For exceedingly did they hate the holy Ilium,  
Both Priam and the people of the spear-skilled king.'

The silent  
prayer of the  
Lacedaemo-  
nians better  
than all the  
offerings of  
the other  
Hellenes.

So that it was in vain for them to sacrifice and offer gifts, seeing that they were hateful to the Gods, who are not, like vile usurers, to be gained over by bribes. And it is foolish for us to boast that we are superior to the Lacedaemonians by reason of our much worship. The idea is inconceivable  
 150 that the Gods have regard, not to the justice and purity of our souls, but to costly processions and sacrifices, which men may celebrate year after year, although they have committed innumerable crimes against the Gods or against their fellow-men or the state. For the Gods, as Ammon and his prophet declare, are no receivers of gifts, and they scorn such unworthy service. Wherefore also it would seem that wisdom and justice are especially honoured both by the Gods and by men of sense; and they are the wisest and most just who know how to speak and act towards Gods and men. But I should like to hear what your opinion is about these matters.

*Al.* I agree, Socrates, with you and with the God, whom, indeed, it would be unbecoming for me to oppose.

*Soc.* Do you not remember saying that you were in great perplexity, lest perchance you should ask for evil, supposing that you were asking for good?

*Al.* I do.

*Soc.* You see, then, that there is a risk in your approaching the God in prayer, lest haply he should refuse your sacrifice when he hears the blasphemy which you utter, and make you partake of other evils as well. The wisest plan, therefore, seems to me that you should keep silence; for your 'highmindedness'—to use the mildest term which men apply to folly—will most likely prevent you from using the prayer of the Lacedaemonians. You had better wait until we find out how we should behave towards the Gods and towards men.

*Al.* And how long must I wait, Socrates, and who will be my teacher? I should be very glad to see the man.

*Soc.* It is he who takes an especial interest in you. But first of all, I think, the darkness must be taken away in which your soul is now enveloped, just as Athene in Homer removes the mist from the eyes of Diomedes that

'He may distinguish between God and mortal man.'

*Alcibiades II.*

SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

Alcibiades cannot tell whether he is asking for good or evil. 'Therefore let his words be few.'



*Alcibiades* 11. Afterwards the means may be given to you whereby you may distinguish between good and evil. At present, I fear, this is beyond your power.

SOCRATES,  
ALCIBIADES.

*Al.* Only let my instructor take away the impediment, whether it pleases him to call it mist or anything else! I care not who he is; but I am resolved to disobey none of his commands, if I am likely to be the better for them.

*Soc.* And surely he has a wondrous care for you.

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*Al.* It seems to be altogether advisable to put off the sacrifice until he is found.

*Soc.* You are right: that will be safer than running such a tremendous risk.

*Al.* But how shall we manage, Socrates?—At any rate I will set this crown of mine upon your head, as you have given me such excellent advice, and to the Gods we will offer crowns and perform the other customary rites when I see that day approaching: nor will it be long hence, if they so will.

*Soc.* I accept your gift, and shall be ready and willing to receive whatever else you may proffer. Euripides makes Creon say in the play, when he beholds Teiresias with his crown and hears that he has gained it by his skill as the first-fruits of the spoil:—

‘An auspicious omen I deem thy victor’s wreath:  
For well thou knowest that wave and storm oppress us<sup>1</sup>.’

And so I count your gift to be a token of good-fortune; for I am in no less stress than Creon, and would fain carry off the victory over your lovers.

<sup>1</sup> *Phoeniss.* 865, 866.



ERYXIÁS.



## INTRODUCTION.

MUCH cannot be said in praise of the style or conception of the *Eryxias*. It is frequently obscure; like the exercise of a student, it is full of small imitations of Plato: — Phaeax returning from an expedition to Sicily (cp. Socrates in the *Charmides* from the army at Potidaea), the figure of the game at draughts, 395 B, borrowed from *Rep.* vi. 487, etc. It has also in many passages the ring of sophistry. On the other hand, the rather unhandsome treatment which is exhibited towards Prodicus is quite unlike the urbanity of Plato.

*Eryxias.*

INTRODUC-  
TION.

Yet there are some points in the argument which are deserving of attention. (1) That wealth depends upon the need of it or demand for it, is the first anticipation in an abstract form of one of the great principles of modern political economy, and the nearest approach to it to be found in an ancient writer. (2) The resolution of wealth into its simplest implements going on to infinity is a subtle and refined thought. (3) That wealth is relative to circumstances is a sound conception. (4) That the arts and sciences which receive payment are likewise to be comprehended under the notion of wealth, also touches a question of modern political economy. (5) The distinction of *post hoc* and *propter hoc*, often lost sight of in modern as well as in ancient times. These metaphysical conceptions and distinctions show considerable power of thought in the writer, whatever we may think of his merits as an imitator of Plato.





# ERYXIAS.

## PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES.  
ERYXIAS.

ERASISTRATUS.  
CRITIAS.

SCENE:—The portico of a temple of Zeus.

**Steph.** IT happened by chance that Eryxias the Steirian was walk-  
39<sup>2</sup> ing with me in the Portico of Zeus the Deliverer, when there  
came up to us Critias and Erasistratus, the latter the son of  
Phaeax, who was the nephew of Erasistratus. Now Erasistratus  
had just arrived from Sicily and that part of the world.  
As they approached, he said, Hail, Socrates!

*Eryxias.*

SOCRATES,  
ERASISTRAT-  
TUS.

*Soc.* The same to you, I said; have you any good news  
from Sicily to tell us?

*Eras.* Most excellent. But, if you please, let us first sit  
down; for I am tired with my yesterday's journey from  
Megara.

*Soc.* Gladly, if that is your desire.

*Eras.* What would you wish to hear first? he said. What  
the Sicilians are doing, or how they are disposed towards our  
city? To my mind, they are very like wasps: so long as  
you only cause them a little annoyance they are quite un-  
manageable; you must destroy their nests if you wish to get  
the better of them. And in a similar way, the Syracusans,  
unless we set to work in earnest, and go against them with a  
great expedition, will never submit to our rule. The petty  
injuries which we at present inflict merely irritate them  
enough to make them utterly intractable. And now they  
have sent ambassadors to Athens, and intend, I suspect, to

The trouble-  
some Sicilians.

*Eryxias.*SOCRATES,  
ERASISTRAT-  
TUS.

play us some trick.—While we were talking, the Syracusan envoys chanced to go by, and Erisastratus, pointing to one of them, said to me, That, Socrates, is the richest man in all Italy and Sicily. For who has larger estates or more land at his disposal to cultivate if he please? And they are of a quality, too, finer than any other land in H  llas. Moreover, he has all the things which go to make up wealth, slaves and horses innumerable, gold and silver without end.

I saw that he was inclined to expatiate on the riches of the man; so I asked him, Well, Erasistratus, and what sort of character does he bear in Sicily?

The wicked  
millionaire.

*Eras.* He is esteemed to be, and really is, the wickedest of all the Sicilians and Italians, and even more wicked than he is rich; indeed, if you were to ask any Sicilian whom he thought to be the worst and the richest of mankind, you would never hear any one else named.

I reflected that we were speaking, not of trivial matters, but about wealth and virtue, which are deemed to be of the greatest moment, and I asked Erasistratus whom he considered the wealthier,—he who was the possessor of a talent of silver or he who had a field worth two talents?

*Eras.* The owner of the field.

*Soc.* And on the same principle he who had robes and bedding and such things which are of greater value to him than to a stranger would be richer than the stranger?

*Eras.* True.

*Soc.* And if any one gave you a choice, which of these would you prefer?

*Eras.* That which was most valuable.

Wealth con-  
sists of things  
which are  
valuable.

*Soc.* In which way do you think you would be the richer?

*Eras.* By choosing as I said.

*Soc.* And he appears to you to be the richest who has goods of the greatest value?

*Eras.* He does.

*Soc.* And are not the healthy richer than the sick, since health is a possession more valuable than riches to the sick? Surely there is no one who would not prefer to be poor and well, rather than to have all the King of Persia's wealth and

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to be ill. And this proves that men set health above wealth, else they would never choose the one in preference to the other.

*Eras.* True.

*Soc.* And if anything appeared to be more valuable than health, he would be the richest who possessed it?

*Eras.* He would.

*Soc.* Suppose that some one came to us at this moment and were to ask, Well, Socrates and Eryxias and Erasistratus, can you tell me what is of the greatest value to men? Is it not that of which the possession will best enable a man to advise how his own and his friends' affairs should be administered?—What will be our reply?

*Eras.* I should say, Socrates, that happiness was the most precious of human possessions.

*Soc.* Not a bad answer. But do we not deem those men who are most prosperous to be the happiest?

*Eras.* That is my opinion.

*Soc.* And are they not most prosperous who commit the fewest errors in respect either of themselves or of other men?

*Eras.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And they who know what is evil and what is good; what should be done and what should be left undone;—these behave the most wisely and make the fewest mistakes?

Erasistratus agreed to this.

*Soc.* Then the wisest and those who do best and the most fortunate and the richest would appear to be all one and the same, if wisdom is really the most valuable of our possessions?

Yes, said Eryxias, interposing, but what use would it be if a man had the wisdom of Nestor and wanted the necessities of life, food and drink and clothes and the like? Where would be the advantage of wisdom then? Or how could he be the richest of men who might even have to go begging, because he had not wherewithal to live?

I thought that what Eryxias was saying had some weight, and I replied, Would the wise man really suffer in this way, if he were so ill-provided; whereas if he had the house of

*Eryxias.*

SOCRATES,  
ERASISTRATUS,  
ERYXIAS.

Of what use would wisdom be, if a man had not the necessities of life?



*Eryxias.*

Polytion, and the house were full of gold and silver, he would lack nothing?

SOCRATES,

ERYXIAS.

*Eryx.* Yes; for then he might dispose of his property and obtain in exchange what he needed, or he might sell it for money with which he could supply his wants and in a moment procure abundance of everything.

The wisdom of Nestor better and even more saleable than the house of Polytion.

*Soc.* True, if he could find some one who preferred such a house to the wisdom of Nestor. But if there are persons who set great store by wisdom like Nestor's and the advantages accruing from it, to sell these, if he were so disposed, would be easier still. Or is a house a most useful and necessary possession, and does it make a great difference in the comfort of life to have a mansion like Polytion's instead of living in a shabby little cottage, whereas wisdom is of small use and it is of no importance whether a man is wise or ignorant about the highest matters? Or is wisdom despised of men and can find no buyers, although cypress wood and marble of Pentelicus are eagerly bought by numerous purchasers? Surely the prudent pilot or the skilful physician, or the artist of any kind who is proficient in his art, is more worth than the things which are especially reckoned among riches; and he who can advise well and prudently for himself and others is able also to sell the product of his art, if he so desire.

And in the arts is not wisdom better than riches?

Eryxias looked askance, as if he had received some unfair treatment, and said, I believe, Socrates, that if you were forced to speak the truth, you would declare that you were richer than Callias the son of Hipponicus. And yet, although you claimed to be wiser about things of real importance, you would not any the more be richer than he. 395

Eryxias is supposed to reply that arguments can prove anything and convince no one.

I dare say, Eryxias, I said, that you may regard these arguments of ours as a kind of game; you think that they have no relation to facts, but are like the pieces in the game of draughts which the player can move in such a way that his opponents are unable to make any countermove<sup>1</sup>. And perhaps, too, as regards riches you are of opinion that while facts remain the same, there are arguments, no matter whether true or false, which enable the user of them to prove that the wisest and the richest are one and the same, although

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. vi. 487.



he is in the wrong and his opponents are in the right. There would be nothing strange in this; it would be as if two persons were to dispute about letters, one declaring that the word Socrates began with an S, the other that it began with an A, and the latter could gain the victory over the former.

*Eryxias.*

SOCRATES,  
ERYXIAS,  
CRITIAS.

Eryxias glanced at the audience, laughing and blushing at once, as if he had had nothing to do with what had just been said, and replied,—No, indeed, Socrates, I never supposed that our arguments should be of a kind which would never convince any one of those here present or be of advantage to them. For what man of sense could ever be persuaded that the wisest and the richest are the same? The truth is that we are discussing the subject of riches, and my notion is that we should argue respecting the honest and dishonest means of acquiring them, and, generally, whether they are a good thing or a bad.

Eryxias dis-  
claims the  
answer which  
is attributed  
to him.

Very good, I said, and I am obliged to you for the hint: in future we will be more careful. But why do not you yourself, as you introduced the argument, and do not think that the former discussion touched the point at issue, tell us whether you consider riches to be a good or an evil?

The argument  
is renewed  
from a fresh  
point of view.  
Eryxias de-  
clares riches  
to be a good;  
Critias main-  
tains that  
they are some-  
times an evil.

I am of opinion, he said, that they are a good. He was about to add something more, when Critias interrupted him:—Do you really suppose so, Eryxias?

Certainly, replied Eryxias; I should be mad if I did not: and I do not fancy that you would find any one else of a contrary opinion.

And I, retorted Critias, should say that there is no one whom I could not compel to admit that riches are bad for some men. But surely, if they were a good, they could not appear bad for any one?

396 Here I interposed and said to them: If you two were having an argument about equitation and what was the best way of riding, supposing that I knew the art myself, I should try to bring you to an agreement. For I should be ashamed if I were present and did not do what I could to prevent your difference. And I should do the same if you were quarrelling about any other art and were likely, unless you agreed on the point in dispute, to part as enemies instead of as friends. But now, when we are contending about a thing

*Eryxias.*

SOCRATES,  
ERYXIAS,  
CRITIAS.

Socrates encourages the two disputants to follow up the argument.

of which the usefulness continues during the whole of life, and it makes an enormous difference whether we are to regard it as beneficial or not,—a thing, too, which is esteemed of the highest importance by the Hellenes:—(for parents, as soon as their children are, as they think, come to years of discretion, urge them to consider how wealth may be acquired, since by riches the value of a man is judged):—When, I say, we are thus in earnest, and you, who agree in other respects, fall to disputing about a matter of such moment, that is, about wealth, and not merely whether it is black or white, light or heavy, but whether it is a good or an evil, whereby, although you are now the dearest of friends and kinsmen, the most bitter hatred may arise betwixt you, I must hinder your dissension to the best of my power. If I could, I would tell you the truth, and so put an end to the dispute; but as I cannot do this, and each of you supposes that you can bring the other to an agreement, I am prepared, as far as my capacity admits, to help you in solving the question. Please, therefore, Critias, try to make us accept the doctrines which you yourself entertain.

*Crit.* I should like to follow up the argument, and will ask Eryxias whether he thinks that there are just and unjust men?

*Eryx.* Most decidedly.

*Crit.* And does injustice seem to you an evil or a good?

*Eryx.* An evil.

*Crit.* Do you consider that he who bribes his neighbour's wife and commits adultery with her, acts justly or unjustly, and this although both the state and the laws forbid?

*Eryx.* Unjustly.

*Crit.* And if the wicked man has wealth and is willing to spend it, he will carry out his evil purposes? whereas he who is short of means cannot do what he fain would, and therefore does not sin? In such a case, surely, it is better that a person should not be wealthy, if his poverty prevents the accomplishment of his desires, and his desires are evil? Or, again, should you call sickness a good or an evil?

*Eryx.* An evil.

*Crit.* Well, and do you think that some men are intemperate?

Wealth may furnish the opportunity of crime.

*Eryx.* Yes.

*Crit.* Then, if it is better for his health that the intemperate man should refrain from meat and drink and other pleasant things, but he cannot owing to his intemperance, will it not also be better that he should be too poor to gratify his lust rather than that he should have a superabundance of means? For thus he will not be able to sin, although he desire never so much.

Critias appeared to be arguing so admirably that Eryxias, if he had not been ashamed of the bystanders, would probably have got up and struck him. For he thought that he had been robbed of a great possession when it became obvious to him that he had been wrong in his former opinion about wealth. I observed his vexation, and feared that they would proceed to abuse and quarrelling: so I said,—I heard that very argument used in the Lyceum yesterday by a wise man, Prodicus of Ceos; but the audience thought that he was talking mere nonsense, and no one could be persuaded that he was speaking the truth. And when at last a certain talkative young gentleman came in, and, taking his seat, began to laugh and jeer at Prodicus, tormenting him and demanding an explanation of his argument, he gained the ear of the audience far more than Prodicus.

Can you repeat the discourse to us? said Erasistratus.

*Soc.* If I can only remember it, I will. The youth began by asking Prodicus, In what way did he think that riches were a good and in what an evil? Prodicus answered, as you did just now, that they were a good to good men and to those who knew in what way they should be employed, while to the bad and the ignorant they were an evil. The same is true, he went on to say, of all other things; men make them to be what they are themselves. The saying of Archilochus is true:—

‘Men’s thoughts correspond to the things which they meet with.’

398 Well, then, replied the youth, if any one makes me wise in that wisdom whereby good men become wise, he must also make everything else good to me. Not that he concerns himself at all with these other things, but he has converted my ignorance into wisdom. If, for example, a person teach

*Eryxias.*

SOCRATES,  
ERYXIAS,  
CRITIAS,  
ERASISTRATUS.

Eryxias takes offence at Critias, whose argument, as Socrates pretends, is only the repetition of which one had been used by Prodicus of Ceos on the day before,

and had been refuted by an impertinent youth.



*Eryxias.*

SOCRATES.

me grammar or music, he will at the same time teach me all that relates to grammar or music, and so when he makes me good, he makes things good to me.

Prodicus did not altogether agree: still he consented to what was said.

And do you think, said the youth, that doing good things is like building a house,—the work of human agency; or do things remain what they were at first, good or bad, for all time?

Prodicus began to suspect, I fancy, the direction which the argument was likely to take, and did not wish to be put down by a mere stripling before all those present:—(if they two had been alone, he would not have minded):—so he answered, cleverly enough: I think that doing good things is a work of human agency.

And is virtue in your opinion, Prodicus, innate or acquired by instruction?

The latter, said Prodicus.

Then you would consider him a simpleton who supposed that he could obtain by praying to the Gods the knowledge of grammar or music or any other art, which he must either learn from another or find out for himself?

Prodicus agreed to this also.

And when you pray to the Gods that you may do well and receive good, you mean by your prayer nothing else than that you desire to become good and wise:—if, at least, things are good to the good and wise and evil to the evil. But in that case, if virtue is acquired by instruction, it would appear that you only pray to be taught what you do not know.

Hereupon I said to Prodicus that it was no misfortune to him if he had been proved to be in error in supposing that the Gods immediately granted to us whatever we asked:—if, I added, whenever you go up to the Acropolis you earnestly entreat the Gods to grant you good things, although you know not whether they can yield your request, it is as though you went to the doors of the grammarian and begged him, although you had never made a study of the art, to give you a knowledge of grammar which would enable you forthwith to do the business of a grammarian.



399 While I was speaking, Prodicus was preparing to retaliate upon his youthful assailant, intending to employ the argument of which you have just made use; for he was annoyed to have it supposed that he offered a vain prayer to the Gods. But the master of the gymnasium came to him and begged him to leave because he was teaching the youths doctrines which were unsuited to them, and therefore bad for them.

*Eryxias.*

SOCRATES,  
ERASISTRATUS.

Prodicus is desired to leave the gymnasium because he is disturbing the minds of youth.

I have told you this because I want you to understand how men are circumstanced in regard to philosophy. Had Prodicus been present and said what you have said, the audience would have thought him raving, and he would have been ejected from the gymnasium. But you have argued so excellently well that you have not only persuaded your hearers, but have brought your opponent to an agreement. For just as in the law courts, if two witnesses testify to the same fact, one of whom seems to be an honest fellow and the other a rogue, the testimony of the rogue often has the contrary effect on the judges' minds to what he intended, while the same evidence if given by the honest man at once strikes them as perfectly true. And probably the audience have something of the same feeling about yourself and Prodicus; they think him a Sophist and a braggart, and regard you as a gentleman of courtesy and worth. For they do not pay attention to the argument so much as to the character of the speaker.

But truly, Socrates, said Erasistratus, though you may be joking, Critias does seem to me to be saying something which is of weight.

Socrates jesting professes to be in earnest.

*Soc.* I am in profound earnest, I assure you. But why, as you have begun your argument so prettily, do you not go on with the rest? There is still something lacking, now you have agreed that [wealth] is a good to some and an evil to others. It remains to enquire what constitutes wealth; for unless you know this, you cannot possibly come to an understanding as to whether it is a good or an evil. I am ready to assist you in the enquiry to the utmost of my power: but first let him who affirms that riches are a good, tell us what, in his opinion, is wealth.

*Eras.* Indeed, Socrates, I have no notion about wealth beyond that which men commonly have. I suppose that

*Eryxias.*SOCRATES,  
ERASISTRATUS.

What is money? It is observed that different kinds of money pass current in different countries, — Carthage, Lacedaemon, Ethiopia, Scythia.

wealth is a quantity of money<sup>1</sup>; and this, I imagine, would also be Critias' definition.

*Soc.* Then now we have to consider, What is money? Or else later on we shall be found to differ about the question. For instance, the Carthaginians use money of this sort. Something which is about the size of a stater is tied up in a small piece of leather: what it is, no one knows but the makers. A seal is next set upon the leather, which then passes into circulation, and he who has the largest number of such pieces is esteemed the richest and best off. And yet if any one among us had a mass of such coins he would be no wealthier than if he had so many pebbles from the mountain. At Lacedaemon, again, they use iron by weight which has been rendered useless: and he who has the greatest mass of such iron is thought to be the richest, although elsewhere it has no value. In Ethiopia engraved stones are employed, of which a Lacedaemonian could make no use. Once more, among the Nomad Scythians a man who owned the house of Polytion would not be thought richer than one who possessed Mount Lycabettus among ourselves. And clearly those things cannot all be regarded as possessions; for in some cases the possessors would appear none the richer thereby: but, as I was saying, some one of them is thought in one place to be money, and the possessors of it are the wealthy, whereas in some other place it is not money, and the ownership of it does not confer wealth; just as the standard of morals varies, and what is honourable to some men is dishonourable to others. And if we wish to enquire why a house is valuable to us but not to the Scythians, or why the Carthaginians value leather which is worthless to us, or the Lacedaemonians find wealth in iron and we do not, can we not get an answer in some such way as this: Would an Athenian, who had a thousand talents weight of the stones which lie about in the Agora and which we do not employ for any purpose, be thought to be any the richer? 400

*Eras.* He certainly would not appear so to me.

*Soc.* But if he possessed a thousand talents weight of some precious stone, we should say that he was very rich?

*Eras.* Of course.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Arist. Pol. i. 9, §§ 10, 14.

*Soc.* The reason is that the one is useless and the other useful?

*Eras.* Yes.

*Soc.* And in the same way among the Scythians a house has no value because they have no use for a house, nor would a Scythian set so much store on the finest house in the world as on a leather coat, because he could use the one and not the other. Or again, the Carthaginian coinage is not wealth in our eyes, for we could not employ it, as we can silver, to procure what we need, and therefore it is of no use to us.

*Eras.* True.

*Soc.* What is useful to us, then, is wealth, and what is useless to us is not wealth?

But how do you mean, Socrates? said Eryxias, interrupt-  
401 ing. Do we not employ in our intercourse with one another speech and violence (?) and various other things? These are useful and yet they are not wealth.

*Soc.* Clearly we have not yet answered the question, What is wealth? That wealth must be useful, to be wealth at all,—thus much is acknowledged by every one. But what particular thing is wealth, if not all things? Let us pursue the argument in another way; and then we may perhaps find what we are seeking. What is the use of wealth, and for what purpose has the possession of riches been invented,—in the sense, I mean, in which drugs have been discovered for the cure of disease? Perhaps in this way we may throw some light on the question. It appears to be clear that whatever constitutes wealth must be useful, and that wealth is one class of useful things; and now we have to enquire, What is the use of those useful things which constitute wealth? For all things probably may be said to be useful which we use in production, just as all things which have life are animals, but there is a special kind of animal which we call ‘man.’ Now if any one were to ask us, What is that of which, if we were rid, we should not want medicine and the instruments of medicine, we might reply that this would be the case if disease were absent from our bodies and either never came to them at all or went away again as soon as it appeared; and we may therefore conclude that

*Eryxias.*

SOCRATES,  
ERASISTRATUS.

Wealth is useful, but other things are useful besides wealth.



*Eryxias.*

SOCRATES,

ERYXIAS.

medicine is the science which is useful for getting rid of disease. But if we are further asked, What is that from which, if we were free, we should have no need of wealth? can we give an answer? If we have none, suppose that we restate the question thus:—If a man could live without food or drink, and yet suffer neither hunger nor thirst, would he want either money or anything else in order to supply his needs?

*Eryx.* He would not.

If the body  
had no wants  
or feelings  
there would  
be no need  
of money.

*Soc.* And does not this apply in other cases? If we did not want for the service of the body the things of which we now stand in need, and heat and cold and the other bodily sensations were unperceived by us, there would be no use in this so-called wealth, if no one, that is, had any necessity for those things which now make us wish for wealth in order that we may satisfy the desires and needs of the body in respect of our various wants. And therefore if the possession of wealth is useful in ministering to our bodily wants, and bodily wants were unknown to us, we should not need wealth, and possibly there would be no such thing as wealth.

*Eryx.* Clearly not.

*Soc.* Then our conclusion is, as would appear, that wealth is what is useful to this end?

Eryxias once more gave his assent, but the small argument considerably troubled him.

*Soc.* And what is your opinion about another question:— 402  
Would you say that the same thing can be at one time useful and at another useless for the production of the same result?

*Eryx.* I cannot say more than that if we require the same thing to produce the same result, then it seems to me to be useful; if not, not.

*Soc.* Then if without the aid of fire we could make a brazen statue, we should not want fire for that purpose; and if we did not want it, it would be useless to us? And the argument applies equally in other cases.

*Eryx.* Clearly.

*Soc.* And therefore conditions which are not required for the existence of a thing are not useful for the production of it?

*Eryx.* Of course not.



*Soc.* And if without gold or silver or anything else which we do not use directly for the body in the way that we do food and drink and bedding and houses,—if without these we could satisfy the wants of the body, they would be of no use to us for that purpose?

*Eryx.* They would not.

*Soc.* They would no longer be regarded as wealth, because they are useless, whereas that would be wealth which enabled us to obtain what was useful to us?

*Eryx.* O Socrates, you will never be able to persuade me that gold and silver and similar things are not wealth. But I am very strongly of opinion that things which are useless to us are not wealth, and that the money which is useful for this purpose is of the greatest use; not that these things are not useful towards life, if by them we can procure wealth.

*Soc.* And how would you answer another question? There are persons, are there not, who teach music and grammar and other arts for pay, and thus procure those things of which they stand in need?

The arts too are wealth, for by them the needs of life are satisfied.

*Eryx.* There are.

*Soc.* And these men by the arts which they profess, and in exchange for them, obtain the necessities of life just as we do by means of gold and silver?

*Eryx.* True.

*Soc.* Then if they procure by this means what they want for the purposes of life, that art will be useful towards life? For do we not say that silver is useful because it enables us to supply our bodily needs?

*Eryx.* We do.

*Soc.* Then if these arts are reckoned among things useful, the arts are wealth for the same reason as gold and silver are, for, clearly, the possession of them gives wealth. Yet a little while ago we found it difficult to accept the argument which  
403 proved that the wisest are the wealthiest. But now there seems no escape from this conclusion. Suppose that we are asked, 'Is a horse useful to everybody?' will not our reply be, 'No, but only to those who know how to use a horse?'

*Eryx.* Certainly.

*Eryxias.*SOCRATES,  
ERYXIAS,  
CRITIAS.

*Soc.* And so, too, physic is not useful to every one, but only to him who knows how to use it?

*Eryx.* True.

*Soc.* And the same is the case with everything else?

*Eryx.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then gold and silver and all the other elements which are supposed to make up wealth are only useful to the person who knows how to use them?

*Eryx.* Exactly.

*Soc.* And were we not saying before that it was the business of a good man and a gentleman to know where and how anything should be used?

*Eryx.* Yes.

The good  
only know  
how to use  
things.

*Soc.* The good and gentle, therefore, will alone have profit from these things, supposing at least that they know how to use them. But if so, to them only will they seem to be wealth. It appears, however, that where a person is ignorant of riding, and has horses which are useless to him, if some one teaches him that art, he makes him also richer, for what was before useless has now become useful to him, and in giving him knowledge he has also conferred riches upon him.

*Eryx.* That is the case.

*Soc.* Yet I dare be sworn that Critias will not be moved a whit by the argument.

*Crit.* No, by heaven, I should be a madman if I were. But why do you not finish the argument which proves that gold and silver and other things which seem to be wealth are not real wealth? For I have been exceedingly delighted to hear the discourses which you have just been holding.

*Soc.* My argument, Critias (I said), appears to have given you the same kind of pleasure which you might have derived from some rhapsode's recitation of Homer; for you do not believe a word of what has been said. But come now, give me an answer to this question. Are not certain things useful to the builder when he is building a house?

*Crit.* They are.

*Soc.* And would you say that those things are useful which are employed in house building,—stones and bricks and beams and the like, and also the instruments with which the

builder built the house, the beams and stones which they provided, and again the instruments by which these were obtained? Eryxias.  
SOCRATES,  
CRITIAS.

*Crit.* It seems to me that they are all useful for building.

*Soc.* And is it not true of every art, that not only the materials but the instruments by which we procure them and without which the work could not go on, are useful for that art?

*Crit.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And further, the instruments by which the instruments  
404 are procured, and so on, going back from stage to stage *ad infinitum*,—are not all these, in your opinion, necessary in order to carry out the work?

*Crit.* We may fairly suppose such to be the case.

*Soc.* And if a man has food and drink and clothes and the other things which are useful to the body, would he need gold or silver or any other means by which he could procure that which he now has?

*Crit.* I do not think so.

*Soc.* Then you consider that a man never wants any of these things for the use of the body?

*Crit.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* And if they appear useless to this end, ought they not always to appear useless? For we have already laid down the principle that things cannot be at one time useful and at another time not, in the same process.

*Crit.* But in that respect your argument and mine are the same. For you maintain if they are useful to a certain end, they can never become useless; whereas I say that in order to accomplish some results bad things are needed, and good for others.

*Soc.* But can a bad thing be used to carry out a good purpose?

*Crit.* I should say not.

*Soc.* And we call those actions good which a man does for the sake of virtue?

*Crit.* Yes.

*Soc.* But can a man learn any kind of knowledge which is imparted by word of mouth if he is wholly deprived of the sense of hearing?

A sophism.  
Gold and silver would be useless if they were not needed to obtain food: and things cannot be at one time useless, at another time useful, in the same actions.



*Eryxias.**Crit.* Certainly not, I think.SOCRATES,  
CRITIAS.*Soc.* And will not hearing be useful for virtue, if virtue is taught by hearing and we use the sense of hearing in giving instruction?*Crit.* Yes.There are in-  
direct means  
towards ends.*Soc.* And since medicine frees the sick man from his disease, that art too may sometimes appear useful in the acquisition of virtue, e. g. when hearing is procured by the aid of medicine.*Crit.* Very likely.*Soc.* But if, again, we obtain by wealth the aid of medicine, shall we not regard wealth as useful for virtue?*Crit.* True.*Soc.* And also the instruments by which wealth is procured?*Crit.* Certainly.Wealth may  
be gained dis-  
creditably, but  
spent in the  
acquisition of  
virtue.*Soc.* Then you think that a man may gain wealth by bad and disgraceful means, and, having obtained the aid of medicine which enables him to acquire the power of hearing, may use that very faculty for the acquisition of virtue?*Crit.* Yes, I do.*Soc.* But can that which is evil be useful for virtue?*Crit.* No.*Soc.* It is not therefore necessary that the means by which we obtain what is useful for a certain object should always be useful for the same object: for it seems that bad actions may sometimes serve good purposes? The matter will be still plainer if we look at it in this way:—If things are useful towards the several ends for which they exist, which ends would not come into existence without them, how would you regard them? Can ignorance, for instance, be useful for knowledge, or disease for health, or vice for virtue? 405*Crit.* Never.*Soc.* And yet we have already agreed — have we not? — that there can be no knowledge where there has not previously been ignorance, nor health where there has not been disease, nor virtue where there has not been vice?*Crit.* I think that we have.Difference  
between  
causes and  
antecedents.*Soc.* But then it would seem that the antecedents without which a thing cannot exist are not necessarily useful to it.



Otherwise ignorance would appear useful for knowledge, disease for health, and vice for virtue.

*Eryxias.*

SOCRATES,  
CRITIAS.

Critias still showed great reluctance to accept any argument which went to prove that all these things were useless. I saw that it was as difficult to persuade him as (according to the proverb) it is to boil a stone, so I said: Let us bid 'good-bye' to the discussion, since we cannot agree whether these things are useful and a part of wealth or not. But what shall we say to another question: Which is the happier and better man,—he who requires the greatest quantity of necessities for body and diet, or he who requires only the fewest and least? The answer will perhaps become more obvious if we suppose some one, comparing the man himself at different times, to consider whether his condition is better when he is sick or when he is well?

*Crit.* That is not a question which needs much consideration.

*Soc.* Probably, I said, every one can understand that health is a better condition than disease. But when have we the greatest and the most various needs, when we are sick or when we are well?

Health is a better condition than disease: and it needs less.

*Crit.* When we are sick.

*Soc.* And when we are in the worst state we have the greatest and most especial need and desire of bodily pleasures?

*Crit.* True.

*Soc.* And seeing that a man is best off when he is least in need of such things, does not the same reasoning apply to the case of any two persons, of whom one has many and great wants and desires, and the other few and moderate? For instance, some men are gamblers, some drunkards, and some gluttons: and gambling and the love of drink and greediness are all desires?

So he is best off who has fewest desires.

*Crit.* Certainly.

*Soc.* But desires are only the lack of something: and those who have the greatest desires are in a worse condition than those who have none or very slight ones?

406 *Crit.* Certainly I consider that those who have such wants are bad, and that the greater their wants the worse they are.

*Soc.* And do we think it possible that a thing should be

*Eryxias.*SOCRATES,  
CRITIAS.

useful for a purpose unless we have need of it for that purpose?

*Crit.* No.

*Soc.* Then if these things are useful for supplying the needs of the body, we must want them for that purpose?

*Crit.* That is my opinion.

*Soc.* And he to whom the greatest number of things are useful for his purpose, will also want the greatest number of means of accomplishing it, supposing that we necessarily feel the want of all useful things?

*Crit.* It seems so.

*Soc.* The argument proves then that he who has great riches has likewise need of many things for the supply of the wants of the body; for wealth appears useful towards that end. And the richest must be in the worst condition, since they seem to be most in want of such things.

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
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














THE  
DIALOGUES OF PLATO  
*JOWETT*

VOL. III.





THE  
DIALOGUES OF PLATO

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

WITH ANALYSES AND INTRODUCTIONS

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
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WITH MARGINAL ANALYSES AND OTHER ADDITIONS, AND AN  
INDEX OF SUBJECTS AND PROPER NAMES

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# THE REPUBLIC.

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## INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.

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THE Republic of Plato is the longest of his works with the exception of the Laws, and is certainly the greatest of them. There are nearer approaches to modern metaphysics in the Philebus and in the Sophist; the Politicus or Statesman is more ideal; the form and institutions of the State are more clearly drawn out in the Laws; as works of art, the Symposium and the Protagoras are of higher excellence. But no other Dialogue of Plato has the same largeness of view and the same perfection of style; no other shows an equal knowledge of the world, or contains more of those thoughts which are new as well as old, and not of one age only but of all. Nowhere in Plato is there a deeper irony or a greater wealth of humour or imagery, or more dramatic power. Nor in any other of his writings is the attempt made to interweave life and speculation, or to connect politics with philosophy. The Republic is the centre around which the other Dialogues may be grouped; here philosophy reaches the highest point (cp. especially in Books V, VI, VII) to which ancient thinkers ever attained. Plato among the Greeks, like Bacon among the moderns, was the first who conceived a method of knowledge, although neither of them always distinguished the bare outline or form from the substance of truth; and both of them had to be content with an abstraction of science which was not yet realized. He was the greatest metaphysical genius whom the world has seen; and in him, more than in any other ancient thinker, the germs of future knowledge are contained. The sciences of logic and psychology, which have supplied so many instruments of thought to after-ages, are based upon the analyses of Socrates and Plato. The principles of definition, the law of contradiction, the fallacy of arguing in a circle, the distinction between the essence and accidents of a thing or notion, between means and ends, between causes and conditions; also the division of the mind into the rational, concupiscent, and irascible elements, or of pleasures and desires into necessary and unnecessary—these

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and other great forms of thought are all of them to be found in the Republic, and were probably first invented by Plato. The greatest of all logical truths, and the one of which writers on philosophy are most apt to lose sight, the difference between words and things, has been most strenuously insisted on by him (cp. Rep. 454 A; Polit. 261 E; Cratyl. 435, 436 ff.), although he has not always avoided the confusion of them in his own writings (e. g. Rep. 463 E). But he does not bind up truth in logical formulæ,—logic is still veiled in metaphysics; and the science which he imagines to ‘contemplate all truth and all existence’ is very unlike the doctrine of the syllogism which Aristotle claims to have discovered (Soph. Elenchi, 33. 18).

Neither must we forget that the Republic is but the third part of a still larger design which was to have included an ideal history of Athens, as well as a political and physical philosophy. The fragment of the Critias has given birth to a world-famous fiction, second only in importance to the tale of Troy and the legend of Arthur; and is said as a fact to have inspired some of the early navigators of the sixteenth century. This mythical tale, of which the subject was a history of the wars of the Athenians against the island of Atlantis, is supposed to be founded upon an unfinished poem of Solon, to which it would have stood in the same relation as the writings of the logographers to the poems of Homer. It would have told of a struggle for Liberty (cp. Tim. 25 C), intended to represent the conflict of Persia and Hellas. We may judge from the noble commencement of the Timæus, from the fragment of the Critias itself, and from the third book of the Laws, in what manner Plato would have treated this high argument. We can only guess why the great design was abandoned; perhaps because Plato became sensible of some incongruity in a fictitious history, or because he had lost his interest in it, or because advancing years forbade the completion of it; and we may please ourselves with the fancy that had this imaginary narrative ever been finished, we should have found Plato himself sympathising with the struggle for Hellenic independence (cp. Laws, iii. 698 ff.), singing a hymn of triumph over Marathon and Salamis, perhaps making the reflection of Herodotus (v. 78) where he contemplates the growth of the Athenian empire—‘How brave a thing is freedom of speech,



which has made the Athenians so far exceed every other state of Hellas in greatness ! ' or, more probably, attributing the victory to the ancient good order of Athens and to the favour of Apollo and Athene (cp. *Introd. to Critias*). *Republic.*  
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Again, Plato may be regarded as the 'captain' (*ἀρχηγός*) or leader of a goodly band of followers ; for in the *Republic* is to be found the original of Cicero's *De Republica*, of St. Augustine's *City of God*, of the *Utopia* of Sir Thomas More, and of the numerous other imaginary States which are framed upon the same model. The extent to which Aristotle or the Aristotelian school were indebted to him in the *Politics* has been little recognised, and the recognition is the more necessary because it is not made by Aristotle himself. The two philosophers had more in common than they were conscious of ; and probably some elements of Plato remain still undetected in Aristotle. In English philosophy too, many affinities may be traced, not only in the works of the Cambridge Platonists, but in great original writers like Berkeley or Coleridge, to Plato and his ideas. That there is a truth higher than experience, of which the mind bears witness to herself, is a conviction which in our own generation has been enthusiastically asserted, and is perhaps gaining ground. Of the Greek authors who at the Renaissance brought a new life into the world Plato has had the greatest influence. The *Republic* of Plato is also the first treatise upon education, of which the writings of Milton and Locke, Rousseau, Jean Paul, and Goethe are the legitimate descendants. Like Dante or Bunyan, he has a revelation of another life ; like Bacon, he is profoundly impressed with the unity of knowledge ; in the early Church he exercised a real influence on theology, and at the Revival of Literature on politics. Even the fragments of his words when 'repeated at second-hand' (*Symp.* 215 D) have in all ages ravished the hearts of men, who have seen reflected in them their own higher nature. He is the father of idealism in philosophy, in politics, in literature. And many of the latest conceptions of modern thinkers and statesmen, such as the unity of knowledge, the reign of law, and the equality of the sexes, have been anticipated in a dream by him.

The argument of the *Republic* is the search after Justice, the nature of which is first hinted at by Cephalus, the just and blame-

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less old man—then discussed on the basis of proverbial morality by Socrates and Polemarchus—then caricatured by Thrasymachus and partially explained by Socrates—reduced to an abstraction by Glaucon and Adeimantus, and having become invisible in the individual reappears at length in the ideal State which is constructed by Socrates. The first care of the rulers is to be education, of which an outline is drawn after the old Hellenic model, providing only for an improved religion and morality, and more simplicity in music and gymnastic, a manlier strain of poetry, and greater harmony of the individual and the State. We are thus led on to the conception of a higher State, in which ‘no man calls anything his own,’ and in which there is neither ‘marrying nor giving in marriage,’ and ‘kings are philosophers’ and ‘philosophers are kings;’ and there is another and higher education, intellectual as well as moral and religious, of science as well as of art, and not of youth only but of the whole of life. Such a State is hardly to be realized in this world and quickly degenerates. To the perfect ideal succeeds the government of the soldier and the lover of honour, this again declining into democracy, and democracy into tyranny, in an imaginary but regular order having not much resemblance to the actual facts. When ‘the wheel has come full circle’ we do not begin again with a new period of human life; but we have passed from the best to the worst, and there we end. The subject is then changed and the old quarrel of poetry and philosophy which had been more lightly treated in the earlier books of the Republic is now resumed and fought out to a conclusion. Poetry is discovered to be an imitation thrice removed from the truth, and Homer, as well as the dramatic poets, having been condemned as an imitator, is sent into banishment along with them. And the idea of the State is supplemented by the revelation of a future life.

The division into books, like all similar divisions<sup>1</sup>, is probably later than the age of Plato. The natural divisions are five in number; — (1) Book I and the first half of Book II down to p. 368, which is introductory; the first book containing a refutation of the popular and sophistical notions of justice, and concluding, like some of the earlier Dialogues, without arriving at any definite result. To this is appended a restatement of the nature of justice

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Sir G. C. Lewis in the *Classical Museum*, vol. ii. p. 1.

according to common opinion, and an answer is demanded to the question — What is justice, stripped of appearances? The second division (2) includes the remainder of the second and the whole of the third and fourth books, which are mainly occupied with the construction of the first State and the first education. The third division (3) consists of the fifth, sixth, and seventh books, in which philosophy rather than justice is the subject of enquiry, and the second State is constructed on principles of communism and ruled by philosophers, and the contemplation of the idea of good takes the place of the social and political virtues. In the eighth and ninth books (4) the perversions of States and of the individuals who correspond to them are reviewed in succession; and the nature of pleasure and the principle of tyranny are further analysed in the individual man. The tenth book (5) is the conclusion of the whole, in which the relations of philosophy to poetry are finally determined, and the happiness of the citizens in this life, which has now been assured, is crowned by the vision of another.

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Or a more general division into two parts may be adopted; the first (Books I–IV) containing the description of a State framed generally in accordance with Hellenic notions of religion and morality, while in the second (Books V–X) the Hellenic State is transformed into an ideal kingdom of philosophy, of which all other governments are the perversions. These two points of view are really opposed, and the opposition is only veiled by the genius of Plato. The *Republic*, like the *Phaedrus* (see Introduction to *Phaedrus*), is an imperfect whole; the higher light of philosophy breaks through the regularity of the Hellenic temple, which at last fades away into the heavens (592 B). Whether this imperfection of structure arises from an enlargement of the plan; or from the imperfect reconciliation in the writer's own mind of the struggling elements of thought which are now first brought together by him; or, perhaps, from the composition of the work at different times — are questions, like the similar question about the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, which are worth asking, but which cannot have a distinct answer. In the age of Plato there was no regular mode of publication, and an author would have the less scruple in altering or adding to a work which was known only to a few of his friends. There is no absurdity in supposing that he may have laid his labours aside for a time, or turned from one work to



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another; and such interruptions would be more likely to occur in the case of a long than of a short writing. In all attempts to determine the chronological order of the Platonic writings on internal evidence, this uncertainty about any single Dialogue being composed at one time is a disturbing element, which must be admitted to affect longer works, such as the Republic and the Laws, more than shorter ones. But, on the other hand, the seeming discrepancies of the Republic may only arise out of the discordant elements which the philosopher has attempted to unite in a single whole, perhaps without being himself able to recognise the inconsistency which is obvious to us. For there is a judgment of after ages which few great writers have ever been able to anticipate for themselves. They do not perceive the want of connexion in their own writings, or the gaps in their systems which are visible enough to those who come after them. In the beginnings of literature and philosophy, amid the first efforts of thought and language, more inconsistencies occur than now, when the paths of speculation are well worn and the meaning of words precisely defined. For consistency, too, is the growth of time; and some of the greatest creations of the human mind have been wanting in unity. Tried by this test, several of the Platonic Dialogues, according to our modern ideas, appear to be defective, but the deficiency is no proof that they were composed at different times or by different hands. And the supposition that the Republic was written uninterruptedly and by a continuous effort is in some degree confirmed by the numerous references from one part of the work to another.

The second title, 'Concerning Justice,' is not the one by which the Republic is quoted, either by Aristotle or generally in antiquity, and, like the other second titles of the Platonic Dialogues, may therefore be assumed to be of later date. Morgenstern and others have asked whether the definition of justice, which is the professed aim, or the construction of the State is the principal argument of the work. The answer is, that the two blend in one, and are two faces of the same truth; for justice is the order of the State, and the State is the visible embodiment of justice, under the conditions of human society. The one is the soul and the other is the body, and the Greek ideal of the State, as of the individual, is a fair mind in a fair body. In Hegelian phraseology the state is the reality of



which justice is the idea. Or, described in Christian language, the kingdom of God is within, and yet developes into a Church or external kingdom; 'the house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens,' is reduced to the proportions of an earthly building. Or, to use a Platonic image, justice and the State are the warp and the woof which run through the whole texture. And when the constitution of the State is completed, the conception of justice is not dismissed, but reappears under the same or different names throughout the work, both as the inner law of the individual soul, and finally as the principle of rewards and punishments in another life. The virtues are based on justice, of which common honesty in buying and selling is the shadow, and justice is based on the idea of good, which is the harmony of the world, and is reflected both in the institutions of states and in motions of the heavenly bodies (cp. *Tim.* 47). The *Timaeus*, which takes up the political rather than the ethical side of the *Republic*, and is chiefly occupied with hypotheses concerning the outward world, yet contains many indications that the same law is supposed to reign over the State, over nature, and over man.

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Too much, however, has been made of this question both in ancient and modern times. There is a stage of criticism in which all works, whether of nature or of art, are referred to design. Now in ancient writings, and indeed in literature generally, there remains often a large element which was not comprehended in the original design. For the plan grows under the author's hand; new thoughts occur to him in the act of writing; he has not worked out the argument to the end before he begins. The reader who seeks to find some one idea under which the whole may be conceived, must necessarily seize on the vaguest and most general. Thus Stallbaum, who is dissatisfied with the ordinary explanations of the argument of the *Republic*, imagines himself to have found the true argument 'in the representation of human life in a State perfected by justice, and governed according to the idea of good.' There may be some use in such general descriptions, but they can hardly be said to express the design of the writer. The truth is, that we may as well speak of many designs as of one; nor need anything be excluded from the plan of a great work to which the mind is naturally led by the association of ideas, and which does not interfere with the general purpose. What kind or degree of

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unity is to be sought after in a building, in the plastic arts, in poetry, in prose, is a problem which has to be determined relatively to the subject-matter. To Plato himself, the enquiry 'what was the intention of the writer,' or 'what was the principal argument of the Republic' would have been hardly intelligible, and therefore had better be at once dismissed (cp. the Introduction to the *Phaedrus*, vol. i.).

Is not the Republic the vehicle of three or four great truths which, to Plato's own mind, are most naturally represented in the form of the State? Just as in the Jewish prophets the reign of Messiah, or 'the day of the Lord,' or the suffering Servant or people of God, or the 'Sun of righteousness with healing in his wings' only convey, to us at least, their great spiritual ideals, so through the Greek State Plato reveals to us his own thoughts about divine perfection, which is the idea of good — like the sun in the visible world; — about human perfection, which is justice — about education beginning in youth and continuing in later years — about poets and sophists and tyrants who are the false teachers and evil rulers of mankind — about 'the world' which is the embodiment of them — about a kingdom which exists nowhere upon earth but is laid up in heaven to be the pattern and rule of human life. No such inspired creation is at unity with itself, any more than the clouds of heaven when the sun pierces through them. Every shade of light and dark, of truth, and of fiction which is the veil of truth, is allowable in a work of philosophical imagination. It is not all on the same plane; it easily passes from ideas to myths and fancies, from facts to figures of speech. It is not prose but poetry, at least a great part of it, and ought not to be judged by the rules of logic or the probabilities of history. The writer is not fashioning his ideas into an artistic whole; they take possession of him and are too much for him. We have no need therefore to discuss whether a State such as Plato has conceived is practicable or not, or whether the outward form or the inward life came first into the mind of the writer. For the practicability of his ideas has nothing to do with their truth (v. 472 D); and the highest thoughts to which he attains may be truly said to bear the greatest 'marks of design' — justice more than the external frame-work of the State, the idea of good more than justice. The great science of dialectic or the organisation of ideas has no real content; but is only a type of the method or

spirit in which the higher knowledge is to be pursued by the spectator of all time and all existence. It is in the fifth, sixth, and seventh books that Plato reaches the 'summit of speculation,' and these, although they fail to satisfy the requirements of a modern thinker, may therefore be regarded as the most important, as they are also the most original, portions of the work.

It is not necessary to discuss at length a minor question which has been raised by Boeckh, respecting the imaginary date at which the conversation was held (the year 411 B.C. which is proposed by him will do as well as any other); for a writer of fiction, and especially a writer who, like Plato, is notoriously careless of chronology (cp. *Rep.* i. 336, *Symp.* 193 A, etc.), only aims at general probability. Whether all the persons mentioned in the *Republic* could ever have met at any one time is not a difficulty which would have occurred to an Athenian reading the work forty years later, or to Plato himself at the time of writing (any more than to Shakespeare respecting one of his own dramas); and need not greatly trouble us now. Yet this may be a question having no answer 'which is still worth asking,' because the investigation shows that we cannot argue historically from the dates in Plato; it would be useless therefore to waste time in inventing far-fetched reconciliements of them in order to avoid chronological difficulties, such, for example, as the conjecture of C. F. Hermann, that Glaucon and Adeimantus are not the brothers but the uncles of Plato (cp. *Apol.* 34 A), or the fancy of Stallbaum that Plato intentionally left anachronisms indicating the dates at which some of his Dialogues were written.

The principal characters in the *Republic* are Cephalus, Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus. Cephalus appears in the introduction only, Polemarchus drops at the end of the first argument, and Thrasymachus is reduced to silence at the close of the first book. The main discussion is carried on by Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus. Among the company are Lysias (the orator) and Euthydemus, the sons of Cephalus and brothers of Polemarchus, an unknown Charmantides — these are mute auditors; also there is Cleitophon, who once interrupts (340 A), where, as in the Dialogue which bears his name, he appears as the friend and ally of Thrasymachus.

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Cephalus, the patriarch of the house, has been appropriately engaged in offering a sacrifice. He is the pattern of an old man who has almost done with life, and is at peace with himself and with all mankind. He feels that he is drawing nearer to the world below, and seems to linger around the memory of the past. He is eager that Socrates should come to visit him, fond of the poetry of the last generation, happy in the consciousness of a well-spent life, glad at having escaped from the tyranny of youthful lusts. His love of conversation, his affection, his indifference to riches, even his garrulity, are interesting traits of character. He is not one of those who have nothing to say, because their whole mind has been absorbed in making money. Yet he acknowledges that riches have the advantage of placing men above the temptation to dishonesty or falsehood. The respectful attention shown to him by Socrates, whose love of conversation, no less than the mission imposed upon him by the Oracle, leads him to ask questions of all men, young and old alike (cp. i. 328 A), should also be noted. Who better suited to raise the question of justice than Cephalus, whose life might seem to be the expression of it? The moderation with which old age is pictured by Cephalus as a very tolerable portion of existence is characteristic, not only of him, but of Greek feeling generally, and contrasts with the exaggeration of Cicero in the *De Senectute*. The evening of life is described by Plato in the most expressive manner, yet with the fewest possible touches. As Cicero remarks (*Ep. ad Attic.* iv. 16), the aged Cephalus would have been out of place in the discussion which follows, and which he could neither have understood nor taken part in without a violation of dramatic propriety (cp. *Lysimachus* in the *Laches*, 89).

His 'son and heir' Polemarchus has the frankness and impetuosity of youth; he is for detaining Socrates by force in the opening scene, and will not 'let him off' (v. 449 B) on the subject of women and children. Like Cephalus, he is limited in his point of view, and represents the proverbial stage of morality which has rules of life rather than principles; and he quotes Simonides (cp. *Aristoph. Clouds*, 1355 ff.) as his father had quoted Pindar. But after this he has no more to say; the answers which he makes are only elicited from him by the dialectic of Socrates. He has not yet experienced the influence of the Sophists like Glaucon and



Adeimantus, nor is he sensible of the necessity of refuting them ; he belongs to the pre-Socratic or pre-dialectical age. He is incapable of arguing, and is bewildered by Socrates to such a degree that he does not know what he is saying. He is made to admit that justice is a thief, and that the virtues follow the analogy of the arts (i. 333 E). From his brother Lysias (contra Eratosth. p. 121) we learn that he fell a victim to the Thirty Tyrants, but no allusion is here made to his fate, nor to the circumstance that Cephalus and his family were of Syracusan origin, and had migrated from Thurii to Athens.

The 'Chalcedonian giant,' Thrasymachus, of whom we have already heard in the Phaedrus (267 D), is the personification of the Sophists, according to Plato's conception of them, in some of their worst characteristics. He is vain and blustering, refusing to discourse unless he is paid, fond of making an oration, and hoping thereby to escape the inevitable Socrates ; but a mere child in argument, and unable to foresee that the next 'move' (to use a Platonic expression) will 'shut him up' (vi. 487 B). He has reached the stage of framing general notions, and in this respect is in advance of Cephalus and Polemarchus. But he is incapable of defending them in a discussion, and vainly tries to cover his confusion with banter and insolence. Whether such doctrines as are attributed to him by Plato were really held either by him or by any other Sophist is uncertain ; in the infancy of philosophy serious errors about morality might easily grow up—they are certainly put into the mouths of speakers in Thucydides ; but we are concerned at present with Plato's description of him, and not with the historical reality. The inequality of the contest adds greatly to the humour of the scene. The pompous and empty Sophist is utterly helpless in the hands of the great master of dialectic, who knows how to touch all the springs of vanity and weakness in him. He is greatly irritated by the irony of Socrates, but his noisy and imbecile rage only lays him more and more open to the thrusts of his assailant. His determination to cram down their throats, or put 'bodily into their souls' his own words, elicits a cry of horror from Socrates. The state of his temper is quite as worthy of remark as the process of the argument. Nothing is more amusing than his complete submission when he has been once thoroughly beaten. At first he seems to continue

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the discussion with reluctance, but soon with apparent good-will, and he even testifies his interest at a later stage by one or two occasional remarks (v. 450 A, B). When attacked by Glaucon (vi. 498 C, D) he is humorously protected by Socrates. 'as one who has never been his enemy and is now his friend.' From Cicero and Quintilian and from Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (iii. 1. 7; ii. 23. 29) we learn that the Sophist whom Plato has made so ridiculous was a man of note whose writings were preserved in later ages. The play on his name which was made by his contemporary Herodicus (*Aris. Rhet.* ii. 23, 29), 'thou wast ever bold in battle,' seems to show that the description of him is not devoid of verisimilitude.

When Thrasymachus has been silenced, the two principal respondents, Glaucon and Adeimantus, appear on the scene: here, as in Greek tragedy (cp. *Introd. to Phaedo*), three actors are introduced. At first sight the two sons of Ariston may seem to wear a family likeness, like the two friends Simmias and Cebes in the *Phaedo*. But on a nearer examination of them the similarity vanishes, and they are seen to be distinct characters. Glaucon is the impetuous youth who can 'just never have enough of fechtung' (cp. the character of him in *Xen. Mem.* iii. 6); the man of pleasure who is acquainted with the mysteries of love (v. 474 D); the 'juvenis qui gaudet canibus,' and who improves the breed of animals (v. 459 A); the lover of art and music (iii. 398 D, E) who has all the experiences of youthful life. He is full of quickness and penetration, piercing easily below the clumsy platitudes of Thrasymachus to the real difficulty; he turns out to the light the seamy side of human life, and yet does not lose faith in the just and true. It is Glaucon who seizes what may be termed the ludicrous relation of the philosopher to the world, to whom a state of simplicity is 'a city of pigs,' who is always prepared with a jest (iii. 398 C, 407 A; v. 450, 451, 468 C; vi. 509 C; ix. 586) when the argument offers him an opportunity, and who is ever ready to second the humour of Socrates and to appreciate the ridiculous, whether in the connoisseurs of music (vii. 531 A), or in the lovers of theatricals (v. 475 D), or in the fantastic behaviour of the citizens of democracy (viii. 557 foll.). His weaknesses are several times alluded to by Socrates (iii. 402 E; v. 474 D, 475 E), who, however, will not allow him to be attacked by his brother Adeimantus (viii. 548 D, E). He is a soldier, and, like Adeimantus, has been

distinguished at the battle of Megara (368 A, anno 456?). . . The character of Adeimantus is deeper and graver, and the profounder objections are commonly put into his mouth. Glaucon is more demonstrative, and generally opens the game; Adeimantus pursues the argument further. Glaucon has more of the liveliness and quick sympathy of youth; Adeimantus has the maturer judgment of a grown-up man of the world. In the second book, when Glaucon insists that justice and injustice shall be considered without regard to their consequences, Adeimantus remarks that they are regarded by mankind in general only for the sake of their consequences; and in a similar vein of reflection he urges at the beginning of the fourth book that Socrates fails in making his citizens happy, and is answered that happiness is not the first but the second thing, not the direct aim but the indirect consequence of the good government of a State. In the discussion about religion and mythology, Adeimantus is the respondent (iii. 376–398), but at p. 398 C, Glaucon breaks in with a slight jest, and carries on the conversation in a lighter tone about music and gymnastic to the end of the book. It is Adeimantus again who volunteers the criticism of common sense on the Socratic method of argument (vi. 487 B), and who refuses to let Socrates pass lightly over the question of women and children (v. 449). It is Adeimantus who is the respondent in the more argumentative, as Glaucon in the lighter and more imaginative portions of the Dialogue. For example, throughout the greater part of the sixth book, the causes of the corruption of philosophy and the conception of the idea of good are discussed with Adeimantus. At p. 506 C, Glaucon resumes his place of principal respondent; but he has a difficulty in apprehending the higher education of Socrates, and makes some false hits in the course of the discussion (526 D, 527 D). Once more Adeimantus returns (viii. 548) with the allusion to his brother Glaucon whom he compares to the contentious State; in the next book (ix. 576) he is again superseded, and Glaucon continues to the end (x. 621 B).

Thus in a succession of characters Plato represents the successive stages of morality, beginning with the Athenian gentleman of the olden time, who is followed by the practical man of that day regulating his life by proverbs and saws; to him succeeds the wild generalization of the Sophists, and lastly come the young disciples of the great teacher, who know the sophistical arguments

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but will not be convinced by them, and desire to go deeper into the nature of things. These too, like Cephalus, Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, are clearly distinguished from one another. Neither in the *Republic*, nor in any other Dialogue of Plato, is a single character repeated.

The delineation of Socrates in the *Republic* is not wholly consistent. In the first book we have more of the real Socrates, such as he is depicted in the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon, in the earliest Dialogues of Plato, and in the *Apology*. He is ironical, provoking, questioning, the old enemy of the Sophists, ready to put on the mask of Silenus as well as to argue seriously. But in the sixth book his enmity towards the Sophists abates; he acknowledges that they are the representatives rather than the corrupters of the world (vi. 492 A). He also becomes more dogmatic and constructive, passing beyond the range either of the political or the speculative ideas of the real Socrates. In one passage (vi. 506 C) Plato himself seems to intimate that the time had now come for Socrates, who had passed his whole life in philosophy, to give his own opinion and not to be always repeating the notions of other men. There is no evidence that either the idea of good or the conception of a perfect state were comprehended in the Socratic teaching, though he certainly dwelt on the nature of the universal and of final causes (cp. Xen. Mem. i. 4; *Phaedo* 97); and a deep thinker like him, in his thirty or forty years of public teaching, could hardly have failed to touch on the nature of family relations, for which there is also some positive evidence in the *Memorabilia* (Mem. i. 2, 51 foll.). The Socratic method is nominally retained; and every inference is either put into the mouth of the respondent or represented as the common discovery of him and Socrates. But any one can see that this is a mere form, of which the affectation grows wearisome as the work advances. The method of enquiry has passed into a method of teaching in which by the help of interlocutors the same thesis is looked at from various points of view. The nature of the process is truly characterized by Glaucon, when he describes himself as a companion who is not good for much in an investigation, but can see what he is shown (iv. 432 C), and may, perhaps, give the answer to a question more fluently than another (v. 474 A; cp. 389 A).

Neither can we be absolutely certain that Socrates himself



taught the immortality of the soul, which is unknown to his disciple Glaucon in the Republic (x. 608 D; cp. vi. 498 D, E; Apol. 40, 41); nor is there any reason to suppose that he used myths or revelations of another world as a vehicle of instruction, or that he would have banished poetry or have denounced the Greek mythology. His favourite oath is retained, and a slight mention is made of the daemonium, or internal sign, which is alluded to by Socrates as a phenomenon peculiar to himself (vi. 496 C). A real element of Socratic teaching, which is more prominent in the Republic than in any of the other Dialogues of Plato, is the use of example and illustration (*τὰ φορτικὰ αὐτῷ προσφέροντες*, iv. 442 E): 'Let us apply the test of common instances.' 'You,' says Adeimantus, ironically, in the sixth book, 'are so unaccustomed to speak in images.' And this use of examples or images, though truly Socratic in origin, is enlarged by the genius of Plato into the form of an allegory or parable, which embodies in the concrete what has been already described, or is about to be described, in the abstract. Thus the figure of the cave in Book VII is a recapitulation of the divisions of knowledge in Book VI. The composite animal in Book IX is an allegory of the parts of the soul. The noble captain and the ship and the true pilot in Book VI are a figure of the relation of the people to the philosophers in the State which has been described. Other figures, such as the dog (ii. 375 A, D; iii. 404 A, 416 A; v. 451 D), or the marriage of the portionless maiden (vi. 495, 496), or the drones and wasps in the eighth and ninth books, also form links of connexion in long passages, or are used to recall previous discussions.

Plato is most true to the character of his master when he describes him as 'not of this world.' And with this representation of him the ideal state and the other paradoxes of the Republic are quite in accordance, though they cannot be shown to have been speculations of Socrates. To him, as to other great teachers both philosophical and religious, when they looked upward, the world seemed to be the embodiment of error and evil. The common sense of mankind has revolted against this view, or has only partially admitted it. And even in Socrates himself the sterner judgment of the multitude at times passes into a sort of ironical pity or love. Men in general are incapable of philosophy, and are therefore at enmity with the philosopher; but their misunderstanding of him

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is unavoidable (vi. 494 foll. ; ix. 589 D) : for they have never seen him as he truly is in his own image ; they are only acquainted with artificial systems possessing no native force of truth — words which admit of many applications. Their leaders have nothing to measure with, and are therefore ignorant of their own stature. But they are to be pitied or laughed at, not to be quarrelled with ; they mean well with their nostrums, if they could only learn that they are cutting off a Hydra's head (iv. 426 D, E). This moderation towards those who are in error is one of the most characteristic features of Socrates in the *Republic* (vi. 499–502). In all the different representations of Socrates, whether of Xenophon or Plato, and amid the differences of the earlier or later Dialogues, he always retains the character of the unwearied and disinterested seeker after truth, without which he would have ceased to be Socrates.

Leaving the characters we may now analyse the contents of the *Republic*, and then proceed to consider (1) The general aspects of this Hellenic ideal of the State, (2) The modern lights in which the thoughts of Plato may be read.

**BOOK I.** The *Republic* opens with a truly Greek scene — a festival in honour of the goddess Bendis which is held in the Piraeus ; to this is added the promise of an equestrian torch-race in the evening. The whole work is supposed to be recited by Socrates on the day after the festival to a small party, consisting of Critias, Timaeus, Hermocrates, and another ; this we learn from the first words of the Timaeus.

When the rhetorical advantage of reciting the Dialogue has been gained, the attention is not distracted by any reference to the audience ; nor is the reader further reminded of the extraordinary length of the narrative. Of the numerous company, three only take any serious part in the discussion ; nor are we informed whether in the evening they went to the torch-race, or talked, as in the Symposium, through the night. The manner in which the conversation has arisen is described as follows :—Socrates and his companion Glaucon are about to leave the festival when they are detained by a message from Polemarchus, who speedily appears accompanied by Adeimantus, the brother of Glaucon, and with playful violence compels them to remain, promising them not only

28 the torch-race, but the pleasure of conversation with the young, which to Socrates is a far greater attraction. They return to the house of Cephalus, Polemarchus' father, now in extreme old age, who is found sitting upon a cushioned seat crowned for a sacrifice. 'You should come to me oftener, Socrates, for I am too old to go to you; and at my time of life, having lost other pleasures, I care the more for conversation.' Socrates asks him what he thinks of age, to which the old man replies, that the sorrows and discontents of age are to be attributed to the tempers of men, and that age is a time of peace in which the tyranny of the passions is no longer felt. Yes, replies Socrates, but the world will say, Cephalus, that you are happy in old age because you are rich. 'And there is something in what they say, Socrates, but not so much as they 30 imagine — as Themistocles replied to the Seriphian, "Neither you, if you had been an Athenian, nor I, if I had been a Seriphian, would ever have been famous," I might in like manner reply to you, Neither a good poor man can be happy in age, nor yet a bad rich man.' Socrates remarks that Cephalus appears not to care about riches, a quality which he ascribes to his having inherited, not acquired them, and would like to know what he considers to be the chief advantage of them. Cephalus answers that when you are old the belief in the world below grows upon you, and 31 then to have done justice and never to have been compelled to do injustice through poverty, and never to have deceived any one, are felt to be unspeakable blessings. Socrates, who is evidently preparing for an argument, next asks, What is the meaning of the word justice? To tell the truth and pay your debts? No more than this? Or must we admit exceptions? Ought I, for example, to put back into the hands of my friend, who has gone mad, the sword which I borrowed of him when he was in his right mind? 'There must be exceptions.' 'And yet,' says Polemarchus, 'the definition which has been given has the authority of Simonides.' Here Cephalus retires to look after the sacrifices, and bequeaths, as Socrates facetiously remarks, the possession of the argument to his heir, Polemarchus. . . . .

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The description of old age is finished, and Plato, as his manner is, has touched the key-note of the whole work in asking for the definition of justice, first suggesting the question which Glaucon afterwards pursues respecting external goods, and preparing for

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the concluding mythus of the world below in the slight allusion of Cephalus. The portrait of the just man is a natural frontispiece or introduction to the long discourse which follows, and may perhaps imply that in all our perplexity about the nature of justice, there is no difficulty in discerning 'who is a just man.' The first explanation has been supported by a saying of Simonides; and now Socrates has a mind to show that the resolution of justice into two unconnected precepts, which have no common principle, fails to satisfy the demands of dialectic.

. . . . . He proceeds: What did Simonides mean by this saying of 332  
his? Did he mean that I was to give back arms to a madman? 'No, not in that case, not if the parties are friends, and evil would result. He meant that you were to do what was proper, good to friends and harm to enemies.' Every act does something to somebody; and following this analogy, Socrates asks, What is this due and proper thing which justice does, and to whom? He is answered that justice does good to friends and harm to enemies. But in what way good or harm? 'In making alliances with the one, and going to war with the other.' Then in time of peace what is the good of justice? The answer is that justice is of use in contracts, 333  
and contracts are money partnerships. Yes; but how in such partnerships is the just man of more use than any other man? 'When you want to have money safely kept and not used.' Then justice will be useful when money is useless. And there is another difficulty: justice, like the art of war or any other art, must be of opposites, good at attack as well as at defence, at stealing as well 334  
as at guarding. But then justice is a thief, though a hero notwithstanding, like Autolycus, the Homeric hero, who was 'excellent above all men in theft and perjury' — to such a pass have you and Homer and Simonides brought us; though I do not forget that the thieving must be for the good of friends and the harm of enemies. And still there arises another question: Are friends to be interpreted as real or seeming; enemies as real or seeming? And 335  
are our friends to be only the good, and our enemies to be the evil? The answer is, that we must do good to our seeming and real good friends, and evil to our seeming and real evil enemies — good to the good, evil to the evil. But ought we to render evil for evil at all, when to do so will only make men more evil? Can justice produce injustice any more than the art of horsemanship



can make bad horsemen, or heat produce cold? The final conclusion is, that no sage or poet ever said that the just return evil for evil; this was a maxim of some rich and mighty man, Periander, Perdiccas, or Ismenias the Theban (about B.C. 398–381). . . .

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Thus the first stage of aphoristic or unconscious morality is shown to be inadequate to the wants of the age; the authority of the poets is set aside, and through the winding mazes of dialectic we make an approach to the Christian precept of forgiveness of injuries. Similar words are applied by the Persian mystic poet to the Divine being when the questioning spirit is stirred within him: — ‘If because I do evil, Thou punishest me by evil, what is the difference between Thee and me?’ In this both Plato and Khèyam rise above the level of many Christian (?) theologians. The first definition of justice easily passes into the second; for the simple words ‘to speak the truth and pay your debts’ is substituted the more abstract ‘to do good to your friends and harm to your enemies.’ Either of these explanations gives a sufficient rule of life for plain men, but they both fall short of the precision of philosophy. We may note in passing the antiquity of casuistry, which not only arises out of the conflict of established principles in particular cases, but also out of the effort to attain them, and is prior as well as posterior to our fundamental notions of morality. The ‘interrogation’ of moral ideas; the appeal to the authority of Homer; the conclusion that the maxim, ‘Do good to your friends and harm to your enemies,’ being erroneous, could not have been the word of any great man (cp. ii. 380 A, B), are all of them very characteristic of the Platonic Socrates.

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. . . Here Thrasymachus, who has made several attempts to interrupt, but has hitherto been kept in order by the company, takes advantage of a pause and rushes into the arena, beginning, like a savage animal, with a roar. ‘Socrates,’ he says, ‘what folly is this?—Why do you agree to be vanquished by one another in a pretended argument?’ He then prohibits all the ordinary definitions of justice; to which Socrates replies that he cannot tell how many twelve is, if he is forbidden to say  $2 \times 6$ , or  $3 \times 4$ , or  $6 \times 2$ , or  $4 \times 3$ . At first Thrasymachus is reluctant to argue; but at length, with a promise of payment on the part of

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the company and of praise from Socrates, he is induced to open the game. 'Listen,' he says; 'my answer is that might is right, justice the interest of the stronger: now praise me.' Let me understand you first. Do you mean that because Polydamas the wrestler, who is stronger than we are, finds the eating of beef for his interest, the eating of beef is also for our interest, who are not so strong? Thrasy-machus is indignant at the illustration, and in pompous words, apparently intended to restore dignity to the argument, he explains his meaning to be that the rulers make laws for their own interests. But suppose, says Socrates, that the 339 ruler or stronger makes a mistake—then the interest of the stronger is not his interest. Thrasy-machus is saved from this speedy downfall by his disciple Cleitophon, who introduces the 340 word 'thinks;'—not the actual interest of the ruler, but what he thinks or what seems to be his interest, is justice. The contradiction is escaped by the unmeaning evasion: for though his real and apparent interests may differ, what the ruler thinks to be his interest will always remain what he thinks to be his interest.

Of course this was not the original assertion, nor is the new interpretation accepted by Thrasy-machus himself. But Socrates is not disposed to quarrel about words, if, as he significantly insinuates, his adversary has changed his mind. In what follows Thrasy-machus does in fact withdraw his admission that the ruler may make a mistake, for he affirms that the ruler as a ruler is infallible. Socrates is quite ready to accept the new position, 341 which he equally turns against Thrasy-machus by the help of the analogy of the arts. Every art or science has an interest, but 342 this interest is to be distinguished from the accidental interest of the artist, and is only concerned with the good of the things or persons which come under the art. And justice has an interest which is the interest not of the ruler or judge, but of those who come under his sway.

Thrasy-machus is on the brink of the inevitable conclusion, when he makes a bold diversion. 'Tell me, Socrates,' he says, 343 'have you a nurse?' What a question! Why do you ask? 'Because, if you have, she neglects you and lets you go about drivelling, and has not even taught you to know the shepherd from the sheep. For you fancy that shepherds and rulers never think of their own interest, but only of their sheep or subjects,

whereas the truth is that they fatten them for their use, sheep and subjects alike. And experience proves that in every relation of life the just man is the loser and the unjust the gainer, especially where injustice is on the grand scale, which is quite another thing from the petty rogueries of swindlers and burglars and robbers of temples. The language of men proves this — our ‘gracious’ and ‘blessed’ tyrant and the like — all which tends to show (1) that justice is the interest of the stronger; and (2) that injustice is more profitable and also stronger than justice.’

Thrasymachus, who is better at a speech than at a close argument, having deluged the company with words, has a mind to escape. But the others will not let him go, and Socrates adds a humble but earnest request that he will not desert them at such a crisis of their fate. ‘And what can I do more for you?’ he says; ‘would you have me put the words bodily into your souls?’ God forbid! replies Socrates; but we want you to be consistent in the use of terms, and not to employ ‘physician’ in an exact sense, and then again ‘shepherd’ or ‘ruler’ in an inexact,—if the words are strictly taken, the ruler and the shepherd look only to the good of their people or flocks and not to their own: whereas you insist that rulers are solely actuated by love of office. ‘No doubt about it,’ replies Thrasymachus. Then why are they paid? Is not the reason, that their interest is not comprehended in their art, and is therefore the concern of another art, the art of pay, which is common to the arts in general, and therefore not identical with any one of them? Nor would any man be a ruler unless he were induced by the hope of reward or the fear of punishment; — the reward is money or honour, the punishment is the necessity of being ruled by a man worse than himself. And if a State [or Church] were composed entirely of good men, they would be affected by the last motive only; and there would be as much ‘nolo episcopari’ as there is at present of the opposite. . . .

The satire on existing governments is heightened by the simple and apparently incidental manner in which the last remark is introduced. There is a similar irony in the argument that the governors of mankind do not like being in office, and that therefore they demand pay.

. . . . Enough of this: the other assertion of Thrasymachus is far

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more important — that the unjust life is more gainful than the just. Now, as you and I, Glaucon, are not convinced by him, we must 348  
 reply to him; but if we try to compare their respective gains we shall want a judge to decide for us; we had better therefore proceed by making mutual admissions of the truth to one another.

Thrasymachus had asserted that perfect injustice was more gainful than perfect justice, and after a little hesitation he is induced by Socrates to admit the still greater paradox that in- 349  
 justice is virtue and justice vice. Socrates praises his frankness, and assumes the attitude of one whose only wish is to understand the meaning of his opponents. At the same time he is weaving a net in which Thrasymachus is finally enclosed. The admission is elicited from him that the just man seeks to gain an advantage over the unjust only, but not over the just, while the unjust would gain an advantage over either. Socrates, in order to test this statement, employs once more the favourite analogy of the arts. The musician, doctor, skilled artist of any sort, does not 350  
 seek to gain more than the skilled, but only more than the unskilled (that is to say, he works up to a rule, standard, law, and does not exceed it), whereas the unskilled makes random efforts at excess. Thus the skilled falls on the side of the good, and the unskilled on the side of the evil, and the just is the skilled, and the unjust is the unskilled.

There was great difficulty in bringing Thrasymachus to the point; the day was hot and he was streaming with perspiration, and for the first time in his life he was seen to blush. But his other thesis that injustice was stronger than justice has not yet been refuted, and Socrates now proceeds to the consideration of this, which, with the assistance of Thrasymachus, he hopes to clear up; the latter is at first churlish, but in the judicious hands of Socrates is soon restored to good-humour: Is there not honour 351  
 among thieves? Is not the strength of injustice only a remnant of justice? Is not absolute injustice absolute weakness also? A house that is divided against itself cannot stand; two men who 352  
 quarrel detract from one another's strength, and he who is at war with himself is the enemy of himself and the gods. Not wickedness therefore, but semi-wickedness flourishes in states,— a remnant of good is needed in order to make union in action possible,— there is no kingdom of evil in this world.



Another question has not been answered: Is the just or the unjust the happier? To this we reply, that every art has an end and an excellence or virtue by which the end is accomplished. And is not the end of the soul happiness, and justice the excellence of the soul by which happiness is attained? Justice and happiness being thus shown to be inseparable, the question whether the just or the unjust is the happier has disappeared.

Thrasymachus replies: 'Let this be your entertainment, Socrates, at the festival of Bendis.' Yes; and a very good entertainment with which your kindness has supplied me, now that you have left off scolding. And yet not a good entertainment — but that was my own fault, for I tasted of too many things. First of all the nature of justice was the subject of our enquiry, and then whether justice is virtue and wisdom, or evil and folly; and then the comparative advantages of just and unjust: and the sum of all is that I know not what justice is; how then shall I know whether the just is happy or not? . . .

Thus the sophistical fabric has been demolished, chiefly by appealing to the analogy of the arts. 'Justice is like the arts (1) in having no external interest, and (2) in not aiming at excess, and (3) justice is to happiness what the implement of the workman is to his work.' At this the modern reader is apt to stumble, because he forgets that Plato is writing in an age when the arts and the virtues, like the moral and intellectual faculties, were still undistinguished. Among early enquirers into the nature of human action the arts helped to fill up the void of speculation; and at first the comparison of the arts and the virtues was not perceived by them to be fallacious. They only saw the points of agreement in them and not the points of difference. Virtue, like art, must take means to an end; good manners are both an art and a virtue; character is naturally described under the image of a statue (ii. 361 D; vii. 540 C); and there are many other figures of speech which are readily transferred from art to morals. The next generation cleared up these perplexities; or at least supplied after ages with a further analysis of them. The contemporaries of Plato were in a state of transition, and had not yet fully realized the common-sense distinction of Aristotle, that 'virtue is concerned with action, art with production' (Nic. Eth. vi. 4), or that 'virtue implies intention and constancy of purpose,'

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whereas 'art requires knowledge only' (Nic. Eth. ii. 3). And yet in the absurdities which follow from some uses of the analogy (cp. i. 333 E, 334 B), there seems to be an intimation conveyed that virtue is more than art. This is implied in the *reductio ad absurdum* that 'justice is a thief,' and in the dissatisfaction which Socrates expresses at the final result.

The expression 'an art of pay' (i. 346 B) which is described as 'common to all the arts' is not in accordance with the ordinary use of language. Nor is it employed elsewhere either by Plato or by any other Greek writer. It is suggested by the argument, and seems to extend the conception of art to doing as well as making. Another flaw or inaccuracy of language may be noted in the words (i. 335 C) 'men who are injured are made more unjust.' For those who are injured are not necessarily made worse, but only harmed or ill-treated.

The second of the three arguments, 'that the just does not aim at excess,' has a real meaning, though wrapped up in an enigmatical form. That the good is of the nature of the finite is a peculiarly Hellenic sentiment, which may be compared with the language of those modern writers who speak of virtue as fitness, and of freedom as obedience to law. The mathematical or logical notion of limit easily passes into an ethical one, and even finds a mythological expression in the conception of envy (*φθόνος*). Ideas of measure, equality, order, unity, proportion, still linger in the writings of moralists; and the true spirit of the fine arts is better conveyed by such terms than by superlatives.

'When workmen strive to do better than well,  
They do confound their skill in covetousness.'

(King John, Act iv. Sc. 2.)

The harmony of the soul and body (iii. 402 D), and of the parts of the soul with one another (iv. 442 C), a harmony 'fairer than that of musical notes,' is the true Hellenic mode of conceiving the perfection of human nature.

In what may be called the epilogue of the discussion with Thrasymachus, Plato argues that evil is not a principle of strength, but of discord and dissolution, just touching the question which has been often treated in modern times by theologians and philosophers, of the negative nature of evil (cp. on the other hand x. 610). In the last argument we trace the germ of the

Aristotelian doctrine of an end and a virtue directed towards the end, which again is suggested by the arts. The final reconciliation of justice and happiness and the identity of the individual and the State are also intimated. Socrates reassumes the character of a ‘know-nothing;’ at the same time he appears to be not wholly satisfied with the manner in which the argument has been conducted. Nothing is concluded; but the tendency of the dialectical process, here as always, is to enlarge our conception of ideas, and to widen their application to human life.

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Steph. **BOOK II.** Thrasymachus is pacified, but the intrepid Glaucon  
 357 insists on continuing the argument. He is not satisfied with the indirect manner in which, at the end of the last book, Socrates had disposed of the question ‘Whether the just or the unjust is the happier.’ He begins by dividing goods into three classes:—first, goods desirable in themselves; secondly, goods desirable in themselves and for their results; thirdly, goods desirable for their results only. He then asks Socrates in which of the three  
 358 classes he would place justice. In the second class, replies Socrates, among goods desirable for themselves and also for their results. ‘Then the world in general are of another mind, for they say that justice belongs to the troublesome class of goods which are desirable for their results only.’ Socrates answers that this is the doctrine of Thrasymachus which he rejects. Glaucon thinks that Thrasymachus was too ready to listen to the voice of the charmer, and proposes to consider the nature of justice and injustice in themselves and apart from the results and rewards of them which the world is always dinning in his ears. He will first of all speak of the nature and origin of justice; secondly, of the manner in which men view justice as a necessity and not a good; and thirdly, he will prove the reasonableness of this view.

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‘To do injustice is said to be a good; to suffer injustice an evil. As the evil is discovered by experience to be greater than the  
 359 good, the sufferers, who cannot also be doers, make a compact that they will have neither, and this compact or mean is called justice, but is really the impossibility of doing injustice. No one would observe such a compact if he were not obliged. Let us suppose that the just and unjust have two rings, like that of Gyges



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in the well-known story, which make them invisible, and then 360  
no difference will appear in them, for every one will do evil if  
he can. And he who abstains will be regarded by the world  
as a fool for his pains. Men may praise him in public out  
of fear for themselves, but they will laugh at him in their hearts.  
(Cp. Gorgias, 483 B.)

‘And now let us frame an ideal of the just and unjust. Imagine  
the unjust man to be master of his craft, seldom making mistakes  
and easily correcting them; having gifts of money, speech, 361  
strength — the greatest villain bearing the highest character: and  
at his side let us place the just in his nobleness and simplicity —  
being, not seeming — without name or reward — clothed in his  
justice only — the best of men who is thought to be the worst,  
and let him die as he has lived. I might add (but I would rather  
put the rest into the mouth of the panegyrists of injustice — they  
will tell you) that the just man will be scourged, racked, bound,  
will have his eyes put out, and will at last be crucified [literally  
*impaled*] — and all this because he ought to have preferred seeming  
to being. How different is the case of the unjust who clings 362  
to appearance as the true reality! His high character makes him  
a ruler; he can marry where he likes, trade where he likes, help  
his friends and hurt his enemies; having got rich by dishonesty  
he can worship the gods better, and will therefore be more loved  
by them than the just.’

I was thinking what to answer, when Adeimantus joined in the  
already unequal fray. He considered that the most important  
point of all had been omitted: — ‘Men are taught to be just for  
the sake of rewards; parents and guardians make reputation the 363  
incentive to virtue. And other advantages are promised by them  
of a more solid kind, such as wealthy marriages and high offices.  
There are the pictures in Homer and Hesiod of fat sheep and  
heavy fleeces, rich corn-fields and trees toppling with fruit, which  
the gods provide in this life for the just. And the Orphic poets  
add a similar picture of another. The heroes of Musaeus and  
Eumolpus lie on couches at a festival, with garlands on their  
heads, enjoying as the meed of virtue a paradise of immortal  
drunkenness. Some go further, and speak of a fair posterity in the  
third and fourth generation. But the wicked they bury in a slough  
and make them carry water in a sieve: and in this life they



attribute to them the infamy which Glaucon was assuming to be the lot of the just who are supposed to be unjust. *Republic II.*

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364 'Take another kind of argument which is found both in poetry and prose:—"Virtue," as Hesiod says, "is honourable but difficult, vice is easy and profitable." You may often see the wicked in great prosperity and the righteous afflicted by the will of heaven. And mendicant prophets knock at rich men's doors, promising to atone for the sins of themselves or their fathers in an easy fashion with sacrifices and festive games, or with charms and invocations to get rid of an enemy good or bad by divine help and at a small charge;—they appeal to books professing to be written by Musaeus and Orpheus, and carry away the minds of whole cities, and promise to "get souls out of purgatory;" and if we  
365 refuse to listen to them, no one knows what will happen to us.

'When a lively-minded ingenuous youth hears all this, what will be his conclusion? "Will he," in the language of Pindar, "make justice his high tower, or fortify himself with crooked deceit?" Justice, he reflects, without the appearance of justice, is misery and ruin; injustice has the promise of a glorious life. Appearance is master of truth and lord of happiness. To appearance then I will turn,—I will put on the show of virtue and trail behind me the fox of Archilochus. I hear some one saying that "wickedness is not easily concealed," to which I reply that "nothing great is easy." Union and force and rhetoric will do much; and if men say that they cannot prevail over the gods, still how do we know that there are gods? Only from the poets, who acknowledge that they may be appeased by sacrifices. Then why not  
366 sin and pay for indulgences out of your sin? For if the righteous are only unpunished, still they have no further reward, while the wicked may be unpunished and have the pleasure of sinning too. But what of the world below? Nay, says the argument, there are atoning powers who will set that matter right, as the poets, who are the sons of the gods, tell us; and this is confirmed by the authority of the State.

'How can we resist such arguments in favour of injustice? Add good manners, and, as the wise tell us, we shall make the best of both worlds. Who that is not a miserable caitiff will refrain from smiling at the praises of justice? Even if a man knows the better part he will not be angry with others; for he knows also that

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more than human virtue is needed to save a man, and that he only praises justice who is incapable of injustice.

‘The origin of the evil is that all men from the beginning, heroes, poets, instructors of youth, have always asserted “the temporal dispensation,” the honours and profits of justice. Had we been taught in early youth the power of justice and injustice inherent in the soul, and unseen by any human or divine eye, we should not have needed others to be our guardians, but every one would have been the guardian of himself. This is what I want you to show, Socrates;—other men use arguments which rather tend to strengthen the position of Thrasymachus that “might is right;” but from you I expect better things. And please, as Glaucon said, to exclude reputation; let the just be thought unjust and the unjust just, and do you still prove to us the superiority of justice.’ . . . 367

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The thesis, which for the sake of argument has been maintained by Glaucon, is the converse of that of Thrasymachus—not right is the interest of the stronger, but right is the necessity of the weaker. Starting from the same premises he carries the analysis of society a step further back;—might is still right, but the might is the weakness of the many combined against the strength of the few.

There have been theories in modern as well as in ancient times which have a family likeness to the speculations of Glaucon; e. g. that power is the foundation of right; or that a monarch has a divine right to govern well or ill; or that virtue is self-love or the love of power; or that war is the natural state of man; or that private vices are public benefits. All such theories have a kind of plausibility from their partial agreement with experience. For human nature oscillates between good and evil, and the motives of actions and the origin of institutions may be explained to a certain extent on either hypothesis according to the character or point of view of a particular thinker. The obligation of maintaining authority under all circumstances and sometimes by rather questionable means is felt strongly and has become a sort of instinct among civilized men. The divine right of kings, or more generally of governments, is one of the forms under which this natural feeling is expressed. Nor again is there any evil which has not some accompaniment of good or pleasure; nor any good

which is free from some alloy of evil; nor any noble or generous thought which may not be attended by a shadow or the ghost of a shadow of self-interest or of self-love. We know that all human actions are imperfect; but we do not therefore attribute them to the worse rather than to the better motive or principle. Such a philosophy is both foolish and false, like that opinion of the clever rogue who assumes all other men to be like himself (iii. 409 C). And theories of this sort do not represent the real nature of the State, which is based on a vague sense of right gradually corrected and enlarged by custom and law (although capable also of perversion), any more than they describe the origin of society, which is to be sought in the family and in the social and religious feelings of man. Nor do they represent the average character of individuals, which cannot be explained simply on a theory of evil, but has always a counteracting element of good. And as men become better such theories appear more and more untruthful to them, because they are more conscious of their own disinterestedness. A little experience may make a man a cynic; a great deal will bring him back to a truer and kindlier view of the mixed nature of himself and his fellow men.

The two brothers ask Socrates to prove to them that the just is happy when they have taken from him all that in which happiness is ordinarily supposed to consist. Not that there is (1) any absurdity in the attempt to frame a notion of justice apart from circumstances. For the ideal must always be a paradox when compared with the ordinary conditions of human life. Neither the Stoical ideal nor the Christian ideal is true as a fact, but they may serve as a basis of education, and may exercise an ennobling influence. An ideal is none the worse because 'some one has made the discovery' that no such ideal was ever realized. (Cp. v. 472 D.) And in a few exceptional individuals who are raised above the ordinary level of humanity, the ideal of happiness may be realized in death and misery. This may be the state which the reason deliberately approves, and which the utilitarian as well as every other moralist may be bound in certain cases to prefer.

Nor again, (2) must we forget that Plato, though he agrees generally with the view implied in the argument of the two brothers, is not expressing his own final conclusion, but rather

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seeking to dramatize one of the aspects of ethical truth. He is developing his idea gradually in a series of positions or situations. He is exhibiting Socrates for the first time undergoing the Socratic interrogation. Lastly, (3) the word 'happiness' involves some degree of confusion because associated in the language of modern philosophy with conscious pleasure or satisfaction, which was not equally present to his mind.

Glaucon has been drawing a picture of the misery of the just and the happiness of the unjust, to which the misery of the tyrant in Book IX is the answer and parallel. And still the unjust must appear just; that is 'the homage which vice pays to virtue.' But now Adeimantus, taking up the hint which had been already given by Glaucon (ii. 358 C), proceeds to show that in the opinion of mankind justice is regarded only for the sake of rewards and reputation, and points out the advantage which is given to such arguments as those of Thrasymachus and Glaucon by the conventional morality of mankind. He seems to feel the difficulty of 'justifying the ways of God to man.' Both the brothers touch upon the question, whether the morality of actions is determined by their consequences (cp. iv. 420 foll.); and both of them go beyond the position of Socrates, that justice belongs to the class of goods not desirable for themselves only, but desirable for themselves and for their results, to which he recalls them. In their attempt to view justice as an internal principle, and in their condemnation of the poets, they anticipate him. The common life of Greece is not enough for them; they must penetrate deeper into the nature of things.

It has been objected that justice is honesty in the sense of Glaucon and Adeimantus, but is taken by Socrates to mean all virtue. May we not more truly say that the old-fashioned notion of justice is enlarged by Socrates, and becomes equivalent to universal order or well-being, first in the State, and secondly in the individual? He has found a new answer to his old question (Protag. 329), 'whether the virtues are one or many,' viz. that one is the ordering principle of the three others. In seeking to establish the purely internal nature of justice, he is met by the fact that man is a social being, and he tries to harmonise the two opposite theses as well as he can. There is no more inconsistency in this than was inevitable in his age and country;



there is no use in turning upon him the cross lights of modern philosophy, which, from some other point of view, would appear equally inconsistent. Plato does not give the final solution of philosophical questions for us; nor can he be judged of by our standard.

The remainder of the Republic is developed out of the question of the sons of Ariston. Three points are deserving of remark in what immediately follows:—First, that the answer of Socrates is altogether indirect. He does not say that happiness consists in the contemplation of the idea of justice, and still less will he be tempted to affirm the Stoical paradox that the just man can be happy on the rack. But first he dwells on the difficulty of the problem and insists on restoring man to his natural condition, before he will answer the question at all. He too will frame an ideal, but his ideal comprehends not only abstract justice, but the whole relations of man. Under the fanciful illustration of the large letters he implies that he will only look for justice in society, and that from the State he will proceed to the individual. His answer in substance amounts to this,—that under favourable conditions, i. e. in the perfect State, justice and happiness will coincide, and that when justice has been once found, happiness may be left to take care of itself. That he falls into some degree of inconsistency, when in the tenth book (612 A) he claims to have got rid of the rewards and honours of justice, may be admitted; for he has left those which exist in the perfect State. And the philosopher ‘who retires under the shelter of a wall’ (vi. 496) can hardly have been esteemed happy by him, at least not in this world. Still he maintains the true attitude of moral action. Let a man do his duty first, without asking whether he will be happy or not, and happiness will be the inseparable accident which attends him. ‘Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you.’

Secondly, it may be remarked that Plato preserves the genuine character of Greek thought in beginning with the State and in going on to the individual. First ethics, then politics—this is the order of ideas to us; the reverse is the order of history. Only after many struggles of thought does the individual assert his right as a moral being. In early ages he is not *one*, but one of many, the citizen of a State which is prior to him; and he

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has no notion of good or evil apart from the law of his country or the creed of his church. And to this type he is constantly tending to revert, whenever the influence of custom, or of party spirit, or the recollection of the past becomes too strong for him.

Thirdly, we may observe the confusion or identification of the individual and the State, of ethics and politics, which pervades early Greek speculation, and even in modern times retains a certain degree of influence. The subtle difference between the collective and individual action of mankind seems to have escaped early thinkers, and we too are sometimes in danger of forgetting the conditions of united human action, whenever we either elevate politics into ethics, or lower ethics to the standard of politics. The good man and the good citizen only coincide in the perfect State; and this perfection cannot be attained by legislation acting upon them from without, but, if at all, by education fashioning them from within.

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. . . Socrates praises the sons of Ariston, 'inspired offspring of the renowned hero,' as the elegiac poet terms them; but he does not understand how they can argue so eloquently on behalf of injustice while their character shows that they are uninfluenced by their own arguments. He knows not how to answer them, although he is afraid of deserting justice in the hour of need. He therefore makes a condition, that having weak eyes he shall be allowed to read the large letters first and then go on to the smaller, that is, he must look for justice in the State first, and will then proceed to the individual. Accordingly he begins to construct the State. 368 369

Society arises out of the wants of man. His first want is food; his second a house; his third a coat. The sense of these needs and the possibility of satisfying them by exchange, draw individuals together on the same spot; and this is the beginning of a State, which we take the liberty to invent, although necessity is the real inventor. There must be first a husbandman, secondly a builder, thirdly a weaver, to which may be added a cobbler. Four or five citizens at least are required to make a city. Now men have different natures, and one man will do one thing better than many; and business waits for no man. Hence there must be a division of labour into different employments; into wholesale and retail trade; into workers, and makers of workmen's 370

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tools; into shepherds and husbandmen. A city which includes all this will have far exceeded the limit of four or five, and yet not be very large. But then again imports will be required, and imports necessitate exports, and this implies variety of produce in order to attract the taste of purchasers; also merchants and ships. In the city too we must have a market and money and retail trades; otherwise buyers and sellers will never meet, and the valuable time of the producers will be wasted in vain efforts at exchange. If we add hired servants the State will be complete. And we may guess that somewhere in the intercourse of the citizens with one another justice and injustice will appear.

Here follows a rustic picture of their way of life. They spend their days in houses which they have built for themselves; they make their own clothes and produce their own corn and wine. Their principal food is meal and flour, and they drink in moderation. They live on the best of terms with each other, and take care not to have too many children. 'But,' said Glaucon, interposing, 'are they not to have a relish?' Certainly; they will have salt and olives and cheese, vegetables and fruits, and chestnuts to roast at the fire. 'Tis a city of pigs, Socrates.' Why, I replied, what do you want more? 'Only the comforts of life,—sofas and tables, also sauces and sweets.' I see; you want not only a State, but a luxurious State; and possibly in the more complex frame we may sooner find justice and injustice. Then the fine arts must go to work—every conceivable instrument and ornament of luxury will be wanted. There will be dancers, painters, sculptors, musicians, cooks, barbers, tire-women, nurses, artists; swineherds and neatherds too for the animals, and physicians to cure the disorders of which luxury is the source. To feed all these superfluous mouths we shall need a part of our neighbours' land, and they will want a part of ours. And this is the origin of war, which may be traced to the same causes as other political evils. Our city will now require the slight addition of a camp, and the citizen will be converted into a soldier. But then again our old doctrine of the division of labour must not be forgotten. The art of war cannot be learned in a day, and there must be a natural aptitude for military duties. There will be some warlike natures who have this aptitude—dogs keen of scent, swift of foot to pursue, and strong of limb to fight. And



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as spirit is the foundation of courage, such natures, whether of men or animals, will be full of spirit. But these spirited natures are apt to bite and devour one another; the union of gentleness to friends and fierceness against enemies appears to be an impossibility, and the guardian of a State requires both qualities. Who then can be a guardian? The image of the dog suggests an answer. For dogs are gentle to friends and fierce to strangers. 376  
Your dog is a philosopher who judges by the rule of knowing or not knowing; and philosophy, whether in man or beast, is the parent of gentleness. The human watchdogs must be philosophers or lovers of learning which will make them gentle. And how are they to be learned without education?

But what shall their education be? Is any better than the old-fashioned sort which is comprehended under the name of music and gymnastic? Music includes literature, and literature is of two kinds, true and false. 'What do you mean?' he said. I mean that children hear stories before they learn gymnastics, and that the stories are either untrue, or have at most one or two grains of truth in a bushel of falsehood. Now early life is very impressible, and children ought not to learn what they will have to unlearn when they grow up; we must therefore have a censorship of nursery tales, banishing some and keeping others. Some of them are very improper, as we may see in the great instances of Homer and Hesiod, who not only tell lies but bad lies; stories about Uranus and Saturn, which are immoral as well as false, 378  
and which should never be spoken of to young persons, or indeed at all; or, if at all, then in a mystery, after the sacrifice, not of an Eleusinian pig, but of some unprocurable animal. Shall our youth be encouraged to beat their fathers by the example of Zeus, or our citizens be incited to quarrel by hearing or seeing representations of strife among the gods? Shall they listen to the narrative of Hephaestus binding his mother, and of Zeus sending him flying for helping her when she was beaten? Such tales may possibly have a mystical interpretation, but the young are incapable of understanding allegory. If any one asks what tales are to be allowed, we will answer that we are legislators and 379  
not book-makers; we only lay down the principles according to which books are to be written; to write them is the duty of others.



And our first principle is, that God must be represented as he is; not as the author of all things, but of good only. We will not suffer the poets to say that he is the steward of good and evil, or that he has two casks full of destinies; — or that Athene and Zeus incited Pandarus to break the treaty; or that God caused the sufferings of Niobe, or of Pelops, or the Trojan war; or that he makes men sin when he wishes to destroy them. Either these were not the actions of the gods, or God was just, and men were the better for being punished. But that the deed was evil, and God the author, is a wicked, suicidal fiction which we will allow no one, old or young, to utter. This is our first and great principle — God is the author of good only.

And the second principle is like unto it: — With God is no variableness or change of form. Reason teaches us this; for if we suppose a change in God, he must be changed either by another or by himself. By another? — but the best works of nature and art and the noblest qualities of mind are least liable to be changed by any external force. By himself? — but he cannot change for the better; he will hardly change for the worse. He remains for ever fairest and best in his own image. Therefore we refuse to listen to the poets who tell us of Here begging in the likeness of a priestess or of other deities who prowling about at night in strange disguises; all that blasphemous nonsense with which mothers fool the manhood out of their children must be suppressed. But some one will say that God, who is himself unchangeable, may take a form in relation to us. Why should he? For gods as well as men hate the lie in the soul, or principle of falsehood; and as for any other form of lying which is used for a purpose and is regarded as innocent in certain exceptional cases — what need have the gods of this? For they are not ignorant of antiquity like the poets, nor are they afraid of their enemies, nor is any madman a friend of theirs. God then is true, he is absolutely true; he changes not, he deceives not, by day or night, by word or sign. This is our second great principle — God is true. Away with the lying dream of Agamemnon in Homer, and the accusation of Thetis against Apollo in Aeschylus. . . .

In order to give clearness to his conception of the State, Plato proceeds to trace the first principles of mutual need and of

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division of labour in an imaginary community of four or five citizens. Gradually this community increases; the division of labour extends to countries; imports necessitate exports; a medium of exchange is required, and retailers sit in the market-place to save the time of the producers. These are the steps by which Plato constructs the first or primitive State, introducing the elements of political economy by the way. As he is going to frame a second or civilized State, the simple naturally comes before the complex. He indulges, like Rousseau, in a picture of primitive life—an idea which has indeed often had a powerful influence on the imagination of mankind, but he does not seriously mean to say that one is better than the other (cp. *Statesman*, p. 272); nor can any inference be drawn from the description of the first state taken apart from the second, such as Aristotle appears to draw in the *Politics*, iv. 4, § 12 (cp. again *Statesman*, 272). We should not interpret a Platonic dialogue any more than a poem or a parable in too literal or matter-of-fact a style. On the other hand, when we compare the lively fancy of Plato with the dried-up abstractions of modern treatises on philosophy, we are compelled to say with Protagoras, that the ‘mythus is more interesting’ (Protag. 320 D).

Several interesting remarks which in modern times would have a place in a treatise on Political Economy are scattered up and down the writings of Plato: cp. especially *Laws*, v. 740, Population; viii. 847, Free Trade; xi. 916–7, Adulteration; 923–4, Wills and Bequests; 930, Begging; *Eryxias*, (though not Plato’s), Value and Demand; *Republic*, ii. 369 ff., Division of Labour. The last subject, and also the origin of Retail Trade, is treated with admirable lucidity in the second book of the *Republic*. But Plato never combined his economic ideas into a system, and never seems to have recognized that Trade is one of the great motive powers of the State and of the world. He would make retail traders only of the inferior sort of citizens (*Rep.* ii. 371; cp. *Laws*, viii. 847), though he remarks, quaintly enough (*Laws*, xi. 918 D), that ‘if only the best men and the best women everywhere were compelled to keep taverns for a time or to carry on retail trade, etc’, then we should know how pleasant and agreeable all these things are.’

The disappointment of Glaucon at the ‘city of pigs,’ the ludicrous description of the ministers of luxury in the more refined

State, and the afterthought of the necessity of doctors, the illustration of the nature of the guardian taken from the dog; the desirableness of offering some almost unprocurable victim when impure mysteries are to be celebrated, the behaviour of Zeus to his father and of Hephaestus to his mother, are touches of humour which have also a serious meaning. In speaking of education Plato rather startles us by affirming that a child must be trained in falsehood first and in truth afterwards. Yet this is not very different from saying that children must be taught through the medium of imagination as well as reason; that their minds can only develop gradually, and that there is much which they must learn without understanding (cp. iii. 402 A). This is also the substance of Plato's view, though he must be acknowledged to have drawn the line somewhat differently from modern ethical writers, respecting truth and falsehood. To us, economies or accommodations would not be allowable unless they were required by the human faculties or necessary for the communication of knowledge to the simple and ignorant. We should insist that the word was inseparable from the intention, and that we must not be 'falsely true,' i. e. speak or act falsely in support of what was right or true. But Plato would limit the use of fictions only by requiring that they should have a good moral effect, and that such a dangerous weapon as falsehood should be employed by the rulers alone and for great objects.

A Greek in the age of Plato attached no importance to the question whether his religion was an historical fact. He was just beginning to be conscious that the past had a history; but he could see nothing beyond Homer and Hesiod. Whether their narratives were true or false did not seriously affect the political or social life of Hellas. Men only began to suspect that they were fictions when they recognised them to be immoral. And so in all religions: the consideration of their morality comes first, afterwards the truth of the documents in which they are recorded, or of the events natural or supernatural which are told of them. But in modern times, and in Protestant countries perhaps more than in Catholic, we have been too much inclined to identify the historical with the moral; and some have refused to believe in religion at all, unless a superhuman accuracy was discernible in every part of the record. The facts of an ancient

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or religious history are amongst the most important of all facts ; but they are frequently uncertain, and we only learn the true lesson which is to be gathered from them when we place ourselves above them. These reflections tend to show that the difference between Plato and ourselves, though not unimportant, is not so great as might at first sight appear. For we should agree with him in placing the moral before the historical truth of religion ; and, generally, in disregarding those errors or mis-statements of fact which necessarily occur in the early stages of all religions. We know also that changes in the traditions of a country cannot be made in a day ; and are therefore tolerant of many things which science and criticism would condemn.

We note in passing that the allegorical interpretation of mythology, said to have been first introduced as early as the sixth century before Christ by Theagenes of Rhegium, was well established in the age of Plato, and here, as in the *Phaedrus* (229-30), though for a different reason, was rejected by him. That anachronisms whether of religion or law, when men have reached another stage of civilization, should be got rid of by fictions is in accordance with universal experience. Great is the art of interpretation ; and by a natural process, which when once discovered was always going on, what could not be altered was explained away. And so without any palpable inconsistency there existed side by side two forms of religion, the tradition inherited or invented by the poets and the customary worship of the temple ; on the other hand, there was the religion of the philosopher, who was dwelling in the heaven of ideas, but did not therefore refuse to offer a cock to *Æsculapius*, or to be seen saying his prayers at the rising of the sun. At length the antagonism between the popular and philosophical religion, never so great among the Greeks as in our own age, disappeared, and was only felt like the difference between the religion of the educated and uneducated among ourselves. The Zeus of Homer and Hesiod easily passed into the 'royal mind' of Plato (*Philebus*, 28) ; the giant *Heracles* became the knight-errant and benefactor of mankind. These and still more wonderful transformations were readily effected by the ingenuity of Stoics and neo-Platonists in the two or three centuries before and after Christ. The Greek and Roman religions were gradually permeated by the spirit of philosophy ; having lost their



ancient meaning, they were resolved into poetry and morality; and probably were never purer than at the time of their decay, when their influence over the world was waning.

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A singular conception which occurs towards the end of the book is the lie in the soul; this is connected with the Platonic and Socratic doctrine that involuntary ignorance is worse than voluntary. The lie in the soul is a true lie, the corruption of the highest truth, the deception of the highest part of the soul, from which he who is deceived has no power of delivering himself. For example, to represent God as false or immoral, or, according to Plato, as deluding men with appearances or as the author of evil; or again, to affirm with Protagoras that 'knowledge is sensation,' or that 'being is becoming,' or with Thrasy-machus 'that might is right,' would have been regarded by Plato as a lie of this hateful sort. The greatest unconsciousness of the greatest untruth, e. g. if, in the language of the Gospels (John iv. 41), 'he who was blind' were to say 'I see,' is another aspect of the state of mind which Plato is describing. The lie in the soul may be further compared with the sin against the Holy Ghost (Luke xii. 10), allowing for the difference between Greek and Christian modes of speaking. To this is opposed the lie in words, which is only such a deception as may occur in a play or poem, or allegory or figure of speech, or in any sort of accommodation,—which though useless to the gods may be useful to men in certain cases. Socrates is here answering the question which he had himself raised (i. 331 C) about the propriety of deceiving a madman; and he is also contrasting the nature of God and man. For God is Truth, but mankind can only be true by appearing sometimes to be partial, or false. Reserving for another place the greater questions of religion or education, we may note further, (1) the approval of the old traditional education of Greece; (2) the preparation which Plato is making for the attack on Homer and the poets; (3) the preparation which he is also making for the use of economies in the State; (4) the contemptuous and at the same time euphemistic manner in which here as below (iii. 390) he alludes to the *Chronique Scandaleuse* of the gods.

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386 which is to banish fear; for no man can be courageous who is

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afraid of death, or who believes the tales which are repeated by the poets concerning the world below. They must be gently requested not to abuse hell; they may be reminded that their stories are both untrue and discouraging. Nor must they be angry if we expunge obnoxious passages, such as the depressing words of Achilles—‘I would rather be a serving-man than rule over all the dead;’ and the verses which tell of the squalid mansions, the senseless shadows, the flitting soul mourning over lost strength and youth, the soul with a gibber going beneath the earth like smoke, or the souls of the suitors which flutter about like bats. The terrors and horrors of Cocytus and Styx, ghosts and sapless shades, and the rest of their Tartarean nomenclature, must vanish. Such tales may have their use; but they are not the proper food for soldiers. As little can we admit the sorrows and sympathies of the Homeric heroes: — Achilles, the son of Thetis, in tears, throwing ashes on his head, or pacing up and down the sea-shore in distraction; or Priam, the cousin of the gods, crying aloud, rolling in the mire. A good man is not prostrated at the loss of children or fortune. Neither is death terrible to him; and therefore lamentations over the dead should not be practised by men of note; they should be the concern of inferior persons only, whether women or men. Still worse is the attribution of such weakness to the gods; as when the goddesses say, ‘Alas! my travail!’ and worst of all, when the king of heaven himself laments his inability to save Hector, or sorrows over the impending doom of his dear Sarpedon. Such a character of God, if not ridiculed by our young men, is likely to be imitated by them. Nor should our citizens be given to excess of laughter—‘Such violent delights’ are followed by a violent re-action. The description in the Iliad of the gods shaking their sides at the clumsiness of Hephaestus will not be admitted by us. ‘Certainly not.’ 387 388 389

Truth should have a high place among the virtues, for falsehood, as we were saying, is useless to the gods, and only useful to men as a medicine. But this employment of falsehood must remain a privilege of state; the common man must not in return tell a lie to the ruler; any more than the patient would tell a lie to his physician, or the sailor to his captain.

In the next place our youth must be temperate, and temperance consists in self-control and obedience to authority. That is a

lesson which Homer teaches in some places: 'The Achaeans marched on breathing prowess, in silent awe of their leaders; '— but a very different one in other places: 'O heavy with wine, who hast the eyes of a dog, but the heart of a stag.' Language of the latter kind will not impress self-control on the minds of youth. The same may be said about his praises of eating and drinking and his dread of starvation; also about the verses in which he tells of the rapturous loves of Zeus and Here, or of how Hephaestus once detained Ares and Aphrodite in a net on a similar occasion. There is a nobler strain heard in the words:—'Endure, my soul, thou hast endured worse.' Nor must we allow our citizens to receive bribes, or to say, 'Gifts persuade the gods, gifts reverend kings;' or to applaud the ignoble advice of Phoenix to Achilles that he should get money out of the Greeks before he assisted them; or the meanness of Achilles himself in taking gifts from Agamemnon; or his requiring a ransom for the body of Hector; or his cursing of Apollo; or his insolence to the river-god Scamander; or his dedication to the dead Patroclus of his own hair which had been already dedicated to the other river-god Spercheius; or his cruelty in dragging the body of Hector round the walls, and slaying the captives at the pyre: such a combination of meanness and cruelty in Cheiron's pupil is inconceivable. The amatory exploits of Peirithous and Theseus are equally unworthy. Either these so-called sons of gods were not the sons of gods, or they were not such as the poets imagine them, any more than the gods themselves are the authors of evil. The youth who believes that such things are done by those who have the blood of heaven flowing in their veins will be too ready to imitate their example.

Enough of gods and heroes;— what shall we say about men? What the poets and story-tellers say—that the wicked prosper and the righteous are afflicted, or that justice is another's gain? Such misrepresentations cannot be allowed by us. But in this we are anticipating the definition of justice, and had therefore better defer the enquiry.

The subjects of poetry have been sufficiently treated; next follows style. Now all poetry is a narrative of events past, present, or to come; and narrative is of three kinds, the simple, the imitative, and a composition of the two. An instance will



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make my meaning clear. The first scene in Homer is of the last 393  
 or mixed kind, being partly description and partly dialogue. But  
 if you throw the dialogue into the ‘*oratio obliqua*,’ the passage  
 will run thus: The priest came and prayed Apollo that the 394  
 Achacans might take Troy and have a safe return if Agamemnon  
 would only give him back his daughter; and the other Greeks  
 assented, but Agamemnon was wroth, and so on — The whole then  
 becomes descriptive, and the poet is the only speaker left; or, if  
 you omit the narrative, the whole becomes dialogue. These are  
 the three styles — which of them is to be admitted into our State?  
 ‘Do you ask whether tragedy and comedy are to be admitted?’  
 Yes, but also something more — Is it not doubtful whether our  
 guardians are to be imitators at all? Or rather, has not the ques-  
 tion been already answered, for we have decided that one man  
 cannot in his life play many parts, any more than he can act both 395  
 tragedy and comedy, or be rhapsodist and actor at once? Human  
 nature is coined into very small pieces, and as our guardians have  
 their own business already, which is the care of freedom, they will  
 have enough to do without imitating. If they imitate they should  
 imitate, not any meanness or baseness, but the good only; for  
 the mask which the actor wears is apt to become his face.  
 We cannot allow men to play the parts of women, quarrelling,  
 weeping, scolding, or boasting against the gods, — least of all when  
 making love or in labour. They must not represent slaves, or  
 bullies, or cowards, or drunkards, or madmen, or blacksmiths, or 396  
 neighing horses, or bellowing bulls, or sounding rivers, or a  
 raging sea. A good or wise man will be willing to perform good  
 and wise actions, but he will be ashamed to play an inferior part  
 which he has never practised; and he will prefer to employ the  
 descriptive style with as little imitation as possible. The man 397  
 who has no self-respect, on the contrary, will imitate anybody and  
 anything; sounds of nature and cries of animals alike; his whole  
 performance will be imitation of gesture and voice. Now in the  
 descriptive style there are few changes, but in the dramatic there  
 are a great many. Poets and musicians use either, or a compound  
 of both, and this compound is very attractive to youth and their  
 teachers as well as to the vulgar. But our State in which one man  
 plays one part only is not adapted for complexity. And when 398  
 one of these polyphonous pantomimic gentlemen offers to exhibit



himself and his poetry we will show him every observance of respect, but at the same time tell him that there is no room for his kind in our State; we prefer the rough, honest poet, and will not depart from our original models (ii. 379 foll.; cp. Laws, vii. 817). Republic III.  
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Next as to the music. A song or ode has three parts,—the subject, the harmony, and the rhythm; of which the two last are dependent upon the first. As we banished strains of lamentation, so we may now banish the mixed Lydian harmonies, which are the harmonies of lamentation; and as our citizens are to be temperate, we may also banish convivial harmonies, such as the

399 Ionian and pure Lydian. Two remain — the Dorian and Phrygian, the first for war, the second for peace; the one expressive of courage, the other of obedience or instruction or religious feeling. And as we reject varieties of harmony, we shall also reject the many-stringed, variously-shaped instruments which give utterance to them, and in particular the flute, which is more complex than any of them. The lyre and the harp may be permitted in the town, and the Pan's-pipe in the fields. Thus we have made a purgation of music, and will now make a purgation of metres.

400 These should be like the harmonies, simple and suitable to the occasion. There are four notes of the tetrachord, and there are three ratios of metre,  $\frac{3}{2}$ ,  $\frac{2}{1}$ ,  $\frac{2}{3}$ , which have all their characteristics, and the feet have different characteristics as well as the rhythms. But about this you and I must ask Damon, the great musician, who speaks, if I remember rightly, of a martial measure as well as of dactylic, trochaic, and iambic rhythms, which he arranges so as to equalize the syllables with one another, assigning to each the proper quantity. We only venture to affirm the general principle that the style is to conform to the subject and the metre to the style; and that the simplicity and harmony of the soul should be reflected in them all. This principle of simplicity has to be learnt by every one in the days of his youth, and may

401 be gathered anywhere, from the creative and constructive arts, as well as from the forms of plants and animals.

Other artists as well as poets should be warned against meanness or unseemliness. Sculpture and painting equally with music must conform to the law of simplicity. He who violates it cannot be allowed to work in our city, and to corrupt the taste of our citizens. For our guardians must grow up, not amid images of

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deformity which will gradually poison and corrupt their souls, but in a land of health and beauty where they will drink in from every object sweet and harmonious influences. And of all these influences the greatest is the education given by music, which finds a way into the innermost soul and imparts to it the sense of beauty and of deformity. At first the effect is unconscious; but when reason arrives, then he who has been thus trained welcomes her as the friend whom he always knew. As in learning to read, first we acquire the elements or letters separately, and afterwards their combinations, and cannot recognize reflections of them until we know the letters themselves; — in like manner we must first attain the elements or essential forms of the virtues, and then trace their combinations in life and experience. There is a music of the soul which answers to the harmony of the world; and the fairest object of a musical soul is the fair mind in the fair body. Some defect in the latter may be excused, but not in the former. True love is the daughter of temperance, and temperance is utterly opposed to the madness of bodily pleasure. Enough has been said of music, which makes a fair ending with love. 402

Next we pass on to gymnastics; about which I would remark, that the soul is related to the body as a cause to an effect, and therefore if we educate the mind we may leave the education of the body in her charge, and need only give a general outline of the course to be pursued. In the first place the guardians must abstain from strong drink, for they should be the last persons to lose their wits. Whether the habits of the palaestra are suitable to them is more doubtful, for the ordinary gymnastic is a sleepy sort of thing, and if left off suddenly is apt to endanger health. But our warrior athletes must be wide-awake dogs, and must also be inured to all changes of food and climate. Hence they will require a simpler kind of gymnastic, akin to their simple music; and for their diet a rule may be found in Homer, who feeds his heroes on roast meat only, and gives them no fish although they are living at the sea-side, nor boiled meats which involve an apparatus of pots and pans; and, if I am not mistaken, he nowhere mentions sweet sauces. Sicilian cookery and Attic confections and Corinthian courtezans, which are to gymnastic what Lydian and Ionian melodies are to music, must be forbidden. Where gluttony and intemperance prevail the town quickly fills 403 404 405

with doctors and pleaders; and law and medicine give themselves airs as soon as the freemen of a State take an interest in them. But what can show a more disgraceful state of education than to have to go abroad for justice because you have none of your own at home? And yet there *is* a worse stage of the same disease — when men have learned to take a pleasure and pride in the twists and turns of the law; not considering how much better it would be for them so to order their lives as to have no need of a nodding justice. And there is a like disgrace in employing a physician, not for the cure of wounds or epidemic disorders, but because a man has by laziness and luxury contracted diseases which were unknown in the days of Asclepius. How simple is the Homeric practice of medicine. Eurypylus after he has been wounded  
406 drinks a posset of Pramnian wine, which is of a heating nature; and yet the sons of Asclepius blame neither the damsel who gives him the drink, nor Patroclus who is attending on him. The truth is that this modern system of nursing diseases was introduced by Herodicus the trainer; who, being of a sickly constitution, by a compound of training and medicine tortured first himself and then a good many other people, and lived a great deal longer than he had any right. But Asclepius would not practise this art, because he knew that the citizens of a well-ordered State have no leisure to be ill, and therefore he adopted the ‘kill or cure’ method, which artisans and labourers employ. ‘They must be at their business,’ they say, ‘and have no time for coddling: if they  
407 recover, well; if they don’t, there is an end of them.’ Whereas the rich man is supposed to be a gentleman who can afford to be ill. Do you know a maxim of Phocylides — that ‘when a man begins to be rich’ (or, perhaps, a little sooner) ‘he should practise virtue’? But how can excessive care of health be inconsistent with an ordinary occupation, and yet consistent with that practice of virtue which Phocylides inculcates? When a student imagines that philosophy gives him a headache, he never does anything; he is always unwell. This was the reason why Asclepius and his sons practised no such art. They were acting in the interest of the public, and did not wish to preserve useless lives, or raise up a puny offspring to wretched sires. Honest diseases they honestly  
408 cured; and if a man was wounded, they applied the proper remedies, and then let him eat and drink what he liked. But



*Republic III.* they declined to treat intemperate and worthless subjects, even though they might have made large fortunes out of them. As to the story of Pindar, that Asclepius was slain by a thunderbolt for restoring a rich man to life, that is a lie — following our old rule we must say either that he did not take bribes, or that he was not the son of a god.

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Glaucon then asks Socrates whether the best physicians and the best judges will not be those who have had severally the greatest experience of diseases and of crimes. Socrates draws a distinction between the two professions. The physician should have had experience of disease in his own body, for he cures with his mind and not with his body. But the judge controls mind by mind; 409 and therefore his mind should not be corrupted by crime. Where then is he to gain experience? How is he to be wise and also innocent? When young a good man is apt to be deceived by evil-doers, because he has no pattern of evil in himself; and therefore the judge should be of a certain age; his youth should have been innocent, and he should have acquired insight into evil not by the practice of it, but by the observation of it in others. This is the ideal of a judge; the criminal turned detective is wonderfully suspicious, but when in company with good men who have experience, he is at fault, for he foolishly imagines that every one is as bad as himself. Vice may be known of virtue, but cannot know virtue. This is the sort of medicine and this the sort of law which will prevail in our State; they will be healing arts to better natures; but the evil body will be left to die by the 410 one, and the evil soul will be put to death by the other. And the need of either will be greatly diminished by good music which will give harmony to the soul, and good gymnastic which will give health to the body. Not that this division of music and gymnastic really corresponds to soul and body; for they are both equally concerned with the soul, which is tamed by the one and aroused and sustained by the other. The two together supply our guardians with their twofold nature. The passionate disposition when it has too much gymnastic is hardened and brutalized, the gentle or philosophic temper which has too much music becomes enervated. While a man is allowing music to pour like water through the 411 funnel of his ears, the edge of his soul gradually wears away, and the passionate or spirited element is melted out of him. Too little



spirit is easily exhausted; too much quickly passes into nervous irritability. So, again, the athlete by feeding and training has his courage doubled, but he soon grows stupid; he is like a wild beast, ready to do everything by blows and nothing by counsel or policy. There are two principles in man, reason and passion, and to these, not to the soul and body, the two arts of music and gymnastic correspond. He who mingles them in harmonious concord is the true musician,—he shall be the presiding genius of our State.

The next question is, Who are to be our rulers? First, the elder must rule the younger; and the best of the elders will be the best guardians. Now they will be the best who love their subjects most, and think that they have a common interest with them in the welfare of the state. These we must select; but they must be watched at every epoch of life to see whether they have retained the same opinions and held out against force and enchantment. For time and persuasion and the love of pleasure may enchant a man into a change of purpose, and the force of grief and pain may compel him. And therefore our guardians must be men who have been tried by many tests, like gold in the refiner's fire, and have been passed first through danger, then through pleasure, and at every age have come out of such trials victorious and without stain, in full command of themselves and their principles; having all their faculties in harmonious exercise for their country's good. These shall receive the highest honours both in life and death. (It would perhaps be better to confine the term 'guardians' to this select class: the younger men may be called 'auxiliaries'.)

And now for one magnificent lie, in the belief of which, Oh that we could train our rulers! — at any rate let us make the attempt with the rest of the world. What I am going to tell is only another version of the legend of Cadmus; but our unbelieving generation will be slow to accept such a story. The tale must be imparted, first to the rulers, then to the soldiers, lastly to the people. We will inform them that their youth was a dream, and that during the time when they seemed to be undergoing their education they were really being fashioned in the earth, who sent them up when they were ready; and that they must protect and cherish her whose children they are, and regard

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 behind. These brothers and sisters have different natures, and 415  
 some of them God framed to rule, whom he fashioned of gold;  
 others he made of silver, to be auxiliaries; others again to be  
 husbandmen and craftsmen, and these were formed by him of  
 brass and iron. But as they are all sprung from a common stock,  
 a golden parent may have a silver son, or a silver parent a golden  
 son, and then there must be a change of rank; the son of the  
 rich must descend, and the child of the artisan rise, in the social  
 scale; for an oracle says 'that the State will come to an end if  
 governed by a man of brass or iron.' Will our citizens ever  
 believe all this? 'Not in the present generation, but in the next,  
 perhaps, Yes.'

Now let the earthborn men go forth under the command of  
 their rulers, and look about and pitch their camp in a high place,  
 which will be safe against enemies from without, and likewise  
 against insurrections from within. There let them sacrifice and  
 set up their tents; for soldiers they are to be and not shop- 416  
 keepers, the watchdogs and guardians of the sheep; and luxury  
 and avarice will turn them into wolves and tyrants. Their habits  
 and their dwellings should correspond to their education. They  
 should have no property; their pay should only meet their  
 expenses; and they should have common meals. Gold and  
 silver we will tell them that they have from God, and this divine  
 gift in their souls they must not alloy with that earthly dross 417  
 which passes under the name of gold. They only of the citizens  
 may not touch it, or be under the same roof with it, or drink  
 from it; it is the accursed thing. Should they ever acquire  
 houses or lands or money of their own, they will become house-  
 holders and tradesmen instead of guardians, enemies and tyrants  
 instead of helpers, and the hour of ruin, both to themselves and  
 the rest of the State, will be at hand.

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The religious and ethical aspect of Plato's education will here-  
 after be considered under a separate head. Some lesser points  
 may be more conveniently noticed in this place.

I. The constant appeal to the authority of Homer, whom, with  
 grave irony, Plato, after the manner of his age, summons as a

witness about ethics and psychology, as well as about diet and medicine; attempting to distinguish the better lesson from the worse (390), sometimes altering the text from design (388, and, perhaps, 389); more than once quoting or alluding to Homer inaccurately (391, 406), after the manner of the early logographers turning the Iliad into prose (393), and delighting to draw far-fetched inferences from his words, or to make ludicrous applications of them. He does not, like Heracleitus, get into a rage with Homer and Archilochus (Heracl. Frag. 119, ed. Bywater), but uses their words and expressions as vehicles of a higher truth; not on a system like Theagenes of Rhegium or Metrodorus, or in later times the Stoics, but as fancy may dictate. And the conclusions drawn from them are sound, although the premises are fictitious. These fanciful appeals to Homer add a charm to Plato's style, and at the same time they have the effect of a satire on the follies of Homeric interpretation. To us (and probably to himself), although they take the form of arguments, they are really figures of speech. They may be compared with modern citations from Scripture, which have often a great rhetorical power even when the original meaning of the words is entirely lost sight of. The real, like the Platonic Socrates, as we gather from the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon, was fond of making similar adaptations (i. 2, 58; ii. 6, 11). Great in all ages and countries, in religion as well as in law and literature, has been the art of interpretation.

2. 'The style is to conform to the subject and the metre to the style.' Notwithstanding the fascination which the word 'classical' exercises over us, we can hardly maintain that this rule is observed in all the Greek poetry which has come down to us. We cannot deny that the thought often exceeds the power of lucid expression in Æschylus and Pindar; or that rhetoric gets the better of the thought in the Sophist-poet Euripides. Only perhaps in Sophocles is there a perfect harmony of the two; in him alone do we find a grace of language like the beauty of a Greek statue, in which there is nothing to add or to take away; at least this is true of single plays or of large portions of them. The connection in the Tragic Choruses and in the Greek lyric poets is not unfrequently a tangled thread which in an age before logic the poet was unable to draw out. Many thoughts and feelings mingled in his mind, and he had no power of disengaging or



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arranging them. For there is a subtle influence of logic which requires to be transferred from prose to poetry, just as the music and perfection of language are infused by poetry into prose. In all ages the poet has been a bad judge of his own meaning (Apol. 22 B); for he does not see that the word which is full of associations to his own mind is difficult and unmeaning to that of another; or that the sequence which is clear to himself is puzzling to others. There are many passages in some of our greatest modern poets which are far too obscure; in which there is no proportion between style and subject; in which any half-expressed figure, any harsh construction, any distorted collocation of words, any remote sequence of ideas is admitted; and there is no voice 'coming sweetly from nature,' or music adding the expression of feeling to thought. As if there could be poetry without beauty, or beauty without ease and clearness. The obscurities of early Greek poets arose necessarily out of the state of language and logic which existed in their age. They are not examples to be followed by us; for the use of language ought in every generation to become clearer and clearer. Like Shakespeare, they were great in spite, not in consequence, of their imperfections of expression. But there is no reason for returning to the necessary obscurity which prevailed in the infancy of literature. The English poets of the last century were certainly not obscure; and we have no excuse for losing what they had gained, or for going back to the earlier or transitional age which preceded them. The thought of our own times has not outstripped language; a want of Plato's 'art of measuring' is the real cause of the disproportion between them.

3. In the third book of the Republic a nearer approach is made to a theory of art than anywhere else in Plato. His views may be summed up as follows:—True art is not fanciful and imitative, but simple and ideal,—the expression of the highest moral energy, whether in action or repose. To live among works of plastic art which are of this noble and simple character, or to listen to such strains, is the best of influences,—the true Greek atmosphere, in which youth should be brought up. That is the way to create in them a natural good taste, which will have a feeling of truth and beauty in all things. For though the poets are to be expelled, still art is recognized as another aspect of



reason — like love in the Symposium, extending over the same sphere, but confined to the preliminary education, and acting through the power of habit (vii. 522 A); and this conception of art is not limited to strains of music or the forms of plastic art, but pervades all nature and has a wide kindred in the world. The Republic of Plato, like the Athens of Pericles, has an artistic as well as a political side.

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There is hardly any mention in Plato of the creative arts; only in two or three passages does he even allude to them (cp. Rep. iv. 420; Soph. 236 A). He is not lost in rapture at the great works of Phidias, the Parthenon, the Propylea, the statues of Zeus or Athene. He would probably have regarded any abstract truth of number or figure (529 E) as higher than the greatest of them. Yet it is hard to suppose that some influence, such as he hopes to inspire in youth, did not pass into his own mind from the works of art which he saw around him. We are living upon the fragments of them, and find in a few broken stones the standard of truth and beauty. But in Plato this feeling has no expression; he nowhere says that beauty is the object of art; he seems to deny that wisdom can take an external form (Phaedrus, 250 E); he does not distinguish the fine from the mechanical arts. Whether or no, like some writers, he felt more than he expressed, it is at any rate remarkable that the greatest perfection of the fine arts should coincide with an almost entire silence about them. In one very striking passage (iv. 420) he tells us that a work of art, like the State, is a whole; and this conception of a whole and the love of the newly-born mathematical sciences may be regarded, if not as the inspiring, at any rate as the regulating principles of Greek art (cp. Xen. Mem: iii. 10. 6; and Sophist, 235, 236).

4. Plato makes the true and subtle remark that the physician had better not be in robust health; and should have known what illness is in his own person. But the judge ought to have had no similar experience of evil; he is to be a good man who, having passed his youth in innocence, became acquainted late in life with the vices of others. And therefore, according to Plato, a judge should not be young, just as a young man according to Aristotle is not fit to be a hearer of moral philosophy. The bad, on the other hand, have a knowledge of vice, but no know-

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ledge of virtue. It may be doubted, however, whether this train of reflection is well founded. In a remarkable passage of the *Laws* (xii. 950 B) it is acknowledged that the evil may form a correct estimate of the good. The union of gentleness and courage in Book ii. at first seemed to be a paradox, yet was afterwards ascertained to be a truth. And Plato might also have found that the intuition of evil may be consistent with the abhorrence of it (cp. *infra*, ix. 582). There is a directness of aim in virtue which gives an insight into vice. And the knowledge of character is in some degree a natural sense independent of any special experience of good or evil.

5. One of the most remarkable conceptions of Plato, because un-Greek and also very different from anything which existed at all in his age of the world, is the transposition of ranks. In the Spartan state there had been enfranchisement of Helots and degradation of citizens under special circumstances. And in the ancient Greek aristocracies, merit was certainly recognized as one of the elements on which government was based. The founders of states were supposed to be their benefactors, who were raised by their great actions above the ordinary level of humanity; at a later period, the services of warriors and legislators were held to entitle them and their descendants to the privileges of citizenship and to the first rank in the state. And although the existence of an ideal aristocracy is slenderly proven from the remains of early Greek history, and we have a difficulty in ascribing such a character, however the idea may be defined, to any actual Hellenic state—or indeed to any state which has ever existed in the world—still the rule of the best was certainly the aspiration of philosophers, who probably accommodated a good deal their views of primitive history to their own notions of good government. Plato further insists on applying to the guardians of his state a series of tests by which all those who fell short of a fixed standard were either removed from the governing body, or not admitted to it; and this ‘academic’ discipline did to a certain extent prevail in Greek states, especially in Sparta. He also indicates that the system of caste, which existed in a great part of the ancient, and is by no means extinct in the modern European world, should be set aside from time to time in favour of merit. He is aware how deeply the greater part of

mankind resent any interference with the order of society, and therefore he proposes his novel idea in the form of what he himself calls a 'monstrous fiction.' (Compare the ceremony of preparation for the two 'great waves' in Book v.) Two principles are indicated by him: first, that there is a distinction of ranks dependent on circumstances prior to the individual: second, that this distinction is and ought to be broken through by personal qualities. He adapts mythology like the Homeric poems to the wants of the state, making 'the Phoenician tale' the vehicle of his ideas. Every Greek state had a myth respecting its own origin; the Platonic republic may also have a tale of earthborn men. The gravity and verisimilitude with which the tale is told, and the analogy of Greek tradition, are a sufficient verification of the 'monstrous falsehood.' Ancient poetry had spoken of a gold and silver and brass and iron age succeeding one another, but Plato supposes these differences in the natures of men to exist together in a single state. Mythology supplies a figure under which the lesson may be taught (as Protagoras says, 'the myth is more interesting'), and also enables Plato to touch lightly on new principles without going into details. In this passage he shadows forth a general truth, but he does not tell us by what steps the transposition of ranks is to be effected. Indeed throughout the Republic he allows the lower ranks to fade into the distance. We do not know whether they are to carry arms, and whether in the fifth book they are or are not included in the communistic regulations respecting property and marriage. Nor is there any use in arguing strictly either from a few chance words, or from the silence of Plato, or in drawing inferences which were beyond his vision. Aristotle, in his criticism on the position of the lower classes, does not perceive that the poetical creation is 'like the air, invulnerable,' and cannot be penetrated by the shafts of his logic (Pol. ii. 5, § 18 foll.).

6. Two paradoxes which strike the modern reader as in the highest degree fanciful and ideal, and which suggest to him many reflections, are to be found in the third book of the Republic: first, the great power of music, so much beyond any influence which is experienced by us in modern times, when the art or science has been far more developed, and has found

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the secret of harmony, as well as of melody; secondly, the indefinite and almost absolute control which the soul is supposed to exercise over the body.

In the first we suspect some degree of exaggeration, such as we may also observe among certain masters of the art, not unknown to us, at the present day. With this natural enthusiasm, which is felt by a few only, there seems to mingle in Plato a sort of Pythagorean reverence for numbers and numerical proportion to which Aristotle is a stranger. Intervals of sound and number are to him sacred things which have a law of their own, not dependent on the variations of sense. They rise above sense, and become a connecting link with the world of ideas. But it is evident that Plato is describing what to him appears to be also a fact. The power of a simple and characteristic melody on the impressible mind of the Greek is more than we can easily appreciate. The effect of national airs may bear some comparison with it. And, besides all this, there is a confusion between the harmony of musical notes and the harmony of soul and body, which is so potently inspired by them.

The second paradox leads up to some curious and interesting questions—How far can the mind control the body? Is the relation between them one of mutual antagonism or of mutual harmony? Are they two or one, and is either of them the cause of the other? May we not at times drop the opposition between them, and the mode of describing them, which is so familiar to us, and yet hardly conveys any precise meaning, and try to view this composite creature, man, in a more simple manner? Must we not at any rate admit that there is in human nature a higher and a lower principle, divided by no distinct line, which at times break asunder and take up arms against one another? Or again, they are reconciled and move together, either unconsciously in the ordinary work of life, or consciously in the pursuit of some noble aim, to be attained not without an effort, and for which every thought and nerve are strained. And then the body becomes the good friend or ally, or servant or instrument of the mind. And the mind has often a wonderful and almost super-human power of banishing disease and weakness and calling out a hidden strength. Reason and the desires, the intellect and the senses are brought into harmony and obedience so as to form a



single human being. They are ever parting, ever meeting; and the identity or diversity of their tendencies or operations is for the most part unnoticed by us. When the mind touches the body through the appetites, we acknowledge the responsibility of the one to the other. There is a tendency in us which says 'Drink.' There is another which says, 'Do not drink; it is not good for you.' And we all of us know which is the rightful superior. We are also responsible for our health, although into this sphere there enter some elements of necessity which may be beyond our control. Still even in the management of health, care and thought, continued over many years, may make us almost free agents, if we do not exact too much of ourselves, and if we acknowledge that all human freedom is limited by the laws of nature and of mind.

We are disappointed to find that Plato, in the general condemnation which he passes on the practice of medicine prevailing in his own day, depreciates the effects of diet. He would like to have diseases of a definite character and capable of receiving a definite treatment. He is afraid of invalidism interfering with the business of life. He does not recognize that time is the great healer both of mental and bodily disorders; and that remedies which are gradual and proceed little by little are safer than those which produce a sudden catastrophe. Neither does he see that there is no way in which the mind can more surely influence the body than by the control of eating and drinking; or any other action or occasion of human life on which the higher freedom of the will can be more simply or truly asserted.

7. Lesser matters of style may be remarked. (1) The affected ignorance of music, which is Plato's way of expressing that he is passing lightly over the subject. (2) The tentative manner in which here, as in the second book, he proceeds with the construction of the State. (3) The description of the State sometimes as a reality (389 D; 416 B), and then again as a work of imagination only (cp. 534 C; 592 B); these are the arts by which he sustains the reader's interest. (4) Connecting links (e. g. 408 C with 379), or the preparation (394 D) for the entire expulsion of the poets in Book x. (5) The companion pictures of the lover of litigation and the valetudinarian (405), the satirical jest about the maxim of Phocylides (407), the manner in which

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*Republic III.* the image of the gold and silver citizens is taken up into the  
 INTRODU- subject (416 E), and the argument from the practice of Asclepius  
 TION. (407), should not escape notice.

## ANALYSIS.

**BOOK IV.** Adeimantus said: 'Suppose a person to argue, *Steph.*  
 Socrates, that you make your citizens miserable, and this by 419  
 their own free-will; they are the lords of the city, and yet in-  
 stead of having, like other men, lands and houses and money  
 of their own, they live as mercenaries and are always mounting  
 guard.' You may add, I replied, that they receive no pay but 420  
 only their food, and have no money to spend on a journey or a  
 mistress. 'Well, and what answer do you give?' My answer is,  
 that our guardians may or may not be the happiest of men,—I  
 should not be surprised to find in the long-run that they were,  
 —but this is not the aim of our constitution, which was de-  
 signed for the good of the whole and not of any one part. If  
 I went to a sculptor and blamed him for having painted the  
 eye, which is the noblest feature of the face, not purple but  
 black, he would reply: 'The eye must be an eye, and you  
 should look at the statue as a whole.' 'Now I can well imagine  
 a fool's paradise, in which everybody is eating and drinking,  
 clothed in purple and fine linen, and potters lie on sofas and  
 have their wheel at hand, that they may work a little when  
 they please; and cobblers and all the other classes of a State 421  
 lose their distinctive character. And a State may get on with-  
 out cobblers; but when the guardians degenerate into boon  
 companions, then the ruin is complete. Remember that we  
 are not talking of peasants keeping holiday, but of a State in  
 which every man is expected to do his own work.' The hap-  
 piness resides not in this or that class, but in the State as a  
 whole. I have another remark to make:—A middle con-  
 dition is best for artisans; they should have money enough  
 to buy tools, and not enough to be independent of business.  
 And will not the same condition be best for our citizens? If 422  
 they are poor, they will be mean; if rich, luxurious and lazy;  
 and in neither case contented. 'But then how will our poor  
 city be able to go to war against an enemy who has money?'  
 There may be a difficulty in fighting against one enemy; against  
 two there will be none. In the first place, the contest will be

carried on by trained warriors against well-to-do citizens: and is not a regular athlete an easy match for two stout opponents at least? Suppose also, that before engaging we send ambassadors to one of the two cities, saying, 'Silver and gold we have not; do you help us and take our share of the spoil;'—who would fight against the lean, wiry dogs, when they might join with them in preying upon the fatted sheep? 'But if many states join their resources, shall we not be in danger?' I am amused to hear you use the word 'state' of any but our own State.

23 They are 'states,' but not 'a state'—many in one. For in every state there are two hostile nations, rich and poor, which you may set one against the other. But our State, while she remains true to her principles, will be in very deed the mightiest of Hellenic states.

To the size of the state there is no limit but the necessity of unity; it must be neither too large nor too small to be one. This is a matter of secondary importance, like the principle of transposition which was intimated in the parable of the earthborn men. The meaning there implied was that every man should do that for which he was fitted, and be at one with himself, and then the whole city would be united. But all these things are secondary,

24 if education, which is the great matter, be duly regarded. When the wheel has once been set in motion, the speed is always increasing; and each generation improves upon the preceding, both in physical and moral qualities. The care of the governors should be directed to preserve music and gymnastic from innovation; alter the songs of a country, Damon says, and you will soon end by altering its laws. The change appears innocent at first, and begins in play; but the evil soon becomes serious, working secretly upon the characters of individuals, then upon social and commercial relations, and lastly upon the institutions

25 of a state; and there is ruin and confusion everywhere. But if education remains in the established form, there will be no danger. A restorative process will be always going on; the spirit of law and order will raise up what has fallen down. Nor will any regulations be needed for the lesser matters of life—rules of deportment or fashions of dress. Like invites like for good or for evil. Education will correct deficiencies and supply the power of self-government. Far be it from us to enter into the



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But without education they may patch and mend as they please; they will make no progress, any more than a patient who thinks to cure himself by some favourite remedy and will not give up his luxurious mode of living. If you tell such persons that they must first alter their habits, then they grow angry; they are charming people. 'Charming,—nay, the very reverse.' Evidently these gentlemen are not in your good graces, nor the state which is like them. And such states there are which first ordain under penalty of death that no one shall alter the constitution, and then suffer themselves to be flattered into and out of anything; and he who indulges them and fawns upon them, is their leader and saviour. 'Yes, the men are as bad as the states.' But do you not admire their cleverness? 'Nay, some of them are stupid enough to believe what the people tell them.' And when all the world is telling a man that he is six feet high, and he has no measure, how can he believe anything else? But don't get into a passion: to see our statesmen trying their nostrums, and fancying that they can cut off at a blow the Hydra-like rogueries of mankind, is as good as a play. Minute enactments are superfluous in good states, and are useless in bad ones.

And now what remains of the work of legislation? Nothing for us; but to Apollo the god of Delphi we leave the ordering of the greatest of all things—that is to say, religion. Only our ancestral deity sitting upon the centre and navel of the earth will be trusted by us if we have any sense, in an affair of such magnitude. No foreign god shall be supreme in our realms. . . .

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Here, as Socrates would say, let us 'reflect on' (σκοπῶμεν) what has preceded: thus far we have spoken not of the happiness of the citizens, but only of the well-being of the State. They may be the happiest of men, but our principal aim in founding the State was not to make them happy. They were to be guardians, not holiday-makers. In this pleasant manner is presented to us the famous question both of ancient and modern philosophy, touching the relation of duty to happiness, of right to utility.

First duty, then happiness, is the natural order of our moral ideas. The utilitarian principle is valuable as a corrective of



error, and shows to us a side of ethics which is apt to be neglected. It may be admitted further that right and utility are co-extensive, and that he who makes the happiness of mankind his object has one of the highest and noblest motives of human action. But utility is not the historical basis of morality; nor the aspect in which moral and religious ideas commonly occur to the mind. The greatest happiness of all is, as we believe, the far-off result of the divine government of the universe. The greatest happiness of the individual is certainly to be found in a life of virtue and goodness. But we seem to be more assured of a law of right than we can be of a divine purpose, that 'all mankind should be saved;' and we infer the one from the other. And the greatest happiness of the individual may be the reverse of the greatest happiness in the ordinary sense of the term, and may be realised in a life of pain, or in a voluntary death. Further, the word 'happiness' has several ambiguities; it may mean either pleasure or an ideal life, happiness subjective or objective, in this world or in another, of ourselves only or of our neighbours and of all men everywhere. By the modern founder of Utilitarianism the self-regarding and disinterested motives of action are included under the same term, although they are commonly opposed by us as benevolence and self-love. The word happiness has not the definiteness or the sacredness of 'truth' and 'right'; it does not equally appeal to our higher nature, and has not sunk into the conscience of mankind. It is associated too much with the comforts and conveniences of life; too little with 'the goods of the soul which we desire for their own sake.' In a great trial, or danger, or temptation, or in any great and heroic action, it is scarcely thought of. For these reasons 'the greatest happiness' principle is not the true foundation of ethics. But though not the first principle, it is the second, which is like unto it, and is often of easier application. For the larger part of human actions are neither right nor wrong, except in so far as they tend to the happiness of mankind (cp. *Introd. to Gorgias and Philebus*).

The same question reappears in politics, where the useful or expedient seems to claim a larger sphere and to have a greater authority. For concerning political measures, we chiefly ask: How will they affect the happiness of mankind? Yet here too we may observe that what we term expediency is merely the law of

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right limited by the conditions of human society. Right and truth are the highest aims of government as well as of individuals; and we ought not to lose sight of them because we cannot directly enforce them. They appeal to the better mind of nations; and sometimes they are too much for merely temporal interests to resist. They are the watchwords which all men use in matters of public policy, as well as in their private dealings; the peace of Europe may be said to depend upon them. In the most commercial and utilitarian states of society the power of ideas remains. And all the higher class of statesmen have in them something of that idealism which Pericles is said to have gathered from the teaching of Anaxagoras. They recognise that the true leader of men must be above the motives of ambition, and that national character is of greater value than material comfort and prosperity. And this is the order of thought in Plato; first, he expects his citizens to do their duty, and then under favourable circumstances, that is to say, in a well-ordered State, their happiness is assured. That he was far from excluding the modern principle of utility in politics is sufficiently evident from other passages, in which 'the most beneficial is affirmed to be the most honourable' (v. 457 B), and also 'the most sacred' (v. 458 E).

We may note (1) The manner in which the objection of Adeimantus here, as in ii. 357 foll., 363; vi. ad init. etc., is designed to draw out and deepen the argument of Socrates. (2) The conception of a whole as lying at the foundation both of politics and of art, in the latter supplying the only principle of criticism, which, under the various names of harmony, symmetry, measure, proportion, unity, the Greek seems to have applied to works of art. (3) The requirement that the State should be limited in size, after the traditional model of a Greek state; as in the Politics of Aristotle (vii. 4, etc.), the fact that the cities of Hellas were small is converted into a principle. (4) The humorous pictures of the lean dogs and the fatted sheep, of the light active boxer upsetting two stout gentlemen at least, of the 'charming' patients who are always making themselves worse; or again, the playful assumption that there is no State but our own; or the grave irony with which the statesman is excused who believes that he is six feet high because he is told so, and having nothing to measure with is to be pardoned for his ignorance — he is too

amusing for us to be seriously angry with him. (5) The light and superficial manner in which religion is passed over when provision has been made for two great principles,—first, that religion shall be based on the highest conception of the gods (ii. 377 foll.), secondly, that the true national or Hellenic type shall be maintained. . . .

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Socrates proceeds: But where amid all this is justice? Son of Ariston, tell me where. Light a candle and search the city, and get your brother and the rest of our friends to help in seeking for her. 'That won't do,' replied Glaucon, 'you yourself promised to make the search and talked about the impiety of deserting justice.' Well, I said, I will lead the way, but do you follow. My notion is, that our State being perfect will contain all the four virtues—wisdom, 428 courage, temperance, justice. If we eliminate the three first, the unknown remainder will be justice.

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First then, of wisdom: the State which we have called into being will be wise because politic. And policy is one among many kinds of skill,—not the skill of the carpenter, or of the worker in metal, or of the husbandman, but the skill of him who advises about the interests of the whole State. Of such a kind is 429 the skill of the guardians, who are a small class in number, far smaller than the blacksmiths; but in them is concentrated the wisdom of the State. And if this small ruling class have wisdom, then the whole State will be wise.

Our second virtue is courage, which we have no difficulty in finding in another class—that of soldiers. Courage may be defined as a sort of salvation—the never-failing salvation of the opinions which law and education have prescribed concerning dangers. You know the way in which dyers first prepare the white ground and then lay on the dye of purple or of any other colour. Colours dyed in this way become fixed, and no soap or 430 lye will ever wash them out. Now the ground is education, and the laws are the colours; and if the ground is properly laid, neither the soap of pleasure nor the lye of pain or fear will ever wash them out. This power which preserves right opinion about danger I would ask you to call 'courage,' adding the epithet 'political' or 'civilized' in order to distinguish it from mere animal courage and from a higher courage which may hereafter be discussed.



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Two virtues remain ; temperance and justice. More than the preceding virtues temperance suggests the idea of harmony. 431  
 Some light is thrown upon the nature of this virtue by the popular description of a man as 'master of himself' — which has an absurd sound, because the master is also the servant. The expression really means that the better principle in a man masters the worse. There are in cities whole classes — women, slaves and the like — who correspond to the worse, and a few only to the better ; and in our State the former class are held under control by the latter. Now to which of these classes does temperance belong? 'To both of them.' And our State if any will be the abode of temperance ; and we were right in describing this virtue as a harmony which is diffused through the whole, making the dwellers in the city to 432  
 be of one mind, and attuning the upper and middle and lower classes like the strings of an instrument, whether you suppose them to differ in wisdom, strength or wealth.

And now we are near the spot ; let us draw in and surround the cover and watch with all our eyes, lest justice should slip away and escape. Tell me, if you see the thicket move first. 'Nay, I would have you lead.' Well then, offer up a prayer and follow. The way is dark and difficult ; but we must push on. I begin to see a track. 'Good news.' Why, Glaucon, our dulness of scent is quite ludicrous ! While we are straining our eyes into the distance, justice is tumbling out at our feet. We are as bad as people looking for a thing which they have in their hands. Have 433  
 you forgotten our old principle of the division of labour, or of every man doing his own business, concerning which we spoke at the foundation of the State — what but this was justice ? Is there any other virtue remaining which can compete with wisdom and temperance and courage in the scale of political virtue ? For 'every one having his own' is the great object of government ; and the great object of trade is that every man should do his own 434  
 business. Not that there is much harm in a carpenter trying to be a cobbler, or a cobbler transforming himself into a carpenter ; but great evil may arise from the cobbler leaving his last and turning into a guardian or legislator, or when a single individual is trainer, warrior, legislator, all in one. And this evil is injustice, or every man doing another's business. I do not say that as yet we are in a condition to arrive at a final conclusion. For the



435 definition which we believe to hold good in states has still to be tested by the individual. Having read the large letters we will now come back to the small. From the two together a brilliant light may be struck out. . . .

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Socrates proceeds to discover the nature of justice by a method of residues. Each of the first three virtues corresponds to one of the three parts of the soul and one of the three classes in the State, although the third, temperance, has more of the nature of a harmony than the first two. If there be a fourth virtue, that can only be sought for in the relation of the three parts in the soul or classes in the State to one another. It is obvious and simple, and for that very reason has not been found out. The modern logician will be inclined to object that ideas cannot be separated like chemical substances, but that they run into one another and may be only different aspects or names of the same thing, and such in this instance appears to be the case. For the definition here given of justice is verbally the same as one of the definitions of temperance given by Socrates in the Charmides (162 A), which however is only provisional, and is afterwards rejected. And so far from justice remaining over when the other virtues are eliminated, the justice and temperance of the Republic can with difficulty be distinguished. Temperance appears to be the virtue of a part only, and one of three, whereas justice is a universal virtue of the whole soul. Yet on the other hand temperance is also described as a sort of harmony, and in this respect is akin to justice. Justice seems to differ from temperance in degree rather than in kind; whereas temperance is the harmony of discordant elements, justice is the perfect order by which all natures and classes do their own business, the right man in the right place, the division and co-operation of all the citizens. Justice, again, is a more abstract notion than the other virtues, and therefore, from Plato's point of view, the foundation of them, to which they are referred and which in idea precedes them. The proposal to omit temperance is a mere trick of style intended to avoid monotony (cp. vii. 528).

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There is a famous question discussed in one of the earlier Dialogues of Plato (Protagoras, 329, 330; cp. Arist. Nic. Ethics, vi. 13. 6), 'Whether the virtues are one or many?' This receives an answer which is to the effect that there are four cardinal virtues

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(now for the first time brought together in ethical philosophy), and one supreme over the rest, which is not like Aristotle's conception of universal justice, virtue relative to others, but the whole of virtue relative to the parts. To this universal conception of justice or order in the first education and in the moral nature of man, the still more universal conception of the good in the second education and in the sphere of speculative knowledge seems to succeed. Both might be equally described by the terms 'law,' 'order,' 'harmony;' but while the idea of good embraces 'all time and all existence,' the conception of justice is not extended beyond man.

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. . . Socrates is now going to identify the individual and the State. But first he must prove that there are three parts of the individual soul. His argument is as follows:—Quantity makes no difference in quality. The word 'just,' whether applied to the individual or to the State, has the same meaning. And the term 'justice' implied that the same three principles in the State and in the individual were doing their own business. But are they really three or one? The question is difficult, and one which can hardly be solved by the methods which we are now using; but the truer and longer way would take up too much of our time. 'The shorter will satisfy me.' Well then, you would admit that the qualities of states mean the qualities of the individuals who compose them? The Scythians and Thracians are passionate, our own race intellectual, and the Egyptians and Phoenicians covetous, because the individual members of each have such and such a character; the difficulty is to determine whether the several principles are one or three; whether, that is to say, we reason with one part of our nature, desire with another, are angry with another, or whether the whole soul comes into play in each sort of action. This enquiry, however, requires a very exact definition of terms. The same thing in the same relation cannot be affected in two opposite ways. But there is no impossibility in a man standing still, yet moving his arms, or in a top which is fixed on one spot going round upon its axis. There is no necessity to mention all the possible exceptions; let us provisionally assume that opposites cannot do or be or suffer opposites in the same relation. And to the class of opposites belong assent and dissent, desire and avoidance. And one form

of desire is thirst and hunger: and here arises a new point — thirst is thirst of drink, hunger is hunger of food; not of warm  
438 drink or of a particular kind of food, with the single exception of course that the very fact of our desiring anything implies that it is good. When relative terms have no attributes, their correlatives have no attributes; when they have attributes, their correlatives also have them. For example, the term 'greater' is simply relative to 'less,' and knowledge refers to a subject of knowledge. But on the other hand, a particular knowledge is of a particular subject. Again, every science has a distinct character, which is defined by an object; medicine, for example, is the science of  
439 health, although not to be confounded with health. Having cleared our ideas thus far, let us return to the original instance of thirst, which has a definite object — drink. Now the thirsty soul may feel two distinct impulses; the animal one saying 'Drink;' the rational one, which says 'Do not drink.' The two impulses are contradictory; and therefore we may assume that they spring from distinct principles in the soul. But is passion a third principle, or akin to desire? There is a story of a certain Leontius which throws some light on this question. He was coming up from the Piræus outside the north wall, and he passed a spot where there were dead bodies lying by the executioner. He felt a longing desire to see them and also an abhorrence of them; at first he turned away  
440 and shut his eyes, then, suddenly tearing them open, he said, — 'Take your fill, ye wretches, of the fair sight.' Now is there not here a third principle which is often found to come to the assistance of reason against desire, but never of desire against reason? This is passion or spirit, of the separate existence of which we may further convince ourselves by putting the following case:— When a man suffers justly, if he be of a generous nature he is not indignant at the hardships which he undergoes: but when he suffers unjustly, his indignation is his great support; hunger and thirst cannot tame him; the spirit within him must do or die, until the voice of the shepherd, that is, of reason, bidding his dog bark no more, is heard within. This shows  
441 that passion is the ally of reason. Is passion then the same with reason? No, for the former exists in children and brutes; and Homer affords a proof of the distinction between them when he says, 'He smote his breast, and thus rebuked his soul.'

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And now, at last, we have reached firm ground, and are able to infer that the virtues of the State and of the individual are the same. For wisdom and courage and justice in the State are severally the wisdom and courage and justice in the individuals who form the State. Each of the three classes will do the work of its own class in the State, and each part in the individual soul; reason, the superior, and passion, the inferior, will be harmonized 442 by the influence of music and gymnastic. The counsellor and the warrior, the head and the arm, will act together in the town of Mansoul, and keep the desires in proper subjection. The courage of the warrior is that quality which preserves a right opinion about dangers in spite of pleasures and pains. The wisdom of the counsellor is that small part of the soul which has authority and reason. The virtue of temperance is the friendship of the ruling and the subject principles, both in the State and in the individual. Of justice we have already spoken; and the notion already given of it may be confirmed by common instances. Will the just state or the just individual steal, lie, commit adultery, 443 or be guilty of impiety to gods and men? 'No.' And is not the reason of this that the several principles, whether in the state or in the individual, do their own business? And justice is the quality which makes just men and just states. Moreover, our old division of labour, which required that there should be one man for one use, was a dream or anticipation of what was to follow; and that dream has now been realized in justice, which begins by binding together the three chords of the soul, and then acts 444 harmoniously in every relation of life. And injustice, which is the insubordination and disobedience of the inferior elements in the soul, is the opposite of justice, and is inharmonious and unnatural, being to the soul what disease is to the body; for in the soul as well as in the body, good or bad actions produce good or bad habits. And virtue is the health and beauty and well-being of the soul, and vice is the disease and weakness and deformity of the soul.

Again the old question returns upon us: Is justice or injustice 445 the more profitable? The question has become ridiculous. For injustice, like mortal disease, makes life not worth having. Come up with me to the hill which overhangs the city and look down upon the single form of virtue, and the infinite forms of vice,



among which are four special ones, characteristic both of states and of individuals. And the state which corresponds to the single form of virtue is that which we have been describing, wherein reason rules under one of two names—monarchy and aristocracy. Thus there are five forms in all, both of states and of souls. . . .

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In attempting to prove that the soul has three separate faculties, Plato takes occasion to discuss what makes difference of faculties. And the criterion which he proposes is difference in the working of the faculties. The same faculty cannot produce contradictory effects. But the path of early reasoners is beset by thorny entanglements, and he will not proceed a step without first clearing the ground. This leads him into a tiresome digression, which is intended to explain the nature of contradiction. First, the contradiction must be at the same time and in the same relation. Secondly, no extraneous word must be introduced into either of the terms in which the contradictory proposition is expressed: for example, thirst is of drink, not of warm drink. He implies, what he does not say, that if, by the advice of reason, or by the impulse of anger, a man is restrained from drinking, this proves that thirst, or desire under which thirst is included, is distinct from anger and reason. But suppose that we allow the term 'thirst' or 'desire' to be modified, and say an 'angry thirst,' or a 'vengeful desire,' then the two spheres of desire and anger overlap and become confused. This case therefore has to be excluded. And still there remains an exception to the rule in the use of the term 'good,' which is always implied in the object of desire. These are the discussions of an age before logic; and any one who is wearied by them should remember that they are necessary to the clearing up of ideas in the first development of the human faculties.

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The psychology of Plato extends no further than the division of the soul into the rational, irascible, and concupiscent elements, which, as far as we know, was first made by him, and has been retained by Aristotle and succeeding ethical writers. The chief difficulty in this early analysis of the mind is to define exactly the place of the irascible faculty (*θυμός*), which may be variously described under the terms righteous indignation, spirit, passion. It is the foundation of courage, which includes in Plato

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moral courage, the courage of enduring pain, and of surmounting intellectual difficulties, as well as of meeting dangers in war. Though irrational, it inclines to side with the rational: it cannot be aroused by punishment when justly inflicted: it sometimes takes the form of an enthusiasm which sustains a man in the performance of great actions. It is the 'lion heart' with which the reason makes a treaty (ix. 589 B). On the other hand it is negative rather than positive; it is indignant at wrong or falsehood, but does not, like Love in the Symposium and Phaedrus, aspire to the vision of Truth or Good. It is the peremptory military spirit which prevails in the government of honour. It differs from anger (*ὀργή*), this latter term having no accessory notion of righteous indignation. Although Aristotle has retained the word, yet we may observe that 'passion' (*θυμός*) has with him lost its affinity to the rational and has become indistinguishable from 'anger' (*ὀργή*). And to this vernacular use Plato himself in the Laws seems to revert (ix. 836 B), though not always (v. 731 A). By modern philosophy too, as well as in our ordinary conversation, the words anger or passion are employed almost exclusively in a bad sense; there is no connotation of a just or reasonable cause by which they are aroused. The feeling of 'righteous indignation' is too partial and accidental to admit of our regarding it as a separate virtue or habit. We are tempted also to doubt whether Plato is right in supposing that an offender, however justly condemned, could be expected to acknowledge the justice of his sentence; this is the spirit of a philosopher or martyr rather than of a criminal.

We may observe (p. 444 D, E) how nearly Plato approaches Aristotle's famous thesis, that 'good actions produce good habits.' The words 'as healthy practices (*ἐπιτηδεύματα*) produce health, so do just practices produce justice,' have a sound very like the Nicomachean Ethics. But we note also that an incidental remark in Plato has become a far-reaching principle in Aristotle, and an inseparable part of a great Ethical system.

There is a difficulty in understanding what Plato meant by 'the longer way' (435 D; cp. *infra*, vi. 504): he seems to intimate some metaphysic of the future which will not be satisfied with arguing from the principle of contradiction. In the sixth and seventh books (compare Sophist and Parmenides) he has given

us a sketch of such a metaphysic; but when Glaucon asks for the final revelation of the idea of good, he is put off with the declaration that he has not yet studied the preliminary sciences. How he would have filled up the sketch, or argued about such questions from a higher point of view, we can only conjecture. Perhaps he hoped to find some *a priori* method of developing the parts out of the whole; or he might have asked which of the ideas contains the other ideas, and possibly have stumbled on the Hegelian identity of the 'ego' and the 'universal.' Or he may have imagined that ideas might be constructed in some manner analogous to the construction of figures and numbers in the mathematical sciences. The most certain and necessary truth was to Plato the universal; and to this he was always seeking to refer all knowledge or opinion, just as in modern times we seek to rest them on the opposite pole of induction and experience. The aspirations of metaphysicians have always tended to pass beyond the limits of human thought and language: they seem to have reached a height at which they are 'moving about in worlds unrealized,' and their conceptions, although profoundly affecting their own minds, become invisible or unintelligible to others. We are not therefore surprized to find that Plato himself has nowhere clearly explained his doctrine of ideas; or that his school in a later generation, like his contemporaries Glaucon and Adeimantus, were unable to follow him in this region of speculation. In the Sophist, where he is refuting the scepticism which maintained either that there was no such thing as predication, or that all might be predicated of all, he arrives at the conclusion that some ideas combine with some, but not all with all. But he makes only one or two steps forward on this path; he nowhere attains to any connected system of ideas, or even to a knowledge of the most elementary relations of the sciences to one another (see *infra*).

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449 or decline in states, when Polemarchus—he was sitting a little farther from me than Adeimantus—taking him by the coat and leaning towards him, said something in an undertone, of which I only caught the words, 'Shall we let him off?' 'Certainly not,' said Adeimantus, raising his voice. Whom, I said, are you

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not going to let off? ‘You,’ he said. Why? ‘Because we think that you are not dealing fairly with us in omitting women and children, of whom you have slyly disposed under the general formula that friends have all things in common.’ And was I not right? ‘Yes,’ he replied, ‘but there are many sorts of communism or community, and we want to know which of them is right. The company, as you have just heard, are resolved to have a further explanation.’ Thrasymachus said, ‘Do you 450 think that we have come hither to dig for gold, or to hear you discourse?’ Yes, I said; but the discourse should be of a reasonable length. Glaucon added, ‘Yes, Socrates, and there is reason in spending the whole of life in such discussions; but pray, without more ado, tell us how this community is to be carried out, and how the interval between birth and education is to be filled up.’ Well, I said, the subject has several difficulties—What is possible? is the first question. What is desirable? is the second. ‘Fear not,’ he replied, ‘for you are speaking among friends.’ That, I replied, is a sorry consolation; I shall destroy 451 my friends as well as myself. Not that I mind a little innocent laughter; but he who kills the truth is a murderer. ‘Then,’ said Glaucon, laughing, ‘in case you should murder us we will acquit you beforehand, and you shall be held free from the guilt of deceiving us.’

Socrates proceeds:—The guardians of our state are to be watch-dogs, as we have already said. Now dogs are not divided into hes and shes—we do not take the masculine gender out to hunt and leave the females at home to look after their puppies. They have the same employments—the only difference between them is that the one sex is stronger and the other weaker. But if women are to have the same employments as men, they must have the same education—they must be taught music and gymnastics, and the art of war. I know that a great joke 452 will be made of their riding on horseback and carrying weapons; the sight of the naked old wrinkled women showing their agility in the palæstra will certainly not be a vision of beauty, and may be expected to become a famous jest. But we must not mind the wits; there was a time when they might have laughed at our present gymnastics. All is habit: people have at last found out that the exposure is better than the concealment of the



person, and now they laugh no more. Evil only should be the subject of ridicule.

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453 The first question is, whether women are able either wholly or partially to share in the employments of men. And here we may be charged with inconsistency in making the proposal at all. For we started originally with the division of labour; and the diversity of employments was based on the difference of natures. But is there no difference between men and women? Nay, are they not wholly different? *There* was the difficulty, Glaucon, which made me unwilling to speak of family relations. However, when a man is out of his depth, whether in a pool or in an ocean, he can only swim for his life; and we must try to find a way of escape, if we can.

454 The argument is, that different natures have different uses, and the natures of men and women are said to differ. But this is only a verbal opposition. We do not consider that the difference may be purely nominal and accidental; for example, a bald man and a hairy man are opposed in a single point of view, but you cannot infer that because a bald man is a cobbler a hairy man ought not to be a cobbler. Now why is such an inference erroneous? Simply because the opposition between them is partial only, like the difference between a male physician and a female physician, not running through the whole nature, like the difference between a physician and a carpenter. And if the difference of the sexes is only that the one beget and the other bear children, this does not prove that they ought to have distinct educations. Admitting that women differ from men in capacity, do not men equally differ from one another? Has not nature scattered all the qualities which our citizens require indifferently up and down among the two sexes? and even in their peculiar pursuits, are not women often, though in some cases superior to men, ridiculously enough surpassed by them? Women are the same in kind as men, and have the same aptitude or want of aptitude for medicine or gymnastic or war, but in a less degree. One woman will be a good guardian, another not; and the good must be chosen to be the colleagues of our guardians. If however their natures are the same, the inference is that their education must also be the same; there is no longer anything unnatural or impossible in a woman learning music

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and gymnastic. And the education which we give them will be the very best, far superior to that of cobblers, and will train up the very best women, and nothing can be more advantageous to the State than this. Therefore let them strip, clothed in their chastity, and share in the toils of war and in the defence of their country; he who laughs at them is a fool for his pains. 457

The first wave is past, and the argument is compelled to admit that men and women have common duties and pursuits. A second and greater wave is rolling in — community of wives and children; is this either expedient or possible? The expediency I do not doubt; I am not so sure of the possibility. 'Nay, I think that a considerable doubt will be entertained on both points.' I meant to have escaped the trouble of proving the first, but as you have detected the little stratagem I must even submit. Only allow me to feed my fancy like the solitary in his walks, with a dream of what might be, and then I will return to the question of what can be. 458

In the first place our rulers will enforce the laws and make new ones where they are wanted, and their allies or ministers will obey. You, as legislator, have already selected the men; and now you shall select the women. After the selection has been made, they will dwell in common houses and have their meals in common, and will be brought together by a necessity more certain than that of mathematics. But they cannot be allowed to live in licentiousness; that is an unholy thing, which the rulers are determined to prevent. For the avoidance of this, holy marriage festivals will be instituted, and their holiness will be in proportion to their usefulness. And here, Glaucon, I should like to ask (as I know that you are a breeder of birds and animals), Do you not take the greatest care in the mating? 'Certainly.' And there is no reason to suppose that less care is required in the marriage of human beings. But then our rulers must be skilful physicians of the State, for they will often need a strong dose of falsehood in order to bring about desirable unions between their subjects. The good must be paired with the good, and the bad with the bad, and the offspring of the one must be reared, and of the other destroyed; in this way the flock will be preserved in prime condition. Hymeneal festivals will be celebrated at times fixed with an eye to population, and the brides and bridegrooms will 459 460

meet at them; and by an ingenious system of lots the rulers will contrive that the brave and the fair come together, and that those of inferior breed are paired with inferiors — the latter will ascribe to chance what is really the invention of the rulers. And when children are born, the offspring of the brave and fair will be carried to an enclosure in a certain part of the city, and there attended by suitable nurses; the rest will be hurried away to places unknown. The mothers will be brought to the fold and will suckle the children; care however must be taken that none of them recognise their own offspring; and if necessary other nurses may also be hired. The trouble of watching and getting up at night will be transferred to attendants. ‘Then the wives of our guardians will have a fine easy time when they are having children.’ And quite right too, I said, that they should.

461 The parents ought to be in the prime of life, which for a man may be reckoned at thirty years — from twenty-five, when he has ‘passed the point at which the speed of life is greatest,’ to fifty-five; and at twenty years for a woman — from twenty to forty. Any one above or below those ages who partakes in the hymeneals shall be guilty of impiety; also every one who forms a marriage connexion at other times without the consent of the rulers. This latter regulation applies to those who are within the specified ages, after which they may range at will, provided they avoid the prohibited degrees of parents and children, or of brothers and sisters, which last, however, are not absolutely prohibited, if a dispensation be procured. ‘But how shall we know the degrees of affinity, when all things are common?’ The answer is, that brothers and sisters are all such as are born 462 seven or nine months after the espousals, and their parents those who are then espoused, and every one will have many children and every child many parents.

Socrates proceeds: I have now to prove that this scheme is advantageous and also consistent with our entire polity. The greatest good of a State is unity; the greatest evil, discord and distraction. And there will be unity where there are no private pleasures or pains or interests — where if one member suffers all the members suffer, if one citizen is touched all are quickly sensitive; and the least hurt to the little finger of the State runs through the whole body and vibrates to the soul. For the true



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State, like an individual, is injured as a whole when any part is affected. Every State has subjects and rulers, who in a democracy are called rulers, and in other States masters: but in our State they are called saviours and allies; and the subjects who in other States are termed slaves, are by us termed nurturers and paymasters, and those who are termed comrades and colleagues in other places, are by us called fathers and brothers. And whereas in other States members of the same government regard one of their colleagues as a friend and another as an enemy, in our State no man is a stranger to another; for every citizen is connected with every other by ties of blood, and these names and this way of speaking will have a corresponding reality — brother, father, sister, mother, repeated from infancy in the ears of children, will not be mere words. Then again the citizens will have all things in common, and having common property they will have common pleasures and pains. 463 464

Can there be strife and contention among those who are of one mind; or lawsuits about property when men have nothing but their bodies which they call their own; or suits about violence when every one is bound to defend himself? The permission to strike when insulted will be an 'antidote' to the knife and will prevent disturbances in the State. But no younger man will strike an elder; reverence will prevent him from laying hands on his kindred, and he will fear that the rest of the family may retaliate. Moreover, our citizens will be rid of the lesser evils of life; there will be no flattery of the rich, no sordid household cares, no borrowing and not paying. Compared with the citizens of other States, ours will be Olympic victors, and crowned with blessings greater still — they and their children having a better maintenance during life, and after death an honourable burial. Nor has the happiness of the individual been sacrificed to the happiness of the State (cp. iv. 419 E); our Olympic victor has not been turned into a cobbler, but he has a happiness beyond that of any cobbler. At the same time, if any conceited youth begins to dream of appropriating the State to himself, he must be reminded that 'half is better than the whole.' 'I should certainly advise him to stay where he is when he has the promise of such a brave life.' 465 466

But is such a community possible? — as among the animals, so



also among men; and if possible, in what way possible? About war there is no difficulty; the principle of communism is adapted to military service. Parents will take their children to look on at a battle, just as potters' boys are trained to the business by looking on at the wheel. And to the parents themselves, as to other animals, the sight of their young ones will prove a great incentive to bravery. Young warriors must learn, but they must not run into danger, although a certain degree of risk is worth incurring when the benefit is great. The young creatures should be placed under the care of experienced veterans, and they should have wings—that is to say, swift and tractable steeds on which they may fly away and escape. One of the first things to be done is to teach a youth to ride.

Cowards and deserters shall be degraded to the class of husbandmen; gentlemen who allow themselves to be taken prisoners, may be presented to the enemy. But what shall be done to the hero? First of all he shall be crowned by all the youths in the army; secondly, he shall receive the right hand of fellowship; and thirdly, do you think that there is any harm in his being kissed? We have already determined that he shall have more wives than others, in order that he may have as many children as possible. And at a feast he shall have more to eat; we have the authority of Homer for honouring brave men with 'long chines,' which is an appropriate compliment, because meat is a very strengthening thing. Fill the bowl then, and give the best seats and meats to the brave—may they do them good! And he who dies in battle will be at once declared to be of the golden race, and will, as we believe, become one of Hesiod's guardian angels. He shall be worshipped after death in the manner prescribed by the oracle; and not only he, but all other benefactors of the State who die in any other way, shall be admitted to the same honours.

The next question is, How shall we treat our enemies? Shall Hellenes be enslaved? No; for there is too great a risk of the whole race passing under the yoke of the barbarians. Or shall the dead be despoiled? Certainly not; for that sort of thing is an excuse for skulking, and has been the ruin of many an army. There is meanness and feminine malice in making an enemy of the dead body, when the soul which was the owner has fled—

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like a dog who cannot reach his assailants, and quarrels with the stones which are thrown at him instead. Again, the arms of Hellenes should not be offered up in the temples of the Gods; they are a pollution, for they are taken from brethren. And on similar grounds there should be a limit to the devastation of Hellenic territory — the houses should not be burnt, nor more than the annual produce carried off. For war is of two kinds, civil and foreign; the first of which is properly termed ‘discord,’ and only the second ‘war;’ and war between Hellenes is in reality civil war — a quarrel in a family, which is ever to be regarded as unpatriotic and unnatural, and ought to be prosecuted with a view to reconciliation in a true phil-Hellenic spirit, as of those who would chasten but not utterly enslave. The war is not against a whole nation who are a friendly multitude of men, women, and children, but only against a few guilty persons; when they are punished peace will be restored. That is the way in which Hellenes should war against one another — and against barbarians, as they war against one another now. 471

‘But, my dear Socrates, you are forgetting the main question: Is such a State possible? I grant all and more than you say about the blessedness of being one family — fathers, brothers, mothers, daughters, going out to war together; but I want to ascertain the possibility of this ideal State.’ You are too unmerciful. The first wave and the second wave I have hardly escaped, and now you will certainly drown me with the third. When you see the towering crest of the wave, I expect you to take pity. ‘Not a whit.’ 472

Well, then, we were led to form our ideal polity in the search after justice, and the just man answered to the just State. Is this ideal at all the worse for being impracticable? Would the picture of a perfectly beautiful man be any the worse because no such man ever lived? Can any reality come up to the idea? Nature will not allow words to be fully realized; but if I am to try and realize the ideal of the State in a measure, I think that an approach may be made to the perfection of which I dream by one or two, I do not say slight, but possible changes in the present constitution of States. I would reduce them to a single one — the great wave, as I call it. *Until, then, kings are philosophers, or philosophers are kings, cities will never cease from ill: no, nor the* 473

*human race; nor will our ideal polity ever come into being.* I know *Republic V.*  
 that this is a hard saying, which few will be able to receive. *ANALYSIS.*  
 ‘Socrates, all the world will take off his coat and rush upon you  
 74 with sticks and stones, and therefore I would advise you to  
 prepare an answer.’ You got me into the scrape, I said. ‘And  
 I was right,’ he replied; ‘however, I will stand by you as a sort  
 of do-nothing, well-meaning ally.’ Having the help of such a  
 champion, I will do my best to maintain my position. And first, I  
 must explain of whom I speak and what sort of natures these are who  
 are to be philosophers and rulers. As you are a man of pleasure,  
 you will not have forgotten how indiscriminate lovers are in their  
 attachments; they love all, and turn blemishes into beauties. The  
 snub-nosed youth is said to have a winning grace; the beak of  
 another has a royal look; the featureless are faultless; the dark  
 are manly, the fair angels; the sickly have a new term of endear-  
 75 ment invented expressly for them, which is ‘honey-pale.’ Lovers of  
 wine and lovers of ambition also desire the objects of their affection  
 in every form. Now here comes the point:—The philosopher too is  
 a lover of knowledge in every form; he has an insatiable curiosity.  
 ‘But will curiosity make a philosopher? Are the lovers of sights  
 and sounds, who let out their ears to every chorus at the Dionysiac  
 festivals, to be called philosophers?’ They are not true philoso-  
 phers, but only an imitation. ‘Then how are we to describe the  
 true?’

You would acknowledge the existence of abstract ideas, such as  
 76 justice, beauty, good, evil, which are severally one, yet in their  
 various combinations appear to be many. Those who recognize  
 these realities are philosophers; whereas the other class hear  
 sounds and see colours, and understand their use in the arts, but  
 cannot attain to the true or waking vision of absolute justice or  
 beauty or truth; they have not the light of knowledge, but of  
 opinion, and what they see is a dream only. Perhaps he of  
 whom we say the last will be angry with us; can we pacify  
 him without revealing the disorder of his mind? Suppose  
 we say that, if he has knowledge we rejoice to hear it, but  
 knowledge must be of something which is, as ignorance is of  
 77 something which is not; and there is a third thing, which both is  
 and is not, and is matter of opinion only. Opinion and knowledge,  
 then, having distinct objects, must also be distinct faculties. And



by faculties I mean powers unseen and distinguishable only by the difference in their objects, as opinion and knowledge differ, since the one is liable to err, but the other is unerring and is the mightiest of all our faculties. If being is the object of knowledge, and not-being of ignorance, and these are the extremes, opinion must lie between them, and may be called darker than the one and brighter than the other. This intermediate or contingent matter is and is not at the same time, and partakes both of existence and of non-existence. Now I would ask my good friend, who denies abstract beauty and justice, and affirms a many beautiful and a many just, whether everything he sees is not in some point of view different — the beautiful ugly, the pious impious, the just unjust? Is not the double also the half, and are not heavy and light relative terms which pass into one another? Everything is and is not, as in the old riddle — ‘A man and not a man shot and did not shoot a bird and not a bird with a stone and not a stone.’ The mind cannot be fixed on either alternative; and these ambiguous, intermediate, erring, half-lighted objects, which have a disorderly movement in the region between being and not-being, are the proper matter of opinion, as the immutable objects are the proper matter of knowledge. And he who grovels in the world of sense, and has only this uncertain perception of things, is not a philosopher, but a lover of opinion only. . . .

The fifth book is the new beginning of the Republic, in which the community of property and of family are first maintained, and the transition is made to the kingdom of philosophers. For both of these Plato, after his manner, has been preparing in some chance words of Book IV (424 A), which fall unperceived on the reader’s mind, as they are supposed at first to have fallen on the ear of Glaucon and Adeimantus. The ‘paradoxes,’ as Morgenstern terms them, of this book of the Republic will be reserved for another place; a few remarks on the style, and some explanations of difficulties, may be briefly added.

First, there is the image of the waves, which serves for a sort of scheme or plan of the book. The first wave, the second wave, the third and greatest wave come rolling in, and we hear the roar of them. All that can be said of the extravagance of Plato’s proposals is anticipated by himself. Nothing is more admirable than the



hesitation with which he proposes the solemn text 'Until kings are philosophers,' &c. ; or the reaction from the sublime to the ridiculous, when Glaucon describes the manner in which the new truth will be received by mankind.

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Some defects and difficulties may be noted in the execution of the communistic plan. Nothing is told us of the application of communism to the lower classes; nor is the table of prohibited degrees capable of being made out. It is quite possible that a child born at one hymeneal festival may marry one of its own brothers or sisters, or even one of its parents, at another. Plato is afraid of incestuous unions, but at the same time he does not wish to bring before us the fact that the city would be divided into families of those born seven and nine months after each hymeneal festival. If it were worth while to argue seriously about such fancies, we might remark that while all the old affinities are abolished, the newly prohibited affinity rests not on any natural or rational principle, but only upon the accident of children having been born in the same month and year. Nor does he explain how the lots could be so manipulated by the legislature as to bring together the fairest and best. The singular expression (460 E) which is employed to describe the age of five-and-twenty may perhaps be taken from some poet.

In the delineation of the philosopher, the illustrations of the nature of philosophy derived from love are more suited to the apprehension of Glaucon, the Athenian man of pleasure, than to modern tastes or feelings (cp. V. 474, 475). They are partly facetious, but also contain a germ of truth. That science is a whole, remains a true principle of inductive as well as of metaphysical philosophy; and the love of universal knowledge is still the characteristic of the philosopher in modern as well as in ancient times.

At the end of the fifth book Plato introduces the figment of contingent matter, which has exercised so great an influence both on the Ethics and Theology of the modern world, and which occurs here for the first time in the history of philosophy. He did not remark that the degrees of knowledge in the subject have nothing corresponding to them in the object. With him a word must answer to an idea; and he could not conceive of an opinion which was an opinion about nothing. The influence of analogy led him to invent 'parallels and conjugates' and to overlook facts. To us

*Hegel on Form (17)*

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some of his difficulties are puzzling only from their simplicity: we do not perceive that the answer to them 'is tumbling out at our feet.' To the mind of early thinkers, the conception of not-being was dark and mysterious (Sophist, 254 A); they did not see that this terrible apparition which threatened destruction to all knowledge was only a logical determination. The common term under which, through the accidental use of language, two entirely different ideas were included was another source of confusion. Thus through the ambiguity of *δοκεῖν*, *φαίνεται*, *εἰκεν*, κ.τ.λ. Plato, attempting to introduce order into the first chaos of human thought, seems to have confused perception and opinion, and to have failed to distinguish the contingent from the relative. In the Theaetetus the first of these difficulties begins to clear up; in the Sophist the second; and for this, as well as for other reasons, both these dialogues are probably to be regarded as later than the Republic.

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**BOOK VI.** Having determined that the many have no know-Step  
ledge of true being, and have no clear patterns in their minds of 482  
justice, beauty, truth, and that philosophers have such patterns, we  
have now to ask whether they or the many shall be rulers in our  
State. But who can doubt that philosophers should be chosen, if  
they have the other qualities which are required in a ruler? For 485  
they are lovers of the knowledge of the eternal and of all truth;  
they are haters of falsehood; their meaner desires are absorbed in  
the interests of knowledge; they are spectators of all time and all  
existence; and in the magnificence of their contemplation the life 486  
of man is as nothing to them, nor is death fearful. Also they are  
of a social, gracious disposition, equally free from cowardice and  
arrogance. They learn and remember easily; they have har-  
monious, well-regulated minds; truth flows to them sweetly by  
nature. Can the god of Jealousy himself find any fault with such 487  
an assemblage of good qualities?

Here Adeimantus interposes:—'No man can answer you, Socrates; but every man feels that this is owing to his own deficiency in argument. He is driven from one position to another, until he has nothing more to say, just as an unskilful player at draughts is reduced to his last move by a more skilled opponent. And yet all the time he may be right.

He may know, in this very instance, that those who make philosophy the business of their lives, generally turn out rogues if they are bad men, and fools if they are good. What do you say?' I should say that he is quite right. 'Then how is such an admission reconcilable with the doctrine that philosophers should be kings?'

488 I shall answer you in a parable which will also let you see how poor a hand I am at the invention of allegories. The relation of good men to their governments is so peculiar, that in order to defend them I must take an illustration from the world of fiction. Conceive the captain of a ship, taller by a head and shoulders than any of the crew, yet a little deaf, a little blind, and rather ignorant of the seaman's art. The sailors want to steer, although they know nothing of the art; and they have a theory that it cannot be learned. If the helm is refused them, they drug the captain's posset, bind him hand and foot, and take possession of the ship. He who joins in the mutiny is termed a good pilot and what not; they have no conception that the true pilot must observe the winds and the stars, and must be their master, whether they like it or not; — such an one would be called by them fool, prater, 489 star-gazer. This is my parable; which I will beg you to interpret for me to those gentlemen who ask why the philosopher has such an evil name, and to explain to them that not he, but those who will not use him, are to blame for his uselessness. The philosopher should not beg of mankind to be put in authority over them. The wise man should not seek the rich, as the proverb bids, but every man, whether rich or poor, must knock at the door of the physician when he has need of him. Now the pilot is the philosopher — he whom in the parable they call star-gazer, and the mutinous sailors are the mob of politicians by whom he is rendered useless. Not that these are the worst enemies of philosophy, who is far more dishonoured by her own professing sons when they are corrupted 490 by the world. Need I recall the original image of the philosopher? Did we not say of him just now, that he loved truth and hated falsehood, and that he could not rest in the multiplicity of phenomena, but was led by a sympathy in his own nature to the contemplation of the absolute? All the virtues as well as truth, who is the leader of them, took up their abode in his soul. But as you were observing, if we turn aside to view the reality, we see



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that the persons who were thus described, with the exception of a small and useless class, are utter rogues.

The point which has to be considered, is the origin of this corruption in nature. Every one will admit that the philosopher, 491  
in our description of him, is a rare being. But what numberless causes tend to destroy these rare beings! There is no good thing which may not be a cause of evil — health, wealth, strength, rank, and the virtues themselves, when placed under unfavourable circumstances. For as in the animal or vegetable world the strongest seeds most need the accompaniment of good air and soil, so the best of human characters turn out the worst when they fall upon an unsuitable soil; whereas weak natures hardly ever do any considerable good or harm; they are not the stuff out of which either great criminals or great heroes are made. The philosopher 492  
follows the same analogy: he is either the best or the worst of all men. Some persons say that the Sophists are the corrupters of youth; but is not public opinion the real Sophist who is everywhere present — in those very persons, in the assembly, in the courts, in the camp, in the applauses and hisses of the theatre re-echoed by the surrounding hills? Will not a young man's heart leap amid these discordant sounds? and will any education save him from being carried away by the torrent? Nor is this all. For if he will not yield to opinion, there follows the gentle compulsion of exile or death. What principle of rival Sophists or anybody else can overcome in such an unequal contest? Characters there may be more than human, who are exceptions — God may save a 493  
man, but not his own strength. Further, I would have you consider that the hireling Sophist only gives back to the world their own opinions; he is the keeper of the monster, who knows how to flatter or anger him, and observes the meaning of his inarticulate grunts. Good is what pleases him, evil what he dislikes; truth and beauty are determined only by the taste of the brute. Such is the Sophist's wisdom, and such is the condition of those who make public opinion the test of truth, whether in art or in morals. The curse is laid upon them of being and doing what it approves, and when they attempt first principles the failure is ludicrous. Think of all this and ask yourself whether the world is more likely to be a believer in the unity of the idea, or in the multiplicity of phenomena. And the world if not a believer



494 in the idea cannot be a philosopher, and must therefore be a persecutor of philosophers. There is another evil: — the world does not like to lose the gifted nature, and so they flatter the young [Alcibiades] into a magnificent opinion of his own capacity; the tall, proper youth begins to expand, and is dreaming of kingdoms and empires. If at this instant a friend whispers to him, 'Now the gods lighten thee; thou art a great fool' and must be educated — do you think that he will listen? Or suppose a better sort of man who is attracted towards philosophy, will they not  
 495 make Herculean efforts to spoil and corrupt him? Are we not right in saying that the love of knowledge, no less than riches, may divert him? Men of this class [Critias] often become politicians — they are the authors of great mischief in states, and sometimes also of great good. And thus philosophy is deserted by her natural protectors, and others enter in and dishonour her. Vulgar little minds see the land open and rush from the prisons of the arts into her temple. A clever mechanic having a soul coarse as his body, thinks that he will gain caste by becoming her suitor. For philosophy, even in her fallen estate, has a dignity of her own — and he, like a bald little blacksmith's apprentice as he is, having made some money and got out of durance, washes and dresses  
 496 himself as a bridegroom and marries his master's daughter. What will be the issue of such marriages? Will they not be vile and bastard, devoid of truth and nature? 'They will.' Small, then, is the remnant of genuine philosophers; there may be a few who are citizens of small states, in which politics are not worth thinking of, or who have been detained by Theages' bridle of ill health; for my own case of the oracular sign is almost unique, and too rare to be worth mentioning. And these few when they have tasted the pleasures of philosophy, and have taken a look at that den of thieves and place of wild beasts, which is human life, will stand aside from the storm under the shelter of a wall, and try to preserve their own innocence and to depart in peace. 'A great work, too, will have been accomplished by them.' Great, yes, but not the greatest; for man is a social being, and can only attain his highest development in the society which is best suited to him.  
 497 Enough, then, of the causes why philosophy has such an evil name. Another question is, Which of existing states is suited to her? Not one of them; at present she is like some exotic seed

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which degenerates in a strange soil; only in her proper state will she be shown to be of heavenly growth. 'And is her proper state ours or some other?' Ours in all points but one, which was left undetermined. You may remember our saying that some living mind or witness of the legislator was needed in states. But we were afraid to enter upon a subject of such difficulty, and now the question recurs and has not grown easier: — How may philosophy be safely studied? Let us bring her into the light of day, and make an end of the inquiry.

In the first place, I say boldly that nothing can be worse than the present mode of study. Persons usually pick up a little 498 philosophy in early youth, and in the intervals of business, but they never master the real difficulty, which is dialectic. Later, perhaps, they occasionally go to a lecture on philosophy. Years advance, and the sun of philosophy, unlike that of Heracleitus, sets never to rise again. This order of education should be reversed; it should begin with gymnastics in youth, and as the man strengthens, he should increase the gymnastics of his soul. Then, when active life is over, let him finally return to philosophy. 'You are in earnest, Socrates, but the world will be equally earnest in withstanding you — no one more than Thrasy Machus.' Do not make a quarrel between Thrasy Machus and me, who were never enemies and are now good friends enough. And I shall do my best to convince him and all mankind of the truth of my words, or at any rate to prepare for the future when, in another life, we may again take part in similar discussions. 'That will be a long time hence.' Not long in comparison with eternity. The many will probably remain incredulous, for they have never seen the natural unity of ideas, but only artificial juxtapositions; not free and generous thoughts, but tricks of controversy and quips of law; — a perfect man ruling in a perfect state, even a single 499 one they have not known. And we foresaw that there was no chance of perfection either in states or individuals until a necessity was laid upon philosophers — not the rogues, but those whom we called the useless class — of holding office; or until the sons of kings were inspired with a true love of philosophy. Whether in the infinity of past time there has been, or is in some distant land, or ever will be hereafter, an ideal such as we have described, we stoutly maintain that there has been, is, and

will be such a state whenever the Muse of philosophy rules. *Republic VI.*

500 Will you say that the world is of another mind? O, my friend,  
do not revile the world! They will soon change their opinion  
if they are gently entreated, and are taught the true nature of the  
philosopher. Who can hate a man who loves him? or be jealous  
of one who has no jealousy? Consider, again, that the many  
hate not the true but the false philosophers — the pretenders who  
force their way in without invitation, and are always speaking  
of persons and not of principles, which is unlike the spirit of  
philosophy. For the true philosopher despises earthly strife;  
his eye is fixed on the eternal order in accordance with which  
he moulds himself into the Divine image (and not himself only,  
but other men), and is the creator of the virtues private as well as  
public. When mankind see that the happiness of states is only  
to be found in that image, will they be angry with us for attempt-  
501 of delineation?’ The artist will do nothing until he has made  
a *tabula rasa*; on this he will draw the constitution of a state,  
glancing often at the divine truth of nature, and from that deriving  
the godlike among men, mingling the two elements, rubbing out  
and painting in, until there is a perfect harmony or fusion of  
the divine and human. But perhaps the world will doubt the  
existence of such an artist. What will they doubt? That the  
philosopher is a lover of truth, having a nature akin to the best? —  
and if they admit this will they still quarrel with us for making  
philosophers our kings? ‘They will be less disposed to quarrel.’  
502 Let us assume then that they are pacified. Still, a person may  
hesitate about the probability of the son of a king being a philo-  
sopher. And we do not deny that they are very liable to be  
corrupted; but yet surely in the course of ages there might be  
one exception — and one is enough. If one son of a king were  
a philosopher, and had obedient citizens, he might bring the ideal  
polity into being. Hence we conclude that our laws are not  
only the best, but that they are also possible, though not free from  
difficulty.

I gained nothing by evading the troublesome questions which  
arose concerning women and children. I will be wiser now  
and acknowledge that we must go to the bottom of another  
question: What is to be the education of our guardians? It was



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agreed that they were to be lovers of their country, and were 503  
to be tested in the refiner's fire of pleasures and pains, and those  
who came forth pure and remained fixed in their principles were  
to have honours and rewards in life and after death. But at this  
point, the argument put on her veil and turned into another path.  
I hesitated to make the assertion which I now hazard,—that our  
guardians must be philosophers. You remember all the contra-  
dictory elements, which met in the philosopher — how difficult to  
find them all in a single person! Intelligence and spirit are not  
often combined with steadiness; the stolid, fearless, nature is  
averse to intellectual toil. And yet these opposite elements are  
all necessary, and therefore, as we were saying before, the  
aspirant must be tested in pleasures and dangers; and also, as  
we must now further add, in the highest branches of knowledge. 504  
You will remember, that when we spoke of the virtues mention  
was made of a longer road, which you were satisfied to leave  
unexplored. 'Enough seemed to have been said.' Enough, my  
friend; but what is enough while anything remains wanting?  
Of all men the guardian must not faint in the search after truth;  
he must be prepared to take the longer road, or he will never  
reach that higher region which is above the four virtues; and of  
the virtues too he must not only get an outline, but a clear and  
distinct vision. (Strange that we should be so precise about  
trifles, so careless about the highest truths!) 'And what are  
the highest?' You to pretend unconsciousness, when you have 505  
so often heard me speak of the idea of good, about which we  
know so little, and without which though a man gain the world  
he has no profit of it! Some people imagine that the good is  
wisdom; but this involves a circle,—the good, they say, is wisdom,  
wisdom has to do with the good. According to others the good is  
pleasure; but then comes the absurdity that good is bad, for there  
are bad pleasures as well as good. Again, the good must have  
reality; a man may desire the appearance of virtue, but he will  
not desire the appearance of good. Ought our guardians then  
to be ignorant of this supreme principle, of which every man 506  
has a presentiment, and without which no man has any real  
knowledge of anything? 'But, Socrates, what is this supreme  
principle, knowledge or pleasure, or what? You may think me  
troublesome, but I say that you have no business to be always



repeating the doctrines of others instead of giving us your own.' *Republic VI.*

Can I say what I do not know? 'You may offer an opinion.' ANALYSIS.

And will the blindness and crookedness of opinion content you when you might have the light and certainty of science? 'I will only ask you to give such an explanation of the good as you have given already of temperance and justice.' I wish that I could, but in my present mood I cannot reach to the height of the knowledge

507 of the good. To the parent or principal I cannot introduce you, but to the child begotten in his image, which I may compare with the interest on the principal, I will. (Audit the account, and do not let me give you a false statement of the debt.) You remember our old distinction of the many beautiful and the one beautiful, the particular and the universal, the objects of sight and the objects of thought? Did you ever consider that the objects of sight imply a faculty of sight which is the most complex and costly of our senses, requiring not only objects of sense, but also a medium, which is light; without which the sight will not distin-

508 guish between colours and all will be a blank? For light is the noble bond between the perceiving faculty and the thing perceived, and the god who gives us light is the sun, who is the eye of the day, but is not to be confounded with the eye of man. This eye of the day or sun is what I call the child of the good, standing in the same relation to the visible world as the good to the intellectual. When the sun shines the eye sees, and in the intellectual world where truth is, there is sight and light. Now that which is the sun of intelligent natures, is the idea of good, the cause of knowledge and truth, yet

509 other and fairer than they are, and standing in the same relation to them in which the sun stands to light. O inconceivable height of beauty, which is above knowledge and above truth! ('You cannot surely mean pleasure,' he said. Peace, I replied.)

And this idea of good, like the sun, is also the cause of growth, and the author not of knowledge only, but of being, yet greater far than either in dignity and power. 'That is a reach of thought more than human; but, pray, go on with the image, for I suspect that there is more behind.' There is, I said; and bearing in mind our two suns or principles, imagine further their corresponding worlds — one of the visible, the other of the intelligible; you may assist your fancy by figuring the distinction under the image

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of a line divided into two unequal parts, and may again subdivide each part into two lesser segments representative of the stages of knowledge in either sphere. The lower portion of the lower or visible sphere will consist of shadows and reflections, and its upper and smaller portion will contain real objects in the world of nature or of art. The sphere of the intelligible will also have two divisions,—one of mathematics, in which there is no ascent but all is descent; no inquiring into premises, but only drawing of inferences. In this division the mind works with figures and numbers, the images of which are taken not from the shadows, but from the objects, although the truth of them is seen only with the mind's eye; and they are used as hypotheses without being analysed. Whereas in the other division reason uses the hypotheses as stages or steps in the ascent to the idea of good, to which she fastens them, and then again descends, walking firmly in the region of ideas, and of ideas only, in her ascent as well as descent, and finally resting in them. 'I partly understand,' he replied; 'you mean that the ideas of science are superior to the hypothetical, metaphorical conceptions of geometry and the other arts or sciences, whichever is to be the name of them; and the latter conceptions you refuse to make subjects of pure intellect, because they have no first principle, although when resting on a first principle, they pass into the higher sphere.' You understand me very well, I said. And now to those four divisions of knowledge you may assign four corresponding faculties—pure intelligence to the highest sphere; active intelligence to the second; to the third, faith; to the fourth, the perception of shadows—and the clearness of the several faculties will be in the same ratio as the truth of the objects to which they are related. . . .

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Like Socrates, we may recapitulate the virtues of the philosopher. In language which seems to reach beyond the horizon of that age and country, he is described as 'the spectator of all time and all existence.' He has the noblest gifts of nature, and makes the highest use of them. All his desires are absorbed in the love of wisdom, which is the love of truth. None of the graces of a beautiful soul are wanting in him; neither can he fear death, or think much of human life. The ideal of modern

times hardly retains the simplicity of the antique ; there is not the same originality either in truth or error which characterized the Greeks. The philosopher is no longer living in the unseen, nor is he sent by an oracle to convince mankind of ignorance ; nor does he regard knowledge as a system of ideas leading upwards by regular stages to the idea of good. The eagerness of the pursuit has abated ; there is more division of labour and less of comprehensive reflection upon nature and human life as a whole ; more of exact observation and less of anticipation and inspiration. Still, in the altered conditions of knowledge, the parallel is not wholly lost ; and there may be a use in translating the conception of Plato into the language of our own age. The philosopher in modern times is one who fixes his mind on the laws of nature in their sequence and connexion, not on fragments or pictures of nature ; on history, not on controversy ; on the truths which are acknowledged by the few, not on the opinions of the many. He is aware of the importance of 'classifying according to nature,' and will try to 'separate the limbs of science without breaking them' (Phaedr. 265 E). There is no part of truth, whether great or small, which he will dishonour ; and in the least things he will discern the greatest (Parm. 130 C). Like the ancient philosopher he sees the world pervaded by analogies, but he can also tell 'why in some cases a single instance is sufficient for an induction' (Mill's Logic, 3, 3, 3), while in other cases a thousand examples would prove nothing. He inquires into a portion of knowledge only, because the whole has grown too vast to be embraced by a single mind or life. He has a clearer conception of the divisions of science and of their relation to the mind of man than was possible to the ancients. Like Plato, he has a vision of the unity of knowledge, not as the beginning of philosophy to be attained by a study of elementary mathematics, but as the far-off result of the working of many minds in many ages. He is aware that mathematical studies are preliminary to almost every other ; at the same time, he will not reduce all varieties of knowledge to the type of mathematics. He too must have a nobility of character, without which genius loses the better half of greatness. Regarding the world as a point in immensity, and each individual as a link in a never-ending chain of existence, he will not think much of his own life, or be greatly afraid of death.

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Adeimantus objects first of all to the form of the Socratic reasoning, thus showing that Plato is aware of the imperfection of his own method. He brings the accusation against himself which might be brought against him by a modern logician — that he extracts the answer because he knows how to put the question. In a long argument words are apt to change their meaning slightly, or premises may be assumed or conclusions inferred with rather too much certainty or universality; the variation at each step may be unobserved, and yet at last the divergence becomes considerable. Hence the failure of attempts to apply arithmetical or algebraic formulae to logic. The imperfection, or rather the higher and more elastic nature of language, does not allow words to have the precision of numbers or of symbols. And this quality in language impairs the force of an argument which has many steps.

The objection, though fairly met by Socrates in this particular instance, may be regarded as implying a reflection upon the Socratic mode of reasoning. And here, as at p. 506 B, Plato seems to intimate that the time had come when the negative and interrogative method of Socrates must be superseded by a positive and constructive one, of which examples are given in some of the later dialogues. Adeimantus further argues that the ideal is wholly at variance with facts; for experience proves philosophers to be either useless or rogues. Contrary to all expectation (cp. p. 497 for a similar surprise) Socrates has no hesitation in admitting the truth of this, and explains the anomaly in an allegory, first characteristically depreciating his own inventive powers. In this allegory the people are distinguished from the professional politicians, and, as at pp. 499, 500, are spoken of in a tone of pity rather than of censure under the image of 'the noble captain who is not very quick in his perceptions.'

The uselessness of philosophers is explained by the circumstance that mankind will not use them. The world in all ages has been divided between contempt and fear of those who employ the power of ideas and know no other weapons. Concerning the false philosopher, Socrates argues that the best is most liable to corruption; and that the finer nature is more likely to suffer from alien conditions. We too observe that there are some kinds



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of excellence which spring from a peculiar delicacy of constitution; as is evidently true of the poetical and imaginative temperament, which often seems to depend on impressions, and hence can only breathe or live in a certain atmosphere. The man of genius has greater pains and greater pleasures, greater powers and greater weaknesses, and often a greater play of character than is to be found in ordinary men. He can assume the disguise of virtue or disinterestedness without having them, or veil personal enmity in the language of patriotism and philosophy,—he can say the word which all men are thinking, he has an insight which is terrible into the follies and weaknesses of his fellow-men. An Alcibiades, a Mirabeau, or a Napoleon the First, are born either to be the authors of great evils in states, or ‘of great good, when they are drawn in that direction.’

Yet the thesis, ‘*corruptio optimi pessima*,’ cannot be maintained generally or without regard to the kind of excellence which is corrupted. The alien conditions which are corrupting to one nature, may be the elements of culture to another. In general a man can only receive his highest development in a congenial state or family, among friends or fellow-workers. But also he may sometimes be stirred by adverse circumstances to such a degree that he rises up against them and reforms them. And while weaker or coarser characters will extract good out of evil, say in a corrupt state of the church or of society, and live on happily, allowing the evil to remain, the finer or stronger natures may be crushed or spoiled by surrounding influences—may become misanthrope and philanthrope by turns; or in a few instances, like the founders of the monastic orders, or the Reformers, owing to some peculiarity in themselves or in their age, may break away entirely from the world and from the church, sometimes into great good, sometimes into great evil, sometimes into both. And the same holds in the lesser sphere of a convent, a school, a family.

Plato would have us consider how easily the best natures are overpowered by public opinion, and what efforts the rest of mankind will make to get possession of them. The world, the church, their own profession, any political or party organization, are always carrying them off their legs and teaching them to apply high and holy names to their own prejudices and interests.

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The 'monster' corporation to which they belong judges right and truth to be the pleasure of the community. The individual becomes one with his order; or, if he resists, the world is too much for him, and will sooner or later be revenged on him. This is, perhaps, a one-sided but not wholly untrue picture of the maxims and practice of mankind when they 'sit down together at an assembly,' either in ancient or modern times.

When the higher natures are corrupted by politics, the lower take possession of the vacant place of philosophy. This is described in one of those continuous images in which the argument, to use a Platonic expression, 'veils herself,' and which is dropped and reappears at intervals. The question is asked,—Why are the citizens of states so hostile to philosophy? The answer is, that they do not know her. And yet there is also a better mind of the many; they would believe if they were taught. But hitherto they have only known a conventional imitation of philosophy, words without thoughts, systems which have no life in them; a [divine] person uttering the words of beauty and freedom, the friend of man holding communion with the Eternal, and seeking to frame the state in that image, they have never known. The same double feeling respecting the mass of mankind has always existed among men. The first thought is that the people are the enemies of truth and right; the second, that this only arises out of an accidental error and confusion, and that they do not really hate those who love them, if they could be educated to know them.

In the latter part of the sixth book, three questions have to be considered: 1st, the nature of the longer and more circuitous way, which is contrasted with the shorter and more imperfect method of Book IV; 2nd, the heavenly pattern or idea of the state; 3rd, the relation of the divisions of knowledge to one another and to the corresponding faculties of the soul.

1. Of the higher method of knowledge in Plato we have only a glimpse. Neither here nor in the *Phaedrus* or *Symposium*, nor yet in the *Philebus* or *Sophist*, does he give any clear explanation of his meaning. He would probably have described his method as proceeding by regular steps to a system of universal knowledge, which inferred the parts from the whole rather than the whole from the parts. This ideal logic is not practised by him

in the search after justice, or in the analysis of the parts of the soul; there, like Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he argues from experience and the common use of language. But at the end of the sixth book he conceives another and more perfect method, in which all ideas are only steps or grades or moments of thought, forming a connected whole which is self-supporting, and in which consistency is the test of truth. He does not explain to us in detail the nature of the process. Like many other thinkers both in ancient and modern times his mind seems to be filled with a vacant form which he is unable to realize. He supposes the sciences to have a natural order and connexion in an age when they can hardly be said to exist. He is hastening on to the 'end of the intellectual world' without even making a beginning of them.

In modern times we hardly need to be reminded that the process of acquiring knowledge is here confused with the contemplation of absolute knowledge. In all science *a priori* and *a posteriori* truths mingle in various proportions. The *a priori* part is that which is derived from the most universal experience of men, or is universally accepted by them; the *a posteriori* is that which grows up around the more general principles and becomes imperceptibly one with them. But Plato erroneously imagines that the synthesis is separable from the analysis, and that the method of science can anticipate science. In entertaining such a vision of *a priori* knowledge he is sufficiently justified, or at least his meaning may be sufficiently explained by the similar attempts of Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and even of Bacon himself, in modern philosophy. Anticipations or divinations, or prophetic glimpses of truths whether concerning man or nature, seem to stand in the same relation to ancient philosophy which hypotheses bear to modern inductive science. These 'guesses at truth' were not made at random; they arose from a superficial impression of uniformities and first principles in nature which the genius of the Greek, contemplating the expanse of heaven and earth, seemed to recognize in the distance. Nor can we deny that in ancient times knowledge must have stood still, and the human mind been deprived of the very instruments of thought, if philosophy had been strictly confined to the results of experience.

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2. Plato supposes that when the tablet has been made blank the artist will fill in the lineaments of the ideal state. Is this a pattern laid up in heaven, or mere vacancy on which he is supposed to gaze with wondering eye? The answer is, that such ideals are framed partly by the omission of particulars, partly by imagination perfecting the form which experience supplies (*Phaedo*, 74). Plato represents these ideals in a figure as belonging to another world; and in modern times the idea will sometimes seem to precede, at other times to co-operate with the hand of the artist. As in science, so also in creative art, there is a synthetical as well as an analytical method. One man will have the whole in his mind before he begins; to another the processes of mind and hand will be simultaneous.

3. There is no difficulty in seeing that Plato's divisions of knowledge are based, first, on the fundamental antithesis of sensible and intellectual which pervades the whole pre-Socratic philosophy; in which is implied also the opposition of the permanent and transient, of the universal and particular. But the age of philosophy in which he lived seemed to require a further distinction;—numbers and figures were beginning to separate from ideas. The world could no longer regard justice as a cube, and was learning to see, though imperfectly, that the abstractions of sense were distinct from the abstractions of mind. Between the Eleatic being or essence and the shadows of phenomena, the Pythagorean principle of number found a place, and was, as Aristotle remarks, a conducting medium from one to the other. Hence Plato is led to introduce a third term which had not hitherto entered into the scheme of his philosophy. He had observed the use of mathematics in education; they were the best preparation for higher studies. The subjective relation between them further suggested an objective one; although the passage from one to the other is really imaginary (*Metaph.* i, 6, 4). For metaphysical and moral philosophy has no connexion with mathematics; number and figure are the abstractions of time and space, not the expressions of purely intellectual conceptions. When divested of metaphor, a straight line or a square has no more to do with right and justice than a crooked line with vice. The figurative association was mistaken for a real one; and thus the three latter divisions of the Platonic proportion were constructed.



There is more difficulty in comprehending how he arrived at the first term of the series, which is nowhere else mentioned, and has no reference to any other part of his system. Nor indeed does the relation of shadows to objects correspond to the relation of numbers to ideas. Probably Plato has been led by the love of analogy (cp. Timaeus, p. 32 B) to make four terms instead of three, although the objects perceived in both divisions of the lower sphere are equally objects of sense. He is also preparing the way, as his manner is, for the shadows of images at the beginning of the seventh book, and the imitation of an imitation in the tenth. The line may be regarded as reaching from unity to infinity, and is divided into two unequal parts, and subdivided into two more; each lower sphere is the multiplication of the preceding. Of the four faculties, faith in the lower division has an intermediate position (cp. for the use of the word faith or belief, πίστις, Timaeus, 29 C, 37 B), contrasting equally with the vagueness of the perception of shadows (*εἰκασία*) and the higher certainty of understanding (*διάνοια*) and reason (*νοῦς*).

The difference between understanding and mind or reason (*νοῦς*) is analogous to the difference between acquiring knowledge in the parts and the contemplation of the whole. True knowledge is a whole, and is at rest; consistency and universality are the tests of truth. To this self-evidencing knowledge of the whole the faculty of mind is supposed to correspond. But there is a knowledge of the understanding which is incomplete and in motion always, because unable to rest in the subordinate ideas. Those ideas are called both images and hypotheses—images because they are clothed in sense, hypotheses because they are assumptions only, until they are brought into connexion with the idea of good.

The general meaning of the passage 508–511, so far as the thought contained in it admits of being translated into the terms of modern philosophy, may be described or explained as follows:—There is a truth, one and self-existent, to which by the help of a ladder let down from above, the human intelligence may ascend. This unity is like the sun in the heavens, the light by which all things are seen, the being by which they are created and sustained. It is the *idea* of good. And the steps of the ladder leading up to this highest or universal existence are the mathe-

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mathematical sciences, which also contain in themselves an element of the universal. These, too, we see in a new manner when we connect them with the idea of good. They then cease to be hypotheses or pictures, and become essential parts of a higher truth which is at once their first principle and their final cause.

We cannot give any more precise meaning to this remarkable passage, but we may trace in it several rudiments or vestiges of thought which are common to us and to Plato: such as (1) the unity and correlation of the sciences, or rather of science, for in Plato's time they were not yet parted off or distinguished; (2) the existence of a Divine Power, or life or idea or cause or reason, not yet conceived or no longer conceived as in the *Timæus* and elsewhere under the form of a person; (3) the recognition of the hypothetical and conditional character of the mathematical sciences, and in a measure of every science when isolated from the rest; (4) the conviction of a truth which is invisible, and of a law, though hardly a law of nature, which permeates the intellectual rather than the visible world.

The method of Socrates is hesitating and tentative, awaiting the fuller explanation of the idea of good, and of the nature of dialectic in the seventh book. The imperfect intelligence of Glaucon, and the reluctance of Socrates to make a beginning, mark the difficulty of the subject. The allusion to Theages' bridle, and to the internal oracle, or demonic sign, of Socrates, which here, as always in Plato, is only prohibitory; the remark that the salvation of any remnant of good in the present evil state of the world is due to God only; the reference to a future state of existence, 498 D, which is unknown to Glaucon in the tenth book, 608 D, and in which the discussions of Socrates and his disciples would be resumed; the surprise in the answers at 487 E and 497 B; the fanciful irony of Socrates, where he pretends that he can only describe the strange position of the philosopher in a figure of speech; the original observation that the Sophists, after all, are only the representatives and not the leaders of public opinion; the picture of the philosopher standing aside in the shower of sleet under a wall; the figure of 'the great beast' followed by the expression of good-will towards the common people who would not have rejected the philosopher if they had known him; the 'right noble thought' that the highest

truths demand the greatest exactness; the hesitation of Socrates in returning once more to his well-worn theme of the idea of good; the ludicrous earnestness of Glaucon; the comparison of philosophy to a deserted maiden who marries beneath her—are some of the most interesting characteristics of the sixth book.

Yet a few more words may be added, on the old theme, which was so oft discussed in the Socratic circle, of which we, like Glaucon and Adeimantus, would fain, if possible, have a clearer notion. Like them, we are dissatisfied when we are told that the idea of good can only be revealed to a student of the mathematical sciences, and we are inclined to think that neither we nor they could have been led along that path to any satisfactory goal. For we have learned that differences of quantity cannot pass into differences of quality, and that the mathematical sciences can never rise above themselves into the sphere of our higher thoughts, although they may sometimes furnish symbols and expressions of them, and may train the mind in habits of abstraction and self-concentration. The illusion which was natural to an ancient philosopher has ceased to be an illusion to us. But if the process by which we are supposed to arrive at the idea of good be really imaginary, may not the idea itself be also a mere abstraction? We remark, first, that in all ages, and especially in primitive philosophy, words such as being, essence, unity, good, have exerted an extraordinary influence over the minds of men. The meagreness or negativeness of their content has been in an inverse ratio to their power. They have become the forms under which all things were comprehended. There was a need or instinct in the human soul which they satisfied; they were not ideas, but gods, and to this new mythology the men of a later generation began to attach the powers and associations of the elder deities.

The idea of good is one of those sacred words or forms of thought, which were beginning to take the place of the old mythology. It meant unity, in which all time and all existence were gathered up. It was the truth of all things, and also the light in which they shone forth, and became evident to intelligences human and divine. It was the cause of all things, the power by which they were brought into being. It was the universal reason divested of a human personality. It was the life as well as the



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light of the world, all knowledge and all power were comprehended in it. The way to it was through the mathematical sciences, and these too were dependent on it. To ask whether God was the maker of it, or made by it, would be like asking whether God could be conceived apart from goodness, or goodness apart from God. The God of the Timæus is not really at variance with the idea of good; they are aspects of the same, differing only as the personal from the impersonal, or the masculine from the neuter, the one being the expression or language of mythology, the other of philosophy.

This, or something like this, is the meaning of the idea of good as conceived by Plato. Ideas of number, order, harmony, development may also be said to enter into it. The paraphrase which has just been given of it goes beyond the actual words of Plato. We have perhaps arrived at the stage of philosophy which enables us to understand what he is aiming at, better than he did himself. We are beginning to realize what he saw darkly and at a distance. But if he could have been told that this, or some conception of the same kind, but higher than this, was the truth at which he was aiming, and the need which he sought to supply, he would gladly have recognized that more was contained in his own thoughts than he himself knew. As his words are few and his manner reticent and tentative, so must the style of his interpreter be. We should not approach his meaning more nearly by attempting to define it further. In translating him into the language of modern thought, we might insensibly lose the spirit of ancient philosophy. It is remarkable that although Plato speaks of the idea of good as the first principle of truth and being, it is nowhere mentioned in his writings except in this passage. Nor did it retain any hold upon the minds of his disciples in a later generation; it was probably unintelligible to them. Nor does the mention of it in Aristotle appear to have any reference to this or any other passage in his extant writings.

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**BOOK VII.** And now I will describe in a figure the enlightenment or unenlightenment of our nature:—Imagine human beings living in an underground den which is open towards the light; they have been there from childhood, having their necks and legs chained, and can only see into the den. Steph  
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At a distance there is a fire, and between the fire and the prisoners a raised way, and a low wall is built along the way, like the screen over which marionette players show their  
515 puppets. Behind the wall appear moving figures, who hold in their hands various works of art, and among them images of men and animals, wood and stone, and some of the passers-by are talking and others silent. 'A strange parable,' he said, 'and strange captives.' They are ourselves, I replied; and they see only the shadows of the images which the fire throws on the wall of the den; to these they give names, and if we add an echo which returns from the wall, the voices of the passengers will seem to proceed from the shadows. Suppose now that you suddenly turn them round and make them look with pain and grief to themselves at the real images; will they believe them to be real? Will not their eyes be dazzled, and will they not try to get away from the light to something which they are able to behold without  
516 blinking? And suppose further, that they are dragged up a steep and rugged ascent into the presence of the sun himself, will not their sight be darkened with the excess of light? Some time will pass before they get the habit of perceiving at all; and at first they will be able to perceive only shadows and reflections in the water; then they will recognize the moon and the stars, and will at length behold the sun in his own proper place as he is. Last of all they will conclude: — This is he who gives us the year and the seasons, and is the author of all that we see. How will they rejoice in passing from darkness to light! How worthless to them will seem the honours and glories of the den! But now imagine further, that they descend into their old habitations; — in that underground dwelling they will not see as well as their  
517 fellows, and will not be able to compete with them in the measurement of the shadows on the wall; there will be many jokes about the man who went on a visit to the sun and lost his eyes, and if they find anybody trying to set free and enlighten one of their number, they will put him to death, if they can catch him. Now the cave or den is the world of sight, the fire is the sun, the way upwards is the way to knowledge, and in the world of knowledge the idea of good is last seen and with difficulty, but when seen is inferred to be the author of good and right — parent of the lord of light in this world, and of truth and understanding in the other.

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He who attains to the beatific vision is always going upwards; he is unwilling to descend into political assemblies and courts of law; for his eyes are apt to blink at the images or shadows of images which they behold in them — he cannot enter into the ideas of those who have never in their lives understood the relation of the shadow to the substance. But blindness is of 518 two kinds, and may be caused either by passing out of darkness into light or out of light into darkness, and a man of sense will distinguish between them, and will not laugh equally at both of them, but the blindness which arises from fulness of light he will deem blessed, and pity the other; or if he laugh at the puzzled soul looking at the sun, he will have more reason to laugh than the inhabitants of the den at those who descend from above. There is a further lesson taught by this parable of ours. Some persons fancy that instruction is like giving eyes to the blind, but we say that the faculty of sight was always there, and that the soul only requires to be turned round towards the light. And this is conversion; other virtues are almost like bodily habits, and may be acquired in the same manner, but intelligence has a diviner life, and is indestructible, turning either to good or evil according to the direction given. Did you never observe 519 how the mind of a clever rogue peers out of his eyes, and the more clearly he sees, the more evil he does? Now if you take such an one, and cut away from him those leaden weights of pleasure and desire which bind his soul to earth, his intelligence will be turned round, and he will behold the truth as clearly as he now discerns his meaner ends. And have we not decided that our rulers must neither be so uneducated as to have no fixed rule of life, nor so over-educated as to be unwilling to leave their paradise for the business of the world? We must choose out therefore the natures who are most likely to ascend to the light and knowledge of the good; but we must not allow them to remain in the region of light; they must be forced down again among the captives in the den to partake of their labours and honours. ‘Will they not think this a hardship?’ You should remember that our purpose in framing the State was not that our citizens should do what they like, but that they should serve 520 the State for the common good of all. May we not fairly say to our philosopher,—Friend, we do you no wrong; for in other



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States philosophy grows wild, and a wild plant owes nothing to the gardener, but you have been trained by us to be the rulers and kings of our hive, and therefore we must insist on your descending into the den. You must, each of you, take your turn, and become able to use your eyes in the dark, and with a little practice you will see far better than those who quarrel about the shadows, whose knowledge is a dream only, whilst yours is a waking reality. It may be that the saint or philosopher who is best fitted, may also be the least inclined to rule, but necessity is laid upon him, and he must no longer live in the heaven of ideas. And this will be the salvation of the State. For those who rule must not be those who are desirous to rule; and, if you can offer to our citizens a better life than that of rulers generally is, there will be a chance that the rich, not only in this world's goods, but in virtue and wisdom, may bear rule. And the only life which is better than the life of political ambition is that of philosophy, which is also the best preparation for the government of a State.

Then now comes the question,—How shall we create our rulers; what way is there from darkness to light? The change is effected by philosophy; it is not the turning over of an oyster-shell, but the conversion of a soul from night to day, from becoming to being. And what training will draw the soul upwards? Our former education had two branches, gymnastic, which was occupied with the body, and music, the sister art, which infused a natural harmony into mind and literature; but neither of these sciences gave any promise of doing what we want. Nothing remains to us but that universal or primary science of which all the arts and sciences are partakers, I mean number or calculation. 'Very true.' Including the art of war? 'Yes, certainly.' Then there is something ludicrous about Palamedes in the tragedy, coming in and saying that he had invented number, and had counted the ranks and set them in order. For if Agamemnon could not count his feet (and without number how could he?) he must have been a pretty sort of general indeed. No man should be a soldier who cannot count, and indeed he is hardly to be called a man. But I am not speaking of these practical applications of arithmetic, for number, in my view, is rather to be regarded as a conductor to thought and being. I will explain



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what I mean by the last expression: — Things sensible are of two kinds; the one class invite or stimulate the mind, while in the other the mind acquiesces. Now the stimulating class are the things which suggest contrast and relation. For example, suppose that I hold up to the eyes three fingers—a fore finger, a middle finger, a little finger—the sight equally recognizes all three fingers, but without number cannot further distinguish them. Or again, suppose two objects to be relatively great and small, these ideas of greatness and smallness are supplied not by the sense, but by the mind. And the perception of their contrast or relation 524 quickens and sets in motion the mind, which is puzzled by the confused intimations of sense, and has recourse to number in order to find out whether the things indicated are one or more than one. Number replies that they are two and not one, and are to be distinguished from one another. Again, the sight beholds great and small, but only in a confused chaos, and not until they are distinguished does the question arise of their respective natures; we are thus led on to the distinction between the visible and intelligible. That was what I meant when I spoke of stimulants to the intellect; I was thinking of the contradictions which arise in perception. The idea of unity, for example, like that of a finger, does not arouse thought unless involving some conception of plurality; but when the one is also the opposite of one, the 525 contradiction gives rise to reflection; an example of this is afforded by any object of sight. All number has also an elevating effect; it raises the mind out of the foam and flux of generation to the contemplation of being, having lesser military and retail uses also. The retail use is not required by us; but as our guardian is to be a soldier as well as a philosopher, the military one may be retained. And to our higher purpose no science can be better adapted; but it must be pursued in the spirit of a philosopher, not of a shopkeeper. It is concerned, not with visible objects, but with abstract truth; for numbers are pure abstractions—the true arithmetician indignantly denies that his unit is capable of division. When you divide, he insists that you are only multiplying; his 526 ‘one’ is not material or resolvable into fractions, but an unvarying and absolute equality; and this proves the purely intellectual character of his study. Note also the great power which arithmetic has of sharpening the wits; no other discipline is equally



severe, or an equal test of general ability, or equally improving to a stupid person.

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Let our second branch of education be geometry. ‘I can easily see,’ replied Glaucon, ‘that the skill of the general will be doubled by his knowledge of geometry.’ That is a small matter; the use of geometry, to which I refer, is the assistance given by it in the contemplation of the idea of good, and the compelling the mind to look at true being, and not at generation only. Yet the present mode of pursuing these studies, as any one who is the least of a mathematician is aware, is mean and ridiculous; they are made to look downwards to the arts, and not upwards to external existence.

527 The geometer is always talking of squaring, subtending, apposing, as if he had in view action; whereas knowledge is the real object of the study. It should elevate the soul, and create the mind of philosophy; it should raise up what has fallen down, not to speak of lesser uses in war and military tactics, and in the improvement of the faculties.

Shall we propose, as a third branch of our education, astronomy? ‘Very good,’ replied Glaucon; ‘the knowledge of the heavens is necessary at once for husbandry, navigation, military tactics.’ I like your way of giving useful reasons for everything in order to make friends of the world. And there is a difficulty in proving to mankind that education is not only useful information but a purification of the eye of the soul, which is better than the bodily eye, for by this alone is truth seen. Now, will you appeal to man-  
528 kind in general or to the philosopher? or would you prefer to look to yourself only? ‘Every man is his own best friend.’ Then take a step backward, for we are out of order, and insert the third dimension which is of solids, after the second which is of planes, and then you may proceed to solids in motion. But solid geometry is not popular and has not the patronage of the State, nor is the use of it fully recognized; the difficulty is great, and the votaries of the study are conceited and impatient. Still the charm of the pursuit  
| wins upon men, and, if government would lend a little assistance,  
| there might be great progress made. ‘Very true,’ replied Glaucon; ‘but do I understand you now to begin with plane geometry, and to place next geometry of solids, and thirdly, astronomy, or the motion of solids?’ Yes, I said; my hastiness has only hindered us.

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‘Very good, and now let us proceed to astronomy, about which I am willing to speak in your lofty strain. No one can fail to see that the contemplation of the heavens draws the soul upwards.’ I am an exception, then; astronomy as studied at present appears to me to draw the soul not upwards, but downwards. Star-gazing is just looking up at the ceiling — no better; a man may lie on his back on land or on water — he may look up or look down, but there is no science in that. The vision of knowledge of which I speak is seen not with the eyes, but with the mind. All the magnificence of the heavens is but the embroidery of a copy which falls far short of the divine Original, and teaches nothing about the absolute harmonies or motions of things. Their beauty is like the beauty of figures drawn by the hand of Daedalus or any other great artist, which may be used for illustration, but no mathematician would seek to obtain from them true conceptions of equality or numerical relations. How ridiculous then to look for these in the map of the heavens, in which the imperfection of matter comes in everywhere as a disturbing element, marring the symmetry of day and night, of months and years, of the sun and stars in their courses. Only by problems can we place astronomy on a truly scientific basis. Let the heavens alone, and exert the intellect.

Still, mathematics admit of other applications, as the Pythagoreans say, and we agree. There is a sister science of harmonical motion, adapted to the ear as astronomy is to the eye, and there may be other applications also. Let us inquire of the Pythagoreans about them, not forgetting that we have an aim higher than theirs, which is the relation of these sciences to the idea of good. The error which pervades astronomy also pervades harmonics. The musicians put their ears in the place of their minds. ‘Yes,’ replied Glaucon, ‘I like to see them laying their ears alongside of their neighbours’ faces — some saying, “That’s a new note,” others declaring that the two notes are the same.’ Yes, I said; but you mean the empirics who are always twisting and torturing the strings of the lyre, and quarrelling about the tempers of the strings; I am referring rather to the Pythagorean harmonists, who are almost equally in error. For they investigate only the numbers of the consonances which are heard, and ascend no higher, — of the true numerical harmony which is unheard, and is only to be found in problems, they have not even a conception.

‘That last,’ he said, ‘must be a marvellous thing.’ A thing, I replied, which is only useful if pursued with a view to the good. *Republic VII.*

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All these sciences are the prelude of the strain, and are profitable if they are regarded in their natural relations to one another.

‘I dare say, Socrates,’ said Glaucon; ‘but such a study will be an endless business.’ What study do you mean — of the prelude, or what? For all these things are only the prelude, and you surely do not suppose that a mere mathematician is also a dialectician?

532 ‘Certainly not. I have hardly ever known a mathematician who could reason.’ And yet, Glaucon, is not true reasoning that hymn of dialectic which is the music of the intellectual world, and which was by us compared to the effort of sight, when from beholding the shadows on the wall we arrived at last at the images which gave the shadows? Even so the dialectical faculty withdrawing from sense arrives by the pure intellect at the contemplation of the idea of good, and never rests but at the very end of the intellectual world. And the royal road out of the cave into the light, and the blinking of the eyes at the sun and turning to contemplate the shadows of reality, not the shadows of an image only — this progress and gradual acquisition of a new faculty of sight by the help of the mathematical sciences, is the elevation of the soul to the contemplation of the highest ideal of being.

533 ‘So far, I agree with you. But now, leaving the prelude, let us proceed to the hymn. What, then, is the nature of dialectic, and what are the paths which lead thither?’ Dear Glaucon, you cannot follow me here. There can be no revelation of the absolute truth to one who has not been disciplined in the previous sciences. But that there is a science of absolute truth, which is attained in some way very different from those now practised, I am confident. For all other arts or sciences are relative to human needs and opinions; and the mathematical sciences are but a dream or hypothesis of true being, and never analyse their own principles. Dialectic alone rises to the principle which is above hypotheses, converting and gently leading the eye of the soul out of the barbarous slough of ignorance into the light of the upper world, with the help of the sciences which we have been describing — sciences, as they are often termed, although they require some other name, implying greater clearness than opinion and less clearness than science, and this in our previous sketch



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was understanding. And so we get four names — two for intellect, and two for opinion,—reason or mind, understanding, faith, perception of shadows — which make a proportion — being: becoming:: intellect: opinion — and science: belief:: understanding: perception of shadows. Dialectic may be further described as that science which defines and explains the essence or being of each nature, which distinguishes and abstracts the good, and is ready to do battle against all opponents in the cause of good. To him who is not a dialectician life is but a sleepy dream; and many a man is in his grave before he is well waked up. And would you have the future rulers of your ideal State intelligent beings, or stupid as posts? ‘Certainly not the latter.’ Then you must train them in dialectic, which will teach them to ask and answer questions, and is the coping-stone of the sciences. 534

I dare say that you have not forgotten how our rulers were chosen; and the process of selection may be carried a step further:—As before, they must be constant and valiant, good-looking, and of noble manners, but now they must also have natural ability which education will improve; that is to say, they must be quick at learning, capable of mental toil, retentive, solid, diligent natures, who combine intellectual with moral virtues; not lame and one-sided, diligent in bodily exercise and indolent in mind, or conversely; not a maimed soul, which hates falsehood and yet unintentionally is always wallowing in the mire of ignorance; not a bastard or feeble person, but sound in wind and limb, and in perfect condition for the great gymnastic trial of the mind. Justice herself can find no fault with natures such as these; and they will be the saviours of our State; disciples of another sort would only make philosophy more ridiculous than she is at present. Forgive my enthusiasm; I am becoming excited; but when I see her trampled under foot, I am angry at the authors of her disgrace. ‘I did not notice that you were more excited than you ought to have been.’ But I felt that I was. Now do not let us forget another point in the selection of our disciples — that they must be young and not old. For Solon is mistaken in saying that an old man can be always learning; youth is the time of study, and here we must remember that the mind is free and dainty, and, unlike the body, must not be made to work against the grain. Learning should be at first a sort of play, in which the natural bent 535 536 537



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is detected. As in training them for war, the young dogs should at first only taste blood; but when the necessary gymnastics are over which during two or three years divide life between sleep and bodily exercise, then the education of the soul will become a more serious matter. At twenty years of age, a selection must be made of the more promising disciples, with whom a new epoch of education will begin. The sciences which they have hitherto learned in fragments will now be brought into relation with each other and with true being; for the power of combining them is the test of speculative and dialectical ability. And afterwards at thirty a further selection shall be made of those who are able to withdraw from the world of sense into the abstraction of ideas. But at this point, judging from present experience, there is a danger that dialectic may be the source of many evils. The danger may be illustrated by a parallel case:—Imagine a person who has been brought up in wealth and luxury amid a crowd of flatterers, and who is suddenly informed that he is a supposititious son. He has hitherto honoured his reputed parents and disregarded the flatterers, and now he does the reverse. This is just what happens with a man's principles. There are certain doctrines which he learnt at home and which exercised a parental authority over him. Presently he finds that imputations are cast upon them; a troublesome querist comes and asks, 'What is the just and good?' or proves that virtue is vice and vice virtue, and his mind becomes unsettled, and he ceases to love, honour, and obey them as he has hitherto done. He is seduced into the life of pleasure, and becomes a lawless person and a rogue. The case of such speculators is very pitiable, and, in order that our thirty years' old pupils may not require this pity, let us take every possible care that young persons do not study philosophy too early. For a young man is a sort of puppy who only plays with an argument; and is reasoned into and out of his opinions every day; he soon begins to believe nothing, and brings himself and philosophy into discredit. A man of thirty does not run on in this way; he will argue and not merely contradict, and adds new honour to philosophy by the sobriety of his conduct. What time shall we allow for this second gymnastic training of the soul?—say, twice the time required for the gymnastics of the body; six, or perhaps five years, to commence at thirty, and then for fifteen

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years let the student go down into the den, and command armies, and gain experience of life. At fifty let him return to the end of all things, and have his eyes uplifted to the idea of good, and order his life after that pattern; if necessary, taking his turn at the helm of State, and training up others to be his successors. When his time comes he shall depart in peace to the Islands of the Blest. He shall be honoured with sacrifices, and receive such worship as the Pythian oracle approves. 540

‘You are a statuary, Socrates, and have made a perfect image of our governors.’ Yes, and of our governesses, for the women will share in all things with the men. And you will admit that our State is not a mere aspiration, but may really come into being when there shall arise philosopher-kings, one or more, who will despise earthly vanities, and will be the servants of justice only. ‘And how will they begin their work?’ Their first act will be to send away into the country all those who are more than ten years of age, and to proceed with those who are left. . . . 541

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At the commencement of the sixth book, Plato anticipated his explanation of the relation of the philosopher to the world in an allegory, in this, as in other passages, following the order which he prescribes in education, and proceeding from the concrete to the abstract. At the commencement of Book VII, under the figure of a cave having an opening towards a fire and a way upwards to the true light, he returns to view the divisions of knowledge, exhibiting familiarly, as in a picture, the result which had been hardly won by a great effort of thought in the previous discussion; at the same time casting a glance onward at the dialectical process, which is represented by the way leading from darkness to light. The shadows, the images, the reflection of the sun and stars in the water, the stars and sun themselves, severally correspond,—the first, to the realm of fancy and poetry,—the second, to the world of sense,—the third, to the abstractions or universals of sense, of which the mathematical sciences furnish the type,—the fourth and last to the same abstractions, when seen in the unity of the idea, from which they derive a new meaning and power. The true dialectical process begins with the contemplation of the real stars, and not mere reflections of them,

and ends with the recognition of the sun, or idea of good, as the parent not only of light but of warmth and growth. To the divisions of knowledge the stages of education partly answer:—first, there is the early education of childhood and youth in the fancies of the poets, and in the laws and customs of the State;—then there is the training of the body to be a warrior athlete, and a good servant of the mind;—and thirdly, after an interval follows the education of later life, which begins with mathematics and proceeds to philosophy in general.

There seem to be two great aims in the philosophy of Plato,—first, to realize abstractions; secondly, to connect them. According to him, the true education is that which draws men from becoming to being, and to a comprehensive survey of all being. He desires to develop in the human mind the faculty of seeing the universal in all things; until at last the particulars of sense drop away and the universal alone remains. He then seeks to combine the universals which he has disengaged from sense, not perceiving that the correlation of them has no other basis but the common use of language. He never understands that abstractions, as Hegel says, are ‘mere abstractions’—of use when employed in the arrangement of facts, but adding nothing to the sum of knowledge when pursued apart from them, or with reference to an imaginary idea of good. Still the exercise of the faculty of abstraction apart from facts has enlarged the mind, and played a great part in the education of the human race. Plato appreciated the value of this faculty, and saw that it might be quickened by the study of number and relation. All things in which there is opposition or proportion are suggestive of reflection. The mere impression of sense evokes no power of thought or of mind, but when sensible objects ask to be compared and distinguished, then philosophy begins. The science of arithmetic first suggests such distinctions. There follow in order the other sciences of plane and solid geometry, and of solids in motion, one branch of which is astronomy or the harmony of the spheres,—to this is appended the sister science of the harmony of sounds. Plato seems also to hint at the possibility of other applications of arithmetical or mathematical proportions, such as we employ in chemistry and natural philosophy, such as the Pythagoreans and even Aristotle make use of in Ethics

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and Politics, e. g. his distinction between arithmetical and geometrical proportion in the Ethics (Book V), or between numerical and proportional equality in the Politics (iii. 8, iv. 12, &c.).

The modern mathematician will readily sympathise with Plato's delight in the properties of pure mathematics. He will not be disinclined to say with him:—Let alone the heavens, and study the beauties of number and figure in themselves. He too will be apt to depreciate their application to the arts. He will observe that Plato has a conception of geometry, in which figures are to be dispensed with; thus in a distant and shadowy way seeming to anticipate the possibility of working geometrical problems by a more general mode of analysis. He will remark with interest on the backward state of solid geometry, which, alas! was not encouraged by the aid of the State in the age of Plato; and he will recognize the grasp of Plato's mind in his ability to conceive of one science of solids in motion including the earth as well as the heavens,—not forgetting to notice the intimation to which allusion has been already made, that besides astronomy and harmonics the science of solids in motion may have other applications. Still more will he be struck with the comprehensiveness of view which led Plato, at a time when these sciences hardly existed, to say that they must be studied in relation to one another, and to the idea of good, or common principle of truth and being. But he will also see (and perhaps without surprise) that in that stage of physical and mathematical knowledge, Plato has fallen into the error of supposing that he can construct the heavens *a priori* by mathematical problems, and determine the principles of harmony irrespective of the adaptation of sounds to the human ear. The illusion was a natural one in that age and country. The simplicity and certainty of astronomy and harmonics seemed to contrast with the variation and complexity of the world of sense; hence the circumstance that there was some elementary basis of fact, some measurement of distance or time or vibrations on which they must ultimately rest, was overlooked by him. The modern predecessors of Newton fell into errors equally great; and Plato can hardly be said to have been very far wrong, or may even claim a sort of prophetic insight into the subject, when we consider that the greater part of astronomy at the present day consists of abstract dynamics,



by the help of which most astronomical discoveries have been made. *Republic VII.*

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The metaphysical philosopher from his point of view recognizes mathematics as an instrument of education,—which strengthens the power of attention, develops the sense of order and the faculty of construction, and enables the mind to grasp under simple formulae the quantitative differences of physical phenomena. But while acknowledging their value in education, he sees also that they have no connexion with our higher moral and intellectual ideas. In the attempt which Plato makes to connect them, we easily trace the influences of ancient Pythagorean notions. There is no reason to suppose that he is speaking of the ideal numbers at p. 525 E; but he is describing numbers which are pure abstractions, to which he assigns a real and separate existence, which, as ‘the teachers of the art’ (meaning probably the Pythagoreans) would have affirmed, repel all attempts at subdivision, and in which unity and every other number are conceived of as absolute. The truth and certainty of numbers, when thus disengaged from phenomena, gave them a kind of sacredness in the eyes of an ancient philosopher. Nor is it easy to say how far ideas of order and fixedness may have had a moral and elevating influence on the minds of men, ‘who,’ in the words of the *Timaeus*, ‘might learn to regulate their erring lives according to them’ (47 C). It is worthy of remark that the old Pythagorean ethical symbols still exist as figures of speech among ourselves. And those who in modern times see the world pervaded by universal law, may also see an anticipation of this last word of modern philosophy in the Platonic idea of good, which is the source and measure of all things, and yet only an abstraction. (Cp. *Philebus*, sub fin.)

Two passages seem to require more particular explanations. First, that which relates to the analysis of vision. The difficulty in this passage may be explained, like many others, from differences in the modes of conception prevailing among ancient and modern thinkers. To us, the perceptions of sense are inseparable from the act of the mind which accompanies them. The consciousness of form, colour, distance, is indistinguishable from the simple sensation, which is the medium of them. Whereas to Plato sense is the Heraclitean flux of sense, not

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the vision of objects in the order in which they actually present themselves to the experienced sight, but as they may be imagined to appear confused and blurred to the half-awakened eye of the infant. The first action of the mind is aroused by the attempt to set in order this chaos, and the reason is required to frame distinct conceptions under which the confused impressions of sense may be arranged. Hence arises the question, 'What is great, what is small?' and thus begins the distinction of the visible and the intelligible.

The second difficulty relates to Plato's conception of harmonics. Three classes of harmonists are distinguished by him: — first, the Pythagoreans, whom he proposes to consult as in the previous discussion on music he was to consult Damon — they are acknowledged to be masters in the art, but are altogether deficient in the knowledge of its higher import and relation to the good; secondly, the mere empirics, whom Glaucon appears to confuse with them, and whom both he and Socrates ludicrously describe as experimenting by mere auscultation on the intervals of sounds. Both of these fall short in different degrees of the Platonic idea of harmony, which must be studied in a purely abstract way, first by the method of problems, and secondly as a part of universal knowledge in relation to the idea of good.

The allegory has a political as well as a philosophical meaning. The den or cave represents the narrow sphere of politics or law (cp. the description of the philosopher and lawyer in the *Theaetetus*, 172–176), and the light of the eternal ideas is supposed to exercise a disturbing influence on the minds of those who return to this lower world. In other words, their principles are too wide for practical application; they are looking far away into the past and future, when their business is with the present. The ideal is not easily reduced to the conditions of actual life, and may often be at variance with them. And at first, those who return are unable to compete with the inhabitants of the den in the measurement of the shadows, and are derided and persecuted by them; but after a while they see the things below in far truer proportions than those who have never ascended into the upper world. The difference between the politician turned into a philosopher and the philosopher turned into a politician, is symbolized by the two kinds of disordered eyesight,

the one which is experienced by the captive who is transferred from darkness to day, the other, of the heavenly messenger who voluntarily for the good of his fellow-men descends into the den. In what way the brighter light is to dawn on the inhabitants of the lower world, or how the idea of good is to become the guiding principle of politics, is left unexplained by Plato. Like the nature and divisions of dialectic, of which Glaucon impatiently demands to be informed, perhaps he would have said that the explanation could not be given except to a disciple of the previous sciences. (Compare Symposium 210 A.)

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Many illustrations of this part of the Republic may be found in modern Politics and in daily life. For among ourselves, too, there have been two sorts of Politicians or Statesmen, whose eyesight has become disordered in two different ways. First, there have been great men who, in the language of Burke, 'have been too much given to general maxims,' who, like J. S. Mill or Burke himself, have been theorists or philosophers before they were politicians, or who, having been students of history, have allowed some great historical parallel, such as the English Revolution of 1688, or possibly Athenian democracy or Roman Imperialism, to be the medium through which they viewed contemporary events. Or perhaps the long projecting shadow of some existing institution may have darkened their vision. The Church of the future, the Commonwealth of the future, the Society of the future, have so absorbed their minds, that they are unable to see in their true proportions the Politics of to-day. They have been intoxicated with great ideas, such as liberty, or equality, or the greatest happiness of the greatest number, or the brotherhood of humanity, and they no longer care to consider how these ideas must be limited in practice or harmonized with the conditions of human life. They are full of light, but the light to them has become only a sort of luminous mist or blindness. Almost every one has known some enthusiastic half-educated person, who sees everything at false distances, and in erroneous proportions.

With this disorder of eyesight may be contrasted another—of those who see not far into the distance, but what is near only; who have been engaged all their lives in a trade or a profession; who are limited to a set or sect of their own. Men of this kind



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have no universal except their own interests or the interests of their class, no principle but the opinion of persons like themselves, no knowledge of affairs beyond what they pick up in the streets or at their club. Suppose them to be sent into a larger world, to undertake some higher calling, from being tradesmen to turn generals or politicians, from being schoolmasters to become philosophers: — or imagine them on a sudden to receive an inward light which reveals to them for the first time in their lives a higher idea of God and the existence of a spiritual world, by this sudden conversion or change is not their daily life likely to be upset; and on the other hand will not many of their old prejudices and narrownesses still adhere to them long after they have begun to take a more comprehensive view of human things? From familiar examples like these we may learn what Plato meant by the eyesight which is liable to two kinds of disorders.

Nor have we any difficulty in drawing a parallel between the young Athenian in the fifth century before Christ who became unsettled by new ideas, and the student of a modern University who has been the subject of a similar ‘aufklärung.’ We too observe that when young men begin to criticise customary beliefs, or to analyse the constitution of human nature, they are apt to lose hold of solid principle (*ἀπαν τὸ βέβαιον αὐτῶν ἐξοίχεται*). They are like trees which have been frequently transplanted. The earth about them is loose, and they have no roots reaching far into the soil. They ‘light upon every flower,’ following their own wayward wills, or because the wind blows them. They catch opinions, as diseases are caught — when they are in the air. Borne hither and thither, ‘they speedily fall into beliefs’ the opposite of those in which they were brought up. They hardly retain the distinction of right and wrong; they seem to think one thing as good as another. They suppose themselves to be searching after truth when they are playing the game of ‘follow my leader.’ They fall in love ‘at first sight’ with paradoxes respecting morality, some fancy about art, some novelty or eccentricity in religion, and like lovers they are so absorbed for a time in their new notion that they can think of nothing else. The resolution of some philosophical or theological question seems to them more interesting and important than any substantial knowledge of



literature or science or even than a good life. Like the youth in the *Philebus*, they are ready to discourse to any one about a new philosophy. They are generally the disciples of some eminent professor or sophist, whom they rather imitate than understand. They may be counted happy if in later years they retain some of the simple truths which they acquired in early education, and which they may, perhaps, find to be worth all the rest. Such is the picture which Plato draws and which we only reproduce, partly in his own words, of the dangers which beset youth in times of transition, when old opinions are fading away and the new are not yet firmly established. Their condition is ingeniously compared by him to that of a supposititious son, who has made the discovery that his reputed parents are not his real ones, and, in consequence, they have lost their authority over him.

The distinction between the mathematician and the dialectician is also noticeable. Plato is very well aware that the faculty of the mathematician is quite distinct from the higher philosophical sense which recognizes and combines first principles (531 E). The contempt which he expresses at p. 533 for distinctions of words, the danger of involuntary falsehood, the apology which Socrates makes for his earnestness of speech, are highly characteristic of the Platonic style and mode of thought. The quaint notion that if Palamedes was the inventor of number Agamemnon could not have counted his feet; the art by which we are made to believe that this State of ours is not a dream only; the gravity with which the first step is taken in the actual creation of the State, namely, the sending out of the city all who had arrived at ten years of age, in order to expedite the business of education by a generation, are also truly Platonic. (For the last, compare the passage at the end of the third book (415 D), in which he expects the lie about the earthborn men to be believed in the second generation.)

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steph. 543 **BOOK VIII.** And so we have arrived at the conclusion, that in the perfect State wives and children are to be in common; and the education and pursuits of men and women, both in war and peace, are to be common, and kings are to be philosophers and warriors, and the soldiers of the State are to live together,

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having all things in common; and they are to be warrior athletes, receiving no pay but only their food, from the other citizens. Now let us return to the point at which we digressed. 'That is easily done,' he replied: 'You were speaking of the State which you had constructed, and of the individual who answered to this, both of whom you affirmed to be good; and you said that of inferior States there were four forms and four individuals corresponding to them, which although deficient in various degrees, were all of them worth inspecting with a view to determining the relative happiness or misery of the best or worst man. Then Polemarchus and Adeimantus interrupted you, and this led to another argument,—and so here we are.' Suppose that we put ourselves again in the same position, and do you repeat your question. 'I should like to know of what constitutions you were speaking?' Besides the perfect State there are only four of any note in Hellas:—first, the famous Lacedaemonian or Cretan commonwealth; secondly, oligarchy, a State full of evils; thirdly, democracy, which follows next in order; fourthly, tyranny, which is the disease or death of all government. Now, States are not made of 'oak and rock,' but of flesh and blood; and therefore as there are five States there must be five human natures in individuals, which correspond to them. And first, there is the ambitious nature, which answers to the Lacedaemonian State; secondly, the oligarchical nature; thirdly, the democratical; and fourthly, the tyrannical. This last will have to be compared with the perfectly just, which is the fifth, that we may know which is the happier, and then we shall be able to determine whether the argument of Thrasymachus or our own is the more convincing. And as before we began with the State and went on to the individual, so now, beginning with timocracy, let us go on to the timocratical man, and then proceed to the other forms of government, and the individuals who answer to them.

But how did timocracy arise out of the perfect State? Plainly, like all changes of government, from division in the rulers. But whence came division? 'Sing, heavenly Muses,' as Homer says;—let them condescend to answer us, as if we were children, to whom they put on a solemn face in jest. 'And what will they say?' They will say that human things are fated to decay, and even the perfect State will not escape from this law of destiny,

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when 'the wheel comes full circle' in a period short or long. Plants or animals have times of fertility and sterility, which the intelligence of rulers because alloyed by sense will not enable them to ascertain, and children will be born out of season. For whereas divine creations are in a perfect cycle or number, the human creation is in a number which declines from perfection, and has four terms and three intervals of numbers, increasing, waning; assimilating, dissimilating, and yet perfectly commensurate with each other. The base of the number with a fourth added (or which is 3:4), multiplied by five and cubed, gives two harmonies:—The first a square number, which is a hundred times the base (or a hundred times a hundred); the second, an oblong, being a hundred squares of the rational diameter of a figure the side of which is five, subtracting one from each square or two perfect squares from all, and adding a hundred cubes of three. This entire number is geometrical and contains the rule or law of generation. When this law is neglected marriages will be unpropitious; the inferior offspring who are then born will in time become the rulers; the State will decline, and education fall into decay; gymnastic will be preferred to music, and the gold and silver and brass and iron will form a chaotic mass—thus division will arise. Such is the Muses' answer to our question. 'And a true answer, of course:—but what more have they to say?' They say that the two races, the iron and brass, and the silver and gold, will draw the State different ways;—the one will take to trade and moneymaking, and the others, having the true riches and not caring for money, will resist them: the contest will end in a compromise; they will agree to have private property, and will enslave their fellow-citizens who were once their friends and nurturers. But they will retain their warlike character, and will be chiefly occupied in fighting and exercising rule. Thus arises timocracy, which is intermediate between aristocracy and oligarchy.

The new form of government resembles the ideal in obedience to rulers and contempt for trade, in having common meals, and in devotion to warlike and gymnastic exercises. But corruption has crept into philosophy, and simplicity of character, which was once her note, is now looked for only in the military class. Arts of war begin to prevail over arts of peace; the ruler is no longer a



philosopher; as in oligarchies, there springs up among them an extravagant love of gain — get another man's and save your own, is their principle; and they have dark places in which they hoard their gold and silver, for the use of their women and others; they take their pleasures by stealth, like boys who are running away from their father — the law; and their education is not inspired by the Muse, but imposed by the strong arm of power. The leading characteristic of this State is party spirit and ambition.

And what manner of man answers to such a State? 'In love of contention,' replied Adeimantus, 'he will be like our friend Glaucon.' In that respect, perhaps, but not in others. He is self-asserting and ill-educated, yet fond of literature, although not himself a speaker, — fierce with slaves, but obedient to rulers, a lover of power and honour, which he hopes to gain by deeds of arms, — fond, too, of gymnastics and of hunting. As he advances in years he grows avaricious, for he has lost philosophy, which is the only saviour and guardian of men. His origin is as follows:—His father is a good man dwelling in an ill-ordered State, who has retired from politics in order that he may lead a quiet life. His mother is angry at her loss of precedence among other women; she is disgusted at her husband's selfishness, and she expatiates to her son on the unmanliness and indolence of his father. The old family servant takes up the tale, and says to the youth: — 'When you grow up you must be more of a man than your father.' All the world are agreed that he who minds his own business is an idiot, while a busybody is highly honoured and esteemed. The young man compares this spirit with his father's words and ways, and as he is naturally well disposed, although he has suffered from evil influences, he rests at a middle point and becomes ambitious and a lover of honour.

And now let us set another city over against another man. The next form of government is oligarchy, in which the rule is of the rich only; nor is it difficult to see how such a State arises. The decline begins with the possession of gold and silver; illegal modes of expenditure are invented; one draws another on, and the multitude are infected; riches outweigh virtue; lovers of money take the place of lovers of honour; misers of



politicians; and, in time, political privileges are confined by law to the rich, who do not shrink from violence in order to effect their purposes.

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Thus much of the origin,—let us next consider the evils of oligarchy. Would a man who wanted to be safe on a voyage take a bad pilot because he was rich, or refuse a good one because he was poor? And does not the analogy apply still more to the State? And there are yet greater evils: two nations are struggling together in one—the rich and the poor; and the rich dare not put arms into the hands of the poor, and are unwilling to pay for defenders out of their own money. And have we not  
552 already condemned that State in which the same persons are warriors as well as shopkeepers? The greatest evil of all is that a man may sell his property and have no place in the State; while there is one class which has enormous wealth, the other is entirely destitute. But observe that these destitutes had not really any more of the governing nature in them when they were rich than now that they are poor; they were miserable spend-thrifts always. They are the drones of the hive; only whereas the actual drone is unprovided by nature with a sting, the two-legged things whom we call drones are some of them without stings and some of them have dreadful stings; in other words, there  
are paupers and there are rogues. These are never far apart; and in oligarchical cities, where nearly everybody is a pauper who is not a ruler, you will find abundance of both. And this evil state of society originates in bad education and bad government.

553 Like State, like man,—the change in the latter begins with the representative of timocracy; he walks at first in the ways of his father, who may have been a statesman, or general, perhaps; and presently he sees him 'fallen from his high estate,' the victim of informers, dying in prison or exile, or by the hand of the executioner. The lesson which he thus receives, makes him cautious; he leaves politics, represses his pride, and saves pence. Avarice is enthroned as his bosom's lord, and assumes the style of the Great King; the rational and spirited elements sit humbly on the ground at either side, the one immersed in calculation, the other absorbed in the admiration of wealth. The love of honour turns to love of money; the conversion is instantaneous. The

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man is mean, saving, toiling, the slave of one passion which is 55  
the master of the rest: Is he not the very image of the State?  
He has had no education, or he would never have allowed the  
blind god of riches to lead the dance within him. And being  
uneducated he will have many slavish desires, some beggarly,  
some knavish, breeding in his soul. If he is the trustee of an  
orphan, and has the power to defraud, he will soon prove that he  
is not without the will, and that his passions are only restrained  
by fear and not by reason. Hence he leads a divided existence;  
in which the better desires mostly prevail. But when he is con- 55  
tending for prizes and other distinctions, he is afraid to incur a loss  
which is to be repaid only by barren honour; in time of war he  
fights with a small part of his resources, and usually keeps his  
money and loses the victory.

Next comes democracy and the democratic man, out of oli-  
garchy and the oligarchical man. Insatiable avarice is the ruling  
passion of an oligarchy; and they encourage expensive habits in  
order that they may gain by the ruin of extravagant youth. Thus  
men of family often lose their property or rights of citizenship;  
but they remain in the city, full of hatred against the new owners  
of their estates and ripe for revolution. The usurer with stooping  
walk pretends not to see them; he passes by, and leaves his  
sting—that is, his money—in some other victim; and many a  
man has to pay the parent or principal sum multiplied into a 55  
family of children, and is reduced into a state of dronage by him.  
The only way of diminishing the evil is either to limit a man in  
his use of his property, or to insist that he shall lend at his own  
risk. But the ruling class do not want remedies; they care  
only for money, and are as careless of virtue as the poorest of the  
citizens. Now there are occasions on which the governors and  
the governed meet together,—at festivals, on a journey, voyaging  
or fighting. The sturdy pauper finds that in the hour of danger  
he is not despised; he sees the rich man puffing and panting,  
and draws the conclusion which he privately imparts to his com-  
panions,—‘that our people are not good for much;’ and as a  
sickly frame is made ill by a mere touch from without, or some-  
times without external impulse is ready to fall to pieces of itself,  
so from the least cause, or with none at all, the city falls ill and  
fights a battle for life or death. And democracy comes into 55

power when the poor are the victors, killing some and exiling some, and giving equal shares in the government to all the rest.

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558 The manner of life in such a State is that of democrats; there is freedom and plainness of speech, and every man does what is right in his own eyes, and has his own way of life. Hence arise the most various developments of character; the State is like a piece of embroidery of which the colours and figures are the manners of men, and there are many who, like women and children, prefer this variety to real beauty and excellence. The State is not one but many, like a bazaar at which you can buy anything. The great charm is, that you may do as you like; you may govern if you like, let it alone if you like; go to war and make peace if you feel disposed, and all quite irrespective of anybody else. When you condemn men to death they remain alive all the same; a gentleman is desired to go into exile, and he stalks about the streets like a hero; and nobody sees him or cares for him. Observe, too, how grandly Democracy sets her foot upon all our fine theories of education,—how little she cares for the training of her statesmen! The only qualification which she demands is the profession of patriotism. Such is democracy;—a pleasing, lawless, various sort of government, distributing equality to equals and unequals alike.

559 Let us now inspect the individual democrat; and first, as in the case of the State, we will trace his antecedents. He is the son of a miserly oligarch, and has been taught by him to restrain the love of unnecessary pleasures. Perhaps I ought to explain this latter term:—Necessary pleasures are those which are good, and which we cannot do without; unnecessary pleasures are those which do no good, and of which the desire might be eradicated by early training. For example, the pleasures of eating and drinking are necessary and healthy, up to a certain point; beyond that point they are alike hurtful to body and mind, and the excess may be avoided. When in excess, they may be rightly called expensive pleasures, in opposition to the useful ones. And the drone, as we called him, is the slave of these unnecessary pleasures and desires, whereas the miserly oligarch is subject only to the necessary.

The oligarch changes into the democrat in the following manner:—The youth who has had a miserly bringing up, gets



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a taste of the drone's honey; he meets with wild companions, who introduce him to every new pleasure. As in the State, so in the individual, there are allies on both sides, temptations from without and passions from within; there is reason also and external influences of parents and friends in alliance with the oligarchical principle; and the two factions are in violent conflict 560 with one another. Sometimes the party of order prevails, but then again new desires and new disorders arise, and the whole mob of passions gets possession of the Acropolis, that is to say, the soul, which they find void and unguarded by true words and works. Falsehoods and illusions ascend to take their place; the prodigal goes back into the country of the Lotophagi or drones, and openly dwells there. And if any offer of alliance or parley of individual elders comes from home, the false spirits shut the gates of the castle and permit no one to enter,—there is a battle, and they gain the victory; and straightway making alliance with the desires, they banish modesty, which they call folly, and send temperance over the border. When the house has been swept and garnished, they dress up the exiled vices, and, crowning them with garlands, bring them back under new names. Insolence they call good breeding, anarchy freedom, waste magnificence, impudence courage. Such is the process by which the 561 youth passes from the necessary pleasures to the unnecessary. After a while he divides his time impartially between them; and perhaps, when he gets older and the violence of passion has abated, he restores some of the exiles and lives in a sort of equilibrium, indulging first one pleasure and then another; and if reason comes and tells him that some pleasures are good and honourable, and others bad and vile, he shakes his head and says that he can make no distinction between them. Thus he lives in the fancy of the hour; sometimes he takes to drink, and then he turns abstainer; he practises in the gymnasium or he does nothing at all; then again he would be a philosopher or a politician; or again, he would be a warrior or a man of business; he is

‘Every thing by starts and nothing long.’

There remains still the finest and fairest of all men and all 562 States—tyranny and the tyrant. Tyranny springs from democracy much as democracy springs from oligarchy. Both arise



from excess; the one from excess of wealth, the other from excess of freedom. 'The great natural good of life,' says the democrat, 'is freedom.' And this exclusive love of freedom and regardlessness of everything else, is the cause of the change from democracy to tyranny. The State demands the strong wine of freedom, and unless her rulers give her a plentiful draught, punishes and insults them; equality and fraternity of governors and governed is the approved principle. Anarchy is the law, not of the State only, but of private houses, and extends even to the animals. Father and son, citizen and foreigner, teacher and pupil, old and young, are all on a level; fathers and teachers fear their sons and pupils, and the wisdom of the young man is a match for the elder, and the old imitate the jaunty manners of the young because they are afraid of being thought morose. Slaves are on a level with their masters and mistresses, and there is no difference between men and women. Nay, the very animals in a democratic State have a freedom which is unknown in other places. The she-dogs are as good as their she-mistresses, and horses and asses march along with dignity and run their noses against anybody who comes in their way. 'That has often been my experience.' At last the citizens become so sensitive that they cannot endure the yoke of laws, written or unwritten; they would have no man call himself their master. Such is the glorious beginning of things out of which tyranny springs. 'Glorious, indeed; but what is to follow?' The ruin of oligarchy is the ruin of democracy; for there is a law of contraries; the excess of freedom passes into the excess of slavery, and the greater the freedom the greater the slavery. You will remember that in the oligarchy were found two classes — rogues and paupers, whom we compared to drones with and without stings. These two classes are to the State what phlegm and bile are to the human body; and the State-physician, or legislator, must get rid of them, just as the bee-master keeps the drones out of the hive. Now in a democracy, too, there are drones, but they are more numerous and more dangerous than in the oligarchy; there they are inert and unpractised, here they are full of life and animation; and the keener sort speak and act, while the others buzz about the bema and prevent their opponents from being heard. And there is another class in democratic States,

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of respectable, thriving individuals, who can be squeezed when the drones have need of their possessions; there is more-  
over a third class, who are the labourers and the artisans, and they make up the mass of the people. When the people meet, they are omnipotent, but they cannot be brought together unless they are attracted by a little honey; and the rich are made to supply the honey, of which the demagogues keep the greater part themselves, giving a taste only to the mob. Their victims attempt to resist; they are driven mad by the stings of the drones, and so become downright oligarchs in self-defence. Then follow informations and convictions for treason. The people have some protector whom they nurse into greatness, and from this root the tree of tyranny springs. The nature of the change is indicated in the old fable of the temple of Zeus Lycaeus, which tells how he who tastes human flesh mixed up with the flesh of other victims will turn into a wolf. Even so the protector, who tastes human blood, and slays some and exiles others with or without law, who hints at abolition of debts and division of lands, must either perish or become a  
wolf—that is, a tyrant. Perhaps he is driven out, but he soon comes back from exile; and then if his enemies cannot get rid of him by lawful means, they plot his assassination. Thereupon the friend of the people makes his well-known request to them for a body-guard, which they readily grant, thinking only of his danger and not of their own. Now let the rich man make to himself wings, for he will never run away again if he does not do so then. And the Great Protector, having crushed all his rivals, stands proudly erect in the chariot of State, a full blown tyrant: Let us enquire into the nature of his happiness. 565

In the early days of his tyranny he smiles and beams upon everybody; he is not a ‘dominus,’ no, not he: he has only come to put an end to debt and the monopoly of land. Having got rid of foreign enemies, he makes himself necessary to the State by  
always going to war. He is thus enabled to depress the poor by heavy taxes, and so keep them at work; and he can get rid of bolder spirits by handing them over to the enemy. Then comes unpopularity; some of his old associates have the courage to oppose him. The consequence is, that he has to make a purgation of the State; but, unlike the physician who purges 567

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away the bad, he must get rid of the high-spirited, the wise and the wealthy; for he has no choice between death and a life of shame and dishonour. And the more hated he is, the more he will require trusty guards; but how will he obtain them? ‘They will come flocking like birds—for pay? Will he not rather obtain them on the spot? He will take the slaves from their owners and make them his body-guard; these are his trusted friends, who admire and look up to him. Are not the tragic poets wise who magnify and exalt the tyrant, and say that he is wise by association with the wise? And are not their praises of tyranny alone a sufficient reason why we should exclude them from our State? They may go to other cities, and gather the mob about them with fine words, and change commonwealths into tyrannies and democracies, receiving honours and rewards for their services; but the higher they and their friends ascend constitution hill, the more their honour will fail and become ‘too asthmatic to mount.’ To return to the tyrant—How will he support that rare army of his? First, by robbing the temples of their treasures, which will enable him to lighten the taxes; then he will take all his father’s property, and spend it on his companions, male or female. Now his father is the demus, and if the demus gets angry, and says that a great hulking son ought not to be a burden on his parents, and bids him and his riotous crew begone, then will the parent know what a monster he has been nurturing, and that the son whom he would fain expel is too strong for him. ‘You do not mean to say that he will beat his father?’ Yes, he will, after having taken away his arms. ‘Then he is a parricide and a cruel, unnatural son.’ And the people have jumped from the fear of slavery into slavery, out of the smoke into the fire. Thus liberty, when out of all order and reason, passes into the worst form of servitude. . . .

In the previous books Plato has described the ideal State; now he returns to the perverted or declining forms, on which he had lightly touched at the end of Book iv. These he describes in a succession of parallels between the individuals and the States, tracing the origin of either in the State or individual which has preceded them. He begins by asking the point at which he digressed; and is thus led shortly to recapitulate the substance

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of the three former books, which also contain a parallel of the philosopher and the State.

Of the first decline he gives no intelligible account; he would not have liked to admit the most probable causes of the fall of his ideal State, which to us would appear to be the impracticability of communism or the natural antagonism of the ruling and subject classes. He throws a veil of mystery over the origin of the decline, which he attributes to ignorance of the law of population. Of this law the famous geometrical figure or number is the expression. Like the ancients in general, he had no idea of the gradual perfectibility of man or of the education of the human race. His ideal was not to be attained in the course of ages, but was to spring in full armour from the head of the legislator. When good laws had been given, he thought only of the manner in which they were likely to be corrupted, or of how they might be filled up in detail or restored in accordance with their original spirit. He appears not to have reflected upon the full meaning of his own words, 'In the brief space of human life, nothing great can be accomplished' (x. 608 B); or again, as he afterwards says in the Laws (iii. 676), 'Infinite time is the maker of cities.' The order of constitutions which is adopted by him represents an order of thought rather than a succession of time, and may be considered as the first attempt to frame a philosophy of history.

The first of these declining States is timocracy, or the government of soldiers and lovers of honour, which answers to the Spartan State; this is a government of force, in which education is not inspired by the Muses, but imposed by the law, and in which all the finer elements of organization have disappeared. The philosopher himself has lost the love of truth, and the soldier, who is of a simpler and honester nature, rules in his stead. The individual who answers to timocracy has some noticeable qualities. He is described as ill educated, but, like the Spartan, a lover of literature; and although he is a harsh master to his servants he has no natural superiority over them. His character is based upon a reaction against the circumstances of his father, who in a troubled city has retired from politics; and his mother, who is dissatisfied at her own position, is always urging him towards the life of political ambition. Such a character may have had this origin, and indeed Livy attributes the Licinian laws to a



feminine jealousy of a similar kind (vii. 34). But there is obviously no connection between the manner in which the timocratic State springs out of the ideal, and the mere accident by which the timocratic man is the son of a retired statesman.

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The two next stages in the decline of constitutions have even less historical foundation. For there is no trace in Greek history of a polity like the Spartan or Cretan passing into an oligarchy of wealth, or of the oligarchy of wealth passing into a democracy. The order of history appears to be different; first, in the Homeric times there is the royal or patriarchal form of government, which a century or two later was succeeded by an oligarchy of birth rather than of wealth, and in which wealth was only the accident of the hereditary possession of land and power. Sometimes this oligarchical government gave way to a government based upon a qualification of property, which, according to Aristotle's mode of using words, would have been called a timocracy; and this in some cities, as at Athens, became the conducting medium to democracy. But such was not the necessary order of succession in States; nor, indeed, can any order be discerned in the endless fluctuation of Greek history (like the tides in the Euripus), except, perhaps, in the almost uniform tendency from monarchy to aristocracy in the earliest times. At first sight there appears to be a similar inversion in the last step of the Platonic succession; for tyranny, instead of being the natural end of democracy, in early Greek history appears rather as a stage leading to democracy; the reign of Peisistratus and his sons is an episode which comes between the legislation of Solon and the constitution of Cleisthenes; and some secret cause common to them all seems to have led the greater part of Hellas at her first appearance in the dawn of history, e. g. Athens, Argos, Corinth, Sicyon, and nearly every State with the exception of Sparta, through a similar stage of tyranny which ended either in oligarchy or democracy. But then we must remember that Plato is describing rather the contemporary governments of the Sicilian States, which alternated between democracy and tyranny, than the ancient history of Athens or Corinth.

The portrait of the tyrant himself is just such as the later Greek delighted to draw of Phalaris and Dionysius, in which, as in the lives of mediaeval saints or mythic heroes, the conduct and actions

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of one were attributed to another in order to fill up the outline. There was no enormity which the Greek was not ready to believe of them; the tyrant was the negation of government and law; his assassination was glorious; there was no crime, however unnatural, which might not with probability be attributed to him. In this, Plato was only following the common thought of his countrymen, which he embellished and exaggerated with all the power of his genius. There is no need to suppose that he drew from life; or that his knowledge of tyrants is derived from a personal acquaintance with Dionysius. The manner in which he speaks of them would rather tend to render doubtful his ever having 'consorted' with them, or entertained the schemes, which are attributed to him in the Epistles, of regenerating Sicily by their help.

Plato in a hyperbolical and serio-comic vein exaggerates the follies of democracy which he also sees reflected in social life. To him democracy is a state of individualism or dissolution; in which every one is doing what is right in his own eyes. Of a people animated by a common spirit of liberty, rising as one man to repel the Persian host, which is the leading idea of democracy in Herodotus and Thucydides, he never seems to think. But if he is not a believer in liberty, still less is he a lover of tyranny. His deeper and more serious condemnation is reserved for the tyrant, who is the ideal of wickedness and also of weakness, and who in his utter helplessness and suspiciousness is leading an almost impossible existence, without that remnant of good which, in Plato's opinion, was required to give power to evil (Book i. p. 352). This ideal of wickedness living in helpless misery, is the reverse of that other portrait of perfect injustice ruling in happiness and splendour, which first of all Thrasy-machus, and afterwards the sons of Ariston had drawn, and is also the reverse of the king whose rule of life is the good of his subjects.

Each of these governments and individuals has a corresponding ethical gradation: the ideal State is under the rule of reason, not extinguishing but harmonizing the passions, and training them in virtue; in the timocracy and the timocratic man the constitution, whether of the State or of the individual, is based, first, upon courage, and secondly, upon the love of honour; this latter virtue,

which is hardly to be esteemed a virtue, has superseded all the rest. In the second stage of decline the virtues have altogether disappeared, and the love of gain has succeeded to them; in the third stage, or democracy, the various passions are allowed to have free play, and the virtues and vices are impartially cultivated. But this freedom, which leads to many curious extravagances of character, is in reality only a state of weakness and dissipation. At last, one monster passion takes possession of the whole nature of man — this is tyranny. In all of them excess — the excess first of wealth and then of freedom, is the element of decay.

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The eighth book of the *Republic* abounds in pictures of life and fanciful allusions; the use of metaphorical language is carried to a greater extent than anywhere else in Plato. We may remark, (1), the description of the two nations in one, which become more and more divided in the Greek Republics, as in feudal times, and perhaps also in our own; (2), the notion of democracy expressed in a sort of Pythagorean formula as equality among unequals; (3), the free and easy ways of men and animals, which are characteristic of liberty, as foreign mercenaries and universal mistrust are of the tyrant; (4), the proposal that mere debts should not be recoverable by law is a speculation which has often been entertained by reformers of the law in modern times, and is in harmony with the tendencies of modern legislation. Debt and land were the two great difficulties of the ancient lawgiver: in modern times we may be said to have almost, if not quite, solved the first of these difficulties, but hardly the second.

Still more remarkable are the corresponding portraits of individuals: there is the family picture of the father and mother and the old servant of the timocratical man, and the outward respectability and inherent meanness of the oligarchical; the uncontrolled licence and freedom of the democrat, in which the young Alcibiades seems to be depicted, doing right or wrong as he pleases, and who at last, like the prodigal, goes into a far country (note here the play of language by which the democratic man is himself represented under the image of a State having a citadel and receiving embassies); and there is the wild-beast nature, which breaks loose in his successor. The hit about the tyrant being a parricide; the representation of the tyrant's life as



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an obscene dream; the rhetorical surprise of a more miserable than the most miserable of men in Book ix; the hint to the poets that if they are the friends of tyrants there is no place for them in a constitutional State, and that they are too clever not to see the propriety of their own expulsion; the continuous image of the drones who are of two kinds, swelling at last into the monster drone having wings (see *infra*, Book ix),—are among Plato's happiest touches.

There remains to be considered the great difficulty of this book of the Republic, the so-called number of the State. This is a puzzle almost as great as the Number of the Beast in the Book of Revelation, and though apparently known to Aristotle, is referred to by Cicero as a proverb of obscurity (Ep. ad. Att. vii. 13, 5). And some have imagined that there is no answer to the puzzle, and that Plato has been practising upon his readers. But such a deception as this is inconsistent with the manner in which Aristotle speaks of the number (Pol. v. 12, § 7), and would have been ridiculous to any reader of the Republic who was acquainted with Greek mathematics. As little reason is there for supposing that Plato intentionally used obscure expressions; the obscurity arises from our want of familiarity with the subject. On the other hand, Plato himself indicates that he is not altogether serious, and in describing his number as a solemn jest of the Muses, he appears to imply some degree of satire on the symbolical use of number. (Cp. Cratylus, *passim*; Protag. 342 ff.)

Our hope of understanding the passage depends principally on an accurate study of the words themselves; on which a faint light is thrown by the parallel passage in the ninth book. Another help is the allusion in Aristotle, who makes the important remark that the latter part of the passage (from ὧν ἐπίτριτος πινθμήν, κ. τ. λ.) describes a solid figure<sup>1</sup>. Some further clue may be gathered from the appearance of the Pythagorean triangle, which is denoted by the numbers 3, 4, 5, and in which, as in every right-angled

<sup>1</sup> Pol. v. 12, § 8: —'He only says that nothing is abiding, but that all things change in a certain cycle; and that the origin of the change is a base of numbers which are in the ratio of 4 : 3; and this when combined with a figure of five gives two harmonies; he means when the number of this figure becomes solid.'



triangle, the squares of the two lesser sides equal the square of the hypotenuse ( $3^2 + 4^2 = 5^2$ , or  $9 + 16 = 25$ ).

Plato begins by speaking of a perfect or cyclical number (cp. Tim. 39 D), i. e. a number in which the sum of the divisors equals the whole; this is the divine or perfect number in which all lesser cycles or revolutions are complete. He also speaks of a human or imperfect number, having four terms and three intervals of numbers which are related to one another in certain proportions; these he converts into figures, and finds in them when they have been raised to the third power certain elements of number, which give two 'harmonies,' the one square, the other oblong; but he does not say that the square number answers to the divine, or the oblong number to the human cycle; nor is any intimation given that the first or divine number represents the period of the world, the second the period of the state, or of the human race as Zeller supposes; nor is the divine number afterwards mentioned (cp. Arist.). The second is the number of generations or births, and presides over them in the same mysterious manner in which the stars preside over them, or in which, according to the Pythagoreans, opportunity, justice, marriage, are represented by some number or figure. This is probably the number 216.

The explanation given in the text supposes the two harmonies to make up the number 8000. This explanation derives a certain plausibility from the circumstance that 8000 is the ancient number of the Spartan citizens (Herod. vii. 34), and would be what Plato might have called 'a number which nearly concerns the population of a city' (588 A); the mysterious disappearance of the Spartan population may possibly have suggested to him the first cause of his decline of States. The lesser or square 'harmony,' of 400, might be a symbol of the guardians,—the larger or oblong 'harmony,' of the people, and the numbers 3, 4, 5 might refer respectively to the three orders in the State or parts of the soul, the four virtues, the five forms of government. The harmony of the musical scale, which is elsewhere used as a symbol of the harmony of the state (Rep. iv. 443 D), is also indicated. For the numbers 3, 4, 5, which represent the sides of the Pythagorean triangle, also denote the intervals of the scale.

The terms used in the statement of the problem may be

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explained as follows.

A perfect number (*τέλειος ἀριθμός*), as already stated, is one which is equal to the sum of its divisors. Thus 6, which is the first perfect or cyclical number,  $= 1 + 2 + 3$ . The words *ὅροι*, 'terms' or 'notes,' and *ἀποστάσεις*, 'intervals,' are applicable to music as well as to number and figure. *Πρώτω* is the 'base' on which the whole calculation depends, or the 'lowest term' from which it can be worked out. The words *δυνάμεναί τε καὶ δυναστεύομεναι* have been variously translated — 'squared and cubed' (Donaldson), 'equalling and equalled in power' (Weber), 'by involution and evolution,' i. e. by raising the power and extracting the root (as in the translation). Numbers are called 'like and unlike' (*ὁμοιοῦντές τε καὶ ἀνομοιοῦντες*) when the factors or the sides of the planes and cubes which they represent are or are not in the same ratio: e. g. 8 and  $27 = 2^3$  and  $3^3$ ; and conversely. 'Waxing' (*αὐξοντες*) numbers, called also 'increasing' (*ὑπερτελεῖς*), are those which are exceeded by the sum of their divisors: e. g. 12 and 18 are less than 16 and 21. 'Waning' (*φθίνοντες*) numbers, called also 'decreasing' (*ἐλλειπείς*), are those which exceed the sum of their divisors: e. g. 8 and 27 exceed 7 and 13. The words translated 'commensurable and agreeable to one another' (*προσήγορα καὶ ῥητά*) seem to be different ways of describing the same relation, with more or less precision. They are equivalent to 'expressible in terms having the same relation to one another,' like the series 8, 12, 18, 27, each of which numbers is in the relation of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  to the preceding. The 'base,' or 'fundamental number, which has  $\frac{1}{3}$  added to it' ( $1\frac{1}{3}$ )  $= \frac{4}{3}$  or a musical fourth. 'Ἀρμονία is a 'proportion' of numbers as of musical notes, applied either to the parts or factors of a single number or to the relation of one number to another. The first harmony is a 'square' number (*ἰσην ἰσάκις*); the second harmony is an 'oblong' number (*προμήκη*), i. e. a number representing a figure of which the opposite sides only are equal. 'Ἀριθμοὶ ἀπὸ διαμέτρων = 'numbers squared from' or 'upon diameters'; *ῥητῶν* = 'rational,' i. e. omitting fractions, *ἁρρήτων*, 'irrational,' i. e. including fractions; e. g. 49 is a square of the rational diameter of a figure the side of which  $= 5$ ; 50, of an irrational diameter of the same. For several of the explanations here given and for a good deal besides I am indebted to an excellent article on the Platonic Number by Dr. Donaldson (Proc. of the Philol. Society, vol. i. p. 81 ff.).

The conclusions which he draws from these data are summed up by him as follows. Having assumed that the number of the perfect or divine cycle is the number of the world, and the number of the imperfect cycle the number of the state, he proceeds: 'The period of the world is defined by the perfect number 6, that of the state by the cube of that number or 216, which is the product of the last pair of terms in the Platonic Tetractys<sup>1</sup>; and if we take this as the basis of our computation, we shall have two cube numbers (*αὐξήσεις δυνάμεναί τε καὶ δυναστεύμεναί*), viz. 8 and 27; and the mean proportionals between these, viz. 12 and 18, will furnish three intervals and four terms, and these terms and intervals stand related to one another in the *sesqui-altera* ratio, i. e. each term is to the preceding as  $\frac{3}{2}$ . Now if we remember that the number  $216 = 8 \times 27 = 3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3$ , and that  $3^2 + 4^2 = 5^2$ , we must admit that this number implies the numbers 3, 4, 5, to which musicians attach so much importance. And if we combine the ratio  $\frac{4}{3}$  with the number 5, or multiply the ratios of the sides by the hypotenuse, we shall by first squaring and then cubing obtain two expressions, which denote the ratio of the two last pairs of terms in the Platonic Tetractys, the former multiplied by the square, the latter by the cube of the number 10, the sum of the first four digits which constitute the Platonic Tetractys.'

The two *ἀρμονίαι* he elsewhere explains as follows: 'The first *ἀρμονία* is *ἰσην ἰσάκις ἑκατὸν τοσαντάκις*, in other words  $(\frac{4}{3} \times 5)^2 = 100 \times \frac{25}{9}$ . The second *ἀρμονία*, a cube of the same root, is described as 100 multiplied (*α*) by the rational diameter of 5 diminished by unity, i. e., as shown above, 48: (*β*) by two incommensurable diameters, i. e. the two first irrationals, or 2 and 3: and (*γ*) by the cube of 3, or 27. Thus we have  $(48 + 5 + 27) 100 = 1000 \times 2^3$ . This second harmony is to be the cube of the number of which the former harmony is the square, and therefore must be divided by the cube of 3. In other words, the whole expression will be: (1), for the first harmony,  $\frac{400}{9}$ : (2), for the second harmony,  $\frac{8000}{27}$ .'

The reasons which have inclined me to agree with Dr. Donaldson and also with Schleiermacher in supposing that 216 is the Platonic number of births are: (1) that it coincides with the description of the number given in the first part of the passage (*ἐν ᾧ πρῶτον . . .*

<sup>1</sup>The Platonic Tetractys consisted of a series of seven terms, 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27.

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ἀπέφηναν): (2) that the number 216 with its permutations would have been familiar to a Greek mathematician, though unfamiliar to us: (3) that 216 is the cube of 6, and also the sum of  $3^3$ ,  $4^3$ ,  $5^3$ , the numbers 3, 4, 5 representing the Pythagorean triangle, of which the sides when squared equal the square of the hypotenuse ( $3^2 + 4^2 = 5^2$ ): (4) that it is also the period of the Pythagorean Metempsychosis: (5) the three ultimate terms or bases (3, 4, 5) of which 216 is composed answer to the third, fourth, fifth in the musical scale: (6) that the number 216 is the product of the cubes of 2 and 3, which are the two last terms in the Platonic Tetractys: (7) that the Pythagorean triangle is said by Plutarch (de Is. et Osir., 373 E), Proclus (super prima Eucl. iv. p. 111), and Quintilian (de Musica iii. p. 152) to be contained in this passage, so that the tradition of the school seems to point in the same direction: (8) that the Pythagorean triangle is called also the figure of marriage (γαμήλιον διάγραμμα).

But though agreeing with Dr. Donaldson thus far, I see no reason for supposing, as he does, that the first or perfect number is the world, the human or imperfect number the state; nor has he given any proof that the second harmony is a cube. Nor do I think that ἀρρήτων δὲ δυνεῖν can mean 'two incommensurables,' which he arbitrarily assumes to be 2 and 3, but rather, as the preceding clause implies, δυνεῖν ἀριθμοῖν ἀπὸ ἀρρήτων διαμέτρων πεμπάδος, i. e. two square numbers based upon irrational diameters of a figure the side of which is  $5 = 50 \times 2$ .

The greatest objection to the translation is the sense given to the words ἐπίτριτος πνυμήν κ.τ.λ., 'a base of three with a third added to it, multiplied by 5.' In this somewhat forced manner Plato introduces once more the numbers of the Pythagorean triangle. But the coincidences in the numbers which follow are in favour of the explanation. The first harmony of 400, as has been already remarked, probably represents the rulers; the second and oblong harmony of 7600, the people.

And here we take leave of the difficulty. The discovery of the riddle would be useless, and would throw no light on ancient mathematics. The point of interest is that Plato should have used such a symbol, and that so much of the Pythagorean spirit should have prevailed in him. His general meaning is that divine creation is perfect, and is represented or presided



over by a perfect or cyclical number; human generation is imperfect, and represented or presided over by an imperfect number or series of numbers. The number 5040, which is the number of the citizens in the Laws, is expressly based by him on utilitarian grounds, namely, the convenience of the number for division; it is also made up of the first seven digits multiplied by one another. The contrast of the perfect and imperfect number may have been easily suggested by the corrections of the cycle, which were made first by Meton and secondly by Callippus; (the latter is said to have been a pupil of Plato). Of the degree of importance or of exactness to be attributed to the problem, the number of the tyrant in Book ix. ( $729 = 365 + 2$ ), and the slight correction of the error in the number  $5040 \div 12$  (Laws, 771 C), may furnish a criterion. There is nothing surprising in the circumstance that those who were seeking for order in nature and had found order in number, should have imagined one to give law to the other. Plato believes in a power of number far beyond what he could see realized in the world around him, and he knows the great influence which 'the little matter of 1, 2, 3' (vii. 522 C) exercises upon education. He may even be thought to have a prophetic anticipation of the discoveries of Quetelet and others, that numbers depend upon numbers; e. g.—in population, the numbers of births and the respective numbers of children born of either sex, on the respective ages of parents, i. e. on other numbers.

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Steph. **BOOK IX.** Last of all comes the tyrannical man, about whom  
571 we have to enquire, Whence is he, and how does he live—in  
happiness or in misery? There is, however, a previous question  
of the nature and number of the appetites, which I should like to  
consider first. Some of them are unlawful, and yet admit of being  
chastened and weakened in various degrees by the power of reason  
and law. 'What appetites do you mean?' I mean those which  
are awake when the reasoning powers are asleep, which get up and  
walk about naked without any self-respect or shame; and there is  
no conceivable folly or crime, however cruel or unnatural, of which,  
in imagination, they may not be guilty. 'True,' he said; 'very  
true.' But when a man's pulse beats temperately, and he has  
supped on a feast of reason and come to a knowledge of himself

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before going to rest, and has satisfied his desires just enough to prevent their perturbing his reason, which remains clear and luminous, and when he is free from quarrel and heat,— the visions which he has on his bed are least irregular and abnormal. Even in good men there is such an irregular wild-beast nature, which peers out in sleep. 572

To return:— You remember what was said of the democrat; that he was the son of a miserly father, who encouraged the saving desires and repressed the ornamental and expensive ones; presently the youth got into fine company, and began to entertain a dislike to his father's narrow ways; and being a better man than the corrupters of his youth, he came to a mean, and led a life, not of lawless or slavish passion, but of regular and successive indulgence. Now imagine that the youth has become a father, and has a son who is exposed to the same temptations, and has companions who lead him into every sort of iniquity, and parents and friends who try to keep him right. The counsellors of evil find that their only chance of retaining him is to implant in his soul a monster drone, or love; while other desires buzz around him and mystify him with sweet sounds and scents, this monster love takes possession of him, and puts an end to every true or modest thought or wish. Love, like drunkenness and madness, is a tyranny; and the tyrannical man, whether made by nature or habit, is just a drinking, lusting, furious sort of animal. 573

And how does such an one live? 'Nay, that you must tell me.' Well then, I fancy that he will live amid revelries and harlotries, and love will be the lord and master of the house. Many desires require much money, and so he spends all that he has and borrows more; and when he has nothing the young ravens are still in the nest in which they were hatched, crying for food. Love urges them on; and they must be gratified by force or fraud, or if not, they become painful and troublesome; and as the new pleasures succeed the old ones, so will the son take possession of the goods of his parents; if they show signs of refusing, he will defraud and deceive them; and if they openly resist, what then? 'I can only say, that I should not much like to be in their place.' But, O heavens, Adeimantus, to think that for some new-fangled and unnecessary love he will give up his old father and mother, best and dearest of friends, or enslave them to the fancies of the hour! 574

Truly a tyrannical son is a blessing to his father and mother !  
 When there is no more to be got out of them, he turns burglar or  
 pickpocket, or robs a temple. Love overmasters the thoughts of  
 his youth, and he becomes in sober reality the monster that he  
 75 was sometimes in sleep. He waxes strong in all violence and  
 lawlessness; and is ready for any deed of daring that will  
 supply the wants of his rabble-rout. In a well-ordered State  
 there are only a few such, and these in time of war go out and  
 become the mercenaries of a tyrant. But in time of peace they  
 stay at home and do mischief; they are the thieves, footpads,  
 cut-purses, man-stealers of the community; or if they are able  
 to speak, they turn false-witnesses and informers. ‘No small  
 catalogue of crimes truly, even if the perpetrators are few.’ Yes, I  
 said; but small and great are relative terms, and no crimes which  
 are committed by them approach those of the tyrant, whom this  
 class, growing strong and numerous, create out of themselves. If  
 the people yield, well and good; but, if they resist, then, as before  
 he beat his father and mother, so now he beats his fatherland and  
 motherland, and places his mercenaries over them. Such men in  
 their early days live with flatterers, and they themselves flatter  
 76 others, in order to gain their ends; but they soon discard their  
 followers when they have no longer any need of them; they are  
 always either masters or servants,—the joys of friendship are  
 unknown to them. And they are utterly treacherous and unjust,  
 if the nature of justice be at all understood by us. They realize  
 our dream; and he who is the most of a tyrant by nature, and  
 leads the life of a tyrant for the longest time, will be the worst  
 of them, and being the worst of them, will also be the most  
 miserable.

Like man, like State,—the tyrannical man will answer to tyranny,  
 which is the extreme opposite of the royal State; for one is the  
 best and the other the worst. But which is the happier? Great  
 and terrible as the tyrant may appear enthroned amid his satel-  
 lites, let us not be afraid to go in and ask; and the answer is, that  
 the monarchical is the happiest, and the tyrannical the most  
 577 miserable of States. And may we not ask the same question  
 about the men themselves, requesting some one to look into them  
 who is able to penetrate the inner nature of man, and will not be  
 panic-struck by the vain pomp of tyranny? I will suppose that he

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is one who has lived with him, and has seen him in family life, or perhaps in the hour of trouble and danger.

Assuming that we ourselves are the impartial judge for whom we seek, let us begin by comparing the individual and State, and ask first of all, whether the State is likely to be free or enslaved—Will there not be a little freedom and a great deal of slavery? And the freedom is of the bad, and the slavery of the good; and this applies to the man as well as to the State; for his soul is full of meanness and slavery, and the better part is enslaved to the worse. He cannot do what he would, and his mind is full of confusion; he is the very reverse of a freeman. The State will be 57  
poor and full of misery and sorrow; and the man's soul will also be poor and full of sorrows, and he will be the most miserable of men. No, not the most miserable, for there is yet a more miserable. 'Who is that?' The tyrannical man who has the misfortune also to become a public tyrant. 'There I suspect that you are right.' Say rather, 'I am sure;' conjecture is out of place in an enquiry of this nature. He is like a wealthy owner of slaves, only he has more of them than any private individual. You will say, 'The owners of slaves are not generally in any fear of them.' But why? Because the whole city is in a league which protects the individual. Suppose however that one of these owners and his household is carried off by a god into a wilderness, where there are no freemen to help him — will he not be in an agony of terror? — will he not be compelled to flatter his slaves and to promise them 57  
many things sore against his will? And suppose the same god who carried him off were to surround him with neighbours who declare that no man ought to have slaves, and that the owners of them should be punished with death. 'Still worse and worse! He will be in the midst of his enemies.' And is not our tyrant such a captive soul, who is tormented by a swarm of passions which he cannot indulge; living indoors always like a woman, and jealous of those who can go out and see the world?

Having so many evils, will not the most miserable of men be still more miserable in a public station? Master of others when he is not master of himself; like a sick man who is compelled to be an athlete; the meanest of slaves and the most abject of flatterers; wanting all things, and never able to satisfy his desires; always in fear and distraction, like the State of which he is the representative.



580 His jealous, hateful, faithless temper grows worse with command; he is more and more faithless, envious, unrighteous,—the most wretched of men, a misery to himself and to others. And so let us have a final trial and proclamation; need we hire a herald, or shall I proclaim the result? ‘Make the proclamation yourself.’ *The son of Ariston (the best) is of opinion that the best and justest of men is also the happiest, and that this is he who is the most royal master of himself; and that the unjust man is he who is the greatest tyrant of himself and of his State. And I add further—*

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This is our first proof. The second is derived from the three kinds of pleasure, which answer to the three elements of the soul

581 —reason, passion, desire; under which last is comprehended avarice as well as sensual appetite, while passion includes ambition, party-feeling, love of reputation. Reason, again, is solely directed to the attainment of truth, and careless of money and reputation. In accordance with the difference of men’s natures, one of these three principles is in the ascendant, and they have their several pleasures corresponding to them. Interrogate now the three natures, and each one will be found praising his own pleasures and depreciating those of others. The money-maker will contrast the vanity of knowledge with the solid advantages of wealth. The ambitious man will despise knowledge which brings no honour; whereas the philosopher will regard only the fruition of truth, and will call other pleasures necessary rather than good.

582 Now, how shall we decide between them? Is there any better criterion than experience and knowledge? And which of the three has the truest knowledge and the widest experience? The experience of youth makes the philosopher acquainted with the two kinds of desire, but the avaricious and the ambitious man never taste the pleasures of truth and wisdom. Honour he has equally with them; they are ‘judged of him,’ but he is ‘not judged of them,’ for they never attain to the knowledge of true being. And his instrument is reason, whereas their standard is only wealth and honour; and if by reason we are to judge, his good will be the truest. And so we arrive at the result that the pleasure of the rational part of the soul, and a life passed in such pleasure is the

583 pleasantest. He who has a right to judge judges thus. Next comes the life of ambition, and, in the third place, that of money-making.

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Twice has the just man overthrown the unjust — once more, as in an Olympian contest, first offering up a prayer to the saviour Zeus, let him try a fall. A wise man whispers to me that the pleasures of the wise are true and pure ; all others are a shadow only. Let us examine this : Is not pleasure opposed to pain, and is there not a mean state which is neither ? When a man is sick, nothing is more pleasant to him than health. But this he never found out while he was well. In pain he desires only to cease from pain ; on the other hand, when he is in an ecstasy of pleasure, rest is painful to him. Thus rest or cessation is both pleasure and pain. But can that which is neither become both ? Again, pleasure and pain are motions, and the absence of them is rest ; but if so, how can the absence of either of them be the other ? Thus we are led to infer that the contradiction is an appearance only, and witchery of the senses. And these are not the only pleasures, for there are others which have no preceding pains. Pure pleasure then is not the absence of pain, nor pure pain the absence of pleasure ; although most of the pleasures which reach the mind through the body are reliefs of pain, and have not only their reactions when they depart, but their anticipations before they come. They can be best described in a simile. There is in nature an upper, lower, and middle region, and he who passes from the lower to the middle imagines that he is going up and is already in the upper world ; and if he were taken back again would think, and truly think, that he was descending. All this arises out of his ignorance of the true upper, middle, and lower regions. And a like confusion happens with pleasure and pain, and with many other things. The man who compares grey with black, calls grey white ; and the man who compares absence of pain with pain, calls the absence of pain pleasure. Again, hunger and thirst are inanitions of the body, ignorance and folly of the soul ; and food is the satisfaction of the one, knowledge of the other. Now which is the purer satisfaction — that of eating and drinking, or that of knowledge ? Consider the matter thus : The satisfaction of that which has more existence is truer than of that which has less. The invariable and immortal has a more real existence than the variable and mortal, and has a corresponding measure of knowledge and truth. The soul, again, has more existence and truth and knowledge than the body, and is therefore more really satisfied and has a more

86 natural pleasure. Those who feast only on earthly food, are always going at random up to the middle and down again; but they never pass into the true upper world, or have a taste of true pleasure. They are like fatted beasts, full of gluttony and sensuality, and ready to kill one another by reason of their insatiable lust; for they are not filled with true being, and their vessel is leaky (cp. Gorgias, 243 A, foll.). Their pleasures are mere shadows of pleasure, mixed with pain, coloured and intensified by contrast, and therefore intensely desired; and men go fighting about them, as Stesichorus says that the Greeks fought about the shadow of Helen at Troy, because they know not the truth.

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The same may be said of the passionate element:—the desires of the ambitious soul, as well as of the covetous, have an inferior satisfaction. Only when under the guidance of reason do either of  
87 the other principles do their own business or attain the pleasure which is natural to them. When not attaining, they compel the other parts of the soul to pursue a shadow of pleasure which is not theirs. And the more distant they are from philosophy and reason, the more distant they will be from law and order, and the more illusive will be their pleasures. The desires of love and tyranny are the farthest from law, and those of the king are nearest to it. There is one genuine pleasure, and two spurious ones: the tyrant goes beyond even the latter; he has run away altogether from law and reason. Nor can the measure of his inferiority be told, except in a figure. The tyrant is the third removed from the oligarch, and has therefore, not a shadow of his pleasure, but the shadow of a shadow only. The oligarch, again, is thrice removed from the king, and thus we get the formula  $3 \times 3$ , which is the number of a surface, representing the shadow which is the tyrant's pleasure, and if you like to cube this 'number of the beast,' you will find that the measure of the difference amounts to 729; the king is 729 times more happy than the tyrant. And this extraordinary number is *nearly* equal to the number of days and nights in a year ( $365 \times 2 = 730$ ); and  
88 is therefore concerned with human life. This is the interval between a good and bad man in happiness only: what must be the difference between them in comeliness of life and virtue!

Perhaps you may remember some one saying at the beginning of our discussion that the unjust man was profited if he had the



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reputation of justice. Now that we know the nature of justice and injustice, let us make an image of the soul, which will personify his words. First of all, fashion a multitudinous beast, having a ring of heads of all manner of animals, tame and wild, and able to produce and change them at pleasure. Suppose now another form of a lion, and another of a man; the second smaller than the first, the third than the second; join them together and cover them with a human skin, in which they are completely concealed. When this has been done, let us tell the supporter of injustice that he is feeding up the beasts and starving the man. The maintainer of justice, on the other hand, is trying to strengthen the man; he is nourishing the gentle principle within him, and making an alliance with the lion heart, in order that he may be able to keep down the many-headed hydra, and bring all into unity with each other and with themselves. Thus in every point of view, whether in relation to pleasure, honour, or advantage, the just man is right, and the unjust wrong. 589

But now, let us reason with the unjust, who is not intentionally in error. Is not the noble that which subjects the beast to the man, or rather to the God in man; the ignoble, that which subjects the man to the beast? And if so, who would receive gold on condition that he was to degrade the noblest part of himself under the worst?—who would sell his son or daughter into the hands of brutal and evil men, for any amount of money? And will he sell his own fairer and diviner part without any compunction to the most godless and foul? Would he not be worse than Eriphyle, who sold her husband's life for a necklace? And intemperance is the letting loose of the multiform monster, and pride and sullenness are the growth and increase of the lion and serpent element, while luxury and effeminacy are caused by a too great relaxation of spirit. Flattery and meanness again arise when the spirited element is subjected to avarice, and the lion is habituated to become a monkey. The real disgrace of handicraft arts is, that those who are engaged in them have to flatter, instead of mastering their desires; therefore we say that they should be placed under the control of the better principle in another because they have none in themselves; not, as Thrasymachus imagined, to the injury of the subjects, but for 590



their good. And our intention in educating the young, is to give them self-control; the law desires to nurse up in them a higher principle, and when they have acquired this, they may go their ways.

‘What, then, shall a man profit, if he gain the whole world’ and become more and more wicked? Or what shall he profit by escaping discovery, if the concealment of evil prevents the cure? If he had been punished, the brute within him would have been silenced, and the gentler element liberated; and he would have united temperance, justice, and wisdom in his soul—a union better far than any combination of bodily gifts. The man of understanding will honour knowledge above all; in the next place he will keep under his body, not only for the sake of health and strength, but in order to attain the most perfect harmony of body and soul. In the acquisition of riches, too, he will aim at order and harmony; he will not desire to heap up wealth without measure, but he will fear that the increase of wealth will disturb the constitution of his own soul. For the same reason he will only accept such honours as will make him a better man; any others he will decline. ‘In that case,’ said he, ‘he will never be a politician.’ Yes, but he will, in his own city; though probably not in his native country, unless by some divine accident. ‘You mean that he will be a citizen of the ideal city, which has no place upon earth.’ But in heaven, I replied, there is a pattern of such a city, and he who wishes may order his life after that image. Whether such a state is or ever will be matters not; he will act according to that pattern and no other. . . .

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The most noticeable points in the 9th Book of the Republic are:—(1) the account of pleasure; (2) the number of the interval which divides the king from the tyrant; (3) the pattern which is in heaven.

INTRODUC-  
TION.

1. Plato’s account of pleasure is remarkable for moderation, and in this respect contrasts with the later Platonists and the views which are attributed to them by Aristotle. He is not, like the Cynics, opposed to all pleasure, but rather desires that the several parts of the soul shall have their natural satisfaction; he even agrees with the Epicureans in describing pleasure

*Republic IX.* as something more than the absence of pain. This is proved by the circumstance that there are pleasures which have no antecedent pains (as he also remarks in the *Philebus*), such as the pleasures of smell, and also the pleasures of hope and anticipation. In the previous book (pp. 558, 559) he had made the distinction between necessary and unnecessary pleasure, which is repeated by Aristotle, and he now observes that there are a further class of 'wild beast' pleasures, corresponding to Aristotle's *θηρίότης*. He dwells upon the relative and unreal character of sensual pleasures and the illusion which arises out of the contrast of pleasure and pain, pointing out the superiority of the pleasures of reason, which are at rest, over the fleeting pleasures of sense and emotion. The pre-eminence of royal pleasure is shown by the fact that reason is able to form a judgment of the lower pleasures, while the two lower parts of the soul are incapable of judging the pleasures of reason. Thus, in his treatment of pleasure, as in many other subjects, the philosophy of Plato is 'sawn up into quantities' by Aristotle; the analysis which was originally made by him became in the next generation the foundation of further technical distinctions. Both in Plato and Aristotle we note the illusion under which the ancients fell of regarding the transience of pleasure as a proof of its unreality, and of confounding the permanence of the intellectual pleasures with the unchangeableness of the knowledge from which they are derived. Neither do we like to admit that the pleasures of knowledge, though more elevating, are not more lasting than other pleasures, and are almost equally dependent on the accidents of our bodily state (cp. *Introd.* to *Philebus*).

2. The number of the interval which separates the king from the tyrant, and royal from tyrannical pleasures, is 729, the cube of 9, which Plato characteristically designates as a number concerned with human life, because *nearly* equivalent to the number of days and nights in the year. He is desirous of proclaiming that the interval between them is immeasurable, and invents a formula to give expression to his idea. Those who spoke of justice as a cube, of virtue as an art of measuring (*Prot.* 357 A), saw no inappropriateness in conceiving the soul under the figure of a line, or the pleasure of the tyrant as separated from the

pleasure of the king by the numerical interval of 729. And in modern times we sometimes use metaphorically what Plato employed as a philosophical formula. 'It is not easy to estimate the loss of the tyrant, except perhaps in this way,' says Plato. So we might say, that although the life of a good man is not to be compared to that of a bad man, yet you may measure the difference between them by valuing one minute of the one at an hour of the other ('One day in thy courts is better than a thousand'), or you might say that 'there is an infinite difference.' But this is not so much as saying, in homely phrase, 'They are a thousand miles asunder.' And accordingly Plato finds the natural vehicle of his thoughts in a progression of numbers; this arithmetical formula he draws out with the utmost seriousness, and both here and in the number of generation seems to find an additional proof of the truth of his speculation in forming the number into a geometrical figure; just as persons in our own day are apt to fancy that a statement is verified when it has been only thrown into an abstract form. In speaking of the number 729 as proper to human life, he probably intended to intimate that one year of the tyrannical = 12 hours of the royal life.

The simple observation that the comparison of two similar solids is effected by the comparison of the cubes of their sides, is the mathematical groundwork of this fanciful expression. There is some difficulty in explaining the steps by which the number 729 is obtained; the oligarch is removed in the third degree from the royal and aristocratical, and the tyrant in the third degree from the oligarchical; but we have to arrange the terms as the sides of a square and to count the oligarch twice over, thus reckoning them not as = 5 but as = 9. The square of 9 is passed lightly over as only a step towards the cube.

3. Towards the close of the Republic, Plato seems to be more and more convinced of the ideal character of his own speculations. At the end of the 9th Book the pattern which is in heaven takes the place of the city of philosophers on earth. The vision which has received form and substance at his hands, is now discovered to be at a distance. And yet this distant kingdom is also the rule of man's life (Bk. vii. 540 E). ('Say not lo! here, or lo! there, for the kingdom of God is within you.') Thus a note is struck which prepares for the revelation of a future



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 INTRODU- ideal of politics is to be realized in the individual.  
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**BOOK X.** Many things pleased me in the order of our State, *Steph* but there was nothing which I liked better than the regulation 595 about poetry. The division of the soul throws a new light on our exclusion of imitation. I do not mind telling you in confidence that all poetry is an outrage on the understanding, unless the hearers have that balm of knowledge which heals error. I have loved Homer ever since I was a boy, and even now he appears to me to be the great master of tragic poetry. But much as I love the man, I love truth more, and therefore I must speak out: and first of all, will you explain what is imitation, for really I do not understand? 'How likely then that I should understand!' That might very well be, for the duller often 596 sees better than the keener eye. 'True, but in your presence I can hardly venture to say what I think.' Then suppose that we begin in our old fashion, with the doctrine of universals. Let us assume the existence of beds and tables. There is one idea of a bed, or of a table, which the maker of each had in his mind when making them; he did not make the ideas of beds and tables, but he made beds and tables according to the ideas. And is there not a maker of the works of all workmen, who makes not only vessels but plants and animals, himself, the earth and heaven, and things in heaven and under the earth? He makes the Gods also. 'He must be a wizard indeed!' But do you not see that there is a sense in which you could do the same? You have only to take a mirror, and catch the reflection of the sun, and the earth, or anything else — there now you have made them. 'Yes, but only in appearance.' Exactly so; and the painter is such a creator as you are with the mirror, and he is even more unreal than the carpenter; although neither the carpenter nor any other artist can be supposed to make 597 the absolute bed. 'Not if philosophers may be believed.' Nor need we wonder that his bed has but an imperfect relation to the truth. Reflect: — Here are three beds; one in nature, which is made by God; another, which is made by the carpenter; and the third, by the painter. God only made one, nor could he have made more than one; for if there had been two, there



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would always have been a third—more absolute and abstract than either, under which they would have been included. We may therefore conceive God to be the natural maker of the bed, and in a lower sense the carpenter is also the maker; but the painter is rather the imitator of what the other two make; he has to do with a creation which is thrice removed from reality. And the tragic poet is an imitator, and, like every other imitator, is thrice removed from the king and from the truth. The painter imitates not the original bed, but the bed made by the carpenter. And this, without being really different, appears to be different, and has many points of view, of which only one is caught by the painter, who represents everything because he represents a piece of everything, and that piece an image. And he can paint any other artist, although he knows nothing of their arts; and this with sufficient skill to deceive children or simple people. Suppose now that somebody came to us and told us, how he had met a man who knew all that everybody knows, and better than anybody:—should we not infer him to be a simpleton who, having no discernment of truth and falsehood, had met with a wizard or enchanter, whom he fancied to be all-wise? And when we hear persons saying that Homer and the tragedians know all the arts and all the virtues, must we not infer that they are under a similar delusion? they do not see that the poets are imitators, and that their creations are only imitations. ‘Very true.’ But if a person could create as well as imitate, he would rather leave some permanent work and not an imitation only; he would rather be the receiver than the giver of praise? ‘Yes, for then he would have more honour and advantage.’

Let us now interrogate Homer and the poets. Friend Homer, say I to him, I am not going to ask you about medicine, or any art to which your poems incidentally refer, but about their main subjects—war, military tactics, politics. If you are only twice and not thrice removed from the truth—not an imitator or an image-maker, please to inform us what good you have ever done to mankind? Is there any city which professes to have received laws from you, as Sicily and Italy have from Charondas, Sparta from Lycurgus, Athens from Solon? Or was any war ever carried on by your counsels? or is any invention attributed to you, as there is to Thales and Anacharsis? Or is there any

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Homeric way of life, such as the Pythagorean was, in which you instructed men, and which is called after you? ‘No, indeed; and Creophylus [Flesh-child] was even more unfortunate in his breeding than he was in his name, if, as tradition says, Homer in his lifetime was allowed by him and his other friends to starve.’ Yes, but could this ever have happened if Homer had really been the educator of Hellas? Would he not have had many devoted followers? If Protagoras and Prodicus can persuade their contemporaries that no one can manage house or State without them, is it likely that Homer and Hesiod would have been allowed to go about as beggars—I mean if they had really been able to do the world any good?—would not men have compelled them to stay where they were, or have followed them about in order to get education? But they did not; and therefore we may infer that Homer and all the poets are only imitators, who do but imitate the appearances of things. For 601 as a painter by a knowledge of figure and colour can paint a cobbler without any practice in cobbling, so the poet can delineate any art in the colours of language, and give harmony and rhythm to the cobbler and also to the general; and you know how mere narration, when deprived of the ornaments of metre, is like a face which has lost the beauty of youth and never had any other. Once more, the imitator has no knowledge of reality, but only of appearance. The painter paints, and the artificer makes a bridle and reins, but neither understands the use of them—the knowledge of this is confined to the horseman; and so of other things. Thus we have three arts: one of use, another of invention, a third of imitation; and the user furnishes the rule to the two others. The flute-player will know the good and bad flute, and the maker will put faith in him; but the imitator will neither know nor have faith—neither science 602 nor true opinion can be ascribed to him. Imitation, then, is devoid of knowledge, being only a kind of play or sport, and the tragic and epic poets are imitators in the highest degree.

And now let us enquire, what is the faculty in man which answers to imitation. Allow me to explain my meaning: Objects are differently seen when in the water and when out of the water, when near and when at a distance; and the painter or juggler makes use of this variation to impose upon us. And

the art of measuring and weighing and calculating comes in to save our bewildered minds from the power of appearance; for, as we were saying, two contrary opinions of the same about the same and at the same time, cannot both of them be true. But which of them is true is determined by the art of calculation; and this is allied to the better faculty in the soul, as the arts of imitation are to the worse. And the same holds of the ear as well as of the eye, of poetry as well as painting. The imitation is of actions voluntary or involuntary, in which there is an expectation of a good or bad result, and present experience of pleasure and pain. But is a man in harmony with himself when he is the subject of these conflicting influences? Is there not rather a contradiction in him? Let me further ask, whether he is more likely to control sorrow when he is alone or when he is in company. 'In the latter case.' Feeling would lead him to indulge his sorrow, but reason and law control him and enjoin patience; since he cannot know whether his affliction is good or evil, and no human thing is of any great consequence, while sorrow is certainly a hindrance to good counsel. For when we stumble, we should not, like children, make an uproar; we should take the measures which reason prescribes, not raising a lament, but finding a cure. And the better part of us is ready to follow reason, while the irrational principle is full of sorrow and distraction at the recollection of our troubles. Unfortunately, however, this latter furnishes the chief materials of the imitative arts. Whereas reason is ever in repose and cannot easily be displayed, especially to a mixed multitude who have no experience of her. Thus the poet is like the painter in two ways: first he paints an inferior degree of truth, and secondly, he is concerned with an inferior part of the soul. He indulges the feelings, while he enfeebles the reason; and we refuse to allow him to have authority over the mind of man; for he has no measure of greater and less, and is a maker of images and very far gone from truth.

But we have not yet mentioned the heaviest count in the indictment—the power which poetry has of injuriously exciting the feelings. When we hear some passage in which a hero laments his sufferings at tedious length, you know that we sympathize with him and praise the poet; and yet in our own

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sorrows such an exhibition of feeling is regarded as effeminate and unmanly (cp. *Ion*, 535 E). Now, ought a man to feel pleasure in seeing another do what he hates and abominates in himself? Is he not giving way to a sentiment which in his own case he would control?—he is off his guard because the sorrow is another's; and he thinks that he may indulge his feelings without disgrace, and will be the gainer by the pleasure. But the inevitable consequence is that he who begins by weeping at the sorrows of others, will end by weeping at his own. The same is true of comedy,—you may often laugh at buffoonery which you would be ashamed to utter, and the love of coarse merriment on the stage will at last turn you into a buffoon at home. Poetry feeds and waters the passions and desires; she lets them rule instead of ruling them. And therefore, when we hear the encomiasts of Homer affirming that he is the educator of Hellas, and that all life should be regulated by his precepts, we may allow the excellence of their intentions, and agree with them in thinking Homer a great poet and tragedian. But we shall continue to prohibit all poetry which goes beyond hymns to the Gods and praises of famous men. Not pleasure and pain, but law and reason shall rule in our State.

These are our grounds for expelling poetry; but lest she should charge us with discourtesy, let us also make an apology to her. We will remind her that there is an ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy, of which there are many traces in the writings of the poets, such as the saying of 'the she-dog, yelping at her mistress,' and 'the philosophers who are ready to circumvent Zeus,' and 'the philosophers who are paupers.' Nevertheless we bear her no ill-will, and will gladly allow her to return upon condition that she makes a defence of herself in verse; and her supporters who are not poets may speak in prose. We confess her charms; but if she cannot show that she is useful as well as delightful, like rational lovers, we must renounce our love, though endeared to us by early associations. Having come to years of discretion, we know that truth, and that a man should be careful how he introduces her to that state or constitution which he himself is; for there is a mighty issue at stake—no less than the good or evil of a human soul. And it is not worth while to forsake justice and virtue



for the attractions of poetry, any more than for the sake of honour or wealth. 'I agree with you.'

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And yet the rewards of virtue are greater far than I have described. 'And can we conceive things greater still?' Not, perhaps, in this brief span of life: but should an immortal being care about anything short of eternity? 'I do not understand what you mean?' Do you not know that the soul is immortal? 'Surely you are not prepared to prove that?' Indeed I am. 'Then let me hear this argument, of which you make so light.'

609 You would admit that everything has an element of good and of evil. In all things there is an inherent corruption; and if this cannot destroy them, nothing else will. The soul too has her own corrupting principles, which are injustice, intemperance, cowardice, and the like. But none of these destroy the soul in the same sense that disease destroys the body. The soul may be full of all iniquities, but is not, by reason of them, brought any nearer to death. Nothing which was not destroyed from within ever perished by external affection of evil. The body, which  
610 is one thing, cannot be destroyed by food, which is another, unless the badness of the food is communicated to the body. Neither can the soul, which is one thing, be corrupted by the body, which is another, unless she herself is infected. And as no bodily evil can infect the soul, neither can any bodily evil, whether disease or violence, or any other destroy the soul, unless it can be shown to render her unholy and unjust. But no one will ever prove that the souls of men become more unjust when they die. If a person has the audacity to say the contrary, the answer is—Then why do criminals require the hand of the executioner, and not die of themselves? 'Truly,' he said, 'injustice would not be very terrible if it brought a cessation of evil; but I rather believe that the injustice which murders others may tend to quicken and stimulate the life of the unjust.' You are quite right. If sin which is her own natural and inherent evil cannot destroy the soul, hardly will anything else  
611 destroy her. But the soul which cannot be destroyed either by internal or external evil must be immortal and everlasting. And if this be true, souls will always exist in the same number. They cannot diminish, because they cannot be destroyed; nor yet increase, for the increase of the immortal must come from some-

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thing mortal, and so all would end in immortality. Neither is the soul variable and diverse; for that which is immortal must be of the fairest and simplest composition. If we would conceive her truly, and so behold justice and injustice in their own nature, she must be viewed by the light of reason pure as at birth, or as she is reflected in philosophy when holding converse with the divine and immortal and eternal. In her present condition we see her only like the sea-god Glaucus, bruised and maimed in the sea which is the world, and covered with shells 612 and stones which are incrustated upon her from the entertainments of earth.

Thus far, as the argument required, we have said nothing of the rewards and honours which the poets attribute to justice; we have contented ourselves with showing that justice in herself is best for the soul in herself, even if a man should put on a Gyges' ring and have the helmet of Hades too. And now you shall repay me what you borrowed; and I will enumerate the rewards of justice in life and after death. I granted, for the sake of argument, as you will remember, that evil might perhaps escape the knowledge of Gods and men, although this was really impossible. And since I have shown that justice has reality, you must grant me also that she has the palm of appearance. In the first place, the just man is known to the Gods, and he is therefore the friend of the Gods, and he will 613 receive at their hands every good, always excepting such evil as is the necessary consequence of former sins. All things end in good to him, either in life or after death, even what appears to be evil; for the Gods have a care of him who desires to be in their likeness. And what shall we say of men? Is not honesty the best policy? The clever rogue makes a great start at first, but breaks down before he reaches the goal, and slinks away in dishonour; whereas the true runner perseveres to the end, and receives the prize. And you must allow me to repeat all the blessings which you attributed to the fortunate unjust — they bear rule in the city, they marry and give in marriage to whom they will; and the evils which you attributed to the unfortunate just, do really fall in the end on the unjust, although, as you implied, their sufferings are better veiled in silence.

But all the blessings of this present life are as nothing when 614

compared with those which await good men after death. 'I should like to hear about them.' Come, then, and I will tell you the story of Er, the son of Armenius, a valiant man. He was supposed to have died in battle, but ten days afterwards his body was found untouched by corruption and sent home for burial. On the twelfth day he was placed on the funeral pyre and there he came to life again, and told what he had seen in the world below. He said that his soul went with a great company to a place, in which there were two chasms near together in the earth beneath, and two corresponding chasms in the heaven above. And there were judges sitting in the intermediate space, bidding the just ascend by the heavenly way on the right hand, having the seal of their judgment set upon them before, while the unjust, having the seal behind, were bidden to descend by the way on the left hand. Him they told to look and listen, as he was to be their messenger to men from the world below. And he beheld and saw the souls departing after judgment at either chasm; some, who came from earth, were worn and travel-stained; others, who came from heaven, were clean and bright. They seemed glad to meet and rest awhile in the meadow; here they discoursed with one another of what they had seen in the other world. Those who came from earth wept at the remembrance of their sorrows, but the spirits from above spoke of glorious sights and heavenly bliss. He said that for every evil deed they were punished tenfold — now the journey was of a thousand years' duration, because the life of man was reckoned as a hundred years — and the rewards of virtue were in the same proportion. He added something hardly worth repeating about infants dying almost as soon as they were born. Of parricides and other murderers he had tortures still more terrible to narrate. He was present when one of the spirits asked — Where is Ardiaeus the Great? (This Ardiaeus was a cruel tyrant, who had murdered his father, and his elder brother, a thousand years before.) Another spirit answered, 'He comes not hither, and will never come. And I myself,' he added, 'actually saw this terrible sight. At the entrance of the chasm, as we were about to reascend, Ardiaeus appeared, and some other sinners — most of whom had been tyrants, but not all — and just as they fancied that they were returning to life, the chasm gave a roar, and then wild, fiery-looking men who knew the

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meaning of the sound, seized him and several others, and bound them hand and foot and threw them down, and dragged them along at the side of the road, lacerating them and carding them like wool, and explaining to the passers-by, that they were going to be cast into hell.' The greatest terror of the pilgrims ascending was lest they should hear the voice, and when there was silence one by one they passed up with joy. To these sufferings there were corresponding delights.

On the eighth day the souls of the pilgrims resumed their journey, and in four days came to a spot whence they looked down upon a line of light, in colour like a rainbow, only brighter and clearer. One day more brought them to the place, and they saw that this was the column of light which binds together the whole universe. The ends of the column were fastened to heaven, and from them hung the distaff of Necessity, on which all the heavenly bodies turned — the hook and spindle were of adamant, and the whorl of a mixed substance. The whorl was in form like a number of boxes fitting into one another with their edges turned upwards, making together a single whorl which was pierced by the spindle. The outermost had the rim broadest, and the inner whorls were smaller and smaller, and had their rims narrower. The largest (the fixed stars) was spangled — the seventh (the sun) was brightest — the eighth (the moon) shone by the light of the seventh — the second and fifth (Saturn and Mercury) 617 were most like one another and yellower than the eighth — the third (Jupiter) had the whitest light — the fourth (Mars) was red — the sixth (Venus) was in whiteness second. The whole had one motion, but while this was revolving in one direction the seven inner circles were moving in the opposite, with various degrees of swiftness and slowness. The spindle turned on the knees of Necessity, and a Siren stood hymning upon each circle, while Lachesis, Clotho, and Atropos, the daughters of Necessity, sat on thrones at equal intervals, singing of past, present, and future, responsive to the music of the Sirens; Clotho from time to time guiding the outer circle with a touch of her right hand; Atropos with her left hand touching and guiding the inner circles; Lachesis in turn putting forth her hand from time to time to guide both of them. On their arrival the pilgrims went to Lachesis, and there was an interpreter who arranged them, and taking from her



knees lots, and samples of lives, got up into a pulpit and said: 'Mortal souls, hear the words of Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity. A new period of mortal life has begun, and you may choose what divinity you please; the responsibility of choosing is with you — God is blameless.' After speaking thus, he cast the lots among them and each one took up the lot which fell near him. He then placed on the ground before them the samples of lives, many more than the souls present; and there were all sorts of lives, of men and of animals. There were tyrannies ending in misery and exile, and lives of men and women famous for their different qualities; and also mixed lives, made up of wealth and poverty, sickness and health. Here, Glaucon, is the great risk of human life, and therefore the whole of education should be directed to the acquisition of such a knowledge as will teach a man to refuse the evil and choose the good. He should know all the combinations which occur in life—of beauty with poverty or with wealth,—of knowledge with external goods,—and at last choose with reference to the nature of the soul, regarding that only as the better life which makes men better, and leaving the rest. And a man must take with him an iron sense of truth and right into the world below, that there too he may remain undazzled by wealth or the allurements of evil, and be determined to avoid the extremes and choose the mean. For this, as the messenger reported the interpreter to have said, is the true happiness of man; and any one, as he proclaimed, may, if he choose with understanding, have a good lot, even though he come last. 'Let not the first be careless in his choice, nor the last despair.' He spoke; and when he had spoken, he who had drawn the first lot chose a tyranny: he did not see that he was fated to devour his own children—and when he discovered his mistake, he wept and beat his breast, blaming chance and the Gods and anybody rather than himself. He was one of those who had come from heaven, and in his previous life had been a citizen of a well-ordered State, but he had only habit and no philosophy. Like many another, he made a bad choice, because he had no experience of life; whereas those who came from earth and had seen trouble were not in such a hurry to choose. But if a man had followed philosophy while upon earth, and had been moderately fortunate in his lot, he might not only be happy here, but his pilgrimage both from and

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to this world would be smooth and heavenly. Nothing was more curious than the spectacle of the choice, at once sad and laughable and wonderful; most of the souls only seeking to avoid their own condition in a previous life. He saw the soul of Orpheus changing 620 into a swan because he would not be born of a woman; there was Thamyras becoming a nightingale; musical birds, like the swan, choosing to be men; the twentieth soul, which was that of Ajax, preferring the life of a lion to that of a man, in remembrance of the injustice which was done to him in the judgment of the arms; and Agamemnon, from a like enmity to human nature, passing into an eagle. About the middle was the soul of Atalanta choosing the honours of an athlete, and next to her Epeus taking the nature of a workwoman; among the last was Thersites, who was changing himself into a monkey. Thither, the last of all, came Odysseus, and sought the lot of a private man, which lay neglected and despised, and when he found it he went away rejoicing, and said that if he had been first instead of last, his choice would have been the same. Men, too, were seen passing into animals, and wild and tame animals changing into one another.

When all the souls had chosen they went to Lachesis, who sent with each of them their genius or attendant to fulfil their lot. He first of all brought them under the hand of Clotho, and drew them within the revolution of the spindle impelled by her hand; from her they were carried to Atropos, who made the threads irreversible; whence, without turning round, they passed beneath 621 the throne of Necessity; and when they had all passed, they moved on in scorching heat to the plain of Forgetfulness and rested at evening by the river Unmindful, whose water could not be retained in any vessel; of this they had all to drink a certain quantity — some of them drank more than was required, and he who drank forgot all things. Er himself was prevented from drinking. When they had gone to rest, about the middle of the night there were thunderstorms and earthquakes, and suddenly they were all driven divers ways, shooting like stars to their birth. Concerning his return to the body, he only knew that awaking suddenly in the morning he found himself lying on the pyre.

Thus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved, and will be our salvation, if we believe that the soul is immortal, and hold fast to the

heavenly way of Justice and Knowledge. So shall we pass undefiled over the river of Forgetfulness, and be dear to ourselves and to the Gods, and have a crown of reward and happiness both in this world and also in the millennial pilgrimage of the other.

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The Tenth Book of the Republic of Plato falls into two divisions: first, resuming an old thread which has been interrupted, Socrates assails the poets, who, now that the nature of the soul has been analyzed, are seen to be very far gone from the truth; and secondly, having shown the reality of the happiness of the just, he demands that appearance shall be restored to him, and then proceeds to prove the immortality of the soul. The argument, as in the Phædo and Gorgias, is supplemented by the vision of a future life.

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Why Plato, who was himself a poet, and whose dialogues are poems and dramas, should have been hostile to the poets as a class, and especially to the dramatic poets; why he should not have seen that truth may be embodied in verse as well as in prose, and that there are some indefinable lights and shadows of human life which can only be expressed in poetry—some elements of imagination which always entwine with reason; why he should have supposed epic verse to be inseparably associated with the impurities of the old Hellenic mythology; why he should try Homer and Hesiod by the unfair and prosaic test of utility,—are questions which have always been debated amongst students of Plato. Though unable to give a complete answer to them, we may show—first, that his views arose naturally out of the circumstances of his age; and secondly, we may elicit the truth as well as the error which is contained in them.

He is the enemy of the poets because poetry was declining in his own lifetime, and a theatrocracy, as he says in the Laws (iii. 701 A), had taken the place of an intellectual aristocracy. Euripides exhibited the last phase of the tragic drama, and in him Plato saw the friend and apologist of tyrants, and the Sophist of tragedy. The old comedy was almost extinct; the new had not yet arisen. Dramatic and lyric poetry, like every other branch of Greek literature, was falling under the power of rhetoric. There was no 'second or third' to Æschylus and



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Sophocles in the generation which followed them. Aristophanes, in one of his later comedies (*Frogs*, 89 foll.), speaks of 'thousands of tragedy-making prattlers, whose attempts at poetry he compares to the chirping of swallows; 'their garrulity went far beyond Euripides,'—'they appeared once upon the stage, and there was an end of them.' To a man of genius who had a real appreciation of the godlike Æschylus and the noble and gentle Sophocles, though disagreeing with some parts of their 'theology' (*Rep.* ii. 380), these 'minor poets' must have been contemptible and intolerable. There is no feeling stronger in the dialogues of Plato than a sense of the decline and decay both in literature and in politics which marked his own age. Nor can he have been expected to look with favour on the licence of Aristophanes, now at the end of his career, who had begun by satirizing Socrates in the *Clouds*, and in a similar spirit forty years afterwards had satirized the founders of ideal commonwealths in his *Eccleziastusae*, or *Female Parliament* (cp. x. 606 C, and *Laws* ii. 658 ff.; 817).

There were other reasons for the antagonism of Plato to poetry. The profession of an actor was regarded by him as a degradation of human nature, for 'one man in his life' cannot 'play many parts;' the characters which the actor performs seem to destroy his own character, and to leave nothing which can be truly called himself. Neither can any man live his life and act it. The actor is the slave of his art, not the master of it. Taking this view Plato is more decided in his expulsion of the dramatic than of the epic poets, though he must have known that the Greek tragedians afforded noble lessons and examples of virtue and patriotism, to which nothing in Homer can be compared. But great dramatic or even great rhetorical power is hardly consistent with firmness or strength of mind, and dramatic talent is often incidentally associated with a weak or dissolute character.

In the Tenth Book Plato introduces a new series of objections. First, he says that the poet or painter is an imitator, and in the third degree removed from the truth. His creations are not tested by rule and measure; they are only appearances. In modern times we should say that art is not merely imitation, but rather the expression of the ideal in forms of sense. Even adopting the humble image of Plato, from which his argument derives a colour, we should maintain that the artist



may ennoble the bed which he paints by the folds of the drapery, or by the feeling of home which he introduces; and there have been modern painters who have imparted such an ideal interest to a blacksmith's or a carpenter's shop. The eye or mind which feels as well as sees can give dignity and pathos to a ruined mill, or a straw-built shed [Rembrandt], to the hull of a vessel 'going to its last home' [Turner]. Still more would this apply to the greatest works of art, which seem to be the visible embodiment of the divine. Had Plato been asked whether the Zeus or Athene of Pheidias was the imitation of an imitation only, would he not have been compelled to admit that something more was to be found in them than in the form of any mortal; and that the rule of proportion to which they conformed was 'higher far than any geometry or arithmetic could express?' (Statesman, 257 A.)

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Again, Plato objects to the imitative arts that they express the emotional rather than the rational part of human nature. He does not admit Aristotle's theory, that tragedy or other serious imitations are a purgation of the passions by pity and fear; to him they appear only to afford the opportunity of indulging them. Yet we must acknowledge that we may sometimes cure disordered emotions by giving expression to them; and that they often gain strength when pent up within our own breast. It is not every indulgence of the feelings which is to be condemned. For there may be a gratification of the higher as well as of the lower — thoughts which are too deep or too sad to be expressed by ourselves, may find an utterance in the words of poets. Every one would acknowledge that there have been times when they were consoled and elevated by beautiful music or by the sublimity of architecture or by the peacefulness of nature. Plato has himself admitted, in the earlier part of the Republic, that the arts might have the effect of harmonizing as well as of enervating the mind; but in the Tenth Book he regards them through a Stoic or Puritan medium. He asks only 'What good have they done?' and is not satisfied with the reply, that 'They have been of use, or have given pleasure to mankind.'

He tells us that he rejoices in the banishment of the poets, since he has found by the analysis of the soul that they are concerned with the inferior faculties. He means to say that

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the higher faculties have to do with universals, the lower with particulars of sense. The poets are on a level with their own age, but not on a level with Socrates and Plato; and he was well aware that Homer and Hesiod could not be made a rule of life by any process of legitimate interpretation; his ironical use of them is in fact a denial of their authority; he saw, too, that the poets were not critics — as he says in the *Apology*, ‘Any one was a better interpreter of their writings than they were themselves’ (22 C). He himself ceased to be a poet when he became a disciple of Socrates; though, as he tells us of Solon, ‘he might have been one of the greatest of them, if he had not been deterred by other pursuits’ (*Tim.* 21 C). Thus from many points of view there is an antagonism between Plato and the poets, which was foreshadowed to him in the old quarrel between philosophy and poetry. The poets, as he says in the *Protagoras* (316 E), were the Sophists of their day; and his dislike of the one class is reflected on the other. He regards them both as the enemies of reasoning and abstraction, though in the case of Euripides more with reference to his immoral sentiments about tyrants and the like. For Plato is the prophet who ‘came into the world to convince men’ — first of the fallibility of sense and opinion, and secondly of the reality of abstract ideas. Whatever strangeness there may be in modern times in opposing philosophy to poetry, which to us seem to have so many elements in common, the strangeness will disappear if we conceive of poetry as allied to sense, and of philosophy as equivalent to thought and abstraction. Unfortunately the very word ‘idea,’ which to Plato is expressive of the most real of all things, is associated in our minds with an element of subjectiveness and unreality. We may note also how he differs from Aristotle who declares poetry to be truer than history, for the opposite reason, because it is concerned with universals, not like history, with particulars (*Poet.* c. 9, 3).

The things which are seen are opposed in Scripture to the things which are unseen — they are equally opposed in Plato to universals and ideas. To him all particulars appear to be floating about in a world of sense; they have a taint of error or even of evil. There is no difficulty in seeing that this is an illusion; for there is no more error or variation in an individual man, horse,

bed, etc., than in the classes to which they respectively belong; nor is the truth which is displayed in individual instances less certain than that which is conveyed through the medium of ideas. But Plato, who is deeply impressed with the real importance of universals as instruments of thought, attributes to them an essential truth which is imaginary and unreal; for universals may be often false and particulars true. Had he attained to any clear conception of the individual, which is the synthesis of the universal and the particular; or had he been able to distinguish between opinion and sensation, which the ambiguity of the words *δόξα*, *φαίνεσθαι*, *εἰκός* and the like, tended to confuse, he would not have denied truth to the particulars of sense.

But the poets are also the representatives of falsehood and feigning in all departments of life and knowledge, like the sophists and rhetoricians of the Gorgias and Phaedrus; they are the false priests, false prophets, lying spirits, enchanters of the world. There is another count put into the indictment against them by Plato, that they are the friends of the tyrant, and bask in the sunshine of his patronage. Despotism in all ages has had an apparatus of false ideas and false teachers at its service—in the history of Modern Europe as well as of Greece and Rome. For no government of men depends solely upon force; without some corruption of literature and morals—some appeal to the imagination of the masses—some pretence to the favour of heaven—some element of good giving power to evil (cp. i. 352), tyranny, even for a short time, cannot be maintained. The Greek tyrants were not insensible to the importance of awakening in their cause a Pseudo-Hellenic feeling; they were proud of successes at the Olympic games; they were not devoid of the love of literature and art. Plato is thinking in the first instance of Greek poets who had graced the courts of Dionysius or Archelaus: and the old spirit of freedom is roused within him at their prostitution of the Tragic Muse in the praises of tyranny. But his prophetic eye extends beyond them to the false teachers of other ages who are the creatures of the government under which they live. He compares the corruption of his contemporaries with the idea of a perfect society, and gathers up into one mass of evil the evils and errors of mankind; to him they are personified in the

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rhetoricians, sophists, poets, rulers who deceive and govern the world.

A further objection which Plato makes to poetry and the imitative arts is that they excite the emotions. Here the modern reader will be disposed to introduce a distinction which appears to have escaped him. For the emotions are neither bad nor good in themselves, and are not most likely to be controlled by the attempt to eradicate them, but by the moderate indulgence of them. And the vocation of art is to present thought in the form of feeling, to enlist the feelings on the side of reason, to inspire even for a moment courage or resignation; perhaps to suggest a sense of infinity and eternity in a way which mere language is incapable of attaining. True, the same power which in the purer age of art embodies gods and heroes only, may be made to express the voluptuous image of a Corinthian courtesan. But this only shows that art, like other outward things, may be turned to good and also to evil, and is not more closely connected with the higher than with the lower part of the soul. All imitative art is subject to certain limitations, and therefore necessarily partakes of the nature of a compromise. Something of ideal truth is sacrificed for the sake of the representation, and something in the exactness of the representation is sacrificed to the ideal. Still, works of art have a permanent element; they idealize and detain the passing thought, and are the intermediates between sense and ideas.

In the present stage of the human mind, poetry and other forms of fiction may certainly be regarded as a good. But we can also imagine the existence of an age in which a severer conception of truth has either banished or transformed them. At any rate we must admit that they hold a different place at different periods of the world's history. In the infancy of mankind, poetry, with the exception of proverbs, is the whole of literature, and the only instrument of intellectual culture; in modern times she is the shadow or echo of her former self, and appears to have a precarious existence. Milton in his day doubted whether an epic poem was any longer possible. At the same time we must remember, that what Plato would have called the charms of poetry have been partly transferred



to prose; he himself (Statesman 304) admits rhetoric to be the handmaiden of Politics, and proposes to find in the strain of law (Laws vii. 811) a substitute for the old poets. Among ourselves the creative power seems often to be growing weaker, and scientific fact to be more engrossing and overpowering to the mind than formerly. The illusion of the feelings, commonly called love, has hitherto been the inspiring influence of modern poetry and romance, and has exercised a humanizing if not a strengthening influence on the world. But may not the stimulus which love has given to fancy be some day exhausted? The modern English novel which is the most popular of all forms of reading is not more than a century or two old: will the tale of love a hundred years hence, after so many thousand variations of the same theme, be still received with unabated interest?

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Art cannot claim to be on a level with philosophy or religion, and may often corrupt them. It is possible to conceive a mental state in which all artistic representations are regarded as a false and imperfect expression, either of the religious ideal or of the philosophical ideal. The fairest forms may be revolting in certain moods of mind, as is proved by the fact that the Mahometans, and many sects of Christians, have renounced the use of pictures and images. The beginning of a great religion, whether Christian or Gentile, has not been 'wood or stone,' but a spirit moving in the hearts of men. The disciples have met in a large upper room or in 'holes and caves of the earth'; in the second or third generation, they have had mosques, temples, churches, monasteries. And the revival or reform of religions, like the first revelation of them, has come from within and has generally disregarded external ceremonies and accompaniments.

But poetry and art may also be the expression of the highest truth and the purest sentiment. Plato himself seems to waver between two opposite views—when, as in the third Book, he insists that youth should be brought up amid wholesome imagery; and again in Book x, when he banishes the poets from his Republic. Admitting that the arts, which some of us almost deify, have fallen short of their higher aim, we must admit on the other hand that to banish imagination wholly would be suicidal

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as well as impossible. For nature too is a form of art; and a breath of the fresh air or a single glance at the varying landscape would in an instant revive and reillumine the extinguished spark of poetry in the human breast. In the lower stages of civilization imagination more than reason distinguishes man from the animals; and to banish art would be to banish thought, to banish language, to banish the expression of all truth. No religion is wholly devoid of external forms; even the Mahometan who renounces the use of pictures and images has a temple in which he worships the Most High, as solemn and beautiful as any Greek or Christian building. Feeling too and thought are not really opposed; for he who thinks must feel before he can execute. And the highest thoughts, when they become familiarized to us, are always tending to pass into the form of feeling.

Plato does not seriously intend to expel poets from life and society. But he feels strongly the unreality of their writings; he is protesting against the degeneracy of poetry in his own day as we might protest against the want of serious purpose in modern fiction, against the unseemliness or extravagance of some of our poets or novelists, against the time-serving of preachers or public writers, against the regardlessness of truth which to the eye of the philosopher seems to characterize the greater part of the world. For we too have reason to complain that our poets and novelists 'paint inferior truth' and 'are concerned with the inferior part of the soul'; that the readers of them become what they read and are injuriously affected by them. And we look in vain for that healthy atmosphere of which Plato speaks,— 'the beauty which meets the sense like a breeze and imperceptibly draws the soul, even in childhood, into harmony with the beauty of reason.'

For there might be a poetry which would be the hymn of divine perfection, the harmony of goodness and truth among men: a strain which should renew the youth of the world, and bring back the ages in which the poet was man's only teacher and best friend,— which would find materials in the living present as well as in the romance of the past, and might subdue to the fairest forms of speech and verse the intractable materials of modern civilization,— which might elicit the simple principles, or, as Plato

would have called them, the essential forms, of truth and justice out of the variety of opinion and the complexity of modern society,—which would preserve all the good of each generation and leave the bad unsung,—which should be based not on vain longings or faint imaginings, but on a clear insight into the nature of man. Then the tale of love might begin again in poetry or prose, two in one, united in the pursuit of knowledge, or the service of God and man; and feelings of love might still be the incentive to great thoughts and heroic deeds as in the days of Dante or Petrarch; and many types of manly and womanly beauty might appear among us, rising above the ordinary level of humanity, and many lives which were like poems (Laws vii. 817 B), be not only written, but lived by us. A few such strains have been heard among men in the tragedies of Æschylus and Sophocles, whom Plato quotes, not, as Homer is quoted by him, in irony, but with deep and serious approval,—in the poetry of Milton and Wordsworth, and in passages of other English poets,—first and above all in the Hebrew prophets and psalmists. Shakespeare has taught us how great men should speak and act; he has drawn characters of a wonderful purity and depth; he has ennobled the human mind, but, like Homer (Rep. x. 599 foll.), he ‘has left no way of life.’ The next greatest poet of modern times, Goethe, is concerned with ‘a lower degree of truth’; he paints the world as a stage on which ‘all the men and women are merely players’; he cultivates life as an art, but he furnishes no ideals of truth and action. The poet may rebel against any attempt to set limits to his fancy; and he may argue truly that moralizing in verse is not poetry. Possibly, like Mephistopheles in Faust, he may retaliate on his adversaries. But the philosopher will still be justified in asking, ‘How may the heavenly gift of poesy be devoted to the good of mankind?’

Returning to Plato, we may observe that a similar mixture of truth and error appears in other parts of the argument. He is aware of the absurdity of mankind framing their whole lives according to Homer; just as in the Phædrus he intimates the absurdity of interpreting mythology upon rational principles; both these were the modern tendencies of his own age, which he deservedly ridicules. On the other hand, his argument that

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Homer, if he had been able to teach mankind anything worth knowing, would not have been allowed by them to go about begging as a rhapsodist, is both false and contrary to the spirit of Plato (cp. *Rep.* vi. 489 A foll.). It may be compared with those other paradoxes of the *Gorgias*, that 'No statesman was ever unjustly put to death by the city of which he was the head'; and that 'No Sophist was ever defrauded by his pupils' (*Gorg.* 519 foll.). . . . .

The argument for immortality seems to rest on the absolute dualism of soul and body. Admitting the existence of the soul, we know of no force which is able to put an end to her. Vice is her own proper evil; and if she cannot be destroyed by that, she cannot be destroyed by any other. Yet Plato has acknowledged that the soul may be so overgrown by the incrustations of earth as to lose her original form; and in the *Timaeus* he recognizes more strongly than in the *Republic* the influence which the body has over the mind, denying even the voluntariness of human actions, on the ground that they proceed from physical states (*Tim.* 86, 87). In the *Republic*, as elsewhere, he wavers between the original soul which has to be restored, and the character which is developed by training and education. . . . .

The vision of another world is ascribed to Er, the son of Arminius, who is said by Clement of Alexandria to have been Zoroaster. The tale has certainly an oriental character, and may be compared with the pilgrimages of the soul in the *Zend Avesta* (cp. Haug, *Avesta*, p. 197). But no trace of acquaintance with Zoroaster is found elsewhere in Plato's writings, and there is no reason for giving him the name of Er the Pamphylian. The philosophy of Heracleitus cannot be shown to be borrowed from Zoroaster, and still less the myths of Plato.

The local arrangement of the vision is less distinct than that of the *Phaedrus* and *Phaedo*. Astronomy is mingled with symbolism and mythology; the great sphere of heaven is represented under the symbol of a cylinder or box, containing the seven orbits of the planets and the fixed stars; this is suspended from an axis or spindle which turns on the knees of Necessity; the revolutions of the seven orbits contained in the cylinder are guided by the fates, and their harmonious motion produces



the music of the spheres. Through the innermost or eighth of these, which is the moon, is passed the spindle; but it is doubtful whether this is the continuation of the column of light, from which the pilgrims contemplate the heavens; the words of Plato imply that they are connected, but not the same. The column itself is clearly not of adamant. The spindle (which is of adamant) is fastened to the ends of the chains which extend to the middle of the column of light—this column is said to hold together the heaven; but whether it hangs from the spindle, or is at right angles to it, is not explained. The cylinder containing the orbits of the stars is almost as much a symbol as the figure of Necessity turning the spindle;—for the outermost rim is the sphere of the fixed stars, and nothing is said about the intervals of space which divide the paths of the stars in the heavens. The description is both a picture and an orrery, and therefore is necessarily inconsistent with itself. The column of light is not the Milky Way—which is neither straight, nor like a rainbow—but the imaginary axis of the earth. This is compared to the rainbow in respect not of form but of colour, and not to the undergirders of a trireme, but to the straight rope running from prow to stern in which the undergirders meet.

The orrery or picture of the heavens given in the Republic differs in its mode of representation from the circles of the same and of the other in the Timaeus. In both the fixed stars are distinguished from the planets, and they move in orbits without them, although in an opposite direction: in the Republic as in the Timaeus (40 B) they are all moving round the axis of the world. But we are not certain that in the former they are moving round the earth. No distinct mention is made in the Republic of the circles of the same and other; although both in the Timaeus and in the Republic the motion of the fixed stars is supposed to coincide with the motion of the whole. The relative thickness of the rims is perhaps designed to express the relative distances of the planets. Plato probably intended to represent the earth, from which Er and his companions are viewing the heavens, as stationary in place; but whether or not herself revolving, unless this is implied in the revolution of the axis, is uncertain (cp. Timaeus). The spectator

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may be supposed to look at the heavenly bodies, either from above or below. The earth is a sort of earth and heaven in one, like the heaven of the *Phaedrus*, on the back of which the spectator goes out to take a peep at the stars and is borne round in the revolution. There is no distinction between the equator and the ecliptic. But Plato is no doubt led to imagine that the planets have an opposite motion to that of the fixed stars, in order to account for their appearances in the heavens. In the description of the meadow, and the retribution of the good and evil after death, there are traces of Homer.

The description of the axis as a spindle, and of the heavenly bodies as forming a whole, partly arises out of the attempt to connect the motions of the heavenly bodies with the mythological image of the web, or weaving of the Fates. The giving of the lots, the weaving of them, and the making of them irreversible, which are ascribed to the three Fates — Lachesis, Clotho, Atropos, are obviously derived from their names. The element of chance in human life is indicated by the order of the lots. But chance, however adverse, may be overcome by the wisdom of man, if he knows how to choose aright; there is a worse enemy to man than chance; this enemy is himself. He who was moderately fortunate in the number of the lot—even the very last comer—might have a good life if he chose with wisdom. And as Plato does not like to make an assertion which is unproven, he more than confirms this statement a few sentences afterwards by the example of Odysseus, who chose last. But the virtue which is founded on habit is not sufficient to enable a man to choose; he must add to virtue knowledge, if he is to act rightly when placed in new circumstances. The routine of good actions and good habits is an inferior sort of goodness; and, as Coleridge says, ‘Common sense is intolerable which is not based on metaphysics,’ so Plato would have said, ‘Habit is worthless which is not based upon philosophy.’

The freedom of the will to refuse the evil and to choose the good is distinctly asserted. ‘Virtue is free, and as a man honours or dishonours her he will have more or less of her.’ The life of man is ‘rounded’ by necessity; there are circumstances prior to birth which affect him (cp. *Pol.* 273 B). But within the walls of necessity there is an open space in which he is his own master,

and can study for himself the effects which the variously compounded gifts of nature or fortune have upon the soul, and act accordingly. All men cannot have the first choice in everything. But the lot of all men is good enough, if they choose wisely and will live diligently.

The verisimilitude which is given to the pilgrimage of a thousand years, by the intimation that Ardiaeus had lived a thousand years before; the coincidence of Er coming to life on the twelfth day after he was supposed to have been dead with the seven days which the pilgrims passed in the meadow, and the four days during which they journeyed to the column of light; the precision with which the soul is mentioned who chose the twentieth lot; the passing remarks that there was no definite character among the souls, and that the souls which had chosen ill blamed any one rather than themselves; or that some of the souls drank more than was necessary of the waters of Forgetfulness, while Er himself was hindered from drinking; the desire of Odysseus to rest at last, unlike the conception of him in Dante and Tennyson; the feigned ignorance of how Er returned to the body, when the other souls went shooting like stars to their birth,—add greatly to the probability of the narrative. They are such touches of nature as the art of Defoe might have introduced when he wished to win credibility for marvels and apparitions.

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There still remain to be considered some points which have been intentionally reserved to the end: (I) the Janus-like character of the Republic, which presents two faces—one an Hellenic state, the other a kingdom of philosophers. Connected with the latter of the two aspects are (II) the paradoxes of the Republic, as they have been termed by Morgenstern: ( $\alpha$ ) the community of property; ( $\beta$ ) of families; ( $\gamma$ ) the rule of philosophers; ( $\delta$ ) the analogy of the individual and the State, which, like some other analogies in the Republic, is carried too far. We may then proceed to consider (III) the subject of education as conceived by Plato, bringing together in a general view the education of youth and the education of after-life; (IV) we may note further some essential differences between ancient and modern politics which are suggested by the Republic;

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(V) we may compare the *Politicus* and the *Laws*; (VI) we may observe the influence exercised by Plato on his imitators; and (VII) take occasion to consider the nature and value of political, and (VIII) of religious ideals.

I. Plato expressly says that he is intending to found an Hellenic State (Book v. 470 E). Many of his regulations are characteristically Spartan; such as the prohibition of gold and silver, the common meals of the men, the military training of the youth, the gymnastic exercises of the women. The life of Sparta was the life of a camp (*Laws* ii. 666 E), enforced even more rigidly in time of peace than in war; the citizens of Sparta, like Plato's, were forbidden to trade — they were to be soldiers and not shop-keepers. Nowhere else in Greece was the individual so completely subjected to the State; the time when he was to marry, the education of his children, the clothes which he was to wear, the food which he was to eat, were all prescribed by law. Some of the best enactments in the Republic, such as the reverence to be paid to parents and elders, and some of the worst, such as the exposure of deformed children, are borrowed from the practice of Sparta. The encouragement of friendships between men and youths, or of men with one another, as affording incentives to bravery, is also Spartan; in Sparta too a nearer approach was made than in any other Greek State to equality of the sexes, and to community of property; and while there was probably less of licentiousness in the sense of immorality, the tie of marriage was regarded more lightly than in the rest of Greece. The 'suprema lex' was the preservation of the family, and the interest of the State. The coarse strength of a military government was not favourable to purity and refinement; and the excessive strictness of some regulations seems to have produced a reaction. Of all Hellenes the Spartans were most accessible to bribery; several of the greatest of them might be described in the words of Plato as having a 'fierce secret longing after gold and silver.' Though not in the strict sense communists, the principle of communism was maintained among them in their division of lands, in their common meals, in their slaves, and in the free use of one another's goods. Marriage was a public institution: and the women were educated by the State, and sang and danced in public with the men.



Many traditions were preserved at Sparta of the severity with which the magistrates had maintained the primitive rule of music and poetry; as in the Republic of Plato, the new-fangled poet was to be expelled. Hymns to the Gods, which are the only kind of music admitted into the ideal State, were the only kind which was permitted at Sparta. The Spartans, though an un-poetical race, were nevertheless lovers of poetry; they had been stirred by the Elegiac strains of Tyrtaeus, they had crowded around Hippias to hear his recitals of Homer; but in this they resembled the citizens of the timocratic rather than of the ideal State (548 E). The council of elder men also corresponds to the Spartan *gerusia*; and the freedom with which they are permitted to judge about matters of detail agrees with what we are told of that institution. Once more, the military rule of not spoiling the dead or offering arms at the temples; the moderation in the pursuit of enemies; the importance attached to the physical well-being of the citizens; the use of warfare for the sake of defence rather than of aggression — are features probably suggested by the spirit and practice of Sparta.

To the Spartan type the ideal State reverts in the first decline; and the character of the individual timocrat is borrowed from the Spartan citizen. The love of Lacedaemon not only affected Plato and Xenophon, but was shared by many undistinguished Athenians; there they seemed to find a principle which was wanting in their own democracy. The *εὐκοσμία* of the Spartans attracted them, that is to say, not the goodness of their laws, but the spirit of order and loyalty which prevailed. Fascinated by the idea, citizens of Athens would imitate the Lacedaemonians in their dress and manners; they were known to the contemporaries of Plato as 'the persons who had their ears bruised,' like the Roundheads of the Commonwealth. The love of another church or country when seen at a distance only, the longing for an imaginary simplicity in civilized times, the fond desire of a past which never has been, or of a future which never will be,— these are aspirations of the human mind which are often felt among ourselves. Such feelings meet with a response in the Republic of Plato.

But there are other features of the Platonic Republic, as, for example, the literary and philosophical education, and the grace

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and beauty of life, which are the reverse of Spartan. Plato wishes to give his citizens a taste of Athenian freedom as well as of Lacedaemonian discipline. His individual genius is purely Athenian, although in theory he is a lover of Sparta; and he is something more than either — he has also a true Hellenic feeling. He is desirous of humanizing the wars of Hellenes against one another; he acknowledges that the Delphian God is the grand hereditary interpreter of all Hellas. The spirit of harmony and the Dorian mode are to prevail, and the whole State is to have an external beauty which is the reflex of the harmony within. But he has not yet found out the truth which he afterwards enunciated in the *Laws* (i. 628 D) — that he was a better legislator who made men to be of one mind, than he who trained them for war. The citizens, as in other Hellenic States, democratic as well as aristocratic, are really an upper class; for, although no mention is made of slaves, the lower classes are allowed to fade away into the distance, and are represented in the individual by the passions. Plato has no idea either of a social State in which all classes are harmonized, or of a federation of Hellas or the world in which different nations or States have a place. His city is equipped for war rather than for peace, and this would seem to be justified by the ordinary condition of Hellenic States. The myth of the earth-born men is an embodiment of the orthodox tradition of Hellas, and the allusion to the four ages of the world is also sanctioned by the authority of Hesiod and the poets. Thus we see that the *Republic* is partly founded on the ideal of the old Greek *polis*, partly on the actual circumstances of Hellas in that age. Plato, like the old painters, retains a traditional form, and like them he has also a vision of a city in the clouds.

There is yet another thread which is interwoven in the texture of the work; for the *Republic* is not only a Dorian State, but a Pythagorean league. The 'way of life' which was connected with the name of Pythagoras, like the Catholic monastic orders, showed the power which the mind of an individual might exercise over his contemporaries, and may have naturally suggested to Plato the possibility of reviving such 'mediaeval institutions.' The Pythagoreans, like Plato, enforced a rule of life and a moral and intellectual training. The influence ascribed to music, which to

us seems exaggerated, is also a Pythagorean feature; it is not to be regarded as representing the real influence of music in the Greek world. More nearly than any other government of Hellas, the Pythagorean league of three hundred was an aristocracy of virtue. For once in the history of mankind the philosophy of order or κόσμος, expressing and consequently enlisting on its side the combined endeavours of the better part of the people, obtained the management of public affairs and held possession of it for a considerable time (until about B. C. 500). Probably only in States prepared by Dorian institutions would such a league have been possible. The rulers, like Plato's φύλακες, were required to submit to a severe training in order to prepare the way for the education of the other members of the community. Long after the dissolution of the Order, eminent Pythagoreans, such as Archytas of Tarentum, retained their political influence over the cities of Magna Græcia. There was much here that was suggestive to the kindred spirit of Plato, who had doubtless meditated deeply on the 'way of life of Pythagoras' (Rep. x. 600 B) and his followers. Slight traces of Pythagoreanism are to be found in the mystical number of the State, in the number which expresses the interval between the king and the tyrant, in the doctrine of transmigration, in the music of the spheres, as well as in the great though secondary importance ascribed to mathematics in education.

But as in his philosophy, so also in the form of his State, he goes far beyond the old Pythagoreans. He attempts a task really impossible, which is to unite the past of Greek history with the future of philosophy, analogous to that other impossibility, which has often been the dream of Christendom, the attempt to unite the past history of Europe with the kingdom of Christ. Nothing actually existing in the world at all resembles Plato's ideal State; nor does he himself imagine that such a State is possible. This he repeats again and again; e. g. in the Republic (ix. *sub fin.*), or in the Laws (Book v. 739), where, casting a glance back on the Republic, he admits that the perfect state of communism and philosophy was impossible in his own age, though still to be retained as a pattern. The same doubt is implied in the earnestness with which he argues in the Republic (v. 472 D) that ideals are none the worse because they cannot be realized in fact, and



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in the chorus of laughter, which like a breaking wave will, as he anticipates, greet the mention of his proposals; though like other writers of fiction, he uses all his art to give reality to his inventions. When asked how the ideal polity can come into being, he answers ironically, 'When one son of a king becomes a philosopher'; he designates the fiction of the earth-born men as 'a noble lie'; and when the structure is finally complete, he fairly tells you that his Republic is a vision only, which in some sense may have reality, but not in the vulgar one of a reign of philosophers upon earth. It has been said that Plato flies as well as walks, but this falls short of the truth; for he flies and walks at the same time, and is in the air and on firm ground in successive instants.

Niebuhr has asked a trifling question, which may be briefly noticed in this place — Was Plato a good citizen? If by this is meant, Was he loyal to Athenian institutions? — he can hardly be said to be the friend of democracy: but neither is he the friend of any other existing form of government; all of them he regarded as 'states of faction' (Laws viii. 832 C); none attained to his ideal of a voluntary rule over voluntary subjects, which seems indeed more nearly to describe democracy than any other; and the worst of them is tyranny. The truth is, that the question has hardly any meaning when applied to a great philosopher whose writings are not meant for a particular age and country, but for all time and all mankind. The decline of Athenian politics was probably the motive which led Plato to frame an ideal State, and the Republic may be regarded as reflecting the departing glory of Hellas. As well might we complain of St. Augustine, whose great work 'The City of God' originated in a similar motive, for not being loyal to the Roman Empire. Even a nearer parallel might be afforded by the first Christians, who cannot fairly be charged with being bad citizens because, though 'subject to the higher powers,' they were looking forward to a city which is in heaven.

II. The idea of the perfect State is full of paradox when judged of according to the ordinary notions of mankind. The paradoxes of one age have been said to become the common-places of the next; but the paradoxes of Plato are at least as paradoxical to us as they were to his contemporaries. The



modern world has either sneered at them as absurd, or denounced them as unnatural and immoral; men have been pleased to find in Aristotle's criticisms of them the anticipation of their own good sense. The wealthy and cultivated classes have disliked and also dreaded them; they have pointed with satisfaction to the failure of efforts to realize them in practice. Yet since they are the thoughts of one of the greatest of human intelligences, and of one who has done most to elevate morality and religion, they seem to deserve a better treatment at our hands. We may have to address the public, as Plato does poetry, and assure them that we mean no harm to existing institutions. There are serious errors which have a side of truth and which therefore may fairly demand a careful consideration: there are truths mixed with error of which we may indeed say, 'The half is better than the whole.' Yet 'the half' may be an important contribution to the study of human nature.

(a) The first paradox is the community of goods, which is mentioned slightly at the end of the third Book, and seemingly, as Aristotle observes, is confined to the guardians; at least no mention is made of the other classes. But the omission is not of any real significance, and probably arises out of the plan of the work, which prevents the writer from entering into details.

Aristotle censures the community of property much in the spirit of modern political economy, as tending to repress industry, and as doing away with the spirit of benevolence. Modern writers almost refuse to consider the subject, which is supposed to have been long ago settled by the common opinion of mankind. But it must be remembered that the sacredness of property is a notion far more fixed in modern than in ancient times. The world has grown older, and is therefore more conservative. Primitive society offered many examples of land held in common, either by a tribe or by a township, and such may probably have been the original form of landed tenure. Ancient legislators had invented various modes of dividing and preserving the divisions of land among the citizens; according to Aristotle there were nations who held the land in common and divided the produce, and there were others who divided the land and stored the produce in common. The evils of debt and the inequality of property were far greater in ancient than in modern

times, and the accidents to which property was subject from war, or revolution, or taxation, or other legislative interference, were also greater. All these circumstances gave property a less fixed and sacred character. The early Christians are believed to have held their property in common, and the principle is sanctioned by the words of Christ himself, and has been maintained as a counsel of perfection in almost all ages of the Church. Nor have there been wanting instances of modern enthusiasts who have made a religion of communism; in every age of religious excitement notions like Wycliffe's 'inheritance of grace' have tended to prevail. A like spirit, but fiercer and more violent, has appeared in politics. 'The preparation of the Gospel of peace' soon becomes the red flag of Republicanism.

We can hardly judge what effect Plato's views would have upon his own contemporaries; they would perhaps have seemed to them only an exaggeration of the Spartan commonwealth. Even modern writers would acknowledge that the right of private property is based on expediency, and may be interfered with in a variety of ways for the public good. Any other mode of vesting property which was found to be more advantageous, would in time acquire the same basis of right; 'the most useful,' in Plato's words, 'would be the most sacred.' The lawyers and ecclesiastics of former ages would have spoken of property as a sacred institution. But they only meant by such language to oppose the greatest amount of resistance to any invasion of the rights of individuals and of the Church.

When we consider the question, without any fear of immediate application to practice, in the spirit of Plato's Republic, are we quite sure that the received notions of property are the best? Is the distribution of wealth which is customary in civilized countries the most favourable that can be conceived for the education and development of the mass of mankind? Can 'the spectator of all time and all existence' be quite convinced that one or two thousand years hence, great changes will not have taken place in the rights of property, or even that the very notion of property, beyond what is necessary for personal maintenance, may not have disappeared? This was a distinction familiar to Aristotle, though likely to be laughed at among ourselves. Such a change would not be greater than some other changes through

which the world has passed in the transition from ancient to modern society, for example, the emancipation of the serfs in Russia, or the abolition of slavery in America and the West Indies; and not so great as the difference which separates the Eastern village community from the Western world. To accomplish such a revolution in the course of a few centuries, would imply a rate of progress not more rapid than has actually taken place during the last fifty or sixty years. The kingdom of Japan underwent more change in five or six years than Europe in five or six hundred. Many opinions and beliefs which have been cherished among ourselves quite as strongly as the sacredness of property have passed away; and the most untenable propositions respecting the right of bequests or entail have been maintained with as much fervour as the most moderate. Some one will be heard to ask whether a state of society can be final in which the interests of thousands are perilled on the life or character of a single person. And many will indulge the hope that our present condition may, after all, be only transitional, and may conduct to a higher, in which property, besides ministering to the enjoyment of the few, may also furnish the means of the highest culture to all, and will be a greater benefit to the public generally, and also more under the control of public authority. There may come a time when the saying, 'Have I not a right to do what I will with my own?' will appear to be a barbarous relic of individualism; — when the possession of a part may be a greater blessing to each and all than the possession of the whole is now to any one.

Such reflections appear visionary to the eye of the practical statesman, but they are within the range of possibility to the philosopher. He can imagine that in some distant age or clime, and through the influence of some individual, the notion of common property may or might have sunk as deep into the heart of a race, and have become as fixed to them, as private property is to ourselves. He knows that this latter institution is not more than four or five thousand years old: may not the end revert to the beginning? In our own age even Utopias affect the spirit of legislation, and an abstract idea may exercise a great influence on practical politics.

The objections that would be generally urged against Plato's community of property, are the old ones of Aristotle, that motives



for exertion would be taken away, and that disputes would arise when each was dependent upon all. Every man would produce as little and consume as much as he liked. The experience of civilized nations has hitherto been adverse to Socialism. The effort is too great for human nature; men try to live in common, but the personal feeling is always breaking in. On the other hand it may be doubted whether our present notions of property are not conventional, for they differ in different countries and in different states of society. We boast of an individualism which is not freedom, but rather an artificial result of the industrial state of modern Europe. The individual is nominally free, but he is also powerless in a world bound hand and foot in the chains of economic necessity. Even if we cannot expect the mass of mankind to become disinterested, at any rate we observe in them a power of organization which fifty years ago would never have been suspected. The same forces which have revolutionized the political system of Europe, may effect a similar change in the social and industrial relations of mankind. And if we suppose the influence of some good as well as neutral motives working in the community, there will be no absurdity in expecting that the mass of mankind having power, and becoming enlightened about the higher possibilities of human life, when they learn how much more is attainable for all than is at present the possession of a favoured few, may pursue the common interest with an intelligence and persistency which mankind have hitherto never seen.

Now that the world has once been set in motion, and is no longer held fast under the tyranny of custom and ignorance; now that criticism has pierced the veil of tradition and the past no longer overpowers the present,—the progress of civilization may be expected to be far greater and swifter than heretofore. Even at our present rate of speed the point at which we may arrive in two or three generations is beyond the power of imagination to foresee. There are forces in the world which work, not in an arithmetical, but in a geometrical ratio of increase. Education, to use the expression of Plato, moves like a wheel with an ever-multiplying rapidity. Nor can we say how great may be its influence, when it becomes universal,—when it has been inherited by many generations,—when it is freed from the trammels



of superstition and rightly adapted to the wants and capacities of different classes of men and women. Neither do we know how much more the co-operation of minds or of hands may be capable of accomplishing, whether in labour or in study. The resources of the natural sciences are not half-developed as yet; the soil of the earth, instead of growing more barren, may become many times more fertile than hitherto; the uses of machinery far greater, and also more minute than at present. New secrets of physiology may be revealed, deeply affecting human nature in its innermost recesses. The standard of health may be raised and the lives of men prolonged by sanitary and medical knowledge. There may be peace, there may be leisure, there may be innocent refreshments of many kinds. The ever-increasing power of locomotion may join the extremes of earth. There may be mysterious workings of the human mind, such as occur only at great crises of history. The East and the West may meet together, and all nations may contribute their thoughts and their experience to the common stock of humanity. Many other elements enter into a speculation of this kind. But it is better to make an end of them. For such reflections appear to the majority far-fetched, and to men of science, commonplace.

( $\beta$ ) Neither to the mind of Plato nor of Aristotle did the doctrine of community of property present at all the same difficulty, or appear to be the same violation of the common Hellenic sentiment, as the community of wives and children. This paradox he prefaces by another proposal, that the occupations of men and women shall be the same, and that to this end they shall have a common training and education. Male and female animals have the same pursuits — why not also the two sexes of man?

But have we not here fallen into a contradiction? for we were saying that different natures should have different pursuits. How then can men and women have the same? And is not the proposal inconsistent with our notion of the division of labour? — These objections are no sooner raised than answered; for, according to Plato, there is no organic difference between men and women, but only the accidental one that men beget and women bear children. Following the analogy of the other animals, he contends that all natural gifts are scattered about indifferently among both sexes, though there may be a superiority of degree

ments of marriage in the Republic are directed to one object — the improvement of the race. In successive generations a great development both of bodily and mental qualities might be possible. The analogy of animals tends to show that mankind can within certain limits receive a change of nature. And as in animals we should commonly choose the best for breeding, and destroy the others, so there must be a selection made of the human beings whose lives are worthy to be preserved.

We start back horrified from this Platonic ideal, in the belief, first, that the higher feelings of humanity are far too strong to be crushed out; secondly, that if the plan could be carried into execution we should be poorly recompensed by improvements in the breed for the loss of the best things in life. The greatest regard for the weakest and meanest of human beings — the infant, the criminal, the insane, the idiot, truly seems to us one of the noblest results of Christianity. We have learned, though as yet imperfectly, that the individual man has an endless value in the sight of God, and that we honour Him when we honour the darkened and disfigured image of Him (cp. Laws xi. 931 A). This is the lesson which Christ taught in a parable when He said, 'Their angels do always behold the face of My Father which is in heaven.' Such lessons are only partially realized in any age; they were foreign to the age of Plato, as they have very different degrees of strength in different countries or ages of the Christian world. To the Greek the family was a religious and customary institution binding the members together by a tie inferior in strength to that of friendship, and having a less solemn and sacred sound than that of country. The relationship which existed on the lower level of custom, Plato imagined that he was raising to the higher level of nature and reason; while from the modern and Christian point of view we regard him as sanctioning murder and destroying the first principles of morality.

The great error in these and similar speculations is that the difference between man and the animals is forgotten in them. The human being is regarded with the eye of a dog- or bird-fancier (v. 459 A), or at best of a slave-owner; the higher or human qualities are left out. The breeder of animals aims chiefly at size or speed or strength; in a few cases at courage or temper; most often the fitness of the animal for food is the great desideratum.

But mankind are not bred to be eaten, nor yet for their superiority in fighting or in running or in drawing carts. Neither does the improvement of the human race consist merely in the increase of the bones and flesh, but in the growth and enlightenment of the mind. Hence there must be 'a marriage of true minds' as well as of bodies, of imagination and reason as well as of lusts and instincts. Men and women without feeling or imagination are justly called brutes; yet Plato takes away these qualities and puts nothing in their place, not even the desire of a noble offspring, since parents are not to know their own children. The most important transaction of social life, he who is the idealist philosopher converts into the most brutal. For the pair are to have no relation to one another, except at the hymeneal festival; their children are not theirs, but the state's; nor is any tie of affection to unite them. Yet here the analogy of the animals might have saved Plato from a gigantic error, if he had 'not lost sight of his own illustration' (ii. 375 D). For the 'nobler sort of birds and beasts' (v. 459 A) nourish and protect their offspring and are faithful to one another.

An eminent physiologist thinks it worth while 'to try and place life on a physical basis.' But should not life rest on the moral rather than upon the physical? The higher comes first, then the lower; first the human and rational, afterwards the animal. Yet they are not absolutely divided; and in times of sickness or moments of self-indulgence they seem to be only different aspects of a common human nature which includes them both. Neither is the moral the limit of the physical, but the expansion and enlargement of it,—the highest form which the physical is capable of receiving. As Plato would say, the body does not take care of the body, and still less of the mind, but the mind takes care of both. In all human action not that which is common to man and the animals is the characteristic element, but that which distinguishes him from them. Even if we admit the physical basis, and resolve all virtue into health of body — '*la façon que notre sang circule,*' still on merely physical grounds we must come back to ideas. Mind and reason and duty and conscience, under these or other names, are always reappearing. There cannot be health of body without health of mind; nor health of mind without the sense of duty and the love of truth (cp. Charm. 156 D, E).

That the greatest of ancient philosophers should in his regulations



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about marriage have fallen into the error of separating body and mind, does indeed appear surprising. Yet the wonder is not so much that Plato should have entertained ideas of morality which to our own age are revolting, but that he should have contradicted himself to an extent which is hardly credible, falling in an instant from the heaven of idealism into the crudest animalism. Rejoicing in the newly found gift of reflection, he appears to have thought out a subject about which he had better have followed the enlightened feeling of his own age. The general sentiment of Hellas was opposed to his monstrous fancy. The old poets, and in later time the tragedians, showed no want of respect for the family, on which much of their religion was based. But the example of Sparta, and perhaps in some degree the tendency to defy public opinion, seems to have misled him. He will make one family out of all the families of the state. He will select the finest specimens of men and women and breed from these only.

Yet because the illusion is always returning (for the animal part of human nature will from time to time assert itself in the disguise of philosophy as well as of poetry), and also because any departure from established morality, even where this is not intended, is apt to be unsettling, it may be worth while to draw out a little more at length the objections to the Platonic marriage. In the first place, history shows that wherever polygamy has been largely allowed the race has deteriorated. One man to one woman is the law of God and nature. Nearly all the civilized peoples of the world at some period before the age of written records, have become monogamists; and the step when once taken has never been retraced. The exceptions occurring among Brahmins or Mahometans or the ancient Persians, are of that sort which may be said to prove the rule. The connexions formed between superior and inferior races hardly ever produce a noble offspring, because they are licentious; and because the children in such cases usually despise the mother and are neglected by the father who is ashamed of them. Barbarous nations when they are introduced by Europeans to vice die out; polygamist peoples either import and adopt children from other countries, or dwindle in numbers, or both. Dynasties and aristocracies which have disregarded the laws of nature have decreased in numbers and degenerated in



stature; 'mariages de convenance' leave their enfeebling stamp on the offspring of them (cp. *King Lear*, Act i. Sc. 2). The marriage of near relations, or the marrying in and in of the same family tends constantly to weakness or idiocy in the children, sometimes assuming the form as they grow older of passionate licentiousness. The common prostitute rarely has any offspring. By such unmistakable evidence is the authority of morality asserted in the relations of the sexes: and so many more elements enter into this 'mystery' than are dreamed of by Plato and some other philosophers.

Recent enquirers have indeed arrived at the conclusion that among primitive tribes there existed a community of wives as of property, and that the captive taken by the spear was the only wife or slave whom any man was permitted to call his own. The partial existence of such customs among some of the lower races of man, and the survival of peculiar ceremonies in the marriages of some civilized nations, are thought to furnish a proof of similar institutions having been once universal. There can be no question that the study of anthropology has considerably changed our views respecting the first appearance of man upon the earth. We know more about the aborigines of the world than formerly, but our increasing knowledge shows above all things how little we know. With all the helps which written monuments afford, we do but faintly realize the condition of man two thousand or three thousand years ago. Of what his condition was when removed to a distance 200,000 or 300,000 years, when the majority of mankind were lower and nearer the animals than any tribe now existing upon the earth, we cannot even entertain conjecture. Plato (*Laws* iii. 676 foll.) and Aristotle (*Metaph.* xi. 8, §§ 19, 20) may have been more right than we imagine in supposing that some forms of civilization were discovered and lost several times over. If we cannot argue that all barbarism is a degraded civilization, neither can we set any limits to the depth of degradation to which the human race may sink through war, disease, or isolation. And if we are to draw inferences about the origin of marriage from the practice of barbarous nations, we should also consider the remoter analogy of the animals. Many birds and animals, especially the carnivorous, have only one mate, and the love and care of offspring which seems to be natural is in-

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consistent with the primitive theory of marriage. If we go back to an imaginary state in which men were almost animals and the companions of them, we have as much right to argue from what is animal to what is human as from the barbarous to the civilized man. The record of animal life on the globe is fragmentary,—the connecting links are wanting and cannot be supplied; the record of social life is still more fragmentary and precarious. Even if we admit that our first ancestors had no such institution as marriage, still the stages by which men passed from outer barbarism to the comparative civilization of China, Assyria, and Greece, or even of the ancient Germans, are wholly unknown to us.

Such speculations are apt to be unsettling, because they seem to show that an institution which was thought to be a revelation from heaven, is only the growth of history and experience. We ask what is the origin of marriage, and we are told that like the right of property, after many wars and contests, it has gradually arisen out of the selfishness of barbarians. We stand face to face with human nature in its primitive nakedness. We are compelled to accept, not the highest, but the lowest account of the origin of human society. But on the other hand we may truly say that every step in human progress has been in the same direction, and that in the course of ages the idea of marriage and of the family has been more and more defined and consecrated. The civilized East is immeasurably in advance of any savage tribes; the Greeks and Romans have improved upon the East; the Christian nations have been stricter in their views of the marriage relation than any of the ancients. In this as in so many other things, instead of looking back with regret to the past, we should look forward with hope to the future. We must consecrate that which we believe to be the most holy, and that ‘which is the most holy will be the most useful.’ There is more reason for maintaining the sacredness of the marriage tie, when we see the benefit of it, than when we only felt a vague religious horror about the violation of it. But in all times of transition, when established beliefs are being undermined, there is a danger that in the passage from the old to the new we may insensibly let go the moral principle, finding an excuse for listening to the voice of passion in the uncertainty of knowledge, or the

fluctuations of opinion. And there are many persons in our own day who, enlightened by the study of anthropology, and fascinated by what is new and strange, some using the language of fear, others of hope, are inclined to believe that a time will come when through the self-assertion of women, or the rebellious spirit of children, by the analysis of human relations, or by the force of outward circumstances, the ties of family life may be broken or greatly relaxed. They point to societies in America and elsewhere which tend to show that the destruction of the family need not necessarily involve the overthrow of all morality. Whatever we may think of such speculations, we can hardly deny that they have been more rife in this generation than in any other; and whither they are tending, who can predict?

To the doubts and queries raised by these 'social reformers' respecting the relation of the sexes and the moral nature of man, there is a sufficient answer, if any is needed. The difference between them and us is really one of fact. They are speaking of man as they wish or fancy him to be, but we are speaking of him as he is. They isolate the animal part of his nature; we regard him as a creature having many sides, or aspects, moving between good and evil, striving to rise above himself and to become 'a little lower than the angels.' We also, to use a Platonic formula, are not ignorant of the dissatisfactions and incompatibilities of family life, of the meannesses of trade, of the flatteries of one class of society by another, of the impediments which the family throws in the way of lofty aims and aspirations. But we are conscious that there are evils and dangers in the background greater still, which are not appreciated, because they are either concealed or suppressed. What a condition of man would that be, in which human passions were controlled by no authority, divine or human, in which there was no shame or decency, no higher affection overcoming or sanctifying the natural instincts, but simply a rule of health! Is it for this that we are asked to throw away the civilization which is the growth of ages?

For strength and health are not the only qualities to be desired; there are the more important considerations of mind and character and soul. We know how human nature may be degraded; we do not know how by artificial means any improvement in the breed can be effected. The problem is a complex one, for if we



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go back only four steps (and these at least enter into the composition of a child), there are commonly thirty progenitors to be taken into account. Many curious facts, rarely admitting of proof, are told us respecting the inheritance of disease or character from a remote ancestor. We can trace the physical resemblances of parents and children in the same family —

‘Sic oculos, sic ille manus, sic ora ferebat’;

but scarcely less often the differences which distinguish children both from their parents and from one another. We are told of similar mental peculiarities running in families, and again of a tendency, as in the animals, to revert to a common or original stock. But we have a difficulty in distinguishing what is a true inheritance of genius or other qualities, and what is mere imitation or the result of similar circumstances. Great men and great women have rarely had great fathers and mothers. Nothing that we know of in the circumstances of their birth or lineage will explain their appearance. Of the English poets of the last and two preceding centuries scarcely a descendant remains,—none have ever been distinguished. So deeply has nature hidden her secret, and so ridiculous is the fancy which has been entertained by some that we might in time by suitable marriage arrangements or, as Plato would have said, ‘by an ingenious system of lots,’ produce a Shakespeare or a Milton. Even supposing that we could breed men having the tenacity of bulldogs, or, like the Spartans, ‘lacking the wit to run away in battle,’ would the world be any the better? Many of the noblest specimens of the human race have been among the weakest physically. Tyrtæus or Aesop, or our own Newton, would have been exposed at Sparta; and some of the fairest and strongest men and women have been among the wickedest and worst. Not by the Platonic device of uniting the strong and fair with the strong and fair, regardless of sentiment and morality, nor yet by his other device of combining dissimilar natures. (Statesman 310 A), have mankind gradually passed from the brutality and licentiousness of primitive marriage to marriage Christian and civilized.

Few persons would deny that we bring into the world an inheritance of mental and physical qualities derived first from our parents, or through them from some remoter ancestor,



secondly from our race, thirdly from the general condition of mankind into which we are born. Nothing is commoner than the remark, that 'So and so is like his father or his uncle'; and an aged person may not unfrequently note a resemblance in a youth to a long-forgotten ancestor, observing that 'Nature sometimes skips a generation.' It may be true also, that if we knew more about our ancestors, these similarities would be even more striking to us. Admitting the facts which are thus described in a popular way, we may however remark that there is no method of difference by which they can be defined or estimated, and that they constitute only a small part of each individual. The doctrine of heredity may seem to take out of our hands the conduct of our own lives, but it is the idea, not the fact, which is really terrible to us. For what we have received from our ancestors is only a fraction of what we are, or may become. The knowledge that drunkenness or insanity has been prevalent in a family may be the best safeguard against their recurrence in a future generation. The parent will be most awake to the vices or diseases in his child of which he is most sensible within himself. The whole of life may be directed to their prevention or cure. The traces of consumption may become fainter, or be wholly effaced: the inherent tendency to vice or crime may be eradicated. And so heredity, from being a curse, may become a blessing. We acknowledge that in the matter of our birth, as in our nature generally, there are previous circumstances which affect us. But upon this platform of circumstances or within this wall of necessity, we have still the power of creating a life for ourselves by the informing energy of the human will.

There is another aspect of the marriage question to which Plato is a stranger. All the children born in his state are foundlings. It never occurred to him that the greater part of them, according to universal experience, would have perished. For children can only be brought up in families. There is a subtle sympathy between the mother and the child which cannot be supplied by other mothers, or by 'strong nurses one or more' (Laws vii. 789 E). If Plato's 'pen' was as fatal as the Crèches of Paris, or the foundling hospital of Dublin, more than nine-tenths of his children would have perished. There would have been no need to expose or put out of the way the weaklier children, for they would have

died of themselves. So emphatically does nature protest against the destruction of the family.

What Plato had heard or seen of Sparta was applied by him in a mistaken way to his ideal commonwealth. He probably observed that both the Spartan men and women were superior in form and strength to the other Greeks; and this superiority he was disposed to attribute to the laws and customs relating to marriage. He did not consider that the desire of a noble offspring was a passion among the Spartans, or that their physical superiority was to be attributed chiefly, not to their marriage customs, but to their temperance and training. He did not reflect that Sparta was great, not in consequence of the relaxation of morality, but in spite of it, by virtue of a political principle stronger far than existed in any other Grecian state. Least of all did he observe that Sparta did not really produce the finest specimens of the Greek race. The genius, the political inspiration of Athens, the love of liberty—all that has made Greece famous with posterity, were wanting among the Spartans. They had no Themistocles, or Pericles, or Aeschylus, or Sophocles, or Socrates, or Plato. The individual was not allowed to appear above the state; the laws were fixed, and he had no business to alter or reform them. Yet whence has the progress of cities and nations arisen, if not from remarkable individuals, coming into the world we know not how, and from causes over which we have no control? Something too much may have been said in modern times of the value of individuality. But we can hardly condemn too strongly a system which, instead of fostering the scattered seeds or sparks of genius and character, tends to smother and extinguish them.

Still, while condemning Plato, we must acknowledge that neither Christianity, nor any other form of religion and society, has hitherto been able to cope with this most difficult of social problems, and that the side from which Plato regarded it is that from which we turn away. Population is the most untameable force in the political and social world. Do we not find, especially in large cities, that the greatest hindrance to the amelioration of the poor is their improvidence in marriage?—a small fault truly, if not involving endless consequences. There are whole countries too, such as India, or, nearer home, Ireland, in which a

right solution of the marriage question seems to lie at the foundation of the happiness of the community. There are too many people on a given space, or they marry too early and bring into the world a sickly and half-developed offspring; or owing to the very conditions of their existence, they become emaciated and hand on a similar life to their descendants. But who can oppose the voice of prudence to the 'mightiest passions of mankind' (Laws viii. 835 C), especially when they have been licensed by custom and religion? In addition to the influences of education, we seem to require some new principles of right and wrong in these matters, some force of opinion, which may indeed be already heard whispering in private, but has never affected the moral sentiments of mankind in general. We unavoidably lose sight of the principle of utility, just in that action of our lives in which we have the most need of it. We shrink from taking the advice of others at the very time when we are least able to judge impartially for ourselves. Little or no light has been thrown on this most difficult of all social questions by modern enquirers. The state physician hardly likes to probe the wound: it is beyond his art; a matter which he cannot safely let alone, but which he dare not touch:

'We do but skin and film the ulcerous place.'

When again in private life we see a whole family one by one dropping into the grave under the Ate of some inherited malady, and the parents perhaps surviving them, do our minds ever go back silently to that day twenty-five or thirty years before on which under the fairest auspices, amid the rejoicings of friends and acquaintances, a bride and bridegroom joined hands with one another? In making such a reflection we are not opposing physical considerations to moral, but moral to physical; we are seeking to make the voice of reason heard, which drives us back from the extravagance of sentimentalism on common sense. The late Dr. Combe is said by his biographer to have resisted the temptation to marriage, because he knew that he was subject to hereditary consumption. One who deserved to be called a man of genius, a friend of my youth, was in the habit of wearing a black ribbon on his wrist, in order to remind him that, being liable to outbreaks of insanity, he must not give way to the natural impulses of affection: he died unmarried in a



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lunatic asylum. These two little facts suggest the reflection that a very few persons have done from a sense of duty what the rest of mankind ought to have done under like circumstances, if they had allowed themselves to think of all the misery which they were about to bring into the world. If we could prevent such marriages without any violation of feeling or propriety, we clearly ought; and the prohibition in the course of time would be protected by a 'horror naturalis' similar to that which, in all civilized ages and countries, has prevented the marriage of near relations by blood. Mankind would have been the happier, if some things which are now allowed had from the beginning been denied to them; if the sanction of religion could have prohibited practices inimical to health; if sanitary principles could in early ages have been invested with a superstitious awe. But, living as we do far on in the world's history, we are no longer able to stamp at once with the impress of religion a new prohibition. A free agent cannot have his fancies regulated by law; and the execution of the law would be rendered impossible, owing to the uncertainty of the cases in which marriage was to be forbidden. Who can weigh virtue, or even fortune against health, or moral and mental qualities against bodily? Who can measure probabilities against certainties? There has been some good as well as evil in the discipline of suffering; and there are diseases, such as consumption, which have exercised a refining and softening influence on the character. Youth is too inexperienced to balance such nice considerations; parents do not often think of them, or think of them too late. They are at a distance and may probably be averted; change of place, a new state of life, the interests of a home may be the cure of them. So persons vainly reason when their minds are already made up and their fortunes irrevocably linked together. Nor is there any ground for supposing that marriages are to any great extent influenced by reflections of this sort, which seem unable to make any head against the irresistible impulse of individual attachment.

Lastly, no one can have observed the first rising flood of the passions in youth, the difficulty of regulating them, and the effects on the whole mind and nature which follow from them, the stimulus which is given to them by the imagination, without feeling that there is something unsatisfactory in our method of



treating them. That the most important influence on human life should be wholly left to chance or shrouded in mystery, and instead of being disciplined or understood, should be required to conform only to an external standard of propriety — cannot be regarded by the philosopher as a safe or satisfactory condition of human things. And still those who have the charge of youth may find a way by watchfulness, by affection, by the manliness and innocence of their own lives, by occasional hints, by general admonitions which every one can apply for himself, to mitigate this terrible evil which eats out the heart of individuals and corrupts the moral sentiments of nations. In no duty towards others is there more need of reticence and self-restraint. So great is the danger lest he who would be the counsellor of another should reveal the secret prematurely, lest he should get another too much into his power, or fix the passing impression of evil by demanding the confession of it.

Nor is Plato wrong in asserting that family attachments may interfere with higher aims. If there have been some who 'to party gave up what was meant for mankind,' there have certainly been others who to family gave up what was meant for mankind or for their country. The cares of children, the necessity of procuring money for their support, the flatteries of the rich by the poor, the exclusiveness of caste, the pride of birth or wealth, the tendency of family life to divert men from the pursuit of the ideal or the heroic, are as lowering in our own age as in that of Plato. And if we prefer to look at the gentle influences of home, the development of the affections, the amenities of society, the devotion of one member of a family for the good of the others, which form one side of the picture, we must not quarrel with him, or perhaps ought rather to be grateful to him, for having presented to us the reverse. Without attempting to defend Plato on grounds of morality, we may allow that there is an aspect of the world which has not unnaturally led him into error.

We hardly appreciate the power which the idea of the State, like all other abstract ideas, exercised over the mind of Plato. To us the State seems to be built up out of the family, or sometimes to be the framework in which family and social life is contained. But to Plato in his present mood of mind the family

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is only a disturbing influence which, instead of filling up, tends to disarrange the higher unity of the State. No organization is needed except a political, which, regarded from another point of view, is a military one. The State is all-sufficing for the wants of man, and, like the idea of the Church in later ages, absorbs all other desires and affections. In time of war the thousand citizens are to stand like a rampart impregnable against the world or the Persian host; in time of peace the preparation for war and their duties to the State, which are also their duties to one another, take up their whole life and time. The only other interest which is allowed to them besides that of war, is the interest of philosophy. When they are too old to be soldiers they are to retire from active life and to have a second novitiate of study and contemplation. There is an element of monasticism even in Plato's communism. If he could have done without children, he might have converted his Republic into a religious order. Neither in the Laws (v. 739 B), when the daylight of common sense breaks in upon him, does he retract his error. In the state of which he would be the founder, there is no marrying or giving in marriage: but because of the infirmity of mankind, he condescends to allow the law of nature to prevail.

(γ) But Plato has an equal, or, in his own estimation, even greater paradox in reserve, which is summed up in the famous text, 'Until kings are philosophers or philosophers are kings, cities will never cease from ill.' And by philosophers he explains himself to mean those who are capable of apprehending ideas, especially the idea of good. To the attainment of this higher knowledge the second education is directed. Through a process of training which has already made them good citizens they are now to be made good legislators. We find with some surprise (not unlike the feeling which Aristotle in a well-known passage describes the hearers of Plato's lectures as experiencing, when they went to a discourse on the idea of good, expecting to be instructed in moral truths, and received instead of them arithmetical and mathematical formulae) that Plato does not propose for his future legislators any study of finance or law or military tactics, but only of abstract mathematics, as a preparation for the still more abstract conception of good. We ask, with Aristotle, What is the use of a man knowing the idea of

good, if he does not know what is good for this individual, this state, this condition of society? We cannot understand how Plato's legislators or guardians are to be fitted for their work of statesmen by the study of the five mathematical sciences. We vainly search in Plato's own writings for any explanation of this seeming absurdity.

The discovery of a great metaphysical conception seems to ravish the mind with a prophetic consciousness which takes away the power of estimating its value. No metaphysical enquirer has ever fairly criticised his own speculations; in his own judgment they have been above criticism; nor has he understood that what to him seemed to be absolute truth may reappear in the next generation as a form of logic or an instrument of thought. And posterity have also sometimes equally misapprehended the real value of his speculations. They appear to them to have contributed nothing to the stock of human knowledge. The *idea* of good is apt to be regarded by the modern thinker as an unmeaning abstraction; but he forgets that this abstraction is waiting ready for use, and will hereafter be filled up by the divisions of knowledge. When mankind do not as yet know that the world is subject to law, the introduction of the mere conception of law or design or final cause, and the far-off anticipation of the harmony of knowledge, are great steps onward. Even the crude generalization of the unity of all things leads men to view the world with different eyes, and may easily affect their conception of human life and of politics, and also their own conduct and character (Tim. 90 A). We can imagine how a great mind like that of Pericles might derive elevation from his intercourse with Anaxagoras (Phaedr. 270 A). To be struggling towards a higher but unattainable conception is a more favourable intellectual condition than to rest satisfied in a narrow portion of ascertained fact. And the earlier, which have sometimes been the greater ideas of science, are often lost sight of at a later period. How rarely can we say of any modern enquirer in the magnificent language of Plato, that 'He is the spectator of all time and of all existence!'

Nor is there anything unnatural in the hasty application of these vast metaphysical conceptions to practical and political life. In the first enthusiasm of ideas men are apt to see them

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everywhere, and to apply them in the most remote sphere. They do not understand that the experience of ages is required to enable them to fill up 'the intermediate axioms.' Plato himself seems to have imagined that the truths of psychology, like those of astronomy and harmonics, would be arrived at by a process of deduction, and that the method which he has pursued in the Fourth Book, of inferring them from experience and the use of language, was imperfect and only provisional. But when, after having arrived at the idea of good, which is the end of the science of dialectic, he is asked, What is the nature, and what are the divisions of the science? he refuses to answer, as if intending by the refusal to intimate that the state of knowledge which then existed was not such as would allow the philosopher to enter into his final rest. The previous sciences must first be studied, and will, we may add, continue to be studied till the end of time, although in a sense different from any which Plato could have conceived. But we may observe, that while he is aware of the vacancy of his own ideal, he is full of enthusiasm in the contemplation of it. Looking into the orb of light, he sees nothing, but he is warmed and elevated. The Hebrew prophet believed that faith in God would enable him to govern the world; the Greek philosopher imagined that contemplation of the good would make a legislator. There is as much to be filled up in the one case as in the other, and the one mode of conception is to the Israelite what the other is to the Greek. Both find a repose in a divine perfection, which, whether in a more personal or impersonal form, exists without them and independently of them, as well as within them.

There is no mention of the idea of good in the *Timaeus*, nor of the divine Creator of the world in the *Republic*; and we are naturally led to ask in what relation they stand to one another. Is God above or below the idea of good? Or is the Idea of Good another mode of conceiving God? The latter appears to be the truer answer. To the Greek philosopher the perfection and unity of God was a far higher conception than his personality, which he hardly found a word to express, and which to him would have seemed to be borrowed from mythology. To the Christian, on the other hand, or to the modern thinker in



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general, it is difficult, if not impossible, to attach reality to what he terms mere abstraction; while to Plato this very abstraction is the truest and most real of all things. Hence, from a difference in forms of thought, Plato appears to be resting on a creation of his own mind only. But if we may be allowed to paraphrase the idea of good by the words 'intelligent principle of law and order in the universe, embracing equally man and nature,' we begin to find a meeting-point between him and ourselves.

The question whether the ruler or statesman should be a philosopher is one that has not lost interest in modern times. In most countries of Europe and Asia there has been some one in the course of ages who has truly united the power of command with the power of thought and reflection, as there have been also many false combinations of these qualities. Some kind of speculative power is necessary both in practical and political life; like the rhetorician in the *Phaedrus*, men require to have a conception of the varieties of human character, and to be raised on great occasions above the commonplaces of ordinary life. Yet the idea of the philosopher-statesman has never been popular with the mass of mankind; partly because he cannot take the world into his confidence or make them understand the motives from which he acts; and also because they are jealous of a power which they do not understand. The revolution which human nature desires to effect step by step in many ages is likely to be precipitated by him in a single year or life. They are afraid that in the pursuit of his greater aims he may disregard the common feelings of humanity. He is too apt to be looking into the distant future or back into the remote past, and unable to see actions or events which, to use an expression of Plato's, 'are tumbling out at his feet.' Besides, as Plato would say, there are other corruptions of these philosophical statesmen. Either 'the native hue of resolution is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought,' and at the moment when action above all things is required he is undecided, or general principles are enunciated by him in order to cover some change of policy; or his ignorance of the world has made him more easily fall a prey to the arts of others; or in some cases he has been converted into a courtier, who enjoys

the luxury of holding liberal opinions, but was never known to perform a liberal action. No wonder that mankind have been in the habit of calling statesmen of this class pedants, sophisters, doctrinaires, visionaries. For, as we may be allowed to say, a little parodying the words of Plato, 'they have seen bad imitations of the philosopher-statesman.' But a man in whom the power of thought and action are perfectly balanced, equal to the present, reaching forward to the future, 'such a one,' ruling in a constitutional state, 'they have never seen.'

But as the philosopher is apt to fail in the routine of political life, so the ordinary statesman is also apt to fail in extraordinary crises. When the face of the world is beginning to alter, and thunder is heard in the distance, he is still guided by his old maxims, and is the slave of his inveterate party prejudices; he cannot perceive the signs of the times; instead of looking forward he looks back; he learns nothing and forgets nothing; with 'wise saws and modern instances' he would stem the rising tide of revolution. He lives more and more within the circle of his own party, as the world without him becomes stronger. This seems to be the reason why the old order of things makes so poor a figure when confronted with the new, why churches can never reform, why most political changes are made blindly and convulsively. The great crises in the history of nations have often been met by an ecclesiastical positiveness, and a more obstinate reassertion of principles which have lost their hold upon a nation. The fixed ideas of a reactionary statesman may be compared to madness; they grow upon him, and he becomes possessed by them; no judgment of others is ever admitted by him to be weighed in the balance against his own.

(δ) Plato, labouring under what, to modern readers, appears to have been a confusion of ideas, assimilates the state to the individual, and fails to distinguish Ethics from Politics. He thinks that to be most of a state which is most like one man, and in which the citizens have the greatest uniformity of character. He does not see that the analogy is partly fallacious, and that the will or character of a state or nation is really the balance or rather the surplus of individual wills, which are limited by the condition of having to act in common.

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The movement of a body of men can never have the pliancy or facility of a single man; the freedom of the individual, which is always limited, becomes still more straitened when transferred to a nation. The powers of action and feeling are necessarily weaker and more balanced when they are diffused through a community; whence arises the often discussed question, 'Can a nation, like an individual, have a conscience?' We hesitate to say that the characters of nations are nothing more than the sum of the characters of the individuals who compose them; because there may be tendencies in individuals which react upon one another. A whole nation may be wiser than any one man in it; or may be animated by some common opinion or feeling which could not equally have affected the mind of a single person, or may have been inspired by a leader of genius to perform acts more than human. Plato does not appear to have analysed the complications which arise out of the collective action of mankind. Neither is he capable of seeing that analogies, though specious as arguments, may often have no foundation in fact, or of distinguishing between what is intelligible or vividly present to the mind, and what is true. In this respect he is far below Aristotle, who is comparatively seldom imposed upon by false analogies. He cannot disentangle the arts from the virtues—at least he is always arguing from one to the other. His notion of music is transferred from harmony of sounds to harmony of life: in this he is assisted by the ambiguities of language as well as by the prevalence of Pythagorean notions. And having once assimilated the state to the individual, he imagines that he will find the succession of states paralleled in the lives of individuals.

Still, through this fallacious medium, a real enlargement of ideas is attained. When the virtues as yet presented no distinct conception to the mind, a great advance was made by the comparison of them with the arts; for virtue is partly art, and has an outward form as well as an inward principle. The harmony of music affords a lively image of the harmonies of the world and of human life, and may be regarded as a splendid illustration which was naturally mistaken for a real analogy. In the same way the identification of ethics with politics has a tendency to give definiteness to ethics, and also to elevate and ennoble men's



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notions of the aims of government and of the duties of citizens; for ethics from one point of view may be conceived as an idealized law and politics; and politics, as ethics reduced to the conditions of human society. There have been evils which have arisen out of the attempt to identify them, and this has led to the separation or antagonism of them, which has been introduced by modern political writers. But we may likewise feel that something has been lost in their separation, and that the ancient philosophers who estimated the moral and intellectual wellbeing of mankind first, and the wealth of nations and individuals second, may have a salutary influence on the speculations of modern times. Many political maxims originate in a reaction against an opposite error; and when the errors against which they were directed have passed away, they in turn become errors.

III. Plato's views of education are in several respects remarkable; like the rest of the Republic they are partly Greek and partly ideal, beginning with the ordinary curriculum of the Greek youth, and extending to after-life. Plato is the first writer who distinctly says that education is to comprehend the whole of life, and to be a preparation for another in which education begins again (vi. 498 D). This is the continuous thread which runs through the Republic, and which more than any other of his ideas admits of an application to modern life.

He has long given up the notion that virtue cannot be taught; and he is disposed to modify the thesis of the Protagoras, that the virtues are one and not many. He is not unwilling to admit the sensible world into his scheme of truth. Nor does he assert in the Republic the involuntariness of vice, which is maintained by him in the Timaeus, Sophist, and Laws (cp. Protag. 345 foll., 352, 355; Apol. 25 E; Gorg. 468, 509 E). Nor do the so-called Platonic ideas recovered from a former state of existence affect his theory of mental improvement. Still we observe in him the remains of the old Socratic doctrine, that true knowledge must be elicited from within, and is to be sought for in ideas, not in particulars of sense. Education, as he says, will implant a principle of intelligence which is better than ten



thousand eyes. The paradox that the virtues are one, and the kindred notion that all virtue is knowledge, are not entirely renounced; the first is seen in the supremacy given to justice over the rest; the second in the tendency to absorb the moral virtues in the intellectual, and to centre all goodness in the contemplation of the idea of good. The world of sense is still depreciated and identified with opinion, though omitted to be a shadow of the true. In the Republic he is evidently impressed with the conviction that vice arises chiefly from ignorance and may be cured by education; the multitude are hardly to be deemed responsible for what they do (v. 499 E). A faint allusion to the doctrine of reminiscence occurs in the Tenth Book (621 A); but Plato's views of education have no more real connection with a previous state of existence than our own; he only proposes to elicit from the mind that which is there already. Education is represented by him, not as the filling of a vessel, but as the turning the eye of the soul towards the light.

He treats first of music or literature, which he divides into true and false, and then goes on to gymnastics; of infancy in the Republic he takes no notice, though in the Laws he gives sage counsels about the nursing of children and the management of the mothers, and would have an education which is even prior to birth. But in the Republic he begins with the age at which the child is capable of receiving ideas, and boldly asserts, in language which sounds paradoxical to modern ears, that he must be taught the false before he can learn the true. The modern and ancient philosophical world are not agreed about truth and falsehood; the one identifies truth almost exclusively with fact, the other with ideas. This is the difference between ourselves and Plato, which is, however, partly a difference of words (cp. *supra*, p. xxxviii). For we too should admit that a child must receive many lessons which he imperfectly understands; he must be taught some things in a figure only, some too which he can hardly be expected to believe when he grows older; but we should limit the use of fiction by the necessity of the case. Plato would draw the line differently; according to him the aim of early education is not truth as a matter of fact, but truth as a matter of principle; the child is to be taught first simple religious truths, and then simple moral truths, and insensibly to learn the lesson of good manners and good taste. He

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would make an entire reformation of the old mythology; like Xenophanes and Heracleitus he is sensible of the deep chasm which separates his own age from Homer and Hesiod, whom he quotes and invests with an imaginary authority, but only for his own purposes. The lusts and treacheries of the gods are to be banished; the terrors of the world below are to be dispelled; the misbehaviour of the Homeric heroes is not to be a model for youth. But there is another strain heard in Homer which may teach our youth endurance; and something may be learnt in medicine from the simple practice of the Homeric age. The principles on which religion is to be based are two only: first, that God is true; secondly, that he is good. Modern and Christian writers have often fallen short of these; they can hardly be said to have gone beyond them.

The young are to be brought up in happy surroundings, out of the way of sights or sounds which may hurt the character or vitiate the taste. They are to live in an atmosphere of health; the breeze is always to be wafting to them the impressions of truth and goodness. Could such an education be realized, or if our modern religious education could be bound up with truth and virtue and good manners and good taste, that would be the best hope of human improvement. Plato, like ourselves, is looking forward to changes in the moral and religious world, and is preparing for them. He recognizes the danger of unsettling young men's minds by sudden changes of laws and principles, by destroying the sacredness of one set of ideas when there is nothing else to take their place. He is afraid too of the influence of the drama, on the ground that it encourages false sentiment, and therefore he would not have his children taken to the theatre; he thinks that the effect on the spectators is bad, and on the actors still worse. His idea of education is that of harmonious growth, in which are insensibly learnt the lessons of temperance and endurance, and the body and mind develope in equal proportions. The first principle which runs through all art and nature is simplicity; this also is to be the rule of human life.

The second stage of education is gymnastic, which answers to the period of muscular growth and development. The simplicity which is enforced in music is extended to gymnastic; Plato is aware that the training of the body may be inconsistent with the

training of the mind, and that bodily exercise may be easily overdone. Excessive training of the body is apt to give men a headache or to render them sleepy at a lecture on philosophy, and this they attribute not to the true cause, but to the nature of the subject. Two points are noticeable in Plato's treatment of gymnastic: — First, that the time of training is entirely separated from the time of literary education. He seems to have thought that two things of an opposite and different nature could not be learnt at the same time. Here we can hardly agree with him; and, if we may judge by experience, the effect of spending two or three years between the ages of seventeen and twenty in mere bodily exercise would be far from improving to the intellect. Secondly, he affirms that music and gymnastic are not, as common opinion is apt to imagine, intended, the one for the cultivation of the mind and the other of the body, but that they are both equally designed for the improvement of the mind. The body, in his view, is the servant of the mind; the subjection of the lower to the higher is for the advantage of both. And doubtless the mind may exercise a very great and paramount influence over the body, if exerted not at particular moments and by fits and starts, but continuously, in making preparation for the whole of life. Other Greek writers saw the mischievous tendency of Spartan discipline (Arist. Pol. viii. 4, § 1 foll.; Thuc. ii. 37, 39). But only Plato recognized the fundamental error on which the practice was based.

The subject of gymnastic leads Plato to the sister subject of medicine, which he further illustrates by the parallel of law. The modern disbelief in medicine has led in this, as in some other departments of knowledge, to a demand for greater simplicity; physicians are becoming aware that they often make diseases 'greater and more complicated' by their treatment of them (Rep. iv. 426 A). In two thousand years their art has made but slender progress; what they have gained in the analysis of the parts is in a great degree lost by their feebler conception of the human frame as a whole. They have attended more to the cure of diseases than to the conditions of health; and the improvements in medicine have been more than counterbalanced by the disuse of regular training. Until lately they have hardly thought of air and water, the importance of which was well understood by the ancients; as Aristotle remarks, 'Air and water, being the elements

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which we most use, have the greatest effect upon health' (Polit. vii. II, § 4). For ages physicians have been under the dominion of prejudices which have only recently given way; and now there are as many opinions in medicine as in theology, and an equal degree of scepticism and some want of toleration about both. Plato has several good notions about medicine; according to him 'the eye cannot be cured without the rest of the body, nor the body without the mind' (Charm. 156 E). No man of sense, he says in the *Timaeus*, would take physic; and we heartily sympathize with him in the *Laws* when he declares that 'the limbs of the rustic worn with toil will derive more benefit from warm baths than from the prescriptions of a not over wise doctor' (vi. 761 C). But we can hardly praise him when, in obedience to the authority of Homer, he depreciates diet, or approve of the inhuman spirit in which he would get rid of invalid and useless lives by leaving them to die. He does not seem to have considered that the 'bridle of Theages' might be accompanied by qualities which were of far more value to the State than the health or strength of the citizens; or that the duty of taking care of the helpless might be an important element of education in a State. The physician himself (this is a delicate and subtle observation) should not be a man in robust health; he should have, in modern phraseology, a nervous temperament; he should have experience of disease in his own person, in order that his powers of observation may be quickened in the case of others.

The perplexity of medicine is paralleled by the perplexity of law; in which, again, Plato would have men follow the golden rule of simplicity. Greater matters are to be determined by the legislator or by the oracle of Delphi, lesser matters are to be left to the temporary regulation of the citizens themselves. Plato is aware that *laissez faire* is an important element of government. The diseases of a State are like the heads of a hydra; they multiply when they are cut off. The true remedy for them is not extirpation but prevention. And the way to prevent them is to take care of education, and education will take care of all the rest. So in modern times men have often felt that the only political measure worth having — the only one which would produce any certain or lasting effect, was a measure of national education. And in our own more than in any previous age the necessity has been



recognized of restoring the ever-increasing confusion of law to simplicity and common sense. *Republic.*

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When the training in music and gymnastic is completed, there follows the first stage of active and public life. But soon education is to begin again from a new point of view. In the interval between the Fourth and Seventh Books we have discussed the nature of knowledge, and have thence been led to form a higher conception of what was required of us. For true knowledge, according to Plato, is of abstractions, and has to do, not with particulars or individuals, but with universals only; not with the beauties of poetry, but with the ideas of philosophy. And the great aim of education is the cultivation of the habit of abstraction. This is to be acquired through the study of the mathematical sciences. They alone are capable of giving ideas of relation, and of arousing the dormant energies of thought.

Mathematics in the age of Plato comprehended a very small part of that which is now included in them; but they bore a much larger proportion to the sum of human knowledge. They were the only organon of thought which the human mind at that time possessed, and the only measure by which the chaos of particulars could be reduced to rule and order. The faculty which they trained was naturally at war with the poetical or imaginative; and hence to Plato, who is everywhere seeking for abstractions and trying to get rid of the illusions of sense, nearly the whole of education is contained in them. They seemed to have an inexhaustible application, partly because their true limits were not yet understood. These Plato himself is beginning to investigate; though not aware that number and figure are mere abstractions of sense, he recognizes that the forms used by geometry are borrowed from the sensible world (vi. 510, 511). He seeks to find the ultimate ground of mathematical ideas in the idea of good, though he does not satisfactorily explain the connexion between them; and in his conception of the relation of ideas to numbers, he falls very far short of the definiteness attributed to him by Aristotle (Met. i. 8, § 24; ix. 17). But if he fails to recognize the true limits of mathematics, he also reaches a point beyond them; in his view, ideas of number become secondary to a higher conception of knowledge. The dialectician is as much above the mathematician as the mathematician is above the ordinary man (cp. vii. 526 D,

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531 E). The one, the self-proving, the good which is the higher sphere of dialectic, is the perfect truth to which all things ascend, and in which they finally repose.

This self-proving unity or idea of good is a mere vision of which no distinct explanation can be given, relative only to a particular stage in Greek philosophy. It is an abstraction under which no individuals are comprehended, a whole which has no parts (cf. Arist., Nic. Eth., i. 4). The vacancy of such a form was perceived by Aristotle, but not by Plato. Nor did he recognize that in the dialectical process are included two or more methods of investigation which are at variance with each other. He did not see that whether he took the longer or the shorter road, no advance could be made in this way. And yet such visions often have an immense effect; for although the method of science cannot anticipate science, the idea of science, not as it is, but as it will be in the future, is a great and inspiring principle. In the pursuit of knowledge we are always pressing forward to something beyond us; and as a false conception of knowledge, for example the scholastic philosophy, may lead men astray during many ages, so the true ideal, though vacant, may draw all their thoughts in a right direction. It makes a great difference whether the general expectation of knowledge, as this indefinite feeling may be termed, is based upon a sound judgment. For mankind may often entertain a true conception of what knowledge ought to be when they have but a slender experience of facts. The correlation of the sciences, the consciousness of the unity of nature, the idea of classification, the sense of proportion, the unwillingness to stop short of certainty or to confound probability with truth, are important principles of the higher education. Although Plato could tell us nothing, and perhaps knew that he could tell us nothing, of the absolute truth, he has exercised an influence on the human mind which even at the present day is not exhausted; and political and social questions may yet arise in which the thoughts of Plato may be read anew and receive a fresh meaning.

The Idea of good is so called only in the Republic, but there are traces of it in other dialogues of Plato. It is a cause as well as an idea, and from this point of view may be compared with the creator of the Timaeus, who out of his goodness created

all things. It corresponds to a certain extent with the modern conception of a law of nature, or of a final cause, or of both in one, and in this regard may be connected with the measure and symmetry of the Philebus. It is represented in the Symposium under the aspect of beauty, and is supposed to be attained there by stages of initiation, as here by regular gradations of knowledge. Viewed subjectively, it is the process or science of dialectic. This is the science which, according to the Phaedrus, is the true basis of rhetoric, which alone is able to distinguish the natures and classes of men and things; which divides a whole into the natural parts, and reunites the scattered parts into a natural or organized whole; which defines the abstract essences or universal ideas of all things, and connects them; which pierces the veil of hypotheses and reaches the final cause or first principle of all; which regards the sciences in relation to the idea of good. This ideal science is the highest process of thought, and may be described as the soul conversing with herself or holding communion with eternal truth and beauty, and in another form is the everlasting question and answer—the ceaseless interrogative of Socrates. The dialogues of Plato are themselves examples of the nature and method of dialectic. Viewed objectively, the idea of good is a power or cause which makes the world without us correspond with the world within. Yet this world without us is still a world of ideas. With Plato the investigation of nature is another department of knowledge, and in this he seeks to attain only probable conclusions (cp. *Timaeus*, 44 D).

If we ask whether this science of dialectic which Plato only half explains to us is more akin to logic or to metaphysics, the answer is that in his mind the two sciences are not as yet distinguished, any more than the subjective and objective aspects of the world and of man, which German philosophy has revealed to us. Nor has he determined whether his science of dialectic is at rest or in motion, concerned with the contemplation of absolute being, or with a process of development and evolution. Modern metaphysics may be described as the science of abstractions, or as the science of the evolution of thought; modern logic, when passing beyond the bounds of mere Aristotelian forms, may be defined as the science of method. The germ of



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both of them is contained in the Platonic dialectic; all metaphysicians have something in common with the ideas of Plato; all logicians have derived something from the method of Plato. The nearest approach in modern philosophy to the universal science of Plato, is to be found in the Hegelian 'succession of moments in the unity of the idea.' Plato and Hegel alike seem to have conceived the world as the correlation of abstractions; and not impossibly they would have understood one another better than any of their commentators understand them (cp. Swift's *Voyage to Laputa*, c. 81). There is, however, a difference between them: for whereas Hegel is thinking of all the minds of men as one mind, which develops the stages of the idea in different countries or at different times in the same country, with Plato these gradations are regarded only as an order of thought or ideas; the history of the human mind had not yet dawned upon him.

Many criticisms may be made on Plato's theory of education. While in some respects he unavoidably falls short of modern thinkers, in others he is in advance of them. He is opposed to the modes of education which prevailed in his own time; but he can hardly be said to have discovered new ones. He does

1 'Having a desire to see those ancients who were most renowned for wit and learning, I set apart one day on purpose. I proposed that Homer and Aristotle might appear at the head of all their commentators; but these were so numerous that some hundreds were forced to attend in the court and outward rooms of the palace. I knew, and could distinguish these two heroes, at first sight, not only from the crowd, but from each other. Homer was the taller and comelier person of the two, walked very erect for one of his age, and his eyes were the most quick and piercing I ever beheld. Aristotle stooped much, and made use of a staff. His visage was meagre, his hair lank and thin, and his voice hollow. I soon discovered that both of them were perfect strangers to the rest of the company, and had never seen or heard of them before. And I had a whisper from a ghost, who shall be nameless, "That these commentators always kept in the most distant quarters from their principals, in the lower world, through a consciousness of shame and guilt, because they had so horribly misrepresented the meaning of these authors to posterity." I introduced Didymus and Eustathius to Homer, and prevailed on him to treat them better than perhaps they deserved, for he soon found they wanted a genius to enter into the spirit of a poet. But Aristotle was out of all patience with the account I gave him of Scotus and Ramus, as I presented them to him; and he asked them "whether the rest of the tribe were as great dunces as themselves?"'



not see that education is relative to the characters of individuals; he only desires to impress the same form of the state on the minds of all. He has no sufficient idea of the effect of literature on the formation of the mind, and greatly exaggerates that of mathematics. His aim is above all things to train the reasoning faculties; to implant in the mind the spirit and power of abstraction; to explain and define general notions, and, if possible, to connect them. No wonder that in the vacancy of actual knowledge his followers, and at times even he himself, should have fallen away from the doctrine of ideas, and have returned to that branch of knowledge in which alone the relation of the one and many can be truly seen — the science of number. In his views both of teaching and training he might be styled, in modern language, a doctrinaire; after the Spartan fashion he would have his citizens cast in one mould; he does not seem to consider that some degree of freedom, 'a little wholesome neglect,' is necessary to strengthen and develop the character and to give play to the individual nature. His citizens would not have acquired that knowledge which in the vision of Er is supposed to be gained by the pilgrims from their experience of evil.

On the other hand, Plato is far in advance of modern philosophers and theologians when he teaches that education is to be continued through life and will begin again in another. He would never allow education of some kind to cease; although he was aware that the proverbial saying of Solon, 'I grow old learning many things,' cannot be applied literally. Himself ravished with the contemplation of the idea of good, and delighting in solid geometry (Rep. vii. 528), he has no difficulty in imagining that a lifetime might be passed happily in such pursuits. We who know how many more men of business there are in the world than real students or thinkers, are not equally sanguine. The education which he proposes for his citizens is really the ideal life of the philosopher or man of genius, interrupted, but only for a time, by practical duties,—a life not for the many, but for the few.

Yet the thought of Plato may not be wholly incapable of application to our own times. Even if regarded as an ideal which can never be realized, it may have a great effect in elevating the characters of mankind, and raising them above the routine

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of their ordinary occupation or profession. It is the best form under which we can conceive the whole of life. Nevertheless the idea of Plato is not easily put into practice. For the education of after life is necessarily the education which each one gives himself. Men and women cannot be brought together in schools or colleges at forty or fifty years of age; and if they could the result would be disappointing. The destination of most men is what Plato would call 'the Den' for the whole of life, and with that they are content. Neither have they teachers or advisers with whom they can take counsel in riper years. There is no 'schoolmaster abroad' who will tell them of their faults, or inspire them with the higher sense of duty, or with the ambition of a true success in life; no Socrates who will convict them of ignorance; no Christ, or follower of Christ, who will reprove them of sin. Hence they have a difficulty in receiving the first element of improvement, which is self-knowledge. The hopes of youth no longer stir them; they rather wish to rest than to pursue high objects. A few only who have come across great men and women, or eminent teachers of religion and morality, have received a second life from them, and have lighted a candle from the fire of their genius.

The want of energy is one of the main reasons why so few persons continue to improve in later years. They have not the will, and do not know the way. They 'never try an experiment,' or look up a point of interest for themselves; they make no sacrifices for the sake of knowledge; their minds, like their bodies, at a certain age become fixed. Genius has been defined as 'the power of taking pains'; but hardly any one keeps up his interest in knowledge throughout a whole life. The troubles of a family, the business of making money, the demands of a profession destroy the elasticity of the mind. The waxen tablet of the memory which was once capable of receiving 'true thoughts and clear impressions' becomes hard and crowded; there is not room for the accumulations of a long life (Theaet. 194 ff.). The student, as years advance, rather makes an exchange of knowledge than adds to his stores. There is no pressing necessity to learn; the stock of Classics or History or Natural Science which was enough for a man at twenty-five is enough for him at fifty. Neither is it easy to give a definite answer to any one who asks how he is to improve. For self-education consists in a

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thousand things, commonplace in themselves,—in adding to what we are by nature something of what we are not; in learning to see ourselves as others see us; in judging, not by opinion, but by the evidence of facts; in seeking out the society of superior minds; in a study of the lives and writings of great men; in observation of the world and character; in receiving kindly the natural influence of different times of life; in any act or thought which is raised above the practice or opinions of mankind; in the pursuit of some new or original enquiry; in any effort of mind which calls forth some latent power.

If any one is desirous of carrying out in detail the Platonic education of after-life, some such counsels as the following may be offered to him:—That he shall choose the branch of knowledge to which his own mind most distinctly inclines, and in which he takes the greatest delight, either one which seems to connect with his own daily employment, or, perhaps, furnishes the greatest contrast to it. He may study from the speculative side the profession or business in which he is practically engaged. He may make Homer, Dante, Shakespeare, Plato, Bacon the friends and companions of his life. He may find opportunities of hearing the living voice of a great teacher. He may select for enquiry some point of history or some unexplained phenomenon of nature. An hour a day passed in such scientific or literary pursuits will furnish as many facts as the memory can retain, and will give him ‘a pleasure not to be repented of’ (*Timaeus*, 59 D). Only let him beware of being the slave of crotchets, or of running after a Will o’ the Wisp in his ignorance, or in his vanity of attributing to himself the gifts of a poet or assuming the air of a philosopher. He should know the limits of his own powers. Better to build up the mind by slow additions, to creep on quietly from one thing to another, to gain insensibly new powers and new interests in knowledge, than to form vast schemes which are never destined to be realized. But perhaps, as Plato would say, ‘This is part of another subject’ (*Tim.* 87 B); though we may also defend our digression by his example (*Theaet.* 72, 77).

IV. We remark with surprise that the progress of nations or



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the natural growth of institutions which fill modern treatises on political philosophy seem hardly ever to have attracted the attention of Plato and Aristotle. The ancients were familiar with the mutability of human affairs ; they could moralize over the ruins of cities and the fall of empires (cp. Plato, *Statesman* 301, 302, and Sulpicius' Letter to Cicero, *Ad Fam.* iv. 5) ; by them fate and chance were deemed to be real powers, almost persons, and to have had a great share in political events. The wiser of them like Thucydides believed that 'what had been would be again,' and that a tolerable idea of the future could be gathered from the past. Also they had dreams of a Golden Age which existed once upon a time and might still exist in some unknown land, or might return again in the remote future. But the regular growth of a state enlightened by experience, progressing in knowledge, improving in the arts, of which the citizens were educated by the fulfilment of political duties, appears never to have come within the range of their hopes and aspirations. Such a state had never been seen, and therefore could not be conceived by them. Their experience (cp. Aristot. *Metaph.* xi. 21 ; Plato, *Laws*, iii. 676-9) led them to conclude that there had been cycles of civilization in which the arts had been discovered and lost many times over, and cities had been overthrown and rebuilt again and again, and deluges and volcanoes and other natural convulsions had altered the face of the earth. Tradition told them of many destructions of mankind and of the preservation of a remnant. The world began again after a deluge and was reconstructed out of the fragments of itself. Also they were acquainted with empires of unknown antiquity, like the Egyptian or Assyrian ; but they had never seen them grow, and could not imagine, any more than we can, the state of man which preceded them. They were puzzled and awestricken by the Egyptian monuments, of which the forms, as Plato says, not in a figure, but literally, were ten thousand years old (*Laws* ii. 656 E), and they contrasted the antiquity of Egypt with their own short memories.

The early legends of Hellas have no real connection with the later history : they are at a distance, and the intermediate region is concealed from view ; there is no road or path which leads from one to the other. At the beginning of Greek history, in the vestibule of the temple, is seen standing first of all the figure of



the legislator, himself the interpreter and servant of the God. The fundamental laws which he gives are not supposed to change with time and circumstances. The salvation of the state is held rather to depend on the inviolable maintenance of them. They were sanctioned by the authority of heaven, and it was deemed impiety to alter them. The desire to maintain them unaltered seems to be the origin of what at first sight is very surprising to us—the intolerant zeal of Plato against innovators in religion or politics (cp. *Laws* x. 907–9); although with a happy inconsistency he is also willing that the laws of other countries should be studied and improvements in legislation privately communicated to the Nocturnal Council (*Laws* xii. 951 E ff.). The additions which were made to them in later ages in order to meet the increasing complexity of affairs were still ascribed by a fiction to the original legislator; and the words of such enactments at Athens were disputed over as if they had been the words of Solon himself. Plato hopes to preserve in a later generation the mind of the legislator; he would have his citizens remain within the lines which he has laid down for them. He would not harass them with minute regulations, and he would have allowed some changes in the laws: but not changes which would affect the fundamental institutions of the state, such for example as would convert an aristocracy into a timocracy, or a timocracy into a popular form of government.

Passing from speculations to facts, we observe that progress has been the exception rather than the law of human history. And therefore we are not surprised to find that the idea of progress is of modern rather than of ancient date; and, like the idea of a philosophy of history, is not more than a century or two old. It seems to have arisen out of the impression left on the human mind by the growth of the Roman Empire and of the Christian Church, and to be due to the political and social improvements which they introduced into the world; and still more in our own century to the idealism of the first French Revolution and the triumph of American Independence; and in a yet greater degree to the vast material prosperity and growth of population in England and her colonies and in America. It is also to be ascribed in a measure to the greater study of the philosophy of history. The optimist temperament of some great writers has

assisted the creation of it, while the opposite character has led a few to regard the future of the world as dark. The 'spectator of all time and of all existence' sees more of 'the increasing purpose which through the ages ran' than formerly: but to the inhabitant of a small state of Hellas the vision was necessarily limited like the valley in which he dwelt. There was no remote past on which his eye could rest, nor any future from which the veil was partly lifted up by the analogy of history. The narrowness of view, which to ourselves appears so singular, was to him natural, if not unavoidable.

V. For the relation of the Republic to the Statesman and the Laws, the two other works of Plato which directly treat of politics, see the Introductions to the two latter; a few general points of comparison may be touched upon in this place.

And first of the Laws. (1) The Republic, though probably written at intervals, yet speaking generally and judging by the indications of thought and style, may be reasonably ascribed to the middle period of Plato's life: the Laws are certainly the work of his declining years, and some portions of them at any rate seem to have been written in extreme old age. (2) The Republic is full of hope and aspiration: the Laws bear the stamp of failure and disappointment. The one is a finished work which received the last touches of the author: the other is imperfectly executed, and apparently unfinished. The one has the grace and beauty of youth: the other has lost the poetical form, but has more of the severity and knowledge of life which is characteristic of old age. (3) The most conspicuous defect of the Laws is the failure of dramatic power, whereas the Republic is full of striking contrasts of ideas and oppositions of character. (4) The Laws may be said to have more the nature of a sermon, the Republic of a poem; the one is more religious, the other more intellectual. (5) Many theories of Plato, such as the doctrine of ideas, the government of the world by philosophers, are not found in the Laws; the immortality of the soul is first mentioned in xii. 959, 967; the person of Socrates has altogether disappeared. The community of women and children is renounced; the institution of common or public meals for women (Laws vi. 781) is for the first time intro-

duced (Ar. Pol. ii. 6, § 5). (6) There remains in the Laws the old enmity to the poets (vii. 817), who are ironically saluted in high-flown terms, and, at the same time, are peremptorily ordered out of the city, if they are not willing to submit their poems to the censorship of the magistrates (cp. Rep. iii. 398). (7) Though the work is in most respects inferior, there are a few passages in the Laws, such as v. 727 ff. (the honour due to the soul), viii. 835 ff. (the evils of licentious or unnatural love), the whole of Book x. (religion), xi. 918 ff. (the dishonesty of retail trade), and 923 ff. (bequests), which come more home to us, and contain more of what may be termed the modern element in Plato than almost anything in the Republic.

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The relation of the two works to one another is very well given :

(i) by Aristotle in the Politics (ii. 6, §§ 1-5) from the side of the Laws :—

‘The same, or nearly the same, objections apply to Plato’s  
‘later work, the Laws, and therefore we had better examine briefly  
‘the constitution which is therein described. In the Republic,  
‘Socrates has definitely settled in all a few questions only; such  
‘as the community of women and children, the community of  
‘property, and the constitution of the state. The population is  
‘divided into two classes—one of husbandmen, and the other of  
‘warriors; from this latter is taken a third class of counsellors  
‘and rulers of the state. But Socrates has not determined whether  
‘the husbandmen and artists are to have a share in the govern-  
‘ment, and whether they too are to carry arms and share in  
‘military service or not. He certainly thinks that the women  
‘ought to share in the education of the guardians, and to fight  
‘by their side. The remainder of the work is filled up with  
‘digressions foreign to the main subject, and with discussions  
‘about the education of the guardians. In the Laws there is  
‘hardly anything but laws; not much is said about the constitution.  
‘This, which he had intended to make more of the ordinary type,  
‘he gradually brings round to the other or ideal form. For with  
‘the exception of the community of women and property, he  
‘supposes everything to be the same in both states; there is to be  
‘the same education; the citizens of both are to live free from  
‘servile occupations, and there are to be common meals in both.  
‘The only difference is that in the Laws the common meals are



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‘extended to women, and the warriors number about 5000, but in the Republic only 1000.’

(ii) by Plato in the Laws (Book v. 739 B–E), from the side of the Republic :—

‘The first and highest form of the state and of the government and of the law is that in which there prevails most widely the ancient saying that “Friends have all things in common.” Whether there is now, or ever will be, this communion of women and children and of property, in which the private and individual is altogether banished from life, and things which are by nature private, such as eyes and ears and hands, have become common, and all men express praise and blame, and feel joy and sorrow, on the same occasions, and the laws unite the city to the utmost,—whether all this is possible or not, I say that no man, acting upon any other principle, will ever constitute a state more exalted in virtue, or truer or better than this. Such a state, whether inhabited by Gods or sons of Gods, will make them blessed who dwell therein; and therefore to this we are to look for the pattern of the state, and to cling to this, and, as far as possible, to seek for one which is like this. The state which we have now in hand, when created, will be nearest to immortality and unity in the next degree; and after that, by the grace of God, we will complete the third one. And we will begin by speaking of the nature and origin of the second.’

The comparatively short work called the Statesman or Politicus in its style and manner is more akin to the Laws, while in its idealism it rather resembles the Republic. As far as we can judge by various indications of language and thought, it must be later than the one and of course earlier than the other. In both the Republic and Statesman a close connection is maintained between Politics and Dialectic. In the Statesman, enquiries into the principles of Method are interspersed with discussions about Politics. The comparative advantages of the rule of law and of a person are considered, and the decision given in favour of a person (Arist. Pol. iii. 15, 16). But much may be said on the other side, nor is the opposition necessary; for a person may rule by law, and law may be so applied as to be the living voice of the legislator. As in the Republic, there is a myth, describing, however, not a future, but a former existence of mankind. The question is



asked, 'Whether the state of innocence which is described in the myth, or a state like our own which possesses art and science and distinguishes good from evil, is the preferable condition of man.' To this question of the comparative happiness of civilized and primitive life, which was so often discussed in the last century and in our own, no answer is given. The Statesman, though less perfect in style than the Republic and of far less range, may justly be regarded as one of the greatest of Plato's dialogues.

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VI. Others as well as Plato have chosen an ideal Republic to be the vehicle of thoughts which they could not definitely express, or which went beyond their own age. The classical writing which approaches most nearly to the Republic of Plato is the 'De Republica' of Cicero; but neither in this nor in any other of his dialogues does he rival the art of Plato. The manners are clumsy and inferior; the hand of the rhetorician is apparent at every turn. Yet noble sentiments are constantly recurring: the true note of Roman patriotism — 'We Romans are a great people' — resounds through the whole work. Like Socrates, Cicero turns away from the phenomena of the heavens to civil and political life. He would rather not discuss the 'two Suns' of which all Rome was talking, when he can converse about 'the two nations in one' which had divided Rome ever since the days of the Gracchi. Like Socrates again, speaking in the person of Scipio, he is afraid lest he should assume too much the character of a teacher, rather than of an equal who is discussing among friends the two sides of a question. He would confine the terms King or State to the rule of reason and justice, and he will not concede that title either to a democracy or to a monarchy. But under the rule of reason and justice he is willing to include the natural superior ruling over the natural inferior, which he compares to the soul ruling over the body. He prefers a mixture of forms of government to any single one. The two portraits of the just and the unjust, which occur in the second book of the Republic, are transferred to the state—Philus, one of the interlocutors, maintaining against his will the necessity of injustice as a principle of government, while the other, Laelius, supports the opposite thesis. His views of language and number are derived

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from Plato; like him he denounces the drama. He also declares that if his life were to be twice as long he would have no time to read the lyric poets. The picture of democracy is translated by him word for word, though he has hardly shown himself able to 'carry the jest' of Plato. He converts into a stately sentence the humorous fancy about the animals, who 'are so imbued with the spirit of democracy that they make the passers-by get out of their way' (i. 42). His description of the tyrant is imitated from Plato, but is far inferior. The second book is historical, and claims for the Roman constitution (which is to him the ideal) a foundation of fact such as Plato probably intended to have given to the Republic in the Critias. His most remarkable imitation of Plato is the adaptation of the vision of Er, which is converted by Cicero into the 'Somnium Scipionis'; he has 'romanized' the myth of the Republic, adding an argument for the immortality of the soul taken from the Phaedrus, and some other touches derived from the Phaedo and the Timaeus. Though a beautiful tale and containing splendid passages, the 'Somnium Scipionis' is very inferior to the vision of Er; it is only a dream, and hardly allows the reader to suppose that the writer believes in his own creation. Whether his dialogues were framed on the model of the lost dialogues of Aristotle, as he himself tells us, or of Plato, to which they bear many superficial resemblances, he is still the Roman orator; he is not conversing, but making speeches, and is never able to mould the intractable Latin to the grace and ease of the Greek Platonic dialogue. But if he is defective in form, much more is he inferior to the Greek in matter; he nowhere in his philosophical writings leaves upon our minds the impression of an original thinker.

Plato's Republic has been said to be a church and not a state; and such an ideal of a city in the heavens has always hovered over the Christian world, and is embodied in St. Augustine's '*De Civitate Dei*,' which is suggested by the decay and fall of the Roman Empire, much in the same manner in which we may imagine the Republic of Plato to have been influenced by the decline of Greek politics in the writer's own age. The difference is that in the time of Plato the degeneracy, though certain, was gradual and insensible: whereas the taking of Rome by the Goths stirred like an earthquake the age of St. Augustine. Men

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were inclined to believe that the overthrow of the city was to be ascribed to the anger felt by the old Roman deities at the neglect of their worship. St. Augustine maintains the opposite thesis; he argues that the destruction of the Roman empire is due, not to the rise of Christianity, but to the vices of Paganism. He wanders over Roman history, and over Greek philosophy and mythology, and finds everywhere crime, impiety and falsehood. He compares the worst parts of the Gentile religions with the best elements of the faith of Christ. He shows nothing of the spirit which led others of the early Christian Fathers to recognize in the writings of the Greek philosophers the power of the divine truth. He traces the parallel of the kingdom of God, that is, the history of the Jews, contained in their scriptures, and of the kingdoms of the world, which are found in Gentile writers, and pursues them both into an ideal future. It need hardly be remarked that his use both of Greek and of Roman historians and of the sacred writings of the Jews is wholly uncritical. The heathen mythology, the Sybilline oracles, the myths of Plato, the dreams of Neo-Platonists are equally regarded by him as matter of fact. He must be acknowledged to be a strictly polemical or controversial writer who makes the best of everything on one side and the worst of everything on the other. He has no sympathy with the old Roman life as Plato has with Greek life, nor has he any idea of the ecclesiastical kingdom which was to arise out of the ruins of the Roman empire. He is not blind to the defects of the Christian Church, and looks forward to a time when Christian and Pagan shall be alike brought before the judgment-seat, and the true City of God shall appear. . . . The work of St. Augustine is a curious repertory of antiquarian learning and quotations, deeply penetrated with Christian ethics, but showing little power of reasoning, and a slender knowledge of the Greek literature and language. He was a great genius, and a noble character, yet hardly capable of feeling or understanding anything external to his own theology. Of all the ancient philosophers he is most attracted by Plato, though he is very slightly acquainted with his writings. He is inclined to believe that the idea of creation in the *Timæus* is derived from the narrative in *Genesis*; and he is strangely taken with the coincidence (?) of Plato's saying that 'the philosopher



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is the lover of God,' and the words of the Book of Exodus in which God reveals himself to Moses (Exod. iii. 14). He dwells at length on miracles performed in his own day, of which the evidence is regarded by him as irresistible. He speaks in a very interesting manner of the beauty and utility of nature and of the human frame, which he conceives to afford a foretaste of the heavenly state and of the resurrection of the body. The book is not really what to most persons the title of it would imply, and belongs to an age which has passed away. But it contains many fine passages and thoughts which are for all time.

The short treatise *de Monarchia* of Dante is by far the most remarkable of mediæval ideals, and bears the impress of the great genius in whom Italy and the Middle Ages are so vividly reflected. It is the vision of an Universal Empire, which is supposed to be the natural and necessary government of the world, having a divine authority distinct from the Papacy, yet coextensive with it. It is not 'the ghost of the dead Roman Empire sitting crowned upon the grave thereof,' but the legitimate heir and successor of it, justified by the ancient virtues of the Romans and the beneficence of their rule. Their right to be the governors of the world is also confirmed by the testimony of miracles, and acknowledged by St. Paul when he appealed to Cæsar, and even more emphatically by Christ Himself, Who could not have made atonement for the sins of men if He had not been condemned by a divinely authorized tribunal. The necessity for the establishment of an Universal Empire is proved partly by *a priori* arguments such as the unity of God and the unity of the family or nation; partly by perversions of Scripture and history, by false analogies of nature, by misapplied quotations from the classics, and by odd scraps and commonplaces of logic, showing a familiar but by no means exact knowledge of Aristotle (of Plato there is none). But a more convincing argument still is the miserable state of the world, which he touchingly describes. He sees no hope of happiness or peace for mankind until all nations of the earth are comprehended in a single empire. The whole treatise shows how deeply the idea of the Roman Empire was fixed in the minds of his contemporaries. Not much argument was needed to maintain the truth of a theory which to his own



contemporaries seemed so natural and congenial. He speaks, *Republic.*  
or rather preaches, from the point of view, not of the ecclesiastic, *INTRODUC-*  
but of the layman, although, as a good Catholic, he is willing *TION.*  
to acknowledge that in certain respects the Empire must submit  
to the Church. The beginning and end of all his noble reflections  
and of his arguments, good and bad, is the aspiration, 'that in  
this little plot of earth belonging to mortal man life may pass  
in freedom and peace.' So inextricably is his vision of the future  
bound up with the beliefs and circumstances of his own age.

The 'Utopia' of Sir Thomas More is a surprising monument  
of his genius, and shows a reach of thought far beyond his  
contemporaries. The book was written by him at the age of  
about 34 or 35, and is full of the generous sentiments of youth.  
He brings the light of Plato to bear upon the miserable state  
of his own country. Living not long after the Wars of the  
Roses, and in the dregs of the Catholic Church in England, he  
is indignant at the corruption of the clergy, at the luxury of the  
nobility and gentry, at the sufferings of the poor, at the calamities  
caused by war. To the eye of More the whole world was  
in dissolution and decay; and side by side with the misery  
and oppression which he has described in the First Book of the  
Utopia, he places in the Second Book the ideal state which by  
the help of Plato he had constructed. The times were full of  
stir and intellectual interest. The distant murmur of the Re-  
formation was beginning to be heard. To minds like More's,  
Greek literature was a revelation: there had arisen an art of inter-  
pretation, and the New Testament was beginning to be understood  
as it had never been before, and has not often been since, in its  
natural sense. The life there depicted appeared to him wholly  
unlike that of Christian commonwealths, in which 'he saw  
nothing but a certain conspiracy of rich men procuring their  
own commodities under the name and title of the Commonwealth.'  
He thought that Christ, like Plato, 'instituted all things common,'  
for which reason, he tells us, the citizens of Utopia were the  
more willing to receive his doctrines<sup>1</sup>. The community of

<sup>1</sup> 'Howbeit, I think this was no small help and furtherance in the matter,  
that they heard us say that Christ instituted among his, all things common, and  
that the same community doth yet remain in the rightest Christian com-  
munities' (Utopia, English Reprints, p. 144).

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property is a fixed idea with him, though he is aware of the arguments which may be urged on the other side<sup>1</sup>. We wonder how in the reign of Henry VIII., though veiled in another language and published in a foreign country, such speculations could have been endured.

He is gifted with far greater dramatic invention than any one who succeeded him, with the exception of Swift. In the art of feigning he is a worthy disciple of Plato. Like him, starting from a small portion of fact, he founds his tale with admirable skill on a few lines in the Latin narrative of the voyages of Amerigo Vespucci. He is very precise about dates and facts, and has the power of making us believe that the narrator of the tale must have been an eyewitness. We are fairly puzzled by his manner of mixing up real and imaginary persons; his boy John Clement and Peter Giles, the citizen of Antwerp, with whom he disputes about the precise words which are supposed to have been used by the (imaginary) Portuguese traveller, Raphael Hythloday. 'I have the more cause,' says Hythloday, 'to fear that my words shall not be believed, for that I know how difficultly and hardly I myself would have believed another man telling the same, if I had not myself seen it with mine own eyes.' Or again: 'If you had been with me in Utopia, and had presently seen their fashions and laws as I did which lived there five years or more, and would never have come thence, but only to make the new land known here,' etc. More greatly regrets that he forgot to ask Hythloday in what part of the world Utopia is situated; he 'would have spent no small sum of money rather than it should have escaped him,' and he begs Peter Giles to see Hythloday or write to him and obtain an answer to the question. After this we are not surprised to hear that a Professor of Divinity (perhaps 'a late famous vicar of Croydon in Surrey,' as the translator thinks) is desirous of being sent thither as a missionary by the High Bishop, 'yea, and that he may himself be made Bishop of Utopia, nothing doubting that he must obtain this Bishopric with suit; and he counteth that a godly

<sup>1</sup> 'These things (I say), when I consider with myself, I hold well with Plato, and do nothing marvel that he would make no laws for them that refused those laws, whereby all men should have and enjoy equal portions of riches and commodities. For the wise man did easily foresee this to be the one and only way to the wealth of a community, if equality of all things should be brought in and established' (Utopia, English Reprints, pp. 67, 68).

suit which proceedeth not of the desire of honour or lucre, but only of a godly zeal.' The design may have failed through the disappearance of Hythloday, concerning whom we have 'very uncertain news' after his departure. There is no doubt, however, that he had told More and Giles the exact situation of the island, but unfortunately at the same moment More's attention, as he is reminded in a letter from Giles, was drawn off by a servant, and one of the company from a cold caught on shipboard coughed so loud as to prevent Giles from hearing. And 'the secret has perished' with him; to this day the place of Utopia remains unknown.

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The words of Phaedrus (275 B), 'O Socrates, you can easily invent Egyptians or anything,' are recalled to our mind as we read this lifelike fiction. Yet the greater merit of the work is not the admirable art, but the originality of thought. More is as free as Plato from the prejudices of his age, and far more tolerant. The Utopians do not allow him who believes not in the immortality of the soul to share in the administration of the state (cp. *Laws* x. 908 foll.), 'howbeit they put him to no punishment, because they be persuaded that it is in no man's power to believe what he list'; and 'no man is to be blamed for reasoning in support of his own religion<sup>1</sup>.' In the public services 'no prayers be used, but such as every man may boldly pronounce without giving offence to any sect.' He says significantly (p. 143), 'There be that give worship to a man that was once of excellent virtue or of famous glory, not only as God, but also the chiefest and highest God. But the most and the wisest part, rejecting all these, believe that there is a certain godly power unknown, far above the capacity and reach of man's wit, dispersed throughout all the world, not in bigness, but in virtue and power. Him they call the Father of all. To Him alone they attribute the beginnings, the increasings, the proceed-

<sup>1</sup> 'One of our company in my presence was sharply punished. He, as soon as he was baptised, began, against our wills, with more earnest affection than wisdom, to reason of Christ's religion, and began to wax so hot in his matter, that he did not only prefer our religion before all other, but also did despise and condemn all other, calling them profane, and the followers of them wicked and devilish, and the children of everlasting damnation. When he had thus long reasoned the matter, they laid hold on him, accused him, and condemned him into exile, not as a despiser of religion, but as a seditious person and a raiser up of dissension among the people' (p. 145).



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ings, the changes, and the ends of all things. Neither give they any divine honours to any other than him.' So far was More from sharing the popular beliefs of his time. Yet at the end he reminds us that he does not in all respects agree with the customs and opinions of the Utopians which he describes. And we should let him have the benefit of this saving clause, and not rudely withdraw the veil behind which he has been pleased to conceal himself.

Nor is he less in advance of popular opinion in his political and moral speculations. He would like to bring military glory into contempt; he would set all sorts of idle people to profitable occupation, including in the same class, priests, women, noblemen, gentlemen, and 'sturdy and valiant beggars,' that the labour of all may be reduced to six hours a day. His dislike of capital punishment, and plans for the reformation of offenders; his detestation of priests and lawyers<sup>1</sup>; his remark that 'although every one may hear of ravenous dogs and wolves and cruel man-eaters, it is not easy to find states that are well and wisely governed,' are curiously at variance with the notions of his age and indeed with his own life. There are many points in which he shows a modern feeling and a prophetic insight like Plato. He is a sanitary reformer; he maintains that civilized states have a right to the soil of waste countries; he is inclined to the opinion which places happiness in virtuous pleasures, but herein, as he thinks, not disagreeing from those other philosophers who define virtue to be a life according to nature. He extends the idea of happiness so as to include the happiness of others; and he argues ingeniously, 'All men agree that we ought to make others happy; but if others, how much more ourselves!' And still he thinks that there may be a more excellent way, but to this no man's reason can attain unless heaven should inspire him with a higher truth. His ceremonies before marriage; his *humane* proposal that war should be carried on by assassinating the leaders of the enemy, may be compared to some of the paradoxes of Plato. He has a charming fancy, like the affinities of Greeks and barbarians in the Timæus, that the Utopians learnt the language of the Greeks with the more readiness because they were originally of the same race with them. He is penetrated with the spirit of Plato, and quotes or adapts many

<sup>1</sup> Compare his satirical observation: 'They (the Utopians) have priests of exceeding holiness, and therefore very few' (p. 150).



thoughts both from the Republic and from the Timæus. He prefers public duties to private, and is somewhat impatient of the importunity of relations. His citizens have no silver or gold of their own, but are ready enough to pay them to their mercenaries (cp. Rep. iv. 422, 423). There is nothing of which he is more contemptuous than the love of money. Gold is used for fetters of criminals, and diamonds and pearls for children's necklaces<sup>1</sup>.

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Like Plato he is full of satirical reflections on governments and princes; on the state of the world and of knowledge. The hero of his discourse (Hythlodæus) is very unwilling to become a minister of state, considering that he would lose his independence and his advice would never be heeded<sup>2</sup>. He ridicules the new logic of his time; the Utopians could never be made to understand the doctrine of Second Intentions<sup>3</sup>. He is very severe on the sports of the gentry; the Utopians count 'hunting the lowest, the vilest, and the most abject part of butchery.' He quotes the words of the Republic in which the philosopher is described 'standing out of the way under a wall until the driving storm of sleet and rain be overpast,' which admit of a singular application to More's own fate; although, writing twenty years before (about the year 1514),

<sup>1</sup> When the ambassadors came arrayed in gold and peacocks' feathers 'to the eyes of all the Utopians except very few, which had been in other countries for some reasonable cause, all that gorgeousness of apparel seemed shameful and reproachful. In so much that they most reverently saluted the vilest and most abject of them for lords — passing over the ambassadors themselves without any honour, judging them by their wearing of golden chains to be bondmen. You should have seen children also, that had cast away their pearls and precious stones, when they saw the like sticking upon the ambassadors' caps, dig and push their mothers under the sides, saying thus to them — "Look, mother, how great a lubber doth yet wear pearls and precious stones, as though he were a little child still." But the mother; yea and that also in good earnest: "Peace, son," saith she, "I think he be some of the ambassadors' fools"' (p. 102).

<sup>2</sup> Cp. an exquisite passage at p. 35, of which the conclusion is as follows: 'And verily it is naturally given . . . suppressed and ended.'

<sup>3</sup> 'For they have not devised one of all those rules of restrictions, amplifications, and suppositions, very wittily invented in the small Logicals, which here our children in every place do learn. Furthermore, they were never yet able to find out the second intentions; insomuch that none of them all could ever see man himself in common, as they call him, though he be (as you know) bigger than was ever any giant, yea, and pointed to of us even with our finger' (p. 105).

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he can hardly be supposed to have foreseen this. There is no touch of satire which strikes deeper than his quiet remark that the greater part of the precepts of Christ are more at variance with the lives of ordinary Christians than the discourse of Utopia<sup>1</sup>.

The 'New Atlantis' is only a fragment, and far inferior in merit to the 'Utopia.' The work is full of ingenuity, but wanting in creative fancy, and by no means impresses the reader with a sense of credibility. In some places Lord Bacon is characteristically different from Sir Thomas More, as, for example, in the external state which he attributes to the governor of Solomon's House, whose dress he minutely describes, while to Sir Thomas More such trappings appear simply ridiculous. Yet, after this programme of dress, Bacon adds the beautiful trait, 'that he had a look as though he pitied men.' Several things are borrowed by him from the Timæus; but he has injured the unity of style by adding thoughts and passages which are taken from the Hebrew Scriptures.

The 'City of the Sun,' written by Campanella (1568-1639), a Dominican friar, several years after the 'New Atlantis' of Bacon, has many resemblances to the Republic of Plato. The citizens have wives and children in common; their marriages are of the same temporary sort, and are arranged by the magistrates from time to time. They do not, however, adopt his system of lots, but bring together the best natures, male and female, 'according to philosophical rules.' The infants until two years of age are brought up by their mothers in public temples; and since individuals for the most part educate their children badly, at the beginning of their third year they are committed to the care of the State, and are taught at first, not out of books, but from paintings of all kinds, which are emblazoned on the walls of the city. The city has six interior circuits of walls, and an outer wall which is the seventh. On this outer wall are painted the figures of legislators and philosophers, and

<sup>1</sup> 'And yet the most part of them is more dissident from the manners of the world now a days, than my communication was. But preachers, sly and wily men, following your counsel (as I suppose) because they saw men evil-willing to frame their manners to Christ's rule, they have wrested and wried his doctrine, and, like a rule of lead, have applied it to men's manners, that by some means at the least way, they might agree together' (p. 66).

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on each of the interior walls the symbols or forms of some one of the sciences are delineated. The women are, for the most part, trained, like the men, in warlike and other exercises; but they have two special occupations of their own. After a battle, they and the boys soothe and relieve the wounded warriors; also they encourage them with embraces and pleasant words (cp. Plato, Rep. v. 468). Some elements of the Christian or Catholic religion are preserved among them. The life of the Apostles is greatly admired by this people because they had all things in common; and the short prayer which Jesus Christ taught men is used in their worship. It is a duty of the chief magistrates to pardon sins, and therefore the whole people make secret confession of them to the magistrates, and they to their chief, who is a sort of Rector Metaphysicus; and by this means he is well informed of all that is going on in the minds of men. After confession, absolution is granted to the citizens collectively, but no one is mentioned by name. There also exists among them a practice of perpetual prayer, performed by a succession of priests, who change every hour. Their religion is a worship of God in Trinity, that is of Wisdom, Love and Power, but without any distinction of persons. They behold in the sun the reflection of His glory; mere graven images they reject, refusing to fall under the 'tyranny' of idolatry.

Many details are given about their customs of eating and drinking, about their mode of dressing, their employments, their wars. Campanella looks forward to a new mode of education, which is to be a study of nature, and not of Aristotle. He would not have his citizens waste their time in the consideration of what he calls the 'dead signs of things.' He remarks that he who knows one science only, does not really know that one any more than the rest, and insists strongly on the necessity of a variety of knowledge. More scholars are turned out in the City of the Sun in one year than by contemporary methods in ten or fifteen. He evidently believes, like Bacon, that henceforward natural science will play a great part in education, a hope which seems hardly to have been realized, either in our own or in any former age; at any rate the fulfilment of it has been long deferred.

There is a good deal of ingenuity and even originality in this



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work, and a most enlightened spirit pervades it. But it has little or no charm of style, and falls very far short of the 'New Atlantis' of Bacon, and still more of the 'Utopia' of Sir Thomas More. It is full of inconsistencies, and though borrowed from Plato, shows but a superficial acquaintance with his writings. It is a work such as one might expect to have been written by a philosopher and man of genius who was also a friar, and who had spent twenty-seven years of his life in a prison of the Inquisition. The most interesting feature of the book, common to Plato and Sir Thomas More, is the deep feeling which is shown by the writer, of the misery and ignorance prevailing among the lower classes in his own time. Campanella takes note of Aristotle's answer to Plato's community of property, that in a society where all things are common, no individual would have any motive to work (Arist. Pol. ii. 5, § 6): he replies, that his citizens being happy and contented in themselves (they are required to work only four hours a day), will have greater regard for their fellows than exists among men at present. He thinks, like Plato, that if he abolishes private feelings and interests, a great public feeling will take their place.

Other writings on ideal states, such as the 'Oceana' of Harrington, in which the Lord Archon, meaning Cromwell, is described, not as he was, but as he ought to have been; or the 'Argenis' of Barclay, which is an historical allegory of his own time, are too unlike Plato to be worth mentioning. More interesting than either of these, and far more Platonic in style and thought, is Sir John Eliot's 'Monarchy of Man,' in which the prisoner of the Tower, no longer able 'to be a politician in the land of his birth,' turns away from politics to view 'that other city which is within him,' and finds on the very threshold of the grave that the secret of human happiness is the mastery of self. The change of government in the time of the English Commonwealth set men thinking about first principles, and gave rise to many works of this class. . . . The great original genius of Swift owes nothing to Plato; nor is there any trace in the conversation or in the works of Dr. Johnson of any acquaintance with his writings. He probably would have refuted Plato without reading him, in the same fashion in which he supposed himself to have refuted Bishop Berkeley's theory of the non-existence of matter. If we



except the so-called English Platonists, or rather Neo-Platonists, who never understood their master, and the writings of Coleridge, who was to some extent a kindred spirit, Plato has left no permanent impression on English literature.

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VII. Human life and conduct are affected by ideals in the same way that they are affected by the examples of eminent men. Neither the one nor the other are immediately applicable to practice, but there is a virtue flowing from them which tends to raise individuals above the common routine of society or trade, and to elevate States above the mere interests of commerce or the necessities of self-defence. Like the ideals of art they are partly framed by the omission of particulars; they require to be viewed at a certain distance, and are apt to fade away if we attempt to approach them. They gain an imaginary distinctness when embodied in a State or in a system of philosophy, but they still remain the visions of 'a world unrealized.' More striking and obvious to the ordinary mind are the examples of great men, who have served their own generation and are remembered in another. Even in our own family circle there may have been some one, a woman, or even a child, in whose face has shone forth a goodness more than human. The ideal then approaches nearer to us, and we fondly cling to it. The ideal of the past, whether of our own past lives or of former states of society, has a singular fascination for the minds of many. Too late we learn that such ideals cannot be recalled, though the recollection of them may have a humanizing influence on other times. But the abstractions of philosophy are to most persons cold and vacant; they give light without warmth; they are like the full moon in the heavens when there are no stars appearing. Men cannot live by thought alone; the world of sense is always breaking in upon them. They are for the most part confined to a corner of earth, and see but a little way beyond their own home or place of abode; they 'do not lift up their eyes to the hills'; they are not awake when the dawn appears. But in Plato we have reached a height from which a man may look into the distance (Rep. iv. 445 C) and behold the future of the world and of philosophy. The ideal of the State and of the life of the philosopher; the ideal of an education

continuing through life and extending equally to both sexes; the ideal of the unity and correlation of knowledge; the faith in good and immortality — are the vacant forms of light on which Plato is seeking to fix the eye of mankind.

VIII. Two other ideals, which never appeared above the horizon in Greek Philosophy, float before the minds of men in our own day: one seen more clearly than formerly, as though each year and each generation brought us nearer to some great change; the other almost in the same degree retiring from view behind the laws of nature, as if oppressed by them, but still remaining a silent hope of we know not what hidden in the heart of man. The first ideal is the future of the human race in this world; the second the future of the individual in another. The first is the more perfect realization of our own present life; the second, the abnegation of it: the one, limited by experience, the other, transcending it. Both of them have been and are powerful motives of action; there are a few in whom they have taken the place of all earthly interests. The hope of a future for the human race at first sight seems to be the more disinterested, the hope of individual existence the more egotistical, of the two motives. But when men have learned to resolve their hope of a future either for themselves or for the world into the will of God — ‘not my will but Thine,’ the difference between them falls away; and they may be allowed to make either of them the basis of their lives, according to their own individual character or temperament. There is as much faith in the willingness to work for an unseen future in this world as in another. Neither is it inconceivable that some rare nature may feel his duty to another generation, or to another century, almost as strongly as to his own, or that living always in the presence of God, he may realize another world as vividly as he does this.

The greatest of all ideals may, or rather must be conceived by us under similitudes derived from human qualities; although sometimes, like the Jewish prophets, we may dash away these figures of speech and describe the nature of God only in negatives. These again by degrees acquire a positive meaning. It would be well, if when meditating on the higher truths either of

philosophy or religion, we sometimes substituted one form of expression for another, lest through the necessities of language we should become the slaves of mere words.

*Republic.*

INTRODUC-  
TION.

There is a third ideal, not the same, but akin to these, which has a place in the home and heart of every believer in the religion of Christ, and in which men seem to find a nearer and more familiar truth, the Divine man, the Son of Man, the Saviour of mankind, Who is the first-born and head of the whole family in heaven and earth, in Whom the Divine and human, that which is without and that which is within the range of our earthly faculties, are indissolubly united. Neither is this divine form of goodness wholly separable from the ideal of the Christian Church, which is said in the New Testament to be 'His body,' or at variance with those other images of good which Plato sets before us. We see Him in a figure only, and of figures of speech we select but a few, and those the simplest, to be the expression of Him. We behold Him in a picture, but He is not there. We gather up the fragments of His discourses, but neither do they represent Him as He truly was. His dwelling is neither in heaven nor earth, but in the heart of man. This is that image which Plato saw dimly in the distance, which, when existing among men, he called, in the language of Homer, 'the likeness of God' (Rep. vi. 501 B), the likeness of a nature which in all ages men have felt to be greater and better than themselves, and which in endless forms, whether derived from Scripture or nature, from the witness of history or from the human heart, regarded as a person or not as a person, with or without parts or passions, existing in space or not in space, is and will always continue to be to mankind the Idea of Good.





# THE REPUBLIC.

## BOOK I.

### PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, *who is the narrator.*

GLAUCON.

ADEIMANTUS.

POLEMARCHUS.

CEPHALUS.

THRASYMACHUS.

CLEITOPHON.

*And others who are mute auditors.*

The scene is laid in the house of Cephalus at the Piraeus; and the whole dialogue is narrated by Socrates the day after it actually took place to Timaeus, Hermocrates, Critias, and a nameless person, who are introduced in the Timaeus.

Steph. 327 **I** WENT down yesterday to the Piraeus with Glaucon the son of Ariston, that I might offer up my prayers to the goddess<sup>1</sup>; and also because I wanted to see in what manner they would celebrate the festival, which was a new thing. I was delighted with the procession of the inhabitants; but that of the Thracians was equally, if not more, beautiful. When we had finished our prayers and viewed the spectacle, we turned in the direction of the city; and at that instant Polemarchus the son of Cephalus chanced to catch sight of us from a distance as we were starting on our way home, and told his servant to run and bid us wait for him. The servant took hold of me by the cloak behind, and said: Polemarchus desires you to wait.

I turned round, and asked him where his master was.

There he is, said the youth, coming after you, if you will only wait.

<sup>1</sup> Bendis, the Thracian Artemis.

*Republic I.*

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Meeting of  
Socrates and  
Glaucon with  
Polemarchus  
at the Bendi-  
dean festival.

*Republic I.*SOCRATES,  
POLEMARCHUS,  
GLAUCON,  
ADEIMANTUS,  
CEPHALUS.

Certainly we will, said Glaucon; and in a few minutes Polemarchus appeared, and with him Adeimantus, Glaucon's brother, Niceratus the son of Nicias, and several others who had been at the procession.

Polemarchus said to me: I perceive, Socrates, that you and your companion are already on your way to the city.

You are not far wrong, I said.

But do you see, he rejoined, how many we are?

Of course.

And are you stronger than all these? for if not, you will have to remain where you are.

May there not be the alternative, I said, that we may persuade you to let us go?

But can you persuade us, if we refuse to listen to you? he said.

Certainly not, replied Glaucon.

Then we are not going to listen; of that you may be assured.

The equestrian torch-race.

Adeimantus added: Has no one told you of the torch-race 328 on horseback in honour of the goddess which will take place in the evening?

With horses! I replied: That is a novelty. Will horsemen carry torches and pass them one to another during the race?

Yes, said Polemarchus, and not only so, but a festival will be celebrated at night, which you certainly ought to see. Let us rise soon after supper and see this festival; there will be a gathering of young men, and we will have a good talk. Stay then, and do not be perverse.

Glaucon said: I suppose, since you insist, that we must.

Very good, I replied.

The gathering of friends at the house of Cephalus.

Accordingly we went with Polemarchus to his house; and there we found his brothers Lysias and Euthydemus, and with them Thrasymachus the Chalcedonian, Charmantides the Paeanian, and Cleitophon the son of Aristonymus. There too was Cephalus the father of Polemarchus, whom I had not seen for a long time, and I thought him very much aged. He was seated on a cushioned chair, and had a garland on his head, for he had been sacrificing in the court; and there were some other chairs in the room arranged in a semicircle,

upon which we sat down by him. He saluted me eagerly, and then he said:—

*Republic I.*

CEPHALUS,  
SOCRATES.

You don't come to see me, Socrates, as often as you ought: If I were still able to go and see you I would not ask you to come to me. But at my age I can hardly get to the city, and therefore you should come oftener to the Piræus. For let me tell you, that the more the pleasures of the body fade away, the greater to me is the pleasure and charm of conversation. Do not then deny my request, but make our house your resort and keep company with these young men; we are old friends, and you will be quite at home with us.

I replied: There is nothing which for my part I like better, Cephalus, than conversing with aged men; for I regard them as travellers who have gone a journey which I too may have to go, and of whom I ought to enquire, whether the way is smooth and easy, or rugged and difficult. And this is a question which I should like to ask of you who have arrived at that time which the poets call the 'threshold of old age' — Is life harder towards the end, or what report do you give of it?

329 I will tell you, Socrates, he said, what my own feeling is. Men of my age flock together; we are birds of a feather, as the old proverb says; and at our meetings the tale of my acquaintance commonly is — I cannot eat, I cannot drink; the pleasures of youth and love are fled away: there was a good time once, but now that is gone, and life is no longer life. Some complain of the slights which are put upon them by relations, and they will tell you sadly of how many evils their old age is the cause. But to me, Socrates, these complainers seem to blame that which is not really in fault. For if old age were the cause, I too being old, and every other old man, would have felt as they do. But this is not my own experience, nor that of others whom I have known. How well I remember the aged poet Sophocles, when in answer to the question, How does love suit with age, Sophocles,— are you still the man you were? Peace, he replied; most gladly have I escaped the thing of which you speak; I feel as if I had escaped from a mad and furious master. His words have often occurred to my mind since, and they seem as good to me now as at the time when he uttered them.

Old age is not to blame for the troubles of old men.

The excellent saying of Sophocles.



*Republic I.*CEPHALUS,  
SOCRATES.

For certainly old age has a great sense of calm and freedom ; when the passions relax their hold, then, as Sophocles says, we are freed from the grasp not of one mad master only, but of many. The truth is, Socrates, that these regrets, and also the complaints about relations, are to be attributed to the same cause, which is not old age, but men's characters and tempers ; for he who is of a calm and happy nature will hardly feel the pressure of age, but to him who is of an opposite disposition youth and age are equally a burden.

It is admitted that the old, if they are to be comfortable, must have a fair share of external goods ; neither virtue alone nor riches alone can make an old man happy.

I listened in admiration, and wanting to draw him out, that he might go on — Yes, Cephalus, I said ; but I rather suspect that people in general are not convinced by you when you speak thus ; they think that old age sits lightly upon you, not because of your happy disposition, but because you are rich, and wealth is well known to be a great comforter.

You are right, he replied ; they are not convinced : and there is something in what they say ; not, however, so much as they imagine. I might answer them as Themistocles answered the Seriphian who was abusing him and saying that he was famous, not for his own merits but because he was an Athenian : ' If you had been a native of my country 330 or I of yours, neither of us would have been famous.' And to those who are not rich and are impatient of old age, the same reply may be made ; for to the good poor man old age cannot be a light burden, nor can a bad rich man ever have peace with himself.

May I ask, Cephalus, whether your fortune was for the most part inherited or acquired by you ?

Acquired ! Socrates ; do you want to know how much I acquired ? In the art of making money I have been midway between my father and grandfather : for my grandfather, whose name I bear, doubled and trebled the value of his patrimony, that which he inherited being much what I possess now ; but my father Lysanias reduced the property below what it is at present : and I shall be satisfied if I leave to these my sons not less but a little more than I received.

Cephalus has inherited rather than made a fortune ; he is therefore in different to money.

That was why I asked you the question, I replied, because I see that you are indifferent about money, which is a characteristic rather of those who have inherited their fortunes than of those who have acquired them ; the makers



of fortunes have a second love of money as a creation of their own, resembling the affection of authors for their own poems, or of parents for their children, besides that natural love of it for the sake of use and profit which is common to them and all men. And hence they are very bad company, for they can talk about nothing but the praises of wealth.

That is true, he said.

Yes, that is very true, but may I ask another question?—What do you consider to be the greatest blessing which you have reaped from your wealth?

One, he said, of which I could not expect easily to convince others. For let me tell you, Socrates, that when a man thinks himself to be near death, fears and cares enter into his mind which he never had before; the tales of a world below and the punishment which is exacted there of deeds done here were once a laughing matter to him, but now he is tormented with the thought that they may be true: either from the weakness of age, or because he is now drawing nearer to that other place, he has a clearer view of these things; suspicions and alarms crowd thickly upon him, and he begins to reflect and consider what wrongs he has done to others. And when he finds that the sum of his transgressions is great he will many a time like a child start up in his sleep for fear, and he is filled with dark forebodings. But  
331 to him who is conscious of no sin, sweet hope, as Pindar charmingly says, is the kind nurse of his age:

‘Hope,’ he says, ‘cherishes the soul of him who lives in justice and holiness, and is the nurse of his age and the companion of his journey;—hope which is mightiest to sway the restless soul of man.’

How admirable are his words! And the great blessing of riches, I do not say to every man, but to a good man, is, that he has had no occasion to deceive or to defraud others, either intentionally or unintentionally; and when he departs to the world below he is not in any apprehension about offerings due to the gods or debts which he owes to men. Now to this peace of mind the possession of wealth greatly contributes; and therefore I say, that, setting one thing against another, of the many advantages which wealth has to give, to a man of sense this is in my opinion the greatest.

*Republic I.*

CEPHALUS,  
SOCRATES.

The advantages of  
wealth.

The fear of death and the consciousness of sin become more vivid in old age; and to be rich frees a man from many temptations.

The admirable strain of  
Pindar.

*Republic I.*CEPHALUS,  
SOCRATES,  
POLEMAR-  
CHUS.Justice to  
speak truth  
and pay your  
debts.This is the  
definition of  
Simonides.  
But you ought  
not on all oc-  
casions to do  
either. What  
then was his  
meaning?

Well said, Cephalus, I replied; but as concerning justice, what is it?—to speak the truth and to pay your debts—no more than this? And even to this are there not exceptions? Suppose that a friend when in his right mind has deposited arms with me and he asks for them when he is not in his right mind, ought I to give them back to him? No one would say that I ought or that I should be right in doing so, any more than they would say that I ought always to speak the truth to one who is in his condition.

You are quite right, he replied.

But then, I said, speaking the truth and paying your debts is not a correct definition of justice.

Quite correct, Socrates, if Simonides is to be believed, said Polemarchus interposing.

I fear, said Cephalus, that I must go now, for I have to look after the sacrifices, and I hand over the argument to Polemarchus and the company.

Is not Polemarchus your heir? I said.

To be sure, he answered, and went away laughing to the sacrifices.

Tell me then, O thou heir of the argument, what did Simonides say, and according to you truly say, about justice?

He said that the re-payment of a debt is just, and in saying so he appears to me to be right.

I should be sorry to doubt the word of such a wise and inspired man, but his meaning, though probably clear to you, is the reverse of clear to me. For he certainly does not mean, as we were just now saying, that I ought to return a deposit of arms or of anything else to one who asks for it when he is not in his right senses; and yet a deposit cannot be denied to be a debt. 332

True.

Then when the person who asks me is not in his right mind I am by no means to make the return?

Certainly not.

When Simonides said that the repayment of a debt was justice, he did not mean to include that case?

Certainly not; for he thinks that a friend ought always to do good to a friend and never evil.

You mean that the return of a deposit of gold which is to the injury of the receiver, if the two parties are friends, is not the repayment of a debt,—that is what you would imagine him to say?

*Republic I.*

SOCRATES,  
POLEMARCHUS.

Yes.

And are enemies also to receive what we owe to them?

To be sure, he said, they are to receive what we owe them, and an enemy, as I take it, owes to an enemy that which is due or proper to him — that is to say, evil.

Simonides, then, after the manner of poets, would seem to have spoken darkly of the nature of justice; for he really meant to say that justice is the giving to each man what is proper to him, and this he termed a debt.

He may have meant to say that justice gives to friends what is good and to enemies what is evil.

That must have been his meaning, he said.

By heaven! I replied; and if we asked him what due or proper thing is given by medicine, and to whom, what answer do you think that he would make to us?

He would surely reply that medicine gives drugs and meat and drink to human bodies.

And what due or proper thing is given by cookery, and to what?

Seasoning to food.

And what is that which justice gives, and to whom?

If, Socrates, we are to be guided at all by the analogy of the preceding instances, then justice is the art which gives good to friends and evil to enemies.

That is his meaning then?

I think so.

And who is best able to do good to his friends and evil to his enemies in time of sickness?

*Illustrations.*

The physician.

Or when they are on a voyage, amid the perils of the sea?

The pilot.

And in what sort of actions or with a view to what result is the just man most able to do harm to his enemy and good to his friend?

In going to war against the one and in making alliances with the other.

But when a man is well, my dear Polemarchus, there is no need of a physician?



*Republic I.*SOCRATES,  
POLEMARCHUS.

No.

And he who is not on a voyage has no need of a pilot?

No.

Then in time of peace justice will be of no use?

I am very far from thinking so.

You think that justice may be of use in peace as well as 333  
in war?

Yes.

Like husbandry for the acquisition of corn?

Yes.

Or like shoemaking for the acquisition of shoes,—that is  
what you mean?

Yes.

And what similar use or power of acquisition has justice in  
time of peace?Justice is  
useful in  
contracts,

In contracts, Socrates, justice is of use.

And by contracts you mean partnerships?

Exactly.

But is the just man or the skilful player a more useful and  
better partner at a game of draughts?

The skilful player.

And in the laying of bricks and stones is the just man a  
more useful or better partner than the builder?

Quite the reverse.

Then in what sort of partnership is the just man a better  
partner than the harp-player, as in playing the harp the harp-  
player is certainly a better partner than the just man?

In a money partnership.

Yes, Polemarchus, but surely not in the use of money; for  
you do not want a just man to be your counsellor in the pur-  
chase or sale of a horse; a man who is knowing about horses  
would be better for that, would he not?

Certainly.

And when you want to buy a ship, the shipwright or the  
pilot would be better?

True.

Then what is that joint use of silver or gold in which the  
just man is to be preferred?especially in  
the safe-keep-  
ing of deposits.

When you want a deposit to be kept safely.

You mean when money is not wanted, but allowed to lie?



Precisely.

That is to say, justice is useful when money is useless?

That is the inference.

And when you want to keep a pruning-hook safe, then justice is useful to the individual and to the state; but when you want to use it, then the art of the vine-dresser?

Clearly.

And when you want to keep a shield or a lyre, and not to use them, you would say that justice is useful; but when you want to use them, then the art of the soldier or of the musician?

Certainly.

And so of all other things;—justice is useful when they are useless, and useless when they are useful?

That is the inference.

Then justice is not good for much. But let us consider this further point: Is not he who can best strike a blow in a boxing match or in any kind of fighting best able to ward off a blow?

Certainly.

And he who is most skilful in preventing or escaping<sup>1</sup> from a disease is best able to create one?

True.

334 And he is the best guard of a camp who is best able to steal a march upon the enemy?

Certainly.

Then he who is a good keeper of anything is also a good thief?

That, I suppose, is to be inferred.

Then if the just man is good at keeping money, he is good at stealing it.

That is implied in the argument.

Then after all the just man has turned out to be a thief. And this is a lesson which I suspect you must have learnt out of Homer; for he, speaking of Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, who is a favourite of his, affirms that

He was excellent above all men in theft and perjury.

And so, you and Homer and Simonides are agreed that

<sup>1</sup> Reading *φυλάσασθαι καὶ λαθεῖν, οὐτος, κ.τ.λ.*

*Republic I.*

SOCRATES,  
POLEMARCHUS.

But not in the use of money; and if so, justice is only useful when money or anything else is useless.

A new point of view: Is not he who is best able to do good best able to do evil?

*Republic I.*SOCRATES,  
POLEMARCHUS.

justice is an art of theft; to be practised however 'for the good of friends and for the harm of enemies,'—that was what you were saying?

No, certainly not that, though I do not now know what I did say; but I still stand by the latter words.

Well, there is another question: By friends and enemies do we mean those who are so really, or only in seeming?

Justice an art of theft to be practised for the good of friends and the harm of enemies. But who are friends and enemies?

Surely, he said, a man may be expected to love those whom he thinks good, and to hate those whom he thinks evil.

Yes, but do not persons often err about good and evil: many who are not good seem to be so, and conversely?

That is true.

Then to them the good will be enemies and the evil will be their friends?

True.

And in that case they will be right in doing good to the evil and evil to the good?

Clearly.

But the good are just and would not do an injustice?

True.

Then according to your argument it is just to injure those who do no wrong?

Nay, Socrates; the doctrine is immoral.

Then I suppose that we ought to do good to the just and harm to the unjust?

I like that better.

Mistakes will sometimes happen.

But see the consequence:—Many a man who is ignorant of human nature has friends who are bad friends, and in that case he ought to do harm to them; and he has good enemies whom he ought to benefit; but, if so, we shall be saying the very opposite of that which we affirmed to be the meaning of Simonides.

Very true, he said; and I think that we had better correct an error into which we seem to have fallen in the use of the words 'friend' and 'enemy.'

What was the error, Polemarchus? I asked.

We assumed that he is a friend who seems to be or who is thought good.

Correction of the definition.

And how is the error to be corrected?

We should rather say that he is a friend who is, as well as

335 seems, good; and that he who seems only, and is not good, only seems to be and is not a friend; and of an enemy the same may be said. *Republic I.*

You would argue that the good are our friends and the bad our enemies?

Yes.

And instead of saying simply as we did at first, that it is just to do good to our friends and harm to our enemies, we should further say: It is just to do good to our friends when they are good and harm to our enemies when they are evil?

Yes, that appears to me to be the truth.

But ought the just to injure any one at all?

Undoubtedly he ought to injure those who are both wicked and his enemies.

When horses are injured, are they improved or deteriorated?

The latter.

Deteriorated, that is to say, in the good qualities of horses, not of dogs?

Yes, of horses.

And dogs are deteriorated in the good qualities of dogs, and not of horses?

Of course.

And will not men who are injured be deteriorated in that which is the proper virtue of man?

Certainly.

And that human virtue is justice?

To be sure.

Then men who are injured are of necessity made unjust?

That is the result.

But can the musician by his art make men unmusical?

Certainly not.

Or the horseman by his art make them bad horsemen?

Impossible.

And can the just by justice make men unjust, or speaking generally, can the good by virtue make them bad?

Assuredly not.

Any more than heat can produce cold?

It cannot.

Or drought moisture?

SOCRATES,  
POLEMARCHUS.

To appearance we must add reality. He is a friend who 'is' as well as 'seems' good. And we should do good to our good friends and harm to our bad enemies.

To harm men is to injure them; and to injure them is to make them unjust. But justice cannot produce injustice.

*Republic I.*

SOCRATES,  
POLEMARCHUS,  
THRASYMACHUS.

Clearly not.  
Nor can the good harm any one?  
Impossible.  
And the just is the good?  
Certainly.

Then to injure a friend or any one else is not the act of a just man, but of the opposite, who is the unjust?

I think that what you say is quite true, Socrates.

Then if a man says that justice consists in the repayment of debts, and that good is the debt which a just man owes to his friends, and evil the debt which he owes to his enemies, —to say this is not wise; for it is not true, if, as has been clearly shown, the injuring of another can be in no case just.

I agree with you, said Polemarchus.

The saying however explained is not to be attributed to any good or wise man.

Then you and I are prepared to take up arms against any one who attributes such a saying to Simonides or Bias or Pittacus, or any other wise man or seer?

I am quite ready to do battle at your side, he said.

Shall I tell you whose I believe the saying to be?

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Whose?

I believe that Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias the Theban, or some other rich and mighty man, who had a great opinion of his own power, was the first to say that justice is 'doing good to your friends and harm to your enemies.'

Most true, he said.

Yes, I said; but if this definition of justice also breaks down, what other can be offered?

The brutality of Thrasymachus.

Several times in the course of the discussion Thrasymachus had made an attempt to get the argument into his own hands, and had been put down by the rest of the company, who wanted to hear the end. But when Polemarchus and I had done speaking and there was a pause, he could no longer hold his peace; and, gathering himself up, he came at us like a wild beast, seeking to devour us. We were quite panic-stricken at the sight of him.

He roared out to the whole company: What folly, Socrates, has taken possession of you all? And why, sillybillies, do you knock under to one another? I say that if you want really to know what justice is, you should not only ask but



answer, and you should not seek honour to yourself from the refutation of an opponent, but have your own answer; for there is many a one who can ask and cannot answer. And now I will not have you say that justice is duty or advantage or profit or gain or interest, for this sort of nonsense will not do for me; I must have clearness and accuracy.

*Republic I.*  
SOCRATES,  
THRASYMA-  
CHUS.

I was panic-stricken at his words, and could not look at him without trembling. Indeed I believe that if I had not fixed my eye upon him, I should have been struck dumb: but when I saw his fury rising, I looked at him first, and was therefore able to reply to him.

Thrasymachus, I said, with a quiver, don't be hard upon us. Polemarchus and I may have been guilty of a little mistake in the argument, but I can assure you that the error was not intentional. If we were seeking for a piece of gold, you would not imagine that we were 'knocking under to one another,' and so losing our chance of finding it. And why, when we are seeking for justice, a thing more precious than many pieces of gold, do you say that we are weakly yielding to one another and not doing our utmost to get at the truth? Nay, my good friend, we are most willing and anxious to do so, but the fact is that we cannot. And if so, you people who know all things should pity us and not be angry with us.

337 How characteristic of Socrates! he replied, with a bitter laugh;—that's your ironical style! Did I not foresee—have I not already told you, that whatever he was asked he would refuse to answer, and try irony or any other shuffle, in order that he might avoid answering?

You are a philosopher, Thrasymachus, I replied, and well know that if you ask a person what numbers make up twelve, taking care to prohibit him whom you ask from answering twice six, or three times four, or six times two, or four times three, 'for this sort of nonsense will not do for me,'—then obviously, if that is your way of putting the question, no one can answer you. But suppose that he were to retort, 'Thrasymachus, what do you mean? If one of these numbers which you interdict be the true answer to the question, am I falsely to say some other number which is not the right one?—is that your meaning?'—How would you answer him?

Socrates cannot give any answer if all true answers are excluded.

Thrasymachus is assailed with his own weapons.

Just as if the two cases were at all alike! he said.

*Republic I.*SOCRATES,  
THRASYMA-  
CHUS,  
GLAUCON.

Why should they not be? I replied; and even if they are not, but only appear to be so to the person who is asked, ought he not to say what he thinks, whether you and I forbid him or not?

I presume then that you are going to make one of the interdicted answers?

I dare say that I may, notwithstanding the danger, if upon reflection I approve of any of them.

But what if I give you an answer about justice other and better, he said, than any of these? What do you deserve to have done to you?

Done to me!—as becomes the ignorant, I must learn from the wise—that is what I deserve to have done to me.

What, and no payment! a pleasant notion!

I will pay when I have the money, I replied.

But you have, Socrates, said Glaucon: and you, Thrasy-machus, need be under no anxiety about money, for we will all make a contribution for Socrates.

Yes, he replied, and then Socrates will do as he always does—refuse to answer himself, but take and pull to pieces the answer of some one else.

Why, my good friend, I said, how can any one answer who knows, and says that he knows, just nothing; and who, even if he has some faint notions of his own, is told by a man of authority not to utter them? The natural thing is, that the speaker should be some one like yourself who pro- 338  
fesses to know and can tell what he knows. Will you then kindly answer, for the edification of the company and of myself?

Glaucon and the rest of the company joined in my request, and Thrasy-machus, as any one might see, was in reality eager to speak; for he thought that he had an excellent answer, and would distinguish himself. But at first he affected to insist on my answering; at length he consented to begin. Behold, he said, the wisdom of Socrates; he refuses to teach himself, and goes about learning of others, to whom he never even says Thank you.

That I learn of others, I replied, is quite true; but that I am ungrateful I wholly deny. Money I have none, and therefore I pay in praise, which is all I have; and how ready

The Sophist  
demands pay-  
ment for his  
instructions.  
The company  
are very will-  
ing to con-  
tribute.

Socrates  
knows little or  
nothing: how  
can he an-  
swer? And  
he is deterred  
by the inter-  
dict of Thra-  
symachus.

I am to praise any one who appears to me to speak well you will very soon find out when you answer; for I expect that you will answer well.

*Republic I.*

SOCRATES,  
THRASYMA-  
CHUS.

The definition  
of Thrasy-  
machus: 'Justice  
is the interest  
of the stronger  
or ruler.'

Listen, then, he said; I proclaim that justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger. And now why do you not praise me? But of course you won't.

Let me first understand you, I replied. Justice, as you say, is the interest of the stronger. What, Thrasymachus, is the meaning of this? You cannot mean to say that because Polydamas, the pancratiast, is stronger than we are, and finds the eating of beef conducive to his bodily strength, that to eat beef is therefore equally for our good who are weaker than he is, and right and just for us?

That's abominable of you, Socrates; you take the words in the sense which is most damaging to the argument.

Not at all, my good sir, I said; I am trying to understand them; and I wish that you would be a little clearer.

Well, he said, have you never heard that forms of government differ; there are tyrannies, and there are democracies, and there are aristocracies?

Yes, I know.

And the government is the ruling power in each state?

Certainly.

And the different forms of government make laws democratical, aristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their several interests; and these laws, which are made by them for their own interests, are the justice which they deliver to their subjects, and him who transgresses them they punish as a breaker of the law, and unjust. And that is what I mean when I say that in all states there is the same principle of justice, which is the interest of the government; and as the government must be supposed to have power, the only reasonable conclusion is, that everywhere there is one principle of justice, which is the interest of the stronger.

Socrates com-  
pels Thrasy-  
machus to  
explain his  
meaning.

339 Now I understand you, I said; and whether you are right or not I will try to discover. But let me remark, that in defining justice you have yourself used the word 'interest' which you forbade me to use. It is true, however, that in your definition the words 'of the stronger' are added.

A small addition, you must allow, he said.



*Republic I.*SOCRATES,  
THRASYMA-  
CHUS,  
POLEMAR-  
CHUS.

Great or small, never mind about that: we must first enquire whether what you are saying is the truth. Now we are both agreed that justice is interest of some sort, but you go on to say 'of the stronger'; about this addition I am not so sure, and must therefore consider further.

Proceed.

He is dissatisfied with the explanation; for rulers may err.

I will; and first tell me, Do you admit that it is just for subjects to obey their rulers?

I do.

But are the rulers of states absolutely infallible, or are they sometimes liable to err?

To be sure, he replied, they are liable to err.

Then in making their laws they may sometimes make them rightly, and sometimes not?

True.

When they make them rightly, they make them agreeably to their interest; when they are mistaken, contrary to their interest; you admit that?

Yes.

And the laws which they make must be obeyed by their subjects,—and that is what you call justice?

Doubtless.

And then the justice which makes a mistake will turn out to be the reverse of the interest of the stronger.

Then justice, according to your argument, is not only obedience to the interest of the stronger but the reverse?


What is that you are saying? he asked.

I am only repeating what you are saying, I believe. But let us consider: Have we not admitted that the rulers may be mistaken about their own interest in what they command, and also that to obey them is justice? Has not that been admitted?

Yes.

Then you must also have acknowledged justice not to be for the interest of the stronger, when the rulers unintentionally command things to be done which are to their own injury. For if, as you say, justice is the obedience which the subject renders to their commands, in that case, O wisest of men, is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker are commanded to do, not what is for the interest, but what is for the injury of the stronger?

Nothing can be clearer, Socrates, said Polemarchus.





340 Yes, said Cleitophon, interposing, if you are allowed to be his witness.

But there is no need of any witness, said Polemarchus, for Thrasymachus himself acknowledges that rulers may sometimes command what is not for their own interest, and that for subjects to obey them is justice.

Yes, Polemarchus,—Thrasymachus said that for subjects to do what was commanded by their rulers is just.

Yes, Cleitophon, but he also said that justice is the interest of the stronger, and, while admitting both these propositions, he further acknowledged that the stronger may command the weaker who are his subjects to do what is not for his own interest; whence follows that justice is the injury quite as much as the interest of the stronger.

But, said Cleitophon, he meant by the interest of the stronger what the stronger thought to be his interest,—this was what the weaker had to do; and this was affirmed by him to be justice.

Those were not his words, rejoined Polemarchus.

Never mind, I replied, if he now says that they are, let us accept his statement. Tell me, Thrasymachus, I said, did you mean by justice what the stronger thought to be his interest, whether really so or not?

Certainly not, he said. Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken the stronger at the time when he is mistaken?

Yes, I said, my impression was that you did so, when you admitted that the ruler was not infallible but might be sometimes mistaken.

You argue like an informer, Socrates. Do you mean, for example, that he who is mistaken about the sick is a physician in that he is mistaken? or that he who errs in arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician or grammarian at the time when he is making the mistake, in respect of the mistake? True, we say that the physician or arithmetician or grammarian has made a mistake, but this is only a way of speaking; for the fact is that neither the grammarian nor any other person of skill ever makes a mistake in so far as he is what his name implies; they none of them err unless their skill fails them, and then they cease to be skilled artists.

*Republic I.*

SOCRATES,  
CLEITOPHON,  
POLEMAR-  
CHUS,  
THRASYMA-  
CHUS.

Cleitophon  
tries to make  
a way of es-  
cape for  
Thrasyma-  
chus by in-  
serting the  
words  
'thought to  
be.'

This evasion  
is repudiated  
by Thrasyma-  
chus;

who adopts  
another line  
of defence:  
'No artist or  
ruler is ever  
mistaken *quâ*  
artist or ruler.'

*Republic I.*SOCRATES,  
THRASYMA-  
CHUS.

No artist or sage or ruler errs at the time when he is what his name implies ; though he is commonly said to err, and I adopted the common mode of speaking. But to be perfectly accurate, since you are such a lover of accuracy, we should say that the ruler, in so far as he is a ruler, is unerring, and, being unerring, always commands that which is for his own 341 interest ; and the subject is required to execute his commands ; and therefore, as I said at first and now repeat, justice is the interest of the stronger.

Indeed, Thrasymachus, and do I really appear to you to argue like an informer?

Certainly, he replied.

And do you suppose that I ask these questions with any design of injuring you in the argument?

Nay, he replied, 'suppose' is not the word—I know it ; but you will be found out, and by sheer force of argument you will never prevail.

I shall not make the attempt, my dear man ; but to avoid any misunderstanding occurring between us in future, let me ask, in what sense do you speak of a ruler or stronger whose interest, as you were saying, he being the superior, it is just that the inferior should execute—is he a ruler in the popular or in the strict sense of the term?

In the strictest of all senses, he said. And now cheat and play the informer if you can ; I ask no quarter at your hands. But you never will be able, never.

And do you imagine, I said, that I am such a madman as to try and cheat Thrasymachus? I might as well shave a lion.

Why, he said, you made the attempt a minute ago, and you failed.

Enough, I said, of these civilities. It will be better that I should ask you a question : Is the physician, taken in that strict sense of which you are speaking, a healer of the sick or a maker of money? And remember that I am now speaking of the true physician.

A healer of the sick, he replied.

And the pilot—that is to say, the true pilot—is he a captain of sailors or a mere sailor?

A captain of sailors.

The essential meaning of words distinguished from their attributes.

The circumstance that he sails in the ship is not to be taken into account; neither is he to be called a sailor; the name pilot by which he is distinguished has nothing to do with sailing, but is significant of his skill and of his authority over the sailors.

Very true, he said.

Now, I said, every art has an interest?

Certainly.

For which the art has to consider and provide?

Yes, that is the aim of art.

And the interest of any art is the perfection of it — this and nothing else?

What do you mean?

I mean what I may illustrate negatively by the example of the body. Suppose you were to ask me whether the body is self-sufficing or has wants, I should reply: Certainly the body has wants; for the body may be ill and require to be cured, and has therefore interests to which the art of medicine ministers; and this is the origin and intention of medicine, as you will acknowledge. Am I not right?

34<sup>2</sup> Quite right, he replied.

But is the art of medicine or any other art faulty or deficient in any quality in the same way that the eye may be deficient in sight or the ear fail of hearing, and therefore requires another art to provide for the interests of seeing and hearing — has art in itself, I say, any similar liability to fault or defect, and does every art require another supplementary art to provide for its interests, and that another and another without end? Or have the arts to look only after their own interests? Or have they no need either of themselves or of another? — having no faults or defects, they have no need to correct them, either by the exercise of their own art or of any other; they have only to consider the interest of their subject-matter. For every art remains pure and faultless while remaining true — that is to say, while perfect and unimpaired. Take the words in your precise sense, and tell me whether I am not right.

Yes, clearly.

Then medicine does not consider the interest of medicine, but the interest of the body?

*Republic I.*

SOCRATES,  
THRASYMA-  
CHUS.

Art has no im-  
perfection to  
be corrected,  
and therefore  
no extraneous  
interest.

*Illustrations.*



*Republic I.*SOCRATES,  
THRASYMA-  
CHUS.

True, he said.

Nor does the art of horsemanship consider the interests of the art of horsemanship, but the interests of the horse; neither do any other arts care for themselves, for they have no needs; they care only for that which is the subject of their art?

True, he said.

But surely, Thrasymachus, the arts are the superiors and rulers of their own subjects?

To this he assented with a good deal of reluctance.

Then, I said, no science or art considers or enjoins the interest of the stronger or superior, but only the interest of the subject and weaker?

He made an attempt to contest this proposition also, but finally acquiesced.

Then, I continued, no physician, in so far as he is a physician, considers his own good in what he prescribes, but the good of his patient; for the true physician is also a ruler having the human body as a subject, and is not a mere money-maker; that has been admitted?

Yes.

And the pilot likewise, in the strict sense of the term, is a ruler of sailors and not a mere sailor?

That has been admitted.

And such a pilot and ruler will provide and prescribe for the interest of the sailor who is under him, and not for his own or the ruler's interest?

He gave a reluctant 'Yes.'

The disinter-  
estedness of  
rulers.

Then, I said, Thrasymachus, there is no one in any rule who, in so far as he is a ruler, considers or enjoins what is for his own interest, but always what is for the interest of his subject or suitable to his art; to that he looks, and that alone he considers in everything which he says and does.

When we had got to this point in the argument, and every one saw that the definition of justice had been completely upset, Thrasymachus, instead of replying to me, said: 'Tell me, Socrates, have you got a nurse? 343

The impu-  
dence of  
Thrasyma-  
chus.

Why do you ask such a question, I said, when you ought rather to be answering?

Because she leaves you to snivel, and never wipes your



nose: she has not even taught you to know the shepherd from the sheep.

What makes you say that? I replied.

Because you fancy that the shepherd or neatherd fattens or tends the sheep or oxen with a view to their own good and not to the good of himself or his master; and you further imagine that the rulers of states, if they are true rulers, never think of their subjects as sheep, and that they are not studying their own advantage day and night. Oh, no; and so entirely astray are you in your ideas about the just and unjust as not even to know that justice and the just are in reality another's good; that is to say, the interest of the ruler and stronger, and the loss of the subject and servant; and injustice the opposite; for the unjust is lord over the truly simple and just: he is the stronger, and his subjects do what is for his interest, and minister to his happiness, which is very far from being their own. Consider further, most foolish Socrates, that the just is always a loser in comparison with the unjust. First of all, in private contracts: wherever the unjust is the partner of the just you will find that, when the partnership is dissolved, the unjust man has always more and the just less. Secondly, in their dealings with the State: when there is an income-tax, the just man will pay more and the unjust less on the same amount of income; and when there is anything to be received the one gains nothing and the other much. Observe also what happens when they take an office; there is the just man neglecting his affairs and perhaps suffering other losses, and getting nothing out of the public, because he is just; moreover he is hated by his friends and acquaintance for refusing to serve them in unlawful ways. But all this is reversed in the case of the unjust man. I am speaking, as before, of

344 injustice on a large scale in which the advantage of the unjust is most apparent; and my meaning will be most clearly seen if we turn to that highest form of injustice in which the criminal is the happiest of men, and the sufferers or those who refuse to do injustice are the most miserable — that is to say tyranny, which by fraud and force takes away the property of others, not little by little but wholesale; comprehending in one, things sacred as well as profane, private

*Republic I.*

SOCRATES,  
THRASYMA-  
CHUS.

Thrasymachus dilates upon the advantages of injustice,

especially when pursued on a great scale.

Tyranny.

*Republic I.*  
SOCRATES,  
THRASYMA-  
CHUS.

and public; for which acts of wrong, if he were detected perpetrating any one of them singly, he would be punished and incur great disgrace — they who do such wrong in particular cases are called robbers of temples, and man-stealers and burglars and swindlers and thieves. But when a man besides taking away the money of the citizens has made slaves of them, then, instead of these names of reproach, he is termed happy and blessed, not only by the citizens but by all who hear of his having achieved the consummation of injustice. For mankind censure injustice, fearing that they may be the victims of it and not because they shrink from committing it. And thus, as I have shown, Socrates, injustice, when on a sufficient scale, has more strength and freedom and mastery than justice; and, as I said at first, justice is the interest of the stronger, whereas injustice is a man's own profit and interest.

Thrasymachus having made his speech wants to run away, but is detained by the company.

Thrasymachus, when he had thus spoken, having, like a bath-man, deluged our ears with his words, had a mind to go away. But the company would not let him; they insisted that he should remain and defend his position; and I myself added my own humble request that he would not leave us. Thrasymachus, I said to him, excellent man, how suggestive are your remarks! And are you going to run away before you have fairly taught or learned whether they are true or not? Is the attempt to determine the way of man's life so small a matter in your eyes — to determine how life may be passed by each one of us to the greatest advantage?

And do I differ from you, he said, as to the importance of the enquiry?

You appear rather, I replied, to have no care or thought about us, Thrasymachus — whether we live better or worse from not knowing what you say you know, is to you a matter of indifference. Prithee, friend, do not keep your knowledge 345 to yourself; we are a large party; and any benefit which you confer upon us will be amply rewarded. For my own part I openly declare that I am not convinced, and that I do not believe injustice to be more gainful than justice, even if uncontrolled and allowed to have free play. For, granting that there may be an unjust man who is able to commit injustice either by fraud or force, still this does not convince me of the

superior advantage of injustice, and there may be others who are in the same predicament with myself. Perhaps we may be wrong; if so, you in your wisdom should convince us that we are mistaken in preferring justice to injustice.

*Republic I.*

SOCRATES,  
THRASYMA-  
CHUS.

And how am I to convince you, he said, if you are not already convinced by what I have just said; what more can I do for you? Would you have me put the proof bodily into your souls?

The swagger  
of Thrasy-  
machus.

Heaven forbid! I said; I would only ask you to be consistent; or, if you change, change openly and let there be no deception. For I must remark, Thrasymachus, if you will recall what was previously said, that although you began by defining the true physician in an exact sense, you did not observe a like exactness when speaking of the shepherd; you thought that the shepherd as a shepherd tends the sheep not with a view to their own good, but like a mere diner or banquetter with a view to the pleasures of the table; or, again, as a trader for sale in the market, and not as a shepherd. Yet surely the art of the shepherd is concerned only with the good of his subjects; he has only to provide the best for them, since the perfection of the art is already ensured whenever all the requirements of it are satisfied. And that was what I was saying just now about the ruler. I conceived that the art of the ruler, considered as ruler, whether in a state or in private life, could only regard the good of his flock or subjects; whereas you seem to think that the rulers in states, that is to say, the true rulers, like being in authority.

Think! Nay, I am sure of it.

Then why in the case of lesser offices do men never take them willingly without payment, unless under the idea that  
346 they govern for the advantage not of themselves but of others? Let me ask you a question: Are not the several arts different, by reason of their each having a separate function? And, my dear illustrious friend, do say what you think, that we may make a little progress.

The arts have  
different func-  
tions and are  
not to be con-  
founded with  
the art of pay-  
ment which is  
common to  
them all.

Yes, that is the difference, he replied.

And each art gives us a particular good and not merely a general one — medicine, for example, gives us health; navigation, safety at sea, and so on?

Yes, he said.



*Republic I.*SOCRATES,  
THRASYMA-  
CHUS.

And the art of payment has the special function of giving pay: but we do not confuse this with other arts, any more than the art of the pilot is to be confused with the art of medicine, because the health of the pilot may be improved by a sea voyage. You would not be inclined to say, would you, that navigation is the art of medicine, at least if we are to adopt your exact use of language?

Certainly not.

Or because a man is in good health when he receives pay you would not say that the art of payment is medicine?

I should not.

Nor would you say that medicine is the art of receiving pay because a man takes fees when he is engaged in healing?

Certainly not.

And we have admitted, I said, that the good of each art is specially confined to the art?

Yes.

Then, if there be any good which all artists have in common, that is to be attributed to something of which they all have the common use?

True, he replied.

And when the artist is benefited by receiving pay the advantage is gained by an additional use of the art of pay, which is not the art professed by him?

He gave a reluctant assent to this.

Then the pay is not derived by the several artists from their respective arts. But the truth is, that while the art of medicine gives health, and the art of the builder builds a house, another art attends them which is the art of pay, The various arts may be doing their own business and benefiting that over which they preside, but would the artist receive any benefit from his art unless he were paid as well?

I suppose not.

But does he therefore confer no benefit when he works for nothing?

Certainly, he confers a benefit.

Then now, Thrasymachus, there is no longer any doubt that neither arts nor governments provide for their own interests; but, as we were before saying, they rule and provide for the interests of their subjects who are the weaker

The true ruler or artist seeks, not his own advantage, but the



and not the stronger — to their good they attend and not to the good of the superior. And this is the reason, my dear Thrasymachus, why, as I was just now saying, no one is willing to govern; because no one likes to take in hand the reformation of evils which are not his concern without remuneration. For, in the execution of his work, and in giving his orders to another, the true artist does not regard his own interest, but always that of his subjects; and therefore in order that rulers may be willing to rule, they must be paid in one of three modes of payment, money, or honour, or a penalty for refusing.

*Republic I.*

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

perfection of  
his art; and  
therefore he  
must be paid.

What do you mean, Socrates? said Glaucon. The first two modes of payment are intelligible enough, but what the penalty is I do not understand, or how a penalty can be a payment.

Three modes  
of paying  
rulers, money,  
honour, and a  
penalty for re-  
fusing to rule.

You mean that you do not understand the nature of this payment which to the best men is the great inducement to rule? Of course you know that ambition and avarice are held to be, as indeed they are, a disgrace?

Very true.

And for this reason, I said, money and honour have no attraction for them; good men do not wish to be openly demanding payment for governing and so to get the name of hirelings, nor by secretly helping themselves out of the public revenues to get the name of thieves. And not being ambitious they do not care about honour. Wherefore necessity must be laid upon them, and they must be induced to serve from the fear of punishment. And this, as I imagine, is the reason why the forwardness to take office, instead of waiting to be compelled, has been deemed dishonourable. Now the worst part of the punishment is that he who refuses to rule is liable to be ruled by one who is worse than himself. And the fear of this, as I conceive, induces the good to take office, not because they would, but because they cannot help — not under the idea that they are going to have any benefit or enjoyment themselves, but as a necessity, and because they are not able to commit the task of ruling to any one who is better than themselves, or indeed as good. For there is reason to think that if a city were composed entirely of good men, then to avoid office would be as much an object of contention as to obtain office is at present; then we should

The penalty  
is the evil of  
being ruled  
by an inferior.

In a city com-  
posed wholly  
of good men  
there would  
be a great  
unwillingness  
to rule.

*Republic I.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON,  
THRASYMA-  
CHUS.Thrasyma-  
chus main-  
tains that the  
life of the un-  
just is better  
than the life  
of the just.

have plain proof that the true ruler is not meant by nature to regard his own interest, but that of his subjects; and every one who knew this would choose rather to receive a benefit from another than to have the trouble of conferring one. So far am I from agreeing with Thrasymachus that justice is the interest of the stronger. This latter question need not be further discussed at present; but when Thrasymachus says that the life of the unjust is more advantageous than that of the just, his new statement appears to me to be of a far more serious character. Which of us has spoken truly? And which sort of life, Glaucon, do you prefer?

I for my part deem the life of the just to be the more advantageous, he answered.

Did you hear all the advantages of the unjust which 348  
Thrasymachus was rehearsing?

Yes, I heard him, he replied, but he has not convinced me.

Then shall we try to find some way of convincing him, if we can, that he is saying what is not true?

Most certainly, he replied.

If, I said, he makes a set speech and we make another recounting all the advantages of being just, and he answers and we rejoin, there must be a numbering and measuring of the goods which are claimed on either side, and in the end we shall want judges to decide; but if we proceed in our enquiry as we lately did, by making admissions to one another, we shall unite the offices of judge and advocate in our own persons.

Very good, he said.

And which method do I understand you to prefer? I said.

That which you propose.

Well, then, Thrasymachus, I said, suppose you begin at the beginning and answer me. You say that perfect injustice is more gainful than perfect justice?

Yes, that is what I say, and I have given you my reasons.

And what is your view about them? Would you call one of them virtue and the other vice?

Certainly.

I suppose that you would call justice virtue and injustice vice?

What a charming notion! So likely too, seeing that I affirm injustice to be profitable and justice not.

A paradox  
still more  
extreme,

What else then would you say?

The opposite, he replied.

And would you call justice vice?

No, I would rather say sublime simplicity.

Then would you call injustice malignity?

No; I would rather say discretion.

And do the unjust appear to you to be wise and good?

Yes, he said; at any rate those of them who are able to be perfectly unjust, and who have the power of subduing states and nations; but perhaps you imagine me to be talking of cutpurses. Even this profession if undetected has advantages, though they are not to be compared with those of which I was just now speaking.

I do not think that I misapprehend your meaning, Thrasy-machus, I replied; but still I cannot hear without amazement that you class injustice with wisdom and virtue, and justice with the opposite.

Certainly, I do so class them.

349

Now, I said, you are on more substantial and almost unanswerable ground; for if the injustice which you were maintaining to be profitable had been admitted by you as by others to be vice and deformity, an answer might have been given to you on received principles; but now I perceive that you will call injustice honourable and strong, and to the unjust you will attribute all the qualities which were attributed by us before to the just, seeing that you do not hesitate to rank injustice with wisdom and virtue.

You have guessed most infallibly, he replied.

Then I certainly ought not to shrink from going through with the argument so long as I have reason to think that you, Thrasy-machus, are speaking your real mind; for I do believe that you are now in earnest and are not amusing yourself at our expense.

I may be in earnest or not, but what is that to you?—to refute the argument is your business.

Very true, I said; that is what I have to do: But will you be so good as answer yet one more question? Does the just man try to gain any advantage over the just?

Far otherwise; if he did he would not be the simple amusing creature which he is.

*Republic I.*

SOCRATES,  
THRASYMA-  
CHUS.

that injustice  
is virtue,

refuted by the  
analogy of the  
arts.



*Republic I.*SOCRATES,  
THRASYMA-  
CHUS.

And would he try to go beyond just action?

He would not.

And how would he regard the attempt to gain an advantage over the unjust; would that be considered by him as just or unjust?

He would think it just, and would try to gain the advantage; but he would not be able.

Whether he would or would not be able, I said, is not to the point. My question is only whether the just man, while refusing to have more than another just man, would wish and claim to have more than the unjust?

Yes, he would.

And what of the unjust — does he claim to have more than the just man and to do more than is just?

Of course, he said, for he claims to have more than all men.

And the unjust man will strive and struggle to obtain more than the unjust man or action, in order that he may have more than all?

True.

We may put the matter thus, I said — the just does not desire more than his like but more than his unlike, whereas the unjust desires more than both his like and his unlike?

Nothing, he said, can be better than that statement.

And the unjust is good and wise, and the just is neither?

Good again, he said.

And is not the unjust like the wise and good and the just unlike them?

Of course, he said, he who is of a certain nature, is like those who are of a certain nature; he who is not, not.

Each of them, I said, is such as his like is?

Certainly, he replied.

Very good, Thrasymachus, I said; and now to take the case of the arts: you would admit that one man is a musician and another not a musician?

Yes.

And which is wise and which is foolish?

Clearly the musician is wise, and he who is not a musician is foolish.

And he is good in as far as he is wise, and bad in as far as he is foolish?

The just tries to obtain an advantage over the unjust, but not over the just; the unjust over both just and unjust.

Illustrations.



Yes.

And you would say the same sort of thing of the physician?

Yes.

And do you think, my excellent friend, that a musician when he adjusts the lyre would desire or claim to exceed or go beyond a musician in the tightening and loosening the strings?

I do not think that he would.

But he would claim to exceed the non-musician?

Of course.

350 And what would you say of the physician? In prescribing meats and drinks would he wish to go beyond another physician or beyond the practice of medicine?

He would not.

But he would wish to go beyond the non-physician?

Yes.

And about knowledge and ignorance in general; see whether you think that any man who has knowledge ever would wish to have the choice of saying or doing more than another man who has knowledge. Would he not rather say or do the same as his like in the same case?

*Republic I.*

SOCRATES,  
THRASYMA-  
CHUS.

The artist re-  
mains within  
the limits of  
his art;

That, I suppose, can hardly be denied.

And what of the ignorant? would he not desire to have more than either the knowing or the ignorant?

I dare say.

And the knowing is wise?

Yes.

And the wise is good?

True.

Then the wise and good will not desire to gain more than his like, but more than his unlike and opposite?

I suppose so.

Whereas the bad and ignorant will desire to gain more than both?

Yes.

But did we not say, Thrasymachus, that the unjust goes beyond both his like and unlike? Were not these your words?

They were.

And you also said that the just will not go beyond his like but his unlike?

and similarly  
the just man  
does

*Republic I.*SOCRATES,  
THRASYMA-  
CHUS.not exceed  
the limits of  
other just  
men.Thrasyma-  
chus perspir-  
ing and even  
blushing.

Yes.

Then the just is like the wise and good, and the unjust like the evil and ignorant?

That is the inference.

And each of them is such as his like is?

That was admitted.

Then the just has turned out to be wise and good and the unjust evil and ignorant.

Thrasymachus made all these admissions, not fluently, as I repeat them, but with extreme reluctance; it was a hot summer's day, and the perspiration poured from him in torrents; and then I saw what I had never seen before, Thrasymachus blushing. As we were now agreed that justice was virtue and wisdom, and injustice vice and ignorance, I proceeded to another point:

Well, I said, Thrasymachus, that matter is now settled; but were we not also saying that injustice had strength; do you remember?

Yes, I remember, he said, but do not suppose that I approve of what you are saying or have no answer; if however I were to answer, you would be quite certain to accuse me of haranguing; therefore either permit me to have my say out, or if you would rather ask, do so, and I will answer 'Very good,' as they say to story-telling old women, and will nod 'Yes' and 'No.'

Certainly not, I said, if contrary to your real opinion.

Yes, he said, I will, to please you, since you will not let me speak. What else would you have?

Nothing in the world, I said; and if you are so disposed I will ask and you shall answer.

Proceed.

Then I will repeat the question which I asked before, in order that our examination of the relative nature of justice and injustice may be carried on regularly. A statement was made that injustice is stronger and more powerful than justice, but now justice, having been identified with wisdom and virtue, is easily shown to be stronger than injustice, if injustice is ignorance; this can no longer be questioned by any one. But I want to view the matter, Thrasymachus, in a different way: You would not deny that a state may be

unjust and may be unjustly attempting to enslave other states, or may have already enslaved them, and may be holding many of them in subjection?

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SOCRATES,  
THRASYMA-  
CHUS.

True, he replied; and I will add that the best and most perfectly unjust state will be most likely to do so.

I know, I said, that such was your position; but what I would further consider is, whether this power which is possessed by the superior state can exist or be exercised without justice or only with justice.

If you are right in your view, and justice is wisdom, then only with justice; but if I am right, then without justice.

At this point  
the temper of  
Thrasyma-  
chus begins  
to improve.  
Cp. 5. 450  
A, 6. 498 C.

I am delighted, Thrasy-machus, to see you not only nodding assent and dissent, but making answers which are quite excellent.

That is out of civility to you, he replied.

You are very kind, I said; and would you have the goodness also to inform me, whether you think that a state, or an army, or a band of robbers and thieves, or any other gang of evil-doers could act at all if they injured one another?

No indeed, he said, they could not.

But if they abstained from injuring one another, then they might act together better?

Yes.

And this is because injustice creates divisions and hatreds and fighting, and justice imparts harmony and friendship; is not that true, Thrasy-machus?

I agree, he said, because I do not wish to quarrel with you.

How good of you, I said; but I should like to know also whether injustice, having this tendency to arouse hatred, wherever existing, among slaves or among freemen, will not make them hate one another and set them at variance and render them incapable of common action?

Perfect in-  
justice,  
whether in  
state or indi-  
viduals, is de-  
structive to  
them.

Certainly.

And even if injustice be found in two only, will they not quarrel and fight, and become enemies to one another and to the just?

They will.

And suppose injustice abiding in a single person, would your wisdom say that she loses or that she retains her natural power?



*Republic I.*SOCRATES,  
THRASYMA-  
CHUS.

Let us assume that she retains her power.

Yet is not the power which injustice exercises of such a nature that wherever she takes up her abode, whether in a city, in an army, in a family, or in any other body, that body is, to begin with, rendered incapable of united action by reason of sedition and distraction; and does it not become its own enemy and at variance with all that opposes it, and with the just? Is not this the case? 352

Yes, certainly.

And is not injustice equally fatal when existing in a single person; in the first place rendering him incapable of action because he is not at unity with himself, and in the second place making him an enemy to himself and the just? Is not that true, Thrasymachus?

Yes.

And O my friend, I said, surely the gods are just?

Granted that they are.

But if so, the unjust will be the enemy of the gods, and the just will be their friend?

Feast away in triumph, and take your fill of the argument; I will not oppose you, lest I should displease the company.

Recapitula-  
tion.

Well then, proceed with your answers, and let me have the remainder of my repast. For we have already shown that the just are clearly wiser and better and abler than the unjust, and that the unjust are incapable of common action; nay more, that to speak as we did of men who are evil acting at any time vigorously together, is not strictly true, for if they had been perfectly evil, they would have laid hands upon one another; but it is evident that there must have been some remnant of justice in them, which enabled them to combine; if there had not been they would have injured one another as well as their victims; they were but half-villains in their enterprises; for had they been whole villains, and utterly unjust, they would have been utterly incapable of action. That, as I believe, is the truth of the matter, and not what you said at first. But whether the just have a better and happier life than the unjust is a further question which we also proposed to consider. I think that they have, and for the reasons which I have given; but still



I should like to examine further, for no light matter is at stake, nothing less than the rule of human life.

Proceed.

I will proceed by asking a question: Would you not say that a horse has some end?

I should.

And the end or use of a horse or of anything would be that which could not be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any other thing?

I do not understand, he said.

Let me explain: Can you see, except with the eye?

Certainly not.

Or hear, except with the ear?

No.

These then may be truly said to be the ends of these organs?

They may.

353 But you can cut off a vine-branch with a dagger or with a chisel, and in many other ways?

Of course.

And yet not so well as with a pruning-hook made for the purpose?

True.

May we not say that this is the end of a pruning-hook?

We may.

Then now I think you will have no difficulty in understanding my meaning when I asked the question whether the end of anything would be that which could not be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any other thing?

I understand your meaning, he said, and assent.

And that to which an end is appointed has also an excellence? Need I ask again whether the eye has an end?

It has.

And has not the eye an excellence?

Yes.

And the ear has an end and an excellence also?

True.

And the same is true of all other things; they have each of them an end and a special excellence?

That is so.

Well, and can the eyes fulfil their end if they are

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SOCRATES,  
THIRASYMA-  
CHUS.

Illustrations  
of ends and  
excellences  
preparatory  
to the enquiry  
into the end  
and excellence  
of the soul.

All things  
which have  
ends have  
also virtues  
and excel-  
lences by  
which they  
fulfil those  
ends.

*Republic I.*  
SOCRATES,  
THRASYMA-  
CHUS.

wanting in their own proper excellence and have a defect instead?

How can they, he said, if they are blind and cannot see?

You mean to say, if they have lost their proper excellence, which is sight; but I have not arrived at that point yet. I would rather ask the question more generally, and only enquire whether the things which fulfil their ends fulfil them by their own proper excellence, and fail of fulfilling them by their own defect?

Certainly, he replied.

I might say the same of the ears; when deprived of their own proper excellence they cannot fulfil their end?

True.

And the same observation will apply to all other things?

I agree.

And the soul  
has a virtue  
and an end —  
the virtue  
justice, the  
end happiness.

Well; and has not the soul an end which nothing else can fulfil? for example, to superintend and command and deliberate and the like. Are not these functions proper to the soul, and can they rightly be assigned to any other?

To no other.

And is not life to be reckoned among the ends of the soul?

Assuredly, he said.

And has not the soul an excellence also?

Yes.

And can she or can she not fulfil her own ends when deprived of that excellence?

She cannot.

Then an evil soul must necessarily be an evil ruler and superintendent, and the good soul a good ruler?

Yes, necessarily.

Hence justice  
and happiness  
are necessarily  
connected.

And we have admitted that justice is the excellence of the soul, and injustice the defect of the soul?

That has been admitted.

Then the just soul and the just man will live well, and the unjust man will live ill?

That is what your argument proves.

And he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who lives ill the reverse of happy? 354

Certainly.

Then the just is happy, and the unjust miserable?

So be it.

But happiness and not misery is profitable.

Of course.

Then, my blessed Thrasymachus, injustice can never be more profitable than justice.

Let this, Socrates, he said, be your entertainment at the Bendidea.

For which I am indebted to you, I said, now that you have grown gentle towards me and have left off scolding. Nevertheless, I have not been well entertained; but that was my own fault and not yours. As an epicure snatches a taste of every dish which is successively brought to table, he not having allowed himself time to enjoy the one before, so have I gone from one subject to another without having discovered what I sought at first, the nature of justice. I left that enquiry and turned away to consider whether justice is virtue and wisdom or evil and folly; and when there arose a further question about the comparative advantages of justice and injustice, I could not refrain from passing on to that. And the result of the whole discussion has been that I know nothing at all. For I know not what justice is, and therefore I am not likely to know whether it is or is not a virtue, nor can I say whether the just man is happy or unhappy.

*Republic I.*

SOCRATES,  
THRASYMA-  
CHUS.

Socrates is  
displeased  
with himself  
and with the  
argument.

## BOOK II.

*Republic II.*

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

WITH these words I was thinking that I had made an end Steph. 357  
of the discussion; but the end, in truth, proved to be only  
a beginning. For Glaucon, who is always the most pugnacious of men, was dissatisfied at Thrasymachus' retirement; he wanted to have the battle out. So he said to me: Socrates, do you wish really to persuade us, or only to seem to have persuaded us, that to be just is always better than to be unjust?

I should wish really to persuade you, I replied, if I could.

The threefold  
division of  
goods.

Then you certainly have not succeeded. Let me ask you now:—How would you arrange goods—are there not some which we welcome for their own sakes, and independently of their consequences, as, for example, harmless pleasures and enjoyments, which delight us at the time, although nothing follows from them?

I agree in thinking that there is such a class, I replied.

Is there not also a second class of goods, such as knowledge, sight, health, which are desirable not only in themselves, but also for their results?

Certainly, I said.

And would you not recognize a third class, such as gymnastic, and the care of the sick, and the physician's art; also the various ways of money-making—these do us good but we regard them as disagreeable; and no one would choose them for their own sakes, but only for the sake of some reward or result which flows from them?

There is, I said, this third class also. But why do you ask?

Because I want to know in which of the three classes you would place justice?

In the highest class, I replied,—among those goods which 358



he who would be happy desires both for their own sake and for the sake of their results.

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SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Then the many are of another mind; they think that justice is to be reckoned in the troublesome class, among goods which are to be pursued for the sake of rewards and of reputation, but in themselves are disagreeable and rather to be avoided.

I know, I said, that this is their manner of thinking, and that this was the thesis which Thrasymachus was maintaining just now, when he censured justice and praised injustice. But I am too stupid to be convinced by him.

I wish, he said, that you would hear me as well as him, and then I shall see whether you and I agree. For Thrasymachus seems to me, like a snake, to have been charmed by your voice sooner than he ought to have been; but to my mind the nature of justice and injustice have not yet been made clear. Setting aside their rewards and results, I want to know what they are in themselves, and how they inwardly work in the soul. If you please, then, I will revive the argument of Thrasymachus. And first I will speak of the nature and origin of justice according to the common view of them. Secondly, I will show that all men who practise justice do so against their will, of necessity, but not as a good. And thirdly, I will argue that there is reason in this view, for the life of the unjust is after all better far than the life of the just—if what they say is true, Socrates, since I myself am not of their opinion. But still I acknowledge that I am perplexed when I hear the voices of Thrasymachus and myriads of others dinning in my ears; and, on the other hand, I have never yet heard the superiority of justice to injustice maintained by any one in a satisfactory way. I want to hear justice praised in respect of itself; then I shall be satisfied, and you are the person from whom I think that I am most likely to hear this; and therefore I will praise the unjust life to the utmost of my power, and my manner of speaking will indicate the manner in which I desire to hear you too praising justice and censuring injustice. Will you say whether you approve of my proposal?

Three heads of the argument:— 1. The nature of justice: 2. Justice a necessity, but not a good: 3. The reasonableness of this notion.

Indeed I do; nor can I imagine any theme about which a man of sense would oftener wish to converse.

*Republic II.*

GLAUCON.

I am delighted, he replied, to hear you say so, and shall begin by speaking, as I proposed, of the nature and origin of justice.

Justice a compromise between doing and suffering evil.

They say that to do injustice is, by nature, good; to suffer injustice, evil; but that the evil is greater than the good. And so when men have both done and suffered injustice and have had experience of both, not being able to avoid the one 359 and obtain the other, they think that they had better agree among themselves to have neither; hence there arise laws and mutual covenants; and that which is ordained by law is termed by them lawful and just. This they affirm to be the origin and nature of justice;—it is a mean or compromise, between the best of all, which is to do injustice and not be punished, and the worst of all, which is to suffer injustice without the power of retaliation; and justice, being at a middle point between the two, is tolerated not as a good, but as the lesser evil, and honoured by reason of the inability of men to do injustice. For no man who is worthy to be called a man would ever submit to such an agreement if he were able to resist; he would be mad if he did. Such is the received account, Socrates, of the nature and origin of justice.

Now that those who practise justice do so involuntarily and because they have not the power to be unjust will best appear if we imagine something of this kind: having given both to the just and the unjust power to do what they will, let us watch and see whither desire will lead them; then we shall discover in the very act the just and unjust man to be proceeding along the same road, following their interest, which all natures deem to be their good, and are only diverted into the path of justice by the force of law. The liberty which we are supposing may be most completely given to them in the form of such a power as is said to have been possessed by Gyges, the ancestor of Croesus the Lydian<sup>1</sup>. According to the tradition, Gyges was a shepherd in the service of the king of Lydia; there was a great storm, and an earthquake made an opening in the earth at the place where he was feeding his flock. Amazed at the sight, he

The story of Gyges.

<sup>1</sup> Reading Γύγη τῷ Κροίσου τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ.

*Republic II.*

GLAUCON.

descended into the opening, where, among other marvels, he beheld a hollow brazen horse, having doors, at which he stooping and looking in saw a dead body of stature, as appeared to him, more than human, and having nothing on but a gold ring; this he took from the finger of the dead and reascended. Now the shepherds met together, according to custom, that they might send their monthly report about the flocks to the king; into their assembly he came having the ring on his finger, and as he was sitting among them he chanced to turn the collet of the ring inside his hand, when instantly he became invisible to the rest of the company and they began to speak of him as if he were no longer present.

360 He was astonished at this, and again touching the ring he turned the collet outwards and reappeared; he made several trials of the ring, and always with the same result — when he turned the collet inwards he became invisible, when outwards he reappeared. Whereupon he contrived to be chosen one of the messengers who were sent to the court; where as soon as he arrived he seduced the queen, and with her help conspired against the king and slew him, and took the kingdom. Suppose now that there were two such magic rings, and the just put on one of them and the unjust the other; no man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature that he would stand fast in justice. No man would keep his hands off what was not his own when he could safely take what he liked out of the market, or go into houses and lie with any one at his pleasure, or kill or release from prison whom he would, and in all respects be like a God among men. Then the actions of the just would be as the actions of the unjust; they would both come at last to the same point. And this we may truly affirm to be a great proof that a man is just, not willingly or because he thinks that justice is any good to him individually, but of necessity, for wherever any one thinks that he can safely be unjust, there he is unjust. For all men believe in their hearts that injustice is far more profitable to the individual than justice, and he who argues as I have been supposing, will say that they are right. If you could imagine any one obtaining this power of becoming invisible, and never doing any wrong or touching what was another's, he would be thought by the lookers-on to be a

The application of the story of Gyges.



*Republic II.*

GLAUCON.

most wretched idiot, although they would praise him to one another's faces, and keep up appearances with one another from a fear that they too might suffer injustice. Enough of this.

Now, if we are to form a real judgment of the life of the just and unjust, we must isolate them; there is no other way; and how is the isolation to be effected? I answer: Let the unjust man be entirely unjust, and the just man entirely just; nothing is to be taken away from either of them, and both are to be perfectly furnished for the work of their respective lives. First, let the unjust be like other distinguished masters of craft; like the skilful pilot or physician, who knows intuitively his own powers and keeps 361 within their limits, and who, if he fails at any point, is able to recover himself. So let the unjust make his unjust attempts in the right way, and lie hidden if he means to be great in his injustice: (he who is found out is nobody:) for the highest reach of injustice is, to be deemed just when you are not. Therefore I say that in the perfectly unjust man we must assume the most perfect injustice; there is to be no deduction, but we must allow him, while doing the most unjust acts, to have acquired the greatest reputation for justice. If he have taken a false step he must be able to recover himself; he must be one who can speak with effect, if any of his deeds come to light, and who can force his way where force is required by his courage and strength, and command of money and friends. And at his side let us place the just man in his nobleness and simplicity, wishing, as Aeschylus says, to be and not to seem good. There must be no seeming, for if he seem to be just he will be honoured and rewarded, and then we shall not know whether he is just for the sake of justice or for the sake of honours and rewards; therefore, let him be clothed in justice only, and have no other covering; and he must be imagined in a state of life the opposite of the former. Let him be the best of men, and let him be thought the worst; then he will have been put to the proof; and we shall see whether he will be affected by the fear of infamy and its consequences. And let him continue thus to the hour of death; being just and seeming to be unjust. When both have reached the uttermost extreme,

The unjust to be clothed with power and reputation.

The just to be unclothed of all but his virtue.



the one of justice and the other of injustice, let judgment be given which of them is the happier of the two. *Republic II.*

Heavens! my dear Glaucon, I said, how energetically you polish them up for the decision, first one and then the other, as if they were two statues. SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

I do my best, he said. And now that we know what they are like there is no difficulty in tracing out the sort of life which awaits either of them. This I will proceed to describe; but as you may think the description a little too coarse, I ask you to suppose, Socrates, that the words which follow are not mine.— Let me put them into the mouths of the eulogists of injustice: They will tell you that the just man who is thought unjust will be scourged, racked, bound — will have his eyes burnt out; and, at last, after suffering every kind of evil, he will be impaled: Then he will understand that he The just man  
will learn by  
each experi-  
ence that he  
ought to seem  
and not to be  
just.  
362 ought to seem only, and not to be, just; the words of Aeschylus may be more truly spoken of the unjust than of the just. For the unjust is pursuing a reality; he does not live with a view to appearances — he wants to be really unjust and not to seem only:—

‘ His mind has a soil deep and fertile,  
Out of which spring his prudent counsels <sup>1</sup>.’

In the first place, he is thought just, and therefore bears rule in the city; he can marry whom he will, and give in marriage to whom he will; also he can trade and deal where he likes, and always to his own advantage, because he has no misgivings about injustice; and at every contest, whether in public or private, he gets the better of his antagonists, and gains at their expense, and is rich, and out of his gains he can benefit his friends, and harm his enemies; moreover, he can offer sacrifices, and dedicate gifts to the gods abundantly and magnificently, and can honour the gods or any man whom he wants to honour in a far better style than the just, and therefore he is likely to be dearer than they are to the gods. And thus, Socrates, gods and men are said to unite in making the life of the unjust better than the life of the just. The unjust  
who appears  
just will at-  
tain every sort  
of prosperity.

I was going to say something in answer to Glaucon, when

<sup>1</sup> Seven against Thebes, 574.

*Republic II.* Adeimantus, his brother, interposed: Socrates, he said, you do not suppose that there is nothing more to be urged?

ADEIMANTUS,  
SOCRATES.

Why, what else is there? I answered.

The strongest point of all has not been even mentioned, he replied.

Well, then, according to the proverb, 'Let brother help brother'—if he fails in any part do you assist him; although I must confess that Glaucon has already said quite enough to lay me in the dust, and take from me the power of helping justice.

Adeimantus takes up the argument. Justice is praised and injustice blamed, but only out of regard to their consequences.

Nonsense, he replied. But let me add something more: There is another side to Glaucon's argument about the praise and censure of justice and injustice, which is equally required in order to bring out what I believe to be his meaning. Parents and tutors are always telling their sons and their wards that they are to be just; but why? not for the sake of justice, but for the sake of character and reputation; in the hope of obtaining for him who is reputed just some of those offices, marriages, and the like which Glaucon has enumerated among the advantages accruing to the unjust from the reputation of justice. More, however, is made of appearances by this class of persons than by the others; for they throw in the good opinion of the gods, and will tell you of a shower of benefits which the heavens, as they say, rain upon the pious; and this accords with the testimony of the noble Hesiod and Homer, the first of whom says, that the gods make the oaks of the just — 363

'To bear acorns at their summit, and bees in the middle;  
And the sheep are bowed down with the weight of their fleeces<sup>1</sup>,'

and many other blessings of a like kind are provided for them. And Homer has a very similar strain; for he speaks of one whose fame is —

'As the fame of some blameless king who, like a god,  
Maintains justice; to whom the black earth brings forth  
Wheat and barley, whose trees are bowed with fruit,  
And his sheep never fail to bear, and the sea gives him fish<sup>2</sup>.'

The rewards  
and

Still grander are the gifts of heaven which Musaeus and his son<sup>3</sup> vouchsafe to the just; they take them down into the

<sup>1</sup> Hesiod, Works and Days, 230. <sup>2</sup> Homer, Od. xix. 109. <sup>3</sup> Eumolpus.

world below, where they have the saints lying on couches at a feast, everlastingly drunk, crowned with garlands; their idea seems to be that an immortality of drunkenness is the highest meed of virtue. Some extend their rewards yet further; the posterity, as they say, of the faithful and just shall survive to the third and fourth generation. This is the style in which they praise justice. But about the wicked there is another strain; they bury them in a slough in Hades, and make them carry water in a sieve; also while they are yet living they bring them to infamy, and inflict upon them the punishments which Glaucon described as the portion of the just who are reputed to be unjust; nothing else does their invention supply. Such is their manner of praising the one and censuring the other.

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ADEIMANTUS.

punishments  
of another  
life.

64 Once more, Socrates, I will ask you to consider another way of speaking about justice and injustice, which is not confined to the poets, but is found in prose writers. The universal voice of mankind is always declaring that justice and virtue are honourable, but grievous and toilsome; and that the pleasures of vice and injustice are easy of attainment, and are only censured by law and opinion. They say also that honesty is for the most part less profitable than dishonesty; and they are quite ready to call wicked men happy, and to honour them both in public and private when they are rich or in any other way influential, while they despise and overlook those who may be weak and poor, even though acknowledging them to be better than the others. But most extraordinary of all is their mode of speaking about virtue and the gods: they say that the gods apportion calamity and misery to many good men, and good and happiness to the wicked. And mendicant prophets go to rich men's doors and persuade them that they have a power committed to them by the gods of making an atonement for a man's own or his ancestor's sins by sacrifices or charms, with rejoicings and feasts; and they promise to harm an enemy, whether just or unjust, at a small cost; with magic arts and incantations binding heaven, as they say, to execute their will. And the poets are the authorities to whom they appeal, now smoothing the path of vice with the words of Hesiod:—

Men are  
always re-  
peating that  
virtue is pain-  
ful and vice  
pleasant.



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ADEIMANTUS.

‘Vice may be had in abundance without trouble; the way is smooth and her dwelling-place is near. But before virtue the gods have set toil<sup>1</sup>,’

and a tedious and uphill road: then citing Homer as a witness that the gods may be influenced by men; for he also says:—

‘The gods, too, may be turned from their purpose; and men pray to them and avert their wrath by sacrifices and soothing entreaties, and by libations and the odour of fat, when they have sinned and transgressed<sup>2</sup>.’

They are taught that sins may be easily expiated.

And they produce a host of books written by Musaeus and Orpheus, who were children of the Moon and the Muses — that is what they say — according to which they perform their ritual, and persuade not only individuals, but whole cities, that expiations and atonements for sin may be made by sacrifices and amusements which fill a vacant hour, and are equally at the service of the living and the dead; the latter sort they call mysteries, and they redeem us from the pains 36 of hell, but if we neglect them no one knows what awaits us.

The effects of all this upon the youthful mind.

He proceeded: And now when the young hear all this said about virtue and vice, and the way in which gods and men regard them, how are their minds likely to be affected, my dear Socrates,—those of them, I mean, who are quickwitted and, like bees on the wing, light on every flower, and from all that they hear are prone to draw conclusions as to what manner of persons they should be and in what way they should walk if they would make the best of life? Probably the youth will say to himself in the words of Pindar —

‘Can I by justice or by crooked ways of deceit ascend a loftier tower which may be a fortress to me all my days?’

For what men say is that, if I am really just and am not also thought just, profit there is none, but the pain and loss on the other hand are unmistakeable. But if, though unjust, I acquire the reputation of justice, a heavenly life is promised to me. Since then, as philosophers prove, appearance tyrannizes over truth and is lord of happiness, to appearance I must devote myself. I will describe around me a picture and shadow of virtue to be the vestibule and exterior of my

<sup>1</sup> Hesiod, Works and Days, 287.

<sup>2</sup> Homer, Iliad, ix. 493.



house; behind I will trail the subtle and crafty fox, as Archilochus, greatest of sages, recommends. But I hear some one exclaiming that the concealment of wickedness is often difficult; to which I answer, Nothing great is easy. Nevertheless, the argument indicates this, if we would be happy, to be the path along which we should proceed. With a view to concealment we will establish secret brotherhoods and political clubs. And there are professors of rhetoric who teach the art of persuading courts and assemblies; and so, partly by persuasion and partly by force, I shall make unlawful gains and not be punished. Still I hear a voice saying that the gods cannot be deceived, neither can they be compelled. But what if there are no gods? or, suppose them to have no care of human things—why in either case should we mind about concealment? And even if there are gods, and they do care about us, yet we know of them only from tradition and the genealogies of the poets; and these are the very persons who say that they may be influenced and turned by 'sacrifices and soothing entreaties and by offerings.' Let us be consistent then, and believe both or neither. If the poets speak truly, why then we had better be unjust, and offer of the fruits of injustice; for if we are just, although we may escape the vengeance of heaven, we shall lose the gains of injustice; but, if we are unjust, we shall keep the gains, and by our sinning and praying, and praying and sinning, the gods will be propitiated, and we shall not be punished. 'But there is a world below in which either we or our posterity will suffer for our unjust deeds.' Yes, my friend, will be the reflection, but there are mysteries and atoning deities, and these have great power. That is what mighty cities declare; and the children of the gods, who were their poets and prophets, bear a like testimony.

On what principle, then, shall we any longer choose justice rather than the worst injustice? when, if we only unite the latter with a deceitful regard to appearances, we shall fare to our mind both with gods and men, in life and after death, as the most numerous and the highest authorities tell us. Knowing all this, Socrates, how can a man who has any superiority of mind or person or rank or wealth, be willing to honour justice; or indeed to refrain from laughing when he hears

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ADEIMANTUS.

The existence of the gods is only known to us through the poets, who likewise assure us that they may be bribed and that they are very ready to forgive.

*Republic II.*

ADEIMANTUS.

All this, even if not absolutely true, affords great excuse for doing wrong.

justice praised? And even if there should be some one who is able to disprove the truth of my words, and who is satisfied that justice is best, still he is not angry with the unjust, but is very ready to forgive them, because he also knows that men are not just of their own free will; unless, peradventure, there be some one whom the divinity within him may have inspired with a hatred of injustice, or who has attained knowledge of the truth — but no other man. He only blames injustice who, owing to cowardice or age or some weakness, has not the power of being unjust. And this is proved by the fact that when he obtains the power, he immediately becomes unjust as far as he can be.

Men should be taught that justice is in itself the greatest good and injustice the greatest evil.

The cause of all this, Socrates, was indicated by us at the beginning of the argument, when my brother and I told you how astonished we were to find that of all the professing panegyrists of justice — beginning with the ancient heroes of whom any memorial has been preserved to us, and ending with the men of our own time — no one has ever blamed injustice or praised justice except with a view to the glories, honours, and benefits which flow from them. No one has ever adequately described either in verse or prose the true essential nature of either of them abiding in the soul, and invisible to any human or divine eye; or shown that of all the things of a man's soul which he has within him, justice is the greatest good, and injustice the greatest evil. Had this been the universal strain, had you sought to persuade us of this from our youth upwards, we should not have been on the watch to keep one another from doing wrong, but every one would have been his own watchman, because afraid, if he did wrong, of harbouring in himself the greatest of evils. I dare say that Thrasymachus and others would seriously hold the language which I have been merely repeating, and words even stronger than these about justice and injustice, grossly, as I conceive, perverting their true nature. But I speak in this vehement manner, as I must frankly confess to you, because I want to hear from you the opposite side; and I would ask you to show not only the superiority which justice has over injustice, but what effect they have on the possessor of them which makes the one to be a good and the other an evil to him. And please, as Glaucon requested of you, to

exclude reputations; for unless you take away from each of them his true reputation and add on the false, we shall say that you do not praise justice, but the appearance of it; we shall think that you are only exhorting us to keep injustice dark, and that you really agree with Thrasymachus in thinking that justice is another's good and the interest of the stronger, and that injustice is a man's own profit and interest, though injurious to the weaker. Now as you have admitted that justice is one of that highest class of goods which are desired indeed for their results, but in a far greater degree for their own sakes—like sight or hearing or knowledge or health, or any other real and natural and not merely conventional good—I would ask you in your praise of justice to regard one point only: I mean the essential good and evil which justice and injustice work in the possessors of them. Let others praise justice and censure injustice, magnifying the rewards and honours of the one and abusing the other; that is a manner of arguing which, coming from them, I am ready to tolerate, but from you who have spent your whole life in the consideration of this question, unless I hear the contrary from your own lips, I expect something better. And therefore, I say, not only prove to us that justice is better than injustice, but show what they either of them do to the possessor of them, which makes the one to be a good and the other an evil, whether seen or unseen by gods and men.

368 I had always admired the genius of Glaucon and Adeimantus; but on hearing these words I was quite delighted, and said: Sons of an illustrious father, that was not a bad beginning of the Elegiac verses which the admirer of Glaucon made in honour of you after you had distinguished yourselves at the battle of Megara:—

‘Sons of Ariston,’ he sang, ‘divine offspring of an illustrious hero.’

The epithet is very appropriate; for there is something truly divine in being able to argue as you have done for the superiority of injustice, and remaining unconvinced by your own arguments. And I do believe that you are not convinced—this I infer from your general character, for had I judged only from your speeches I should have mistrusted you. But now, the greater my confidence in you, the greater is my

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ADEIMANTUS,  
SOCRATES.

Glaucon and Adeimantus able to argue so well, but unconvinced by their own arguments.



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SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

difficulty in knowing what to say. For I am in a strait between two; on the one hand I feel that I am unequal to the task; and my inability is brought home to me by the fact that you were not satisfied with the answer which I made to Thrasymachus, proving, as I thought, the superiority which justice has over injustice. And yet I cannot refuse to help, while breath and speech remain to me; I am afraid that there would be an impiety in being present when justice is evil spoken of and not lifting up a hand in her defence. And therefore I had best give such help as I can.

Glaucou and the rest entreated me by all means not to let the question drop, but to proceed in the investigation. They wanted to arrive at the truth, first, about the nature of justice and injustice, and secondly, about their relative advantages. I told them, what I really thought, that the enquiry would be of a serious nature, and would require very good eyes. Seeing then, I said, that we are no great wits, I think that we had better adopt a method which I may illustrate thus; suppose that a short-sighted person had been asked by some one to read small letters from a distance; and it occurred to some one else that they might be found in another place which was larger and in which the letters were larger—if they were the same and he could read the larger letters first, and then proceed to the lesser—this would have been thought a rare piece of good fortune.

Very true, said Adeimantus; but how does the illustration apply to our enquiry?

I will tell you, I replied; justice, which is the subject of our enquiry, is, as you know, sometimes spoken of as the virtue of an individual, and sometimes as the virtue of a State.

True, he replied.

And is not a State larger than an individual?

It is.

Then in the larger the quantity of justice is likely to be larger and more easily discernible. I propose therefore that we enquire into the nature of justice and injustice, first as they appear in the State, and secondly in the individual, proceeding from the greater to the lesser and comparing them.

The large  
letters, and  
the small.

Justice to be  
seen in the  
State more  
easily than in  
the individual.



That, he said, is an excellent proposal.

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And if we imagine the State in process of creation, we shall see the justice and injustice of the State in process of creation also.

SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

I dare say.

When the State is completed there may be a hope that the object of our search may be more easily discovered.

Yes, far more easily.

But ought we to attempt to construct one? I said; for to do so, as I am inclined to think, will be a very serious task. Reflect therefore.

I have reflected, said Adeimantus, and am anxious that you should proceed.

A State, I said, arises, as I conceive, out of the needs of mankind; no one is self-sufficing, but all of us have many wants. Can any other origin of a State be imagined?

The State  
arises out of  
the wants of  
men.

There can be no other.

Then, as we have many wants, and many persons are needed to supply them, one takes a helper for one purpose and another for another; and when these partners and helpers are gathered together in one habitation the body of inhabitants is termed a State.

True, he said.

And they exchange with one another, and one gives, and another receives, under the idea that the exchange will be for their good.

Very true.

Then, I said, let us begin and create in idea a State; and yet the true creator is necessity, who is the mother of our invention.

Of course, he replied.

Now the first and greatest of necessities is food, which is the condition of life and existence.

Certainly.

The second is a dwelling, and the third clothing and the like.

True.

And now let us see how our city will be able to supply this great demand: We may suppose that one man is a husbandman, another a builder, some one else a weaver—

The four or  
five greater  
needs of life,  
and the four  
or five kinds  
of citizens  
who corre-  
spond to  
them.

*Republic II.*SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

shall we add to them a shoemaker, or perhaps some other purveyor to our bodily wants?

Quite right.

The barest notion of a State must include four or five men. Clearly.

The division  
of labour.

And how will they proceed? Will each bring the result of his labours into a common stock?—the individual husbandman, for example, producing for four, and labouring four times as long and as much as he need in the provision of food with which he supplies others as well as himself; or will he have nothing to do with others and not be at the trouble of producing for them, but provide for himself alone a fourth of the food in a fourth of the time, and in the remaining three fourths of his time be employed in making a house or a coat or a pair of shoes, having no partnership with others, but supplying himself all his own wants? 37

Adeimantus thought that he should aim at producing food only and not at producing everything.

Probably, I replied, that would be the better way; and when I hear you say this, I am myself reminded that we are not all alike; there are diversities of natures among us which are adapted to different occupations.

Very true.

And will you have a work better done when the workman has many occupations, or when he has only one?

When he has only one.

Further, there can be no doubt that a work is spoilt when not done at the right time?

No doubt.

For business is not disposed to wait until the doer of the business is at leisure; but the doer must follow up what he is doing, and make the business his first object.

He must.

And if so, we must infer that all things are produced more plentifully and easily and of a better quality when one man does one thing which is natural to him and does it at the right time, and leaves other things.

Undoubtedly.

The first  
citizens are:—  
1. a husband-  
man,

Then more than four citizens will be required; for the husbandman will not make his own plough or mattock, or

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SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

2. a builder,  
3. a weaver,  
4. a shoe-maker. To these must be added:—5. a carpenter, 6. a smith, etc.,  
7. merchants,  
8. retailers.

other implements of agriculture, if they are to be good for anything. Neither will the builder make his tools — and he too needs many; and in like manner the weaver and shoemaker.

True.

Then carpenters, and smiths, and many other artisans, will be sharers in our little State, which is already beginning to grow?

True.

Yet even if we add neatherds, shepherds, and other herdsmen, in order that our husbandmen may have oxen to plough with, and builders as well as husbandmen may have draught cattle, and curriers and weavers fleeces and hides,—still our State will not be very large.

That is true; yet neither will it be a very small State which contains all these.

Then, again, there is the situation of the city — to find a place where nothing need be imported is wellnigh impossible.

Impossible.

Then there must be another class of citizens who will bring the required supply from another city?

There must.

371 But if the trader goes empty-handed, having nothing which they require who would supply his need, he will come back empty-handed.

That is certain.

And therefore what they produce at home must be not only enough for themselves, but such both in quantity and quality as to accommodate those from whom their wants are supplied.

Very true.

Then more husbandmen and more artisans will be required?

They will.

Not to mention the importers and exporters, who are called merchants?

Yes.

Then we shall want merchants?

We shall.

And if merchandise is to be carried over the sea, skilful sailors will also be needed, and in considerable numbers?

Yes, in considerable numbers.

Then, again, within the city, how will they exchange their



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ADEIMANTUS.

productions? To secure such an exchange was, as you will remember, one of our principal objects when we formed them into a society and constituted a State.

Clearly they will buy and sell.

Then they will need a market-place, and a money-token for purposes of exchange.

Certainly.

The origin of  
retail trade.

Suppose now that a husbandman, or an artisan, brings some production to market, and he comes at a time when there is no one to exchange with him,—is he to leave his calling and sit idle in the market-place?

Not at all; he will find people there who, seeing the want, undertake the office of salesmen. In well-ordered states they are commonly those who are the weakest in bodily strength, and therefore of little use for any other purpose; their duty is to be in the market, and to give money in exchange for goods to those who desire to sell and to take money from those who desire to buy.

This want, then, creates a class of retail-traders in our State. Is not 'retailer' the term which is applied to those who sit in the market-place engaged in buying and selling, while those who wander from one city to another are called merchants?

Yes, he said.

And there is another class of servants, who are intellectually hardly on the level of companionship; still they have plenty of bodily strength for labour, which accordingly they sell, and are called, if I do not mistake, hirelings, hire being the name which is given to the price of their labour.

True.

Then hirelings will help to make up our population?

Yes.

And now, Adeimantus, is our State matured and perfected?

I think so.

Where, then, is justice, and where is injustice, and in what part of the State did they spring up?

Probably in the dealings of these citizens with one another. 37<sup>2</sup>  
I cannot imagine that they are more likely to be found any where else.

I dare say that you are right in your suggestion, I said;



we had better think the matter out, and not shrink from the enquiry.

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SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

A picture of  
primitive life.

Let us then consider, first of all, what will be their way of life, now that we have thus established them. Will they not produce corn, and wine, and clothes, and shoes, and build houses for themselves? And when they are housed, they will work, in summer, commonly, stripped and barefoot, but in winter substantially clothed and shod. They will feed on barley-meal and flour of wheat, baking and kneading them, making noble cakes and loaves; these they will serve up on a mat of reeds or on clean leaves, themselves reclining the while upon beds strewn with yew or myrtle. And they and their children will feast, drinking of the wine which they have made, wearing garlands on their heads, and hymning the praises of the gods, in happy converse with one another. And they will take care that their families do not exceed their means; having an eye to poverty or war.

But, said Glaucon, interposing, you have not given them a relish to their meal.

True, I replied, I had forgotten; of course they must have a relish — salt, and olives, and cheese, and they will boil roots and herbs such as country people prepare; for a dessert we shall give them figs, and peas, and beans; and they will roast myrtle-berries and acorns at the fire, drinking in moderation. And with such a diet they may be expected to live in peace and health to a good old age, and bequeath a similar life to their children after them.

Yes, Socrates, he said, and if you were providing for a city of pigs, how else would you feed the beasts?

But what would you have, Glaucon? I replied.

Why, he said, you should give them the ordinary conveniences of life. People who are to be comfortable are accustomed to lie on sofas, and dine off tables, and they should have sauces and sweets in the modern style.

Yes, I said, now I understand: the question which you would have me consider is, not only how a State, but how a luxurious State is created; and possibly there is no harm in this, for in such a State we shall be more likely to see how justice and injustice originate. In my opinion the true and healthy constitution of the State is the one which I have

A luxurious  
State must be  
called into  
existence,

*Republic II.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

described. But if you wish also to see a State at fever-heat, I have no objection. For I suspect that many will not be satisfied with the simpler way of life. They will be for adding 373  
sofas, and tables, and other furniture; also dainties, and perfumes, and incense, and courtesans, and cakes, all these not of one sort only, but in every variety; we must go beyond the necessities of which I was at first speaking, such as houses, and clothes, and shoes: the arts of the painter and the embroiderer will have to be set in motion, and gold and ivory and all sorts of materials must be procured.

True, he said.

and in this  
many new  
callings will  
be required.

Then we must enlarge our borders; for the original healthy State is no longer sufficient. Now will the city have to fill and swell with a multitude of callings which are not required by any natural want; such as the whole tribe of hunters and actors, of whom one large class have to do with forms and colours; another will be the votaries of music — poets and their attendant train of rhapsodists, players, dancers, contractors; also makers of divers kinds of articles, including women's dresses. And we shall want more servants. Will not tutors be also in request, and nurses wet and dry, tirewomen and barbers, as well as confectioners and cooks; and swineherds, too, who were not needed and therefore had no place in the former edition of our State, but are needed now? They must not be forgotten: and there will be animals of many other kinds, if people eat them.

Certainly.

And living in this way we shall have much greater need of physicians than before?

Much greater.

And the country which was enough to support the original inhabitants will be too small now, and not enough?

Quite true.

The territory  
of our State  
must be en-  
larged; and  
hence will  
arise war be-  
tween us and  
our neigh-  
bours.

Then a slice of our neighbours' land will be wanted by us for pasture and tillage, and they will want a slice of ours, if, like ourselves, they exceed the limit of necessity, and give themselves up to the unlimited accumulation of wealth?

That, Socrates, will be inevitable.

And so we shall go to war, Glaucon. Shall we not?

Most certainly, he replied.

Then, without determining as yet whether war does good or harm, thus much we may affirm, that now we have discovered war to be derived from causes which are also the causes of almost all the evils in States, private as well as public.

Undoubtedly.

374 And our State must once more enlarge; and this time the enlargement will be nothing short of a whole army, which will have to go out and fight with the invaders for all that we have, as well as for the things and persons whom we were describing above.

Why? he said; are they not capable of defending themselves?

No, I said; not if we were right in the principle which was acknowledged by all of us when we were framing the State: the principle, as you will remember, was that one man cannot practise many arts with success.

Very true, he said.

But is not war an art?

Certainly.

And an art requiring as much attention as shoemaking?

Quite true.

And the shoemaker was not allowed by us to be a husbandman, or a weaver, or a builder — in order that we might have our shoes well made; but to him and to every other worker was assigned one work for which he was by nature fitted, and at that he was to continue working all his life long and at no other; he was not to let opportunities slip, and then he would become a good workman. Now nothing can be more important than that the work of a soldier should be well done. But is war an art so easily acquired that a man may be a warrior who is also a husbandman, or shoemaker, or other artisan; although no one in the world would be a good dice or draught player who merely took up the game as a recreation, and had not from his earliest years devoted himself to this and nothing else? No tools will make a man a skilled workman, or master of defence, nor be of any use to him who has not learned how to handle them, and has never bestowed any attention upon them. How then will he who takes up a shield or other implement of war become a good

*Republic II.*

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

War is an art, and as no art can be pursued with success unless a man's whole attention is devoted to it, a soldier cannot be allowed to exercise any calling but his own.

The warrior's art requires a long apprenticeship and many natural gifts.



*Republic II.*  
 SOCRATES,  
 GLAUCON.

fighter all in a day, whether with heavy-armed or any other kind of troops?

Yes, he said, the tools which would teach men their own use would be beyond price.

And the higher the duties of the guardian, I said, the more time, and skill, and art, and application will be needed by him?

No doubt, he replied.

Will he not also require natural aptitude for his calling?

Certainly.

The selection  
 of guardians.

Then it will be our duty to select, if we can, natures which are fitted for the task of guarding the city?

It will.

And the selection will be no easy matter, I said; but we must be brave and do our best.

We must.

Is not the noble youth very like a well-bred dog in respect of guarding and watching? 37

What do you mean?

I mean that both of them ought to be quick to see, and swift to overtake the enemy when they see him; and strong too if, when they have caught him, they have to fight with him.

All these qualities, he replied, will certainly be required by them.

Well, and your guardian must be brave if he is to fight well?

Certainly.

And is he likely to be brave who has no spirit, whether horse or dog or any other animal? Have you never observed how invincible and unconquerable is spirit and how the presence of it makes the soul of any creature to be absolutely fearless and indomitable?

I have.

Then now we have a clear notion of the bodily qualities which are required in the guardian.

True.

And also of the mental ones; his soul is to be full of spirit?

Yes.

But are not these spirited natures apt to be savage with one another, and with everybody else?



A difficulty by no means easy to overcome, he replied.

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Whereas, I said, they ought to be dangerous to their enemies, and gentle to their friends; if not, they will destroy themselves without waiting for their enemies to destroy them.

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

True, he said.

What is to be done then? I said; how shall we find a gentle nature which has also a great spirit, for the one is the contradiction of the other?

True.

He will not be a good guardian who is wanting in either of these two qualities; and yet the combination of them appears to be impossible; and hence we must infer that to be a good guardian is impossible.

The guardian must unite the opposite qualities of gentleness and spirit.

I am afraid that what you say is true, he replied.

Here feeling perplexed I began to think over what had preceded.—My friend, I said, no wonder that we are in a perplexity; for we have lost sight of the image which we had before us.

What do you mean? he said.

I mean to say that there do exist natures gifted with those opposite qualities.

And where do you find them?

Many animals, I replied, furnish examples of them; our friend the dog is a very good one: you know that well-bred dogs are perfectly gentle to their familiars and acquaintances, and the reverse to strangers.

Such a combination may be observed in the dog.

Yes, I know.

Then there is nothing impossible or out of the order of nature in our finding a guardian who has a similar combination of qualities?

Certainly not.

Would not he who is fitted to be a guardian, besides the spirited nature, need to have the qualities of a philosopher?

I do not apprehend your meaning.

376 The trait of which I am speaking, I replied, may be also seen in the dog, and is remarkable in the animal.

What trait?

Why, a dog, whenever he sees a stranger, is angry; when an acquaintance, he welcomes him, although the one has

The dog distinguishes

*Republic II.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON,  
ADEIMANTUS.friend and  
enemy by the  
criterion of  
knowing and  
not knowing:

never done him any harm, nor the other any good. Did this never strike you as curious?

The matter never struck me before; but I quite recognise the truth of your remark.

And surely this instinct of the dog is very charming;—your dog is a true philosopher.

Why?

Why, because he distinguishes the face of a friend and of an enemy only by the criterion of knowing and not knowing. And must not an animal be a lover of learning who determines what he likes and dislikes by the test of knowledge and ignorance?

Most assuredly.

whereby he is  
shown to be a  
philosopher.

And is not the love of learning the love of wisdom, which is philosophy?

They are the same, he replied.

And may we not say confidently of man also, that he who is likely to be gentle to his friends and acquaintances, must by nature be a lover of wisdom and knowledge?

That we may safely affirm.

Then he who is to be a really good and noble guardian of the State will require to unite in himself philosophy and spirit and swiftness and strength?

Undoubtedly.

How are our  
citizens to be  
reared and  
educated?

Then we have found the desired natures; and now that we have found them, how are they to be reared and educated? Is not this an enquiry which may be expected to throw light on the greater enquiry which is our final end—How do justice and injustice grow up in States? for we do not want either to omit what is to the point or to draw out the argument to an inconvenient length.

Adeimantus thought that the enquiry would be of great service to us.

Then, I said, my dear friend, the task must not be given up, even if somewhat long.

Certainly not.

Come then, and let us pass a leisure hour in story-telling, and our story shall be the education of our heroes.

By all means.

And what shall be their education? Can we find a better

than the traditional sort?—and this has two divisions, gymnastic for the body, and music for the soul. *Republic II.*

True.

Shall we begin education with music, and go on to gymnastic afterwards? *Education divided into gymnastic for the body and music for the soul. Music includes literature, which may be true or false.*

By all means.

And when you speak of music, do you include literature or not?

I do.

And literature may be either true or false?

Yes.

377 And the young should be trained in both kinds, and we begin with the false?

I do not understand your meaning, he said.

You know, I said, that we begin by telling children stories which, though not wholly destitute of truth, are in the main fictitious; and these stories are told them when they are not of an age to learn gymnastics.

Very true.

That was my meaning when I said that we must teach music before gymnastics.

Quite right, he said.

You know also that the beginning is the most important part of any work, especially in the case of a young and tender thing; for that is the time at which the character is being formed and the desired impression is more readily taken. *The beginning the most important part of education.*

Quite true.

And shall we just carelessly allow children to hear any casual tales which may be devised by casual persons, and to receive into their minds ideas for the most part the very opposite of those which we should wish them to have when they are grown up?

We cannot.

Then the first thing will be to establish a censorship of the writers of fiction, and let the censors receive any tale of fiction which is good, and reject the bad; and we will desire mothers and nurses to tell their children the authorised ones only. Let them fashion the mind with such tales, even more fondly than they mould the body with their hands; but most of those which are now in use must be discarded. *Works of fiction to be placed under a censorship.*



*Republic II.*SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

Of what tales are you speaking? he said.

You may find a model of the lesser in the greater, I said; for they are necessarily of the same type, and there is the same spirit in both of them.

Very likely, he replied; but I do not as yet know what you would term the greater.

Homer and Hesiod are tellers of bad lies, that is to say, they give false representations of the gods,

Those, I said, which are narrated by Homer and Hesiod, and the rest of the poets, who have ever been the great story-tellers of mankind.

But which stories do you mean, he said; and what fault do you find with them?

A fault which is most serious, I said; the fault of telling a lie, and, what is more, a bad lie.

But when is this fault committed?

Whenever an erroneous representation is made of the nature of gods and heroes,—as when a painter paints a portrait not having the shadow of a likeness to the original.

Yes, he said, that sort of thing is certainly very blameable; but what are the stories which you mean?

First of all, I said, there was that greatest of all lies in high places, which the poet told about Uranus, and which was a bad lie too,—I mean what Hesiod says that Uranus did, and how Cronus retaliated on him<sup>1</sup>. The doings of Cronus, and the sufferings which in turn his son inflicted upon him, even if they were true, ought certainly not to be lightly told to young and thoughtless persons; if possible, they had better be buried in silence. But if there is an absolute necessity for their mention, a chosen few might hear them in a mystery, and they should sacrifice not a common [Eleusinian] pig, but some huge and unprocurable victim; and then the number of the hearers will be very few indeed. 378

Why, yes, said he, those stories are extremely objectionable.

which have a bad effect on the minds of youth.

Yes, Adeimantus, they are stories not to be repeated in our State; the young man should not be told that in committing the worst of crimes he is far from doing anything outrageous; and that even if he chastises his father when he does wrong, in whatever manner, he will only be following the example of the first and greatest among the gods.

<sup>1</sup> Hesiod, *Theogony*, 154, 459.



I entirely agree with you, he said; in my opinion those stories are quite unfit to be repeated.

Neither, if we mean our future guardians to regard the habit of quarrelling among themselves as of all things the basest, should any word be said to them of the wars in heaven, and of the plots and fightings of the gods against one another, for they are not true. No, we shall never mention the battles of the giants, or let them be embroidered on garments; and we shall be silent about the innumerable other quarrels of gods and heroes with their friends and relatives. If they would only believe us we would tell them that quarrelling is unholy, and that never up to this time has there been any quarrel between citizens; this is what old men and old women should begin by telling children; and when they grow up, the poets also should be told to compose for them in a similar spirit<sup>1</sup>. But the narrative of Hephaestus binding Here his mother, or how on another occasion Zeus sent him flying for taking her part when she was being beaten, and all the battles of the gods in Homer—these tales must not be admitted into our State, whether they are supposed to have an allegorical meaning or not. For a young person cannot judge what is allegorical and what is literal; anything that he receives into his mind at that age is likely to become indelible and unalterable; and therefore it is most important that the tales which the young first hear should be models of virtuous thoughts.

There you are right, he replied; but if any one asks where are such models to be found and of what tales are you speaking—how shall we answer him?

379 I said to him, You and I, Adeimantus, at this moment are not poets, but founders of a State: now the founders of a State ought to know the general forms in which poets should cast their tales, and the limits which must be observed by them, but to make the tales is not their business.

Very true, he said; but what are these forms of theology which you mean?

Something of this kind, I replied:—God is always to be represented as he truly is, whatever be the sort of poetry, epic, lyric or tragic, in which the representation is given.

Right.

<sup>1</sup> Placing the comma after *γρᾱνσί*, and not after *γίγνομένοις*.

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SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

The stories about the quarrels of the gods and their evil behaviour to one another are untrue.

And allegorical interpretations of them are not understood by the young.

God is to be represented as he truly is.

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ADEIMANTUS.

And is he not truly good? and must he not be represented  
as such?

Certainly.

And no good thing is hurtful?

No, indeed.

And that which is not hurtful hurts not?

Certainly not.

And that which hurts not does no evil?

No.

And can that which does no evil be a cause of evil?

Impossible.

And the good is advantageous?

Yes.

And therefore the cause of well-being?

Yes.

It follows therefore that the good is not the cause of  
all things, but of the good only?

Assuredly.

God, if he be  
good, is the  
author of good  
only.

Then God, if he be good, is not the author of all things, as  
the many assert, but he is the cause of a few things only, and  
not of most things that occur to men. For few are the goods  
of human life, and many are the evils, and the good is to be  
attributed to God alone; of the evils the causes are to be  
sought elsewhere, and not in him.

That appears to me to be most true, he said.

The fictions  
of the poets.

Then we must not listen to Homer or to any other poet who  
is guilty of the folly of saying that two casks

‘Lie at the threshold of Zeus, full of lots, one of good, the other of  
evil lots <sup>1</sup>,’

and that he to whom Zeus gives a mixture of the two

‘Sometimes meets with evil fortune, at other times with good;’

but that he to whom is given the cup of unmingled ill,

‘Him wild hunger drives o’er the beauteous earth.’

And again —

‘Zeus, who is the dispenser of good and evil to us.’

And if any one asserts that the violation of oaths and treaties,

<sup>1</sup> Iliad xxiv. 527.

which was really the work of Pandarus<sup>1</sup>, was brought about by Athene and Zeus, or that the strife and contention of the gods was instigated by Themis and Zeus<sup>2</sup>, he shall not have our approval; neither will we allow our young men to hear the words of Aeschylus, that

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ADEIMANTUS.

80 'God plants guilt among men when he desires utterly to destroy a house.'

And if a poet writes of the sufferings of Niobe — the subject of the tragedy in which these iambic verses occur — or of the house of Pelops, or of the Trojan war or on any similar theme, either we must not permit him to say that these are the works of God, or if they are of God, he must devise some explanation of them such as we are seeking: he must say that God did what was just and right, and they were the better for being punished; but that those who are punished are miserable, and that God is the author of their misery — the poet is not to be permitted to say; though he may say that the wicked are miserable because they require to be punished, and are benefited by receiving punishment from God; but that God being good is the author of evil to any one is to be strenuously denied, and not to be said or sung or heard in verse or prose by any one whether old or young in any well-ordered commonwealth. Such a fiction is suicidal, ruinous, impious.

Only that evil which is of the nature of punishment to be attributed to God.

I agree with you, he replied, and am ready to give my assent to the law.

Let this then be one of our rules and principles concerning the gods, to which our poets and reciters will be expected to conform,—that God is not the author of all things, but of good only.

That will do, he said.

And what do you think of a second principle? Shall I ask you whether God is a magician, and of a nature to appear insidiously now in one shape, and now in another — sometimes himself changing and passing into many forms, sometimes deceiving us with the semblance of such transformations; or is he one and the same immutably fixed in his own proper image?

<sup>1</sup> *Iliad* ii. 69.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.* xx.



*Republic II.*SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.Things must  
be changed  
either by  
another or by  
themselves.

I cannot answer you, he said, without more thought.

Well, I said; but if we suppose a change in anything, that change must be effected either by the thing itself, or by some other thing?

Most certainly.

And things which are at their best are also least liable to be altered or discomposed; for example, when healthiest and strongest, the human frame is least liable to be affected by meats and drinks, and the plant which is in the fullest vigour also suffers least from winds or the heat of the sun or any similar causes.

Of course.

And will not the bravest and wisest soul be least confused 381  
or deranged by any external influence?

True.

And the same principle, as I should suppose, applies to all composite things—furniture, houses, garments: when good and well made, they are least altered by time and circumstances.

Very true.

Then everything which is good, whether made by art or nature, or both, is least liable to suffer change from without?

True.

But surely God and the things of God are in every way perfect?

Of course they are.

Then he can hardly be compelled by external influence to take many shapes?

He cannot.

But may he not change and transform himself?

Clearly, he said, that must be the case if he is changed at all.

And will he then change himself for the better and fairer, or for the worse and more unsightly?

If he change at all he can only change for the worse, for we cannot suppose him to be deficient either in virtue or beauty.

Very true, Adeimantus; but then, would any one, whether God or man, desire to make himself worse?

Impossible.

Then it is impossible that God should ever be willing to

But God  
cannot be  
changed by  
other; and  
will not be  
changed by  
himself.



change; being, as is supposed, the fairest and best that is conceivable, every God remains absolutely and for ever in his own form.

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SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

That necessarily follows, he said, in my judgment.

Then, I said, my dear friend, let none of the poets tell us that

‘The gods, taking the disguise of strangers from other lands, walk up and down cities in all sorts of forms<sup>1</sup>;’

and let no one slander Proteus and Thetis, neither let any one, either in tragedy or in any other kind of poetry, introduce Here disguised in the likeness of a priestess asking an alms

‘For the life-giving daughters of Inachus the river of Argos;’

—let us have no more lies of that sort. Neither must we have mothers under the influence of the poets scaring their children with a bad version of these myths—telling how certain gods, as they say, ‘Go about by night in the likeness of so many strangers and in divers forms;’ but let them take heed lest they make cowards of their children, and at the same time speak blasphemy against the gods.

Heaven forbid, he said.

But although the gods are themselves unchangeable, still by witchcraft and deception they may make us think that they appear in various forms?

Perhaps, he replied.

Well, but can you imagine that God will be willing to lie, whether in word or deed, or to put forth a phantom of himself?

Nor will he make any false representation of himself.

382 I cannot say, he replied.

Do you not know, I said, that the true lie, if such an expression may be allowed, is hated of gods and men?

What do you mean? he said.

I mean that no one is willingly deceived in that which is the truest and highest part of himself, or about the truest and highest matters; there, above all, he is most afraid of a lie having possession of him.

<sup>1</sup> Hom. Od. xvii. 485.

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ADEIMANTUS.

Still, he said, I do not comprehend you.

The reason is, I replied, that you attribute some profound meaning to my words; but I am only saying that deception, or being deceived or uninformed about the highest realities in the highest part of themselves, which is the soul, and in that part of them to have and to hold the lie, is what mankind least like;—that, I say, is what they utterly detest.

There is nothing more hateful to them.

And, as I was just now remarking, this ignorance in the soul of him who is deceived may be called the true lie; for the lie in words is only a kind of imitation and shadowy image of a previous affection of the soul, not pure unadulterated falsehood. Am I not right?

Perfectly right.

The true lie is hated not only by the gods, but also by men?

Yes.

Whereas the lie in words is in certain cases useful and not hateful; in dealing with enemies—that would be an instance; or again, when those whom we call our friends in a fit of madness or illusion are going to do some harm, then it is useful and is a sort of medicine or preventive; also in the tales of mythology, of which we were just now speaking—because we do not know the truth about ancient times, we make falsehood as much like truth as we can, and so turn it to account.

Very true, he said.

But can any of these reasons apply to God? Can we suppose that he is ignorant of antiquity, and therefore has recourse to invention?

That would be ridiculous, he said.

Then the lying poet has no place in our idea of God?

I should say not.

Or perhaps he may tell a lie because he is afraid of enemies?

That is inconceivable.

But he may have friends who are senseless or mad?

But no mad or senseless person can be a friend of God.

Then no motive can be imagined why God should lie?

None whatever.

The true lie is equally hated both by gods and men; the remedial or preventive lie is comparatively innocent, but God can have no need of it.

Then the superhuman and divine is absolutely incapable of falsehood? *Republic II.*

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ADEIMANTUS.

Yes.

Then is God perfectly simple and true both in word and deed<sup>1</sup>; he changes not; he deceives not, either by sign or word, by dream or waking vision.

383 Your thoughts, he said, are the reflection of my own.

You agree with me then, I said, that this is the second type or form in which we should write and speak about divine things. The gods are not magicians who transform themselves, neither do they deceive mankind in any way.

I grant that.

Then, although we are admirers of Homer, we do not . admire the lying dream which Zeus sends to Agamemnon; neither will we praise the verses of Aeschylus in which Thetis says that Apollo at her nuptials

Away then  
with the false-  
hoods of the  
poets!

'Was celebrating in song her fair progeny whose days were to be long, and to know no sickness. And when he had spoken of my lot as in all things blessed of heaven he raised a note of triumph and cheered my soul. And I thought that the word of Phoebus, being divine and full of prophecy, would not fail. And now he himself who uttered the strain, he who was present at the banquet, and who said this — he it is who has slain my son<sup>2</sup>.'

These are the kind of sentiments about the gods which will arouse our anger; and he who utters them shall be refused a chorus; neither shall we allow teachers to make use of them in the instruction of the young, meaning, as we do, that our guardians, as far as men can be, should be true worshippers of the gods and like them.

I entirely agree, he said, in these principles, and promise to make them my laws.

<sup>1</sup> Omitting *κατὰ φαντασίας*.

<sup>2</sup> From a lost play.

## BOOK III.

*Republic III.*

SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

The discour-  
aging lessons  
of mythology.

SUCH then, I said, are our principles of theology — some **Steph.** tales are to be told, and others are not to be told to our <sup>386</sup> disciples from their youth upwards, if we mean them to honour the gods and their parents, and to value friendship with one another.

Yes; and I think that our principles are right, he said.

But if they are to be courageous, must they not learn other lessons besides these, and lessons of such a kind as will take away the fear of death? Can any man be courageous who has the fear of death in him?

Certainly not, he said.

And can he be fearless of death, or will he choose death in battle rather than defeat and slavery, who believes the world below to be real and terrible?

Impossible.

The descrip-  
tion of the  
world below  
in Homer.

Then we must assume a control over the narrators of this class of tales as well as over the others, and beg them not simply to revile, but rather to commend the world below, intimating to them that their descriptions are untrue, and will do harm to our future warriors.

That will be our duty, he said.

Then, I said, we shall have to obliterate many obnoxious passages, beginning with the verses,

‘ I would rather be a serf on the land of a poor and portionless man than rule over all the dead who have come to nought <sup>1</sup>.’

We must also expunge the verse, which tells us how Pluto feared,

‘ Lest the mansions grim and squalid which the gods abhor should be seen both of mortals and immortals <sup>2</sup>.’

<sup>1</sup> Od. xi. 489.

<sup>2</sup> Il. xx. 64.



And again:—

‘O heavens! verily in the house of Hades there is soul and ghostly form but no mind at all<sup>1</sup>!’

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SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

Again of Tiresias:—

‘[To him even after death did Persephone grant mind,] that he alone should be wise; but the other souls are flitting shades<sup>2</sup>.’

Again:—

‘The soul flying from the limbs had gone to Hades, lamenting her fate, leaving manhood and youth<sup>3</sup>.’

Again:—

387 ‘And the soul, with shrilling cry, passed like smoke beneath the earth<sup>4</sup>.’

And,—

‘As bats in hollow of mystic cavern, whenever any of them has dropped out of the string and falls from the rock, fly shrilling and cling to one another, so did they with shrilling cry hold together as they moved<sup>5</sup>.’

And we must beg Homer and the other poets not to be angry if we strike out these and similar passages, not because they are unpoetical, or unattractive to the popular ear, but because the greater the poetical charm of them, the less are they meet for the ears of boys and men who are meant to be free, and who should fear slavery more than death.

Such tales to  
be rejected.

Undoubtedly.

Also we shall have to reject all the terrible and appalling names which describe the world below — Cocytus and Styx, ghosts under the earth, and sapless shades, and any similar words of which the very mention causes a shudder to pass through the inmost soul of him who hears them. I do not say that these horrible stories may not have a use of some kind; but there is a danger that the nerves of our guardians may be rendered too excitable and effeminate by them.

There is a real danger, he said.

Then we must have no more of them.

True.

Another and a nobler strain must be composed and sung by us.

<sup>1</sup> Il. xxiii. 103.

<sup>2</sup> Od. x. 495.

<sup>3</sup> Il. xvi. 856.

<sup>4</sup> Ib. xxiii. 100.

<sup>5</sup> Od. xxiv. 6.

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ADEIMANTUS.

The effeminate and pitiful strains of famous men, and yet more of the gods, must also be banished.

Clearly.

And shall we proceed to get rid of the weepings and wailings of famous men?

They will go with the rest.

But shall we be right in getting rid of them? Reflect: our principle is that the good man will not consider death terrible to any other good man who is his comrade.

Yes; that is our principle.

And therefore he will not sorrow for his departed friend as though he had suffered anything terrible?

He will not.

Such an one, as we further maintain, is sufficient for himself and his own happiness, and therefore is least in need of other men.

True, he said.

And for this reason the loss of a son or brother, or the deprivation of fortune, is to him of all men least terrible.

Assuredly.

And therefore he will be least likely to lament, and will bear with the greatest equanimity any misfortune of this sort which may befall him.

Yes, he will feel such a misfortune far less than another.

Then we shall be right in getting rid of the lamentations of famous men, and making them over to women (and not even to women who are good for anything), or to men of a 388 baser sort, that those who are being educated by us to be the defenders of their country may scorn to do the like.

That will be very right.

Such are the laments of Achilles, and Priam,

Then we will once more entreat Homer and the other poets not to depict Achilles<sup>1</sup>, who is the son of a goddess, first lying on his side, then on his back, and then on his face; then starting up and sailing in a frenzy along the shores of the barren sea; now taking the sooty ashes in both his hands<sup>2</sup> and pouring them over his head, or weeping and wailing in the various modes which Homer has delineated. Nor should he describe Priam the kinsman of the gods as praying and beseeching,' Rolling in the dirt, calling each man loudly by his name<sup>3</sup>.'

Il. xxiv. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Ib. xviii. 23.<sup>3</sup> Ib. xxii. 414.

Still more earnestly will we beg of him at all events not to introduce the gods lamenting and saying, *Republic III.*

‘Alas! my misery! Alas! that I bore the bravest to my sorrow <sup>1</sup>.’

But if he must introduce the gods, at any rate let him not dare so completely to misrepresent the greatest of the gods, as to make him say — *SOCRATES, ADEIMANTUS.*  
and of Zeus when he beholds the fate of Hector or Sarpedon.

‘O heavens! with my eyes verily I behold a dear friend of mine chased round and round the city, and my heart is sorrowful <sup>2</sup>.’

Or again:—

‘Woe is me that I am fated to have Sarpedon, dearest of men to me, subdued at the hands of Patroclus the son of Menoetius <sup>3</sup>.’

For if, my sweet Adeimantus, our youth seriously listen to such unworthy representations of the gods, instead of laughing at them as they ought, hardly will any of them deem that he himself, being but a man, can be dishonoured by similar actions; neither will he rebuke any inclination which may arise in his mind to say and do the like. And instead of having any shame or self-control, he will be always whining and lamenting on slight occasions.

Yes, he said, that is most true.

Yes, I replied; but that surely is what ought not to be, as the argument has just proved to us; and by that proof we must abide until it is disproved by a better.

It ought not to be.

Neither ought our guardians to be given to laughter. For a fit of laughter which has been indulged to excess almost always produces a violent reaction.

So I believe.

Then persons of worth, even if only mortal men, must not be represented as overcome by laughter, and still less must such a representation of the gods be allowed.

389 Still less of the gods, as you say, he replied.

Then we shall not suffer such an expression to be used about the gods as that of Homer when he describes how

‘Inextinguishable laughter arose among the blessed gods, when they saw Hephaestus bustling about the mansion <sup>4</sup>.’

On your views, we must not admit them.

Neither are the guardians to be encouraged to laugh by the example of the gods.

<sup>1</sup> Il. xviii. 54.

<sup>2</sup> Ib. xxii. 168.

<sup>3</sup> Ib. xvi. 433.

<sup>4</sup> Ib. i. 599.



*Republic III.*SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.Our youth  
must be  
truthful,

On my views, if you like to father them on me; that we must not admit them is certain.

Again, truth should be highly valued; if, as we were saying, a lie is useless to the gods, and useful only as a medicine to men, then the use of such medicines should be restricted to physicians; private individuals have no business with them.

Clearly not, he said.

Then if any one at all is to have the privilege of lying, the rulers of the State should be the persons; and they, in their dealings either with enemies or with their own citizens, may be allowed to lie for the public good. But nobody else should meddle with anything of the kind; and although the rulers have this privilege, for a private man to lie to them in return is to be deemed a more heinous fault than for the patient or the pupil of a gymnasium not to speak the truth about his own bodily illnesses to the physician or to the trainer, or for a sailor not to tell the captain what is happening about the ship and the rest of the crew, and how things are going with himself or his fellow sailors.

Most true, he said.

If, then, the ruler catches anybody beside himself lying in the State,

‘Any of the craftsmen, whether he be priest or physician or carpenter<sup>1</sup>,’

he will punish him for introducing a practice which is equally subversive and destructive of ship or State.

Most certainly, he said, if our idea of the State is ever carried out<sup>2</sup>.

and also  
temperate.

In the next place our youth must be temperate?

Certainly.

Are not the chief elements of temperance, speaking generally, obedience to commanders and self-control in sensual pleasures?

True.

Then we shall approve such language as that of Diomedes in Homer,

‘Friend, sit still and obey my word<sup>3</sup>,’

<sup>1</sup> Od. xvii. 383 sq.    <sup>2</sup> Or, ‘if his words are accompanied by actions.’

<sup>3</sup> Il. iv. 412.



and the verses which follow,

‘ The Greeks marched breathing prowess<sup>1</sup>,  
 . . . . in silent awe of their leaders<sup>2</sup>,’

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SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

and other sentiments of the same kind.

We shall.

What of this line,

‘ O heavy with wine, who hast the eyes of a dog and the heart of a stag<sup>3</sup>,’

90 and of the words which follow? Would you say that these, or any similar impertinences which private individuals are supposed to address to their rulers, whether in verse or prose, are well or ill spoken?

They are ill spoken.

They may very possibly afford some amusement, but they do not conduce to temperance. And therefore they are likely to do harm to our young men — you would agree with me there?

Yes.

And then, again, to make the wisest of men say that nothing in his opinion is more glorious than

‘ When the tables are full of bread and meat, and the cup-bearer carries round wine which he draws from the bowl and pours into the cups<sup>4</sup>;’

The praises of eating and drinking, and the tale of the improper behaviour of Zeus and Here, are not to be repeated to the young.

is it fit or conducive to temperance for a young man to hear such words? Or the verse

‘ The saddest of fates is to die and meet destiny from hunger<sup>5</sup>’?

What would you say again to the tale of Zeus, who, while other gods and men were asleep and he the only person awake, lay devising plans, but forgot them all in a moment through his lust, and was so completely overcome at the sight of Here that he would not even go into the hut, but wanted to lie with her on the ground, declaring that he had never been in such a state of rapture before, even when they first met one another

‘ Without the knowledge of their parents<sup>6</sup>;’

<sup>1</sup> Od. iii. 8.

<sup>2</sup> Ib. iv. 431.

<sup>3</sup> Ib. i. 225.

<sup>4</sup> Ib. ix. 8.

<sup>5</sup> Ib. xii. 342.

<sup>6</sup> Il. xiv. 281.

*Republic III.*SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.The indecent  
tale of Ares  
and Aphro-  
dite.The opposite  
strain of  
endurance.

or that other tale of how Hephaestus, because of similar goings on, cast a chain around Ares and Aphrodite<sup>1</sup>?

Indeed, he said, I am strongly of opinion that they ought not to hear that sort of thing.

But any deeds of endurance which are done or told by famous men, these they ought to see and hear; as, for example, what is said in the verses,

‘He smote his breast, and thus reproached his heart,  
Endure, my heart; far worse hast thou endured<sup>2</sup>!’

Certainly, he said.

In the next place, we must not let them be receivers of gifts or lovers of money.

Certainly not.

Neither must we sing to them of

‘Gifts persuading gods, and persuading reverend kings<sup>3</sup>.’

Condem-  
nation of  
Achilles and  
Phoenix.

Neither is Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, to be approved or deemed to have given his pupil good counsel when he told him that he should take the gifts of the Greeks and assist them<sup>4</sup>; but that without a gift he should not lay aside his anger. Neither will we believe or acknowledge Achilles himself to have been such a lover of money that he took Agamemnon’s gifts, or that when he had received payment he restored the dead body of Hector, but that without payment he was unwilling to do so<sup>5</sup>.

Undoubtedly, he said, these are not sentiments which can 391  
be approved.

Loving Homer as I do<sup>6</sup>, I hardly like to say that in attributing these feelings to Achilles, or in believing that they are truly attributed to him, he is guilty of downright impiety. As little can I believe the narrative of his insolence to Apollo, where he says,

‘Thou hast wronged me, O far-darter, most abominable of deities. Verily I would be even with thee, if I had only the power<sup>7</sup>;’

or his insubordination to the river-god<sup>8</sup>, on whose divinity he is ready to lay hands; or his offering to the dead Patroclus

<sup>1</sup> Od. viii. 266.

<sup>2</sup> Ib. xx. 17.

<sup>3</sup> Quoted by Suidas as attributed to Hesiod. <sup>4</sup> Il. ix. 515. <sup>5</sup> Ib. xxiv. 175.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *infra*, x. 595.

<sup>7</sup> Il. xxii. 15 sq.

<sup>8</sup> Ib. xxi. 130, 223 sq.

of his own hair<sup>1</sup>, which had been previously dedicated to the other river-god Spercheius, and that he actually performed this vow; or that he dragged Hector round the tomb of Patroclus<sup>2</sup>, and slaughtered the captives at the pyre<sup>3</sup>; of all this I cannot believe that he was guilty, any more than I can allow our citizens to believe that he, the wise Cheiron's pupil, the son of a goddess and of Peleus who was the gentlest of men and third in descent from Zeus, was so disordered in his wits as to be at one time the slave of two seemingly inconsistent passions, meanness, not untainted by avarice, combined with overweening contempt of gods and men.

You are quite right, he replied.

And let us equally refuse to believe, or allow to be repeated, the tale of Theseus son of Poseidon, or of Peirithous son of Zeus, going forth as they did to perpetrate a horrid rape; or of any other hero or son of a god daring to do such impious and dreadful things as they falsely ascribe to them in our day: and let us further compel the poets to declare either that these acts were not done by them, or that they were not the sons of gods;—both in the same breath they shall not be permitted to affirm. We will not have them trying to persuade our youth that the gods are the authors of evil, and that heroes are no better than men—sentiments which, as we were saying, are neither pious nor true, for we have already proved that evil cannot come from the gods.

Assuredly not.

And further they are likely to have a bad effect on those who hear them; for everybody will begin to excuse his own vices when he is convinced that similar wickednesses are always being perpetrated by—

'The kindred of the gods, the relatives of Zeus, whose ancestral altar, the altar of Zeus, is aloft in air on the peak of Ida,'

and who have

'the blood of deities yet flowing in their veins<sup>4</sup>.'

And therefore let us put an end to such tales, lest they engender laxity of morals among the young.

<sup>1</sup> Il. xxiii. 151.

<sup>2</sup> Ib. xxii. 394.

<sup>3</sup> Ib. xxiii. 175.

<sup>4</sup> From the Niobe of Aeschylus.

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SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

The impious  
behaviour of  
Achilles to  
Apollo and  
the river-  
gods; his  
cruelty.

The tale of  
Theseus and  
Peirithous.

The bad effect  
of these  
mythological  
tales upon the  
young.



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By all means, he replied.

SOCRATES,

ADEIMANTUS.

But now that we are determining what classes of subjects are or are not to be spoken of, let us see whether any have been omitted by us. The manner in which gods and demigods and heroes and the world below should be treated has been already laid down.

Very true.

Misstatements  
of the poets  
about men.

And what shall we say about men? That is clearly the remaining portion of our subject.

Clearly so.

But we are not in a condition to answer this question at present, my friend.

Why not?

Because, if I am not mistaken, we shall have to say that about men poets and story-tellers are guilty of making the gravest misstatements when they tell us that wicked men are often happy, and the good miserable; and that injustice is profitable when undetected, but that justice is a man's own loss and another's gain—these things we shall forbid them to utter, and command them to sing and say the opposite.

To be sure we shall, he replied.

But if you admit that I am right in this, then I shall maintain that you have implied the principle for which we have been all along contending.

I grant the truth of your inference.

That such things are or are not to be said about men is a question which we cannot determine until we have discovered what justice is, and how naturally advantageous to the possessor, whether he seem to be just or not.

Most true, he said.

Enough of the subjects of poetry: let us now speak of the style; and when this has been considered, both matter and manner will have been completely treated.

I do not understand what you mean, said Adeimantus.

Then I must make you understand; and perhaps I may be more intelligible if I put the matter in this way. You are aware, I suppose, that all mythology and poetry is a narration of events, either past, present, or to come?

Certainly, he replied.



And narration may be either simple narration, or imitation, or a union of the two?

That again, he said, I do not quite understand.

I fear that I must be a ridiculous teacher when I have so much difficulty in making myself apprehended. Like a bad speaker, therefore, I will not take the whole of the subject, but will break a piece off in illustration of my meaning. You know the first lines of the *Iliad*, in which the poet says that Chryses prayed Agamemnon to release his daughter, and that Agamemnon flew into a passion with him; whereupon Chryses, failing of his object, invoked the anger of the God against the Achaeans. Now as far as these lines,

‘And he prayed all the Greeks, but especially the two sons of Atreus, the chiefs of the people,’

the poet is speaking in his own person; he never leads us to suppose that he is any one else. But in what follows he takes the person of Chryses, and then he does all that he can to make us believe that the speaker is not Homer, but the aged priest himself. And in this double form he has cast the entire narrative of the events which occurred at Troy and in Ithaca and throughout the *Odyssey*.

Yes.

And a narrative it remains both in the speeches which the poet recites from time to time and in the intermediate passages?

Quite true.

But when the poet speaks in the person of another, may we not say that he assimilates his style to that of the person who, as he informs you, is going to speak?

Certainly.

And this assimilation of himself to another, either by the use of voice or gesture, is the imitation of the person whose character he assumes?

Of course.

Then in this case the narrative of the poet may be said to proceed by way of imitation?

Very true.

Or, if the poet everywhere appears and never conceals himself, then again the imitation is dropped, and his poetry becomes simple narration. However, in order that I may

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SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

Analysis of  
the dramatic  
element in  
Epic poetry.

Epic poetry  
has an element  
of imitation in  
the speeches;  
the rest is  
simple nar-  
rative.

Illustrations  
from the be-  
ginning of the  
*Iliad*.

*Republic III.*  
SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

make my meaning quite clear, and that you may no more say, 'I don't understand,' I will show how the change might be effected. If Homer had said, 'The priest came, having his daughter's ransom in his hands, supplicating the Achaeans, and above all the kings;' and then if, instead of speaking in the person of Chryses, he had continued in his own person, the words would have been, not imitation, but simple narration. The passage would have run as follows (I am no poet, and therefore I drop the metre), 'The priest came and prayed the gods on behalf of the Greeks that they might capture Troy and return safely home, but begged that they would give him back his daughter, and take the ransom which he brought, and respect the God. Thus he spoke, and the other Greeks revered the priest and assented. But Agamemnon was wroth, and bade him depart and not come again, lest the staff and chaplets of the God should be of no avail to him — the daughter of Chryses should not be released, he said — she should grow old with him in Argos. And then he told him to go away and not to provoke him, if he intended to get home unscathed. And the old man went away in fear and silence, and, when he had left the camp, he called upon Apollo by his many names, reminding him of everything which he had done pleasing to him, whether in building his temples, or in offering sacrifice, and praying that his good deeds might be returned to him, and that the Achaeans might expiate his tears by the arrows of the god,' — and so on. In this way the whole becomes simple narrative.

I understand, he said.

Or you may suppose the opposite case — that the intermediate passages are omitted, and the dialogue only left.

That also, he said, I understand; you mean, for example, as in tragedy.

You have conceived my meaning perfectly; and if I mistake not, what you failed to apprehend before is now made clear to you, that poetry and mythology are, in some cases, wholly imitative — instances of this are supplied by tragedy and comedy; there is likewise the opposite style, in which the poet is the only speaker — of this the dithyramb affords the best example; and the combination of both is found in epic, and in several other styles of poetry. Do I take you with me?

Tragedy and Comedy are wholly imitative; dithyrambic and some other kinds of poetry are devoid of imitation. Epic poetry is a combination of the two.

Yes, he said ; I see now what you meant.

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I will ask you to remember also what I began by saying, that we had done with the subject and might proceed to the style.

SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

Yes, I remember.

In saying this, I intended to imply that we must come to an understanding about the mimetic art,—whether the poets, in narrating their stories, are to be allowed by us to imitate, and if so, whether in whole or in part, and if the latter, in what parts ; or should all imitation be prohibited?

You mean, I suspect, to ask whether tragedy and comedy shall be admitted into our State?

Yes, I said ; but there may be more than this in question : I really do not know as yet, but whither the argument may blow, thither we go.

A hint about  
Homer (cp.  
*infra*, bk. x.).

And go we will, he said.

Then, Adeimantus, let me ask you whether our guardians ought to be imitators ; or rather, has not this question been decided by the rule already laid down that one man can only do one thing well, and not many ; and that if he attempt many, he will altogether fail of gaining much reputation in any?

Our guardians  
ought not to  
be imitators,  
for one man  
can only do  
one thing  
well ;

Certainly.

And this is equally true of imitation ; no one man can imitate many things as well as he would imitate a single one?

He cannot.

195 Then the same person will hardly be able to play a serious part in life, and at the same time to be an imitator and imitate many other parts as well ; for even when two species of imitation are nearly allied, the same persons cannot succeed in both, as, for example, the writers of tragedy and comedy—did you not just now call them imitations?

Yes, I did ; and you are right in thinking that the same persons cannot succeed in both.

Any more than they can be rhapsodists and actors at once? True.

Neither are comic and tragic actors the same ; yet all these things are but imitations.

They are so.

And human nature, Adeimantus, appears to have been



*Republic III.*SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.he cannot  
even imitate  
many things.

coined into yet smaller pieces, and to be as incapable of imitating many things well, as of performing well the actions of which the imitations are copies.

Quite true, he replied.

If then we adhere to our original notion and bear in mind that our guardians, setting aside every other business, are to dedicate themselves wholly to the maintenance of freedom in the State, making this their craft, and engaging in no work which does not bear on this end, they ought not to practise or imitate anything else; if they imitate at all, they should imitate from youth upward only those characters which are suitable to their profession — the courageous, temperate, holy, free, and the like; but they should not depict or be skilful at imitating any kind of illiberality or baseness, lest from imitation they should come to be what they imitate. Did you never observe how imitations, beginning in early youth and continuing far into life, at length grow into habits and become a second nature, affecting body, voice, and mind?

Yes, certainly, he said.

Imitations  
which are of  
the degrading  
sort.

Then, I said, we will not allow those for whom we profess a care and of whom we say that they ought to be good men, to imitate a woman, whether young or old, quarrelling with her husband, or striving and vaunting against the gods in conceit of her happiness, or when she is in affliction, or sorrow, or weeping; and certainly not one who is in sickness, love, or labour.

Very right, he said.

Neither must they represent slaves, male or female, performing the offices of slaves?

They must not.

And surely not bad men, whether cowards or any others, who do the reverse of what we have just been prescribing, who scold or mock or revile one another in drink or out of drink, or who in any other manner sin against themselves and their neighbours in word or deed, as the manner of such is. Neither should they be trained to imitate the action or speech of men or women who are mad or bad; for madness, like vice, is to be known but not to be practised or imitated.

Very true, he replied.



Neither may they imitate smiths or other artificers, or oarsmen, or boatswains, or the like? *Republic III.*

How can they, he said, when they are not allowed to apply their minds to the callings of any of these? *SOCRATES, ADEIMANTUS.*

Nor may they imitate the neighing of horses, the bellowing of bulls, the murmur of rivers and roll of the ocean, thunder, and all that sort of thing?

Nay, he said, if madness be forbidden, neither may they copy the behaviour of madmen.

You mean, I said, if I understand you aright, that there is one sort of narrative style which may be employed by a truly good man when he has anything to say, and that another sort will be used by a man of an opposite character and education.

And which are these two sorts? he asked.

Suppose, I answered, that a just and good man in the course of a narration comes on some saying or action of another good man,—I should imagine that he will like to personate him, and will not be ashamed of this sort of imitation: he will be most ready to play the part of the good man when he is acting firmly and wisely; in a less degree when he is overtaken by illness or love or drink, or has met with any other disaster. But when he comes to a character which is unworthy of him, he will not make a study of that; he will disdain such a person, and will assume his likeness, if at all, for a moment only when he is performing some good action; at other times he will be ashamed to play a part which he has never practised, nor will he like to fashion and frame himself after the baser models; he feels the employment of such an art, unless in jest, to be beneath him, and his mind revolts at it.

Imitations which may be encouraged.

So I should expect, he replied.

Then he will adopt a mode of narration such as we have illustrated out of Homer, that is to say, his style will be both imitative and narrative; but there will be very little of the former, and a great deal of the latter. Do you agree?

Certainly, he said; that is the model which such a speaker  
397 must necessarily take.

But there is another sort of character who will narrate anything, and, the worse he is, the more unscrupulous he will be; nothing will be too bad for him: and he will be ready to

Imitations which are to be prohibited.

*Republic III.*SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

imitate anything, not as a joke, but in right good earnest, and before a large company. As I was just now saying, he will attempt to represent the roll of thunder, the noise of wind and hail, or the creaking of wheels, and pulleys, and the various sounds of flutes, pipes, trumpets, and all sorts of instruments: he will bark like a dog, bleat like a sheep, or crow like a cock; his entire art will consist in imitation of voice and gesture, and there will be very little narration.

That, he said, will be his mode of speaking.

These, then, are the two kinds of style?

Yes.

Two kinds of style—the one simple, the other multiplex. There is also a third which is a combination of the two.

And you would agree with me in saying that one of them is simple and has but slight changes; and if the harmony and rhythm are also chosen for their simplicity, the result is that the speaker, if he speaks correctly, is always pretty much the same in style, and he will keep within the limits of a single harmony (for the changes are not great), and in like manner he will make use of nearly the same rhythm?

That is quite true, he said.

Whereas the other requires all sorts of harmonies and all sorts of rhythms, if the music and the style are to correspond, because the style has all sorts of changes.

That is also perfectly true, he replied.

And do not the two styles, or the mixture of the two, comprehend all poetry, and every form of expression in words? No one can say anything except in one or other of them or in both together.

They include all, he said.

The simple style alone can be allowed by us; the mixed style is attractive, but unsuited to the character of our State.

And shall we receive into our State all the three styles, or one only of the two unmixed styles? or would you include the mixed?

I should prefer only to admit the pure imitator of virtue.

Yes, I said, Adeimantus; but the mixed style is also very charming: and indeed the pantomimic, which is the opposite of the one chosen by you, is the most popular style with children and their attendants, and with the world in general.

I do not deny it.

But I suppose you would argue that such a style is unsuitable to our State, in which human nature is not twofold or manifold, for one man plays one part only?

Yes ; quite unsuitable.

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And this is the reason why in our State, and in our State only, we shall find a shoemaker to be a shoemaker and not a pilot also, and a husbandman to be a husbandman and not a dicast also, and a soldier a soldier and not a trader also, and the same throughout?

SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS,  
GLAUCON.

True, he said.

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And therefore when any one of these pantomimic gentlemen, who are so clever that they can imitate anything, comes to us, and makes a proposal to exhibit himself and his poetry, we will fall down and worship him as a sweet and holy and wonderful being ; but we must also inform him that in our State such as he are not permitted to exist ; the law will not allow them. And so when we have anointed him with myrrh, and set a garland of wool upon his head, we shall send him away to another city. For we mean to employ for our souls' health the rougher and severer poet or story-teller, who will imitate the style of the virtuous only, and will follow those models which we prescribed at first when we began the education of our soldiers.

The pantomimic artist is to receive great honours, but he is to be sent out of the country.

We certainly will, he said, if we have the power.

Then now, my friend, I said, that part of music or literary education which relates to the story or myth may be considered to be finished ; for the matter and manner have both been discussed.

I think so too, he said.

Next in order will follow melody and song.

That is obvious.

Every one can see already what we ought to say about them, if we are to be consistent with ourselves.

I fear, said Glaucon, laughing, that the word 'every one' hardly includes me, for I cannot at the moment say what they should be ; though I may guess.

At any rate you can tell that a song or ode has three parts — the words, the melody, and the rhythm ; that degree of knowledge I may presuppose?

Yes, he said ; so much as that you may.

And as for the words, there will surely be no difference between words which are and which are not set to music ;



*Republic III.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.Melody and  
rhythm.

both will conform to the same laws, and these have been already determined by us?

Yes.

And the melody and rhythm will depend upon the words? Certainly.

We were saying, when we spoke of the subject-matter, that we had no need of lamentation and strains of sorrow?

True.

And which are the harmonies expressive of sorrow? You are musical, and can tell me.

The harmonies which you mean are the mixed or tenor Lydian, and the full-toned or bass Lydian, and such like.

These then, I said, must be banished; even to women who have a character to maintain they are of no use, and much less to men.

Certainly.

In the next place, drunkenness and softness and indolence are utterly unbecoming the character of our guardians.

Utterly unbecoming.

And which are the soft or drinking harmonies?

The Ionian, he replied, and the Lydian; they are termed 399  
'relaxed.'

Well, and are these of any military use?

Quite the reverse, he replied; and if so the Dorian and the Phrygian are the only ones which you have left.

I answered: Of the harmonies I know nothing, but I want to have one warlike, to sound the note or accent which a brave man utters in the hour of danger and stern resolve, or when his cause is failing, and he is going to wounds or death or is overtaken by some other evil, and at every such crisis meets the blows of fortune with firm step and a determination to endure; and another to be used by him in times of peace and freedom of action, when there is no pressure of necessity, and he is seeking to persuade God by prayer, or man by instruction and admonition, or on the other hand, when he is expressing his willingness to yield to persuasion or entreaty or admonition, and which represents him when by prudent conduct he has attained his end, not carried away by his success, but acting moderately and wisely under the circumstances, and acquiescing in the event. These

The relaxed  
melodies or  
harmonies are  
the Ionian and  
the Lydian.  
These are to  
be banished.



two harmonies I ask you to leave ; the strain of necessity and the strain of freedom, the strain of the unfortunate and the strain of the fortunate, the strain of courage, and the strain of temperance ; these, I say, leave.

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SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

And these, he replied, are the Dorian and Phrygian harmonies of which I was just now speaking.

Then, I said, if these and these only are to be used in our songs and melodies, we shall not want multiplicity of notes or a panharmonic scale?

The Dorian  
and Phrygian  
are to be  
retained.

I suppose not.

Then we shall not maintain the artificers of lyres with three corners and complex scales, or the makers of any other many-stringed curiously-harmonised instruments?

Certainly not.

But what do you say to flute-makers and flute-players? Would you admit them into our State when you reflect that in this composite use of harmony the flute is worse than all the stringed instruments put together ; even the panharmonic music is only an imitation of the flute?

Musical  
instruments—  
which are to  
be rejected  
and which  
allowed?

Clearly not.

There remain then only the lyre and the harp for use in the city, and the shepherds may have a pipe in the country.

That is surely the conclusion to be drawn from the argument.

The preferring of Apollo and his instruments to Marsyas and his instruments is not at all strange, I said.

Not at all, he replied.

And so, by the dog of Egypt, we have been unconsciously purging the State, which not long ago we termed luxurious.

And we have done wisely, he replied.

Then let us now finish the purgation, I said. Next in order to harmonies, rhythms will naturally follow, and they should be subject to the same rules, for we ought not to seek out complex systems of metre, or metres of every kind, but rather to discover what rhythms are the expressions of a courageous and harmonious life ; and when we have found them, we shall adapt the foot and the melody to words having a like spirit, not the words to the foot and melody. To say what these rhythms are will be your duty—you must teach me them, as you have already taught me the harmonies.

*Republic III.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.Three kinds  
of rhythm as  
there are four  
notes of the  
tetrachord.

But, indeed, he replied, I cannot tell you. I only know that there are some three principles of rhythm out of which metrical systems are framed, just as in sounds there are four notes<sup>1</sup> out of which all the harmonies are composed; that is an observation which I have made. But of what sort of lives they are severally the imitations I am unable to say.

Then, I said, we must take Damon into our counsels; and he will tell us what rhythms are expressive of meanness, or insolence, or fury, or other unworthiness, and what are to be reserved for the expression of opposite feelings. And I think that I have an indistinct recollection of his mentioning a complex Cretic rhythm; also a dactylic or heroic, and he arranged them in some manner which I do not quite understand, making the rhythms equal in the rise and fall of the foot, long and short alternating; and, unless I am mistaken, he spoke of an iambic as well as of a trochaic rhythm, and assigned to them short and long quantities<sup>2</sup>. Also in some cases he appeared to praise or censure the movement of the foot quite as much as the rhythm; or perhaps a combination of the two; for I am not certain what he meant. These matters, however, as I was saying, had better be referred to Damon himself, for the analysis of the subject would be difficult, you know?

Rather so, I should say.

But there is no difficulty in seeing that grace or the absence of grace is an effect of good or bad rhythm.

None at all.

Rhythm and  
harmony fol-  
low style, and  
style is the ex-  
pression of the  
soul.

And also that good and bad rhythm naturally assimilate to a good and bad style; and that harmony and discord in like manner follow style; for our principle is that rhythm and harmony are regulated by the words, and not the words by them.

Just so, he said, they should follow the words.

And will not the words and the character of the style depend on the temper of the soul?

<sup>1</sup> i. e. the four notes of the tetrachord.

<sup>2</sup> Socrates expresses himself carelessly in accordance with his assumed ignorance of the details of the subject. In the first part of the sentence he appears to be speaking of paeonic rhythms which are in the ratio of  $\frac{3}{2}$ ; in the second part, of dactylic and anapaestic rhythms, which are in the ratio of  $\frac{1}{2}$ ; in the last clause, of iambic and trochaic rhythms, which are in the ratio of  $\frac{1}{2}$  or  $\frac{2}{1}$ .

Yes.

And everything else on the style?

Yes.

Then beauty of style and harmony and grace and good rhythm depend on simplicity,— I mean the true simplicity of a rightly and nobly ordered mind and character, not that other simplicity which is only an euphemism for folly?

Very true, he replied.

And if our youth are to do their work in life, must they not make these graces and harmonies their perpetual aim?

They must.

401 And surely the art of the painter and every other creative and constructive art are full of them,— weaving, embroidery, architecture, and every kind of manufacture; also nature, animal and vegetable,— in all of them there is grace or the absence of grace. And ugliness and discord and inharmonious motion are nearly allied to ill words and ill nature, as grace and harmony are the twin sisters of goodness and virtue and bear their likeness.

That is quite true, he said.

But shall our superintendence go no further, and are the poets only to be required by us to express the image of the good in their works, on pain, if they do anything else, of expulsion from our State? Or is the same control to be extended to other artists, and are they also to be prohibited from exhibiting the opposite forms of vice and intemperance and meanness and indecency in sculpture and building and the other creative arts; and is he who cannot conform to this rule of ours to be prevented from practising his art in our State, lest the taste of our citizens be corrupted by him? We would not have our guardians grow up amid images of moral deformity, as in some noxious pasture, and there browse and feed upon many a baneful herb and flower day by day, little by little, until they silently gather a festering mass of corruption in their own soul. Let our artists rather be those who are gifted to discern the true nature of the beautiful and graceful; then will our youth dwell in a land of health, amid fair sights and sounds, and receive the good in everything: and beauty, the effluence of fair works, shall flow into the eye and ear, like a health-giving breeze from a purer region, and

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SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Simplicity the  
great first  
principle;

and a principle  
which is  
widely spread  
in nature and  
art.

Our citizens  
must grow up  
to manhood  
amidst impres-  
sions of grace  
and beauty  
only; all ugliness and vice  
must be ex-  
cluded.



*Republic III.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.The power  
of imparting  
grace is  
possessed by  
harmony.

insensibly draw the soul from earliest years into likeness and sympathy with the beauty of reason.

There can be no nobler training than that, he replied.

And therefore, I said, Glaucon, musical training is a more potent instrument than any other, because rhythm and harmony find their way into the inward places of the soul, on which they mightily fasten, imparting grace, and making the soul of him who is rightly educated graceful, or of him who is ill-educated ungraceful; and also because he who has received this true education of the inner being will most shrewdly perceive omissions or faults in art and nature, and with a true taste, while he praises and rejoices over and receives into his soul the good, and becomes noble and good, he will justly blame and hate the bad, now in the days of his youth, even before he is able to know the reason why; and when reason comes he will recognise and salute the friend with whom his education has made him long familiar. 402

Yes, he said, I quite agree with you in thinking that our youth should be trained in music and on the grounds which you mention.

Just as in learning to read, I said, we were satisfied when we knew the letters of the alphabet, which are very few, in all their recurring sizes and combinations; not slighting them as unimportant whether they occupy a space large or small, but everywhere eager to make them out; and not thinking ourselves perfect in the art of reading until we recognise them wherever they are found<sup>1</sup>:

True —

Or, as we recognise the reflection of letters in the water, or in a mirror, only when we know the letters themselves; the same art and study giving us the knowledge of both:

Exactly —

The true  
musician must  
know the  
essential forms  
of virtue and  
vice.

Even so, as I maintain, neither we nor our guardians, whom we have to educate, can ever become musical until we and they know the essential forms of temperance, courage, liberality, magnificence, and their kindred, as well as the contrary forms, in all their combinations, and can recognise them and their images wherever they are found, not slighting

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, II. 368 D.



them either in small things or great, but believing them all to be within the sphere of one art and study. *Republic III.*

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Most assuredly.

And when a beautiful soul harmonizes with a beautiful form, and the two are cast in one mould, that will be the fairest of sights to him who has an eye to see it? *The harmony of soul and body the fairest of sights.*

The fairest indeed.

And the fairest is also the loveliest?

That may be assumed.

And the man who has the spirit of harmony will be most in love with the loveliest; but he will not love him who is of an inharmonious soul?

That is true, he replied, if the deficiency be in his soul; but if there be any merely bodily defect in another he will be patient of it, and will love all the same. *The true lover will not mind defects of the person.*

I perceive, I said, that you have or have had experiences of this sort, and I agree. But let me ask you another question: Has excess of pleasure any affinity to temperance?

How can that be? he replied; pleasure deprives a man of the use of his faculties quite as much as pain.

Or any affinity to virtue in general?

403 None whatever.

Any affinity to wantonness and intemperance?

Yes, the greatest.

And is there any greater or keener pleasure than that of sensual love?

No, nor a madder.

Whereas true love is a love of beauty and order — temperate and harmonious?

*True love is temperate and harmonious.*

Quite true, he said.

Then no intemperance or madness should be allowed to approach true love?

Certainly not.

Then mad or intemperate pleasure must never be allowed to come near the lover and his beloved; neither of them can have any part in it if their love is of the right sort?

*True love is free from sensuality and coarseness.*

No, indeed, Socrates, it must never come near them.

Then I suppose that in the city which we are founding you would make a law to the effect that a friend should use no other familiarity to his love than a father would use to his

*Republic III.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

son, and then only for a noble purpose, and he must first have the other's consent; and this rule is to limit him in all his intercourse, and he is never to be seen going further, or, if he exceeds, he is to be deemed guilty of coarseness and bad taste.

I quite agree, he said.

Thus much of music, which makes a fair ending; for what should be the end of music if not the love of beauty?

I agree, he said.

Gymnastic.

After music comes gymnastic, in which our youth are next to be trained.

Certainly.

Gymnastic as well as music should begin in early years; the training in it should be careful and should continue through life. Now my belief is,—and this is a matter upon which I should like to have your opinion in confirmation of my own, but my own belief is,—not that the good body by any bodily excellence improves the soul, but, on the contrary, that the good soul, by her own excellence, improves the body as far as this may be possible. What do you say?

Yes, I agree.

The body to  
be entrusted  
to the mind.

Then, to the mind when adequately trained, we shall be right in handing over the more particular care of the body; and in order to avoid prolixity we will now only give the general outlines of the subject.

Very good.

That they must abstain from intoxication has been already remarked by us; for of all persons a guardian should be the last to get drunk and not know where in the world he is.

Yes, he said; that a guardian should require another guardian to take care of him is ridiculous indeed.

But next, what shall we say of their food; for the men are in training for the great contest of all — are they not?

Yes, he said.

And will the habit of body of our ordinary athletes be suited to them? 404

Why not?

The usual  
training of  
athletes too  
gross and  
sleepy.

I am afraid, I said, that a habit of body such as they have is but a sleepy sort of thing, and rather perilous to health. Do you not observe that these athletes sleep away their

lives, and are liable to most dangerous illnesses if they depart, in ever so slight a degree, from their customary regimen? *Republic III.*  
SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Yes, I do.

Then, I said, a finer sort of training will be required for our warrior athletes, who are to be like wakeful dogs, and to see and hear with the utmost keenness; amid the many changes of water and also of food, of summer heat and winter cold, which they will have to endure when on a campaign, they must not be liable to break down in health.

That is my view.

The really excellent gymnastic is twin sister of that simple music which we were just now describing.

How so?

Why, I conceive that there is a gymnastic which, like our music, is simple and good; and especially the military gymnastic. Military  
gymnastic.

What do you mean?

My meaning may be learned from Homer; he, you know, feeds his heroes at their feasts, when they are campaigning, on soldiers' fare; they have no fish, although they are on the shores of the Hellespont, and they are not allowed boiled meats but only roast, which is the food most convenient for soldiers, requiring only that they should light a fire, and not involving the trouble of carrying about pots and pans.

True.

And I can hardly be mistaken in saying that sweet sauces are nowhere mentioned in Homer. In proscribing them, however, he is not singular; all professional athletes are well aware that a man who is to be in good condition should take nothing of the kind.

Yes, he said; and knowing this, they are quite right in not taking them.

Then you would not approve of Syracusan dinners, and the refinements of Sicilian cookery? Syracusan  
dinners and  
Corinthian  
courtezans  
are pro-  
hibited.

I think not.

Nor, if a man is to be in condition, would you allow him to have a Corinthian girl as his fair friend?

Certainly not.



*Republic III.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.The luxurious  
style of living  
may be justly  
compared to  
the panhar-  
monic strain  
of music.

Neither would you approve of the delicacies, as they are thought, of Athenian confectionary?

Certainly not.

All such feeding and living may be rightly compared by us to melody and song composed in the panharmonic style, and in all the rhythms.

Exactly.

There complexity engendered licence, and here disease; whereas simplicity in music was the parent of temperance in the soul; and simplicity in gymnastic of health in the body.

Most true, he said.

But when intemperance and diseases multiply in a State, 405  
halls of justice and medicine are always being opened; and the arts of the doctor and the lawyer give themselves airs, finding how keen is the interest which not only the slaves but the freemen of a city take about them.

Of course.

Every man  
should be his  
own doctor  
and lawyer.

And yet what greater proof can there be of a bad and disgraceful state of education than this, that not only artisans and the meaner sort of people need the skill of first-rate physicians and judges, but also those who would profess to have had a liberal education? Is it not disgraceful, and a great sign of the want of good-breeding, that a man should have to go abroad for his law and physic because he has none of his own at home, and must therefore surrender himself into the hands of other men whom he makes lords and judges over him?

Of all things, he said, the most disgraceful.

Bad as it is to  
go to law, it  
is still worse  
to be a lover  
of litigation.

Would you say 'most,' I replied, when you consider that there is a further stage of the evil in which a man is not only a life-long litigant, passing all his days in the courts, either as plaintiff or defendant, but is actually led by his bad taste to pride himself on his litigiousness; he imagines that he is a master in dishonesty; able to take every crooked turn, and wriggle into and out of every hole, bending like a withy and getting out of the way of justice: and all for what?—in order to gain small points not worth mentioning, he not knowing that so to order his life as to be able to do without a napping judge is a far higher and nobler sort of thing. Is not that still more disgraceful?



Yes, he said, that is still more disgraceful.

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Well, I said, and to require the help of medicine, not when a wound has to be cured, or on occasion of an epidemic, but just because, by indolence and a habit of life such as we have been describing, men fill themselves with waters and winds, as if their bodies were a marsh, compelling the ingenious sons of Asclepius to find more names for diseases, such as flatulence and catarrh; is not this, too, a disgrace?

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Bad also to  
require the  
help of  
medicine.

Yes, he said, they do certainly give very strange and new-fangled names to diseases.

Yes, I said, and I do not believe that there were any such diseases in the days of Asclepius; and this I infer from the circumstance that the hero Eurypylus, after he has been wounded in Homer, drinks a posset of Pramnian wine well besprinkled with barley-meal and grated cheese, which are certainly inflammatory, and yet the sons of Asclepius who were at the Trojan war do not blame the damsel who gives him the drink, or rebuke Patroclus, who is treating his case.

In the time of  
Asclepius and  
of Homer the  
practice of  
medicine was  
very simple.

Well, he said, that was surely an extraordinary drink to be given to a person in his condition.

Not so extraordinary, I replied, if you bear in mind that in former days, as is commonly said, before the time of Herodicus, the guild of Asclepius did not practise our present system of medicine, which may be said to educate diseases. But Herodicus, being a trainer, and himself of a sickly constitution, by a combination of training and doctoring found out a way of torturing first and chiefly himself, and secondly the rest of the world.

The nursing  
of disease  
began with  
Herodicus.

How was that? he said.

By the invention of lingering death; for he had a mortal disease which he perpetually tended, and as recovery was out of the question, he passed his entire life as a valetudinarian; he could do nothing but attend upon himself, and he was in constant torment whenever he departed in anything from his usual regimen, and so dying hard, by the help of science he struggled on to old age.

A rare reward of his skill!

Yes, I said; a reward which a man might fairly expect who never understood that, if Asclepius did not instruct his descendants in valetudinarian arts, the omission arose, not

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GLAUCON.

from ignorance or inexperience of such a branch of medicine, but because he knew that in all well-ordered states every individual has an occupation to which he must attend, and has therefore no leisure to spend in continually being ill. This we remark in the case of the artisan, but, ludicrously enough, do not apply the same rule to people of the richer sort.

How do you mean? he said.

The working-  
man has no  
time for tedi-  
ous remedies.

I mean this: When a carpenter is ill he asks the physician for a rough and ready cure; an emetic or a purge or a cautery or the knife,—these are his remedies. And if some one prescribes for him a course of dietetics, and tells him that he must swathe and swaddle his head, and all that sort of thing, he replies at once that he has no time to be ill, and that he sees no good in a life which is spent in nursing his disease to the neglect of his customary employment; and therefore bidding good-bye to this sort of physician, he resumes his ordinary habits, and either gets well and lives and does his business, or, if his constitution fails, he dies and has no more trouble.

Yes, he said, and a man in his condition of life ought to use the art of medicine thus far only.

Has he not, I said, an occupation; and what profit would there be in his life if he were deprived of his occupation? 407

Quite true, he said.

But with the rich man this is otherwise; of him we do not say that he has any specially appointed work which he must perform, if he would live.

He is generally supposed to have nothing to do.

Then you never heard of the saying of Phocylides, that as soon as a man has a livelihood he should practise virtue?

Nay, he said, I think that he had better begin somewhat sooner.

The slow cure  
equally an im-  
pediment to  
the mechani-  
cal arts, to the  
practice of  
virtue,

Let us not have a dispute with him about this, I said; but rather ask ourselves: Is the practice of virtue obligatory on the rich man, or can he live without it? And if obligatory on him, then let us raise a further question, whether this dieting of disorders, which is an impediment to the application of the mind in carpentering and the mechanical arts, does not equally stand in the way of the sentiment of Phocylides?

Of that, he replied, there can be no doubt; such excessive care of the body, when carried beyond the rules of gymnastic, is most inimical to the practice of virtue.

<sup>1</sup> Yes, indeed, I replied, and equally incompatible with the management of a house, an army, or an office of state; and, what is most important of all, irreconcilable with any kind of study or thought or self-reflection — there is a constant suspicion that headache and giddiness are to be ascribed to philosophy, and hence all practising or making trial of virtue in the higher sense is absolutely stopped; for a man is always fancying that he is being made ill, and is in constant anxiety about the state of his body.

Yes, likely enough.

And therefore our politic Asclepius may be supposed to have exhibited the power of his art only to persons who, being generally of healthy constitution and habits of life, had a definite ailment; such as these he cured by purges and operations, and bade them live as usual, herein consulting the interests of the State; but bodies which disease had penetrated through and through he would not have attempted to cure by gradual processes of evacuation and infusion: he did not want to lengthen out good-for-nothing lives, or to have weak fathers begetting weaker sons; — if a man was not able to live in the ordinary way he had no business to cure him; for such a cure would have been of no use either to himself, or to the State.

Then, he said, you regard Asclepius as a statesman.

Clearly; and his character is further illustrated by his sons.

408 Note that they were heroes in the days of old and practised the medicines of which I am speaking at the siege of Troy: You will remember how, when Pandarus wounded Menelaus, they

‘Sucked the blood out of the wound, and sprinkled soothing remedies<sup>2</sup>,’

but they never prescribed what the patient was afterwards to eat or drink in the case of Menelaus, any more than in the case of Eurypylus; the remedies, as they conceived, were enough to heal any man who before he was wounded was

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and to any  
kind of study  
or thought.

Asclepius  
would not  
cure diseased  
constitutions  
because they  
were of no use  
to the State.

The case of  
Menelaus,  
who was at-  
tended by the  
sons of Ascle-  
pius.

<sup>1</sup> Making the answer of Socrates begin at *καὶ γὰρ πρὸς κ.τ.λ.*

<sup>2</sup> *Iliad* iv. 218.



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GLAUCON.

healthy and regular in his habits; and even though he did happen to drink a posset of Pramnian wine, he might get well all the same. But they would have nothing to do with unhealthy and intemperate subjects, whose lives were of no use either to themselves or others; the art of medicine was not designed for their good, and though they were as rich as Midas, the sons of Asclepius would have declined to attend them.

The offence of  
Asclepius.

They were very acute persons, those sons of Asclepius.

Naturally so, I replied. Nevertheless, the tragedians and Pindar disobeying our behests, although they acknowledge that Asclepius was the son of Apollo, say also that he was bribed into healing a rich man who was at the point of death, and for this reason he was struck by lightning. But we, in accordance with the principle already affirmed by us, will not believe them when they tell us both;—if he was the son of a god, we maintain that he was not avaricious; or, if he was avaricious, he was not the son of a god.

All that, Socrates, is excellent; but I should like to put a question to you: Ought there not to be good physicians in a State, and are not the best those who have treated the greatest number of constitutions good and bad? and are not the best judges in like manner those who are acquainted with all sorts of moral natures?

Yes, I said, I too would have good judges and good physicians. But do you know whom I think good?

Will you tell me?

I will, if I can. Let me however note that in the same question you join two things which are not the same.

How so? he asked.

The physician  
should have  
experience  
of illness in  
his own  
person;

Why, I said, you join physicians and judges. Now the most skilful physicians are those who, from their youth upwards, have combined with the knowledge of their art the greatest experience of disease; they had better not be robust in health, and should have had all manner of diseases in their own persons. For the body, as I conceive, is not the instrument with which they cure the body; in that case we could not allow them ever to be or to have been sickly; but they cure the body with the mind, and the mind which has become and is sick can cure nothing.



That is very true, he said.

409 But with the judge it is otherwise ; since he governs mind by mind ; he ought not therefore to have been trained among vicious minds, and to have associated with them from youth upwards, and to have gone through the whole calendar of crime, only in order that he may quickly infer the crimes of others as he might their bodily diseases from his own self-consciousness ; the honourable mind which is to form a healthy judgment should have had no experience or contamination of evil habits when young. And this is the reason why in youth good men often appear to be simple, and are easily practised upon by the dishonest, because they have no examples of what evil is in their own souls.

Yes, he said, they are far too apt to be deceived.

Therefore, I said, the judge should not be young ; he should have learned to know evil, not from his own soul, but from late and long observation of the nature of evil in others : knowledge should be his guide, not personal experience.

Yes, he said, that is the ideal of a judge.

Yes, I replied, and he will be a good man (which is my answer to your question) ; for he is good who has a good soul. But the cunning and suspicious nature of which we spoke,—he who has committed many crimes, and fancies himself to be a master in wickedness, when he is amongst his fellows, is wonderful in the precautions which he takes, because he judges of them by himself : but when he gets into the company of men of virtue, who have the experience of age, he appears to be a fool again, owing to his unseasonable suspicions ; he cannot recognise an honest man, because he has no pattern of honesty in himself ; at the same time, as the bad are more numerous than the good, and he meets with them oftener, he thinks himself, and is by others thought to be, rather wise than foolish.

Most true, he said.

Then the good and wise judge whom we are seeking is not this man, but the other ; for vice cannot know virtue too, but a virtuous nature, educated by time, will acquire a knowledge both of virtue and vice : the virtuous, and not the vicious man has wisdom — in my opinion.

And in mine also.

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GLAUCON.

on the other hand, the judge should not learn to know evil by the practice of it, but by long observation of evil in others.

Such a knowledge of human nature far better and truer than that of the adept in crime.

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This is the sort of medicine, and this is the sort of law, which you will sanction in your state. They will minister to better natures, giving health both of soul and of body; but those who are diseased in their bodies they will leave to die, and the corrupt and incurable souls they will put an end to themselves. 410

That is clearly the best thing both for the patients and for the State.

And thus our youth, having been educated only in that simple music which, as we said, inspires temperance, will be reluctant to go to law.

Clearly.

And the musician, who, keeping to the same track, is content to practise the simple gymnastic, will have nothing to do with medicine unless in some extreme case.

That I quite believe.

The very exercises and toils which he undergoes are intended to stimulate the spirited element of his nature, and not to increase his strength; he will not, like common athletes, use exercise and regimen to develop his muscles.

Very right, he said.

Neither are the two arts of music and gymnastic really designed, as is often supposed, the one for the training of the soul, the other for the training of the body.

What then is the real object of them?

I believe, I said, that the teachers of both have in view chiefly the improvement of the soul.

How can that be? he asked.

Did you never observe, I said, the effect on the mind itself of exclusive devotion to gymnastic, or the opposite effect of an exclusive devotion to music?

In what way shown? he said.

The one producing a temper of hardness and ferocity, the other of softness and effeminacy, I replied.

Yes, he said, I am quite aware that the mere athlete becomes too much of a savage, and that the mere musician is melted and softened beyond what is good for him.

Yet surely, I said, this ferocity only comes from spirit, which, if rightly educated, would give courage, but, if too much intensified, is liable to become hard and brutal.

Music and gymnastic are equally designed for the improvement of the mind.

The mere athlete must be softened, and the philosophic nature prevented from becoming too soft.

That I quite think.

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On the other hand the philosopher will have the quality of gentleness. And this also, when too much indulged, will turn to softness, but, if educated rightly, will be gentle and moderate.

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GLAUCON.

True.

And in our opinion the guardians ought to have both these qualities?

Assuredly.

And both should be in harmony?

Beyond question.

411 And the harmonious soul is both temperate and courageous?

Yes.

And the inharmonious is cowardly and boorish?

Very true.

And, when a man allows music to play upon him and to pour into his soul through the funnel of his ears those sweet and soft and melancholy airs of which we were just now speaking, and his whole life is passed in warbling and the delights of song; in the first stage of the process the passion or spirit which is in him is tempered like iron, and made useful, instead of brittle and useless. But, if he carries on the softening and soothing process, in the next stage he begins to melt and waste, until he has wasted away his spirit and cut out the sinews of his soul; and he becomes a feeble warrior.

Music, if carried too far, renders the weaker nature effeminate, the stronger irritable.

Very true.

If the element of spirit is naturally weak in him the change is speedily accomplished, but if he have a good deal, then the power of music weakening the spirit renders him excitable; —on the least provocation he flames up at once, and is speedily extinguished; instead of having spirit he grows irritable and passionate and is quite impracticable.

Exactly.

And so in gymnastics, if a man takes violent exercise and is a great feeder, and the reverse of a great student of music and philosophy, at first the high condition of his body fills him with pride and spirit, and he becomes twice the man that he was.

And in like manner the well-fed athlete, if he have no education,



*Republic III.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.degenerates  
into a wild  
beast.

Certainly.

And what happens? if he do nothing else, and holds no converse with the Muses, does not even that intelligence which there may be in him, having no taste of any sort of learning or enquiry or thought or culture, grow feeble and dull and blind, his mind never waking up or receiving nourishment, and his senses not being purged of their mists?

True, he said.

And he ends by becoming a hater of philosophy, uncivilized, never using the weapon of persuasion,—he is like a wild beast, all violence and fierceness, and knows no other way of dealing; and he lives in all ignorance and evil conditions, and has no sense of propriety and grace.

That is quite true, he said.

And as there are two principles of human nature, one the spirited and the other the philosophical, some God, as I should say, has given mankind two arts answering to them (and only indirectly to the soul and body), in order that these two principles (like the strings of an instrument) may be 412 relaxed or drawn tighter until they are duly harmonized.

That appears to be the intention.

Music to be  
mingled with  
gymnastic,  
and both  
attempered to  
the individual  
soul.

And he who mingles music with gymnastic in the fairest proportions, and best attempers them to the soul, may be rightly called the true musician and harmonist in a far higher sense than the tuner of the strings.

You are quite right, Socrates.

And such a presiding genius will be always required in our State if the government is to last.

Yes, he will be absolutely necessary.

Enough of  
principles of  
education:  
who are to be  
our rulers?


Such, then, are our principles of nurture and education: Where would be the use of going into further details about the dances of our citizens, or about their hunting and coursing, their gymnastic and equestrian contests? For these all follow the general principle, and having found that, we shall have no difficulty in discovering them.

I dare say that there will be no difficulty.

Very good, I said; then what is the next question? Must we not ask who are to be rulers and who subjects?

Certainly.

There can be no doubt that the elder must rule the younger.





Clearly.

And that the best of these must rule.

That is also clear.

Now, are not the best husbandmen those who are most devoted to husbandry?

Yes.

And as we are to have the best of guardians for our city, must they not be those who have most the character of guardians?

Yes.

And to this end they ought to be wise and efficient, and to have a special care of the State?

True.

And a man will be most likely to care about that which he loves?

To be sure.

And he will be most likely to love that which he regards as having the same interests with himself, and that of which the good or evil fortune is supposed by him at any time most to affect his own?

Very true, he replied.

Then there must be a selection. Let us note among the guardians those who in their whole life show the greatest eagerness to do what is for the good of their country, and the greatest repugnance to do what is against her interests.

Those are the right men.

And they will have to be watched at every age, in order that we may see whether they preserve their resolution, and never, under the influence either of force or enchantment, forget or cast off their sense of duty to the State.

How cast off? he said.

413 I will explain to you, I replied. A resolution may go out of a man's mind either with his will or against his will; with his will when he gets rid of a falsehood and learns better, against his will whenever he is deprived of a truth.

I understand, he said, the willing loss of a resolution; the meaning of the unwilling I have yet to learn.

Why, I said, do you not see that men are unwillingly deprived of good, and willingly of evil? Is not to have lost the truth an evil, and to possess the truth a good? and you

*Republic III.*

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

The elder  
must rule and  
the younger  
serve.

Those are to  
be appointed  
rulers who  
have been  
tested in all  
the stages of  
their life;

*Republic III.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

would agree that to conceive things as they are is to possess the truth?

Yes, he replied; I agree with you in thinking that mankind are deprived of truth against their will.

And is not this involuntary deprivation caused either by theft, or force, or enchantment?

Still, he replied, I do not understand you.

I fear that I must have been talking darkly, like the tragedians. I only mean that some men are changed by persuasion and that others forget; argument steals away the hearts of one class, and time of the other; and this I call theft. Now you understand me?

Yes.

Those again who are forced, are those whom the violence of some pain or grief compels to change their opinion.

I understand, he said, and you are quite right.

And you would also acknowledge that the enchanted are those who change their minds either under the softer influence of pleasure, or the sterner influence of fear?

Yes, he said; everything that deceives may be said to enchant.

Therefore, as I was just now saying, we must enquire who are the best guardians of their own conviction that what they think the interest of the State is to be the rule of their lives. We must watch them from their youth upwards, and make them perform actions in which they are most likely to forget or to be deceived, and he who remembers and is not deceived is to be selected, and he who fails in the trial is to be rejected. That will be the way?

Yes.

And there should also be toils and pains and conflicts prescribed for them, in which they will be made to give further proof of the same qualities.

Very right, he replied.

And then, I said, we must try them with enchantments—that is the third sort of test—and see what will be their behaviour: like those who take colts amid noise and tumult to see if they are of a timid nature, so must we take our youth amid terrors of some kind, and again pass them into pleasures, and prove them more thoroughly than gold is

and who are  
unchanged by  
the influence  
either of  
pleasure, or  
of fear,

or of enchant-  
ments.

proved in the furnace, that we may discover whether they are armed against all enchantments, and of a noble bearing always, good guardians of themselves and of the music which they have learned, and retaining under all circumstances a rhythmical and harmonious nature, such as will be most serviceable to the individual and to the State. And he who at every age, as boy and youth and in mature life, has come out of the trial victorious and pure, shall be appointed a ruler and guardian of the State; he shall be honoured in life and death, and shall receive sepulture and other memorials of honour, the greatest that we have to give. But him who fails, we must reject. I am inclined to think that this is the sort of way in which our rulers and guardians should be chosen and appointed. I speak generally, and not with any pretension to exactness.

*Republic III.*

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

If they stand the test they are to be honoured in life and after death.

414

And, speaking generally, I agree with you, he said.

And perhaps the word 'guardian' in the fullest sense ought to be applied to this higher class only who preserve us against foreign enemies and maintain peace among our citizens at home, that the one may not have the will, or the others the power, to harm us. The young men whom we before called guardians may be more properly designated auxiliaries and supporters of the principles of the rulers.

The title of guardians to be reserved for the elders, the young men to be called auxiliaries.

I agree with you, he said.

How then may we devise one of those needful falsehoods of which we lately spoke—just one royal lie which may deceive the rulers, if that be possible, and at any rate the rest of the city?

What sort of lie? he said.

Nothing new, I replied; only an old Phoenician<sup>1</sup> tale of what has often occurred before now in other places, (as the poets say, and have made the world believe,) though not in our time, and I do not know whether such an event could ever happen again, or could now even be made probable, if it did.

The Phoenician tale.

How your words seem to hesitate on your lips!

You will not wonder, I replied, at my hesitation when you have heard.

Speak, he said, and fear not.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Laws, 663 E.



*Republic III.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.The citizens  
to be told that  
they are  
really autoch-  
thonous, sent  
up out of the  
earth,

Well then, I will speak, although I really know not how to look you in the face, or in what words to utter the audacious fiction, which I propose to communicate gradually, first to the rulers, then to the soldiers, and lastly to the people. They are to be told that their youth was a dream, and the education and training which they received from us, an appearance only; in reality during all that time they were being formed and fed in the womb of the earth, where they themselves and their arms and appurtenances were manufactured; when they were completed, the earth, their mother, sent them up; and so, their country being their mother and also their nurse, they are bound to advise for her good, and to defend her against attacks, and her citizens they are to regard as children of the earth and their own brothers.

You had good reason, he said, to be ashamed of the lie which you were going to tell.

and composed  
of metals of  
various  
quality.

True, I replied, but there is more coming; I have only 415 told you half. Citizens, we shall say to them in our tale, you are brothers, yet God has framed you differently. Some of you have the power of command, and in the composition of these he has mingled gold, wherefore also they have the greatest honour; others he has made of silver, to be auxiliaries; others again who are to be husbandmen and craftsmen he has composed of brass and iron; and the species will generally be preserved in the children. But as all are of the same original stock, a golden parent will sometimes have a silver son, or a silver parent a golden son. And God proclaims as a first principle to the rulers, and above all else, that there is nothing which they should so anxiously guard, or of which they are to be such good guardians, as of the purity of the race. They should observe what elements mingle in their offspring; for if the son of a golden or silver parent has an admixture of brass and iron, then nature orders a transposition of ranks, and the eye of the ruler must not be pitiful towards the child because he has to descend in the scale and become a husbandman or artisan, just as there may be sons of artisans who having an admixture of gold or silver in them are raised to honour, and become guardians or auxiliaries. For an oracle says that when a man of brass or iron guards the State, it will be destroyed. Such is the

The noble  
quality to rise  
in the State,  
the ignoble to  
descend.



tale; is there any possibility of making our citizens believe in it?

Not in the present generation, he replied; there is no way of accomplishing this; but their sons may be made to believe in the tale, and their sons' sons, and posterity after them.

I see the difficulty, I replied; yet the fostering of such a belief will make them care more for the city and for one another. Enough, however, of the fiction, which may now fly abroad upon the wings of rumour, while we arm our earth-born heroes, and lead them forth under the command of their rulers. Let them look round and select a spot whence they can best suppress insurrection, if any prove refractory within, and also defend themselves against enemies, who like wolves may come down on the fold from without; there let them encamp, and when they have encamped, let them sacrifice to the proper Gods and prepare their dwellings.

Just so, he said.

And their dwellings must be such as will shield them against the cold of winter and the heat of summer.

I suppose that you mean houses, he replied.

Yes, I said; but they must be the houses of soldiers, and not of shop-keepers.

What is the difference? he said.

416 That I will endeavour to explain, I replied. To keep watch-dogs, who, from want of discipline or hunger, or some evil habit or other, would turn upon the sheep and worry them, and behave not like dogs but wolves, would be a foul and monstrous thing in a shepherd?

Truly monstrous, he said.

And therefore every care must be taken that our auxiliaries, being stronger than our citizens, may not grow to be too much for them and become savage tyrants instead of friends and allies?

Yes, great care should be taken.

And would not a really good education furnish the best safeguard?

But they are well-educated already, he replied.

I cannot be so confident, my dear Glaucon, I said; I am much more certain that they ought to be, and that true education, whatever that may be, will have the greatest

*Republic III.*

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Is such a fiction credible?

—Yes, in a future generation; not in the present.

The selection of a site for the warriors' camp.

The warriors must be humanized by education.

*Republic III.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

tendency to civilize and humanize them in their relations to one another, and to those who are under their protection.

Very true, he replied.

And not only their education, but their habitations, and all that belongs to them, should be such as will neither impair their virtue as guardians, nor tempt them to prey upon the other citizens. Any man of sense must acknowledge that.

He must.

Their way of  
life will be that  
of a camp.

Then now let us consider what will be their way of life, if they are to realize our idea of them. In the first place, none of them should have any property of his own beyond what is absolutely necessary; neither should they have a private house or store closed against any one who has a mind to enter; their provisions should be only such as are required by trained warriors, who are men of temperance and courage; they should agree to receive from the citizens a fixed rate of pay, enough to meet the expenses of the year and no more; and they will go to mess and live together like soldiers in a camp. Gold and silver we will tell them that they have from God; the diviner metal is within them, and they have therefore no need of the dross which is current among men, and ought not to pollute the divine by any such earthly admixture; for that commoner metal has 417 been the source of many unholy deeds, but their own is undefiled. And they alone of all the citizens may not touch or handle silver or gold, or be under the same roof with them, or wear them, or drink from them. And this will be their salvation, and they will be the saviours of the State. But should they ever acquire homes or lands or moneys of their own, they will become housekeepers and husbandmen instead of guardians, enemies and tyrants instead of allies of the other citizens; hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against, they will pass their whole life in much greater terror of internal than of external enemies, and the hour of ruin, both to themselves and to the rest of the State, will be at hand. For all which reasons may we not say that thus shall our State be ordered, and that these shall be the regulations appointed by us for our guardians concerning their houses and all other matters?

They must  
have no  
homes or  
property of  
their own.

Yes, said Glaucon.

## BOOK IV.

Steph. HERE Adeimantus interposed a question: How would you  
419 answer, Socrates, said he, if a person were to say that you  
are making<sup>1</sup> these people miserable, and that they are the  
cause of their own unhappiness; the city in fact belongs to  
them, but they are none the better for it; whereas other men  
acquire lands, and build large and handsome houses, and  
have everything handsome about them, offering sacrifices  
to the gods on their own account, and practising hospitality;  
moreover, as you were saying just now, they have gold  
and silver, and all that is usual among the favourites of  
fortune; but our poor citizens are no better than mercenaries  
who are quartered in the city and are always mounting  
guard?

*Republic IV.*  
ADEIMANTUS,  
SOCRATES.  
An objection  
that Socrates  
has made his  
citizens poor  
and miserable:

420 Yes, I said; and you may add that they are only fed,  
and not paid in addition to their food, like other men; and  
therefore they cannot, if they would, take a journey of  
pleasure; they have no money to spend on a mistress or any  
other luxurious fancy, which, as the world goes, is thought to  
be happiness; and many other accusations of the same  
nature might be added.

and worst of  
all, adds  
Socrates, they  
have no  
money.

But, said he, let us suppose all this to be included in the  
charge.

You mean to ask, I said, what will be our answer?

Yes.

If we proceed along the old path, my belief, I said, is  
that we shall find the answer. And our answer will be that,  
even as they are, our guardians may very likely be the  
happiest of men; but that our aim in founding the State was  
not the disproportionate happiness of any one class, but the  
greatest happiness of the whole; we thought that in a State

Yet very  
likely they  
may be the  
happiest of  
mankind.

<sup>1</sup> Or, 'that for their own good you are making these people miserable.'



*Republic IV.*ADEIMANTUS,  
SOCRATES.The state, like  
a statue, must  
be judged of  
as a whole.

which is ordered with a view to the good of the whole we should be most likely to find justice, and in the ill-ordered State injustice: and, having found them, we might then decide which of the two is the happier. At present, I take it, we are fashioning the happy State, not piecemeal, or with a view of making a few happy citizens, but as a whole; and by-and-by we will proceed to view the opposite kind of State. Suppose that we were painting a statue, and some one came up to us and said, Why do you not put the most beautiful colours on the most beautiful parts of the body — the eyes ought to be purple, but you have made them black — to him we might fairly answer, Sir, you would not surely have us beautify the eyes to such a degree that they are no longer eyes; consider rather whether, by giving this and the other features their due proportion, we make the whole beautiful. And so I say to you, do not compel us to assign to the guardians a sort of happiness which will make them anything but guardians; for we too can clothe our husbandmen in royal apparel, and set crowns of gold on their heads, and bid them till the ground as much as they like, and no more. Our potters also might be allowed to repose on couches, and feast by the fireside, passing round the winecup, while their wheel is conveniently at hand, and working at pottery only as much as they like; in this way we might make every class happy — and then, as you imagine, the whole State would be happy. But do not put this idea into our heads; for, if we listen to you, the husbandman will be no longer a 421 husbandman, the potter will cease to be a potter, and no one will have the character of any distinct class in the State. Now this is not of much consequence where the corruption of society, and pretension to be what you are not, is confined to cobblers; but when the guardians of the laws and of the government are only seeming and not real guardians, then see how they turn the State upside down; and on the other hand they alone have the power of giving order and happiness to the State. We mean our guardians to be true saviours and not the destroyers of the State, whereas our opponent is thinking of peasants at a festival, who are enjoying a life of revelry, not of citizens who are doing their duty to the State. But, if so, we mean different things, and he is

The guardians  
must be  
guardians,  
not boon  
companions.



speaking of something which is not a State. And therefore we must consider whether in appointing our guardians we would look to their greatest happiness individually, or whether this principle of happiness does not rather reside in the State as a whole. But if the latter be the truth, then the guardians and auxiliaries, and all others equally with them, must be compelled or induced to do their own work in the best way. And thus the whole State will grow up in a noble order, and the several classes will receive the proportion of happiness which nature assigns to them.

I think that you are quite right.

I wonder whether you will agree with another remark which occurs to me.

What may that be?

There seem to be two causes of the deterioration of the arts.

What are they?

Wealth, I said, and poverty.

How do they act?

The process is as follows: When a potter becomes rich, will he, think you, any longer take the same pains with his art?

Certainly not.

He will grow more and more indolent and careless?

Very true.

And the result will be that he becomes a worse potter?

Yes; he greatly deteriorates.

But, on the other hand, if he has no money, and cannot provide himself with tools or instruments, he will not work equally well himself, nor will he teach his sons or apprentices to work equally well.

Certainly not.

Then, under the influence either of poverty or of wealth, workmen and their work are equally liable to degenerate?

That is evident.

Here, then, is a discovery of new evils, I said, against which the guardians will have to watch, or they will creep into the city unobserved.

What evils?

422 Wealth, I said, and poverty; the one is the parent of

*Republic IV.*

ADEIMANTUS,  
SOCRATES.

When an artisan grows rich, he becomes careless: if he is very poor, he has no money to buy tools with. The city should be neither poor nor rich.

*Republic IV.*SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.But how,  
being poor,  
can she con-  
tend against  
a wealthy  
enemy?Our wiry sol-  
diers will be  
more than a  
match for  
their fat  
neighbours.

luxury and indolence, and the other of meanness and viciousness, and both of discontent.

That is very true, he replied; but still I should like to know, Socrates, how our city will be able to go to war, especially against an enemy who is rich and powerful, if deprived of the sinews of war.

There would certainly be a difficulty, I replied, in going to war with one such enemy; but there is no difficulty where there are two of them.

How so? he asked.

In the first place, I said, if we have to fight, our side will be trained warriors fighting against an army of rich men.

That is true, he said.

And do you not suppose, Adeimantus, that a single boxer who was perfect in his art would easily be a match for two stout and well-to-do gentlemen who were not boxers?

Hardly, if they came upon him at once.

What, not, I said, if he were able to run away and then turn and strike at the one who first came up? And supposing he were to do this several times under the heat of a scorching sun, might he not, being an expert, overturn more than one stout personage?

Certainly, he said, there would be nothing wonderful in that.

And yet rich men probably have a greater superiority in the science and practise of boxing than they have in military qualities.

Likely enough.

Then we may assume that our athletes will be able to fight with two or three times their own number?

I agree with you, for I think you are right.

And they will  
have allies  
who will  
readily join  
on condition  
of receiving  
the spoil.

And suppose that, before engaging, our citizens send an embassy to one of the two cities, telling them what is the truth: Silver and gold we neither have nor are permitted to have, but you may; do you therefore come and help us in war, and take the spoils of the other city: Who, on hearing these words, would choose to fight against lean wiry dogs, rather than, with the dogs on their side, against fat and tender sheep?

That is not likely; and yet there might be a danger to the

poor State if the wealth of many States were to be gathered into one.

*Republic IV.*

SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

But how simple of you to use the term State at all of any but our own!

Why so?

423 You ought to speak of other States in the plural number ; not one of them is a city, but many cities, as they say in the game. For indeed any city, however small, is in fact divided into two, one the city of the poor, the other of the rich ; these are at war with one another ; and in either there are many smaller divisions, and you would be altogether beside the mark if you treated them all as a single State. But if you deal with them as many, and give the wealth or power or persons of the one to the others, you will always have a great many friends and not many enemies. And your State, while the wise order which has now been prescribed continues to prevail in her, will be the greatest of States, I do not mean to say in reputation or appearance, but in deed and truth, though she number not more than a thousand defenders. A single State which is her equal you will hardly find, either among Hellenes or barbarians, though many that appear to be as great and many times greater.

But many cities will conspire ?  
No : they are divided in themselves.

That is most true, he said.

And what, I said, will be the best limit for our rulers to fix when they are considering the size of the State and the amount of territory which they are to include, and beyond which they will not go?

The limit to the size of the State the possibility of unity.

What limit would you propose?

I would allow the State to increase so far as is consistent with unity ; that, I think, is the proper limit.

Very good, he said.

Here then, I said, is another order which will have to be conveyed to our guardians : Let our city be accounted neither large nor small, but one and self-sufficing.

And surely, said he, this is not a very severe order which we impose upon them.

And the other, said I, of which we were speaking before is lighter still,—I mean the duty of degrading the offspring of the guardians when inferior, and of elevating into the rank of guardians the offspring of the lower classes, when naturally

The duty of adjusting the citizens to the rank for



*Republic IV.*SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.which nature  
intended  
them.

superior. The intention was, that, in the case of the citizens generally, each individual should be put to the use for which nature intended him, one to one work, and then every man would do his own business, and be one and not many; and so the whole city would be one and not many.

Yes, he said; that is not so difficult.

The regulations which we are prescribing, my good Adeimantus, are not, as might be supposed, a number of great principles, but trifles all, if care be taken, as the saying is, of the one great thing,—a thing, however, which I would rather call, not, great, but sufficient for our purpose.

What may that be? he asked.

Education, I said, and nurture: If our citizens are well educated, and grow into sensible men, they will easily see their way through all these, as well as other matters which I omit; such, for example, as marriage, the possession of women and the procreation of children, which will all follow the general principle that friends have all things in common, as the proverb says. 424

That will be the best way of settling them.

Good education has a cumulative force and affects the breed.

Also, I said, the State, if once started well, moves with accumulating force like a wheel. For good nurture and education implant good constitutions, and these good constitutions taking root in a good education improve more and more, and this improvement affects the breed in man as in other animals.

Very possibly, he said.

No innovations to be made either in music or gymnastic.

Then to sum up: This is the point to which, above all, the attention of our rulers should be directed,—that music and gymnastic be preserved in their original form, and no innovation made. They must do their utmost to maintain them intact. And when any one says that mankind most regard

‘The newest song which the singers have<sup>1</sup>,’

they will be afraid that he may be praising, not new songs, but a new kind of song; and this ought not to be praised, or conceived to be the meaning of the poet; for any musical innovation is full of danger to the whole State, and ought to be prohibited. So Damon tells me, and I can quite believe

Damon.

<sup>1</sup> Od. i. 352.



him ;— he says that when modes of music change, the fundamental laws of the State always change with them.

*Republic IV.*

Yes, said Adeimantus ; and you may add my suffrage to Damon's and your own.

SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

Then, I said, our guardians must lay the foundations of their fortress in music?

Yes, he said ; the lawlessness of which you speak too easily steals in.

Yes, I replied, in the form of amusement ; and at first sight it appears harmless.

Why, yes, he said, and there is no harm ; were it not that little by little this spirit of licence, finding a home, imperceptibly penetrates into manners and customs ; whence, issuing with greater force, it invades contracts between man and man, and from contracts goes on to laws and constitutions, in utter recklessness, ending at last, Socrates, by an overthrow of all rights, private as well as public.

The spirit of lawlessness, beginning in music, gradually pervades the whole of life.

Is that true? I said.

That is my belief, he replied.

Then, as I was saying, our youth should be trained from the first in a stricter system, for if amusements become lawless, and the youths themselves become lawless, they can never grow up into well-conducted and virtuous citizens.

Very true, he said.

And when they have made a good beginning in play, and by the help of music have gained the habit of good order, then this habit of order, in a manner how unlike the lawless play of the others! will accompany them in all their actions and be a principle of growth to them, and if there be any fallen places in the State will raise them up again.

The habit of order the basis of education.

Very true, he said.

Thus educated, they will invent for themselves any lesser rules which their predecessors have altogether neglected.

What do you mean?

I mean such things as these :— when the young are to be silent before their elders ; how they are to show respect to them by standing and making them sit ; what honour is due to parents ; what garments or shoes are to be worn ; the mode of dressing the hair ; deportment and manners in general. You would agree with me?

If the citizens have the root of the matter in them, they will supply the details for themselves.

*Republic IV.*

Yes.

SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

But there is, I think, small wisdom in legislating about such matters,— I doubt if it is ever done ; nor are any precise written enactments about them likely to be lasting.

Impossible.

It would seem, Adeimantus, that the direction in which education starts a man, will determine his future life. Does not like always attract like?

To be sure.

Until some one rare and grand result is reached which may be good, and may be the reverse of good?

That is not to be denied.

And for this reason, I said, I shall not attempt to legislate further about them.

Naturally enough, he replied.

The mere  
routine of  
administra-  
tion may be  
omitted by us.

Well, and about the business of the agora, and the ordinary dealings between man and man, or again about agreements with artisans ; about insult and injury, or the commencement of actions, and the appointment of juries, what would you say? there may also arise questions about any impositions and exactions of market and harbour dues which may be required, and in general about the regulations of markets, police, harbours, and the like. But, oh heavens! shall we condescend to legislate on any of these particulars?

I think, he said, that there is no need to impose laws about them on good men ; what regulations are necessary they will find out soon enough for themselves.

Yes, I said, my friend, if God will only preserve to them the laws which we have given them.

And without divine help, said Adeimantus, they will go on for ever making and mending their laws and their lives in the hope of attaining perfection.

Illustration of  
reformers of  
the law taken  
from invalids  
who are  
always doc-  
toring them-  
selves, but  
will

You would compare them, I said, to those invalids who, having no self-restraint, will not leave off their habits of intemperance?

Exactly.

Yes, I said ; and what a delightful life they lead! they are always doctoring and increasing and complicating their disorders, and always fancying that they will be cured by any nostrum which anybody advises them to try. 426

Such cases are very common, he said, with invalids of this sort. *Republic IV.*

Yes, I replied; and the charming thing is that they deem him their worst enemy who tells them the truth, which is simply that, unless they give up eating and drinking and wenching and idling, neither drug nor cautery nor spell nor amulet nor any other remedy will avail. SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.  
never listen  
to the truth.

Charming! he replied. I see nothing charming in going into a passion with a man who tells you what is right.

These gentlemen, I said, do not seem to be in your good graces.

Assuredly not.

Nor would you praise the behaviour of States which act like the men whom I was just now describing. For are there not ill-ordered States in which the citizens are forbidden under pain of death to alter the constitution; and yet he who most sweetly courts those who live under this régime and indulges them and fawns upon them and is skilful in anticipating and gratifying their humours is held to be a great and good statesman—do not these States resemble the persons whom I was describing?

Yes, he said; the States are as bad as the men; and I am very far from praising them.

But do you not admire, I said, the coolness and dexterity of these ready ministers of political corruption?

Yes, he said, I do; but not of all of them, for there are some whom the applause of the multitude has deluded into the belief that they are really statesmen, and these are not much to be admired. Demagogues  
trying their  
hands at  
legislation  
may be  
excused for  
their igno-  
rance of the  
world.

What do you mean? I said; you should have more feeling for them. When a man cannot measure, and a great many others who cannot measure declare that he is four cubits high, can he help believing what they say?

Nay, he said, certainly not in that case.

Well, then, do not be angry with them; for are they not as good as a play, trying their hand at paltry reforms such as I was describing; they are always fancying that by legislation they will make an end of frauds in contracts, and the other rascalities which I was mentioning, not knowing that they are in reality cutting off the heads of a hydra?



*Republic IV.*

Yes, he said; that is just what they are doing.

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SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS,  
GLAUCON.

I conceive, I said, that the true legislator will not trouble himself with this class of enactments whether concerning laws or the constitution either in an ill-ordered or in a well-ordered State; for in the former they are quite useless, and in the latter there will be no difficulty in devising them; and many of them will naturally flow out of our previous regulations.

What, then, he said, is still remaining to us of the work of legislation?

Nothing to us, I replied; but to Apollo, the god of Delphi, there remains the ordering of the greatest and noblest and chiefest things of all.

Which are they? he said.

Religion to be  
left to the God  
of Delphi.

The institution of temples and sacrifices, and the entire service of gods, demigods, and heroes; also the ordering of the repositories of the dead, and the rites which have to be observed by him who would propitiate the inhabitants of the world below. These are matters of which we are ignorant ourselves, and as founders of a city we should be unwise in trusting them to any interpreter but our ancestral deity. He is the god who sits in the centre, on the navel of the earth, and he is the interpreter of religion to all mankind.

You are right, and we will do as you propose.

But where, amid all this, is justice? son of Ariston, tell me where. Now that our city has been made habitable, light a candle and search, and get your brother and Polemarchus and the rest of our friends to help, and let us see where in it we can discover justice and where injustice, and in what they differ from one another, and which of them the man who would be happy should have for his portion, whether seen or unseen by gods and men.

Nonsense, said Glaucon: did you not promise to search yourself, saying that for you not to help justice in her need would be an impiety?

I do not deny that I said so; and as you remind me, I will be as good as my word; but you must join.

We will, he replied.

Well, then, I hope to make the discovery in this way:



I mean to begin with the assumption that our State, if rightly ordered, is perfect. *Republic IV.*

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

That is most certain.

And being perfect, is therefore wise and valiant and temperate and just.

That is likewise clear.

And whichever of these qualities we find in the State, the one which is not found will be the residue?

428 Very good.

If there were four things, and we were searching for one of them, wherever it might be, the one sought for might be known to us from the first, and there would be no further trouble; or we might know the other three first, and then the fourth would clearly be the one left.

Very true, he said.

And is not a similar method to be pursued about the virtues, which are also four in number?

Clearly.

First among the virtues found in the State, wisdom comes into view, and in this I detect a certain peculiarity.

What is that?

The State which we have been describing is said to be wise as being good in counsel?

Very true.

And good counsel is clearly a kind of knowledge, for not by ignorance, but by knowledge, do men counsel well?

Clearly.

And the kinds of knowledge in a State are many and diverse?

Of course.

There is the knowledge of the carpenter; but is that the sort of knowledge which gives a city the title of wise and good in counsel?

Certainly not; that would only give a city the reputation of skill in carpentering.

Then a city is not to be called wise because possessing a knowledge which counsels for the best about wooden implements?

Certainly not.

Nor by reason of a knowledge which advises about brazen

The place of the virtues in the State:  
(1) The wisdom of the statesman advises, not about particular arts or pursuits,

*Republic IV.*  
SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

pots, he said, nor as possessing any other similar knowledge?

Not by reason of any of them, he said.

Nor yet by reason of a knowledge which cultivates the earth; that would give the city the name of agricultural?

Yes.

but about the  
whole State.

Well, I said, and is there any knowledge in our recently-founded State among any of the citizens which advises, not about any particular thing in the State, but about the whole, and considers how a State can best deal with itself and with other States?

There certainly is.

And what is this knowledge, and among whom is it found? I asked.

It is the knowledge of the guardians, he replied, and is found among those whom we were just now describing as perfect guardians.

And what is the name which the city derives from the possession of this sort of knowledge?

The name of good in counsel and truly wise.

The states-  
men or  
guardians are  
the smallest  
of all classes  
in the State.

And will there be in our city more of these true guardians or more smiths?

The smiths, he replied, will be far more numerous.

Will not the guardians be the smallest of all the classes who receive a name from the profession of some kind of knowledge?

Much the smallest.

And so by reason of the smallest part or class, and of the knowledge which resides in this presiding and ruling part of itself, the whole State, being thus constituted according to nature, will be wise; and this, which has the only know- 429  
ledge worthy to be called wisdom, has been ordained by nature to be of all classes the least.

Most true.

Thus, then, I said, the nature and place in the State of one of the four virtues has somehow or other been discovered.

And, in my humble opinion, very satisfactorily discovered, he replied.

Again, I said, there is no difficulty in seeing the nature of

courage, and in what part that quality resides which gives the name of courageous to the State.

*Republic IV.*

How do you mean?

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Why, I said, every one who calls any State courageous or cowardly, will be thinking of the part which fights and goes out to war on the State's behalf.

(2) The courage which makes the city courageous is found chiefly in the soldier.

No one, he replied, would ever think of any other.

The rest of the citizens may be courageous or may be cowardly, but their courage or cowardice will not, as I conceive, have the effect of making the city either the one or the other.

Certainly not.

The city will be courageous in virtue of a portion of herself which preserves under all circumstances that opinion about the nature of things to be feared and not to be feared in which our legislator educated them; and this is what you term courage.

It is the quality which preserves right opinion about things to be feared and not to be feared.

I should like to hear what you are saying once more, for I do not think that I perfectly understand you.

I mean that courage is a kind of salvation.

Salvation of what?

Of the opinion respecting things to be feared, what they are and of what nature, which the law implants through education; and I mean by the words 'under all circumstances' to intimate that in pleasure or in pain, or under the influence of desire or fear, a man preserves, and does not lose this opinion. Shall I give you an illustration?

If you please.

You know, I said, that dyers, when they want to dye wool for making the true sea-purple, begin by selecting their white colour first; this they prepare and dress with much care and pains, in order that the white ground may take the purple hue in full perfection. The dyeing then proceeds; and whatever is dyed in this manner becomes a fast colour, and no washing either with lyes or without them can take away the bloom. But, when the ground has not been duly prepared, you will have noticed how poor is the look either of purple or of any other colour.

Illustration from the art of dyeing.

Yes, he said; I know that they have a washed-out and ridiculous appearance.



*Republic IV.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.Our soldiers  
must take the  
dye of the  
laws.

Then now, I said, you will understand what our object was in selecting our soldiers, and educating them in music and gymnastic; we were contriving influences which would prepare them to take the dye of the laws in perfection, and the colour of their opinion about dangers and of every other opinion was to be indelibly fixed by their nurture and training, not to be washed away by such potent lyes as pleasure — mightier agent far in washing the soul than any soda or lye; or by sorrow, fear, and desire, the mightiest of all other solvents. And this sort of universal saving power of true opinion in conformity with law about real and false dangers I call and maintain to be courage, unless you disagree. 430

But I agree, he replied; for I suppose that you mean to exclude mere uninstructed courage, such as that of a wild beast or of a slave — this, in your opinion, is not the courage which the law ordains, and ought to have another name.

Most certainly.

Then I may infer courage to be such as you describe?

Why, yes, said I, you may, and if you add the words 'of a citizen,' you will not be far wrong; — hereafter, if you like, we will carry the examination further, but at present we are seeking not for courage but justice; and for the purpose of our enquiry we have said enough.

You are right, he replied.

Two virtues remain to be discovered in the State — first, temperance, and then justice which is the end of our search.

Very true.

Now, can we find justice without troubling ourselves about temperance?

I do not know how that can be accomplished, he said, nor do I desire that justice should be brought to light and temperance lost sight of; and therefore I wish that you would do me the favour of considering temperance first.

Certainly, I replied, I should not be justified in refusing your request.

Then consider, he said.

Yes, I replied; I will; and as far as I can at present see, the virtue of temperance has more of the nature of harmony and symphony than the preceding.

How so? he asked.

Two other  
virtues, tem-  
perance and  
justice, which  
must be  
considered in  
their proper  
order.



Temperance, I replied, is the ordering or controlling of certain pleasures and desires; this is curiously enough implied in the saying of 'a man being his own master;' and other traces of the same notion may be found in language.

No doubt, he said.

There is something ridiculous in the expression 'master of himself;' for the master is also the servant and the servant the master; and in all these modes of speaking the same person is denoted.

Certainly.

The meaning is, I believe, that in the human soul there is a better and also a worse principle; and when the better has the worse under control, then a man is said to be master of himself; and this is a term of praise: but when, owing to evil education or association, the better principle, which is also the smaller, is overwhelmed by the greater mass of the worse—in this case he is blamed and is called the slave of self and unprincipled.

Yes, there is reason in that.

And now, I said, look at our newly-created State, and there you will find one of these two conditions realized; for the State, as you will acknowledge, may be justly called master of itself, if the words 'temperance' and 'self-mastery' truly express the rule of the better part over the worse.

Yes, he said, I see that what you say is true.

Let me further note that the manifold and complex pleasures and desires and pains are generally found in children and women and servants, and in the freemen so called who are of the lowest and more numerous class.

Certainly, he said.

Whereas the simple and moderate desires which follow reason, and are under the guidance of mind and true opinion, are to be found only in a few, and those the best born and best educated.

Very true.

These two, as you may perceive, have a place in our State; and the meaner desires of the many are held down by the virtuous desires and wisdom of the few.

That I perceive, he said.

Then if there be any city which may be described as

*Republic IV.*

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

The temperate is master of himself, but the same person, when intemperate, is also the slave of himself.

The State which has the passions and desires of the many controlled

*Republic IV.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.by the few  
may be  
rightly called  
temperate.

master of its own pleasures and desires, and master of itself, ours may claim such a designation?

Certainly, he replied.

It may also be called temperate, and for the same reasons?

Yes.

And if there be any State in which rulers and subjects will be agreed as to the question who are to rule, that again will be our State?

Undoubtedly.

And the citizens being thus agreed among themselves, in which class will temperance be found—in the rulers or in the subjects?

In both, as I should imagine, he replied.

Do you observe that we were not far wrong in our guess that temperance was a sort of harmony?

Why so?

Temperance  
resides in the  
whole State.

Why, because temperance is unlike courage and wisdom, each of which resides in a part only, the one making the State wise and the other valiant; not so temperance, which extends to the whole, and runs through all the notes of the scale, and produces a harmony of the weaker and the stronger and the middle class, whether you suppose them to be stronger or weaker in wisdom or power or numbers or wealth, or anything else. Most truly then may we deem temperance to be the agreement of the naturally superior and inferior, as to the right to rule of either, both in states and individuals. 432

I entirely agree with you.

And so, I said, we may consider three out of the four virtues to have been discovered in our State. The last of those qualities which make a state virtuous must be justice, if we only knew what that was.

The inference is obvious.

Justice is  
not far off.

The time then has arrived, Glaucon, when, like huntsmen, we should surround the cover, and look sharp that justice does not steal away, and pass out of sight and escape us; for beyond a doubt she is somewhere in this country: watch therefore and strive to catch a sight of her, and if you see her first, let me know.

Would that I could! but you should regard me rather as

a follower who has just eyes enough to see what you show him — that is about as much as I am good for.

*Republic II.*

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Offer up a prayer with me and follow.

I will, but you must show me the way.

Here is no path, I said, and the wood is dark and perplexing; still we must push on.

Let us push on.

Here I saw something: Halloo! I said, I begin to perceive a track, and I believe that the quarry will not escape.

Good news, he said.

Truly, I said, we are stupid fellows.

Why so?

Why, my good sir, at the beginning of our enquiry, ages ago, there was justice tumbling out at our feet, and we never saw her; nothing could be more ridiculous. Like people who go about looking for what they have in their hands — that was the way with us — we looked not at what we were seeking, but at what was far off in the distance; and therefore, I suppose, we missed her.

What do you mean?

I mean to say that in reality for a long time past we have been talking of justice, and have failed to recognise her.

I grow impatient at the length of your exordium.

433 Well then, tell me, I said, whether I am right or not: You remember the original principle which we were always laying down at the foundation of the State, that one man should practise one thing only, the thing to which his nature was best adapted; — now justice is this principle or a part of it.

We had already found her when we spoke of one man doing one thing only.

Yes, we often said that one man should do one thing only.

Further, we affirmed that justice was doing one's own business, and not being a busybody; we said so again and again, and many others have said the same to us.

Yes, we said so.

Then to do one's own business in a certain way may be assumed to be justice. Can you tell me whence I derive this inference?

I cannot, but I should like to be told.

Because I think that this is the only virtue which remains in the State when the other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are abstracted; and, that this is the ultimate

From another point of view Justice



*Republic IV.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.is the residue  
of the three  
others.

cause and condition of the existence of all of them, and while remaining in them is also their preservative; and we were saying that if the three were discovered by us, justice would be the fourth or remaining one.

That follows of necessity.

If we are asked to determine which of these four qualities by its presence contributes most to the excellence of the State, whether the agreement of rulers and subjects, or the preservation in the soldiers of the opinion which the law ordains about the true nature of dangers, or wisdom and watchfulness in the rulers, or whether this other which I am mentioning, and which is found in children and women, slave and freeman, artisan, ruler, subject,—the quality, I mean, of every one doing his own work, and not being a busybody, would claim the palm—the question is not so easily answered.

Certainly, he replied, there would be a difficulty in saying which.

Then the power of each individual in the State to do his own work appears to compete with the other political virtues, wisdom, temperance, courage.

Yes, he said.

And the virtue which enters into this competition is justice?

Exactly.

Our idea is confirmed by the administration of justice in lawsuits. No man is to have what is not his own.

Let us look at the question from another point of view: Are not the rulers in a State those to whom you would entrust the office of determining suits at law?

Certainly.

And are suits decided on any other ground but that a man may neither take what is another's, nor be deprived of what is his own?

Yes; that is their principle.

Which is a just principle?

Yes.

Then on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and doing what is a man's own, and belongs to him?

Very true.

Illustration:  
Classes,

Think, now, and say whether you agree with me or not. Suppose a carpenter to be doing the business of a cobbler,



or a cobbler of a carpenter; and suppose them to exchange their implements or their duties, or the same person to be doing the work of both, or whatever be the change; do you think that any great harm would result to the State?

Not much.

But when the cobbler or any other man whom nature designed to be a trader, having his heart lifted up by wealth or strength or the number of his followers, or any like advantage, attempts to force his way into the class of warriors, or a warrior into that of legislators and guardians, for which he is unfitted, and either to take the implements or the duties of the other; or when one man is trader, legislator, and warrior all in one, then I think you will agree with me in saying that this interchange and this meddling of one with another is the ruin of the State.

Most true.

Seeing then, I said, that there are three distinct classes, any meddling of one with another, or the change of one into another, is the greatest harm to the State, and may be most justly termed evil-doing?

Precisely.

And the greatest degree of evil-doing to one's own city would be termed by you injustice?

Certainly.

This then is injustice; and on the other hand when the trader, the auxiliary, and the guardian each do their own business, that is justice, and will make the city just.

I agree with you.

We will not, I said, be over-positive as yet; but if, on trial, this conception of justice be verified in the individual as well as in the State, there will be no longer any room for doubt; if it be not verified, we must have a fresh enquiry. First let us complete the old investigation, which we began, as you remember, under the impression that, if we could previously examine justice on the larger scale, there would be less difficulty in discerning her in the individual. That larger example appeared to be the State, and accordingly we constructed as good a one as we could, knowing well that in the good State justice would be found. Let the discovery which we made be now applied to the individual — if they agree,

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SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

like individuals, should not meddle with one another's occupations.

From the larger example of the State we will now return to the individual.

*Republic IV.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

we shall be satisfied; or, if there be a difference in the individual, we will come back to the State and have another trial of the theory. The friction of the two when rubbed together may possibly strike a light in which justice will shine forth, and the vision which is then revealed we will fix in our souls. 435

That will be in regular course; let us do as you say.

I proceeded to ask: When two things, a greater and less, are called by the same name, are they like or unlike in so far as they are called the same?

Like, he replied.

The just man then, if we regard the idea of justice only, will be like the just State?

He will.

And a State was thought by us to be just when the three classes in the State severally did their own business; and also thought to be temperate and valiant and wise by reason of certain other affections and qualities of these same classes?

True, he said.

And so of the individual; we may assume that he has the same three principles in his own soul which are found in the State; and he may be rightly described in the same terms, because he is affected in the same manner?

Certainly, he said.

How can we decide whether or no the soul has three distinct principles?

Once more then, O my friend, we have alighted upon an easy question — whether the soul has these three principles or not?

An easy question! Nay, rather, Socrates, the proverb holds that hard is the good.

Our method is inadequate, and for a better and longer one we have not at present time.

Very true, I said; and I do not think that the method which we are employing is at all adequate to the accurate solution of this question; the true method is another and a longer one. Still we may arrive at a solution not below the level of the previous enquiry.

May we not be satisfied with that? he said;—under the circumstances, I am quite content.

I too, I replied, shall be extremely well satisfied.

Then faint not in pursuing the speculation, he said.

Must we not acknowledge, I said, that in each of us there

are the same principles and habits which there are in the State; and that from the individual they pass into the State?—how else can they come there? Take the quality of passion or spirit;—it would be ridiculous to imagine that this quality, when found in States, is not derived from the individuals who are supposed to possess it, e. g. the Thracians, Scythians, and in general the northern nations; and the same may be said of the love of knowledge, which is the special characteristic of our part of the world, or of the love of money, which may, with equal truth, be attributed to the Phoenicians and Egyptians.

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SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Exactly so, he said.

There is no difficulty in understanding this.

None whatever.

But the question is not quite so easy when we proceed to ask whether these principles are three or one; whether, that is to say, we learn with one part of our nature, are angry with another, and with a third part desire the satisfaction of our natural appetites; or whether the whole soul comes into play in each sort of action—to determine that is the difficulty.

A digression  
in which an  
attempt is  
made to  
attain logical  
clearness.

Yes, he said; there lies the difficulty.

Then let us now try and determine whether they are the same or different.

How can we? he asked.

I replied as follows: The same thing clearly cannot act or be acted upon in the same part or in relation to the same thing at the same time, in contrary ways; and therefore whenever this contradiction occurs in things apparently the same, we know that they are really not the same, but different.

The criterion  
of truth:  
Nothing can  
be and not be  
at the same  
time in the  
same relation.

Good.

For example, I said, can the same thing be at rest and in motion at the same time in the same part?

Impossible.

Still, I said, let us have a more precise statement of terms, lest we should hereafter fall out by the way. Imagine the case of a man who is standing and also moving his hands and his head, and suppose a person to say that one and the same person is in motion and at rest at the same moment



*Republic IV.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

— to such a mode of speech we should object, and should rather say that one part of him is in motion while another is at rest.

Very true.

Anticipation  
of objections  
to this 'law  
of thought.'

And suppose the objector to refine still further, and to draw the nice distinction that not only parts of tops, but whole tops, when they spin round with their pegs fixed on the spot, are at rest and in motion at the same time (and he may say the same of anything which revolves in the same spot), his objection would not be admitted by us, because in such cases things are not at rest and in motion in the same parts of themselves; we should rather say that they have both an axis and a circumference; and that the axis stands still, for there is no deviation from the perpendicular; and that the circumference goes round. But if, while revolving, the axis inclines either to the right or left, forwards or backwards, then in no point of view can they be at rest.

That is the correct mode of describing them, he replied.

Then none of these objections will confuse us, or incline us to believe that the same thing at the same time, in the same part or in relation to the same thing, can act or be acted upon in contrary ways. 437

Certainly not, according to my way of thinking.

Yet, I said, that we may not be compelled to examine all such objections, and prove at length that they are untrue, let us assume their absurdity, and go forward on the understanding that hereafter, if this assumption turn out to be untrue, all the consequences which follow shall be withdrawn.

Yes, he said, that will be the best way.

Likes and  
dislikes exist  
in many  
forms.

Well, I said, would you not allow that assent and dissent, desire and aversion, attraction and repulsion, are all of them opposites, whether they are regarded as active or passive (for that makes no difference in the fact of their opposition)?

Yes, he said, they are opposites.

Well, I said, and hunger and thirst, and the desires in general, and again willing and wishing,—all these you would refer to the classes already mentioned. You would say—would you not?—that the soul of him who desires is seeking



after the object of his desire ; or that he is drawing to himself the thing which he wishes to possess : or again, when a person wants anything to be given him, his mind, longing for the realization of his desire, intimates his wish to have it by a nod of assent, as if he had been asked a question?

Very true.

And what would you say of unwillingness and dislike and the absence of desire ; should not these be referred to the opposite class of repulsion and rejection?

Certainly.

Admitting this to be true of desire generally, let us suppose a particular class of desires, and out of these we will select hunger and thirst, as they are termed, which are the most obvious of them?

Let us take that class, he said.

The object of one is food, and of the other drink?

Yes.

And here comes the point : is not thirst the desire which the soul has of drink, and of drink only ; not of drink qualified by anything else ; for example, warm or cold, or much or little, or, in a word, drink of any particular sort : but if the thirst be accompanied by heat, then the desire is of cold drink ; or, if accompanied by cold, then of warm drink ; or, if the thirst be excessive, then the drink which is desired will be excessive ; or, if not great, the quantity of drink will also be small : but thirst pure and simple will desire drink pure and simple, which is the natural satisfaction of thirst, as food is of hunger?

There may be simple thirst or qualified thirst, having respectively a simple or a qualified object.

Yes, he said ; the simple desire is, as you say, in every case of the simple object, and the qualified desire of the  
438 qualified object.

But here a confusion may arise ; and I should wish to guard against an opponent starting up and saying that no man desires drink only, but good drink, or food only, but good food ; for good is the universal object of desire, and thirst being a desire, will necessarily be thirst after good drink ; and the same is true of every other desire.

Exception : The term good expresses, not a particular, but an universal relation.

Yes, he replied, the opponent might have something to say.

Nevertheless I should still maintain, that of relatives some  
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*Republic IV.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.Illustration of  
the argument  
from the use  
of language  
about correla-  
tive terms.

have a quality attached to either term of the relation ; others are simple and have their correlatives simple.

I do not know what you mean.

Well, you know of course that the greater is relative to the less?

Certainly.

And the much greater to the much less?

Yes.

And the sometime greater to the sometime less, and the greater that is to be to the less that is to be?

Certainly, he said.

And so of more and less, and of other correlative terms, such as the double and the half, or again, the heavier and the lighter, the swifter and the slower ; and of hot and cold, and of any other relatives ;—is not this true of all of them?

Yes.

And does not the same principle hold in the sciences? The object of science is knowledge (assuming that to be the true definition), but the object of a particular science is a particular kind of knowledge ; I mean, for example, that the science of house-building is a kind of knowledge which is defined and distinguished from other kinds and is therefore termed architecture.

Certainly.

Because it has a particular quality which no other has?

Yes.

And it has this particular quality because it has an object of a particular kind ; and this is true of the other arts and sciences?

Yes.

Recapitula-  
tion.

Now, then, if I have made myself clear, you will understand my original meaning in what I said about relatives. My meaning was, that if one term of a relation is taken alone, the other is taken alone ; if one term is qualified, the other is also qualified. I do not mean to say that relatives may not be disparate, or that the science of health is healthy, or of disease necessarily diseased, or that the sciences of good and evil are therefore good and evil ; but only that, when the term science is no longer used absolutely, but has a qualified object which in this case is the nature of health and disease,

Anticipation  
of a possible  
confusion.

it becomes defined, and is hence called not merely science, but the science of medicine. *Republic IV.*

I quite understand, and I think as you do.

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

439 Would you not say that thirst is one of these essentially relative terms, having clearly a relation —

Yes, thirst is relative to drink.

And a certain kind of thirst is relative to a certain kind of drink; but thirst taken alone is neither of much nor little, nor of good nor bad, nor of any particular kind of drink, but of drink only?

Certainly.

Then the soul of the thirsty one, in so far as he is thirsty, desires only drink; for this he yearns and tries to obtain it?

That is plain.

And if you suppose something which pulls a thirsty soul away from drink, that must be different from the thirsty principle which draws him like a beast to drink; for, as we were saying, the same thing cannot at the same time with the same part of itself act in contrary ways about the same.

The law of  
contradiction.

Impossible.

No more than you can say that the hands of the archer push and pull the bow at the same time, but what you say is that one hand pushes and the other pulls.

Exactly so, he replied.

And might a man be thirsty, and yet unwilling to drink?

Yes, he said, it constantly happens.

And in such a case what is one to say? Would you not say that there was something in the soul bidding a man to drink, and something else forbidding him, which is other and stronger than the principle which bids him?

I should say so.

And the forbidding principle is derived from reason, and that which bids and attracts proceeds from passion and disease?

The opposi-  
tion of desire  
and reason.

Clearly.

Then we may fairly assume that they are two, and that they differ from one another; the one with which a man reasons, we may call the rational principle of the soul, the other, with which he loves and hungers and thirsts and feels the



*Republic IV.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

flutterings of any other desire, may be termed the irrational or appetitive, the ally of sundry pleasures and satisfactions?

Yes, he said, we may fairly assume them to be different.

Then let us finally determine that there are two principles existing in the soul. And what of passion, or spirit? Is it a third, or akin to one of the preceding?

I should be inclined to say — akin to desire.

The third principle of spirit or passion illustrated by an example.

Well, I said, there is a story which I remember to have heard, and in which I put faith. The story is, that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, coming up one day from the Piraeus, under the north wall on the outside, observed some dead bodies lying on the ground at the place of execution. He felt a desire to see them, and also a dread and abhorrence of them; for a time he struggled and covered his eyes, but at length 440 the desire got the better of him; and forcing them open, he ran up to the dead bodies, saying, Look, ye wretches, take your fill of the fair sight.

I have heard the story myself, he said.

The moral of the tale is, that anger at times goes to war with desire, as though they were two distinct things.

Yes; that is the meaning, he said.

Passion never takes part with desire against reason.

And are there not many other cases in which we observe that when a man's desires violently prevail over his reason, he reviles himself, and is angry at the violence within him, and that in this struggle, which is like the struggle of factions in a State, his spirit is on the side of his reason;—but for the passionate or spirited element to take part with the desires when reason decides that she should not be opposed<sup>1</sup>, is a sort of thing which I believe that you never observed occurring in yourself, nor, as I should imagine, in any one else?

Certainly not.

Righteous indignation never felt by a person of noble character when he deservedly suffers.

Suppose that a man thinks he has done a wrong to another, the nobler he is the less able is he to feel indignant at any suffering, such as hunger, or cold, or any other pain which the injured person may inflict upon him — these he deems to be just, and, as I say, his anger refuses to be excited by them.

True, he said.

But when he thinks that he is the sufferer of the wrong,

<sup>1</sup> Reading *μη δὲν ἀντιπράττειν*, without a comma after *δεῖν*.



then he boils and chafes, and is on the side of what he believes to be justice; and because he suffers hunger or cold or other pain he is only the more determined to persevere and conquer. His noble spirit will not be quelled until he either slays or is slain; or until he hears the voice of the shepherd, that is, reason, bidding his dog bark no more. *Republic IV.*  
SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

The illustration is perfect, he replied; and in our State, as we were saying, the auxiliaries were to be dogs, and to hear the voice of the rulers, who are their shepherds.

I perceive, I said, that you quite understand me; there is, however, a further point which I wish you to consider.

What point?

You remember that passion or spirit appeared at first sight to be a kind of desire, but now we should say quite the contrary; for in the conflict of the soul spirit is arrayed on the side of the rational principle.

Most assuredly.

But a further question arises: Is passion different from reason also, or only a kind of reason; in which latter case, instead of three principles in the soul, there will only be two, Not two,  
but three  
principles in  
the soul, as in  
the State.  
441 the rational and the concupiscent; or rather, as the State was composed of three classes, traders, auxiliaries, counsellors, so may there not be in the individual soul a third element which is passion or spirit, and when not corrupted by bad education is the natural auxiliary of reason?

Yes, he said, there must be a third.

Yes, I replied, if passion, which has already been shown to be different from desire, turn out also to be different from reason.

But that is easily proved:—We may observe even in young children that they are full of spirit almost as soon as they are born, whereas some of them never seem to attain to the use of reason, and most of them late enough.

Excellent, I said, and you may see passion equally in brute animals, which is a further proof of the truth of what you are saying. And we may once more appeal to the words of Homer, which have been already quoted by us, Appeal to  
Homer.

‘He smote his breast, and thus rebuked his soul<sup>1</sup>;’

<sup>1</sup> Od. xx. 17, quoted supra, III. 390 D.

*Republic IV.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

for in this verse Homer has clearly supposed the power which reasons about the better and worse to be different from the unreasoning anger which is rebuked by it.

Very true, he said.

The conclusion that the same three principles exist both in the State and in the individual applied to each of them.

And so, after much tossing, we have reached land, and are fairly agreed that the same principles which exist in the State exist also in the individual, and that they are three in number.

Exactly.

Must we not then infer that the individual is wise in the same way, and in virtue of the same quality which makes the State wise?

Certainly.

Also that the same quality which constitutes courage in the State constitutes courage in the individual, and that both the State and the individual bear the same relation to all the other virtues?

Assuredly.

And the individual will be acknowledged by us to be just in the same way in which the State is just?

That follows of course.

We cannot but remember that the justice of the State consisted in each of the three classes doing the work of its own class?

We are not very likely to have forgotten, he said.

We must recollect that the individual in whom the several qualities of his nature do their own work will be just, and will do his own work?

Yes, he said, we must remember that too.

And ought not the rational principle, which is wise, and has the care of the whole soul, to rule, and the passionate or spirited principle to be the subject and ally?

Certainly.

Music and gymnastic will harmonize passion and reason. These two combined will control desire,

And, as we were saying, the united influence of music and gymnastic will bring them into accord, nerving and sustaining the reason with noble words and lessons, and moderating and soothing and civilizing the wildness of passion by 442 harmony and rhythm?

Quite true, he said.

And these two, thus nurtured and educated, and having

learned truly to know their own functions, will rule<sup>1</sup> over the concupiscent, which in each of us is the largest part of the soul and by nature most insatiable of gain; over this they will keep guard, lest, waxing great and strong with the fulness of bodily pleasures, as they are termed, the concupiscent soul, no longer confined to her own sphere, should attempt to enslave and rule those who are not her natural-born subjects, and overturn the whole life of man?

*Republic IV.*  
SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Very true, he said.

Both together will they not be the best defenders of the whole soul and the whole body against attacks from without; the one counselling, and the other fighting under his leader, and courageously executing his commands and counsels?

and will be  
the best  
defenders  
both of body  
and soul.

True.

And he is to be deemed courageous whose spirit retains in pleasure and in pain the commands of reason about what he ought or ought not to fear?

The cour-  
ageous.

Right, he replied.

And him we call wise who has in him that little part which rules, and which proclaims these commands; that part too being supposed to have a knowledge of what is for the interest of each of the three parts and of the whole?

The wise.

Assuredly.

And would you not say that he is temperate who has these same elements in friendly harmony, in whom the one ruling principle of reason, and the two subject ones of spirit and desire are equally agreed that reason ought to rule, and do not rebel?

The  
temperate.

Certainly, he said, that is the true account of temperance whether in the State or individual.

And surely, I said, we have explained again and again how and by virtue of what quality a man will be just.

The just.

That is very certain.

And is justice dimmer in the individual, and is her form different, or is she the same which we found her to be in the State?

<sup>1</sup> Reading *προστατήσεται* with Bekker; or, if the reading *προστήσεται*, which is found in the MSS., be adopted, then the nominative must be supplied from the previous sentence: 'Music and gymnastic will place in authority over . . .' This is very awkward, and the awkwardness is increased by the necessity of changing the subject at *τηρήσεται*.



*Republic IV.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.• The nature  
of justice  
illustrated by  
commonplace  
instances.

There is no difference in my opinion, he said.

Because, if any doubt is still lingering in our minds, a few commonplace instances will satisfy us of the truth of what I am saying.

What sort of instances do you mean?

If the case is put to us, must we not admit that the just State, or the man who is trained in the principles of such a State, will be less likely than the unjust to make away with a deposit of gold or silver? Would any one deny this? 443

No one, he replied.

Will the just man or citizen ever be guilty of sacrilege or theft, or treachery either to his friends or to his country?

Never.

Neither will he ever break faith where there have been oaths or agreements?

Impossible.

No one will be less likely to commit adultery, or to dishonour his father and mother, or to fail in his religious duties?

No one.

And the reason is that each part of him is doing its own business, whether in ruling or being ruled?

Exactly so.

Are you satisfied then that the quality which makes such men and such states is justice, or do you hope to discover some other?

Not I, indeed.

We have  
realized the  
hope enter-  
tained in  
the first  
construction  
of the State.

Then our dream has been realized; and the suspicion which we entertained at the beginning of our work of construction, that some divine power must have conducted us to a primary form of justice, has now been verified?

Yes, certainly.

And the division of labour which required the carpenter and the shoemaker and the rest of the citizens to be doing each his own business, and not another's, was a shadow of justice, and for that reason it was of use?

Clearly.

The three  
principles  
harmonize  
in one.

But in reality justice was such as we were describing, being concerned however, not with the outward man, but with the inward, which is the true self and concernment of



man: for the just man does not permit the several elements within him to interfere with one another, or any of them to do the work of others,—he sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master and his own law, and at peace with himself; and when he has bound together the three principles within him, which may be compared to the higher, lower, and middle notes of the scale, and the intermediate intervals — when he has bound all these together, and is no longer many, but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature, then he proceeds to act, if he has to act, whether in a matter of property, or in the treatment of the body, or in some affair of politics or private business; always thinking and calling that which preserves and co-operates with this harmonious condition, just and good action, and the knowledge which presides over it, wisdom, and that which at any time impairs this condition, he will call unjust action, and the opinion which presides over it ignorance.

*Republic IV.*

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

The harmony  
of human  
life.

444

You have said the exact truth, Socrates.

Very good; and if we were to affirm that we had discovered the just man and the just State, and the nature of justice in each of them, we should not be telling a falsehood?

Most certainly not.

May we say so, then?

Let us say so.

And now, I said, injustice has to be considered.

Clearly.

Must not injustice be a strife which arises among the three principles — a meddlesomeness, and interference, and rising up of a part of the soul against the whole, an assertion of unlawful authority, which is made by a rebellious subject against a true prince, of whom he is the natural vassal,—what is all this confusion and delusion but injustice, and intemperance and cowardice and ignorance, and every form of vice?

Injustice the  
opposite of  
justice.

Exactly so.

And if the nature of justice and injustice be known, then the meaning of acting unjustly and being unjust, or, again, of acting justly, will also be perfectly clear?

What do you mean? he said.

Why, I said, they are like disease and health; being in the soul just what disease and health are in the body.

*Republic IV.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.Analogy of  
body and  
soul.Health :  
disease : :  
justice :  
injustice.

How so? he said.

Why, I said, that which is healthy causes health, and that which is unhealthy causes disease.

Yes.

And just actions cause justice, and unjust actions cause injustice?

That is certain.

And the creation of health is the institution of a natural order and government of one by another in the parts of the body; and the creation of disease is the production of a state of things at variance with this natural order?

True.

And is not the creation of justice the institution of a natural order and government of one by another in the parts of the soul, and the creation of injustice the production of a state of things at variance with the natural order?

Exactly so, he said.

Then virtue is the health and beauty and well-being of the soul, and vice the disease and weakness and deformity of the same?

True.

And do not good practices lead to virtue, and evil practices to vice?

Assuredly.

The old  
question,  
whether the  
just or the  
unjust is the  
happier,  
has become  
ridiculous.

Still our old question of the comparative advantage of 445 justice and injustice has not been answered: Which is the more profitable, to be just and act justly and practise virtue, whether seen or unseen of gods and men, or to be unjust and act unjustly, if only unpunished and unreformed?

In my judgment, Socrates, the question has now become ridiculous. We know that, when the bodily constitution is gone, life is no longer endurable, though pampered with all kinds of meats and drinks, and having all wealth and all power; and shall we be told that when the very essence of the vital principle is undermined and corrupted, life is still worth having to a man, if only he be allowed to do whatever he likes with the single exception that he is not to acquire justice and virtue, or to escape from injustice and vice; assuming them both to be such as we have described?

Yes, I said, the question is, as you say, ridiculous. Still,

as we are near the spot at which we may see the truth in the clearest manner with our own eyes, let us not faint by the way.

*Republic II.*

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Certainly not, he replied.

Come up hither, I said, and behold the various forms of vice, those of them, I mean, which are worth looking at.

I am following you, he replied: proceed.

I said, The argument seems to have reached a height from which, as from some tower of speculation, a man may look down and see that virtue is one, but that the forms of vice are innumerable; there being four special ones which are deserving of note.

What do you mean? he said.

I mean, I replied, that there appear to be as many forms of the soul as there are distinct forms of the State.

As many  
forms of the  
soul as of  
the State.

How many?

There are five of the State, and five of the soul, I said.

What are they?

The first, I said, is that which we have been describing, and which may be said to have two names, monarchy and aristocracy, accordingly as rule is exercised by one distinguished man or by many.

True, he replied.

But I regard the two names as describing one form only; for whether the government is in the hands of one or many, if the governors have been trained in the manner which we have supposed, the fundamental laws of the State will be maintained.

That is true, he replied.

## BOOK V.

*Republic V.*

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON,  
ADEIMANTUS.

The commu-  
nity of women  
and children.

SUCH is the good and true City or State, and the good and true man is of the same pattern; and if this is right every other is wrong; and the evil is one which affects not only the ordering of the State, but also the regulation of the individual soul, and is exhibited in four forms. Steph. 449

What are they? he said.

I was proceeding to tell the order in which the four evil forms appeared to me to succeed one another, when Polemarchus, who was sitting a little way off, just beyond Adeimantus, began to whisper to him: stretching forth his hand, he took hold of the upper part of his coat by the shoulder, and drew him towards him, leaning forward himself so as to be quite close and saying something in his ear, of which I only caught the words, 'Shall we let him off, or what shall we do?'

Certainly not, said Adeimantus, raising his voice.

Who is it, I said, whom you are refusing to let off?

You, he said.

I repeated <sup>1</sup>, Why am I especially not to be let off?

The saying  
'Friends have  
all things in  
common' is  
an insufficient  
solution of  
the problem.

Why, he said, we think that you are lazy, and mean to cheat us out of a whole chapter which is a very important part of the story; and you fancy that we shall not notice your airy way of proceeding; as if it were self-evident to everybody, that in the matter of women and children 'friends have all things in common.'

And was I not right, Adeimantus?

Yes, he said; but what is right in this particular case, like everything else, requires to be explained; for community may be of many kinds. Please, therefore, to say what sort of community you mean. We have been long

<sup>1</sup> Reading *ἔτι ἐγὼ εἶπον*.



expecting that you would tell us something about the family life of your citizens—how they will bring children into the world, and rear them when they have arrived, and, in general, what is the nature of this community of women and children—for we are of opinion that the right or wrong management of such matters will have a great and paramount influence on the State for good or for evil. And now, since the question is still undetermined, and you are taking in hand another State, we have resolved, as you heard, not  
450 to let you go until you give an account of all this.

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SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS,  
GLAUCON,  
THRASYMA-  
CHUS.

To that resolution, said Glaucon, you may regard me as saying Agreed.

And without more ado, said Thrasymachus, you may consider us all to be equally agreed.

I said, You know not what you are doing in thus assailing me: What an argument are you raising about the State! Just as I thought that I had finished, and was only too glad that I had laid this question to sleep, and was reflecting how fortunate I was in your acceptance of what I then said, you ask me to begin again at the very foundation, ignorant of what a hornet's nest of words you are stirring. Now I foresaw this gathering trouble, and avoided it.

The feigned  
surprise of  
Socrates.

For what purpose do you conceive that we have come here, said Thrasymachus,—to look for gold, or to hear discourse?

The good-  
humour of  
Thrasyma-  
chus.

Yes, but discourse should have a limit.

Yes, Socrates, said Glaucon, and the whole of life is the only limit which wise men assign to the hearing of such discourses. But never mind about us; take heart yourself and answer the question in your own way: What sort of community of women and children is this which is to prevail among our guardians? and how shall we manage the period between birth and education, which seems to require the greatest care? Tell us how these things will be.

Yes, my simple friend, but the answer is the reverse of easy; many more doubts arise about this than about our previous conclusions. For the practicability of what is said may be doubted; and looked at in another point of view, whether the scheme, if ever so practicable, would be for the best, is also doubtful. Hence I feel a reluctance to approach

*Republic V.*

SOCRATES,

GLAUCON.

the subject, lest our aspiration, my dear friend, should turn out to be a dream only.

Fear not, he replied, for your audience will not be hard upon you; they are not sceptical or hostile.

I said: My good friend, I suppose that you mean to encourage me by these words.

Yes, he said.

A friendly audience is more dangerous than a hostile one.

Then let me tell you that you are doing just the reverse; the encouragement which you offer would have been all very well had I myself believed that I knew what I was talking about: to declare the truth about matters of high interest which a man honours and loves among wise men who love him need occasion no fear or faltering in his mind; but to carry on an argument when you are yourself only a hesitating enquirer, which is my condition, is a dangerous and slippery thing; and the danger is not that I shall be laughed at (of which the fear would be childish), but that I shall miss the truth where I have most need to be sure of my footing, and drag my friends after me in my fall. And I pray Nemesis not to visit upon me the words which I am going to utter. For I do indeed believe that to be an involuntary homicide is a less crime than to be a deceiver about beauty or goodness or justice in the matter of laws<sup>1</sup>. And that is a risk which I would rather run among enemies than among friends, and therefore you do well to encourage me<sup>2</sup>. 451

Glaucon laughed and said: Well then, Socrates, in case you and your argument do us any serious injury you shall be acquitted beforehand of the homicide, and shall not be held to be a deceiver; take courage then and speak.

Well, I said, the law says that when a man is acquitted he is free from guilt, and what holds at law may hold in argument.

Then why should you mind?

Well, I replied, I suppose that I must retrace my steps and say what I perhaps ought to have said before in the proper place. The part of the men has been played out, and now properly enough comes the turn of the women. Of them I will proceed to speak, and the more readily since I am invited by you.

<sup>1</sup> Or inserting *καὶ* before *νομίμων*: 'a deceiver about beauty or goodness or principles of justice or law.'

<sup>2</sup> Reading *ὥστε ἐν με παραμυθεῖ*.

For men born and educated like our citizens, the only way, in my opinion, of arriving at a right conclusion about the possession and use of women and children is to follow the path on which we originally started, when we said that the men were to be the guardians and watchdogs of the herd.

*Republic V.*  
SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

True.

Let us further suppose the birth and education of our women to be subject to similar or nearly similar regulations; then we shall see whether the result accords with our design.

What do you mean?

What I mean may be put into the form of a question, I said: Are dogs divided into hes and shes, or do they both share equally in hunting and in keeping watch and in the other duties of dogs? or do we entrust to the males the entire and exclusive care of the flocks, while we leave the females at home, under the idea that the bearing and suckling their puppies is labour enough for them?

No distinction among the animals such as is made between men and women.

No, he said, they share alike; the only difference between them is that the males are stronger and the females weaker.

But can you use different animals for the same purpose, unless they are bred and fed in the same way?

You cannot.

Then, if women are to have the same duties as men, they  
452 must have the same nurture and education?

Yes.

The education which was assigned to the men was music and gymnastic.

Yes.

Then women must be taught music and gymnastic and also the art of war, which they must practise like the men?

Women must be taught music, gymnastic, and military exercises equally with men.

That is the inference, I suppose.

I should rather expect, I said, that several of our proposals, if they are carried out, being unusual, may appear ridiculous.

No doubt of it.

Yes, and the most ridiculous thing of all will be the sight of women naked in the palaestra, exercising with the men, especially when they are no longer young; they certainly will not be a vision of beauty, any more than the enthusiastic



*Republic V.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

old men who in spite of wrinkles and ugliness continue to frequent the gymnasia.

Yes, indeed, he said: according to present notions the proposal would be thought ridiculous.

But then, I said, as we have determined to speak our minds, we must not fear the jests of the wits which will be directed against this sort of innovation; how they will talk of women's attainments both in music and gymnastic, and above all about their wearing armour and riding upon horseback!

Very true, he replied.

Convention  
should not be  
permitted to  
stand in the  
way of a  
higher good.

Yet having begun we must go forward to the rough places of the law; at the same time begging of these gentlemen for once in their life to be serious. Not long ago, as we shall remind them, the Hellenes were of the opinion, which is still generally received among the barbarians, that the sight of a naked man was ridiculous and improper; and when first the Cretans and then the Lacedaemonians introduced the custom, the wits of that day might equally have ridiculed the innovation.

No doubt.

But when experience showed that to let all things be uncovered was far better than to cover them up, and the ludicrous effect to the outward eye vanished before the better principle which reason asserted, then the man was perceived to be a fool who directs the shafts of his ridicule at any other sight but that of folly and vice, or seriously inclines to weigh the beautiful by any other standard but that of the good<sup>1</sup>.

Very true, he replied.

First, then, whether the question is to be put in jest or in earnest, let us come to an understanding about the nature of woman: Is she capable of sharing either wholly or partially in the actions of men, or not at all? And is the art of war one of those arts in which she can or can not share? That will be the best way of commencing the enquiry, and will probably lead to the fairest conclusion.

That will be much the best way.

Shall we take the other side first and begin by arguing against ourselves; in this manner the adversary's position will not be undefended.

<sup>1</sup> Reading with Paris A. καὶ καλοῦ . . .



Why not? he said.

Then let us put a speech into the mouths of our opponents. They will say: 'Socrates and Glaucon, no adversary need convict you, for you yourselves, at the first foundation of the State, admitted the principle that everybody was to do the one work suited to his own nature.' And certainly, if I am not mistaken, such an admission was made by us. 'And do not the natures of men and women differ very much indeed?' And we shall reply: Of course they do. Then we shall be asked, 'Whether the tasks assigned to men and to women should not be different, and such as are agreeable to their different natures?' Certainly they should. 'But if so, have you not fallen into a serious inconsistency in saying that men and women, whose natures are so entirely different, ought to perform the same actions?'—What defence will you make for us, my good Sir, against any one who offers these objections?

That is not an easy question to answer when asked suddenly; and I shall and I do beg of you to draw out the case on our side.

These are the objections, Glaucon, and there are many others of a like kind, which I foresaw long ago; they made me afraid and reluctant to take in hand any law about the possession and nurture of women and children.

By Zeus, he said, the problem to be solved is anything but easy.

Why yes, I said, but the fact is that when a man is out of his depth, whether he has fallen into a little swimming bath or into mid ocean, he has to swim all the same.

Very true.

And must not we swim and try to reach the shore: we will hope that Arion's dolphin or some other miraculous help may save us?

I suppose so, he said.

Well then, let us see if any way of escape can be found. We acknowledged—did we not? that different natures ought to have different pursuits, and that men's and women's natures are different. And now what are we saying?—that different natures ought to have the same pursuits,—this is the inconsistency which is charged upon us.

*Republic V.*

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Objection:  
We were  
saying that  
every one  
should do his  
own work:  
Have not  
women and  
men severally  
a work of  
their own?

*Republic V.*

Precisely.

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Verily, Glaucon, I said, glorious is the power of the art of contradiction! 454

Why do you say so?

The seeming  
inconsistency  
arises out of  
a verbal  
opposition.

Because I think that many a man falls into the practice against his will. When he thinks that he is reasoning he is really disputing, just because he cannot define and divide, and so know that of which he is speaking; and he will pursue a merely verbal opposition in the spirit of contention and not of fair discussion.

Yes, he replied, such is very often the case; but what has that to do with us and our argument?

A great deal; for there is certainly a danger of our getting unintentionally into a verbal opposition.

In what way?

When we  
assigned to  
different na-  
tures different  
pursuits, we  
meant only  
those differ-  
ences of  
nature which  
affected the  
pursuits.

Why we valiantly and pugnaciously insist upon the verbal truth, that different natures ought to have different pursuits, but we never considered at all what was the meaning of sameness or difference of nature, or why we distinguished them when we assigned different pursuits to different natures and the same to the same natures.

Why, no, he said, that was never considered by us.

I said: Suppose that by way of illustration we were to ask the question whether there is not an opposition in nature between bald men and hairy men; and if this is admitted by us, then, if bald men are cobblers, we should forbid the hairy men to be cobblers, and conversely?

That would be a jest, he said.

Yes, I said, a jest; and why? because we never meant when we constructed the State, that the opposition of natures should extend to every difference, but only to those differences which affected the pursuit in which the individual is engaged; we should have argued, for example, that a physician and one who is in mind a physician<sup>1</sup> may be said to have the same nature.

True.

Whereas the physician and the carpenter have different natures?

Certainly.

<sup>1</sup> Reading *ιατρὸν μὲν καὶ ἱατρικὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα*.

And if, I said, the male and female sex appear to differ in their fitness for any art or pursuit, we should say that such pursuit or art ought to be assigned to one or the other of them; but if the difference consists only in women bearing and men begetting children, this does not amount to a proof that a woman differs from a man in respect of the sort of education she should receive; and we shall therefore continue to maintain that our guardians and their wives ought to have the same pursuits.

Very true, he said.

455 Next, we shall ask our opponent how, in reference to any of the pursuits or arts of civic life, the nature of a woman differs from that of a man?

That will be quite fair.

And perhaps he, like yourself, will reply that to give a sufficient answer on the instant is not easy; but after a little reflection there is no difficulty.

Yes, perhaps.

Suppose then that we invite him to accompany us in the argument, and then we may hope to show him that there is nothing peculiar in the constitution of women which would affect them in the administration of the State.

By all means.

Let us say to him: Come now, and we will ask you a question:—when you spoke of a nature gifted or not gifted in any respect, did you mean to say that one man will acquire a thing easily, another with difficulty; a little learning will lead the one to discover a great deal; whereas the other, after much study and application, no sooner learns than he forgets; or again, did you mean, that the one has a body which is a good servant to his mind, while the body of the other is a hindrance to him?—would not these be the sort of differences which distinguish the man gifted by nature from the one who is ungifted?

No one will deny that.

And can you mention any pursuit of mankind in which the male sex has not all these gifts and qualities in a higher degree than the female? Need I waste time in speaking of the art of weaving, and the management of pancakes and preserves, in which womankind does really appear to be

*Republic V.*

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

The same natural gifts are found in both sexes, but they are possessed in a higher degree by men than women.



*Republic V.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

great, and in which for her to be beaten by a man is of all things the most absurd?

You are quite right, he replied, in maintaining the general inferiority of the female sex: although many women are in many things superior to many men, yet on the whole what you say is true.

And if so, my friend, I said, there is no special faculty of administration in a state which a woman has because she is a woman, or which a man has by virtue of his sex, but the gifts of nature are alike diffused in both; all the pursuits of men are the pursuits of women also, but in all of them a woman is inferior to a man.

Very true.

Then are we to impose all our enactments on men and none of them on women?

That will never do.

One woman has a gift of healing, another not; one is 456 a musician, and another has no music in her nature?

Very true.

And one woman has a turn for gymnastic and military exercises, and another is unwarlike and hates gymnastics?

Certainly.

And one woman is a philosopher, and another is an enemy of philosophy; one has spirit, and another is without spirit?

That is also true.

Then one woman will have the temper of a guardian, and another not. Was not the selection of the male guardians determined by differences of this sort?

Yes.

Men and women alike possess the qualities which make a guardian; they differ only in their comparative strength or weakness.

Obviously.

And those women who have such qualities are to be selected as the companions and colleagues of men who have similar qualities and whom they resemble in capacity and in character?

Very true.

And ought not the same natures to have the same pursuits?

They ought.

Then, as we were saying before, there is nothing unnatural

Men and women are to be governed by the same laws and to have the same pursuits.



in assigning music and gymnastic to the wives of the guardians — to that point we come round again.

*Republic V.*

Certainly not.

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

The law which we then enacted was agreeable to nature, and therefore not an impossibility or mere aspiration; and the contrary practice, which prevails at present, is in reality a violation of nature.

That appears to be true.

We had to consider, first, whether our proposals were possible, and secondly whether they were the most beneficial?

Yes.

And the possibility has been acknowledged?

Yes.

The very great benefit has next to be established?

Quite so.

You will admit that the same education which makes a man a good guardian will make a woman a good guardian; for their original nature is the same?

There are different degrees of goodness both in women and in men.

Yes.

I should like to ask you a question.

What is it?

Would you say that all men are equal in excellence, or is one man better than another?

The latter.

And in the commonwealth which we were founding do you conceive the guardians who have been brought up on our model system to be more perfect men, or the cobblers whose education has been cobbling?

What a ridiculous question!

You have answered me, I replied: Well, and may we not further say that our guardians are the best of our citizens?

By far the best.

And will not their wives be the best women?

Yes, by far the best.

And can there be anything better for the interests of the State than that the men and women of a State should be as good as possible?

There can be nothing better.

457 And this is what the arts of music and gymnastic, when present in such manner as we have described, will accomplish?

*Republic V.*

Certainly.

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Then we have made an enactment not only possible but in the highest degree beneficial to the State?

True.

Then let the wives of our guardians strip, for their virtue will be their robe, and let them share in the toils of war and the defence of their country; only in the distribution of labours the lighter are to be assigned to the women, who are the weaker natures, but in other respects their duties are to be the same. And as for the man who laughs at naked women exercising their bodies from the best of motives, in his laughter he is plucking

‘ A fruit of unripe wisdom,’

and he himself is ignorant of what he is laughing at, or what he is about;—for that is, and ever will be, the best of sayings, *That the useful is the noble and the hurtful is the base.*

The noble  
saying.

Very true.

Here, then, is one difficulty in our law about women, which we may say that we have now escaped; the wave has not swallowed us up alive for enacting that the guardians of either sex should have all their pursuits in common; to the utility and also to the possibility of this arrangement the consistency of the argument with itself bears witness.

Yes, that was a mighty wave which you have escaped.

The second  
and greater  
wave.

Yes, I said, but a greater is coming; you will not think much of this when you see the next.

Go on; let me see.

The law, I said, which is the sequel of this and of all that has preceded, is to the following effect,—‘that the wives of our guardians are to be common, and their children are to be common, and no parent is to know his own child, nor any child his parent.’

Yes, he said, that is a much greater wave than the other; and the possibility as well as the utility of such a law are far more questionable.

I do not think, I said, that there can be any dispute about the very great utility of having wives and children in common; the possibility is quite another matter, and will be very much disputed.

I think that a good many doubts may be raised about both.

*Republic I.*

You imply that the two questions must be combined, I replied. Now I meant that you should admit the utility; and in this way, as I thought, I should escape from one of them, and then there would remain only the possibility.

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

The utility  
and possibility  
of a commu-  
nity of wives  
and children.

But that little attempt is detected, and therefore you will please to give a defence of both.

458 Well, I said, I submit to my fate. Yet grant me a little favour: let me feast my mind with the dream as day dreamers are in the habit of feasting themselves when they are walking alone; for before they have discovered any means of effecting their wishes — that is a matter which never troubles them — they would rather not tire themselves by thinking about possibilities; but assuming that what they desire is already granted to them, they proceed with their plan, and delight in detailing what they mean to do when their wish has come true — that is a way which they have of not doing much good to a capacity which was never good for much. Now I myself am beginning to lose heart, and I should like, with your permission, to pass over the question of possibility at present. Assuming therefore the possibility of the proposal, I shall now proceed to enquire how the rulers will carry out these arrangements, and I shall demonstrate that our plan, if executed, will be of the greatest benefit to the State and to the guardians. First of all, then, if you have no objection, I will endeavour with your help to consider the advantages of the measure; and hereafter the question of possibility.

The utility to  
be considered  
first, the  
possibility  
afterwards.

I have no objection; proceed.

First, I think that if our rulers and their auxiliaries are to be worthy of the name which they bear, there must be willingness to obey in the one and the power of command in the other; the guardians must themselves obey the laws, and they must also imitate the spirit of them in any details which are entrusted to their care.

That is right, he said.

You, I said, who are their legislator, having selected the men, will now select the women and give them to them; — they must be as far as possible of like natures with them; and they must live in common houses and meet at common meals. None of them will have anything specially his or her own;

The legislator  
will select  
guardians  
male and  
female, who  
will



*Republic V.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

meet at com-  
mon meals  
and exercises,  
and will be  
drawn to one  
another by an  
irresistible  
necessity.

they will be together, and will be brought up together, and will associate at gymnastic exercises. And so they will be drawn by a necessity of their natures to have intercourse with each other — necessity is not too strong a word, I think?

Yes, he said; — necessity, not geometrical, but another sort of necessity which lovers know, and which is far more convincing and constraining to the mass of mankind.

True, I said; and this, Glaucon, like all the rest, must proceed after an orderly fashion; in a city of the blessed, licentiousness is an unholy thing which the rulers will forbid.

Yes, he said, and it ought not to be permitted.

Then clearly the next thing will be to make matrimony sacred in the highest degree, and what is most beneficial will be deemed sacred?

Exactly.

459

The breeding  
of human  
beings, as of  
animals, to be  
from the best  
and from those  
who are of a  
ripe age.

And how can marriages be made most beneficial? — that is a question which I put to you, because I see in your house dogs for hunting, and of the nobler sort of birds not a few. Now, I beseech you, do tell me, have you ever attended to their pairing and breeding?

In what particulars?

Why, in the first place, although they are all of a good sort, are not some better than others?

True.

And do you breed from them all indifferently, or do you take care to breed from the best only?

From the best.

And do you take the oldest or the youngest, or only those of ripe age?

I choose only those of ripe age.

And if care was not taken in the breeding, your dogs and birds would greatly deteriorate?

Certainly.

And the same of horses and of animals in general?

Undoubtedly.

Good heavens! my dear friend, I said, what consummate skill will our rulers need if the same principle holds of the human species!

Certainly, the same principle holds; but why does this involve any particular skill?



Because, I said, our rulers will often have to practise upon the body corporate with medicines. Now you know that when patients do not require medicines, but have only to be put under a regimen, the inferior sort of practitioner is deemed to be good enough; but when medicine has to be given, then the doctor should be more of a man.

*Republic V.*  
SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.  
Useful lies  
'very honest  
knaveries.'

That is quite true, he said; but to what are you alluding?

I mean, I replied, that our rulers will find a considerable dose of falsehood and deceit necessary for the good of their subjects: we were saying that the use of all these things regarded as medicines might be of advantage.

And we were very right.

And this lawful use of them seems likely to be often needed in the regulations of marriages and births.

How so?

Why, I said, the principle has been already laid down that the best of either sex should be united with the best as often, and the inferior with the inferior, as seldom as possible; and that they should rear the offspring of the one sort of union, but not of the other, if the flock is to be maintained in first-rate condition. Now these goings on must be a secret which the rulers only know, or there will be a further danger of our herd, as the guardians may be termed, breaking out into rebellion.

Arrangements  
for the im-  
provement of  
the breed;

Very true.

Had we not better appoint certain festivals at which we will bring together the brides and bridegrooms, and sacrifices will be offered and suitable hymeneal songs composed by our poets: the number of weddings is a matter which must be left to the discretion of the rulers, whose aim will be to preserve the average of population? There are many other things which they will have to consider, such as the effects of wars and diseases and any similar agencies, in order as far as this is possible to prevent the State from becoming either too large or too small.

and for the  
regulation of  
population.

Certainly, he replied.

We shall have to invent some ingenious kind of lots which the less worthy may draw on each occasion of our bringing them together, and then they will accuse their own ill-luck and not the rulers.

Pairing by lot.

*Republic V.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.The brave  
deserve the  
fair.

To be sure, he said.

And I think that our braver and better youth, besides their other honours and rewards, might have greater facilities of intercourse with women given them; their bravery will be a reason, and such fathers ought to have as many sons as possible.

True.

And the proper officers, whether male or female or both, for offices are to be held by women as well as by men —

Yes —

What is to be  
done with the  
children?

The proper officers will take the offspring of the good parents to the pen or fold, and there they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a separate quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of the better when they chance to be deformed, will be put away in some mysterious, unknown place, as they should be.

Yes, he said, that must be done if the breed of the guardians is to be kept pure.

They will provide for their nurture, and will bring the mothers to the fold when they are full of milk, taking the greatest possible care that no mother recognises her own child; and other wet-nurses may be engaged if more are required. Care will also be taken that the process of suckling shall not be protracted too long; and the mothers will have no getting up at night or other trouble, but will hand over all this sort of thing to the nurses and attendants.

You suppose the wives of our guardians to have a fine easy time of it when they are having children.

Why, said I, and so they ought. Let us, however, proceed with our scheme. We were saying that the parents should be in the prime of life?

Very true.

And what is the prime of life? May it not be defined as a period of about twenty years in a woman's life, and thirty in a man's?

Which years do you mean to include?

A woman to  
bear children  
from

A woman, I said, at twenty years of age may begin to bear children to the State, and continue to bear them until forty; a man may begin at five-and-twenty, when he has passed the

point at which the pulse of life beats quickest, and continue to beget children until he be fifty-five.

461 Certainly, he said, both in men and women those years are the prime of physical as well as of intellectual vigour.

Any one above or below the prescribed ages who takes part in the public hymeneals shall be said to have done an unholy and unrighteous thing; the child of which he is the father, if it steals into life, will have been conceived under auspices very unlike the sacrifices and prayers, which at each hymeneal priestesses and priests and the whole city will offer, that the new generation may be better and more useful than their good and useful parents, whereas his child will be the offspring of darkness and strange lust.

Very true, he replied.

And the same law will apply to any one of those within the prescribed age who forms a connection with any women in the prime of life without the sanction of the rulers; for we shall say that he is raising up a bastard to the State, uncertified and unconsecrated.

Very true, he replied.

This applies, however, only to those who are within the specified age: after that we allow them to range at will, except that a man may not marry his daughter or his daughter's daughter, or his mother or his mother's mother; and women, on the other hand, are prohibited from marrying their sons or fathers, or son's son or father's father, and so on in either direction. And we grant all this, accompanying the permission with strict orders to prevent any embryo which may come into being from seeing the light; and if any force a way to the birth, the parents must understand that the offspring of such an union cannot be maintained, and arrange accordingly.

That also, he said, is a reasonable proposition. But how will they know who are fathers and daughters, and so on?

They will never know. The way will be this:—dating from the day of the hymeneal, the bridegroom who was then married will call all the male children who are born in the seventh and the tenth month afterwards his sons, and the female children his daughters, and they will call him father, and he will call their children his grandchildren, and they

*Republic V.*

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

twenty to  
forty; a man  
to beget  
them from  
twenty-five  
to fifty-five.

After the  
prescribed age  
has been  
passed, more  
licence is  
allowed: but  
all who were  
born after  
certain  
hymeneal  
festivals at  
which their  
parents or  
grandparents  
came together  
must be kept  
separate.



*Republic V.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

will call the elder generation grandfathers and grandmothers. All who were begotten at the time when their fathers and mothers came together will be called their brothers and sisters, and these, as I was saying, will be forbidden to intermarry. This, however, is not to be understood as an absolute prohibition of the marriage of brothers and sisters; if the lot favours them, and they receive the sanction of the Pythian oracle, the law will allow them.

Quite right, he replied.

Such is the scheme, Glaucon, according to which the guardians of our State are to have their wives and families in common. And now you would have the argument show that this community is consistent with the rest of our polity, and also that nothing can be better — would you not?

Yes, certainly.

462

Shall we try to find a common basis by asking of ourselves what ought to be the chief aim of the legislator in making laws and in the organization of a State,—what is the greatest good, and what is the greatest evil, and then consider whether our previous description has the stamp of the good or of the evil?

By all means.

The greatest good of States, unity; the greatest evil, discord. The one the result of public, the other of private feelings.

Can there be any greater evil than discord and distraction and plurality where unity ought to reign? or any greater good than the bond of unity?

There cannot.

And there is unity where there is community of pleasures and pains — where all the citizens are glad or grieved on the same occasions of joy and sorrow?

No doubt.

Yes; and where there is no common but only private feeling a State is disorganized — when you have one half of the world triumphing and the other plunged in grief at the same events happening to the city or the citizens?

Certainly.

Such differences commonly originate in a disagreement about the use of the terms 'mine' and 'not mine,' 'his' and 'not his.'

Exactly so.

And is not that the best-ordered State in which the greatest



number of persons apply the terms 'mine' and 'not mine' in the same way to the same thing?

Quite true.

Or that again which most nearly approaches to the condition of the individual — as in the body, when but a finger of one of us is hurt, the whole frame, drawn towards the soul as a centre and forming one kingdom under the ruling power therein, feels the hurt and sympathizes all together with the part affected, and we say that the man has a pain in his finger; and the same expression is used about any other part of the body, which has a sensation of pain at suffering or of pleasure at the alleviation of suffering.

Very true, he replied; and I agree with you that in the best-ordered State there is the nearest approach to this common feeling which you describe.

Then when any one of the citizens experiences any good or evil, the whole State will make his case their own, and will either rejoice or sorrow with him?

Yes, he said, that is what will happen in a well-ordered State.

It will now be time, I said, for us to return to our State and see whether this or some other form is most in accordance with these fundamental principles.

Very good.

463 Our State like every other has rulers and subjects?

True.

All of whom will call one another citizens?

Of course.

But is there not another name which people give to their rulers in other States?

Generally they call them masters, but in democratic States they simply call them rulers.

And in our State what other name besides that of citizens do the people give the rulers?

They are called saviours and helpers, he replied.

And what do the rulers call the people?

Their maintainers and foster-fathers.

And what do they call them in other States?

Slaves.

And what do the rulers call one another in other States?

*Republic V.*

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

The State  
like a living  
being which  
feels alto-  
gether when  
hurt in any  
part.

How different  
are the terms  
which are  
applied to the  
rulers in other  
States and in  
our own!

*Republic V.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Fellow-rulers.

And what in ours?

Fellow-guardians.

Did you ever know an example in any other State of a ruler who would speak of one of his colleagues as his friend and of another as not being his friend?

Yes, very often.

And the friend he regards and describes as one in whom he has an interest, and the other as a stranger in whom he has no interest?

Exactly.

But would any of your guardians think or speak of any other guardian as a stranger?

Certainly he would not; for every one whom they meet will be regarded by them either as a brother or sister, or father or mother, or son or daughter, or as the child or parent of those who are thus connected with him.

The State one  
family.

Capital, I said; but let me ask you once more: Shall they be a family in name only; or shall they in all their actions be true to the name? For example, in the use of the word 'father,' would the care of a father be implied and the filial reverence and duty and obedience to him which the law commands; and is the violator of these duties to be regarded as an impious and unrighteous person who is not likely to receive much good either at the hands of God or of man? Are these to be or not to be the strains which the children will hear repeated in their ears by all the citizens about those who are intimated to them to be their parents and the rest of their kinsfolk?

Using the  
same terms,  
they will have  
the same  
modes of  
thinking and  
acting, and  
this is to be  
attributed  
mainly to the  
community of  
women and  
children.

These, he said, and none other; for what can be more ridiculous than for them to utter the names of family ties with the lips only and not to act in the spirit of them?

Then in our city the language of harmony and concord will be more often heard than in any other. As I was describing before, when any one is well or ill, the universal word will be 'with me it is well' or 'it is ill.'

Most true.

And agreeably to this mode of thinking and speaking, were we not saying that they will have their pleasures and pains in common?

Yes, and so they will.

*Republic V.*

And they will have a common interest in the same thing which they will alike call 'my own,' and having this common interest they will have a common feeling of pleasure and pain?

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Yes, far more so than in other States.

And the reason of this, over and above the general constitution of the State, will be that the guardians will have a community of women and children?

That will be the chief reason.

And this unity of feeling we admitted to be the greatest good, as was implied in our own comparison of a well-ordered State to the relation of the body and the members, when affected by pleasure or pain?

That we acknowledged, and very rightly.

Then the community of wives and children among our citizens is clearly the source of the greatest good to the State?

Certainly.

And this agrees with the other principle which we were affirming,—that the guardians were not to have houses or lands or any other property; their pay was to be their food, which they were to receive from the other citizens, and they were to have no private expenses; for we intended them to preserve their true character of guardians.

Right, he replied.

Both the community of property and the community of families, as I am saying, tend to make them more truly guardians; they will not tear the city in pieces by differing about 'mine' and 'not mine;' each man dragging any acquisition which he has made into a separate house of his own, where he has a separate wife and children and private pleasures and pains; but all will be affected as far as may be by the same pleasures and pains because they are all of one opinion about what is near and dear to them, and therefore they all tend towards a common end.

There will be no private interests among them, and therefore no lawsuits or trials for assault or violence to elders.

Certainly, he replied.

And as they have nothing but their persons which they can call their own, suits and complaints will have no existence among them; they will be delivered from all those quarrels of which money or children or relations are the occasion.



*Republic V.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Of course they will.

Neither will trials for assault or insult ever be likely to occur among them. For that equals should defend themselves against equals we shall maintain to be honourable and right; we shall make the protection of the person a 465 matter of necessity.

That is good, he said.

Yes; and there is a further good in the law; viz. that if a man has a quarrel with another he will satisfy his resentment then and there, and not proceed to more dangerous lengths.

Certainly.

To the elder shall be assigned the duty of ruling and chastising the younger.

Clearly.

Nor can there be a doubt that the younger will not strike or do any other violence to an elder, unless the magistrates command him; nor will he slight him in any way. For there are two guardians, shame and fear, mighty to prevent him: shame, which makes men refrain from laying hands on those who are to them in the relation of parents; fear, that the injured one will be succoured by the others who are his brothers, sons, fathers.

That is true, he replied.

Then in every way the laws will help the citizens to keep the peace with one another?

Yes, there will be no want of peace.

And as the guardians will never quarrel among themselves there will be no danger of the rest of the city being divided either against them or against one another.

None whatever.

I hardly like even to mention the little meannesses of which they will be rid, for they are beneath notice: such, for example, as the flattery of the rich by the poor, and all the pains and pangs which men experience in bringing up a family, and in finding money to buy necessities for their household, borrowing and then repudiating, getting how they can, and giving the money into the hands of women and slaves to keep—the many evils of so many kinds which people suffer in this way are mean enough and obvious enough, and not worth speaking of.

From how  
many other  
evils will our  
citizens be  
delivered!



Yes, he said, a man has no need of eyes in order to perceive that. *Republic V.*

And from all these evils they will be delivered, and their life will be blessed as the life of Olympic victors and yet more blessed. *SOCRATES, GLAUCON.*

How so?

The Olympic victor, I said, is deemed happy in receiving a part only of the blessedness which is secured to our citizens, who have won a more glorious victory and have a more complete maintenance at the public cost. For the victory which they have won is the salvation of the whole State; and the crown with which they and their children are crowned is the fulness of all that life needs; they receive rewards from the hands of their country while living, and after death have an honourable burial.

Yes, he said, and glorious rewards they are.

466 Do you remember, I said, how in the course of the previous discussion<sup>1</sup> some one who shall be nameless accused us of making our guardians unhappy — they had nothing and might have possessed all things — to whom we replied that, if an occasion offered, we might perhaps hereafter consider this question, but that, as at present advised, we would make our guardians truly guardians, and that we were fashioning the State with a view to the greatest happiness, not of any particular class, but of the whole?

Yes, I remember.

And what do you say, now that the life of our protectors is made out to be far better and nobler than that of Olympic victors — is the life of shoemakers, or any other artisans, or of husbandmen, to be compared with it? *Their life not to be compared with that of citizens in ordinary States.*

Certainly not.

At the same time I ought here to repeat what I have said elsewhere, that if any of our guardians shall try to be happy in such a manner that he will cease to be a guardian, and is not content with this safe and harmonious life, which, in our judgment, is of all lives the best, but infatuated by some youthful conceit of happiness which gets up into his head shall seek to appropriate the whole state to himself, then he *He who seeks to be more than a guardian is naught.*

<sup>1</sup> Pages 419, 420 ff.

*Republic V.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.The common  
way of life  
includes  
common  
education,  
common chil-  
dren, common  
services and  
duties of men  
and women.

will have to learn how wisely Hesiod spoke, when he said, 'half is more than the whole.'

If he were to consult me, I should say to him: Stay where you are, when you have the offer of such a life.

You agree then, I said, that men and women are to have a common way of life such as we have described — common education, common children; and they are to watch over the citizens in common whether abiding in the city or going out to war; they are to keep watch together, and to hunt together like dogs; and always and in all things, as far as they are able, women are to share with the men? And in so doing they will do what is best, and will not violate, but preserve the natural relation of the sexes.

I agree with you, he replied.

The enquiry, I said, has yet to be made, whether such a community will be found possible — as among other animals, so also among men — and if possible, in what way possible?

You have anticipated the question which I was about to suggest.

There is no difficulty, I said, in seeing how war will be carried on by them.

How?

The children  
to accompany  
their parents  
on military  
expeditions;

Why, of course they will go on expeditions together; and will take with them any of their children who are strong enough, that, after the manner of the artisan's child, they may look on at the work which they will have to do when they are grown up; and besides looking on they will have to 467 help and be of use in war, and to wait upon their fathers and mothers. Did you never observe in the arts how the potters' boys look on and help, long before they touch the wheel?

Yes, I have.

And shall potters be more careful in educating their children and in giving them the opportunity of seeing and practising their duties than our guardians will be?

The idea is ridiculous, he said.

There is also the effect on the parents, with whom, as with other animals, the presence of their young ones will be the greatest incentive to valour.

That is quite true, Socrates; and yet if they are defeated, which may often happen in war, how great the danger is!

the children will be lost as well as their parents, and the State will never recover. *Republic V.*

True, I said ; but would you never allow them to run any risk?

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

I am far from saying that.

Well, but if they are ever to run a risk should they not do so on some occasion when, if they escape disaster, they will be the better for it?

Clearly.

Whether the future soldiers do or do not see war in the days of their youth is a very important matter, for the sake of which some risk may fairly be incurred.

but care  
must be taken  
that they do  
not run any  
serious risk.

Yes, very important.

This then must be our first step,—to make our children spectators of war ; but we must also contrive that they shall be secured against danger ; then all will be well.

True.

Their parents may be supposed not to be blind to the risks of war, but to know, as far as human foresight can, what expeditions are safe and what dangerous?

That may be assumed.

And they will take them on the safe expeditions and be cautious about the dangerous ones?

True.

And they will place them under the command of experienced veterans who will be their leaders and teachers?

Very properly.

Still, the dangers of war cannot be always foreseen ; there is a good deal of chance about them?

True.

Then against such chances the children must be at once furnished with wings, in order that in the hour of need they may fly away and escape.

What do you mean? he said.

I mean that we must mount them on horses in their earliest youth, and when they have learnt to ride, take them on horseback to see war : the horses must not be spirited and warlike, but the most tractable and yet the swiftest that can be had. In this way they will get an excellent view of what is hereafter to be their own business ; and if there is danger they have only to follow their elder leaders and escape.



*Republic V.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.The coward  
is to be  
degraded into  
a lower rank.

I believe that you are right, he said.

Next, as to war; what are to be the relations of your soldiers to one another and to their enemies? I should be inclined to propose that the soldier who leaves his rank or throws away his arms, or is guilty of any other act of cowardice, should be degraded into the rank of a husbandman or artisan. What do you think?

By all means, I should say.

And he who allows himself to be taken prisoner may as well be made a present of to his enemies; he is their lawful prey, and let them do what they like with him.

Certainly.

The hero  
to receive  
honour from  
his comrades  
and favour  
from his  
beloved,

But the hero who has distinguished himself, what shall be done to him? In the first place, he shall receive honour in the army from his youthful comrades; every one of them in succession shall crown him. What do you say?

I approve.

And what do you say to his receiving the right hand of fellowship?

To that too, I agree.

But you will hardly agree to my next proposal.

What is your proposal?

That he should kiss and be kissed by them.

Most certainly, and I should be disposed to go further, and say: Let no one whom he has a mind to kiss refuse to be kissed by him while the expedition lasts. So that if there be a lover in the army, whether his love be youth or maiden, he may be more eager to win the prize of valour.

Capital, I said. That the brave man is to have more wives than others has been already determined: and he is to have first choices in such matters more than others, in order that he may have as many children as possible?

Agreed.

and to have  
precedence,  
and a larger  
share of meats  
and drinks;

Again, there is another manner in which, according to Homer, brave youths should be honoured; for he tells how Ajax<sup>1</sup>, after he had distinguished himself in battle, was rewarded with long chins, which seems to be a compliment appropriate to a hero in the flower of his age, being not only a tribute of honour but also a very strengthening thing.

<sup>1</sup> Iliad, vii. 321.



Most true, he said.

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Then in this, I said, Homer shall be our teacher; and we too, at sacrifices and on the like occasions, will honour the brave according to the measure of their valour, whether men or women, with hymns and those other distinctions which we were mentioning; also with

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

'seats of precedence, and meats and full cups<sup>1</sup>;'

and in honouring them, we shall be at the same time training them.

That, he replied, is excellent.

Yes, I said; and when a man dies gloriously in war shall we not say, in the first place, that he is of the golden race?

To be sure.

Nay, have we not the authority of Hesiod for affirming that when they are dead

also to be  
worshipped  
after death.

469 'They are holy angels upon the earth, authors of good, averters of evil, the guardians of speech-gifted men'<sup>2</sup>

Yes; and we accept his authority.

We must learn of the god how we are to order the sepulture of divine and heroic personages, and what is to be their special distinction; and we must do as he bids?

By all means.

And in ages to come we will reverence them and kneel before their sepulchres as at the graves of heroes. And not only they but any who are deemed pre-eminently good, whether they die from age, or in any other way, shall be admitted to the same honours.

That is very right, he said.

Next, how shall our soldiers treat their enemies? What about this?

Behaviour  
to enemies.

In what respect do you mean?

First of all, in regard to slavery? Do you think it right that Hellenes should enslave Hellenic States, or allow others to enslave them, if they can help? Should not their custom be to spare them, considering the danger which there is that the whole race may one day fall under the yoke of the barbarians?

To spare them is infinitely better.

<sup>1</sup> Iliad, viii. 162.

<sup>2</sup> Probably Works and Days, 121 foll.

*Republic V.*SOCRATES,   
 GLAUCON.No Hellene  
shall be made  
a slave.

Then no Hellene should be owned by them as a slave; that is a rule which they will observe and advise the other Hellenes to observe.

Certainly, he said; they will in this way be united against the barbarians and will keep their hands off one another.

Next as to the slain; ought the conquerors, I said, to take anything but their armour? Does not the practice of despoiling an enemy afford an excuse for not facing the battle? Cowards skulk about the dead, pretending that they are fulfilling a duty, and many an army before now has been lost from this love of plunder.

Very true.

Those who  
fall in battle  
are not to be  
despoiled.

And is there not illiberality and avarice in robbing a corpse, and also a degree of meanness and womanishness in making an enemy of the dead body when the real enemy has flown away and left only his fighting gear behind him,—is not this rather like a dog who cannot get at his assailant, quarrelling with the stones which strike him instead?

Very like a dog, he said.

Then we must abstain from spoiling the dead or hindering their burial?

Yes, he replied, we most certainly must.

The arms of  
Hellenes are  
not to be  
offered at  
temples;

Neither shall we offer up arms at the temples of the gods, least of all the arms of Hellenes, if we care to maintain good 470 feeling with other Hellenes; and, indeed, we have reason to fear that the offering of spoils taken from kinsmen may be a pollution unless commanded by the god himself?

Very true.

Again, as to the devastation of Hellenic territory or the burning of houses, what is to be the practice?

May I have the pleasure, he said, of hearing your opinion?

Both should be forbidden, in my judgment; I would take the annual produce and no more. Shall I tell you why?

Pray do.

nor Hellenic  
territory  
devastated.

Why, you see, there is a difference in the names 'discord' and 'war,' and I imagine that there is also a difference in their natures; the one is expressive of what is internal and domestic, the other of what is external and foreign; and the first of the two is termed discord, and only the second, war.

That is a very proper distinction, he replied.

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And may I not observe with equal propriety that the Hellenic race is all united together by ties of blood and friendship, and alien and strange to the barbarians?

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Very good, he said.

And therefore when Hellenes fight with barbarians and barbarians with Hellenes, they will be described by us as being at war when they fight, and by nature enemies, and this kind of antagonism should be called war; but when Hellenes fight with one another we shall say that Hellas is then in a state of disorder and discord, they being by nature friends; and such enmity is to be called discord.

Hellenic warfare is only a kind of discord not intended to be lasting.

I agree.

Consider then, I said, when that which we have acknowledged to be discord occurs, and a city is divided, if both parties destroy the lands and burn the houses of one another, how wicked does the strife appear! No true lover of his country would bring himself to tear in pieces his own nurse and mother: There might be reason in the conqueror depriving the conquered of their harvest, but still they would have the idea of peace in their hearts and would not mean to go on fighting for ever.

Yes, he said, that is a better temper than the other.

And will not the city, which you are founding, be an Hellenic city?

It ought to be, he replied.

Then will not the citizens be good and civilized?

Yes, very civilized.

And will they not be lovers of Hellas, and think of Hellas as their own land, and share in the common temples?

The lover of his own city will also be a lover of Hellas.

Most certainly.

471 And any difference which arises among them will be regarded by them as discord only — a quarrel among friends, which is not to be called a war?

Certainly not.

Then they will quarrel as those who intend some day to be reconciled?

Certainly.

They will use friendly correction, but will not enslave or destroy their opponents; they will be correctors, not enemies?



*Republic I.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.Hellenes  
should deal  
mildly with  
Hellenes;  
and with  
barbarians as  
Hellenes now  
deal with one  
another.

Just so.

And as they are Hellenes themselves they will not devastate Hellas, nor will they burn houses, nor ever suppose that the whole population of a city — men, women, and children — are equally their enemies, for they know that the guilt of war is always confined to a few persons and that the many are their friends. And for all these reasons they will be unwilling to waste their lands and rase their houses; their enmity to them will only last until the many innocent sufferers have compelled the guilty few to give satisfaction?

I agree, he said, that our citizens should thus deal with their Hellenic enemies; and with barbarians as the Hellenes now deal with one another.

Then let us enact this law also for our guardians:—that they are neither to devastate the lands of Hellenes nor to burn their houses.

Agreed; and we may agree also in thinking that these, like all our previous enactments, are very good.

The complaint  
of Glaucon  
respecting the  
hesitation of  
Socrates.

But still I must say, Socrates, that if you are allowed to go on in this way you will entirely forget the other question which at the commencement of this discussion you thrust aside:—Is such an order of things possible, and how, if at all? For I am quite ready to acknowledge that the plan which you propose, if only feasible, would do all sorts of good to the State. I will add, what you have omitted, that your citizens will be the bravest of warriors, and will never leave their ranks, for they will all know one another, and each will call the other father, brother, son; and if you suppose the women to join their armies, whether in the same rank or in the rear, either as a terror to the enemy, or as auxiliaries in case of need, I know that they will then be absolutely invincible; and there are many domestic advantages which might also be mentioned and which I also fully acknowledge: but, as I admit all these advantages and as many more as you please, if only this State of yours were to come into existence, we need say no more about them; assuming then the existence of the State, let us now turn to the question of possibility and ways and means—the rest may be left.



472 If I loiter<sup>1</sup> for a moment, you instantly make a raid upon me, I said, and have no mercy; I have hardly escaped the first and second waves, and you seem not to be aware that you are now bringing upon me the third, which is the greatest and heaviest. When you have seen and heard the third wave, I think you will be more considerate and will acknowledge that some fear and hesitation was natural respecting a proposal so extraordinary as that which I have now to state and investigate.

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SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Socrates excuses himself and makes one or two remarks preparatory to a final effort.

The more appeals of this sort which you make, he said, the more determined are we that you shall tell us how such a State is possible: speak out and at once.

Let me begin by reminding you that we found our way hither in the search after justice and injustice.

True, he replied; but what of that?

I was only going to ask whether, if we have discovered them, we are to require that the just man should in nothing fail of absolute justice; or may we be satisfied with an approximation, and the attainment in him of a higher degree of justice than is to be found in other men?

The approximation will be enough.

We were enquiring into the nature of absolute justice and into the character of the perfectly just, and into injustice and the perfectly unjust, that we might have an ideal. We were to look at these in order that we might judge of our own happiness and unhappiness according to the standard which they exhibited and the degree in which we resembled them, but not with any view of showing that they could exist in fact.

(1) The ideal is a standard only which can never be perfectly realized;

True, he said.

Would a painter be any the worse because, after having delineated with consummate art an ideal of a perfectly beautiful man, he was unable to show that any such man could ever have existed?

He would be none the worse.

Well, and were we not creating an ideal of a perfect State?

To be sure.

And is our theory a worse theory because we are unable to

<sup>1</sup> Reading *στραγγενομένῳ*.

*Republic V.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.(2) but is none  
the worse  
for this.

prove the possibility of a city being ordered in the manner described?

Surely not, he replied.

That is the truth, I said. But if, at your request, I am to try and show how and under what conditions the possibility is highest, I must ask you, having this in view, to repeat your former admissions.

What admissions?

I want to know whether ideals are ever fully realized in language? Does not the word express more than the fact, and must not the actual, whatever a man may think, always, in the nature of things, fall short of the truth? What do you say? 473

I agree.

Then you must not insist on my proving that the actual State will in every respect coincide with the ideal: if we are only able to discover how a city may be governed nearly as we proposed, you will admit that we have discovered the possibility which you demand; and will be contented. I am sure that I should be contented — will not you?

Yes, I will.

(3) Although  
the ideal  
cannot be  
realized,  
one or two  
changes, or  
rather a single  
change, might  
revolutionize  
a State.

Let me next endeavour to show what is that fault in States which is the cause of their present maladministration, and what is the least change which will enable a State to pass into the truer form; and let the change, if possible, be of one thing only, or, if not, of two; at any rate, let the changes be as few and slight as possible.

Certainly, he replied.

I think, I said, that there might be a reform of the State if only one change were made, which is not a slight or easy though still a possible one.

What is it? he said.

Socrates goes  
forth to meet  
the wave.

Now then, I said, I go to meet that which I liken to the greatest of the waves; yet shall the word be spoken, even though the wave break and drown me in laughter and dishonour; and do you mark my words.

Proceed.

I said: *Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those*

*commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have rest from their evils,—no, nor the human race, as I believe,—and then only will this our State have a possibility of life and behold the light of day.* Such was the thought, my dear Glaucon, which I would fain have uttered if it had not seemed too extravagant; for to be convinced that in no other State can there be happiness private or public is indeed a hard thing.

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SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

'Cities will never cease from ill until they are governed by philosophers.'

474 Socrates, what do you mean? I would have you consider that the word which you have uttered is one at which numerous persons, and very respectable persons too, in a figure pulling off their coats all in a moment, and seizing any weapon that comes to hand, will run at you might and main, before you know where you are, intending to do heaven knows what; and if you don't prepare an answer, and put yourself in motion, you will be 'pared by their fine wits,' and no mistake.

What will the world say to this?

You got me into the scrape, I said.

And I was quite right; however, I will do all I can to get you out of it; but I can only give you good-will and good advice, and, perhaps, I may be able to fit answers to your questions better than another—that is all. And now, having such an auxiliary, you must do your best to show the unbelievers that you are right.

I ought to try, I said, since you offer me such invaluable assistance. And I think that, if there is to be a chance of our escaping, we must explain to them whom we mean when we say that philosophers are to rule in the State; then we shall be able to defend ourselves: There will be discovered to be some natures who ought to study philosophy and to be leaders in the State; and others who are not born to be philosophers, and are meant to be followers rather than leaders.

But who is a philosopher?

Then now for a definition, he said.

Follow me, I said, and I hope that I may in some way or other be able to give you a satisfactory explanation.

Proceed.

I dare say that you remember, and therefore I need not remind you, that a lover, if he is worthy of the name, ought to show his love, not to some one part of that which he loves, but to the whole.

Parallel of the lover.



*Republic V.* 2SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.The lover of  
the fair loves  
them all;

I really do not understand, and therefore beg of you to assist my memory.

Another person, I said, might fairly reply as you do; but a man of pleasure like yourself ought to know that all who are in the flower of youth do somehow or other raise a pang or emotion in a lover's breast, and are thought by him to be worthy of his affectionate regards. Is not this a way which you have with the fair: one has a snub nose, and you praise his charming face; the hook-nose of another has, you say, a royal look; while he who is neither snub nor hooked has the grace of regularity: the dark visage is manly, the fair are children of the gods; and as to the sweet 'honey pale,' as they are called, what is the very name but the invention of a lover who talks in diminutives, and is not averse to paleness if appearing on the cheek of youth? In a word, there is no excuse which you will not make, and nothing which you will not say, in order not to lose a single flower that blooms in the spring-time of youth. 475

If you make me an authority in matters of love, for the sake of the argument, I assent.

the lover of  
wines all  
wines;

And what do you say of lovers of wine? Do you not see them doing the same? They are glad of any pretext of drinking any wine.

Very good.

the lover of  
honour all  
honour;

And the same is true of ambitious men; if they cannot command an army, they are willing to command a file; and if they cannot be honoured by really great and important persons, they are glad to be honoured by lesser and meaner people,—but honour of some kind they must have.

Exactly.

Once more let me ask: Does he who desires any class of goods, desire the whole class or a part only?

The whole.

the philoso-  
pher, or lover  
of wisdom, all  
knowledge.

And may we not say of the philosopher that he is a lover, not of a part of wisdom only, but of the whole?

Yes, of the whole.

And he who dislikes learning, especially in youth, when he has no power of judging what is good and what is not, such an one we maintain not to be a philosopher or a lover of knowledge, just as he who refuses his food is not hungry,



and may be said to have a bad appetite and not a good one? *Republic V.*

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GLAUCON.

Very true, he said.

Whereas he who has a taste for every sort of knowledge and who is curious to learn and is never satisfied, may be justly termed a philosopher? Am I not right?

Glaucou said: If curiosity makes a philosopher, you will find many a strange being will have a title to the name. All the lovers of sights have a delight in learning, and must therefore be included. Musical amateurs, too, are a folk strangely out of place among philosophers, for they are the last persons in the world who would come to anything like a philosophical discussion, if they could help, while they run about at the Dionysiac festivals as if they had let out their ears to hear every chorus; whether the performance is in town or country — that makes no difference — they are there. Now are we to maintain that all these and any who have similar tastes, as well as the professors of quite minor arts, are philosophers?

Under knowledge, however, are not to be included sights and sounds, or under the lovers of knowledge, musical amateurs and the like.

Certainly not, I replied; they are only an imitation.

He said: Who then are the true philosophers?

Those, I said, who are lovers of the vision of truth.

That is also good, he said; but I should like to know what you mean?

To another, I replied, I might have a difficulty in explaining; but I am sure that you will admit a proposition which I am about to make.

What is the proposition?

That since beauty is the opposite of ugliness, they are two?

Certainly.

476 And inasmuch as they are two, each of them is one?

True again.

And of just and unjust, good and evil, and of every other class, the same remark holds: taken singly, each of them is one; but from the various combinations of them with actions and things and with one another, they are seen in all sorts of lights and appear many?

Very true.

And this is the distinction which I draw between the sight-

*Republic V.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

loving, art-loving, practical class and those of whom I am speaking, and who are alone worthy of the name of philosophers.

How do you distinguish them? he said.

The lovers of sounds and sights, I replied, are, as I conceive, fond of fine tones and colours and forms and all the artificial products that are made out of them, but their mind is incapable of seeing or loving absolute beauty.

True, he replied.

Few are they who are able to attain to the sight of this.

Very true.

And he who, having a sense of beautiful things has no sense of absolute beauty, or who, if another lead him to a knowledge of that beauty is unable to follow — of such an one I ask, Is he awake or in a dream only? Reflect: is not the dreamer, sleeping or waking, one who likens dissimilar things, who puts the copy in the place of the real object?

I should certainly say that such an one was dreaming.

But take the case of the other, who recognises the existence of absolute beauty and is able to distinguish the idea from the objects which participate in the idea, neither putting the objects in the place of the idea nor the idea in the place of the objects — is he a dreamer, or is he awake?

He is wide awake.

And may we not say that the mind of the one who knows has knowledge, and that the mind of the other, who opines only, has opinion?

Certainly.

But suppose that the latter should quarrel with us and dispute our statement, can we administer any soothing cordial or advice to him, without revealing to him that there is sad disorder in his wits?

We must certainly offer him some good advice, he replied.

Come, then, and let us think of something to say to him. Shall we begin by assuring him that he is welcome to any knowledge which he may have, and that we are rejoiced at his having it? But we should like to ask him a question: Does he who has knowledge know something or nothing? (You must answer for him.)

I answer that he knows something.

True knowledge is the ability to distinguish between the one and many, between the idea and the objects which partake of the idea.

Something that is or is not?

Something that is; for how can that which is not ever be known?

477 And are we assured, after looking at the matter from many points of view, that absolute being is or may be absolutely known, but that the utterly non-existent is utterly unknown?

Nothing can be more certain.

Good. But if there be anything which is of such a nature as to be and not to be, that will have a place intermediate between pure being and the absolute negation of being?

Yes, between them.

And, as knowledge corresponded to being and ignorance of necessity to not-being, for that intermediate between being and not-being there has to be discovered a corresponding intermediate between ignorance and knowledge, if there be such?

Certainly.

Do we admit the existence of opinion?

Undoubtedly.

As being the same with knowledge, or another faculty?

Another faculty.

Then opinion and knowledge have to do with different kinds of matter corresponding to this difference of faculties?

Yes.

And knowledge is relative to being and knows being. But before I proceed further I will make a division.

What division?

I will begin by placing faculties in a class by themselves: they are powers in us, and in all other things, by which we do as we do. Sight and hearing, for example, I should call faculties. Have I clearly explained the class which I mean?

Yes, I quite understand.

Then let me tell you my view about them. I do not see them, and therefore the distinctions of figure, colour, and the like, which enable me to discern the differences of some things, do not apply to them. In speaking of a faculty I think only of its sphere and its result; and that which has the same sphere and the same result I call the same faculty, but that which has another sphere and another result I call different. Would that be your way of speaking?

*Republic V.*

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

There is an intermediate between being and not being, and a corresponding intermediate between ignorance and knowledge. This intermediate is a faculty termed opinion.



*Republic V.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Yes.

And will you be so very good as to answer one more question? Would you say that knowledge is a faculty, or in what class would you place it?

Certainly knowledge is a faculty, and the mightiest of all faculties.

And is opinion also a faculty?

Certainly, he said; for opinion is that with which we are able to form an opinion.

And yet you were acknowledging a little while ago that knowledge is not the same as opinion?

Opinion  
differs from  
knowledge  
because the  
one errs and  
the other is  
unerring.

Why, yes, he said: how can any reasonable being ever 478 identify that which is infallible with that which errs?

An excellent answer, proving, I said, that we are quite conscious of a distinction between them.

Yes.

Then knowledge and opinion having distinct powers have also distinct spheres or subject-matters?

That is certain.

Being is the sphere or subject-matter of knowledge, and knowledge is to know the nature of being?

Yes.

And opinion is to have an opinion?

Yes.

And do we know what we opine? or is the subject-matter of opinion the same as the subject-matter of knowledge?

Nay, he replied, that has been already disproven; if difference in faculty implies difference in the sphere or subject-matter, and if, as we were saying, opinion and knowledge are distinct faculties, then the sphere of knowledge and of opinion cannot be the same.

Then if being is the subject-matter of knowledge, something else must be the subject-matter of opinion?

Yes, something else.

It also differs  
from igno-  
rance, which  
is concerned  
with nothing.

Well then, is not-being the subject-matter of opinion? or, rather, how can there be an opinion at all about not-being? Reflect: when a man has an opinion, has he not an opinion about something? Can he have an opinion which is an opinion about nothing?

Impossible.



He who has an opinion has an opinion about some one thing?

*Republic V.*

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Yes.

And not-being is not one thing but, properly speaking, nothing?

True.

Of not-being, ignorance was assumed to be the necessary correlative ; of being, knowledge?

True, he said.

Then opinion is not concerned either with being or with not-being?

Not with either.

And can therefore neither be ignorance nor knowledge?

That seems to be true.

But is opinion to be sought without and beyond either of them, in a greater clearness than knowledge, or in a greater darkness than ignorance?

Its place is not to be sought without or beyond knowledge or ignorance, but between them.

In neither.

Then I suppose that opinion appears to you to be darker than knowledge, but lighter than ignorance?

Both ; and in no small degree.

And also to be within and between them?

Yes.

Then you would infer that opinion is intermediate?

No question.

But were we not saying before, that if anything appeared to be of a sort which is and is not at the same time, that sort of thing would appear also to lie in the interval between pure being and absolute not-being ; and that the corresponding faculty is neither knowledge nor ignorance, but will be found in the interval between them?

True.

And in that interval there has now been discovered something which we call opinion?

There has.

Then what remains to be discovered is the object which partakes equally of the nature of being and not-being, and cannot rightly be termed either, pure and simple ; this unknown term, when discovered, we may truly call the subject of opinion, and assign each to their proper faculty,—

*Republic V.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.The absolute-  
ness of the  
one and the  
relativeness  
of the many.

the extremes to the faculties of the extremes and the mean to the faculty of the mean.

True.

This being premised, I would ask the gentleman who is of 479 opinion that there is no absolute or unchangeable idea of beauty — in whose opinion the beautiful is the manifold — he, I say, your lover of beautiful sights, who cannot bear to be told that the beautiful is one, and the just is one, or that anything is one — to him I would appeal, saying, Will you be so very kind, sir, as to tell us whether, of all these beautiful things, there is one which will not be found ugly; or of the just, which will not be found unjust; or of the holy, which will not also be unholy?

No, he replied; the beautiful will in some point of view be found ugly; and the same is true of the rest.

And may not the many which are doubles be also halves? — doubles, that is, of one thing, and halves of another?

Quite true.

And things great and small, heavy and light, as they are termed, will not be denoted by these any more than by the opposite names?

True; both these and the opposite names will always attach to all of them.

And can any one of those many things which are called by particular names be said to be this rather than not to be this?

He replied: They are like the punning riddles which are asked at feasts or the children's puzzle about the eunuch aiming at the bat, with what he hit him, as they say in the puzzle, and upon what the bat was sitting. The individual objects of which I am speaking are also a riddle, and have a double sense: nor can you fix them in your mind, either as being or not-being, or both, or neither.

Then what will you do with them? I said. Can they have a better place than between being and not-being? For they are clearly not in greater darkness or negation than not-being, or more full of light and existence than being.

That is quite true, he said.

Thus then we seem to have discovered that the many ideas which the multitude entertain about the beautiful and about

all other things are tossing about in some region which is half-way between pure being and pure not-being?

*Republic V.*

We have.

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Yes; and we had before agreed that anything of this kind which we might find was to be described as matter of opinion, and not as matter of knowledge; being the intermediate flux which is caught and detained by the intermediate faculty.

Quite true.

Then those who see the many beautiful, and who yet neither see absolute beauty, nor can follow any guide who points the way thither; who see the many just, and not absolute justice, and the like,—such persons may be said to have opinion but not knowledge?

Opinion is the knowledge, not of the absolute, but of the many.

That is certain.

But those who see the absolute and eternal and immutable may be said to know, and not to have opinion only?

Neither can that be denied.

The one love and embrace the subjects of knowledge, the other those of opinion? The latter are the same, as I dare say you will remember, who listened to sweet sounds and gazed upon fair colours, but would not tolerate the existence of absolute beauty.

Yes, I remember.

Shall we then be guilty of any impropriety in calling them lovers of opinion rather than lovers of wisdom, and will they be very angry with us for thus describing them?

I shall tell them not to be angry; no man should be angry at what is true.

But those who love the truth in each thing are to be called lovers of wisdom and not lovers of opinion.

Assuredly.

## BOOK VI.

*Republic VI.*

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

If we had  
time, we  
might have a  
nearer view of  
the true and  
false philoso-  
pher.

Which of  
them shall  
be our  
guardians?

A question  
hardly to be  
asked.

AND thus, Glaucon, after the argument has gone a weary way, the true and the false philosophers have at length appeared in view. Steph. 484

I do not think, he said, that the way could have been shortened.

I suppose not, I said; and yet I believe that we might have had a better view of both of them if the discussion could have been confined to this one subject and if there were not many other questions awaiting us, which he who desires to see in what respect the life of the just differs from that of the unjust must consider.

And what is the next question? he asked.

Surely, I said, the one which follows next in order. Inasmuch as philosophers only are able to grasp the eternal and unchangeable, and those who wander in the region of the many and variable are not philosophers, I must ask you which of the two classes should be the rulers of our State?

And how can we rightly answer that question?

Whichever of the two are best able to guard the laws and institutions of our State — let them be our guardians.

Very good.

Neither, I said, can there be any question that the guardian who is to keep anything should have eyes rather than no eyes?

There can be no question of that.

And are not those who are verily and indeed wanting in the knowledge of the true being of each thing, and who have in their souls no clear pattern, and are unable as with a painter's eye to look at the absolute truth and to that original to repair, and having perfect vision of the other world to order the laws about beauty, goodness, justice in this, if not



already ordered, and to guard and preserve the order of them — are not such persons, I ask, simply blind?

*Republic VI.*

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Truly, he replied, they are much in that condition.

And shall they be our guardians when there are others who, besides being their equals in experience and falling short of them in no particular of virtue, also know the very truth of each thing?

There can be no reason, he said, for rejecting those who  
485 have this greatest of all great qualities; they must always have the first place unless they fail in some other respect.

Suppose then, I said, that we determine how far they can unite this and the other excellences.

By all means.

In the first place, as we began by observing, the nature of the philosopher has to be ascertained. We must come to an understanding about him, and, when we have done so, then, if I am not mistaken, we shall also acknowledge that such an union of qualities is possible, and that those in whom they are united, and those only, should be rulers in the State.

The philosopher is a lover of truth and of all true being.

What do you mean?

Let us suppose that philosophical minds always love knowledge of a sort which shows them the eternal nature not varying from generation and corruption.

Agreed.

And further, I said, let us agree that they are lovers of all true being; there is no part whether greater or less, or more or less honourable, which they are willing to renounce; as we said before of the lover and the man of ambition.

True.

And if they are to be what we were describing, is there not another quality which they should also possess?

What quality?

Truthfulness: they will never intentionally receive into their mind falsehood, which is their detestation, and they will love the truth.

Yes, that may be safely affirmed of them.

‘May be,’ my friend, I replied, is not the word; say rather, ‘must be affirmed:’ for he whose nature is amorous of anything cannot help loving all that belongs or is akin to the object of his affections.

*Republic VI.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Right, he said.

And is there anything more akin to wisdom than truth?

How can there be?

Can the same nature be a lover of wisdom and a lover of falsehood?

Never.

The true lover of learning then must from his earliest youth, as far as in him lies, desire all truth?

Assuredly.

But then again, as we know by experience, he whose desires are strong in one direction will have them weaker in others; they will be like a stream which has been drawn off into another channel.

True.

He will be absorbed in the pleasures of the soul, and therefore temperate and the reverse of covetous or mean.

He whose desires are drawn towards knowledge in every form will be absorbed in the pleasures of the soul, and will hardly feel bodily pleasure — I mean, if he be a true philosopher and not a sham one.

That is most certain.

Such an one is sure to be temperate and the reverse of covetous; for the motives which make another man desirous of having and spending, have no place in his character.

Very true.

Another criterion of the philosophical nature has also to be considered. 486

What is that?

There should be no secret corner of illiberality; nothing can be more antagonistic than meanness to a soul which is ever longing after the whole of things both divine and human.

Most true, he replied.

In the magnificence of his contemplations he will not think much of human life.

Then how can he who has magnificence of mind and is the spectator of all time and all existence, think much of human life?

He cannot.

Or can such an one account death fearful?

No indeed.

Then the cowardly and mean nature has no part in true philosophy?

Certainly not.

*Republic VI.*

Or again: can he who is harmoniously constituted, who is not covetous or mean, or a boaster, or a coward — can he, I say, ever be unjust or hard in his dealings?

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Impossible.

Then you will soon observe whether a man is just and gentle, or rude and unsociable; these are the signs which distinguish even in youth the philosophical nature from the unphilosophical.

He will be of a gentle, sociable, harmonious nature; a lover of learning, having a good memory and moving spontaneously in the world of being.

True.

There is another point which should be remarked.

What point?

Whether he has or has not a pleasure in learning; for no one will love that which gives him pain, and in which after much toil he makes little progress.

Certainly not.

And again, if he is forgetful and retains nothing of what he learns, will he not be an empty vessel?

That is certain.

Labouring in vain, he must end in hating himself and his fruitless occupation?

Yes.

Then a soul which forgets cannot be ranked among genuine philosophic natures; we must insist that the philosopher should have a good memory?

Certainly.

And once more, the inharmonious and unseemly nature can only tend to disproportion?

Undoubtedly.

And do you consider truth to be akin to proportion or to disproportion?

To proportion.

Then, besides other qualities, we must try to find a naturally well-proportioned and gracious mind, which will move spontaneously towards the true being of everything.

Certainly.

Well, and do not all these qualities, which we have been enumerating, go together, and are they not, in a manner, necessary to a soul, which is to have a full and perfect participation of being?



*Republic VI.*

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON,  
ADEIMANTUS.

Conclusion:  
What a  
blameless  
study then is  
philosophy!

Nay, says  
Adeimantus,  
you can prove  
anything, but  
your hearers  
are uncon-  
vinced all  
the same.

Common  
opinion  
declares  
philosophers  
to be either  
rogues or  
useless.

Socrates,  
instead of  
denying this  
statement,  
admits the  
truth of it.

They are absolutely necessary, he replied.

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And must not that be a blameless study which he only can pursue who has the gift of a good memory, and is quick to learn,— noble, gracious, the friend of truth, justice, courage, temperance, who are his kindred?

The god of jealousy himself, he said, could find no fault with such a study.

And to men like him, I said, when perfected by years and education, and to these only you will entrust the State.

Here Adeimantus interposed and said: To these statements, Socrates, no one can offer a reply; but when you talk in this way, a strange feeling passes over the minds of your hearers: They fancy that they are led astray a little at each step in the argument, owing to their own want of skill in asking and answering questions; these littles accumulate, and at the end of the discussion they are found to have sustained a mighty overthrow and all their former notions appear to be turned upside down. And as unskilful players of draughts are at last shut up by their more skilful adversaries and have no piece to move, so they too find themselves shut up at last; for they have nothing to say in this new game of which words are the counters; and yet all the time they are in the right. The observation is suggested to me by what is now occurring. For any one of us might say, that although in words he is not able to meet you at each step of the argument, he sees as a fact that the votaries of philosophy, when they carry on the study, not only in youth as a part of education, but as the pursuit of their maturer years, most of them become strange monsters, not to say utter rogues, and that those who may be considered the best of them are made useless to the world by the very study which you extol.

Well, and do you think that those who say so are wrong?

I cannot tell, he replied; but I should like to know what is your opinion.

Hear my answer; I am of opinion that they are quite right.

Then how can you be justified in saying that cities will not cease from evil until philosophers rule in them, when philosophers are acknowledged by us to be of no use to them?

You ask a question, I said, to which a reply can only be given in a parable.



Yes, Socrates; and that is a way of speaking to which you are not at all accustomed, I suppose.

*Republic VI.*

SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

A parable.

488 I perceive, I said, that you are vastly amused at having plunged me into such a hopeless discussion; but now hear the parable, and then you will be still more amused at the meagreness of my imagination: for the manner in which the best men are treated in their own States is so grievous that no single thing on earth is comparable to it; and therefore, if I am to plead their cause, I must have recourse to fiction, and put together a figure made up of many things, like the fabulous unions of goats and stags which are found in pictures. Imagine then a fleet or a ship in which there is a captain who is taller and stronger than any of the crew, but he is a little deaf and has a similar infirmity in sight, and his knowledge of navigation is not much better. The sailors are quarrelling with one another about the steering — every one is of opinion that he has a right to steer, though he has never learned the art of navigation and cannot tell who taught him or when he learned, and will further assert that it cannot be taught, and they are ready to cut in pieces any one who says the contrary. They throng about the captain, begging and praying him to commit the helm to them; and if at any time they do not prevail, but others are preferred to them, they kill the others or throw them overboard, and having first chained up the noble captain's senses with drink or some narcotic drug, they mutiny and take possession of the ship and make free with the stores; thus, eating and drinking, they proceed on their voyage in such manner as might be expected of them. Him who is their partisan and cleverly aids them in their plot for getting the ship out of the captain's hands into their own whether by force or persuasion, they compliment with the name of sailor, pilot, able seaman, and abuse the other sort of man, whom they call a good-for-nothing; but that the true pilot must pay attention to the year and seasons and sky and stars and winds, and whatever else belongs to his art, if he intends to be really qualified for the command of a ship, and that he must and will be the steerer, whether other people like or not — the possibility of this union of authority with the steerer's art has never seriously entered into their thoughts or been made part

The noble captain whose senses are rather dull (the people in their better mind); the mutinous crew (the mob of politicians); and the pilot (the true philosopher).

*Republic VI.*SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

of their calling<sup>1</sup>. Now in vessels which are in a state of 489  
mutiny and by sailors who are mutineers, how will the true  
pilot be regarded? Will he not be called by them a prater, a  
star-gazer, a good-for-nothing?

Of course, said Adeimantus.

The inter-  
pretation.

Then you will hardly need, I said, to hear the interpretation  
of the figure, which describes the true philosopher in his  
relation to the State; for you understand already.

Certainly.

Then suppose you now take this parable to the gentleman  
who is surprised at finding that philosophers have no honour  
in their cities; explain it to him and try to convince him that  
their having honour would be far more extraordinary.

I will.

The use-  
lessness of  
philosophers  
arises out of  
the unwill-  
ingness of  
mankind to  
make use of  
them.

Say to him, that, in deeming the best votaries of philo-  
sophy to be useless to the rest of the world, he is right; but  
also tell him to attribute their uselessness to the fault of  
those who will not use them, and not to themselves. The  
pilot should not humbly beg the sailors to be commanded by  
him—that is not the order of nature; neither are ‘the wise  
to go to the doors of the rich’—the ingenious author of this  
saying told a lie—but the truth is, that, when a man is ill,  
whether he be rich or poor, to the physician he must go, and  
he who wants to be governed, to him who is able to govern.  
The ruler who is good for anything ought not to beg his  
subjects to be ruled by him; although the present governors  
of mankind are of a different stamp; they may be justly  
compared to the mutinous sailors, and the true helmsmen to  
those who are called by them good-for-nothings and star-  
gazers.

Precisely so, he said.

The real  
enemies of  
philosophy  
her professing  
followers.

For these reasons, and among men like these, philosophy,  
the noblest pursuit of all, is not likely to be much esteemed  
by those of the opposite faction; not that the greatest and  
most lasting injury is done to her by her opponents, but  
by her own professing followers, the same of whom you

<sup>1</sup> Or, applying *ὅπως δὲ κυβερνήσει* to the mutineers, ‘But only under-  
standing (*ἐπαίοντας*) that he (the mutinous pilot) must rule in spite of other  
people, never considering that there is an art of command which may be  
practised in combination with the pilot’s art.’

suppose the accuser to say, that the greater number of them are arrant rogues, and the best are useless; in which opinion I agreed.

*Republic VI.*  
SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

Yes.

And the reason why the good are useless has now been explained?

True.

Then shall we proceed to show that the corruption of the majority is also unavoidable, and that this is not to be laid to the charge of philosophy any more than the other?

The corruption of philosophy due to many causes.

By all means.

490 And let us ask and answer in turn, first going back to the description of the gentle and noble nature. Truth, as you will remember, was his leader, whom he followed always and in all things; failing in this, he was an impostor, and had no part or lot in true philosophy.

Yes, that was said.

Well, and is not this one quality, to mention no others, greatly at variance with present notions of him?

Certainly, he said.

And have we not a right to say in his defence, that the true lover of knowledge is always striving after being — that is his nature; he will not rest in the multiplicity of individuals which is an appearance only, but will go on — the keen edge will not be blunted, nor the force of his desire abate until he have attained the knowledge of the true nature of every essence by a sympathetic and kindred power in the soul, and by that power drawing near and mingling and becoming incorporate with very being, having begotten mind and truth, he will have knowledge and will live and grow truly, and then, and not till then, will he cease from his travail.

But before considering this, let us re-enumerate the qualities of the philosopher:

Nothing, he said, can be more just than such a description of him.

And will the love of a lie be any part of a philosopher's nature? Will he not utterly hate a lie?

He will.

And when truth is the captain, we cannot suspect any evil of the band which he leads?

his love of essence, of truth, of justice, besides his other virtues and natural gifts.

Impossible.



*Republic VI.*SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

Justice and health of mind will be of the company, and temperance will follow after?

True, he replied.

Neither is there any reason why I should again set in array the philosopher's virtues, as you will doubtless remember that courage, magnificence, apprehension, memory, were his natural gifts. And you objected that, although no one could deny what I then said, still, if you leave words and look at facts, the persons who are thus described are some of them manifestly useless, and the greater number utterly depraved; we were then led to enquire into the grounds of these accusations, and have now arrived at the point of asking why are the majority bad, which question of necessity brought us back to the examination and definition of the true philosopher.

Exactly.

The reasons  
why philo-  
sophical  
natures  
so easily  
deteriorate.

And we have next to consider the corruptions of the philosophic nature, why so many are spoiled and so few escape spoiling — I am speaking of those who were said to be useless but not wicked — and, when we have done with them, we will speak of the imitators of philosophy, what manner of men are they who aspire after a profession which is above them and of which they are unworthy, and then, by their manifold inconsistencies, bring upon philosophy, and upon all philosophers, that universal reprobation of which we speak. 491

What are these corruptions? he said.

(1) There are  
but a few of  
them;

I will see if I can explain them to you. Every one will admit that a nature having in perfection all the qualities which we required in a philosopher, is a rare plant which is seldom seen among men.

Rare indeed.

And what numberless and powerful causes tend to destroy these rare natures!

What causes?

(2) and they  
may be dis-  
tracted from  
philosophy by  
their own  
virtues;

In the first place there are their own virtues, their courage, temperance, and the rest of them, every one of which praiseworthy qualities (and this is a most singular circumstance) destroys and distracts from philosophy the soul which is the possessor of them.

That is very singular, he replied.



Then there are all the ordinary goods of life — beauty, wealth, strength, rank, and great connections in the State — you understand the sort of things — these also have a corrupting and distracting effect.

*Republic VI.*  
SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

I understand; but I should like to know more precisely what you mean about them.

and also,  
(3), by the  
ordinary  
goods of life.

Grasp the truth as a whole, I said, and in the right way; you will then have no difficulty in apprehending the preceding remarks, and they will no longer appear strange to you.

And how am I to do so? he asked.

Why, I said, we know that all germs or seeds, whether vegetable or animal, when they fail to meet with proper nutriment or climate or soil, in proportion to their vigour, are all the more sensitive to the want of a suitable environment, for evil is a greater enemy to what is good than to what is not.

Very true.

There is reason in supposing that the finest natures, when under alien conditions, receive more injury than the inferior, because the contrast is greater.

(4) The finer  
natures more  
liable to  
injury than  
the inferior.

Certainly.

And may we not say, Adeimantus, that the most gifted minds, when they are ill-educated, become pre-eminently bad? Do not great crimes and the spirit of pure evil spring out of a fulness of nature ruined by education rather than from any inferiority, whereas weak natures are scarcely capable of any very great good or very great evil?

There I think that you are right.

492 And our philosopher follows the same analogy — he is like a plant which, having proper nurture, must necessarily grow and mature into all virtue, but, if sown and planted in an alien soil, becomes the most noxious of all weeds, unless he be preserved by some divine power. Do you really think, as people so often say, that our youth are corrupted by Sophists, or that private teachers of the art corrupt them in any degree worth speaking of? Are not the public who say these things the greatest of all Sophists? And do they not educate to perfection young and old, men and women alike, and fashion them after their own hearts?

(5) They are  
not corrupted  
by private  
sophists, but  
compelled by  
the opinion of  
the world  
meeting in the  
assembly or in  
some other  
place of  
resort.

When is this accomplished? he said.

*Republic VI.*SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

When they meet together, and the world sits down at an assembly, or in a court of law, or a theatre, or a camp, or in any other popular resort, and there is a great uproar, and they praise some things which are being said or done, and blame other things, equally exaggerating both, shouting and clapping their hands, and the echo of the rocks and the place in which they are assembled redoubles the sound of the praise or blame—at such a time will not a young man's heart, as they say, leap within him? Will any private training enable him to stand firm against the overwhelming flood of popular opinion? or will he be carried away by the stream? Will he not have the notions of good and evil which the public in general have—he will do as they do, and as they are, such will he be?

Yes, Socrates; necessity will compel him.

(6) The other  
compulsion of  
violence and  
death.

And yet, I said, there is a still greater necessity, which has not been mentioned.

What is that?

The gentle force of attainer or confiscation or death, which, as you are aware, these new Sophists and educators, who are the public, apply when their words are powerless.

Indeed they do; and in right good earnest.

Now what opinion of any other Sophist, or of any private person, can be expected to overcome in such an unequal contest?

None, he replied.

They must be  
saved, if at  
all, by the  
power of God.

No, indeed, I said, even to make the attempt is a great piece of folly; there neither is, nor has been, nor is ever likely to be, any different type of character <sup>1</sup> which has had no other training in virtue but that which is supplied by public opinion <sup>1</sup>—I speak, my friend, of human virtue only; what is more than human, as the proverb says, is not included: for I would not have you ignorant that, in the present evil state of governments, whatever is saved and comes to good is saved by the power of God, as we may truly say.

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I quite assent, he replied.

Then let me crave your assent also to a further observation.

What are you going to say?

Why, that all those mercenary individuals, whom the many

<sup>1</sup> Or, taking *παρὰ* in another sense, 'trained to virtue on their principles.'

call Sophists and whom they deem to be their adversaries, do, in fact, teach nothing but the opinion of the many, that is to say, the opinions of their assemblies; and this is their wisdom. I might compare them to a man who should study the tempers and desires of a mighty strong beast who is fed by him — he would learn how to approach and handle him, also at what times and from what causes he is dangerous or the reverse, and what is the meaning of his several cries, and by what sounds, when another utters them, he is soothed or infuriated; and you may suppose further, that when, by continually attending upon him, he has become perfect in all this, he calls his knowledge wisdom, and makes of it a system or art, which he proceeds to teach, although he has no real notion of what he means by the principles or passions of which he is speaking, but calls this honourable and that dishonourable, or good or evil, or just or unjust, all in accordance with the tastes and tempers of the great brute. Good he pronounces to be that in which the beast delights and evil to be that which he dislikes; and he can give no other account of them except that the just and noble are the necessary, having never himself seen, and having no power of explaining to others the nature of either, or the difference between them, which is immense. By heaven, would not such an one be a rare educator?

*Republic VI.*

SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

The great brute; his behaviour and temper (the people looked at from their worse side).

Indeed he would.

And in what way does he who thinks that wisdom is the discernment of the tempers and tastes of the motley multitude, whether in painting or music, or, finally, in politics, differ from him whom I have been describing? For when a man consorts with the many, and exhibits to them his poem or other work of art or the service which he has done the State, making them his judges <sup>1</sup> when he is not obliged, the so-called necessity of Diomedes will oblige him to produce whatever they praise. And yet the reasons are utterly ludicrous which they give in confirmation of their own notions about the honourable and good. Did you ever hear any of them which were not?

He who associates with the people will conform to their tastes and will produce only what pleases them.

No, nor am I likely to hear.

You recognise the truth of what I have been saying? Then

<sup>1</sup> Putting a comma after τῶν ἀναγκαίων.



*Republic VI.*SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

let me ask you to consider further whether the world will ever be induced to believe in the existence of absolute beauty rather than of the many beautiful, or of the absolute in each kind rather than of the many in each kind? 494

Certainly not.

Then the world cannot possibly be a philosopher?

Impossible.

And therefore philosophers must inevitably fall under the censure of the world?

They must.

And of individuals who consort with the mob and seek to please them?

That is evident.

Then, do you see any way in which the philosopher can be preserved in his calling to the end? and remember what we were saying of him, that he was to have quickness and memory and courage and magnificence — these were admitted by us to be the true philosopher's gifts.

Yes.

Will not such an one from his early childhood be in all things first among all, especially if his bodily endowments are like his mental ones?

Certainly, he said.

And his friends and fellow-citizens will want to use him as he gets older for their own purposes?

No question.

Falling at his feet, they will make requests to him and do him honour and flatter him, because they want to get into their hands now, the power which he will one day possess.

That often happens, he said.

And what will a man such as he is be likely to do under such circumstances, especially if he be a citizen of a great city, rich and noble, and a tall proper youth? Will he not be full of boundless aspirations, and fancy himself able to manage the affairs of Hellenes and of barbarians, and having got such notions into his head will he not dilate and elevate himself in the fulness of vain pomp and senseless pride?

To be sure he will.

Now, when he is in this state of mind, if some one gently comes to him and tells him that he is a fool and must get

The youth  
who has great  
bodily and  
mental gifts  
will be  
flattered from  
his childhood,

and being  
incapable  
of having



understanding, which can only be got by slaving for it, do you think that, under such adverse circumstances, he will be easily induced to listen?

Far otherwise.

And even if there be some one who through inherent goodness or natural reasonableness has had his eyes opened a little and is humbled and taken captive by philosophy, how will his friends behave when they think that they are likely to lose the advantage which they were hoping to reap from his companionship? Will they not do and say anything to prevent him from yielding to his better nature and to render his teacher powerless, using to this end private intrigues as well as public prosecutions?

There can be no doubt of it.

And how can one who is thus circumstanced ever become a philosopher?

Impossible.

Then were we not right in saying that even the very qualities which make a man a philosopher may, if he be ill-educated, divert him from philosophy, no less than riches and their accompaniments and the other so-called goods of life?

We were quite right.

Thus, my excellent friend, is brought about all that ruin and failure which I have been describing of the natures best adapted to the best of all pursuits; they are natures which we maintain to be rare at any time; this being the class out of which come the men who are the authors of the greatest evil to States and individuals; and also of the greatest good when the tide carries them in that direction; but a small man never was the doer of any great thing either to individuals or to States.

That is most true, he said.

And so philosophy is left desolate, with her marriage rite incomplete: for her own have fallen away and forsaken her, and while they are leading a false and unbecoming life, other unworthy persons, seeing that she has no kinsmen to be her protectors, enter in and dishonour her; and fasten upon her the reproaches which, as you say, her reprovers utter, who affirm of her votaries that some are good for nothing, and that the greater number deserve the severest punishment.

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*Republic VI.*

SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

reason, will be  
easily drawn  
away from  
philosophy.

The very  
qualities  
which make  
a man a  
philosopher  
may also  
divert him  
from phi-  
losophy.

Great natures  
alone are  
capable, either  
of great good,  
or great evil.

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ADEIMANTUS.The attrac-  
tiveness of  
philosophy to  
the vulgar.

That is certainly what people say.

Yes; and what else would you expect, I said, when you think of the puny creatures who, seeing this land open to them — a land well stocked with fair names and showy titles — like prisoners running out of prison into a sanctuary, take a leap out of their trades into philosophy; those who do so being probably the cleverest hands at their own miserable crafts? For, although philosophy be in this evil case, still there remains a dignity about her which is not to be found in the arts. And many are thus attracted by her whose natures are imperfect and whose souls are maimed and disfigured by their meannesses, as their bodies are by their trades and crafts. Is not this unavoidable?

Yes.

Are they not exactly like a bald little tinker who has just got out of durance and come into a fortune; he takes a bath and puts on a new coat, and is decked out as a bridegroom going to marry his master's daughter, who is left poor and desolate?

A most exact parallel.

What will be the issue of such marriages? Will they not be vile and bastard?

There can be no question of it.

The *mesal-*  
*liance* of  
philosophy.

And when persons who are unworthy of education approach philosophy and make an alliance with her who is in a rank above them, what sort of ideas and opinions are likely to be generated? <sup>1</sup> Will they not be sophisms captivating to the ear <sup>1</sup>, having nothing in them genuine, or worthy of or akin to true wisdom?

No doubt, he said.

Few are  
the worthy  
disciples:

Then, Adeimantus, I said, the worthy disciples of philosophy will be but a small remnant: perchance some noble and well-educated person, detained by exile in her service, who in the absence of corrupting influences remains devoted to her; or some lofty soul born in a mean city, the politics of which he contemns and neglects; and there may be a gifted few who leave the arts, which they justly despise, and come to her;— or peradventure there are some who are restrained by our friend 'Theages' bridle; for everything in the life of Theages

<sup>1</sup> Or 'will they not deserve to be called sophisms,' . . . .

conspired to divert him from philosophy ; but ill-health kept him away from politics. My own case of the internal sign is hardly worth mentioning, for rarely, if ever, has such a monitor been given to any other man. Those who belong to this small class have tasted how sweet and blessed a possession philosophy is, and have also seen enough of the madness of the multitude ; and they know that no politician is honest, nor is there any champion of justice at whose side they may fight and be saved. Such an one may be compared to a man who has fallen among wild beasts—he will not join in the wickedness of his fellows, but neither is he able singly to resist all their fierce natures, and therefore seeing that he would be of no use to the State or to his friends, and reflecting that he would have to throw away his life without doing any good either to himself or others, he holds his peace, and goes his own way. He is like one who, in the storm of dust and sleet which the driving wind hurries along, retires under the shelter of a wall ; and seeing the rest of mankind full of wickedness, he is content, if only he can live his own life and be pure from evil or unrighteousness, and depart in peace and good-will, with bright hopes.

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SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

and these are  
unable to  
resist the  
madness of  
the world ;

they therefore  
in order to  
escape the  
storm take  
shelter behind  
a wall and live  
their own life.

Yes, he said, and he will have done a great work before he departs.

497 A great work—yes ; but not the greatest, unless he find a State suitable to him ; for in a State which is suitable to him, he will have a larger growth and be the saviour of his country, as well as of himself.

The causes why philosophy is in such an evil name have now been sufficiently explained : the injustice of the charges against her has been shown—is there anything more which you wish to say ?

Nothing more on that subject, he replied ; but I should like to know which of the governments now existing is in your opinion the one adapted to her.

Not any of them, I said ; and that is precisely the accusation which I bring against them—not one of them is worthy of the philosophic nature, and hence that nature is warped and estranged ;—as the exotic seed which is sown in a foreign land becomes denaturalized, and is wont to be overpowered and to lose itself in the new soil, even so this growth

No existing  
State suited  
to philosophy.



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ADEIMANTUS.

of philosophy, instead of persisting, degenerates and receives another character. But if philosophy ever finds in the State that perfection which she herself is, then will be seen that she is in truth divine, and that all other things, whether natures of men or institutions, are but human;—and now, I know, that you are going to ask, What that State is:

No, he said; there you are wrong, for I was going to ask another question — whether it is the State of which we are the founders and inventors, or some other?

Even our own  
State requires  
the addition  
of the living  
authority.

Yes, I replied, ours in most respects; but you may remember my saying before, that some living authority would always be required in the State having the same idea of the constitution which guided you when as legislator you were laying down the laws.

That was said, he replied.

Yes, but not in a satisfactory manner; you frightened us by interposing objections, which certainly showed that the discussion would be long and difficult; and what still remains is the reverse of easy.

What is there remaining?

The question how the study of philosophy may be so ordered as not to be the ruin of the State: All great attempts are attended with risk; 'hard is the good,' as men say.

Still, he said, let the point be cleared up, and the enquiry will then be complete.

I shall not be hindered, I said, by any want of will, but, if at all, by a want of power: my zeal you may see for yourselves; and please to remark in what I am about to say how boldly and unhesitatingly I declare that States should pursue philosophy, not as they do now, but in a different spirit.

In what manner?

The super-  
ficial study  
of philosophy  
which exists  
in the present  
day.

At present, I said, the students of philosophy are quite 498 young; beginning when they are hardly past childhood, they devote only the time saved from moneymaking and house-keeping to such pursuits; and even those of them who are reputed to have most of the philosophic spirit, when they come within sight of the great difficulty of the subject, I mean dialectic, take themselves off. In after life when invited by some one else, they may, perhaps, go and hear a lecture, and about this they make much ado, for philosophy is not considered



by them to be their proper business: at last, when they grow old, in most cases they are extinguished more truly than Heracleitus' sun, inasmuch as they never light up again <sup>1</sup>.

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SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

But what ought to be their course?

Just the opposite. In childhood and youth their study, and what philosophy they learn, should be suited to their tender years: during this period while they are growing up towards manhood, the chief and special care should be given to their bodies that they may have them to use in the service of philosophy; as life advances and the intellect begins to mature, let them increase the gymnastics of the soul; but when the strength of our citizens fails and is past civil and military duties, then let them range at will and engage in no serious labour, as we intend them to live happily here, and to crown this life with a similar happiness in another.

How truly in earnest you are, Socrates! he said; I am sure of that; and yet most of your hearers, if I am not mistaken, are likely to be still more earnest in their opposition to you, and will never be convinced; Thrasymachus least of all.

Thrasymachus once more.

Do not make a quarrel, I said, between Thrasymachus and me, who have recently become friends, although, indeed, we were never enemies; for I shall go on striving to the utmost until I either convert him and other men, or do something which may profit them against the day when they live again, and hold the like discourse in another state of existence.

You are speaking of a time which is not very near.

Rather, I replied, of a time which is as nothing in comparison with eternity. Nevertheless, I do not wonder that the many refuse to believe; for they have never seen that of which we are now speaking realized; they have seen only a conventional imitation of philosophy, consisting of words artificially brought together, not like these of ours having a natural unity. But a human being who in word and work is perfectly moulded, as far as he can be, into the proportion and likeness of virtue — such a man ruling in a city which bears the same image, they have never yet seen, neither one nor many of them — do you think that they ever did?

The people hate philosophy because they have only known bad and conventional imitations of it.

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<sup>1</sup> Heracleitus said that the sun was extinguished every evening and re-lighted every morning.

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No indeed.

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ADEIMANTUS.

No, my friend, and they have seldom, if ever, heard free and noble sentiments; such as men utter when they are earnestly and by every means in their power seeking after truth for the sake of knowledge, while they look coldly on the subtleties of controversy, of which the end is opinion and strife, whether they meet with them in the courts of law or in society.

They are strangers, he said, to the words of which you speak.

And this was what we foresaw, and this was the reason why truth forced us to admit, not without fear and hesitation, that neither cities nor States nor individuals will ever attain perfection until the small class of philosophers whom we termed useless but not corrupt are providentially compelled, whether they will or not, to take care of the State, and until a like necessity be laid on the State to obey them<sup>1</sup>; or until kings, or if not kings, the sons of kings or princes, are divinely inspired with a true love of true philosophy. That either or both of these alternatives are impossible, I see no reason to affirm: if they were so, we might indeed be justly ridiculed as dreamers and visionaries. Am I not right?

Quite right.

Somewhere,  
at some time,  
there may  
have been or  
may be a  
philosopher  
who is also  
the ruler of a  
State.

If then, in the countless ages of the past, or at the present hour in some foreign clime which is far away and beyond our ken, the perfected philosopher is or has been or hereafter shall be compelled by a superior power to have the charge of the State, we are ready to assert to the death, that this our constitution has been, and is—yea, and will be whenever the Muse of Philosophy is queen. There is no impossibility in all this; that there is a difficulty, we acknowledge ourselves.

My opinion agrees with yours, he said.

But do you mean to say that this is not the opinion of the multitude?

I should imagine not, he replied.

O my friend, I said, do not attack the multitude: they will change their minds, if, not in an aggressive spirit, but gently

<sup>1</sup> Reading *κατηκόρ* or *κατηκόρις*.

and with the view of soothing them and removing their dislike of over-education, you show them your philosophers as they really are and describe as you were just now doing  
500 their character and profession, and then mankind will see that he of whom you are speaking is not such as they supposed — if they view him in this new light, they will surely change their notion of him, and answer in another strain<sup>1</sup>. Who can be at enmity with one who loves them, who that is himself gentle and free from envy will be jealous of one in whom there is no jealousy? Nay, let me answer for you, that in a few this harsh temper may be found but not in the majority of mankind.

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SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

I quite agree with you, he said.

And do you not also think, as I do, that the harsh feeling which the many entertain towards philosophy originates in the pretenders, who rush in uninvited, and are always abusing them, and finding fault with them, who make persons instead of things the theme of their conversation? and nothing can be more unbecoming in philosophers than this.

The feeling against philosophy is really a feeling against pretended philosophers who are always talking about persons.

It is most unbecoming.

For he, Adeimantus, whose mind is fixed upon true being, has surely no time to look down upon the affairs of earth, or to be filled with malice and envy, contending against men; his eye is ever directed towards things fixed and immutable, which he sees neither injuring nor injured by one another, but all in order moving according to reason; these he imitates, and to these he will, as far as he can, conform himself. Can a man help imitating that with which he holds reverential converse?

The true philosopher, who has his eye fixed upon immutable principles, will fashion States after the heavenly image.

Impossible.

And the philosopher holding converse with the divine order, becomes orderly and divine, as far as the nature of man allows; but like every one else, he will suffer from detraction.

Of course.

<sup>1</sup> Reading ἡ καὶ ἐν οὕτω θεωρται without a question, and ἀλλοίαν τοι: or, retaining the question and taking ἀλλοίαν δόξαν in a new sense: 'Do you mean to say really that, viewing him in this light, they will be of another mind from yours, and answer in another strain?'



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ADEIMANTUS.

And if a necessity be laid upon him of fashioning, not only himself, but human nature generally, whether in States or individuals, into that which he beholds elsewhere, will he, think you, be an unskilful artificer of justice, temperance, and every civil virtue?

Anything but unskilful.

And if the world perceives that what we are saying about him is the truth, will they be angry with philosophy? Will they disbelieve us, when we tell them that no State can be happy which is not designed by artists who imitate the heavenly pattern?

They will not be angry if they understand, he said. But how will they draw out the plan of which you are speaking? 501

He will begin with a 'tabula rasa' and there inscribe his laws.

They will begin by taking the State and the manners of men, from which, as from a tablet, they will rub out the picture, and leave a clean surface. This is no easy task. But whether easy or not, herein will lie the difference between them and every other legislator,—they will have nothing to do either with individual or State, and will inscribe no laws, until they have either found, or themselves made, a clean surface.

They will be very right, he said.

Having effected this, they will proceed to trace an outline of the constitution?

No doubt.

And when they are filling in the work, as I conceive, they will often turn their eyes upwards and downwards: I mean that they will first look at absolute justice and beauty and temperance, and again at the human copy; and will mingle and temper the various elements of life into the image of a man; and this they will conceive according to that other image, which, when existing among men, Homer calls the form and likeness of God.

Very true, he said.

And one feature they will erase, and another they will put in, until they have made the ways of men, as far as possible, agreeable to the ways of God?

Indeed, he said, in no way could they make a fairer picture.

And now, I said, are we beginning to persuade those whom



you described as rushing at us with might and main, that the painter of constitutions is such an one as we were praising; at whom they were so very indignant because to his hands we committed the State; and are they growing a little calmer at what they have just heard?

Much calmer, if there is any sense in them.

Why, where can they still find any ground for objection? Will they doubt that the philosopher is a lover of truth and being?

They would not be so unreasonable.

Or that his nature, being such as we have delineated, is akin to the highest good?

Neither can they doubt this.

But again, will they tell us that such a nature, placed under favorable circumstances, will not be perfectly good and wise if any ever was? Or will they prefer those whom we have rejected?

Surely not.

Then will they still be angry at our saying, that, until philosophers bear rule, States and individuals will have no rest from evil, nor will this our imaginary State ever be realized?

I think that they will be less angry.

502 Shall we assume that they are not only less angry but quite gentle, and that they have been converted and for very shame, if for no other reason, cannot refuse to come to terms?

By all means, he said.

Then let us suppose that the reconciliation has been effected. Will any one deny the other point, that there may be sons of kings or princes who are by nature philosophers?

Surely no man, he said.

And when they have come into being will any one say that they must of necessity be destroyed; that they can hardly be saved is not denied even by us; but that in the whole course of ages no single one of them can escape — who will venture to affirm this?

Who indeed!

But, said I, one is enough; let there be one man who has a city obedient to his will, and he might bring into existence the ideal polity about which the world is so incredulous.

Yes, one is enough.

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SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

The enemies  
of philosophy,  
when they  
hear the  
truth, are  
gradually  
propitiated,

and at length  
become quite  
gentle.

There may  
have been  
one son of  
a king a  
philosopher  
who has re-  
mained un-  
corrupted  
and has a  
State obe-  
dient to his  
will.

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ADEIMANTUS.

The ruler may impose the laws and institutions which we have been describing, and the citizens may possibly be willing to obey them?

Certainly.

And that others should approve, of what we approve, is no miracle or impossibility?

I think not.

But we have sufficiently shown, in what has preceded, that all this, if only possible, is assuredly for the best.

We have.

Our constitution then is not unattainable.

And now we say not only that our laws, if they could be enacted, would be for the best, but also that the enactment of them, though difficult, is not impossible.

Very good.

And so with pain and toil we have reached the end of one subject, but more remains to be discussed;—how and by what studies and pursuits will the saviours of the constitution be created, and at what ages are they to apply themselves to their several studies?

Certainly.

Recapitulation.

I omitted the troublesome business of the possession of women, and the procreation of children, and the appointment of the rulers, because I knew that the perfect State would be eyed with jealousy and was difficult of attainment; but that piece of cleverness was not of much service to me, for I had to discuss them all the same. The women and children are now disposed of, but the other question of the rulers must be investigated from the very beginning. We were saying, as you will remember, that they were to be lovers of their country, tried by the test of pleasures and pains, and neither 503 in hardships, nor in dangers, nor at any other critical moment were to lose their patriotism—he was to be rejected who failed, but he who always came forth pure, like gold tried in the refiner's fire, was to be made a ruler, and to receive honours and rewards in life and after death. This was the sort of thing which was being said, and then the argument turned aside and veiled her face; not liking to stir the question which has now arisen.

I perfectly remember, he said.

Yes, my friend, I said, and I then shrank from hazarding

the bold word ; but now let me dare to say — that the perfect guardian must be a philosopher.

Yes, he said, let that be affirmed.

And do not suppose that there will be many of them ; for the gifts which were deemed by us to be essential rarely grow together ; they are mostly found in shreds and patches.

What do you mean ? he said.

You are aware, I replied, that quick intelligence, memory, sagacity, cleverness, and similar qualities, do not often grow together, and that persons who possess them and are at the same time high-spirited and magnanimous are not so constituted by nature as to live orderly and in a peaceful and settled manner ; they are driven any way by their impulses, and all solid principle goes out of them.

Very true, he said.

On the other hand, those steadfast natures which can better be depended upon, which in a battle are impregnable to fear and immovable, are equally immovable when there is anything to be learned ; they are always in a torpid state, and are apt to yawn and go to sleep over any intellectual toil.

Quite true.

And yet we were saying that both qualities were necessary in those to whom the higher education is to be imparted, and who are to share in any office or command.

Certainly, he said.

And will they be a class which is rarely found ?

Yes, indeed.

Then the aspirant must not only be tested in those labours and dangers and pleasures which we mentioned before, but there is another kind of probation which we did not mention — he must be exercised also in many kinds of knowledge, to see whether the soul will be able to endure the highest of all, or will faint under them, as in any other studies and exercises.

Yes, he said, you are quite right in testing him. But what do you mean by the highest of all knowledge ?

You may remember, I said, that we divided the soul into three parts ; and distinguished the several natures of justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom ?

Indeed, he said, if I had forgotten, I should not deserve to hear more.

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ADEIMANTUS.

The guardian must be a philosopher, and a philosopher must be a person of rare gifts.

The contrast of the quick and solid temperaments.

They must be united.

He who is to hold command must be tested in many kinds of knowledge



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ADEIMANTUS.The shorter  
exposition of  
education,  
which has  
been already  
given, in-  
adequate.

And do you remember the word of caution which preceded the discussion of them <sup>1</sup>?

To what do you refer?

We were saying, if I am not mistaken, that he who wanted to see them in their perfect beauty must take a longer and more circuitous way, at the end of which they would appear; but that we could add on a popular exposition of them on a level with the discussion which had preceded. And you replied that such an exposition would be enough for you, and so the enquiry was continued in what to me seemed to be a very inaccurate manner; whether you were satisfied or not, it is for you to say.

Yes, he said, I thought and the others thought that you gave us a fair measure of truth.

But, my friend, I said, a measure of such things which in any degree falls short of the whole truth is not fair measure; for nothing imperfect is the measure of anything, although persons are too apt to be contented and think that they need search no further.

Not an uncommon case when people are indolent.

Yes, I said; and there cannot be any worse fault in a guardian of the State and of the laws.

True.

The guardian  
must take the  
longer road  
of the higher  
learning,

The guardian then, I said, must be required to take the longer circuit, and toil at learning as well as at gymnastics, or he will never reach the highest knowledge of all which, as we were just now saying, is his proper calling.

What, he said, is there a knowledge still higher than this—higher than justice and the other virtues?

Yes, I said, there is. And of the virtues too we must behold not the outline merely, as at present—nothing short of the most finished picture should satisfy us. When little things are elaborated with an infinity of pains, in order that they may appear in their full beauty and utmost clearness, how ridiculous that we should not think the highest truths worthy of attaining the highest accuracy!

A right noble thought<sup>2</sup>; but do you suppose that we

<sup>1</sup> Cp. IV. 435 D.

<sup>2</sup> Or, separating *καὶ μάλα* from *ἄξιον*, 'True, he said, and a noble thought': or *ἄξιον τὸ διανόημα* may be a gloss.



shall refrain from asking you what is this highest knowledge?

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SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

which leads  
upwards at  
last to the  
idea of good.

505 Nay, I said, ask if you will; but I am certain that you have heard the answer many times, and now you either do not understand me or, as I rather think, you are disposed to be troublesome; for you have often been told that the idea of good is the highest knowledge, and that all other things become useful and advantageous only by their use of this. You can hardly be ignorant that of this I was about to speak, concerning which, as you have often heard me say, we know so little; and, without which, any other knowledge or possession of any kind will profit us nothing. Do you think that the possession of all other things is of any value if we do not possess the good? or the knowledge of all other things if we have no knowledge of beauty and goodness?

Assuredly not.

You are further aware that most people affirm pleasure to be the good, but the finer sort of wits say it is knowledge?

But what is  
the good?  
Some say  
pleasure,  
others know-  
ledge, which  
they absurdly  
explain to  
mean know-  
ledge of the  
good.

Yes.

And you are aware too that the latter cannot explain what they mean by knowledge, but are obliged after all to say knowledge of the good?

How ridiculous!

Yes, I said, that they should begin by reproaching us with our ignorance of the good, and then presume our knowledge of it — for the good they define to be knowledge of the good, just as if we understood them when they use the term 'good' — this is of course ridiculous.

Most true, he said.

And those who make pleasure their good are in equal perplexity; for they are compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures as well as good.

Certainly.

And therefore to acknowledge that bad and good are the same?

True.

There can be no doubt about the numerous difficulties in which this question is involved.

There can be none.

Further, do we not see that many are willing to do or to

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ADEIMANTUS.

have or to seem to be what is just and honourable without the reality; but no one is satisfied with the appearance of good—the reality is what they seek; in the case of the good, appearance is despised by every one.

Very true, he said.

Every man  
pursues the  
good, but  
without  
knowing the  
nature of it.

Of this then, which every soul of man pursues and makes the end of all his actions, having a presentiment that there is such an end, and yet hesitating because neither knowing the nature nor having the same assurance of this as of other things, and therefore losing whatever good there is in other things,—of a principle such and so great as this ought the best men in our State, to whom everything is entrusted, to be in the darkness of ignorance? 506

Certainly not, he said.

I am sure, I said, that he who does not know how the beautiful and the just are likewise good will be but a sorry guardian of them; and I suspect that no one who is ignorant of the good will have a true knowledge of them.

That, he said, is a shrewd suspicion of yours.

And if we only have a guardian who has this knowledge our State will be perfectly ordered?

The guardian  
ought to  
know these  
things.

Of course, he replied; but I wish that you would tell me whether you conceive this supreme principle of the good to be knowledge or pleasure, or different from either?

Aye, I said, I knew all along that a fastidious gentleman<sup>1</sup> like you would not be contented with the thoughts of other people about these matters.

True, Socrates; but I must say that one who like you has passed a lifetime in the study of philosophy should not be always repeating the opinions of others, and never telling his own.

Well, but has any one a right to say positively what he does not know?

Not, he said, with the assurance of positive certainty; he has no right to do that: but he may say what he thinks, as a matter of opinion.

And do you not know, I said, that all mere opinions are bad, and the best of them blind? You would not deny that

<sup>1</sup> Reading *ἀνὴρ καλός*: or reading *ἀνὴρ καλῶς*, 'I quite well knew from the very first, that you, &c.'

those who have any true notion without intelligence are only like blind men who feel their way along the road?

Very true.

And do you wish to behold what is blind and crooked and base, when others will tell you of brightness and beauty?

Still, I must implore you, Socrates, said Glaucon, not to turn away just as you are reaching the goal; if you will only give such an explanation of the good as you have already given of justice and temperance and the other virtues, we shall be satisfied.

Yes, my friend, and I shall be at least equally satisfied, but I cannot help fearing that I shall fail, and that my indiscreet zeal will bring ridicule upon me. No, sweet sirs, let us not at present ask what is the actual nature of the good, for to reach what is now in my thoughts would be an effort too great for me. But of the child of the good who is likest him, I would fain speak, if I could be sure that you wished to hear — otherwise, not.

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SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS,  
GLAUCON.

We can only attain to the things of mind through the things of sense.

The 'child' of the good.

By all means, he said, tell us about the child, and you shall remain in our debt for the account of the parent.

507 I do indeed wish, I replied, that I could pay, and you receive, the account of the parent, and not, as now, of the offspring only; take, however, this latter by way of interest<sup>1</sup>, and at the same time have a care that I do not render a false account, although I have no intention of deceiving you.

Yes, we will take all the care that we can: proceed.

Yes, I said, but I must first come to an understanding with you, and remind you of what I have mentioned in the course of this discussion, and at many other times.

What?

The old story, that there is a many beautiful and a many good, and so of other things which we describe and define; to all of them the term 'many' is applied.

True, he said.

And there is an absolute beauty and an absolute good, and of other things to which the term 'many' is applied there is an absolute; for they may be brought under a single idea, which is called the essence of each.

Very true.

<sup>1</sup> A play upon *τόκος*, which means both 'offspring' and 'interest.'



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GLAUCON.

The many, as we say, are seen but not known, and the ideas are known but not seen.

Exactly.

And what is the organ with which we see the visible things?

The sight, he said.

And with the hearing, I said, we hear, and with the other senses perceive the other objects of sense?

True.

Sight the  
most complex  
of the senses,

But have you remarked that sight is by far the most costly and complex piece of workmanship which the artificer of the senses ever contrived?

No, I never have, he said.

Then reflect: has the ear or voice need of any third or additional nature in order that the one may be able to hear and the other to be heard?

Nothing of the sort.

No, indeed, I replied; and the same is true of most, if not all, the other senses—you would not say that any of them requires such an addition?

Certainly not.

But you see that without the addition of some other nature there is no seeing or being seen?

How do you mean?

and, unlike  
the other  
senses, re-  
quires the  
addition of  
a third nature  
before it can  
be used.  
This third  
nature is  
light.

Sight being, as I conceive, in the eyes, and he who has eyes wanting to see; colour being also present in them, still unless there be a third nature specially adapted to the purpose, the owner of the eyes will see nothing and the colours will be invisible.

Of what nature are you speaking?

Of that which you term light, I replied.

True, he said.

Noble, then, is the bond which links together sight and visibility, and great beyond other bonds by no small difference of nature; for light is their bond, and light is no ignoble thing?

Nay, he said, the reverse of ignoble.

And which, I said, of the gods in heaven would you say was the lord of this element? Whose is that light which makes the eye to see perfectly and the visible to appear?



You mean the sun, as you and all mankind say.

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May not the relation of sight to this deity be described as follows?

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GLAUCON.

How?

Neither sight nor the eye in which sight resides is the sun?

No.

Yet of all the organs of sense the eye is the most like the sun?

The eye like  
the sun, but  
not the same  
with it.

By far the most like.

And the power which the eye possesses is a sort of effluence which is dispensed from the sun?

Exactly.

Then the sun is not sight, but the author of sight who is recognised by sight?

True, he said.

And this is he whom I call the child of the good, whom the good begat in his own likeness, to be in the visible world, in relation to sight and the things of sight, what the good is in the intellectual world in relation to mind and the things of mind:

Will you be a little more explicit? he said.

Why, you know, I said, that the eyes, when a person directs them towards objects on which the light of day is no longer shining, but the moon and stars only, see dimly, and are nearly blind; they seem to have no clearness of vision in them?

Very true.

But when they are directed towards objects on which the sun shines, they see clearly and there is sight in them?

Visible objects  
are to be seen  
only when the  
sun shines  
upon them;  
truth is only  
known when  
illuminated by  
the idea of  
good.

Certainly.

And the soul is like the eye: when resting upon that on which truth and being shine, the soul perceives and understands, and is radiant with intelligence; but when turned towards the twilight of becoming and perishing, then she has opinion only, and goes blinking about, and is first of one opinion and then of another, and seems to have no intelligence?

Just so.

Now, that which imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing to the knower is what I would have you term the

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GLAUCON.The idea of  
good higher  
than science  
or truth (the  
objective  
than the  
subjective).

idea of good, and this you will deem to be the cause of science <sup>1</sup>, and of truth in so far as the latter becomes the subject of knowledge; beautiful too, as are both truth and knowledge, you will be right in esteeming this other nature as more beautiful than either; and, as in the previous instance, light and sight may be truly said to be like the sun, and yet not to be the sun, so in this other sphere, science and truth may be deemed to be like the good, but not the good; the good has a place of honour yet higher.

What a wonder of beauty that must be, he said, which is the author of science and truth, and yet surpasses them in beauty; for you surely cannot mean to say that pleasure is the good?

God forbid, I replied; but may I ask you to consider the image in another point of view?

In what point of view?

You would say, would you not, that the sun is not only the author of visibility in all visible things, but of generation and nourishment and growth, though he himself is not generation?

Certainly.

In like manner the good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge to all things known, but of their being and essence, and yet the good is not essence, but far exceeds essence in dignity and power.

Glaucón said, with a ludicrous earnestness: By the light of heaven, how amazing!

Yes, I said, and the exaggeration may be set down to you, for you made me utter my fancies.

And pray continue to utter them; at any rate let us hear if there is anything more to be said about the similitude of the sun.

Yes, I said, there is a great deal more.

Then omit nothing, however slight.

I will do my best, I said; but I should think that a great deal will have to be omitted.

I hope not, he said.

You have to imagine, then, that there are two ruling

As the sun is  
the cause of  
generation, so  
the good is  
the cause of  
being and  
essence.

<sup>1</sup> Reading *διανοῶν*.

powers, and that one of them is set over the intellectual world, the other over the visible. I do not say heaven, lest you should fancy that I am playing upon the name (*οὐρανός*, *ὁρατός*). May I suppose that you have this distinction of the visible and intelligible fixed in your mind?

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SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

I have.

Now take a line which has been cut into two unequal<sup>1</sup> parts, and divide each of them again in the same proportion, and suppose the two main divisions to answer, one to the visible and the other to the intelligible, and then compare the subdivisions in respect of their clearness and want of clearness, and you will find that the first section in the  
510 sphere of the visible consists of images. And by images I mean, in the first place, shadows, and in the second place, reflections in water and in solid, smooth and polished bodies and the like: Do you understand?

The two spheres of sight and knowledge are represented by a line which is divided into two unequal parts.

Yes, I understand.

Imagine, now, the other section, of which this is only the resemblance, to include the animals which we see, and everything that grows or is made.

Very good.

Would you not admit that both the sections of this division have different degrees of truth, and that the copy is to the original as the sphere of opinion is to the sphere of knowledge?

Most undoubtedly.

Next proceed to consider the manner in which the sphere of the intellectual is to be divided.

In what manner?

Thus:— There are two subdivisions, in the lower of which the soul uses the figures given by the former division as images: the enquiry can only be hypothetical, and instead of going upwards to a principle descends to the other end; in the higher of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses, and goes up to a principle which is above hypotheses, making no use of images<sup>2</sup> as in the former case, but proceeding only in and through the ideas themselves.

Images and hypotheses.

I do not quite understand your meaning, he said.

<sup>1</sup> Reading *ἀνισα*.

<sup>2</sup> Reading *ὥνπερ ἐκεῖνο εἰκόνων*.



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GLAUCON.The hypo-  
theses of  
mathematics.

Then I will try again; you will understand me better when I have made some preliminary remarks. You are aware that students of geometry, arithmetic, and the kindred sciences assume the odd and the even and the figures and three kinds of angles and the like in their several branches of science; these are their hypotheses, which they and everybody are supposed to know, and therefore they do not deign to give any account of them either to themselves or others; but they begin with them, and go on until they arrive at last, and in a consistent manner, at their conclusion?

Yes, he said, I know.

In both  
spheres  
hypotheses  
are used, in  
the lower  
taking the  
form of  
images, but in  
the higher the  
soul ascends  
above hy-  
potheses to the  
idea of good.

And do you not know also that although they make use of the visible forms and reason about them, they are thinking not of these, but of the ideals which they resemble; not of the figures which they draw, but of the absolute square and the absolute diameter, and so on — the forms which they draw or make, and which have shadows and reflections in water of their own, are converted by them into images, but they are really seeking to behold the things themselves, which can only be seen with the eye of the mind?

That is true.

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And of this kind I spoke as the intelligible, although in the search after it the soul is compelled to use hypotheses; not ascending to a first principle, because she is unable to rise above the region of hypothesis, but employing the objects of which the shadows below are resemblances in their turn as images, they having in relation to the shadows and reflections of them a greater distinctness, and therefore a higher value.

I understand, he said, that you are speaking of the province of geometry and the sister arts.

Dialectic by  
the help of  
hypotheses  
rises above  
hypotheses.

And when I speak of the other division of the intelligible, you will understand me to speak of that other sort of knowledge which reason herself attains by the power of dialectic, using the hypotheses not as first principles, but only as hypotheses — that is to say, as steps and points of departure into a world which is above hypotheses, in order that she may soar beyond them to the first principle of the whole; and clinging to this and then to that which depends on this, by successive steps she descends again without the aid of



any sensible object, from ideas, through ideas, and in ideas she ends. *Republic VI.*

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GLAUCON.

I understand you, he replied; not perfectly, for you seem to me to be describing a task which is really tremendous; but, at any rate, I understand you to say that knowledge and being, which the science of dialectic contemplates, are clearer than the notions of the arts, as they are termed, which proceed from hypotheses only: these are also contemplated by the understanding, and not by the senses: yet, because they start from hypotheses and do not ascend to a principle, those who contemplate them appear to you not to exercise the higher reason upon them, although when a first principle is added to them they are cognizable by the higher reason. And the habit which is concerned with geometry and the cognate sciences I suppose that you would term understanding and not reason, as being intermediate between opinion and reason.

Return to  
psychology.

You have quite conceived my meaning, I said; and now, corresponding to these four divisions, let there be four faculties in the soul—reason answering to the highest, understanding to the second, faith (or conviction) to the third, and perception of shadows to the last—and let there be a scale of them, and let us suppose that the several faculties have clearness in the same degree that their objects have truth.

Four faculties: Reason, understanding, faith, perception of shadows.

I understand, he replied, and give my assent, and accept your arrangement.

## BOOK VII.

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SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

The den, the  
prisoners: the  
light at a  
distance;

the low wall,  
and the  
moving  
figures of  
which the  
shadows are  
seen on the  
opposite wall  
of the den.

AND now, I said, let me show in a figure how far our Steph.  
nature is enlightened or unenlightened:—Behold! human 514  
beings living in an underground den, which has a mouth  
open towards the light and reaching all along the den;  
here they have been from their childhood, and have their  
legs and necks chained so that they cannot move, and  
can only see before them, being prevented by the chains  
from turning round their heads. Above and behind them  
a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the  
prisoners there is a raised way; and you will see, if you  
look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which  
marionette players have in front of them, over which they  
show the puppets.

I see.

And do you see, I said, men passing along the wall carry-  
ing all sorts of vessels, and statues and figures of animals  
made of wood and stone and various materials, which appear 515  
over the wall? Some of them are talking, others silent.

You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange  
prisoners.

Like ourselves, I replied; and they see only their own  
shadows, or the shadows of one another, which the fire  
throws on the opposite wall of the cave?

True, he said; how could they see anything but the  
shadows if they were never allowed to move their heads?

And of the objects which are being carried in like manner  
they would only see the shadows?

Yes, he said.

And if they were able to converse with one another, would  
they not suppose that they were naming what was actually  
before them <sup>1</sup>?

<sup>1</sup> Reading *παρόντα*.

Very true.

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And suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the other side, would they not be sure to fancy when one of the passers-by spoke that the voice which they heard came from the passing shadow?

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The prisoners  
would mistake  
the shadows  
for realities.

No question, he replied.

To them, I said, the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of the images.

That is certain.

And now look again, and see what will naturally follow if the prisoners are released and disabused of their error. At first, when any of them is liberated and compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round and walk and look towards the light, he will suffer sharp pains; the glare will distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of which in his former state he had seen the shadows; and then conceive some one saying to him, that what he saw before was an illusion, but that now, when he is approaching nearer to being and his eye is turned towards more real existence, he has a clearer vision,—what will be his reply? And you may further imagine that his instructor is pointing to the objects as they pass and requiring him to name them,—will he not be perplexed? Will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to him?

And when  
released,  
they would  
still persist  
in maintain-  
ing the  
superior  
truth of the  
shadows.

Far truer.

And if he is compelled to look straight at the light, will he not have a pain in his eyes which will make him turn away to take refuge in the objects of vision which he can see, and which he will conceive to be in reality clearer than the things which are now being shown to him?

True, he said.

516 And suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and rugged ascent, and held fast until he is forced into the presence of the sun himself, is he not likely to be pained and irritated? When he approaches the light his eyes will be dazzled, and he will not be able to see anything at all of what are now called realities.

When  
dragged up-  
wards, they  
would be  
dazzled by  
excess of  
light.

Not all in a moment, he said.

He will require to grow accustomed to the sight of the

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upper world. And first he will see the shadows best, next the reflections of men and other objects in the water, and then the objects themselves; then he will gaze upon the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled heaven; and he will see the sky and the stars by night better than the sun or the light of the sun by day?

Certainly.

At length  
they will see  
the sun and  
understand  
his nature.

Last of all he will be able to see the sun, and not mere reflections of him in the water, but he will see him in his own proper place, and not in another; and he will contemplate him as he is.

Certainly.

He will then proceed to argue that this is he who gives the season and the years, and is the guardian of all that is in the visible world, and in a certain way the cause of all things which he and his fellows have been accustomed to behold?

Clearly, he said, he would first see the sun and then reason about him.

They would  
then pity  
their old  
companions  
of the den.

And when he remembered his old habitation, and the wisdom of the den and his fellow-prisoners, do you not suppose that he would felicitate himself on the change, and pity them?

Certainly, he would.

And if they were in the habit of conferring honours among themselves on those who were quickest to observe the passing shadows and to remark which of them went before, and which followed after, and which were together; and who were therefore best able to draw conclusions as to the future, do you think that he would care for such honours and glories, or envy the possessors of them? Would he not say with Homer,

‘ Better to be the poor servant of a poor master,’

and to endure anything, rather than think as they do and live after their manner?

Yes, he said, I think that he would rather suffer anything than entertain these false notions and live in this miserable manner.

Imagine once more, I said, such an one coming suddenly



out of the sun to be replaced in his old situation; would he not be certain to have his eyes full of darkness?

To be sure, he said.

517 And if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring the shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of the den, while his sight was still weak, and before his eyes had become steady (and the time which would be needed to acquire this new habit of sight might be very considerable), would he not be ridiculous? Men would say of him that up he went and down he came without his eyes; and that it was better not even to think of ascending; and if any one tried to loose another and lead him up to the light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put him to death.

No question, he said.

This entire allegory, I said, you may now append, dear Glaucon, to the previous argument; the prison-house is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according to my poor belief, which, at your desire, I have expressed—whether rightly or wrongly God knows. But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally either in public or private life must have his eye fixed.

I agree, he said, as far as I am able to understand you.

Moreover, I said, you must not wonder that those who attain to this beatific vision are unwilling to descend to human affairs; for their souls are ever hastening into the upper world where they desire to dwell; which desire of theirs is very natural, if our allegory may be trusted.

Yes, very natural.

And is there anything surprising in one who passes from divine contemplations to the evil state of man, misbehaving

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GLAUCON.

But when they returned to the den they would see much worse than those who had never left it.

The prison is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun.

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GLAUCON.

Nothing extraordinary in the philosopher being unable to see in the dark.

The eyes may be blinded in two ways, by excess or by defect of light.

The conversion of the soul is the turning round the eye from darkness to light.

himself in a ridiculous manner; if, while his eyes are blinking and before he has become accustomed to the surrounding darkness, he is compelled to fight in courts of law, or in other places, about the images or the shadows of images of justice, and is endeavouring to meet the conceptions of those who have never yet seen absolute justice?

Anything but surprising, he replied.

Any one who has common sense will remember that the 518  
bewilderments of the eyes are of two kinds, and arise from two causes, either from coming out of the light or from going into the light, which is true of the mind's eye, quite as much as of the bodily eye; and he who remembers this when he sees any one whose vision is perplexed and weak, will not be too ready to laugh; he will first ask whether that soul of man has come out of the brighter life, and is unable to see because unaccustomed to the dark, or having turned from darkness to the day is dazzled by excess of light. And he will count the one happy in his condition and state of being, and he will pity the other; or, if he have a mind to laugh at the soul which comes from below into the light, there will be more reason in this than in the laugh which greets him who returns from above out of the light into the den.

That, he said, is a very just distinction.

But then, if I am right, certain professors of education must be wrong when they say that they can put a knowledge into the soul which was not there before, like sight into blind eyes.

They undoubtedly say this, he replied.

Whereas, our argument shows that the power and capacity of learning exists in the soul already; and that just as the eye was unable to turn from darkness to light without the whole body, so too the instrument of knowledge can only by the movement of the whole soul be turned from the world of becoming into that of being, and learn by degrees to endure the sight of being, and of the brightest and best of being, or in other words, of the good.

Very true.

And must there not be some art which will effect conversion in the easiest and quickest manner; not implanting

the faculty of sight, for that exists already, but has been turned in the wrong direction, and is looking away from the truth?

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GLAUCON.

The virtue of wisdom has a divine power which may be turned either towards good or towards evil.

Yes, he said, such an art may be presumed.

And whereas the other so-called virtues of the soul seem to be akin to bodily qualities, for even when they are not originally innate they can be implanted later by habit and exercise, the virtue of wisdom more than anything else contains a divine element which always remains, and by this conversion is rendered useful and profitable; or, on the other hand, hurtful and useless. Did you never observe the narrow intelligence flashing from the keen eye of a clever rogue — how eager he is, how clearly his paltry soul sees the way to his end; he is the reverse of blind, but his keen eye-sight is forced into the service of evil, and he is mischievous in proportion to his cleverness?

Very true, he said.

But what if there had been a circumcision of such natures in the days of their youth; and they had been severed from those sensual pleasures, such as eating and drinking, which, like leaden weights, were attached to them at their birth, and which drag them down and turn the vision of their souls upon the things that are below — if, I say, they had been released from these impediments and turned in the opposite direction, the very same faculty in them would have seen the truth as keenly as they see what their eyes are turned to now.

Very likely.

Yes, I said; and there is another thing which is likely, or rather a necessary inference from what has preceded, that neither the uneducated and uninformed of the truth, nor yet those who never make an end of their education, will be able ministers of State: not the former, because they have no single aim of duty which is the rule of all their actions, private as well as public; nor the latter, because they will not act at all except upon compulsion, fancying that they are already dwelling apart in the islands of the blest.

Neither the uneducated nor the over-educated will be good servants of the State.

Very true, he replied.

Then, I said, the business of us who are the founders of the State will be to compel the best minds to attain that



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knowledge which we have already shown to be the greatest of all — they must continue to ascend until they arrive at the good; but when they have ascended and seen enough we must not allow them to do as they do now.

What do you mean?

Men should ascend to the upper world, but they should also return to the lower.

I mean that they remain in the upper world: but this must not be allowed; they must be made to descend again among the prisoners in the den, and partake of their labours and honours, whether they are worth having or not.

But is not this unjust? he said; ought we to give them a worse life, when they might have a better?

You have again forgotten, my friend, I said, the intention of the legislator, who did not aim at making any one class in the State happy above the rest; the happiness was to be in the whole State, and he held the citizens together by persuasion and necessity, making them benefactors of the State, and therefore benefactors of one another; to this end he 520 created them, not to please themselves, but to be his instruments in binding up the State.

True, he said, I had forgotten.

The duties of philosophers.

Observe, Glaucon, that there will be no injustice in compelling our philosophers to have a care and providence of others; we shall explain to them that in other States, men of their class are not obliged to share in the toils of politics: and this is reasonable, for they grow up at their own sweet will, and the government would rather not have them. Being self-taught, they cannot be expected to show any gratitude for a culture which they have never received. But we have brought you into the world to be rulers of the hive, kings of yourselves and of the other citizens, and have educated you far better and more perfectly than they have been educated, and you are better able to share in the double duty. Wherefore each of you, when his turn comes, must go down to the general underground abode, and get the habit of seeing in the dark. When you have acquired the habit, you will see ten thousand times better than the inhabitants of the den, and you will know what the several images are, and what they represent, because you have seen the beautiful and just and good in their truth. And thus our State, which is also yours, will be a reality, and not a dream

Their obligations to their country will induce them to take part in her government.



only, and will be administered in a spirit unlike that of other States, in which men fight with one another about shadows only and are distracted in the struggle for power, which in their eyes is a great good. Whereas the truth is that the State in which the rulers are most reluctant to govern is always the best and most quietly governed, and the State in which they are most eager, the worst.

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GLAUCON.

Quite true, he replied.

And will our pupils, when they hear this, refuse to take their turn at the toils of State, when they are allowed to spend the greater part of their time with one another in the heavenly light?

Impossible, he answered; for they are just men, and the commands which we impose upon them are just; there can be no doubt that every one of them will take office as a stern necessity, and not after the fashion of our present rulers of State.

They will be willing but not anxious to rule.

21 Yes, my friend, I said; and there lies the point. 'You must contrive for your future rulers another and a better life than that of a ruler, and then you may have a well-ordered State; for only in the State which offers this, will they rule who are truly rich, not in silver and gold, but in virtue and wisdom, which are the true blessings of life. Whereas if they go to the administration of public affairs, poor and hungry after their own private advantage, thinking that hence they are to snatch the chief good, order there can never be; for they will be fighting about office, and the civil and domestic broils which thus arise will be the ruin of the rulers themselves and of the whole State.

The statesman must be provided with a better life than that of a ruler; and then he will not covet office.

Most true, he replied.

And the only life which looks down upon the life of political ambition is that of true philosophy. Do you know of any other?

Indeed, I do not, he said.

And those who govern ought not to be lovers of the task? For, if they are, there will be rival lovers, and they will fight.

No question.

Who then are those whom we shall compel to be guardians? Surely they will be the men who are wisest about affairs of

*Republic VII.* State, and by whom the State is best administered, and who at the same time have other honours and another and a better life than that of politics?

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GLAUCON.

They are the men, and I will choose them, he replied.

And now shall we consider in what way such guardians will be produced, and how they are to be brought from darkness to light,—as some are said to have ascended from the world below to the gods?

By all means, he replied.

The training  
of the  
guardians.

The process, I said, is not the turning over of an oyster-shell<sup>1</sup>, but the turning round of a soul passing from a day which is little better than night to the true day of being, that is, the ascent from below<sup>2</sup>, which we affirm to be true philosophy?

Quite so.

What know-  
ledge will  
draw the soul  
upwards?

And should we not enquire what sort of knowledge has the power of effecting such a change?

Certainly.

What sort of knowledge is there which would draw the soul from becoming to being? And another consideration has just occurred to me: You will remember that our young men are to be warrior athletes?

Yes, that was said.

Then this new kind of knowledge must have an additional quality?

What quality?

Usefulness in war.

Yes, if possible.

Recapitula-  
tion.

There were two parts in our former scheme of education, were there not?

The first  
education had  
two parts,  
music and  
gymnastic.

Just so.

There was gymnastic which presided over the growth and decay of the body, and may therefore be regarded as having to do with generation and corruption?

True.

Then that is not the knowledge which we are seeking to discover? 522

<sup>1</sup> In allusion to a game in which two parties fled or pursued according as an oyster-shell which was thrown into the air fell with the dark or light side uppermost.

<sup>2</sup> Reading οὔσαν ἐπάνωδον.

No.

But what do you say of music, what also entered to a certain extent into our former scheme?

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GLAUCON.

Music, he said, as you will remember, was the counterpart of gymnastic, and trained the guardians by the influences of habit, by harmony making them harmonious, by rhythm rhythmical, but not giving them science; and the words, whether fabulous or possibly true, had kindred elements of rhythm and harmony in them. But in music there was nothing which tended to that good which you are now seeking.

You are most accurate, I said, in your recollection; in music there certainly was nothing of the kind. But what branch of knowledge is there, my dear Glaucon, which is of the desired nature; since all the useful arts were reckoned mean by us?

Undoubtedly; and yet if music and gymnastic are excluded, and the arts are also excluded, what remains?

Well, I said, there may be nothing left of our special subjects; and then we shall have to take something which is not special, but of universal application.

What may that be?

A something which all arts and sciences and intelligences use in common, and which every one first has to learn among the elements of education.

There remains  
for the second  
education,  
arithmetic:

What is that?

The little matter of distinguishing one, two, and three — in a word, number and calculation:— do not all arts and sciences necessarily partake of them?

Yes.

Then the art of war partakes of them?

To be sure.

Then Palamedes, whenever he appears in tragedy, proves Agamemnon ridiculously unfit to be a general. Did you never remark how he declares that he had invented number, and had numbered the ships and set in array the ranks of the army at Troy; which implies that they had never been numbered before, and Agamemnon must be supposed literally to have been incapable of counting his own feet — how could he if he was ignorant of number? And if that is true, what sort of general must he have been?



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GLAUCON.

I should say a very strange one, if this was as you say.

Can we deny that a warrior should have a knowledge of arithmetic?

Certainly he should, if he is to have the smallest understanding of military tactics, or indeed, I should rather say, if he is to be a man at all.

I should like to know whether you have the same notion which I have of this study?

What is your notion?

that being a  
study which  
leads naturally  
to reflection,  
for

It appears to me to be a study of the kind which we are seeking, and which leads naturally to reflection, but never to have been rightly used; for the true use of it is simply to draw the soul towards being. 523

Will you explain your meaning? he said.

I will try, I said; and I wish you would share the enquiry with me, and say 'yes' or 'no' when I attempt to distinguish in my own mind what branches of knowledge have this attracting power, in order that we may have clearer proof that arithmetic is, as I suspect, one of them.

Explain, he said.

reflection is  
aroused by  
contradictory  
impressions  
of sense.

I mean to say that objects of sense are of two kinds; some of them do not invite thought because the sense is an adequate judge of them; while in the case of other objects sense is so untrustworthy that further enquiry is imperatively demanded.

You are clearly referring, he said, to the manner in which the senses are imposed upon by distance, and by painting in light and shade.

No, I said, that is not at all my meaning.

Then what is your meaning?

When speaking of uninviting objects, I mean those which do not pass from one sensation to the opposite; inviting objects are those which do; in this latter case the sense coming upon the object, whether at a distance or near, gives no more vivid idea of anything in particular than of its opposite. An illustration will make my meaning clearer: — here are three fingers — a little finger, a second finger, and a middle finger.

Very good.



You may suppose that they are seen quite close: And here comes the point.

*Republic VII.*

What is it?

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Each of them equally appears a finger, whether seen in the middle or at the extremity, whether white or black, or thick or thin—it makes no difference; a finger is a finger all the same. In these cases a man is not compelled to ask of thought the question what is a finger? for the sight never intimates to the mind that a finger is other than a finger.

No difficulty  
in simple  
perception.

True.

And therefore, I said, as we might expect, there is nothing here which invites or excites intelligence.

There is not, he said.

524 But is this equally true of the greatness and smallness of the fingers? Can sight adequately perceive them? and is no difference made by the circumstance that one of the fingers is in the middle and another at the extremity? And in like manner does the touch adequately perceive the qualities of thickness or thinness, of softness or hardness? And so of the other senses; do they give perfect intimations of such matters? Is not their mode of operation on this wise—the sense which is concerned with the quality of hardness is necessarily concerned also with the quality of softness, and only intimates to the soul that the same thing is felt to be both hard and soft?

But the same  
senses at the  
same time  
give different  
impressions  
which are at  
first indistinct  
and have to  
be distin-  
guished by  
the mind.

You are quite right, he said.

And must not the soul be perplexed at this intimation which the sense gives of a hard which is also soft? What, again, is the meaning of light and heavy, if that which is light is also heavy, and that which is heavy, light?

Yes, he said, these intimations which the soul receives are very curious and require to be explained.

Yes, I said, and in these perplexities the soul naturally summons to her aid calculation and intelligence, that she may see whether the several objects announced to her are one or two.

The aid of  
numbers is  
invoked in  
order to  
remove the  
confusion.

True.

And if they turn out to be two, is not each of them one and different?

Certainly.

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GLAUCON.

And if each is one, and both are two, she will conceive the two as in a state of division, for if they were undivided they could only be conceived of as one?

True.

The eye certainly did see both small and great, but only in a confused manner; they were not distinguished.

Yes.

The chaos  
then begins  
to be defined.

Whereas the thinking mind, intending to light up the chaos, was compelled to reverse the process, and look at small and great as separate and not confused.

Very true.

Was not this the beginning of the enquiry 'What is great?' and 'What is small?'

Exactly so.

The parting  
of the visible  
and intelligi-  
ble.

And thus arose the distinction of the visible and the intelligible.

Most true.

This was what I meant when I spoke of impressions which invited the intellect, or the reverse—those which are simultaneous with opposite impressions, invite thought; those which are not simultaneous do not.

I understand, he said, and agree with you.

And to which class do unity and number belong?

I do not know, he replied.

Thought is  
aroused by  
the contra-  
diction of the  
one and  
many.

Think a little and you will see that what has preceded will supply the answer; for if simple unity could be adequately perceived by the sight or by any other sense, then, as we were saying in the case of the finger, there would be nothing to attract towards being; but when there is some contradiction always present, and one is the reverse of one and involves the conception of plurality, then thought begins to be aroused within us, and the soul perplexed and wanting to arrive at a decision asks 'What is absolute unity?' This is the way in which the study of the one has a power of drawing 525 and converting the mind to the contemplation of true being.

And surely, he said, this occurs notably in the case of one; for we see the same thing to be both one and infinite in multitude?

Yes, I said; and this being true of one must be equally true of all number?

Certainly.

And all arithmetic and calculation have to do with number?

Yes.

And they appear to lead the mind towards truth?

Yes, in a very remarkable manner.

Then this is knowledge of the kind for which we are seeking, having a double use, military and philosophical; for the man of war must learn the art of number or he will not know how to array his troops, and the philosopher also, because he has to rise out of the sea of change and lay hold of true being, and therefore he must be an arithmetician.

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GLAUCON.

Arithmetic  
has a practical and  
also a philosophical use,  
the latter  
the higher.

That is true.

And our guardian is both warrior and philosopher?

Certainly.

Then this is a kind of knowledge which legislation may fitly prescribe; and we must endeavour to persuade those who are to be the principal men of our State to go and learn arithmetic, not as amateurs, but they must carry on the study until they see the nature of numbers with the mind only; nor again, like merchants or retail-traders, with a view to buying or selling, but for the sake of their military use, and of the soul herself; and because this will be the easiest way for her to pass from becoming to truth and being.

That is excellent, he said.

Yes, I said, and now having spoken of it, I must add how charming the science is! and in how many ways it conduces to our desired end, if pursued in the spirit of a philosopher, and not of a shopkeeper!

How do you mean?

I mean, as I was saying, that arithmetic has a very great and elevating effect, compelling the soul to reason about abstract number, and rebelling against the introduction of visible or tangible objects into the argument. You know how steadily the masters of the art repel and ridicule any one who attempts to divide absolute unity when he is calculating, and if you divide, they multiply<sup>1</sup>, taking care that one shall continue one and not become lost in fractions.

The higher  
arithmetic is  
concerned,  
not with  
visible or  
tangible objects, but  
with abstract  
numbers.

<sup>1</sup> Meaning either (1) that they integrate the number because they deny the possibility of fractions; or (2) that division is regarded by them as a process of multiplication, for the fractions of one continue to be units.



*Republic VII.*

That is very true.

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GLAUCON.

Now, suppose a person were to say to them: O my 526  
friends, what are these wonderful numbers about which you  
are reasoning, in which, as you say, there is a unity such as  
you demand, and each unit is equal, invariable, indivisible,—  
what would they answer?

They would answer, as I should conceive, that they were  
speaking of those numbers which can only be realized in  
thought.

Then you see that this knowledge may be truly called  
necessary, necessitating as it clearly does the use of the pure  
intelligence in the attainment of pure truth?

Yes; that is a marked characteristic of it.

And have you further observed, that those who have a  
natural talent for calculation are generally quick at every  
other kind of knowledge; and even the dull, if they have  
had an arithmetical training, although they may derive no  
other advantage from it, always become much quicker than  
they would otherwise have been.

Very true, he said.

And indeed, you will not easily find a more difficult study,  
and not many as difficult.

You will not.

And, for all these reasons, arithmetic is a kind of know-  
ledge in which the best natures should be trained, and which  
must not be given up.

I agree.

Let this then be made one of our subjects of education.  
And next, shall we enquire whether the kindred science also  
concerns us?

You mean geometry?

Exactly so.

Clearly, he said, we are concerned with that part of  
geometry which relates to war; for in pitching a camp, or  
taking up a position, or closing or extending the lines of an  
army, or any other military manœuvre, whether in actual  
battle or on a march, it will make all the difference whether  
a general is or is not a geometrician.

Yes, I said, but for that purpose a very little of either  
geometry or calculation will be enough; the question relates

The arith-  
metician is  
naturally  
quick, and  
the study of  
arithmetic  
gives him  
still greater  
quickness.

Geometry  
has practical  
applications;



rather to the greater and more advanced part of geometry — whether that tends in any degree to make more easy the vision of the idea of good; and thither, as I was saying, all things tend which compel the soul to turn her gaze towards that place, where is the full perfection of being, which she ought, by all means, to behold.

True, he said.

Then if geometry compels us to view being, it concerns us; if becoming only, it does not concern us?

527 Yes, that is what we assert.

Yet anybody who has the least acquaintance with geometry will not deny that such a conception of the science is in flat contradiction to the ordinary language of geometers.

How so?

They have in view practice only, and are always speaking, in a narrow and ridiculous manner, of squaring and extending and applying and the like — they confuse the necessities of geometry with those of daily life; whereas knowledge is the real object of the whole science.

Certainly, he said.

Then must not a further admission be made?

What admission?

That the knowledge at which geometry aims is knowledge of the eternal, and not of aught perishing and transient.

That, he replied, may be readily allowed, and is true.

Then, my noble friend, geometry will draw the soul towards truth, and create the spirit of philosophy, and raise up that which is now unhappily allowed to fall down.

Nothing will be more likely to have such an effect.

Then nothing should be more sternly laid down than that the inhabitants of your fair city should by all means learn geometry. Moreover the science has indirect effects, which are not small.

Of what kind? he said.

There are the military advantages of which you spoke, I said; and in all departments of knowledge, as experience proves, any one who has studied geometry is infinitely quicker of apprehension than one who has not.

Yes indeed, he said, there is an infinite difference between them.

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these however  
are trifling in  
comparison  
with that  
greater part  
of the science  
which tends  
towards the  
good,

and is con-  
cerned with  
the eternal.

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*SOCRATES,*  
*GLAUCON.*

'Then shall we propose this as a second branch of knowledge which our youth will study?

Let us do so, he replied.

And suppose we make astronomy the third — what do you say?

*Astronomy, like the previous sciences, is at first praised by Glaucon for its practical uses.*

I am strongly inclined to it, he said; the observation of the seasons and of months and years is as essential to the general as it is to the farmer or sailor.

I am amused, I said, at your fear of the world, which makes you guard against the appearance of insisting upon useless studies; and I quite admit the difficulty of believing that in every man there is an eye of the soul which, when by other pursuits lost and dimmed, is by these purified and re-illuminated; and is more precious far than ten thousand bodily eyes, for by it alone is truth seen. Now there are two classes of persons: one class of those who will agree with you and will take your words as a revelation; another class to whom they will be utterly unmeaning, and who will naturally deem them to be idle tales, for they see no sort of profit which is to be obtained from them. And therefore you had better decide at once with which of the two you are proposing to argue. You will very likely say with neither, and that your chief aim in carrying on the argument is your own improvement; at the same time you do not grudge to others any benefit which they may receive.

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I think that I should prefer to carry on the argument mainly on my own behalf.

*Correction of the order.*

Then take a step backward, for we have gone wrong in the order of the sciences.

What was the mistake? he said.

After plane geometry, I said, we proceeded at once to solids in revolution, instead of taking solids in themselves; whereas after the second dimension the third, which is concerned with cubes and dimensions of depth, ought to have followed.

That is true, Socrates; but so little seems to be known as yet about these subjects.

Why, yes, I said, and for two reasons:—in the first place, no government patronises them; this leads to a want of energy in the pursuit of them, and they are difficult; in the

second place, students cannot learn them unless they have a director. But then a director can hardly be found, and even if he could, as matters now stand, the students, who are very conceited, would not attend to him. That, however, would be otherwise if the whole State became the director of these studies and gave honour to them; then disciples would want to come, and there would be continuous and earnest search, and discoveries would be made; since even now, disregarded as they are by the world, and maimed of their fair proportions, and although none of their votaries can tell the use of them, still these studies force their way by their natural charm, and very likely, if they had the help of the State, they would some day emerge into light.

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The pitiable  
condition  
of solid  
geometry.

Yes, he said, there is a remarkable charm in them. But I do not clearly understand the change in the order. First you began with a geometry of plane surfaces?

Yes, I said.

And you placed astronomy next, and then you made a step backward?

Yes, and I have delayed you by my hurry; the ludicrous state of solid geometry, which, in natural order, should have followed, made me pass over this branch and go on to astronomy, or motion of solids.

The motion  
of solids.

True, he said.

Then assuming that the science now omitted would come into existence if encouraged by the State, let us go on to astronomy, which will be fourth.

529 The right order, he replied. And now, Socrates, as you rebuked the vulgar manner in which I praised astronomy before, my praise shall be given in your own spirit. For every one, as I think, must see that astronomy compels the soul to look upwards and leads us from this world to another.

Glaucou  
grows  
sentimental  
about  
astronomy

Every one but myself, I said; to every one else this may be clear, but not to me.

And what then would you say?

I should rather say that those who elevate astronomy into philosophy appear to me to make us look downwards and not upwards.

What do you mean? he asked.



4) *Astronomy one form of the motion of solids:**Republic VII.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.He is  
rebuked  
by Socrates,

You, I replied, have in your mind a truly sublime conception of our knowledge of the things above. And I dare say that if a person were to throw his head back and study the fretted ceiling, you would still think that his mind was the percipient, and not his eyes. And you are very likely right, and I may be a simpleton: but, in my opinion, that knowledge only which is of being and of the unseen can make the soul look upwards, and whether a man gapes at the heavens or blinks on the ground, seeking to learn some particular of sense, I would deny that he can learn, for nothing of that sort is matter of science; his soul is looking downwards, not upwards, whether his way to knowledge is by water or by land, whether he floats, or only lies on his back.

I acknowledge, he said, the justice of your rebuke. Still, I should like to ascertain how astronomy can be learned in any manner more conducive to that knowledge of which we are speaking?

I will tell you, I said: The starry heaven which we behold is wrought upon a visible ground, and therefore, although the fairest and most perfect of visible things, must necessarily be deemed inferior far to the true motions of absolute swiftness and absolute slowness, which are relative to each other, and carry with them that which is contained in them, in the true number and in every true figure. Now, these are to be apprehended by reason and intelligence, but not by sight.


True, he replied.

The spangled heavens should be used as a pattern and with a view to that higher knowledge; their beauty is like the beauty of figures or pictures excellently wrought by the hand of Daedalus, or some other great artist, which we may chance to behold; any geometrician who saw them would appreciate the exquisiteness of their workmanship, but he would never dream of thinking that in them he could find the true equal or the true double, or the truth of any other proportion.

No, he replied, such an idea would be ridiculous.

And will not a true astronomer have the same feeling when he looks at the movements of the stars? Will he not think that heaven and the things in heaven are framed by the

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who explains  
that the  
higher  
astronomy is  
an abstract  
science.



Creator of them in the most perfect manner? But he will never imagine that the proportions of night and day, or of both to the month, or of the month to the year, or of the stars to these and to one another, and any other things that are material and visible can also be eternal and subject to no deviation — that would be absurd; and it is equally absurd to take so much pains in investigating their exact truth.

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I quite agree, though I never thought of this before.

Then, I said, in astronomy, as in geometry, we should employ problems, and let the heavens alone if we would approach the subject in the right way and so make the natural gift of reason to be of any real use.

The real knowledge of astronomy or geometry is to be attained by the use of abstractions.

That, he said, is a work infinitely beyond our present astronomers.

Yes, I said; and there are many other things which must also have a similar extension given to them, if our legislation is to be of any value. But can you tell me of any other suitable study?

No, he said, not without thinking.

Motion, I said, has many forms, and not one only; two of them are obvious enough even to wits no better than ours; and there are others, as I imagine, which may be left to wiser persons.

But where are the two?

There is a second, I said, which is the counterpart of the one already named.

And what may that be?

The second, I said, would seem relatively to the ears to be what the first is to the eyes; for I conceive that as the eyes are designed to look up at the stars, so are the ears to hear harmonious motions; and these are sister sciences — as the Pythagoreans say, and we, Glaucon, agree with them?

What astronomy is to the eye, harmonics are to the ear.

Yes, he replied.

But this, I said, is a laborious study, and therefore we had better go and learn of them; and they will tell us whether there are any other applications of these sciences. At the same time, we must not lose sight of our own higher object.

What is that?

There is a perfection which all knowledge ought to reach,

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GLAUCON.

They must be  
studied with a  
view to the  
good and not  
after the  
fashion of the  
empirics or  
even of the  
Pythagoreans.

and which our pupils ought also to attain, and not to fall short of, as I was saying that they did in astronomy. For in the science of harmony, as you probably know, the same 531 thing happens. The teachers of harmony compare the sounds and consonances which are heard only, and their labour, like that of the astronomers, is in vain.

Yes, by heaven! he said; and 'tis as good as a play to hear them talking about their condensed notes, as they call them; they put their ears close alongside of the strings like persons catching a sound from their neighbour's wall<sup>1</sup> — one set of them declaring that they distinguish an intermediate note and have found the least interval which should be the unit of measurement; the others insisting that the two sounds have passed into the same — either party setting their ears before their understanding.

You mean, I said, those gentlemen who tease and torture the strings and rack them on the pegs of the instrument: I might carry on the metaphor and speak after their manner of the blows which the plectrum gives, and make accusations against the strings, both of backwardness and forwardness to sound; but this would be tedious, and therefore I will only say that these are not the men, and that I am referring to the Pythagoreans, of whom I was just now proposing to enquire about harmony. For they too are in error, like the astronomers; they investigate the numbers of the harmonies which are heard, but they never attain to problems — that is to say, they never reach the natural harmonies of number, or reflect why some numbers are harmonious and others not.

That, he said, is a thing of more than mortal knowledge.

A thing, I replied, which I would rather call useful; that is, if sought after with a view to the beautiful and good; but if pursued in any other spirit, useless.

Very true, he said.

All these  
studies must  
be correlated  
with one  
another.

Now, when all these studies reach the point of inter-communion and connection with one another, and come to be considered in their mutual affinities, then, I think, but not till then, will the pursuit of them have a value for our objects; otherwise there is no profit in them.

<sup>1</sup> Or, 'close alongside of their neighbour's instruments, as if to catch a sound from them.'

I suspect so; but you are speaking, Socrates, of a vast work. *Republic VII.*

What do you mean? I said; the prelude or what? Do you not know that all this is but the prelude to the actual strain which we have to learn? For you surely would not regard the skilled mathematician as a dialectician?

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GLAUCON.

Assuredly not, he said; I have hardly ever known a mathematician who was capable of reasoning.

Want of  
reasoning  
power in  
mathema-  
ticians.

532 But do you imagine that men who are unable to give and take a reason will have the knowledge which we require of them?

Neither can this be supposed.

And so, Glaucon, I said, we have at last arrived at the hymn of dialectic. This is that strain which is of the intellect only, but which the faculty of sight will nevertheless be found to imitate; for sight, as you may remember, was imagined by us after a while to behold the real animals and stars, and last of all the sun himself. And so with dialectic; when a person starts on the discovery of the absolute by the light of reason only, and without any assistance of sense, and perseveres until by pure intelligence he arrives at the perception of the absolute good, he at last finds himself at the end of the intellectual world, as in the case of sight at the end of the visible.

Dialectic  
proceeds by  
reason only,  
without any  
help of sense.

Exactly, he said.

Then this is the progress which you call dialectic?

True.

But the release of the prisoners from chains, and their translation from the shadows to the images and to the light, and the ascent from the underground den to the sun, while in his presence they are vainly trying to look on animals and plants and the light of the sun, but are able to perceive even with their weak eyes the images<sup>1</sup> in the water [which are divine], and are the shadows of true existence (not shadows of images cast by a light of fire, which compared with the sun is only an image) — this power of elevating the highest principle in the soul to the contemplation of that which is best in existence, with which we may compare the raising of that

The gradual  
acquirement  
of dialectic by  
the pursuit of  
the arts  
anticipated in  
the allegory  
of the den.

<sup>1</sup> Omitting ἐνταῦθα δὲ πρὸς φαντάσματα. The word θεῖα is bracketed by Stallbaum.



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faculty which is the very light of the body to the sight of that which is brightest in the material and visible world — this power is given, as I was saying, by all that study and pursuit of the arts which has been described.

I agree in what you are saying, he replied, which may be hard to believe, yet, from another point of view, is harder still to deny. This however is not a theme to be treated of in passing only, but will have to be discussed again and again. And so, whether our conclusion be true or false, let us assume all this, and proceed at once from the prelude or preamble to the chief strain<sup>1</sup>, and describe that in like manner. Say, then, what is the nature and what are the divisions of dialectic, and what are the paths which lead thither; for these paths will also lead to our final rest.

The nature of dialectic can only be revealed to those who have been students of the preliminary sciences,

Dear Glaucon, I said, you will not be able to follow me here, though I would do my best, and you should behold not an image only but the absolute truth, according to my notion. Whether what I told you would or would not have been a reality I cannot venture to say; but you would have seen something like reality; of that I am confident. 533

Doubtless, he replied.

But I must also remind you, that the power of dialectic alone can reveal this, and only to one who is a disciple of the previous sciences.

Of that assertion you may be as confident as of the last.

And assuredly no one will argue that there is any other method of comprehending by any regular process all true existence or of ascertaining what each thing is in its own nature; for the arts in general are concerned with the desires or opinions of men, or are cultivated with a view to production and construction, or for the preservation of such productions and constructions; and as to the mathematical sciences which, as we were saying, have some apprehension of true being — geometry and the like — they only dream about being, but never can they behold the waking reality so long as they leave the hypotheses which they use unexamined, and are unable to give an account of them. For when a man knows not his own first principle, and when the conclusion

<sup>1</sup> A play upon the word νόμος, which means both 'law' and 'strain.'



and intermediate steps are also constructed out of he knows not what, how can he imagine that such a fabric of convention can ever become science? *Republic VII.*  
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GLAUCON.

Impossible, he said.

Then dialectic, and dialectic alone, goes directly to the first principle and is the only science which does away with hypotheses in order to make her ground secure; the eye of the soul, which is literally buried in an outlandish slough, is by her gentle aid lifted upwards; and she uses as handmaids and helpers in the work of conversion, the sciences which we have been discussing. Custom terms them sciences, but they ought to have some other name, implying greater clearness than opinion and less clearness than science: and this, in our previous sketch, was called understanding. But why should we dispute about names when we have realities of such importance to consider? *which are her handmaids.*

Why indeed, he said, when any name will do which expresses the thought of the mind with clearness?

At any rate, we are satisfied, as before, to have four divisions; two for intellect and two for opinion, and to call the first division science, the second understanding, the third belief, and the fourth perception of shadows, opinion *Two divisions of the mind, intellect and opinion, each having two subdivisions.*  
534 being concerned with becoming, and intellect with being; and so to make a proportion:—

As being is to becoming, so is pure intellect to opinion.

And as intellect is to opinion, so is science to belief, and understanding to the perception of shadows.

But let us defer the further correlation and subdivision of the subjects of opinion and of intellect, for it will be a long enquiry, many times longer than this has been.

As far as I understand, he said, I agree.

And do you also agree, I said, in describing the dialectician as one who attains a conception of the essence of each thing? And he who does not possess and is therefore unable to impart this conception, in whatever degree he fails, may in that degree also be said to fail in intelligence? Will you admit so much?

Yes, he said; how can I deny it?

And you would say the same of the conception of the good? Until the person is able to abstract and define rationally the

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SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

No truth  
which does  
not rest on  
the idea of  
good

idea of good, and unless he can run the gauntlet of all objections, and is ready to disprove them, not by appeals to opinion, but to absolute truth, never faltering at any step of the argument—unless he can do all this, you would say that he knows neither the idea of good nor any other good; he apprehends only a shadow, if anything at all, which is given by opinion and not by science;—dreaming and slumbering in this life, before he is well awake here, he arrives at the world below, and has his final quietus.

In all that I should most certainly agree with you.

And surely you would not have the children of your ideal State, whom you are nurturing and educating—if the ideal ever becomes a reality—you would not allow the future rulers to be like posts<sup>1</sup>, having no reason in them, and yet to be set in authority over the highest matters.

Certainly not.

Then you will make a law that they shall have such an education as will enable them to attain the greatest skill in asking and answering questions?

Yes, he said, you and I together will make it.

ought to have  
a high place.

Dialectic, then, as you will agree, is the coping-stone of the sciences, and is set over them; no other science can be placed higher—the nature of knowledge can no further go?

I agree, he said.

But to whom we are to assign these studies, and in what way they are to be assigned, are questions which remain to be considered. 535

Yes, clearly.

You remember, I said, how the rulers were chosen before?

Certainly, he said.

The natural  
gifts which  
are required in  
the dialecti-  
cian; a  
towardly un-  
derstanding;  
a good  
memory;

The same natures must still be chosen, and the preference again given to the surest and the bravest, and, if possible, to the fairest; and, having noble and generous tempers, they should also have the natural gifts which will facilitate their education.

And what are these?

Such gifts as keenness and ready powers of acquisition; for the mind more often faints from the severity of study

<sup>1</sup> *γραμμάς*, literally 'lines,' probably the starting-point of a race-course.

than from the severity of gymnastics: the toil is more entirely the mind's own, and is not shared with the body.

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SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Very true, he replied.

Further, he of whom we are in search should have a good memory, and be an unwearied solid man who is a lover of labour in any line; or he will never be able to endure the great amount of bodily exercise and to go through all the intellectual discipline and study which we require of him.

strength of  
character;

Certainly, he said; he must have natural gifts.

The mistake at present is, that those who study philosophy have no vocation, and this, as I was before saying, is the reason why she has fallen into disrepute: her true sons should take her by the hand and not bastards.

What do you mean?

In the first place, her votary should not have a lame or halting industry — I mean, that he should not be half industrious and half idle: as, for example, when a man is a lover of gymnastic and hunting, and all other bodily exercises, but a hater rather than a lover of the labour of learning or listening or enquiring. Or the occupation to which he devotes himself may be of an opposite kind, and he may have the other sort of lameness.

industry;

Certainly, he said.

And as to truth, I said, is not a soul equally to be deemed halt and lame which hates voluntary falsehood and is extremely indignant at herself and others when they tell lies, but is patient of involuntary falsehood, and does not mind wallowing like a swinish beast in the mire of ignorance, and has no shame at being detected?

love of truth;

To be sure.

536 And, again, in respect of temperance, courage, magnificence, and every other virtue, should we not carefully distinguish between the true son and the bastard? for where there is no discernment of such qualities states and individuals unconsciously err; and the state makes a ruler, and the individual a friend, of one who, being defective in some part of virtue, is in a figure lame or a bastard.

the moral  
virtues.

That is very true, he said.

All these things, then, will have to be carefully considered by us; and if only those whom we introduce to this vast



*Republic VII.* system of education and training are sound in body and mind, justice herself will have nothing to say against us, and we shall be the saviours of the constitution and of the State; but, if our pupils are men of another stamp, the reverse will happen, and we shall pour a still greater flood of ridicule on philosophy than she has to endure at present.

That would not be creditable.

Socrates plays a little with himself and his subject.

Certainly not, I said; and yet perhaps, in thus turning jest into earnest I am equally ridiculous.

In what respect?

I had forgotten, I said, that we were not serious, and spoke with too much excitement. For when I saw philosophy so undeservedly trampled under foot of men I could not help feeling a sort of indignation at the authors of her disgrace: and my anger made me too vehement.

For the study of dialectic the young must be selected.

Indeed! I was listening, and did not think so.

But I, who am the speaker, felt that I was. And now let me remind you that, although in our former selection we chose old men, we must not do so in this. Solon was under a delusion when he said that a man when he grows old may learn many things—for he can no more learn much than he can run much; youth is the time for any extraordinary toil.

Of course.

The preliminary studies should be commenced in childhood, but never forced.

And, therefore, calculation and geometry and all the other elements of instruction, which are a preparation for dialectic, should be presented to the mind in childhood; not, however, under any notion of forcing our system of education.

Why not?

Because a freeman ought not to be a slave in the acquisition of knowledge of any kind. Bodily exercise, when compulsory, does no harm to the body; but knowledge which is acquired under compulsion obtains no hold on the mind.

Very true.

Then, my good friend, I said, do not use compulsion, but let early education be a sort of amusement; you will then be 537 better able to find out the natural bent.

That is a very rational notion, he said.

Do you remember that the children, too, were to be taken



to see the battle on horseback; and that if there were no danger they were to be brought close up and, like young hounds, have a taste of blood given them?

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SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Yes, I remember.

The same practice may be followed, I said, in all these things — labours, lessons, dangers — and he who is most at home in all of them ought to be enrolled in a select number.

At what age?

At the age when the necessary gymnastics are over: the period whether of two or three years which passes in this sort of training is useless for any other purpose; for sleep and exercise are unpropitious to learning; and the trial of who is first in gymnastic exercises is one of the most important tests to which our youth are subjected.

The necessary  
gymnastics  
must be com-  
pleted first.

Certainly, he replied.

After that time those who are selected from the class of twenty years old will be promoted to higher honour, and the sciences which they learned without any order in their early education will now be brought together, and they will be able to see the natural relationship of them to one another and to true being.

At twenty  
years of age  
the disciples  
will begin to  
be taught the  
correlation of  
the sciences.

Yes, he said, that is the only kind of knowledge which takes lasting root.

Yes, I said; and the capacity for such knowledge is the great criterion of dialectical talent: the comprehensive mind is always the dialectical.

I agree with you, he said.

These, I said, are the points which you must consider; and those who have most of this comprehension, and who are most steadfast in their learning, and in their military and other appointed duties, when they have arrived at the age of thirty will have to be chosen by you out of the select class, and elevated to higher honour; and you will have to prove them by the help of dialectic, in order to learn which of them is able to give up the use of sight and the other senses, and in company with truth to attain absolute being: And here, my friend, great caution is required.

At thirty the  
most promis-  
ing will be  
placed in a  
select class.

Why great caution?

Do you not remark, I said, how great is the evil which dialectic has introduced?

The growth  
of scepticism

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GLAUCON.

What evil? he said.

The students of the art are filled with lawlessness.

Quite true, he said.

Do you think that there is anything so very unnatural or inexcusable in their case? or will you make allowance for them?

In what way make allowance?

in the minds  
of the young  
illustrated by  
the case of a  
supposititious  
son,

I want you, I said, by way of parallel, to imagine a supposititious son who is brought up in great wealth; he is one of a great and numerous family, and has many 538 flatterers. When he grows up to manhood, he learns that his alleged are not his real parents; but who the real are he is unable to discover. Can you guess how he will be likely to behave towards his flatterers and his supposed parents, first of all during the period when he is ignorant of the false relation, and then again when he knows? Or shall I guess for you?

If you please.

who ceases  
to honour his  
father when  
he discovers  
that he is not  
his father.

Then I should say, that while he is ignorant of the truth he will be likely to honour his father and his mother and his supposed relations more than the flatterers; he will be less inclined to neglect them when in need, or to do or say anything against them; and he will be less willing to disobey them in any important matter.

He will.

But when he has made the discovery, I should imagine that he would diminish his honour and regard for them, and would become more devoted to the flatterers; their influence over him would greatly increase; he would now live after their ways, and openly associate with them, and, unless he were of an unusually good disposition, he would trouble himself no more about his supposed parents or other relations.

Well, all that is very probable. But how is the image applicable to the disciples of philosophy?

In this way: you know that there are certain principles about justice and honour, which were taught us in childhood, and under their parental authority we have been brought up, obeying and honouring them.

That is true.

There are also opposite maxims and habits of pleasure

which flatter and attract the soul, but do not influence those of us who have any sense of right, and they continue to obey and honour the maxims of their fathers.

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GLAUCON.

True.

Now, when a man is in this state, and the questioning spirit asks what is fair or honourable, and he answers as the legislator has taught him, and then arguments many and diverse refute his words, until he is driven into believing that nothing is honourable any more than dishonourable, or just and good any more than the reverse, and so of all the notions which he most valued, do you think that he will still honour and obey them as before?

So men who begin to analyse the first principles of morality cease to respect them.

Impossible.

539 And when he ceases to think them honourable and natural as heretofore, and he fails to discover the true, can he be expected to pursue any life other than that which flatters his desires?

He cannot.

And from being a keeper of the law he is converted into a breaker of it?

Unquestionably.

Now all this is very natural in students of philosophy such as I have described, and also, as I was just now saying, most excusable.

Yes, he said; and, I may add, pitiable.

Therefore, that your feelings may not be moved to pity about our citizens who are now thirty years of age, every care must be taken in introducing them to dialectic.

Certainly.

There is a danger lest they should taste the dear delight too early; for youngsters, as you may have observed, when they first get the taste in their mouths, argue for amusement, and are always contradicting and refuting others in imitation of those who refute them; like puppy-dogs, they rejoice in pulling and tearing at all who come near them.

Young men are fond of pulling truth to pieces and thus bring disgrace upon themselves and upon philosophy.

Yes, he said, there is nothing which they like better.

And when they have made many conquests and received defeats at the hands of many, they violently and speedily get into a way of not believing anything which they believed before, and hence, not only they, but philosophy and all that



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GLAUCON.The dialectician and  
the eristic.

relates to it is apt to have a bad name with the rest of the world.

Too true, he said.

But when a man begins to get older, he will no longer be guilty of such insanity; he will imitate the dialectician who is seeking for truth, and not the eristic, who is contradicting for the sake of amusement; and the greater moderation of his character will increase instead of diminishing the honour of the pursuit.

Very true, he said.

And did we not make special provision for this, when we said that the disciples of philosophy were to be orderly and steadfast, not, as now, any chance aspirant or intruder?

Very true.

Suppose, I said, the study of philosophy to take the place of gymnastics and to be continued diligently and earnestly and exclusively for twice the number of years which were passed in bodily exercise — will that be enough?

Would you say six or four years? he asked.

The study of  
philosophy  
to continue  
for five years;  
30-35.

Say five years, I replied; at the end of the time they must be sent down again into the den and compelled to hold any military or other office which young men are qualified to hold: in this way they will get their experience of life, and there will be an opportunity of trying whether, when they are drawn all manner of ways by temptation, they will stand firm or flinch.

And how long is this stage of their lives to last?

540

During fifteen  
years, 35-50,  
they are to  
hold office.At the end of  
that time they  
are to live  
chiefly in the  
contempla-  
tion of the  
good, but  
occasionally  
to return to  
politics.

Fifteen years, I answered; and when they have reached fifty years of age, then let those who still survive and have distinguished themselves in every action of their lives and in every branch of knowledge come at last to their consummation: the time has now arrived at which they must raise the eye of the soul to the universal light which lightens all things, and behold the absolute good; for that is the pattern according to which they are to order the State and the lives of individuals, and the remainder of their own lives also; making philosophy their chief pursuit, but, when their turn comes, toiling also at politics and ruling for the public good, not as though they were performing some heroic



action, but simply as a matter of duty ; and when they have brought up in each generation others like themselves and left them in their place to be governors of the State, then they will depart to the Islands of the Blest and dwell there ; and the city will give them public memorials and sacrifices and honour them, if the Pythian oracle consent, as demigods, but if not, as in any case blessed and divine.

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SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

You are a sculptor, Socrates, and have made statues of our governors faultless in beauty.

Yes, I said, Glaucon, and of our governesses too ; for you must not suppose that what I have been saying applies to men only and not to women as far as their nature can go.

There you are right, he said, since we have made them to share in all things like men.

Well, I said, and you would agree (would you not?) that what has been said about the State and the government is not a mere dream, and although difficult not impossible, but only possible in the way which has been supposed ; that is to say, when the true philosopher kings are born in a State, one or more of them, despising the honours of this present world which they deem mean and worthless, esteeming above all things right and the honour that springs from right, and regarding justice as the greatest and most necessary of all things, whose ministers they are, and whose principles will be exalted by them when they set in order their own city?

How will they proceed?

They will begin by sending out into the country all the inhabitants of the city who are more than ten years old, and will take possession of their children, who will be unaffected by the habits of their parents ; these they will train in their own habits and laws, I mean in the laws which we have given them : and in this way the State and constitution of which we were speaking will soonest and most easily attain happiness, and the nation which has such a constitution will gain most.

Practical  
measures for  
the speedy  
foundation of  
the State.

Yes, that will be the best way. And I think, Socrates, that you have very well described how, if ever, such a constitution might come into being.

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GLAUCON.

Enough then of the perfect State, and of the man who bears its image — there is no difficulty in seeing how we shall describe him.

There is no difficulty, he replied; and I agree with you in thinking that nothing more need be said.

## BOOK VIII.

**Steph.** AND so, Glaucon, we have arrived at the conclusion that in  
543 the perfect State wives and children are to be in common ;  
and that all education and the pursuits of war and peace are  
also to be common, and the best philosophers and the  
bravest warriors are to be their kings?

That, replied Glaucon, has been acknowledged.

Yes, I said ; and we have further acknowledged that  
the governors, when appointed themselves, will take their  
soldiers and place them in houses such as we were describing,  
which are common to all, and contain nothing private, or  
individual ; and about their property, you remember what  
we agreed?

Yes, I remember that no one was to have any of the  
ordinary possessions of mankind ; they were to be warrior  
athletes and guardians, receiving from the other citizens, in  
lieu of annual payment, only their maintenance, and they  
were to take care of themselves and of the whole State.

True, I said ; and now that this division of our task is  
concluded, let us find the point at which we digressed, that  
we may return into the old path.

There is no difficulty in returning ; you implied, then as  
now, that you had finished the description of the State : you  
said that such a State was good, and that the man was good  
who answered to it, although, as now appears, you had more  
544 excellent things to relate both of State and man. And  
you said further, that if this was the true form, then the others  
were false ; and of the false forms, you said, as I remember,  
that there were four principal ones, and that their defects, and  
the defects of the individuals corresponding to them, were  
worth examining. When we had seen all the individuals, and  
finally agreed as to who was the best and who was the worst

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VIII.*

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Recapitu-  
lation of  
Book V.

Return to the  
end of Book  
IV.

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VIII.

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

of them, we were to consider whether the best was not also the happiest, and the worst the most miserable. I asked you what were the four forms of government of which you spoke, and then Polemarchus and Adeimantus put in their word; and you began again, and have found your way to the point at which we have now arrived.

Your recollection, I said, is most exact.

Then, like a wrestler, he replied, you must put yourself again in the same position; and let me ask the same questions, and do you give me the same answer which you were about to give me then.

Yes, if I can, I will, I said.

I shall particularly wish to hear what were the four constitutions of which you were speaking.

Four im-  
perfect con-  
stitutions,  
the Cretan or  
Spartan,  
Oligarchy,  
Democracy,  
Tyranny.

That question, I said, is easily answered: the four governments of which I spoke, so far as they have distinct names, are, first, those of Crete and Sparta, which are generally applauded; what is termed oligarchy comes next; this is not equally approved, and is a form of government which teems with evils: thirdly, democracy, which naturally follows oligarchy, although very different: and lastly comes tyranny, great and famous, which differs from them all, and is the fourth and worst disorder of a State. I do not know, do you? of any other constitution which can be said to have a distinct character. There are lordships and principalities which are bought and sold, and some other intermediate forms of government. But these are nondescripts and may be found equally among Hellenes and among barbarians.

Yes, he replied, we certainly hear of many curious forms of government which exist among them.

States are  
like men,  
because they  
are made up  
of men.

Do you know, I said, that governments vary as the dispositions of men vary, and that there must be as many of the one as there are of the other? For we cannot suppose that States are made of 'oak and rock,' and not out of the human natures which are in them, and which in a figure turn the scale and draw other things after them?

Yes, he said, the States are as the men are; they grow out of human characters.

Then if the constitutions of States are five, the dispositions of individual minds will also be five?



Certainly.

545 Him who answers to aristocracy, and whom we rightly call just and good, we have already described.

We have.

Then let us now proceed to describe the inferior sort of natures, being the contentious and ambitious, who answer to the Spartan polity; also the oligarchical, democratical, and tyrannical. Let us place the most just by the side of the most unjust, and when we see them we shall be able to compare the relative happiness or unhappiness of him who leads a life of pure justice or pure injustice. The enquiry will then be completed. And we shall know whether we ought to pursue injustice, as Thrasymachus advises, or in accordance with the conclusions of the argument to prefer justice.

Certainly, he replied, we must do as you say.

Shall we follow our old plan, which we adopted with a view to clearness, of taking the State first and then proceeding to the individual, and begin with the government of honour?—I know of no name for such a government other than timocracy, or perhaps timarchy. We will compare with this the like character in the individual; and, after that, consider oligarchy and the oligarchical man; and then again we will turn our attention to democracy and the democratical man; and lastly, we will go and view the city of tyranny, and once more take a look into the tyrant's soul, and try to arrive at a satisfactory decision.

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GLAUCON.

The State  
and the in-  
dividual.

That way of viewing and judging of the matter will be very suitable.

First, then, I said, let us enquire how timocracy (the government of honour) arises out of aristocracy (the government of the best). Clearly, all political changes originate in divisions of the actual governing power; a government which is united, however small, cannot be moved.

How ti-  
mocracy  
arises out of  
aristocracy.

Very true, he said.

In what way, then, will our city be moved, and in what manner will the two classes of auxiliaries and rulers disagree among themselves or with one another? Shall we, after the manner of Homer, pray the Muses to tell us 'how discord first arose'? Shall we imagine them in solemn

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GLAUCON.

mockery, to play and jest with us as if we were children, and to address us in a lofty tragic vein, making believe to be in earnest?

How would they address us?

After this manner:—A city which is thus constituted can 546 hardly be shaken; but, seeing that everything which has a beginning has also an end, even a constitution such as yours will not last for ever, but will in time be dissolved. And this is the dissolution:—In plants that grow in the earth, as well as in animals that move on the earth's surface, fertility and sterility of soul and body occur when the circumferences of the circles of each are completed, which in short-lived existences pass over a short space, and in long-lived ones over a long space. But to the knowledge of human fecundity and sterility all the wisdom and education of your rulers will not attain; the laws which regulate them will not be discovered by an intelligence which is alloyed with sense, but will escape them, and they will bring children into the world when they ought not. Now that which is of divine birth has a period which is contained in a perfect number<sup>1</sup>, but the period of human birth is comprehended in a number in which first increments by involution and evolution [*or* squared and cubed] obtaining three intervals and four terms of like and unlike, waxing and waning numbers, make all the terms commensurable and agreeable to one another<sup>2</sup>. The base of these (3) with a third added (4) when combined with five (20) and raised to the third power furnishes two harmonies; the first a square which is a hundred times as great ( $400 = 4 \times 100$ )<sup>3</sup>, and the other a figure having one side equal to the former, but oblong<sup>4</sup>, consisting of a hundred numbers squared upon rational diameters of a square (i. e. omitting fractions), the side of which is five ( $7 \times 7 = 49 \times 100 = 4900$ ), each of them

The intelligence which is alloyed with sense will not know how to regulate births and deaths in accordance with the number which controls them.

<sup>1</sup> i. e. a cyclical number, such as 6, which is equal to the sum of its divisors 1, 2, 3, so that when the circle or time represented by 6 is completed, the lesser times or rotations represented by 1, 2, 3 are also completed.

<sup>2</sup> Probably the numbers 3, 4, 5, 6 of which the three first = the sides of the Pythagorean triangle. The terms will then be  $3^3$ ,  $4^3$ ,  $5^3$ , which together =  $6^3 = 216$ .

<sup>3</sup> Or the first a square which is  $100 \times 100 = 10,000$ . The whole number will then be  $17,500 =$  a square of 100, and an oblong of 100 by 75.

<sup>4</sup> Reading *προμήκη* δέ.

being less by one (than the perfect square which includes the fractions, sc. 50) or less by<sup>1</sup> two perfect squares of irrational diameters (of a square the side of which is five =  $50 + 50 = 100$ ); and a hundred cubes of three ( $27 \times 100 = 2700 + 4900 + 400 = 8000$ ). Now this number represents a geometrical figure which has control over the good and evil of births. For when your guardians are ignorant of the law of births, and unite bride and bridegroom out of season, the children will not be goodly or fortunate. And though only the best of them will be appointed by their predecessors, still they will be unworthy to hold their fathers' places, and when they come into power as guardians, they will soon be found to fail in taking care of us, the Muses, first by undervaluing music; which neglect will soon extend to gymnastic; and hence the young men of your State will be less cultivated. In the succeeding generation rulers will be appointed who have lost the guardian power of testing the metal of your different races, which, like Hesiod's, are of gold and silver and brass and iron. And so iron will be mingled with silver, and brass with gold, and hence there will arise dissimilarity and inequality and irregularity, which always and in all places are causes of hatred and war. This the Muses affirm to be the stock from which discord has sprung, wherever arising; and this is their answer to us.

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SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

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Yes, and we may assume that they answer truly.

Why, yes, I said, of course they answer truly; how can the Muses speak falsely?

And what do the Muses say next?

When discord arose, then the two races were drawn different ways: the iron and brass fell to acquiring money and land and houses and gold and silver; but the gold and silver races, not wanting money but having the true riches in their own nature, inclined towards virtue and the ancient order of things. There was a battle between them, and at last they agreed to distribute their land and houses among individual owners; and they enslaved their friends and maintainers, whom they had formerly protected in the condition of freemen, and made of them subjects and servants; and

Discord will  
then arise  
and individual  
take the  
place of common  
property.

<sup>1</sup> Or, 'consisting of two numbers squared upon irrational diameters,' &c. = 100. For other explanations of the passage see Introduction.



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GLAUCON.

they themselves were engaged in war and in keeping a watch against them.

I believe that you have rightly conceived the origin of the change.

And the new government which thus arises will be of a form intermediate between oligarchy and aristocracy?

Very true.

Such will be the change, and after the change has been made, how will they proceed? Clearly, the new State, being in a mean between oligarchy and the perfect State, will partly follow one and partly the other, and will also have some peculiarities.

True, he said.

In the honour given to rulers, in the abstinence of the warrior class from agriculture, handicrafts, and trade in general, in the institution of common meals, and in the attention paid to gymnastics and military training—in all these respects this State will resemble the former.

True.

Timocracy  
will retain  
the military  
and reject  
the philo-  
sophical  
character of  
the perfect  
State.

But in the fear of admitting philosophers to power, because they are no longer to be had simple and earnest, but are made up of mixed elements; and in turning from them to passionate and less complex characters, who are by nature fitted for war rather than peace; and in the value set by them upon military stratagems and contrivances, and in the waging of everlasting wars—this State will be for the most part peculiar. 548

Yes.

The soldier  
class miserly  
and covetous.

Yes, I said; and men of this stamp will be covetous of money, like those who live in oligarchies; they will have a fierce secret longing after gold and silver, which they will hoard in dark places, having magazines and treasuries of their own for the deposit and concealment of them; also castles which are just nests for their eggs, and in which they will spend large sums on their wives, or on any others whom they please.

That is most true, he said.

And they are miserly because they have no means of openly acquiring the money which they prize; they will spend that which is another man's on the gratification of



their desires, stealing their pleasures and running away like children from the law, their father: they have been schooled not by gentle influences but by force, for they have neglected her who is the true Muse, the companion of reason and philosophy, and have honoured gymnastic more than music.

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SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON,  
ADEIMANTUS.

Undoubtedly, he said, the form of government which you describe is a mixture of good and evil.

Why, there is a mixture, I said; but one thing, and one thing only, is predominantly seen,—the spirit of contention and ambition; and these are due to the prevalence of the passionate or spirited element.

The spirit of  
ambition  
predominates  
in such  
States.

Assuredly, he said.

Such is the origin and such the character of this State, which has been described in outline only; the more perfect execution was not required, for a sketch is enough to show the type of the most perfectly just and most perfectly unjust; and to go through all the States and all the characters of men, omitting none of them, would be an interminable labour.

Very true, he replied.

Now what man answers to this form of government—how did he come into being, and what is he like?

The timo-  
cratic man,  
uncultured,  
but fond of

I think, said Adeimantus, that in the spirit of contention which characterises him, he is not unlike our friend Glaucon.

culture,  
ambitious,  
contentious,  
rough with  
slaves, and  
courteous to

Perhaps, I said, he may be like him in that one point; but there are other respects in which he is very different.

In what respects?

freemen; a  
soldier, ath-  
lete, hunter;  
a despiser of  
riches while  
young, fond of  
them when he  
grows old.

549 He should have more of self-assertion and be less cultivated, and yet a friend of culture; and he should be a good listener, but no speaker. Such a person is apt to be rough with slaves, unlike the educated man, who is too proud for that; and he will also be courteous to freemen, and remarkably obedient to authority; he is a lover of power and a lover of honour; claiming to be a ruler, not because he is eloquent, or on any ground of that sort, but because he is a soldier and has performed feats of arms; he is also a lover of gymnastic exercises and of the chase.

Yes, that is the type of character which answers to timocracy.

Such an one will despise riches only when he is young;

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SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

but as he gets older he will be more and more attracted to them, because he has a piece of the avaricious nature in him, and is not single-minded towards virtue, having lost his best guardian.

Who was that? said Adeimantus.

Philosophy, I said, tempered with music, who comes and takes up her abode in a man, and is the only saviour of his virtue throughout life.

Good, he said.

Such, I said, is the timocratical youth, and he is like the timocratical State.

Exactly.

His origin is as follows:— He is often the young son of a brave father, who dwells in an ill-governed city, of which he declines the honours and offices, and will not go to law, or exert himself in any way, but is ready to waive his rights in order that he may escape trouble.

And how does the son come into being?

The timocratic man often originates in a reaction against his father's character, which is encouraged by his mother.

The character of the son begins to develop when he hears his mother complaining that her husband has no place in the government, of which the consequence is that she has no precedence among other women. Further, when she sees her husband not very eager about money, and instead of battling and railing in the law courts or assembly, taking whatever happens to him quietly; and when she observes that his thoughts always centre in himself, while he treats her with very considerable indifference, she is annoyed, and says to her son that his father is only half a man and far too easy-going: adding all the other complaints about her own ill-treatment which women are so fond of rehearsing.

Yes, said Adeimantus, they give us plenty of them, and their complaints are so like themselves.

and by the old servants of the household.

And you know, I said, that the old servants also, who are supposed to be attached to the family, from time to time talk privately in the same strain to the son; and if they see any one who owes money to his father, or is wronging him in any way, and he fails to prosecute them, they tell the youth that when he grows up he must retaliate upon people of this sort, 55<sup>o</sup> and be more of a man than his father. He has only to walk abroad and he hears and sees the same sort of thing: those

who do their own business in the city are called simpletons, and held in no esteem, while the busy-bodies are honoured and applauded. The result is that the young man, hearing and seeing all these things — hearing, too, the words of his father, and having a nearer view of his way of life, and making comparisons of him and others — is drawn opposite ways: while his father is watering and nourishing the rational principle in his soul, the others are encouraging the passionate and appetitive; and he being not originally of a bad nature, but having kept bad company, is at last brought by their joint influence to a middle point, and gives up the kingdom which is within him to the middle principle of contentiousness and passion, and becomes arrogant and ambitious.

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SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

You seem to me to have described his origin perfectly.

Then we have now, I said, the second form of government and the second type of character?

We have.

Next, let us look at another man who, as Aeschylus says,

‘Is set over against another State;’

or rather, as our plan requires, begin with the State.

By all means.

I believe that oligarchy follows next in order.

Oligarchy

And what manner of government do you term oligarchy?

A government resting on a valuation of property, in which the rich have power and the poor man is deprived of it.

I understand, he replied.

Ought I not to begin by describing how the change from timocracy to oligarchy arises?

Yes.

Well, I said, no eyes are required in order to see how the one passes into the other.

How?

The accumulation of gold in the treasury of private individuals is the ruin of timocracy; they invent illegal modes of expenditure; for what do they or their wives care about the law?

arises out of  
increased  
accumulation  
and increased  
expenditure  
among the  
citizens.

Yes, indeed.

And then one, seeing another grow rich, seeks to rival



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*VIII.*

SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

As riches increase, virtue decreases: the one is honoured, the other despised; the one cultivated, the other neglected.

In an oligarchy a money qualification is established.

A ruler is elected because he is rich: Who would elect a pilot on this principle?

him, and thus the great mass of the citizens become lovers of money.

Likely enough.

And so they grow richer and richer, and the more they think of making a fortune the less they think of virtue; for when riches and virtue are placed together in the scales of the balance, the one always rises as the other falls.

True.

And in proportion as riches and rich men are honoured in the State, virtue and the virtuous are dishonoured. 551

Clearly.

And what is honoured is cultivated, and that which has no honour is neglected.

That is obvious.

And so at last, instead of loving contention and glory, men become lovers of trade and money; they honour and look up to the rich man, and make a ruler of him, and dishonour the poor man.

They do so.

They next proceed to make a law which fixes a sum of money as the qualification of citizenship; the sum is higher in one place and lower in another, as the oligarchy is more or less exclusive; and they allow no one whose property falls below the amount fixed to have any share in the government. These changes in the constitution they effect by force of arms, if intimidation has not already done their work.

Very true.

And this, speaking generally, is the way in which oligarchy is established.

Yes, he said; but what are the characteristics of this form of government, and what are the defects of which we were speaking<sup>1</sup>?

First of all, I said, consider the nature of the qualification. Just think what would happen if pilots were to be chosen according to their property, and a poor man were refused permission to steer, even though he were a better pilot?

You mean that they would shipwreck?

Yes; and is not this true of the government of anything<sup>2</sup>?

I should imagine so.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, 544 C.

<sup>2</sup> Omitting *ἢ τινος*.



Except a city?—or would you include a city?

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VIII.*

Nay, he said, the case of a city is the strongest of all, inasmuch as the rule of a city is the greatest and most difficult of all.

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ADEIMANTUS.

This, then, will be the first great defect of oligarchy?

Clearly.

And here is another defect which is quite as bad.

What defect?

The inevitable division: such a State is not one, but two States, the one of poor, the other of rich men; and they are living on the same spot and always conspiring against one another.

The extreme  
division of  
classes in  
such a State.

That, surely, is at least as bad.

Another discreditable feature is, that, for a like reason, they are incapable of carrying on any war. Either they arm the multitude, and then they are more afraid of them than of the enemy; or, if they do not call them out in the hour of battle, they are oligarchs indeed, few to fight as they are few to rule. And at the same time their fondness for money makes them unwilling to pay taxes.

They dare not  
go to war.

How discreditable!

And, as we said before, under such a constitution the same persons have too many callings—they are husbandmen, tradesmen, warriors, all in one. Does that look well?

Anything but well.

There is another evil which is, perhaps, the greatest of all, and to which this State first begins to be liable.

What evil?

A man may sell all that he has, and another may acquire his property; yet after the sale he may dwell in the city of which he is no longer a part, being neither trader, nor artisan, nor horseman, nor hoplite, but only a poor, helpless creature.

The ruined  
man, who  
has no  
occupation,  
once a  
spendthrift,  
now a pauper,  
still exists in  
the State.

Yes, that is an evil which also first begins in this State.

The evil is certainly not prevented there; for oligarchies have both the extremes of great wealth and utter poverty.

True.

But think again: In his wealthy days, while he was spending his money, was a man of this sort a whit more good to the State for the purposes of citizenship? Or

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*VIII.*SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

did he only seem to be a member of the ruling body, although in truth he was neither ruler nor subject, but just a spendthrift?

As you say, he seemed to be a ruler, but was only a spendthrift.

May we not say that this is the drone in the house who is like the drone in the honeycomb, and that the one is the plague of the city as the other is of the hive?

Just so, Socrates.

And God has made the flying drones, Adeimantus, all without stings, whereas of the walking drones he has made some without stings but others have dreadful stings; of the stingless class are those who in their old age end as paupers; of the stingers come all the criminal class, as they are termed.

Most true, he said.

Where there  
are paupers,  
there are  
thieves

Clearly then, whenever you see paupers in a State, somewhere in that neighbourhood there are hidden away thieves and cut-purses and robbers of temples, and all sorts of malefactors.

Clearly.

Well, I said, and in oligarchical States do you not find paupers?

Yes, he said; nearly everybody is a pauper who is not a ruler.

and other  
criminals.

And may we be so bold as to affirm that there are also many criminals to be found in them, rogues who have stings, and whom the authorities are careful to restrain by force?

Certainly, we may be so bold.

The existence of such persons is to be attributed to want of education, ill-training, and an evil constitution of the State?

True.

Such, then, is the form and such are the evils of oligarchy; and there may be many other evils.

Very likely.

Then oligarchy, or the form of government in which the 553 rulers are elected for their wealth, may now be dismissed. Let us next proceed to consider the nature and origin of the individual who answers to this State.

By all means.

Does not the timocratical man change into the oligarchical on this wise?

How?

A time arrives when the representative of timocracy has a son: at first he begins by emulating his father and walking in his footsteps, but presently he sees him of a sudden foundering against the State as upon a sunken reef, and he and all that he has is lost; he may have been a general or some other high officer who is brought to trial under a prejudice raised by informers, and either put to death, or exiled, or deprived of the privileges of a citizen, and all his property taken from him.

Nothing more likely.

And the son has seen and known all this—he is a ruined man, and his fear has taught him to knock ambition and passion headforemost from his bosom's throne; humbled by poverty he takes to money-making and by mean and miserly savings and hard work gets a fortune together. Is not such an one likely to seat the concupiscent and covetous element on the vacant throne and to suffer it to play the great king within him, girt with tiara and chain and scimitar?

Most true, he replied.

And when he has made reason and spirit sit down on the ground obediently on either side of their sovereign, and taught them to know their place, he compels the one to think only of how lesser sums may be turned into larger ones, and will not allow the other to worship and admire anything but riches and rich men, or to be ambitious of anything so much as the acquisition of wealth and the means of acquiring it.

Of all changes, he said, there is none so speedy or so sure as the conversion of the ambitious youth into the avaricious one.

And the avaricious, I said, is the oligarchical youth?

Yes, he said; at any rate the individual out of whom he came is like the State out of which oligarchy came.

Let us then consider whether there is any likeness between them.

554 Very good.

First, then, they resemble one another in the value which they set upon wealth?

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SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

The ruin of  
the timo-  
cratical man  
gives birth to  
the oligarchi-  
cal.

His son begins  
life a ruined  
man and takes  
to money-  
making.

The oligarchi-  
cal man  
and State  
resemble one  
another in  
their esti-  
mation of  
wealth:



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SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

in their toiling  
and saving  
ways, in their  
want of  
cultivation.

Certainly.

Also in their penurious, laborious character; the individual only satisfies his necessary appetites, and confines his expenditure to them; his other desires he subdues, under the idea that they are unprofitable.

True.

He is a shabby fellow, who saves something out of everything and makes a purse for himself; and this is the sort of man whom the vulgar applaud. Is he not a true image of the State which he represents?

He appears to me to be so; at any rate money is highly valued by him as well as by the State.

You see that he is not a man of cultivation, I said.

I imagine not, he said; had he been educated he would never have made a blind god director of his chorus, or given him chief honour<sup>1</sup>.

Excellent! I said. Yet consider: Must we not further admit that owing to this want of cultivation there will be found in him dronelike desires as of pauper and rogue, which are forcibly kept down by his general habit of life?

True.

Do you know where you will have to look if you want to discover his rogueries?

Where must I look?

You should see him where he has some great opportunity of acting dishonestly, as in the guardianship of an orphan.

Aye.

It will be clear enough then that in his ordinary dealings which give him a reputation for honesty he coerces his bad passions by an enforced virtue; not making them see that they are wrong, or taming them by reason, but by necessity and fear constraining them, and because he trembles for his possessions.

To be sure.

Yes, indeed, my dear friend, but you will find that the natural desires of the drone commonly exist in him all the same whenever he has to spend what is not his own.

<sup>1</sup> Reading *καὶ ἐπίμα μάλιστα*. *Εὖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ*, according to Schneider's excellent emendation.

The oligarchical man keeps up a fair outside, but he has only an enforced virtue and will cheat when he can.



Yes, and they will be strong in him too.

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The man, then, will be at war with himself; he will be two men, and not one; but, in general, his better desires will be found to prevail over his inferior ones.

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ADEIMANTUS.

True.

For these reasons such an one will be more respectable than most people; yet the true virtue of a unanimous and harmonious soul will flee far away and never come near him.

I should expect so.

555 And surely, the miser individually will be an ignoble competitor in a State for any prize of victory, or other object of honourable ambition; he will not spend his money in the contest for glory; so afraid is he of awakening his expensive appetites and inviting them to help and join in the struggle; in true oligarchical fashion he fights with a small part only of his resources, and the result commonly is that he loses the prize and saves his money.

His meanness  
in a contest;  
he saves his  
money and  
loses the prize.

Very true.

Can we any longer doubt, then, that the miser and money-maker answers to the oligarchical State?

There can be no doubt.

Next comes democracy; of this the origin and nature have still to be considered by us; and then we will enquire into the ways of the democratic man, and bring him up for judgment.

Democracy  
arises out of  
the extravagance  
and indebtedness  
of men of  
family and  
position,

That, he said, is our method.

Well, I said, and how does the change from oligarchy into democracy arise? Is it not on this wise?—The good at which such a State aims is to become as rich as possible, a desire which is insatiable?

What then?

The rulers, being aware that their power rests upon their wealth, refuse to curtail by law the extravagance of the spendthrift youth because they gain by their ruin; they take interest from them and buy up their estates and thus increase their own wealth and importance?

To be sure.

There can be no doubt that the love of wealth and the spirit of moderation cannot exist together in citizens of the same state to any considerable extent; one or the other will be disregarded.

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*VIII.*

SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

That is tolerably clear.

And in oligarchical States, from the general spread of carelessness and extravagance, men of good family have often been reduced to beggary?

Yes, often.

who remain  
in the city,  
and form a  
dangerous  
class ready  
to head a  
revolution.

And still they remain in the city; there they are, ready to sting and fully armed, and some of them owe money, some have forfeited their citizenship; a third class are in both predicaments; and they hate and conspire against those who have got their property, and against everybody else, and are eager for revolution.

That is true.

On the other hand, the men of business, stooping as they walk, and pretending not even to see those whom they have already ruined, insert their sting — that is, their money — into some one else who is not on his guard against them, and recover the parent sum many times over multiplied into a family of children: and so they make drone and pauper to abound in the State.

Yes, he said, there are plenty of them — that is certain.

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Two remedies:  
(1) restrictions on  
the free use  
of property;

The evil blazes up like a fire; and they will not extinguish it, either by restricting a man's use of his own property, or by another remedy:

What other?

(2) contracts  
to be made at  
a man's own  
risk.

One which is the next best, and has the advantage of compelling the citizens to look to their characters:— Let there be a general rule that every one shall enter into voluntary contracts at his own risk, and there will be less of this scandalous money-making, and the evils of which we were speaking will be greatly lessened in the State.

Yes, they will be greatly lessened.

At present the governors, induced by the motives which I have named, treat their subjects badly; while they and their adherents, especially the young men of the governing class, are habituated to lead a life of luxury and idleness both of body and mind; they do nothing, and are incapable of resisting either pleasure or pain.

Very true.

They themselves care only for making money, and are as indifferent as the pauper to the cultivation of virtue.

Yes, quite as indifferent.

Such is the state of affairs which prevails among them. And often rulers and their subjects may come in one another's way, whether on a journey or on some other occasion of meeting, on a pilgrimage or a march, as fellow-soldiers or fellow-sailors; aye and they may observe the behaviour of each other in the very moment of danger—for where danger is, there is no fear that the poor will be despised by the rich—and very likely the wiry sunburnt poor man may be placed in battle at the side of a wealthy one who has never spoilt his complexion and has plenty of superfluous flesh—when he sees such an one puffing and at his wits'-end, how can he avoid drawing the conclusion that men like him are only rich because no one has the courage to despoil them? And when they meet in private will not people be saying to one another 'Our warriors are not good for much'?

Yes, he said, I am quite aware that this is their way of talking.

And, as in a body which is diseased the addition of a touch from without may bring on illness, and sometimes even when there is no external provocation a commotion may arise within—in the same way wherever there is weakness in the State there is also likely to be illness, of which the occasion may be very slight, the one party introducing from without their oligarchical, the other their democratical allies, and then the State falls sick, and is at war with herself; and may  
557 be at times distracted, even when there is no external cause.

Yes, surely.

And then democracy comes into being after the poor have conquered their opponents, slaughtering some and banishing some, while to the remainder they give an equal share of freedom and power; and this is the form of government in which the magistrates are commonly elected by lot.

Yes, he said, that is the nature of democracy, whether the revolution has been effected by arms, or whether fear has caused the opposite party to withdraw.

And now what is their manner of life, and what sort of a government have they? for as the government is, such will be the man.

Clearly, he said.

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SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

The subjects  
discover the  
weakness of  
their rulers.

A slight  
cause, in-  
ternal or ex-  
ternal, may  
produce revo-  
lution.

Such is the  
origin and  
nature of  
democracy.



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SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

Democracy  
allows a man  
to do as he  
likes, and  
therefore con-  
tains the  
greatest  
variety of  
characters  
and consti-  
tutions.

In the first place, are they not free; and is not the city full of freedom and frankness—a man may say and do what he likes?

'Tis said so, he replied.

And where freedom is, the individual is clearly able to order for himself his own life as he pleases?

Clearly.

Then in this kind of State there will be the greatest variety of human natures?

There will.

This, then, seems likely to be the fairest of States, being like an embroidered robe which is spangled with every sort of flower<sup>1</sup>. And just as women and children think a variety of colours to be of all things most charming, so there are many men to whom this State, which is spangled with the manners and characters of mankind, will appear to be the fairest of States.

Yes..

Yes, my good Sir, and there will be no better in which to look for a government.

Why?

Because of the liberty which reigns there—they have a complete assortment of constitutions; and he who has a mind to establish a State, as we have been doing, must go to a democracy as he would to a bazaar at which they sell them, and pick out the one that suits him; then, when he has made his choice, he may found his State.

He will be sure to have patterns enough.

The law falls  
into abey-  
ance.

And there being no necessity, I said, for you to govern in this State, even if you have the capacity, or to be governed, unless you like, or to go to war when the rest go to war, or to be at peace when others are at peace, unless you are so disposed—there being no necessity also, because some law forbids you to hold office or be a dicast, that you should not hold office or be a dicast, if you have a fancy—is not this a way of life which for the moment is supremely de- 558  
lightful?

For the moment, yes.

<sup>1</sup> Omitting *τί μὲν; ἔφη.*



And is not their humanity to the condemned<sup>1</sup> in some cases quite charming? Have you not observed how, in a democracy, many persons, although they have been sentenced to death or exile, just stay where they are and walk about the world — the gentleman parades like a hero, and nobody sees or cares?

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SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

Yes, he replied, many and many a one.

See too, I said, the forgiving spirit of democracy, and the 'don't care' about trifles, and the disregard which she shows of all the fine principles which we solemnly laid down at the foundation of the city — as when we said that, except in the case of some rarely gifted nature, there never will be a good man who has not from his childhood been used to play amid things of beauty and make of them a joy and a study — how grandly does she trample all these fine notions of ours under her feet, never giving a thought to the pursuits which make a statesman, and promoting to honour any one who professes to be the people's friend.

All principles  
of order and  
good taste  
are trampled  
under foot by  
democracy.

Yes, she is of a noble spirit.

These and other kindred characteristics are proper to democracy, which is a charming form of government, full of variety and disorder, and dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike.

We know her well.

Consider now, I said, what manner of man the individual is, or rather consider, as in the case of the State, how he comes into being.

Very good, he said.

Is not this the way — he is the son of the miserly and oligarchical father who has trained him in his own habits?

Exactly.

And, like his father, he keeps under by force the pleasures which are of the spending and not of the getting sort, being those which are called unnecessary?

Which are  
the necessary  
and which the  
unnecessary  
pleasures?

Obviously.

Would you like, for the sake of clearness, to distinguish which are the necessary and which are the unnecessary pleasures?

I should.

<sup>1</sup> Or, 'the philosophical temper of the condemned.'

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SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

Necessary  
desires cannot  
be got rid of,

Are not necessary pleasures those of which we cannot get rid, and of which the satisfaction is a benefit to us? And they are rightly called so, because we are framed by nature to desire both what is beneficial and what is necessary, and cannot help it.

True.

559

We are not wrong therefore in calling them necessary?

We are not.

And the desires of which a man may get rid, if he takes pains from his youth upwards — of which the presence, moreover, does no good, and in some cases the reverse of good — shall we not be right in saying that all these are unnecessary?

Yes, certainly.

Suppose we select an example of either kind, in order that we may have a general notion of them?

Very good.

Will not the desire of eating, that is, of simple food and condiments, in so far as they are required for health and strength, be of the necessary class?

That is what I should suppose.

The pleasure of eating is necessary in two ways; it does us good and it is essential to the continuance of life?

Yes.

but may be  
indulged to  
excess.

But the condiments are only necessary in so far as they are good for health?

Certainly.

Illustration  
taken from  
eating and  
drinking.

And the desire which goes beyond this, of more delicate food, or other luxuries, which might generally be got rid of, if controlled and trained in youth, and is hurtful to the body, and hurtful to the soul in the pursuit of wisdom and virtue, may be rightly called unnecessary?

Very true.

May we not say that these desires spend, and that the others make money because they conduce to production?

Certainly.

And of the pleasures of love, and all other pleasures, the same holds good?

True.

And the drone of whom we spoke was he who was surfeited in pleasures and desires of this sort, and was the slave

of the unnecessary desires, whereas he who was subject to the necessary only was miserly and oligarchical?

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SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

Very true.

Again, let us see how the democratical man grows out of the oligarchical: the following, as I suspect, is commonly the process.

What is the process?

When a young man who has been brought up as we were just now describing, in a vulgar and miserly way, has tasted drones' honey and has come to associate with fierce and crafty natures who are able to provide for him all sorts of refinements and varieties of pleasure — then, as you may imagine, the change will begin of the oligarchical principle within him into the democratical?

The young oligarch is led away by his wild associates.

Inevitably.

And as in the city like was helping like, and the change was effected by an alliance from without assisting one division of the citizens, so too the young man is changed by a class of desires coming from without to assist the desires within him, that which is akin and alike again helping that which is akin and alike?

There are allies to either part of his nature.

Certainly.

And if there be any ally which aids the oligarchical principle within him, whether the influence of a father or of kindred, advising or rebuking him, then there arises in his soul a faction and an opposite faction, and he goes to war with himself.

It must be so.

And there are times when the democratical principle gives way to the oligarchical, and some of his desires die, and others are banished; a spirit of reverence enters into the young man's soul and order is restored.

Yes, he said, that sometimes happens.

And then, again, after the old desires have been driven out, fresh ones spring up, which are akin to them, and because he their father does not know how to educate them, wax fierce and numerous.

Yes, he said, that is apt to be the way.

They draw him to his old associates, and holding secret intercourse with them, breed and multiply in him.



*Republic*  
*VIII.*

SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

Very true.

At length they seize upon the citadel of the young man's soul, which they perceive to be void of all accomplishments and fair pursuits and true words, which make their abode in the minds of men who are dear to the gods, and are their best guardians and sentinels.

None better.

False and boastful conceits and phrases mount upwards and take their place.

They are certain to do so.

The progress  
of the  
oligarchic  
young man  
told in an  
allegory.

And so the young man returns into the country of the lotus-eaters, and takes up his dwelling there in the face of all men; and if any help be sent by his friends to the oligarchical part of him, the aforesaid vain conceits shut the gate of the king's fastness; and they will neither allow the embassy itself to enter, nor if private advisers offer the fatherly counsel of the aged will they listen to them or receive them. There is a battle and they gain the day, and then modesty, which they call silliness, is ignominiously thrust into exile by them, and temperance, which they nickname unmanliness, is trampled in the mire and cast forth; they persuade men that moderation and orderly expenditure are vulgarity and meanness, and so, by the help of a rabble of evil appetites, they drive them beyond the border.

Yes, with a will.

And when they have emptied and swept clean the soul of him who is now in their power and who is being initiated by them in great mysteries, the next thing is to bring back to their house insolence and anarchy and waste and impudence in bright array having garlands on their heads, and a great company with them, hymning their praises and calling them by sweet names; insolence they term breeding, and anarchy liberty, and waste magnificence, and impudence 561  
courage. And so the young man passes out of his original nature, which was trained in the school of necessity, into the freedom and libertinism of useless and unnecessary pleasures.

Yes, he said, the change in him is visible enough.

He becomes  
a rake; but

After this he lives on, spending his money and labour and time on unnecessary pleasures quite as much as on necessary



ones; but if he be fortunate, and is not too much disordered in his wits, when years have elapsed, and the heyday of passion is over — supposing that he then re-admits into the city some part of the exiled virtues, and does not wholly give himself up to their successors — in that case he balances his pleasures and lives in a sort of equilibrium, putting the government of himself into the hands of the one which comes first and wins the turn; and when he has had enough of that, then into the hands of another; he despises none of them but encourages them all equally.

Very true, he said.

Neither does he receive or let pass into the fortress any true word of advice; if any one says to him that some pleasures are the satisfactions of good and noble desires, and others of evil desires, and that he ought to use and honour some and chastise and master the others — whenever this is repeated to him he shakes his head and says that they are all alike, and that one is as good as another.

Yes, he said; that is the way with him.

Yes, I said, he lives from day to day indulging the appetite of the hour; and sometimes he is lapped in drink and strains of the flute; then he becomes a water-drinker, and tries to get thin; then he takes a turn at gymnastics; sometimes idling and neglecting everything, then once more living the life of a philosopher; often he is busy with politics, and starts to his feet and says and does whatever comes into his head; and, if he is emulous of any one who is a warrior, off he is in that direction, or of men of business, once more in that. His life has neither law nor order; and this distracted existence he terms joy and bliss and freedom; and so he goes on.

Yes, he replied, he is all liberty and equality.

Yes, I said; his life is motley and manifold and an epitome of the lives of many; — he answers to the State which we described as fair and spangled. And many a man and many a woman will take him for their pattern, and many a constitution and many an example of manners is contained in him.

Just so.

562 Let him then be set over against democracy; he may truly be called the democratic man.

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*VIII.*

SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

he also sometimes stops short in his career and gives way to pleasures good and bad indifferently.

He rejects all advice,

passing his life in the alternation from one extreme to another.

He is 'not one, but all mankind's epitome.'

*Republic*  
*VIII.*

SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

Tyranny and  
the tyrant.

Let that be his place, he said.

Last of all comes the most beautiful of all, man and State alike, tyranny and the tyrant; these we have now to consider.

Quite true, he said.

Say then, my friend, In what manner does tyranny arise? —that it has a democratic origin is evident.

Clearly.

And does not tyranny spring from democracy in the same manner as democracy from oligarchy — I mean, after a sort?

How?

The insatiable  
desire of  
wealth creates  
a demand for  
democracy,  
the insatiable  
desire of free-  
dom creates a  
demand for  
tyranny.

The good which oligarchy proposed to itself and the means by which it was maintained was excess of wealth — am I not right?

Yes.

And the insatiable desire of wealth and the neglect of all other things for the sake of money-getting was also the ruin of oligarchy?

True.

And democracy has her own good, of which the insatiable desire brings her to dissolution?

What good?

Freedom, I replied; which, as they tell you in a democracy, is the glory of the State — and that therefore in a democracy alone will the freeman of nature deign to dwell.

Yes; the saying is in everybody's mouth.

I was going to observe, that the insatiable desire of this and the neglect of other things introduces the change in democracy, which occasions a demand for tyranny.

How so?

When a democracy which is thirsting for freedom has evil cup-bearers presiding over the feast, and has drunk too deeply of the strong wine of freedom, then, unless her rulers are very amenable and give a plentiful draught, she calls them to account and punishes them, and says that they are cursed oligarchs.

Yes, he replied, a very common occurrence.

Freedom in  
the end means  
anarchy.

Yes, I said; and loyal citizens are insultingly termed by her slaves who hug their chains and men of naught; she would have subjects who are like rulers, and rulers who are

like subjects: these are men after her own heart, whom she praises and honours both in private and public. Now, in such a State, can liberty have any limit?

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VIII.*

SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

Certainly not.

By degrees the anarchy finds a way into private houses, and ends by getting among the animals and infecting them.

How do you mean?

63 I mean that the father grows accustomed to descend to the level of his sons and to fear them, and the son is on a level with his father, he having no respect or reverence for either of his parents; and this is his freedom, and the metic is equal with the citizen and the citizen with the metic, and the stranger is quite as good as either.

Yes, he said, that is the way.

And these are not the only evils, I said — there are several lesser ones: In such a state of society the master fears and flatters his scholars, and the scholars despise their masters and tutors; young and old are all alike; and the young man is on a level with the old, and is ready to compete with him in word or deed; and old men condescend to the young and are full of pleasantry and gaiety; they are loth to be thought morose and authoritative, and therefore they adopt the manners of the young.

The inversion  
of all social  
relations.

Quite true, he said.

The last extreme of popular liberty is when the slave bought with money, whether male or female, is just as free as his or her purchaser; nor must I forget to tell of the liberty and equality of the two sexes in relation to each other.

Why not, as Aeschylus says, utter the word which rises to our lips?

That is what I am doing, I replied; and I must add that no one who does not know would believe, how much greater is the liberty which the animals who are under the dominion of man have in a democracy than in any other State: for truly, the she-dogs, as the proverb says, are as good as their she-mistresses, and the horses and asses have a way of marching along with all the rights and dignities of freemen; and they will run at anybody who comes in their way if he does not leave the road clear for them: and all things are just ready to burst with liberty.

Freedom  
among the  
animals.



*Republic*  
*VIII.*

SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

No law, no  
authority.

When I take a country walk, he said, I often experience what you describe. You and I have dreamed the same thing.

And above all, I said, and as the result of all, see how sensitive the citizens become; they chafe impatiently at the least touch of authority, and at length, as you know, they cease to care even for the laws, written or unwritten; they will have no one over them.

Yes, he said, I know it too well.

Such, my friend, I said, is the fair and glorious beginning out of which springs tyranny.

Glorious indeed, he said. But what is the next step?

The ruin of oligarchy is the ruin of democracy; the same disease magnified and intensified by liberty overmasters democracy — the truth being that the excessive increase of anything often causes a reaction in the opposite direction; 564 and this is the case not only in the seasons and in vegetable and animal life, but above all in forms of government.

True.

The excess of liberty, whether in States or individuals, seems only to pass into excess of slavery.

Yes, the natural order.

And so tyranny naturally arises out of democracy, and the most aggravated form of tyranny and slavery out of the most extreme form of liberty?

As we might expect.

The common  
evil of oligarchy and  
democracy is  
the class of  
idle spend-  
thrifts.

That, however, was not, as I believe, your question — you rather desired to know what is that disorder which is generated alike in oligarchy and democracy, and is the ruin of both?

Just so, he replied.

Well, I said, I meant to refer to the class of idle spend-thrifts, of whom the more courageous are the leaders and the more timid the followers, the same whom we were comparing to drones, some stingless, and others having stings.

A very just comparison.

Illustration.

These two classes are the plagues of every city in which they are generated, being what phlegm and bile are to the body. And the good physician and lawgiver of the State



ought, like the wise bee-master, to keep them at a distance and prevent, if possible, their ever coming in; and if they have anyhow found a way in, then he should have them and their cells cut out as speedily as possible.

*Republic*  
*VIII.*

SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

Yes, by all means, he said.

Then, in order that we may see clearly what we are doing, let us imagine democracy to be divided, as indeed it is, into three classes; for in the first place freedom creates rather more drones in the democratic than there were in the oligarchical State.

Altogether  
three  
classes in a  
democracy.

That is true.

And in the democracy they are certainly more intensified.

How so?

Because in the oligarchical State they are disqualified and driven from office, and therefore they cannot train or gather strength; whereas in a democracy they are almost the entire ruling power, and while the keener sort speak and act, the rest keep buzzing about the bema and do not suffer a word to be said on the other side; hence in democracies almost everything is managed by the drones.

(1) The  
drones or  
spendthrifts  
who are more  
numerous and  
active than  
in the  
oligarchy.

Very true, he said.

Then there is another class which is always being severed from the mass.

What is that?

They are the orderly class, which in a nation of traders is sure to be the richest.

(2) The  
orderly or  
wealthy class  
who are fed  
upon by  
the drones.

Naturally so.

They are the most squeezable persons and yield the largest amount of honey to the drones.

Why, he said, there is little to be squeezed out of people who have little.

And this is called the wealthy class, and the drones feed upon them.

565 That is pretty much the case, he said.

The people are a third class, consisting of those who work with their own hands; they are not politicians, and have not much to live upon. This, when assembled, is the largest and most powerful class in a democracy.

(3) The  
working class  
who also get  
a share.

True, he said; but then the multitude is seldom willing to congregate unless they get a little honey.

*Republic*  
*VIII.*

SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

The well-to-  
do have to  
defend them-  
selves against  
the people.

The people  
have a pro-  
tector who,  
when once he  
tastes blood,  
is converted  
into a tyrant.

And do they not share? I said. Do not their leaders deprive the rich of their estates and distribute them among the people; at the same time taking care to reserve the larger part for themselves?

Why, yes, he said, to that extent the people do share.

And the persons whose property is taken from them are compelled to defend themselves before the people as they best can?

What else can they do?

And then, although they may have no desire of change, the others charge them with plotting against the people and being friends of oligarchy?

True.

And the end is that when they see the people, not of their own accord, but through ignorance, and because they are deceived by informers, seeking to do them wrong, then at last they are forced to become oligarchs in reality; they do not wish to be, but the sting of the drones torments them and breeds revolution in them.

That is exactly the truth.

Then come impeachments and judgments and trials of one another.

True.

The people have always some champion whom they set over them and nurse into greatness.

Yes, that is their way.

This and no other is the root from which a tyrant springs; when he first appears above ground he is a protector.

Yes, that is quite clear.

How then does a protector begin to change into a tyrant? Clearly when he does what the man is said to do in the tale of the Arcadian temple of Lycaean Zeus.

What tale?

The tale is that he who has tasted the entrails of a single human victim minced up with the entrails of other victims is destined to become a wolf. Did you never hear it?

O yes.

And the protector of the people is like him; having a mob entirely at his disposal, he is not restrained from shedding the blood of kinsmen; by the favourite method of false accusation he brings them into court and murders them,

making the life of man to disappear, and with unholy tongue and lips tasting the blood of his fellow citizens; some he kills and others he banishes, at the same time hinting at the abolition of debts and partition of lands: and after this, what will be his destiny? Must he not either perish at the hands of his enemies, or from being a man become a wolf — that is, a tyrant?

Inevitably.

This, I said, is he who begins to make a party against the rich?

The same.

After a while he is driven out, but comes back, in spite of his enemies, a tyrant full grown.

That is clear.

And if they are unable to expel him, or to get him condemned to death by a public accusation, they conspire to assassinate him.

Yes, he said, that is their usual way.

Then comes the famous request for a body-guard, which is the device of all those who have got thus far in their tyrannical career — ‘Let not the people’s friend,’ as they say, ‘be lost to them.’

Exactly.

The people readily assent; all their fears are for him — they have none for themselves.

Very true.

And when a man who is wealthy and is also accused of being an enemy of the people sees this, then, my friend, as the oracle said to Croesus,

‘By pebbly Hermus’ shore he flees and rests not, and is not ashamed to be a coward<sup>1</sup>.’

And quite right too, said he, for if he were, he would never be ashamed again.

But if he is caught he dies.

Of course.

And he, the protector of whom we spoke, is to be seen, not ‘larding the plain’ with his bulk, but himself the overthrower of many, standing up in the chariot of State with the reins in his hand, no longer protector, but tyrant absolute.

*Republic*  
*VIII.*

SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

After a time  
he is driven  
out, but  
comes back  
a full-grown  
tyrant.

The body-  
guard.

The protector  
standing up  
in the chariot  
of State.

<sup>1</sup> Herod. i. 55.



*Republic*  
*VIII.*

SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

No doubt, he said.

And now let us consider the happiness of the man, and also of the State in which a creature like him is generated.

Yes, he said, let us consider that.

At first, in the early days of his power, he is full of smiles, and he salutes every one whom he meets;—he to be called a tyrant, who is making promises in public and also in private! liberating debtors, and distributing land to the people and his followers, and wanting to be so kind and good to every one!

Of course, he said.

He stirs up  
wars, and  
impoverishes  
his subjects  
by the imposi-  
tion of taxes.

But when he has disposed of foreign enemies by conquest or treaty, and there is nothing to fear from them, then he is 567 always stirring up some war or other, in order that the people may require a leader.

To be sure.

Has he not also another object, which is that they may be impoverished by payment of taxes, and thus compelled to devote themselves to their daily wants and therefore less likely to conspire against him?

Clearly.

And if any of them are suspected by him of having notions of freedom, and of resistance to his authority, he will have a good pretext for destroying them by placing them at the mercy of the enemy; and for all these reasons the tyrant must be always getting up a war.

He must.

Now he begins to grow unpopular.

A necessary result.

Then some of those who joined in setting him up, and who are in power, speak their minds to him and to one another, and the more courageous of them cast in his teeth what is being done.

Yes, that may be expected.

He gets rid of  
his bravest  
and boldest  
followers.

And the tyrant, if he means to rule, must get rid of them; he cannot stop while he has a friend or an enemy who is good for anything.

He cannot.

And therefore he must look about him and see who is valiant, who is high-minded, who is wise, who is wealthy;



happy man, he is the enemy of them all, and must seek occasion against them whether he will or no, until he has made a purgation of the State.

*Republic  
VIII.*

SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

Yes, he said, and a rare purgation.

Yes, I said, not the sort of purgation which the physicians make of the body; for they take away the worse and leave the better part, but he does the reverse.

His purgation  
of the State.

If he is to rule, I suppose that he cannot help himself.

What a blessed alternative, I said:—to be compelled to dwell only with the many bad, and to be by them hated, or not to live at all!

Yes, that is the alternative.

And the more detestable his actions are to the citizens the more satellites and the greater devotion in them will he require?

Certainly.

And who are the devoted band, and where will he procure them?

They will flock to him, he said, of their own accord, if he pays them.

By the dog! I said, here are more drones, of every sort and from every land.

More drones.

Yes, he said, there are.

But will he not desire to get them on the spot?

How do you mean?

He will rob the citizens of their slaves; he will then set them free and enrol them in his body-guard.

To be sure, he said; and he will be able to trust them best of all.

What a blessed creature, I said, must this tyrant be; he has put to death the others and has these for his trusted friends.

He puts to  
death his  
friends and  
lives with the  
slaves whom  
he has enfran-  
chised.

Yes, he said; they are quite of his sort.

Yes, I said, and these are the new citizens whom he has called into existence, who admire him and are his companions, while the good hate and avoid him.

Of course.

Verily, then, tragedy is a wise thing and Euripides a great tragedian.

Euripides and  
the tragedians

Why so?

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*VIII.*

SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

praise  
tyranny,  
which is an  
excellent  
reason for  
expelling  
them from  
our State.

Why, because he is the author of the pregnant saying,

‘ Tyrants are wise by living with the wise ; ’

and he clearly meant to say that they are the wise whom the tyrant makes his companions.

Yes, he said, and he also praises tyranny as godlike ; and many other things of the same kind are said by him and by the other poets.

And therefore, I said, the tragic poets being wise men will forgive us and any others who live after our manner if we do not receive them into our State, because they are the eulogists of tyranny.

Yes, he said, those who have the wit will doubtless forgive us.

But they will continue to go to other cities and attract mobs, and hire voices fair and loud and persuasive, and draw the cities over to tyrannies and democracies.

Very true.

Moreover, they are paid for this and receive honour — the greatest honour, as might be expected, from tyrants, and the next greatest from democracies ; but the higher they ascend our constitution hill, the more their reputation fails, and seems unable from shortness of breath to proceed further.

True.

But we are wandering from the subject : Let us therefore return and enquire how the tyrant will maintain that fair and numerous and various and ever-changing army of his.

The tyrant  
seizes the  
treasures in  
the temples,  
and when  
these fail  
feeds upon  
the people.

If, he said, there are sacred treasures in the city, he will confiscate and spend them ; and in so far as the fortunes of attainted persons may suffice, he will be able to diminish the taxes which he would otherwise have to impose upon the people.

And when these fail?

Why, clearly, he said, then he and his boon companions, whether male or female, will be maintained out of his father's estate.

You mean to say that the people, from whom he has derived his being, will maintain him and his companions?

Yes, he said ; they cannot help themselves.

But what if the people fly into a passion, and aver that a

569 grown-up son ought not to be supported by his father, but that the father should be supported by the son? The father did not bring him into being, or settle him in life, in order that when his son became a man he should himself be the servant of his own servants and should support him and his rabble of slaves and companions; but that his son should protect him, and that by his help he might be emancipated from the government of the rich and aristocratic, as they are termed. And so he bids him and his companions depart, just as any other father might drive out of the house a riotous son and his undesirable associates.

By heaven, he said, then the parent will discover what a monster he has been fostering in his bosom; and, when he wants to drive him out, he will find that he is weak and his son strong.

Why, you do not mean to say that the tyrant will use violence? What! beat his father if he opposes him?

Yes, he will, having first disarmed him.

Then he is a parricide, and a cruel guardian of an aged parent; and this is real tyranny, about which there can be no longer a mistake: as the saying is, the people who would escape the smoke which is the slavery of freemen, has fallen into the fire which is the tyranny of slaves. Thus liberty, getting out of all order and reason, passes into the harshest and bitterest form of slavery.

True, he said.

Very well; and may we not rightly say that we have sufficiently discussed the nature of tyranny, and the manner of the transition from democracy to tyranny?

Yes, quite enough, he said.

*Republic  
VIII.*

SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

They rebel,  
and then he  
beats his  
own parent,  
i. e. the  
people.

## BOOK IX.

*Republic IX.*

SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

LAST of all comes the tyrannical man; about whom we have once more to ask, how is he formed out of the democratical? and how does he live, in happiness or in misery? Steph. 57<sup>1</sup>

Yes, he said, he is the only one remaining.

There is, however, I said, a previous question which remains unanswered.

What question?

A digression  
having a  
purpose.

I do not think that we have adequately determined the nature and number of the appetites, and until this is accomplished the enquiry will always be confused.

Well, he said, it is not too late to supply the omission.

The wild  
beast latent  
in man peers  
forth in sleep.

Very true, I said; and observe the point which I want to understand: Certain of the unnecessary pleasures and appetites I conceive to be unlawful; every one appears to have them, but in some persons they are controlled by the laws and by reason, and the better desires prevail over them — either they are wholly banished or they become few and weak; while in the case of others they are stronger, and there are more of them.

Which appetites do you mean?

I mean those which are awake when the reasoning and human and ruling power is asleep; then the wild beast within us, gorged with meat or drink, starts up and having shaken off sleep, goes forth to satisfy his desires; and there is no conceivable folly or crime — not excepting incest or any other unnatural union, or parricide, or the eating of forbidden food — which at such a time, when he has parted company with all shame and sense, a man may not be ready to commit.

Most true, he said.

The contrast  
of the tem-  
perate

But when a man's pulse is healthy and temperate, and when before going to sleep he has awakened his rational



572 powers, and fed them on noble thoughts and enquiries, collecting himself in meditation; after having first indulged his appetites neither too much nor too little, but just enough to lay them to sleep, and prevent them and their enjoyments and pains from interfering with the higher principle — which he leaves in the solitude of pure abstraction, free to contemplate and aspire to the knowledge of the unknown, whether in past, present, or future: when again he has allayed the passionate element, if he has a quarrel against any one — I say, when, after pacifying the two irrational principles, he rouses up the third, which is reason, before he takes his rest, then, as you know, he attains truth most nearly, and is least likely to be the sport of fantastic and lawless visions.

*Republic IX.*  
SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.  
man whose  
passions are  
under the  
control of  
reason.

I quite agree.

In saying this I have been running into a digression; but the point which I desire to note is that in all of us, even in good men, there is a lawless wild-beast nature, which peers out in sleep. Pray, consider whether I am right, and you agree with me.

Yes, I agree.

And now remember the character which we attributed to the democratic man. He was supposed from his youth upwards to have been trained under a miserly parent, who encouraged the saving appetites in him, but discountenanced the unnecessary, which aim only at amusement and ornament?

Recapitulation.

True.

And then he got into the company of a more refined, licentious sort of people, and taking to all their wanton ways rushed into the opposite extreme from an abhorrence of his father's meanness. At last, being a better man than his corruptors, he was drawn in both directions until he halted midway and led a life, not of vulgar and slavish passion, but of what he deemed moderate indulgence in various pleasures. After this manner the democrat was generated out of the oligarch?

Yes, he said; that was our view of him, and is so still.

And now, I said, years will have passed away, and you must conceive this man, such as he is, to have a son, who is brought up in his father's principles.

I can imagine him.

*Republic IX.*SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

Then you must further imagine the same thing to happen to the son which has already happened to the father:—he is drawn into a perfectly lawless life, which by his seducers is termed perfect liberty; and his father and friends take part with his moderate desires, and the opposite party assist the opposite ones. As soon as these dire magicians and tyrant-makers find that they are losing their hold on him, they contrive to implant in him a master passion, to be lord over his idle and spendthrift lusts—a sort of monstrous winged drone—that is the only image which will adequately describe him. 573

Yes, he said, that is the only adequate image of him.

And when his other lusts, amid clouds of incense and perfumes and garlands and wines, and all the pleasures of a dissolute life, now let loose, come buzzing around him, nourishing to the utmost the sting of desire which they implant in his drone-like nature, then at last this lord of the soul, having Madness for the captain of his guard, breaks out into a frenzy; and if he finds in himself any good opinions or appetites in process of formation<sup>1</sup>, and there is in him any sense of shame remaining, to these better principles he puts an end, and casts them forth until he has purged away temperance and brought in madness to the full.

Yes, he said, that is the way in which the tyrannical man is generated.

And is not this the reason why of old love has been called a tyrant?

I should not wonder.

Further, I said, has not a drunken man also the spirit of a tyrant?

He has.

And you know that a man who is deranged and not right in his mind, will fancy that he is able to rule, not only over men, but also over the gods?

That he will.

And the tyrannical man in the true sense of the word comes into being when, either under the influence of nature, or habit, or both, he becomes drunken, lustful, passionate? O my friend, is not that so?

<sup>1</sup> Or, 'opinions or appetites such as are deemed to be good.'

The tyrannical man is made up of lusts and appetites.

Love, drink, madness are but different forms of tyranny.

Assuredly.

*Republic IX.*

Such is the man and such is his origin. And next, how does he live?

SOCRATES,  
ADEIMANTUS.

Suppose, as people facetiously say, you were to tell me.

I imagine; I said, at the next step in his progress, that there will be feasts and carousals and revellings and courtezans, and all that sort of thing; Love is the lord of the house within him, and orders all the concerns of his soul.

That is certain.

Yes; and every day and every night desires grow up many and formidable, and their demands are many.

They are indeed, he said.

His revenues, if he has any, are soon spent.

True.

Then comes debt and the cutting down of his property.

Of course.

574 When he has nothing left, must not his desires, crowding in the nest like young ravens, be crying aloud for food; and he, goaded on by them, and especially by love himself, who is in a manner the captain of them, is in a frenzy, and would fain discover whom he can defraud or despoil of his property, in order that he may gratify them?

His desires  
become  
greater and  
his means  
less.

Yes, that is sure to be the case.

He must have money, no matter how, if he is to escape horrid pains and pangs.

He must.

And as in himself there was a succession of pleasures, and the new got the better of the old and took away their rights, so he being younger will claim to have more than his father and his mother, and if he has spent his own share of the property, he will take a slice of theirs.

He will rob  
his father and  
mother.

No doubt he will.

And if his parents will not give way, then he will try first of all to cheat and deceive them.

Very true.

And if he fails, then he will use force and plunder them.

Yes, probably.

And if the old man and woman fight for their own, what then, my friend? Will the creature feel any compunction at tyrannizing over them?



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ADEIMANTUS.

He will prefer  
the love of a  
girl or a youth  
to his aged  
parents, and  
may even be  
induced to  
strike them.

Nay, he said, I should not feel at all comfortable about his parents.

But, O heavens! Adeimantus, on account of some new-fangled love of a harlot, who is anything but a necessary connection, can you believe that he would strike the mother who is his ancient friend and necessary to his very existence, and would place her under the authority of the other, when she is brought under the same roof with her; or that, under like circumstances, he would do the same to his withered old father, first and most indispensable of friends, for the sake of some newly-found blooming youth who is the reverse of indispensable?

Yes, indeed, he said; I believe that he would.

Truly, then, I said, a tyrannical son is a blessing to his father and mother.

He is indeed, he replied.

He turns  
highwayman,  
robs temples,  
loses all his  
early prin-  
ciples, and  
becomes in  
waking reality  
the evil  
dream which  
he had in  
sleep.

He first takes their property, and when that fails, and pleasures are beginning to swarm in the hive of his soul, then he breaks into a house, or steals the garments of some nightly wayfarer; next he proceeds to clear a temple. Meanwhile the old opinions which he had when a child, and which gave judgment about good and evil, are overthrown by those others which have just been emancipated, and are now the body-guard of love and share his empire. These in his democratic days, when he was still subject to the laws and to his father, were only let loose in the dreams of sleep. But now that he is under the dominion of Love, he becomes always and in waking reality what he was then very rarely and in a dream only; he will commit the foulest murder, or eat forbidden food, or be guilty of any other horrid act. Love is his tyrant, and lives lordly in him and lawlessly, 575 and being himself a king, leads him on, as a tyrant leads a State, to the performance of any reckless deed by which he can maintain himself and the rabble of his associates, whether those whom evil communications have brought in from without, or those whom he himself has allowed to break loose within him by reason of a similar evil nature in himself. Have we not here a picture of his way of life?

He gathers  
followers  
about him.

Yes, indeed, he said.

And if there are only a few of them in the State, and the



rest of the people are well disposed, they go away and become the body-guard or mercenary soldiers of some other tyrant who may probably want them for a war; and if there is no war, they stay at home and do many little pieces of mischief in the city.

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ADEIMANTUS.

What sort of mischief?

For example, they are the thieves, burglars, cut-purses, foot-pads, robbers of temples, man-stealers of the community; or if they are able to speak they turn informers, and bear false witness, and take bribes.

A small catalogue of evils, even if the perpetrators of them are few in number.

Yes, I said; but small and great are comparative terms, and all these things, in the misery and evil which they inflict upon a State, do not come within a thousand miles of the tyrant; when this noxious class and their followers grow numerous and become conscious of their strength, assisted by the infatuation of the people, they choose from among themselves the one who has most of the tyrant in his own soul, and him they create their tyrant.

A private person can do but little harm in comparison of the tyrant.

Yes, he said, and he will be the most fit to be a tyrant.

If the people yield, well and good; but if they resist him, as he began by beating his own father and mother, so now, if he has the power, he beats them, and will keep his dear old fatherland or motherland, as the Cretans say, in subjection to his young retainers whom he has introduced to be their rulers and masters. This is the end of his passions and desires.

Exactly.

When such men are only private individuals and before they get power, this is their character; they associate entirely with their own flatterers or ready tools; or if they want anything from anybody, they in their turn are equally ready to bow down before them: they profess every sort of affection for them; but when they have gained their point they know them no more.

The behaviour of the tyrant to his early supporters.

Yes, truly.

They are always either the masters or servants and never the friends of anybody; the tyrant never tastes of true freedom or friendship.

He is always either

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ADEIMANTUS,  
GLAUCON.master or  
servant,always  
treacherous,unjust,  
the waking  
reality of our  
dream,a tyrant by  
nature, a  
tyrant in fact.The wicked  
are also the  
most miser-  
able.Like man,  
like State.The opposite  
of the king.

Certainly not.

And may we not rightly call such men treacherous?

No question.

Also they are utterly unjust, if we were right in our notion of justice?

Yes, he said, and we were perfectly right.

Let us then sum up in a word, I said, the character of the worst man: he is the waking reality of what we dreamed.

Most true.

And this is he who being by nature most of a tyrant bears rule, and the longer he lives the more of a tyrant he becomes.

That is certain, said Glaucon, taking his turn to answer.

And will not he who has been shown to be the wickedest, be also the most miserable? and he who has tyrannized longest and most, most continually and truly miserable; although this may not be the opinion of men in general?

Yes, he said, inevitably.

And must not the tyrannical man be like the tyrannical State, and the democratical man like the democratical State: and the same of the others?

Certainly.

And as State is to State in virtue and happiness, so is man in relation to man?

To be sure.

Then comparing our original city, which was under a king, and the city which is under a tyrant, how do they stand as to virtue?

They are the opposite extremes, he said, for one is the very best and the other is the very worst.

There can be no mistake, I said, as to which is which, and therefore I will at once enquire whether you would arrive at a similar decision about their relative happiness and misery. And here we must not allow ourselves to be panic-stricken at the apparition of the tyrant, who is only a unit and may perhaps have a few retainers about him; but let us go as we ought into every corner of the city and look all about, and then we will give our opinion.

A fair invitation, he replied; and I see, as every one must, that a tyranny is the wretchedest form of government, and the rule of a king the happiest.

And in estimating the men too, may I not fairly make a  
77 like request, that I should have a judge whose mind can  
enter into and see through human nature? he must not be  
like a child who looks at the outside and is dazzled at the  
pompous aspect which the tyrannical nature assumes to the  
beholder, but let him be one who has a clear insight. May I  
suppose that the judgment is given in the hearing of us all  
by one who is able to judge, and has dwelt in the same place  
with him, and been present at his daily life and known him  
in his family relations, where he may be seen stripped of his  
tragedy attire, and again in the hour of public danger—he  
shall tell us about the happiness and misery of the tyrant  
when compared with other men?

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GLAUCON.

That again, he said, is a very fair proposal.

Shall I assume that we ourselves are able and experienced  
judges and have before now met with such a person? We  
shall then have some one who will answer our enquiries.

By all means.

Let me ask you not to forget the parallel of the individual  
and the State; bearing this in mind, and glancing in turn  
from one to the other of them, will you tell me their re-  
spective conditions?

What do you mean? he asked.

Beginning with the State, I replied, would you say that a  
city which is governed by a tyrant is free or enslaved?

The State is  
not free, but  
enslaved.

No city, he said, can be more completely enslaved.

And yet, as you see, there are freemen as well as masters  
in such a State?

Yes, he said, I see that there are—a few; but the people,  
speaking generally, and the best of them are miserably  
degraded and enslaved.

Then if the man is like the State, I said, must not the  
same rule prevail? his soul is full of meanness and  
vulgarity—the best elements in him are enslaved; and  
there is a small ruling part, which is also the worst and  
maddest.

Like a slave,  
the tyrant is  
full of mean-  
ness, and the  
ruling part  
of him is  
madness.

Inevitably.

And would you say that the soul of such an one is the soul  
of a freeman, or of a slave?

He has the soul of a slave, in my opinion.



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GLAUCON.The city  
which is sub-  
ject to him is  
goaded by  
a gadfly;

And the State which is enslaved under a tyrant is utterly incapable of acting voluntarily?

Utterly incapable.

And also the soul which is under a tyrant (I am speaking of the soul taken as a whole) is least capable of doing what she desires; there is a gadfly which goads her, and she is full of trouble and remorse?

Certainly.

And is the city which is under a tyrant rich or poor?

Poor.

poor;

And the tyrannical soul must be always poor and insatiable? 578

True.

And must not such a State and such a man be always full of fear?

Yes, indeed.

full of misery.

Is there any State in which you will find more of lamentation and sorrow and groaning and pain?

Certainly not.

And is there any man in whom you will find more of this sort of misery than in the tyrannical man, who is in a fury of passions and desires?

Impossible.

Reflecting upon these and similar evils, you held the tyrannical State to be the most miserable of States?

And I was right, he said.

Also the  
tyrannical  
man is most  
miserable.

Certainly, I said. And when you see the same evils in the tyrannical man, what do you say of him?

I say that he is by far the most miserable of all men.

Yet there is  
a still more  
miserable  
being, the  
tyrannical  
man who is a  
public tyrant.

There, I said, I think that you are beginning to go wrong.

What do you mean?

I do not think that he has as yet reached the utmost extreme of misery.

Then who is more miserable?

One of whom I am about to speak.

Who is that?

He who is of a tyrannical nature, and instead of leading a private life has been cursed with the further misfortune of being a public tyrant.

From what has been said, I gather that you are right.



Yes, I replied, but in this high argument you should be a little more certain, and should not conjecture only; for of all questions, this respecting good and evil is the greatest.

Very true, he said.

Let me then offer you an illustration, which may, I think, throw a light upon this subject.

What is your illustration?

The case of rich individuals in cities who possess many slaves: from them you may form an idea of the tyrant's condition, for they both have slaves; the only difference is that he has more slaves.

Yes, that is the difference.

You know that they live securely and have nothing to apprehend from their servants?

What should they fear?

Nothing. But do you observe the reason of this?

Yes; the reason is, that the whole city is leagued together for the protection of each individual.

Very true, I said. But imagine one of these owners, the master say of some fifty slaves, together with his family and property and slaves, carried off by a god into the wilderness, where there are no freemen to help him — will he not be in an agony of fear lest he and his wife and children should be put to death by his slaves?

9 Yes, he said, he will be in the utmost fear.

The time has arrived when he will be compelled to flatter divers of his slaves, and make many promises to them of freedom and other things, much against his will — he will have to cajole his own servants.

Yes, he said, that will be the only way of saving himself.

And suppose the same god, who carried him away, to surround him with neighbours who will not suffer one man to be the master of another, and who, if they could catch the offender, would take his life?

His case will be still worse, if you suppose him to be everywhere surrounded and watched by enemies.

And is not this the sort of prison in which the tyrant will be bound — he who being by nature such as we have described, is full of all sorts of fears and lusts? His soul is dainty and greedy, and yet alone, of all men in the city, he is never

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In cities there are many great slave-owners, and they help to protect one another.

But suppose a slave-owner and his slaves carried off into the wilderness, what will happen then? Such is the condition of the tyrant.

He is the daintiest of all men and has to endure the hardships of a prison.

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allowed to go on a journey, or to see the things which other freemen desire to see, but he lives in his hole like a woman hidden in the house, and is jealous of any other citizen who goes into foreign parts and sees anything of interest.

Very true, he said.

Miserable in himself, he is still more miserable if he be in a public station.

And amid evils such as these will not he who is ill-governed in his own person — the tyrannical man, I mean — whom you just now decided to be the most miserable of all — will not he be yet more miserable when, instead of leading a private life, he is constrained by fortune to be a public tyrant? He has to be master of others when he is not master of himself: he is like a diseased or paralytic man who is compelled to pass his life, not in retirement, but fighting and combating with other men.

Yes, he said, the similitude is most exact.

He then leads a life worse than the worst,

Is not his case utterly miserable? and does not the actual tyrant lead a worse life than he whose life you determined to be the worst?

Certainly.

in unhappiness,

He who is the real tyrant, whatever men may think, is the real slave, and is obliged to practise the greatest adulation and servility, and to be the flatterer of the vilest of mankind. He has desires which he is utterly unable to satisfy, and has more wants than any one, and is truly poor, if you know how to inspect the whole soul of him: all his life long he is beset with fear and is full of convulsions and distractions, even as the State which he resembles: and surely the resemblance holds?

Very true, he said.

and in wickedness.

Moreover, as we were saying before, he grows worse 580 from having power: he becomes and is of necessity more jealous, more faithless, more unjust, more friendless, more impious, than he was at first; he is the purveyor and cherisher of every sort of vice, and the consequence is that he is supremely miserable, and that he makes everybody else as miserable as himself.

No man of any sense will dispute your words.

The umpire decides that

Come then, I said, and as the general umpire in theatrical contests proclaims the result, do you also decide who in your opinion is first in the scale of happiness, and who second,

and in what order the others follow: there are five of them in all—they are the royal, timocratical, oligarchical, democratical, tyrannical.

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The decision will be easily given, he replied; they shall be choruses coming on the stage, and I must judge them in the order in which they enter, by the criterion of virtue and vice, happiness and misery.

Need we hire a herald, or shall I announce, that the son of Ariston [the best] has decided that the best and justest is also the happiest, and that this is he who is the most royal man and king over himself; and that the worst and most unjust man is also the most miserable, and that this is he who being the greatest tyrant of himself is also the greatest tyrant of his State?

the best is the  
happiest and  
the worst is  
the most  
miserable.  
This is the  
proclamation  
of the son of  
Ariston.

Make the proclamation yourself, he said.

And shall I add, 'whether seen or unseen by gods and men'?

Let the words be added.

Then this, I said, will be our first proof; and there is another, which may also have some weight.

What is that?

The second proof is derived from the nature of the soul: seeing that the individual soul, like the State, has been divided by us into three principles, the division may, I think, furnish a new demonstration.

Proof, derived  
from the three  
principles of  
the soul.

Of what nature?

It seems to me that to these three principles three pleasures correspond; also three desires and governing powers.

How do you mean? he said.

There is one principle with which, as we were saying, a man learns, another with which he is angry; the third, having many forms, has no special name, but is denoted by the general term appetitive, from the extraordinary strength and vehemence of the desires of eating and drinking and the other sensual appetites which are the main elements of it; also money-loving, because such desires are generally satisfied by the help of money.

That is true, he said.

If we were to say that the loves and pleasures of this third part were concerned with gain, we should then be

(1) The  
appetitive:



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able to fall back on a single notion; and might truly and intelligibly describe this part of the soul as loving gain or money.

I agree with you.

Again, is not the passionate element wholly set on ruling and conquering and getting fame?

True.

(2) The  
ambitious:

Suppose we call it the contentious or ambitious — would the term be suitable?

Extremely suitable.

(3) The  
principle of  
knowledge  
and truth.

On the other hand, every one sees that the principle of knowledge is wholly directed to the truth, and cares less than either of the others for gain or fame.

Far less.

'Lover of wisdom,' 'lover of knowledge,' are titles which we may fitly apply to that part of the soul?

Certainly.

One principle prevails in the souls of one class of men, another in others, as may happen?

Yes.

Then we may begin by assuming that there are three classes of men — lovers of wisdom, lovers of honour, lovers of gain?

Exactly.

And there are three kinds of pleasure, which are their several objects?

Very true.

Each will  
depreciate  
the others,  
but only the  
philosopher  
has the power  
to judge,

Now, if you examine the three classes of men, and ask of them in turn which of their lives is pleasantest, each will be found praising his own and depreciating that of others: the money-maker will contrast the vanity of honour or of learning if they bring no money with the solid advantages of gold and silver?

True, he said.

And the lover of honour — what will be his opinion? Will he not think that the pleasure of riches is vulgar, while the pleasure of learning, if it brings no distinction, is all smoke and nonsense to him?

Very true.



And are we to suppose<sup>1</sup>, I said, that the philosopher sets any value on other pleasures in comparison with the pleasure of knowing the truth, and in that pursuit abiding, ever learning, not so far indeed from the heaven of pleasure? Does he not call the other pleasures necessary, under the idea that if there were no necessity for them, he would rather not have them?

There can be no doubt of that, he replied.

Since, then, the pleasures of each class and the life of each are in dispute, and the question is not which life is more or less honourable, or better or worse, but which is the more pleasant or painless — how shall we know who speaks truly?

I cannot myself tell, he said.

Well, but what ought to be the criterion? Is any better than experience and wisdom and reason?

There cannot be a better, he said.

Then, I said, reflect. Of the three individuals, which has the greatest experience of all the pleasures which we enumerated? Has the lover of gain, in learning the nature of essential truth, greater experience of the pleasure of knowledge than the philosopher has of the pleasure of gain?

The philosopher, he replied, has greatly the advantage; for he has of necessity always known the taste of the other pleasures from his childhood upwards: but the lover of gain in all his experience has not of necessity tasted — or, I should rather say, even had he desired, could hardly have tasted — the sweetness of learning and knowing truth.

Then the lover of wisdom has a great advantage over the lover of gain, for he has a double experience?

Yes, very great.

Again, has he greater experience of the pleasures of honour, or the lover of honour of the pleasures of wisdom?

Nay, he said, all three are honoured in proportion as they attain their object; for the rich man and the brave man and the wise man alike have their crowd of admirers, and as they all receive honour they all have experience of the pleasures of honour; but the delight which is to be found

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because he alone has experience of the highest pleasures and is also acquainted with the lower.

<sup>1</sup> Reading with Grasere and Hermann *τι οἰώμεθα*, and omitting *οὐδὲν*, which is not found in the best MSS.

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in the knowledge of true being is known to the philosopher only.

His experience, then, will enable him to judge better than any one?

Far better.

And he is the only one who has wisdom as well as experience?

Certainly.

Further, the very faculty which is the instrument of judgment is not possessed by the covetous or ambitious man, but only by the philosopher?

What faculty?

Reason, with whom, as we were saying, the decision ought to rest.

Yes.

And reasoning is peculiarly his instrument?

Certainly.

If wealth and gain were the criterion, then the praise or blame of the lover of gain would surely be the most trustworthy?

Assuredly.

Or if honour or victory or courage, in that case the judgment of the ambitious or pugnacious would be the truest?

Clearly.

But since experience and wisdom and reason are the judges —

The only inference possible, he replied, is that pleasures which are approved by the lover of wisdom and reason are the truest.

And so we arrive at the result, that the pleasure of the intelligent part of the soul is the pleasantest of the three, 583 and that he of us in whom this is the ruling principle has the pleasantest life.

Unquestionably, he said, the wise man speaks with authority when he approves of his own life.

And what does the judge affirm to be the life which is next, and the pleasure which is next?

Clearly that of the soldier and lover of honour; who is nearer to himself than the money-maker.

Last comes the lover of gain?

The philosopher alone having both judgment and experience,

the pleasures which he approves are the true pleasures: he places  
(1) the love of wisdom,  
(2) the love of honour,  
(3) and lowest the love of gain.

Very true, he said.

Twice in succession, then, has the just man overthrown the unjust in this conflict; and now comes the third trial, which is dedicated to Olympian Zeus the saviour: a sage whispers in my ear that no pleasure except that of the wise is quite true and pure—all others are a shadow only; and surely this will prove the greatest and most decisive of falls?

Yes, the greatest; but will you explain yourself?

I will work out the subject and you shall answer my questions.

Proceed.

Say, then, is not pleasure opposed to pain?

True.

And there is a neutral state which is neither pleasure nor pain?

There is.

A state which is intermediate, and a sort of repose of the soul about either—that is what you mean?

Yes.

You remember what people say when they are sick?

What do they say?

That after all nothing is pleasanter than health. But then they never knew this to be the greatest of pleasures until they were ill.

Yes, I know, he said.

And when persons are suffering from acute pain, you must have heard them say that there is nothing pleasanter than to get rid of their pain?

I have.

And there are many other cases of suffering in which the mere rest and cessation of pain, and not any positive enjoyment, is extolled by them as the greatest pleasure?

Yes, he said; at the time they are pleased and well content to be at rest.

Again, when pleasure ceases, that sort of rest or cessation will be painful?

Doubtless, he said.

Then the intermediate state of rest will be pleasure and will also be pain?

So it would seem.

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True pleasure is not relative but absolute.

The states intermediate between pleasure and pain are termed pleasures or pains only in relation to their opposites.

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But can that which is neither become both?

I should say not.

And both pleasure and pain are motions of the soul, are they not?

Yes.

Pleasure and pain are said to be states of rest, but they are really motions.

But that which is neither was just now shown to be rest 584 and not motion, and in a mean between them?

Yes.

How, then, can we be right in supposing that the absence of pain is pleasure, or that the absence of pleasure is pain?

Impossible.

This then is an appearance only and not a reality; that is to say, the rest is pleasure at the moment and in comparison of what is painful, and painful in comparison of what is pleasant; but all these representations, when tried by the test of true pleasure, are not real but a sort of imposition?

That is the inference.

All pleasures are not merely cessations of pains, or pains of pleasures; e. g. the pleasures of smell are not.

Look at the other class of pleasures which have no antecedent pains and you will no longer suppose, as you perhaps may at present, that pleasure is only the cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure.

What are they, he said, and where shall I find them?

There are many of them: take as an example the pleasures of smell, which are very great and have no antecedent pains; they come in a moment, and when they depart leave no pain behind them.

Most true, he said.

Let us not, then, be induced to believe that pure pleasure is the cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure.

No.

Still, the more numerous and violent pleasures which reach the soul through the body are generally of this sort — they are reliefs of pain.

That is true.

And the anticipations of future pleasures and pains are of a like nature?

Yes.

Shall I give you an illustration of them?

Let me hear.



You would allow, I said, that there is in nature an upper and lower and middle region?

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I should.

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And if a person were to go from the lower to the middle region, would he not imagine that he is going up; and he who is standing in the middle and sees whence he has come, would imagine that he is already in the upper region, if he has never seen the true upper world?

Illustrations  
of the un-  
reality of  
certain plea-  
sures.

To be sure, he said; how can he think otherwise?

But if he were taken back again he would imagine, and truly imagine, that he was descending?

No doubt.

All that would arise out of his ignorance of the true upper and middle and lower regions?

Yes.

Then can you wonder that persons who are inexperienced in the truth, as they have wrong ideas about many other things, should also have wrong ideas about pleasure and pain and the intermediate state; so that when they are only being drawn towards the painful they feel pain and think the pain which they experience to be real, and in like manner, when  
585 drawn away from pain to the neutral or intermediate state, they firmly believe that they have reached the goal of satiety and pleasure; they, not knowing pleasure, err in contrasting pain with the absence of pain, which is like contrasting black with grey instead of white — can you wonder, I say, at this?

No, indeed; I should be much more disposed to wonder at the opposite.

Look at the matter thus: — Hunger, thirst, and the like, are inanitions of the bodily state?

Yes.

And ignorance and folly are inanitions of the soul?

True.

And food and wisdom are the corresponding satisfactions of either?

Certainly.

And is the satisfaction derived from that which has less or from that which has more existence the truer?

The intel-  
lectual more  
real than the  
sensual.

Clearly, from that which has more

What classes of things have a greater share of pure

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existence in your judgment — those of which food and drink and condiments and all kinds of sustenance are examples, or the class which contains true opinion and knowledge and mind and all the different kinds of virtue? Put the question in this way:— Which has a more pure being — that which is concerned with the invariable, the immortal, and the true, and is of such a nature, and is found in such natures; or that which is concerned with and found in the variable and mortal, and is itself variable and mortal?

Far purer, he replied, is the being of that which is concerned with the invariable.

And does the essence of the invariable partake of knowledge in the same degree as of essence?

Yes, of knowledge in the same degree.

And of truth in the same degree?

Yes.

And, conversely, that which has less of truth will also have less of essence?

Necessarily.

Then, in general, those kinds of things which are in the service of the body have less of truth and essence than those which are in the service of the soul?

Far less.

And has not the body itself less of truth and essence than the soul?

Yes.

What is filled with more real existence, and actually has a more real existence, is more really filled than that which is filled with less real existence and is less real?

Of course.

And if there be a pleasure in being filled with that which is according to nature, that which is more really filled with more real being will more really and truly enjoy true pleasure; whereas that which participates in less real being will be less truly and surely satisfied, and will participate in an illusory and less real pleasure?

Unquestionably.

Those then who know not wisdom and virtue, and are 586  
always busy with gluttony and sensuality, go down and up again as far as the mean; and in this region they move at

The pleasures of the sensual and also of the passionate element are unreal and mixed.

random throughout life, but they never pass into the true upper world; thither they neither look, nor do they ever find their way, neither are they truly filled with true being, nor do they taste of pure and abiding pleasure. Like cattle, with their eyes always looking down and their heads stooping to the earth, that is, to the dining-table, they fatten and feed and breed, and, in their excessive love of these delights, they kick and butt at one another with horns and hoofs which are made of iron; and they kill one another by reason of their insatiable lust. For they fill themselves with that which is not substantial, and the part of themselves which they fill is also unsubstantial and incontinent.

*Republic IX.*  
SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Verily, Socrates, said Glaucon, you describe the life of the many like an oracle.

Their pleasures are mixed with pains—how can they be otherwise? For they are mere shadows and pictures of the true, and are coloured by contrast, which exaggerates both light and shade, and so they implant in the minds of fools insane desires of themselves; and they are fought about as Stesichorus says that the Greeks fought about the shadow of Helen at Troy in ignorance of the truth.

Something of that sort must inevitably happen.

And must not the like happen with the spirited or passionate element of the soul? Will not the passionate man who carries his passion into action, be in the like case, whether he is envious and ambitious, or violent and contentious, or angry and discontented, if he be seeking to attain honour and victory and the satisfaction of his anger without reason or sense?

Yes, he said, the same will happen with the spirited element also.

Then may we not confidently assert that the lovers of money and honour, when they seek their pleasures under the guidance and in the company of reason and knowledge, and pursue after and win the pleasures which wisdom shows them, will also have the truest pleasures in the highest degree which is attainable to them, inasmuch as they follow truth; and they will have the pleasures which are natural to them, if that which is best for each one is also most natural to him?

Both kinds of pleasures are attained in the highest degree when the desires which seek them are under the guidance of reason.

Yes, certainly; the best is the most natural.



*Republic IX.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

And when the whole soul follows the philosophical principle, and there is no division, the several parts are just, and do each of them their own business, and enjoy severally 587 the best and truest pleasures of which they are capable?

Exactly.

But when either of the two other principles prevails, it fails in attaining its own pleasure, and compels the rest to pursue after a pleasure which is a shadow only and which is not their own?

True.

And the greater the interval which separates them from philosophy and reason, the more strange and illusive will be the pleasure?

Yes.

And is not that farthest from reason which is at the greatest distance from law and order?

Clearly.

And the lustful and tyrannical desires are, as we saw, at the greatest distance?

Yes.

And the royal and orderly desires are nearest?

Yes.

Then the tyrant will live at the greatest distance from true or natural pleasure, and the king at the least?

Certainly.

But if so, the tyrant will live most unpleasantly, and the king most pleasantly?

Inevitably.

Would you know the measure of the interval which separates them?

Will you tell me?

There appear to be three pleasures, one genuine and two spurious: now the transgression of the tyrant reaches a point beyond the spurious; he has run away from the region of law and reason, and taken up his abode with certain slave pleasures which are his satellites, and the measure of his inferiority can only be expressed in a figure.

How do you mean?

I assume, I said, that the tyrant is in the third place from the oligarch; the democrat was in the middle?

The measure  
of the inter-  
val which  
separates  
the king  
from the  
tyrant,



Yes.

*Republic IX.*

And if there is truth in what has preceded, he will be wedded to an image of pleasure which is thrice removed as to truth from the pleasure of the oligarch?

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

He will.

And the oligarch is third from the royal; since we count as one royal and aristocratical?

Yes, he is third.

Then the tyrant is removed from true pleasure by the space of a number which is three times three?

expressed  
under the  
symbol of  
a cube cor-  
responding  
to the num-  
ber 729,

Manifestly.

The shadow then of tyrannical pleasure determined by the number of length will be a plane figure.

Certainly.

And if you raise the power and make the plane a solid, there is no difficulty in seeing how vast is the interval by which the tyrant is parted from the king.

Yes; the arithmetician will easily do the sum.

Or if some person begins at the other end and measures the interval by which the king is parted from the tyrant in truth of pleasure, he will find him, when the multiplication is completed, living 729 times more pleasantly, and the tyrant more painfully by this same interval.

588 What a wonderful calculation! And how enormous is the distance which separates the just from the unjust in regard to pleasure and pain!

Yet a true calculation, I said, and a number which nearly concerns human life, if human beings are concerned with days and nights and months and years<sup>1</sup>.

which is  
*nearly* the  
number of  
days and  
nights in a  
year.

Yes, he said, human life is certainly concerned with them.

Then if the good and just man be thus superior in pleasure to the evil and unjust, his superiority will be infinitely greater in propriety of life and in beauty and virtue?

Immeasurably greater.

Well, I said, and now having arrived at this stage of the argument, we may revert to the words which brought us hither: Was not some one saying that injustice was a gain to the perfectly unjust who was reputed to be just?

Refutation  
of Thra-  
symachus.

Yes, that was said.

<sup>1</sup> 729 *nearly* equals the number of days and nights in the year.

*Republic IX.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Now then, having determined the power and quality of justice and injustice, let us have a little conversation with him.

What shall we say to him?

Let us make an image of the soul, that he may have his own words presented before his eyes.

Of what sort?

The triple animal who has outwardly the image of a man.

An ideal image of the soul, like the composite creations of ancient mythology, such as the Chimera or Scylla or Cerberus, and there are many others in which two or more different natures are said to grow into one.

There are said to have been such unions.

Then do you now model the form of a multitudinous, many-headed monster, having a ring of heads of all manner of beasts, tame and wild, which he is able to generate and metamorphose at will.

You suppose marvellous powers in the artist; but, as language is more pliable than wax or any similar substance, let there be such a model as you propose.

Suppose now that you make a second form as of a lion, and a third of a man, the second smaller than the first, and the third smaller than the second.

That, he said, is an easier task; and I have made them as you say.

And now join them, and let the three grow into one.

That has been accomplished.

Next fashion the outside of them into a single image, as of a man, so that he who is not able to look within, and sees only the outer hull, may believe the beast to be a single human creature.

I have done so, he said.

Will any one say that we should strengthen the monster and the lion at the expense of the man?

And now, to him who maintains that it is profitable for the human creature to be unjust, and unprofitable to be just, let us reply that, if he be right, it is profitable for this creature to feast the multitudinous monster and strengthen the lion and the lion-like qualities, but to starve and weaken the man, 589 who is consequently liable to be dragged about at the mercy of either of the other two; and he is not to attempt to familiarize or harmonize them with one another—he ought rather to suffer them to fight and bite and devour one another.

Certainly, he said; that is what the approver of injustice says. *Republic IX.*

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

To him the supporter of justice makes answer that he should ever so speak and act as to give the man within him in some way or other the most complete mastery over the entire human creature. He should watch over the many-headed monster like a good husbandman, fostering and cultivating the gentle qualities, and preventing the wild ones from growing; he should be making the lion-heart his ally, and in common care of them all should be uniting the several parts with one another and with himself.

Yes, he said, that is quite what the maintainer of justice will say.

And so from every point of view, whether of pleasure, honour, or advantage, the approver of justice is right and speaks the truth, and the disapprover is wrong and false and ignorant?

Yes, from every point of view.

Come, now, and let us gently reason with the unjust, who is not intentionally in error. 'Sweet Sir,' we will say to him, 'what think you of things esteemed noble and ignoble? Is not the noble that which subjects the beast to the man, or rather to the god in man; and the ignoble that which subjects the man to the beast?' He can hardly avoid saying Yes — can he now?

For the noble principle subjects the beast to the man, the ignoble the man to the beast.

Not if he has any regard for my opinion.

But, if he agree so far, we may ask him to answer another question: 'Then how would a man profit if he received gold and silver on the condition that he was to enslave the noblest part of him to the worst? Who can imagine that a man who sold his son or daughter into slavery for money, especially if he sold them into the hands of fierce and evil men, would be the gainer, however large might be the sum which he received? And will any one say that he is not a miserable caitiff who remorselessly sells his own divine being to that which is most godless and detestable? Eriphyle took the necklace as the price of her husband's life, but he is taking a bribe in order to compass a worse ruin.'

A man would not be the gainer if he sold his child: how much worse to sell his soul!

Yes, said Glaucon, far worse — I will answer for him.

Has not the intemperate been censured of old, because in

590



*Republic IX.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Proofs:—

(1) Men are  
blamed for  
the predomi-  
nance of  
the lower  
nature,

him the huge multiform monster is allowed to be too much at large?

Clearly.

And men are blamed for pride and bad temper when the lion and serpent element in them disproportionately grows and gains strength?

Yes.

And luxury and softness are blamed, because they relax and weaken this same creature, and make a coward of him?

Very true.

And is not a man reproached for flattery and meanness who subordinates the spirited animal to the unruly monster, and, for the sake of money, of which he can never have enough, habituates him in the days of his youth to be trampled in the mire, and from being a lion to become a monkey?

True, he said.

as well as for  
the meanness  
of their em-  
ployments  
and char-  
acter:

And why are mean employments and manual arts a reproach? Only because they imply a natural weakness of the higher principle; the individual is unable to control the creatures within him, but has to court them, and his great study is how to flatter them.

Such appears to be the reason.

(2) It is ad-  
mitted that  
every one  
should be the  
servant of a  
divine rule,  
or at any rate  
be kept under  
control by  
an external  
authority:

And therefore, being desirous of placing him under a rule like that of the best, we say that he ought to be the servant of the best, in whom the Divine rules; not, as Thrasymachus supposed, to the injury of the servant, but because every one had better be ruled by divine wisdom dwelling within him; or, if this be impossible, then by an external authority, in order that we may be all, as far as possible, under the same government, friends and equals.

True, he said.

(3) The care  
taken of chil-  
dren shows  
that we seek  
to establish  
in them a  
higher prin-  
ciple.

And this is clearly seen to be the intention of the law, which is the ally of the whole city; and is seen also in the authority which we exercise over children, and the refusal to let them be free until we have established in them a principle analogous to the constitution of a state, and by cultivation of this higher element have set up in their hearts a guardian and ruler like our own, and when this is done they may go their ways. 591

Yes, he said, the purpose of the law is manifest.



From what point of view, then, and on what ground can we say that a man is profited by injustice or intemperance or other baseness, which will make him a worse man, even though he acquire money or power by his wickedness?

*Republic IX.*  
SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON

From no point of view at all.

What shall he profit, if his injustice be undetected and unpunished? He who is undetected only gets worse, whereas he who is detected and punished has the brutal part of his nature silenced and humanized; the gentler element in him is liberated, and his whole soul is perfected and ennobled by the acquirement of justice and temperance and wisdom, more than the body ever is by receiving gifts of beauty, strength and health, in proportion as the soul is more honourable than the body.

The wise man will employ his energies in freeing and harmonizing the nobler elements of his nature and in regulating his bodily habits.

Certainly, he said.

To this nobler purpose the man of understanding will devote the energies of his life. And in the first place, he will honour studies which impress these qualities on his soul, and will disregard others?

Clearly, he said.

In the next place, he will regulate his bodily habit and training, and so far will he be from yielding to brutal and irrational pleasures, that he will regard even health as quite a secondary matter; his first object will be not that he may be fair or strong or well, unless he is likely thereby to gain temperance, but he will always desire so to attemper the body as to preserve the harmony of the soul?

His first aim not health but harmony of soul.

Certainly he will, if he has true music in him.

And in the acquisition of wealth there is a principle of order and harmony which he will also observe; he will not allow himself to be dazzled by the foolish applause of the world, and heap up riches to his own infinite harm?

Certainly not, he said.

He will look at the city which is within him, and take heed that no disorder occur in it, such as might arise either from superfluity or from want; and upon this principle he will regulate his property and gain or spend according to his means.

He will not heap up riches,

Very true.

And, for the same reason, he will gladly accept and enjoy

*Republic IX.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

and he will  
only accept  
such political  
honours as  
will not de-  
teriorate his  
character.

He has a city  
of his own,  
and the ideal  
pattern of  
this will be  
the law of  
his life.

such honours as he deems likely to make him a better man; 592  
but those, whether private or public, which are likely to  
disorder his life, he will avoid?

Then, if that is his motive, he will not be a statesman.

By the dog of Egypt, he will! in the city which is his own  
he certainly will, though in the land of his birth perhaps not,  
unless he have a divine call.

I understand; you mean that he will be a ruler in the city  
of which we are the founders, and which exists in idea only;  
for I do not believe that there is such an one anywhere on  
earth?

In heaven, I replied, there is laid up a pattern of it,  
methinks, which he who desires may behold, and beholding,  
may set his own house in order<sup>1</sup>. But whether such an one  
exists, or ever will exist in fact, is no matter; for he will live  
after the manner of that city, having nothing to do with any  
other.

I think so, he said.

<sup>1</sup> Or 'take up his abode there.'

## BOOK X.

Steph. OF the many excellences which I perceive in the order of  
595 our State, there is none which upon reflection pleases me  
better than the rule about poetry. *Republic X.*  
SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

To what do you refer?

To the rejection of imitative poetry, which certainly ought  
not to be received; as I see far more clearly now that  
the parts of the soul have been distinguished.

What do you mean?

Speaking in confidence, for I should not like to have my  
words repeated to the tragedians and the rest of the imitative  
tribe—but I do not mind saying to you, that all poetical  
imitations are ruinous to the understanding of the hearers,  
and that the knowledge of their true nature is the only  
antidote to them. *Poetical imitations are ruinous to the mind of the hearer.*

Explain the purport of your remark.

Well, I will tell you, although I have always from my  
earliest youth had an awe and love of Homer, which even  
now makes the words falter on my lips, for he is the great  
captain and teacher of the whole of that charming tragic  
company; but a man is not to be revered more than  
the truth, and therefore I will speak out.

Very good, he said.

Listen to me then, or rather, answer me.

Put your question.

Can you tell me what imitation is? for I really do not  
know. *The nature of imitation.*

A likely thing, then, that I should know.

596 Why not? for the duller eye may often see a thing sooner  
than the keener.

Very true, he said; but in your presence, even if I had any

*Republic X.*  
SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

faint notion, I could not muster courage to utter it. Will you enquire yourself?

Well then, shall we begin the enquiry in our usual manner: Whenever a number of individuals have a common name, we assume them to have also a corresponding idea or form:—do you understand me?

I do.

Let us take any common instance; there are beds and tables in the world — plenty of them, are there not?

Yes.

But there are only two ideas or forms of them — one the idea of a bed, the other of a table.

True.

And the maker of either of them makes a bed or he makes a table for our use, in accordance with the idea — that is our way of speaking in this and similar instances — but no artificer makes the ideas themselves: how could he?

Impossible.

And there is another artist,—I should like to know what you would say of him.

Who is he?

One who is the maker of all the works of all other workmen.

What an extraordinary man!

Wait a little, and there will be more reason for your saying so. For this is he who is able to make not only vessels of every kind, but plants and animals, himself and all other things — the earth and heaven, and the things which are in heaven or under the earth; he makes the gods also.

He must be a wizard and no mistake.

Oh! you are incredulous, are you? Do you mean that there is no such maker or creator, or that in one sense there might be a maker of all these things but in another not? Do you see that there is a way in which you could make them all yourself?

What way?

An easy way enough; or rather, there are many ways in which the feat might be quickly and easily accomplished, none quicker than that of turning a mirror round and round — you would soon enough make the sun and the heavens, and the earth and yourself, and other animals and plants, and

The idea is one, but the objects comprehended under it are many.

The universal creator an extraordinary person. But note also that everybody is a creator in a sense. For all things may be made by the reflection of them in a mirror.



all the other things of which we were just now speaking, in the mirror. *Republic X.*

Yes, he said ; but they would be appearances only.

Very good, I said, you are coming to the point now. And the painter too is, as I conceive, just such another — a creator of appearances, is he not?

Of course.

But then I suppose you will say that what he creates is untrue. And yet there is a sense in which the painter also creates a bed?

Yes, he said, but not a real bed.

597 And what of the maker of the bed? were you not saying that he too makes, not the idea which, according to our view, is the essence of the bed, but only a particular bed?

Yes, I did.

Then if he does not make that which exists he cannot make true existence, but only some semblance of existence ; and if any one were to say that the work of the maker of the bed, or of any other workman, has real existence, he could hardly be supposed to be speaking the truth.

At any rate, he replied, philosophers would say that he was not speaking the truth.

No wonder, then, that his work too is an indistinct expression of truth.

No wonder.

Suppose now that by the light of the examples just offered we enquire who this imitator is?

If you please.

Well then, here are three beds: one existing in nature, which is made by God, as I think that we may say — for no one else can be the maker?

Three beds  
and three  
makers of  
beds.

No.

There is another which is the work of the carpenter?

Yes.

And the work of the painter is a third?

Yes.

Beds, then, are of three kinds, and there are three artists who superintend them: God, the maker of the bed, and the painter?

Yes, there are three of them.

*Republic X.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.(1) The  
creator.God could  
only make  
one bed; if  
he made two,  
a third would  
still appear  
behind them.

God, whether from choice or from necessity, made one bed in nature and one only; two or more such ideal beds neither ever have been nor ever will be made by God.

Why is that?

Because even if He had made but two, a third would still appear behind them which both of them would have for their idea, and that would be the ideal bed and not the two others.

Very true, he said.

God knew this, and He desired to be the real maker of a real bed, not a particular maker of a particular bed, and therefore He created a bed which is essentially and by nature one only.

So we believe.

Shall we, then, speak of Him as the natural author or maker of the bed?

Yes, he replied; inasmuch as by the natural process of creation He is the author of this and of all other things.

(2) The  
human  
maker.

And what shall we say of the carpenter — is not he also the maker of the bed?

Yes.

But would you call the painter a creator and maker?

Certainly not.

Yet if he is not the maker, what is he in relation to the bed?

(3) The imi-  
tator, i.e. the  
painter or  
poet,

I think, he said, that we may fairly designate him as the imitator of that which the others make.

Good, I said; then you call him who is third in the descent from nature an imitator?

Certainly, he said.

And the tragic poet is an imitator, and therefore, like all other imitators, he is thrice removed from the king and from the truth?

That appears to be so.

Then about the imitator we are agreed. And what about the painter?—I would like to know whether he may be thought to imitate that which originally exists in nature, or only the creations of artists?

The latter.

As they are or as they appear? you have still to determine this.

What do you mean?

I mean, that you may look at a bed from different points of view, obliquely or directly or from any other point of view, and the bed will appear different, but there is no difference in reality. And the same of all things.

Yes, he said, the difference is only apparent.

Now let me ask you another question: Which is the art of painting designed to be — an imitation of things as they are, or as they appear — of appearance or of reality?

Of appearance.

Then the imitator, I said, is a long way off the truth, and can do all things because he lightly touches on a small part of them, and that part an image. For example: A painter will paint a cobbler, carpenter, or any other artist, though he knows nothing of their arts; and, if he is a good artist, he may deceive children or simple persons, when he shows them his picture of a carpenter from a distance, and they will fancy that they are looking at a real carpenter.

Certainly.

And whenever any one informs us that he has found a man who knows all the arts, and all things else that anybody knows, and every single thing with a higher degree of accuracy than any other man — whoever tells us this, I think that we can only imagine him to be a simple creature who is likely to have been deceived by some wizard or actor whom he met, and whom he thought all-knowing, because he himself was unable to analyse the nature of knowledge and ignorance and imitation.

Most true.

And so, when we hear persons saying that the tragedians, and Homer, who is at their head, know all the arts and all things human, virtue as well as vice, and divine things too, for that the good poet cannot compose well unless he knows his subject, and that he who has not this knowledge can never be a poet, we ought to consider whether here also there may not be a similar illusion. Perhaps they may have come across imitators and been deceived by them; they may not have remembered when they saw their works that these were but imitations thrice removed from the truth, and could easily be made without any knowledge of the truth,

*Republic A.*

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

whose art is  
one of imita-  
tion or ap-  
pearance and  
a long way  
removed from  
the truth.

Any one who  
does all  
things does  
only a very  
small part of  
them.

Any one who  
pretends to  
know all  
things is ig-  
norant of the  
very nature of  
knowledge.

And he who  
attributes  
such uni-  
versal know-  
ledge to the  
poets is  
similarly  
deceived.



*Republic X.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.He who  
could make  
the original  
would not  
make the  
image.If Homer  
had been a  
legislator,  
or general,  
or inventor,

because they are appearances only and not realities? Or, after all, they may be in the right, and poets do really know the things about which they seem to the many to speak so well?

The question, he said, should by all means be considered.

Now do you suppose that if a person were able to make the original as well as the image, he would seriously devote himself to the image-making branch? Would he allow imitation to be the ruling principle of his life, as if he had nothing higher in him?

I should say not.

The real artist, who knew what he was imitating, would be interested in realities and not in imitations; and would desire to leave as memorials of himself works many and fair; and, instead of being the author of encomiums, he would prefer to be the theme of them.

Yes, he said, that would be to him a source of much greater honour and profit.

Then, I said, we must put a question to Homer; not about medicine, or any of the arts to which his poems only incidentally refer: we are not going to ask him, or any other poet, whether he has cured patients like Asclepius, or left behind him a school of medicine such as the Asclepiads were, or whether he only talks about medicine and other arts at second-hand; but we have a right to know respecting military tactics, politics, education, which are the chiefest and noblest subjects of his poems, and we may fairly ask him about them. 'Friend Homer,' then we say to him, 'if you are only in the second remove from truth in what you say of virtue, and not in the third — not an image maker or imitator — and if you are able to discern what pursuits make men better or worse in private or public life, tell us what State was ever better governed by your help? The good order of Lacedaemon is due to Lycurgus, and many other cities great and small have been similarly benefited by others; but who says that you have been a good legislator to them and have done them any good? Italy and Sicily boast of Charondas, and there is Solon who is renowned among us; but what city has anything to say about you?' Is there any city which he might name?

I think not, said Glaucon; not even the Homerids themselves pretend that he was a legislator.



600 Well, but is there any war on record which was carried on successfully by him, or aided by his counsels, when he was alive? *Republic X.*  
SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

There is not.

Or is there any invention<sup>1</sup> of his, applicable to the arts or to human life, such as Thales the Milesian or Anacharsis the Scythian, and other ingenious men have conceived, which is attributed to him?

There is absolutely nothing of the kind.

But, if Homer never did any public service, was he privately a guide or teacher of any? Had he in his lifetime friends who loved to associate with him, and who handed down to posterity an Homeric way of life, such as was established by Pythagoras who was so greatly beloved for his wisdom, and whose followers are to this day quite celebrated for the order which was named after him?

Nothing of the kind is recorded of him. For surely, Socrates, Creophylus, the companion of Homer, that child of flesh, whose name always makes us laugh, might be more justly ridiculed for his stupidity, if, as is said, Homer was greatly neglected by him and others in his own day when he was alive?

Yes, I replied, that is the tradition. But can you imagine, Glaucon, that if Homer had really been able to educate and improve mankind—if he had possessed knowledge and not been a mere imitator—can you imagine, I say, that he would not have had many followers, and been honoured and loved by them? Protagoras of Abdera, and Prodicus of Ceos, and a host of others, have only to whisper to their contemporaries; ‘You will never be able to manage either your own house or your own State until you appoint us to be your ministers of education’—and this ingenious device of theirs has such an effect in making men love them that their companions all but carry them about on their shoulders. And is it conceivable that the contemporaries of Homer, or again of Hesiod, would have allowed either of them to go about as rhapsodists, if they had really been able to make mankind virtuous? Would they not have been as unwilling to part with them as with gold, and have compelled them to stay

or had done anything else for the improvement of mankind, he would not have been allowed to starve.

<sup>1</sup> Omitting *εἰς*.

*Republic X.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

at home with them? Or, if the master would not stay, then the disciples would have followed him about everywhere, until they had got education enough?

Yes, Socrates, that, I think, is quite true.

The poets,  
like the  
painters, are  
but imitators;

Then must we not infer that all these poetical individuals, beginning with Homer, are only imitators; they copy images of virtue and the like, but the truth they never reach? The poet is like a painter who, as we have already observed, will make a likeness of a cobbler though he understands nothing of cobbling; and his picture is good enough for those who know no more than he does, and judge only by colours and figures. 601

Quite so.

In like manner the poet with his words and phrases<sup>1</sup> may be said to lay on the colours of the several arts, himself understanding their nature only enough to imitate them; and other people, who are as ignorant as he is, and judge only from his words, imagine that if he speaks of cobbling, or of military tactics, or of anything else, in metre and harmony and rhythm, he speaks very well — such is the sweet influence which melody and rhythm by nature have. And I think that you must have observed again and again what a poor appearance the tales of poets make when stripped of the colours which music puts upon them, and recited in simple prose.

Yes, he said.

They are like faces which were never really beautiful, but only blooming; and now the bloom of youth has passed away from them?

Exactly.

they know  
nothing of  
true existence.

Here is another point: The imitator or maker of the image knows nothing of true existence; he knows appearances only. Am I not right?

Yes.

Then let us have a clear understanding, and not be satisfied with half an explanation.

Proceed.

Of the painter we say that he will paint reins, and he will paint a bit?

Yes.

<sup>1</sup> Or, 'with his nouns and verbs.'

And the worker in leather and brass will make them?

*Republic X.*

Certainly.

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GLAUCON.

But does the painter know the right form of the bit and reins? Nay, hardly even the workers in brass and leather who make them; only the horseman who knows how to use them — he knows their right form.

The maker has more knowledge than the imitator, but less than the user.

Most true.

And may we not say the same of all things?

What?

That there are three arts which are concerned with all things: one which uses, another which makes, a third which imitates them?

Three arts, using, making, imitating.

Yes.

And the excellence or beauty or truth of every structure, animate or inanimate, and of every action of man, is relative to the use for which nature or the artist has intended them.

Goodness of things relative to use; hence the maker of them is instructed by the user.

True.

Then the user of them must have the greatest experience of them, and he must indicate to the maker the good or bad qualities which develop themselves in use; for example, the flute-player will tell the flute-maker which of his flutes is satisfactory to the performer; he will tell him how he ought to make them, and the other will attend to his instructions?

Of course.

The one knows and therefore speaks with authority about the goodness and badness of flutes, while the other, confiding in him, will do what he is told by him?

True.

The instrument is the same, but about the excellence or badness of it the maker will only attain to a correct belief; and this he will gain from him who knows, by talking to him and being compelled to hear what he has to say, whereas the user will have knowledge?

The maker has belief and not knowledge, the imitator neither.

True.

But will the imitator have either? Will he know from use whether or no his drawing is correct or beautiful? or will he have right opinion from being compelled to associate with another who knows and gives him instructions about what he should draw?



*Republic X.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Neither.

Then he will no more have true opinion than he will have knowledge about the goodness or badness of his imitations?

I suppose not.

The imitative artist will be in a brilliant state of intelligence about his own creations?

Nay, very much the reverse.

And still he will go on imitating without knowing what makes a thing good or bad, and may be expected therefore to imitate only that which appears to be good to the ignorant multitude?

Just so.

Thus far then we are pretty well agreed that the imitator has no knowledge worth mentioning of what he imitates. Imitation is only a kind of play or sport, and the tragic poets, whether they write in Iambic or in Heroic verse, are imitators in the highest degree?

Very true.

Imitation has  
been proved  
to be thrice  
removed from  
the truth.

And now tell me, I conjure you, has not imitation been shown by us to be concerned with that which is thrice removed from the truth?

Certainly.

And what is the faculty in man to which imitation is addressed?

What do you mean?

I will explain: The body which is large when seen near, appears small when seen at a distance?

True.

And the same objects appear straight when looked at out of the water, and crooked when in the water; and the concave becomes convex, owing to the illusion about colours to which the sight is liable. Thus every sort of confusion is revealed within us; and this is that weakness of the human mind on which the art of conjuring and of deceiving by light and shadow and other ingenious devices imposes, having an effect upon us like magic.

True.

And the arts of measuring and numbering and weighing come to the rescue of the human understanding—there



is the beauty of them — and the apparent greater or less, or more or heavier, no longer have the mastery over us, but give way before calculation and measure and weight?

*Republic A.*

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

The art of  
measuring  
given to man  
that he may  
correct the  
variety of  
appearances.

Most true.

And this, surely, must be the work of the calculating and rational principle in the soul?

To be sure.

And when this principle measures and certifies that some things are equal, or that some are greater or less than others, there occurs an apparent contradiction?

True.

603 But were we not saying that such a contradiction is impossible — the same faculty cannot have contrary opinions at the same time about the same thing?

Very true.

Then that part of the soul which has an opinion contrary to measure is not the same with that which has an opinion in accordance with measure?

True.

And the better part of the soul is likely to be that which trusts to measure and calculation?

Certainly.

And that which is opposed to them is one of the inferior principles of the soul?

No doubt.

This was the conclusion at which I was seeking to arrive when I said that painting or drawing, and imitation in general, when doing their own proper work, are far removed from truth, and the companions and friends and associates of a principle within us which is equally removed from reason, and that they have no true or healthy aim.

Exactly.

The imitative art is an inferior who marries an inferior, and has inferior offspring.

The produc-  
tions of the  
imitative arts  
are bastard  
and illegiti-  
mate.

Very true.

And is this confined to the sight only, or does it extend to the hearing also, relating in fact to what we term poetry?

Probably the same would be true of poetry.

Do not rely, I said, on a probability derived from the analogy of painting; but let us examine further and see

*Republic X.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

whether the faculty with which poetical imitation is concerned is good or bad.

By all means.

We may state the question thus:— Imitation imitates the actions of men, whether voluntary or involuntary, on which, as they imagine, a good or bad result has ensued, and they rejoice or sorrow accordingly. Is there anything more?

No, there is nothing else.

They imitate  
opposites;

But in all this variety of circumstances is the man at unity with himself — or rather, as in the instance of sight there was confusion and opposition in his opinions about the same things, so here also is there not strife and inconsistency in his life? Though I need hardly raise the question again, for I remember that all this has been already admitted; and the soul has been acknowledged by us to be full of these and ten thousand similar oppositions occurring at the same moment?

And we were right, he said.

Yes, I said, thus far we were right; but there was an omission which must now be supplied.

What was the omission?

Were we not saying that a good man, who has the misfortune to lose his son or anything else which is most dear to him, will bear the loss with more equanimity than another?

Yes.

they en-  
courage  
weakness;

But will he have no sorrow, or shall we say that although he cannot help sorrowing, he will moderate his sorrow?

The latter, he said, is the truer statement.

Tell me: will he be more likely to struggle and hold out 604 against his sorrow when he is seen by his equals, or when he is alone?

It will make a great difference whether he is seen or not.

When he is by himself he will not mind saying or doing many things which he would be ashamed of any one hearing or seeing him do?

True.

There is a principle of law and reason in him which bids him resist, as well as a feeling of his misfortune which is forcing him to indulge his sorrow?

True.

*Republic X.*

But when a man is drawn in two opposite directions, to and from the same object, this, as we affirm, necessarily implies two distinct principles in him?

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Certainly.

One of them is ready to follow the guidance of the law?

How do you mean?

The law would say that to be patient under suffering is best, and that we should not give way to impatience, as there is no knowing whether such things are good or evil; and nothing is gained by impatience; also, because no human thing is of serious importance, and grief stands in the way of that which at the moment is most required.

they are at  
variance with  
the exhorta-  
tions of  
philosophy;

What is most required? he asked.

That we should take counsel about what has happened, and when the dice have been thrown order our affairs in the way which reason deems best; not, like children who have had a fall, keeping hold of the part struck and wasting time in setting up a howl, but always accustoming the soul forthwith to apply a remedy, raising up that which is sickly and fallen, banishing the cry of sorrow by the healing art.

Yes, he said, that is the true way of meeting the attacks of fortune.

Yes, I said; and the higher principle is ready to follow this suggestion of reason?

Clearly.

And the other principle, which inclines us to recollection of our troubles and to lamentation, and can never have enough of them, we may call irrational, useless, and cowardly?

they recall  
trouble and  
sorrow;

Indeed, we may.

And does not the latter — I mean the rebellious principle — furnish a great variety of materials for imitation? Whereas the wise and calm temperament, being always nearly equable, is not easy to imitate or to appreciate when imitated, especially at a public festival when a promiscuous crowd is assembled in a theatre. For the feeling represented is one to which they are strangers.

Certainly.

605 Then the imitative poet who aims at being popular is not



*Republic A.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

they minister in an inferior manner to an inferior principle in the soul.

by nature made, nor is his art intended, to please or to affect the rational principle in the soul; but he will prefer the passionate and fitful temper, which is easily imitated?

Clearly.

And now we may fairly take him and place him by the side of the painter, for he is like him in two ways: first, inasmuch as his creations have an inferior degree of truth—in this, I say, he is like him; and he is also like him in being concerned with an inferior part of the soul; and therefore we shall be right in refusing to admit him into a well-ordered State, because he awakens and nourishes and strengthens the feelings and impairs the reason. As in a city when the evil are permitted to have authority and the good are put out of the way, so in the soul of man, as we maintain, the imitative poet implants an evil constitution, for he indulges the irrational nature which has no discernment of greater and less, but thinks the same thing at one time great and at another small—he is a manufacturer of images and is very far removed from the truth<sup>1</sup>.

Exactly.

But we have not yet brought forward the heaviest count in our accusation:—the power which poetry has of harming even the good (and there are very few who are not harmed), is surely an awful thing?

Yes, certainly, if the effect is what you say.

How can we be right in sympathizing with the sorrows of poetry when we would fain restrain those of real life?

Hear and judge: The best of us, as I conceive, when we listen to a passage of Homer, or one of the tragedians, in which he represents some pitiful hero who is drawling out his sorrows in a long oration, or weeping, and smiting his breast—the best of us, you know, delight in giving way to sympathy, and are in raptures at the excellence of the poet who stirs our feelings most.

Yes, of course I know.

But when any sorrow of our own happens to us, then you may observe that we pride ourselves on the opposite quality—we would fain be quiet and patient; this is the manly part, and the other which delighted us in the recitation is now deemed to be the part of a woman.

Very true, he said.

<sup>1</sup> Reading εἰδωλοποιούντα . . . ἀφροσύνα.



Now can we be right in praising and admiring another who is doing that which any one of us would abominate and be ashamed of in his own person?

*Republic A.*

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

No, he said, that is certainly not reasonable.

606 Nay, I said, quite reasonable from one point of view.

What point of view?

If you consider, I said, that when in misfortune we feel a natural hunger and desire to relieve our sorrow by weeping and lamentation, and that this feeling which is kept under control in our own calamities is satisfied and delighted by the poets;—the better nature in each of us, not having been sufficiently trained by reason or habit, allows the sympathetic element to break loose because the sorrow is another's; and the spectator fancies that there can be no disgrace to himself in praising and pitying any one who comes telling him what a good man he is, and making a fuss about his troubles; he thinks that the pleasure is a gain, and why should he be supercilious and lose this and the poem too? Few persons ever reflect, as I should imagine, that from the evil of other men something of evil is communicated to themselves. And so the feeling of sorrow which has gathered strength at the sight of the misfortunes of others is with difficulty repressed in our own.

We fail to observe that a sentimental pity soon creates a real weakness.

How very true!

And does not the same hold also of the ridiculous? There are jests which you would be ashamed to make yourself, and yet on the comic stage, or indeed in private, when you hear them, you are greatly amused by them, and are not at all disgusted at their unseemliness;—the case of pity is repeated;—there is a principle in human nature which is disposed to raise a laugh, and this which you once restrained by reason, because you were afraid of being thought a buffoon, is now let out again; and having stimulated the risible faculty at the theatre, you are betrayed unconsciously to yourself into playing the comic poet at home.

In like manner the love of comedy may turn a man into a buffoon.

Quite true, he said.

And the same may be said of lust and anger and all the other affections, of desire and pain and pleasure, which are held to be inseparable from every action—in all of them

*Republic X.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

poetry feeds and waters the passions instead of drying them up; she lets them rule, although they ought to be controlled, if mankind are ever to increase in happiness and virtue.

I cannot deny it.

We are lovers  
of Homer,  
but we must  
expel him  
from our  
State.

Therefore, Glaucon, I said, whenever you meet with any of the eulogists of Homer declaring that he has been the educator of Hellas, and that he is profitable for education and for the ordering of human things, and that you should take him up again and again and get to know him and 607 regulate your whole life according to him, we may love and honour those who say these things—they are excellent people, as far as their lights extend; and we are ready to acknowledge that Homer is the greatest of poets and first of tragedy writers; but we must remain firm in our conviction that hymns to the gods and praises of famous men are the only poetry which ought to be admitted into our State. For if you go beyond this and allow the honeyed muse to enter, either in epic or lyric verse, not law and the reason of mankind, which by common consent have ever been deemed best, but pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our State.

That is most true, he said.

Apology to  
the poets.

And now since we have reverted to the subject of poetry, let this our defence serve to show the reasonableness of our former judgment in sending away out of our State an art having the tendencies which we have described; for reason constrained us. But that she may not impute to us any harshness or want of politeness, let us tell her that there is an ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry; of which there are many proofs, such as the saying of 'the yelping hound howling at her lord,' or of one 'mighty in the vain talk of fools,' and 'the mob of sages circumventing Zeus,' and the 'subtle thinkers who are beggars after all'; and there are innumerable other signs of ancient enmity between them. Notwithstanding this, let us assure our sweet friend and the sister arts of imitation, that if she will only prove her title to exist in a well-ordered State we shall be delighted to receive her—we are very conscious of her charms; but we may not on that account betray the truth.

I dare say, Glaucon, that you are as much charmed by her as I am, especially when she appears in Homer?

*Republic V.*  
SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Yes, indeed, I am greatly charmed.

Shall I propose, then, that she be allowed to return from exile, but upon this condition only — that she make a defence of herself in lyrical or some other metre?

Certainly.

And we may further grant to those of her defenders who are lovers of poetry and yet not poets the permission to speak in prose on her behalf: let them show not only that she is pleasant but also useful to States and to human life, and we will listen in a kindly spirit; for if this can be proved we shall surely be the gainers — I mean, if there is a use in poetry as well as a delight?

Certainly, he said, we shall be the gainers.

If her defence fails, then, my dear friend, like other persons who are enamoured of something, but put a restraint upon themselves when they think their desires are opposed to their interests, so too must we after the manner of lovers give her up, though not without a struggle. We too are inspired by that love of poetry which the education of noble States has implanted in us, and therefore we would have her appear at her best and truest; but so long as she is unable to make good her defence, this argument of ours shall be a charm to us, which we will repeat to ourselves while we listen to her strains; that we may not fall away into the childish love of her which captivates the many. At all events we are well aware<sup>1</sup> that poetry being such as we have described is not to be regarded seriously as attaining to the truth; and he who listens to her, fearing for the safety of the city which is within him, should be on his guard against her seductions and make our words his law.

Poetry is attractive but not true.

Yes, he said, I quite agree with you.

Yes, I said, my dear Glaucon, for great is the issue at stake, greater than appears, whether a man is to be good or bad. And what will any one be profited if under the influence of honour or money or power, aye, or under the excitement of poetry, he neglect justice and virtue?

<sup>1</sup> Or, if we accept Madvig's ingenious but unnecessary emendation ἀσόμεθα, 'At all events we will sing, that' &c.



*Republic X.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

The rewards  
of virtue extend  
not only to this  
little space of  
human life  
but to the  
whole of existence.

Yes, he said; I have been convinced by the argument, as I believe that any one else would have been.

And yet no mention has been made of the greatest prizes and rewards which await virtue.

What, are there any greater still? If there are, they must be of an inconceivable greatness.

Why, I said, what was ever great in a short time? The whole period of three score years and ten is surely but a little thing in comparison with eternity?

Say rather 'nothing,' he replied.

And should an immortal being seriously think of this little space rather than of the whole?

Of the whole, certainly. But why do you ask?

Are you not aware, I said, that the soul of man is immortal and imperishable?

He looked at me in astonishment, and said: No, by heaven: And are you really prepared to maintain this?

Yes, I said, I ought to be, and you too—there is no difficulty in proving it.

I see a great difficulty; but I should like to hear you state this argument of which you make so light.

Listen then.

I am attending.

There is a thing which you call good and another which you call evil?

Yes, he replied.

Would you agree with me in thinking that the corrupting and destroying element is the evil, and the saving and improving element the good?

Yes.

609

Everything  
has a good  
and an evil,  
and if not  
destroyed by  
its own evil,  
will not be  
destroyed  
by that of  
another.

And you admit that everything has a good and also an evil; as ophthalmia is the evil of the eyes and disease of the whole body; as mildew is of corn, and rot of timber, or rust of copper and iron: in everything, or in almost everything, there is an inherent evil and disease?

Yes, he said.

And anything which is infected by any of these evils is made evil, and at last wholly dissolves and dies?

True.

The vice and evil which is inherent in each is the destruction



of each; and if this does not destroy them there is nothing else that will; for good certainly will not destroy them, nor again, that which is neither good nor evil.

*Republic A.*  
SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Certainly not.

If, then, we find any nature which having this inherent corruption cannot be dissolved or destroyed, we may be certain that of such a nature there is no destruction?

That may be assumed.

Well, I said, and is there no evil which corrupts the soul?

Yes, he said, there are all the evils which we were just now passing in review: unrighteousness, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance.

But does any of these dissolve or destroy her?—and here do not let us fall into the error of supposing that the unjust and foolish man, when he is detected, perishes through his own injustice, which is an evil of the soul. Take the analogy of the body: The evil of the body is a disease which wastes and reduces and annihilates the body; and all the things of which we were just now speaking come to annihilation through their own corruption attaching to them and inhering in them and so destroying them. Is not this true?

Therefore, if the soul cannot be destroyed by moral evil, she certainly will not be destroyed by physical evil.

Yes.

Consider the soul in like manner. Does the injustice or other evil which exists in the soul waste and consume her? do they by attaching to the soul and inhering in her at last bring her to death, and so separate her from the body?

Certainly not.

And yet, I said, it is unreasonable to suppose that anything can perish from without through affection of external evil which could not be destroyed from within by a corruption of its own?

It is, he replied.

Consider, I said, Glaucon, that even the badness of food, whether staleness, decomposition, or any other bad quality, when confined to the actual food, is not supposed to destroy the body; although, if the badness of food communicates corruption to the body, then we should say that the body  
610 has been destroyed by a corruption of itself, which is disease, brought on by this; but that the body, being one thing, can be destroyed by the badness of food, which

*Republic X.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.Evil means  
the conta-  
gion of evil,  
and the evil  
of the body  
does not  
infect the  
soul.

is another, and which does not engender any natural infection — this we shall absolutely deny?

Very true.

And, on the same principle, unless some bodily evil can produce an evil of the soul, we must not suppose that the soul, which is one thing, can be dissolved by any merely external evil which belongs to another?

Yes, he said, there is reason in that.

Either, then, let us refute this conclusion, or, while it remains unrefuted, let us never say that fever, or any other disease, or the knife put to the throat, or even the cutting up of the whole body into the minutest pieces, can destroy the soul, until she herself is proved to become more unholy or unrighteous in consequence of these things being done to the body; but that the soul, or anything else if not destroyed by an internal evil, can be destroyed by an external one, is not to be affirmed by any man.

And surely, he replied, no one will ever prove that the souls of men become more unjust in consequence of death.

But if some one who would rather not admit the immortality of the soul boldly denies this, and says that the dying do really become more evil and unrighteous, then, if the speaker is right, I suppose that injustice, like disease, must be assumed to be fatal to the unjust, and that those who take this disorder die by the natural inherent power of destruction which evil has, and which kills them sooner or later, but in quite another way from that in which, at present, the wicked receive death at the hands of others as the penalty of their deeds?

Nay, he said, in that case injustice, if fatal to the unjust, will not be so very terrible to him, for he will be delivered from evil. But I rather suspect the opposite to be the truth, and that injustice which, if it have the power, will murder others, keeps the murderer alive — aye, and well awake too; so far removed is her dwelling-place from being a house of death.

True, I said; if the inherent natural vice or evil of the soul is unable to kill or destroy her, hardly will that which is appointed to be the destruction of some other body, destroy a soul or anything else except that of which it was appointed to be the destruction.

Yes, that can hardly be.

*Republic X.*

611 But the soul which cannot be destroyed by an evil, whether inherent or external, must exist for ever, and if existing for ever, must be immortal?

SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.

Certainly.

That is the conclusion, I said; and, if a true conclusion, then the souls must always be the same, for if none be destroyed they will not diminish in number. Neither will they increase, for the increase of the immortal natures must come from something mortal, and all things would thus end in immortality.

If the soul is indestructible, the number of souls can never increase or diminish.

Very true.

But this we cannot believe — reason will not allow us — any more than we can believe the soul, in her truest nature, to be full of variety and difference and dissimilarity.

What do you mean? he said.

The soul, I said, being, as is now proven, immortal, must be the fairest of compositions and cannot be compounded of many elements?

Certainly not.

Her immortality is demonstrated by the previous argument, and there are many other proofs; but to see her as she really is, not as we now behold her, marred by communion with the body and other miseries, you must contemplate her with the eye of reason, in her original purity; and then her beauty will be revealed, and justice and injustice and all the things which we have described will be manifested more clearly. Thus far, we have spoken the truth concerning her as she appears at present, but we must remember also that we have seen her only in a condition which may be compared to that of the sea-god Glaucus, whose original image can hardly be discerned because his natural members are broken off and crushed and damaged by the waves in all sorts of ways, and incrustations have grown over them of seaweed and shells and stones, so that he is more like some monster than he is to his own natural form. And the soul which we behold is in a similar condition, disfigured by ten thousand ills. But not there, Glaucon, not there must we look.

The soul, if she is to be seen truly, should be stripped of the accidents of earth.

Where then?

At her love of wisdom. Let us see whom she affects, and



*Republic N.*SOCRATES,  
GLAUCON.Her true con-  
versation is  
with the  
eternal.

what society and converse she seeks in virtue of her near kindred with the immortal and eternal and divine; also how different she would become if wholly following this superior principle, and borne by a divine impulse out of the ocean in which she now is, and disengaged from the stones and shells and things of earth and rock which in wild variety spring up around her because she feeds upon earth, and is overgrown 612 by the good things of this life as they are termed: then you would see her as she is, and know whether she have one shape only or many, or what her nature is. Of her affections and of the forms which she takes in this present life I think that we have now said enough.

True, he replied.

Having put  
aside for argu-  
ment's sake  
the rewards  
of virtue, we  
may now  
claim to  
have them  
restored.

And thus, I said, we have fulfilled the conditions of the argument<sup>1</sup>; we have not introduced the rewards and glories of justice, which, as you were saying, are to be found in Homer and Hesiod; but justice in her own nature has been shown to be best for the soul in her own nature. Let a man do what is just, whether he have the ring of Gyges or not, and even if in addition to the ring of Gyges he put on the helmet of Hades.

Very true.

And now, Glaucon, there will be no harm in further enumerating how many and how great are the rewards which justice and the other virtues procure to the soul from gods and men, both in life and after death.

Certainly not, he said.

Will you repay me, then, what you borrowed in the argument?

What did I borrow?

The assumption that the just man should appear unjust and the unjust just: for you were of opinion that even if the true state of the case could not possibly escape the eyes of gods and men, still this admission ought to be made for the sake of the argument, in order that pure justice might be weighed against pure injustice. Do you remember?

I should be much to blame if I had forgotten.

Then, as the cause is decided, I demand on behalf of justice that the estimation in which she is held by gods and

<sup>1</sup> Reading ἀπελυσάμεθα.



men and which we acknowledge to be her due should now be restored to her by us<sup>1</sup>; since she has been shown to confer reality, and not to deceive those who truly possess her, let what has been taken from her be given back, that so she may win that palm of appearance which is hers also, and which she gives to her own.

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The demand, he said, is just.

In the first place, I said — and this is the first thing which you will have to give back — the nature both of the just and unjust is truly known to the gods.

Granted.

And if they are both known to them, one must be the friend and the other the enemy of the gods, as we admitted from the beginning?

True.

The just man  
is the friend  
of the gods,  
and all things  
work to-  
gether for  
his good.

513 And the friend of the gods may be supposed to receive from them all things at their best, excepting only such evil as is the necessary consequence of former sins?

Certainly.

Then this must be our notion of the just man, that even when he is in poverty or sickness, or any other seeming misfortune, all things will in the end work together for good to him in life and death: for the gods have a care of any one whose desire is to become just and to be like God, as far as man can attain the divine likeness, by the pursuit of virtue?

Yes, he said; if he is like God he will surely not be neglected by him.

And of the unjust may not the opposite be supposed?

Certainly.

The unjust is  
the opposite.

Such, then, are the palms of victory which the gods give the just?

That is my conviction.

And what do they receive of men? Look at things as they really are, and you will see that the clever unjust are in the case of runners, who run well from the starting-place to the goal but not back again from the goal: they go off at a great pace, but in the end only look foolish, slinking away with their ears dragging on their shoulders, and without a crown; but the true runner comes to the finish and receives the

He may be  
compared to a  
runner who is  
only good at  
the start.

<sup>1</sup> Reading ἡμῶν.

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prize and is crowned. And this is the way with the just; he who endures to the end of every action and occasion of his entire life has a good report and carries off the prize which men have to bestow.

True.

Recapitulation of things unfit for ears polite which had been described by Glaucon in Book II.

And now you must allow me to repeat of the just the blessings which you were attributing to the fortunate unjust. I shall say of them, what you were saying of the others, that as they grow older, they become rulers in their own city if they care to be; they marry whom they like and give in marriage to whom they will; all that you said of the others I now say of these. And, on the other hand, of the unjust I say that the greater number, even though they escape in their youth, are found out at last and look foolish at the end of their course, and when they come to be old and miserable are flouted alike by stranger and citizen; they are beaten and then come those things unfit for ears polite, as you truly term them; they will be racked and have their eyes burned out, as you were saying. And you may suppose that I have repeated the remainder of your tale of horrors. But will you let me assume, without reciting them, that these things are true?

Certainly, he said, what you say is true.

These, then, are the prizes and rewards and gifts which are bestowed upon the just by gods and men in this present life, in addition to the other good things which justice of herself provides. 614

Yes, he said; and they are fair and lasting.

And yet, I said, all these are as nothing either in number or greatness in comparison with those other recompenses which await both just and unjust after death. And you ought to hear them, and then both just and unjust will have received from us a full payment of the debt which the argument owes to them.

Speak, he said; there are few things which I would more gladly hear.

The vision  
of Er.

Well, I said, I will tell you a tale; not one of the tales which Odysseus tells to the hero Alcinous, yet this too is a tale of a hero, Er the son of Armenius, a Pamphylian by birth. He was slain in battle, and ten days afterwards, when the bodies of the dead were taken up already in a state of corruption, his body was found unaffected by decay, and

carried away home to be buried. And on the twelfth day, as he was lying on the funeral pile, he returned to life and told them what he had seen in the other world. He said that when his soul left the body he went on a journey with a great company, and that they came to a mysterious place at which there were two openings in the earth; they were near together, and over against them were two other openings in the heaven above. In the intermediate space there were judges seated, who commanded the just, after they had given judgment on them and had bound their sentences in front of them, to ascend by the heavenly way on the right hand; and in like manner the unjust were bidden by them to descend by the lower way on the left hand; these also bore the symbols of their deeds, but fastened on their backs. He drew near, and they told him that he was to be the messenger who would carry the report of the other world to men, and they bade him hear and see all that was to be heard and seen in that place. Then he beheld and saw on one side the souls departing at either opening of heaven and earth when sentence had been given on them; and at the two other openings other souls, some ascending out of the earth dusty and worn with travel, some descending out of heaven clean and bright. And arriving ever and anon they seemed to have come from a long journey, and they went forth with gladness into the meadow, where they encamped as at a festival; and those who knew one another embraced and conversed, the souls which came from earth curiously enquiring about the things above, and the souls which came from heaven about the things beneath. And they told one another of what had happened by the way, those from below weeping and sorrowing at the remembrance of the things which they had endured and seen in their journey beneath the earth (now the journey lasted a thousand years), while those from above were describing heavenly delights and visions of inconceivable beauty. The story, Glaucon, would take too long to tell; but the sum was this:—He said that for every wrong which they had done to any one they suffered tenfold; or once in a hundred years—such being reckoned to be the length of man's life, and the penalty being thus paid ten times in a thousand years. If, for example, there were any who had been

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The judgment.

The two openings in heaven and the two in earth through which passed those who were beginning and those who had completed their pilgrimage.

The meeting in the meadow.

The punishment tenfold the sin.



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‘Unbaptized  
infants.’Ardiaeus  
the tyrant.Incurable  
sinners.

the cause of many deaths, or had betrayed or enslaved cities or armies, or been guilty of any other evil behaviour, for each and all of their offences they received punishment ten times over, and the rewards of beneficence and justice and holiness were in the same proportion. I need hardly repeat what he said concerning young children dying almost as soon as they were born. Of piety and impiety to gods and parents, and of murderers<sup>1</sup>, there were retributions other and greater far which he described. He mentioned that he was present when one of the spirits asked another, ‘Where is Ardiaeus the Great?’ (Now this Ardiaeus lived a thousand years before the time of Er: he had been the tyrant of some city of Pamphylia, and had murdered his aged father and his elder brother, and was said to have committed many other abominable crimes.) The answer of the other spirit was: ‘He comes not hither and will never come. And this,’ said he, ‘was one of the dreadful sights which we ourselves witnessed. We were at the mouth of the cavern, and, having completed all our experiences, were about to reascend, when of a sudden Ardiaeus appeared and several others, most of whom were tyrants; and there were also besides the tyrants private individuals who had been great criminals: they were just, as they fancied, about to return into the upper world, but the mouth, instead of admitting them, gave a roar, whenever any of these incurable sinners or some one who had not been sufficiently punished tried to ascend; and then wild men of fiery aspect, who were standing by and heard the sound, seized and carried them off; and Ardiaeus and others 616 they bound head and foot and hand, and threw them down and flayed them with scourges, and dragged them along the road at the side, carding them on thorns like wool, and declaring to the passers-by what were their crimes, and that<sup>2</sup> they were being taken away to be cast into hell.’ And of all the many terrors which they had endured, he said that there was none like the terror which each of them felt at that moment, lest they should hear the voice; and when there was silence, one by one they ascended with exceeding joy. These, said Er, were the penalties and retributions, and there were blessings as great.

<sup>1</sup> Reading ἀντόχειρας.<sup>2</sup> Reading καὶ ὅτι.



Now when the spirits which were in the meadow had tarried seven days, on the eighth they were obliged to proceed on their journey, and, on the fourth day after, he said that they came to a place where they could see from above a line of light, straight as a column, extending right through the whole heaven and through the earth, in colour resembling the rainbow, only brighter and purer; another day's journey brought them to the place, and there, in the midst of the light, they saw the ends of the chains of heaven let down from above: for this light is the belt of heaven, and holds together the circle of the universe, like the undergirders of a trireme. From these ends is extended the spindle of Necessity, on which all the revolutions turn. The shaft and hook of this spindle are made of steel, and the whorl is made partly of steel and also partly of other materials. Now the whorl is in form like the whorl used on earth; and the description of it implied that there is one large hollow whorl which is quite scooped out, and into this is fitted another lesser one, and another, and another, and four others, making eight in all, like vessels which fit into one another; the whorls show their edges on the upper side, and on their lower side all together form one continuous whorl. This is pierced by the spindle, which is driven home through the centre of the eighth. The first and outermost whorl has the rim broadest, and the seven inner whorls are narrower, in the following proportions—the sixth is next to the first in size, the fourth next to the sixth; then comes the eighth; the seventh is fifth, the fifth is sixth, the third is seventh, last and eighth comes the second. The largest [or fixed stars] is spangled, and the seventh [or sun] is brightest; the eighth [or moon] coloured by the reflected light of the seventh; the second and fifth [Saturn and Mercury] are in colour like one another, and yellower than the preceding; the third [Jupiter] has the whitest light; the fourth [Mars] is reddish; the sixth [Venus] is in whiteness second. Now the whole spindle has the same motion; but, as the whole revolves in one direction, the seven inner circles move slowly in the other, and of these the swiftest is the eighth; next in swiftness are the seventh, sixth, and fifth, which move together; third in swiftness appeared to move according to the law of this

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The whorls  
representing  
the spheres of  
the heavenly  
bodies.

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reversed motion the fourth; the third appeared fourth and the second fifth. The spindle turns on the knees of Necessity; and on the upper surface of each circle is a siren, who goes round with them, hymning a single tone or note. The eight together form one harmony; and round about, at equal intervals, there is another band, three in number, each sitting upon her throne: these are the Fates, daughters of Necessity, who are clothed in white robes and have chaplets upon their heads, Lachesis and Clotho and Atropos, who accompany with their voices the harmony of the sirens — Lachesis singing of the past, Clotho of the present, Atropos of the future; Clotho from time to time assisting with a touch of her right hand the revolution of the outer circle of the whorl or spindle, and Atropos with her left hand touching and guiding the inner ones, and Lachesis laying hold of either in turn, first with one hand and then with the other.

When Er and the spirits arrived, their duty was to go at once to Lachesis; but first of all there came a prophet who arranged them in order; then he took from the knees of Lachesis lots and samples of lives, and having mounted a high pulpit, spoke as follows: 'Hear the word of Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity. Mortal souls, behold a new cycle of life and mortality. Your genius will not be allotted to you, but you will choose your genius; and let him who draws the first lot have the first choice, and the life which he chooses shall be his destiny. Virtue is free, and as a man honours or dishonours her he will have more or less of her; the responsibility is with the chooser — God is justified.' When the Interpreter had thus spoken he scattered lots indifferently among them all, and each of them took up the lot which fell near him, all but Er himself (he was not allowed), and each as he took his lot perceived the number which he had obtained. Then the Interpreter placed on the ground before them the samples of lives; and there were many more lives than the souls present, and they were of all sorts. There were lives of every animal and of man in every condition. And there were tyrannies among them, some lasting out the tyrant's life, others which broke off in the middle and came to an end in poverty and exile and beggary; and there were

The proclamation  
of the free  
choice.

lives of famous men, some who were famous for their form and beauty as well as for their strength and success in games, or, again, for their birth and the qualities of their ancestors; and some who were the reverse of famous for the opposite qualities. And of women likewise; there was not, however, any definite character in them, because the soul, when choosing a new life, must of necessity become different. But there was every other quality, and they all mingled with one another, and also with elements of wealth and poverty, and disease and health; and there were mean states also. And here, my dear Glaucon, is the supreme peril of our human state; and therefore the utmost care should be taken. Let each one of us leave every other kind of knowledge and seek and follow one thing only, if peradventure he may be able to learn and may find some one who will make him able to learn and discern between good and evil, and so to choose always and everywhere the better life as he has opportunity. He should consider the bearing of all these things which have been mentioned severally and collectively upon virtue; he should know what the effect of beauty is when combined with poverty or wealth in a particular soul, and what are the good and evil consequences of noble and humble birth, of private and public station, of strength and weakness, of cleverness and dullness, and of all the natural and acquired gifts of the soul, and the operation of them when conjoined; he will then look at the nature of the soul, and from the consideration of all these qualities he will be able to determine which is the better and which is the worse; and so he will choose, giving the name of evil to the life which will make his soul more unjust, and good to the life which will make his soul more just; all else he will disregard. For we have seen and know that this is the best choice both in life and after death. A man must take with him into the world below an adamantine faith in truth and right, that there too he may be undazzled by the desire of wealth or the other allurements of evil, lest, coming upon tyrannies and similar villanies, he do irremediable wrongs to others and suffer yet worse himself; but let him know how to choose the mean and avoid the extremes on either side, as far as possible, not only in this life but

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in all that which is to come. For this is the way of happiness.

And according to the report of the messenger from the other world this was what the prophet said at the time: 'Even for the last comer, if he chooses wisely and will live diligently, there is appointed a happy and not undesirable existence. Let not him who chooses first be careless, and let not the last despair.' And when he had spoken, he who had the first choice came forward and in a moment chose the greatest tyranny; his mind having been darkened by folly and sensuality, he had not thought out the whole matter before he chose, and did not at first sight perceive that he was fated, among other evils, to devour his own children. But when he had time to reflect, and saw what was in the lot, he began to beat his breast and lament over his choice, forgetting the proclamation of the prophet; for, instead of throwing the blame of his misfortune on himself, he accused chance and the gods, and everything rather than himself.

Habit not  
enough with-  
out philoso-  
phy when  
circumstances  
change.

Now he was one of those who came from heaven, and in a former life had dwelt in a well-ordered State, but his virtue was a matter of habit only, and he had no philosophy. And it was true of others who were similarly overtaken, that the greater number of them came from heaven and therefore they had never been schooled by trial, whereas the pilgrims who came from earth having themselves suffered and seen others suffer were not in a hurry to choose. And owing to this inexperience of theirs, and also because the lot was a chance, many of the souls exchanged a good destiny for an evil or an evil for a good. For if a man had always on his arrival in this world dedicated himself from the first to sound philosophy, and had been moderately fortunate in the number of the lot, he might, as the messenger reported, be happy here, and also his journey to another life and return to this, instead of being rough and underground, would be smooth and heavenly. Most curious, he said, was the spectacle—sad and laughable and strange; for the choice of the souls was in most cases based on their experience of a previous 620 life. There he saw the soul which had once been Orpheus choosing the life of a swan out of enmity to the race of women, hating to be born of a woman because they had

The specta-  
cle of the  
election.



been his murderers; he beheld also the soul of Thamyra *Republic N.* choosing the life of a nightingale; birds, on the other hand, *SOCRATES.* like the swan and other musicians, wanting to be men. The soul which obtained the twentieth<sup>1</sup> lot chose the life of a lion, and this was the soul of Ajax the son of Telamon, who would not be a man, remembering the injustice which was done him in the judgment about the arms. The next was Agamemnon, who took the life of an eagle, because, like Ajax, he hated human nature by reason of his sufferings. About the middle came the lot of Atalanta; she, seeing the great fame of an athlete, was unable to resist the temptation: and after her there followed the soul of Epeus the son of Panopeus passing into the nature of a woman cunning in the arts; and far away among the last who chose, the soul of the jester Thersites was putting on the form of a monkey. There came also the soul of Odysseus having yet to make a choice, and his lot happened to be the last of them all. Now the recollection of former toils had disenchanted him of ambition, and he went about for a considerable time in search of the life of a private man who had no cares; he had some difficulty in finding this, which was lying about and had been neglected by everybody else; and when he saw it, he said that he would have done the same had his lot been first instead of last, and that he was delighted to have it. And not only did men pass into animals, but I must also mention that there were animals tame and wild who changed into one another and into corresponding human natures—the good into the gentle and the evil into the savage, in all sorts of combinations.

All the souls had now chosen their lives, and they went in the order of their choice to Lachesis, who sent with them the genius whom they had severally chosen, to be the guardian of their lives and the fulfiller of the choice: this genius led the souls first to Clotho, and drew them within the revolution of the spindle impelled by her hand, thus ratifying the destiny of each; and then, when they were fastened to this, carried them to Atropos, who spun the threads and made  
621 them irreversible, whence without turning round they passed beneath the throne of Necessity; and when they had all passed, they marched on in a scorching heat to the plain of

<sup>1</sup> Reading *εἰκοστήν*.

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Forgetfulness, which was a barren waste destitute of trees and verdure; and then towards evening they encamped by the river of Unmindfulness, whose water no vessel can hold; of this they were all obliged to drink a certain quantity, and those who were not saved by wisdom drank more than was necessary; and each one as he drank forgot all things. Now after they had gone to rest, about the middle of the night there was a thunderstorm and earthquake, and then in an instant they were driven upwards in all manner of ways to their birth, like stars shooting. He himself was hindered from drinking the water. But in what manner or by what means he returned to the body he could not say; only, in the morning, awaking suddenly, he found himself lying on the pyre.

And thus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved and has not perished, and will save us if we are obedient to the word spoken; and we shall pass safely over the river of Forgetfulness and our soul will not be defiled. Wherefore my counsel is, that we hold fast ever to the heavenly way and follow after justice and virtue always, considering that the soul is immortal and able to endure every sort of good and every sort of evil. Thus shall we live dear to one another and to the gods, both while remaining here and when, like conquerors in the games who go round to gather gifts, we receive our reward. And it shall be well with us both in this life and in the pilgrimage of a thousand years which we have been describing.

TIMAEUS.





## INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.

OF all the writings of Plato the *Timæus* is the most obscure and repulsive to the modern reader, and has nevertheless had the greatest influence over the ancient and mediæval world. The obscurity arises in the infancy of physical science, out of the confusion of theological, mathematical, and physiological notions, out of the desire to conceive the whole of nature without any adequate knowledge of the parts, and from a greater perception of similarities which lie on the surface than of differences which are hidden from view. To bring sense under the control of reason; to find some way through the mist or labyrinth of appearances, either the highway of mathematics, or more devious paths suggested by the analogy of man with the world, and of the world with man; to see that all things have a cause and are tending towards an end — this is the spirit of the ancient physical philosopher. He has no notion of trying an experiment and is hardly capable of observing the curiosities of nature which are ‘tumbling out at his feet,’ or of interpreting even the most obvious of them. He is driven back from the nearer to the more distant, from particulars to generalities, from the earth to the stars. He lifts up his eyes to the heavens and seeks to guide by their motions his erring footsteps. But we neither appreciate the conditions of knowledge to which he was subjected, nor have the ideas which fastened upon his imagination the same hold upon us. For he is hanging between matter and mind; he is under the dominion at the same time both of sense and of abstractions; his impressions are taken almost at random from the outside of nature; he sees the light, but not the objects which are revealed by the light; and he brings into juxtaposition things which to us

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appear wide as the poles asunder, because he finds nothing between them. He passes abruptly from persons to ideas and numbers, and from ideas and numbers to persons,—from the heavens to man, from astronomy to physiology; he confuses, or rather does not distinguish, subject and object, first and final causes, and is dreaming of geometrical figures lost in a flux of sense. He contrasts the perfect movements of the heavenly bodies with the imperfect representation of them (Rep. vii. 519), and he does not always require strict accuracy even in applications of number and figure (Rep. ix. 587 D, E). His mind lingers around the forms of mythology, which he uses as symbols or translates into figures of speech. He has no implements of observation, such as the telescope or microscope; the great science of chemistry is a blank to him. It is only by an effort that the modern thinker can breathe the atmosphere of the ancient philosopher, or understand how, under such unequal conditions, he seems in many instances, by a sort of inspiration, to have anticipated the truth.

The influence which the Timaus has exercised upon posterity is due partly to a misunderstanding. In the supposed depths of this dialogue the Neo-Platonists found hidden meanings and connections with the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, and out of them they elicited doctrines quite at variance with the spirit of Plato. Believing that he was inspired by the Holy Ghost, or had received his wisdom from Moses, they seemed to find in his writings the Christian Trinity, the Word, the Church, the creation of the world in a Jewish sense, as they really found the personality of God or of mind, and the immortality of the soul. All religions and philosophies met and mingled in the schools of Alexandria, and the Neo-Platonists had a method of interpretation which could elicit any meaning out of any words. They were really incapable of distinguishing between the opinions of one philosopher and another—between Aristotle and Plato, or between the serious thoughts of Plato and his passing fancies. They were absorbed in his theology and were under the dominion of his name, while that which was truly great and truly characteristic in him, his effort to realize and connect abstractions, was not understood by them at all. Yet the genius of Plato and Greek philosophy reacted upon the East, and a Greek element of thought and language

overlaid and partly reduced to order the chaos of Orientalism. And kindred spirits, like St. Augustine, even though they were acquainted with his writings only through the medium of a Latin translation, were profoundly affected by them, seeming to find 'God and his word everywhere insinuated' in them (August. Confess. viii. c. 2).

There is no danger of the modern commentators on the *Timaeus* falling into the absurdities of the Neo-Platonists. In the present day we are well aware that an ancient philosopher is to be interpreted from himself and by the contemporary history of thought. We know that mysticism is not criticism. The fancies of the Neo-Platonists are only interesting to us because they exhibit a phase of the human mind which prevailed widely in the first centuries of the Christian era, and is not wholly extinct in our own day. But they have nothing to do with the interpretation of Plato, and in spirit they are opposed to him. They are the feeble expression of an age which has lost the power not only of creating great works, but of understanding them. They are the spurious birth of a marriage between philosophy and tradition, between Hellas and the East—*εἰκὸς γεννᾶν νόθα καὶ φαῦλα* (Rep. vi. 496 A). Whereas the so-called mysticism of Plato is purely Greek, arising out of his imperfect knowledge and high aspirations, and is the growth of an age in which philosophy is not wholly separated from poetry and mythology.

A greater danger with modern interpreters of Plato is the tendency to regard the *Timaeus* as the centre of his system. We do not know how Plato would have arranged his own dialogues, or whether the thought of arranging any of them, besides the two 'Trilogies' which he has expressly connected, was ever present to his mind. But, if he had arranged them, there are many indications that this is not the place which he would have assigned to the *Timaeus*. We observe, first of all, that the dialogue is put into the mouth of a Pythagorean philosopher, and not of Socrates. And this is required by dramatic propriety; for the investigation of nature was expressly renounced by Socrates in the *Phaedo* (96 ff.). Nor does Plato himself attribute any importance to his guesses at science. He is not at all absorbed by them, as he is by the *idea* of good. He is modest and hesitating, and confesses that his words partake of the uncertainty of the



subject (Tim. 29 C). The dialogue is primarily concerned with the animal creation, including under this term the heavenly bodies, and with man only as one among the animals. But we can hardly suppose that Plato would have preferred the study of nature to man, or that he would have deemed the formation of the world and the human frame to have the same interest which he ascribes to the mystery of being and not-being, or to the great political problems which he discusses in the Republic and the Laws. There are no speculations on physics in the other dialogues of Plato, and he himself regards the consideration of them as a rational pastime only (cp. 59 D, &c.). He is beginning to feel the need of further divisions of knowledge; and is becoming aware that besides dialectic, mathematics, and the arts, there is another field which has been hitherto unexplored by him. But he has not as yet defined this intermediate territory which lies somewhere between medicine and mathematics, and he would have felt that there was as great an impiety in ranking theories of physics first in the order of knowledge, as in placing the body before the soul.

It is true, however, that the Timaeus is by no means confined to speculations on physics. The deeper foundations of the Platonic philosophy, such as the nature of God, the distinction of the sensible and intellectual, the great original conceptions of time and space, also appear in it. They are found principally in the first half of the dialogue. The construction of the heavens is for the most part ideal; the cyclic year serves as the connection between the world of absolute being and of generation, just as the number of population in the Republic (Book viii. 546) is the expression or symbol of the transition from the ideal to the actual state. In some passages we are uncertain whether we are reading a description of astronomical facts or contemplating processes of the human mind (37 C), or of that divine mind (cp. Phil. 22 D) which in Plato is hardly separable from it. The characteristics of man are transferred to the world-animal, as for example when intelligence and knowledge are said to be perfected by the circle of the Same, and true opinion by the circle of the Other; and conversely the motions of the world-animal reappear in man; its amorphous state continues in the child (44), and in both disorder and chaos are gradually succeeded by stability and order. It is not however



to passages like these that Plato is referring when he speaks of the uncertainty of his subject, but rather to the composition of bodies, to the relations of colours, the nature of diseases, and the like, about which he truly feels the lamentable ignorance prevailing in his own age.

We are led by Plato himself to regard the *Timaeus*, not as the centre or inmost shrine of the edifice, but as a detached building in a different style, framed, not after the Socratic, but after some Pythagorean model. As in the *Cratylus* and *Parmenides*, we are uncertain whether Plato is expressing his own opinions, or appropriating and perhaps improving the philosophical speculations of others. In all three dialogues he is exerting his dramatic and imitative power; in the *Cratylus* mingling a satirical and humorous purpose with true principles of language; in the *Parmenides* overthrowing Megarianism by a sort of ultra-Megarianism, which discovers contradictions in the one as great as those which have been previously shown to exist in the ideas. There is a similar uncertainty about the *Timaeus*; in the first part he scales the heights of transcendentalism, in the latter part he treats in a bald and superficial manner of the functions and diseases of the human frame. He uses the thoughts and almost the words of *Parmenides* when he discourses of being and of essence, adopting from old religion into philosophy the conception of God, and from the Megarians the *idea* of good. He agrees with *Empedocles* and the Atomists in attributing the greater differences of kinds to the figures of the elements and their movements into and out of one another. With *Heracleitus*, he acknowledges the perpetual flux; like *Anaxagoras*, he asserts the predominance of mind, although admitting an element of necessity which reason is incapable of subduing; like the Pythagoreans he supposes the mystery of the world to be contained in number. Many, if not all the elements of the Pre-Socratic philosophy are included in the *Timaeus*. It is a composite or eclectic work of imagination, in which Plato, without naming them, gathers up into a kind of system the various elements of philosophy which preceded him.

If we allow for the difference of subject, and for some growth in Plato's own mind, the discrepancy between the *Timaeus* and the other dialogues will not appear to be great. It is probable that the relation of the ideas to God or of God to the world was differently

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conceived by him at different times of his life. In all his later dialogues we observe a tendency in him to personify mind or God, and he therefore naturally inclines to view creation as the work of design. The creator is like a human artist who frames in his mind a plan which he executes by the help of his servants. Thus the language of philosophy which speaks of first and second causes is crossed by another sort of phraseology: 'God made the world because he was good, and the demons ministered to him.' The *Timaeus* is cast in a more theological and less philosophical mould than the other dialogues, but the same general spirit is apparent; there is the same dualism or opposition between the ideal and actual (51 B ff.) — the soul is prior to the body (34 C), the intelligible and unseen to the visible and corporeal (28). There is the same distinction between knowledge and opinion (37 C) which occurs in the *Theaetetus* and *Republic*, the same enmity to the poets (19 D), the same combination of music and gymnastics (88 C). The doctrine of transmigration is still held by him (90 E ff.), as in the *Phaedrus* and *Republic*; and the soul has a view of the heavens in a prior state of being (41 E). The ideas also remain, but they have become types in nature, forms of men, animals, birds, fishes (39 E). And the attribution of evil to physical causes (86 D, E) accords with the doctrine which he maintains in the *Laws* (Book ix. 861) respecting the involuntariness of vice.

The style and plan of the *Timaeus* differ greatly from that of any other of the Platonic dialogues. The language is weighty, abrupt, and in some passages sublime. But Plato has not the same mastery over his instrument which he exhibits in the *Phaedrus* or *Symposium*. Nothing can exceed the beauty or art of the introduction, in which he is using words after his accustomed manner. But in the rest of the work the power of language seems to fail him, and the dramatic form is wholly given up. He could write in one style, but not in another, and the Greek language had not as yet been fashioned by any poet or philosopher to describe physical phenomena. The early physiologists had generally written in verse; the prose writers, like Democritus and Anaxagoras, as far as we can judge from their fragments, never attained to a periodic style. And hence we find the same sort of clumsiness in the *Timaeus* of Plato which characterizes the

philosophical poem of Lucretius. There is a want of flow and often a defect of rhythm; the meaning is sometimes obscure, and there is a greater use of apposition and more of repetition than occurs in Plato's earlier writings. The sentences are less closely connected and also more involved; the antecedents of demonstrative and relative pronouns are in some cases remote and perplexing. The greater frequency of participles and of absolute constructions gives the effect of heaviness. The descriptive portion of the *Timaeus* retains traces of the first Greek prose composition; for the great master of language was speaking on a theme with which he was imperfectly acquainted, and had no words in which to express his meaning. The rugged grandeur of the opening discourse of *Timaeus* (*Tim.* 28-31) may be compared with the more harmonious beauty of a similar passage in the *Phaedrus* (245).

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To the same cause we may attribute the want of plan. Plato had not the command of his materials which would have enabled him to produce a perfect work of art. Hence there are several new beginnings and resumptive and formal or artificial connexions; we miss the '*callida junctura*' of the earlier dialogues. His speculations about the Eternal, his theories of creation, his mathematical anticipations, are supplemented by desultory remarks on the one immortal and the two mortal souls of man, on the functions of the bodily organs in health and disease, on sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. He soars into the heavens, and then, as if his wings were suddenly clipped, he walks ungracefully and with difficulty upon the earth. The greatest things in the world, and the least things in man, are brought within the compass of a short treatise. But the intermediate links are missing, and we cannot be surprised that there should be a want of unity in a work which embraces astronomy, theology, physiology, and natural philosophy in a few pages.

It is not easy to determine how Plato's cosmos may be presented to the reader in a clearer and shorter form; or how we may supply a thread of connexion to his ideas without giving greater consistency to them than they possessed in his mind, or adding on consequences which would never have occurred to him. For he has glimpses of the truth, but no comprehensive or perfect vision. There are isolated expressions about the nature



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of God which have a wonderful depth and power (29 E ff., 37 ff.); but we are not justified in assuming that these had any greater significance to the mind of Plato than language of a neutral and impersonal character. . . . With a view to the illustration of the *Timaeus* I propose to divide this Introduction into sections, of which the first will contain an outline of the dialogue: (2) I shall consider the aspects of nature which presented themselves to Plato and his age, and the elements of philosophy which entered into the conception of them: (3) the theology and physics of the *Timaeus*, including the soul of the world, the conception of time and space, and the composition of the elements: (4) in the fourth section I shall consider the Platonic astronomy, and the position of the earth. There will remain, (5) the psychology, (6) the physiology of Plato, and (7) his analysis of the senses to be briefly commented upon: (8) lastly, we may examine in what points Plato approaches or anticipates the discoveries of modern science.

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§ 1.

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Socrates begins the *Timaeus* with a summary of the Republic. <sup>Steph.</sup> He lightly touches upon a few points,— the division of labour and <sup>17,</sup> distribution of the citizens into classes, the double nature and <sup>18</sup> training of the guardians, the community of property and of women and children. But he makes no mention of the second education, or of the government of philosophers.

And now he desires to see the ideal State set in motion; he <sup>19</sup> would like to know how she behaved in some great struggle. But he is unable to invent such a narrative himself; and he is afraid that the poets are equally incapable; for, although he pretends to have nothing to say against them, he remarks that they are a tribe of imitators, who can only describe what they have seen. And he fears that the Sophists, who are plentifully supplied with graces of speech, in their erratic way of life having never had a city or house of their own, may through want of experience err in their conception of philosophers and statesmen. 'And therefore to you I turn, Timaeus, citizen of Locris, who are <sup>20</sup> at once a philosopher and a statesman, and to you, Critias, whom all Athenians know to be similarly accomplished, and to Hermocrates, who is also fitted by nature and education to share in our



discourse.' *Her.* 'We will do our best, and have been already preparing; for on our way home, Critias told us of an ancient tradition, which I wish, Critias, that you would repeat to Socrates.' *Timaæus.*

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- 'I will, if Timaæus approves.' 'I approve.' Listen then, Socrates, to a tale of Solon's, who, being the friend of Dropides my great-grandfather, told it to my grandfather Critias, and he told me. The narrative related to ancient famous actions of the
- 21 Athenian people, and to one especially, which I will rehearse in honour of you and of the goddess. Critias when he told this tale of the olden time, was ninety years old, I being not more than ten. The occasion of the rehearsal was the day of the Apaturia called the Registration of Youth, at which our parents gave prizes for recitation. Some poems of Solon were recited by the boys. They had not at that time gone out of fashion, and the recital of them led some one to say, perhaps in compliment to Critias, that Solon was not only the wisest of men but also the best of poets. The old man brightened up at hearing this, and said: Had Solon only had the leisure which was required to complete the famous legend which he brought with him from Egypt he would have been as distinguished as Homer and Hesiod. 'And what was the subject of the poem?' said the person who made the remark. The subject was a very noble one; he described the most famous action in which the Athenian people were ever engaged. But the memory of their exploits has passed away owing to the lapse of time and the extinction of the actors. 'Tell us,' said the other, 'the whole story, and where Solon heard the story.' He replied — There is at the head of the Egyptian Delta, where the river Nile divides, a city and district called Sais; the city was the birthplace of King Amasis, and is under the protection of the goddess Neith or Athene. The citizens have a friendly feeling towards the Athenians, believing themselves to be related to them. Hither
- 22 came Solon, and was received with honour; and here he first learnt, by conversing with the Egyptian priests, how ignorant he and his countrymen were of antiquity. Perceiving this, and with the view of eliciting information from them, he told them the tales of Phoroneus and Niobe, and also of Deucalion and Pyrrha, and he endeavoured to count the generations which had since passed. Thereupon an aged priest said to him: 'O Solon, Solon, you Hellenes are ever young, and there is no old man who is a

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Hellene.’ ‘What do you mean?’ he asked. ‘In mind,’ replied the priest, ‘I mean to say that you are children; there is no opinion or tradition of knowledge among you which is white with age; and I will tell you why. Like the rest of mankind you have suffered from convulsions of nature, which are chiefly brought about by the two great agencies of fire and water. The former is symbolized in the Hellenic tale of young Phaëthon who drove his father’s horses the wrong way, and having burnt up the earth was himself burnt up by a thunderbolt. For there occurs at long intervals a derangement of the heavenly bodies, and then the earth is destroyed by fire. At such times, and when fire is the agent, those who dwell by rivers or on the seashore are safer than those who dwell upon high and dry places, who in their turn are safer when the danger is from water. Now the Nile is our saviour from fire, and as there is little rain in Egypt, we are not harmed by water; whereas in other countries, when a deluge comes, the inhabitants are swept by the rivers into the sea. The memorials which your own and other nations have once had of the famous actions of mankind perish in the waters at certain periods; and the rude survivors in the mountains begin again, knowing nothing of the world before the flood. But in Egypt the traditions of our own and other lands are by us registered for ever in our temples. The genealogies which you have recited to us out of your own annals, Solon, are a mere children’s story. For in the first place, you remember one deluge only, and there were many of them, and you know nothing of that fairest and noblest race of which you are a seed or remnant. The memory of them was lost, because there was no written voice among you. For in the times before the great flood Athens was the greatest and best of cities and did the noblest deeds and had the best constitution of any under the face of heaven.’ Solon marvelled, and desired to be informed of the particulars. ‘You are welcome to hear them,’ said the priest, ‘both for your own sake and for that of the city, and above all for the sake of the goddess who is the common foundress of both our cities. Nine thousand years have elapsed since she founded yours, and eight thousand since she founded ours, as our annals record. Many laws exist among us which are the counterpart of yours as they were in the olden time. I will briefly describe them to you, and you shall read the

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account of them at your leisure in the sacred registers. In the first place, there was a caste of priests among the ancient Athenians, and another of artisans; also castes of shepherds, hunters, and husbandmen, and lastly of warriors, who, like the warriors of Egypt, were separated from the rest, and carried shields and spears, a custom which the goddess first taught you, and then the Asiatics, and we among Asiatics first received from her. Observe again, what care the law took in the pursuit of wisdom, searching out the deep things of the world, and applying them to the use of man. The spot of earth which the goddess chose had the best of climates, and produced the wisest men; in no other was she herself, the philosopher and warrior goddess, so likely to have votaries. And there you dwelt as became the children of the gods, excelling all men in virtue, and many famous actions are recorded of you. The most famous of them all was the overthrow of the island of Atlantis. This great island lay over against the Pillars of Heracles, in extent greater than Libya and Asia put together, and was the passage to other islands and to a great ocean of which the Mediterranean sea was only the harbour; and within the Pillars the empire of Atlantis reached in Europe to Tyrrhenia and in Libya to Egypt. This mighty power was arrayed against Egypt and Hellas and all the countries bordering on the Mediterranean. Then your city did bravely, and won renown over the whole earth. For at the peril of her own existence, and when the other Hellenes had deserted her, she repelled the invader, and of her own accord gave liberty to all the nations within the Pillars. A little while afterwards there were great earthquakes and floods, and your warrior race all sank into the earth; and the great island of Atlantis also disappeared in the sea. This is the explanation of the shallows which are found in that part of the Atlantic ocean.'

Such was the tale, Socrates, which Critias heard from Solon; and I noticed when listening to you yesterday, how close the resemblance was between your city and citizens and the ancient Athenian State. But I would not speak at the time, because I wanted to refresh my memory. I had heard the old man when I was a child, and though I could not remember the whole of our yesterday's discourse, I was able to recall every word of this, which is branded into my mind; and I am prepared, Socrates, to



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rehearse to you the entire narrative. The imaginary State which you were describing may be identified with the reality of Solon, and our antediluvian ancestors may be your citizens. 'That is excellent, Critias, and very appropriate to a Panathenaic festival; the truth of the story is a great advantage.' Then now let me 27 explain to you the order of our entertainment; first, Timaeus, who is a natural philosopher, will speak of the origin of the world, going down to the creation of man, and then I shall receive the men whom he has created, and some of whom will have been educated by you, and introduce them to you as the lost Athenian citizens of whom the Egyptian record spoke. As the law of Solon prescribes, we will bring them into court and acknowledge their claims to citizenship. 'I see,' replied Socrates, 'that I shall be well entertained; and do you, Timaeus, offer up a prayer and begin.'

*Tim.* All men who have any right feeling, at the beginning of any enterprise, call upon the Gods; and he who is about to speak of the origin of the universe has a special need of their aid. May my words be acceptable to them, and may I speak in the manner which will be most intelligible to you and will best express my own meaning!

First, I must distinguish between that which always is and never becomes and which is apprehended by reason and reflection, and that which always becomes and never is and is conceived by 28 opinion with the help of sense. All that becomes and is created is the work of a cause, and that is fair which the artificer makes after an eternal pattern, but whatever is fashioned after a created pattern is not fair. Is the world created or uncreated?—that is the first question. Created, I reply, being visible and tangible and having a body, and therefore sensible; and if sensible, then created; and if created, made by a cause, and the cause is the ineffable father of all things, who had before him an eternal 29 archetype. For to imagine that the archetype was created would be blasphemy, seeing that the world is the noblest of creations, and God is the best of causes. And the world being thus created according to the eternal pattern is the copy of something; and we may assume that words are akin to the matter of which they speak. What is spoken of the unchanging or intelligible must be certain and true; but what is spoken of the created image can only be probable; being is to becoming what truth is to belief.



And amid the variety of opinions which have arisen about God and the nature of the world we must be content to take probability for our rule, considering that I, who am the speaker, and you, who are the judges, are only men; to probability we may attain but no further.

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*Soc.* Excellent, Timæus; I like your manner of approaching the subject — proceed.

*Tim.* Why did the Creator make the world? . . . He was good, and therefore not jealous, and being free from jealousy he desired  
30 that all things should be like himself. Wherefore he set in order  
| the visible world, which he found in disorder. Now he who is the best could only create the fairest; and reflecting that of visible things the intelligent is superior to the unintelligent, he put intelligence in soul and soul in body, and framed the universe to be the best and fairest work in the order of nature, and the world became a living soul through the providence of God.

In the likeness of what animal was the world made? — that is the third question. . . . The form of the perfect animal was a whole, and contained all intelligible beings, and the visible animal, made after the pattern of this, included all visible creatures.

31 Are there many worlds or one only? — that is the fourth  
question. . . . One only. For if in the original there had been  
| more than one they would have been the parts of a third, which would have been the true pattern of the world; and therefore there is, and will ever be, but one created world. Now that which is created is of necessity corporeal and visible and tangible, — visible  
and therefore made of fire, — tangible and therefore solid and made  
32 of earth. But two terms must be united by a third, which is a  
| mean between them; and had the earth been a surface only, one mean would have sufficed, but two means are required to unite solid bodies. And as the world was composed of solids, between the elements of fire and earth God placed two other elements of air and water, and arranged them in a continuous proportion —

fire : air : : air : water, and air : water : : water : earth,

and so put together a visible and palpable heaven, having harmony and friendship in the union of the four elements; and being at unity with itself it was indissoluble except by the hand

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of the framer. Each of the elements was taken into the universe whole and entire; for he considered that the animal should be perfect and one, leaving no remnants out of which another 33 animal could be created, and should also be free from old age and disease, which are produced by the action of external forces. And as he was to contain all things, he was made in the all-containing form of a sphere, round as from a lathe and every way equidistant from the centre, as was natural and suitable to him. He was finished and smooth, having neither eyes nor ears, for there was nothing without him which he could see or hear; and he had no need to carry food to his mouth, nor was there air for him to breathe; and he did not require hands, for there was nothing of which he could take hold, nor feet, with which to walk. All that he did was done rationally in and by himself, and he 34 moved in a circle turning within himself, which is the most intellectual of motions; but the other six motions were wanting to him; wherefore the universe had no feet or legs.

And so the thought of God made a God in the image of a perfect body, having intercourse with himself and needing no other, but in every part harmonious and self-contained and truly blessed. The soul was first made by him — the elder to rule the younger; not in the order in which our wayward fancy has led us to describe them, but the soul first and afterwards the body. God took of the unchangeable and indivisible and also of the 35 divisible and corporeal, and out of the two he made a third nature, essence, which was in a mean between them, and partook of the same and the other, the intractable nature of the other being compressed into the same. Having made a compound of all the three, he proceeded to divide the entire mass into portions related to one another in the ratios of 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27, and 36 proceeded to fill up the double and triple intervals thus —

$$\begin{array}{ccccccccccc} \overline{1}, & \frac{4}{3}, & \frac{3}{2}, & \overline{2}, & \frac{8}{3}, & 3, & \overline{4}, & \frac{16}{3}, & 6, & \overline{8} : \\ \overline{1}, & \frac{3}{2}, & 2, & \overline{3}, & \frac{9}{2}, & 6, & \overline{9}, & \frac{27}{2}, & 18, & \overline{27}; \end{array}$$

in which double series of numbers are two kinds of means; the one exceeds and is exceeded by equal parts of the extremes, e. g. 1,  $\frac{4}{3}$ , 2; the other kind of mean is one which is equidistant from the extremes — 2, 4, 6. In this manner there were formed intervals of thirds, 3 : 2, of fourths, 4 : 3, and of ninths, 9 : 8. And

next he filled up the intervals of a fourth with ninths, leaving a remnant which is in the ratio of 256:243. The entire compound was divided by him lengthways into two parts, which he united at the centre like the letter X, and bent them into an inner and outer circle or sphere, cutting one another again at a point over against the point at which they cross. The outer circle or sphere was named the sphere of the same — the inner, the sphere of the other or diverse; and the one revolved horizontally to the right, the other diagonally to the left. To the sphere of the same which was undivided he gave dominion, but the sphere of the other or diverse was distributed into seven unequal orbits, having intervals in ratios of twos and threes, three of either sort, and he bade the orbits move in opposite directions to one another — three of them, the Sun, Mercury, Venus, with equal swiftness, and the remaining four — the Moon, Saturn, Mars, Jupiter, with unequal swiftness to the three and to one another, but all in due proportion.

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37 When the Creator had made the soul he made the body within her; and the soul interfused everywhere from the centre to the circumference of heaven, herself turning in herself, began a divine life of rational and everlasting motion. The body of heaven is visible, but the soul is invisible, and partakes of reason and harmony, and is the best of creations, being the work of the best. And being composed of the same, the other, and the essence, these three, and also divided and bound in harmonical proportion, and revolving within herself — the soul when touching anything which has essence, whether divided or undivided, is stirred to utter the sameness or diversity of that and some other thing, and to tell how and when and where individuals are affected or related, whether in the world of change or of essence. When reason is in the neighbourhood of sense, and the circle of the other or diverse is moving truly, then arise true opinions and beliefs; when reason is in the sphere of thought, and the circle of the same runs smoothly, then intelligence is perfected.

When the Father who begat the world saw the image which he had made of the Eternal Gods moving and living, he rejoiced; and in his joy resolved, since the archetype was eternal, to make the creature eternal as far as this was possible. Wherefore he made an image of eternity which is time, having an uniform motion according to number, parted into months and days and



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years, and also having greater divisions of past, present, and future. These all apply to becoming in time, and have no meaning in relation to the eternal nature, which ever is and never was or will be; for the unchangeable is never older or younger, and when we say that he 'was' or 'will be,' we are mistaken, for these words are applicable only to becoming, and not to true being; and equally wrong are we in saying that what has become *is* become and that what becomes *is* becoming, and that the non-existent *is* non-existent. . . . These are the forms of time which imitate eternity and move in a circle measured by number. 38

Thus was time made in the image of the eternal nature; and it was created together with the heavens, in order that if they were dissolved, it might perish with them. And God made the sun and moon and five other wanderers, as they are called, seven in all, and to each of them he gave a body moving in an orbit, being one of the seven orbits into which the circle of the other was divided. He put the moon in the orbit which was nearest to the earth, the sun in that next, the morning star and Mercury in the orbits which move opposite to the sun but with equal swiftness—this being the reason why they overtake and are overtaken by one another. All these bodies became living creatures, and learnt their appointed tasks, and began to move, the nearer more swiftly, the remoter more slowly, according to the 39 diagonal movement of the other. And since this was controlled by the movement of the same, the seven planets in their courses appeared to describe spirals; and that appeared fastest which was slowest, and that which overtook others appeared to be overtaken by them. And God lighted a fire in the second orbit from the earth which is called the sun, to give light over the whole heaven, and to teach intelligent beings that knowledge of number which is derived from the revolution of the same. Thus arose day and night, which are the periods of the most intelligent nature; a month is created by the revolution of the moon, a year by that of the sun. Other periods of wonderful length and complexity are not observed by men in general; there is moreover a cycle or perfect year at the completion of which they all meet and coincide. . . . To this end the stars came into being, that the created heaven might imitate the eternal nature.



Thus far the universal animal was made in the divine image, *Timaeus.*  
 but the other animals were not as yet included in him. And *ANALYSIS.*  
 God created them according to the patterns or species of them  
 40 which existed in the divine original. There are four of them:  
 one of gods, another of birds, a third of fishes, and a fourth of  
 animals. The gods were made in the form of a circle, which is  
 the most perfect figure and the figure of the universe. They  
 were created chiefly of fire, that they might be bright, and were  
 made to know and follow the best, and to be scattered over the  
 heavens, of which they were to be the glory. Two kinds of  
 motion were assigned to them — first, the revolution in the same  
 and around the same, in peaceful unchanging thought of the  
 same; and to this was added a forward motion which was under  
 the control of the same. Thus then the fixed stars were created,  
 being divine and eternal animals, revolving on the same spot, and  
 the wandering stars, in their courses, were created in the manner  
 already described. The earth, which is our nurse, clinging around  
 the pole extended through the universe, he made to be the  
 guardian and artificer of night and day, first and eldest of gods  
 that are in the interior of heaven. Vain would be the labour  
 of telling all the figures of them, moving as in dance, and their  
 juxta-positions and approximations, and when and where and  
 behind what other stars they appear or disappear — to tell of all  
 this without looking at a plan of them would be labour in vain.

The knowledge of the other gods is beyond us, and we can  
 only accept the traditions of the ancients, who were the children  
 of the gods, as they said; for surely they must have known their  
 own ancestors. Although they give no proof, we must believe  
 them as is customary. They tell us that Oceanus and Tethys  
 were the children of Earth and Heaven; that Phorcys, Cronos,  
 41 and Rhea came in the next generation, and were followed by Zeus  
 and Herè, whose brothers and children are known to everybody.

When all of them, both those who show themselves in the  
 sky, and those who retire from view, had come into being, the  
 Creator addressed them thus: — ‘Gods, sons of gods, my works, if  
 I will, are indissoluble. That which is bound may be dissolved,  
 but only an evil being would dissolve that which is harmonious  
 and happy. And although you are not immortal you shall not  
 die, for I will hold you together. Hear me, then: — Three tribes

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of mortal beings have still to be created, but if created by me they would be like gods. Do ye therefore make them; I will implant in them the seed of immortality, and you shall weave together the mortal and immortal, and provide food for them, and receive them again in death.' Thus he spake, and poured the remains of the elements into the cup in which he had mingled the soul of the universe. They were no longer pure as before, but diluted; and the mixture he distributed into souls equal in number to the stars, and assigned each to a star — then having mounted them, as in a chariot, he showed them the nature of the universe, and told them of their future birth and human lot. They were to be sown in the planets, and out of them was to come forth the most religious of animals, which would hereafter be called man. The 42  
souls were to be implanted in bodies, which were in a perpetual flux, whence, he said, would arise, first, sensation; secondly, love, which is a mixture of pleasure and pain; thirdly, fear and anger, and the opposite affections: and if they conquered these, they would live righteously, but if they were conquered by them, unrighteously. He who lived well would return to his native star, and would there have a blessed existence; but, if he lived ill, he would pass into the nature of a woman, and if he did not then alter his evil ways, into the likeness of some animal, until the reason which was in him reasserted her sway over the elements of fire, air, earth, water, which had engrossed her, and he regained his first and better nature. Having given this law to his creatures, that he might be guiltless of their future evil, he sowed them, some in the earth, some in the moon, and some in the other planets; and he ordered the younger gods to frame human bodies for them and to make the necessary additions to them, and to avert from them all but self-inflicted evil.

Having given these commands, the Creator remained in his own nature. And his children, receiving from him the immortal principle, borrowed from the world portions of earth, air, fire, water, hereafter to be returned, which they fastened together, 43  
not with the adamantine bonds which bound themselves, but by little invisible pegs, making each separate body out of all the elements, subject to influx and efflux, and containing the courses of the soul. These swelling and surging as in a river moved irregularly and irrationally in all the six possible ways, forwards,

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backwards, right, left, up and down. But violent as were the internal and alimentary fluids, the tide became still more violent when the body came into contact with flaming fire, or the solid earth, or gliding waters, or the stormy wind; the motions produced by these impulses pass through the body to the soul and have the name of sensations. Uniting with the ever-flowing current, they shake the courses of the soul, stopping the revolution of the same and twisting in all sorts of ways the nature of the other, and the harmonical ratios of twos and threes and the mean terms which connect them, until the circles are bent and disordered and their motion becomes irregular. You may imagine a position of the body in which the head is resting upon the ground, and the legs are in the air, and the top is bottom and the left right. And something similar happens when the disordered motions of the soul come into contact with any external  
 44) thing; they say the same or the other in a manner which is the very opposite of the truth, and they are false and foolish, and have no guiding principle in them. And when external impressions enter in, they are really conquered, though they seem to conquer.

By reason of these affections the soul is at first without intelligence, but as time goes on the stream of nutriment abates, and the courses of the soul regain their proper motion, and apprehend the same and the other rightly, and become rational. The soul of him who has education is whole and perfect and escapes the worst disease, but, if a man's education be neglected, he walks lamely through life and returns good for nothing to the world below. This, however, is an after-stage—at present, we are only concerned with the creation of the body and soul.

The two divine courses were encased by the gods in a sphere which is called the head, and is the god and lord of us. And to this they gave the body to be a vehicle, and the members to be  
 45) instruments, having the power of flexion and extension. Such was the origin of legs and arms. In the next place, the gods gave a forward motion to the human body, because the front part of man was the more honourable and had authority. And they put in a face in which they inserted organs to minister in all things to the providence of the soul. They first contrived the eyes, into which they conveyed a light akin to the light of day,



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making it to flow through the pupils. When the light of the eye is surrounded by the light of day, then like falls upon like, and they unite and form one body which conveys to the soul the motions of visible objects. But when the visual ray goes forth into the darkness, then unlike falls upon unlike — the eye no longer sees, and we go to sleep. The fire or light, when kept in by the eyelids, equalizes the inward motions, and there is rest accompanied by few dreams; only when the greater motions 46 remain they engender in us corresponding visions of the night. And now we shall be able to understand the nature of reflections in mirrors. The fires from within and from without meet about the smooth and bright surface of the mirror; and because they meet in a manner contrary to the usual mode, the right and left sides of the object are transposed. In a concave mirror the top and bottom are inverted, but this is no transposition.

These are the second causes which God used as his ministers in fashioning the world. They are thought by many to be the prime causes, but they are not so; for they are destitute of mind and reason, and the lover of mind will not allow that there are any prime causes other than the rational and invisible ones — these he investigates first, and afterwards the causes of things which are moved by others, and which work by chance and without order. Of the second or concurrent causes of sight I have already spoken, and I will now speak of the higher purpose of God in giving us eyes. Sight is the source of the greatest benefits to 47 us; for if our eyes had never seen the sun, stars, and heavens; the words which we have spoken would not have been uttered. The sight of them and their revolutions has given us the knowledge of number and time, the power of enquiry, and philosophy, which is the great blessing of human life; not to speak of the lesser benefits which even the vulgar can appreciate. God gave us the faculty of sight that we might behold the order of the heavens and create a corresponding order in our own erring minds. To the like end the gifts of speech and hearing were bestowed upon us; not for the sake of irrational pleasure, but in order that we might harmonize the courses of the soul by sympathy with the harmony of sound, and cure ourselves of our irregular and graceless ways.

Thus far we have spoken of the works of mind; and there are



other works done from necessity, which we must now place  
 48 beside them; for the creation is made up of both, mind per-  
 suading necessity as far as possible to work out good. Before the  
 heavens there existed fire, air, water, earth, which we suppose  
 men to know, though no one has explained their nature, and we  
 erroneously maintain them to be the letters or elements of the  
 whole, although they cannot reasonably be compared even to  
 syllables or first compounds. I am not now speaking of the  
 first principles of things, because I cannot discover them by  
 our present mode of enquiry. But as I observed the rule of  
 probability at first, I will begin anew, seeking by the grace of  
 God to observe it still.

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In our former discussion I distinguished two kinds of being —  
 49 the unchanging or invisible, and the visible or changing. But  
 now a third kind is required, which I shall call the receptacle  
 or nurse of generation. There is a difficulty in arriving at an  
 exact notion of this third kind, because the four elements them-  
 selves are of inexact natures and easily pass into one another, and  
 are too transient to be detained by any one name; wherefore we  
 are compelled to speak of water or fire, not as substances, but as  
 50 qualities. They may be compared to images made of gold, which  
 are continually assuming new forms. Somebody asks what they  
 are; if you do not know, the safest answer is to reply that they  
 are gold. In like manner there is a universal nature out of which  
 all things are made, and which is like none of them; but they  
 enter into and pass out of her, and are made after patterns of the  
 true in a wonderful and inexplicable manner. The containing  
 principle may be likened to a mother, the source or spring to  
 a father, the intermediate nature to a child; and we may also  
 remark that the matter which receives every variety of form must  
 be formless, like the inodorous liquids which are prepared to  
 receive scents, or the smooth and soft materials on which figures  
 51 are impressed. In the same way space or matter is neither earth  
 nor fire nor air nor water, but an invisible and formless being  
 which receives all things, and in an incomprehensible manner  
 partakes of the intelligible. But we may say, speaking generally,  
 that fire is that part of this nature which is inflamed, water that  
 which is moistened, and the like.

Let me ask a question in which a great principle is involved:

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Is there an essence of fire and the other elements, or are there only fires visible to sense? I answer in a word: If mind is one thing and true opinion another, then there are self-existent essences; but if mind is the same with opinion, then the visible and corporeal is most real. But they are not the same, and they have a different origin and nature. The one comes to us by instruction, the other by persuasion; the one is rational, the other is irrational; the one is movable by persuasion, the other immovable; the one is possessed by every man, the other by the gods and by very few men. And we must acknowledge that as there are two kinds of knowledge, so there are two kinds of being corresponding to them; the one uncreated, indestructible, im- 52  
movable, which is seen by intelligence only; the other created, which is always becoming in place and vanishing out of place, and is apprehended by opinion and sense. There is also a third nature — that of space, which is indestructible, and is perceived by a kind of spurious reason without the help of sense. This is presented to us in a dreamy manner, and yet is said to be necessary, for we say that all things must be somewhere in space. For they are the images of other things and must therefore have a separate existence and exist in something (i. e. in space). But true reason assures us that while two things (i. e. the idea and the image) are different they cannot inhere in one another, so as to be one and two at the same time.

To sum up: Being and generation and space, these three, existed before the heavens, and the nurse or vessel of generation, moistened by water and inflamed by fire, and taking the forms of air and earth, assumed various shapes. By the motion of the vessel, the elements were divided, and like grain win-  
nowed by fans, the close and heavy particles settled in one 53  
place, the light and airy ones in another. At first they were without reason or measure, and had only certain faint traces of themselves, until God fashioned them by figure and number. In this, as in every other part of creation, I suppose God to have made things, as far as was possible, fair and good, out of things not fair and good.

And now I will explain to you the generation of the world by a method with which your scientific training will have made you familiar. Fire, air, earth, and water are bodies and therefore

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solids, and solids are contained in planes, and plane rectilinear figures are made up of triangles. Of triangles there are two kinds; one having the opposite sides equal (isosceles), the other with unequal sides (scalene). These we may fairly assume to be the original elements of fire and the other bodies; what principles are prior to these God only knows, and he of men whom God loves. Next, we must determine what are the four most beautiful figures which are unlike one another and yet sometimes capable of resolution into one another. . . . Of the two kinds of triangles the equal-sided has but one form, the unequal-sided has an infinite variety of forms; and there is none more beautiful than that which forms the half of an equilateral triangle. Let us then choose two triangles; one, the isosceles, the other, that form of scalene which has the square of the longer side three times as great as the square of the lesser side; and affirm that, out of these, fire and the other elements have been constructed.

I was wrong in imagining that all the four elements could be generated into and out of one another. For as they are formed, three of them from the triangle which has the sides unequal, the fourth from the triangle which has equal sides, three can be resolved into one another, but the fourth cannot be resolved into them nor they into it. So much for their passage into one another: I must now speak of their construction. From the triangle of which the hypotenuse is twice the lesser side the three first regular solids are formed — first, the equilateral pyramid or tetrahedron; secondly, the octahedron; thirdly, the icosahedron; and from the isosceles triangle is formed the cube. And there is a fifth figure [which is made out of twelve pentagons], the dodecahedron — this God used as a model for the twelvefold division of the Zodiac.

Let us now assign the geometrical forms to their respective elements. The cube is the most stable of them because resting on a quadrangular plane surface, and composed of isosceles triangles. To the earth then, which is the most stable of bodies and the most easily modelled of them, may be assigned the form of a cube; and the remaining forms to the other elements,— to fire the pyramid, to air the octahedron, and to water the icosahedron, — according to their degrees of lightness or heaviness or power, or want of power, of penetration. The single particles of any of the



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elements are not seen by reason of their smallness; they only become visible when collected. The ratios of their motions, numbers, and other properties, are ordered by the God, who harmonized them as far as necessity permitted.

The probable conclusion is as follows:—Earth, when dissolved by the more penetrating element of fire, whether acting immediately or through the medium of air or water, is decomposed but not transformed. Water, when divided by fire or air, becomes one part fire, and two parts air. A volume of air divided becomes two of fire. On the other hand, when condensed, two volumes of fire make a volume of air; and two and a half parts of air condense into one of water. Any element which is fastened upon 57 by fire is cut by the sharpness of the triangles, until at length, coalescing with the fire, it is at rest; for similars are not affected by similars. When two kinds of bodies quarrel with one another, then the tendency to decomposition continues until the smaller either escapes to its kindred element or becomes one with its conqueror. And this tendency in bodies to condense or escape is a source of motion. . . . Where there is motion there must be a mover, and where there is a mover there must be something to move. These cannot exist in what is uniform, and therefore motion is due to want of uniformity. But then why, when things 58 are divided after their kinds, do they not cease from motion? The answer is, that the circular motion of all things compresses them, and as ‘nature abhors a vacuum,’ the finer and more subtle particles of the lighter elements, such as fire and air, are thrust into the interstices of the larger, each of them penetrating according to their rarity, and thus all the elements are on their way up and down everywhere and always into their own places. Hence there is a principle of inequality, and therefore of motion, in all time.

In the next place, we may observe that there are different kinds of fire — (1) flame, (2) light that burns not, (3) the red heat of the embers of fire. And there are varieties of air, as for example, the pure aether, the opaque mist, and other nameless forms. Water, again, is of two kinds, liquid and fusile. The liquid is composed of small and unequal particles, the fusile of large and uniform particles and is more solid, but nevertheless melts at the approach of fire, and then spreads upon the earth. When the 59



substance cools, the fire passes into the air, which is displaced, and forces together and condenses the liquid mass. This process is called cooling and congelment. Of the fusile kinds the fairest and heaviest is gold; this is hardened by filtration through rock, and is of a bright yellow colour. A shoot of gold which is darker and denser than the rest is called adamant. Another kind is called copper, which is harder and yet lighter because the interstices are larger than in gold. There is mingled with it a fine and small portion of earth which comes out in the form of rust. These are a few of the conjectures which philosophy forms, when, leaving the eternal nature, she turns for innocent recreation to consider the truths of generation.

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Water which is mingled with fire is called liquid because it rolls upon the earth, and soft because its bases give way. This becomes more equable when separated from fire and air, and then congeals into hail or ice, or the looser forms of hoar frost or snow. There are other waters which are called juices and are distilled through plants. Of these we may mention, first, wine, which warms the soul as well as the body; secondly, oily substances, as for example, oil or pitch; thirdly, honey, which relaxes the contracted parts of the mouth and so produces sweetness; fourthly, vegetable acid, which is frothy and has a burning quality and dissolves the flesh. Of the kinds of earth, that which is filtered through water passes into stone; the water is broken up by the earth and escapes in the form of air—this in turn presses upon the mass of earth, and the earth, compressed into an indissoluble union with the remaining water, becomes rock. Rock, when it is made up of equal particles, is fair and transparent, but the reverse when of unequal. Earth is converted into pottery when the watery part is suddenly drawn away; or if moisture remains, the earth, when fused by fire, becomes, on cooling, a stone of a black colour. When the earth is finer and of a briny nature then two half-solid bodies are formed by separating the water,—soda and salt. The strong compounds of earth and water are not soluble by water, but only by fire. Earth itself, when not consolidated, is dissolved by water; when consolidated, by fire only. The cohesion of water, when strong, is dissolved by fire only; when weak, either by air or fire, the former entering the interstices, the latter penetrating even the

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triangles. Air when strongly condensed is indissoluble by any power which does not reach the triangles, and even when not strongly condensed is only resolved by fire. Compounds of earth and water are unaffected by water while the water occupies the interstices in them, but begin to liquefy when fire enters into the interstices of the water. They are of two kinds, some of them, like glass, having more earth, others, like wax, having more water in them.

Having considered objects of sense, we now pass on to sensation. But we cannot explain sensation without explaining the nature of flesh and of the mortal soul; and as we cannot treat of both together, in order that we may proceed at once to the sensations we must assume the existence of body and soul.

What makes fire burn? The fineness of the sides, the sharpness of the angles, the smallness of the particles, the quickness of the motion. Moreover, the pyramid, which is the figure of fire, is 62 more cutting than any other. The feeling of cold is produced by the larger particles of moisture outside the body trying to eject the smaller ones in the body which they compress. The struggle which arises between elements thus unnaturally brought together causes shivering. That is hard to which the flesh yields, and soft which yields to the flesh, and these two terms are also relative to one another. The yielding matter is that which has the slenderest base, whereas that which has a rectangular base is compact and repellent. Light and heavy are wrongly explained with reference to a lower and higher in place. For in the universe, which is a sphere, there is no opposition of above or below, and that which is to us above would be below to a man standing at the 63 antipodes. The greater or less difficulty in detaching any element from its like is the real cause of heaviness or of lightness. If you draw the earth into the dissimilar air, the particles of earth cling to their native element, and you more easily detach a small portion than a large. There would be the same difficulty in moving any of the upper elements towards the lower. The smooth and the rough are severally produced by the union of evenness with compactness, and of hardness with inequality. 64

Pleasure and pain are the most important of the affections common to the whole body. According to our general doctrine of sensation, parts of the body which are easily moved readily

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transmit the motion to the mind; but parts which are not easily moved have no effect upon the patient. The bones and hair are of the latter kind, sight and hearing of the former. Ordinary affections are neither pleasant nor painful. The impressions of sight afford an example of these, and are neither violent nor sudden. But sudden replenishments of the body cause pleasure,  
 65 and sudden disturbances, as for example cuttings and burnings, have the opposite effect.

From sensations common to the whole body, we proceed to those of particular parts. The affections of the tongue appear to be caused by contraction and dilation, but they have more of roughness or smoothness than is found in other affections. Earthy particles, entering into the small veins of the tongue which reach to the heart, when they melt into and dry up the little veins are astringent if they are rough; or if not so rough, they are only harsh, and if excessively abstergent, like potash and soda, bitter. Purgatives of a weaker sort are called salt and, having no bitterness, are rather agreeable. Inflammatory bodies,  
 66 which by their lightness are carried up into the head, cutting all that comes in their way, are termed pungent. But when these are refined by putrefaction, and enter the narrow veins of the tongue, and meet there particles of earth and air, two kinds of globules are formed — one of earthy and impure liquid, which boils and ferments, the other of pure and transparent water, which are called bubbles; of all these affections the cause is termed acid. When, on the other hand, the composition of the deliquescent particles is congenial to the tongue, and disposes the parts according to their nature, this remedial power in them is called sweet.

Smells are not divided into kinds; all of them are transitional, and arise out of the decomposition of one element into another, for the simple air or water is without smell. They are vapours or mists, thinner than water and thicker than air: and hence in drawing in the breath, when there is an obstruction, the air  
 67 passes, but there is no smell. They have no names, but are distinguished as pleasant and unpleasant, and their influence extends over the whole region from the head to the navel.

Hearing is the effect of a stroke which is transmitted through the ears by means of the air, brain, and blood to the soul, beginning



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at the head and extending to the liver. The sound which moves swiftly is acute ; that which moves slowly is grave ; that which is uniform is smooth, and the opposite is harsh. Loudness depends on the quantity of the sound. Of the harmony of sounds I will hereafter speak (80).

Colours are flames which emanate from all bodies, having particles corresponding to the sense of sight. Some of the particles are less and some larger, and some are equal to the parts of the sight. The equal particles appear transparent ; the larger contract, and the lesser dilate the sight. White is produced by the dilation, black by the contraction, of the particles of sight. There is also a swifter motion of another sort of fire which forces a way 68 through the passages of the eyes, and elicits from them a union of fire and water which we call tears. The inner fire flashes forth, and the outer finds a way in and is extinguished in the moisture, and all sorts of colours are generated by the mixture. This affection is termed by us dazzling, and the object which produces it is called bright. There is yet another sort of fire which mingles with the moisture of the eye without flashing, and produces a colour like blood—to this we give the name of red. A bright element mingling with red and white produces a colour which we call auburn. The law of proportion, however, according to which compound colours are formed, cannot be determined scientifically or even probably. Red, when mingled with black and white, gives a purple hue, which becomes umber when the colours are burnt and there is a larger admixture of black. Flame-colour is a mixture of auburn and dun ; dun of white and black ; yellow of white and auburn. White and bright meeting, and falling upon a full black, become dark blue ; dark blue mingling with white becomes a light blue ; the union of flame-colour and black makes leek-green. There is no difficulty in seeing how other colours are probably composed. But he who should attempt to test the truth of this by experiment, would forget the difference of the human and divine nature. God only is able to compound and resolve substances ; such experiments are impossible to man.

These are the elements of necessity which the Creator received in the world of generation when he made the all-sufficient and perfect creature, using the secondary causes as his ministers, but



himself fashioning the good in all things. For there are two sorts of causes, the one divine, the other necessary; and we should seek to discover the divine above all, and, for their sake, the necessary, because without them the higher cannot be attained by us.

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Having now before us the causes out of which the rest of our discourse is to be framed, let us go back to the point at which we began, and add a fair ending to our tale. As I said at first, all things were originally a chaos in which there was no order or proportion. The elements of this chaos were arranged by the Creator, and out of them he made the world. Of the divine he himself was the author, but he committed to his offspring the creation of the mortal. From him they received the immortal soul, but themselves made the body to be its vehicle, and constructed within another soul which was mortal, and subject to terrible affections—pleasure, the inciter of evil; pain, which deters from good; rashness and fear, foolish counsellors; anger hard to be appeased; hope easily led astray. These they mingled with irrational sense and all-daring love according to necessary laws and so framed man. And, fearing to pollute the divine element, they gave the mortal soul a separate habitation in the breast, parted off from the head by a narrow isthmus. And as in a house the women's apartments are divided from the men's, the cavity of the thorax was divided into two parts, a higher and a lower. The higher of the two, which is the seat of courage and anger, lies nearer to the head, between the midriff and the neck, and assists reason in restraining the desires. The heart is the house of guard in which all the veins meet, and through them reason sends her commands to the extremity of her kingdom. When the passions are in revolt, or danger approaches from without, then the heart beats and swells; and the creating powers, knowing this, implanted in the body the soft and bloodless substance of the lung, having a porous and springy nature like a sponge, and being kept cool by drink and air which enters through the trachea.

The part of the soul which desires meat and drink was placed between the midriff and navel, where they made a sort of manger; and here they bound it down, like a wild animal, away from the council-chamber, and leaving the better principle undisturbed to

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advise quietly for the good of the whole. For the Creator knew 71  
 that the belly would not listen to reason, and was under the power  
 of idols and fancies. Wherefore he framed the liver to connect  
 with the lower nature, contriving that it should be compact, and  
 bright, and sweet, and also bitter and smooth, in order that the  
 power of thought which originates in the mind might there be re-  
 flected, terrifying the belly with the elements of bitterness and gall,  
 and a suffusion of bilious colours when the liver is contracted, and  
 causing pain and misery by twisting out of its place the lobe and  
 closing up the vessels and gates. And the converse happens  
 when some gentle inspiration coming from intelligence mirrors  
 the opposite fancies, giving rest and sweetness and freedom, and  
 at night, moderation and peace accompanied with prophetic in-  
 sight, when reason and sense are asleep. For the authors of our  
 being, in obedience to their Father's will and in order to make  
 men as good as they could, gave to the liver the power of divina-  
 tion, which is never active when men are awake or in health; but  
 when they are under the influence of some disorder or enthusiasm  
 then they receive intimations, which have to be interpreted by 72  
 others who are called prophets, but should rather be called inter-  
 preters of prophecy; after death these intimations become unintel-  
 ligible. The spleen which is situated in the neighbourhood, on  
 the left side, keeps the liver bright and clean, as a napkin does a  
 mirror, and the evacuations of the liver are received into it; and  
 being a hollow tissue it is for a time swollen with these impurities,  
 but when the body is purged it returns to its natural size.

The truth concerning the soul can only be established by the  
 word of God. Still, we may venture to assert what is probable  
 both concerning soul and body.

The creative powers were aware of our tendency to excess. 73  
 And so when they made the belly to be a receptacle for food, in  
 order that men might not perish by insatiable gluttony, they  
 formed the convolutions of the intestines, in this way retarding  
 the passage of food through the body, lest mankind should be  
 absorbed in eating and drinking, and the whole race become  
 impervious to divine philosophy.

The creation of bones and flesh was on this wise. The founda-  
 tion of these is the marrow which binds together body and soul,  
 and the marrow is made out of such of the primary triangles as

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are adapted by their perfection to produce all the four elements. These God took and mingled them in due proportion, making as many kinds of marrow as there were hereafter to be kinds of souls. The receptacle of the divine soul he made round, and called that portion of the marrow brain, intending that the vessel containing this substance should be the head. The remaining part he divided into long and round figures, and to these as to anchors, fastening the mortal soul, he proceeded to make the rest of the body, first forming for both parts a covering of bone. The bone was formed by sifting pure smooth earth and wetting it with marrow. It was then thrust alternately into fire and water, and thus rendered insoluble by either. Of bone he made a globe which he placed around the brain, leaving a narrow opening, and around the marrow of the neck and spine he formed the vertebrae, like hinges, which extended from the head through the whole of the trunk. And as the bone was brittle and liable to mortify and destroy the marrow by too great rigidity and susceptibility to heat and cold, he contrived sinews and flesh—the first to give flexibility, the second to guard against heat and cold, and to be a protection against falls, containing a warm moisture, which in summer exudes and cools the body, and in winter is a defence against cold. Having this in view, the Creator mingled earth with fire and water and mixed with them a ferment of acid and salt, so as to form pulpy flesh. But the sinews he made of a mixture of bone and unfermented flesh, giving them a mean nature between the two, and a yellow colour. Hence they were more glutinous than flesh, but softer than bone. The bones which have most of the living soul within them he covered with the thinnest film of flesh, those which have least of it, he lodged deeper. At the joints he diminished the flesh in order not to impede the flexure of the limbs, and also to avoid clogging the perceptions of the mind.

74 About the thighs and arms, which have no sense because there is little soul in the marrow, and about the inner bones, he laid the flesh thicker. For where the flesh is thicker there is less feeling, except in certain parts which the Creator has made solely of flesh, as for example, the tongue. Had the combination of solid bone and thick flesh been consistent with acute perceptions, the Creator would have given man a sinewy and fleshy head, and then he would have lived twice as long. But our creators were of

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opinion that a shorter life which was better was preferable to a longer which was worse, and therefore they covered the head with thin bone, and placed the sinews at the extremity of the head round the neck, and fastened the jawbones to them below the face. And they framed the mouth, having teeth and tongue and lips, with a view to the necessary and the good; for food is a necessity, and the river of speech is the best of rivers. Still, the head could not be left a bare globe of bone on account of the extremes of heat and cold, nor be allowed to become dull and senseless by an overgrowth of flesh. Wherefore it was covered by a peel or skin which met and grew by the help of the cerebral 76 humour. The diversity of the sutures was caused by the struggle of the food against the courses of the soul. The skin of the head was pierced by fire, and out of the punctures came forth a moisture, part liquid, and part of a skinny nature, which was hardened by the pressure of the external cold and became hair. And God gave hair to the head of man to be a light covering, so that it might not interfere with his perceptions. Nails were formed by combining sinew, skin, and bone, and were made by the creators with a view to the future when, as they knew, women and other animals who would require them would be framed out of man.

The gods also mingled natures akin to that of man with other 77 forms and perceptions. Thus trees and plants were created, which were originally wild and have been adapted by cultivation to our use. They partake of that third kind of life which is seated between the midriff and the navel, and is altogether passive and incapable of reflection.

When the creators had furnished all these natures for our sustenance, they cut channels through our bodies as in a garden, watering them with a perennial stream. Two were cut down the back, along the back bone, where the skin and flesh meet, one on the right and the other on the left, having the marrow of generation between them. In the next place, they divided the veins about the head and interlaced them with each other in order that they might form an additional link between the head and the body, and that the sensations from both sides might be diffused throughout the body. In the third place, they contrived the passage of liquids, which may be explained in this way:—Finer 78



bodies retain coarser, but not the coarser the finer, and the belly is capable of retaining food, but not fire and air. God therefore formed a network of fire and air to irrigate the veins, having within it two lesser nets, and stretched cords reaching from both the lesser nets to the extremity of the outer net. The inner parts of the net were made by him of fire, the lesser nets and their cavities of air. The two latter he made to pass into the mouth; the one ascending by the air-pipes from the lungs, the other by the side of the air-pipes from the belly. The entrance to the first he divided into two parts, both of which he made to meet at the channels of the nose, that when the mouth was closed the passage connected with it might still be fed with air. The cavity of the network he spread around the hollows of the body, making the entire receptacle to flow into and out of the lesser nets and the lesser nets into and out of it, while the outer net found a way into and out of the pores of the body, and the internal heat followed the air to and fro. These, as we affirm, are the phenomena of respiration. And all this process takes place in order that the body may be watered and cooled and nourished, and the meat and

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79 drink digested and liquefied and carried into the veins.

The causes of respiration have now to be considered. The exhalation of the breath through the mouth and nostrils displaces the external air, and at the same time leaves a vacuum into which through the pores the air which is displaced enters. Also the vacuum which is made when the air is exhaled through the pores is filled up by the inhalation of breath through the mouth and nostrils. The explanation of this double phenomenon is as follows:—Elements move towards their natural places. Now as every animal has within him a fountain of fire, the air which is inhaled through the mouth and nostrils, on coming into contact with this, is heated; and when heated, in accordance with the law of attraction, it escapes by the way it entered toward the place of fire. On leaving the body it is cooled and drives round the air which it displaces through the pores into the empty lungs. This again is in turn heated by the internal fire and escapes, as it entered, through the pores.

80 The phenomena of medical cupping-glasses, of swallowing, and of the hurling of bodies, are to be explained on a similar principle; as also sounds, which are sometimes discordant on account

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of the inequality of them, and again harmonious by reason of equality. The slower sounds reaching the swifter, when they begin to pause, by degrees assimilate with them: whence arises a pleasure which even the unwise feel, and which to the wise becomes a higher sense of delight, being an imitation of divine harmony in mortal motions. Streams flow, lightnings play, amber and the magnet attract, not by reason of attraction, but because 'nature abhors a vacuum,' and because things, when compounded or dissolved, move different ways, each to its own place.

I will now return to the phenomena of respiration. The fire, entering the belly, minces the food, and as it escapes, fills the veins by drawing after it the divided portions, and thus the streams of nutriment are diffused through the body. The fruits or herbs which are our daily sustenance take all sorts of colours when intermixed, but the colour of red or fire predominates, and hence the liquid which we call blood is red, being the nurturing principle of the body, whence all parts are watered and empty 81 places filled.

The process of repletion and depletion is produced by the attraction of like to like, after the manner of the universal motion. The external elements by their attraction are always diminishing the substance of the body: the particles of blood, too, formed out of the newly digested food, are attracted towards kindred elements within the body and so fill up the void. When more is taken away than flows in, then we decay; and when less, we grow and increase.

The young of every animal has the triangles new and closely locked together, and yet the entire frame is soft and delicate, being newly made of marrow and nurtured on milk. These triangles are sharper than those which enter the body from without in the shape of food, and therefore they cut them up. But as life advances, the triangles wear out and are no longer able to assimilate food; and at length, when the bonds which unite the triangles of the marrow become undone, they in turn unloose the bonds of the soul; and if the release be according to nature, she then flies away with joy. For the death which is natural is pleasant, but that which is caused by violence is painful.

Every one may understand the origin of diseases. They may 82

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be occasioned by the disarrangement or disproportion of the elements out of which the body is framed. This is the origin of many of them, but the worst of all owe their severity to the following causes: There is a natural order in the human frame according to which the flesh and sinews are made of blood, the sinews out of the fibres, and the flesh out of the congealed substance which is formed by separation from the fibres. The glutinous matter which comes away from the sinews and the flesh, not only binds the flesh to the bones, but nourishes the bones and waters the marrow. When these processes take place in regular order the body is in health.

But when the flesh wastes and returns into the veins there is discoloured blood as well as air in the veins, having acid and salt qualities, from which is generated every sort of phlegm and bile.

- 83 All things go the wrong way and cease to give nourishment to the body, no longer preserving their natural courses, but at war with themselves and destructive to the constitution of the body. The oldest part of the flesh which is hard to decompose blackens from long burning, and from being corroded grows bitter, and as the bitter element refines away, becomes acid. When tinged with blood the bitter substance has a red colour, and this when mixed with black takes the hue of grass; or again, the bitter substance has an auburn colour, when new flesh is decomposed by the internal flame. To all which phenomena some physician or philosopher who was able to see the one in many has given the name of bile. The various kinds of bile have names answering to their colours. Lymph or serum is of two kinds: first, the whey of blood, which is gentle; secondly, the secretion of dark and bitter bile, which, when mingled under the influence of heat with salt, is malignant and is called acid phlegm. There is also white phlegm, formed by the decomposition of young and tender flesh, and covered with little bubbles, separately invisible, but becoming visible when collected. The water of tears and perspiration and similar substances is also the watery part of fresh phlegm. All these humours become sources of disease when the blood is replenished in irregular ways and not by food or drink.
- 84 The danger, however, is not so great when the foundation remains, for then there is a possibility of recovery. But when the substance which unites the flesh and bones is diseased, and is no



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longer renewed from the muscles and sinews, and instead of being oily and smooth and glutinous becomes rough and salt and dry, then the fleshy parts fall away and leave the sinews bare and full of brine, and the flesh gets back again into the circulation of the blood, and makes the previously mentioned disorders still greater. There are other and worse diseases which are prior to these; as when the bone through the density of the flesh does not receive sufficient air, and becomes stagnant and gangrened, and crumbling away passes into the food, and the food into the flesh, and the flesh returns again into the blood. Worst of all and most fatal is the disease of the marrow, by which the whole course of the body is reversed. There is a third class of diseases which are produced, some by wind and some by phlegm and some by bile. When the lung, which is the steward of the air, is obstructed by rheums, and in one part no air, and in another too much, enters in, then the parts which are unrefreshed by air corrode, and other parts are distorted by the excess of air; and in this manner painful diseases are produced. The most painful are caused by wind generated within the body, which gets about the great sinews of the shoulders—these are termed tetanus. The cure of them is difficult, and in most cases they are relieved only by fever. White 85 phlegm, which is dangerous if kept in, by reason of the air bubbles, is not equally dangerous if able to escape through the pores, although it variegates the body, generating divers kinds of leprosy. If, when mingled with black bile, it disturbs the courses of the head in sleep, there is not so much danger; but if it assails those who are awake, then the attack is far more dangerous, and is called epilepsy or the sacred disease. Acid and salt phlegm is the source of catarrh.

Inflammations originate in bile, which is sometimes relieved by boils and swellings, but when detained, and above all when mingled with pure blood, generates many inflammatory disorders, disturbing the position of the fibres which are scattered about in the blood in order to maintain the balance of rare and dense which is necessary to its regular circulation. If the bile, which is only stale blood, or liquefied flesh, comes in little by little, it is congealed by the fibres and produces internal cold and shuddering. But when it enters with more of a flood it overcomes the fibres by its heat and reaches the spinal marrow, and burning up the



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86 cables of the soul sets her free from the body. When on the other hand the body, though wasted, still holds out, then the bile is expelled, like an exile from a factious state, causing diarrhœas and dysenteries and similar disorders. The body which is diseased from the effects of fire is in a continual fever; when air is the agent, the fever is quotidian; when water, the fever intermits a day; when earth, which is the most sluggish element, the fever intermits three days and is with difficulty shaken off.

Of mental disorders there are two sorts, one madness, the other ignorance, and they may be justly attributed to disease. Excessive pleasures or pains are among the greatest diseases, and deprive men of their senses. When the seed about the spinal marrow is too abundant, the body has too great pleasures and pains; and during a great part of his life he who is the subject of them is more or less mad. He is often thought bad, but this is a mistake; for the truth is that the intemperance of lust is due to the fluidity of the marrow produced by the loose consistency of the bones. And this is true of vice in general, which is commonly regarded as disgraceful, whereas it is really involuntary and arises from a bad habit of the body and evil education. In like manner the soul is often made vicious by the influence of bodily pain; the briny phlegm and other bitter and bilious humours wander over the body and find no exit, but are compressed within, and mingle  
87 their own vapours with the motions of the soul, and are carried to the three places of the soul, creating infinite varieties of trouble and melancholy, of rashness and cowardice, of forgetfulness and stupidity. When men are in this evil plight of body, and evil forms of government and evil discourses are superadded, and there is no education to save them, they are corrupted through two causes; but of neither of them are they really the authors. For the planters are to blame rather than the plants, the educators and not the educated. Still, we should endeavour to attain virtue and avoid vice; but this is part of another subject.

Enough of disease — I have now to speak of the means by which the mind and body are to be preserved, a higher theme than the other. The good is the beautiful, and the beautiful is the symmetrical, and there is no greater or fairer symmetry than that of body and soul, as the contrary is the greatest of deformities. A leg or an arm too long or too short is at once ugly and unservice-

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able, and the same is true if body and soul are disproportionate. For a strong and impassioned soul may 'fret the pigmy body to decay,' and so produce convulsions and other evils. The violence of controversy, or the earnestness of enquiry, will often generate inflammations and rheums which are not understood, or assigned to their true cause by the professors of medicine. And in like manner the body may be too much for the soul, darkening the reason, and quickening the animal desires. The only security is to preserve the balance of the two, and to this end the mathematician or philosopher must practise gymnastics, and the gymnast must cultivate music. The parts of the body too must be treated in the same way—they should receive their appropriate exercise. For the body is set in motion when it is heated and cooled by the elements which enter in, or is dried up and moistened by external things; and, if given up to these processes when at rest, it is liable to destruction. But the natural motion, as in the world, so also in the human frame, produces harmony and divides hostile powers. The best exercise is the spontaneous motion of the body, as in gymnastics, because most akin to the motion of mind; not so good is the motion of which the source is in another, as in sailing or riding; least good when the body is at rest and the motion is in parts only, which is a species of motion imparted by physic. This should only be resorted to by men of sense in extreme cases; lesser diseases are not to be irritated by medicine. For every disease is akin to the living being and has an appointed term, just as life has, which depends on the form of the triangles, and cannot be protracted when they are worn out. And he who, instead of accepting his destiny, endeavours to prolong his life by medicine, is likely to multiply and magnify his diseases. Regimen and not medicine is the true cure, when a man has time at his disposal.

Enough of the nature of man and of the body, and of training and education. The subject is a great one and cannot be adequately treated as an appendage to another. To sum up all in a word: there are three kinds of soul located within us, and any one of them, if remaining inactive, becomes very weak; if exercised, very strong. Wherefore we should duly train and exercise all three kinds.

The divine soul God lodged in the head, to raise us, like plants

which are not of earthly origin, to our kindred; for the head is nearest to heaven. He who is intent upon the gratification of his desires and cherishes the mortal soul, has all his ideas mortal, and is himself mortal in the truest sense. But he who seeks after knowledge and exercises the divine part of himself in godly and immortal thoughts, attains to truth and immortality, as far as is possible to man, and also to happiness, while he is training up within him the divine principle and indwelling power of order. There is only one way in which one person can benefit another; and that is by assigning to him his proper nurture and motion. To the motions of the soul answer the motions of the universe, and by the study of these the individual is restored to his original nature.

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Thus we have finished the discussion of the universe, which, according to our original intention, has now been brought down to the creation of man. Completeness seems to require that something should be briefly said about other animals: first of women, who are probably degenerate and cowardly men. And  
 91 when they degenerated, the gods implanted in men the desire of union with them, creating in man one animate substance and in woman another in the following manner:—The outlet for liquids they connected with the living principle of the spinal marrow, which the man has the desire to emit into the fruitful womb of the woman; this is like a fertile field in which the seed is quickened and matured, and at last brought to light. When this desire is unsatisfied the man is over-mastered by the power of the generative organs, and the woman is subjected to disorders from the obstruction of the passages of the breath, until the two meet and pluck the fruit of the tree.

The race of birds was created out of innocent, light-minded men, who thought to pursue the study of the heavens by sight; these were transformed into birds, and grew feathers instead of hair. The race of wild animals were men who had no philosophy, and never looked up to heaven or used the courses of the head, but followed only the influences of passion. Naturally they turned to their kindred earth, and put their forelegs to the ground,  
 92 and their heads were crushed into strange oblong forms. Some of them have four feet, and some of them more than four,—the latter, who are the more senseless, drawing closer to their native



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element; the most senseless of all have no limbs and trail their whole body on the ground. The fourth kind are the inhabitants of the waters; these are made out of the most senseless and ignorant and impure of men, whom God placed in the uttermost parts of the world in return for their utter ignorance, and caused them to respire water instead of the pure element of air. Such are the laws by which animals pass into one another.

And so the world received animals, mortal and immortal, and was fulfilled with them, and became a visible God, comprehending the visible, made in the image of the Intellectual, being the one perfect only-begotten heaven.

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Nature in the aspect which she presented to a Greek philosopher of the fourth century before Christ is not easily reproduced to modern eyes. The associations of mythology and poetry have to be added, and the unconscious influence of science has to be subtracted, before we can behold the heavens or the earth as they appeared to the Greek. The philosopher himself was a child and also a man — a child in the range of his attainments, but also a great intelligence having an insight into nature, and often anticipations of the truth. He was full of original thoughts, and yet liable to be imposed upon by the most obvious fallacies. He occasionally confused numbers with ideas, and atoms with numbers; his *a priori* notions were out of all proportion to his experience. He was ready to explain the phenomena of the heavens by the most trivial analogies of earth. The experiments which nature worked for him he sometimes accepted, but he never tried experiments for himself which would either prove or disprove his theories. His knowledge was unequal; while in some branches, such as medicine and astronomy, he had made considerable proficiency, there were others, such as chemistry, electricity, mechanics, of which the very names were unknown to him. He was the natural enemy of mythology, and yet mythological ideas still retained their hold over him. He was endeavouring to form a conception of principles, but these principles or ideas were regarded by him as real powers or entities, to which the



world has been subjected. He was always tending to argue from what was near to what was remote, from what was known to what was unknown, from man to the universe, and back again from the universe to man. While he was arranging the world, he was arranging the forms of thought in his own mind; and the light from within and the light from without often crossed and helped to confuse one another. He might be compared to a builder engaged in some great design, who could only dig with his hands because he was unprovided with common tools; or to some poet or musician, like Tynnichus (Ion 534 D), obliged to accommodate his lyric raptures to the limits of the tetrachord or of the flute.

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The Hesiodic and Orphic cosmogonies were a phase of thought intermediate between mythology and philosophy and had a great influence on the beginnings of knowledge. There was nothing behind them; they were to physical science what the poems of Homer were to early Greek history. They made men think of the world as a whole; they carried the mind back into the infinity of past time; they suggested the first observation of the effects of fire and water on the earth's surface. To the ancient physics they stood much in the same relation which geology does to modern science. But the Greek was not, like the enquirer of the last generation, confined to a period of six thousand years; he was able to speculate freely on the effects of infinite ages in the production of physical phenomena. He could imagine cities which had existed time out of mind (Statesm. 302 A; Laws iii. 676), laws or forms of art and music which had lasted, 'not in word only, but in very truth, for ten thousand years' (Laws ii. 656 E; cp. also vii. 799 A); he was aware that natural phenomena like the Delta of the Nile might have slowly accumulated in long periods of time (cp. Hdt. ii. 5, 10). But he seems to have supposed that the course of events was recurring rather than progressive. To this he was probably led by the fixedness of Egyptian customs and the general observation that there were other civilizations in the world more ancient than that of Hellas.

The ancient philosophers found in mythology many ideas which, if not originally derived from nature, were easily transferred to her — such, for example, as love or hate, corresponding to attraction or repulsion; or the conception of necessity allied both

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to the regularity and irregularity of nature ; or of chance, the nameless or unknown cause ; or of justice, symbolizing the law of compensation ; or of the Fates and Furies, typifying the fixed order or the extraordinary convulsions of nature. Their own interpretations of Homer and the poets were supposed by them to be the original meaning. Musing in themselves on the phenomena of nature, they were relieved at being able to utter the thoughts of their hearts in figures of speech which to them were not figures, and were already consecrated by tradition. Hesiod and the Orphic poets moved in a region of half-personification in which the meaning or principle appeared through the person. In their vaster conceptions of Chaos, Erebus, Aether, Night, and the like, the first rude attempts at generalization are dimly seen. The Gods themselves, especially the greater Gods, such as Zeus, Poseidon, Apollo, Athené, are universals as well as individuals. They were gradually becoming lost in a common conception of mind or God. They continued to exist for the purposes of ritual or of art ; but from the sixth century onwards or even earlier there arose and gained strength in the minds of men the notion of 'one God, greatest among Gods and men, who was all sight, all hearing, all knowing' (Xenophanes).

Under the influence of such ideas, perhaps also deriving from the traditions of their own or of other nations scraps of medicine and astronomy, men came to the observation of nature. The Greek philosopher looked at the blue circle of the heavens and it flashed upon him that all things were one ; the tumult of sense abated, and the mind found repose in the thought which former generations had been striving to realize. The first expression of this was some element, rarefied by degrees into a pure abstraction, and purged from any tincture of sense. Soon an inner world of ideas began to be unfolded, more absorbing, more overpowering, more abiding than the brightest of visible objects, which to the eye of the philosopher looking inward, seemed to pale before them, retaining only a faint and precarious existence. At the same time, the minds of men parted into the two great divisions of those who saw only a principle of motion, and of those who saw only a principle of rest, in nature and in themselves ; there were born Heracliteans or Eleatics, as there have been in later ages born Aristotelians or Platonists. Like some philosophers in

modern times, who are accused of making a theory first and finding their facts afterwards, the advocates of either opinion never thought of applying either to themselves or to their adversaries the criterion of fact. They were mastered by their ideas and not masters of them. Like the Heraclitean fanatics whom Plato has ridiculed in the Theaetetus (179 E, 180), they were incapable of giving a reason of the faith that was in them, and had all the animosities of a religious sect. Yet, doubtless, there was some first impression derived from external nature, which, as in mythology, so also in philosophy, worked upon the minds of the first thinkers. Though incapable of induction or generalization in the modern sense, they caught an inspiration from the external world. The most general facts or appearances of nature, the circle of the universe, the nutritive power of water, the air which is the breath of life, the destructive force of fire, the seeming regularity of the greater part of nature and the irregularity of a remnant, the recurrence of day and night and of the seasons, the solid earth and the impalpable aether, were always present to them.

The great source of error and also the beginning of truth to them was reasoning from analogy; they could see resemblances, but not differences; and they were incapable of distinguishing illustration from argument. Analogy in modern times only points the way, and is immediately verified by experiment. The dreams and visions, which pass through the philosopher's mind, of resemblances between different classes of substances, or between the animal and vegetable world, are put into the refiner's fire, and the dross and other elements which adhere to them are purged away. But the contemporary of Plato and Socrates was incapable of resisting the power of any analogy which occurred to him, and was drawn into any consequences which seemed to follow. He had no methods of difference or of concomitant variations, by the use of which he could distinguish the accidental from the essential. He could not isolate phenomena, and he was helpless against the influence of any word which had an equivocal or double sense.

Yet without this crude use of analogy the ancient physical philosopher would have stood still; he could not have made even 'one guess among many' without comparison. The course of natural phenomena would have passed unheeded before his eyes,


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like fair sights or musical sounds before the eyes and ears of an animal. Even the fetichism of the savage is the beginning of reasoning; the assumption of the most fanciful of causes indicates a higher mental state than the absence of all enquiry about them. The tendency to argue from the higher to the lower, from man to the world, has led to many errors, but has also had an elevating influence on philosophy. The conception of the world as a whole, a person, an animal, has been the source of hasty generalizations; yet this general grasp of nature led also to a spirit of comprehensiveness in early philosophy, which has not increased, but rather diminished, as the fields of knowledge have become more divided. The modern physicist confines himself to one or perhaps two branches of science. But he comparatively seldom rises above his own department, and often falls under the narrowing influence which any single branch, when pursued to the exclusion of every other, has over the mind. Language, too, exercised a spell over the beginnings of physical philosophy, leading to error and sometimes to truth; for many thoughts were suggested by the double meanings of words (cp. *στοιχεῖον*, *συλλαβή*, *μουσική*, *ἁρμονία*, *κόσμος*), and the accidental distinctions of words sometimes led the ancient philosopher to make corresponding differences in things (cp. *βούλεσθαι*, *ἐπιθυμεῖν*, *φόβος*, *δέος*, *αἰδώς*, *αἰσχύνη*). 'If they are the same, why have they different names; or if they are different, why have they the same name?' — is an argument not easily answered in the infancy of knowledge. The modern philosopher has always been taught the lesson which he still imperfectly learns, that he must disengage himself from the influence of words. Nor are there wanting in Plato, who was himself too often the victim of them, impressive admonitions that we should regard not words but things (cp. *Statesm.* 261 E). But upon the whole, the ancients, though not entirely dominated by them, were much more subject to the influence of words than the moderns. They had no clear divisions of colours or substances; even the four elements were undefined; the fields of knowledge were not parted off. They were bringing order out of disorder, having a small grain of experience mingled in a confused heap of *a priori* notions. And yet, probably, their first impressions, the illusions and mirages of their fancy, created a greater intellectual activity and made a nearer approach to the truth than any patient





investigation of isolated facts, for which the time had not yet come, could have accomplished.

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There was one more illusion to which the ancient philosophers were subject, and against which Plato in his later dialogues seems to be struggling — the tendency to mere abstractions; not perceiving that pure abstraction is only negation, they thought that the greater the abstraction the greater the truth. Behind any pair of ideas a new idea which comprehended them — the *τρίτος ἀνθρώπος*, as it was technically termed — began at once to appear. Two are truer than three, one than two. The words ‘being,’ or ‘unity,’ or ‘essence,’ or ‘good,’ became sacred to them. They did not see that they had a word only, and in one sense the most unmeaning of words. They did not understand that the content of notions is in inverse proportion to their universality — the element which is the most widely diffused is also the thinnest; or, in the language of the common logic, the greater the extension the less the comprehension. But this vacant idea of a whole without parts, of a subject without predicates, a rest without motion, has been also the most fruitful of all ideas. It is the beginning of *a priori* thought, and indeed of thinking at all. Men were led to conceive it, not by a love of hasty generalization, but by a divine instinct, a dialectical enthusiasm, in which the human faculties seemed to yearn for enlargement. We know that ‘being’ is only the verb of existence, the copula, the most general symbol of relation, the first and most meagre of abstractions; but to some of the ancient philosophers this little word appeared to attain divine proportions, and to comprehend all truth. Being or essence, and similar words, represented to them a supreme or divine being, in which they thought that they found the containing and continuing principle of the universe. In a few years the human mind was peopled with abstractions; a new world was called into existence to give law and order to the old. But between them there was still a gulf, and no one could pass from the one to the other.

Number and figure were the greatest instruments of thought which were possessed by the Greek philosopher; having the same power over the mind which was exerted by abstract ideas, they were also capable of practical application. Many curious and, to the early thinker, mysterious properties of them came to light when they were compared with one another. They admitted of

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infinite multiplication and construction; in Pythagorean triangles or in proportions of  $1 : 2 : 4 : 8$  and  $1 : 3 : 9 : 27$ , or compounds of them, the laws of the world seemed to be more than half revealed. They were also capable of infinite subdivision — a wonder and also a puzzle to the ancient thinker (cp. Rep. vii. 525 E). They were not, like being or essence, mere vacant abstractions, but admitted of progress and growth, while at the same time they confirmed a higher sentiment of the mind, that there was order in the universe. And so there began to be a real sympathy between the world within and the world without. The numbers and figures which were present to the mind's eye became visible to the eye of sense; the truth of nature was mathematics; the other properties of objects seemed to reappear only in the light of number. Law and morality also found a natural expression in number and figure. Instruments of such power and elasticity could not fail to be 'a most gracious assistance' to the first efforts of human intelligence.

There was another reason why numbers had so great an influence over the minds of early thinkers — they were verified by experience. Every use of them, even the most trivial, assured men of their truth; they were everywhere to be found, in the least things and the greatest alike. One, two, three, counted on the fingers was a 'trivial matter' (Rep. vii. 522 C), a little instrument out of which to create a world; but from these and by the help of these all our knowledge of nature has been developed. They were the measure of all things, and seemed to give law to all things; nature was rescued from chaos and confusion by their power; the notes of music, the motions of the stars, the forms of atoms, the evolution and recurrence of days, months, years, the military divisions of an army, the civil divisions of a state, seemed to afford a 'present witness' of them — what would have become of man or of the world if deprived of number (Rep. vii. 522 E) The mystery of number and the mystery of music were akin. There was a music of rhythm and of harmonious motion everywhere; and to the real connexion which existed between music and number, a fanciful or imaginary relation was superadded. There was a music of the spheres as well as of the notes of the lyre. If in all things seen there was number and figure, why should they not also pervade the unseen world, with which by their wonderful and unchangeable nature they seemed to hold communion?

Two other points strike us in the use which the ancient philosophers made of numbers. First, they applied to external nature the relations of them which they found in their own minds; and where nature seemed to be at variance with number, as for example in the case of fractions, they protested against her (*Rep.* vii. 525; *Arist. Metaph.* i. 6). Having long meditated on the properties of  $1 : 2 : 4 : 8$ , or  $1 : 3 : 9 : 27$ , or of 3, 4, 5, they discovered in them many curious correspondences and were disposed to find in them the secret of the universe. Secondly, they applied number and figure equally to those parts of physics, such as astronomy or mechanics, in which the modern philosopher expects to find them, and to those in which he would never think of looking for them, such as physiology and psychology. For the sciences were not yet divided, and there was nothing really irrational in arguing that the same laws which regulated the heavenly bodies were partially applied to the erring limbs or brain of man. Astrology was the form which the lively fancy of ancient thinkers almost necessarily gave to astronomy. The observation that the lower principle, e. g. mechanics, is always seen in the higher, e. g. in the phenomena of life, further tended to perplex them. Plato's doctrine of the same and the other ruling the courses of the heavens and of the human body is not a mere vagary, but is a natural result of the state of knowledge and thought at which he had arrived.

When in modern times we contemplate the heavens, a certain amount of scientific truth imperceptibly blends, even with the cursory glance of an unscientific person. He knows that the earth is revolving round the sun, and not the sun around the earth. He does not imagine the earth to be the centre of the universe, and he has some conception of chemistry and the cognate sciences. A very different aspect of nature would have been present to the mind of the early Greek philosopher. He would have beheld the earth a surface only, not mirrored, however faintly, in the glass of science, but indissolubly connected with some theory of one, two, or more elements. He would have seen the world pervaded by number and figure, animated by a principle of motion, immanent in a principle of rest. He would have tried to construct the universe on a quantitative principle, seeming to find in endless combinations of geometrical figures or in the infinite variety of their sizes a sufficient account of the multiplicity of

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phenomena. To these *a priori* speculations he would add a rude conception of matter and his own immediate experience of health and disease. His cosmos would necessarily be imperfect and unequal, being the first attempt to impress form and order on the primaevæal chaos of human knowledge. He would see all things as in a dream.

The ancient physical philosophers have been charged by Dr. Whewell and others with wasting their fine intelligences in wrong methods of enquiry; and their progress in moral and political philosophy has been sometimes contrasted with their supposed failure in physical investigations. 'They had plenty of ideas,' says Dr. Whewell, 'and plenty of facts; but their ideas did not accurately represent the facts with which they were acquainted.' This is a very crude and misleading way of describing ancient science. It is the mistake of an uneducated person — uneducated, that is, in the higher sense of the word — who imagines every one else to be like himself and explains every other age by his own. No doubt the ancients often fell into strange and fanciful errors: the time had not yet arrived for the slower and surer path of the modern inductive philosophy. But it remains to be shown that they could have done more in their age and country; or that the contributions which they made to the sciences with which they were acquainted are not as great upon the whole as those made by their successors. There is no single step in astronomy as great as that of the nameless Pythagorean who first conceived the world to be a body moving round the sun in space: there is no truer or more comprehensive principle than the application of mathematics alike to the heavenly bodies, and to the particles of matter. The ancients had not the instruments which would have enabled them to correct or verify their anticipations, and their opportunities of observation were limited. Plato probably did more for physical science by asserting the supremacy of mathematics than Aristotle or his disciples by their collections of facts. When the thinkers of modern times, following Bacon, undervalue or disparage the speculations of ancient philosophers, they seem wholly to forget the conditions of the world and of the human mind, under which they carried on their investigations. When we accuse them of being under the influence of words, do we suppose that we are altogether free from this illusion? When



we remark that Greek physics soon became stationary or extinct, may we not observe also that there have been and may be again periods in the history of modern philosophy which have been barren and unproductive? We might as well maintain that Greek art was not real or great, because it had *nihil simile aut secundum*, as say that Greek physics were a failure because they made no subsequent progress.

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The charge of premature generalization which is often urged against ancient philosophers is really an anachronism. For they can hardly be said to have generalized at all. They may be said more truly to have cleared up and defined by the help of experience ideas which they already possessed. The beginnings of thought about nature must always have this character. A true method is the result of many ages of experiment and observation, and is ever going on and enlarging with the progress of science and knowledge. At first men personify nature, then they form impressions of nature, at last they conceive 'measure' or laws of nature. They pass out of mythology into philosophy. Early science is not a process of discovery in the modern sense; but rather a process of correcting by observation, and to a certain extent only, the first impressions of nature, which mankind, when they began to think, had received from poetry or language or unintelligent sense. Of all scientific truths the greatest and simplest is the uniformity of nature; this was expressed by the ancients in many ways, as fate, or necessity, or measure, or limit. Unexpected events, of which the cause was unknown to them, they attributed to chance (cp. Thucyd. i. 140). But their conception of nature was never that of law interrupted by exceptions,—a somewhat unfortunate metaphysical invention of modern times, which is at variance with facts and has failed to satisfy the requirements of thought.

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Plato's account of the soul is partly mythical or figurative, and partly literal. Not that either he or we can draw a line between them, or say, 'This is poetry, this is philosophy'; for the transition from the one to the other is imperceptible. Neither must we expect to find in him absolute consistency. He is apt to pass from one level or stage of thought to another without always making it

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apparent that he is changing his ground. In such passages we have to interpret his meaning by the general spirit of his writings. To reconcile his inconsistencies would be contrary to the first principles of criticism and fatal to any true understanding of him.

There is a further difficulty in explaining this part of the *Timæus*—the natural order of thought is inverted. We begin with the most abstract, and proceed from the abstract to the concrete. We are searching into things which are upon the utmost limit of human intelligence, and then of a sudden we fall rather heavily to the earth. There are no intermediate steps which lead from one to the other. But the abstract is a vacant form to us until brought into relation with man and nature. God and the world are mere names, like the Being of the Eleatics, unless some human qualities are added on to them. Yet the negation has a kind of unknown meaning to us. The priority of God and of the world, which he is imagined to have created, to all other existences, gives a solemn awe to them. And as in other systems of theology and philosophy, that of which we know least has the greatest interest to us.

There is no use in attempting to define or explain the first God in the Platonic system, who has sometimes been thought to answer to God the Father; or the world, in whom the Fathers of the Church seemed to recognize 'the firstborn of every creature.' Nor need we discuss at length how far Plato agrees in the later Jewish idea of creation, according to which God made the world out of nothing. For his original conception of matter as something which has no qualities is really a negation. Moreover in the Hebrew Scriptures the creation of the world is described, even more explicitly than in the *Timæus*, not as a single act, but as a work or process which occupied six days. There is a chaos in both, and it would be untrue to say that the Greek, any more than the Hebrew, had any definite belief in the eternal existence of matter. The beginning of things vanished into the distance. The real creation began, not with matter, but with ideas. According to Plato in the *Timæus*, God took of the same and the other, of the divided and undivided, of the finite and infinite, and made essence, and out of the three combined created the soul of the world. To the soul he added a body formed out of the four elements. The general meaning of these words is that God im-

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parted determinations of thought, or, as we might say, gave law and variety to the material universe. The elements are moving in a disorderly manner before the work of creation begins (30 A); and there is an eternal pattern of the world, which, like the 'idea of good,' is not the Creator himself, but not separable from him. The pattern too, though eternal, is a creation, a world of thought prior to the world of sense, which may be compared to the wisdom of God in the book of Ecclesiasticus, or to the 'God in the form of a globe' of the old Eleatic philosophers. The visible, which already exists, is fashioned in the likeness of this eternal pattern. On the other hand, there is no truth of which Plato is more firmly convinced than of the priority of the soul to the body, both in the universe and in man. So inconsistent are the forms in which he describes the works which no tongue can utter — his language, as he himself says (29 C), partaking of his own uncertainty about the things of which he is speaking.

We may remark in passing, that the Platonic compared with the Jewish description of the process of creation has less of freedom or spontaneity. The Creator in Plato is still subject to a remnant of necessity which he cannot wholly overcome (cp. 35 A). When his work is accomplished he remains in his own nature. Plato is more sensible than the Hebrew prophet of the existence of evil, which he seeks to put as far as possible out of the way of God (cp. 42 D). And he can only suppose this to be accomplished by God retiring into himself and committing the lesser works of creation to inferior powers. (Compare, however, Laws x. 903 for another solution of the difficulty.)

Nor can we attach any intelligible meaning to his words when he speaks of the visible being in the image of the invisible (28). For how can that which is divided be like that which is undivided? or that which is changing be the copy of that which is unchanging? All the old difficulties about the ideas come back upon us in an altered form. We can imagine two worlds, one of which is the mere double of the other, or one of which is an imperfect copy of the other, or one of which is the vanishing ideal of the other; but we cannot imagine an intellectual world which has no qualities — 'a thing in itself' — a point which has no parts or magnitude, which is nowhere, and nothing. This cannot be the archetype according to which God made the world, and is



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in reality, whether in Plato or in Kant, a mere negative residuum of human thought.

There is another aspect of the same difficulty which appears to have no satisfactory solution. In what relation does the archetype stand to the Creator himself? For the idea or pattern of the world is not the thought of God, but a separate, self-existent nature, of which creation is the copy. We can only reply, (1) that to the mind of Plato subject and object were not yet distinguished; (2) that he supposes the process of creation to take place in accordance with his own theory of ideas; and as we cannot give a consistent account of the one, neither can we of the other. He means (3) to say that the creation of the world is not a material process of working with legs and arms, but ideal and intellectual; according to his own fine expression, 'the thought of God made the God that was to be' (34 A). He means (4) to draw an absolute distinction between the invisible or unchangeable which is or is the place of mind or being, and the world of sense or becoming which is visible and changing. He means (5) that the idea of the world is prior to the world, just as the other ideas are prior to sensible objects; and like them may be regarded as eternal and self-existent, and also, like the *idea* of good, may be viewed apart from the divine mind.

There are several other questions which we might ask and which can receive no answer, or at least only an answer of the same kind as the preceding. How can matter be conceived to exist without form? Or, how can the essences or forms of things be distinguished from the eternal ideas, or essence itself from the soul? Or, how could there have been motion in the chaos when as yet time was not? Or, how did chaos come into existence, if not by the will of the Creator? Or, how could there have been a time when the world was not, if time was not? Or, how could the Creator have taken portions of an indivisible same? Or, how could space or anything else have been eternal when time is only created? Or, how could the surfaces of geometrical figures have formed solids? We must reply again that we cannot follow Plato in all his inconsistencies, but that the gaps of thought are probably more apparent to us than to him. He would, perhaps, have said that 'the first things are known only to God and to him of men whom God loves.' How often have the gaps in Theology been



concealed from the eye of faith! And we may say that only by an effort of metaphysical imagination can we hope to understand Plato from his own point of view; we must not ask for consistency. Everywhere we find traces of the Platonic theory of knowledge expressed in an objective form, which by us has to be translated into the subjective, before we can attach any meaning to it. And this theory is exhibited in so many different points of view, that we cannot with any certainty interpret one dialogue by another; e. g. the *Timaeus* by the *Parmenides* or *Phaedrus* or *Philebus*.

The soul of the world may also be conceived as the personification of the numbers and figures in which the heavenly bodies move. Imagine these as in a Pythagorean dream, stripped of qualitative difference and reduced to mathematical abstractions. They too conform to the principle of the same, and may be compared with the modern conception of laws of nature. They are in space, but not in time, and they are the makers of time. They are represented as constantly thinking of the same; for thought in the view of Plato is equivalent to truth or law, and need not imply a human consciousness, a conception which is familiar enough to us, but has no place, hardly even a name, in ancient Greek philosophy. To this principle of the same is opposed the principle of the other—the principle of irregularity and disorder, of necessity and chance, which is only partially impressed by mathematical laws and figures. (We may observe by the way, that the principle of the other, which is the principle of plurality and variation in the *Timaeus*, has nothing in common with the ‘other’ of the *Sophist*, which is the principle of determination.) The element of the same dominates to a certain extent over the other—the fixed stars keep the ‘wanderers’ of the inner circle in their courses (36 C), and a similar principle of fixedness or order appears to regulate the bodily constitution of man (89 A, 90 D). But there still remains a rebellious seed of evil derived from the original chaos, which is the source of disorder in the world, and of vice and disease in man.

But what did Plato mean by essence, *οὐσία*, which is the intermediate nature compounded of the Same and the Other, and out of which, together with these two, the soul of the world is created? It is difficult to explain a process of thought so strange and unaccustomed to us, in which modern distinctions run into one another

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and are lost sight of. First, let us consider once more the meaning of the Same and the Other. The Same is the unchanging and indivisible, the heaven of the fixed stars, partaking of the divine nature, which, having law in itself, gives law to all besides and is the element of order and permanence in man and on the earth. It is the rational principle, mind regarded as a work, as creation — not as the creator. The old tradition of Parmenides and of the Eleatic Being, the foundation of so much in the philosophy of Greece and of the world, was lingering in Plato's mind. The Other is the variable or changing element, the residuum of disorder or chaos, which cannot be reduced to order, nor altogether banished, the source of evil, seen in the errors of man and also in the wanderings of the planets, a necessity which protrudes through nature. Of this too there was a shadow in the Eleatic philosophy in the realm of opinion, which, like a mist, seemed to darken the purity of truth in itself.—So far the words of Plato may perhaps find an intelligible meaning. But when he goes on to speak of the Essence which is compounded out of both, the track becomes fainter and we can only follow him with hesitating steps. But still we find a trace reappearing of the teaching of Anaxagoras: 'All was confusion, and then mind came and arranged things.' We have already remarked that Plato was not acquainted with the modern distinction of subject and object, and therefore he sometimes confuses mind and the things of mind — *νοῦς* and *νοητά*. By *οὐσία* he clearly means some conception of the intelligible and the intelligent; it belongs to the class of *νοητά*. Matter, being, the Same, the eternal,—for any of these terms, being almost vacant of meaning, is equally suitable to express indefinite existence,—are compared or united with the Other or Diverse, and out of the union or comparison is elicited the idea of intelligence, the 'One in many,' brighter than any Promethean fire (cp. Phil. 16 C), which co-existing with them and so forming a new existence, is or becomes the intelligible world. . . . So we may perhaps venture to paraphrase or interpret or put into other words the parable in which Plato has wrapped up his conception of the creation of the world. The explanation may help to fill up with figures of speech the void of knowledge.

The entire compound was divided by the Creator in certain proportions and reunited; it was then cut into two strips, which

were bent into an inner circle and an outer, both moving with an uniform motion around a centre, the outer circle containing the fixed, the inner the wandering stars. The soul of the world was diffused everywhere from the centre to the circumference. To this God gave a body, consisting at first of fire and earth, and afterwards receiving an addition of air and water; because solid bodies, like the world, are always connected by two middle terms and not by one. The world was made in the form of a globe, and all the material elements were exhausted in the work of creation.

The proportions in which the soul of the world as well as the human soul is divided answer to a series of numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27, composed of the two Pythagorean progressions 1, 2, 4, 8, and 1, 3, 9, 27, of which the number 1 represents a point, 2 and 3 lines, 4 and 8, 9 and 27 the squares and cubes respectively of 2 and 3. This series, of which the intervals are afterwards filled up, probably represents (1) the diatonic scale according to the Pythagoreans and Plato; (2) the order and distances of the heavenly bodies; and (3) may possibly contain an allusion to the music of the spheres, which is referred to in the myth at the end of the Republic. The meaning of the words that 'solid bodies are always connected by two middle terms' or mean proportionals has been much disputed. The most received explanation is that of Martin, who supposes that Plato is only speaking of surfaces and solids compounded of prime numbers (i. e. of numbers not made up of two factors, or, in other words, only measurable by unity). The square of any such number represents a surface, the cube a solid. The squares of any two such numbers (e. g.  $2^2$ ,  $3^2 = 4$ , 9), have always a single mean proportional (e. g. 4 and 9 have the single mean 6), whereas the cubes of primes (e. g.  $3^3$  and  $5^3$ ) have always two mean proportionals (e. g.  $27 : 45 : 75 : 125$ ). But to this explanation of Martin's it may be objected, (1) that Plato nowhere says that his proportion is to be limited to prime numbers; (2) that the limitation of surfaces to squares is also not to be found in his words; nor (3) is there any evidence to show that the distinction of prime from other numbers was known to him. What Plato chiefly intends to express is that a solid requires a stronger bond than a surface; and that the double bond which is given by two means is stronger than the single bond given by one. Having reflected on the singular numerical phe-

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nomenon of the existence of one mean proportional between two square numbers or rather perhaps only between the two lowest squares; and of two mean proportionals between two cubes, perhaps again confining his attention to the two lowest cubes, he finds in the latter symbol an expression of the relation of the elements, as in the former an image of the combination of two surfaces. Between fire and earth, the two extremes, he remarks that there are introduced, not one, but two elements, air and water, which are compared to the two mean proportionals between two cube numbers. The vagueness of his language does not allow us to determine whether anything more than this was intended by him.

Leaving the further explanation of details, which the reader will find discussed at length in Boeckh and Martin, we may now return to the main argument: Why did God make the world? Like man, he must have a purpose; and his purpose is the diffusion of that goodness or good which he himself is. The term 'goodness' is not to be understood in this passage as meaning benevolence or love, in the Christian sense of the term, but rather law, order, harmony, like the idea of good in the Republic. The ancient mythologers, and even the Hebrew prophets, had spoken of the jealousy of God; and the Greek had imagined that there was a Nemesis always attending the prosperity of mortals. But Plato delights to think of God as the author of order in his works, who, like a father, lives over again in his children, and can never have too much of good or friendship among his creatures. Only, as there is a certain remnant of evil inherent in matter which he cannot get rid of, he detaches himself from them and leaves them to themselves, that he may be guiltless of their faults and sufferings.

Between the ideal and the sensible Plato interposes the two natures of time and space. Time is conceived by him to be only the shadow or image of eternity which ever is and never has been or will be, but is described in a figure only as past or future. This is one of the great thoughts of early philosophy, which are still as difficult to our minds as they were to the early thinkers; or perhaps more difficult, because we more distinctly see the consequences which are involved in such an hypothesis. All the



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objections which may be urged against Kant's doctrine of the ideality of space and time at once press upon us. If time is unreal, then all which is contained in time is unreal — the succession of human thoughts as well as the flux of sensations; there is no connecting link between *φαινόμενα* and *ὄντα*. Yet, on the other hand, we are conscious that knowledge is independent of time, that truth is not a thing of yesterday or to-morrow, but an 'eternal now.' To the 'spectator of all time and all existence' the universe remains at rest. The truths of geometry and arithmetic in all their combinations are always the same. The generations of men, like the leaves of the forest, come and go, but the mathematical laws by which the world is governed remain, and seem as if they could never change. The ever-present image of space is transferred to time — succession is conceived as extension. (We remark that Plato does away with the above and below in space, as he has done away with the absolute existence of past and future.) The course of time, unless regularly marked by divisions of number, partakes of the indefiniteness of the Heraclitean flux. By such reflections we may conceive the Greek to have attained the metaphysical conception of eternity, which to the Hebrew was gained by meditation on the Divine Being. No one saw that this objective was really a subjective, and involved the subjectivity of all knowledge. 'Non in tempore sed cum tempore finxit Deus mundum,' says St. Augustine, repeating a thought derived from the *Timaeus*, but apparently unconscious of the results to which his doctrine would have led.

The contradictions involved in the conception of time or motion, like the infinitesimal in space, were a source of perplexity to the mind of the Greek, who was driven to find a point of view above or beyond them. They had sprung up in the decline of the Eleatic philosophy and were very familiar to Plato, as we gather from the *Parmenides*. The consciousness of them had led the great Eleatic philosopher to describe the nature of God or Being under negatives. He sings of 'Being unbegotten and imperishable, unmoved and never-ending, which never was nor will be, but always is, one and continuous, which cannot spring from any other; for it cannot be said or imagined not to be.' The idea of eternity was for a great part a negation. There are regions of speculation in which the negative is hardly separable from the positive, and even seems

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to pass into it. Not only Buddhism, but Greek as well as Christian philosophy, show that it is quite possible that the human mind should retain an enthusiasm for mere negations. In different ages and countries there have been forms of light in which nothing could be discerned and which have nevertheless exercised a life-giving and illumining power. For the higher intelligence of man seems to require, not only something above sense, but above knowledge, which can only be described as Mind or Being or Truth or God or the unchangeable and eternal element, in the expression of which all predicates fail and fall short. Eternity or the eternal is not merely the unlimited in time but the truest of all Being, the most real of all realities, the most certain of all knowledge, which we nevertheless only see through a glass darkly. The passionate earnestness of Parmenides contrasts with the vacuity of the thought which he is revolving in his mind.

Space is said by Plato to be the 'containing vessel or nurse of generation.' Reflecting on the simplest kinds of external objects, which to the ancients were the four elements, he was led to a more general notion of a substance, more or less like themselves, out of which they were fashioned. He would not have them too precisely distinguished. Thus seems to have arisen the first dim perception of *ύλη* or matter, which has played so great a part in the metaphysical philosophy of Aristotle and his followers. But besides the material out of which the elements are made, there is also a space in which they are contained. There arises thus a second nature which the senses are incapable of discerning and which can hardly be referred to the intelligible class. For it is and it is not, it is nowhere when filled, it is nothing when empty. Hence it is said to be discerned by a kind of spurious or analogous reason, partaking so feebly of existence as to be hardly perceivable, yet always reappearing as the containing mother or nurse of all things. It had not that sort of consistency to Plato which has been given to it in modern times by geometry and metaphysics. Neither of the Greek words by which it is described are so purely abstract as the English word 'space' or the Latin 'spatium.' Neither Plato nor any other Greek would have spoken of *χρόνος καὶ τόπος* or *χώρα* in the same manner as we speak of 'time' and 'space.'

Yet space is also of a very permanent or even eternal nature;

and Plato seems more willing to admit of the unreality of time than of the unreality of space; because, as he says, all things must necessarily exist in space. We, on the other hand, are disposed to fancy that even if space were annihilated time might still survive. He admits indeed that our knowledge of space is of a dreamy kind, and is given by a spurious reason without the help of sense. (Cp. the hypotheses and images of Rep. vi. 511.) It is true that it does not attain to the clearness of ideas. But like them it seems to remain, even if all the objects contained in it are supposed to have vanished away. Hence it was natural for Plato to conceive of it as eternal. We must remember further that in his attempt to realize either space or matter the two abstract ideas of weight and extension, which are familiar to us, had never passed before his mind.

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Thus far God, working according to an eternal pattern, out of his goodness has created the same, the other, and the essence (compare the three principles of the Philebus — the finite, the infinite, and the union of the two), and out of them has formed the outer circle of the fixed stars and the inner circle of the planets, divided according to certain musical intervals; he has also created time, the moving image of eternity, and space, existing by a sort of necessity and hardly distinguishable from matter. The matter out of which the world is formed is not absolutely void, but retains in the chaos certain germs or traces of the elements. These Plato, like Empedocles, supposed to be four in number — fire, air, earth, and water. They were at first mixed together; but already in the chaos, before God fashioned them by form and number, the greater masses of the elements had an appointed place. Into the confusion (*μῆγμα*) which preceded Plato does not attempt further to penetrate. They are called elements, but they are so far from being elements (*στοιχεῖα*) or letters in the higher sense that they are not even syllables or first compounds. The real elements are two triangles, the rectangular isosceles which has but one form, and the most beautiful of the many forms of scalene, which is half of an equilateral triangle. By the combination of these triangles which exist in an infinite variety of sizes, the surfaces of the four elements are constructed.

That there were only five regular solids was already known to



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the ancients; and out of the surfaces which he has formed Plato proceeds to generate the four first of the five. He perhaps forgets that he is only putting together surfaces and has not provided for their transformation into solids. The first solid is a regular pyramid, of which the base and sides are formed by four equilateral or twenty-four scalene triangles. Each of the four solid angles in this figure is a little larger than the largest of obtuse angles. The second solid is composed of the same triangles, which unite as eight equilateral triangles, and make one solid angle out of four plane angles—six of these angles form a regular octahedron. The third solid is a regular icosahedron, having twenty triangular equilateral bases, and therefore 120 rectangular scalene triangles. The fourth regular solid, or cube, is formed by the combination of four isosceles triangles into one square and of six squares into a cube. The fifth regular solid, or dodecahedron, cannot be formed by a combination of either of these triangles, but each of its faces may be regarded as composed of thirty triangles of another kind. Probably Plato notices this as the only remaining regular polyhedron, which from its approximation to a globe, and possibly because, as Plutarch remarks, it is composed of  $12 \times 30 = 360$  scalene triangles (Platon. Quaest. 5), representing thus the signs and degrees of the Zodiac, as well as the months and days of the year, God may be said to have ‘used in the delineation of the universe.’ According to Plato earth was composed of cubes, fire of regular pyramids, air of regular octahedrons, water of regular icosahedrons. The stability of the last three increases with the number of their sides.

The elements are supposed to pass into one another, but we must remember that these transformations are not the transformations of real solids, but of imaginary geometrical figures; in other words, we are composing and decomposing the faces of substances and not the substances themselves—it is a house of cards which we are pulling to pieces and putting together again (cp. however *Laws* x. 894 A). Yet perhaps Plato may regard these sides or faces as only the forms which are impressed on pre-existent matter. It is remarkable that he should speak of each of these solids as a possible world in itself, though upon the whole he inclines to the opinion that they form one world and not five. To suppose that there is an infinite number of worlds,



as Democritus (Hippolyt. Ref. Haer. I. 13) had said, would be, as he satirically observes, 'the characteristic of a very indefinite and ignorant mind' (55 C, D).

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The twenty triangular faces of an icosahedron form the faces or sides of two regular octahedrons and of a regular pyramid ( $20 = 8 \times 2 + 4$ ); and therefore, according to Plato, a particle of water when decomposed is supposed to give two particles of air and one of fire. So because an octahedron gives the sides of two pyramids ( $8 = 4 \times 2$ ), a particle of air is resolved into two particles of fire.

The transformation is effected by the superior power or number of the conquering elements. The manner of the change is (1) a separation of portions of the elements from the masses in which they are collected; (2) a resolution of them into their original triangles; and (3) a reunion of them in new forms. Plato himself proposes the question, Why does motion continue at all when the elements are settled in their places? He answers that although the force of attraction is continually drawing similar elements to the same spot, still the revolution of the universe exercises a condensing power, and thrusts them again out of their natural places. Thus want of uniformity, the condition of motion, is produced (57 D ff.). In all such disturbances of matter there is an alternative for the weaker element: it may escape to its kindred, or take the form of the stronger—becoming denser, if it be denser, or rarer, if rarer. This is true of fire, air, and water, which, being composed of similar triangles, are interchangeable; earth, however, which has triangles peculiar to itself, is capable of dissolution, but not of change (56 D ff.). Of the interchangeable elements, fire, the rarest, can only become a denser, and water, the densest, only a rarer: but air may become a denser or a rarer. No single particle of the elements is visible, but only the aggregates of them are seen. The subordinate species depend, not upon differences of form in the original triangles, but upon differences of size. The obvious physical phenomena from which Plato has gathered his views of the relations of the elements seem to be the effect of fire upon air, water, and earth, and the effect of water upon earth. The particles are supposed by him to be in a perpetual process of circulation caused by inequality. This process of circulation does

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not admit of a vacuum, as he tells us in his strange account of respiration (79 B).

Of the phenomena of light and heavy he speaks afterwards, when treating of sensation, but they may be more conveniently considered by us in this place. They are not, he says, to be explained by 'above' and 'below,' which in the universal globe have no existence (62 D), but by the attraction of similars towards the great masses of similar substances; fire to fire, air to air, water to water, earth to earth. Plato's doctrine of attraction implies not only (1) the attraction of similar elements to one another, but also (2) of smaller bodies to larger ones. Had he confined himself to the latter he would have arrived, though, perhaps, without any further result or any sense of the greatness of the discovery, at the modern doctrine of gravitation. He does not observe that water has an equal tendency towards both water and earth. So easily did the most obvious facts which were inconsistent with his theories escape him.

The general physical doctrines of the *Timaeus* may be summed up as follows: (1) Plato supposes the greater masses of the elements to have been already settled in their places at the creation: (2) they are four in number, and are formed of rectangular triangles variously combined into regular solid figures: (3) three of them, fire, air, and water, admit of transformation into one another; the fourth, earth, cannot be similarly transformed: (4) different sizes of the same triangles form the lesser species of each element: (5) there is an attraction of like to like—smaller masses of the same kind being drawn towards greater: (6) there is no void, but the particles of matter are ever pushing one another round and round (*περίωσις*). Like the atomists, Plato attributes the differences between the elements to differences in geometrical figures. But he does not explain the process by which surfaces become solids; and he characteristically ridicules Democritus for not seeing that the worlds are finite and not infinite.

## § 4.

The astronomy of Plato is based on the two principles of the same and the other, which God combined in the creation of the world. The soul, which is compounded of the same, the other, and the essence, is diffused from the centre to the circumference

of the heavens. We speak of a soul of the universe; but more truly regarded, the universe of the *Timaeus* is a soul, governed by mind, and holding in solution a residuum of matter or evil, which the author of the world is unable to expel, and of which Plato cannot tell us the origin. The creation, in Plato's sense, is really the creation of order; and the first step in giving order is the division of the heavens into an inner and outer circle of the other and the same, of the divisible and the indivisible, answering to the two spheres, of the planets and of the world beyond them, all together moving around the earth, which is their centre. To us there is a difficulty in apprehending how that which is at rest can also be in motion, or that which is indivisible exist in space. But the whole description is so ideal and imaginative, that we can hardly venture to attribute to many of Plato's words in the *Timaeus* any more meaning than to his mythical account of the heavens in the *Republic* and in the *Phaedrus*. (Cp. his denial of the 'blasphemous opinion' that there are planets or wandering stars; all alike move in circles—*Laws* vii. 821, 822.) The stars are the habitations of the souls of men, from which they come and to which they return. In attributing to the fixed stars only the most perfect motion—that which is on the same spot or circling around the same—he might perhaps have said that to 'the spectator of all time and all existence,' to borrow once more his own grand expression, or viewed, in the language of Spinoza, 'sub specie aeternitatis,' they were still at rest, but appeared to move in order to teach men the periods of time. Although absolutely in motion, they are relatively at rest; or we may conceive of them as resting, while the space in which they are contained, or the whole *anima mundi*, revolves.

The universe revolves around a centre once in twenty-four hours, but the orbits of the fixed stars take a different direction from those of the planets. The outer and the inner sphere cross one another and meet again at a point opposite to that of their first contact; the first moving in a circle from left to right along the side of a parallelogram which is supposed to be inscribed in it, the second also moving in a circle along the diagonal of the same parallelogram from right to left; or, in other words, the first describing the path of the equator, the second, the path of the ecliptic. The motion of the second is controlled by the first,

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and hence the oblique line in which the planets are supposed to move becomes a spiral. The motion of the same is said to be undivided, whereas the inner motion is split into seven unequal orbits—the intervals between them being in the ratio of two and three, three of either:—the Sun, moving in the opposite direction to Mercury and Venus, but with equal swiftness; the remaining four, Moon, Saturn, Mars, Jupiter, with unequal swiftness to the former three and to one another. Thus arises the following progression:—Moon 1, Sun 2, Venus 3, Mercury 4, Mars 8, Jupiter 9, Saturn 27. This series of numbers is the compound of the two Pythagorean ratios, having the same intervals, though not in the same order, as the mixture which was originally divided in forming the soul of the world.

Plato was struck by the phenomenon of Mercury, Venus, and the Sun appearing to overtake and be overtaken by one another. The true reason of this, namely, that they lie within the circle of the earth's orbit, was unknown to him, and the reason which he gives—that the two former move in an opposite direction to the latter—is far from explaining the appearance of them in the heavens. All the planets, including the sun, are carried round in the daily motion of the circle of the fixed stars, and they have a second or oblique motion which gives the explanation of the different lengths of the sun's course in different parts of the earth. The fixed stars have also two movements—a forward movement in their orbit which is common to the whole circle; and a movement on the same spot around an axis, which Plato calls the movement of thought about the same. In this latter respect they are more perfect than the wandering stars, as Plato himself terms them in the *Timæus*, although in the *Laws* (*loc. cit.*) he condemns the appellation as blasphemous.

The revolution of the world around the earth, which is accomplished in a single day and night, is described as being the most perfect or intelligent. Yet Plato also speaks of an 'annus magnus' or cyclical year, in which periods wonderful for their complexity are found to coincide in a perfect number, i. e. a number which equals the sum of its factors, as  $6 = 1 + 2 + 3$ . This, although not literally contradictory, is in spirit irreconcilable with the perfect revolution of twenty-four hours. The same remark may be applied to the complexity of the appearances and



occultations of the stars, which, if the outer heaven is supposed to be moving around the centre once in twenty-four hours, must be confined to the effects produced by the seven planets. Plato seems to confuse the actual observation of the heavens with his desire to find in them mathematical perfection. The same spirit is carried yet further by him in the passage already quoted from the *Laws*, in which he affirms their wanderings to be an appearance only, which a little knowledge of mathematics would enable men to correct.

We have now to consider the much discussed question of the rotation or immobility of the earth. Plato's doctrine on this subject is contained in the following words:—'The earth, which is our nurse, compacted [*or revolving*] around the pole which is extended through the universe, he made to be the guardian and artificer of night and day, first and eldest of gods that are in the interior of heaven' (40 B, C). There is an unfortunate doubt in this passage (1) about the meaning of the word *ἠλλομένην*, which is translated either 'compactd' or 'revolving,' and is equally capable of both explanations. A doubt (2) may also be raised as to whether the words 'artificer of day and night' are consistent with the mere passive causation of them, produced by the immobility of the earth in the midst of the circling universe. We must admit, further, (3) that Aristotle attributed to Plato the doctrine of the rotation of the earth on its axis. On the other hand it has been urged that if the earth goes round with the outer heaven and sun in twenty-four hours, there is no way of accounting for the alternation of day and night; since the equal motion of the earth and sun would have the effect of absolute immobility. To which it may be replied that Plato never says that the earth goes round with the outer heaven and sun; although the whole question depends on the relation of earth and sun, their movements are nowhere precisely described. But if we suppose, with Mr. Grote, that the diurnal rotation of the earth on its axis and the revolution of the sun and outer heaven precisely coincide, it would be difficult to imagine that Plato was unaware of the consequence. For though he was ignorant of many things which are familiar to us, and often confused in his ideas where we have become clear, we have no right to attribute to him a childish want of reasoning about very simple facts, or an

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inability to understand the necessary and obvious deductions from geometrical figures or movements. Of the causes of day and night the pre-Socratic philosophers, and especially the Pythagoreans, gave various accounts, and therefore the question can hardly be imagined to have escaped him. On the other hand it may be urged that the further step, however simple and obvious, is just what Plato often seems to be ignorant of, and that as there is no limit to his insight, there is also no limit to the blindness which sometimes obscures his intelligence (cp. the construction of solids out of surfaces in his account of the creation of the world, or the attraction of similars to similars). Further, Mr. Grote supposes, not that *ἰλλομένην* means 'revolving,' or that this is the sense in which Aristotle understood the word, but that the rotation of the earth is necessarily implied in its adherence to the cosmical axis. But (α) if, as Mr. Grote assumes, Plato did not see that the rotation of the earth on its axis and of the sun and outer heavens around the earth in equal times was inconsistent with the alternation of day and night, neither need we suppose that he would have seen the immobility of the earth to be inconsistent with the rotation of the axis. And (β) what proof is there that the axis of the world revolves at all? (γ) The comparison of the two passages quoted by Mr. Grote (see p. 19 of his pamphlet on 'The Rotation of the Earth') from Aristotle or the writer *De Caelo*, Book II (c. 13, *ἐνιοι* — *γέγραπται*, and c. 14, *ἡμεῖς* — *μέσον*), clearly shows, although this is a matter of minor importance, that Aristotle, as Proclus and Simplicius supposed, understood *ἰλλεσθαι* in the *Timaeus* to mean 'revolving.' For the second passage, in which motion on an axis is expressly mentioned, refers to the first, but this would be unmeaning unless *ἰλλεσθαι* in the first passage meant rotation on an axis. (4) The immobility of the earth is more in accordance with Plato's other writings than the opposite hypothesis. For in the *Phaedo* the earth is described as the centre of the world, and is not said to be in motion. In the *Republic* the pilgrims appear to be looking out from the earth upon the motions of the heavenly bodies; in the *Phaedrus*, Hestia, who remains immovable in the house of Zeus while the other gods go in procession, is called the first and eldest of the gods, and is probably the symbol of the earth. The silence of Plato in these and in some other passages (cp. *Laws* x. 893 B) in which he

might be expected to speak of the rotation of the earth, is more favourable to the doctrine of its immobility than to the opposite. If he had meant to say that the earth revolves on its axis, he would have said so in distinct words, and have explained the relation of its movements to those of the other heavenly bodies. (5) The meaning of the words 'artificer of day and night' is literally true according to Plato's view. For the alternation of day and night is not produced by the motion of the heavens alone, or by the immobility of the earth alone, but by both together; and that which has the inherent force or energy to remain at rest when all other bodies are moving, may be truly said to act, equally with them. (6) We should not lay too much stress on Aristotle having adopted the other interpretation of the words, although Alexander of Aphrodisias thinks that he could not have been ignorant either of the doctrine of Plato or of the sense which he intended to give to the word *ἡλλομένην*. For the citations of Plato in Aristotle are frequently misinterpreted by him; and he seems hardly ever to have had in his mind the connection in which they occur. In this instance the allusion is very slight, and there is no reason to suppose that the diurnal revolution of the heavens was present to his mind. Hence we need not attribute to him the error from which we are defending Plato.

After weighing one against the other all these complicated probabilities, the final conclusion at which we arrive is that there is nearly as much to be said on the one side of the question as on the other, and that we are not perfectly certain, whether, as Böckh and the majority of commentators, ancient as well as modern, are inclined to believe, Plato thought that the earth was at rest in the centre of the universe, or, as Aristotle and Mr. Grote suppose, that it revolved on its axis. Whether we assume the earth to be stationary in the centre of the universe, or to revolve with the heavens, no explanation is given of the variation in the length of days and nights at different times of the year. The relations of the earth and heavens are so indistinct in the *Timæus* and so figurative in the *Phædo*, *Phædrus* and *Republic*, that we must give up the hope of ascertaining how they were imagined by Plato, if he had any fixed or scientific conception of them at all.

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The soul of the world is framed on the analogy of the soul of man, and many traces of anthropomorphism blend with Plato's highest flights of idealism. The heavenly bodies are endowed with thought; the principles of the same and other exist in the universe as well as in the human mind. The soul of man is made out of the remains of the elements which had been used in creating the soul of the world; these remains, however, are diluted to the third degree; by this Plato expresses the measure of the difference between the soul human and divine. The human soul, like the cosmical, is framed before the body, as the mind is before the soul of either (30 B) — this is the order of the divine work — and the finer parts of the body, which are more akin to the soul, such as the spinal marrow, are prior to the bones and flesh. The brain, the containing vessel of the divine part of the soul, is (nearly) in the form of a globe, which is the image of the gods, who are the stars, and of the universe.

There is, however, an inconsistency in Plato's manner of conceiving the soul of man; he cannot get rid of the element of necessity which is allowed to enter. He does not, like Kant, attempt to vindicate for men a freedom out of space and time; but he acknowledges him to be subject to the influence of external causes, and leaves hardly any place for freedom of the will. The lusts of men are caused by their bodily constitution (86 C), though they may be increased by bad education and bad laws, which implies that they may be decreased by good education and good laws. He appears to have an inkling of the truth that to the higher nature of man evil is involuntary. This is mixed up with the view which, while apparently agreeing with it, is in reality the opposite of it, that vice is due to physical causes (86 D). In the *Timaëus*, as well as in the *Laws*, he also regards vices and crimes as simply involuntary; they are diseases analogous to the diseases of the body, and arising out of the same causes. If we draw together the opposite poles of Plato's system, we find that, like Spinoza, he combines idealism with fatalism (see *infra*, p. 425).

The soul of man is divided by him into three parts, answering roughly to the charioteer and steeds of the *Phaedrus*, and to the *λόγος*, *θυμός*, and *ἐπιθυμία* of the *Republic* and *Nicomachean Ethics*.



First, there is the immortal nature of which the brain is the seat, and which is akin to the soul of the universe. This alone thinks and knows and is the ruler of the whole. Secondly, there is the higher mortal soul which, though liable to perturbations of her own, takes the side of reason against the lower appetites. The seat of this is the heart, in which courage, anger, and all the nobler affections are supposed to reside. There the veins all meet; it is their centre or house of guard whence they carry the orders of the thinking being to the extremities of his kingdom. There is also a third or appetitive soul, which receives the commands of the immortal part, not immediately but mediately, through the liver, which reflects on its surface the admonitions and threats of the reason. •

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The liver is imagined by Plato to be a smooth and bright substance, having a store of sweetness and also of bitterness, which reason freely uses in the execution of her mandates. In this region, as ancient superstition told, were to be found intimations of the future. But Plato is careful to observe that although such knowledge is given to the inferior parts of man, it requires to be interpreted by the superior. Reason, and not enthusiasm, is the true guide of man; he is only inspired when he is demented by some distemper or possession. The ancient saying, that 'only a man in his senses can judge of his own actions,' is approved by modern philosophy too. The same irony which appears in Plato's remark, that 'the men of old time must surely have known the gods who were their ancestors, and we should believe them as custom requires,' is also manifest in his account of divination.

The appetitive soul is seated in the belly, and there imprisoned like a wild beast, far away from the council chamber, as Plato graphically calls the head, in order that the animal passions may not interfere with the deliberations of reason. Though the soul is said by him to be prior to the body, yet we cannot help seeing that it is constructed on the model of the body — the threefold division into the rational, passionate, and appetitive corresponding to the head, heart and belly. The human soul differs from the soul of the world in this respect, that it is enveloped and finds its expression in matter, whereas the soul of the world is not only enveloped or diffused in matter, but is the element in which matter moves. The breath of man is within him, but the air

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or aether of heaven is the element which surrounds him and all things.

Pleasure and pain are attributed in the *Timaeus* to the suddenness of our sensations — the first being a sudden restoration, the second a sudden violation, of nature (cp. *Phileb.* 31 D). The sensations become conscious to us when they are exceptional. Sight is not attended either by pleasure or pain, but hunger and the appeasing of hunger are pleasant and painful because they are extraordinary.

## § 6.

I shall not attempt to connect the physiological speculations of Plato either with ancient or modern medicine. What light I can throw upon them will be derived from the comparison of them with his general system.

There is no principle so apparent in the physics of the *Timaeus*, or in ancient physics generally, as that of continuity. The world is conceived of as a whole, and the elements are formed into and out of one another; the varieties of substances and processes are hardly known or noticed. And in a similar manner the human body is conceived of as a whole, and the different substances of which, to a superficial observer, it appears to be composed — the blood, flesh, sinews — like the elements out of which they are formed, are supposed to pass into one another in regular order, while the infinite complexity of the human frame remains unobserved. And diseases arise from the opposite process — when the natural proportions of the four elements are disturbed, and the secondary substances which are formed out of them, namely, blood, flesh, sinews, are generated in an inverse order.

Plato found heat and air within the human frame, and the blood circulating in every part. He assumes in language almost unintelligible to us that a network of fire and air envelopes the greater part of the body. This outer net contains two lesser nets, one corresponding to the stomach, the other to the lungs; and the entrance to the latter is forked or divided into two passages which lead to the nostrils and to the mouth. In the process of respiration the external net is said to find a way in and out of the pores of the skin: while the interior of it and the lesser nets move

alternately into each other. The whole description is figurative, as Plato himself implies (79 D) when he speaks of a 'fountain of fire *which we compare* to the network of a creel.' He really means by this what we should describe as a state of heat or temperature in the interior of the body. The 'fountain of fire' or heat is also in a figure the circulation of the blood. The passage is partly imagination, partly fact.

He has a singular theory of respiration for which he accounts solely by the movement of the air in and out of the body; he does not attribute any part of the process to the action of the body itself. The air has a double ingress and a double exit, through the mouth or nostrils, and through the skin. When exhaled through the mouth or nostrils, it leaves a vacuum which is filled up by other air finding a way in through the pores, this air being thrust out of its place by the exhalation from the mouth and nostrils. There is also a corresponding process of inhalation through the mouth or nostrils, and of exhalation through the pores. The inhalation through the pores appears to take place nearly at the same time as the exhalation through the mouth; and conversely. The internal fire is in either case the propelling cause outwards—the inhaled air, when heated by it, having a natural tendency to move out of the body to the place of fire; while the impossibility of a vacuum is the propelling cause inwards.

Thus we see that this singular theory is dependent on two principles largely employed by Plato in explaining the operations of nature, the impossibility of a vacuum and the attraction of like to like. To these there has to be added a third principle, which is the condition of the action of the other two,—the interpenetration of particles in proportion to their density or rarity. It is this which enables fire and air to permeate the flesh.

Plato's account of digestion and the circulation of the blood is closely connected with his theory of respiration. Digestion is supposed to be effected by the action of the internal fire, which in the process of respiration moves into the stomach and minces the food. As the fire returns to its place, it takes with it the minced food or blood; and in this way the veins are replenished. Plato does not enquire how the blood is separated from the faeces.

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Of the anatomy and functions of the body he knew very little, — e. g. of the uses of the nerves in conveying motion and sensation, which he supposed to be communicated by the bones and veins; he was also ignorant of the distinction between veins and arteries; — the latter term he applies to the vessels which conduct air from the mouth to the lungs; — he supposes the lung to be hollow and bloodless; the spinal marrow he conceives to be the seed of generation; he confuses the parts of the body with the states of the body — the network of fire and air is spoken of as a bodily organ; he has absolutely no idea of the phenomena of respiration, which he attributes to a law of equalization in nature, the air which is breathed out displacing other air which finds a way in; he is wholly unacquainted with the process of digestion. Except the general divisions into the spleen, the liver, the belly, and the lungs, and the obvious distinctions of flesh, bones, and the limbs of the body, we find nothing that reminds us of anatomical facts. But we find much which is derived from his theory of the universe, and transferred to man, as there is much also in his theory of the universe which is suggested by man. The microcosm of the human body is the lesser image of the macrocosm. The courses of the same and the other affect both; they are made of the same elements and therefore in the same proportions. Both are intelligent natures endued with the power of self-motion, and the same equipoise is maintained in both. The animal is a sort of ‘world’ to the particles of the blood which circulate in it. All the four elements entered into the original composition of the human frame; the bone was formed out of smooth earth; liquids of various kinds pass to and fro; the network of fire and air irrigates the veins. Infancy and childhood is the chaos or first turbid flux of sense prior to the establishment of order; the intervals of time which may be observed in some intermittent fevers correspond to the density of the elements. The spinal marrow, including the brain, is formed out of the finest sorts of triangles, and is the connecting link between body and mind. Health is only to be preserved by imitating the motions of the world in space, which is the mother and nurse of generation. The work of digestion is carried on by the superior sharpness of the triangles forming the substances of the human body to those which are introduced into it in the shape



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of food. The freshest and acutest forms of triangles are those that are found in children, but they become more obtuse with advancing years; and when they finally wear out and fall to pieces, old age and death supervene.

. As in the Republic, Plato is still the enemy of the purgative treatment of physicians, which, except in extreme cases, no man of sense will ever adopt. For, as he adds, with an insight into the truth, 'every disease is akin to the nature of the living being and is only irritated by stimulants.' He is of opinion that nature should be left to herself, and is inclined to think that physicians are in vain (cp. Laws vi. 761 C — where he says that warm baths would be more beneficial to the limbs of the aged rustic than the prescriptions of a not over-wise doctor). If he seems to be extreme in his condemnation of medicine and to rely too much on diet and exercise, he might appeal to nearly all the best physicians of our own age in support of his opinions, who often speak to their patients of the worthlessness of drugs. For we ourselves are sceptical about medicine, and very unwilling to submit to the purgative treatment of physicians. May we not claim for Plato an anticipation of modern ideas as about some questions of astronomy and physics, so also about medicine? As in the Charmides (156, 157) he tells us that the body cannot be cured without the soul, so in the Timaeus he strongly asserts the sympathy of soul and body; any defect of either is the occasion of the greatest discord and disproportion in the other. Here too may be a presentiment that in the medicine of the future the interdependence of mind and body will be more fully recognized, and that the influence of the one over the other may be exerted in a manner which is not now thought possible.

§ 7.

In Plato's explanation of sensation we are struck by the fact that he has not the same distinct conception of organs of sense which is familiar to ourselves. The senses are not instruments, but rather passages, through which external objects strike upon the mind. The eye is the aperture through which the stream of vision passes, the ear is the aperture through which the vibrations of sound pass. But that the complex structure of the eye or the

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ear is in any sense the cause of sight and hearing he seems hardly to be aware.

The process of sight is the most complicated (cp. Rep. vi. 507, 508), and consists of three elements — the light which is supposed to reside within the eye, the light of the sun, and the light emitted from external objects. When the light of the eye meets the light of the sun, and both together meet the light issuing from an external object, this is the simple act of sight. When the particles of light which proceed from the object are exactly equal to the particles of the visual ray which meet them from within, then the body is transparent. If they are larger and contract the visual ray, a black colour is produced; if they are smaller and dilate it, a white. Other phenomena are produced by the variety and motion of light. A sudden flash of fire at once elicits light and moisture from the eye, and causes a bright colour. A more subdued light, on mingling with the moisture of the eye, produces a red colour. Out of these elements all other colours are derived. All of them are combinations of bright and red with white and black. Plato himself tells us that he does not know in what proportions they combine, and he is of opinion that such knowledge is granted to the gods only. To have seen the affinity of them to each other and their connection with light, is not a bad basis for a theory of colours. We must remember that they were not distinctly defined to his, as they are to our eyes; he saw them, not as they are divided in the prism, or artificially manufactured for the painter's use, but as they exist in nature, blended and confused with one another.

We can hardly agree with him when he tells us that smells do not admit of kinds. He seems to think that no definite qualities can attach to bodies which are in a state of transition or evaporation; he also makes the subtle observation that smells must be denser than air, though thinner than water, because when there is an obstruction to the breathing, air can penetrate, but not smell.

The affections peculiar to the tongue are of various kinds, and, like many other affections, are caused by contraction and dilation. Some of them are produced by rough, others by abstergent, others by inflammatory substances,—these act upon the tasting instruments of the tongue, and produce a more or less disagreeable sensation, while other particles congenial to the tongue soften and

harmonize them. The instruments of taste reach from the tongue to the heart. Plato has a lively sense of the manner in which sensation and motion are communicated from one part of the body to the other, though he confuses the affections with the organs. Hearing is a blow which passes through the ear and ends in the region of the liver, being transmitted by means of the air, the brain, and the blood to the soul. The swifter sound is acute, the sound which moves slowly is grave. A great body of sound is loud, the opposite is low. Discord is produced by the swifter and slower motions of two sounds, and is converted into harmony when the swifter motions begin to pause and are overtaken by the slower.

The general phenomena of sensation are partly internal, but the more violent are caused by conflict with external objects. Proceeding by a method of superficial observation, Plato remarks that the more sensitive parts of the human frame are those which are least covered by flesh, as is the case with the head and the elbows. Man, if his head had been covered with a thicker pulp of flesh, might have been a longer-lived animal than he is, but could not have had as quick perceptions. On the other hand, the tongue is one of the most sensitive of organs; but then this is made, not to be a covering to the bones which contain the marrow or source of life, but with an express purpose, and in a separate mass (75 A).

§ 8.

We have now to consider how far in any of these speculations Plato approximated to the discoveries of modern science. The modern physical philosopher is apt to dwell exclusively on the absurdities of ancient ideas about science, on the hap-hazard fancies and *a priori* assumptions of ancient teachers, on their confusion of facts and ideas, on their inconsistency and blindness to the most obvious phenomena. He measures them not by what preceded them, but by what has followed them. He does not consider that ancient physical philosophy was not a free enquiry, but a growth, in which the mind was passive rather than active, and was incapable of resisting the impressions which flowed in upon it. He hardly allows to the notions of the ancients the merit of being the stepping-stones by which he has himself risen

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to a higher knowledge. He never reflects, how great a thing it was to have formed a conception, however imperfect, either of the human frame as a whole, or of the world as a whole. According to the view taken in these volumes the errors of ancient physicists were not separable from the intellectual conditions under which they lived. Their genius was their own; and they were not the rash and hasty generalizers which, since the days of Bacon, we have been apt to suppose them. The thoughts of men widened to receive experience; at first they seemed to know all things as in a dream: after a while they look at them closely and hold them in their hands. They begin to arrange them in classes and to connect causes with effects. General notions are necessary to the apprehension of particular facts, the metaphysical to the physical. Before men can observe the world, they must be able to conceive it.

To do justice to the subject, we should consider the physical philosophy of the ancients as a whole; we should remember, (1) that the nebular theory was the received belief of several of the early physicists; (2) that the development of animals out of fishes who came to land, and of man out of the animals, was held by Anaximander in the sixth century before Christ (cp. Plut. Symp. Quaest. viii. 8. 4; Plac. Phil. v. 19. 1); (3) that even by Philolaus and the early Pythagoreans, the earth was held to be a body like the other stars revolving in space around the sun or a central fire; (4) that the beginnings of chemistry are discernible in the 'similar particles' of Anaxagoras. Also they knew or thought (5) that there was a sex in plants as well as in animals; (6) they were aware that musical notes depended on the relative length or tension of the strings from which they were emitted, and were measured by ratios of number; (7) that mathematical laws pervaded the world; and even qualitative differences were supposed to have their origin in number and figure; (8) the annihilation of matter was denied by several of them, and the seeming disappearance of it held to be a transformation only. For, although one of these discoveries might have been supposed to be a happy guess, taken together they seem to imply a great advance and almost maturity of natural knowledge.

We should also remember, when we attribute to the ancients hasty generalizations and delusions of language, that physical



philosophy and metaphysical too have been guilty of similar fallacies in quite recent times. We by no means distinguish clearly between mind and body, between ideas and facts. Have not many discussions arisen about the Atomic theory in which a point has been confused with a material atom? Have not the natures of things been explained by imaginary entities, such as life or phlogiston, which exist in the mind only? Has not disease been regarded, like sin, sometimes as a negative and necessary, sometimes as a positive or malignant principle? The 'idols' of Bacon are nearly as common now as ever; they are inherent in the human mind, and when they have the most complete dominion over us, we are least able to perceive them. We recognize them in the ancients, but we fail to see them in ourselves.

Such reflections, although this is not the place in which to dwell upon them at length, lead us to take a favourable view of the speculations of the *Timaeus*. We should consider not how much Plato actually knew, but how far he has contributed to the general ideas of physics, or supplied the notions which, whether true or false, have stimulated the minds of later generations in the path of discovery. Some of them may seem old-fashioned, but may nevertheless have had a great influence in promoting system and assisting enquiry, while in others we hear the latest word of physical or metaphysical philosophy. There is also an intermediate class, in which Plato falls short of the truths of modern science, though he is not wholly unacquainted with them. (1) To the first class belongs the teleological theory of creation. Whether all things in the world can be explained as the result of natural laws, or whether we must not admit of tendencies and marks of design also, has been a question much disputed of late years. Even if all phenomena are the result of natural forces, we must admit that there are many things in heaven and earth which are as well expressed under the image of mind or design as under any other. At any rate, the language of Plato has been the language of natural theology down to our own time, nor can any description of the world wholly dispense with it. The notion of first and second or co-operative causes, which originally appears in the *Timaeus*, has likewise survived to our own day, and has been a great peace-maker between theology and science. Plato also approaches very near to our doctrine of the primary and

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secondary qualities of matter (61 ff.). (2) Another popular notion which is found in the *Timaeus*, is the feebleness of the human intellect — ‘God knows the original qualities of things; man can only hope to attain to probability.’ We speak in almost the same words of human intelligence, but not in the same manner of the uncertainty of our knowledge of nature. The reason is that the latter is assured to us by experiment, and is not contrasted with the certainty of ideal or mathematical knowledge. But the ancient philosopher never experimented: in the *Timaeus* Plato seems to have thought that there would be impiety in making the attempt; he, for example, who tried experiments in colours would ‘forget the difference of the human and divine natures’ (68 D). Their indefiniteness is probably the reason why he singles them out, as especially incapable of being tested by experiment. (Compare the saying of Anaxagoras — Sext. Pyrrh. i. 33 — that since snow is made of water and water is black, snow ought to be black.)

The greatest ‘divination’ of the ancients was the supremacy which they assigned to mathematics in all the realms of nature; for in all of them there is a foundation of mechanics. Even physiology partakes of figure and number; and Plato is not wrong in attributing them to the human frame, but in the omission to observe how little could be explained by them. Thus we may remark in passing that the most fanciful of ancient philosophies is also the most nearly verified in fact. The fortunate guess that the world is a sum of numbers and figures has been the most fruitful of anticipations. The ‘diatonic’ scale of the Pythagoreans and Plato suggested to Kepler that the secret of the distances of the planets from one another was to be found in mathematical proportions. The doctrine that the heavenly bodies all move in a circle is known by us to be erroneous; but without such an error how could the human mind have comprehended the heavens? Astronomy, even in modern times, has made far greater progress by the high *a priori* road than could have been attained by any other. Yet, strictly speaking — and the remark applies to ancient physics generally — this high *a priori* road was based upon *a posteriori* grounds. For there were no facts of which the ancients were so well assured by experience as facts of number. Having observed that they held good in a few

instances, they applied them everywhere; and in the complexity, of which they were capable, found the explanation of the equally complex phenomena of the universe. They seemed to see them in the least things as well as in the greatest; in atoms, as well as in suns and stars; in the human body as well as in external nature. And now a favourite speculation of modern chemistry is the explanation of qualitative difference by quantitative, which is at present verified to a certain extent and may hereafter be of far more universal application. What is this but the atoms of Democritus and the triangles of Plato? The ancients should not be wholly deprived of the credit of their guesses because they were unable to prove them. May they not have had, like the animals, an instinct of something more than they knew?

Besides general notions we seem to find in the *Timæus* some more precise approximations to the discoveries of modern physical science. First, the doctrine of equipoise. Plato affirms, almost in so many words, that nature abhors a vacuum. Whenever a particle is displaced, the rest push and thrust one another until equality is restored. We must remember that these ideas were not derived from any definite experiment, but were the original reflections of man, fresh from the first observation of nature. The latest word of modern philosophy is continuity and development, but to Plato this is the beginning and foundation of science; there is nothing that he is so strongly persuaded of as that the world is one, and that all the various existences which are contained in it are only the transformations of the same soul of the world acting on the same matter. He would have readily admitted that out of the protoplasm all things were formed by the gradual process of creation; but he would have insisted that mind and intelligence — not meaning by this, however, a conscious mind or person — were prior to them, and could alone have created them. Into the workings of this eternal mind or intelligence he does not enter further; nor would there have been any use in attempting to investigate the things which no eye has seen nor any human language can express.

Lastly, there remain two points in which he seems to touch great discoveries of modern times — the law of gravitation, and the circulation of the blood.

(1) The law of gravitation, according to Plato, is a law, not only



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of the attraction of lesser bodies to larger ones, but of similar bodies to similar, having a magnetic power as well as a principle of gravitation. He observed that earth, water, and air had settled down to their places, and he imagined fire or the exterior aether to have a place beyond air. When air seemed to go upwards and fire to pierce through air — when water and earth fell downward, they were seeking their native elements. He did not remark that his own explanation did not suit all phenomena; and the simpler explanation, which assigns to bodies degrees of heaviness and lightness proportioned to the mass and distance of the bodies which attract them, never occurred to him. Yet the affinities of similar substances have some effect upon the composition of the world, and of this Plato may be thought to have had an anticipation. He may be described as confusing the attraction of gravitation with the attraction of cohesion. The influence of such affinities and the chemical action of one body upon another in long periods of time have become a recognized principle of geology.

(2) Plato is perfectly aware — and he could hardly be ignorant — that blood is a fluid in constant motion. He also knew that blood is partly a solid substance consisting of several elements, which, as he might have observed in the use of ‘cupping-glasses’ (79 E), decompose and die, when no longer in motion. But the specific discovery that the blood flows out on one side of the heart through the arteries and returns through the veins on the other, which is commonly called the circulation of the blood, was absolutely unknown to him.

A further study of the *Timaeus* suggests some after-thoughts which may be conveniently brought together in this place. The topics which I propose briefly to reconsider are (*a*) the relation of the *Timaeus* to the other dialogues of Plato and to the previous philosophy; (*b*) the nature of God and of creation; (*c*) the morality of the *Timaeus*:—

(*a*) The *Timaeus* is more imaginative and less scientific than any other of the Platonic dialogues. It is conjectural astronomy, conjectural natural philosophy, conjectural medicine. The writer himself is constantly repeating that he is speaking what is probable only. The dialogue is put into the mouth of *Timaeus*, a



Pythagorean philosopher, and therefore here, as in the Parmenides, we are in doubt how far Plato is expressing his own sentiments. Hence the connexion with the other dialogues is comparatively slight. We may fill up the lacunae of the Timaeus by the help of the Republic or Phaedrus: we may identify the same and other with the *πέρας* and *ἄπειρον* of the Philebus. We may find in the Laws or in the Statesman parallels with the account of creation and of the first origin of man. It would be possible to frame a scheme in which all these various elements might have a place. But such a mode of proceeding would be unsatisfactory, because we have no reason to suppose that Plato intended his scattered thoughts to be collected in a system. There is a common spirit in his writings, and there are certain general principles, such as the opposition of the sensible and intellectual, and the priority of mind, which run through all of them; but he has no definite forms of words in which he consistently expresses himself. While the determinations of human thought are in process of creation he is necessarily tentative and uncertain. And there is least of definiteness, whenever either in describing the beginning or the end of the world, he has recourse to myths. These are not the fixed modes in which spiritual truths are revealed to him, but the efforts of imagination, by which at different times and in various manners he seeks to embody his conceptions. The clouds of mythology are still resting upon him, and he has not yet pierced 'to the heaven of the fixed stars' which is beyond them. It is safer then to admit the inconsistencies of the Timaeus, or to endeavour to fill up what is wanting from our own imagination, inspired by a study of the dialogue, than to refer to other Platonic writings,—and still less should we refer to the successors of Plato,—for the elucidation of it.

More light is thrown upon the Timaeus by a comparison of the previous philosophies. For the physical science of the ancients was traditional, descending through many generations of Ionian and Pythagorean philosophers. Plato does not look out upon the heavens and describe what he sees in them, but he builds upon the foundations of others, adding something out of the 'depths of his own self-consciousness.' Socrates had already spoken of God the creator, who made all things for the best. While he ridiculed the superficial explanations of phenomena which were current in

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his age, he recognised the marks both of benevolence and of design in the frame of man and in the world. The apparatus of winds and waters is contemptuously rejected by him in the *Phaedo*, but he thinks that there is a power greater than that of any Atlas in the 'Best' (*Phaedo* 97 ff.; cp. *Arist. Met.* i. 4, 5). Plato, following his master, affirms this principle of the best, but he acknowledges that the best is limited by the conditions of matter. In the generation before Socrates, Anaxagoras had brought together 'Chaos' and 'Mind'; and these are connected by Plato in the *Timaeus*, but in accordance with his own mode of thinking he has interposed between them the idea or pattern according to which mind worked. The circular impulse (περίωσις) of the one philosopher answers to the circular movement (περιχώρησις) of the other. But unlike Anaxagoras, Plato made the sun and stars living beings and not masses of earth or metal. The Pythagoreans again had framed a world out of numbers, which they constructed into figures. Plato adopted their speculations and improved upon them by a more exact knowledge of geometry. The Atomists too made the world, if not out of geometrical figures, at least out of different forms of atoms, and these atoms resembled the triangles of Plato in being too small to be visible. But though the physiology of the *Timaeus* is partly borrowed from them, they are either ignored by Plato or referred to with a secret contempt and dislike. He looks with more favour on the Pythagoreans, whose intervals of number applied to the distances of the planets reappear in the *Timaeus*. It is probable that among the Pythagoreans living in the fourth century B. C., there were already some who, like Plato, made the earth their centre. Whether he obtained his circles of the Same and Other from any previous thinker is uncertain. The four elements are taken from Empedocles; the interstices of the *Timaeus* may also be compared with his πόροι. The passage of one element into another is common to Heracleitus and several of the Ionian philosophers. So much of a syncretist is Plato, though not after the manner of the Neoplatonists. For the elements which he borrows from others are fused and transformed by his own genius. On the other hand we find fewer traces in Plato of early Ionic or Eleatic speculation. He does not imagine the world of sense to be made up of opposites or to be in a perpetual flux, but to vary within

certain limits which are controlled by what he calls the principle of the same. Unlike the Eleatics, who relegated the world to the sphere of not-being, he admits creation to have an existence which is real and even eternal, although dependent on the will of the creator (41 A, B). Instead of maintaining the doctrine that the void has a necessary place in the existence of the world, he rather affirms the modern thesis that nature abhors a vacuum, as in the Sophist he also denies the reality of not-being (cp. Aristot. *Metaph.* i. 4, § 9). But though in these respects he differs from them, he is deeply penetrated by the spirit of their philosophy; he differs from them with reluctance, and gladly recognizes the 'generous depth' of Parmenides (*Theaet.* 183 E).

There is a similarity between the *Timaeus* and the fragments of Philolaus, which by some has been thought to be so great as to create a suspicion that they are derived from it. Philolaus is known to us from the *Phaedo* of Plato as a Pythagorean philosopher residing at Thebes in the latter half of the fifth century B. C., after the dispersion of the original Pythagorean society. He was the teacher of Simmias and Cebes, who became disciples of Socrates. We have hardly any other information about him. The story that Plato had purchased three books of his writings from a relation is not worth repeating; it is only a fanciful way in which an ancient biographer dresses up the fact that there was supposed to be a resemblance between the two writers. Similar gossiping stories are told about the sources of the *Republic* and the *Phaedo*. That there really existed in antiquity a work passing under the name of Philolaus there can be no doubt. Fragments of this work are preserved to us, chiefly in Stobaeus, a few in Boethius and other writers. They remind us of the *Timaeus*, as well as of the *Phaedrus* and *Philebus*. When the writer says (*Stob. Eclog.* i. 22, 7) that all things are either finite (definite) or infinite (indefinite), or a union of the two, and that this antithesis and synthesis pervades all art and nature, we are reminded of the *Philebus* (23 ff.). When he calls the centre of the world *ἐστία*, we have a parallel to the *Phaedrus* (247 A). His distinction between the world of order, to which the sun and moon and the stars belong, and the world of disorder, which lies in the region between the moon and the earth, approximates to Plato's sphere of the Same and of the Other. Like



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Plato (Tim. 62 C ff.), he denied the above and below in space, and said that all things were the same in relation to a centre. He speaks also of the world as one and indestructible; 'for neither from within nor from without does it admit of destruction' (cp. Tim. 33). He mentions ten heavenly bodies, including the sun and moon, the earth and the counter-earth (*ἀντίχθων*), and in the midst of them all he places the central fire, around which they are moving — this is hidden from the earth by the counter-earth. Of neither is there any trace in Plato, who makes the earth the centre of his system. Philolaus magnifies the virtues of particular numbers, especially of the number 10 (Stob. Eclog. i. 2, 3), and descants upon odd and even numbers, after the manner of the later Pythagoreans. It is worthy of remark that these mystical fancies are nowhere to be found in the writings of Plato, although the importance of number as a form and also an instrument of thought is ever present to his mind. Both Philolaus and Plato agree in making the world move in certain numerical ratios according to a musical scale: though Böckh is of opinion that the two scales, of Philolaus and of the Timaeus, do not correspond . . . . We appear not to be sufficiently acquainted with the early Pythagoreans to know how far the statements contained in these fragments corresponded with their doctrines; and we therefore cannot pronounce, either in favour of the genuineness of the fragments, with Böckh and Zeller, or, with Valentine Rose and Schaarschmidt, against them. But it is clear that they throw but little light upon the Timaeus, and that their resemblance to it has been exaggerated.

That there is a degree of confusion and indistinctness in Plato's account both of man and of the universe has been already acknowledged. We cannot tell (nor could Plato himself have told) where the figure or myth ends and the philosophical truth begins; we cannot explain (nor could Plato himself have explained to us) the relation of the ideas to appearance, of which one is the copy of the other, and yet of all things in the world they are the most opposed and unlike. This opposition is presented to us in many forms, as the antithesis of the one and many, of the finite and infinite, of the intelligible and sensible, of the unchangeable and the changing, of the indivisible and the divisible, of the fixed stars and the planets, of the creative mind and the primeval chaos.



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These pairs of opposites are so many aspects of the great opposition between ideas and phenomena — they easily pass into one another; and sometimes the two members of the relation differ in kind, sometimes only in degree. As in Aristotle's matter and form, the connexion between them is really inseparable; for if we attempt to separate them they become devoid of content and therefore indistinguishable; there is no difference between the idea of which nothing can be predicated, and the chaos or matter which has no perceptible qualities — between Being in the abstract and Nothing. Yet we are frequently told that the one class of them is the reality and the other appearance; and one is often spoken of as the double or reflection of the other. For Plato never clearly saw that both elements had an equal place in mind and in nature; and hence, especially when we argue from isolated passages in his writings, or attempt to draw what appear to us to be the natural inferences from them, we are full of perplexity. There is a similar confusion about necessity and free-will, and about the state of the soul after death. Also he sometimes supposes that God is immanent in the world, sometimes that he is transcendent. And having no distinction of objective and subjective, he passes imperceptibly from one to the other; from intelligence to soul, from eternity to time. These contradictions may be softened or concealed by a judicious use of language, but they cannot be wholly got rid of. That an age of intellectual transition must also be one of inconsistency; that the creative is opposed to the critical or defining habit of mind or time, has been often repeated by us. But, as Plato would say, 'there is no harm in repeating twice or thrice' (*Laws* vi. 754 C) what is important for the understanding of a great author.

It has not, however, been observed, that the confusion partly arises out of the elements of opposing philosophies which are preserved in him. He holds these in solution, he brings them into relation with one another, but he does not perfectly harmonize them. They are part of his own mind, and he is incapable of placing himself outside of them and criticizing them. They grow as he grows; they are a kind of composition with which his own philosophy is overlaid. In early life he fancies that he has mastered them: but he is also mastered by them; and in language (cp. *Sophist*, 243 B) which may be compared with the

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hesitating tone of the Timæus, he confesses in his later years that they are full of obscurity to him. He attributes new meanings to the words of Parmenides and Heracleitus; but at times the old Eleatic philosophy appears to go beyond him; then the world of phenomena disappears, but the doctrine of ideas is also reduced to nothingness. All these philosophers are nearer to one another than they themselves supposed, and nearer to him than he supposed. All of them are antagonistic to sense and have an affinity to number and measure and a presentiment of ideas. Even in Plato they still retain their contentious or controversial character, which was developed by the growth of dialectic. He is never able to reconcile the first causes of the pre-Socratic philosophers with the final causes of Socrates himself. There is no intelligible account of the relation of numbers to the universal ideas, or of universals to the idea of good. He found them all three, in the Pythagorean philosophy and in the teaching of Socrates and of the Megarians respectively; and, because they all furnished modes of explaining and arranging phenomena, he is unwilling to give up any of them, though he is unable to unite them in a consistent whole.

Lastly, Plato, though an idealist philosopher, is Greek and not Oriental in spirit and feeling. He is no mystic or ascetic; he is not seeking in vain to get rid of matter or to find absorption in the divine nature, or in the Soul of the Universe. And therefore we are not surprised to find that his philosophy in the Timæus returns at last to a worship of the heavens, and that to him, as to other Greeks, nature, though containing a remnant of evil, is still glorious and divine. He takes away or drops the veil of mythology, and presents her to us in what appears to him to be the form — fairer and truer far — of mathematical figures. It is this element in the Timæus, no less than its affinity to certain Pythagorean speculations, which gives it a character not wholly in accordance with the other dialogues of Plato.

(b) The Timæus contains an assertion perhaps more distinct than is found in any of the other dialogues (cp. Rep. ii. 379 A; Laws x. 901, 902) of the goodness of God. 'He was good himself, and he fashioned the good everywhere.' He was not 'a jealous God,' and therefore he desired that all other things should be equally good. He is the *idea* of good who has now become a

person, and speaks and is spoken of as God. Yet his personality seems to appear only in the act of creation. In so far as he works with his eye fixed upon an eternal pattern he is like the human artificer in the Republic (vi. 501 B; x. 597). Here the theory of Platonic ideas intrudes upon us. God, like man, is supposed to have an ideal of which Plato is unable to tell us the origin. He may be said, in the language of modern philosophy, to resolve the divine mind into subject and object.

The first work of creation is perfected, the second begins under the direction of inferior ministers. The supreme God is withdrawn from the world and returns to his own accustomed nature (Tim. 42 E). As in the Statesman (272 E), he retires to his place of view. So early did the Epicurean doctrine take possession of the Greek mind, and so natural is it to the heart of man, when he has once passed out of the stage of mythology into that of rational religion. For he sees the marks of design in the world; but he no longer sees or fancies that he sees God walking in the garden or haunting stream or mountain. He feels also that he must put God as far as possible out of the way of evil, and therefore he banishes him from an evil world. Plato is sensible of the difficulty; and he often shows that he is desirous of justifying the ways of God to man. Yet on the other hand, in the Tenth Book of the Laws (899, 900 ff.) he passes a censure on those who say that the Gods have no care of human things.

The creation of the world is the impression of order on a previously existing chaos. The formula of Anaxagoras — 'all things were in chaos or confusion, and then mind came and disposed them' — is a summary of the first part of the Timaeus. It is true that of a chaos without differences no idea could be formed. All was not mixed but one; and therefore it was not difficult for the later Platonists to draw inferences by which they were enabled to reconcile the narrative of the Timaeus with the Mosaic account of the creation. Neither when we speak of mind or intelligence, do we seem to get much further in our conception than circular motion, which was deemed to be the most perfect. Plato, like Anaxagoras, while commencing his theory of the universe with ideas of mind and of the best, is compelled in the execution of his design to condescend to the crudest physics.

(c) The morality of the Timaeus is singular, and it is difficult to

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adjust the balance between the two elements of it. The difficulty which Plato feels, is that which all of us feel, and which is increased in our own day by the progress of physical science, how the responsibility of man is to be reconciled with his dependence on natural causes. And sometimes, like other men, he is more impressed by one aspect of human life, sometimes by the other. In the *Republic* he represents man as freely choosing his own lot in a state prior to birth—a conception which, if taken literally, would still leave him subject to the dominion of necessity in his after life; in the *Statesman* he supposes the human race to be preserved in the world only by a divine interposition; while in the *Timaeus* the supreme God commissions the inferior deities to avert from him all but self-inflicted evils—words which imply that all the evils of men are really self-inflicted. And here, like Plato (54 B;—the insertion of a note in the text of an ancient writer is a literary curiosity worthy of remark), we may take occasion to correct an error which occurred at p. 408. For there we too hastily said that Plato in the *Timaeus* regarded all ‘vices and crimes as involuntary.’ But the fact is that he is inconsistent with himself; in one and the same passage (86) vice is attributed to the relaxation of the bodily frame, and yet we are exhorted to avoid it and pursue virtue. It is also admitted that good and evil conduct are to be attributed respectively to good and evil laws and institutions. These cannot be given by individuals to themselves; and therefore human actions, in so far as they are dependent upon them, are regarded by Plato as involuntary rather than voluntary. Like other writers on this subject, he is unable to escape from some degree of self-contradiction. He had learned from Socrates that vice is ignorance, and suddenly the doctrine seems to him to be confirmed by observing how much of the good and bad in human character depends on the bodily constitution. So in modern times the speculative doctrine of necessity has often been supported by physical facts.

The *Timaeus* also contains an anticipation of the stoical life according to nature. Man contemplating the heavens is to regulate his erring life according to them. He is to partake of the repose of nature and of the order of nature, to bring the variable principle in himself into harmony with the principle of the same. The ethics of the *Timaeus* may be summed up in the single idea



of 'law.' To feel habitually that he is part of the order of the universe, is one of the highest ethical motives of which man is capable. Something like this is what Plato means when he speaks of the soul 'moving about the same in unchanging thought of the same.' He does not explain how man is acted upon by the lesser influences of custom or of opinion; or how the commands of the soul watching in the citadel are conveyed to the bodily organs. But this perhaps, to use once more expressions of his own, 'is part of another subject' (87 B) or 'may be more suitably discussed on some other occasion' (38 B).

There is no difficulty, by the help of Aristotle and later writers, in criticizing the *Timaeus* of Plato, in pointing out the inconsistencies of the work, in dwelling on the ignorance of anatomy displayed by the author, in showing the fancifulness or unmeaningness of some of his reasons. But the *Timaeus* still remains the greatest effort of the human mind to conceive the world as a whole which the genius of antiquity has bequeathed to us.

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One more aspect of the *Timaeus* remains to be considered—the mythological or geographical. Is it not a wonderful thing that a few pages of one of Plato's dialogues have grown into a great legend, not confined to Greece only, but spreading far and wide over the nations of Europe and reaching even to Egypt and Asia? Like the tale of Troy, or the legend of the Ten Tribes (cp. Ewald, *Hist. of Isr.*, vol. v), which perhaps originated in a few verses of II Esdras, c. xiii, it has become famous, because it has coincided with a great historical fact. Like the romance of King Arthur, which has had so great a charm, it has found a way over the seas from one country and language to another. It inspired the navigators of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; it foreshadowed the discovery of America. It realized the fiction so natural to the human mind, because it answered the enquiry about the origin of the arts, that there had somewhere existed an ancient primitive civilization. It might find a place wherever men chose to look for it; in North, South, East, or West; in the Islands of the Blest; before the entrance of the Straits of Gibraltar, in Sweden or in Palestine. It mattered little whether the description in Plato agreed with the locality assigned to it or not. It

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was a legend so adapted to the human mind that it made a habitation for itself in any country. It was an island in the clouds, which might be seen anywhere by the eye of faith. It was a subject especially congenial to the ponderous industry of certain French and Swedish writers, who delighted in heaping up learning of all sorts but were incapable of using it.

M. Martin has written a valuable dissertation on the opinions entertained respecting the Island of Atlantis in ancient and modern times. It is a curious chapter in the history of the human mind. The tale of Atlantis is the fabric of a vision, but it has never ceased to interest mankind. It was variously regarded by the ancients themselves. The stronger heads among them, like Strabo and Longinus, were as little disposed to believe in the truth of it as the modern reader in Gulliver or Robinson Crusoe. On the other hand there is no kind or degree of absurdity or fancy in which the more foolish writers, both of antiquity and of modern times, have not indulged respecting it. The Neo-Platonists, loyal to their master, like some commentators on the Christian Scriptures, sought to give an allegorical meaning to what they also believed to be an historical fact. It was as if some one in our own day were to convert the poems of Homer into an allegory of the Christian religion, at the same time maintaining them to be an exact and veritable history. In the Middle Ages the legend seems to have been half-forgotten until revived by the discovery of America. It helped to form the Utopia of Sir Thomas More and the New Atlantis of Bacon, although probably neither of those great men were at all imposed upon by the fiction. It was most prolific in the seventeenth or in the early part of the eighteenth century, when the human mind, seeking for Utopias or inventing them, was glad to escape out of the dulness of the present into the romance of the past or some ideal of the future. The later forms of such narratives contained features taken from the Edda, as well as from the Old and New Testament; also from the tales of missionaries and the experiences of travellers and of colonists.

The various opinions respecting the Island of Atlantis have no interest for us except in so far as they illustrate the extravagances of which men are capable. But this is a real interest and a serious lesson, if we remember that now as formerly the

human mind is liable to be imposed upon by the illusions of the past, which are ever assuming some new form.

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When we have shaken off the rubbish of ages, there remain one or two questions of which the investigation has a permanent value :—

i. Did Plato derive the legend of Atlantis from an Egyptian source? It may be replied that there is no such legend in any writer previous to Plato; neither in Homer, nor in Pindar, nor in Herodotus is there any mention of an Island of Atlantis, nor any reference to it in Aristotle, nor any citation of an earlier writer by a later one in which it is to be found. Nor have any traces been discovered hitherto in Egyptian monuments of a connexion between Greece and Egypt older than the eighth or ninth century B. C. It is true that Proclus, writing in the fifth century after Christ, tells us of stones and columns in Egypt on which the history of the Island of Atlantis was engraved. The statement may be false—there are similar tales about columns set up ‘by the Canaanites whom Joshua drove out’ (Procop.); but even if true, it would only show that the legend, 800 years after the time of Plato, had been transferred to Egypt, and inscribed, not, like other forgeries, in books, but on stone. Probably in the Alexandrian age, when Egypt had ceased to have a history and began to appropriate the legends of other nations, many such monuments were to be found of events which had become famous in that or other countries. The oldest witness to the story is said to be Crantor, a Stoic philosopher who lived a generation later than Plato, and therefore may have borrowed it from him. The statement is found in Proclus; but we require better assurance than Proclus can give us before we accept this or any other statement which he makes.

Secondly, passing from the external to the internal evidence, we may remark that the story is far more likely to have been invented by Plato than to have been brought by Solon from Egypt. That is another part of his legend which Plato also seeks to impose upon us. The verisimilitude which he has given to the tale is a further reason for suspecting it; for he could easily ‘invent Egyptian or any other tales’ (Phaedrus 275 B). Are not the words, ‘The truth of the story is a great advantage,’ if we read between the lines, an indication of the fiction? It is only a



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legend that Solon went to Egypt, and if he did he could not have conversed with Egyptian priests or have read records in their temples. The truth is that the introduction is a mosaic work of small touches which, partly by their minuteness, and also by their seeming probability, win the confidence of the reader. Who would desire better evidence than that of Critias, who had heard the narrative in youth when the memory is strongest (26 B) at the age of ten from his grandfather Critias, an old man of ninety, who in turn had heard it from Solon himself? Is not the famous expression — ‘You Hellenes are ever children and there is no knowledge among you hoary with age,’ really a compliment to the Athenians who are described in these words as ‘ever young’? And is the thought expressed in them to be attributed to the learning of the Egyptian priest, and not rather to the genius of Plato? Or when the Egyptian says — ‘Hereafter at our leisure we will take up the written documents and examine in detail the exact truth about these things’ — what is this but a literary trick by which Plato sets off his narrative? Could any war between Athens and the Island of Atlantis have really coincided with the struggle between the Greeks and Persians, as is sufficiently hinted though not expressly stated in the narrative of Plato? And whence came the tradition to Egypt? or in what does the story consist except in the war between the two rival powers and the submersion of both of them? And how was the tale transferred to the poem of Solon? ‘It is not improbable,’ says Mr. Grote, ‘that Solon did leave an unfinished Egyptian poem’ (Plato, vol. iii. p. 295). But are probabilities for which there is not a tittle of evidence, and which are without any parallel to be deemed worthy of attention by the critic? How came the poem of Solon to disappear in antiquity? or why did Plato, if the whole narrative was known to him, break off almost at the beginning of it?

While therefore admiring the diligence and erudition of M. Martin, we cannot for a moment suppose that the tale was told to Solon by an Egyptian priest, nor can we believe that Solon wrote a poem upon the theme which was thus suggested to him — a poem which disappeared in antiquity; or that the Island of Atlantis or the antediluvian Athens ever had any existence except in the imagination of Plato. Martin is of opinion that Plato would have



been terrified if he could have foreseen the endless fancies to which his Island of Atlantis has given occasion. Rather he would have been infinitely amused if he could have known that his gift of invention would have deceived M. Martin himself into the belief that the tradition was brought from Egypt by Solon and made the subject of a poem by him (Tome i. p. 323). M. Martin may also be gently censured for citing without sufficient discrimination ancient authors having very different degrees of authority and value.

ii. It is an interesting and not unimportant question which is touched upon by Martin, whether the Atlantis of Plato in any degree held out a guiding light to the early navigators. He is inclined to think that there is no real connexion between them. But surely the discovery of the New World was preceded by a prophetic anticipation of it, which, like the hope of a Messiah, was entering into the hearts of men? And this hope was nursed by ancient tradition, which had found expression from time to time in the celebrated lines of Seneca and in many other places. This tradition was sustained by the great authority of Plato, and therefore the legend of the Island of Atlantis, though not closely connected with the voyages of the early navigators, may be truly said to have contributed indirectly to the great discovery.

The *Timaeus* of Plato, like the *Protagoras* and several portions of the *Phaedrus* and *Republic*, was translated by Cicero into Latin. About a fourth, comprehending with *lacunae* the first portion of the dialogue, is preserved in several MSS. These generally agree, and therefore may be supposed to be derived from a single original. The version is very faithful, and is a remarkable monument of Cicero's skill in managing the difficult and intractable Greek. In his treatise *De Naturâ Deorum*, i. 8. 12, ii. 12, he also refers to the *Timaeus*, which, speaking in the person of Velleius the Epicurean, he severely criticises.

The commentary of Proclus (fl. c. 440 A.D.) on the *Timaeus* is a wonderful monument of the silliness and prolixity of the Alexandrian Age. It extends to about thirty pages of the book, and is thirty times the length of the original. It is surprising that this

*Timaeus.*  
INTRODUC-  
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*Timaeus.*INTRODUC-  
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voluminous work should have found a translator (Thomas Taylor, a kindred spirit, who was himself a Neo-Platonist, after the fashion, not of the fifth or sixteenth, but of the nineteenth century A.D.). The commentary is of little or no value, either in a philosophical or philological point of view. The writer is unable to explain particular passages in any precise manner, and he is equally incapable of grasping the whole. He does not take words in their simple meaning or sentences in their natural connexion. He is thinking, not of the context in Plato, but of the contemporary Pythagorean philosophers and their wordy strife. He finds nothing in the text which he does not bring to it. He is full of Porphyry, Iamblichus and Plotinus, of misapplied logic, of misunderstood grammar, and of the Orphic theology.

Although such a work can contribute little or nothing to the understanding of Plato, it throws an interesting light on the Alexandrian times; it realizes how a philosophy made up of words only may create a deep and widespread enthusiasm, how the forms of logic and rhetoric may usurp the place of reason and truth, how all philosophies grow faded and discoloured, and are patched and made up again like worn-out garments, and retain only a second-hand existence. He who would study this degeneracy of philosophy and of the Greek mind in the original cannot do better than devote a few of his days and nights to the commentary of Proclus on the *Timaeus*.

A very different account must be given of the short work entitled '*Timaeus Locrus*,' which is a brief but clear analysis of the *Timaeus* of Plato, omitting the introduction or dialogue and making a few small additions. It does not allude to the original from which it is taken; it is quite free from mysticism and Neo-Platonism. In length it does not exceed a fifth part of the *Timaeus*. It is written in the Doric dialect, and contains several words which do not occur in classical Greek. No other indication of its date, except this uncertain one of language, appears in it. In several places the writer has simplified the language of Plato, in a few others he has embellished and exaggerated it. He generally preserves the thought of the original, but does not copy the words. On the whole this little tract faithfully reflects the meaning and spirit of the *Timaeus*.

From the garden of the *Timaeus*, as from the other dialogues of Plato, we may still gather a few flowers and present them at parting to the reader. There is nothing in Plato grander and simpler than the conversation between Solon and the Egyptian priest, in which the youthfulness of Hellas is contrasted with the antiquity of Egypt. Here are to be found the famous words, ‘O Solon, Solon, you Hellenes are ever young, and there is not an old man among you’—which may be compared to the lively saying of Hegel, that ‘Greek history began with the youth Achilles and left off with the youth Alexander.’ The numerous arts of verisimilitude by which Plato insinuates into the mind of the reader the truth of his narrative have been already referred to. Here occur a sentence or two not wanting in Platonic irony (*φωνᾶντα συνετοῖσι*—a word to the wise). 40 D ff.: ‘To know or tell the origin of the other divinities is beyond us, and we must accept the traditions of the men of old time who affirm themselves to be the offspring of the Gods—that is what they say—and they must surely have known their own ancestors. How can we doubt the word of the children of the Gods? Although they give no probable or certain proofs, still, as they declare that they are speaking of what took place in their own family, we must conform to custom and believe them.’ 76 E: ‘Our creators well knew that women and other animals would some day be framed out of men, and they further knew that many animals would require the use of nails for many purposes; wherefore they fashioned in men at their first creation the rudiments of nails.’ Or once more, let us reflect on two serious passages in which the order of the world is supposed to find a place in the human soul and to infuse harmony into it. 37 A ff.: ‘The soul, when touching anything that has essence, whether dispersed in parts or undivided, is stirred through all her powers to declare the sameness or difference of that thing and some other; and to what individuals are related, and by what affected, and in what way and how and when, both in the world of generation and in the world of immutable being. And when reason, which works with equal truth, whether she be in the circle of the diverse or of the same,—in voiceless silence holding her onward course in the sphere of the self-moved,—when reason, I say, is hovering around the sensible world, and when the circle of the diverse also moving truly imparts the intimations of sense



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to the whole soul, then arise opinions and beliefs sure and certain. But when reason is concerned with the rational, and the circle of the same moving smoothly declares it, then intelligence and knowledge are necessarily perfected;’ where, proceeding in a similar path of contemplation, he supposes the inward and the outer world mutually to imply each other. And 47 B: ‘God invented and gave us sight to the end that we might behold the courses of intelligence in the heaven, and apply them to the courses of our own intelligence which are akin to them, the unperturbed to the perturbed; and that we, learning them and partaking of the natural truth of reason, might imitate the absolutely unerring courses of God and regulate our own vagaries.’ Or let us weigh carefully some other profound thoughts, such as the following. 44 C: ‘He who neglects education walks lame to the end of his life, and returns imperfect and good for nothing to the world below.’ 28 C: ‘The father and maker of all this universe is past finding out; and even if we found him, to tell of him to all men would be impossible.’ Or, lastly, 29 D: ‘Let me tell you then why the Creator made this world of generation. He was good, and the good can never have jealousy of anything. And being free from jealousy, he desired that all things should be as like himself as they could be. This is in the truest sense the origin of creation and of the world, as we shall do well in believing on the testimony of wise men: God desired that all things should be good and nothing bad, so far as this was attainable.’ This is the leading thought in the *Timaeus*, just as the *idea* of Good is the leading thought of the *Republic*, the one expression describing the personal, the other the impersonal Good or God, differing in form rather than in substance, and both equally implying to the mind of Plato a divine reality. The slight touch, perhaps ironical, contained in the words, ‘as we shall do well in believing on the testimony of wise men,’ is very characteristic of Plato.



# TIMAEUS.

## PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES.  
TIMAEUS.

CRITIAS.  
HERMOCRATES.

Steph. *Socrates.* ONE, two, three; but where, my dear Timaeus, *Timaeus.*  
<sup>17</sup> is the fourth of those who were yesterday my guests and are *SOCRATES,*  
to be my entertainers to-day? *TIMAEUS.*

*Timaeus.* He has been taken ill, Socrates; for he would *The*  
not willingly have been absent from this gathering. *appointed*  
*meeting.*

*Soc.* Then, if he is not coming, you and the two others  
must supply his place.

*Tim.* Certainly, and we will do all that we can; having  
been handsomely entertained by you yesterday, those of  
us who remain should be only too glad to return your  
hospitality.

*Soc.* Do you remember what were the points of which I *The chief*  
required you to speak? *points in*

*Tim.* We remember some of them, and you will be here *the Re-*  
to remind us of anything which we have forgotten: or *public:—*  
rather, if we are not troubling you, will you briefly re-  
capitulate the whole, and then the particulars will be more  
firmly fixed in our memories?

*Soc.* To be sure I will: the chief theme of my yesterday's  
discourse was the State—how constituted and of what  
citizens composed it would seem likely to be most perfect.

*Tim.* Yes, Socrates; and what you said of it was very  
much to our mind.

*Soc.* Did we not begin by separating the husbandmen and *(1) Separation*  
the artisans from the class of defenders of the State? *of classes.*

*Timaeus.**Tim.* Yes.SOCRATES,  
TIMAEUS.(2) Division  
of labour.

*Soc.* And when we had given to each one that single employment and particular art which was suited to his nature, we spoke of those who were intended to be our warriors, and said that they were to be guardians of the city against attacks from within as well as from without, and to have no other employment; they were to be merciful in judging their subjects, of whom they were by nature friends, but fierce to their enemies, when they came across them in battle. 18

*Tim.* Exactly.(3) The  
double char-  
acter of the  
guardians.

*Soc.* We said, if I am not mistaken, that the guardians should be gifted with a temperament in a high degree both passionate and philosophical; and that then they would be as they ought to be, gentle to their friends and fierce with their enemies.

*Tim.* Certainly.(4) Their  
education.

*Soc.* And what did we say of their education? Were they not to be trained in gymnastic, and music, and all other sorts of knowledge which were proper for them<sup>1</sup>?

*Tim.* Very true.(5) Com-  
munity of  
goods.

*Soc.* And being thus trained they were not to consider gold or silver or anything else to be their own private property; they were to be like hired troops, receiving pay for keeping guard from those who were protected by them — the pay was to be no more than would suffice for men of simple life; and they were to spend in common, and to live together in the continual practice of virtue, which was to be their sole pursuit.

*Tim.* That was also said.(6) The  
women to  
share in the  
pursuits of  
the men.

*Soc.* Neither did we forget the women; of whom we declared, that their natures should be assimilated and brought into harmony with those of the men, and that common pursuits should be assigned to them both in time of war and in their ordinary life.

*Tim.* That, again, was as you say.(7) Com-  
munity of  
wives and  
children.

*Soc.* And what about the procreation of children? Or rather was not the proposal too singular to be forgotten? for

<sup>1</sup> Or 'which are akin to these;' or *τούτοις* may be taken with *ἐν ᾧ* *ἀπασιν*.

all wives and children were to be in common, to the intent that no one should ever know his own child, but they were to imagine that they were all one family; those who were within a suitable limit of age were to be brothers and sisters, those who were of an elder generation parents and grandparents, and those of a younger, children and grandchildren.

*Timaëus.*

SOCRATES,  
TIMAEUS.

*Tim.* Yes, and the proposal is easy to remember, as you say.

*Soc.* And do you also remember how, with a view of securing as far as we could the best breed, we said that the chief magistrates, male and female, should contrive secretly, by the use of certain lots, so to arrange the nuptial meeting, that the bad of either sex and the good of either sex might pair with their like; and there was to be no quarrelling on this account, for they would imagine that the union was a mere accident, and was to be attributed to the lot?

(8) The  
nuptial lots.

*Tim.* I remember.

*Soc.* And you remember how we said that the children of the good parents were to be educated, and the children of the bad secretly dispersed among the inferior citizens; and while they were all growing up the rulers were to be on the look-out, and to bring up from below in their turn those who were worthy, and those among themselves who were unworthy were to take the places of those who came up?

(9) Trans-  
position of  
good and bad  
citizens.

*Tim.* True.

*Soc.* Then have I now given you all the heads of our yesterday's discussion? Or is there anything more, my dear Timaëus, which has been omitted?

*Tim.* Nothing, Socrates; it was just as you have said.

*Soc.* I should like, before proceeding further, to tell you how I feel about the State which we have described. I might compare myself to a person who, on beholding beautiful animals either created by the painter's art, or, better still, alive but at rest, is seized with a desire of seeing them in motion or engaged in some struggle or conflict to which their forms appear suited; this is my feeling about the State which we have been describing. There are conflicts which all cities undergo, and I should like to hear some one tell of our own city carrying on a struggle against her neighbours, and how she went out to war in a becoming manner, and

Socrates  
desires to  
breathe life  
into his state:  
he would like  
to describe  
its infant  
struggles.  
But he has  
not the gift  
of descrip-  
tion himself,  
and he finds  
the poets



*Timaëus.*

SOCRATES.

equally  
incapable.  
The  
Sophists have  
no state of  
their own,  
and therefore  
are not  
politicians.

He turns to  
Timaëus,  
Critias, and  
Hermocrates.

when at war showed by the greatness of her actions and the magnanimity of her words in dealing with other cities a result worthy of her training and education. Now I, Critias and Hermocrates, am conscious that I myself should never be able to celebrate the city and her citizens in a befitting manner, and I am not surprised at my own incapacity; to me the wonder is rather that the poets present as well as past are no better — not that I mean to depreciate them; but every one can see that they are a crowd of imitators, and will imitate best and most easily the life in which they have been brought up; while that which is beyond the range of a man's education he finds hard to carry out in action, and still harder adequately to represent in language. I am aware that the Sophists have plenty of brave words and fair conceits, but I am afraid that being only wanderers from one city to another, and having never had habitations of their own, they may fail in their conception of philosophers and statesmen, and may not know what they do and say in time of war, when they are fighting or holding parley with their enemies. And thus people of your class are the only ones remaining who are fitted by nature and education to take part at once both in politics and philosophy. Here is Timaëus, of Locris in Italy, a city which has admirable laws, and who is himself 20 in wealth and rank the equal of any of his fellow-citizens; he has held the most important and honourable offices in his own state, and, as I believe, has scaled the heights of all philosophy; and here is Critias, whom every Athenian knows to be no novice in the matters of which we are speaking; and as to Hermocrates, I am assured by many witnesses that his genius and education qualify him to take part in any speculation of the kind. And therefore yesterday when I saw that you wanted me to describe the formation of the State, I readily assented, being very well aware, that, if you only would, none were better qualified to carry the discussion further, and that when you had engaged our city in a suitable war, you of all men living could best exhibit her playing a fitting part. When I had completed my task, I in return imposed this other task upon you. You conferred together and agreed to entertain me to-day, as I had entertained you, with a feast of discourse. Here am I in festive



array, and no man can be more ready for the promised banquet.

*Her.* And we too, Socrates, as Timaeus says, will not be wanting in enthusiasm; and there is no excuse for not complying with your request. As soon as we arrived yesterday at the guest-chamber of Critias, with whom we are staying, or rather on our way thither, we talked the matter over, and he told us an ancient tradition, which I wish, Critias, that you would repeat to Socrates, so that he may help us to judge whether it will satisfy his requirements or not.

*Crit.* I will, if Timaeus, who is our other partner, approves.

*Tim.* I quite approve.

*Crit.* Then listen, Socrates, to a tale which, though strange, is certainly true, having been attested by Solon, who was the wisest of the seven sages. He was a relative and a dear friend of my great-grandfather, Dropides, as he himself says in many passages of his poems; and he told the story to Critias, my grandfather, who remembered and repeated it to us. There were of old, he said, great and marvellous actions  
21 of the Athenian city, which have passed into oblivion through lapse of time and the destruction of mankind, and one in particular, greater than all the rest. This we will now rehearse. It will be a fitting monument of our gratitude to you, and a hymn of praise true and worthy of the goddess, on this her day of festival.

*Soc.* Very good. And what is this ancient famous action of the Athenians<sup>1</sup>, which Critias declared, on the authority of Solon, to be not a mere legend, but an actual fact<sup>1</sup>?

*Crit.* I will tell an old-world story which I heard from an aged man; for Critias, at the time of telling it, was, as he said, nearly ninety years of age, and I was about ten. Now the day was that day of the Apaturia which is called the Registration of Youth, at which, according to custom, our parents gave prizes for recitations, and the poems of several poets were recited by us boys, and many of us sang the poems of Solon, which at that time had not gone out of fashion. One of our tribe, either because he thought so or to please Critias, said that in his judgment Solon was not

*Timaeus.*

SOCRATES,  
TIMAEUS,  
HERMO-  
CRATES,  
CRITIAS.

Hermocrates tells Socrates how Critias had narrated a story which may satisfy his demands.

Critias consents to repeat it. He had heard the tale from his grandfather, who received it from Solon. It told of the glories of ancient Athens.

<sup>1</sup> Or 'which, though unrecorded in history, Critias declared, on the authority of Solon, to be an actual fact?'

*Timaëus.*

CRITIAS.

Solon brought  
it from  
Egypt,—

only the wisest of men, but also the noblest of poets. The old man, as I very well remember, brightened up at hearing this and said, smiling: Yes, Amynander, if Solon had only, like other poets, made poetry the business of his life, and had completed the tale which he brought with him from Egypt, and had not been compelled, by reason of the factions and troubles which he found stirring in his own country when he came home, to attend to other matters, in my opinion he would have been as famous as Homer or Hesiod, or any poet.

And what was the tale about, Critias? said Amynander.

About the greatest action which the Athenians ever did, and which ought to have been the most famous, but, through the lapse of time and the destruction of the actors, it has not come down to us.

Tell us, said the other, the whole story, and how and from whom Solon heard this veritable tradition.

from Sais, a  
city founded  
by Neith, the  
Greek  
Athene.

He replied:—In the Egyptian Delta, at the head of which the river Nile divides, there is a certain district which is called the district of Sais, and the great city of the district is also called Sais, and is the city from which King Amasis came. The citizens have a deity for their foundress; she is called in the Egyptian tongue Neith, and is asserted by them to be the same whom the Hellenes call Athene; they are great lovers of the Athenians, and say that they are in some way related to them. To this city came Solon, and was received there with great honour; he asked the priests who 22 were most skilful in such matters, about antiquity, and made the discovery that neither he nor any other Hellene knew anything worth mentioning about the times of old. On one occasion, wishing to draw them on to speak of antiquity, he began to tell about the most ancient things in our part of the world—about Phoroneus, who is called 'the first man,' and about Niobe; and after the Deluge, of the survival of Deucalion and Pyrrha; and he traced the genealogy of their descendants, and reckoning up the dates, tried to compute how many years ago the events of which he was speaking happened. Thereupon one of the priests, who was of a very great age, said: O Solon, Solon, you Hellenes are never anything but children, and there is not an old man among

you. Solon in return asked him what he meant. I mean to say, he replied, that in mind you are all young; there is no old opinion handed down among you by ancient tradition, nor any science which is hoary with age. And I will tell you why. There have been, and will be again, many destructions of mankind arising out of many causes; the greatest have been brought about by the agencies of fire and water, and other lesser ones by innumerable other causes. There is a story, which even you have preserved, that once upon a time Phaëthon, the son of Helios, having yoked the steeds in his father's chariot, because he was not able to drive them in the path of his father, burnt up all that was upon the earth, and was himself destroyed by a thunderbolt. Now this has the form of a myth, but really signifies a declination of the bodies moving in the heavens around the earth, and a great conflagration of things upon the earth, which recurs after long intervals; at such times those who live upon the mountains and in dry and lofty places are more liable to destruction than those who dwell by rivers or on the sea-shore. And from this calamity the Nile, who is our never-failing saviour, delivers and preserves us. When, on the other hand, the gods purge the earth with a deluge of water, the survivors in your country are herdsmen and shepherds who dwell on the mountains, but those who, like you, live in cities are carried by the rivers into the sea. Whereas in this land, neither then nor at any other time, does the water come down from above on the fields, having always a tendency to come up from below; for which reason the traditions preserved here are the most ancient. The fact is, that wherever the extremity of winter frost or of summer sun does not prevent, mankind exist, sometimes in greater, sometimes in lesser numbers. And whatever happened either in your country or in ours, or in any other region of which we are informed — if there were any actions noble or great or in any other way remarkable, they have all been written down by us of old, and are preserved in our temples. Whereas just when you and other nations are beginning to be provided with letters and the other requisites of civilized life, after the usual interval, the stream from heaven, like a pestilence, comes pouring down, and leaves only those of you who are

*Timæus.*

CRITIAS.

The priests of Sais declared the traditions of Egypt to be far older than those of Hellas,

because Greek history had been frequently interrupted by deluges.



*Timaens.*

CRITIAS.

destitute of letters and education; and so you have to begin all over again like children, and know nothing of what happened in ancient times, either among us or among yourselves. As for those genealogies of yours which you just now recounted to us, Solon, they are no better than the tales of children. In the first place you remember a single deluge only, but there were many previous ones; in the next place, you do not know that there formerly dwelt in your land the fairest and noblest race of men which ever lived, and that you and your whole city are descended from a small seed or remnant of them which survived. And this was unknown to you, because, for many generations, the survivors of that destruction died, leaving no written word. For there was a time, Solon, before the great deluge of all, when the city which now is Athens was first in war and in every way the best governed of all cities, and is said to have performed the noblest deeds and to have had the fairest constitution of any of which tradition tells, under the face of heaven. Solon marvelled at his words, and earnestly requested the priests to inform him exactly and in order about these former citizens. You are welcome to hear about them, Solon, said the priest, both for your own sake and for that of your city, and above all, for the sake of the goddess who is the common patron and parent and educator of both our cities. She founded your city a thousand years before ours<sup>1</sup>, receiving from the Earth and Hephaestus the seed of your race, and afterwards she founded ours, of which the constitution is recorded in our sacred registers to be 8000 years old. As touching your citizens of 9000 years ago, I will briefly inform you of their laws and of their most famous action; the exact 24 particulars of the whole we will hereafter go through at our leisure in the sacred registers themselves. If you compare these very laws with ours you will find that many of ours are the counterpart of yours as they were in the olden time. In the first place, there is the caste of priests, which is separated from all the others; next, there are the artificers, who ply their several crafts by themselves and do not intermix; and

Athens one thousand years more ancient than Sais. The goddess Athene was the foundress of both: this explains the similarity of their institutions.

<sup>1</sup> Observe that Plato gives the same date (9000 years ago) for the foundation of Athens and for the repulse of the invasion from Atlantis. (Crit. 108 E.)



also there is the class of shepherds and of hunters<sup>1</sup>, as well as that of husbandmen; and you will observe, too, that the warriors in Egypt are distinct from all the other classes, and are commanded by the law to devote themselves solely to military pursuits; moreover, the weapons which they carry are shields and spears, a style of equipment which the goddess taught of Asiatics first to us, as in your part of the world first to you. Then as to wisdom, do you observe how our law from the very first made a study of the whole order of things, extending even to prophecy and medicine which gives health; out of these divine elements deriving what was needful for human life, and adding every sort of knowledge which was akin to them. All this order and arrangement the goddess first imparted to you when establishing your city; and she chose the spot of earth in which you were born, because she saw that the happy temperament of the seasons in that land would produce the wisest of men. Wherefore the goddess, who was a lover both of war and of wisdom, selected and first of all settled that spot which was the most likely to produce men likest herself. And there you dwelt, having such laws as these and still better ones, and excelled all mankind in all virtue, as became the children and disciples of the gods.

*Timæus.*

CRITIAS.

Many great and wonderful deeds are recorded of your state in our histories. But one of them exceeds all the rest in greatness and valour. For these histories tell of a mighty power which unprovoked made an expedition against the whole of Europe and Asia, and to which your city put an end. This power came forth out of the Atlantic Ocean, for in those days the Atlantic was navigable; and there was an island situated in front of the straits which are by you called the pillars of Heracles; the island was larger than Libya and Asia put together, and was the way to other islands, and from these you might pass to the whole of the opposite continent which surrounded the true ocean; for this sea which is within the Straits of Heracles is only a harbour, having a narrow entrance, but that other is a real sea, and the surrounding land may be most truly called a boundless continent.

The most glorious act of ancient Athens was the deliverance of Europe and Libya from the power of Atlantis.

<sup>1</sup> Reading τὸ τῶν θηρευτῶν.

*Timæus.*

CRITIAS.

Now in this island of Atlantis there was a great and wonderful empire which had rule over the whole island and several others, and over parts of the continent, and, furthermore, the men of Atlantis had subjected the parts of Libya within the columns of Heracles as far as Egypt, and of Europe as far as Tyrrhenia. This vast power, gathered into one, endeavoured to subdue at a blow our country and yours and the whole of the region within the straits; and then, Solon, your country shone forth, in the excellence of her virtue and strength, among all mankind. She was pre-eminent in courage and military skill, and was the leader of the Hellenes. And when the rest fell off from her, being compelled to stand alone, after having undergone the very extremity of danger, she defeated and triumphed over the invaders, and preserved from slavery those who were not yet subjugated, and generously liberated all the rest of us who dwell within the pillars. But afterwards there occurred violent earthquakes and floods; and in a single day and night of misfortune all your warlike men in a body sank into the earth, and the island of Atlantis in like manner disappeared in the depths of the sea. For which reason the sea in those parts is impassable and impenetrable, because there is a shoal of mud in the way; and this was caused by the subsidence of the island.

Soon afterwards both empires disappeared.

The arrangements of the ideal state recalled to Critias' mind the narrative of Solon.

I have told you briefly, Socrates, what the aged Critias heard from Solon and related to us. And when you were speaking yesterday about your city and citizens, the tale which I have just been repeating to you came into my mind, and I remarked with astonishment how, by some mysterious coincidence, you agreed in almost every particular with the narrative of Solon; but I did not like to speak at the moment. For a long time had elapsed, and I had forgotten too much; 26 I thought that I must first of all run over the narrative in my own mind, and then I would speak. And so I readily assented to your request yesterday, considering that in all such cases the chief difficulty is to find a tale suitable to our purpose, and that with such a tale we should be fairly well provided.

And therefore, as Hermocrates has told you, on my way home yesterday I at once communicated the tale to my com-

panions as I remembered it ; and after I left them, during the night by thinking I recovered nearly the whole of it. Truly, as is often said, the lessons of our childhood make a wonderful impression on our memories ; for I am not sure that I could remember all the discourse of yesterday, but I should be much surprised if I forgot any of these things which I have heard very long ago. I listened at the time with child-like interest to the old man's narrative ; he was very ready to teach me, and I asked him again and again to repeat his words, so that like an indelible picture they were branded into my mind. As soon as the day broke, I rehearsed them as he spoke them to my companions, that they, as well as myself, might have something to say. And now, Socrates, to make an end of my preface, I am ready to tell you the whole tale. I will give you not only the general heads, but the particulars, as they were told to me. The city and citizens, which you yesterday described to us in fiction, we will now transfer to the world of reality. It shall be the ancient city of Athens, and we will suppose that the citizens whom you imagined, were our veritable ancestors, of whom the priest spoke ; they will perfectly harmonize, and there will be no inconsistency in saying that the citizens of your republic are these ancient Athenians. Let us divide the subject among us, and all endeavour according to our ability gracefully to execute the task which you have imposed upon us. Consider then, Socrates, if this narrative is suited to the purpose, or whether we should seek for some other instead.

*Timaeus.*  
SOCRATES,  
CRITIAS.

*Soc.* And what other, Critias, can we find that will be better than this, which is natural and suitable to the festival of the goddess, and has the very great advantage of being a fact and not a fiction? How or where shall we find another if we abandon this? We cannot, and therefore you must tell  
27 the tale, and good luck to you ; and I in return for my yesterday's discourse will now rest and be a listener.

Socrates is satisfied that the rehearsal of this narrative will be a suitable continuation of the discussion.

*Crit.* Let me proceed to explain to you, Socrates, the order in which we have arranged our entertainment. Our intention is, that Timaeus, who is the most of an astronomer amongst us, and has made the nature of the universe his special study, should speak first, beginning with the generation of the world and going down to the creation of man ;

But Timaeus will begin the feast by describing the generation of the



*Timaeus.*SOCRATES,  
TIMAEUS.Universe  
down to the  
creation of  
man :  
Critias will  
follow him.


next, I am to receive the men whom he has created, and of whom some will have profited by the excellent education which you have given them ; and then, in accordance with the tale of Solon, and equally with his law, we will bring them into court and make them citizens, as if they were those very Athenians whom the sacred Egyptian record has recovered from oblivion, and thenceforward we will speak of them as Athenians and fellow-citizens.

*Soc.* I see that I shall receive in my turn a perfect and splendid feast of reason. And now, Timaeus, you, I suppose, should speak next, after duly calling upon the Gods.

At the com-  
mencement  
Timaeus  
invokes the  
gods.

*Tim.* All men, Socrates, who have any degree of right feeling, at the beginning of every enterprise, whether small or great, always call upon God. And we, too, who are going to discourse of the nature of the universe, how created or how existing without creation, if we be not altogether out of our wits, must invoke the aid of Gods and Goddesses and pray that our words may be acceptable to them and consistent with themselves. Let this, then, be our invocation of the Gods, to which I add an exhortation of myself to speak in such manner as will be most intelligible to you, and will most accord with my own intent.

First then, in my judgment, we must make a distinction and ask, What is that which always is and has no becoming ; and what is that which is always becoming and never is ? That which is apprehended by intelligence and reason is always in the same state ; but that which is conceived by 28 opinion with the help of sensation and without reason, is always in a process of becoming and perishing and never really is. Now everything that becomes or is created must of necessity be created by some cause, for without a cause nothing can be created. The work of the creator, whenever he looks to the unchangeable and fashions the form and nature of his work after an unchangeable pattern, must necessarily be made fair and perfect ; but when he looks to the created only, and uses a created pattern, it is not fair or perfect. Was the heaven then or the world, whether called by this or by any other more appropriate name — assuming the name, I am asking a question which has to be asked at the beginning of an enquiry about anything — was the world,

The world  
was created,  
and is  
therefore  
apprehended  
by sense.



I say, always in existence and without beginning? or created, and had it a beginning? Created, I reply, being visible and tangible and having a body, and therefore sensible; and all sensible things are apprehended by opinion and sense and are in a process of creation and created. Now that which is created must, as we affirm, of necessity be created by a cause. But the father and maker of all this universe is past finding out; and even if we found him, to tell of him to all men would be impossible. And there is still a question to be asked about him: Which of the patterns had the artificer in view when he made the world,—the pattern of the unchangeable, or of that which is created? If the world be indeed fair and the artificer good, it is manifest that he must have looked to that which is eternal; but if what cannot be said without blasphemy is true, then to the created pattern. Every one will see that he must have looked to the eternal; for the world is the fairest of creations and he is the best of causes. And having been created in this way, the world has been framed in the likeness of that which is apprehended by reason and mind and is unchangeable, and must therefore of necessity, if this is admitted, be a copy of something. Now it is all-important that the beginning of everything should be according to nature. And in speaking of the copy and the original we may assume that words are akin to the matter which they describe; when they relate to the lasting and permanent and intelligible, they ought to be lasting and unalterable, and, as far as their nature allows, irrefutable and immovable—nothing less. But when they express only the copy or likeness and not the eternal things themselves, they need only be likely and analogous to the real words. As being is to becoming, so is truth to belief. If then, Socrates, amid the many opinions about the gods and the generation of the universe, we are not able to give notions which are altogether and in every respect exact and consistent with one another, do not be surprised. Enough, if we adduce probabilities as likely as any others; for we must remember that I who am the speaker, and you who are the judges, are only mortal men, and we ought to accept the tale which is probable and enquire no further.

*Soc.* Excellent, Timaeus; and we will do precisely as you

*Timaeus.*

SOCRATES,  
TIMAEUS.

God was the cause of it, and he fashioned it after the eternal pattern.

The eternal pattern can be spoken of with certainty; the created copy can only be described in the language of probability.

*Timaëus.*SOCRATES,  
TIMAEUS.

God made the  
world good,  
wishing  
everything  
to be like  
himself.  
To this end  
he brought  
order into it  
and endowed  
it with  
soul and  
intelligence.

bid us. The prelude is charming, and is already accepted by us — may we beg of you to proceed to the strain?

*Tim.* Let me tell you then why the creator made this world of generation. He was good, and the good can never have any jealousy of anything. And being free from jealousy, he desired that all things should be as like himself as they could be. This is in the truest sense the origin of creation and of the world, as we shall do well in believing on the testimony 30 of wise men: God desired that all things should be good and nothing bad, so far as this was attainable. Wherefore also finding the whole visible sphere not at rest, but moving in an irregular and disorderly fashion, out of disorder he brought order, considering that this was in every way better than the other. Now the deeds of the best could never be or have been other than the fairest; and the creator, reflecting on the things which are by nature visible, found that no unintelligent creature taken as a whole was fairer than the intelligent taken as a whole; and that intelligence could not be present in anything which was devoid of soul. For which reason, when he was framing the universe, he put intelligence in soul, and soul in body, that he might be the creator of a work which was by nature fairest and best. Wherefore, using the language of probability, we may say that the world became a living creature truly endowed with soul and intelligence by the providence of God.

The  
original of  
the universe  
is a perfect  
animal, which  
comprehends  
all intelligible  
animals, just  
as the copy  
contains all  
visible  
animals.

This being supposed, let us proceed to the next stage: In the likeness of what animal did the Creator make the world? It would be an unworthy thing to liken it to any nature which exists as a part only; for nothing can be beautiful which is like any imperfect thing; but let us suppose the world to be the very image of that whole of which all other animals both individually and in their tribes are portions. For the original of the universe contains in itself all intelligible beings, just as this world comprehends us and all other visible creatures. For the Deity, intending to make this world like the fairest and most perfect of intelligible beings, framed one visible animal comprehending within itself all other animals of a kindred nature. Are we right in saying 31 that there is one world, or that they are many and infinite? There must be one only, if the created copy is to accord with

the original. For that which includes all other intelligible creatures cannot have a second or companion; in that case there would be need of another living being which would include both, and of which they would be parts, and the likeness would be more truly said to resemble not them, but that other which included them. In order then that the world might be solitary, like the perfect animal, the creator made not two worlds or an infinite number of them; but there is and ever will be one only-begotten and created heaven.

*Timæus.*

TIMÆUS.

Now that which is created is of necessity corporeal, and also visible and tangible. And nothing is visible where there is no fire, or tangible which has no solidity, and nothing is solid without earth. Wherefore also God in the beginning of creation made the body of the universe to consist of fire and earth. But two things cannot be rightly put together without a third; there must be some bond of union between them. And the fairest bond is that which makes the most complete fusion of itself and the things which it combines; and proportion is best adapted to effect such a union. For whenever in any three numbers, whether cube or square, there is a mean, which is to the last term what the first term is to it; and again, when the mean is to the first term as the last term is to the mean,—then the mean becoming first and last, and the first and last both becoming means, they will all of them of necessity come to be the same, and having become the same with one another will be all one. If the universal frame had been created a surface only and having no depth, a single mean would have sufficed to bind together itself and the other terms; but now, as the world must be solid, and solid bodies are always compacted not by one mean but by two, God placed water and air in the mean between fire and earth, and made them to have the same proportion so far as was possible (as fire is to air so is air to water, and as air is to water so is water to earth); and thus he bound and put together a visible and tangible heaven. And for these reasons, and out of such elements which are in number four, the body of the world was created, and it was harmonized by proportion, and therefore has the spirit of friendship; and having been reconciled to itself, it was indissoluble by the hand of any other than the framer.

The world is visible and tangible, and therefore composed of fire and earth. These elements, being solids, required two means to unite them, water and air.



*Timaæus.*

TIMAÆUS.

All the four elements were included entire in the composition of the world, which was therefore perfect and not subject to decay; for nothing was left outside which could hurt or destroy it.

It received a spherical form,—without eyes, ears, mouth, hands, feet, and was made to revolve in a circle on the same spot.

Now the creation took up the whole of each of the four elements; for the Creator compounded the world out of all the fire and all the water and all the air and all the earth, leaving no part of any of them nor any power of them outside. His intention was, in the first place, that the animal should be as far as possible a perfect whole and of perfect parts: secondly, that it should be one, leaving no remnants 33 out of which another such world might be created: and also that it should be free from old age and unaffected by disease. Considering that if heat and cold and other powerful forces which unite bodies surround and attack them from without when they are unprepared, they decompose them, and by bringing diseases and old age upon them, make them waste away—for this cause and on these grounds he made the world one whole, having every part entire, and being therefore perfect and not liable to old age and disease. And he B gave to the world the figure which was suitable and also natural. Now to the animal which was to comprehend all animals, that figure was suitable which comprehends within itself all other figures. Wherefore he made the world in the form of a globe, round as from a lathe, having its extremes in every direction equidistant from the centre, the most perfect and the most like itself of all figures; for he considered that the like is infinitely fairer than the unlike. This he finished off, making the surface smooth all round for many reasons; in the first place, because the living being had no need of eyes when there was nothing remaining outside him to be seen; nor of ears when there was nothing to be heard; and there was no surrounding atmosphere to be breathed; nor would there have been any use of organs by the help of which he might receive his food or get rid of what he had already digested, since there was nothing which went from him or came into him: for there was nothing beside him. Of design he was created thus, his own waste providing his own food, and all that he did or suffered taking place in and by himself. For the Creator conceived that a being which was self-sufficient would be far more excellent than one which lacked anything; and, as he had no need to take anything or defend himself against any one, the Creator did not think it necessary to bestow upon him hands: nor had he any need



34 of feet, nor of the whole apparatus of walking; but the movement suited to his spherical form was assigned to him, being of all the seven that which is most appropriate to mind and intelligence; and he was made to move in the same manner and on the same spot, within his own limits revolving in a circle. All the other six motions were taken away from him, and he was made not to partake of their deviations. And as this circular movement required no feet, the universe was created without legs and without feet.

*Timæus.*

TIMÆUS.

Such was the whole plan of the eternal God about the god that was to be, to whom for this reason he gave a body, smooth and even, having a surface in every direction equidistant from the centre, a body entire and perfect, and formed out of perfect bodies. And in the centre he put the soul, which he diffused throughout the body, making it also to be the exterior environment of it; and he made the universe a circle moving in a circle, one and solitary, yet by reason of its excellence able to converse with itself, and needing no other friendship or acquaintance. Having these purposes in view he created the world a blessed god.

In the centre was placed the soul, which pervaded the whole, and even surrounded it.

Now God did not make the soul after the body, although we are speaking of them in this order; for having brought them together he would never have allowed that the elder should be ruled by the younger; but this is a random manner of speaking which we have, because somehow we ourselves too are very much under the dominion of chance. Whereas he made the soul in origin and excellence prior to and older than the body, to be the ruler and mistress, of whom the body was to be the subject. And he made her out of the following elements and on this wise: Out of the indivisible and unchangeable, and also out of that which is divisible and has to do with material bodies, he compounded a third and intermediate kind of essence, partaking of the nature of the same<sup>1</sup> and of the other, and this compound he placed accordingly in a mean between the indivisible, and the divisible and material. He took the three elements of the same, the other, and the essence, and mingled them into one form, compressing by force the reluctant and unsociable nature of the other into

Though posterior to the body in the order of our exposition, in the order of creation it is prior to it.

It was created thus. First out of the indivisible (i. e. the Same) and the divisible (i. e. the Other) God made Essence. He then mingled

<sup>1</sup> Omitting *αὐτὸ περί*.

*Timaæus.*

TIMAEUS.

these three  
elements and  
divided the  
whole mixture  
into parts,  
according to  
the propor-  
tions of the  
Pythagorean  
Tetractys  
and of the  
Diatonic  
scale.

the same. When he had mingled them with the essence and out of three made one, he again divided this whole into as many portions as was fitting, each portion being a compound of the same, the other, and the essence. And he proceeded to divide after this manner:—First of all, he took away one part of the whole [1], and then he separated a second part which was double the first [2], and then he took away a third part which was half as much again as the second and three times as much as the first [3], and then he took a fourth part which was twice as much as the second [4], and a fifth part which was three times the third [9], and a sixth part which was eight times the first [8], and a seventh part which was twenty-seven times the first [27]. After this he filled up the double intervals [i. e. between 1, 2, 4, 8] and the triple [i. e. between 1, 3, 9, 27], cutting off yet other portions from the mixture and placing them in the intervals, so that in each interval there were two kinds of means, the one exceeding and exceeded by equal parts of its extremes [as for example 1,  $\frac{4}{3}$ , 2, in which the mean  $\frac{4}{3}$  is one-third of 1 more than 1, and one-third of 2 less than 2], the other being that kind of mean which exceeds and is exceeded by an equal number<sup>1</sup>. Where there were intervals of  $\frac{3}{2}$  and of  $\frac{4}{3}$  and of  $\frac{9}{8}$ , made by the connecting terms in the former intervals, he filled up all the intervals of  $\frac{4}{3}$  with the interval of  $\frac{9}{8}$ , leaving a fraction over; and the interval which this fraction expressed was in the ratio of 256 to 243<sup>2</sup>. And thus the whole mixture out of which he cut these portions was all exhausted by him. This entire compound he divided lengthways into two parts, which he joined to one another at the centre like the letter X, and bent them into a circular form, connecting them with themselves and each other at the point opposite to their original meeting-point; and, comprehending them in a uniform revolution upon the same axis, he made the one the outer and the other the inner circle. Now the motion of the outer circle he called the motion of the same,

The com-  
pound was  
cut into two  
strips, which  
were crossed  
and then bent  
round into an  
outer circle,  
revolving  
to the right  
(i. e. the  
circle of the  
Same), and  
an inner,  
revolving  
diagonally

<sup>1</sup> e. g.  $\bar{1}, \frac{4}{3}, \frac{3}{2}, \bar{2}, \frac{8}{3}, 3, \bar{4}, \frac{16}{3}, 6, \bar{8}$ ; and  
 $\bar{1}, \frac{3}{2}, 2, \bar{3}, \frac{9}{2}, 6, \bar{9}, \frac{27}{2}, 18, \bar{27}$ .

<sup>2</sup> e. g.  $243 : 256 :: \frac{81}{64} : \frac{4}{3} :: \frac{243}{128} : 2 :: \frac{81}{32} : \frac{8}{3} :: \frac{243}{64} : 4 :: \frac{81}{16} : \frac{16}{3} :: \frac{243}{32} : 8$ .  
(MARTIN.)

and the motion of the inner circle the motion of the other or diverse. The motion of the same he carried round by the side<sup>1</sup> to the right, and the motion of the diverse diagonally<sup>2</sup> to the left. And he gave dominion to the motion of the same and like, for that he left single and undivided; but the inner motion he divided in six places and made seven unequal circles having their intervals in ratios of two and three, three of each, and bade the orbits proceed in a direction opposite to one another; and three [Sun, Mercury, Venus] he made to move with equal swiftness, and the remaining four [Moon, Saturn, Mars, Jupiter] to move with unequal swiftness to the three and to one another, but in due proportion.

*Timaëus.*

TIMAEUS.

to the left  
(i. e. the circle  
of the Other).  
The latter was  
subdivided  
into seven  
unequal  
circles (i. e.  
the orbits of  
the seven  
planets).

Now when the Creator had framed the soul according to his will, he formed within her the corporeal universe, and brought the two together, and united them centre to centre. The soul, interfused everywhere from the centre to the circumference of heaven, of which also she is the external envelopment, herself turning in herself, began a divine beginning of never-ceasing and rational life enduring throughout all time. The body of heaven is visible, but the soul is invisible, and partakes of reason and harmony, and being made by the best of intellectual and everlasting natures, is the best of things created. And because she is composed of the same and of the other and of the essence, these three, and is divided and united in due proportion, and in her revolutions returns upon herself, the soul, when touching anything which has essence, whether dispersed in parts or undivided, is stirred through all her powers, to declare the sameness or difference of that thing and some other; and to what individuals are related, and by what affected, and in what way and how and when, both in the world of generation and in the world of immutable being. And when reason, which works with equal truth, whether she be in the circle of the diverse or of the same — in voiceless silence holding her onward course in the sphere of the self-moved — when reason, I say, is hovering around the sensible world and when the circle of the diverse also moving truly imparts the intimations

After framing  
the soul, God  
formed within  
her the body  
of the  
universe.

The soul,  
being com-  
pounded of  
the Same, the  
Other, and  
the Essence,  
is moved to  
utter the  
sameness or  
otherness of  
any essence  
which she  
touches.  
When con-  
templating  
the sensible  
world, she  
attains to true  
opinion;  
when the  
rational, to  
knowledge.

<sup>1</sup> i. e. of the rectangular figure supposed to be inscribed in the circle of the Same.

<sup>2</sup> i. e. across the rectangular figure from corner to corner.



*Timæus.*

TIMÆUS.

of sense to the whole soul, then arise opinions and beliefs sure and certain. But when reason is concerned with the rational, and the circle of the same moving smoothly declares it, then intelligence and knowledge are necessarily perfected. And if any one affirms that in which these two are found to be other than the soul, he will say the very opposite of the truth.

God, to make creation more perfect, endowed it with the immortality of which it is capable. To this end he made time, —a moving image of eternity, which is immovable. The modes of time are not to be applied to the eternal essence.

When the father and creator saw the creature which he had made moving and living, the created image of the eternal gods, he rejoiced, and in his joy determined to make the copy still more like the original; and as this was eternal, he sought to make the universe eternal, so far as might be. Now the nature of the ideal being was everlasting, but to bestow this attribute in its fulness upon a creature was impossible. Wherefore he resolved to have a moving image of eternity, and when he set in order the heaven, he made this image eternal but moving according to number, while eternity itself rests in unity; and this image we call time. For there were no days and nights and months and years before the heaven was created, but when he constructed the heaven he created them also. They are all parts of time, and the past and future are created species of time, which we unconsciously but wrongly transfer to the eternal essence; for we say that he 'was,' he 'is,' he 'will be,' but the truth is that 'is' alone is properly attributed to him, and that 'was' 38 and 'will, be' are only to be spoken of becoming in time, for they are motions, but that which is immovably the same cannot become older or younger by time, nor ever did or has become, or hereafter will be, older or younger, nor is subject at all to any of those states which affect moving and sensible things and of which generation is the cause. These are the forms of time, which imitates eternity and revolves according to a law of number. Moreover, when we say that what has become *is* become and what becomes *is* becoming, and that what will become *is* about to become and that the non-existent *is* non-existent,—all these are inaccurate modes of expression<sup>1</sup>. But perhaps this whole subject will be more suitably discussed on some other occasion.



Time, then, and the heaven came into being at the same instant in order that, having been created together, if ever there was to be a dissolution of them, they might be dissolved together. It was framed after the pattern of the eternal nature, that it might resemble this as far as was possible; for the pattern exists from eternity, and the created heaven has been, and is, and will be, in all time. Such was the mind and thought of God in the creation of time. The sun and moon and five other stars, which are called the planets, were created by him in order to distinguish and preserve the numbers of time; and when he had made their several bodies, he placed them in the orbits in which the circle of the other was revolving (cp. 36 D),—in seven orbits seven stars. First, there was the moon in the orbit nearest the earth, and next the sun, in the second orbit above the earth; then came the morning star and the star sacred to Hermes, moving in orbits which have an equal swiftness with the sun, but in an opposite direction; and this is the reason why the sun and Hermes and Lucifer overtake and are overtaken by each other. To enumerate the places which he assigned to the other stars, and to give all the reasons why he assigned them, although a secondary matter, would give more trouble than the primary. These things at some future time, when we are at leisure, may have the consideration which they deserve, but not at present.

*Timæus.*  
TIMÆUS.

The seven planets were intended to preserve the numbers of time.

39 Now, when all the stars which were necessary to the creation of time had attained a motion suitable to them, and had become living creatures having bodies fastened by vital chains, and learnt their appointed task, moving in the motion of the diverse, which is diagonal, and passes through and is governed by the motion of the same, they revolved, some in a larger and some in a lesser orbit,—those which had the lesser orbit revolving faster, and those which had the larger more slowly. Now by reason of the motion of the same, those which revolved fastest appeared to be overtaken by those which moved slower although they really overtook them; for the motion of the same made them all turn in a spiral, and, because some went one way and some another, that which receded most slowly from the sphere of the same, which was the swiftest, appeared to follow it most nearly.

The circle of the Same controls the circle of the Other, which moves diagonally to it. Thus the planets in their revolutions describe spirals, and the slowest seem to overtake the fastest.

*Timaëus.*

TIMAEUS.

The sun was created to afford a visible measure of the swiftness of the planets.

Night and day.

The month and year.

The cyclic year.

After the creation of time God fashions in the created animal four species like those which exist in the ideal: e. g. the gods of heaven (i. e. fixed stars and planets), birds, sea and land animals.

That there might be some visible measure of their relative swiftness and slowness as they proceeded in their eight courses, God lighted a fire, which we now call the sun, in the second from the earth of these orbits, that it might give light to the whole of heaven, and that the animals, as many as nature intended, might participate in number, learning arithmetic from the revolution of the same and the like. Thus, then, and for this reason the night and the day were created, being the period of the one most intelligent revolution. And the month is accomplished when the moon has completed her orbit and overtaken the sun, and the year when the sun has completed his own orbit. Mankind, with hardly an exception, have not remarked the periods of the other stars, and they have no name for them, and do not measure them against one another by the help of number, and hence they can scarcely be said to know that their wanderings, being infinite in number and admirable for their variety, make up time. And yet there is no difficulty in seeing that the perfect number of time fulfils the perfect year when all the eight revolutions, having their relative degrees of swiftness, are accomplished together and attain their completion at the same time, measured by the rotation of the same and equally moving. After this manner, and for these reasons, came into being such of the stars as in their heavenly progress received reversals of motion, to the end that the created heaven might imitate the eternal nature, and be as like as possible to the perfect and intelligible animal.

Thus far and until the birth of time the created universe was made in the likeness of the original, but inasmuch as all animals were not yet comprehended therein, it was still unlike. What remained, the creator then proceeded to fashion after the nature of the pattern. Now as in the ideal animal the mind perceives ideas or species of a certain nature and number, he thought that this created animal ought to have species of a like nature and number. There are four such; one of them is the heavenly race of the gods; 40 another, the race of birds whose way is in the air; the third, the watery species; and the fourth, the pedestrian and land creatures. Of the heavenly and divine, he created the greater part out of fire, that they might be the brightest of

all things and fairest to behold, and he fashioned them after the likeness of the universe in the figure of a circle, and made them follow the intelligent motion of the supreme, distributing them over the whole circumference of heaven, which was to be a true cosmos or glorious world spangled with them all over. And he gave to each of them two movements: the first, a movement on the same spot after the same manner, whereby they ever continue to think consistently the same thoughts about the same things; the second, a forward movement, in which they are controlled by the revolution of the same and the like; but by the other five motions they were unaffected (cp. 43 B), in order that each of them might attain the highest perfection. And for this reason the fixed stars were created, to be divine and eternal animals, ever-abiding and revolving after the same manner and on the same spot; and the other stars which reverse their motion and are subject to deviations of this kind, were created in the manner already described. The earth, which is our nurse, clinging<sup>1</sup> around the pole which is extended through the universe, he framed to be the guardian and artificer of night and day, first and eldest of gods that are in the interior of heaven. Vain would be the attempt to tell all the figures of them circling as in dance, and their juxtapositions, and the return of them in their revolutions upon themselves, and their approximations, and to say which of these deities in their conjunctions meet, and which of them are in opposition, and in what order they get behind and before one another, and when they are severally eclipsed to our sight and again reappear, sending terrors and intimations of the future to those who cannot calculate their movements—to attempt to tell of all this without a visible representation of the heavenly system<sup>2</sup> would be labour in vain. Enough on this head; and now let what we have said about the nature of the created and visible gods have an end.

To know or tell the origin of the other divinities is beyond us, and we must accept the traditions of the men of old time who affirm themselves to be the offspring of the gods—that

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The fixed stars revolve on their axes and are carried round in the sphere of the Same.

The motions of the planets have been already (38 ff.) described.

The earth is the immovable(?) centre of the universe.

As for the Gods of mythology, we must

<sup>1</sup> Or 'circling.'

<sup>2</sup> Reading τοῖς οὐ δυν. and τούτων αὐτῶν.



*Timaëus.*

TIMAEUS.

accept the  
statements of  
their children  
about them.

is what they say — and they must surely have known their own ancestors. How can we doubt the word of the children of the gods? Although they give improbable or certain proofs, still, as they declare that they are speaking of what took place in their own family, we must conform to custom and believe them. In this manner, then, according to them, the genealogy of these gods is to be received and set forth.

Oceanus and Tethys were the children of Earth and Heaven, and from these sprang Phorcys and Cronos and Rhea, and all that generation; and from Cronos and Rhea sprang Zeus and Herè, and all those who are said to be 41 their brethren, and others who were the children of these.

The creator  
of the universe  
bids the  
created gods  
fashion the  
mortal bodies  
of man and  
of the lower  
animals: he  
himself will  
furnish the  
immortal  
principle of  
the soul.

Now, when all of them, both those who visibly appear in their revolutions as well as those other gods who are of a more retiring nature, had come into being, the creator of the universe addressed them in these words: ‘Gods, children of gods, who are my works, and of whom I am the artificer and father, my creations are indissoluble, if so I will. All that is bound may be undone, but only an evil being would wish to undo that which is harmonious and happy. Wherefore, since ye are but creatures, ye are not altogether immortal and indissoluble, but ye shall certainly not be dissolved, nor be liable to the fate of death, having in my will a greater and mightier bond than those with which ye were bound at the time of your birth. And now listen to my instructions:— Three tribes of mortal beings remain to be created — without them the universe will be incomplete, for it will not contain every kind of animal which it ought to contain, if it is to be perfect. On the other hand, if they were created by me and received life at my hands, they would be on an equality with the gods. In order then that they may be mortal, and that this universe may be truly universal, do ye, according to your natures, betake yourselves to the formation of animals, imitating the power which was shown by me in creating you. The part of them worthy of the name immortal, which is called divine and is the guiding principle of those who are willing to follow justice and you — of that divine part I will myself sow the seed, and having made a beginning, I will hand the work over to you. And



do ye then interweave the mortal with the immortal, and make and beget living creatures, and give them food, and make them to grow, and receive them again in death.'

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Thus he spake, and once more into the cup in which he had previously mingled the soul of the universe he poured the remains of the elements, and mingled them in much the same manner; they were not, however, pure as before, but diluted to the second and third degree. And having made it he divided the whole mixture into souls equal in number to the stars, and assigned each soul to a star; and having there placed them as in a chariot, he showed them the nature of the universe, and declared to them the laws of destiny, according to which their first birth would be one and the same for all,—no one should suffer a disadvantage at his hands; they were to be sown in the instruments of time severally adapted to them, and to come forth the most religious of animals; and as human nature was of two kinds, the superior race would hereafter be called man. Now, when they should be implanted in bodies by necessity, and be always gaining or losing some part of their bodily substance, then in the first place it would be necessary that they should all have in them one and the same faculty of sensation, arising out of irresistible impressions; in the second place, they must have love, in which pleasure and pain mingle; also fear and anger, and the feelings which are akin or opposite to them; if they conquered these they would live righteously, and if they were conquered by them, unrighteously. He who lived well during his appointed time was to return and dwell in his native star, and there he would have a blessed and congenial existence. But if he failed in attaining this, at the second birth he would pass into a woman, and if, when in that state of being, he did not desist from evil, he would continually be changed into some brute who resembled him in the evil nature which he had acquired, and would not cease from his toils and transformations until he followed the revolution of the same and the like within him, and overcame by the help of reason the turbulent and irrational mob of later accretions, made up of fire and air and water and earth, and returned to the form of his first and better state. Having given all these laws to his creatures, that he might be guiltless of

He makes the human soul of the same elements as the universal; and having distributed it into souls equal in number to the stars, sets one soul in each star and reveals to them their future life on the planets, when they will have mortal bodies.

Those who then live well will return from the planets to their original star; those who live badly will take a lower form at their next birth.

*Timaëus.*

TIMAEUS.

future evil in any of them, the creator sowed some of them in the earth, and some in the moon, and some in the other instruments of time; and when he had sown them he committed to the younger gods the fashioning of their mortal bodies, and desired them to furnish what was still lacking to the human soul, and having made all the suitable additions, to rule over them, and to pilot the mortal animal in the best and wisest manner which they could, and avert from him all but self-inflicted evils.

The created  
gods provide  
for the human  
soul bodies  
compounded  
of earth, air,  
fire and water.

When the creator had made all these ordinances he remained in his own accustomed nature, and [his children heard and were obedient to their father's word, and] receiving from him the immortal principle of a mortal creature, in imitation of their own creator they borrowed portions of fire, and earth, and water, and air from the world, which were hereafter to be restored — these they took and welded them together, 43 not with the indissoluble chains by which they were themselves bound, but with little pegs too small to be visible, making up out of all the four elements each separate body, and fastening the courses of the immortal soul in a body which was in a state of perpetual influx and efflux. Now these courses, detained as in a vast river, neither overcame nor were overcome; but were hurrying and hurried to and fro, so that the whole animal was moved and progressed, irregularly however and irrationally and anyhow, in all the six directions of motion, wandering backwards and forwards, and right and left, and up and down, and in all the six directions. For great as was the advancing and retiring flood which provided nourishment, the affections produced by external contact caused still greater tumult — when the body of any one met and came into collision with some external fire, or with the solid earth or the gliding waters, or was caught in the tempest borne on the air, and the motions produced by any of these impulses were carried through the body to the soul. All such motions have consequently received the general name of 'sensations,' which they still retain. And they did in fact at that time create a very great and mighty movement; uniting with the ever-flowing stream in stirring up and violently shaking the courses of the soul, they completely stopped the revolution of the same by their

The courses of  
the soul, when  
placed in  
them, are so  
disturbed by  
the ebbing  
and flowing  
stream of  
nutriment and  
by external  
sensations,  
that the  
revolution of  
the same is  
stopped,

opposing current, and hindered it from predominating and advancing; and they so disturbed the nature of the other or diverse, that the three double intervals [i. e. between 1, 2, 4, 8], and the three triple intervals [i. e. between 1, 3, 9, 27], together with the mean terms and connecting links which are expressed by the ratios of 3 : 2, and 4 : 3, and of 9 : 8,—these, although they cannot be wholly undone except by him who united them, were twisted by them in all sorts of ways, and the circles were broken and disordered in every possible manner, so that when they moved they were tumbling to pieces, and moved irrationally, at one time in a reverse direction, and then again obliquely, and then upside down, as you might imagine a person who is upside down and has his head leaning upon the ground and his feet up against something in the air; and when he is in such a position, both he and the spectator fancy that the right of either is his left, and the left right. If, when powerfully experiencing these and similar effects, the revolutions of the soul come in contact  
44 with some external thing, either of the class of the same or of the other, they speak of the same or of the other in a manner the very opposite of the truth; and they become false and foolish, and there is no course or revolution in them which has a guiding or directing power; and if again any sensations enter in violently from without and drag after them the whole vessel of the soul, then the courses of the soul, though they seem to conquer, are really conquered.

And by reason of all these affections, the soul, when encased in a mortal body, now, as in the beginning, is at first without intelligence; but when the flood of growth and nutriment abates, and the courses of the soul, calming down, go their own way and become steadier as time goes on, then the several circles return to their natural form, and their revolutions are corrected, and they call the same and the other by their right names, and make the possessor of them to become a rational being. And if these combine in him with any true nurture or education, he attains the fulness and health of the perfect man, and escapes the worst disease of all; but if he neglects education he walks lame to the end of his life, and returns imperfect and good for nothing to the world below. This, however, is a later stage; at present we

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and the mean terms which unite the sphere of the other are disordered.

Thus at first the soul does not attain to truth and wisdom.

As the stream of nutriment abates, the courses of the soul regain their proper motions, and the man becomes a rational creature.

True education renders him perfect.



*Timæus.*

TIMÆUS.

must treat more exactly the subject before us, which involves a preliminary enquiry into the generation of the body and its members, and as to how the soul was created,— for what reason and by what providence of the gods; and holding fast to probability, we must pursue our way.

These courses were encased in the head, which, like the universe, is in the form of a sphere. The body, with its four limbs, is the vehicle of the head; it moves forward because the front part of us is the more honourable.

In the front part of the head the face was inserted, and in the face, eyes. Sight arises thus :—The light from the eyes and the light of day, which is akin to it, combine; and when they meet with the

First, then, the gods, imitating the spherical shape of the universe, enclosed the two divine courses in a spherical body, that, namely, which we now term the head, being the most divine part of us and the lord of all that is in us: to this the gods, when they put together the body, gave all the other members to be servants, considering that it partook of every sort of motion. In order then that it might not tumble about among the high and deep places of the earth, but might be able to get over the one and out of the other, they provided the body to be its vehicle and means of locomotion; which consequently had length and was furnished with four limbs extended and flexible; these God contrived to be instruments of locomotion with which it might take hold and find support, and so be able to pass through all places, carrying 45 on high the dwelling-place of the most sacred and divine part of us. Such was the origin of legs and hands, which for this reason were attached to every man; and the gods, deeming the front part of man to be more honourable and more fit to command than the hinder part, made us to move mostly in a forward direction. Wherefore man must needs have his front part unlike and distinguished from the rest of his body. And so in the vessel of the head, they first of all put a face in which they inserted organs to minister in all things to the providence of the soul, and they appointed this part, which has authority, to be by nature the part which is in front. And of the organs they first contrived the eyes to give light, and the principle according to which they were inserted was as follows: So much of fire as would not burn, but gave a gentle light, they formed into a substance akin to the light of every-day life; and the pure fire which is within us and related thereto they made to flow through the eyes in a stream smooth and dense, compressing the whole eye, and especially the centre part, so that it kept out everything of a coarser nature, and allowed to pass only this pure element. When the light of day surrounds the stream of vision, then like falls



upon like, and they coalesce, and one body is formed by natural affinity in the line of vision, wherever the light that falls from within meets with an external object. And the whole stream of vision, being similarly affected in virtue of similarity, diffuses the motions of what it touches or what touches it over the whole body, until they reach the soul, causing that perception which we call sight. But when night comes on and the external and kindred fire departs, then the stream of vision is cut off; for going forth to an unlike element it is changed and extinguished, being no longer of one nature with the surrounding atmosphere which is now deprived of fire: and so the eye no longer sees, and we feel disposed to sleep. For when the eyelids, which the gods invented for the preservation of sight, are closed, they keep in the internal fire; and the power of the fire diffuses and equalizes the inward motions; when they are equalized, there is rest, and when the rest is profound, sleep comes over us

46 scarce disturbed by dreams; but where the greater motions still remain, of whatever nature and in whatever locality, they engender corresponding visions in dreams, which are remembered by us when we are awake and in the external world. And now there is no longer any difficulty in understanding the creation of images in mirrors and all smooth and bright surfaces. For from the communion of the internal and external fires, and again from the union of them and their numerous transformations when they meet in the mirror, all these appearances of necessity arise, when the fire from the face coalesces with the fire from the eye on the bright and smooth surface. And right appears left and left right, because the visual rays come into contact with the rays emitted by the object in a manner contrary to the usual mode of meeting; but the right appears right, and the left left, when the position of one of the two concurring lights is reversed; and this happens when the mirror is concave and its smooth surface repels the right stream of vision to the left side, and the left to the right<sup>1</sup>. Or if the mirror be turned vertically, then the concavity makes the countenance appear to be all

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light from an object, all three form one body, which transmits to the soul the motions of the object.

In the case of reflections in plane mirrors, the transposition of right and left is due to the fact that the light from the eye and the object meet in an unusual manner.

In a concave mirror, if held horizontally, there is no transposition; but if it be held vertically,

<sup>1</sup> He is speaking of two kinds of mirrors, first the plane, secondly the concave; and the latter is supposed to be placed, first horizontally, and then vertically.

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the image is inverted.

Enough of the secondary or irrational causes of sight; the first or intelligent cause is the purpose for which God gave it.

From sight we derive number and philosophy;

and the observation of the intelligent motions of the heavens

upside down, and the lower rays are driven upwards and the upper downwards.

All these are to be reckoned among the second and co-operative causes which God, carrying into execution the idea of the best as far as possible, uses as his ministers. They are thought by most men not to be the second, but the prime causes of all things, because they freeze and heat, and contract and dilate, and the like. But they are not so, for they are incapable of reason or intellect; the only being which can properly have mind is the invisible soul, whereas fire and water, and earth and air, are all of them visible bodies. The lover of intellect and knowledge ought to explore causes of intelligent nature first of all, and, secondly, of those things which, being moved by others, are compelled to move others. And this is what we too must do. Both kinds of causes should be acknowledged by us, but a distinction should be made between those which are endowed with mind and are the workers of things fair and good, and those which are deprived of intelligence and always produce chance effects without order or design. Of the second or co-operative causes of sight, which help to give to the eyes the power which they now possess, enough has been said. I will therefore now proceed to speak of the higher use and purpose for which God has given them to us. The sight in my opinion 47 is the source of the greatest benefit to us, for had we never seen the stars, and the sun, and the heaven, none of the words which we have spoken about the universe would ever have been uttered. But now the sight of day and night, and the months and the revolutions of the years, have created number, and have given us a conception of time, and the power of enquiring about the nature of the universe; and from this source we have derived philosophy, than which no greater good ever was or will be given by the gods to mortal man. This is the greatest boon of sight: and of the lesser benefits why should I speak? even the ordinary man if he were deprived of them would bewail his loss, but in vain. Thus much let me say however: God invented and gave us sight to the end that we might behold the courses of intelligence in the heaven, and apply them to the courses of our own intelligence which are akin to them, the unperturbed

to the perturbed; and that we, learning them and partaking of the natural truth of reason, might imitate the absolutely unerring courses of God and regulate our own vagaries. The same may be affirmed of speech and hearing: they have been given by the gods to the same end and for a like reason. For this is the principal end of speech, whereto it most contributes. Moreover, so much of music as is adapted to the sound of the voice<sup>1</sup> and to the sense of hearing is granted to us for the sake of harmony; and harmony, which has motions akin to the revolutions of our souls, is not regarded by the intelligent votary of the Muses as given by them with a view to irrational pleasure, which is deemed to be the purpose of it in our day, but as meant to correct any discord which may have arisen in the courses of the soul, and to be our ally in bringing her into harmony and agreement with herself; and rhythm too was given by them for the same reason, on account of the irregular and graceless ways which prevail among mankind generally, and to help us against them.

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enables us to correct the erring courses of our souls.

Speech, hearing, harmony, and rhythm have the same object in view.

48 Thus far in what we have been saying, with small exceptions, the works of intelligence have been set forth; and now we must place by the side of them in our discourse the things which come into being through necessity — for the creation is mixed, being made up of necessity and mind. Mind, the ruling power, persuaded necessity to bring the greater part of created things to perfection, and thus and after this manner in the beginning, when the influence of reason got the better of necessity, the universe was created. But if a person will truly tell of the way in which the work was accomplished, he must include the other influence of the variable cause as well. Wherefore, we must return again and find another suitable beginning, as about the former matters, so also about these. To which end we must consider the nature of fire, and water, and air, and earth, such as they were prior to the creation of the heaven, and what was happening to them in this previous state<sup>2</sup>; for no one has as yet explained the manner of their generation, but we speak of fire and the rest of them, whatever they mean, as

So far we have spoken chiefly of the works of mind; now we must tell of the works of necessity and of the variable cause.

Thus we are led to consider the nature of the four elements.

<sup>1</sup> Reading *φωνῇ* and placing the comma after *ἀκοήν*. <sup>2</sup> Cp. *infra*, 53 A.



*Timæus.*

TIMÆUS.

though men knew their natures, and we maintain them to be the first principles and letters or elements of the whole, when they cannot reasonably be compared by a man of any sense even to syllables or first compounds. And let me say thus much: I will not now speak of the first principle or principles of all things, or by whatever name they are to be called, for this reason,—because it is difficult to set forth my opinion according to the method of discussion which we are at present employing. Do not imagine, any more than I can bring myself to imagine, that I should be right in undertaking so great and difficult a task. Remembering what I said at first about probability, I will do my best to give as probable an explanation as any other,—or rather, more probable; and I will first go back to the beginning and try to speak of each thing and of all<sup>1</sup>. Once more, then, at the commencement of my discourse, I call upon God, and beg him to be our saviour out of a strange and unwonted enquiry, and to bring us to the haven of probability. So now let us begin again.

At the beginning of our discourse we assumed two natures: (1) an intelligible pattern; (2) a created copy. Now we must add a third—(3) the receptacle of all generation, i. e. space.

This new beginning of our discussion of the universe requires a fuller division than the former; for then we made two classes, now a third must be revealed. The two sufficed for the former discussion: one, which we assumed, was a pattern intelligible and always the same; and the second was only the imitation of the pattern, generated and visible. 49 There is also a third kind which we did not distinguish at the time, conceiving that the two would be enough. But now the argument seems to require that we should set forth in words another kind, which is difficult of explanation and dimly seen. What nature are we to attribute to this new kind of being? We reply, that it is the receptacle, and in a manner the nurse, of all generation. I have spoken the truth; but I must express myself in clearer language, and this will be an arduous task for many reasons, and in particular because I must first raise questions concerning fire and the other elements, and determine what each of them is; for to say, with any probability or certitude, which of them

<sup>1</sup> Putting the comma after *μᾶλλον δὲ*; or, following Stallbaum and omitting the comma, 'or rather, before entering on this probable discussion, we will begin again, and try to speak of each thing and of all.'



should be called water rather than fire, and which should be called any of them rather than all or some one of them, is a difficult matter. How, then, shall we settle this point, and what questions about the elements may be fairly raised?

In the first place, we see that what we just now called water, by condensation, I suppose, becomes stone and earth; and this same element, when melted and dispersed, passes into vapour and air. Air, again, when inflamed, becomes fire; and again fire, when condensed and extinguished, passes once more into the form of air; and once more, air, when collected and condensed, produces cloud and mist; and from these, when still more compressed, comes flowing water, and from water comes earth and stones once more; and thus generation appears to be transmitted from one to the other in a circle. Thus, then, as the several elements never present themselves in the same form, how can any one have the assurance to assert positively that any of them, whatever it may be, is one thing rather than another? No one can. But much the safest plan is to speak of them as follows:—Anything which we see to be continually changing, as, for example, fire, we must not call ‘this’ or ‘that,’ but rather say that it is ‘of such a nature;’ nor let us speak of water as ‘this,’ but always as ‘such;’ nor must we imply that there is any stability in any of those things which we indicate by the use of the words ‘this’ and ‘that,’ supposing ourselves to signify something thereby; for they are too volatile to be detained in any such expressions as ‘this,’ or ‘that,’ or ‘relative to this,’ or any other mode of speaking which represents them as permanent. We ought not to apply ‘this’ to any of them, but rather the word ‘such;’ which expresses the similar principle circulating in each and all of them; for example, that should be called ‘fire’ which is of such a nature always, and so of everything that has generation. That in which the elements severally grow up, and appear, and decay, is alone to be called by the name  
50 ‘this’ or ‘that;’ but that which is of a certain nature, hot or white, or anything which admits of opposite qualities, and all things that are compounded of them, ought not to be so denominated. Let me make another attempt to explain my meaning more clearly. Suppose a person to make all kinds

*Timæus.*

TIMÆUS.

Since the elements are perpetually changing into and out of one another and have in them nothing permanent, they should be called, not ‘this’ or ‘that,’ but always ‘such.’ Unchanging space is the only fixed nature.

An illustration.

*Timaëus.*

TIMAEUS.

Space is that which, being without form, can receive any form, i. e. the impress of any *idea*.

The three natures which have been assumed may be likened to a father, child, and mother.

of figures of gold and to be always transmuting one form into all the rest ;— somebody points to one of them and asks what it is. By far the safest and truest answer is, 'That is gold ; and not to call the triangle or any other figures which are formed in the gold 'these,' as though they had existence, since they are in process of change while he is making the assertion ; but if the questioner be willing to take the safe and indefinite expression, 'such,' we should be satisfied. And the same argument applies to the universal nature which receives all bodies — that must be always called the same ; for, while receiving all things, she never departs at all from her own nature, and never in any way, or at any time, assumes a form like that of any of the things which enter into her ; she is the natural recipient of all impressions, and is stirred and informed by them, and appears different from time to time by reason of them. But the forms which enter into and go out of her are the likenesses of real existences modelled after their patterns in a wonderful and inexplicable manner, which we will hereafter investigate. For the present we have only to conceive of three natures : first, that which is in process of generation ; secondly, that in which the generation takes place ; and thirdly, that of which the thing generated is a resemblance. And we may liken the receiving principle to a mother, and the source or spring to a father, and the intermediate nature to a child ; and may remark further, that if the model is to take every variety of form, then the matter in which the model is fashioned will not be duly prepared, unless it is formless, and free from the impress of any of those shapes which it is hereafter to receive from without. For if the matter were like any of the supervening forms, then whenever any opposite or entirely different nature was stamped upon its surface, it would take the impression badly, because it would intrude its own shape. Wherefore, that which is to receive all forms should have no form ; as in making perfumes they first contrive that the liquid substance which is to receive the scent shall be as inodorous as possible ; or as those who wish to impress figures on soft substances do not allow any previous impression to remain, but begin by making the surface as even and smooth as possible. In the same way that which is to receive perpetually and

through its whole extent the resemblances of all eternal beings ought to be devoid of any particular form. Wherefore, the mother and receptacle of all created and visible and in any way sensible things, is not to be termed earth, or air, or fire, or water, or any of their compounds, or any of the elements from which these are derived, but is an invisible and formless being which receives all things and in some mysterious way partakes of the intelligible, and is most incomprehensible. In saying this we shall not be far wrong; as far, however, as we can attain to a knowledge of her from the previous considerations, we may truly say that fire is that part of her nature which from time to time is inflamed, and water that which is moistened, and that the mother substance becomes earth and air, in so far as she receives the impressions of them.

*Timæus.*

TIMÆUS.

The elements are only affections of space, produced by the impression of ideas.

Let us consider this question more precisely. Is there any self-existent fire? and do all those things which we call self-existent exist? or are only those things which we see, or in some way perceive through the bodily organs, truly existent, and nothing whatever besides them? And is all that which we call an intelligible essence nothing at all, and only a name? Here is a question which we must not leave unexamined or undetermined, nor must we affirm too confidently that there can be no decision; neither must we interpolate in our present long discourse a digression equally long, but if it is possible to set forth a great principle in a few words, that is just what we want.

But have ideas any existence?

Thus I state my view:—If mind and true opinion are two distinct classes, then I say that there certainly are these self-existent ideas unperceived by sense, and apprehended only by the mind; if, however, as some say, true opinion differs in no respect from mind, then everything that we perceive through the body is to be regarded as most real and certain. But we must affirm them to be distinct, for they have a distinct origin and are of a different nature; the one is implanted in us by instruction, the other by persuasion; the one is always accompanied by true reason, the other is without reason; the one cannot be overcome by persuasion, but the other can: and lastly, every man may be said to share in true opinion, but mind is the attribute of the gods and of very few

We must admit that they have, if, as is the case, mind and true opinion differ; for corresponding to the difference between these mental states, there must be a difference



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between  
the objects  
apprehended  
by them.

Space is not  
perceived by  
sense, but by  
a kind of spu-  
rious reason.

Space, being,  
and genera-  
tion existed  
before the  
heaven.  
Space, on  
taking the  
forms of the  
elements, was  
filled with  
dissimilar

men. Wherefore also we must acknowledge that there is one kind of being which is always the same, uncreated and indestructible, never receiving anything into itself from without, nor itself going out to any other, but invisible and imperceptible by any sense, and of which the contemplation is granted to intelligence only. And there is another nature of the same name with it, and like to it, perceived by sense, created, always in motion, becoming in place and again vanishing out of place, which is apprehended by opinion and sense. And there is a third nature, which is space, and is eternal, and admits not of destruction and provides a home for all created things, and is apprehended without the help of sense, by a kind of spurious reason, and is hardly real; which we beholding as in a dream, say of all existence that it must of necessity be in some place and occupy a space, but that what is neither in heaven nor in earth has no existence. Of these and other things of the same kind, relating to the true and waking reality of nature, we have only this dream-like sense, and we are unable to cast off sleep and determine the truth about them. For an image, since the reality, after which it is modelled, does not belong to it<sup>1</sup>, and it exists ever as the fleeting shadow of some other, must be inferred to be in another [i. e. in space], grasping existence in some way or other, or it could not be at all. But true and exact reason, vindicating the nature of true being, maintains that while two things [i. e. the image and space] are different they cannot exist one of them in the other and so be one and also two at the same time.

Thus have I concisely given the result of my thoughts; and my verdict is that being and space and generation, these three, existed in their three ways before the heaven; and that the nurse of generation, moistened by water and inflamed by fire, and receiving the forms of earth and air, and experiencing all the affections which accompany these, presented a strange variety of appearances; and being full of powers which were neither similar nor equally balanced, was never in any part in a state of equipoise, but swaying un-

<sup>1</sup> Or, 'since in its very intention it is not self-existent'—which, though obscure, avoids any inaccuracy of construction.



53 evenly hither and thither, was shaken by them, and by its motion again shook them; and the elements when moved were separated and carried continually, some one way, some another; as, when grain is shaken and winnowed by fans and other instruments used in the threshing of corn, the close and heavy particles are borne away and settle in one direction, and the loose and light particles in another. In this manner, the four kinds or elements were then shaken by the receiving vessel, which, moving like a winnowing machine, scattered far away from one another the elements most unlike, and forced the most similar elements into close contact. Wherefore also the various elements had different places before they were arranged so as to form the universe. At first, they were all without reason and measure. But when the world began to get into order, fire and water and earth and air had only certain faint traces of themselves, and were altogether such as everything might be expected to be in the absence of God; this, I say, was their nature at that time, and God fashioned them by form and number. Let it be consistently maintained by us in all that we say that God made them as far as possible the fairest and best, out of things which were not fair and good. And now I will endeavour to show you the disposition and generation of them by an unaccustomed argument, which I am compelled to use; but I believe that you will be able to follow me, for your education has made you familiar with the methods of science.

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forces, which swayed her to and fro. Thus earth, air, fire and water, were sifted into their proper places, while they were yet in a rudimentary state, before God perfected them by form and number.

In the first place, then, as is evident to all, fire and earth and water and air are bodies. And every sort of body possesses solidity, and every solid must necessarily be contained in planes; and every plane rectilinear figure is composed of triangles; and all triangles are originally of two kinds, both of which are made up of one right and two acute angles; one of them has at either end of the base the half of a divided right angle, having equal sides, while in the other the right angle is divided into unequal parts, having unequal sides. These, then, proceeding by a combination of probability with demonstration, we assume to be the original elements of fire and the other bodies; but the principles which are prior to these God only knows, and he of men

The manner of their generation was as follows:—

The four elements are solid bodies, and all solids are made up of plane surfaces, and all plane surfaces of triangles. All triangles

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are ultimately  
of two kinds,  
—i. e. the  
rectangular  
isosceles, and  
the rectangu-  
lar scalene.

The  
rectangular  
isosceles,  
which has but  
one form, and  
that one of  
the many  
forms of  
scalene which  
is half of an  
equilateral  
triangle were  
chosen for  
making the  
elements.

Three of them  
are generated  
out of the  
latter: the  
fourth alone  
from the  
former.  
Therefore  
only three  
can pass into  
each other.

who is the friend of God. And next we have to determine what are the four most beautiful bodies which are unlike one another, and of which some are capable of resolution into one another; for having discovered thus much, we shall know the true origin of earth and fire and of the proportionate and intermediate elements. And then we shall not be willing to allow that there are any distinct kinds of visible bodies fairer than these. Wherefore we must endeavour to construct the four forms of bodies which excel in beauty, and then we shall be able to say that we have sufficiently apprehended their nature. Now of the two triangles, the isosceles 54 has one form only; the scalene or unequal-sided has an infinite number. Of the infinite forms we must select the most beautiful, if we are to proceed in due order, and any one who can point out a more beautiful form than ours for the construction of these bodies, shall carry off the palm, not as an enemy, but as a friend. Now, the one which we maintain to be the most beautiful of all the many triangles (and we need not speak of the others) is that of which the double forms a third triangle which is equilateral; the reason of this would be long to tell; he who disproves what we are saying, and shows that we are mistaken, may claim a friendly victory. Then let us choose two triangles, out of which fire and the other elements have been constructed, one isosceles, the other having the square of the longer side equal to three times the square of the lesser side.

Now is the time to explain what was before obscurely said: there was an error in imagining that all the four elements might be generated by and into one another; this, I say, was an erroneous supposition, for there are generated from the triangles which we have selected four kinds—three from the one which has the sides unequal; the fourth alone is framed out of the isosceles triangle. Hence they cannot all be resolved into one another, a great number of small bodies being combined into a few large ones, or the converse. But three of them can be thus resolved and compounded, for they all spring from one, and when the greater bodies are broken up, many small bodies will spring up out of them and take their own proper figures; or, again, when many small bodies are dissolved into their triangles, if they become

one, they will form one large mass of another kind. So much for their passage into one another. I have now to speak of their several kinds, and show out of what combinations of numbers each of them was formed. The first will be the simplest and smallest construction, and its element is that triangle which has its hypotenuse twice the lesser side. When two such triangles are joined at the diagonal, and this is repeated three times, and the triangles rest their diagonals and shorter sides on the same point as a centre, a single equilateral triangle is formed out of six triangles; and four equilateral triangles, if put together, make out of every three plane angles one solid angle, being  
 55 that which is nearest to the most obtuse of plane angles; and out of the combination of these four angles arises the first solid form which distributes into equal and similar parts the whole circle in which it is inscribed. The second species of solid is formed out of the same triangles, which unite as eight equilateral triangles and form one solid angle out of four plane angles, and out of six such angles the second body is completed. And the third body is made up of 120 triangular elements, forming twelve solid angles, each of them included in five plane equilateral triangles, having altogether twenty bases, each of which is an equilateral triangle. The one element [that is, the triangle which has its hypotenuse twice the lesser side] having generated these figures, generated no more; but the isosceles triangle produced the fourth elementary figure, which is compounded of four such triangles, joining their right angles in a centre, and forming one equilateral quadrangle. Six of these united form eight solid angles, each of which is made by the combination of three plane right angles; the figure of the body thus composed is a cube, having six plane quadrangular equilateral bases. There was yet a fifth combination which God used in the delineation of the universe.

Now, he who, duly reflecting on all this, enquires whether the worlds are to be regarded as indefinite or definite in number, will be of opinion that the notion of their indefiniteness is characteristic of a sadly indefinite and ignorant mind. He, however, who raises the question whether they are to be truly regarded as one or five, takes up a more reasonable

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The first and simplest solid, the pyramid, has four equilateral triangular surfaces, each formed by the union of six rectangular scalene triangles.

The second species, the octahedron, has eight such surfaces, and the third, the icosahedron, twenty.

The fourth, the cube, has six square surfaces, each formed of four rectangular isosceles triangles.

There is also a fifth species.

Although there are five elementary solids, there is but one world.



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position. Arguing from probabilities, I am of opinion that they are one; another, regarding the question from another point of view, will be of another mind. But, leaving this enquiry, let us proceed to distribute the elementary forms, which have now been created in idea, among the four elements.

We have now to assign to the four elements their respective forms,—to earth the cube, to water the icosahedron, to air the octahedron, to fire the pyramid.

To earth, then, let us assign the cubical form; for earth is the most immovable of the four and the most plastic of all bodies, and that which has the most stable bases must of necessity be of such a nature. Now, of the triangles which we assumed at first, that which has two equal sides is by nature more firmly based than that which has unequal sides; and of the compound figures which are formed out of either, the plane equilateral quadrangle has necessarily a more stable basis than the equilateral triangle, both in the whole and in the parts. Wherefore, in assigning this figure to earth, we 56 adhere to probability; and to water we assign that one of the remaining forms which is the least movable; and the most movable of them to fire; and to air that which is intermediate. Also we assign the smallest body to fire, and the greatest to water, and the intermediate in size to air; and, again, the acutest body to fire, and the next in acuteness to air, and the third to water. Of all these elements, that which has the fewest bases must necessarily be the most movable, for it must be the acutest and most penetrating in every way, and also the lightest as being composed of the smallest number of similar particles: and the second body has similar properties in a second degree, and the third body in the third degree. Let it be agreed, then, both according to strict reason and according to probability, that the pyramid is the solid which is the original element and seed of fire; and let us assign the element which was next in the order of generation to air, and the third to water. We must imagine all these to be so small that no single particle of any of the four kinds is seen by us on account of their smallness: but when many of them are collected together their aggregates are seen. And the ratios of their numbers, motions, and other properties, everywhere God, as far as necessity allowed or gave consent, has exactly perfected, and harmonized in due proportion.

Individual particles cannot be seen: masses of each kind are visible.



From all that we have just been saying about the elements or kinds, the most probable conclusion is as follows:—earth, when meeting with fire and dissolved by its sharpness, whether the dissolution take place in the fire itself or perhaps in some mass of air or water, is borne hither and thither, until its parts, meeting together and mutually harmonizing, again become earth; for they can never take any other form. But water, when divided by fire or by air, on re-forming, may become one part fire and two parts air; and a single volume of air divided becomes two of fire. Again, when a small body of fire is contained in a larger body of air or water or earth, and both are moving, and the fire struggling is overcome and broken up, then two volumes of fire form one volume of air; and when air is overcome and cut up into small pieces, two and a half parts of air are condensed into one part of water. Let us consider the matter in another way. When one of the other elements is

57 fastened upon by fire, and is cut by the sharpness of its angles and sides, it coalesces with the fire, and then ceases to be cut by them any longer. For no element which is one and the same with itself can be changed by or change another of the same kind and in the same state. But so long as in the process of transition the weaker is fighting against the stronger, the dissolution continues. . Again, when a few small particles, enclosed in many larger ones, are in process of decomposition and extinction, they only cease from their tendency to extinction when they consent to pass into the conquering nature, and fire becomes air and air water. But if bodies of another kind go and attack them [i. e. the small particles], the latter continue to be dissolved until, being completely forced back and dispersed, they make their escape to their own kindred, or else, being overcome and assimilated to the conquering power, they remain where they are and dwell with their victors, and from being many become one. And owing to these affections, all things are changing their place, for by the motion of the receiving vessel the bulk of each class is distributed into its proper place; but those things which become unlike themselves and like other things, are hurried by the shaking into the place of the things to which they grow like.

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Of the three elements, fire, air, water, a denser, if overpowered by a rarer, is forced to change into a rarer, and *vice versa*.

Earth, however, which is the densest of all, cannot change, because its component triangles are unlike those of the other elements.

Change of nature is accompanied by change of place.

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The varieties of the four elements are due to differences in the size of the elementary triangles.

How is it that the elements are perpetually moving?—i. e. How is absence of uniformity, the condition of motion, secured for them?

We have seen that there is a continual tendency to produce uniformity, due to the motion of the receiving vessel. There is also a tendency to destroy it, due to the revolution of the universe, which thrusts the elements into each other.

Now all unmixed and primary bodies are produced by such causes as these. As to the subordinate species which are included in the greater kinds, they are to be attributed to the varieties in the structure of the two original triangles. For either structure did not originally produce the triangle of one size only, but some larger and some smaller, and there are as many sizes as there are species of the four elements. Hence when they are mingled with themselves and with one another there is an endless variety of them, which those who would arrive at the probable truth of nature ought duly to consider.

Unless a person comes to an understanding about the nature and conditions of rest and motion, he will meet with many difficulties in the discussion which follows. Something has been said of this matter already, and something more remains to be said, which is, that motion never exists in what is uniform. For to conceive that anything can be moved without a mover is hard or indeed impossible, and equally impossible to conceive that there can be a mover unless there be something which can be moved;—motion cannot exist where either of these are wanting, and for these to be uniform is impossible; wherefore we must assign rest to uniformity and motion to the want of uniformity. Now 58 inequality is the cause of the nature which is wanting in uniformity; and of this we have already described the origin. But there still remains the further point—why things when divided after their kinds do not cease to pass through one another and to change their place—which we will now proceed to explain. In the revolution of the universe are comprehended all the four elements, and this being circular and having a tendency to come together, compresses everything and will not allow any place to be left void. Wherefore, also, fire above all things penetrates everywhere, and air next, as being next in rarity of the elements; and the two other elements in like manner penetrate according to their degrees of rarity. For those things which are composed of the largest particles have the largest void left in their compositions, and those which are composed of the smallest particles have the least. And the contraction caused by the compression thrusts the smaller particles into the interstices

of the larger. And thus, when the small parts are placed side by side with the larger, and the lesser divide the greater and the greater unite the lesser, all the elements are borne up and down and hither and thither towards their own places; for the change in the size of each changes its position in space. And these causes generate an inequality which is always maintained, and is continually creating a perpetual motion of the elements in all time.

In the next place we have to consider that there are divers kinds of fire. There are, for example, first, flame; and secondly, those emanations of flame which do not burn but only give light to the eyes; thirdly, the remains of fire, which are seen in red-hot embers after the flame has been extinguished. There are similar differences in the air; of which the brightest part is called the aether, and the most turbid sort mist and darkness; and there are various other nameless kinds which arise from the inequality of the triangles. Water, again, admits in the first place of a division into two kinds; the one liquid and the other fusile. The liquid kind is composed of the small and unequal particles of water; and moves itself and is moved by other bodies owing to the want of uniformity and the shape of its particles; whereas the fusile kind, being formed of large and uniform particles, is more stable than the other, and is heavy and compact by reason of its uniformity. But when fire gets in and dissolves the particles and destroys the uniformity, it has greater mobility, and becoming fluid is thrust forth by the neighbouring air and spreads upon the earth; and this dissolution of the solid masses is called melting, and their spreading out  
59 upon the earth flowing. Again, when the fire goes out of the fusile substance, it does not pass into a vacuum, but into the neighbouring air; and the air which is displaced forces together the liquid and still movable mass into the place which was occupied by the fire, and unites it with itself. Thus compressed the mass resumes its equability, and is again at unity with itself, because the fire which was the author of the inequality has retreated; and this departure of the fire is called cooling, and the coming together which follows upon it is termed congealment. Of all the kinds termed fusile, that which is the densest and is formed out of

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Kinds of fire:—

- (i) flame;
- (ii) light;
- (iii) red heat.

Kinds of air:—

- (i) aether;
- (ii) mist.

There are also other kinds without names.

Kinds of water:—

- (i) liquid;
- (ii) fusile.

The former is mobile; the latter is solid, but melts when heated, — congealing again as it cools.

Of the fusile kind are



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- (1) gold,  
(2) adamant,

- (3) copper.

The phenomenon  
of rust.

To natural  
science the  
student of  
the eternal  
may turn for  
recreation.

From water  
of the liquid  
kind are  
formed

- (1) hail or ice,

- (2) snow,

- (3) hoar-frost,

- (4) juices in  
general and  
four in particular,—i. e.

the finest and most uniform parts is that most precious possession called gold, which is hardened by filtration through rock; this is unique in kind, and has both a glittering and a yellow colour. A shoot of gold, which is so dense as to be very hard, and takes a black colour, is termed adamant.

There is also another kind which has parts nearly like gold, and of which there are several species; it is denser than gold, and it contains a small and fine portion of earth, and is therefore harder, yet also lighter because of the great interstices which it has within itself; and this substance, which is one of the bright and denser kinds of water, when solidified is called copper. There is an alloy of earth mingled with it, which, when the two parts grow old and are disunited, shows itself separately and is called rust. The remaining phenomena of the same kind there will be no difficulty in reasoning out by the method of probabilities.

A man may sometimes set aside meditations about eternal things, and for recreation turn to consider the truths of generation which are probable only; he will thus gain a pleasure not to be repented of, and secure for himself while he lives a wise and moderate pastime. Let us grant ourselves this indulgence, and go through the probabilities relating to the same subjects which follow next in order.

Water which is mingled with fire, so much as is fine and liquid (being so called by reason of its motion and the way in which it rolls along the ground), and soft, because its bases give way and are less stable than those of earth, when separated from fire and air and isolated, becomes more uniform, and by their retirement is compressed into itself; and if the condensation be very great, the water above the earth becomes hail, but on the earth, ice; and that which is congealed in a less degree and is only half solid, when above the earth is called snow, and when upon the earth, and condensed from dew, hoar-frost. Then, again, there are the numerous kinds of water which have been mingled with one another, and are distilled through plants which grow in the earth; and this whole class is called by the name of juices or saps. The unequal admixture of these fluids creates 60 a variety of species; most of them are nameless, but four which are of a fiery nature are clearly distinguished and have



names. First, there is wine, which warms the soul as well as the body: secondly, there is the oily nature, which is smooth and divides the visual ray, and for this reason is bright and shining and of a glistening appearance, including pitch, the juice of the castor berry, oil itself, and other things of a like kind: thirdly, there is the class of substances which expand the contracted parts<sup>1</sup> of the mouth, until they return to their natural state, and by reason of this property create sweetness;—these are included under the general name of honey: and, lastly, there is a frothy nature, which differs from all juices, having a burning quality which dissolves the flesh; it is called *opos* (a vegetable acid).

As to the kinds of earth, that which is filtered through water passes into stone in the following manner:—The water which mixes with the earth and is broken up in the process changes into air, and taking this form mounts into its own place. But as there is no surrounding vacuum it thrusts away the neighbouring air, and this being rendered heavy, and, when it is displaced, having been poured around the mass of earth, forcibly compresses it and drives it into the vacant space whence the new air had come up; and the earth when compressed by the air into an indissoluble union with water becomes rock. The fairer sort is that which is made up of equal and similar parts and is transparent; that which has the opposite qualities is inferior. But when all the watery part is suddenly drawn out by fire, a more brittle substance is formed, to which we give the name of pottery. Sometimes also moisture may remain, and the earth which has been fused by fire becomes, when cool, a certain stone of a black colour. A like separation of the water which had been copiously mingled with them may occur in two substances composed of finer particles of earth and of a briny nature; out of either of them a half-solid body is then formed, soluble in water—the one, soda, which is used for purging away oil and earth, the other, salt, which harmonizes so well in combinations pleasing to the palate, and is, as the law testifies, a substance dear to the gods. The compounds of earth and water are not soluble by water, but by fire only,

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(a) wine,

(b) oil,

(c) honey,

(d) vegetable acid.

Kinds of

earth:—

(i) rock, of which there are two species;

(ii) earthen-ware;

(iii) a certain stone of a black colour;

(iv) soda;

(v) salt;

(vi) compounds of earth and

<sup>1</sup> Cp. 65 C, 66 C.

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water, including  
*a.* glass and fusile stones, and  
*b.* wax and incense.—  
 These compounds, like compressed earth or water, are soluble by fire only, which penetrates the water in them. Earth and water, however, in their natural state are soluble, the former by water only, the latter by fire and air.

and for this reason:—Neither fire nor air melt masses of earth; for their particles, being smaller than the interstices in its structure, have plenty of room to move without forcing their way, and so they leave the earth unmelted and undissolved; but particles of water, which are larger, force a passage, and dissolve and melt the earth. Wherefore 61  
 earth when not consolidated by force is dissolved by water only; when consolidated, by nothing but fire; for this is the only body which can find an entrance. The cohesion of water again, when very strong, is dissolved by fire only — when weaker, then either by air or fire — the former entering the interstices, and the latter penetrating even the triangles. But nothing can dissolve air, when strongly condensed, which does not reach the elements or triangles; or if not strongly condensed, then only fire can dissolve it. As to bodies composed of earth and water, while the water occupies the vacant interstices of the earth in them which are compressed by force, the particles of water which approach them from without, finding no entrance, flow around the entire mass and leave it undissolved; but the particles of fire, entering into the interstices of the water, do to the water what water does to earth and fire to air<sup>1</sup>, and are the sole causes of the compound body of earth and water liquefying and becoming fluid. Now these bodies are of two kinds; some of them, such as glass and the fusible sort of stones, have less water than they have earth; on the other hand, substances of the nature of wax and incense have more of water entering into their composition.

From objects of sense we pass on to consider flesh, which perceives sensations, and sensations themselves.

I have thus shown the various classes of bodies as they are diversified by their forms and combinations and changes into one another, and now I must endeavour to set forth their affections and the causes of them. In the first place, the bodies which I have been describing are necessarily objects of sense. But we have not yet considered the origin of flesh, or what belongs to flesh, or of that part of the soul which is mortal. And these things cannot be adequately explained without also explaining the affections which are concerned with sensation, nor the latter without the former:

<sup>1</sup> The text seems to be corrupt.

and yet to explain them together is hardly possible; for which reason we must assume first one or the other and afterwards examine the nature of our hypothesis<sup>1</sup>. In order, then, that the affections may follow regularly after the elements, let us presuppose the existence of body and soul.

First, let us enquire what we mean by saying that fire is hot; and about this we may reason from the dividing or cutting power which it exercises on our bodies. We all of us feel that fire is sharp; and we may further consider the fineness of the sides, and the sharpness of the angles, and the smallness of the particles, and the swiftness of the motion; — all this makes the action of fire violent and sharp, so that it cuts whatever it meets. And we must not forget that the original figure of fire [i. e. the pyramid], more than any other form, has a dividing power which cuts our bodies into small pieces (*κερματίζει*), and thus naturally produces that affection which we call heat; and hence the origin of the name (*θερμὸς, κέρμα*). Now, the opposite of this is sufficiently manifest; nevertheless we will not fail to describe it. For the larger particles of moisture which surround the body, entering in and driving out the lesser, but not being able to take their places, compress the moist principle in us; and this from being unequal and disturbed, is forced by them into a state of rest, which is due to equability and compression. But things which are contracted contrary to nature are by nature at war, and force themselves apart; and to this war and convulsion the name of shivering and trembling is given; and the whole affection and the cause of the affection are both termed cold. That is called hard to which our flesh yields, and soft which yields to our flesh; and things are also termed hard and soft relatively to one another. That which yields has a small base; but that which rests on quadrangular bases is firmly posed and belongs to the class which offers the greatest resistance; so too does that which is the most compact and therefore most repellent. The nature of the light and the heavy will be best understood when examined in connexion with our notions of above and below; for it is quite a mistake to suppose that the universe

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i. Sensations common to the whole body:—

(1) Heat, due to the sharpness of fire, which cuts the flesh.

(2) Cold, due to contraction.

(3) Hardness, and (4) Softness, the qualities in things which make them resist or yield.

(5) Lightness, and (6) Heaviness, are not to be

<sup>1</sup> Omitting *ὅσπερα*.



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explained by  
dividing the  
world into an  
upper and a  
lower region.  
For the uni-  
verse is  
shaped like a  
globe, and its  
extremes,  
being simi-  
larly related  
to the centre,  
cannot have  
opposite  
predicates  
applied to  
them.

Lightness and  
heaviness are  
really due to  
attraction.  
Bodies are  
drawn  
towards the  
mass of their  
kindred with  
a force pro-  
portionate to  
their size.  
The greater  
this force,  
the greater  
the weight.

is parted into two regions, separate from and opposite to each other, the one a lower to which all things tend which have any bulk, and an upper to which things only ascend against their will. For as the universe is in the form of a sphere, all the extremities, being equidistant from the centre, are equally extremities, and the centre, which is equidistant from them, is equally to be regarded as the opposite of them all. Such being the nature of the world, when a person says that any of these points is above or below, may he not be justly charged with using an improper expression? For the centre of the world cannot be rightly called either above or below, but is the centre and nothing else; and the circumference is not the centre, and has in no one part of itself a different relation to the centre from what it has in any of the opposite parts. Indeed, when it is in every direction similar, how can one rightly give to it names which imply opposition? For if there were any solid body in equipoise at the centre of the 63 universe, there would be nothing to draw it to this extreme rather than to that, for they are all perfectly similar; and if a person were to go round the world in a circle, he would often, when standing at the antipodes of his former position, speak of the same point as above and below; for, as I was saying just now, to speak of the whole which is in the form of a globe as having one part above and another below is not like a sensible man. The reason why these names are used, and the circumstances under which they are ordinarily applied by us to the division of the heavens, may be elucidated by the following supposition:—If a person were to stand in that part of the universe which is the appointed place of fire, and where there is the great mass of fire to which fiery bodies gather—if, I say, he were to ascend thither, and, having the power to do this, were to abstract particles of fire and put them in scales and weigh them, and then, raising the balance, were to draw the fire by force towards the uncongenial element of the air, it would be very evident that he could compel the smaller mass more readily than the larger; for when two things are simultaneously raised by one and the same power, the smaller body must necessarily yield to the superior power with less reluctance than the larger; and the larger body is called heavy and said to tend downwards, and the smaller



body is called light and said to tend upwards. And we may detect ourselves who are upon the earth doing precisely the same thing. For we often separate earthy natures, and sometimes earth itself, and draw them into the uncongenial element of air by force and contrary to nature, both clinging to their kindred elements. But that which is smaller yields to the impulse given by us towards the dissimilar element more easily than the larger; and so we call the former light, and the place towards which it is impelled we call above, and the contrary state and place we call heavy and below respectively. Now the relations of these must necessarily vary, because the principal masses of the different elements hold opposite positions; for that which is light, heavy, below or above in one place will be found to be and become contrary and transverse and every way diverse in relation to that which is light, heavy, below or above in an opposite place. And about all of them this has to be considered:—that the tendency of each towards its kindred element makes the body which is moved heavy, and the place towards which the motion tends below, but things which have an opposite tendency we call by an opposite name. Such are the causes which we assign to these phenomena. As to the smooth and the rough, any one who sees them can explain the reason of them to another. For roughness is hardness mingled with irregularity, and smoothness is produced by the joint effect of uniformity and density.

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(7) Roughness; and

(8) Smoothness.

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The most important of the affections which concern the whole body remains to be considered,—that is, the cause of pleasure and pain in the perceptions of which I have been speaking, and in all other things which are perceived by sense through the parts of the body, and have both pains and pleasures attendant on them. Let us imagine the causes of every affection, whether of sense or not, to be of the following nature, remembering that we have already distinguished between the nature which is easy and which is hard to move; for this is the direction in which we must hunt the prey which we mean to take. A body which is of a nature to be easily moved, on receiving an impression however slight, spreads abroad the motion in a circle, the parts communicating with each other, until at last, reaching the principle of

How is it that sensations are accompanied by pleasure and pain? Sensations arise thus. An object comes into contact with an organ of sense. This, if composed of fine particles, like the eye or ear,

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readily transmits the motion to the soul; if of larger, like the bones, less readily.

The result is sensation.—

As regards pleasure and pain—an organ consisting of large particles is more liable to them than an organ of the opposite kind. Pain arises when the particles are suddenly disturbed, pleasure when they are suddenly restored to their natural state.

mind, they announce the quality of the agent. But a body of the opposite kind, being immobile, and not extending to the surrounding region, merely receives the impression, and does not stir any of the neighbouring parts; and since the parts do not distribute the original impression to other parts, it has no effect of motion on the whole animal, and therefore produces no effect on the patient. This is true of the bones and hair and other more earthy parts of the human body; whereas what was said above relates mainly to sight and hearing, because they have in them the greatest amount of fire and air. Now we must conceive of pleasure and pain in this way. An impression produced in us contrary to nature and violent, if sudden, is painful; and, again, the sudden return to nature is pleasant; but a gentle and gradual return is imperceptible and *vice versa*. On the other hand the impression of sense which is most easily produced is most readily felt, but is not accompanied by pleasure or pain; such, for example, are the affections of the sight, which, as we said above, is a body naturally uniting with our body in the day-time (45); for cuttings and burnings and other affections which happen to the sight do not give pain, nor is there pleasure when the sight returns to its natural state; but the sensations are clearest and strongest according to the manner in which the eye is affected by the object, and itself strikes and touches it; there is no violence either in the contraction or dilation of the eye. But bodies formed of larger particles yield to the agent only with a struggle; and then they impart their motions to the whole and cause pleasure and pain—pain when alienated from their natural conditions, and pleasure when restored to them. Things which experience gradual withdrawals and emptyings of their nature, and great and sudden replenishments, fail to perceive the emptying, but are sensible of the replenishment; and so they occasion no pain, but the greatest pleasure, to the mortal part of the soul, as is manifest in the case of perfumes. But things which are changed all of a sudden, and only gradually and with difficulty return to their own nature, have effects in every way opposite to the former, as is evident in the case of burnings and cuttings of the body.

Thus have we discussed the general affections of the whole

body, and the names of the agents which produce them. And now I will endeavour to speak of the affections of particular parts, and the causes and agents of them, as far as I am able. In the first place let us set forth what was omitted when we were speaking of juices, concerning the affections peculiar to the tongue. These too, like most of the other affections, appear to be caused by certain contractions and dilations, but they have besides more of roughness and smoothness than is found in other affections; for whenever earthy particles enter into the small veins which are the testing instruments of the tongue, reaching to the heart, and fall upon the moist, delicate portions of flesh—when, as they are dissolved, they contract and dry up the little veins, they are astringent if they are rougher, but if not so rough, then only harsh. Those of them which are of an abstergent nature, and purge the whole surface of the tongue, if they do it in excess, and so encroach as to consume some part of the flesh itself, like potash and soda, are all termed bitter. But the particles which are deficient in the alkaline quality, and which cleanse only moderately, are called salt, and having no bitterness or roughness, are regarded as rather agreeable than otherwise. Bodies which share in and are made smooth by the heat of the mouth, and which are inflamed, and again in turn inflame that which heats them, and which are so light that they are carried upwards to the sensations of the head, and cut all that comes in their way, by reason of these qualities in them, are all termed pungent. But when these same particles, refined by putrefaction, enter into the narrow veins, and are duly proportioned to the particles of earth and air which are there, they set them whirling about one another, and while they are in a whirl cause them to dash against and enter into one another, and so form hollows surrounding the particles that enter—which watery vessels of air (for a film of moisture, sometimes earthy, sometimes pure, is spread around the air) are hollow spheres of water; and those of them which are pure, are transparent, and are called bubbles, while those composed of the earthy liquid, which is in a state of general agitation and effervescence, are said to boil or ferment;—of all these affections the cause is termed acid. And there is the opposite affection arising from an opposite cause, when

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ii. Affections of particular organs:—

(1) of the tongue,—produced by contraction and dilation of the veins. They are as follows:  
a. Astringency.

b. Harshness.

c. Bitterness.

d. Saltness.

e. Pungency.

f. Acidity.

g. Sweetness.



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the mass of entering particles, immersed in the moisture of the mouth, is congenial to the tongue, and smooths and oils over the roughness, and relaxes the parts which are unnaturally contracted, and contracts the parts which are relaxed, and disposes them all according to their nature;—that sort of remedy of violent affections is pleasant and agreeable to every man, and has the name sweet. But enough of this.

(2) Of the nostrils. Smells can only be distinguished as pleasant or the reverse. The substances which emit them, vapour and mist, are half-formed, being intermediate between water and air.

The faculty of smell does not admit of differences of kind; for all smells are of a half-formed nature, and no element is so proportioned as to have any smell. The veins about the nose are too narrow to admit earth and water, and too wide to detain fire and air; and for this reason no one ever perceives the smell of any of them; but smells always proceed from bodies that are damp, or putrefying, or liquefying, or evaporating, and are perceptible only in the intermediate state, when water is changing into air and air into water; and all of them are either vapour or mist. That which is passing out of air into water is mist, and that which is passing from water into air is vapour; and hence all smells are thinner than water and thicker than air. The proof of this is, that when there is any obstruction to the respiration, and a man draws in his breath by force, then no smell filters through, but the air without the smell alone penetrates. Wherefore the varieties of smell have no name, and they 67 have not many, or definite and simple kinds; but they are distinguished only as painful and pleasant, the one sort irritating and disturbing the whole cavity which is situated between the head and the navel, the other having a soothing influence, and restoring this same region to an agreeable and natural condition.

(3) Of the ear. Sounds are blows which pass through the ears to the soul. They are acute and grave, smooth and harsh, &c.

In considering the third kind of sense, hearing, we must speak of the causes in which it originates. We may in general assume sound to be a blow which passes through the ears, and is transmitted by means of the air, the brain, and the blood, to the soul, and that hearing is the vibration of this blow, which begins in the head and ends in the region of the liver. The sound which moves swiftly is acute, and the sound which moves slowly is grave, and that which is regular is equable and smooth, and the reverse is harsh. A



great body of sound is loud, and a small body of sound the reverse. Respecting the harmonies of sound I must hereafter speak. Timæus.  
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There is a fourth class of sensible things, having many intricate varieties, which must now be distinguished. They are called by the general name of colours, and are a flame which emanates from every sort of body, and has particles corresponding to the sense of sight. I have spoken already, in what has preceded, of the causes which generate sight, and in this place it will be natural and suitable to give a rational theory of colours. (4) Of the eye.  
Colours are  
flames emitted  
by objects.

Of the particles coming from other bodies which fall upon the sight, some are smaller and some are larger, and some are equal to the parts of the sight itself. Those which are equal are imperceptible, and we call them transparent. The larger produce contraction, the smaller dilation, in the sight, exercising a power akin to that of hot and cold bodies on the flesh, or of astringent bodies on the tongue, or of those heating bodies which we termed pungent. White and black are similar effects of contraction and dilation in another sphere, and for this reason have a different appearance. Wherefore, we ought to term white that which dilates the visual ray, and the opposite of this black. There is also a swifter motion of a different sort of fire which strikes and dilates the ray of sight until it reaches the eyes, forcing a way through their passages and melting them, and eliciting from them a union of fire and water which we call tears, being itself an opposite fire which comes to them from an opposite direction — the inner fire flashes forth like lightning, and the outer finds a way in and is extinguished in the moisture, and all sorts of colours are generated by the mixture. This affection is termed dazzling, and the object which produces it is called bright and flashing. There is another sort of fire which is intermediate, and which reaches and mingles with the moisture of the eye without flashing; and in this, the fire mingling with the ray of the moisture, produces a colour like blood, to which we give the name of red. A bright hue mingled with red and white gives the colour called auburn (*ξανθόν*). The law of proportion, however, according to which the several colours are formed, Simple  
colours are :  
  
a. Trans-  
parent.  
  
b. White.  
c. Black.  
d. Bright.  
  
e. Red.  
  
The com-  
pound  
colours are :  
a. Auburn.

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*b. Purple.*

*c. Umber.*

*d. Flame-colour.*

*e. Dun.*

*f. Pale yellow.*

*g. Dark blue.*

*h. Light blue.*

*i. Leek green.*

even if a man knew he would be foolish in telling, for he could not give any necessary reason, nor indeed any tolerable or probable explanation of them. Again, red, when mingled with black and white, becomes purple, but it becomes umber (*ὄρφνινον*) when the colours are burnt as well as mingled and the black is more thoroughly mixed with them. Flame-colour (*πυρρὸν*) is produced by a union of auburn and dun (*φαιδὸν*), and dun by an admixture of black and white; pale yellow (*ὠχρὸν*), by an admixture of white and auburn. White and bright meeting, and falling upon a full black, become dark blue (*κυανοῦν*), and when dark blue mingles with white, a light blue (*γλαυκὸν*) colour is formed, as flame-colour with black makes leek green (*πράσιον*). There will be no difficulty in seeing how and by what mixtures the colours derived from these are made according to the rules of probability. He, however, who should attempt to verify all this by experiment, would forget the difference of the human and divine nature. For God only has the knowledge and also the power which are able to combine many things into one and again resolve the one into many. But no man either is or ever will be able to accomplish either the one or the other operation.

These are the necessary causes which God used in creating the universe.

They are subservient to the divine, which we must seek, if we wish to attain bliss.

These are the elements, thus of necessity then subsisting, which the creator of the fairest and best of created things associated with himself, when he made the self-sufficing and most perfect God, using the necessary causes as his ministers in the accomplishment of his work, but himself contriving the good in all his creations. Wherefore we may distinguish two sorts of causes, the one divine and the other necessary, and may seek for the divine in all things, as far as our nature admits, with a view to the blessed life; but the necessary 69 kind only for the sake of the divine, considering that without them and when isolated from them, these higher things for which we look cannot be apprehended or received or in any way shared by us.

We must complete our account of creation.

Seeing, then, that we have now prepared for our use the various classes of causes which are the material out of which the remainder of our discourse must be woven, just as wood is the material of the carpenter, let us revert in a few words to the point at which we began, and then endeavour to add on a suitable ending to the beginning of our tale.

As I said at first, when all things were in disorder God created in each thing in relation to itself, and in all things in relation to each other, all the measures and harmonies which they could possibly receive. For in those days nothing had any proportion except by accident; nor did any of the things which now have names deserve to be named at all — as, for example, fire, water, and the rest of the elements. All these the creator first set in order, and out of them he constructed the universe, which was a single animal comprehending in itself all other animals, mortal and immortal. Now of the divine, he himself was the creator, but the creation of the mortal he committed to his offspring. And they, imitating him, received from him the immortal principle of the soul; and around this they proceeded to fashion a mortal body, and made it to be the vehicle of the soul, and constructed within the body a soul of another nature which was mortal, subject to terrible and irresistible affections,—first of all, pleasure, the greatest incitement to evil; then, pain, which deters from good; also rashness and fear, two foolish counsellors, anger hard to be appeased, and hope easily led astray;—these they mingled with irrational sense and with all-daring love<sup>1</sup> according to necessary laws, and so framed man. Wherefore, fearing to pollute the divine any more than was absolutely unavoidable, they gave to the mortal nature a separate habitation in another part of the body, placing the neck between them to be the isthmus and boundary, which they constructed between the head and breast, to keep them apart. And in the breast, and in what is termed the thorax, they encased the mortal soul; and as the one part of this was superior and the other inferior they divided the  
70 cavity of the thorax into two parts, as the women's and men's apartments are divided in houses, and placed the midriff to be a wall of partition between them. That part of the inferior soul which is endowed with courage and passion and loves contention they settled nearer the head, midway between the midriff and the neck, in order that it might be under the rule of reason and might join with it in controlling and restraining the desires when they are no longer willing

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As we have seen, God, by reducing chaos to order, made the world-animal, which contains all other animals, mortal and immortal. The immortal soul of man was created by God, the mortal by his children: the former was set in the head, the latter in the breast and thorax.

Of the mortal soul there are two parts:—  
(1) Passion, seated between the midriff and the neck, and intended to assist reason against desire.

<sup>1</sup> Putting a colon after *εὐπαράγωγον* and reading *αἰσθήσει δὲ ἀλόγῳ*.



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The heart acts  
as herald and  
executive of  
reason, car-  
rying its  
commands  
throughout  
the body.

It is sustained  
and refreshed  
by the soft-  
ness and  
coolness of  
the lung.

(2) Desire,  
chained up  
between the  
midriff and the  
navel, far  
away from  
the council-  
chamber.

Knowing  
that this  
part would  
be guided

of their own accord to obey the word of command issuing from the citadel.

The heart, the knot<sup>1</sup> of the veins and the fountain of the blood which races through all the limbs, was set in the place of guard, that when the might of passion was roused by reason making proclamation of any wrong assailing them from without or being perpetrated by the desires within, quickly the whole power of feeling in the body, perceiving these commands and threats, might obey and follow through every turn and alley, and thus allow the principle of the best to have the command in all of them. But the gods, fore-knowing that the palpitation of the heart in the expectation of danger and the swelling and excitement of passion was caused by fire, formed and implanted as a supporter to the heart the lung, which was, in the first place, soft and blood-less, and also had within hollows like the pores of a sponge, in order that by receiving the breath and the drink, it might give coolness and the power of respiration and alleviate the heat. Wherefore they cut the air-channels leading to the lung, and placed the lung about the heart as a soft spring, that, when passion was rife within, the heart, beating against a yielding body, might be cooled and suffer less, and might thus become more ready to join with passion in the service of reason.

The part of the soul which desires meats and drinks and the other things of which it has need by reason of the bodily nature, they placed between the midriff and the boundary of the navel, contriving in all this region a sort of manger for the food of the body; and there they bound it down like a wild animal which was chained up with man, and must be nourished if man was to exist. They appointed this lower creation his place here in order that he might be always feeding at the manger, and have his dwelling as far as might be from the council-chamber, making as little noise and disturbance as possible, and permitting the best part to advise quietly for the good of the whole. And knowing that this lower principle in man would not comprehend reason, and even if attaining to some degree of perception would

<sup>1</sup> Reading ἄμμα.



never naturally care for rational notions, but that it would be led away by phantoms and visions night and day,—to be a remedy for this, God combined with it the liver, and placed it in the house of the lower nature, contriving that it should be solid and smooth, and bright and sweet, and should also have a bitter quality, in order that the power of thought, which proceeds from the mind, might be reflected as in a mirror which receives likenesses of objects and gives back images of them to the sight; and so might strike terror into the desires, when, making use of the bitter part of the liver, to which it is akin, it comes threatening and invading, and diffusing this bitter element swiftly through the whole liver produces colours like bile, and contracting every part makes it wrinkled and rough; and twisting out of its right place and contorting the lobe and closing and shutting up the vessels and gates, causes pain and loathing. And the converse happens when some gentle inspiration of the understanding pictures images of an opposite character, and allays the bile and bitterness by refusing to stir or touch the nature opposed to itself, but by making use of the natural sweetness of the liver, corrects all things and makes them to be right and smooth and free, and renders the portion of the soul which resides about the liver happy and joyful, enabling it to pass the night in peace, and to practise divination in sleep, inasmuch as it has no share in mind and reason. For the authors of our being, remembering the command of their father when he bade them create the human race as good as they could, that they might correct our inferior parts and make them to attain a measure of truth, placed in the liver the seat of divination. And herein is a proof that God has given the art of divination not to the wisdom, but to the foolishness of man. No man, when in his wits, attains prophetic truth and inspiration; but when he receives the inspired word, either his intelligence is enthralled in sleep, or he is demented by some distemper or possession. And he who would understand what he remembers to have been

72 said, whether in a dream or when he was awake, by the prophetic and inspired nature, or would determine by reason the meaning of the apparitions which he has seen, and what indications they afford to this man or that, of past, present or

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by images alone, God constructed the liver with its mirror-like surface, in which are imaged the intimations of reason.

These intimations are given to men when asleep or demented, but can only be interpreted by the sane man who is awake.

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future good and evil, must first recover his wits. But, while he continues demented, he cannot judge of the visions which he sees or the words which he utters; the ancient saying is very true, that 'only a man who has his wits can act or judge about himself and his own affairs.' And for this reason it is customary to appoint interpreters to be judges of the true inspiration. Some persons call them prophets; they are quite unaware that they are only the expositors of dark sayings and visions, and are not to be called prophets at all, but only interpreters of prophecy.

The spleen,  
like a napkin,  
keeps the  
liver clean.

Such is the nature of the liver, which is placed as we have described in order that it may give prophetic intimations. During the life of each individual these intimations are plainer, but after his death the liver becomes blind, and delivers oracles too obscure to be intelligible. The neighbouring organ [the spleen] is situated on the left-hand side, and is constructed with a view of keeping the liver bright and pure,—like a napkin, always ready prepared and at hand to clean the mirror. And hence, when any impurities arise in the region of the liver by reason of disorders of the body, the loose nature of the spleen, which is composed of a hollow and bloodless tissue, receives them all and clears them away, and when filled with the unclean matter, swells and festers, but, again, when the body is purged, settles down into the same place as before, and is humbled.

Our account  
of the soul is  
probable:  
God only  
knows if it  
is true.

Concerning the soul, as to which part is mortal and which divine, and how and why they are separated, and where located, if God acknowledges that we have spoken the truth, then, and then only, can we be confident; still, we may venture to assert that what has been said by us is probable, and will be rendered more probable by investigation. Let us assume thus much.

The bowels  
intended to  
prevent the  
food from  
passing

The creation of the rest of the body follows next in order, and this we may investigate in a similar manner. And it appears to be very meet that the body should be framed on the following principles:—

The authors of our race were aware that we should be intemperate in eating and drinking, and take a good deal more than was necessary or proper, by reason of gluttony. In order then that disease might not quickly destroy us, and lest

73 our mortal race should perish without fulfilling its end — intending to provide against this, the gods made what is called the lower belly, to be a receptacle for the superfluous meat and drink, and formed the convolution of the bowels, so that the food might be prevented from passing quickly through and compelling the body to require more food, thus producing insatiable gluttony, and making the whole race an enemy to philosophy and music, and rebellious against the divinest element within us.

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away too quickly, that men might not be perpetually occupied in eating and drinking.

The bones and flesh, and other similar parts of us, were made as follows. The first principle of all of them was the generation of the marrow. For the bonds of life which unite the soul with the body are made fast there, and they are the root and foundation of the human race. The marrow itself is created out of other materials: God took such of the primary triangles as were straight and smooth, and were adapted by their perfection to produce fire and water, and air and earth — these, I say, he separated from their kinds, and mingling them in due proportions with one another, made the marrow out of them to be a universal seed of the whole race of mankind; and in this seed he then planted and enclosed the souls, and in the original distribution gave to the marrow as many and various forms as the different kinds of souls were hereafter to receive. That which, like a field, was to receive the divine seed, he made round every way, and called that portion of the marrow, brain, intending that, when an animal was perfected, the vessel containing this substance should be the head; but that which was intended to contain the remaining and mortal part of the soul he distributed into figures at once round and elongated, and he called them all by the name ‘marrow;’ and to these, as to anchors, fastening the bonds of the whole soul, he proceeded to fashion around them the entire framework of our body, constructing for the marrow, first of all, a complete covering of bone.

Marrow is composed of the most perfect of the elementary triangles, mingled in due proportion. To the marrow of the head the divine soul is fastened, to the marrow of the spine the mortal soul.

Bone was composed by him in the following manner. Having sifted pure and smooth earth he kneaded it and wetted it with marrow, and after that he put it into fire and then into water, and once more into fire and again into water — in this way by frequent transfers from one to the other he made it insoluble by either. Out of this he fashioned, as in a lathe,

Bone is made of fine earth, kneaded with marrow, and dipped repeatedly



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in fire and water. Of bone were fashioned coverings for the brain and the spinal marrow, i.e. the skull and vertebrae.

Joints were inserted to give flexion; the sinews were intended to hold the bones together, the flesh to protect them.

Flesh was formed by blending earth, fire and water, and then mingling with them a ferment of acid and salt; the sinews by mixing bone and unfermented flesh.

The most sensitive of the bones, as well as the joints, are thinly

a globe made of bone, which he placed around the brain, and in this he left a narrow opening; and around the marrow of the neck and back he formed vertebrae which he placed under one another like pivots, beginning at the head and extending through the whole of the trunk. Thus wishing to preserve the entire seed, he enclosed it in a stone-like casing, inserting joints, and using in the formation of them the power of the other or diverse as an intermediate nature, that they might have motion and flexure. Then again, considering that the bone would be too brittle and inflexible, and when heated and again cooled would soon mortify and destroy the seed within — having this in view, he contrived the sinews and the flesh, that so binding all the members together by the sinews, which admitted of being stretched and relaxed about the vertebrae, he might thus make the body capable of flexion and extension, while the flesh would serve as a protection against the summer heat and against the winter cold, and also against falls, softly and easily yielding to external bodies, like articles made of felt; and containing in itself a warm moisture which in summer exudes and makes the surface damp, would impart a natural coolness to the whole body; and again in winter by the help of this internal warmth would form a very tolerable defence against the frost which surrounds it and attacks it from without. He who modelled us, considering these things, mixed earth with fire and water and blended them; and making a ferment of acid and salt, he mingled it with them and formed soft and succulent flesh. As for the sinews, he made them of a mixture of bone and unfermented flesh, attempered so as to be in a mean, and gave them a yellow colour; wherefore the sinews have a firmer and more glutinous nature than flesh, but a softer and moister nature than the bones. With these God covered the bones and marrow, binding them together by sinews, and then enshrouded them all in an upper covering of flesh. The more living and sensitive of the bones he enclosed in the thinnest film of flesh, and those which had the least life within them in the thickest and most solid flesh. So again on the joints of the bones, where reason indicated that no more was required, he placed only a thin covering of flesh, that it might not interfere with the flexion of our bodies and



75 make them unwieldy because difficult to move; and also that it might not, by being crowded and pressed and matted together, destroy sensation by reason of its hardness, and impair the memory and dull the edge of intelligence. Wherefore also the thighs and the shanks and the hips, and the bones of the arms and the forearms, and other parts which have no joints, and the inner bones, which on account of the rarity of the soul in the marrow are destitute of reason—all these are abundantly provided with flesh; but such as have mind in them are in general less fleshy, except where the creator has made some part solely of flesh in order to give sensation,—as, for example, the tongue. But commonly this is not the case. For the nature which comes into being and grows up in us by a law of necessity, does not admit of the combination of solid bone and much flesh with acute perceptions. More than any other part the framework of the head would have had them, if they could have co-existed, and the human race, having a strong and fleshy and sinewy head, would have had a life twice or many times as long as it now has, and also more healthy and free from pain. But our creators, considering whether they should make a longer-lived race which was worse, or a shorter-lived race which was better, came to the conclusion that every one ought to prefer a shorter span of life, which was better, to a longer one, which was worse; and therefore they covered the head with thin bone, but not with flesh and sinews, since it had no joints; and thus the head was added, having more wisdom and sensation than the rest of the body, but also being in every man far weaker. For these reasons and after this manner God placed the sinews at the extremity of the head, in a circle round the neck, and glued them together by the principle of likeness and fastened the extremities of the jaw-bones to them below the face, and the other sinews he dispersed throughout the body, fastening limb to limb. The framers of us framed the mouth, as now arranged, having teeth and tongue and lips, with a view to the necessary and the good, contriving the way in for necessary purposes, the way out for the best purposes; for that is necessary which enters in and gives food to the body; but the river of speech, which flows out of a man and ministers to the intelligence, is the fairest

*Timaus.*

TIMAEUS.

covered with flesh;

the least sensitive are thickly covered.

Flesh, however, without bone, is sometimes highly sensitive: e. g. the tongue. But this is exceptional: for the chief purpose of the flesh is to give protection, not sensation. And because God wished us to live a rational and not a long life, the head was not covered with flesh.

The mouth was constructed with a view to the necessary and the good.

*Timæus.*

TIMÆUS.

The skull was not left bare, but enveloped with skin (= the film which forms on flesh as it dries).

The sutures and their diversity.

Out of punctures in the skin of the head grew the hair.

Nails are compounded of sinew, skin and bone; they were made with a view to the time when women and animals should

and noblest of all streams. Still the head could neither be left a bare frame of bones, on account of the extremes of heat and cold in the different seasons, nor yet be allowed to be wholly covered, and so become dull and senseless by reason of an overgrowth of flesh. The fleshy nature was not therefore wholly dried up, but a large sort of peel was parted off 76 and remained over, which is now called the skin. This met and grew by the help of the cerebral moisture, and became the circular envelopment of the head. And the moisture, rising up under the sutures, watered and closed in the skin upon the crown, forming a sort of knot. The diversity of the sutures was caused by the power of the courses of the soul and of the food, and the more these struggled against one another the more numerous they became, and fewer if the struggle were less violent. This skin the divine power pierced all round with fire, and out of the punctures which were thus made the moisture issued forth, and the liquid and heat which was pure came away, and a mixed part which was composed of the same material as the skin, and had a fineness equal to the punctures, was borne up by its own impulse and extended far outside the head, but being too slow to escape, was thrust back by the external air, and rolled up underneath the skin, where it took root. Thus the hair sprang up in the skin, being akin to it because it is like threads of leather, but rendered harder and closer through the pressure of the cold, by which each hair, while in process of separation from the skin, is compressed and cooled. Wherefore the creator formed the head hairy, making use of the causes which I have mentioned, and reflecting also that instead of flesh the brain needed the hair to be a light covering or guard, which would give shade in summer and shelter in winter, and at the same time would not impede our quickness of perception. From the combination of sinew, skin, and bone, in the structure of the finger, there arises a triple compound, which, when dried up, takes the form of one hard skin partaking of all three natures, and was fabricated by these second causes, but designed by mind which is the principal cause with an eye to the future. For our creators well knew that women and other animals would some day be framed out of men, and they further knew that many animals would require the

use of nails for many purposes; wherefore they fashioned in men at their first creation the rudiments of nails. For this purpose and for these reasons they caused skin, hair, and nails to grow at the extremities of the limbs.

*Timæus.*

*TIMÆUS.*

spring from man.

77 And now that all the parts and members of the mortal animal had come together, since its life of necessity consisted of fire and breath, and it therefore wasted away by dissolution and depletion, the gods contrived the following remedy: They mingled a nature akin to that of man with other forms and perceptions, and thus created another kind of animal. These are the trees and plants and seeds which have been improved by cultivation and are now domesticated among us; anciently there were only the wild kinds, which are older than the cultivated. For everything that partakes of life may be truly called a living being, and the animal of which we are now speaking partakes of the third kind of soul, which is said to be seated between the midriff and the navel, having no part in opinion or reason or mind, but only in feelings of pleasure and pain and the desires which accompany them. For this nature is always in a passive state, revolving in and about itself, repelling the motion from without and using its own, and accordingly is not endowed by nature with the power of observing or reflecting on its own concerns. Wherefore it lives and does not differ from a living being, but is fixed and rooted in the same spot, having no power of self-motion.

Seeing that mankind would need food, trees and plants were created. These are animals and have life, being endowed with the lower mortal soul.

Now after the superior powers had created all these natures to be food for us who are of the inferior nature, they cut various channels through the body as through a garden, that it might be watered as from a running stream. In the first place, they cut two hidden channels or veins down the back where the skin and the flesh join, which answered severally to the right and left side of the body. These they let down along the backbone, so as to have the marrow of generation between them, where it was most likely to flourish, and in order that the stream coming down from above might flow freely to the other parts, and equalize the irrigation. In the next place, they divided the veins about the head, and interlacing them, they sent them in opposite directions; those coming from the right side they

Next the gods cut two channels down the back, one on either side of the spine. After this they diverted the veins on the right of the head to the left of the body, and *vice versa*.



*Timæus.*

TIMÆUS.

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The under-  
lying principle  
of the irriga-  
tion of the  
body is that  
finer elements  
can pene-  
trate larger,  
but not larger  
elements  
finer.

So the surface  
of the trunk  
was made like  
a wheel of fire  
and air, con-  
taining within  
itself two  
lesser wheels  
(the chest and  
belly) of air.  
Alternately  
the interior  
of the greater  
wheel which  
consists of fire  
flows into the  
lesser wheels,  
and the lesser  
wheels into it.  
The outer  
wheel also finds  
its way in  
and out of the  
body,—the  
fire within

sent to the left of the body, and those from the left they diverted towards the right, so that they and the skin might together form a bond which should fasten the head to the body, since the crown of the head was not encircled by sinews; and also in order that the sensations from both sides might be distributed over the whole body. And next, they ordered the water-courses of the body in a manner which I will describe, and which will be more easily understood if 78 we begin by admitting that all things which have lesser parts retain the greater, but the greater cannot retain the lesser. Now of all natures fire has the smallest parts, and therefore penetrates through earth and water and air and their compounds, nor can anything hold it. And a similar principle applies to the human belly; for when meats and drinks enter it, it holds them, but it cannot hold air and fire, because the particles of which they consist are smaller than its own structure.

These elements, therefore, God employed for the sake of distributing moisture from the belly into the veins, weaving together a network of fire and air like a wheel, having at the entrance two lesser wheels; further he constructed one of these with two openings, and from the lesser wheels he extended cords reaching all round to the extremities of the network. All the interior of the net he made of fire, but the lesser wheels and their cavity, of air. The network he took and spread over the newly-formed animal in the following manner:—He let the lesser wheels pass into the mouth; there were two of them, and one he let down by the air-pipes into the lungs, the other by the side of the air-pipes into the belly. The former he divided into two branches, both of which he made to meet at the channels of the nose, so that when the way through the mouth did not act, the streams of the mouth as well were replenished through the nose. With the other cavity (i. e. of the greater wheel) he enveloped the hollow parts of the body, and at one time he made all this to flow into the lesser wheels, quite gently, for they are composed of air, and at another time he caused the lesser wheels to flow back again; and the net he made to find a way in and out through the pores of the body, and the rays of fire which are bound fast within followed the passage of the air either way,



never at any time ceasing so long as the mortal being holds together. This process, as we affirm, the name-giver named inspiration and expiration. And all this movement, active as well as passive, takes place in order that the body, being watered and cooled, may receive nourishment and life; for when the respiration is going in and out, and the fire, which is fast bound within, follows it, and ever and anon moving to  
79 and fro, enters through the belly and reaches the meat and drink, it dissolves them, and dividing them into small portions and guiding them through the passages where it goes, pumps them as from a fountain into the channels of the veins, and makes the stream of the veins flow through the body as through a conduit.

Let us once more consider the phenomena of respiration, and enquire into the causes which have made it what it is. They are as follows:—Seeing that there is no such thing as a vacuum into which any of those things which are moved can enter, and the breath is carried from us into the external air, the next point is, as will be clear to every one, that it does not go into a vacant space, but pushes its neighbour out of its place, and that which is thrust out in turn drives out its neighbour; and in this way everything of necessity at last comes round to that place from whence the breath came forth, and enters in there, and following the breath, fills up the vacant space; and this goes on like the rotation of a wheel, because there can be no such thing as a vacuum. Wherefore also the breast and the lungs, when they emit the breath, are replenished by the air which surrounds the body and which enters in through the pores of the flesh and is driven round in a circle; and again, the air which is sent away and passes out through the body forces the breath inwards through the passage of the mouth and the nostrils. Now the origin of this movement may be supposed to be as follows. In the interior of every animal the hottest part is that which is around the blood and veins; it is in a manner an internal fountain of fire, which we compare to the network of a creel, being woven all of fire and extended through the centre of the body, while the outer parts are composed of air. Now we must admit that heat naturally proceeds outward to its own place and to its kindred

*Timæus.*

TIMÆUS.

following the air in either direction. The motion of the fire into and out of the belly dissolves the food and pumps the blood into the veins.

Expiration and inspiration take place through the pores as well as through the mouth and nostrils. Expiration is due to the attraction of similars: the air on entering the body is heated, and then moves outward, seeking the place of fire. Inspiration is due to the impossibility of a vacuum; thus while air is breathed out of the body, other air must enter to fill the vacancy.

*Timæus.*

TIMÆUS.

element; and as there are two exits for the heat, the one out through the body, and the other through the mouth and nostrils, when it moves towards the one, it drives round the air at the other, and that which is driven round falls into the fire and becomes warm, and that which goes forth is cooled. But when the heat changes its place, and the particles at the other exit grow warmer, the hotter air inclining in that direction and carried towards its native element, fire, pushes round the air at the other; and this being affected in the same way and communicating the same impulse, a circular motion swaying to and fro is produced by the double process, which we call inspiration and expiration.

Other phenomena to be explained on a similar principle:—Cupping-glasses, swallowing of drink, projection of bodies, sounds swift and slow, flowing of water, fall of thunderbolts, magnetic stones.

The phenomena of medical cupping-glasses and of the swallowing of drink and of the projection of bodies, whether 80 discharged in the air or bowled along the ground, are to be investigated on a similar principle; and swift and slow sounds, which appear to be high and low, and are sometimes discordant on account of their inequality, and then again harmonical on account of the equality of the motion which they excite in us. For when the motions of the antecedent swifter sounds begin to pause and the two are equalized, the slower sounds overtake the swifter and then propel them. When they overtake them they do not intrude a new and discordant motion, but introduce the beginnings of a slower, which answers to the swifter as it dies away, thus producing a single mixed expression out of high and low, whence arises a pleasure which even the unwise feel, and which to the wise becomes a higher sort of delight, being an imitation of divine harmony in mortal motions. Moreover, as to the flowing of water, the fall of the thunderbolt, and the marvels that are observed about the attraction of amber and the Heracleian stones,—in none of these cases is there any attraction; but he who investigates rightly, will find that such wonderful phenomena are attributable to the combination of certain conditions,—the non-existence of a vacuum, the fact that objects push one another round, and that they change places, passing severally into their proper positions as they are divided or combined.

Such, as we have seen, is the nature and such are the causes of respiration,—the subject in which this discussion

originated. For the fire cuts the food and following the breath surges up within, fire and breath rising together and filling the veins by drawing up out of the belly and pouring into them the cut portions of the food ; and so the streams of food are kept flowing through the whole body in all animals. And fresh cuttings from kindred substances, whether the fruits of the earth or herb of the field, which God planted to be our daily food, acquire all sorts of colours by their intermixture ; but red is the most pervading of them, being created by the cutting action of fire and by the impression which it makes on a moist substance ; and hence the liquid which circulates in the body has a colour such as we have described. The liquid itself we call blood, which nourishes  
81 the flesh and the whole body, whence all parts are watered and empty places filled.

*Timæus.*

TIMÆUS.

The red colour of blood is due to the action of fire.

Now the process of repletion and evacuation is effected after the manner of the universal motion by which all kindred substances are drawn towards one another. For the external elements which surround us are always causing us to consume away, and distributing and sending off like to like ; the particles of blood, too, which are divided and contained within the frame of the animal as in a sort of heaven, are compelled to imitate the motion of the universe. Each, therefore, of the divided parts within us, being carried to its kindred nature, replenishes the void. When more is taken away than flows in, then we decay, and when less, we grow and increase.

The bodily processes of repletion and evacuation are caused by attraction.

The frame of the entire creature when young has the triangles of each kind new, and may be compared to the keel of a vessel which is just off the stocks ; they are locked firmly together and yet the whole mass is soft and delicate, being freshly formed of marrow and nurtured on milk. Now when the triangles out of which meats and drinks are composed come in from without, and are comprehended in the body, being older and weaker than the triangles already there, the frame of the body gets the better of them and its newer triangles cut them up, and so the animal grows great, being nourished by a multitude of similar particles. But when the roots of the triangles are loosened by having undergone many conflicts with many things in the course

When the body is young, the triangles of which it is composed are new and strong, and overcome the triangles of the food ; but in old age they are overcome by them.



*Timæus.*

TIMÆUS.

Death takes place when the triangles of the marrow, becoming disunited, loosen the soul's bonds. A natural death is pleasant, a violent, painful.

Diseases of the body arise (i) when any of the four elements is out of place or there is too much or too little of them in any part;

and (ii) when blood, flesh, and sinews are produced in a wrong order.

of time, they are no longer able to cut or assimilate the food which enters, but are themselves easily divided by the bodies which come in from without. In this way every animal is overcome and decays, and this affection is called old age. And at last, when the bonds by which the triangles of the marrow are united no longer hold, and are parted by the strain of existence, they in turn loosen the bonds of the soul, and she, obtaining a natural release, flies away with joy. For that which takes place according to nature is pleasant, but that which is contrary to nature is painful. And thus death, if caused by disease or produced by wounds, is painful and violent; but that sort of death which comes with old age and fulfils the debt of nature is the easiest of deaths, and is accompanied with pleasure rather than with pain.

Now every one can see whence diseases arise. There are four natures out of which the body is compacted, earth and 82 fire and water and air, and the unnatural excess or defect of these, or the change of any of them from its own natural place into another, or — since there are more kinds than one of fire and of the other elements — the assumption by any of these of a wrong kind, or any similar irregularity, produces disorders and diseases; for when any of them is produced or changed in a manner contrary to nature, the parts which were previously cool grow warm, and those which were dry become moist, and the light become heavy, and the heavy light; all sorts of changes occur. For, as we affirm, a thing can only remain the same with itself, whole and sound, when the same is added to it, or subtracted from it, in the same respect and in the same manner and in due proportion; and whatever comes or goes away in violation of these laws causes all manner of changes and infinite diseases and corruptions. Now there is a second class of structures which are also natural, and this affords a second opportunity of observing diseases to him who would understand them. For whereas marrow and bone and flesh and sinews are composed of the four elements, and the blood, though after another manner, is likewise formed out of them, most diseases originate in the way which I have described; but the worst of all owe their severity to the fact that the generation of these substances proceeds in a wrong order; they are then destroyed. For the natural order is that the flesh



83 and sinews should be made of blood, the sinews out of the fibres to which they are akin, and the flesh out of the clots which are formed when the fibres are separated. And the glutinous and rich matter which comes away from the sinews and the flesh, not only glues the flesh to the bones, but nourishes and imparts growth to the bone which surrounds the marrow; and by reason of the solidity of the bones, that which filters through consists of the purest and smoothest and oiliest sort of triangles, dropping like dew from the bones and watering the marrow. Now when each process takes place in this order, health commonly results; when in the opposite order, disease. For when the flesh becomes decomposed and sends back the wasting substance into the veins, then an over-supply of blood of diverse kinds, mingling with air in the veins, having variegated colours and bitter properties, as well as acid and saline qualities, contains all sorts of bile and serum and phlegm. For all things go the wrong way, and having become corrupted, first they taint the blood itself, and then ceasing to give nourishment to the body they are carried along the veins in all directions, no longer preserving the order of their natural courses, but at war with themselves, because they receive no good from one another, and are hostile to the abiding constitution of the body, which they corrupt and dissolve. The oldest part of the flesh which is corrupted, being hard to decompose, from long burning grows black, and from being everywhere corroded becomes bitter, and is injurious to every part of the body which is still uncorrupted. Sometimes, when the bitter element is refined away, the black part assumes an acidity which takes the place of the bitterness; at other times the bitterness being tinged with blood has a redder colour; and this, when mixed with black, takes the hue of grass<sup>1</sup>; and again, an auburn colour mingles with the bitter matter when new flesh is decomposed by the fire which surrounds the internal flame;—to all which symptoms some physician perhaps, or rather some philosopher, who had the power of seeing in many dissimilar things one nature deserving of a name, has assigned the common name of bile. But the other kinds of

Timaens.

TIMAEUS.

The proper order is that flesh and sinew should be formed from blood, flesh from the liquid and sinew from the fibrous part of it; and that from these should exude a glutinous matter which nourishes bone and marrow. When this order is reversed, all sorts of bile and phlegm are generated.

The various kinds of bile.

<sup>1</sup> Reading  $\chi\lambda\omicron\omega\delta\epsilon\gamma$ .

*Timaeus.*

TIMAEUS.

Of phlegm  
there is an  
acid and a  
white sort.

Stages of the  
disease :—  
(1) When the  
flesh is at-  
tacked, if the  
foundations  
remain sound,  
there is less  
danger.

•  
(2) There is  
more when  
the flesh falls  
away from the  
sinews and  
bones.

(3) Worse still  
are the prior  
disorders, such  
as crumbling  
away and  
gangrene of  
the bones ;  
and  
(4) worst of  
all is disease  
of the spinal  
marrow.

bile are variously distinguished by their colours. As for serum, that sort which is the watery part of blood is innocent, but that which is a secretion of black and acid bile is malignant when mingled by the power of heat with any salt substance, and is then called acid phlegm. Again, the substance which is formed by the liquefaction of new and tender flesh when air is present, if inflated and encased in liquid so as to form bubbles, which separately are invisible owing to their small size, but when collected are of a bulk which is visible, and have a white colour arising out of the generation of foam—all this decomposition of tender flesh when intermingled with air is termed by us white phlegm. And the whey or sediment of newly-formed phlegm is sweat and tears, and includes the various daily discharges by which the body is purified. Now all these become causes of disease when the blood is not replenished in a natural manner by food and drink but gains bulk from opposite sources in violation of the laws of nature. When the several 84 parts of the flesh are separated by disease, if the foundation remains, the power of the disorder is only half as great, and there is still a prospect of an easy recovery ; but when that which binds the flesh to the bones is diseased, and no longer being separated from the muscles and sinews<sup>1</sup>, ceases to give nourishment to the bone and to unite flesh and bone, and from being oily and smooth and glutinous becomes rough and salt and dry, owing to bad regimen, then all the substance thus corrupted crumbles away under the flesh and the sinews, and separates from the bone, and the fleshy parts fall away from their foundation and leave the sinews bare and full of brine, and the flesh again gets into the circulation of the blood and makes the previously-mentioned disorders still greater. And if these bodily affections be severe, still worse are the prior disorders ; as when the bone itself, by reason of the density of the flesh, does not obtain sufficient air, but becomes mouldy and hot and gangrened and receives no nutriment, and the natural process is inverted, and the bone crumbling passes into the food, and the food into the flesh, and the flesh again falling into the blood makes

<sup>1</sup> Reading *αὐτό* for *αὐτό* and *ἄμα* for *αἶμα*.

all maladies that may occur more virulent than those already mentioned. But the worst case of all is when the marrow is diseased, either from excess or defect; and this is the cause of the very greatest and most fatal disorders, in which the whole course of the body is reversed.

*Timaæus.*

*TIMAEUS.*

There is a third class of diseases which may be conceived of as arising in three ways; for they are produced sometimes by wind, and sometimes by phlegm, and sometimes by bile. When the lung, which is the dispenser of the air to the body, is obstructed by rheums and its passages are not free, some of them not acting, while through others too much air enters, then the parts which are unrefreshed by air corrode, while in other parts the excess of air forcing its way through the veins distorts them and decomposing the body is enclosed in the midst of it and occupies the midriff; thus numberless painful diseases are produced, accompanied by copious sweats. And oftentimes when the flesh is dissolved in the body, wind, generated within and unable to escape, is the source of quite as much pain as the air coming in from without; but the greatest pain is felt when the wind gets about the sinews and the veins of the shoulders, and swells them up, and so twists back the great tendons and the sinews which are connected with them. These disorders are called tetanus and opisthotonus, by reason of the tension which accompanies them. The cure of them is difficult; relief is in most cases  
85 given by fever supervening. The white phlegm, though dangerous when detained within by reason of the air-bubbles, yet if it can communicate with the outside air, is less severe, and only discolours the body, generating leprous eruptions and similar diseases. When it is mingled with black bile and dispersed about the courses of the head, which are the divinest part of us, the attack if coming on in sleep, is not so severe; but when assailing those who are awake it is hard to be got rid of, and being an affection of a sacred part, is most justly called sacred. An acid and salt phlegm, again, is the source of all those diseases which take the form of catarrh, but they have many names because the places into which they flow are manifold.

(iii) A third class of diseases is produced  
α. by wind  
— i. e. disorders of the lungs,

tetanus and opisthotonus ;

δ. by phlegm  
— i. e. leprosy,

epilepsy,

and catarrh :

ε. by bile—  
i. e. tumours and

Inflammations of the body come from burnings and inflamings, and all of them originate in bile. When bile finds



*Timæus.*

TIMÆUS.

inflammations,

chills and shuddering,

disease of the marrow,

diarrhoea and dysentery.

Excess of fire causes continuous fever, of air quotidian, of water tertian, of earth quartan.

There are two kinds of mental disease,

a means of discharge, it boils up and sends forth all sorts of tumours; but when imprisoned within, it generates many inflammatory diseases, above all when mingled with pure blood; since it then displaces the fibres which are scattered about in the blood and are designed to maintain the balance of rare and dense, in order that the blood may not be so liquefied by heat as to exude from the pores of the body, nor again become too dense and thus find a difficulty in circulating through the veins. The fibres are so constituted as to maintain this balance; and if any one brings them all together when the blood is dead and in process of cooling, then the blood which remains becomes fluid, but if they are left alone, they soon congeal by reason of the surrounding cold. The fibres having this power over the blood, bile, which is only stale blood, and which from being flesh is dissolved again into blood, at the first influx coming in little by little, hot and liquid, is congealed by the power of the fibres; and so congealing and made to cool, it produces internal cold and shuddering. When it enters with more of a flood and overcomes the fibres by its heat, and boiling up throws them into disorder, if it have power enough to maintain its supremacy, it penetrates the marrow and burns up what may be termed the cables of the soul, and sets her free; but when there is not so much of it, and the body though wasted still holds out, the bile is itself mastered, and is either utterly banished, or is thrust through the veins into the lower or upper belly, and is driven out of the body like an exile from a state in which there has been civil war; whence arise 86 diarrhoeas and dysenteries, and all such disorders. When the constitution is disordered by excess of fire, continuous heat and fever are the result; when excess of air is the cause, then the fever is quotidian; when of water, which is a more sluggish element than either fire or air, then the fever is a tertian; when of earth, which is the most sluggish of the four, and is only purged away in a four-fold period, the result is a quartan fever, which can with difficulty be shaken off.

Such is the manner in which diseases of the body arise; the disorders of the soul, which depend upon the body, originate as follows. We must acknowledge disease of the mind to be a want of intelligence; and of this there are two



kinds; to wit, madness and ignorance. In whatever state a man experiences either of them, that state may be called disease; and excessive pains and pleasures are justly to be regarded as the greatest diseases to which the soul is liable. For a man who is in great joy or in great pain, in his unseasonable eagerness to attain the one and to avoid the other, is not able to see or to hear anything rightly; but he is mad, and is at the time utterly incapable of any participation in reason. He who has the seed about the spinal marrow too plentiful and overflowing, like a tree overladen with fruit, has many throes, and also obtains many pleasures in his desires and their offspring, and is for the most part of his life deranged, because his pleasures and pains are so very great; his soul is rendered foolish and disordered by his body; yet he is regarded not as one diseased, but as one who is voluntarily bad, which is a mistake. The truth is that the intemperance of love is a disease of the soul due chiefly to the moisture and fluidity which is produced in one of the elements by the loose consistency of the bones. And in general, all that which is termed the incontinence of pleasure and is deemed a reproach under the idea that the wicked voluntarily do wrong is not justly a matter for reproach. For no man is voluntarily bad; but the bad become bad by reason of an ill disposition of the body and bad education, things which are hateful to every man and happen to him against his will. And in the case of pain too in like manner the soul suffers much evil from the body. For where the acid and briny phlegm and other bitter and bilious humours wander about in the body, and find no exit or escape, but are pent up within and mingle their own vapours with the motions of the soul, and are blended with them, they produce all sorts of diseases, more or fewer, and in every degree of intensity; and being carried to the three places of the soul, whichever they may severally assail, they create infinite varieties of ill-temper and melancholy, of rashness and cowardice, and also of forgetfulness and stupidity. Further, when to this evil constitution of body evil forms of government are added and evil discourses are uttered in private as well as in public, and no sort of instruction is given in youth to cure these evils, then all of us who are bad become bad from two causes which

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madness and ignorance. Vice is due to an ill-disposition of the body,

and is involuntary.

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Bad education and bad government increase the evil.

*Timaeus.*

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are entirely beyond our control. In such cases the planters are to blame rather than the plants, the educators rather than the educated. But however that may be, we should endeavour as far as we can by education, and studies, and learning, to avoid vice and attain virtue; this, however, is part of another subject.

The great means of preventing disease is to preserve the due proportion of mind and body.

There is a corresponding enquiry concerning the mode of treatment by which the mind and the body are to be preserved, about which it is meet and right that I should say a word in turn; for it is more our duty to speak of the good than of the evil. Everything that is good is fair, and the fair is not without proportion, and the animal which is to be fair must have due proportion. Now we perceive lesser symmetries or proportions and reason about them, but of the highest and greatest we take no heed; for there is no proportion or disproportion more productive of health and disease, and virtue and vice, than that between soul and body. This however we do not perceive, nor do we reflect that when a weak or small frame is the vehicle of a great and mighty soul, or conversely, when a little soul is encased in a large body, then the whole animal is not fair, for it lacks the most important of all symmetries; but the due proportion of mind and body is the fairest and loveliest of all sights to him who has the seeing eye. Just as a body which has a leg too long, or which is unsymmetrical in some other respect, is an unpleasant sight, and also, when doing its share of work, is much distressed and makes convulsive efforts, and often stumbles through awkwardness, and is the cause of infinite evil to its own self — in like manner we should conceive of the double nature which we call the living being; and when in this compound there is an impassioned soul more powerful than the body, that soul, I say, convulses and fills with disorders the whole inner nature of man; and when eager in the pursuit of some sort of learning or study, causes wasting; or again, when teaching or disputing in private or in public, and strifes and controversies arise, inflames and dissolves the composite frame of man and introduces rheums; and the nature of this phenomenon is not understood by most professors of medicine, who ascribe it to the opposite of the real cause. And once more, when a body large and too strong

The soul should not be allowed to wear out the body;

for the soul is united to a small and weak intelligence, then inasmuch as there are two desires natural to man,—one of food for the sake of the body, and one of wisdom for the sake of the diviner part of us—then, I say, the motions of the stronger, getting the better and increasing their own power, but making the soul dull, and stupid, and forgetful, engender ignorance, which is the greatest of diseases. There is one protection against both kinds of disproportion:—that we should not move the body without the soul or the soul without the body, and thus they will be on their guard against each other, and be healthy and well balanced. And therefore the mathematician or any one else whose thoughts are much absorbed in some intellectual pursuit, must allow his body also to have due exercise, and practise gymnastic; and he who is careful to fashion the body, should in turn impart to the soul its proper motions, and should cultivate music and all philosophy, if he would deserve to be called truly fair and truly good. And the separate parts should be treated in the same manner, in imitation of the pattern of the universe; for as the body is heated and also cooled within by the elements which enter into it, and is again dried up and moistened by external things, and experiences these and the like affections from both kinds of motions, the result is that the body if given up to motion when in a state of quiescence is overmastered and perishes; but if any one, in imitation of that which we call the foster-mother and nurse of the universe, will not allow the body ever to be inactive, but is always producing motions and agitations through its whole extent, which form the natural defence against other motions both internal and external, and by moderate exercise reduces to order according to their affinities the particles and affections which are wandering about the body, as we have already said when speaking of the universe<sup>1</sup>, he will not allow enemy placed by the side of enemy to stir up wars and disorders in the body, but he will place friend by the side of friend, so as to create health. Now of all motions that is the best which is produced in a thing by itself, for it is most akin to the motion of thought and of the universe; but that motion which is caused by others is not so good, and worst of all is

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nor the body  
to embrate  
the soul.

Both should  
be equally  
exercised: the  
mathemati-  
cian should  
practise gym-  
nastic, and  
the gymnast  
should study  
music.

Motion, as in  
the universe,  
so in the body,  
produces  
order and  
harmony.

The best  
exercise and  
purification is  
the sponta-  
neous

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*, 33 A.



*Timæus.*

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motion of the body, as in gymnastic; less good is an external motion, as in sailing; least good the external motion of a part only produced by medicine. The last should be employed only in extreme cases.

that which moves the body, when at rest, in parts only and by some external agency. Wherefore of all modes of purifying and re-uniting the body the best is gymnastic; the next best is a surging motion, as in sailing or any other mode of conveyance which is not fatiguing; the third sort of motion may be of use in a case of extreme necessity, but in any other will be adopted by no man of sense: I mean the purgative treatment of physicians; for diseases unless they are very dangerous should not be irritated by medicines, since every form of disease is in a manner akin to the living being, whose complex frame has an appointed term of life. For not the whole race only, but each individual—barring inevitable accidents—comes into the world having a fixed span, and the triangles in us are originally framed with power to last for a certain time, beyond which no man can prolong his life. And this holds also of the constitution of diseases; if any one regardless of the appointed time tries to subdue them by medicine, he only aggravates and multiplies them. Wherefore we ought always to manage them by regimen, as far as a man can spare the time, and not provoke a disagreeable enemy by medicines.

Enough of the body. The soul, which trains it, must be tended with the utmost care.

Enough of the composite animal, and of the body which is a part of him, and of the manner in which a man may train and be trained by himself so as to live most according to reason: and we must above and before all provide that the element which is to train him shall be the fairest and best adapted to that purpose. A minute discussion of this subject would be a serious task; but if, as before, I am to give only an outline, the subject may not unfitly be summed up as follows.

The three parts of the soul should be duly exercised,

I have often remarked that there are three kinds of soul located within us, having each of them motions, and I must now repeat in the fewest words possible, that one part, if remaining inactive and ceasing from its natural motion, must necessarily become very weak, but that which is trained and exercised, very strong. Wherefore we should take care that the movements of the different parts of the soul should be in due proportion.

especially the divine part.

And we should consider that God gave the sovereign part of the human soul to be the divinity of each one, being that



part which, as we say, dwells at the top of the body, and inasmuch as we are a plant not of an earthly but of a heavenly growth, raises us from earth to our kindred who are in heaven. And in this we say truly; for the divine power suspended the head and root of us from that place where the generation of the soul first began, and thus made the whole body upright. When a man is always occupied with the cravings of desire and ambition, and is eagerly striving to satisfy them, all his thoughts must be mortal, and, as far as it is possible altogether to become such, he must be mortal every whit, because he has cherished his mortal part. But he who has been earnest in the love of knowledge and of true wisdom, and has exercised his intellect more than any other part of him, must have thoughts immortal and divine, if he attain truth, and in so far as human nature is capable of sharing in immortality, he must altogether be immortal; and since he is ever cherishing the divine power, and has the divinity within him in perfect order, he will be perfectly happy.) Now there is only one way of taking care of things, and this is to give to each the food and motion which are natural to it. And the motions which are naturally akin to the divine principle within us are the thoughts and revolutions of the universe. These each man should follow, and correct the courses of the head which were corrupted at our birth, and by learning the harmonies and revolutions of the universe, should assimilate the thinking being to the thought, renewing his original nature, and having assimilated them should attain to that perfect life which the gods have set before mankind, both for the present and the future.

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For if a man neglects it and is the slave of desire and ambition, he cannot attain to immortality.

The motions of reason are akin to the thoughts and revolutions of the universe.

Thus our original design of discoursing about the universe down to the creation of man is nearly completed. A brief mention may be made of the generation of other animals, so far as the subject admits of brevity; in this manner our argument will best attain a due proportion. On the subject of animals, then, the following remarks may be offered. Of the men who came into the world, those who were cowards or led unrighteous lives may with reason be supposed to have changed into the nature of women in the second generation.

91 And this was the reason why at that time the gods created in us the desire of sexual intercourse, contriving in man one

We have spoken of the origin of man. Women and the other animals were generated on this wise. Cowardly and unjust men became women in the second generation.

*Timaëus.*

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animated substance, and in woman another, which they formed respectively in the following manner. The outlet for drink by which liquids pass through the lung under the kidneys and into the bladder, which receives and then by the pressure of the air emits them, was so fashioned by them as to penetrate also into the body of the marrow, which passes from the head along the neck and through the back, and which in the preceding discourse we have named the seed. And the seed having life, and becoming endowed with respiration, produces in that part in which it respire a lively desire of emission, and thus creates in us the love of procreation. Wherefore also in men the organ of generation becoming rebellious and masterful, like an animal disobedient to reason, and maddened with the sting of lust, seeks to gain absolute sway; and the same is the case with the so-called womb or matrix of women; the animal within them is desirous of procreating children, and when remaining unfruitful long beyond its proper time, gets discontented and angry, and wandering in every direction through the body, closes up the passages of the breath, and, by obstructing respiration, drives them to extremity, causing all varieties of disease, until at length the desire and love of the man and the woman, bringing them together<sup>1</sup> and as it were plucking the fruit from the tree, sow in the womb, as in a field, animals unseen by reason of their smallness and without form; these again are separated and matured within; they are then finally brought out into the light, and thus the generation of animals is completed.

Simple-  
minded men  
passed into  
birds;

those who  
were the  
slaves of  
passion into  
beasts;

Thus were created women and the female sex in general. But the race of birds was created out of innocent light-minded men, who, although their minds were directed toward heaven, imagined, in their simplicity, that the clearest demonstration of the things above was to be obtained by sight; these were remodelled and transformed into birds, and they grew feathers instead of hair. The race of wild pedestrian animals, again, came from those who had no philosophy in any of their thoughts, and never considered at all about the nature of the heavens, because they had ceased to use the courses

<sup>1</sup> Reading *ξυνδύζοντες* (conj. Hermann).

of the head, but followed the guidance of those parts of the soul which are in the breast. \* In consequence of these habits of theirs they had their front-legs and their heads resting upon the earth to which they were drawn by natural affinity; and the crowns of their heads were elongated and of all sorts of shapes, into which the courses of the soul were crushed by reason of disuse. And this was the reason why they were  
92 created quadrupeds and polypods: God gave the more senseless of them the more support that they might be more attracted to the earth. And the most foolish of them, who trail their bodies entirely upon the ground and have no longer any need of feet, he made without feet to crawl upon the earth. The fourth class were the inhabitants of the water: these were made out of the most entirely senseless and ignorant of all, whom the transformers did not think any longer worthy of pure respiration, because they possessed a soul which was made impure by all sorts of transgression; and instead of the subtle and pure medium of air, they gave them the deep and muddy sea to be their element of respiration; and hence arose the race of fishes and oysters, and other aquatic animals, which have received the most remote habitations as a punishment of their outlandish ignorance. These are the laws by which animals pass into one another, now, as ever, changing as they lose or gain wisdom and folly.

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the most foolish into reptiles:

the most ignorant and impure into fish.

We may now say that our discourse about the nature of the universe has an end. The world has received animals, mortal and immortal, and is fulfilled with them, and has become a visible animal containing the visible — the sensible God who is the image of the intellectual<sup>1</sup>, the greatest, best, fairest, most perfect — the one only-begotten heaven.

Our task is now completed.

<sup>1</sup> Or reading ποιητοῦ — 'of his maker.'





CRITIAS.



## INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.

THE Critias is a fragment which breaks off in the middle of a sentence. It was designed to be the second part of a trilogy, which, like the other great Platonic trilogy of the Sophist, Statesman, Philosopher, was never completed. Timaeus had brought down the origin of the world to the creation of man, and the dawn of history was now to succeed the philosophy of nature. The Critias is also connected with the Republic. Plato, as he has already told us (Tim. 19, 20), intended to represent the ideal state engaged in a patriotic conflict. This mythical conflict is prophetic or symbolical of the struggle of Athens and Persia, perhaps in some degree also of the wars of the Greeks and Carthaginians, in the same way that the Persian is prefigured by the Trojan war to the mind of Herodotus, or as the narrative of the first part of the Aeneid is intended by Virgil to foreshadow the wars of Carthage and Rome. The small number of the primitive Athenian citizens (20,000), 'which is about their present number' (Crit. 112 D), is evidently designed to contrast with the myriads and barbaric array of the Atlantic hosts. The passing remark in the Timaeus (25 C) that Athens was left alone in the struggle, in which she conquered and became the liberator of Greece, is also an allusion to the later history. Hence we may safely conclude that the entire narrative is due to the imagination of Plato, who has used the name of Solon and introduced the Egyptian priests to give verisimilitude to his story. To the Greek such a tale, like that of the earth-born men, would have seemed perfectly accordant with the character of his mythology, and not more marvellous than the wonders of the East narrated by Herodotus and others: he might have been deceived into

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believing it. But it appears strange that later ages should have been imposed upon by the fiction. As many attempts have been made to find the great island of Atlantis, as to discover the country of the lost tribes. Without regard to the description of Plato, and without a suspicion that the whole narrative is a fabrication, interpreters have looked for the spot in every part of the globe, America, Arabia Felix, Ceylon, Palestine, Sardinia, Sweden.

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Timaëus concludes with a prayer that his words may be acceptable to the God whom he has revealed, and Critias, whose turn follows, begs that a larger measure of indulgence may be conceded to him, because he has to speak of men whom we know and not of gods whom we do not know. Socrates readily grants his request, and anticipating that Hermocrates will make a similar petition, extends by anticipation a like indulgence to him. Steph. 106  
107  
108

Critias returns to his story, professing only to repeat what Solon was told by the priests. The war of which he was about to speak had occurred 9000 years ago<sup>1</sup>. One of the combatants was the city of Athens, the other was the great island of Atlantis. Critias proposes to speak of these rival powers first of all, giving to Athens the precedence; the various tribes of Greeks and barbarians who took part in the war will be dealt with as they successively appear on the scene. 109

In the beginning the gods agreed to divide the earth by lot in a friendly manner, and when they had made the allotment they settled their several countries, and were the shepherds or rather the pilots of mankind, whom they guided by persuasion, and not by force. Hephaestus and Athene, brother and sister deities, in mind and art united, obtained as their lot the land of Attica, a land suited to the growth of virtue and wisdom; and there they settled a brave race of children of the soil, and taught them how to order the state. Some of their names, such as Cecrops, Erechtheus, Erichthonius, and Erysichthon, were preserved and adopted in later times, but the memory of their deeds has passed away; for there have since been many deluges, and the remnant who survived in the mountains were ignorant of the art of writing,

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, p. 444, footnote.



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and during many generations were wholly devoted to acquiring the means of life. . . . And the armed image of the goddess which was dedicated by the ancient Athenians is an evidence to other ages that men and women had in those days, as they ought always to have, common virtues and pursuits. There were various classes of citizens, including handicraftsmen and husbandmen and a superior class of warriors who dwelt apart, and were educated, and had all things in common, like our guardians. Attica in those days extended southwards to the Isthmus, and inland to the heights of Parnes and Cithaeron, and between them and the sea included the district of Oropus. The country was then, as what remains of it still is, the most fertile in the world, and abounded in rich plains and pastures. But in the course of ages much of the soil was washed away and disappeared in the deep sea. And the inhabitants of this fair land were endowed with intelligence and the love of beauty.

The Acropolis of the ancient Athens extended to the Ilissus and Eridanus, and included the Pnyx, and the Lycabettus on the opposite side to the Pnyx, having a level surface and deep soil. The side of the hill was inhabited by craftsmen and husbandmen; and the warriors dwelt by themselves on the summit, around the temples of Hephaestus and Athene, in an enclosure which was like the garden of a single house. In winter they retired into houses on the north of the hill, in which they held their syssitia. These were modest dwellings, which they bequeathed unaltered to their children's children. In summer time the south side was inhabited by them, and then they left their gardens and dining-halls. In the midst of the Acropolis was a fountain, which gave an abundant supply of cool water in summer and warm in winter; of this there are still some traces. They were careful to preserve the number of fighting men and women at 20,000, which is equal to that of the present military force. And so they passed their lives as guardians of the citizens and leaders of the Hellenes. They were a just and famous race, celebrated for their beauty and virtue all over Europe and Asia.

And now I will speak to you of their adversaries, but first I ought to explain that the Greek names were given to Solon in an Egyptian form, and he enquired their meaning and translated them. His manuscript was left with my grandfather Dropides,

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and is now in my possession. . . . In the division of the earth Poseidon obtained as his portion the island of Atlantis, and there he begat children whose mother was a mortal. Towards the sea and in the centre of the island there was a very fair and fertile plain, and near the centre, about fifty stadia from the plain, there was a low mountain in which dwelt a man named Evenor and his wife Leucippe, and their daughter Cleito, of whom Poseidon became enamoured. He to secure his love enclosed the mountain with rings or zones varying in size, two of land and three of sea, which his divine power readily enabled him to excavate and fashion, and, as there was no shipping in those days, no man could get into the place. To the interior island he conveyed under the earth springs of water hot and cold, and supplied the land with all things needed for the life of man. Here he begat 114 a family consisting of five pairs of twin male children. The eldest was Atlas, and him he made king of the centre island, while to his twin brother, Eumelus, or Gadeirus, he assigned that part of the country which was nearest the Straits. The other brothers he made chiefs over the rest of the island. And their kingdom extended as far as Egypt and Tyrrhenia. Now Atlas had a fair posterity, and great treasures derived from mines—among them that precious metal orichalcum; and there was abundance of wood, and herds of elephants, and pastures for animals of all kinds, 115 and fragrant herbs, and grasses, and trees bearing fruit. These they used, and employed themselves in constructing their temples, and palaces, and harbours, and docks, in the following manner:—First, they bridged over the zones of sea, and made a way to and from the royal palace which they built in the centre island. This ancient palace was ornamented by successive generations; and they dug a canal which passed through the zones of land from the island to the sea. The zones of earth were surrounded by walls 116 made of stone of divers colours, black and white and red, which they sometimes intermingled for the sake of ornament; and as they quarried they hollowed out beneath the edges of the zones double docks having roofs of rock. The outermost of the walls was coated with brass, the second with tin, and the third, which was the wall of the citadel, flashed with the red light of orichalcum. In the interior of the citadel was a holy temple, dedicated to Cleito and Poseidon, and surrounded by an enclosure of gold, .

and there was Poseidon's own temple, which was covered with silver, and the pinnacles with gold. The roof was of ivory, adorned with gold and silver and orichalcum, and the rest of the interior was lined with orichalcum. Within was an image of the god standing in a chariot drawn by six winged horses, and touching the roof with his head; around him were a hundred Nereids, riding on dolphins. Outside the temple were placed golden statues of all the descendants of the ten kings and of their wives; there was an altar too, and there were palaces, corresponding to the greatness and glory both of the kingdom and of the temple.

Also there were fountains of hot and cold water, and suitable buildings surrounding them, and trees, and there were baths both of the kings and of private individuals, and separate baths for women, and also for cattle. The water from the baths was carried to the grove of Poseidon, and by aqueducts over the bridges to the outer circles. And there were temples in the zones, and in the larger of the two there was a racecourse for horses, which ran all round the island. The guards were distributed in the zones according to the trust reposed in them; the most trusted of them were stationed in the citadel. The docks were full of triremes and stores. The land between the harbour and the sea was surrounded by a wall, and was crowded with dwellings, and the harbour and canal resounded with the din of human voices.

The plain around the city was highly cultivated and sheltered from the north by mountains; it was oblong, and where falling out of the straight line followed the circular ditch, which was of an incredible depth. This depth received the streams which came down from the mountains, as well as the canals of the interior, and found a way to the sea. The entire country was divided into sixty thousand lots, each of which was a square of ten stadia; and the owner of a lot was bound to furnish the sixth part of a war-chariot, so as to make up ten thousand chariots, two horses and riders upon them, a pair of chariot-horses without a seat, and an attendant and charioteer, two hoplites, two archers, two slingers, three stone-shooters, three javelin-men, and four sailors to make up the complement of twelve hundred ships.

Each of the ten kings was absolute in his own city and kingdom. The relations of the different governments to one another were determined by the injunctions of Poseidon, which had been

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inscribed by the first kings on a column of orichalcum in the temple of Poseidon, at which the kings and princes gathered together and held a festival every fifth and every sixth year alternately. Around the temple ranged the bulls of Poseidon, one of which the ten kings caught and sacrificed, shedding the blood of the victim over the inscription, and vowing not to transgress the laws of their father Poseidon. When night came, they put on azure robes and gave judgment against offenders. The most important of their laws related to their dealings with one another. They were not to take up arms against one another, and were to come to the rescue if any of their brethren were attacked. They were to deliberate in common about war, and the king was not to have the power of life and death over his kinsmen, unless he had the assent of the majority. 120

For many generations, as tradition tells, the people of Atlantis were obedient to the laws and to the gods, and practised gentleness and wisdom in their intercourse with one another. They knew that they could only have the true use of riches by not caring about them. But gradually the divine portion of their souls became diluted with too much of the mortal admixture, and they began to degenerate, though to the outward eye they appeared glorious as ever at the very time when they were filled with all iniquity. The all-seeing Zeus, wanting to punish them, held a council of the gods, and when he had called them together, he spoke as follows:— 121

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No one knew better than Plato how to invent a 'noble lie.' Observe (1) the innocent declaration of Socrates, that the truth of the story is a great advantage: (2) the manner in which traditional names and indications of geography are intermingled ('Why, here be truths!'): (3) the extreme minuteness with which the numbers are given, as in the Old Epic poetry: (4) the ingenious reason assigned for the Greek names occurring in the Egyptian tale (113 A): (5) the remark that the armed statue of Athene indicated the common warrior life of men and women (110 B): (6) the particularity with which the third deluge before that of Deucalion is affirmed to have been the great destruction (112 A): (7) the happy guess that great geological changes have been effected by water: (8) the indulgence of the prejudice



against sailing beyond the Columns, and the popular belief of the shallowness of the ocean in that part: (9) the confession that the depth of the ditch in the Island of Atlantis was not to be believed, and 'yet he could only repeat what he had heard' (118 C), compared with the statement made in an earlier passage that Poseidon, being a God, found no difficulty in contriving the water-supply of the centre island (113 E): (10) the mention of the old rivalry of Poseidon and Athene, and the creation of the first inhabitants out of the soil. Plato here, as elsewhere, ingeniously gives the impression that he is telling the truth which mythology had corrupted.

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TION.

The world, like a child, has readily, and for the most part unhesitatingly, accepted the tale of the Island of Atlantis. In modern times we hardly seek for traces of the submerged continent; but even Mr. Grote is inclined to believe in the Egyptian poem of Solon of which there is no evidence in antiquity; while others, like Martin, discuss the Egyptian origin of the legend, or like M. de Humboldt, whom he quotes, are disposed to find in it a vestige of a widely-spread tradition. Others, adopting a different vein of reflection, regard the Island of Atlantis as the anticipation of a still greater island — the Continent of America. 'The tale,' says M. Martin, 'rests upon the authority of the Egyptian priests; and the Egyptian priests took a pleasure in deceiving the Greeks.' He never appears to suspect that there is a greater deceiver or magician than the Egyptian priests, that is to say, Plato himself, from the dominion of whose genius the critic and natural philosopher of modern times are not wholly emancipated. Although worthless in respect of any result which can be attained by them, discussions like those of M. Martin (*Timée*, tome i. pp. 257–332) have an interest of their own, and may be compared to the similar discussions regarding the Lost Tribes (2 Esdras xiii. 40), as showing how the chance word of some poet or philosopher has given birth to endless religious or historical enquiries. (See Introduction to the *Timaeus*, pp. 429–33.)

In contrasting the small Greek city numbering about twenty thousand inhabitants with the barbaric greatness of the island of Atlantis, Plato probably intended to show that a state, such as the ideal Athens, was invincible, though matched against any number of opponents (cp. *Rep.* iv. 423 B). Even in a great empire

*Critias.*INTRODUC-  
TION.

there might be a degree of virtue and justice, such as the Greeks believed to have existed under the sway of the first Persian kings. But all such empires were liable to degenerate, and soon incurred the anger of the gods. Their Oriental wealth, and splendour of gold and silver, and variety of colours, seemed also to be at variance with the simplicity of Greek notions. In the island of Atlantis, Plato is describing a sort of Babylonian or Egyptian city, to which he opposes the frugal life of the true Hellenic citizen. It is remarkable that in his brief sketch of them, he idealizes the husbandmen 'who are lovers of honour and true husbandmen' (III E), as well as the warriors who are his sole concern in the Republic; and that though he speaks of the common pursuits of men and women, he says nothing of the community of wives and children.

It is singular that Plato should have prefixed the most detested of Athenian names to this dialogue, and even more singular that he should have put into the mouth of Socrates a panegyric on him (Tim. 20 A). Yet we know that his character was accounted infamous by Xenophon, and that the mere acquaintance with him was made a subject of accusation against Socrates. We can only infer that in this, and perhaps in some other cases, Plato's characters have no reference to the actual facts. The desire to do honour to his own family, and the connexion with Solon, may have suggested the introduction of his name. Why the *Critias* was never completed, whether from accident, or from advancing age, or from a sense of the artistic difficulty of the design, cannot be determined.

# CRITIAS.

## PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

CRITIAS.  
HERMOCRATES.

TIMAEUS.  
SOCRATES.

teph. 106 *Timaeus.* How thankful I am, Socrates, that I have arrived at last, and, like a weary traveller after a long journey, may be at rest! And I pray the being who always was of old, and has now been by me revealed, to grant that my words may endure in so far as they have been spoken truly and acceptably to him; but if unintentionally I have said anything wrong, I pray that he will impose upon me a just retribution, and the just retribution of him who errs is that he should be set right. Wishing, then, to speak truly in future concerning the generation of the gods, I pray him to give me knowledge, which of all medicines is the most perfect and best. And now having offered my prayer I deliver up the argument to Critias, who is to speak next according to our agreement<sup>1</sup>.

07 *Critias.* And I, Timaeus, accept the trust, and as you at first said that you were going to speak of high matters, and begged that some forbearance might be shown to you, I too ask the same or greater forbearance for what I am about to say. And although I very well know that my request may appear to be somewhat ambitious and discourteous, I must make it nevertheless. For will any man of sense deny that you have spoken well? I can only attempt to show that I ought to have more indulgence than you, because my

*Critias.*

TIMAEUS,  
CRITIAS.

Timaeus prays to the 'ancient of days' that the truth of his words may endure, and for enlightenment where he has erred.

Critias asks for greater indulgence than was shown to Timaeus on the ground that it is easier to speak well of the Gods, whom we do not

<sup>1</sup> Tim. 27 A.

*Critias.*CRITIAS,  
SOCRATES.know, than of  
men, whom  
we do.An illustra-  
tion.

theme is more difficult; and I shall argue that to seem to speak well of the gods to men is far easier than to speak well of men to men: for the inexperience and utter ignorance of his hearers about any subject, is a great assistance to him who has to speak of it, and we know how ignorant we are concerning the gods. But I should like to make my meaning clearer, if you will follow me. All that is said by any of us can only be imitation and representation. For if we consider the likenesses which painters make of bodies divine and heavenly, and the different degrees of gratification with which the eye of the spectator receives them, we shall see that we are satisfied with the artist who is able in any degree to imitate the earth and its mountains, and the rivers, and the woods, and the universe, and the things that are and move therein, and further, that knowing nothing precise about such matters, we do not examine or analyze the painting; all that is required is a sort of indistinct and deceptive mode of shadowing them forth. But when a person endeavours to paint the human form we are quick at finding out defects, and our familiar knowledge makes us severe judges of any one who does not render every point of similarity. And we may observe the same thing to happen in discourse; we are satisfied with a picture of divine and heavenly things which has very little likeness to them; but we are more precise in our criticism of mortal and human things. Wherefore if at the moment of speaking I cannot suitably express my meaning, you must excuse me, considering that to form approved likenesses of human things is the reverse of easy. This is what I want to suggest to you, and at the same time to beg, Socrates, that I may have not less, but more indulgence conceded to me in what I am about to say. Which favour, if I am right in asking, I hope that you will be ready to grant. 108

Socrates  
grants the  
indulgence,  
and, not to  
have the  
same request  
repeated,  
extends it to  
Hermocrates.

*Socrates.* Certainly, Critias, we will grant your request, and we will grant the same by anticipation to Hermocrates, as well as to you and Timaeus; for I have no doubt that when his turn comes a little while hence, he will make the same request which you have made. In order, then, that he may provide himself with a fresh beginning, and not be compelled to say the same things over again, let him



understand that the indulgence is already extended by anticipation to him. And now, friend Critias, I will announce to you the judgment of the theatre. They are of opinion that the last performer was wonderfully successful, and that you will need a great deal of indulgence before you will be able to take his place.

*Hermocrates.* The warning, Socrates, which you have addressed to him, I must also take to myself. But remember, Critias, that faint heart never yet raised a trophy; and therefore you must go and attack the argument like a man. First invoke Apollo and the Muses, and then let us hear you sound the praises and show forth the virtues of your ancient citizens.

*Crit.* Friend Hermocrates, you, who are stationed last and have another in front of you, have not lost heart as yet; the gravity of the situation will soon be revealed to you; meanwhile I accept your exhortations and encouragements. But besides the gods and goddesses whom you have mentioned, I would specially invoke Mnemosyne; for all the important part of my discourse is dependent on her favour, and if I can recollect and recite enough of what was said by the priests and brought hither by Solon, I doubt not that I shall satisfy the requirements of this theatre. And now, making no more excuses, I will proceed.

Let me begin by observing first of all, that nine thousand was the sum of years which had elapsed since the war which was said to have taken place between those who dwelt outside the pillars of Heracles and all who dwelt within them; this war I am going to describe. Of the combatants on the one side, the city of Athens was reported to have been the leader and to have fought out the war; the combatants on the other side were commanded by the kings of Atlantis, which, as I was saying, was an island greater in extent than Libya and Asia, and when afterwards sunk by an earthquake, became an impassable barrier of mud to voyagers sailing from hence to any part of the ocean. The progress of the history will unfold the various nations of barbarians and families of Hellenes which then existed, as they successively appear on the scene; but I must describe first of all the Athenians of that day, and their enemies who

*Critias.*

SOCRATES,  
CRITIAS,  
HERMO-  
CRATES.

Critias in-  
vokes the  
aid of  
Mnemosyne.

The subject  
is the war be-  
tween Athens  
and Atlantis.

He proposes  
to speak first  
of Athens.

*Critias.*

CRITIAS.

fought with them, and then the respective powers and governments of the two kingdoms. Let us give the precedence to Athens.

When the Gods divided the earth, the land of Attica was allotted to Hephaestus and Athene, who implanted there brave children of the soil. Of these the history was lost, but their names remained.

In the days of old, the gods had the whole earth distributed among them by allotment<sup>1</sup>. There was no quarrelling; for you cannot rightly suppose that the gods did not know what was proper for each of them to have, or, knowing this, that they would seek to procure for themselves by contention that which more properly belonged to others. They all of them by just apportionment obtained what they wanted, and peopled their own districts; and when they had peopled them they tended us, their nurselings and possessions, as shepherds tend their flocks, excepting only that they did not use blows or bodily force, as shepherds do, but governed us like pilots from the stern of the vessel, which is an easy way of guiding animals, holding our souls by the rudder of persuasion according to their own pleasure;—thus did they guide all mortal creatures. Now different gods had their allotments in different places which they set in order. Hephaestus and Athene, who were brother and sister, and sprang from the same father, having a common nature, and being united also in the love of philosophy and art, both obtained as their common portion this land, which was naturally adapted for wisdom and virtue; and there they implanted brave children of the soil, and put into their minds the order of government; their names are preserved, but their actions have disappeared by reason of the destruction of those who received the tradition, and the lapse of ages. For when there were any survivors, as I have already said, they were men who dwelt in the mountains; and they were ignorant of the art of writing, and had heard only the names of the chiefs of the land, but very little about their actions. The names they were willing enough to give to their children; but the virtues and the laws of their predecessors, they knew only by obscure traditions; and as they themselves and their children lacked for many generations the necessities of life, they directed their attention to the supply of their wants, and of them they conversed, to the neglect of events that had happened in times long past; for mythology 110

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Polit. 271 ff.

and the enquiry into antiquity are first introduced into cities when they begin to have leisure<sup>1</sup>, and when they see that the necessities of life have already been provided, but not before. And this is the reason why the names of the ancients have been preserved to us and not their actions. This I infer because Solon said that the priests in their narrative of that war mentioned most of the names which are recorded prior to the time of Theseus, such as Cecrops, and Erechtheus, and Erichthonius, and Erysichthon, and the names of the women in like manner. Moreover, since military pursuits were then common to men and women, the men of those days in accordance with the custom of the time set up a figure and image of the goddess in full armour, to be a testimony that all animals which associate together, male as well as female, may, if they please, practise in common the virtue which belongs to them without distinction of sex.

Critias.

CRITIAS.

The men and women had military pursuits in common.

Now the country was inhabited in those days by various classes of citizens;—there were artisans, and there were husbandmen, and there was also a warrior class originally set apart by divine men. The latter dwelt by themselves, and had all things suitable for nurture and education; neither had any of them anything of their own, but they regarded all that they had as common property; nor did they claim to receive of the other citizens anything more than their necessary food. And they practised all the pursuits which we yesterday described as those of our imaginary guardians. Concerning the country the Egyptian priests said what is not only probable but manifestly true, that the boundaries were in those days fixed by the Isthmus, and that in the direction of the continent they extended as far as the heights of Cithaeron and Parnes; the boundary line came down in the direction of the sea, having the district of Oropus on the right, and with the river Asopus as the limit on the left. The land was the best in the world, and was therefore able in those days to support a vast army, raised from the surrounding people. Even the remnant of Attica which now exists may compare with any region in the world for the variety and excellence of its fruits and the suitableness of its

Castes.

Common property among the warriors.

Boundaries of antediluvian Attica.

The productiveness of the soil still equal to

111

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Arist. *Metaphys.* I. 1, § 16.



*Critias.*

CRITIAS.

that of any  
country;although the  
land is a mere  
skeleton from  
which the  
richer and  
softer parts  
have been  
washed away.

pastures to every sort of animal, which proves what I am saying; but in those days the country was fair as now and yielded far more abundant produce. How shall I establish my words? and what part of it can be truly called a remnant of the land that then was? The whole country is only a long promontory extending far into the sea away from the rest of the continent, while the surrounding basin of the sea is everywhere deep in the neighbourhood of the shore. Many great deluges have taken place during the nine thousand years, for that is the number of years which have elapsed since the time of which I am speaking; and during all this time and through so many changes, there has never been any considerable accumulation of the soil coming down from the mountains, as in other places, but the earth has fallen away all round and sunk out of sight. The consequence is, that in comparison of what then was, there are remaining only the bones of the wasted body, as they may be called, as in the case of small islands, all the richer and softer parts of the soil having fallen away, and the mere skeleton of the land being left. But in the primitive state of the country, its mountains were high hills covered with soil, and the plains, as they are termed by us, of Phelleus were full of rich earth, and there was abundance of wood in the mountains. Of this last the traces still remain, for although some of the mountains now only afford sustenance to bees, not so very long ago there were still to be seen roofs of timber cut from trees growing there, which were of a size sufficient to cover the largest houses; and there were many other high trees, cultivated by man and bearing abundance of food for cattle. Moreover, the land reaped the benefit of the annual rainfall, not as now losing the water which flows off the bare earth into the sea, but, having an abundant supply in all places, and receiving it into herself and treasuring it up in the close clay soil, it let off into the hollows the streams which it absorbed from the heights, providing everywhere abundant fountains and rivers, of which there may still be observed sacred memorials in places where fountains once existed; and this proves the truth of what I am saying.

Such was the natural state of the country, which was cul-



tivated, as we may well believe, by true husbandmen, who made husbandry their business, and were lovers of honour, and of a noble nature, and had a soil the best in the world, and abundance of water, and in the heaven above an excellently attempered climate. Now the city in those days was arranged on this wise. In the first place the Acropolis was  
 112 not as now. For the fact is that a single night of excessive rain washed away the earth and laid bare the rock; at the same time there were earthquakes, and then occurred the extraordinary inundation, which was the third before the great destruction of Deucalion. But in primitive times the hill of the Acropolis extended to the Eridanus and Ilissus, and included the Pnyx on one side, and the Lycabettus as a boundary on the opposite side to the Pnyx, and was all well covered with soil, and level at the top, except in one or two places. Outside the Acropolis and under the sides of the hill there dwelt artisans, and such of the husbandmen as were tilling the ground near; the warrior class dwelt by themselves around the temples of Athene and Hephaestus at the summit, which moreover they had enclosed with a single fence like the garden of a single house. On the north side they had dwellings in common and had erected halls for dining in winter, and had all the buildings which they needed for their common life, besides temples, but there was no adorning of them with gold and silver, for they made no use of these for any purpose; they took a middle course between meanness and ostentation, and built modest houses in which they and their children's children grew old, and they handed them down to others who were like themselves, always the same. But in summer-time they left their gardens and gymnasia and dining halls, and then the southern side of the hill was made use of by them for the same purpose. Where the Acropolis now is there was a fountain, which was choked by the earthquake, and has left only the few small streams which still exist in the vicinity, but in those days the fountain gave an abundant supply of water for all and of suitable temperature in summer and in winter. This is how they dwelt, being the guardians of their own citizens and the leaders of the Hellenes, who were their willing followers. And they took care to preserve the same number of men and

*Critias.*

CRITIAS.

The extent of the Acropolis.

On its slopes dwelt artisans and husbandmen; on its summit the warrior class.

Their winter and summer habitations.

The fountain on the Acropolis.

The number

*Critias.*

CRITIAS.

of the popu-  
lation the  
same then  
as now.

women through all time, being so many as were required for warlike purposes, then as now,—that is to say, about twenty thousand. Such were the ancient Athenians, and after this manner they righteously administered their own land and the rest of Hellas; they were renowned all over Europe and Asia for the beauty of their persons and for the many virtues of their souls, and of all men who lived in those days they were the most illustrious. And next, if I have not forgotten what I heard when I was a child, I will impart to you the character and origin of their adversaries. For friends should not keep their stories to themselves, but have them in common.

Explanation  
of the occur-  
rence of  
Greek names  
in the narra-  
tive.

Yet, before proceeding further in the narrative, I ought to 113 warn you, that you must not be surprised if you should perhaps hear Hellenic names given to foreigners. I will tell you the reason of this: Solon, who was intending to use the tale for his poem, enquired into the meaning of the names, and found that the early Egyptians in writing them down had translated them into their own language, and he recovered the meaning of the several names and when copying them out again translated them into our language. My great-grandfather, Dropides, had the original writing, which is still in my possession, and was carefully studied by me when I was a child. Therefore if you hear names such as are used in this country, you must not be surprised, for I have told how they came to be introduced. The tale, which was of great length, began as follows:—

Atlantis  
the lot of  
Poseidon.

I have before remarked in speaking of the allotments of the gods, that they distributed the whole earth into portions differing in extent, and made for themselves temples and instituted sacrifices. And Poseidon, receiving for his lot the island of Atlantis, begat children by a mortal woman, and settled them in a part of the island, which I will describe. Looking towards the sea, but in the centre of the whole island, there was a plain which is said to have been the fairest of all plains and very fertile. Near the plain again, and also in the centre of the island at a distance of about fifty stadia, there was a mountain not very high on any side. In this mountain there dwelt one of the earth-born primeval men of that country, whose name was Evenor, and he had a wife

named Leucippe, and they had an only daughter who was called Cleito. The maiden had already reached womanhood, when her father and mother died; Poseidon fell in love with her and had intercourse with her, and breaking the ground, enclosed the hill in which she dwelt all round, making alternate zones of sea and land larger and smaller, encircling one another; there were two of land and three of water, which he turned as with a lathe, each having its circumference equidistant every way from the centre, so that no man could get to the island, for ships and voyages were not as yet. He himself, being a god, found no difficulty in making special arrangements for the centre island, bringing up two springs of water from beneath the earth, one of warm water and the other of cold, and making every variety of food to spring up abundantly from the soil. He also begat and brought up five pairs of twin male children; and dividing the island of  
114 Atlantis into ten portions, he gave to the first-born of the eldest pair his mother's dwelling and the surrounding allotment, which was the largest and best, and made him king over the rest; the others he made princes, and gave them rule over many men, and a large territory. And he named them all; the eldest, who was the first king, he named Atlas, and after him the whole island and the ocean were called Atlantic. To his twin brother, who was born after him, and obtained as his lot the extremity of the island towards the pillars of Heracles, facing the country which is now called the region of Gades in that part of the world, he gave the name which in the Hellenic language is Eumelus, in the language of the country which is named after him, Gadeirus. Of the second pair of twins he called one Ampheres, and the other Evaemon. To the elder of the third pair of twins he gave the name Mneseus, and Autochthon to the one who followed him. Of the fourth pair of twins he called the elder Elasippus, and the younger Mestor. And of the fifth pair he gave to the elder the name of Azaes, and to the younger that of Diaprepes. All these and their descendants for many generations were the inhabitants and rulers of divers islands in the open sea; and also, as has been already said, they held sway in our direction over the country within the pillars as far as Egypt and Tyrrhenia. Now Atlas had a

*Critias.*

CRITIAS.

His love for Cleito. He surrounded the hill in which she lived with alternate zones of sea and land.

Their children, Atlas and his brothers, were the princes of the island. The extent of their dominion.



*Critias.*

CRITIAS.

Their vast  
wealth.

Mines.

Forests.

Animals tame  
and wild.Fruits and  
flowers.

numerous and honourable family, and they retained the kingdom, the eldest son handing it on to his eldest for many generations; and they had such an amount of wealth as was never before possessed by kings and potentates, and is not likely ever to be again, and they were furnished with everything which they needed, both in the city and country. For because of the greatness of their empire many things were brought to them from foreign countries, and the island itself provided most of what was required by them for the uses of life. In the first place, they dug out of the earth whatever was to be found there, solid as well as fusile, and that which is now only a name and was then something more than a name, orichalcum, was dug out of the earth in many parts of the island, being more precious in those days than anything except gold. There was an abundance of wood for carpenter's work, and sufficient maintenance for tame and wild animals. Moreover, there were a great number of elephants in the island; for as there was provision for all other sorts of animals, both for those which live in lakes and marshes and rivers, and also for those which live in mountains and on plains, so there was for the animal which is the largest and most voracious of all. Also whatever fragrant things there now are in the earth, whether roots, or herbage, or woods, or essences which distil from fruit and flower, grew and thrived in that land; also the fruit which admits of cultivation, both the dry sort, which is given us for nourishment and any other which we use for food—we call them all by the common name of pulse, and the fruits having a hard rind, affording drinks and meats and ointments, and good store of chestnuts and the like, which furnish pleasure and amusement, and are fruits which spoil with keeping, and the pleasant kinds of dessert, with which we console ourselves after dinner, when we are tired of eating—all these that sacred island which then beheld the light of the sun, brought forth fair and wondrous and in infinite abundance. With such blessings the earth freely furnished them; meanwhile they went on constructing their temples and palaces and harbours and docks. And they arranged the whole country in the following manner:—

First of all they bridged over the zones of sea which



surrounded the ancient metropolis, making a road to and from the royal palace. And at the very beginning they built the palace in the habitation of the god and of their ancestors, which they continued to ornament in successive generations, every king surpassing the one who went before him to the utmost of his power, until they made the building a marvel to behold for size and for beauty. And beginning from the sea they bored a canal of three hundred feet in width and one hundred feet in depth and fifty stadia in length, which they carried through to the outermost zone, making a passage from the sea up to this, which became a harbour, and leaving an opening sufficient to enable the largest vessels to find ingress. Moreover, they divided at the bridges the zones of land which parted the zones of sea, leaving room for a single trireme to pass out of one zone into another, and they covered over the channels so as to leave a way underneath for the ships; for the banks were raised considerably above the water. Now the largest of the zones into which a passage was cut from the sea was three stadia in breadth, and the zone of land which came next of equal breadth; but the next two zones, the one of water, the other of land, were two stadia, and the one which surrounded the central island was a stadium only in width. The island in which the palace was situated had a diameter of five stadia. All this including the zones and the bridge, which was the sixth part of a stadium in width, they surrounded by a stone wall on every side, placing towers and gates on the bridges where the sea passed in. The stone which was used in the work they quarried from underneath the centre island, and from underneath the zones, on the outer as well as the inner side. One kind was white, another black, and a third red, and as they quarried, they at the same time hollowed out double docks, having roofs formed out of the native rock. Some of their buildings were simple, but in others they put together different stones, varying the colour to please the eye, and to be a natural source of delight. The entire circuit of the wall, which went round the outermost zone, they covered with a coating of brass, and the circuit of the next wall they coated with tin, and the third, which encompassed the citadel, flashed with the red light of

*Critias.*

CRITIAS.

The bridges  
over the  
zones.The royal  
palace.The great  
canal.

The harbour.

Size of the  
zones,and of the  
centre island.The walls sur-  
rounding the  
zones: their  
variegated  
appearance.

*Critias.*

CRITIAS.

The temple  
of Cleito and  
Poseidon.Splendour of  
Poseidon's  
own temple.

orichalcum. The palaces in the interior of the citadel were constructed on this wise:—In the centre was a holy temple dedicated to Cleito and Poseidon, which remained inaccessible, and was surrounded by an enclosure of gold; this was the spot where the family of the ten princes first saw the light, and thither the people annually brought the fruits of the earth in their season from all the ten portions, to be an offering to each of the ten. Here was Poseidon's own temple which was a stadium in length, and half a stadium in width, and of a proportionate height, having a strange barbaric appearance. All the outside of the temple, with the exception of the pinnacles, they covered with silver, and the pinnacles with gold. In the interior of the temple the roof was of ivory, curiously wrought everywhere with gold and silver and orichalcum; and all the other parts, the walls and pillars and floor, they coated with orichalcum. In the temple they placed statues of gold: there was the god himself standing in a chariot—the charioteer of six winged horses—and of such a size that he touched the roof of the building with his head; around him there were a hundred Nereids riding on dolphins, for such was thought to be the number of them by the men of those days. There were also in the interior of the temple other images which had been dedicated by private persons. And around the temple on the outside were placed statues of gold of all the descendants of the ten kings and of their wives, and there were many other great offerings of kings and of private persons, coming both from the city itself and from the foreign cities over which they held sway. There was an altar too, which in size and workmanship corresponded to this magnificence, and the palaces, in like manner, answered to the greatness of the kingdom and the glory of the temple. 117

Springs.

In the next place, they had fountains, one of cold and another of hot water, in gracious plenty flowing; and they were wonderfully adapted for use by reason of the pleasantness and excellence of their waters<sup>1</sup>. They constructed buildings about them and planted suitable trees; also they made cisterns, some open to the heaven, others roofed over, to be used in winter as warm baths; there were the kings'

Baths.

<sup>1</sup> Reading *ἐκατέρου πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν*.

baths, and the baths of private persons, which were kept apart; and there were separate baths for women, and for horses and cattle, and to each of them they gave as much adornment as was suitable. Of the water which ran off they carried some to the grove of Poseidon, where were growing all manner of trees of wonderful height and beauty, owing to the excellence of the soil, while the remainder was conveyed by aqueducts along the bridges to the outer circles; and there were many temples built and dedicated to many gods; also gardens and places of exercise, some for men, and others for horses in both of the two islands formed by the zones; and in the centre of the larger of the two there was set apart a race-course of a stadium in width, and in length allowed to extend all round the island, for horses to race in. Also there were guard-houses at intervals for the guards, the more trusted of whom were appointed to keep watch in the lesser zone, which was nearer the Acropolis; while the most trusted of all had houses given them within the citadel, near the persons of the kings. The docks were full of triremes and naval stores, and all things were quite ready for use. Enough of the plan of the royal palace.

*Critias.*

CRITIAS.

The grove of Poseidon.

Aqueducts.

Temples.

Gardens.

Hippodromes.

Guard-houses.

Docks.

Leaving the palace and passing out across the three harbours, you came to a wall which began at the sea and went all round: this was everywhere distant fifty stadia from the largest zone or harbour, and enclosed the whole, the ends meeting at the mouth of the channel which led to the sea. The entire area was densely crowded with habitations; and the canal and the largest of the harbours were full of vessels and merchants coming from all parts, who, from their numbers, kept up a multitudinous sound of human voices, and din and clatter of all sorts night and day.

Between the outermost wall and the great harbour was the mercantile quarter.

I have described the city and the environs of the ancient palace nearly in the words of Solon, and now I must endeavour to represent to you the nature and arrangement of the rest of the land. The whole country was said by him to be very lofty and precipitous on the side of the sea, but the country immediately about and surrounding the city was a level plain, itself surrounded by mountains which descended towards the sea; it was smooth and even, and of an oblong shape, extending in one direction three thousand stadia, but

The city lay in an oblong plain, surrounded by mountains, which descended abruptly into the sea.



*Critias.*

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across the centre inland it was two thousand stadia. This part of the island looked towards the south, and was sheltered from the north. The surrounding mountains were celebrated for their number and size and beauty, far beyond any which still exist, having in them also many wealthy villages of country folk, and rivers, and lakes, and meadows supplying food enough for every animal, wild or tame, and much wood of various sorts, abundant for each and every kind of work.

I will now describe the plain, as it was fashioned by nature and by the labours of many generations of kings through long ages. It was for the most part rectangular and oblong, and where falling out of the straight line followed the circular ditch. The depth, and width, and length of this ditch were incredible, and gave the impression that a work of such extent, in addition to so many others, could never have been artificial. Nevertheless I must say what I was told. It was excavated to the depth of a hundred feet, and its breadth was a stadium everywhere; it was carried round the whole of the plain, and was ten thousand stadia in length. It received the streams which came down from the mountains, and winding round the plain and meeting at the city, was there let off into the sea. Further inland, likewise, straight canals of a hundred feet in width were cut from it through the plain, and again let off into the ditch leading to the sea: these canals were at intervals of a hundred stadia, and by them they brought down the wood from the mountains to the city, and conveyed the fruits of the earth in ships, cutting transverse passages from one canal into another, and to the city. Twice in the year they gathered the fruits of the earth—in winter having the benefit of the rains of heaven, and in summer the water which the land supplied by introducing streams from the canals.

The great  
foss, 100 feet  
in depth, 600  
in width, and  
10,000 stadia  
in length.

The cross  
canals.

Two harvests.

60,000 lots  
and 60,000  
officers.

As to the population, each of the lots in the plain had to find a leader for the men who were fit for military service, and the size of a lot was a square of ten stadia each way, and the total number of all the lots was sixty thousand. And of the inhabitants of the mountains and of the rest of the country there was also a vast multitude, which was distributed among the lots and had leaders assigned to them according to their districts and villages. The leader was



required to furnish for the war the sixth portion of a war-chariot, so as to make up a total of ten thousand chariots; also two horses and riders for them, and a pair of chariot-horses without a seat, accompanied by a horseman who could fight on foot carrying a small shield, and having a charioteer who stood behind the man-at-arms to guide the two horses; also, he was bound to furnish two heavy-armed soldiers, two archers, two slingers, three stone-shooters and three javelin-men, who were light-armed, and four sailors to make up the complement of twelve hundred ships. Such was the military order of the royal city — the order of the other nine governments varied, and it would be wearisome to recount their several differences.

As to offices and honours, the following was the arrangement from the first. Each of the ten kings in his own division and in his own city had the absolute control of the citizens, and, in most cases, of the laws, punishing and slaying whomsoever he would. Now the order of precedence among them and their mutual relations were regulated by the commands of Poseidon which the law had handed down. These were inscribed by the first kings on a pillar of orichalcum, which was situated in the middle of the island, at the temple of Poseidon, whither the kings were gathered together every fifth and every sixth year alternately, thus giving equal honour to the odd and to the even number. And when they were gathered together they consulted about their common interests, and enquired if any one had transgressed in anything, and passed judgment, and before they passed judgment they gave their pledges to one another on this wise:—There were bulls who had the range of the temple of Poseidon; and the ten kings, being left alone in the temple, after they had offered prayers to the god that they might capture the victim which was acceptable to him, hunted the bulls, without weapons, but with staves and nooses; and the bull which they caught they led up to the pillar and cut its throat over the top of it so that the blood fell upon the sacred inscription. Now on the pillar, besides the laws, there was inscribed an oath invoking mighty curses on the disobedient. When therefore, after slaying the bull in the accustomed manner, they had burnt

*Critias.*

CRITIAS.

Military  
strength:

10,000  
chariots, 1,200  
ships, &c.

Laws affecting  
the kings in-  
scribed on a  
column of  
orichalcum.

Administra-  
tion of these  
laws by the  
ten kings in  
the temple of  
Poseidon,  
after sacrifice  
and prayer.

*Critias.*

CRITIAS.

They put on  
azure robes  
when they  
gave judg-  
ment, and  
recorded their  
decisions on  
golden tablets.

The kings  
were not to  
take up arms  
against one  
another, but  
were to unite  
for mutual  
defence.

The virtues of  
the people of  
Atlantis were  
great so long  
as the divine  
element

its limbs, they filled a bowl of wine and cast in a clot of 12  
blood for each of them; the rest of the victim they put in the  
fire, after having purified the column all round. Then they  
drew from the bowl in golden cups, and pouring a libation  
on the fire, they swore that they would judge according to  
the laws on the pillar, and would punish him who in any  
point had already transgressed them, and that for the future  
they would not, if they could help; offend against the  
writing on the pillar, and would neither command others, nor  
obey any ruler who commanded them, to act otherwise than  
according to the laws of their father Poseidon. This was the  
prayer which each of them offered up for himself and for his  
descendants, at the same time drinking and dedicating the  
cup out of which he drank in the temple of the god; and  
after they had supped and satisfied their needs, when darkness  
came on, and the fire about the sacrifice was cool, all of them  
put on most beautiful azure robes, and, sitting on the ground,  
at night, over the embers of the sacrifices by which they  
had sworn, and extinguishing all the fire about the temple,  
they received and gave judgment, if any of them had an  
accusation to bring against any one; and when they had  
given judgment, at daybreak they wrote down their sentences  
on a golden tablet, and dedicated it together with their robes  
to be a memorial.

There were many special laws affecting the several kings  
inscribed about the temples, but the most important was  
the following: They were not to take up arms against one  
another, and they were all to come to the rescue if any one  
in any of their cities attempted to overthrow the royal house;  
like their ancestors, they were to deliberate in common about  
war and other matters, giving the supremacy to the de-  
scendants of Atlas. And the king was not to have the power  
of life and death over any of his kinsmen unless he had the  
assent of the majority of the ten.

Such was the vast power which the god settled in the lost  
island of Atlantis; and this he afterwards directed against  
our land for the following reasons, as tradition tells: For  
many generations, as long as the divine nature lasted in  
them, they were obedient to the laws, and well-affectioned  
towards the god, whose seed they were; for they possessed

true and in every way great spirits, uniting gentleness with wisdom in the various chances of life, and in their intercourse with one another. They despised everything but virtue, caring little for their present state of life, and thinking lightly of the possession of gold and other property, which seemed only a burden to them; neither were they intoxicated by luxury; nor did wealth deprive them of their self-control; but they were sober, and saw clearly that all these goods are increased by virtue and friendship with one another, whereas by too great regard and respect for them, they are lost and friendship with them. By such reflections and by the continuance in them of a divine nature, the qualities which we have described grew and increased among them; but when the divine portion began to fade away, and became diluted too often and too much with the mortal admixture, and the human nature got the upper hand, they then, being unable to bear their fortune, behaved unseemly, and to him who had an eye to see, grew visibly debased, for they were losing the fairest of their precious gifts; but to those who had no eye to see the true happiness, they appeared glorious and blessed at the very time when they were full of avarice and unrighteous power. Zeus, the god of gods, who rules according to law, and is able to see into such things, perceiving that an honourable race was in a woeful plight, and wanting to inflict punishment on them, that they might be chastened and improve, collected all the gods into their<sup>1</sup> most holy habitation, which, being placed in the centre of the world, beholds all created things. And when he had called them together, he spake as follows:—

*Critias.*

CRITIAS.

lasted in them; but when this grew weaker, they degenerated.

Intimation of the overthrow of Atlantis.

<sup>1</sup> Reading αἰτῶν.

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






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THE  
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*JOWETT*

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THE  
DIALOGUES OF PLATO

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

WITH ANALYSES AND INTRODUCTIONS

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# PARMENIDES.

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## INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.

THE awe with which Plato regarded the character of 'the great' Parmenides has extended to the dialogue which he calls by his name. None of the writings of Plato have been more copiously illustrated, both in ancient and modern times, and in none of them have the interpreters been more at variance with one another. Nor is this surprising. For the *Parmenides* is more fragmentary and isolated than any other dialogue, and the design of the writer is not expressly stated. The date is uncertain; the relation to the other writings of Plato is also uncertain; the connexion between the two parts is at first sight extremely obscure; and in the latter of the two we are left in doubt as to whether Plato is speaking his own sentiments by the lips of Parmenides, and overthrowing him out of his own mouth, or whether he is propounding consequences which would have been admitted by Zeno and Parmenides themselves. The contradictions which follow from the hypotheses of the one and many have been regarded by some as transcendental mysteries; by others as a mere illustration, taken at random, of a new method. They seem to have been inspired by a sort of dialectical frenzy, such as may be supposed to have prevailed in the Megarian School (cp. *Cratylus* 346, 407 E, etc.). The criticism on his own doctrine of Ideas has also been considered, not as a real criticism, but as an exuberance of the metaphysical imagination which enabled Plato to go beyond himself. To the latter part of the dialogue we may certainly apply the words in which he himself describes the earlier philosophers in the *Sophist* (243 A): 'They went on their way rather regardless of whether we understood them or not.'

The *Parmenides* in point of style is one of the best of the Platonic writings; the first portion of the dialogue is in no way defective in ease and grace and dramatic interest; nor in the

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second part, where there was no room for such qualities, is there any want of clearness or precision. The latter half is an exquisite mosaic, of which the small pieces are with the utmost fineness and regularity adapted to one another. Like the Protagoras, Phaedo, and others, the whole is a narrated dialogue, combining with the mere recital of the words spoken, the observations of the reciter on the effect produced by them. Thus we are informed by him that Zeno and Parmenides were not altogether pleased at the request of Socrates that they would examine into the nature of the one and many in the sphere of Ideas, although they received his suggestion with approving smiles. And we are glad to be told that Parmenides was 'aged but well-favoured,' and that Zeno was 'very good-looking'; also that Parmenides affected to decline the great argument, on which, as Zeno knew from experience, he was not unwilling to enter. The character of Antiphon, the half-brother of Plato, who had once been inclined to philosophy, but has now shown the hereditary disposition for horses, is very naturally described. He is the sole depositary of the famous dialogue; but, although he receives the strangers like a courteous gentleman, he is impatient of the trouble of reciting it. As they enter, he has been giving orders to a bridle-maker; by this slight touch Plato verifies the previous description of him. After a little persuasion he is induced to favour the Clazomenians, who come from a distance, with a rehearsal. Respecting the visit of Zeno and Parmenides to Athens, we may observe — first, that such a visit is consistent with dates, and may possibly have occurred; secondly, that Plato is very likely to have invented the meeting ('You, Socrates, can easily invent Egyptian tales or anything else,' Phaedrus 275 B); thirdly, that no reliance can be placed on the circumstance as determining the date of Parmenides and Zeno; fourthly, that the same occasion appears to be referred to by Plato in two other places (Theaet. 183 E, Soph. 217 C).

Many interpreters have regarded the Parmenides as a 'reductio ad absurdum' of the Eleatic philosophy. But would Plato have been likely to place this in the mouth of the great Parmenides himself, who appeared to him, in Homeric language, to be 'venerable and awful,' and to have a 'glorious depth of mind'? (Theaet. 183 E). It may be admitted that he has ascribed to an



Eleatic stranger in the Sophist opinions which went beyond the doctrines of the Eleatics. But the Eleatic stranger expressly criticises the doctrines in which he had been brought up; he admits that he is going to 'lay hands on his father Parmenides.' Nothing of this kind is said of Zeno and Parmenides. How then, without a word of explanation, could Plato assign to them the refutation of their own tenets?

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The conclusion at which we must arrive is that the Parmenides is not a refutation of the Eleatic philosophy. Nor would such an explanation afford any satisfactory connexion of the first and second parts of the dialogue. And it is quite inconsistent with Plato's own relation to the Eleatics. For of all the pre-Socratic philosophers, he speaks of them with the greatest respect. But he could hardly have passed upon them a more unmeaning slight than to ascribe to their great master tenets the reverse of those which he actually held.

Two preliminary remarks may be made. First, that whatever latitude we may allow to Plato in bringing together by a 'tour de force,' as in the Phaedrus, dissimilar themes, yet he always in some way seeks to find a connexion for them. Many threads join together in one the love and dialectic of the Phaedrus. We cannot conceive that the great artist would place in juxtaposition two absolutely divided and incoherent subjects. And hence we are led to make a second remark: viz. that no explanation of the Parmenides can be satisfactory which does not indicate the connexion of the first and second parts. To suppose that Plato would first go out of his way to make Parmenides attack the Platonic Ideas, and then proceed to a similar but more fatal assault on his own doctrine of Being, appears to be the height of absurdity.

Perhaps there is no passage in Plato showing greater metaphysical power than that in which he assails his own theory of Ideas. The arguments are nearly, if not quite, those of Aristotle; they are the objections which naturally occur to a modern student of philosophy. Many persons will be surprised to find Plato criticizing the very conceptions which have been supposed in after ages to be peculiarly characteristic of him. How can he have placed himself so completely without them? How can he have ever persisted in them after seeing the fatal objections

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which might be urged against them? The consideration of this difficulty has led a recent critic (Ueberweg), who in general accepts the authorized canon of the Platonic writings, to condemn the *Parmenides* as spurious. The accidental want of external evidence, at first sight, seems to favour this opinion.

In answer, it might be sufficient to say, that no ancient writing of equal length and excellence is known to be spurious. Nor is the silence of Aristotle to be hastily assumed; there is at least a doubt whether his use of the same arguments does not involve the inference that he knew the work. And, if the *Parmenides* is spurious, like Ueberweg, we are led on further than we originally intended, to pass a similar condemnation on the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*, and therefore on the *Politicus* (cp. *Theaet.* 183 E, *Soph.* 217). But the objection is in reality fanciful, and rests on the assumption that the doctrine of the Ideas was held by Plato throughout his life in the same form. For the truth is, that the Platonic Ideas were in constant process of growth and transmutation; sometimes veiled in poetry and mythology, then again emerging as fixed Ideas, in some passages regarded as absolute and eternal, and in others as relative to the human mind, existing in and derived from external objects as well as transcending them. The *anamnesis* of the Ideas is chiefly insisted upon in the mythical portions of the dialogues, and really occupies a very small space in the entire works of Plato. Their transcendental existence is not asserted, and is therefore implicitly denied in the *Philebus*; different forms are ascribed to them in the *Republic*, and they are mentioned in the *Theaetetus*, the *Sophist*, the *Politicus*, and the *Laws*, much as Universals would be spoken of in modern books. Indeed, there are very faint traces of the transcendental doctrine of Ideas, that is, of their existence apart from the mind, in any of Plato's writings, with the exception of the *Meno*, the *Phaedrus*, the *Phaedo*, and in portions of the *Republic*. The stereotyped form which Aristotle has given to them is not found in Plato (cp. Essay on the Platonic Ideas in the Introduction to the *Meno*).

The full discussion of this subject involves a comprehensive survey of the philosophy of Plato, which would be out of place here. But, without digressing further from the immediate subject of the *Parmenides*, we may remark that Plato is quite serious in his objections to his own doctrines; nor does Socrates attempt to

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offer any answer to them. The perplexities which surround the one and many in the sphere of the Ideas are also alluded to in the Philebus, and no answer is given to them. Nor have they ever been answered, nor can they be answered by any one else who separates the phenomenal from the real. To suppose that Plato, at a later period of his life, reached a point of view from which he was able to answer them, is a groundless assumption. The real progress of Plato's own mind has been partly concealed from us by the dogmatic statements of Aristotle, and also by the degeneracy of his own followers, with whom a doctrine of numbers quickly superseded Ideas.

As a preparation for answering some of the difficulties which have been suggested, we may begin by sketching the first portion of the dialogue:—

- 126 Cephalus, of Clazomenae in Ionia, the birthplace of Anaxagoras, a citizen of no mean city in the history of philosophy, who is the narrator of the dialogue, describes himself as meeting Adeimantus and Glaucon in the Agora at Athens. 'Welcome, Cephalus: can we do anything for you in Athens?' 'Why, yes: I came to ask a favour of you. First, tell me your half-brother's name, which I have forgotten—he was a mere child when I was last here;—I know his father's, which is Pylilampes.' 'Yes, and the name of our brother is Antiphon. But why do you ask?' 'Let me introduce to you some countrymen of mine, who are lovers of philosophy; they have heard that Antiphon remembers a conversation of Socrates with Parmenides and Zeno, of which the report came to him from Pythodorus, Zeno's friend.' 'That is quite true.' 'And can they hear the dialogue?' 'Nothing easier; in the days of his youth he made a careful study of the piece; at present, his thoughts have another direction: he takes after his grandfather, and has given up philosophy for horses.'

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- 127 'We went to look for him, and found him giving instructions to a worker in brass about a bridle. When he had done with him, and had learned from his brothers the purpose of our visit, he saluted me as an old acquaintance, and we asked him to repeat the dialogue. At first, he complained of the trouble, but he soon consented. He told us that Pythodorus had described to him the appearance of Parmenides and Zeno; they had come to Athens

*Parmenides.*

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at the great Panathenaea, the former being at the time about sixty-five years old, aged but well-favoured — Zeno, who was said to have been beloved of Parmenides in the days of his youth, about forty, and very good-looking:—that they lodged with Pythodorus at the Ceramicus outside the wall, whither Socrates, then a very young man, came to see them: Zeno was reading one of his theses, which he had nearly finished, when Pythodorus entered with Parmenides and Aristoteles, who was afterwards one of the Thirty. When the recitation was completed, Socrates requested that the first thesis of the treatise might be read again.'

'You mean, Zeno,' said Socrates, 'to argue that being, if it is many, must be both like and unlike, which is a contradiction; and each division of your argument is intended to elicit a similar absurdity, which may be supposed to follow from the assumption that being is many.' 'Such is my meaning.' 'I see,' said 128 Socrates, turning to Parmenides, 'that Zeno is your second self in his writings too; you prove admirably that the all is one: he gives proofs no less convincing that the many are nought. To deceive the world by saying the same thing in entirely different forms, is a strain of art beyond most of us.' 'Yes, Socrates,' said Zeno; 'but though you are as keen as a Spartan hound, you do not quite catch the motive of the piece, which was only intended to protect Parmenides against ridicule by showing that the hypothesis of the existence of the many involved greater absurdities than the hypothesis of the one. The book was a youthful composition of mine, which was stolen from me, and therefore I had no choice about the publication.' 'I quite believe you,' said Socrates; 'but will you answer me a question? I should like to know, whether you would assume an idea of like- 129 ness in the abstract, which is the contradictory of unlikeness in the abstract, by participation in either or both of which things are like or unlike or partly both. For the same things may very well partake of like and unlike in the concrete, though like and unlike in the abstract are irreconcilable. Nor does there appear to me to be any absurdity in maintaining that the same things may partake of the one and many, though I should be indeed surprised to hear that the absolute one is also many.]] For example, I, being many, that is to say, having many parts or



members, am yet also one, and partake of the one, being one of seven who are here present (cp. Philebus 14, 15). This is not an absurdity, but a truism. But I should be amazed if there were a similar entanglement in the nature of the ideas themselves, nor  
 130 can I believe that one and many, like and unlike, rest and motion, in the abstract, are capable either of admixture or of separation.'

Pythodorus said that in his opinion Parmenides and Zeno were not very well pleased at the questions which were raised; nevertheless, they looked at one another and smiled in seeming delight and admiration of Socrates. 'Tell me,' said Parmenides, 'do you think that the abstract ideas of likeness, unity, and the rest, exist apart from individuals which partake of them? and is this your own distinction?' 'I think that there are such ideas.' 'And would you make abstract ideas of the just, the beautiful, the good?' 'Yes,' he said. 'And of human beings like ourselves, of water, fire, and the like?' 'I am not certain.' 'And would you be undecided also about ideas of which the mention will, perhaps, appear laughable: of hair, mud, filth, and other things which are base and vile?' 'No, Parmenides; visible things like these are, as I believe, only what they appear to be: though I am sometimes disposed to imagine that there is nothing without an idea; but I repress any such notion, from a fear of falling into an abyss of nonsense.' 'You are young, Socrates, and therefore naturally regard the opinions of men; the time will come when philosophy will have a firmer hold of you, and you will not despise even the meanest things. But tell me, is your meaning that things become  
 131 like by partaking of likeness, great by partaking of greatness, just and beautiful by partaking of justice and beauty, and so of other ideas?' 'Yes, that is my meaning.' 'And do you suppose the individual to partake of the whole, or of the part?' 'Why not of the whole?' said Socrates. 'Because,' said Parmenides, 'in that case the whole, which is one, will become many.' 'Nay,' said Socrates, 'the whole may be like the day, which is one and in many places: in this way the ideas may be one and also many.' 'In the same sort of way,' said Parmenides, 'as a sail, which is one, may be a cover to many—that is your meaning?' 'Yes.' 'And would you say that each man is covered by the whole sail, or by a part only?' 'By a part.' 'Then the ideas have parts, and the objects partake of a part of them only?' 'That seems to

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follow.' 'And would you like to say that the ideas are really divisible and yet remain one?' 'Certainly not.' 'Would you venture to affirm that great objects have a portion only of greatness transferred to them; or that small or equal objects are small or equal because they are only portions of smallness or equality?' 'Impossible.' 'But how can individuals participate in ideas, except in the ways which I have mentioned?' 'That is not an easy question to answer.' 'I should imagine the conception of ideas to arise as follows: you see great objects pervaded by a common form or idea of greatness, which you abstract.' 'That is quite true.' 'And supposing you embrace in one view the idea of greatness thus gained and the individuals which it comprises, a further idea of greatness arises, which makes both great; and this may go on to infinity.' Socrates replies that the ideas may be thoughts in the mind only; in this case, the consequence would no longer follow. 'But must not the thought be of something which is the same in all and is the idea? And if the world partakes in the ideas, and the ideas are thoughts, must not all things think? Or can thought be without thought?' 'I acknowledge the unmeaningness of this,' says Socrates, 'and would rather have recourse to the explanation that the ideas are types in nature, and that other things partake of them by becoming like them.' 'But to become like them is to be comprehended in the same idea; and the likeness of the idea and the individuals implies another idea of likeness, and another without end.' 'Quite true.' 'The theory, then, of participation by likeness has to be given up. You have hardly yet, Socrates, found out the real difficulty of maintaining abstract ideas.' 'What difficulty?' 'The greatest of all perhaps is this: an opponent will argue that the ideas are not within the range of human knowledge; and you cannot disprove the assertion without a long and laborious demonstration, which he may be unable or unwilling to follow. In the first place, neither you nor any one who maintains the existence of absolute ideas will affirm that they are subjective.' 'That would be a contradiction.' 'True; and therefore any relation in these ideas is a relation which concerns themselves only; and the objects which are named after them, are relative to one another only, and have nothing to do with the ideas themselves.' 'How do you mean?' said Socrates. 'I may illustrate my meaning in this way:—

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One of us has a slave; and the idea of a slave in the abstract is relative to the idea of a master in the abstract; this correspondence of ideas, however, has nothing to do with the particular relation of our slave to us.—Do you see my meaning?’ ‘Perfectly.’ ‘And absolute knowledge in the same way corresponds to absolute truth and being, and particular knowledge to particular truth and being.’ ‘Clearly.’ ‘And there is a subjective knowledge which is of subjective truth, having many kinds, general and particular. But the ideas themselves are not subjective, and therefore are not within our ken.’ ‘They are not.’ ‘Then the beautiful and the good in their own nature are unknown to us?’ ‘It would seem so.’ ‘There is a worse consequence yet.’ ‘What is that?’ ‘I think we must admit that absolute knowledge is the most exact knowledge, which we must therefore attribute to God. But then see what follows: God, having this exact knowledge, can have no knowledge of human things, as we have divided the two spheres, and forbidden any passing from one to the other:—the gods have knowledge and authority in their world only, as we have in ours.’ ‘Yet, surely, to deprive God of knowledge is monstrous.’—These are some of the difficulties which are involved in the assumption of absolute ideas; the learner will find them nearly impossible to understand, and the teacher who has to impart them will require superhuman ability; there will always be a suspicion, either that they have no existence, or are beyond human knowledge.’ ‘There I agree with you,’ said Socrates. ‘Yet if these difficulties induce you to give up universal ideas, what becomes of the mind? and where are the reasoning and reflecting powers? philosophy is at an end.’ ‘I certainly do not see my way.’ ‘I think,’ said Parmenides, ‘that this arises out of your attempting to define abstractions, such as the good and the beautiful and the just, before you have had sufficient previous training; I noticed your deficiency when you were talking with Aristoteles, the day before yesterday. Your enthusiasm is a wonderful gift; but I fear that unless you discipline yourself by dialectic while you are young, truth will elude your grasp.’ ‘And what kind of discipline would you recommend?’ ‘The training which you heard Zeno practising; at the same time, I admire your saying to him that you did not care to consider the difficulty in reference to visible objects, but only in relation to ideas.’

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‘Yes; because I think that in visible objects you may easily show any number of inconsistent consequences.’ ‘Yes; and you should consider, not only the consequences which follow from a given hypothesis, but the consequences also which follow from the denial of the hypothesis. For example, what follows from the assumption of the existence of the many, and the counter-argument of what follows from the denial of the existence of the many: and similarly of likeness and unlikeness, motion, rest, generation, corruption, being and not being. And the consequences must include consequences to the things supposed and to other things, in themselves and in relation to one another, to individuals whom you select, to the many, and to the all; these must be drawn out both on the affirmative and on the negative hypothesis,—that is, if you are to train yourself perfectly to the intelligence of the truth.’ ‘What you are suggesting seems to be a tremendous process, and one of which I do not quite understand the nature,’ said Socrates; ‘will you give me an example?’ ‘You must not impose such a task on a man of my years,’ said Parmenides. ‘Then will you, Zeno?’ ‘Let us rather,’ said Zeno, with a smile, ‘ask Parmenides, for the undertaking is a serious one, as he truly says; nor could I urge him to make the attempt, except in a select audience of persons who will understand him.’ The whole party joined in the request.

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Here we have, first of all, an unmistakable attack made by the youthful Socrates on the paradoxes of Zeno. He perfectly understands their drift, and Zeno himself is supposed to admit this. But they appear to him, as he says in the *Philebus* also, to be rather truisms than paradoxes. For every one must acknowledge the obvious fact, that the body being one has many members, and that, in a thousand ways, the like partakes of the unlike, the many of the one. The real difficulty begins with the relations of ideas in themselves, whether of the one and many, or of any other ideas, to one another and to the mind. But this was a problem which the Eleatic philosophers had never considered; their thoughts had not gone beyond the contradictions of matter, motion, space, and the like.

It was no wonder that Parmenides and Zeno should hear the novel speculations of Socrates with mixed feelings of admiration



and displeasure. He was going out of the received circle of disputation into a region in which they could hardly follow him. From the crude idea of Being in the abstract, he was about to proceed to universals or general notions. There is no contradiction in material things partaking of the ideas of one and many; neither is there any contradiction in the ideas of one and many, like and unlike, in themselves. But the contradiction arises when we attempt to conceive ideas in their connexion, or to ascertain their relation to phenomena. Still he affirms the existence of such ideas; and this is the position which is now in turn submitted to the criticisms of Parmenides.

To appreciate truly the character of these criticisms, we must remember the place held by Parmenides in the history of Greek philosophy. He is the founder of idealism, and also of dialectic, or, in modern phraseology, of metaphysics and logic (Theaet. 183 E, Soph. 217 C, 241 D). Like Plato, he is struggling after something wider and deeper than satisfied the contemporary Pythagoreans. And Plato with a true instinct recognizes him as his spiritual father, whom he 'revered and honoured more than all other philosophers together.' He may be supposed to have thought more than he said, or was able to express. And, although he could not, as a matter of fact, have criticized the ideas of Plato without an anachronism, the criticism is appropriately placed in the mouth of the founder of the ideal philosophy.

There was probably a time in the life of Plato when the ethical teaching of Socrates came into conflict with the metaphysical theories of the earlier philosophers, and he sought to supplement the one by the other. The older philosophers were great and awful; and they had the charm of antiquity. Something which found a response in his own mind seemed to have been lost as well as gained in the Socratic dialectic. He felt no incongruity in the veteran Parmenides correcting the youthful Socrates. Two points in his criticism are especially deserving of notice. First of all, Parmenides tries him by the test of consistency. Socrates is willing to assume ideas or principles of the just, the beautiful, the good, and to extend them to man (cp. Phaedo 98); but he is reluctant to admit that there are general ideas of hair, mud, filth, etc. There is an ethical universal or idea, but is there also a universal of physics? — of the meanest things in the world as well as of

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the greatest? Parmenides rebukes this want of consistency in Socrates, which he attributes to his youth. As he grows older, philosophy will take a firmer hold of him, and then he will despise neither great things nor small, and he will think less of the opinions of mankind (cp. *Soph.* 227 A). Here is lightly touched one of the most familiar principles of modern philosophy, that in the meanest operations of nature, as well as in the noblest, in mud and filth, as well as in the sun and stars, great truths are contained. At the same time, we may note also the transition in the mind of Plato, to which Aristotle alludes (*Met.* 1. 6, 2), when, as he says, he transferred the Socratic universal of ethics to the whole of nature.

The other criticism of Parmenides on Socrates attributes to him a want of practice in dialectic. He has observed this deficiency in him when talking to Aristoteles on a previous occasion. Plato seems to imply that there was something more in the dialectic of Zeno than in the mere interrogation of Socrates. Here, again, he may perhaps be describing the process which his own mind went through when he first became more intimately acquainted, whether at Megara or elsewhere, with the Eleatic and Megarian philosophers. Still, Parmenides does not deny to Socrates the credit of having gone beyond them in seeking to apply the paradoxes of Zeno to ideas; and this is the application which he himself makes of them in the latter part of the dialogue. He then proceeds to explain to him the sort of mental gymnastic which he should practise. He should consider not only what would follow from a given hypothesis, but what would follow from the denial of it, to that which is the subject of the hypothesis, and to all other things. There is no trace in the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon of any such method being attributed to Socrates; nor is the dialectic here spoken of that 'favourite method' of proceeding by regular divisions, which is described in the *Phaedrus* and *Philebus*, and of which examples are given in the *Politicus* and in the *Sophist*. It is expressly spoken of (p. 135 E) as the method which Socrates had heard Zeno practise in the days of his youth (cp. *Soph.* 217 C).

The discussion of Socrates with Parmenides is one of the most remarkable passages in Plato. Few writers have ever been able to anticipate 'the criticism of the morrow' on their own favourite notions. But Plato may here be said to anticipate the judgment

not only of the morrow, but of all after-ages on the Platonic Ideas. For in some points he touches questions which have not yet received their solution in modern philosophy.

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The first difficulty which Parmenides raises respecting the Platonic ideas relates to the manner in which individuals are connected with them. Do they participate in the ideas, or do they merely resemble them? Parmenides shows that objections may be urged against either of these modes of conceiving the connection. Things are little by partaking of littleness, great by partaking of greatness, and the like. But they cannot partake of a part of greatness, for that will not make them great, etc.; nor can each object monopolise the whole. The only answer to this is, that 'partaking' is a figure of speech, really corresponding to the processes which a later logic designates by the terms 'abstraction' and 'generalization.' When we have described accurately the methods or forms which the mind employs, we cannot further criticize them; at least we can only criticize them with reference to their fitness as instruments of thought to express facts.

Socrates attempts to support his view of the ideas by the parallel of the day, which is one and in many places; but he is easily driven from his position by a counter illustration of Parmenides, who compares the idea of greatness to a sail. He truly explains to Socrates that he has attained the conception of ideas by a process of generalization. At the same time, he points out a difficulty, which appears to be involved — viz. that the process of generalization will go on to infinity. Socrates meets the supposed difficulty by a flash of light, which is indeed the true answer 'that the ideas are in our minds only.' Neither realism is the truth, nor nominalism is the truth, but conceptualism; and conceptualism or any other psychological theory falls very far short of the infinite subtlety of language and thought.

But the realism of ancient philosophy will not admit of this answer, which is repelled by Parmenides with another truth or half-truth of later philosophy, 'Every subject or subjective must have an object.' Here is the great though unconscious truth (shall we say?) or error, which underlay the early Greek philosophy. 'Ideas must have a real existence;' they are not mere forms or opinions, which may be changed arbitrarily by individuals. But the early Greek philosopher never clearly saw that true

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ideas were only universal facts, and that there might be error in universals as well as in particulars.

Socrates makes one more attempt to defend the Platonic Ideas by representing them as paradigms; this is again answered by the 'argumentum ad infinitum.' We may remark, in passing, that the process which is thus described has no real existence. The mind, after having obtained a general idea, does not really go on to form another which includes that, and all the individuals contained under it, and another and another without end. The difficulty belongs in fact to the Megarian age of philosophy, and is due to their illogical logic, and to the general ignorance of the ancients respecting the part played by language in the process of thought. No such perplexity could ever trouble a modern metaphysician, any more than the fallacy of 'calvus' or 'acervus,' or of 'Achilles and the tortoise.' These 'surds' of metaphysics ought to occasion no more difficulty in speculation than a perpetually recurring fraction in arithmetic.

It is otherwise with the objection which follows: How are we to bridge the chasm between human truth and absolute truth, between gods and men? This is the difficulty of philosophy in all ages: How can we get beyond the circle of our own ideas, or how, remaining within them, can we have any criterion of a truth beyond and independent of them? Parmenides draws out this difficulty with great clearness. According to him, there are not only one but two chasms: the first, between individuals and the ideas which have a common name; the second, between the ideas in us and the ideas absolute. The first of these two difficulties mankind, as we may say, a little parodying the language of the Philebus, have long agreed to treat as obsolete; the second remains a difficulty for us as well as for the Greeks of the fourth century before Christ, and is the stumblingblock of Kant's *Kritik*, and of the Hamiltonian adaptation of Kant, as well as of the Platonic ideas. It has been said that 'you cannot criticize Revelation.' 'Then how do you know what is Revelation, or that there is one at all,' is the immediate rejoinder — 'You know nothing of things in themselves.' 'Then how do you know that there are things in themselves?' In some respects, the difficulty pressed harder upon the Greek than upon ourselves. For conceiving of God more under the attribute of knowledge than we do, he was



more under the necessity of separating the divine from the human, as two spheres which had no communication with one another. *Parmenides.*

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It is remarkable that Plato, speaking by the mouth of Parmenides, does not treat even this second class of difficulties as hopeless or insoluble. He says only that they cannot be explained without a long and laborious demonstration: 'the teacher will require superhuman ability, and the learner will be hard of understanding.' But an attempt must be made to find an answer to them; for, as Socrates and Parmenides both admit, the denial of abstract ideas is the destruction of the mind. We can easily imagine that among the Greek schools of philosophy in the fourth century before Christ a panic might arise from the denial of universals, similar to that which arose in the last century from Hume's denial of our ideas of cause and effect. Men do not at first recognize that thought, like digestion, will go on much the same, notwithstanding any theories which may be entertained respecting the nature of the process. Parmenides attributes the difficulties in which Socrates is involved to a want of comprehensiveness in his mode of reasoning; he should consider every question on the negative as well as the positive hypothesis, with reference to the consequences which flow from the denial as well as from the assertion of a given statement.

The argument which follows is the most singular in Plato. It appears to be an imitation, or parody, of the Zenonian dialectic, just as the speeches in the *Phaedrus* are an imitation of the style of *Lysias*, or as the derivations in the *Cratylus* or the fallacies of the *Euthydemus* are a parody of some contemporary Sophist. The interlocutor is not supposed, as in most of the other Platonic dialogues, to take a living part in the argument; he is only required to say 'Yes' and 'No' in the right places. A hint has been already given that the paradoxes of Zeno admitted of a higher application (pp. 129, 135 E). This hint is the thread by which Plato connects the two parts of the dialogue.

The paradoxes of Parmenides seem trivial to us, because the words to which they relate have become trivial; their true nature as abstract terms is perfectly understood by us, and we are inclined to regard the treatment of them in Plato as a mere straw-splitting, or legerdemain of words. Yet there was a power in them which fascinated the Neoplatonists for centuries afterwards. Something

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that they found in them, or brought to them — some echo or anticipation of a great truth or error, exercised a wonderful influence over their minds. To do the Parmenides justice, we should imagine similar ἀπορίαι raised on themes as sacred to us, as the notions of One or Being were to an ancient Eleatic. ‘If God is, what follows? if God is not, what follows?’ Or again: If God is or is not the world; or if God is or is not many, or has or has not parts, or is or is not in the world, or in time; or is or is not finite or infinite. Or if the world is or is not; or has or has not a beginning or end; or is or is not infinite, or infinitely divisible. Or again: if God is or is not identical with his laws; or if man is or is not identical with the laws of nature. We can easily see that here are many subjects for thought, and that from these and similar hypotheses questions of great interest might arise. And we also remark, that the conclusions derived from either of the two alternative propositions might be equally impossible and contradictory.

When we ask what is the object of these paradoxes, some have answered that they are a mere logical puzzle, while others have seen in them an Hegelian propaedeutic of the doctrine of Ideas. The first of these views derives support from the manner in which Parmenides speaks of a similar method being applied to all Ideas. Yet it is hard to suppose that Plato would have furnished so elaborate an example, not of his own but of the Eleatic dialectic, had he intended only to give an illustration of method. The second view has been often overstated by those who, like Hegel himself, have tended to confuse ancient with modern philosophy. We need not deny that Plato, trained in the school of Cratylus and Heracleitus, may have seen that a contradiction in terms is sometimes the best expression of a truth higher than either (cp. Soph. 255 ff.). But his ideal theory is not based on antinomies. The correlation of Ideas was the metaphysical difficulty of the age in which he lived; and the Megarian and Cynic philosophy was a ‘*reductio ad absurdum*’ of their isolation. To restore them to their natural connexion and to detect the negative element in them is the aim of Plato in the Sophist. But his view of their connexion falls very far short of the Hegelian identity of Being and Not-being. The Being and Not-being of Plato never merge in each other, though he is aware that ‘determination is only negation.’

After criticizing the hypotheses of others, it may appear presumptuous to add another guess to the many which have been already offered. May we say, in Platonic language, that we still seem to see vestiges of a track which has not yet been taken? It is quite possible that the obscurity of the *Parmenides* would not have existed to a contemporary student of philosophy, and, like the similar difficulty in the *Philebus*, is really due to our ignorance of the mind of the age. There is an obscure Megarian influence on Plato which cannot wholly be cleared up, and is not much illustrated by the doubtful tradition of his retirement to Megara after the death of Socrates. For Megara was within a walk of Athens (*Phaedr.* 227 E), and Plato might have learned the Megarian doctrines without settling there.

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We may begin by remarking that the theses of *Parmenides* are expressly said to follow the method of Zeno, and that the complex dilemma, though declared to be capable of universal application, is applied in this instance to Zeno's familiar question of the 'one and many.' Here, then, is a double indication of the connexion of the *Parmenides* with the Eristic school. The old Eleatics had asserted the existence of Being, which they at first regarded as finite, then as infinite, then as neither finite nor infinite, to which some of them had given what Aristotle calls 'a form,' others had ascribed a material nature only. The tendency of their philosophy was to deny to Being all predicates. The Megarians, who succeeded them, like the Cynics, affirmed that no predicate could be asserted of any subject; they also converted the idea of Being into an abstraction of Good, perhaps with the view of preserving a sort of neutrality or indifference between the mind and things. As if they had said, in the language of modern philosophy: 'Being is not only neither finite nor infinite, neither at rest nor in motion, but neither subjective nor objective.'

This is the track along which Plato is leading us. Zeno had attempted to prove the existence of the one by disproving the existence of the many, and *Parmenides* seems to aim at proving the existence of the subject by showing the contradictions which follow from the assertion of any predicates. Take the simplest of all notions, 'unity'; you cannot even assert being or time of this without involving a contradiction. But is the contradiction also the final conclusion? Probably no more than of Zeno's denial of

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the many, or of Parmenides' assault upon the Ideas; no more than of the earlier dialogues 'of search.' To us there seems to be no residuum of this long piece of dialectics. But to the mind of Parmenides and Plato, 'Gott-betrunkene Menschen,' there still remained the idea of 'being' or 'good,' which could not be conceived, defined, uttered, but could not be got rid of. Neither of them would have imagined that their disputation ever touched the Divine Being (cp. Phil. 22 C). The same difficulties about Unity and Being are raised in the Sophist (250 ff.); but there only as preliminary to their final solution.

If this view is correct, the real aim of the hypotheses of Parmenides is to criticize the earlier Eleatic philosophy from the point of view of Zeno or the Megarians. It is the same kind of criticism which Plato has extended to his own doctrine of Ideas. Nor is there any want of poetical consistency in attributing to the 'father Parmenides' the last review of the Eleatic doctrines. The latest phases of all philosophies were fathered upon the founder of the school.

Other critics have regarded the final conclusion of the Parmenides either as sceptical or as Heracleitean. In the first case, they assume that Plato means to show the impossibility of any truth. But this is not the spirit of Plato, and could not with propriety be put into the mouth of Parmenides, who, in this very dialogue, is urging Socrates, not to doubt everything, but to discipline his mind with a view to the more precise attainment of truth. The same remark applies to the second of the two theories. Plato everywhere ridicules (perhaps unfairly) his Heracleitean contemporaries: and if he had intended to support an Heracleitean thesis, would hardly have chosen Parmenides, the condemner of the 'undiscerning tribe who say that things both are and are not,' to be the speaker. Nor, thirdly, can we easily persuade ourselves with Zeller that by the 'one' he means the Idea; and that he is seeking to prove indirectly the unity of the Idea in the multiplicity of phenomena.

We may now endeavour to thread the mazes of the labyrinth which Parmenides knew so well, and trembled at the thought of them.

The argument has two divisions: There is the hypothesis that



i. One is.

ii. One is not.

If one is, it is nothing.

If one is not, it is everything.

But is and is not may be taken in two senses:

Either one is one,

Or, one has being,

from which opposite consequences are deduced,

i. a. If one is one, it is nothing (137 C—142 B).

i. b. If one has being, it is all things (142 B—157 B).

To which are appended two subordinate consequences:

i. aa. If one has being, all other things are (157 B—159 B).

i. bb. If one is one, all other things are not (159 B—160 B).

The same distinction is then applied to the negative hypothesis:

ii. a. If one is not one, it is all things (160 B—163 B).

ii. b. If one has not being, it is nothing (163 B—164 B).

Involving two parallel consequences respecting the other or remainder:

ii. aa. If one is not one, other things are all (164 B—165 E).

ii. bb. If one has not being, other things are not (165 E to the end).

137 'I cannot refuse,' said Parmenides, 'since, as Zeno remarks, we are alone, though I may say with Ibycus, who in his old age fell in love, I, like the old racehorse, tremble at the prospect of the course which I am to run, and which I know so well. But as I must attempt this laborious game, what shall be the subject? Suppose I take my own hypothesis of the one.' 'By all means,' said Zeno. 'And who will answer me? Shall I propose the youngest? he will be the most likely to say what he thinks, and his answers will give me time to breathe.' 'I am the youngest,' said Aristoteles, 'and at your service; proceed with your questions.'—The result may be summed up as follows:—

i. a. One is not many, and therefore has no parts, and therefore is not a whole, which is a sum of parts, and therefore has neither beginning, middle, nor end, and is therefore unlimited, and there-

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fore formless, being neither round nor straight, for neither round nor straight can be defined without assuming that they have parts; 138  
 and therefore is not in place, whether in another which would encircle and touch the one at many points; or in itself, because that which is self-containing is also contained, and therefore not one but two. This being premised, let us consider whether one is capable either of motion or rest. For motion is either change of substance, or motion on an axis, or from one place to another. But the one is incapable of change of substance, which implies that it ceases to be itself, or of motion on an axis, because there would be parts around the axis; and any other motion involves change of place. But existence in place has been already shown to be impossible; and yet more impossible is coming into being in place, which implies partial existence in two places at once, or entire existence neither within nor without the same; and how can this be? And more impossible still is the coming into being either as a whole or parts of that which is neither a whole nor parts. The one, then, is incapable of motion. But neither can 139  
 the one be in anything, and therefore not in the same, whether itself or some other, and is therefore incapable of rest. Neither is one the same with itself or any other, or other than itself or any other. For if other than itself, then other than one, and therefore not one; and, if the same with other, it would be other, and other than one. Neither can one while remaining one be other than other; for other, and not one, is the other than other. But if not other by virtue of being one, not by virtue of itself; and if not by virtue of itself, not itself other, and if not itself other, not other than anything. Neither will one be the same with itself. For the nature of the same is not that of the one, but a thing which becomes the same with anything does not become one; for example, that which becomes the same with the many becomes many and not one. And therefore if the one is the same with itself, the one is not one with itself; and therefore one and not one. And therefore one is neither other than other, nor the same with itself. Neither will the one be like or unlike itself or other; for likeness is sameness of affections, and the one and the same are different. And one having any affection which is other 140  
 than being one would be more than one. The one, then, cannot have the same affection with and therefore cannot be like itself

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or other; nor can the one have any other affection than its own, that is, be unlike itself or any other, for this would imply that it was more than one. The one, then, is neither like nor unlike itself or other. This being the case, neither can the one be equal or unequal to itself or other. For equality implies sameness of measure, as inequality implies a greater or less number of measures. But the one, not having sameness, cannot have sameness of measure; nor a greater or less number of measures, for that would imply parts and multitude. Once more, can one be older or younger than itself or other? or of the same age with itself or other? That would imply likeness and unlikeness, equality and inequality. Therefore one cannot be in time, because that which is in time is ever becoming older and younger than itself, (for older and younger are relative terms, and he who becomes older becomes younger,) and is also of the same age with itself. None of which, or any other expressions of time, whether past, future, or present, can be affirmed of one. One neither is, has been, nor will be, nor becomes, nor has, nor will become. And, as these are the only modes of being, one is not, and is not one. But to that which is not, there is no attribute or relative, neither name nor word nor idea nor science nor perception nor opinion appertaining. One, then, is neither named, nor uttered, nor known, nor perceived, nor imagined. But can all this be true? 'I think not.'

i. b. Let us, however, commence the inquiry again. We have to work out all the consequences which follow on the assumption that the one is. If one is, one partakes of being, which is not the same with one; the words 'being' and 'one' have different meanings. Observe the consequence: In the one of being or the being of one are two parts, being and one, which form one whole. And each of the two parts is also a whole, and involves the other, and may be further subdivided into one and being, and is therefore not one but two; and thus one is never one, and in this way the one, if it is, becomes many and infinite. Again, let us conceive of a one which by an effort of abstraction we separate from being: will this abstract one be one or many? You say one only; let us see. In the first place, the being of one is other than one; and one and being, if different, are so because they

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both partake of the nature of other, which is therefore neither one nor being; and whether we take being and other, or being and one, or one and other, in any case we have two things which separately are called either, and together both. And both are two and either of two is severally one, and if one be added to any of the pairs, the sum is three; and two is an even number, three an odd; and two units exist twice, and therefore there are twice two; and three units exist thrice, and therefore there are thrice three, and taken together they give twice three and thrice two: we have even numbers multiplied into even, and odd into even, and even into odd numbers. But if one is, and both odd and even numbers are implied in one, must not every number exist? 144

And number is infinite, and therefore existence must be infinite, for all and every number partakes of being; therefore being has the greatest number of parts, and every part, however great or however small, is equally one. But can one be in many places and yet be a whole? If not a whole it must be divided into parts and represented by a number corresponding to the number of the parts. And if so, we were wrong in saying that being has the greatest number of parts; for being is coequal and coextensive with one, and has no more parts than one; and so the abstract one broken up into parts by being is many and infinite. But the parts are parts of a whole, and the whole is their containing limit, 145

and the one is therefore limited as well as infinite in number; and that which is a whole has beginning, middle, and end, and a middle is equidistant from the extremes; and one is therefore of a certain figure, round or straight, or a combination of the two, and being a whole includes all the parts which are the whole, and is therefore self-contained. But then, again, the whole is not in the parts, whether all or some. Not in all, because, if in all, also in one; for, if wanting in any one, how in all? — not in some, because the greater would then be contained in the less. But if not in all, nor in any, nor in some, either nowhere or in other. And if nowhere, nothing; therefore in other. The one as a whole, then, is in another, but regarded as a sum of parts is in itself; and is, therefore, both in itself and in another. This being the case, the one is at once both at rest and in motion: at rest, 146

because resting in itself; in motion because it is ever in other. And if there is truth in what has preceded, one is the same and



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not the same with itself and other. For everything in relation to every other thing is either the same with it or other; or if neither the same nor other, then in the relation of part to a whole or whole to a part. But one cannot be a part or whole in relation to one, nor other than one; and is therefore the same with one.

Yet this sameness is again contradicted by one being in another place from itself which is in the same place; this follows from one being in itself and in another; one, therefore, is other than itself. But if anything is other than anything, will it not be other than other? And the not one is other than the one, and the one than the not one; therefore one is other than all others. But the same and the other exclude one another, and therefore the other can never be in the same; nor can the other be in anything for ever so short a time, as for that time the other will be in the same. And the other, if never in the same, cannot be either in the one or in the not one. And one is not other than not one, either by reason of other or of itself; and therefore they are not

147 other than one another at all. Neither can the not one partake or be part of one, for in that case it would be one; nor can the not one be number, for that also involves one. And therefore, not being other than the one or related to the one as a whole to parts or parts to a whole, not one is the same as one. Wherefore the one is the same and also not the same with the others and also with itself; and is therefore like and unlike itself and the others, and just as different from the others as they are from the one, neither more nor less. But if neither more nor less, equally different; and therefore the one and the others have the same relations.

This may be illustrated by the case of names: when you repeat the same name twice over, you mean the same thing; and when you say that the other is other than the one, or the one other than the other, this very word other (*ἕτερον*), which is attributed to both, 148 implies sameness. One, then, as being other than others, and other as being other than one, are alike in that they have the relation of otherness; and likeness is similarity of relations. And everything as being other of everything is also like everything. Again, same and other, like and unlike, are opposites: and since in virtue of being other than the others the one is like them, in virtue of being the same it must be unlike. Again, one, as having the same relations, has no difference of relation, and is

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therefore not unlike, and therefore like; or, as having different relations, is different and unlike. Thus, one, as being the same and not the same with itself and others—for both these reasons and for either of them—is also like and unlike itself and the others. Again, how far can one touch itself and the others? As existing in others, it touches the others; and as existing in itself, touches only itself. But from another point of view, that which touches another must be next in order of place; one, therefore, must be next in order of place to itself, and would therefore be two, and in two places. But one cannot be two, and therefore cannot be in contact with itself. Nor again can one touch the other. Two objects are required to make one contact; three objects make two contacts; and all the objects in the world, if placed in a series, would have as many contacts as there are objects, less one. But if one only exists, and not two, there is no contact. And the others, being other than one, have no part in one, and therefore none in number, and therefore two has no existence, and therefore there is no contact. For all which reasons, one has and has not contact with itself and the others. 149

Once more, Is one equal and unequal to itself and the others? Suppose one and the others to be greater or less than each other or equal to one another, they will be greater or less or equal by reason of equality or greatness or smallness inhering in them in addition to their own proper nature. Let us begin by assuming smallness to be inherent in one: in this case the inherence is either in the whole or in a part. If the first, smallness is either coextensive with the whole one, or contains the whole, and, if coextensive with the one, is equal to the one, or if containing the one will be greater than the one. But smallness thus performs the function of equality or of greatness, which is impossible. Again, if the inherence be in a part, the same contradiction follows: smallness will be equal to the part or greater than the part; therefore smallness will not inhere in anything, and except the idea of smallness there will be nothing small. Neither will greatness; for greatness will have a greater;—and there will be no small in relation to which it is great. And there will be no great or small in objects, but greatness and smallness will be relative only to each other; therefore the others cannot be greater or less than the one; also the one can neither exceed nor 150

be exceeded by the others, and they are therefore equal to one another. And this will be true also of the one in relation to itself: one will be equal to itself as well as to the others (*ταῖς ἑα*). *Parmenides.*

151 Yet one, being in itself, must also be about itself, containing and contained, and is therefore greater and less than itself. Further, there is nothing beside the one and the others; and as these must be in something, they must therefore be in one another; and as that in which a thing is is greater than the thing, the inference is that they are both greater and less than one another, because containing and contained in one another. Therefore the one is equal to and greater and less than itself or other, having also measures or parts or numbers equal to or greater or less than itself or other. ANALYSIS.

152 But does one partake of time? This must be acknowledged, if the one partakes of being. For 'to be' is the participation of being in present time, 'to have been' in past, 'to be about to be' in future time. And as time is ever moving forward, the one becomes older than itself; and therefore younger than itself; and is older and also younger when in the process of becoming it arrives at the present; and it is always older and younger, for at any moment the one is, and therefore it becomes and is not older and younger than itself but during an equal time with itself, and is therefore contemporary with itself.

153 And what are the relations of the one to the others? Is it or does it become older or younger than they? At any rate the others are more than one, and one, being the least of all numbers, must be prior in time to greater numbers. But on the other hand, one must come into being in a manner accordant with its own nature. Now one has parts or others, and has therefore a beginning, middle, and end, of which the beginning is first and the end last. And the parts come into existence first; last of all  
154 the whole, contemporaneously with the end, being therefore younger, while the parts or others are older than the one. But, again, the one comes into being in each of the parts as much as in the whole, and must be of the same age with them. Therefore one is at once older and younger than the parts or others, and also contemporaneous with them, for no part can be a part which is not one. Is this true of becoming as well as being? Thus much may be affirmed, that the same things which are older or

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younger cannot become older or younger in a greater degree than they were at first by the addition of equal times. But, on the other hand, the one, if older than others, has come into being a longer time than they have. And when equal time is added to a longer and shorter, the relative difference between them is diminished. In this way that which was older becomes younger, and that which was younger becomes older, that is to say, younger and older than at first; and they ever become and never have become, for then they would be. Thus the one and others always 155 are and are becoming and not becoming younger and also older than one another. And one, partaking of time and also partaking of becoming older and younger, admits of all time, present, past, and future — was, is, shall be — was becoming, is becoming, will become. And there is science of the one, and opinion and name and expression, as is already implied in the fact of our inquiry.

Yet once more, if one be one and many, and neither one nor many, and also participant of time, must there not be a time at which one as being one partakes of being, and a time when one as not being one is deprived of being? But these two contradictory states cannot be experienced by the one both together: there must be a time of transition. And the transition is a 156 process of generation and destruction, into and from being and not-being, the one and the others. For the generation of the one is the destruction of the others, and the generation of the others is the destruction of the one. There is also separation and aggregation, assimilation and dissimilation, increase, diminution, equalization, a passage from motion to rest, and from rest to motion in the one and many. But when do all these changes take place? When does motion become rest, or rest motion? The answer to this question will throw a light upon all the others. Nothing can be in motion and at rest at the same time; and therefore the change takes place 'in a moment' — which is a strange expression, and seems to mean change in no time. Which is true also of all the other changes, which likewise take 157 place in no time.

i. aa. But if one is, what happens to the others, which in the first place are not one, yet may partake of one in a certain way?



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The others are other than the one because they have parts, for if they had no parts they would be simply one, and parts imply a whole to which they belong; otherwise each part would be a part of many, and being itself one of them, of itself, and if a part of all, of each one of the other parts, which is absurd. For a part, if not a part of one, must be a part of all but this one, and if so not a part of each one; and if not a part of each one, not a part of any one of many, and so not of one; and if of none, how of all? Therefore a part is neither a part of many nor of all, but of an absolute and perfect whole or one. And if the others have parts, they must partake of the whole, and must be the whole of which they are the parts. And each part, as the word 'each' implies, is also an absolute one. And both the whole and the parts partake of one, for the whole of which the parts are parts is one, and each part is one part of the whole; and whole and parts as participating in one are other than one, and as being other than one are many and infinite; and however small a fraction you separate from them is many and not one. Yet the fact of their being parts furnishes the others with a limit towards other parts and towards the whole; they are finite and also infinite: finite through participation in the one, infinite in their own nature. And as being finite, they are alike; and as being infinite, they are alike; but as being both finite and also infinite, they are in the highest degree unlike. And all other opposites might without difficulty be shown to unite in them.

i. bb. Once more, leaving all this: Is there not also an opposite series of consequences which is equally true of the others, and may be deduced from the existence of one? There is. One is distinct from the others, and the others from one; for one and the others are all things, and there is no third existence besides them. And the whole of one cannot be in others nor parts of it, for it is separated from others and has no parts, and therefore the others have no unity, nor plurality, nor duality, nor any other number, nor any opposition or distinction, such as likeness and unlikeness, some and other, generation and corruption, odd and even. For if they had these they would partake either of one opposite, and this would be a participation in one; or of two opposites, and this would be a participation in two. Thus if one exists, one is

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ii. a. But, again, assume the opposite hypothesis, that the one is not, and what is the consequence? In the first place, the proposition, that one is not, is clearly opposed to the proposition, that not one is not. The subject of any negative proposition implies at once knowledge and difference. Thus 'one' in the proposition — 'The one is not,' must be something known, or the words would be unintelligible; and again this 'one which is not' is something different from other things. Moreover, this and that, some and other, may be all attributed or related to the one which is not, and which though non-existent may and must have plurality, if the one only is non-existent and nothing else; but if all is not-being there is 161 nothing which can be spoken of. Also the one which is not differs, and is different in kind from the others, and therefore unlike them; and they being other than the one, are unlike the one, which is therefore unlike them. But one, being unlike other, must be like itself; for the unlikeness of one to itself is the destruction of the hypothesis; and one cannot be equal to the others; for that would suppose being in the one, and the others would be equal to one and like one; both which are impossible, if one does not exist. The one which is not, then, if not equal is unequal to the others, and inequality implies great and small, and equality lies between great and small, and therefore the one which is not partakes of equality. Further, the one which is not has being; for that which is true is, and it is true that the one is not. And so the one which is not, if remitting aught of the being of non-existence, would become existent. For not being implies the being of not-being, and being the not-being of not-being; or more truly being partakes of the being of being and not of the being of 162 not-being, and not-being of the being of not-being and not of the not-being of not-being. And therefore the one which is not has being and also not-being. And the union of being and not-being involves change or motion. But how can not-being, which is nowhere, move or change, either from one place to another or in the same place? And whether it is or is not, it would cease to be one if experiencing a change of substance. The one which is not, then, is both in motion and at rest, is altered and unaltered, and 163

becomes and is destroyed, and does not become and is not destroyed. *Parmenides.*  
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ii. b. Once more, let us ask the question, If one is not, what happens in regard to one? The expression 'is not' implies negation of being: — do we mean by this to say that a thing, which is not, in a certain sense is? or do we mean absolutely to deny being of it? The latter. Then the one which is not can neither be nor become nor perish nor experience change of substance or place.

164 Neither can rest, or motion, or greatness, or smallness, or equality, or unlikeness, or likeness either to itself or other, or attribute or relation, or now or hereafter or formerly, or knowledge or opinion or perception or name or anything else be asserted of that which is not.

ii. aa. Once more, if one is not, what becomes of the others? If we speak of them they must be, and their very name implies difference, and difference implies relation, not to the one, which is not, but to one another. And they are others of each other not as units but as infinities, the least of which is also infinity, and capable of infinitesimal division. And they will have no unity or number, but only a semblance of unity and number; and the least  
165 of them will appear large and manifold in comparison with the infinitesimal fractions into which it may be divided. Further, each particle will have the appearance of being equal with the fractions. For in passing from the greater to the less it must reach an intermediate point, which is equality. Moreover, each particle although having a limit in relation to itself and to other particles, yet it has neither beginning, middle, nor end; for there is always a beginning before the beginning, and a middle within the middle, and an end beyond the end, because the infinitesimal division is never arrested by the one. Thus all being is one at a distance, and broken up when near, and like at a distance and unlike when near; and also the particles which compose being seem to be like and unlike, in rest and motion, in generation and corruption, in contact and separation, if one is not.

ii. bb. Once more, let us inquire, If the one is not, and the others of the one are, what follows? In the first place, the others will  
166 not be the one, nor the many, for in that case the one would be

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contained in them; neither will they appear to be one or many; because they have no communion or participation in that which is not, nor semblance of that which is not. If one is not, the others neither are, nor appear to be one or many, like or unlike, in contact or separation. In short, if one is not, nothing is.

The result of all which is, that whether one is or is not, one and the others, in relation to themselves and to one another, are and are not, and appear to be and appear not to be, in all manner of ways.

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I. On the first hypothesis we may remark: first, That one is one is an identical proposition, from which we might expect that no further consequences could be deduced. The train of consequences which follows, is inferred by altering the predicate into 'not many.' Yet, perhaps, if a strict Eristic had been present, οἷος ἀνὴρ εἰ καὶ νῦν παρῆν, he might have affirmed that the not many presented a different aspect of the conception from the one, and was therefore not identical with it. Such a subtlety would be very much in character with the Zenonian dialectic. Secondly, We may note, that the conclusion is really involved in the premises. For one is conceived as one, in a sense which excludes all predicates. When the meaning of one has been reduced to a point, there is no use in saying that it has neither parts nor magnitude. Thirdly, The conception of the same is, first of all, identified with the one; and then by a further analysis distinguished from, and even opposed to it. Fourthly, We may detect notions, which have reappeared in modern philosophy, e. g. the bare abstraction of undefined unity, answering to the Hegelian 'Seyn,' or the identity of contradictions 'that which is older is also younger,' etc., cp. 152, or the Kantian conception of an *a priori* synthetical proposition 'one is.'

II. In the first series of propositions the word 'is' is really the copula; in the second, the verb of existence. As in the first series, the negative consequence followed from one being affirmed to be equivalent to the not many; so here the affirmative consequence is deduced from one being equivalent to the many.

In the former case, nothing could be predicated of the one, but



now everything — multitude, relation, place, time, transition. One is regarded in all the aspects of one, and with a reference to all the consequences which flow, either from the combination or the separation of them. The notion of transition involves the singular extra-temporal conception of ‘suddenness.’ This idea of ‘suddenness’ is based upon the contradiction which is involved in supposing that anything can be in two places at once. It is a mere fiction; and we may observe that similar antinomies have led modern philosophers to deny the reality of time and space. It is not the infinitesimal of time, but the negative of time. By the help of this invention the conception of change, which sorely exercised the minds of early thinkers, seems to be, but is not really at all explained. The difficulty arises out of the imperfection of language, and should therefore be no longer regarded as a difficulty at all. The only way of meeting it, if it exists, is to acknowledge that this rather puzzling double conception is necessary to the expression of the phenomena of motion or change, and that this and similar double notions, instead of being anomalies, are among the higher and more potent instruments of human thought.

The processes by which Parmenides obtains his remarkable results may be summed up as follows: (1) Compound or correlative ideas which involve each other, such as, being and not-being, one and many, are conceived sometimes in a state of composition, and sometimes of division: (2) The division or distinction is sometimes heightened into total opposition, e. g. between one and same, one and other: or (3) The idea, which has been already divided, is regarded, like a number, as capable of further infinite subdivision: (4) The argument often proceeds ‘a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter’ and conversely: (5) The analogy of opposites is misused by him; he argues indiscriminately sometimes from what is like, sometimes from what is unlike in them: (6) The idea of being or not-being is identified with existence or non-existence in place or time: (7) The same ideas are regarded sometimes as in process of transition, sometimes as alternatives or opposites: (8) There are no degrees or kinds of sameness, likeness, difference, nor any adequate conception of motion or change: (9) One, being, time, like space in Zeno’s puzzle of Achilles and the tortoise, are regarded sometimes as continuous and sometimes

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as discrete: (10) In some parts of the argument the abstraction is so rarefied as to become not only fallacious, but almost unintelligible, e. g. in the contradiction which is elicited out of the relative terms older and younger at p. 152: (11) The relation between two terms is regarded under contradictory aspects, as for example when the existence of the one and the non-existence of the one are equally assumed to involve the existence of the many: (12) Words are used through long chains of argument, sometimes loosely, sometimes with the precision of numbers or of geometrical figures.

The argument is a very curious piece of work, unique in literature. It seems to be an exposition or rather a 'reductio ad absurdum' of the Megarian philosophy, but we are too imperfectly acquainted with this last to speak with confidence about it. It would be safer to say that it is an indication of the sceptical, hyper-logical fancies which prevailed among the contemporaries of Socrates. It throws an indistinct light upon Aristotle, and makes us aware of the debt which the world owes to him or his school. It also bears a resemblance to some modern speculations, in which an attempt is made to narrow language in such a manner that number and figure may be made a calculus of thought. It exaggerates one side of logic and forgets the rest. It has the appearance of a mathematical process; the inventor of it delights, as mathematicians do, in eliciting or discovering an unexpected result. It also helps to guard us against some fallacies by showing the consequences which flow from them.

In the *Parmenides* we seem to breathe the spirit of the Megarian philosophy, though we cannot compare the two in detail. But Plato also goes beyond his Megarian contemporaries; he has split their straws over again, and admitted more than they would have desired. He is indulging the analytical tendencies of his age, which can divide but not combine. And he does not stop to inquire whether the distinctions which he makes are shadowy and fallacious, but 'whither the argument blows' he follows.

III. The negative series of propositions contains the first conception of the negation of a negation. Two minus signs in arithmetic or algebra make a plus. Two negatives destroy each other. This abstruse notion is the foundation of the Hegelian logic. The mind must not only admit that determination is negation, but must get through negation into affirmation. Whether this process

is real, or in any way an assistance to thought, or, like some other logical forms, a mere figure of speech transferred from the sphere of mathematics, may be doubted. That Plato and the most subtle philosopher of the nineteenth century should have lighted upon the same notion, is a singular coincidence of ancient and modern thought.

IV. The one and the many or others are reduced to their strictest arithmetical meaning. That one is three or three one, is a proposition which has, perhaps, given rise to more controversy in the world than any other. But no one has ever meant to say that three and one are to be taken in the same sense. Whereas the one and many of the *Parmenides* have precisely the same meaning; there is no notion of one personality or substance having many attributes or qualities. The truth seems to be rather the opposite of that which Socrates implies at p. 129: There is no contradiction in the concrete, but in the abstract; and the more abstract the idea, the more palpable will be the contradiction. For just as nothing can persuade us that the number one is the number three, so neither can we be persuaded that any abstract idea is identical with its opposite, although they may both inhere together in some external object, or some more comprehensive conception. Ideas, persons, things may be one in one sense and many in another, and may have various degrees of unity and plurality. But in whatever sense and in whatever degree they are one they cease to be many; and in whatever degree or sense they are many they cease to be one.

Two points remain to be considered: 1st, the connexion between the first and second parts of the dialogue; 2ndly, the relation of the *Parmenides* to the other dialogues.

I. In both divisions of the dialogue the principal speaker is the same, and the method pursued by him is also the same, being a criticism on received opinions: first, on the doctrine of Ideas; secondly, of Being. From the Platonic Ideas we naturally proceed to the Eleatic One or Being which is the foundation of them. They are the same philosophy in two forms, and the simpler form is the truer and deeper. For the Platonic Ideas are mere numerical differences, and the moment we attempt to distinguish between them, their transcendental character is lost; ideas of justice,

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temperance, and good, are really distinguishable only with reference to their application in the world. If we once ask how they are related to individuals or to the ideas of the divine mind, they are again merged in the aboriginal notion of Being. [No one can answer the questions which Parmenides asks of Socrates. And yet these questions are asked with the express acknowledgment that the denial of ideas will be the destruction of the human mind. The true answer to the difficulty here thrown out is the establishment of a rational psychology; and this is a work which is commenced in the Sophist. Plato, in urging the difficulty of his own doctrine of Ideas, is far from denying that some doctrine of Ideas is necessary, and for this he is paving the way.]

In a similar spirit he criticizes the Eleatic doctrine of Being, not intending to deny Ontology, but showing that the old Eleatic notion, and the very name 'Being,' is unable to maintain itself against the subtleties of the Megarians. He did not mean to say that Being or Substance had no existence, but he is preparing for the development of his later view, that ideas were capable of relation. The fact that contradictory consequences follow from the existence or non-existence of one or many, does not prove that they have or have not existence, but rather that some different mode of conceiving them is required. Parmenides may still have thought that 'Being was,' just as Kant would have asserted the existence of 'things in themselves,' while denying the transcendental use of the Categories.

Several lesser links also connect the first and second parts of the dialogue: (1) The thesis is the same as that which Zeno has been already discussing: (2) Parmenides has intimated in the first part, that the method of Zeno should, as Socrates desired, be extended to Ideas: (3) The difficulty of participating in greatness, smallness, equality is urged against the Ideas as well as against the One.

II. The Parmenides is not only a criticism of the Eleatic notion of Being, but also of the methods of reasoning then in existence, and in this point of view, as well as in the other, may be regarded as an introduction to the Sophist. Long ago, in the Euthydemus, the vulgar application of the 'both and neither' Eristic had been subjected to a similar criticism, which there takes the form of banter and irony, here of illustration.



The attack upon the Ideas is resumed in the *Philebus*, and is followed by a return to a more rational philosophy. The perplexity of the One and Many is there confined to the region of Ideas, and replaced by a theory of classification; the Good arranged in classes is also contrasted with the barren abstraction of the Megarians. The war is carried on against the Eristics in all the later dialogues, sometimes with a playful irony, at other times with a sort of contempt. But there is no lengthened refutation of them. The *Parmenides* belongs to that stage of the dialogues of Plato in which he is partially under their influence, using them as a sort of 'critics or diviners' of the truth of his own, and of the Eleatic theories. In the *Theaetetus* a similar negative dialectic is employed in the attempt to define science, which after every effort remains undefined still. The same question is revived from the objective side in the *Sophist*: Being and Not-being are no longer exhibited in opposition, but are now reconciled; and the true nature of Not-being is discovered and made the basis of the correlation of ideas. Some links are probably missing which might have been supplied if we had trustworthy accounts of Plato's oral teaching.

To sum up: the *Parmenides* of Plato is a critique, first, of the Platonic Ideas, and secondly, of the Eleatic doctrine of Being. Neither are absolutely denied. But certain difficulties and consequences are shown in the assumption of either, which prove that the Platonic as well as the Eleatic doctrine must be remodelled. The negation and contradiction which are involved in the conception of the One and Many are preliminary to their final adjustment. The Platonic Ideas are tested by the interrogative method of Socrates; the Eleatic One or Being is tried by the severer and perhaps impossible method of hypothetical consequences, negative and affirmative. In the latter we have an example of the Zenonian or Megarian dialectic, which proceeded, not 'by assailing premises, but conclusions'; this is worked out and improved by Plato. When primary abstractions are used in every conceivable sense, any or every conclusion may be deduced from them. The words 'one,' 'other,' 'being,' 'like,' 'same,' 'whole,' and their opposites, have slightly different meanings, as they are applied to objects of thought or objects of sense — to number, time, place, and to the higher ideas of the reason; — and out of their different meanings this 'feast' of contradictions 'has been provided.'

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The *Parmenides* of Plato belongs to a stage of philosophy which has passed away. At first we read it with a purely antiquarian or historical interest; and with difficulty throw ourselves back into a state of the human mind in which Unity and Being occupied the attention of philosophers. We admire the precision of the language, in which, as in some curious puzzle, each word is exactly fitted into every other, and long trains of argument are carried out with a sort of geometrical accuracy. We doubt whether any abstract notion could stand the searching cross-examination of *Parmenides*; and may at last perhaps arrive at the conclusion that Plato has been using an imaginary method to work out an unmeaning conclusion. But the truth is, that he is carrying on a process which is not either useless or unnecessary in any age of philosophy. We fail to understand him, because we do not realize that the questions which he is discussing could have had any value or importance. We suppose them to be like the speculations of some of the Schoolmen, which end in nothing. But in truth he is trying to get rid of the stumblingblocks of thought which beset his contemporaries. Seeing that the Megarians and Cynics were making knowledge impossible, he takes their 'catch-words' and analyzes them from every conceivable point of view. He is criticizing the simplest and most general of our ideas, in which, as they are the most comprehensive, the danger of error is the most serious; for, if they remain unexamined, as in a mathematical demonstration, all that flows from them is affected, and the error pervades knowledge far and wide. In the beginning of philosophy this correction of human ideas was even more necessary than in our own times, because they were more bound up with words; and words when once presented to the mind exercised a greater power over thought. There is a natural realism which says, 'Can there be a word devoid of meaning, or an idea which is an idea of nothing?' In modern times mankind have often given too great importance to a word or idea. The philosophy of the ancients was still more in slavery to them, because they had not the experience of error, which would have placed them above the illusion.

The method of the *Parmenides* may be compared with the process of purgation, which Bacon sought to introduce into philosophy. Plato is warning us against two sorts of 'Idols of the

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Den'; first, his own Ideas, which he himself having created is unable to connect in any way with the external world; secondly, against two idols in particular, 'Unity' and 'Being,' which had grown up in the pre-Socratic philosophy, and were still standing in the way of all progress and development of thought. He does not say with Bacon, 'Let us make truth by experiment,' or 'From these vague and inexact notions let us turn to facts.' The time has not yet arrived for a purely inductive philosophy. The instruments of thought must first be forged, that they may be used hereafter by modern inquirers. How, while mankind were disputing about universals, could they classify phenomena? How could they investigate causes, when they had not as yet learned to distinguish between a cause and an end? How could they make any progress in the sciences without first arranging them? These are the deficiencies which Plato is seeking to supply in an age when knowledge was a shadow of a name only. In the earlier dialogues the Socratic conception of universals is illustrated by his genius; in the *Phaedrus* the nature of division is explained; in the *Republic* the law of contradiction and the unity of knowledge are asserted; in the later dialogues he is constantly engaged both with the theory and practice of classification. These were the 'new weapons,' as he terms them in the *Philebus*, which he was preparing for the use of some who, in after ages, would be found ready enough to disown their obligations to the great master, or rather, perhaps, would be incapable of understanding them.

Numberless fallacies, as we are often truly told, have originated in a confusion of the 'copula,' and the 'verb of existence.' Would not the distinction which Plato by the mouth of Parmenides makes between 'One is one' and 'One has being' have saved us from this and many similar confusions? We see again that a long period in the history of philosophy was a barren tract, not uncultivated, but unfruitful, because there was no inquiry into the relation of language and thought, and the metaphysical imagination was incapable of supplying the missing link between words and things. The famous dispute between Nominalists and Realists would never have been heard of, if, instead of transferring the Platonic Ideas into a crude Latin phraseology, the spirit of Plato had been truly understood and appreciated. Upon the term

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substance at least two celebrated theological controversies appear to hinge, which would not have existed, or at least not in their present form, if we had 'interrogated' the word substance, as Plato has the notions of Unity and Being. These weeds of philosophy have struck their roots deep into the soil, and are always tending to reappear, sometimes in new-fangled forms; while similar words, such as development, evolution, law, and the like, are constantly put in the place of facts, even by writers who profess to base truth entirely upon fact. In an unmetaphysical age there is probably more metaphysics in the common sense (i. e. more *a priori* assumption) than in any other, because there is more complete unconsciousness that we are resting on our own ideas, while we please ourselves with the conviction that we are resting on facts. We do not consider how much metaphysics are required to place us above metaphysics, or how difficult it is to prevent the forms of expression which are ready made for our use from outrunning actual observation and experiment.

In the last century the educated world were astonished to find that the whole fabric of their ideas was falling to pieces, because Hume amused himself by analyzing the word 'cause' into uniform sequence. Then arose a philosophy which, equally regardless of the history of the mind, sought to save mankind from scepticism by assigning to our notions of 'cause and effect,' 'substance and accident,' 'whole and part,' a necessary place in human thought. Without them we could have no experience, and therefore they were supposed to be prior to experience — to be incrustated on the 'I'; although in the phraseology of Kant there could be no transcendental use of them, or, in other words, they were only applicable within the range of our knowledge. But into the origin of these ideas, which he obtains partly by an analysis of the proposition, partly by development of the 'ego,' he never inquires — they seem to him to have a necessary existence; nor does he attempt to analyse the various senses in which the word 'cause' or 'substance' may be employed.

The philosophy of Berkeley could never have had any meaning, even to himself, if he had first analyzed from every point of view the conception of 'matter.' This poor forgotten word (which was 'a very good word' to describe the simplest generalization of external objects) is now superseded in the vocabulary of physical



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philosophers by 'force,' which seems to be accepted without any rigid examination of its meaning, as if the general idea of 'force' in our minds furnished an explanation of the infinite variety of forces which exist in the universe. A similar ambiguity occurs in the use of the favourite word 'law,' which is sometimes regarded as a mere abstraction, and then elevated into a real power or entity, almost taking the place of God. Theology, again, is full of undefined terms which have distracted the human mind for ages. Mankind have reasoned from them, but not to them; they have drawn out the conclusions without proving the premises; they have asserted the premises without examining the terms. The passions of religious parties have been roused to the utmost about words of which they could have given no explanation; and which had really no distinct meaning. One sort of them, faith, grace, justification, have been the symbols of one class of disputes; as the words substance, nature, person, of another, revelation, inspiration, and the like, of a third. All of them have been the subject of endless reasonings and inferences; but a spell has hung over the minds of theologians or philosophers which has prevented them from examining the words themselves. Either the effort to rise above and beyond their own first ideas was too great for them, or there might, perhaps, have seemed to be an irreverence in doing so. About the Divine Being Himself, in whom all true theological ideas live and move, men have spoken and reasoned much, and have fancied that they instinctively know Him. But they hardly suspect that under the name of God even Christians have included two characters or natures as much opposed as the good and evil principle of the Persians.

To have the true use of words we must compare them with things; in using them we acknowledge that they seldom give a perfect representation of our meaning. In like manner when we interrogate our ideas we find that we are not using them always in the sense which we supposed. And Plato, while he criticizes the inconsistency of his own doctrine of universals and draws out the endless consequences which flow from the assertion either that 'Being is' or that 'Being is not,' by no means intends to deny the existence of universals or the unity under which they are comprehended. There is nothing further

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from his thoughts than scepticism (cp. 135 B, C). But before proceeding he must examine the foundations which he and others have been laying; there is nothing true which is not from some point of view untrue, nothing absolute which is not also relative (cp. Rep. vi. 507).

And so, in modern times, because we are called upon to analyze our ideas and to come to a distinct understanding about the meaning of words; because we know that the powers of language are very unequal to the subtlety of nature or of mind, we do not therefore renounce the use of them; but we replace them in their old connexion, having first tested their meaning and quality, and having corrected the error which is involved in them; or rather always remembering to make allowance for the adulteration or alloy which they contain. We cannot call a new metaphysical world into existence any more than we can frame a new universal language; in thought, as in speech, we are dependent on the past. We know that the words 'cause' and 'effect' are very far from representing to us the continuity or the complexity of nature or the different modes or degrees in which phenomena are connected. Yet we accept them as the best expression which we have of the correlation of forces or objects. We see that the term 'law' is a mere abstraction, under which laws of matter and of mind, the law of nature and the law of the land are included, and some of these uses of the word are confusing, because they introduce into one sphere of thought associations which belong to another; for example, order or sequence is apt to be confounded with external compulsion and the internal workings of the mind with their material antecedents. Yet none of them can be dispensed with; we can only be on our guard against the error or confusion which arises out of them. Thus in the use of the word 'substance' we are far from supposing that there is any mysterious substratum apart from the objects which we see, and we acknowledge that the negative notion is very likely to become a positive one. Still we retain the word as a convenient generalization, though not without a double sense, substance, and essence, derived from the two-fold translation of the Greek *οὐσία*.

So the human mind makes the reflection that God is not a person like ourselves—is not a cause like the material causes in nature, nor even an intelligent cause like a human agent—nor an

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TION.

individual, for He is universal; and that every possible conception which we can form of Him is limited by the human faculties. We cannot by any effort of thought or exertion of faith be in and out of our own minds at the same instant. How can we conceive Him under the forms of time and space, who is out of time and space? How get rid of such forms and see Him as He is? How can we imagine His relation to the world or to ourselves? Innumerable contradictions follow from either of the two alternatives, that God is or that He is not. Yet we are far from saying that we know nothing of Him, because all that we know is subject to the conditions of human thought. To the old belief in Him we return, but with corrections. He is a person, but not like ourselves; a mind, but not a human mind; a cause, but not a material cause, nor yet a maker or artificer. The words which we use are imperfect expressions of His true nature; but we do not therefore lose faith in what is best and highest in ourselves and in the world.

‘A little philosophy takes us away from God; a great deal brings us back to Him.’ When we begin to reflect, our first thoughts respecting Him and ourselves are apt to be sceptical. For we can analyze our religious as well as our other ideas; we can trace their history; we can criticize their perversion; we see that they are relative to the human mind and to one another. But when we have carried our criticism to the furthest point, they still remain, a necessity of our moral nature, better known and understood by us, and less liable to be shaken, because we are more aware of their necessary imperfection. They come to us with ‘better opinion, better confirmation,’ not merely as the inspirations either of ourselves or of another, but deeply rooted in history and in the human mind.





# PARMENIDES.

## PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

|             |              |
|-------------|--------------|
| CEPHALUS.   | SOCRATES.    |
| ADEIMANTUS. | ZENO.        |
| GLAUCON.    | PARMENIDES.  |
| ANTIPHON.   | ARISTOTELES. |
| PYTHODORUS. |              |

Cephalus rehearses a dialogue which is supposed to have been narrated in his presence by Antiphon, the half-brother of Adeimantus and Glaucon, to certain Clazomenians.

Steph. 126 WE had come from our home at Clazomenae to Athens, and met Adeimantus and Glaucon in the Agora. Welcome, Cephalus, said Adeimantus, taking me by the hand; is there anything which we can do for you in Athens? *Parmenides.*  
CEPHALUS,  
ADEIMANTUS.  
Preface.

Yes; that is why I am here; I wish to ask a favour of you. What may that be? he said.

I want you to tell me the name of your half-brother, which I have forgotten; he was a mere child when I last came hither from Clazomenae, but that was a long time ago; his father's name, if I remember rightly, was Pylilampes? *The request of the Clazomenians.*

Yes, he said, and the name of our brother, Antiphon; but why do you ask?

Let me introduce some countrymen of mine, I said; they are lovers of philosophy, and have heard that Antiphon was intimate with a certain Pythodorus, a friend of Zeno, and remembers a conversation which took place between Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides many years ago, Pythodorus having often recited it to him.

Quite true.

And could we hear it? I asked.

*Parmenides.*

CEPHALUS,  
ADEIMANTUS,  
ANTIPHON,  
SOCRATES,  
ZENO.

Nothing easier, he replied; when he was a youth he made a careful study of the piece; at present his thoughts run in another direction; like his grandfather Antiphon he is devoted to horses. But, if that is what you want, let us go and look for him; he dwells at Melita, which is quite near, and he has only just left us to go home.

*Descriptive.*

Accordingly we went to look for him; he was at home, and in the act of giving a bridle to a smith to be fitted. When he had done with the smith, his brothers told him the purpose of our visit; and he saluted me as an acquaintance whom he remembered from my former visit, and we asked him to repeat the dialogue. At first he was not very willing, and complained of the trouble, but at length he consented. He told us that Pythodorus had described to him the appearance of Parmenides and Zeno; they came to Athens, as he said, at the great Panathenaea; the former was, at the time of his visit, about 65 years old, very white with age, but well favoured. Zeno was nearly 40 years of age, tall and fair to look upon; in the days of his youth he was reported to have been beloved by Parmenides. He said that they lodged with Pythodorus in the Ceramicus, outside the wall, whither Socrates, then a very young man, came to see them, and many others with him; they wanted to hear the writings of Zeno, which had been brought to Athens for the first time on the occasion of their visit. These Zeno himself read to them in the absence of Parmenides, and had very nearly finished when Pythodorus entered, and with him Parmenides and Aristoteles who was afterwards one of the Thirty, and heard the little that remained of the dialogue. Pythodorus had heard Zeno repeat them before. 127

When the recitation was completed, Socrates requested that the first thesis of the first argument might be read over again, and this having been done, he said: What is your meaning, Zeno? Do you maintain that if being is many, it must be both like and unlike, and that this is impossible, for neither can the like be unlike, nor the unlike like — is that your position?

Just so, said Zeno.

And if the unlike cannot be like, or the like unlike, then according to you, being could not be many; for this would

The contention of Zeno is, that being cannot be many, because, if it were, it would be like and

involve an impossibility. In all that you say have you any other purpose except to disprove the being of the many? and is not each division of your treatise intended to furnish a separate proof of this, there being in all as many proofs of the not-being of the many as you have composed arguments? Is that your meaning, or have I misunderstood you?

*Parmenides*

SOCRATES,  
ZENO.

unlike at the same time, which is impossible.

128 No, said Zeno; you have correctly understood my general purpose.

I see, Parmenides, said Socrates, that Zeno would like to be not only one with you in friendship but your second self in his writings too; he puts what you say in another way, and would fain make believe that he is telling us something which is new. For you, in your poems, say 'The All is one, and of this you adduce excellent proofs; and he on the other hand says 'There is no many; and on behalf of this he offers overwhelming evidence. You affirm unity, he denies plurality. And so you deceive the world into believing that you are saying different things when really you are saying much the same. This is a strain of art beyond the reach of most of us.

'The many are not' is only another way of expressing the thesis of Parmenides that 'All is one.'

Yes, Socrates, said Zeno. But although you are as keen as a Spartan hound in pursuing the track, you do not fully apprehend the true motive of the composition, which is not really such an artificial work as you imagine; for what you speak of was an accident; there was no pretence of a great purpose; nor any serious intention of deceiving the world. The truth is, that these writings of mine were meant to protect the arguments of Parmenides against those who make fun of him and seek to show the many ridiculous and contradictory results which they suppose to follow from the affirmation of the one. My answer is addressed to the partisans of the many, whose attack I return with interest by retorting upon them that their hypothesis of the being of many, if carried out, appears to be still more ridiculous than the hypothesis of the being of one. Zeal for my master led me to write the book in the days of my youth, but some one stole the copy; and therefore I had no choice whether it should be published or not; the motive, however, of writing, was not the ambition of an elder man, but the pugnacity of a young one. This you do not seem to see,

A misunderstanding.

*Parmenides.*SOCRATES,  
ZENO.

Socrates; though in other respects, as I was saying, your notion is a very just one.

Differences  
between abso-  
lute ideas or  
natures, and  
the things  
which par-  
take of them.

I understand, said Socrates, and quite accept your account. But tell me, Zeno, do you not further think that there is an idea of likeness in itself, and another idea of unlikeness, 129 which is the opposite of likeness, and that in these two, you and I and all other things to which we apply the term many, participate — things which participate in likeness become in that degree and manner like; and so far as they participate in unlikeness become in that degree unlike, or both like and unlike in the degree in which they participate in both? And may not all things partake of both opposites, and be both like and unlike, by reason of this participation?— Where is the wonder? Now if a person could prove the absolute like to become unlike, or the absolute unlike to become like, that, in my opinion, would indeed be a wonder; but there is nothing extraordinary, Zeno, in showing that the things which only partake of likeness and unlikeness experience both. Nor, again, if a person were to show that all is one by partaking of one, and at the same time many by partaking of many, would that be very astonishing. But if he were to show me that the absolute one was many, or the absolute many one, I should be truly amazed. And so of all the rest: I should be surprised to hear that the natures or ideas themselves had these opposite qualities; but not if a person wanted to prove of me that I was many and also one. When he wanted to show that I was many he would say that I have a right and a left side, and a front and a back, and an upper and a lower half, for I cannot deny that I partake of multitude; when, on the other hand, he wants to prove that I am one, he will say, that we who are here assembled are seven, and that I am one and partake of the one. In both instances he proves his case. So again, if a person shows that such things as wood, stones, and the like, being many are also one, we admit that he shows the coexistence of the one and many, but he does not show that the many are one or the one many; he is uttering not a paradox but a truism. If however, as I just now suggested, some one were to abstract simple notions of like, unlike, one, many, rest, motion, and similar ideas, and then to show that



these admit of admixture and separation in themselves, I should be very much astonished. This part of the argument appears to be treated by you, Zeno, in a very spirited manner; but, as I was saying, I should be far more amazed if any one  
 130 found in the ideas themselves which are apprehended by reason, the same puzzle and entanglement which you have shown to exist in visible objects.

While Socrates was speaking, Pythodorus thought that Parmenides and Zeno were not altogether pleased at the successive steps of the argument; but still they gave the closest attention, and often looked at one another, and smiled as if in admiration of him. When he had finished, Parmenides expressed their feelings in the following words:—

Socrates, he said, I admire the bent of your mind towards philosophy; tell me now, was this your own distinction between ideas in themselves and the things which partake of them? and do you think that there is an idea of likeness apart from the likeness which we possess, and of the one and many, and of the other things which Zeno mentioned?

I think that there are such ideas, said Socrates.

Parmenides proceeded: And would you also make absolute ideas of the just and the beautiful and the good, and of all that class?

Parmenides asks Socrates whether he would make ideas of all things.

Yes, he said, I should.

And would you make an idea of man apart from us and from all other human creatures, or of fire and water?

I am often undecided, Parmenides, as to whether I ought to include them or not.

And would you feel equally undecided, Socrates, about things of which the mention may provoke a smile?—I mean such things as hair, mud, dirt, or anything else which is vile and paltry; would you suppose that each of these has an idea distinct from the actual objects with which we come into contact, or not?

Certainly not, said Socrates; visible things like these are such as they appear to us, and I am afraid that there would be an absurdity in assuming any idea of them, although I sometimes get disturbed, and begin to think that there is nothing without an idea; but then again, when I have taken

Socrates fears to extend his idealism to mud, dirt, etc.,

*Parmenides.*

SOCRATES,  
PARMENIDES.

and is rebuked  
by Parmen-  
ides for ex-  
hibiting an  
unphilosophic  
temper.

up this position, I run away, because I am afraid that I may fall into a bottomless pit of nonsense, and perish; and so I return to the ideas of which I was just now speaking, and occupy myself with them.

Yes, Socrates, said Parmenides; that is because you are still young; the time will come, if I am not mistaken, when philosophy will have a firmer grasp of you, and then you will not despise even the meanest things; at your age, you are too much disposed to regard the opinions of men. But I should like to know whether you mean that there are certain ideas of which all other things partake, and from which they derive their names; that similars, for example, 131 become similar, because they partake of similarity; and great things become great, because they partake of greatness; and that just and beautiful things become just and beautiful, because they partake of justice and beauty?

Yes, certainly, said Socrates, that is my meaning.

Then each individual partakes either of the whole of the idea or else of a part of the idea? Can there be any other mode of participation?

There cannot be, he said.

Then do you think that the whole idea is one, and yet, being one, is in each one of the many?

Why not, Parmenides? said Socrates.

Because one and the same thing will exist as a whole at the same time in many separate individuals, and will therefore be in a state of separation from itself.

Nay, but the idea may be like the day which is one and the same in many places at once, and yet continuous with itself; in this way each idea may be one and the same in all at the same time.

I like your way, Socrates, of making one in many places at once. You mean to say, that if I were to spread out a sail and cover a number of men, there would be one whole including many — is not that your meaning?

I think so.

And would you say that the whole sail includes each man, or a part of it only, and different parts different men?

The latter.

Then, Socrates, the ideas themselves will be divisible, and

The whole  
idea cannot  
exist in dif-  
ferent objects  
at the same  
time;

things which participate in them will have a part of them only and not the whole idea existing in each of them?

*Parmenides.*

SOCRATES,  
PARMENIDES.

That seems to follow.

Then would you like to say, Socrates, that the one idea is really divisible and yet remains one?

Certainly not, he said.

Suppose that you divide absolute greatness, and that of the many great things, each one is great in virtue of a portion of greatness less than absolute greatness—is that conceivable?

nor can objects contain only parts of ideas, for this would equally involve an absurdity. Things cannot become great or equal or small by addition of a part of greatness or equality or smallness.

No.

Or will each equal thing, if possessing some small portion of equality less than absolute equality, be equal to some other thing by virtue of that portion only?

Impossible.

Or suppose one of us to have a portion of smallness; this is but a part of the small, and therefore the absolutely small is greater; if the absolutely small be greater, that to which the part of the small is added will be smaller and not greater than before.

How absurd!

Then in what way, Socrates, will all things participate in the ideas, if they are unable to participate in them either as parts or wholes?

Indeed, he said, you have asked a question which is not easily answered.

Well, said Parmenides, and what do you say of another question?

What question?

I imagine that the way in which you are led to assume one idea of each kind is as follows:—You see a number of great objects, and when you look at them there seems to you to be one and the same idea (or nature) in them all; hence you conceive of greatness as one.

Ideas are given by generalization.

Very true, said Socrates.

And if you go on and allow your mind in like manner to embrace in one view the idea of greatness and of great things which are not the idea, and to compare them, will not another greatness arise, which will appear to be the source of all these?

But the general and its particulars together form a new idea;

Parmenides.

It would seem so.

SOCRATES,  
PARMENIDES.

the new idea  
and its par-  
ticulars  
another;  
and so *ad*  
*infinitum*.

It is sug-  
gested that  
the ideas are  
thoughts  
only.—This  
solution is  
rejected.

Then another idea of greatness now comes into view over and above absolute greatness, and the individuals which partake of it; and then another, over and above all these, by virtue of which they will all be great, and so each idea instead of being one will be infinitely multiplied.

But may not the ideas, asked Socrates, be thoughts only, and have no proper existence except in our minds, Parmenides? For in that case each idea may still be one, and not experience this infinite multiplication.

And can there be individual thoughts which are thoughts of nothing?

Impossible, he said.

The thought must be of something?

Yes.

Of something which is or which is not?

Of something which is.

Must it not be of a single something, which the thought recognizes as attaching to all, being a single form or nature?

Yes.

And will not the something which is apprehended as one and the same in all, be an idea?

From that, again, there is no escape.

Then, said Parmenides, if you say that everything else participates in the ideas, must you not say either that everything is made up of thoughts, and that all things think; or that they are thoughts but have no thought?

The latter view, Parmenides, is no more rational than the previous one. In my opinion, the ideas are, as it were, patterns fixed in nature, and other things are like them, and resemblances of them — what is meant by the participation of other things in the ideas, is really assimilation to them.

But if, said he, the individual is like the idea, must not the idea also be like the individual, in so far as the individual is a resemblance of the idea? That which is like, cannot be conceived of as other than the like of like.

Impossible.

And when two things are alike, must they not partake of the same idea?

They must.

A fresh at-  
tempt.  
The ideas are  
patterns, and  
other things  
will be like  
them. But  
then there  
will be like-  
ness of the  
like to the  
like, and a  
common idea  
including  
both; and  
so on *ad*  
*infinitum*.



And will not that of which the two partake, and which makes them alike, be the idea itself?

*Parmenides.*

Certainly.

SOCRATES,  
PARMENIDES.

133 Then the idea cannot be like the individual, or the individual like the idea; for if they are alike, some further idea of likeness will always be coming to light, and if that be like anything else, another; and new ideas will be always arising, if the idea resembles that which partakes of it?

Quite true.

The theory, then, that other things participate in the ideas by resemblance, has to be given up, and some other mode of participation devised?

Resemblance  
must be  
given up.

It would seem so.

Do you see then, Socrates, how great is the difficulty of affirming the ideas to be absolute?

Yes, indeed.

And, further, let me say that as yet you only understand a small part of the difficulty which is involved if you make of each thing a single idea, parting it off from other things.

What difficulty? he said.

There are many, but the greatest of all is this:—If an opponent argues that these ideas, being such as we say they ought to be, must remain unknown, no one can prove to him that he is wrong, unless he who denies their existence be a man of great ability and knowledge, and is willing to follow a long and laborious demonstration; he will remain unconvinced, and still insist that they cannot be known.

What do you mean, Parmenides? said Socrates.

In the first place, I think, Socrates, that you, or any one who maintains the existence of absolute essences, will admit that they cannot exist in us.

No, said Socrates; for then they would be no longer absolute.

Ideas would  
be no longer  
absolute, if  
they existed  
within us.

True, he said; and therefore when ideas are what they are in relation to one another, their essence is determined by a relation among themselves, and has nothing to do with the resemblances, or whatever they are to be termed, which are in our sphere, and from which we receive this or that name when we partake of them. And the things which are within our sphere and have the same names with them, are likewise

And if without us, then they and their resemblances in our sphere are related among themselves only and

*Parmenides.*SOCRATES,  
PARMENIDES.

not to one  
another.  
For example,  
we must dis-  
tinguish the  
individual  
slave and  
master in the  
concrete from  
the ideas of  
mastership  
and slavery in  
the abstract.

only relative to one another, and not to the ideas which have the same names with them, but belong to themselves and not to them.

What do you mean? said Socrates.

I may illustrate my meaning in this way, said Parmenides :  
— A master has a slave ; now there is nothing absolute in the relation between them, which is simply a relation of one man to another. But there is also an idea of mastership in the abstract, which is relative to the idea of slavery in the abstract. These natures have nothing to do with us, nor we with them ; they are concerned with themselves only, and we with ourselves. Do you see my meaning? 134

Yes, said Socrates, I quite see your meaning.

And will not knowledge — I mean absolute knowledge — answer to absolute truth?

Certainly.

And each kind of absolute knowledge will answer to each kind of absolute being?

Yes.

But the knowledge which we have, will answer to the truth which we have ; and again, each kind of knowledge which we have, will be a knowledge of each kind of being which we have?

Certainly.

But the ideas themselves, as you admit, we have not, and cannot have?

No, we cannot.

And the absolute natures or kinds are known severally by the absolute idea of knowledge?

Yes.

And we have not got the idea of knowledge?

No.

Then none of the ideas are known to us, because we have no share in absolute knowledge?

I suppose not.

Then the nature of the beautiful in itself, and of the good in itself, and all other ideas which we suppose to exist absolutely, are unknown to us?

It would seem so.

I think that there is a stranger consequence still.

The truth  
which we  
have will cor-  
respond to the  
knowledge  
which we  
have ; and  
we have no  
knowledge  
of the abso-  
lute or of the  
ideas.

What is it?

Would you, or would you not say, that absolute knowledge, if there is such a thing, must be a far more exact knowledge than our knowledge; and the same of beauty and of the rest?

Yes.

And if there be such a thing as participation in absolute knowledge, no one is more likely than God to have this most exact knowledge?

Certainly.

But then, will God, having absolute knowledge, have a knowledge of human things?

Why not?

Because, Socrates, said Parmenides, we have admitted that the ideas are not valid in relation to human things; nor human things in relation to them; the relations of either are limited to their respective spheres.

Yes, that has been admitted.

And if God has this perfect authority, and perfect knowledge, his authority cannot rule us, nor his knowledge know us, or any human thing; just as our authority does not extend to the gods, nor our knowledge know anything which is divine, so by parity of reason they, being gods, are not our masters, neither do they know the things of men.

Yet, surely, said Socrates, to deprive God of knowledge is monstrous.

135 These, Socrates, said Parmenides, are a few, and only a few of the difficulties in which we are involved if ideas really are and we determine each one of them to be an absolute unity. He who hears what may be said against them will deny the very existence of them — and even if they do exist, he will say that they must of necessity be unknown to man; and he will seem to have reason on his side, and as we were remarking just now, will be very difficult to convince; a man must be gifted with very considerable ability before he can learn that everything has a class and an absolute essence; and still more remarkable will he be who discovers all these things for himself, and having thoroughly investigated them is able to teach them to others.

*Parmenides.*

SOCRATES,  
PARMENIDES.

Another  
objection.  
God above  
has absolute  
knowledge.  
But if so, he  
cannot have  
a knowledge  
of human  
things, be-  
cause they  
are in another  
sphere.

*Parmenides.*SOCRATES,  
PARMENIDES.

I agree with you, Parmenides, said Socrates; and what you say is very much to my mind.

And yet, Socrates, said Parmenides, if a man, fixing his attention on these and the like difficulties, does away with ideas of things and will not admit that every individual thing has its own determinate idea which is always one and the same, he will have nothing on which his mind can rest; and so he will utterly destroy the power of reasoning, as you seem to me to have particularly noted.

Very true, he said.

But, then, what is to become of philosophy? Whither shall we turn, if the ideas are unknown?

I certainly do not see my way at present.

Parmenides  
has observed  
Socrates to  
be untried  
in dialectic.

Yes, said Parmenides; and I think that this arises, Socrates, out of your attempting to define the beautiful, the just, the good, and the ideas generally, without sufficient previous training. I noticed your deficiency, when I heard you talking here with your friend Aristoteles, the day before yesterday. The impulse that carries you towards philosophy is assuredly noble and divine; but there is an art which is called by the vulgar idle talking, and which is often imagined to be useless; in that you must train and exercise yourself, now that you are young, or truth will elude your grasp.

And what is the nature of this exercise, Parmenides, which you would recommend?

That which you heard Zeno practising; at the same time, I give you credit for saying to him that you did not care to examine the perplexity in reference to visible things, or to consider the question in that way; but only in reference to objects of thought, and to what may be called ideas.

Why, yes, he said, there appears to me to be no difficulty in showing by this method that visible things are like and unlike and may experience anything.

He suggests  
that the con-  
sequences of  
the not being,  
as well as of  
the being of  
anything,  
should be  
considered.

Quite true, said Parmenides; but I think that you should go a step further, and consider not only the consequences which flow from a given hypothesis, but also the con- 136  
sequences which flow from denying the hypothesis; and that will be still better training for you.

What do you mean? he said.

I mean, for example, that in the case of this very hypothesis



of Zeno's about the many, you should enquire not only what will be the consequences to the many in relation to themselves and to the one, and to the one in relation to itself and the many, on the hypothesis of the being of the many, but also what will be the consequences to the one and the many in their relation to themselves and to each other, on the opposite hypothesis. Or, again, if likeness is or is not, what will be the consequences in either of these cases to the subjects of the hypothesis, and to other things, in relation both to themselves and to one another, and so of unlikeness; and the same holds good of motion and rest, of generation and destruction, and even of being and not-being. In a word, when you suppose anything to be or not to be, or to be in any way affected, you must look at the consequences in relation to the thing itself, and to any other things which you choose,—to each of them singly, to more than one, and to all; and so of other things, you must look at them in relation to themselves and to anything else which you suppose either to be or not to be, if you would train yourself perfectly and see the real truth.

*Parmenides.*

SOCRATES,  
PARMENIDES,  
ZENO.

That, Parmenides, is a tremendous business of which you speak, and I do not quite understand you; will you take some hypothesis and go through the steps?—then I shall apprehend you better.

Socrates asks him to give an example of this process.

That, Socrates, is a serious task to impose on a man of my years.

Parmenides is at first disinclined to engage in such a laborious pastime: but at the request of the company he proceeds.

Then will you, Zeno? said Socrates.

Zeno answered with a smile:—Let us make our petition to Parmenides himself, who is quite right in saying that you are hardly aware of the extent of the task which you are imposing on him; and if there were more of us I should not ask him, for these are not subjects which any one, especially at his age, can well speak of before a large audience; most people are not aware that this roundabout progress through all things is the only way in which the mind can attain truth and wisdom. And therefore, Parmenides, I join in the request of Socrates, that I may hear the process again which I have not heard for a long time.

When Zeno had thus spoken, Pythodorus, according to Antiphon's report of him, said, that he himself and Aristo-

*Parmenides.*PARMENIDES,  
ZENO,  
ARISTOTELES.

teles and the whole company entreated Parmenides to give an example of the process. I cannot refuse, said Parmenides; and yet I feel rather like Ibycus, who, when in his old age, against his will, he fell in love, compared himself to an old racehorse, who was about to run in a chariot race, shaking with fear at the course he knew so well — this was his simile of himself. And I also experience a trembling when I remember through what an ocean of words I have to wade at my time of life. But I must indulge you, as Zeno says that I ought, and we are alone. Where shall I begin? And what shall be our first hypothesis, if I am to attempt this laborious pastime? Shall I begin with myself, and take my own hypothesis of the one? and consider the consequences which follow on the supposition either of the being or of the not-being of one? 137

By all means, said Zeno.

And who will answer me? he said. Shall I propose the youngest? He will not make difficulties and will be the most likely to say what he thinks; and his answers will give me time to breathe.

I am the one whom you mean, Parmenides, said Aristoteles; for I am the youngest and at your service. Ask, and I will answer.

i. a. If the one is, it cannot be many, and therefore cannot have parts, or be a whole, because a whole is made up of parts;

Parmenides proceeded: i. a. If one is, he said, the one cannot be many?

Impossible.

Then the one cannot have parts, and cannot be a whole?

Why not?

Because every part is part of a whole; is it not?

Yes.

And what is a whole? would not that of which no part is wanting be a whole?

Certainly.

Then, in either case, the one would be made up of parts; both as being a whole, and also as having parts?

To be sure.

And in either case, the one would be many, and not one?

True.

But, surely, it ought to be one and not many?

It ought.

Then, if the one is to remain one, it will not be a whole, and will not have parts? *Parmenides.*

No.

But if it has no parts, it will have neither beginning, middle, nor end; for these would of course be parts of it.

Right.

But then, again, a beginning and an end are the limits of everything?

Certainly.

Then the one, having neither beginning nor end, is unlimited?

Yes, unlimited.

And therefore formless; for it cannot partake either of round or straight.

But why?

Why, because the round is that of which all the extreme points are equidistant from the centre?

Yes.

And the straight is that of which the centre intercepts the view of the extremes?

True.

138 Then the one would have parts and would be many, if it partook either of a straight or of a circular form?

Assuredly.

But having no parts, it will be neither straight nor round?

Right.

And, being of such a nature, it cannot be in any place, for it cannot be either in another or in itself.

How so?

Because if it were in another, it would be encircled by that in which it was, and would touch it at many places and with many parts; but that which is one and indivisible, and does not partake of a circular nature, cannot be touched all round in many places.

Certainly not.

But if, on the other hand, one were in itself, it would also be contained by nothing else but itself<sup>1</sup>; that is to say, if it were really in itself; for nothing can be in anything which does not contain it.

PARMENIDES,  
ARISTOTELES.

and having no parts it cannot have a beginning, middle, and end; nor any limit or form.

It is neither circular nor straight;

it does not exist in any place;

<sup>1</sup> Omitting *δν*.

*Parmenides.*

Impossible.

PARMENIDES,  
ARISTOTELES.

But then, that which contains must be other than that which is contained? for the same whole cannot do and suffer both at once; and if so, one will be no longer one, but two?

True.

Then one cannot be anywhere, either in itself or in another? No.

it has neither  
rest nor  
motion.

Further consider, whether that which is of such a nature can have either rest or motion.

Why not?

Two forms  
of motion—  
(1) change of  
nature;  
(2) loco-  
motion.

Why, because the one, if it were moved, would be either moved in place or changed in nature; for these are the only kinds of motion.

Yes.

And the one, when it changes and ceases to be itself, cannot be any longer one.

It cannot.

It cannot therefore experience the sort of motion which is change of nature?

Clearly not.

Then can the motion of the one be in place?

Perhaps.

Two forms of  
locomotion—  
(a) in a place;  
(b) from one  
place to  
another.

But if the one moved in place, must it not either move round and round in the same place, or from one place to another?

It must.

And that which moves in a circle must rest upon a centre; and that which goes round upon a centre must have parts which are different from the centre; but that which has no centre and no parts cannot possibly be carried round upon a centre?

Impossible.

But perhaps the motion of the one consists in change of place?

Perhaps so, if it moves at all.

The one does  
not admit of  
change of  
nature, nor  
of either form  
of locomotion.

And have we not already shown that it cannot be in anything?

Yes.

Then its coming into being in anything is still more impossible; is it not?

I do not see why.



Why, because anything which comes into being in anything, can neither as yet be in that other thing while still coming into being, nor be altogether out of it, if already coming into being in it.

Certainly not.

And therefore whatever comes into being in another must have parts, and then one part may be in, and another part out of that other; but that which has no parts can never be at one and the same time neither wholly within nor wholly without anything.

True.

And is there not a still greater impossibility in that which has no parts, and is not a whole, coming into being anywhere, 139 since it cannot come into being either as a part or as a whole?

Clearly.

Then it does not change place by revolving in the same spot, nor by going somewhere and coming into being in something; nor again, by change in itself?

Very true.

Then in respect of any kind of motion the one is immovable?

Immovable.

But neither can the one be in anything, as we affirm?

Yes, we said so.

Then it is never in the same?

Why not?

Because if it were in the same it would be in something.

Certainly.

And we said that it could not be in itself, and could not be in other?

True.

Then one is never in the same place?

It would seem not.

But that which is never in the same place is never quiet or at rest?

Never.

One then, as would seem, is neither at rest nor in motion?

It certainly appears so.

Neither will it be the same with itself or other; nor again, other than itself or other.

*Parmenides.*

PARMENIDES,  
ARISTOTELES.

Again, the one is never in the same any more than in the other, and is therefore in no place and therefore incapable of rest.

*Parmenides.*

How is that?

PARMENIDES,  
ARISTOTELES.

If other than itself it would be other than one, and would not be one.

Neither  
otherness  
nor same-  
ness can be  
attributed  
to the one,  
in reference  
to itself or  
other ;

True.

And if the same with other, it would be that other, and not itself ; so that upon this supposition too, it would not have the nature of one, but would be other than one?

It would.

Then it will not be the same with other, or other than itself?

It will not.

Neither will it be other than other, while it remains one ; for not one, but only other, can be other than other, and nothing else.

True.

Then not by virtue of being one will it be other?

Certainly not.

But if not by virtue of being one, not by virtue of itself ; and if not by virtue of itself, not itself, and itself not being other at all, will not be other than anything?

Right.

Neither will one be the same with itself.

How not?

Surely the nature of the one is not the nature of the same.

Why not?

It is not when anything becomes the same with anything that it becomes one.

What of that?

Anything which becomes the same with the many, necessarily becomes many and not one.

True.

But, if there were no difference between the one and the same, when a thing became the same, it would always become one ; and when it became one, the same?

Certainly.

And, therefore, if one be the same with itself, it is not one with itself, and will therefore be one and also not one.

Surely that is impossible.

And therefore the one can neither be other than other, nor the same with itself.

*Parmenides.*

PARMENIDES,  
ARISTOTELES.

nor yet like-  
ness, which  
is sameness of  
affections; nor  
unlikeness,

Impossible.

And thus the one can neither be the same, nor other, either  
in relation to itself or other?

No.

Neither will the one be like anything or unlike itself or other.

Why not?

Because likeness is sameness of affections.

Yes.

And sameness has been shown to be of a nature distinct  
from oneness?

That has been shown.

140 But if the one had any other affection than that of being  
one, it would be affected in such a way as to be more than  
one; which is impossible.

True.

Then the one can never be so affected as to be the same  
either with another or with itself?

Clearly not.

Then it cannot be like another, or like itself?

No.

Nor can it be affected so as to be other, for then it would  
be affected in such a way as to be more than one.

It would.

That which is affected otherwise than itself or another,  
will be unlike itself or another, for sameness of affections  
is likeness.

True.

But the one, as appears, never being affected otherwise, is  
never unlike itself or other?

Never.

Then the one will never be either like or unlike itself  
or other?

Plainly not.

Again, being of this nature, it can neither be equal nor  
unequal either to itself or to other.

nor equality,  
nor inequality  
of size;

How is that?

Why, because the one if equal must be of the same  
measures as that to which it is equal.

True.

And if greater or less than things which are commensurable

*Parmenides.* with it, the one will have more measures than that which is less, and fewer than that which is greater?

PARMENIDES,  
ARISTOTELES.

Yes.

And so of things which are not commensurate with it, the one will have greater measures than that which is less and smaller than that which is greater.

Certainly.

But how can that which does not partake of sameness, have either the same measures or have anything else the same?

Impossible.

And not having the same measures, the one cannot be equal either with itself or with another?

It appears so.

But again, whether it have fewer or more measures, it will have as many parts as it has measures; and thus again the one will be no longer one but will have as many parts as measures.

Right.

And if it were of one measure, it would be equal to that measure; yet it has been shown to be incapable of equality.

It has.

Then it will neither partake of one measure, nor of many, nor of few, nor of the same at all, nor be equal to itself or another; nor be greater or less than itself, or other?

Certainly.

nor equality  
or inequality  
of age;

Well, and do we suppose that one can be older, or younger than anything, or of the same age with it?

Why not?

Why, because that which is of the same age with itself or other, must partake of equality or likeness of time; and we said that the one did not partake either of equality or of likeness?

We did say so.

And we also said, that it did not partake of inequality or unlikeness.

Very true.

How then can one, being of this nature, be either older or younger than anything, or have the same age with it?

In no way.



Then one cannot be older or younger, or of the same age, either with itself or with another? *Parmenides.*

Clearly not.

Then the one, being of this nature, cannot be in time at all; for must not that which is in time, be always growing older than itself? *PARMENIDES, ARISTOTELES.*

Certainly.

And that which is older, must always be older than something which is younger?

True.

Then, that which becomes older than itself, also becomes at the same time younger than itself, if it is to have something to become older than.

What do you mean?

I mean this:—A thing does not need to become different from another thing which is already different; it *is* different, and if its different has become, it has become different; if its different will be, it will be different; but of that which is becoming different, there cannot have been, or be about to be, or yet be, a different—the only different possible is one which is becoming.

That is inevitable.

But, surely, the elder is a difference relative to the younger, and to nothing else.

True.

Then that which becomes older than itself must also, at the same time, become younger than itself?

Yes.

But again, it is true that it cannot become for a longer or for a shorter time than itself, but it must become, and be, and have become, and be about to be, for the same time with itself?

That again is inevitable.

Then things which are in time, and partake of time, must in every case, I suppose, be of the same age with themselves; and must also become at once older and younger than themselves?

Yes.

But the one did not partake of those affections?

Not at all.

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*Parmenides.*PARMENIDES,  
ARISTOTELES.nor modes  
of time.

Then it does not partake of time, and is not in any time?

So the argument shows.

Well, but do not the expressions 'was,' and 'has become,'  
and 'was becoming,' signify a participation of past time?

Certainly.

And do not 'will be,' 'will become,' 'will have become,'  
signify a participation of future time?

Yes.

And 'is,' or 'becomes,' signifies a participation of present  
time?

Certainly.

And if the one is absolutely without participation in time,  
it never had become, or was becoming, or was at any time,  
or is now become or is becoming, or is, or will become,  
or will have become, or will be, hereafter.

Most true.

But are there any modes of partaking of being other than  
these?

There are none

Then the one cannot possibly partake of being?

That is the inference.

Then the one is not at all?

Clearly not.

Then the one does not exist in such way as to be one;  
for if it were and partook of being, it would already be; but  
if the argument is to be trusted, the one neither is nor is  
one?

True.

But that which is not admits of no attribute or relation?

Of course not.

Then there is no name, nor expression, nor perception,  
nor opinion, nor knowledge of it?

Clearly not.

Then it is neither named, nor expressed, nor opined, nor  
known, nor does anything that is perceive it.

So we must infer.

But can all this be true about the one?

I think not.

The conclu-  
sion is un-  
satisfactory.

i. b. If one

i. b. Suppose, now, that we return once more to the

original hypothesis; let us see whether, on a further review, any new aspect of the question appears.

I shall be very happy to do so.

We say that we have to work out together all the consequences, whatever they may be, which follow, if the one is?

Yes.

Then we will begin at the beginning:— If one is, can one be, and not partake of being?

Impossible.

Then the one will have being, but its being will not be the same with the one; for if the same, it would not be the being of the one; nor would the one have participated in being, for the proposition that one is would have been identical with the proposition that one is one; but our hypothesis is not if one is one, what will follow, but if one is:—am I not right?

Quite right.

We mean to say, that being has not the same significance as one?

Of course.

And when we put them together shortly, and say ‘One is,’ that is equivalent to saying, ‘partakes of being’?

Quite true.

Once more then let us ask, if one is what will follow. Does not this hypothesis necessarily imply that one is of such a nature as to have parts?

How so?

In this way:— If being is predicated of the one, if the one is, and one of being, if being is one; and if being and one are not the same; and since the one, which we have assumed, is, must not the whole, if it is one, itself be, and have for its parts, one and being?

Certainly.

And is each of these parts — one and being — to be simply called a part, or must the word ‘part’ be relative to the word ‘whole’?

The latter.

Then that which is one is both a whole and has a part?

Certainly.

*Parmenides.*

PARMENIDES,  
ARISTOTELES.

is, what will  
follow?

The one which  
is will partake  
of being, and  
will therefore  
have parts,  
one and  
being;

and each part  
has one and  
being for the  
parts of itself;  
and so on *ad  
infinitum.*

*Parmenides.*PARMENIDES,  
ARISTOTELES.

Again, of the parts of the one, if it is — I mean being and one — does either fail to imply the other? is the one wanting to being, or being to the one?

Impossible.

Thus, each of the parts also has in turn both one and being, and is at the least made up of two parts; and the same principle goes on for ever, and every part whatever has always these two parts; for being always involves one, and one being; so that one is always disappearing, and becoming two.

Certainly.

And so the one, if it is, must be infinite in multiplicity?

Clearly.

Let us take another direction.

What direction?

We say that the one partakes of being and therefore it is?

Yes.

Another  
argument.

And in this way, the one, if it has being, has turned out to be many?

True.

When one is  
abstracted  
from being,  
they are a  
pair of  
differents.

But now, let us abstract the one which, as we say, partakes of being, and try to imagine it apart from that of which, as we say, it partakes — will this abstract one be one only or many?

One, I think.

Let us see:— Must not the being of one be other than one? for the one is not being, but, considered as one, only partook of being?

Certainly.

If being and the one be two different things, it is not because the one is one that it is other than being; nor because being is being that it is other than the one; but they differ from one another in virtue of otherness and difference.

Certainly.

So that the other is not the same — either with the one or with being?

Certainly not.

And therefore whether we take being and the other, or being and the one, or the one and the other, in every



such case we take two things, which may be rightly called both. *Parmenides.*

How so?

PARMENIDES,  
ARISTOTELES.

In this way — you may speak of being?

Yes.

And also of one?

Yes.

Then now we have spoken of either of them?

Yes.

Well, and when I speak of being and one, I speak of them both? *Transition from one to two,*

Certainly.

And if I speak of being and the other, or of the one and the other,—in any such case do I not speak of both?

Yes.

And must not that which is correctly called both, be also two?

Undoubtedly.

And of two things how can either by any possibility not be one?

It cannot.

Then, if the individuals of the pair are together two, they must be severally one? *from odd to even numbers,*

Clearly.

And if each of them is one, then by the addition of any one to any pair, the whole becomes three?

Yes.

And three are odd, and two are even?

Of course.

And if there are two there must also be twice, and if there are three there must be thrice; that is, if twice one makes two, and thrice one three? *from addition to multiplication.*

Certainly.

There are two, and twice, and therefore there must be twice two; and there are three, and there is thrice, and therefore there must be thrice three?

Of course.

If there are three and twice, there is twice three; and if there are two and thrice, there is thrice two?

Undoubtedly.

*Parmenides.*

Here, then, we have even taken even times, and odd taken 144

PARMENIDES,

odd times, and even taken odd times, and odd taken even

ARISTOTELES.

times.

True.

And if this is so, does any number remain which has no necessity to be?

None whatever.

Then if one is, number must also be?

It must.

Out of the  
one that is,  
has come  
difference,  
and from  
difference  
number of  
every sort,

But if there is number, there must also be many, and infinite multiplicity of being; for number is infinite in multiplicity, and partakes also of being: am I not right?

Certainly.

And if all number participates in being, every part of number will also participate?

Yes.

and number  
is co-extensive  
with being;

Then being is distributed over the whole multitude of things, and nothing that is, however small or however great, is devoid of it? And, indeed, the very supposition of this is absurd, for how can that which is, be devoid of being?

In no way.

And it is divided into the greatest and into the smallest, and into being of all sizes, and is broken up more than all things; the divisions of it have no limit.

True.

Then it has the greatest number of parts?

Yes, the greatest number.

Is there any of these which is a part of being, and yet no part?

Impossible.

for every  
single part of  
being, how-  
ever small,  
is one.

But if it is at all and so long as it is, it must be one, and cannot be none?

Certainly.

Then the one attaches to every single part of being, and does not fail in any part, whether great or small, or whatever may be the size of it?

True.

But reflect: — Can one, in its entirety, be in many places at the same time?

No; I see the impossibility of that.

And if not in its entirety, then it is divided; for it cannot be present with all the parts of being, unless divided.

*Parmenides.*

True.

PARMENIDES,  
ARISTOTELES.

And that which has parts will be as many as the parts are? Certainly.

Again, one is in as many places as being, and must therefore be divided into as many parts.

Then we were wrong in saying just now, that being was distributed into the greatest number of parts. For it is not distributed into parts more than the one, but into parts equal to the one; the one is never wanting to being, or being to the one, but being two they are co-equal and co-extensive.

Certainly that is true.

The one itself, then, having been broken up into parts by being, is many and infinite?

True.

Then not only the one which has being is many, but the one itself distributed by being, must also be many?

The abstract one, as well as the one which is, is both one and many, finite and infinite.

Certainly.

Further, inasmuch as the parts are parts of a whole, the one, as a whole, will be limited; for are not the parts contained by the whole?

Certainly.

And that which contains, is a limit?

Of course.

Then the one if it has being is one and many, whole and parts, having limits and yet unlimited in number?

Clearly.

And because having limits, also having extremes?

Certainly.

And if a whole, having beginning and middle and end. For can anything be a whole without these three? And if any one of them is wanting to anything, will that any longer be a whole?

No.

Then the one, as appears, will have beginning, middle, and end.

The one, as being a whole and also finite, has a beginning, middle and end, and

It will.

But, again, the middle will be equidistant from the extremes; or it would not be in the middle?

Yes.

*Parmenides.*PARMENIDES,  
ARISTOTELES.so partakes  
of figure.Regarded as  
the sum of  
its parts, it  
is in itself;regarded as a  
whole, it is in  
other, because  
it is not in the  
parts, neither  
in one, nor  
more than one,  
nor in all.

Then the one will partake of figure, either rectilinear or round, or a union of the two?

True.

And if this is the case, it will be both in itself and in another too.

How?

Every part is in the whole, and none is outside the whole.

True.

And all the parts are contained by the whole?

Yes.

And the one is all its parts, and neither more nor less than all?

No.

And the one is the whole?

Of course.

But if all the parts are in the whole, and the one is all of them and the whole, and they are all contained by the whole, the one will be contained by the one; and thus the one will be in itself.

That is true.

But then, again, the whole is not in the parts — neither in all the parts, nor in some one of them. For if it is in all, it must be in one; for if there were any one in which it was not, it could not be in all the parts; for the part in which it is wanting is one of all, and if the whole is not in this, how can it be in them all?

It cannot.

Nor can the whole be in some of the parts; for if the whole were in some of the parts, the greater would be in the less, which is impossible.

Yes, impossible.

But if the whole is neither in one, nor in more than one, nor in all of the parts, it must be in something else, or cease to be anywhere at all?

Certainly.

If it were nowhere, it would be nothing; but being a whole, and not being in itself, it must be in another.

Very true.

The one then, regarded as a whole, is in another, but



regarded as being all its parts, is in itself; and therefore the one must be itself in itself and also in another.

Certainly.

The one then, being of this nature, is of necessity both at rest and in motion?

How?

146 The one is at rest since it is in itself, for being in one, and not passing out of this, it is in the same, which is itself.

True.

And that which is ever in the same, must be ever at rest?

Certainly.

Well, and must not that, on the contrary, which is ever in other, never be in the same; and if never in the same, never at rest, and if not at rest, in motion?

True.

Then the one being always itself in itself and other, must always be both at rest and in motion?

Clearly.

And must be the same with itself, and other than itself; and also the same with the others, and other than the others; this follows from its previous affections.

How so?

Everything in relation to every other thing, is either the same or other; or if neither the same nor other, then in the relation of a part to a whole, or of a whole to a part.

Clearly.

And is the one a part of itself?

Certainly not.

Since it is not a part in relation to itself it cannot be related to itself as whole to part?

It cannot.

But is the one other than one?

No.

And therefore not other than itself?

Certainly not.

If then it be neither other, nor a whole, nor a part in relation to itself, must it not be the same with itself?

Certainly.

But then, again, a thing which is in another place from

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The one therefore is both at rest and in motion: at rest, if in itself; in motion, if in another.

Four possible relations of two things:  
(1) sameness,  
(2) otherness,  
(3) part and whole,  
(4) whole and part.

The one stands to itself in the relation of sameness,

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True.

Then the one has been shown to be at once in itself and in another?

Yes.

but, as exist-  
ing in another  
place than  
itself, of  
otherness.

Thus, then, as appears, the one will be other than itself?

True.

Well, then, if anything be other than anything, will it not be other than that which is other?

Certainly.

The one is  
proved to be  
also other than  
the not-one  
and so other  
than other.

And will not all things that are not one, be other than the one, and the one other than the not-one?

Of course.

Then the one will be other than the others?

True.

But, consider:—Are not the absolute same, and the absolute other, opposites to one another?

Of course.

Yet from an-  
other point of  
view neither  
the one nor  
the not-one  
can partake  
of otherness,  
and therefore  
cannot be  
other than  
one another.

Then will the same ever be in the other, or the other in the same?

They will not.

If then the other is never in the same, there is nothing in which the other is during any space of time; for during that space of time, however small, the other would be in the same. Is not that true?

Yes.

And since the other is never in the same, it can never be in anything that is.

True.

Then the other will never be either in the not-one, or in the one?

Certainly not.

Then not by reason of otherness is the one other than the not-one, or the not-one other than the one.

No.

Nor by reason of themselves will they be other than one another, if not partaking of the other.

How can they be?

But if they are not other, either by reason of themselves

or of the other, will they not altogether escape being other than one another?

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Again, the not-one cannot partake of the one; otherwise it would not have been not-one, but would have been in some way one.  
and therefore it cannot be number; and it cannot be part or whole of the one;

They will.

Again, the not-one cannot partake of the one; otherwise it would not have been not-one, but would have been in some way one.

True.

Nor can the not-one be number; for having number, it would not have been not-one at all.

It would not.

Again, is the not-one part of the one; or rather, would it not in that case partake of the one?

It would.

If then, in every point of view, the one and the not-one are distinct, then neither is the one part or whole of the not-one, nor is the not-one part or whole of the one?

No.

But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one another, nor other than one another, will be the same with one another:—so we said?

and therefore, according to our former table of relations, the one is the same with the not-one, the same with and also other than itself and others.

Yes.

Then shall we say that the one, being in this relation to the not-one, is the same with it?

Let us say so.

Then it is the same with itself and the others, and also other than itself and the others.

That appears to be the inference.

And it will also be like and unlike itself and the others?

Perhaps.

Since the one was shown to be other than the others, the others will also be other than the one.

It is like and unlike itself and other; for one and other are other than one another, yet other in the same degree.

Yes.

And the one is other than the others in the same degree that the others are other than it, and neither more nor less?

True.

And if neither more nor less, then in a like degree?

Yes.

In virtue of the affection by which the one is other than others and others in like manner other than it, the one will be affected like the others and the others like the one.

And therefore they are affected in the same manner.

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ARISTOTELES.For when we  
apply the  
same name,  
we imply the  
presence of  
the same  
nature.

How do you mean?

I may take as an illustration the case of names: You give  
a name to a thing?

Yes.

And you may say the name once or oftener?

Yes.

And when you say it once, you mention that of which it is  
the name? and when more than once, is it something else  
which you mention? or must it always be the same thing of  
which you speak, whether you utter the name once or more  
than once?

Of course it is the same.

And is not 'other' a name given to a thing?

Certainly.

Whenever, then, you use the word 'other,' whether once  
or oftener, you name that of which it is the name, and to no  
other do you give the name?

True.

Then when we say that the others are other than the one,  
and the one other than the others, in repeating the word  
'other' we speak of that nature to which the name is applied,  
and of no other?

Quite true.

Then the one which is other than others, and the other  
which is other than the one, in that the word 'other' is 148  
applied to both, will be in the same condition; and that  
which is in the same condition is like?

Yes.

Then in virtue of the affection by which the one is other  
than the others, every thing will be like every thing, for every  
thing is other than every thing.

True.

Again, the like is opposed to the unlike?

Yes.

And the other to the same?

True again.

And the one was also shown to be the same with the others?

Yes.

And to be the same with the others is the opposite of  
being other than the others?One, in that  
it is other than  
the others, is  
shown to be  
like; and  
therefore, in  
that it is the  
same with  
the others, to  
be unlike.



Certainly.

And in that it was other it was shown to be like?

Yes.

But in that it was the same it will be unlike by virtue of the opposite affection to that which made it like ; and this was the affection of otherness.

Yes.

The same then will make it unlike ; otherwise it will not be the opposite of the other.

True.

Then the one will be both like and unlike the others ; like in so far as it is other, and unlike in so far as it is the same.

Yes, that argument may be used.

And there is another argument.

What?

In so far as it is affected in the same way it is not affected otherwise, and not being affected otherwise is not unlike, and not being unlike, is like ; but in so far as it is affected by other it is otherwise, and being otherwise affected is unlike.

True.

Then because the one is the same with the others and other than the others, on either of these two grounds, or on both of them, it will be both like and unlike the others?

Certainly.

And in the same way as being other than itself and the same with itself, on either of these two grounds and on both of them, it will be like and unlike itself?

Of course.

Again, how far can the one touch or not touch itself and others?—consider.

I am considering.

The one was shown to be in itself which was a whole?

True.

And also in other things?

Yes.

In so far as it is in other things it would touch other things, but in so far as it is in itself it would be debarred from touching them, and would touch itself only.

Clearly.

Then the inference is that it would touch both?

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From another  
point of view  
the opposite  
consequences  
follow.

Again, the  
one will and  
will not touch  
both itself  
and others.

Being in  
both, it will  
touch both.

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It would.

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But what do you say to a new point of view? Must not that which is to touch another be next to that which it is to touch, and occupy the place nearest to that in which what it touches is situated?

True.

But if contact implies at least two separate things, one cannot touch itself,—for it cannot be two;

Then the one, if it is to touch itself, ought to be situated next to itself, and occupy the place next to that in which itself is?

It ought.

And that would require that the one should be two, and be in two places at once, and this, while it is one, will never happen. 149

No.

Then the one cannot touch itself any more than it can be two?

It cannot.

or other,—  
for 'other'  
cannot be  
'one' thing.

Neither can it touch others.

Why not?

The reason is, that whatever is to touch another must be in separation from, and next to, that which it is to touch, and no third thing can be between them.

True.

Two things, then, at the least are necessary to make contact possible?

They are.

And if to the two a third be added in due order, the number of terms will be three, and the contacts two?

Yes.

And every additional term makes one additional contact, whence it follows that the contacts are one less in number than the terms; the first two terms exceeded the number of contacts by one, and the whole number of terms exceeds the whole number of contacts by one in like manner; and for every one which is afterwards added to the number of terms, one contact is added to the contacts.

True.

Whatever is the whole number of things, the contacts will be always one less.

True.

But if there be only one, and not two, there will be no contact? *Parmenides.*

How can there be?

And do we not say that the others being other than the one are not one and have no part in the one?

True.

Then they have no number, if they have no one in them?

Of course not.

Then the others are neither one nor two, nor are they called by the name of any number?

No.

One, then, alone is one, and two do not exist?

Clearly not.

And if there are not two, there is no contact?

There is not.

Then neither does the one touch the others, nor the others the one, if there is no contact?

Certainly not.

For all which reasons the one touches and does not touch itself and the others?

True.

Further — is the one equal and unequal to itself and others? *The one is equal and unequal to itself and others;*

How do you mean?

If the one were greater or less than the others, or the others greater or less than the one, they would not be greater or less than each other in virtue of their being the one and the others; but, if in addition to their being what they are they had equality, they would be equal to one another, or if the one had smallness and the others greatness, or the one had greatness and the others smallness — whichever kind had greatness would be greater, and whichever had smallness would be smaller?

Certainly.

Then there are two such ideas as greatness and smallness; for if they were not they could not be opposed to each other and be present in that which is.

How could they?

150 If, then, smallness is present in the one it will be present either in the whole or in a part of the whole?

Certainly.

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equal, because, not partaking of greatness and smallness, it must partake of equality to itself and others :

Suppose the first ; it will be either co-equal and co-extensive with the whole one, or will contain the one?

Clearly.

If it be co-extensive with the one it will be co-equal with the one, or if containing the one it will be greater than the one?

Of course.

But can smallness be equal to anything or greater than anything, and have the functions of greatness and equality and not its own functions?

Impossible.

Then smallness cannot be in the whole of one, but, if at all, in a part only?

Yes.

And surely not in all of a part, for then the difficulty of the whole will recur ; it will be equal to or greater than any part in which it is.

Certainly.

Then smallness will not be in anything, whether in a whole or in a part ; nor will there be anything small but actual smallness.

True.

Neither will greatness be in the one, for if greatness be in anything there will be something greater other and besides greatness itself, namely, that in which greatness is ; and this too when the small itself is not there, which the one, if it is great, must exceed ; this, however, is impossible, seeing that smallness is wholly absent.

True.

But absolute greatness is only greater than absolute smallness, and smallness is only smaller than absolute greatness.

Very true.

Then other things are not greater or less than the one, if they have neither greatness nor smallness ; nor have greatness or smallness any power of exceeding or being exceeded in relation to the one, but only in relation to one another ; nor will the one be greater or less than them or others, if it has neither greatness nor smallness.

Clearly not.



Then if the one is neither greater nor less than the others, it cannot either exceed or be exceeded by them?

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Certainly not.

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And that which neither exceeds nor is exceeded, must be on an equality; and being on an equality, must be equal.

Of course.

And this will be true also of the relation of the one to itself; having neither greatness nor smallness in itself, it will neither exceed nor be exceeded by itself, but will be on an equality with and equal to itself.

Certainly.

Then the one will be equal both to itself and the others?

Clearly so.

And yet the one, being itself in itself, will also surround and be without itself; and, as containing itself, will be greater than itself; and, as contained in itself, will be less; and will thus be greater and less than itself.

Unequal to  
itself,—be-  
cause it  
contains and  
is contained  
in itself, and  
is therefore  
greater and  
less than  
itself.

It will.

Now there cannot possibly be anything which is not included in the one and the others?

Of course not.

But, surely, that which is must always be somewhere?

Yes.

But that which is in anything will be less, and that in which it is will be greater; in no other way can one thing be in another.

True.

And since there is nothing other or besides the one and the others, and they must be in something, must they not be in one another, the one in the others and the others in the one, if they are to be anywhere?

Unequal to  
others,—be-  
cause it con-  
tains and is  
contained in  
them, and  
is therefore  
greater and  
less than  
them.

That is clear.

But inasmuch as the one is in the others, the others will be greater than the one, because they contain the one, which will be less than the others, because it is contained in them; and inasmuch as the others are in the one, the one on the same principle will be greater than the others, and the others less than the one.

True.

The one, then, will be equal to and greater and less than itself and the others?

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Clearly.

And if it be greater and less and equal, it will be of equal and more and less measures or divisions than itself and the others, and if of measures, also of parts?

Of course.

That which is equal and unequal to itself and others, must be of a number of divisions or parts equal and unequal to itself and others.

And if of equal and more and less measures or divisions, it will be in number more or less than itself and the others, and likewise equal in number to itself and to the others?

How is that?

It will be of more measures than those things which it exceeds, and of as many parts as measures; and so with that to which it is equal, and that than which it is less.

True.

And being greater and less than itself, and equal to itself, it will be of equal measures with itself and of more and fewer measures than itself; and if of measures then also of parts?

It will.

And being of equal parts with itself, it will be numerically equal to itself; and being of more parts, more, and being of less, less than itself?

Certainly.

And the same will hold of its relation to other things; inasmuch as it is greater than them, it will be more in number than them; and inasmuch as it is smaller, it will be less in number; and inasmuch as it is equal in size to other things, it will be equal to them in number.

Certainly.

Once more, then, as would appear, the one will be in number both equal to and more and less than both itself and all other things.

It will.

Does one partake of time and become older and younger, and neither older nor younger than itself and others?

Does the one also partake of time? And is it and does it become older and younger than itself and others, and again, neither younger nor older than itself and others, by virtue of participation in time?

How do you mean?

If one is, being must be predicated of it?

Yes.

But to be (*elvai*) is only participation of being in present  
152 time, and to have been is the participation of being at a past  
time, and to be about to be is the participation of being at a  
future time?

Very true.

Then the one, since it partakes of being, partakes of time?

Certainly.

And is not time always moving forward?

Yes.

Then the one is always becoming older than itself, since it  
moves forward in time?

Certainly.

And do you remember that the older becomes older than  
that which becomes younger?

I remember.

Then since the one becomes older than itself, it becomes  
younger at the same time?

Certainly.

Thus, then, the one becomes older as well as younger than  
itself?

Yes.

And it is older (is it not?) when in becoming, it gets to the  
point of time between 'was' and 'will be,' which is 'now':  
for surely in going from the past to the future, it cannot skip  
the present?

No.

And when it arrives at the present it stops from becoming  
older, and no longer becomes, but is older, for if it went on,  
it would never be reached by the present, for it is the nature  
of that which goes on, to touch both the present and the  
future, letting go the present and seizing the future, while in  
process of becoming between them.

True.

But that which is becoming cannot skip the present; when  
it reaches the present it ceases to become, and is then what-  
ever it may happen to be becoming.

Clearly.

And so the one, when in becoming older it reaches the  
present, ceases to become, and is then older.

Certainly.

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The one is,  
and therefore  
partakes of  
time: and  
since time is  
always mov-  
ing forward,  
it becomes  
older than  
itself.

But older and  
younger are  
relative terms,  
and therefore  
that which be-  
comes older  
than itself  
must become  
also younger  
than itself.

One becomes  
older until it  
reaches the  
now or  
present;  
then it  
ceases to  
become and  
is older;

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ARISTOTELES.and also  
younger.It always is  
and becomes  
older and  
younger  
than itself;and since it is  
and becomes  
during the  
same time  
with itself is  
of the same  
age, and  
therefore  
neither older  
nor younger  
than itself.Is the one  
younger  
or older  
than other  
things?  
The less  
comes into  
being before  
the greater:  
the one is  
less than the  
many or  
others, and  
therefore  
comes into  
being before  
them and is  
older than  
they.

And it is older than that than which it was becoming older,  
and it was becoming older than itself.

Yes.

And that which is older is older than that which is  
younger?

True.

Then the one is younger than itself, when in becoming  
older it reaches the present?

Certainly.

But the present is always present with the one during all  
its being; for whenever it is it is always now.

Certainly.

Then the one always both is and becomes older and  
younger than itself?

Truly.

And is it or does it become a longer time than itself or  
an equal time with itself?

An equal time.

But if it becomes or is for an equal time with itself, it is  
of the same age with itself?

Of course.

And that which is of the same age, is neither older nor  
younger?

No.

The one, then, becoming and being the same time with  
itself, neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself? 153

I should say not.

And what are its relations to other things? Is it or does  
it become older or younger than they?

I cannot tell you.

You can at least tell me that others than the one are more  
than the one — other would have been one, but the others  
have multitude, and are more than one?

They will have multitude.

And a multitude implies a number larger than one?

Of course.

And shall we say that the lesser or the greater is the first  
to come or to have come into existence?

The lesser.

Then the least is the first? And that is the one?



Yes.

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Then the one of all things that have number is the first to come into being ; but all other things have also number, being plural and not singular.

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They have.

And since it came into being first it must be supposed to have come into being prior to the others, and the others later ; and the things which came into being later, are younger than that which preceded them? And so the other things will be younger than the one, and the one older than other things?

True.

What would you say of another question? Can the one have come into being contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible?

Impossible.

And yet, surely, the one was shown to have parts ; and if parts, then a beginning, middle and end?

The one has  
parts and  
comes into  
being with  
the last of  
them ;

Yes.

And a beginning, both of the one itself and of all other things, comes into being first of all ; and after the beginning, the others follow, until you reach the end?

Certainly.

And all these others we shall affirm to be parts of the whole and of the one, which, as soon as the end is reached, has become whole and one?

Yes ; that is what we shall say.

But the end comes last, and the one is of such a nature as to come into being with the last ; and, since the one cannot come into being except in accordance with its own nature, its nature will require that it should come into being after the others, simultaneously with the end.

and therefore  
it is younger  
than the  
others.  
But again,  
each part  
is one,

Clearly.

Then the one is younger than the others and the others older than the one.

That also is clear in my judgment.

Well, and must not a beginning or any other part of the one or of anything, if it be a part and not parts, being a part, be also of necessity one?

Certainly.

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and one comes  
into being  
together with  
each part, and  
so the one is  
neither older  
nor younger  
than the  
others but  
coeval.

And will not the one come into being together with each part — together with the first part when that comes into being, and together with the second part and with all the rest, and will not be wanting to any part, which is added to any other part until it has reached the last and become one whole; it will be wanting neither to the middle, nor to the first, nor to the last, nor to any of them, while the process of becoming is going on?

True.

Then the one is of the same age with all the others, so that if the one itself does not contradict its own nature, it will be neither prior nor posterior to the others, but simultaneous; and according to this argument the one will be neither older 154 nor younger than the others, nor the others than the one, but according to the previous argument the one will be older and younger than the others and the others than the one.

Certainly.

Again,  
nothing can  
become older  
or younger  
than it was at  
first in relation  
to something  
else, if an  
equal amount  
of time be  
added to both.  
This is true  
of the one  
and the other.

After this manner then the one is and has become. But as to its becoming older and younger than the others, and the others than the one, and neither older nor younger, what shall we say? Shall we say as of being so also of becoming, or otherwise?

I cannot answer.

But I can venture to say, that even if one thing were older or younger than another, it could not become older or younger in a greater degree than it was at first; for equals added to unequals, whether to periods of time or to anything else, leave the difference between them the same as at first.

Of course.

Then that which is, cannot become older or younger than that which is, since the difference of age is always the same; the one is and has become older and the other younger; but they are no longer becoming so.

True.

And the one which is does not therefore become either older or younger than the others which are.

No.

But consider whether they may not become older and younger in another way.

In what way?

Just as the one was proven to be older than the others and the others than the one.

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And what of that?

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If the one is older than the others, it has come into being a longer time than the others.

Yes.

But consider again; if we add equal time to a greater and a less time, will the greater differ from the less time by an equal or by a smaller portion than before?

But if an equal time be added to a greater and less, the relative difference between them diminishes; and so the one, which is older, will by such addition become younger than the others, and they in turn older than it.

By a smaller portion.

Then the difference between the age of the one and the age of the others will not be afterwards so great as at first, but if an equal time be added to both of them they will differ less and less in age?

Yes.

And that which differs in age from some other less than formerly, from being older will become younger in relation to that other than which it was older?

Yes, younger.

And if the one becomes younger the others aforesaid will become older than they were before, in relation to the one.

Certainly.

155 Then that which had become younger becomes older relatively to that which previously had become and was older; it never really is older, but is always becoming, for the one is always growing on the side of youth and the other on the side of age. And in like manner the older is always in process of becoming younger than the younger; for as they are always going in opposite directions they become in ways the opposite to one another, the younger older than the older, and the older younger than the younger. They cannot, however, have become; for if they had already become they would be and not merely become. But that is impossible; for they are always becoming both older and younger than one another: the one becomes younger than the others because it was seen to be older and prior, and the others become older than the one because they came into being later; and in the same way the others are in the same relation to the one, because they were seen to be older and prior to the one.

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That is clear. •

PARMENIDES,  
ARISTOTELES.

Inasmuch then, as one thing does not become older or younger than another, in that they always differ from each other by an equal number, the one cannot become older or younger than the others, nor the others than the one; but inasmuch as that which came into being earlier and that which came into being later must continually differ from each other by a different portion — in this point of view the others must become older and younger than the one, and the one than the others.

Certainly.

For all these reasons, then, the one is and becomes older and younger than itself and the others, and neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself or the others.

Certainly.

But since the one partakes of time, and partakes of becoming older and younger, must it not also partake of the past, the present, and the future?

Of course it must.

Then the one was and is and will be, and was becoming and is becoming and will become?

Certainly.

And there is and was and will be something which is in relation to it and belongs to it?

True.

And since we have at this moment opinion and knowledge and perception of the one, there is opinion and knowledge and perception of it?

Quite right.

Then there is name and expression for it, and it is named and expressed, and everything of this kind which appertains to other things appertains to the one.

Certainly, that is true.

Opposites  
cannot be  
predicated  
of the same  
thing at the  
same time

Yet once more and for the third time, let us consider: If the one is both one and many, as we have described, and is neither one nor many, and participates in time, must it not, in as far as it is one, at times partake of being, and in as far as it is not one, at times not partake of being?

Certainly.



But can it partake of being when not partaking of being, or not partake of being when partaking of being?

Impossible.

Then the one partakes and does not partake of being at different times, for that is the only way in which it can partake and not partake of the same.

True.

156 And is there not also a time at which it assumes being and relinquishes being—for how can it have and not have the same thing unless it receives and also gives it up at some time?

Impossible.

And the assuming of being is what you would call becoming?

I should.

And the relinquishing of being you would call destruction?

I should.

The one then, as would appear, becomes and is destroyed by taking and giving up being.

Certainly.

And being one and many and in process of becoming and being destroyed, when it becomes one it ceases to be many, and when many, it ceases to be one?

Certainly.

And as it becomes one and many, must it not inevitably experience separation and aggregation?

Inevitably.

And whenever it becomes like and unlike it must be assimilated and dissimilated?

Yes.

And when it becomes greater or less or equal it must grow or diminish or be equalized?

True.

And when being in motion it rests, and when being at rest it changes to motion, it can surely be in no time at all?

How can it?

But that a thing which is previously at rest should be afterwards in motion, or previously in motion and afterwards at rest, without experiencing change, is impossible.

Impossible.

*Parmenides.*

PARMENIDES,  
ARISTOTELES.

The one must therefore partake of being and not-being and assume them at different times.

How does the change take place?

*Parmenides*PARMENIDES,  
ARISTOTELES.

And surely there cannot be a time in which a thing can be at once neither in motion nor at rest?

There cannot.

But neither can it change without changing.

True.

When then does it change; for it cannot change either when at rest, or when in motion, or when in time?

It cannot.

And does this strange thing in which it is at the time of changing really exist?

What thing?

The moment. For the moment seems to imply a something out of which change takes place into either of two states; for the change is not from the state of rest as such, nor from the state of motion as such; but there is this curious nature which we call the moment lying between rest and motion, not being in any time; and into this and out of this what is in motion changes into rest, and what is at rest into motion.

So it appears.

And the one then, since it is at rest and also in motion, will change to either, for only in this way can it be in both. And in changing it changes in a moment, and when it is changing it will be in no time, and will not then be either in motion or at rest.

It will not.

And it will be in the same case in relation to the other changes, when it passes from being into cessation of being, or from not-being into becoming—then it passes between certain states of motion and rest, and neither is nor is not, nor becomes nor is destroyed.

Very true.

And on the same principle, in the passage from one to many and from many to one, the one is neither one nor many, neither separated nor aggregated; and in the passage from like to unlike, and from unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, neither in a state of assimilation nor of dissimilation; and in the passage from small to great and equal and back again, it will be neither small nor great, nor equal, nor in a state of increase, or diminution, or equalization.

As the one is always partaking of one of two opposites, the transition takes place in a moment.

Nature of the moment.

True.

*Parmenides.*

All these, then, are the affections of the one, if the one has being.

PARMENIDES,  
ARISTOTELES.

Of course.

i. aa. But if one is, what will happen to the others — is not that also to be considered?

The affections  
of the others, if  
the one is.

Yes.

Let us show then, if one is, what will be the affections of the others than the one.

Let us do so.

Inasmuch as there are things other than the one, the others are not the one; for if they were they could not be other than the one.

Things other  
than one are  
not the one,  
and yet they  
participate in  
the one; for  
the others are  
parts of a  
whole which  
is one.

Very true.

Nor are the others altogether without the one, but in a certain way they participate in the one.

In what way?

Because the others are other than the one inasmuch as they have parts; for if they had no parts they would be simply one.

Right.

And parts, as we affirm, have relation to a whole?

So we say.

And a whole must necessarily be one made up of many; and the parts will be parts of the one, for each of the parts is not a part of many, but of a whole.

How do you mean?

If anything were a part of many, being itself one of them, it will surely be a part of itself, which is impossible, and it will be a part of each one of the other parts, if of all; for if not a part of some one, it will be a part of all the others but this one, and thus will not be a part of each one; and if not a part of each one, it will not be a part of any one of the many; and not being a part of any one, it cannot be a part or anything else of all those things of none of which it is anything.

Clearly not.

Then the part is not a part of the many, nor of all, but is of a certain single form, which we call a whole, being one

*Parmenides.*PARMENIDES,  
ARISTOTELES.Again, each  
part is not  
only a part  
but also a  
perfect whole  
in itself.

perfect unity framed out of all — of this the part will be a part.

Certainly.

If, then, the others have parts, they will participate in the whole and in the one.

True.

Then the others than the one must be one perfect whole, having parts.

Certainly.

And the same argument holds of each part, for the part must participate in the one; for if each of the parts is a part, 158 this means, I suppose, that it is one separate from the rest and self-related; otherwise it is not each.

True.

But when we speak of the part participating in the one, it must clearly be other than one; for if not, it would not merely have participated, but would have been one; whereas only the one itself can be one.

Very true.

The whole  
and the part  
are both one,  
and therefore  
they must  
participate  
in the one  
and be other  
than the one,  
and more  
than one and  
infinite in  
number.

Both the whole and the part must participate in the one; for the whole will be one whole, of which the parts will be parts; and each part will be one part of the whole which is the whole of the part.

True.

And will not the things which participate in the one, be other than it?

Of course.

And the things which are other than the one will be many; for if the things which are other than the one were neither one nor more than one, they would be nothing.

True.

But, seeing that the things which participate in the one as a part, and in the one as a whole, are more than one, must not those very things which participate in the one be infinite in number?

How so?

Let us look at the matter thus:—Is it not a fact that in partaking of the one they are not one, and do not partake of the one at the very time when they are partaking of it?



Clearly.

*Parmenides.*

They do so then as multitudes in which the one is not present?

PARMENIDES,  
ARISTOTELES.

Very true.

And if we were to abstract from them in idea the very smallest fraction, must not that least fraction, if it does not partake of the one, be a multitude and not one?

It must.

And if we continue to look at the other side of their nature, regarded simply, and in itself, will not they, as far as we see them, be unlimited in number?

The others  
unlimited and  
also limited  
in their  
nature,

Certainly.

And yet, when each several part becomes a part, then the parts have a limit in relation to the whole and to each other, and the whole in relation to the parts.

Just so.

The result to the others than the one is that the union of themselves and the one appears to create a new element in them which gives to them limitation in relation to one another; whereas in their own nature they have no limit.

That is clear.

Then the others than the one, both as whole and parts, are infinite, and also partake of limit.

both as whole  
and parts.

Certainly.

Then they are both like and unlike one another and themselves.

Wherefore  
also they are  
like and  
unlike.

How is that?

Inasmuch as they are unlimited in their own nature, they are all affected in the same way.

True.

And inasmuch as they all partake of limit, they are all affected in the same way.

Of course.

But inasmuch as their state is both limited and unlimited, they are affected in opposite ways.

Yes.

159 And opposites are the most unlike of things.

Certainly.

Considered, then, in regard to either one of their affections, they will be like themselves and one another; considered in

*Parmenides.* reference to both of them together, most opposed and most unlike.

PARMENIDES,  
ARISTOTELES.

That appears to be true.

Then the others are both like and unlike themselves and one another?

True.

And they are the same and also different from one another, and in motion and at rest, and experience every sort of opposite affection, as may be proved without difficulty of them, since they have been shown to have experienced the affections aforesaid?

True.

A reversal of  
former con-  
clusions.

i. bb. Suppose, now, that we leave the further discussion of these matters as evident, and consider again upon the hypothesis that the one is, whether the opposite of all this is or is not equally true of the others.

By all means.

Then let us begin again, and ask, If one is, what must be the affections of the others?

Let us ask that question.

Must not the one be distinct from the others, and the others from the one?

Why so?

Why, because there is nothing else beside them which is distinct from both of them; for the expression 'one and the others' includes all things.

Yes, all things.

Then we cannot suppose that there is anything different from them in which both the one and the others might exist?

There is nothing.

Then the one and the others are never in the same?

True:

Then they are separated from each other?

Yes.

And we surely cannot say that what is truly one has parts?

Impossible.

Then the one will not be in the others as a whole, nor as part, if it be separated from the others, and has no parts?

Impossible.

One and the  
others are  
never in the  
same, for  
there is  
nothing out-  
side them in  
which they  
can jointly  
partake, and  
therefore  
they must  
be always  
distinct.

Then there is no way in which the others can partake of the one, if they do not partake either in whole or in part?

It would seem not.

Then there is no way in which the others are one, or have in themselves any unity?

There is not.

Nor are the others many; for if they were many, each part of them would be a part of the whole; but now the others, not partaking in any way of the one, are neither one nor many, nor whole, nor part.

True.

Then the others neither are nor contain two or three, if entirely deprived of the one?

True.

Then the others are neither like nor unlike the one, nor is likeness and unlikeness in them; for if they were like and unlike, or had in them likeness and unlikeness, they would have two natures in them opposite to one another.

That is clear.

But for that which partakes of nothing to partake of two things was held by us to be impossible?

Impossible.

160 Then the others are neither like nor unlike nor both, for if they were like or unlike they would partake of one of those two natures, which would be one thing, and if they were both they would partake of opposites which would be two things, and this has been shown to be impossible.

True.

Therefore they are neither the same, nor other, nor in motion, nor at rest, nor in a state of becoming, nor of being destroyed, nor greater, nor less, nor equal, nor have they experienced anything else of the sort; for, if they are capable of experiencing any such affection, they will participate in one and two and three, and odd and even, and in these, as has been proved, they do not participate, seeing that they are altogether and in every way devoid of the one.

Very true.

Therefore if one is, the one is all things, and also nothing, both in relation to itself and to other things.

Certainly.

*Parmenides.*

PARMENIDES,  
ARISTOTELES.

And the  
others being  
separated  
from the one  
cannot be  
either one  
or many.

Nor can they  
be opposites;  
for they can-  
not partake  
of two things  
if they can-  
not partake  
of one.

The others  
without the  
one = o.

The one is  
all things;  
but also  
nothing  
(141 E, 142).

*Parmenides.*  
 PARMENIDES,  
 ARISTOTELES.

If the one is  
 not, what  
 then?

ii. a. Well, and ought we not to consider next what will be the consequence if the one is not?

Yes; we ought.

What is the meaning of the hypothesis — If the one is not; is there any difference between this and the hypothesis — If the not one is not?

There is a difference, certainly.

Is there a difference only, or rather are not the two expressions — if the one is not, and if the not one is not, entirely opposed?

They are entirely opposed.

And suppose a person to say:— If greatness is not, if smallness is not, or anything of that sort, does he not mean, whenever he uses such an expression, that 'what is not' is other than other things?

To be sure.

What is the  
 meaning of  
 'the one  
 which is not'?

And so when he says 'If one is not' he clearly means, that what 'is not' is other than all others; we know what he means — do we not?

Yes, we do.

It sometimes  
 means other  
 than or dif-  
 ferent from  
 other things;  
 and therefore  
 has difference,  
 etc.

When he says 'one,' he says something which is known; and secondly something which is other than all other things; it makes no difference whether he predicate of one being or not-being, for that which is said 'not to be' is known to be something all the same, and is distinguished from other things.

Certainly.

Then I will begin again, and ask: If one is not, what are the consequences? In the first place, as would appear, there is a knowledge of it, or the very meaning of the words, 'if one is not,' would not be known.

True.

Secondly, the others differ from it, or it could not be described as different from the others?

Certainly.

Difference, then, belongs to it as well as knowledge; for in speaking of the one as different from the others, we do not speak of a difference in the others, but in the one.

Clearly so.

Moreover, the one that is not is something and partakes of relation to 'that,' and 'this,' and 'these,' and the like, and is an



attribute of 'this'; for the one, or the others than the one, could not have been spoken of, nor could any attribute or relative of the one that is not have been or been spoken of, nor could it have been said to be anything, if it did not partake of 'some,' or of the other relations just now mentioned.

True.

Being, then, cannot be ascribed to the one, since it is not;  
161 but the one that is not may or rather must participate in many things, if it and nothing else is not; if, however, neither the one nor the one that is not is supposed not to be, and we are speaking of something of a different nature, we can predicate nothing of it. But supposing that the one that is not and nothing else is not, then it must participate in the predicate 'that,' and in many others.

Certainly.

And it will have unlikeness in relation to the others, for the others being different from the one will be of a different kind.

Certainly.

And are not things of a different kind also other in kind?

Of course.

And are not things other in kind unlike?

They are unlike.

And if they are unlike the one, that which they are unlike will clearly be unlike them?

Clearly so.

Then the one will have unlikeness in respect of which the others are unlike it?

That would seem to be true.

And if unlikeness to other things is attributed to it, it must have likeness to itself.

How so?

If the one have unlikeness to one, something else must be meant; nor will the hypothesis relate to one; but it will relate to something other than one?

Quite so.

But that cannot be.

No.

Then the one must have likeness to itself?

It must.

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*Parmenides.*  
PARMENIDES,  
ARISTOTELES.

It is unlike  
the others,  
and must  
therefore  
have like-  
ness to  
itself.

*Parmenides.*

PARMENIDES,  
ARISTOTELES.

The one which  
is not is un-  
equal to the  
others and the  
others to it.

Again, it is not equal to the others; for if it were equal, then it would at once be and be like them in virtue of the equality; but if one has no being, then it can neither be nor be like?

It cannot.

But since it is not equal to the others, neither can the others be equal to it?

Certainly not.

And things that are not equal are unequal?

True.

And they are unequal to an unequal?

Of course.

Then the one partakes of inequality, and in respect of this the others are unequal to it?

Very true.

And inequality implies greatness and smallness?

Yes.

Then the one, if of such a nature, has greatness and smallness?

That appears to be true.

And greatness and smallness always stand apart?

True.

Then there is always something between them?

There is.

And can you think of anything else which is between them other than equality?

No, it is equality which lies between them.

Then that which has greatness and smallness also has equality, which lies between them?

That is clear.

Then the one, which is not, partakes, as would appear, of greatness and smallness and equality?

Clearly.

Further, it must surely in a sort partake of being?

How so?

It must be so, for if not, then we should not speak the truth in saying that the one is not. But if we speak the truth, clearly we must say what is. Am I not right?

Yes.

And since we affirm that we speak truly, we must also affirm that we say what is?

But partak-  
ing of in-  
equality, it  
partakes also  
of greatness  
and smallness,  
and therefore  
of equality  
which lies be-  
tween them;

it must surely  
partake of be-  
ing in a sense;

Certainly.

Then, as would appear, the one, when it is not, is; for if it were not to be when it is not, but<sup>1</sup> were to relinquish something of being, so as to become not-being, it would at once be.

Quite true.

Then the one which is not, if it is to maintain itself, must have the being of not-being as the bond of not-being, just as being must have as a bond the not-being of not-being in order to perfect its own being; for the truest assertion of the being of being and of the not-being of not-being is when being partakes of the being of being, and not of the being of not-being — that is, the perfection of being; and when not-being does not partake of the not-being of not-being but of the being of not-being — that is the perfection of not-being.

Most true.

Since then what is partakes of not-being, and what is not of being, must not the one also partake of being in order not to be?

Certainly.

Then the one, if it is not, clearly has being?

Clearly.

And has not-being also, if it is not?

Of course.

But can anything which is in a certain state not be in that state without changing?

Impossible.

Then everything which is and is not in a certain state, implies change?

Certainly.

And change is motion — we may say that?

Yes, motion.

And the one has been proved both to be and not to be?

Yes.

And therefore is and is not in the same state?

Yes.

Thus the one that is not has been shown to have motion also, because it changes from being to not-being?

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PARMENIDES,  
ARISTOTELES.

for not-being  
implies being  
and being  
implies not-  
being.

But to be  
both, it must  
change from  
one to the  
other, and  
therefore be  
in motion.

<sup>1</sup> Or, 'to remit something of existence in relation to not-being.'

*Parmenides.*

That appears to be true.

PARMENIDES,  
ARISTOTELES.

But surely if it is nowhere among what is, as is the fact, since it is not, it cannot change from one place to another?

How can  
it change?  
Not (a) by  
change of  
place, nor  
(b) by re-  
volving in  
the same  
place,

Impossible.

Then it cannot move by changing place?

No.

Nor can it turn on the same spot, for it nowhere touches the same, for the same is, and that which is not cannot be reckoned among things that are?

It cannot.

Then the one, if it is not, cannot turn in that in which it is not?

No.

nor (c) by  
change of  
nature.

Neither can the one, whether it is or is not, be altered into other than itself, for if it altered and became different from itself, then we could not be still speaking of the one, but of something else?

True.

It is therefore  
unmoved;

But if the one neither suffers alteration, nor turns round in the same place, nor changes place, can it still be capable of motion?

Impossible.

and being  
unmoved,  
it must be  
at rest.

Now that which is unmoved must surely be at rest, and that which is at rest must stand still?

Certainly.

Then the one that is not, stands still, and is also in motion?

That seems to be true.

But motion  
implies  
alteration.

But if it be in motion it must necessarily undergo alteration, for anything which is moved, in so far as it is moved, is no longer in the same state, but in another? 163

Yes.

Then the one, being moved, is altered?

Yes.

And, further, if not moved in any way, it will not be altered in any way?

No.

Then, in so far as the one that is not is moved, it is altered, but in so far as it is not moved, it is not altered?

Right.

Then the one that is not is altered and is not altered?



That is clear.

*Farmenides.*

And must not that which is altered become other than it previously was, and lose its former state and be destroyed; but that which is not altered can neither come into being nor be destroyed?

PARMENIDES,  
ARISTOTELES.

The one that is not becomes and is destroyed, and neither becomes nor is destroyed.

Very true.

And the one that is not, being altered, becomes and is destroyed; and not being altered, neither becomes nor is destroyed; and so the one that is not becomes and is destroyed, and neither becomes nor is destroyed?

True.

ii. b. And now, let us go back once more to the beginning, and see whether these or some other consequences will follow.

Let us do as you say.

If one is not, we ask what will happen in respect of one? That is the question.

If one is not,  
what then?

Yes.

Do not the words 'is not' signify absence of being in that to which we apply them?

'Is not' implies absence of being in the most absolute sense.

Just so.

And when we say that a thing is not, do we mean that it is not in one way but is in another? or do we mean, absolutely, that what is not has in no sort or way or kind participation of being?

Quite absolutely.

Then, that which is not cannot be, or in any way participate in being?

It cannot.

And did we not mean by becoming, and being destroyed, the assumption of being and the loss of being?

The one which is not cannot either have or lose or assume being,

Nothing else.

And can that which has no participation in being, either assume or lose being?

Impossible.

The one then, since it in no way is, cannot have or lose or assume being in any way?

True.

Then the one that is not, since it in no way partakes of being, neither perishes nor becomes?

*Parmenides.*

No.

PARMENIDES,

ARISTOTELES.

Then it is not altered at all; for if it were it would become  
and be destroyed?

nor be altered  
nor be in  
motion,

True.

But if it be not altered it cannot be moved?

Certainly not.

nor yet at  
rest.

Nor can we say that it stands, if it is nowhere; for  
that which stands must always be in one and the same  
spot?

Of course.

Then we must say that the one which is not never stands  
still and never moves?

Neither.

It has no  
attributes and  
no conditions  
of any kind.

Nor is there any existing thing which can be attributed to  
it; for if there had been, it would partake of being?

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That is clear.

And therefore neither smallness, nor greatness, nor equality,  
can be attributed to it?

No.

Nor yet likeness nor difference, either in relation to itself  
or to others?

Clearly not.

Well, and if nothing should be attributed to it, can other  
things be attributed to it?

Certainly not.

And therefore other things can neither be like or unlike,  
the same, or different in relation to it?

They cannot.

Nor can what is not, be anything, or be this thing, or be  
related to or the attribute of this or that or other, or be past,  
present, or future. Nor can knowledge, or opinion, or per-  
ception, or expression, or name, or any other thing that is,  
have any concern with it?

No.

Then the one that is not has no condition of any kind?

Such appears to be the conclusion.

Again, If one  
is not, what  
happens to  
the others?

ii. aa. Yet once more; if one is not, what becomes of the  
others? Let us determine that.

Yes; let us determine that.

The others must surely be; for if they, like the one, were not, we could not be now speaking of them. *Parmenides.*

True.

*PARMENIDES,  
ARISTOTELES.*

But to speak of the others implies difference — the terms 'other' and 'different' are synonymous?

True.

Other means other than other, and different, different from the different?

*Other implies difference; it cannot mean other than the one; and therefore the others are other than each other,*

Yes.

Then, if there are to be others, there is something than which they will be other?

Certainly.

And what can that be?— for if the one is not, they will not be other than the one.

They will not.

Then they will be other than each other; for the only remaining alternative is that they are other than nothing.

True.

And they are each other than one another, as being plural and not singular; for if one is not, they cannot be singular, but every particle of them is infinite in number; and even if a person takes that which appears to be the smallest fraction, this, which seemed one, in a moment evanesces into many, as in a dream, and from being the smallest becomes very great, in comparison with the fractions into which it is split up?

*and each of them, though devoid of the one, appears to be one.*

Very true.

And in such particles the others will be other than one another, if others are, and the one is not?

Exactly.

And will there not be many particles, each appearing to be one, but not being one, if one is not?

True.

And it would seem that number can be predicated of them if each of them appears to be one, though it is really many?

It can.

And there will seem to be odd and even among them, which will also have no reality, if one is not?

Yes.

And there will appear to be a least among them; and even

*Parmenides.* this will seem large and manifold in comparison with the many small fractions which are contained in it? 165

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ARISTOTELES.

Certainly.

And each particle will be imagined to be equal to the many and little; for it could not have appeared to pass from the greater to the less without having appeared to arrive at the middle; and thus would arise the appearance of equality.

Yes.

And having neither beginning, middle, nor end, each separate particle yet appears to have a limit in relation to itself and other.

How so?

Because, when a person conceives of any one of these as such, prior to the beginning another beginning appears, and there is another end, remaining after the end, and in the middle truer middles within but smaller, because no unity can be conceived of any of them, since the one is not.

Very true.

And so all being, whatever we think of, must be broken up into fractions, for a particle will have to be conceived of without unity?

Certainly.

When seen at  
a distance the  
others appear  
to be one;  
when near,  
many and  
infinite.

And such being when seen indistinctly and at a distance, appears to be one; but when seen near and with keen intellect, every single thing appears to be infinite, since it is deprived of the one, which is not?

Nothing more certain.

Then each of the others must appear to be infinite and finite, and one and many, if others than the one exist and not the one.

They must.

Then will they not appear to be like and unlike?

In what way?

Just as in a picture things appear to be all one to a person standing at a distance, and to be in the same state and alike?

True.

But when you approach them, they appear to be many and different; and because of the appearance of the difference, different in kind from, and unlike, themselves?

True.



And so must the particles appear to be like and unlike themselves and each other. *Parmenides.*

Certainly.

PARMENIDES,  
ARISTOTELES.

And must they not be the same and yet different from one another, and in contact with themselves, although they are separated, and having every sort of motion, and every sort of rest, and becoming and being destroyed, and in neither state, and the like, all which things may be easily enumerated, if the one is not and the many are?

Most true.

ii. bb. Once more, let us go back to the beginning, and ask if the one is not, and the others of the one are, what will follow.

If one is not and the others are, what then? The others are not one and therefore not many.

Let us ask that question.

In the first place, the others will not be one?

Impossible.

Nor will they be many; for if they were many one would be contained in them. But if no one of them is one, all of them are nought, and therefore they will not be many.

True.

If there be no one in the others, the others are neither many nor one.

166 They are not.

Nor do they appear either as one or many.

Why not?

Because the others have no sort or manner or way of communion with any sort of not-being, nor can anything which is not, be connected with any of the others; for that which is not has no parts.

Again, if the others appear to be one or many they must in some sense partake of not-being; but this is not the case.

True.

Nor is there an opinion or any appearance of not-being in connexion with the others, nor is not-being ever in any way attributed to the others.

No.

Then if one is not, there is no conception of any of the others either as one or many; for you cannot conceive the many without the one.

You cannot.

*Parmenides.*

Then if one is not, the others neither are, nor can be conceived to be either one or many?

PARMENIDES,  
ARISTOTELES.

It would seem not.

Nor as like or unlike?

No.

Nor are they  
like or unlike,  
the same or  
different.

Nor as the same or different, nor in contact or separation, nor in any of those states which we enumerated as appearing to be ;— the others neither are nor appear to be any of these, if one is not?

True.

Then may we not sum up the argument in a word and say truly: If one is not, then nothing is?

Certainly.

Let thus much be said; and further let us affirm what seems to be the truth, that, whether one is or is not, one and the others in relation to themselves and one another, all of them, in every way, are and are not, and appear to be and appear not to be.

Most true.

THEAETETUS.





## INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.

SOME dialogues of Plato are of so various a character that their relation to the other dialogues cannot be determined with any degree of certainty. The Theaetetus, like the Parmenides, has points of similarity both with his earlier and his later writings. The perfection of style, the humour, the dramatic interest, the complexity of structure, the fertility of illustration, the shifting of the points of view, are characteristic of his best period of authorship. The vain search, the negative conclusion, the figure of the midwives, the constant profession of ignorance on the part of Socrates, also bear the stamp of the early dialogues, in which the original Socrates is not yet Platonized. Had we no other indications, we should be disposed to range the Theaetetus with the Apology and the Phaedrus, and perhaps even with the Protagoras and the Laches.

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But when we pass from the style to an examination of the subject, we trace a connexion with the later rather than with the earlier dialogues. In the first place there is the connexion, indicated by Plato himself at the end of the dialogue, with the Sophist, to which in many respects the Theaetetus is so little akin. (1) The same persons reappear, including the younger Socrates, whose name is just mentioned in the Theaetetus (147 C); (2) the theory of rest, which at p. 133 D Socrates has declined to consider, is resumed by the Eleatic Stranger; (3) there is a similar allusion in both dialogues to the meeting of Parmenides and Socrates (Theaet. 183 E, Soph. 217); and (4) the inquiry into not-being in the Sophist supplements the question of false opinion which is raised in the Theaetetus. (Compare also Theaet. 168 A, 210, and Soph. 230 B; Theaet. 174 D, E, and Soph. 227 A; Theaet. 188 E, and Soph. 237 D; Theaet. 179 A, and Soph. 233 B; Theaet. 172 D, Soph. 253 C, for parallel turns of thought.) Secondly, the later date of the

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dialogue is confirmed by the absence of the doctrine of recollection and of any doctrine of ideas except that which derives them from generalization and from reflection of the mind upon itself. The general character of the *Theaetetus* is dialectical, and there are traces of the same Megarian influences which appear in the *Parmenides*, and which later writers, in their matter of fact way, have explained by the residence of Plato at Megara. Socrates disclaims the character of a professional eristic (164 C), and also, with a sort of ironical admiration, expresses his inability to attain the Megarian precision in the use of terms (197 A). Yet he too employs a similar sophistical skill in overturning every conceivable theory of knowledge.

The direct indications of a date amount to no more than this: the conversation is said to have taken place when *Theaetetus* was a youth, and shortly before the death of Socrates. At the time of his own death he is supposed to be a full-grown man. Allowing nine or ten years for the interval between youth and manhood, the dialogue could not have been written earlier than 390, when Plato was about thirty-nine years of age. No more definite date is indicated by the engagement in which *Theaetetus* is said to have fallen or to have been wounded, and which may have taken place any time during the Corinthian war, between the years 390–387. The later date which has been suggested, 369, when the Athenians and Lacedaemonians disputed the Isthmus with Epaminondas, would make the age of *Theaetetus* at his death forty-five or forty-six. This a little impairs the beauty of Socrates' remark, that 'he would be a great man if he lived.'

In this uncertainty about the place of the *Theaetetus*, it seemed better, as in the case of the *Republic*, *Timaeus*, *Critias*, to retain the order in which Plato himself has arranged this and the two companion dialogues. We cannot exclude the possibility which has been already noticed in reference to other works of Plato, that the *Theaetetus* may not have been all written continuously; or the probability that the *Sophist* and *Politicus*, which differ greatly in style, were only appended after a long interval of time. The allusion to *Parmenides* at 183, compared with *Sophist* 217, would probably imply that the dialogue which is called by his name was already in existence; unless, indeed, we suppose the passage in which the allusion occurs to have been inserted afterwards.

Again, the Theaetetus may be connected with the Gorgias, either dialogue from different points of view containing an analysis of the real and apparent (Schleiermacher); and both may be brought into relation with the Apology as illustrating the personal life of Socrates. The Philebus, too, may with equal reason be placed either after or before what, in the language of Thrasyllus, may be called the Second Platonic Trilogy. Both the Parmenides and the Sophist, and still more the Theaetetus, have points of affinity with the Cratylus, in which the principles of rest and motion are again contrasted, and the Sophistical or Protagorean theory of language is opposed to that which is attributed to the disciple of Heracleitus, not to speak of lesser resemblances in thought and language. The Parmenides, again, has been thought by some to hold an intermediate position between the Theaetetus and the Sophist; upon this view, Soph. 250 foll. may be regarded as the answer to the problems about One and Being which have been raised in the Parmenides. Any of these arrangements may suggest new views to the student of Plato; none of them can lay claim to an exclusive probability in its favour.

The Theaetetus is one of the narrated dialogues of Plato, and is the only one which is supposed to have been written down. In a short introductory scene, Euclides and Terpsion are described as meeting before the door of Euclides' house in Megara. This may have been a spot familiar to Plato (for Megara was within a walk of Athens), but no importance can be attached to the accidental introduction of the founder of the Megarian philosophy. The real intention of the preface is to create an interest about the person of Theaetetus, who has just been carried up from the army at Corinth in a dying state. The expectation of his death recalls the promise of his youth, and especially the famous conversation which Socrates had with him when he was quite young, a few days before his own trial and death, as we are once more reminded at the end of the dialogue. Yet we may observe that Plato has himself forgotten this, when he represents Euclides as from time to time coming to Athens and correcting the copy from Socrates' own mouth. The narrative, having introduced Theaetetus, and having guaranteed the authenticity of the dialogue (cp. Symposium, Phaedo, Parmenides), is then dropped. No further use is made of the device. As Plato himself remarks, who in this as in some other minute

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points is imitated by Cicero (*De Amicitia*, c. i), the interlocutory words are omitted.

Theaetetus, the hero of the battle of Corinth and of the dialogue, is a disciple of Theodorus, the great geometrician, whose science is thus indicated to be the propaedeutic to philosophy. An interest has been already excited about him by his approaching death, and now he is introduced to us anew by the praises of his master Theodorus. He is a youthful Socrates, and exhibits the same contrast of the fair soul and the ungainly face and frame, the Silenus mask and the god within, which are described in the *Symposium*. The picture which Theodorus gives of his courage and patience and intelligence and modesty is verified in the course of the dialogue. His courage is shown by his behaviour in the battle, and his other qualities shine forth as the argument proceeds. Socrates takes an evident delight in 'the wise Theaetetus,' who has more in him than 'many bearded men'; he is quite inspired by his answers. At first the youth is lost in wonder, and is almost too modest to speak (151 E), but, encouraged by Socrates, he rises to the occasion, and grows full of interest and enthusiasm about the great question. Like a youth (162 D), he has not finally made up his mind, and is very ready to follow the lead of Socrates, and to enter into each successive phase of the discussion which turns up. His great dialectical talent is shown in his power of drawing distinctions (163 E), and of foreseeing the consequences of his own answers (154 D). The enquiry about the nature of knowledge is not new to him; long ago he has felt the 'pang of philosophy,' and has experienced the youthful intoxication which is depicted in the *Philebus* (p. 15). But he has hitherto been unable to make the transition from mathematics to metaphysics. He can form a general conception of square and oblong numbers (p. 148), but he is unable to attain a similar expression of knowledge in the abstract. Yet at length (p. 185) he begins to recognize that there are universal conceptions of being, likeness, sameness, number, which the mind contemplates in herself, and with the help of Socrates is conducted from a theory of sense to a theory of ideas.

There is no reason to doubt that Theaetetus was a real person, whose name survived in the next generation. But neither can any importance be attached to the notices of him in Suidas and Proclus, which are probably based on the mention of him in Plato.



According to a confused statement in Suidas, who mentions him twice over, first, as a pupil of Socrates, and then of Plato, he is said to have written the first work on the Five Solids. But no early authority cites the work, the invention of which may have been easily suggested by the division of roots, which Plato attributes to him, and the allusion to the backward state of solid geometry in the Republic (vii. 528 B). At any rate, there is no occasion to recall him to life again after the battle of Corinth, in order that we may allow time for the completion of such a work (Müller). We may also remark that such a supposition entirely destroys the pathetic interest of the introduction.

Theodorus, the geometrician, had once been the friend and disciple of Protagoras, but he is very reluctant to leave his retirement and defend his old master. He is too old to learn Socrates' game of question and answer, and prefers the digressions to the main argument, because he finds them easier to follow. The mathematician, as Socrates says in the Republic, is not capable of giving a reason in the same manner as the dialectician (vii. 531 D, E), and Theodorus could not therefore have been appropriately introduced as the chief respondent. But he may be fairly appealed to, when the honour of his master is at stake. He is the 'guardian of his orphans,' although this is a responsibility which he wishes to throw upon Callias, the friend and patron of all Sophists, declaring that he himself had early 'run away' from philosophy, and was absorbed in mathematics. His extreme dislike to the Heraclitean fanatics, which may be compared with the dislike of Theaetetus (155 E) to the materialists, and his ready acceptance of the noble words of Socrates (175, 176), are noticeable traits of character.

The Socrates of the Theaetetus is the same as the Socrates of the earlier dialogues. He is the invincible disputant, now advanced in years, of the Protagoras and Symposium; he is still pursuing his divine mission, his 'Herculean labours,' of which he has described the origin in the Apology; and he still hears the voice of his oracle, bidding him receive or not receive the truant souls. There he is supposed to have a mission to convict men of self-conceit; in the Theaetetus he has assigned to him by God the functions of a man-midwife, who delivers men of their thoughts, and under this character he is present throughout the dialogue. He is the true prophet who has an insight into the natures of men,

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and can divine their future (142 C); and he knows that sympathy is the secret power which unlocks their thoughts. The hit at Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, who was specially committed to his charge in the Laches, may be remarked by the way. The attempt to discover the definition of knowledge is in accordance with the character of Socrates as he is described in the *Memorabilia*, asking What is justice? what is temperance? and the like. But there is no reason to suppose that he would have analyzed the nature of perception, or traced the connexion of Protagoras and Heracleitus, or have raised the difficulty respecting false opinion. The humorous illustrations, as well as the serious thoughts, run through the dialogue. The snubnosedness of Theaetetus, a characteristic which he shares with Socrates, and the man-midwifery of Socrates, are not forgotten in the closing words. At the end of the dialogue, as in the *Euthyphro*, he is expecting to meet Meletus at the porch of the king Archon; but with the same indifference to the result which is everywhere displayed by him, he proposes that they shall reassemble on the following day at the same spot. The day comes, and in the *Sophist* the three friends again meet, but no further allusion is made to the trial, and the principal share in the argument is assigned, not to Socrates, but to an Eleatic stranger; the youthful Theaetetus also plays a different and less independent part. And there is no allusion in the Introduction to the second and third dialogues, which are afterwards appended. There seems, therefore, reason to think that there is a real change, both in the characters and in the design.

The dialogue is an enquiry into the nature of knowledge, which is interrupted by two digressions. The first is the digression about the midwives, which is also a leading thought or continuous image, like the wave in the *Republic*, appearing and reappearing at intervals. Again and again we are reminded that the successive conceptions of knowledge are extracted from Theaetetus, who in his turn truly declares that Socrates has got a great deal more out of him than ever was in him. Socrates is never weary of working out the image in humorous details,—discerning the symptoms of labour, carrying the child round the hearth, fearing that Theaetetus will bite him, comparing his conceptions to wind-eggs, asserting an hereditary right to the occupation. There is also a

serious side to the image, which is an apt similitude of the Socratic theory of education (cp. *Repub.* vii. 518 D, *Sophist* 230), and accords with the ironical spirit in which the wisest of men delights to speak of himself.

The other digression is the famous contrast of the lawyer and philosopher. This is a sort of landing-place or break in the middle of the dialogue. At the commencement of a great discussion, the reflection naturally arises, How happy are they who, like the philosopher, have time for such discussions (cp. *Rep.* v. 450)! There is no reason for the introduction of such a digression; nor is a reason always needed, any more than for the introduction of an episode in a poem, or of a topic in conversation. That which is given by Socrates is quite sufficient, viz. that the philosopher may talk and write as he pleases. But though not very closely connected, neither is the digression out of keeping with the rest of the dialogue. The philosopher naturally desires to pour forth the thoughts which are always present to him, and to discourse of the higher life. The idea of knowledge, although hard to be defined, is realised in the life of philosophy. And the contrast is the favourite antithesis between the world, in the various characters of sophist, lawyer, statesman, speaker, and the philosopher,—between opinion and knowledge,—between the conventional and the true.

The greater part of the dialogue is devoted to setting up and throwing down definitions of science and knowledge. Proceeding from the lower to the higher by three stages, in which perception, opinion, reasoning are successively examined, we first get rid of the confusion of the idea of knowledge and specific kinds of knowledge,—a confusion which has been already noticed in the *Lysis*, *Laches*, *Meno*, and other dialogues. In the infancy of logic, a form of thought has to be invented before the content can be filled up. We cannot define knowledge until the nature of definition has been ascertained. Having succeeded in making his meaning plain, Socrates proceeds to analyze (1) the first definition which Theaetetus proposes: 'Knowledge is sensible perception.' This is speedily identified with the Protagorean saying, 'Man is the measure of all things;' and of this again the foundation is discovered in the perpetual flux of Heracleitus. The relativity of sensation is then developed at length, and for a

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moment the definition appears to be accepted. But soon the Protagorean thesis is pronounced to be suicidal; for the adversaries of Protagoras are as good a measure as he is, and they deny his doctrine. He is then supposed to reply that the perception may be true at any given instant. But the reply is in the end shown to be inconsistent with the Heraclitean foundation, on which the doctrine has been affirmed to rest. For if the Heraclitean flux is extended to every sort of change in every instant of time, how can any thought or word be detained even for an instant? Sensible perception, like everything else, is tumbling to pieces. Nor can Protagoras himself maintain that one man is as good as another in his knowledge of the future; and 'the expedient,' if not 'the just and true,' belongs to the sphere of the future.

And so we must ask again, What is knowledge? The comparison of sensations with one another implies a principle which is above sensation, and which resides in the mind itself. We are thus led to look for knowledge in a higher sphere, and accordingly Theaetetus, when again interrogated, replies (2) that 'knowledge is true opinion.' But how is false opinion possible? The Megarian or Eristic spirit within us revives the question, which has been already asked and indirectly answered in the *Meno*: 'How can a man be ignorant of that which he knows?' No answer is given to this not unanswerable question. The comparison of the mind to a block of wax, or to a decoy of birds, is found wanting.

But are we not inverting the natural order in looking for opinion before we have found knowledge? And knowledge is not true opinion; for the Athenian dicasts have true opinion but not knowledge. What then is knowledge? We answer (3), 'True opinion, with definition or explanation.' But all the different ways in which this statement may be understood are set aside, like the definitions of courage in the *Laches*, or of friendship in the *Lysis*, or of temperance in the *Charmides*. At length we arrive at the conclusion, in which nothing is concluded.

There are two special difficulties which beset the student of the *Theaetetus*: (1) he is uncertain how far he can trust Plato's account of the theory of Protagoras; and he is also uncertain (2) how far, and in what parts of the dialogue, Plato is expressing his own opinion. The dramatic character of the work renders the answer to both these questions difficult.



1. In reply to the first, we have only probabilities to offer. Three main points have to be decided: (a) Would Protagoras have identified his own thesis, 'Man is the measure of all things,' with the other, 'All knowledge is sensible perception'? (b) Would he have based the relativity of knowledge on the Heraclitean flux? (c) Would he have asserted the absoluteness of sensation at each instant? Of the work of Protagoras on 'Truth' we know nothing, with the exception of the two famous fragments, which are cited in this dialogue, 'Man is the measure of all things,' and, 'Whether there are gods or not, I cannot tell.' Nor have we any other trustworthy evidence of the tenets of Protagoras, or of the sense in which his words are used. For later writers, including Aristotle in his *Metaphysics*, have mixed up the Protagoras of Plato, as they have the Socrates of Plato, with the real person.

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Returning then to the *Theaetetus*, as the only possible source from which an answer to these questions can be obtained, we may remark, that Plato had 'The Truth' of Protagoras before him, and frequently refers to the book. He seems to say expressly, that in this work the doctrine of the Heraclitean flux was not to be found (p. 152); 'he told the real truth' (not in the book, which is so entitled, but) 'privately to his disciples,'—words which imply that the connexion between the doctrines of Protagoras and Heraclitus was not generally recognized in Greece, but was really discovered or invented by Plato. On the other hand, the doctrine that 'Man is the measure of all things,' is expressly identified by Socrates with the other statement, that 'What appears to each man is to him;' and a reference is made to the books in which the statement occurs;—this *Theaetetus*, who has 'often read the books,' is supposed to acknowledge (152 A: so Cratylus 385 E). And Protagoras, in the speech attributed to him, never says that he has been misunderstood: at p. 166 C he rather seems to imply that the absoluteness of sensation at each instant was to be found in his words (cp. 158 E). He is only indignant at the 'reductio ad absurdum' devised by Socrates for his 'homomensura,' which Theodorus also considers to be 'really too bad.'

The question may be raised, how far Plato in the *Theaetetus* could have misrepresented Protagoras without violating the laws

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of dramatic probability. Could he have pretended to cite from a well-known writing what was not to be found there? But such a shadowy enquiry is not worth pursuing further. We need only remember that in the criticism which follows of the thesis of Protagoras, we are criticizing the Protagoras of Plato, and not attempting to draw a precise line between his real sentiments and those which Plato has attributed to him.

2. The other difficulty is a more subtle, and also a more important one, because bearing on the general character of the Platonic dialogues. On a first reading of them, we are apt to imagine that the truth is only spoken by Socrates, who is never guilty of a fallacy himself, and is the great detector of the errors and fallacies of others. But this natural presumption is disturbed by the discovery that the Sophists are sometimes in the right and Socrates in the wrong. Like the hero of a novel, he is not to be supposed always to represent the sentiments of the author. There are few modern readers who do not side with Protagoras, rather than with Socrates, in the dialogue which is called by his name. The *Cratylus* presents a similar difficulty: in his etymologies, as in the number of the State, we cannot tell how far Socrates is serious; for the Socratic irony will not allow him to distinguish between his real and his assumed wisdom. No one is the superior of the invincible Socrates in argument (except in the first part of the *Parmenides*, where he is introduced as a youth); but he is by no means supposed to be in possession of the whole truth. Arguments are often put into his mouth (cp. Introduction to the *Gorgias*) which must have seemed quite as untenable to Plato as to a modern writer. In this dialogue a great part of the answer of Protagoras is just and sound; remarks are made by him on verbal criticism, and on the importance of understanding an opponent's meaning, which are conceived in the true spirit of philosophy. And the distinction which he is supposed to draw between Eristic and Dialectic (167, 168), is really a criticism of Plato on himself and his own criticism of Protagoras.

The difficulty seems to arise from not attending to the dramatic character of the writings of Plato. There are two, or more, sides to questions; and these are parted among the different speakers. Sometimes one view or aspect of a question is made to predominate over the rest, as in the *Gorgias* or *Sophist*; but in other

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dialogues truth is divided, as in the *Laches* and *Protagoras*, and the interest of the piece consists in the contrast of opinions. The confusion caused by the irony of Socrates, who, if he is true to his character, cannot say anything of his own knowledge, is increased by the circumstance that in the *Theaetetus* and some other dialogues he is occasionally playing both parts himself, and even charging his own arguments with unfairness. In the *Theaetetus* he is designedly held back from arriving at a conclusion. For we cannot suppose that Plato conceived a definition of knowledge to be impossible. But this is his manner of approaching and surrounding a question. The lights which he throws on his subject are indirect, but they are not the less real for that. He has no intention of proving a thesis by a cut-and-dried argument; nor does he imagine that a great philosophical problem can be tied up within the limits of a definition. If he has analyzed a proposition or notion, even with the severity of an impossible logic, if half-truths have been compared by him with other half-truths, if he has cleared up or advanced popular ideas, or illustrated a new method, his aim has been sufficiently accomplished.

The writings of Plato belong to an age in which the power of analysis had outrun the means of knowledge; and through a spurious use of dialectic, the distinctions which had been already 'won from the void and formless infinite,' seemed to be rapidly returning to their original chaos. The two great speculative philosophies, which a century earlier had so deeply impressed the mind of Hellas, were now degenerating into Eristic. The contemporaries of Plato and Socrates were vainly trying to find new combinations of them, or to transfer them from the object to the subject. The Megarians, in their first attempts to attain a severer logic, were making knowledge impossible (cp. *Theaet.* 202). They were asserting 'the one good under many names,' and, like the Cynics, seem to have denied predication, while the Cynics themselves were depriving virtue of all which made virtue desirable in the eyes of Socrates and Plato. And besides these, we find mention in the later writings of Plato, especially in the *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, and *Laws*, of certain impenetrable godless persons, who will not believe what they 'cannot hold in their hands'; and cannot be approached in argument, because they

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cannot argue (*Theaet.* 155 E ; *Soph.* 246 A). No school of Greek philosophers exactly answers to these persons, in whom Plato may perhaps have blended some features of the Atomists with the vulgar materialistic tendencies of mankind in general (cp. Introduction to the *Sophist*).

And not only was there a conflict of opinions, but the stage which the mind had reached presented other difficulties hardly intelligible to us, who live in a different cycle of human thought. All times of mental progress are times of confusion ; we only see, or rather seem to see things clearly, when they have been long fixed and defined. In the age of Plato, the limits of the world of imagination and of pure abstraction, of the old world and the new, were not yet fixed. The Greeks, in the fourth century before Christ, had no words for 'subject' and 'object,' and no distinct conception of them ; yet they were always hovering about the question involved in them. The analysis of sense, and the analysis of thought, were equally difficult to them ; and hopelessly confused by the attempt to solve them, not through an appeal to facts, but by the help of general theories respecting the nature of the universe.

Plato, in his *Theaetetus*, gathers up the sceptical tendencies of his age, and compares them. But he does not seek to reconstruct out of them a theory of knowledge. The time at which such a theory could be framed had not yet arrived. For there was no measure of experience with which the ideas swarming in men's minds could be compared ; the meaning of the word 'science' could scarcely be explained to them, except from the mathematical sciences, which alone offered the type of universality and certainty. Philosophy was becoming more and more vacant and abstract, and not only the Platonic Ideas and the Eleatic Being, but all abstractions seemed to be at variance with sense and at war with one another.

The want of the Greek mind in the fourth century before Christ was not another theory of rest or motion, or Being or atoms, but rather a philosophy which could free the mind from the power of abstractions and alternatives, and show how far rest and how far motion, how far the universal principle of Being and the multitudinous principle of atoms, entered into the composition of the world ; which could distinguish between the true and false



analogy, and allow the negative as well as the positive a place in human thought. To such a philosophy Plato, in the *Theaetetus*, offers many contributions. He has followed philosophy into the region of mythology, and pointed out the similarities of opposing phases of thought. He has also shown that extreme abstractions are self-destructive, and, indeed, hardly distinguishable from one another. But his intention is not to unravel the whole subject of knowledge, if this had been possible; and several times in the course of the dialogue he rejects explanations of knowledge which have germs of truth in them; as, for example, 'the resolution of the compound into the simple;' or 'right opinion with a mark of difference.'

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- Steph. Terpsion, who has come to Megara from the country, is described as having looked in vain for Euclides in the Agora; the latter explains that he has been down to the harbour, and on his way thither had met Theaetetus, who was being carried up from the army to Athens. He was scarcely alive, for he had been badly wounded at the battle of Corinth, and had taken the dysentery which prevailed in the camp. The mention of his condition suggests the reflection, 'What a loss he will be!' 'Yes, indeed,' replies Euclid; 'only just now I was hearing of his noble conduct in the battle.' 'That I should expect; but why did he not remain at Megara?' 'I wanted him to remain, but he would not; so I went with him as far as Erineum; and as I parted from him, I remembered that Socrates had seen him when he was a youth, and had a remarkable conversation with him, not long before his own death; and he then prophesied of him that he would be a great man if he lived.' 'How true that has been; how like all that Socrates said! And could you repeat the conversation?'
- 142
- 143 'Not from memory; but I took notes when I returned home, which I afterwards filled up at leisure, and got Socrates to correct them from time to time, when I came to Athens.' . . . Terpsion had long intended to ask for a sight of this writing, of which he had already heard. They are both tired, and agree to rest and have the conversation read to them by a servant. . . . 'Here is the roll, Terpsion; I need only observe that I have omitted, for the sake of convenience, the interlocutory words, "said I," "said

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*Theaetetus.* he"; and that Theaetetus, and Theodorus, the geometrician of  
*ANALYSIS.* Cyrene, are the persons with whom Socrates is conversing.'

Socrates begins by asking Theodorus whether, in his visit to Athens, he has found any Athenian youth likely to attain distinction in science. 'Yes, Socrates, there is one very remarkable youth, with whom I have become acquainted. He is no beauty, and therefore you need not imagine that I am in love with him; and, to say the truth, he is very like you, for he has a snub nose, and projecting eyes, although these features are not so marked in him as in you. He combines the most various qualities, quickness, 144  
 patience, courage; and he is gentle as well as wise, always silently flowing on, like a river of oil. Look! he is the middle one of those who are entering the palaestra.'

Socrates, who does not know his name, recognizes him as the son of Euphronius, who was himself a good man and a rich. He is informed by Theodorus that the youth is named Theaetetus, but the property of his father has disappeared in the hands of trustees; this does not, however, prevent him from adding liberality to his other virtues. At the desire of Socrates he invites Theaetetus to sit by them.

'Yes,' says Socrates, 'that I may see in you, Theaetetus, the image of my ugly self, as Theodorus declares. Not that his remark is of any importance; for though he is a philosopher, he is not a painter, and therefore he is no judge of our faces; 145  
 but, as he is a man of science, he may be a judge of our intellects. And if he were to praise the mental endowments of either of us, in that case the hearer of the eulogy ought to examine into what he says, and the subject should not refuse to be examined.' Theaetetus consents, and is caught in a trap (cp. the similar trap which is laid for Theodorus, at p. 166, 168 D). 'Then, Theaetetus, you will have to be examined, for Theodorus has been praising you in a style of which I never heard the like.' 'He was only jesting.' 'Nay, that is not his way; and I cannot allow you, on that pretence, to retract the assent which you have already given, or I shall make Theodorus repeat your praises and swear to them.' Theaetetus, in reply, professes that he is willing to be examined, and Socrates begins by asking him what he learns of Theodorus. He is himself anxious to learn anything

*Theaetetus.*

ANALYSIS.

of anybody; and now he has a little question to which he wants Theaetetus or Theodorus (or whichever of the company would not be 'donkey' to the rest) to find an answer. Without further preface, but at the same time apologizing for his eagerness, he asks, 'What is knowledge?' Theodorus is too old to answer questions, and begs him to interrogate Theaetetus, who has the advantage of youth.

Theaetetus replies, that knowledge is what he learns of Theodorus, i. e. geometry and arithmetic; and that there are other kinds of knowledge — shoemaking, carpentering, and the like. But Socrates rejoins, that this answer contains too much and also too little. For although Theaetetus has enumerated several kinds of knowledge, he has not explained the common nature of them; as if he had been asked, 'What is clay?' and instead of saying, 'Clay is moistened earth,' he had answered, 'There is one clay of image-makers, another of potters, another of oven-makers.' Theaetetus at once divines that Socrates means him to extend to all kinds of knowledge the same process of generalization which he has already learned to apply to arithmetic. For he has discovered a division of numbers into square numbers, 4, 9, 16, &c., which are composed of equal factors, and represent figures which have equal sides, and oblong numbers, 3, 5, 6, 7, &c., which are composed of unequal factors, and represent figures which have unequal sides. But he has never succeeded in attaining a similar conception of knowledge, though he has often tried; and, when this and similar questions were brought to him from Socrates, has been sorely distressed by them. Socrates explains to him that he is in labour. For men as well as women have pangs of labour; and both at times require the assistance of midwives. And he, Socrates, is a midwife, although this is a secret; he has inherited the art from his mother bold and bluff, and he ushers into light, not children, but the thoughts of men. Like the midwives, who are 'past bearing children,' he too can have no offspring — the God will not allow him to bring anything into the world of his own. He also reminds Theaetetus that the midwives are or ought to be the only matchmakers (this is the preparation for a biting jest, 151 B); for those who reap the fruit are most likely to know on what soil the plants will grow. But respectable midwives avoid this department of practice — they

*Theaetetus.*

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do not want to be called procuresses. There are some other differences between the two sorts of pregnancy. For women do not bring into the world at one time real children and at another time idols which are with difficulty distinguished from them. 'At first,' says Socrates in his character of the man-midwife, 'my patients are barren and stolid, but after a while they "round apace," if the gods are propitious to them; and this is due not to me but to themselves; I and the god only assist in bringing their ideas to the birth. Many of them have left me too soon, and the result has been that they have produced abortions; or when I have delivered them of children they have lost them by an ill bringing up, and have ended by seeing themselves, as others see them, to be great fools. Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, is one of these, and there have been others. The truants often return to me and beg to be taken back; and then, if my familiar allows me, which is not always the case, I receive them, and they begin to grow again. There come to me also those who have nothing in them, and have no need of my art; and I am their matchmaker (see above), and marry them to Prodicus or some other inspired sage who is likely to suit them. I tell you this long story because I suspect that you are in labour. Come then to me, who am a midwife, and the son of a midwife, and I will deliver you. And do not bite me, as the women do, if I abstract your first-born; for I am acting out of good-will towards you; the God who is within me is the friend of man, though he will not allow me to dissemble the truth. Once more then, Theaetetus, I repeat my old question — "What is knowledge?" Take courage, and by the help of God you will discover an answer.' 'My answer is, that knowledge is perception.' 'That is the theory of Protagoras, who has another way of expressing the same thing when he says, "Man is the measure of all things." He was a very wise man, and we should try to understand him. In order to illustrate his meaning let me suppose that there is the same wind blowing in our faces, and one of us may be hot and the other cold. How is this? Protagoras will reply that the wind is hot to him who is cold, cold to him who is hot. And "is" means "appears," and when you say "appears to him," that means "he feels." Thus feeling, appearance, perception, coincide with being. I suspect, however, that this was only a "façon de parler," by which he imposed on the common herd

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152



like you and me; he told "the truth" [in allusion to the title of his book, which was called "The Truth"] in secret to his disciples. For he was really a votary of that famous philosophy in which all things are said to be relative; nothing is great or small, or heavy or light, or one, but all is in motion and mixture and transition and flux and generation, not "being," as we ignorantly affirm, but "becoming." This has been the doctrine, not of Protagoras only, but of all philosophers, with the single exception of Parmenides; Empedocles, Heracleitus, and others, and all the poets, with Epicharmus, the king of Comedy, and Homer, the king of Tragedy, at their head, have said the same; the latter has these words —

*Theætetus.*

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"Ocean, whence the gods sprang, and mother Tethys."

153 And many arguments are used to show, that motion is the source of life, and rest of death: fire and warmth are produced by friction, and living creatures owe their origin to a similar cause; the bodily frame is preserved by exercise and destroyed by indolence; and if the sun ceased to move, "chaos would come again." Now apply this doctrine of "All is motion" to the senses, and first of all to the sense of sight. The colour of white, or any other colour, is neither in the eyes nor out of them, but ever in motion  
154 between the object and the eye, and varying in the case of every percipient. All is relative, and, as the followers of Protagoras remark, endless contradictions arise when we deny this; e. g. here are six dice; they are more than four and less than twelve; "more and also less," would you not say?' 'Yes.' 'But Protagoras will retort: "Can anything be more or less without addition or subtraction?"'

'I should say "No" if I were not afraid of contradicting my former answer.'

'And if you say "Yes," the tongue will escape conviction but not the mind, as Euripides would say?' 'True.' 'The thoroughbred Sophists, who know all that can be known, would have a sparring match over this, but you and I, who have no professional pride,  
155 want only to discover whether our ideas are clear and consistent. And we cannot be wrong in saying, first, that nothing can be greater or less while remaining equal; secondly, that there can be no becoming greater or less without addition or subtraction; thirdly,

*Theaetetus.*

ANALYSIS.

that what is and was not, cannot be without having become. But then how is this reconcileable with the case of the dice, and with similar examples? — that is the question.’ ‘I am often perplexed and amazed, Socrates, by these difficulties.’ ‘That is because you are a philosopher, for philosophy begins in wonder, and Iris is the child of Thaumás. Do you know the original principle on which the doctrine of Protagoras is based?’ ‘No.’ ‘Then I will tell you; but we must not let the uninitiated hear, and by the uninitiated I mean the obstinate people who believe in nothing which they cannot hold in their hands. The brethren whose mysteries I am 156 about to unfold to you are far more ingenious. They maintain that all is motion; and that motion has two forms, action and passion, out of which endless phenomena are created, also in two forms — sense and the object of sense — which come to the birth together. There are two kinds of motions, a slow and a fast; the motions of the agent and the patient are slower, because they move and create in and about themselves, but the things which are born of them have a swifter motion, and pass rapidly from place to place. The eye and the appropriate object come together, and give birth to whiteness and the sensation of whiteness; the eye is filled with seeing, and becomes not sight but a seeing eye, and the object is filled with whiteness, and becomes not whiteness but white; and no other compound of either with another would have produced the same effect. All sensation is to be resolved into a 157 similar combination of an agent and patient. Of either, taken separately, no idea can be formed; and the agent may become a patient, and the patient an agent. Hence there arises a general reflection that nothing is, but all things become; no name can detain or fix them. Are not these speculations charming, Theaetetus, and very good for a person in your interesting situation? I am offering you specimens of other men’s wisdom, because I have no wisdom of my own, and I want to deliver you of something; and presently we will see whether you have brought forth wind or not. Tell me, then, what do you think of the notion that “All things are becoming”?’

‘When I hear your arguments, I am marvellously ready to assent.’

‘But I ought not to conceal from you that there is a serious objection which may be urged against this doctrine of Protagoras.

*Theaetetus.*

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158 For there are states, such as madness and dreaming, in which perception is false; and half our life is spent in dreaming; and who can say that at this instant we are not dreaming? Even the fancies of madmen are real at the time. But if knowledge is perception, how can we distinguish between the true and the false in such cases? Having stated the objection, I will now state the answer. Protagoras would deny the continuity of phenomena; 159 he would say that what is different is entirely different, and whether active or passive has a different power. There are infinite agents and patients in the world, and these produce in every combination of them a different perception. Take myself as an instance:—Socrates may be ill or he may be well,—and remember that Socrates, with all his accidents, is spoken of. The wine which I drink when I am well is pleasant to me, but the same wine is unpleasant to me when I am ill. And there is 160 nothing else from which I can receive the same impression, nor can another receive the same impression from the wine. Neither can I and the object of sense become separately what we become together. For the one in becoming is relative to the other, but they have no other relation; and the combination of them is absolute at each moment. [In modern language, the act of sensation is really indivisible, though capable of a mental analysis into subject and object.] My sensation alone is true, and true to me only. And therefore, as Protagoras says, “To myself I am the judge of what is and what is not.” Thus the flux of Homer and Heracleitus, the great Protagorean saying that “Man is the measure of all things,” the doctrine of Theaetetus that “Knowledge is perception,” have all the same meaning. And this is your new-born child, which by my art I have brought to light; and 161 you must not be angry if instead of rearing your infant we expose him.’

‘Theaetetus will not be angry,’ says Theodorus; ‘he is very good-natured. But I should like to know, Socrates, whether you mean to say that all this is untrue?’

‘First reminding you that I am not the bag which contains the arguments, but that I abstract them from Theaetetus, shall I tell you what amazes me in your friend Protagoras?’

‘What may that be?’

‘I like his doctrine that what appears is; but I wonder that he

*Theaetetus.*

ANALYSIS.

did not begin his great work on Truth with a declaration that a pig, or a dog-faced baboon, or any other monster which has sensation, is a measure of all things; then, while we were reverencing him as a god, he might have produced a magnificent effect by expounding to us that he was no wiser than a tadpole. For if sensations are always true, and one man's discernment is as good as another's, and every man is his own judge, and everything that he judges is right and true, then what need of Protagoras to be our instructor at a high figure; and why should we be less knowing than he is, or have to go to him, if every man is the measure of all things? My own art of midwifery, and all dialectic, is an enormous folly, if Protagoras' "Truth" be indeed truth, and the philosopher is not merely amusing himself by giving oracles out of his book.'

Theodorus thinks that Socrates is unjust to his master, Protagoras; but he is too old and stiff to try a fall with him, and therefore refers him to Theaetetus, who is already driven out of his former opinion by the arguments of Socrates. 162

Socrates then takes up the defence of Protagoras, who is supposed to reply in his own person — 'Good people, you sit and declaim about the gods, of whose existence or non-existence I have nothing to say, or you discourse about man being reduced to the level of the brutes; but what proof have you of your statements? And yet surely you and Theodorus had better reflect whether probability is a safe guide. Theodorus would be a bad geometer if he had nothing better to offer.' . . . Theaetetus is affected by the appeal to geometry, and Socrates is induced by him to put the question in a new form. He proceeds as follows: — 'Should we say that we know what we see and hear,— e. g. the sound of words or the sight of letters in a foreign tongue?' 163

'We should say that the figures of the letters, and the pitch of the voice in uttering them, were known to us, but not the meaning of them.'

'Excellent; I want you to grow, and therefore I will leave that answer and ask another question: Is not seeing perceiving?' 'Very true.' 'And he who sees knows?' 'Yes.' 'And he who remembers, remembers that which he sees and knows?' 'Very true.' 'But if he closes his eyes, does he not remember?' 'He 164 does.' 'Then he may remember and not see; and if seeing is



knowing, he may remember and not know. Is not this a "reductio ad absurdum" of the hypothesis that knowledge is sensible perception? Yet perhaps we are crowing too soon; and if Protagoras, "the father of the myth," had been alive, the result might have been very different. But he is dead, and Theodorus, whom he left guardian of his "orphan," has not been very zealous in defending him.'

Theaetetus.

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165 Theodorus objects that Callias is the true guardian, but he hopes that Socrates will come to the rescue. Socrates prefaces his defence by resuming the attack. He asks whether a man can know and not know at the same time? 'Impossible.' Quite possible, if you maintain that seeing is knowing. The confident adversary, suiting the action to the word, shuts one of your eyes; and now, says he, you see and do not see, but do you know and not know? And a fresh opponent darts from his ambush, and transfers to knowledge the terms which are commonly applied to sight. He asks whether you can know near and not at a distance; whether you can have a sharp and also a dull knowledge. While you are wondering at his incomparable wisdom, he gets you into his power, and you will not escape until you have come to an understanding with him about the money which is to be paid for your release.

166 But Protagoras has not yet made his defence; and already he may be heard contemptuously replying that he is not responsible for the admissions which were made by a boy, who could not foresee the coming move, and therefore had answered in a manner which enabled Socrates to raise a laugh against himself. 'But I cannot be fairly charged,' he will say, 'with an answer which I should not have given; for I never maintained that the memory of a feeling is the same as a feeling, or denied that a man might know and not know the same thing at the same time. Or, if you will have extreme precision, I say that man in different relations is many or rather infinite in number. And I challenge you, either to show that his perceptions are not individual, or that if they are, what appears to him is not what is. As to your pigs and baboons, you are yourself a pig, and you make my writings a sport of other swine. But I still affirm that man is the measure of all things, although I admit that one man may be a thousand times better than another, in proportion as he has better impressions. Neither

*Theaetetus.*

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do I deny the existence of wisdom or of the wise man. But I maintain that wisdom is a practical remedial power of turning evil into good, the bitterness of disease into the sweetness of health, and does not consist in any greater truth or superior knowledge. For the impressions of the sick are as true as the impressions of the healthy; and the sick are as wise as the healthy. Nor  
 167  
 can any man be cured of a false opinion, for there is no such thing; but he may be cured of the evil habit which generates in him an evil opinion. This is effected in the body by the drugs of the physician, and in the soul by the words of the Sophist; and the new state or opinion is not truer, but only better than the old. And philosophers are not tadpoles, but physicians and husbandmen, who till the soil and infuse health into animals and plants, and make the good take the place of the evil, both in individuals and states. Wise and good rhetoricians make the good to appear just in states (for that is just which appears just to a state), and in return, they deserve to be well paid. And you, Socrates, whether you please or not, must continue to be a measure. This is my defence, and I must request you to meet me fairly. We are professing to reason, and not merely to dispute; and there is a great difference between reasoning and disputation. For the disputer is always seeking to trip up his opponent; and this is a mode of argument which disgusts men with philosophy as they grow older. But the reasoner is trying to understand him and to point out his errors to him, whether arising from his own or from his companions' fault; he does not  
 168  
 argue from the customary use of names, which the vulgar pervert in all manner of ways. If you are gentle to an adversary he will follow and love you; and if defeated he will lay the blame on himself, and seek to escape from his own prejudices into philosophy. I would recommend you, Socrates, to adopt this humaner method, and to avoid captious and verbal criticisms.'

Such, Theodorus, is the very slight help which I am able to afford to your friend; had he been alive, he would have helped himself in far better style.

'You have made a most valorous defence.'

Yes; but did you observe that Protagoras bade me be serious, and complained of our getting up a laugh against him with the aid of a boy? He meant to intimate that you must take the place

of Theaetetus, who may be wiser than many bearded men, but not wiser than you, Theodorus.

*Theaetetus.*

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169 'The rule of the Spartan Palaestra is, Strip or depart; but you are like the giant Antaeus, and will not let me depart unless I try a fall with you.'

Yes, that is the nature of my complaint. And many a Hercules, many a Theseus mighty in deeds and words has broken my head; but I am always at this rough game. Please, then, to favour me.

'On the condition of not exceeding a single fall, I consent.'

170 Socrates now resumes the argument. As he is very desirous of doing justice to Protagoras, he insists on citing his own words,—  
'What appears to each man is to him.' And how, asks Socrates, are these words reconcileable with the fact that all mankind are agreed in thinking themselves wiser than others in some respects, and inferior to them in others? In the hour of danger they are ready to fall down and worship any one who is their superior in wisdom as if he were a god. And the world is full of men who are asking to be taught and willing to be ruled, and of other men who are willing to rule and teach them. All which implies that men do judge of one another's impressions, and think some wise and others foolish. How will Protagoras answer this argument? For he cannot say that no one deems another ignorant or mistaken. If you form a judgment, thousands and tens of thousands are ready to maintain the opposite. The multitude may not and do not agree in Protagoras' own thesis that 'Man is the measure  
171 of all things;' and then who is to decide? Upon his own showing must not his 'truth' depend on the number of suffrages, and be more or less true in proportion as he has more or fewer of them? And he must acknowledge further, that they speak truly who deny him to speak truly, which is a famous jest. And if he admits that they speak truly who deny him to speak truly, he must admit that he himself does not speak truly. But his opponents will refuse to admit this of themselves, and he must allow that they are right in their refusal. The conclusion is, that all mankind, including Protagoras himself, will deny that he speaks truly; and his truth will be true neither to himself nor to anybody else.

Theodorus is inclined to think that this is going too far. Socrates ironically replies, that he is not going beyond the truth. But if the old Protagoras could only pop his head out of the world below, he

*Theaetetus.*

ANALYSIS.

would doubtless give them both a sound castigation and be off to the shades in an instant. Seeing that he is not within call, we must examine the question for ourselves. It is clear that there are great differences in the understandings of men. Admitting, with Protagoras, that immediate sensations of hot, cold, and the like, are to each one such as they appear, yet this hypothesis cannot be extended to judgments or opinions. And even if we were to admit further,—and this is the view of some who are not thorough-going followers of Protagoras,—that right and wrong, holy and unholy, are to each state or individual such as they appear, still Protagoras will not venture to maintain that every man is equally the measure of expediency, or that the thing which seems is expedient to every one. But this begins a new question. ‘Well, Socrates, we have plenty of leisure.’ Yes, we have, and, after the manner of philosophers, we are digressing; I have often observed how ridiculous this habit of theirs makes them when they appear in court. ‘What do you mean?’ I mean to say that a philosopher is a gentleman, but a lawyer is a servant. The one can have his talk out, and wander at will from one subject to another, as the fancy takes him; like ourselves, he may be long or short, as he pleases. But the lawyer is always in a hurry; there is the clepsydra limiting his time, and the brief limiting his topics, and his adversary is standing over him and exacting his rights. He is a servant disputing about a fellow-servant before his master, who holds the cause in his hands; the path never diverges, and often the race is for his life. Such experiences render him keen and shrewd; he learns the arts of flattery, and is perfect in the practice of crooked ways; dangers have come upon him too soon, when the tenderness of youth was unable to meet them with truth and honesty, and he has resorted to counter-acts of dishonesty and falsehood, and become warped and distorted; without any health or freedom or sincerity in him he has grown up to manhood, and is or esteems himself to be a master of cunning. Such are the lawyers; will you have the companion picture of philosophers? or will this be too much of a digression? 172 173

‘Nay, Socrates, the argument is our servant, and not our master. Who is the judge or where is the spectator, having a right to control us?’

I will describe the leaders, then; for the inferior sort are not



*Theæctetus.*

ANALYSIS.

worth the trouble. The lords of philosophy have not learned the way to the dicastery or ecclesia; they neither see nor hear the laws and votes of the state, written or recited; societies, whether political or festive, clubs, and singing maidens do not enter even into their dreams. And the scandals of persons or their ancestors, male and female, they know no more than they can tell the number of pints in the ocean. Neither are they conscious of their own ignorance; for they do not practise singularity in order to gain reputation, but the truth is, that the outer form of them only is residing in the city; the inner man, as Pindar says, is going on a voyage of discovery, measuring as with line and rule the things  
 174 which are under and in the earth, interrogating the whole of nature, only not condescending to notice what is near them.

‘What do you mean, Socrates?’

I will illustrate my meaning by the jest of the witty maid-servant, who saw Thales tumbling into a well, and said of him, that he was so eager to know what was going on in heaven, that he could not see what was before his feet. This is applicable to all philosophers. The philosopher is unacquainted with the world; he hardly knows whether his neighbour is a man or an animal. For he is always searching into the essence of man, and enquiring what such a nature ought to do or suffer different from any other. Hence, on every occasion in private life and public, as I was saying, when he appears in a law-court or anywhere, he is the joke, not only of maid-servants, but of the general herd, falling into wells and every sort of disaster; he looks such an awkward, inexperienced creature, unable to say anything personal, when he is abused, in answer to his adversaries (for he knows no evil of any one); and when he hears the praises of others, he cannot help laughing from the bottom of his soul at their pretensions; and this also gives him a ridiculous appearance. A king or tyrant appears to him to be a kind of swine-herd or cow-herd, milking away at an animal who is much more troublesome and dangerous than cows or sheep; like the cow-herd, he has no time to be educated, and the pen in which he keeps his flock in the mountains is surrounded by a wall. When he hears of large landed properties of ten thousand acres or more, he thinks of the whole  
 175 earth; or if he is told of the antiquity of a family, he remembers that every one has had myriads of progenitors, rich and poor,

*Theætetus.*

ANALYSIS.

Greeks and barbarians, kings and slaves. And he who boasts of his descent from Amphytryon in the twenty-fifth generation, may, if he pleases, add as many more, and double that again, and our philosopher only laughs at his inability to do a larger sum. Such is the man at whom the vulgar scoff; he seems to them as if he could not mind his feet. 'That is very true, Socrates.' But when he tries to draw the quick-witted lawyer out of his pleas and rejoinders to the contemplation of absolute justice or injustice in their own nature, or from the popular praises of wealthy kings to the view of happiness and misery in themselves, or to the reasons why a man should seek after the one and avoid the other, then the situation is reversed; the little wretch turns giddy, and is ready to fall over the precipice; his utterance becomes thick, and he makes himself ridiculous, not to servant-maids, but to every man of liberal education. Such are the two pictures: the one of the philosopher and gentleman, who may be excused for not having learned how to make a bed, or cook up flatteries; the other, a serviceable knave, who hardly knows how to wear his cloak,— 176  
still less can he awaken harmonious thoughts or hymn virtue's praises.

'If the world, Socrates, were as ready to receive your words as I am, there would be greater peace and less evil among mankind.'

Evil, Theodorus, must ever remain in this world to be the antagonist of good, out of the way of the gods in heaven. Wherefore also we should fly away from ourselves to them; and to fly to them is to become like them; and to become like them is to become holy, just and true. But many live in the old wives' fable of appearances; they think that you should follow virtue in order that you may seem to be good. And yet the truth is, that God is righteous; and of men, he is most like him who is most righteous. To know this is wisdom; and in comparison of this the wisdom of the arts or the seeming wisdom of politicians is mean and common. The unrighteous man is apt to pride himself on his cunning; when others call him rogue, he says to himself: 'They only mean that I am one who deserves to live, and not a mere burden of the earth.' But he should reflect that his ignorance makes his condition worse than if he knew. For the penalty of injustice is not death or stripes, but the fatal necessity

*Theaetetus.*

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of becoming more and more unjust. Two patterns of life are set before him; the one blessed and divine, the other godless and wretched; and he is growing more and more like the one and  
 177 unlike the other. He does not see that if he continues in his cunning, the place of innocence will not receive him after death. And yet if such a man has the courage to hear the argument out, he often becomes dissatisfied with himself, and has no more strength in him than a child.—But we have digressed enough.

‘For my part, Socrates, I like the digressions better than the argument, because I understand them better.’

To return. When we left off, the Protagoreans and Heracliteans were maintaining that the ordinances of the State were  
 178 just, while they lasted. But no one would maintain that the laws of the State were always good or expedient, although this may be the intention of them. For the expedient has to do with the future, about which we are liable to mistake. Now, would Protagoras maintain that man is the measure not only of the present and past, but of the future; and that there is no difference in the judgments of men about the future? Would an untrained man, for example, be as likely to know when he is going to have a fever, as the physician who attended him? And if they differ in opinion, which of them is likely to be right; or are they both right? Is not a vine-grower a better judge of a vintage which is not yet gathered, or a cook of a dinner which is in preparation, or Protagoras of the probable effect of a speech than an ordinary person?

179 The last example speaks ‘ad hominem.’ For Protagoras would never have amassed a fortune if every man could judge of the future for himself. He is, therefore, compelled to admit that he is a measure; but I, who know nothing, am not equally convinced that I am. This is one way of refuting him; and he is refuted also by the authority which he attributes to the opinions of others, who deny his opinions. I am not equally sure that we can dis-  
 180 prove the truth of immediate states of feeling. But this leads us to the doctrine of the universal flux, about which a battle-royal is always going on in the cities of Ionia. ‘Yes; the Ephesians are downright mad about the flux; they cannot stop to argue with you, but are in perpetual motion, obedient to their text-books.

Their restlessness is beyond expression, and if you ask any of  
 180 them a question, they will not answer, but dart at you some

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unintelligible saying, and another and another, making no way either with themselves or with others; for nothing is fixed in them or their ideas,—they are at war with fixed principles.’ I suppose, Theodorus, that you have never seen them in time of peace, when they discourse at leisure to their disciples? ‘Disciples! they have none; they are a set of uneducated fanatics, and each of them says of the other that they have no knowledge. We must trust to ourselves, and not to them for the solution of the problem.’ Well, the doctrine is old, being derived from the poets, who speak in a figure of Oceanus and Tethys; the truth was once concealed, but is now revealed by the superior wisdom of a later generation, and made intelligible to the cobbler, who, on hearing that all is in motion, and not some things only, as he ignorantly fancied, may be expected to fall down and worship his teachers. And the opposite doctrine must not be forgotten:—

‘Alone being remains unmoved which is the name for all,’

as Parmenides affirms. Thus we are in the midst of the fray; both parties are dragging us to their side; and we are not certain 181 which of them are in the right; and if neither, then we shall be in a ridiculous position, having to set up our own opinion against ancient and famous men.

Let us first approach the river-gods, or patrons of the flux.

When they speak of motion, must they not include two kinds of motion, change of place and change of nature?—And all things must be supposed to have both kinds of motion; for if not, the same things would be at rest and in motion, which is contrary 182 to their theory. And did we not say, that all sensations arise thus: they move about between the agent and patient together with a perception, and the patient ceases to be a perceiving power and becomes a percipient, and the agent a quale instead of a quality; but neither has any absolute existence? But now we make the further discovery, that neither white or whiteness, nor any sense or sensation, can be predicated of anything, for they are in a perpetual flux. And therefore we must modify the doctrine of Theaetetus and Protagoras, by asserting further that knowledge is and is not sensation; and of everything we must 183 say equally, that this is and is not, or becomes or becomes not.



And still the word 'this' is not quite correct, for language fails in the attempt to express their meaning.

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At the close of the discussion, Theodorus claims to be released from the argument, according to his agreement. But Theaetetus insists that they shall proceed to consider the doctrine of rest.

- 184 This is declined by Socrates, who has too much reverence for the great Parmenides lightly to attack him. [We shall find that he returns to the doctrine of rest in the Sophist; but at present he does not wish to be diverted from his main purpose, which is, to deliver Theaetetus of his conception of knowledge.] He proceeds to interrogate him further. When he says that 'knowledge is perception,' with what does he perceive? The first answer is, that he perceives sights with the eye, and sounds with the ear. This leads Socrates to make the reflection that nice distinctions of words are sometimes pedantic, but sometimes necessary; and he proposes in this case to substitute the word 'through' for 'with.'
- 185 For the senses are not like the Trojan warriors in the horse, but have a common centre of perception, in which they all meet. This common principle is able to compare them with one another, and must therefore be distinct from them (cp. Rep. vii. 523, 524). And as there are facts of sense which are perceived through the organs of the body, there are also mathematical and other abstractions, such as sameness and difference, likeness and unlikeness,
- 186 which the soul perceives by herself. Being is the most universal of these abstractions. The good and the beautiful are abstractions of another kind, which exist in relation and which above all others the mind perceives in herself, comparing within her past, present, and future. For example; we know a thing to be hard or soft by the touch, of which the perception is given at birth to men and animals. But the essence of hardness or softness, or the fact that this hardness is, and is the opposite of softness, is slowly learned by reflection and experience. Mere perception does not reach being, and therefore fails of truth; and therefore has no share in knowledge. But if so, knowledge is not perception.
- 187 What then is knowledge? The mind, when occupied by herself with being, is said to have opinion — shall we say that 'Knowledge is true opinion'? But still an old difficulty recurs; we ask ourselves, 'How is false opinion possible?' This difficulty may be stated as follows:—

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1. Either we know or do not know a thing (for the intermediate 188  
 processes of learning and forgetting need not at present be con-  
 sidered); and in thinking or having an opinion, we must either  
 know or not know that which we think, and we cannot know and  
 be ignorant at the same time; we cannot confuse one thing which  
 we do not know, with another thing which we do not know; nor  
 can we think that which we do not know to be that which we  
 know, or that which we know to be that which we do not know.  
 And what other case is conceivable, upon the supposition that we  
 either know or do not know all things? Let us try another  
 answer in the sphere of being: 'When a man thinks, and thinks  
 that which is not.' But would this hold in any parallel case? 189  
 Can a man see and see nothing? or hear and hear nothing? or  
 touch and touch nothing? Must he not see, hear, or touch some  
 one existing thing? For if he thinks about nothing he does not  
 think, and not thinking he cannot think falsely. And so the path  
 of being is closed against us, as well as the path of knowledge.  
 But may there not be 'heterodoxy,'<sup>1</sup> or transference of opinion; —  
 I mean, may not one thing be supposed to be another? Theae-  
 tetus is confident that this must be 'the true falsehood,' when  
 a man puts good for evil or evil for good. Socrates will not  
 discourage him by attacking the paradoxical expression 'true  
 falsehood,' but passes on. The new notion involves a process of  
 thinking about two things, either together or alternately. And 190  
 thinking is the conversing of the mind with herself, which is  
 carried on in question and answer, until she no longer doubts,  
 but determines and forms an opinion. And false opinion consists  
 in saying to yourself, that one thing is another. But did you ever  
 say to yourself, that good is evil, or evil good? Even in sleep,  
 did you ever imagine that odd was even? Or did any man in his  
 senses ever fancy that an ox was a horse, or that two are one?  
 So that we can never think one thing to be another; for you  
 must not meet me with the verbal quibble that one — *ἕτερον* — is  
 other — *ἕτερον* [both 'one' and 'other' in Greek are called 'other' —  
*ἕτερον*]. He who has both the two things in his mind, cannot mis-  
 place them; and he who has only one of them in his mind,  
 cannot misplace them — on either supposition transplacement is  
 inconceivable.

3. But perhaps there may still be a sense in which we can think 191

that which we do not know to be that which we know: e. g. *Theaetetus*.  
 Theaetetus may know Socrates, but at a distance he may mistake  
 another person for him. This process may be conceived by the  
 help of an image. Let us suppose that every man has in his  
 mind a block of wax of various qualities, the gift of Memory, the  
 mother of the Muses; and on this he receives the seal or stamp  
 of those sensations and perceptions which he wishes to remember.  
 That which he succeeds in stamping is remembered and known  
 by him as long as the impression lasts; but that, of which the  
 impression is rubbed out or imperfectly made, is forgotten, and  
 not known. No one can think one thing to be another, when he  
 has the memorial or seal of both of these in his soul, and a  
 sensible impression of neither; or when he knows one and does  
 not know the other, and has no memorial or seal of the other; or  
 when he knows neither; or when he perceives both, or one and  
 not the other, or neither; or when he perceives and knows both,  
 and identifies what he perceives with what he knows (this is still  
 more impossible); or when he does not know one, and does not  
 know and does not perceive the other; or does not perceive one,  
 and does not know and does not perceive the other; or has no  
 perception or knowledge of either — all these cases must be ex-  
 cluded. (But he may err when he confuses what he knows or  
 perceives, or what he perceives and does not know, with what he  
 knows, or what he knows and perceives with what he knows and  
 perceives.)

Theaetetus is unable to follow these distinctions; which Socrates  
 proceeds to illustrate by examples, first of all remarking, that  
 knowledge may exist without perception, and perception without  
 knowledge. I may know Theodorus and Theaetetus and not  
 see them; I may see them, and not know them. 'That I under-  
 stand.' But I could not mistake one for the other if I knew you  
 both, and had no perception of either; or if I knew one only, and  
 perceived neither; or if I knew and perceived neither, or in any  
 other of the excluded cases. The only possibility of error is:  
 1st, when knowing you and Theodorus, and having the impres-  
 sion of both of you on the waxen block, I, seeing you both imper-  
 fectly and at a distance, put the foot in the wrong shoe — that is to  
 say, put the seal or stamp on the wrong object: or 2ndly, when  
 knowing both of you I only see one; or when, seeing and

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knowing you both, I fail to identify the impression and the object. But there could be no error when perception and knowledge correspond.

The waxen block in the heart of a man's soul, as I may say in the words of Homer, (who played upon the words *κῆρ* and *κηρός*,<sup>2</sup> may be smooth and deep, and large enough, and then the signs are clearly marked and lasting, and do not get confused. But in the 'hairy heart,' as the all-wise poet sings, when the wax is muddy or hard or moist, there is a corresponding confusion and want of retentiveness; in the muddy and impure there is indistinctness, and 195 still more in the hard, for there the impressions have no depth of wax, and in the moist they are too soon effaced. Yet greater is the indistinctness when they are all jolted together in a little soul, which is narrow and has no room. These are the sort of natures which have false opinion; from stupidity they see and hear and think amiss; and this is falsehood and ignorance. Error, then, is a confusion of thought and sense.

Theaetetus is delighted with this explanation. But Socrates has no sooner found the new solution than he sinks into a fit of despondency. For an objection occurs to him: — May there not be errors where there is no confusion of mind and sense? e. g. in numbers. No one can confuse the man whom he has in his 196 thoughts with the horse which he has in his thoughts, but he may err in the addition of five and seven. And observe that these are purely mental conceptions. Thus we are involved once more in the dilemma of saying, either that there is no such thing as false opinion, or that a man knows what he does not know.

We are at our wit's end, and may therefore be excused for making a bold diversion. All this time we have been repeating the words 'know,' 'understand,' yet we do not know what knowledge is. 'Why, Socrates, how can you argue at all without using them?' Nay, but the true hero of dialectic would have forbidden 197 me to use them until I had explained them. And I must explain them now. The verb 'to know' has two senses, to have and to possess knowledge, and I distinguish 'having' from 'possessing.' A man may possess a garment which he does not wear; or he may have wild birds in an aviary; these in one sense he possesses, and in another he has none of them. Let this aviary be an image of the mind, as the waxen block was; when we are



young, the aviary is empty; after a time the birds are put in; for under this figure we may describe different forms of knowledge; — there are some of them in groups, and some single, which are flying about everywhere; and let us suppose a hunt after the science of odd and even, or some other science. The possession of the birds is clearly not the same as the having them in the hand. And the original chase of them is not the same as taking them in the hand when they are already caged.

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This distinction between use and possession saves us from the absurdity of supposing that we do not know what we know, because we may know in one sense, i. e. possess, what we do not know in another, i. e. use. But have we not escaped one difficulty only to encounter a greater? For how can the exchange of two kinds of knowledge ever become false opinion? As well might we suppose that ignorance could make a man know, or that blindness could make him see. Theaetetus suggests that in the aviary there may be flying about mock birds, or forms of ignorance, and we put forth our hands and grasp ignorance, when we are intending to grasp knowledge. But how can he who knows the forms of knowledge and the forms of ignorance imagine one to be the other? Is there some other form of knowledge which distinguishes them? and another, and another? Thus we go round and round in a circle and make no progress.

All this confusion arises out of our attempt to explain false opinion without having explained knowledge. What then is knowledge? Theaetetus repeats that knowledge is true opinion.

But this seems to be refuted by the instance of orators and judges. For surely the orator cannot convey a true knowledge of crimes at which the judges were not present; he can only persuade them, and the judge may form a true opinion and truly judge. But if true opinion were knowledge they could not have judged without knowledge.

Once more. Theaetetus offers a definition which he has heard: Knowledge is true opinion accompanied by definition or explanation. Socrates has had a similar dream, and has further heard that the first elements are names only, and that definition or explanation begins when they are combined; the letters are unknown, the syllables or combinations are known. But this new hypothesis when tested by the letters of the alphabet is

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found to break down. The first syllable of Socrates' name is SO. But what is SO? Two letters, S and O, a sibilant and a vowel, of which no further explanation can be given. And how can any one be ignorant of either of them, and yet know both of them? There is, however, another alternative:—We may suppose that the syllable has a separate form or idea distinct from the letters or parts. The all of the parts may not be the whole. Theaetetus is very much inclined to adopt this suggestion, but when interrogated by Socrates he is unable to draw any distinction between the whole and all the parts. And if the syllables have no parts, then they are those original elements of which there is no explanation. But how can the syllable be known if the letter remains unknown? In learning to read as children, we are first taught the letters and then the syllables. And in music, the notes, which are the letters, have a much more distinct meaning to us than the combination of them.

Once more, then, we must ask the meaning of the statement, that 'Knowledge is right opinion, accompanied by explanation or definition.' Explanation may mean, (1) the reflection or expression of a man's thoughts—but every man who is not deaf and dumb is able to express his thoughts—or (2) the enumeration of the elements of which anything is composed. A man may have a true opinion about a waggon, but then, and then only, has he knowledge of a waggon when he is able to enumerate the hundred planks of Hesiod. Or he may know the syllables of the name Theaetetus, but not the letters; yet not until he knows both can he be said to have knowledge as well as opinion. But on the other hand he may know the syllable 'The' in the name Theaetetus, yet he may be mistaken about the same syllable in the name Theodorus, and in learning to read we often make such mistakes. And even if he could write out all the letters and syllables of your name in order, still he would only have right opinion. Yet there may be a third meaning of the definition, besides the image or expression of the mind, and the enumeration of the elements, viz. (3) perception of difference.

For example, I may see a man who has eyes, nose, and mouth—that will not distinguish him from any other man. Or he may have a snub-nose and prominent eyes;—that will not distinguish him from myself and you and others who are like me. But

when I see a certain kind of snub-nosedness, then I recognize Theaetetus. And having this sign of difference, I have knowledge. But have I knowledge or opinion of this difference? If I have only opinion I have not knowledge; if I have knowledge we assume a disputed term; for knowledge will have to be defined as right opinion with knowledge of difference.

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And so, Theaetetus, knowledge is neither perception nor true opinion, nor yet definition accompanying true opinion. And I have shown that the children of your brain are not worth rearing. Are you still in labour, or have you brought all you have to say about knowledge to the birth? If you have any more thoughts, you will be the better for having got rid of these; or if you have none, you will be the better for not fancying that you know what you do not know. Observe the limits of my art, which, like my mother's, is an art of midwifery; I do not pretend to compare with the good and wise of this and other ages.

And now I go to meet Meletus at the porch of the King Archon; but to-morrow I shall hope to see you again, Theodorus, at this place.

I. The saying of Theaetetus, that 'Knowledge is sensible perception,' may be assumed to be a current philosophical opinion of the age. 'The ancients,' as Aristotle (*De Anim.* iii. 3) says, citing a verse of Empedocles, 'affirmed knowledge to be the same as perception.' We may now examine these words, first, with reference to their place in the history of philosophy, and secondly, in relation to modern speculations.

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(a) In the age of Socrates the mind was passing from the object to the subject. The same impulse which a century before had led men to form conceptions of the world, now led them to frame general notions of the human faculties and feelings, such as memory, opinion, and the like. The simplest of these is sensation, or sensible perception, by which Plato seems to mean the generalized notion of feelings and impressions of sense, without determining whether they are conscious or not.

The theory that 'Knowledge is sensible perception' is the antithesis of that which derives knowledge from the mind (*Theact.*

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185), or which assumes the existence of ideas independent of the mind (Parm. 134). Yet from their extreme abstraction these theories do not represent the opposite poles of thought in the same way that the corresponding differences would in modern philosophy. The most ideal and the most sensational have a tendency to pass into one another; Heracleitus, like his great successor Hegel, has both aspects. The Eleatic isolation of Being and the Megarian or Cynic isolation of individuals are placed in the same class by Plato (Soph. 251 C, D); and the same principle which is the symbol of motion to one mind is the symbol of rest to another. The Atomists, who are sometimes regarded as the Materialists of Plato, denied the reality of sensation. And in the ancient as well as the modern world there were reactions from theory to experience, from ideas to sense. This is a point of view from which the philosophy of sensation presented great attraction to the ancient thinker. Amid the conflict of ideas and the variety of opinions, the impression of sense remained certain and uniform. Hardness, softness, cold, heat, &c. are not absolutely the same to different persons (cp. 171 D), but the art of measuring could at any rate reduce them all to definite natures (Rep. x. 602 D). Thus the doctrine that knowledge is perception supplies or seems to supply a firm standing ground. Like the other notions of the earlier Greek philosophy, it was held in a very simple way, without much basis of reasoning, and without suggesting the questions which naturally arise in our own minds on the same subject.

(β) The fixedness of impressions of sense furnishes a link of connexion between ancient and modern philosophy. The modern thinker often repeats the parallel axiom, 'All knowledge is experience.' He means to say that the outward and not the inward is both the original source and the final criterion of truth, because the outward can be observed and analyzed; the inward is only known by external results, and is dimly perceived by each man for himself. In what does this differ from the saying of Theaetetus? Chiefly in this — that the modern term 'experience,' while implying a point of departure in sense and a return to sense, also includes all the processes of reasoning and imagination which have intervened. The necessary connexion between them by no means affords a measure of the relative degree of importance



which is to be ascribed to either element. For the inductive portion of any science may be small, as in mathematics or ethics, compared with that which the mind has attained by reasoning and reflection on a very few facts.

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II. The saying that 'All knowledge is sensation' is identified by Plato with the Protagorean thesis that 'Man is the measure of all things.' The interpretation which Protagoras himself is supposed to give of these latter words is: 'Things are to me as they appear to me, and to you as they appear to you.' But there remains still an ambiguity both in the text and in the explanation, which has to be cleared up. Did Protagoras merely mean to assert the relativity of knowledge to the human mind? or did he mean to deny that there is an objective standard of truth?

These two questions have not been always clearly distinguished; the relativity of knowledge has been sometimes confounded with uncertainty. The untutored mind is apt to suppose that objects exist independently of the human faculties, because they really exist independently of the faculties of any individual. In the same way, knowledge appears to be a body of truths stored up in books, which when once ascertained are independent of the discoverer. Further consideration shows us that these truths are not really independent of the mind; there is an adaptation of one to the other, of the eye to the object of sense, of the mind to the conception. There would be no world, if there neither were nor ever had been any one to perceive the world. A slight effort of reflection enables us to understand this; but no effort of reflection will enable us to pass beyond the limits of our own faculties, or to imagine the relation or adaptation of objects to the mind to be different from that of which we have experience. There are certain laws of language and logic to which we are compelled to conform, and to which our ideas naturally adapt themselves; and we can no more get rid of them than we can cease to be ourselves. The absolute and infinite, whether explained as self-existence, or as the totality of human thought, or as the Divine nature, if known to us at all, cannot escape from the category of relation.

But because knowledge is subjective or relative to the mind, we are not to suppose that we are therefore deprived of any of the

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tests or criteria of truth. One man still remains wiser than another, a more accurate observer and relater of facts, a truer measure of the 'proportions of knowledge. The nature of testimony is not altered, nor the verification of causes by prescribed methods less certain. Again, the truth must often come to a man through others, according to the measure of his capacity and education. But neither does this affect the testimony, whether written or oral, which he knows by experience to be trustworthy. He cannot escape from the laws of his own mind; and he cannot escape from the further accident of being dependent for his knowledge on others. But still this is no reason why he should always be in doubt; of many personal, of many historical and scientific facts he may be absolutely assured. And having such a mass of acknowledged truth in the mathematical and physical, not to speak of the moral sciences, the moderns have certainly no reason to acquiesce in the statement that truth is appearance only, or that there is no difference between appearance and truth.

The relativity of knowledge is a truism to us, but was a great psychological discovery in the fifth century before Christ. Of this discovery, the first distinct assertion is contained in the thesis of Protagoras. Probably he had no intention either of denying or affirming an objective standard of truth. He did not consider whether man in the higher or man in the lower sense was a 'measure of all things.' Like other great thinkers, he was absorbed with one idea, and that idea was the absoluteness of perception. Like Socrates, he seemed to see that philosophy must be brought back from 'nature' to 'truth,' from the world to man. But he did not stop to analyze whether he meant 'man' in the concrete or man in the abstract, any man or some men, 'quod semper quod ubique' or individual private judgment. Such an analysis lay beyond his sphere of thought; the age before Socrates had not arrived at these distinctions. Like the Cynics, again, he discarded knowledge in any higher sense than perception. For 'truer' or 'wiser' he substituted the word 'better,' and is not unwilling to admit that both states and individuals are capable of practical improvement. But this improvement does not arise from intellectual enlightenment, nor yet from the exertion of the will, but from a change of circumstances and

impressions; and he who can effect this change in himself or others may be deemed a philosopher. In the mode of effecting it, while agreeing with Socrates and the Cynics in the importance which he attaches to practical life, he is at variance with both of them. To suppose that practice can be divorced from speculation, or that we may do good without caring about truth, is by no means singular, either in philosophy or life. The singularity of this, as of some other (so-called) sophistical doctrines, is the frankness with which they are avowed, instead of being veiled, as in modern times, under ambiguous and convenient phrases.

Plato appears to treat Protagoras much as he himself is treated by Aristotle; that is to say, he does not attempt to understand him from his own point of view. But he entangles him in the meshes of a more advanced logic. To which Protagoras is supposed to reply by Megarian quibbles, which destroy logic, 'Not only man, but each man, and each man at each moment.' In the arguments about sight and memory there is a palpable unfairness which is worthy of the great 'brainless brothers,' Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, and may be compared with the *ἐγκεκαλυμμένος* ('obvelatus') of Eubulides. For he who sees with one eye only cannot be truly said both to see and not to see; nor is memory, which is liable to forget, the immediate knowledge to which Protagoras applies the term. Theodorus justly charges Socrates with going beyond the truth; and Protagoras has equally right on his side when he protests against Socrates arguing from the common use of words, which 'the vulgar pervert in all manner of ways.'

III. The theory of Protagoras is connected by Aristotle as well as Plato with the flux of Heracleitus. But Aristotle is only following Plato, and Plato, as we have already seen, did not mean to imply that such a connexion was admitted by Protagoras himself. His metaphysical genius saw or seemed to see a common tendency in them, just as the modern historian of ancient philosophy might perceive a parallelism between two thinkers of which they were probably unconscious themselves. We must remember throughout that Plato is not speaking of Heracleitus, but of the Heracliteans, who succeeded him; nor of the great original ideas of the master, but of the Eristic into which they had

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degenerated a hundred years later. There is nothing in the fragments of Heracleitus which at all justifies Plato's account of him. His philosophy may be resolved into two elements—first, change, secondly, law or measure pervading the change: these he saw everywhere, and often expressed in strange mythological symbols. But he has no analysis of sensible perception such as Plato attributes to him; nor is there any reason to suppose that he pushed his philosophy into that absolute negation in which Heracliteanism was sunk in the age of Plato. He never said that 'change means every sort of change;' and he expressly distinguished between 'the general and particular understanding.' Like a poet, he surveyed the elements of mythology, nature, thought, which lay before him, and sometimes by the light of genius he saw or seemed to see a mysterious principle working behind them. But as has been the case with other great philosophers, and with Plato and Aristotle themselves, what was really permanent and original could not be understood by the next generation, while a perverted logic carried out his chance expressions with an illogical consistency. His simple and noble thoughts, like those of the great Eleatic, soon degenerated into a mere strife of words. And when thus reduced to mere words, they seem to have exercised a far wider influence in the cities of Ionia (where the people 'were mad about them') than in the life-time of Heracleitus—a phenomenon which, though at first sight singular, is not without a parallel in the history of philosophy and theology.

It is this perverted form of the Heraclitean philosophy which is supposed to effect the final overthrow of Protagorean sensationalism. For if all things are changing at every moment, in all sorts of ways, then there is nothing fixed or defined at all, and therefore no sensible perception, nor any true word by which that or anything else can be described. Of course Protagoras would not have admitted the justice of this argument any more than Heracleitus would have acknowledged the 'uneducated fanatics' who appealed to his writings. He might have said, 'The excellent Socrates has first confused me with Heracleitus, and Heracleitus with his Ephesian successors, and has then disproved the existence both of knowledge and sensation. But I am not responsible for what I never said, nor will I admit



that my common-sense account of knowledge can be overthrown by unintelligible Heraclitean paradoxes.'

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IV. Still at the bottom of the arguments there remains a truth, that knowledge is something more than sensible perception;—this alone would not distinguish man from a tadpole. The absoluteness of sensations at each moment destroys the very consciousness of sensations (cp. *Phileb.* 21 D), or the power of comparing them. The senses are not mere holes in a 'Trojan horse,' but the organs of a presiding nature, in which they meet. A great advance has been made in psychology when the senses are recognized as organs of sense, and we are admitted to see or feel 'through them' and not 'by them,' a distinction of words which, as Socrates observes, is by no means pedantic. A still further step has been made when the most abstract notions, such as Being and Not-being, sameness and difference, unity and plurality, are acknowledged to be the creations of the mind herself, working upon the feelings or impressions of sense. In this manner Plato describes the process of acquiring them, in the words (186 D) 'Knowledge consists not in the feelings or affections (*παθήμασι*), but in the process of reasoning about them (*συλλογισμῷ*).' Here, as in the *Parmenides* (132 A), he means something not really different from generalization. As in the *Sophist*, he is laying the foundation of a rational psychology, which is to supersede the Platonic reminiscence of Ideas as well as the Eleatic Being and the individualism of Megarians and Cynics.

V. Having rejected the doctrine that 'Knowledge is perception,' we now proceed to look for a definition of knowledge in the sphere of opinion. But here we are met by a singular difficulty: How is false opinion possible? For we must either know or not know that which is presented to the mind or to sense. We of course should answer at once: 'No; the alternative is not necessary, for there may be degrees of knowledge; and we may know and have forgotten, or we may be learning, or we may have a general but not a particular knowledge, or we may know but not be able to explain;' and many other ways may be imagined in which we know and do not know at the same time. But these answers belong to a later stage of metaphysical discussion; whereas the difficulty in question naturally arises owing to the childhood of

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the human mind, like the parallel difficulty respecting Not-being. Men had only recently arrived at the notion of opinion; they could not at once define the true and pass beyond into the false. The very word *δόξα* was full of ambiguity, being sometimes, as in the Eleatic philosophy, applied to the sensible world, and again used in the more ordinary sense of opinion. There is no connexion between sensible appearance and probability, and yet both of them met in the word *δόξα*, and could hardly be disengaged from one another in the mind of the Greek living in the fifth or fourth century B. C. To this was often added, as at the end of the fifth book of the Republic, the idea of relation, which is equally distinct from either of them; also a fourth notion, the conclusion of the dialectical process, the making up of the mind after she has been 'talking to herself' (Theat. 190).

We are not then surprised that the sphere of opinion and of Not-being should be a dusky, half-lighted place (Rep. v. p. 478), belonging neither to the old world of sense and imagination, nor to the new world of reflection and reason. Plato attempts to clear up this darkness. In his accustomed manner he passes from the lower to the higher, without omitting the intermediate stages. This appears to be the reason why he seeks for the definition of knowledge first in the sphere of opinion. Hereafter we shall find that something more than opinion is required.

False opinion is explained by Plato at first as a confusion of mind and sense, which arises when the impression on the mind does not correspond to the impression made on the senses. It is obvious that this explanation (supposing the distinction between impressions on the mind and impressions on the senses to be admitted) does not account for all forms of error; and Plato has excluded himself from the consideration of the greater number, by designedly omitting the intermediate processes of learning and forgetting; nor does he include fallacies in the use of language or erroneous inferences. But he is struck by one possibility of error, which is not covered by his theory, viz. errors in arithmetic. For in numbers and calculation there is no combination of thought and sense, and yet errors may often happen. Hence he is led to discard the explanation which might nevertheless have been supposed to hold good (for anything which he says to the contrary) as a rationale of error, in the case of facts derived from sense.

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Another attempt is made to explain false opinion by assigning to error a sort of positive existence. But error or ignorance is essentially negative — a not-knowing; if we knew an error, we should be no longer in error. We may veil our difficulty under figures of speech, but these, although telling arguments with the multitude, can never be the real foundation of a system of psychology. Only they lead us to dwell upon mental phenomena which if expressed in an abstract form would not be realized by us at all. The figure of the mind receiving impressions is one of those images which have rooted themselves for ever in language. It may or may not be a 'gracious aid' to thought; but it cannot be got rid of. The other figure of the enclosure is also remarkable as affording the first hint of universal all-pervading ideas, — a notion further carried out in the Sophist. This is implied in the birds, some in flocks, some solitary, which fly about anywhere and everywhere. Plato discards both figures, as not really solving the question which to us appears so simple: 'How do we make mistakes?' The failure of the enquiry seems to show that we should return to knowledge, and begin with that; and we may afterwards proceed, with a better hope of success, to the examination of opinion.

But is true opinion really distinct from knowledge? The difference between these he seeks to establish by an argument, which to us appears singular and unsatisfactory. The existence of true opinion is proved by the rhetoric of the law courts, which cannot give knowledge, but may give true opinion. The rhetorician cannot put the judge or juror in possession of all the facts which prove an act of violence, but he may truly persuade them of the commission of such an act. Here the idea of true opinion seems to be a right conclusion from imperfect knowledge. But the correctness of such an opinion will be purely accidental; and is really the effect of one man, who has the means of knowing, persuading another who has not. Plato would have done better if he had said that true opinion was a contradiction in terms.

Assuming the distinction between knowledge and opinion, Theaetetus, in answer to Socrates, proceeds to define knowledge as true opinion, with definite or rational explanation. This Socrates identifies with another and different theory, of those who assert that knowledge first begins with a proposition.

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The elements may be perceived by sense, but they are names, and cannot be defined. When we assign to them some predicate, they first begin to have a meaning (*ὀνομάτων συμπλοκὴ λόγον οὐσία*). This seems equivalent to saying, that the individuals of sense become the subject of knowledge when they are regarded as they are in nature in relation to other individuals.

Yet we feel a difficulty in following this new hypothesis. For must not opinion be equally expressed in a proposition? The difference between true and false opinion is not the difference between the particular and the universal, but between the true universal and the false. Thought may be as much at fault as sight. When we place individuals under a class, or assign to them attributes, this is not knowledge, but a very rudimentary process of thought; the first generalization of all, without which language would be impossible. And has Plato kept altogether clear of a confusion, which the analogous word *λόγος* tends to create, of a proposition and a definition? And is not the confusion increased by the use of the analogous term 'elements,' or 'letters'? For there is no real resemblance between the relation of letters to a syllable, and of the terms to a proposition.

Plato, in the spirit of the Megarian philosophy, soon discovers a flaw in the explanation. For how can we know a compound of which the simple elements are unknown to us? Can two unknowns make a known? Can a whole be something different from the parts? The answer of experience is that they can; for we may know a compound, which we are unable to analyze into its elements; and all the parts, when united, may be more than all the parts separated: e. g. the number four, or any other number, is more than the units which are contained in it; any chemical compound is more than and different from the simple elements. But ancient philosophy in this, as in many other instances, proceeding by the path of mental analysis, was perplexed by doubts which warred against the plainest facts.

Three attempts to explain the new definition of knowledge still remain to be considered. They all of them turn on the explanation of *λόγος*. The first account of the meaning of the word is the reflection of thought in speech — a sort of nominalism: 'La science est une langue bien faite.' But anybody who is not dumb can say what he thinks; therefore mere speech cannot be knowledge.



And yet we may observe, that there is in this explanation an element of truth which is not recognized by Plato; viz. that truth and thought are inseparable from language, although mere expression in words is not truth. The second explanation of λόγος is the enumeration of the elementary parts of the complex whole. But this is only definition accompanied with right opinion, and does not yet attain to the certainty of knowledge. Plato does not mention the greater objection, which is, that the enumeration of particulars is endless; such a definition would be based on no principle, and would not help us at all in gaining a common idea. The third is the best explanation,—the possession of a characteristic mark, which seems to answer to the logical definition by genus and difference. But this, again, is equally necessary for right opinion; and we have already determined, although not on very satisfactory grounds, that knowledge must be distinguished from opinion. A better distinction is drawn between them in the *Timæus* (p. 51 E). They might be opposed as philosophy and rhetoric, and as conversant respectively with necessary and contingent matter. But no true idea of the nature of either of them, or of their relation to one another, could be framed until science obtained a content. The ancient philosophers in the age of Plato thought of science only as pure abstraction, and to this opinion stood in no relation.

Like *Theætetus*, we have attained to no definite result. But an interesting phase of ancient philosophy has passed before us. And the negative result is not to be despised. For on certain subjects, and in certain states of knowledge, the work of negation or clearing the ground must go on, perhaps for a generation, before the new structure can begin to rise. Plato saw the necessity of combating the illogical logic of the Megarians and Eristics. For the completion of the edifice, he makes preparation in the *Theætetus*, and crowns the work in the *Sophist*.

Many (1) fine expressions, and (2) remarks full of wisdom, (3) also germs of a metaphysic of the future, are scattered up and down in the dialogue. Such, for example, as (1) the comparison of *Theætetus*' progress in learning to the 'noiseless flow of a river of oil'; the satirical touch, 'flavouring a sauce or fawning speech'; or the remarkable expression, 'full of impure dialectic'; or the lively images under which the argument is described,—'the flood

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of arguments pouring in,' the fresh discussions 'bursting in like a band of revellers.' (2) As illustrations of the second head, may be cited the remark of Socrates, that 'distinctions of words, although sometimes pedantic, are also necessary'; or the fine touch in the character of the lawyer, that 'dangers came upon him when the tenderness of youth was unequal to them'; or the description of the manner in which the spirit is broken in a wicked man who listens to reproof until he becomes like a child; or the punishment of the wicked, which is not physical suffering, but the perpetual companionship of evil (cp. Gorgias); or the saying, often repeated by Aristotle and others, that 'philosophy begins in wonder, for Iris is the child of Thaumias'; or the superb contempt with which the philosopher takes down the pride of wealthy landed proprietors by comparison of the whole earth. (3) Important metaphysical ideas are: *a.* the conception of thought, as the mind talking to herself; *b.* the notion of a common sense, developed further by Aristotle, and the explicit declaration, that the mind gains her conceptions of Being, sameness, number, and the like, from reflection on herself; *c.* the excellent distinction of Theaetetus (which Socrates, speaking with emphasis, 'leaves to grow') between seeing the forms or hearing the sounds of words in a foreign language, and understanding the meaning of them; and *d.* the distinction of Socrates himself between 'having' and 'possessing' knowledge, in which the answer to the whole discussion appears to be contained.

There is a difference between ancient and modern psychology, and we have a difficulty in explaining one in the terms of the other. To us the inward and outward sense and the inward and outward worlds of which they are the organs are parted by a wall, and appear as if they could never be confounded. The mind is endued with faculties, habits, instincts, and a personality or consciousness in which they are bound together. Over against these are placed forms, colours, external bodies coming into contact with our own body. We speak of a subject which is ourselves, of an object which is all the rest. These are separable in thought, but united in any act of sensation, reflection, or volition. As there are various degrees in which the mind may enter into or be abstracted from the operations of sense, so there are various points at which

this separation or union may be supposed to occur. And within the sphere of mind the analogy of sense reappears; and we distinguish not only external objects, but objects of will and of knowledge which we contrast with them. These again are comprehended in a higher object, which reunites with the subject. A multitude of abstractions are created by the efforts of successive thinkers which become logical determinations; and they have to be arranged in order, before the scheme of thought is complete. The framework of the human intellect is not the *peculium* of an individual, but the joint work of many who are of all ages and countries. What we are in mind is due, not merely to our physical, but to our mental antecedents which we trace in history, and more especially in the history of philosophy. Nor can mental phenomena be truly explained either by physiology or by the observation of consciousness apart from their history. They have a growth of their own, like the growth of a flower, a tree, a human being. They may be conceived as of themselves constituting a common mind, and having a sort of personal identity in which they coexist.

So comprehensive is modern psychology, seeming to aim at constructing anew the entire world of thought. And prior to or simultaneously with this construction a negative process has to be carried on, a clearing away of useless abstractions which we have inherited from the past. Many erroneous conceptions of the mind derived from former philosophies have found their way into language, and we with difficulty disengage ourselves from them. Mere figures of speech have unconsciously influenced the minds of great thinkers. Also there are some distinctions, as, for example, that of the will and of the reason, and of the moral and intellectual faculties, which are carried further than is justified by experience. Any separation of things which we cannot see or exactly define, though it may be necessary, is a fertile source of error. The division of the mind into faculties or powers or virtues is too deeply rooted in language to be got rid of, but it gives a false impression. For if we reflect on ourselves we see that all our faculties easily pass into one another, and are bound together in a single mind or consciousness; but this mental unity is apt to be concealed from us by the distinctions of language.

A profusion of words and ideas has obscured rather than

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enlightened mental science. It is hard to say how many fallacies have arisen from the representation of the mind as a box, as a 'tabula rasa,' a book, a mirror, and the like. It is remarkable how Plato in the *Theaetetus*, after having indulged in the figure of the waxen tablet and the decoy, afterwards discards them. The mind is also represented by another class of images, as the spring of a watch, a motive power, a breath, a stream, a succession of points or moments. As Plato remarks in the *Cratylus*, words expressive of motion as well as of rest are employed to describe the faculties and operations of the mind; and in these there is contained another store of fallacies. Some shadow or reflection of the body seems always to adhere to our thoughts about ourselves, and mental processes are hardly distinguished in language from bodily ones. To see or perceive are used indifferently of both; the words intuition, moral sense, common sense, the mind's eye, are figures of speech transferred from one to the other. And many other words used in early poetry or in sacred writings to express the works of mind have a materialistic sound; for old mythology was allied to sense, and the distinction of matter and mind had not as yet arisen. Thus materialism receives an illusive aid from language; and both in philosophy and religion the imaginary figure or association easily takes the place of real knowledge.

Again, there is the illusion of looking into our own minds as if our thoughts or feelings were written down in a book. This is another figure of speech, which might be appropriately termed 'the fallacy of the looking-glass.' We cannot look at the mind unless we have the eye which sees, and we can only look, not into, but out of the mind at the thoughts, words, actions of ourselves and others. What we dimly recognize within us is not experience, but rather the suggestion of an experience, which we may gather, if we will, from the observation of the world. The memory has but a feeble recollection of what we were saying or doing a few weeks or a few months ago, and still less of what we were thinking or feeling. This is one among many reasons why there is so little self-knowledge among mankind; they do not carry with them the thought of what they are or have been. The so-called 'facts of consciousness' are equally evanescent; they are facts which nobody ever saw, and which can neither be



defined nor described. Of the three laws of thought the first (All  $A = A$ ) is an identical proposition — that is to say, a mere word or symbol claiming to be a proposition: the two others (Nothing can be  $A$  and not  $A$ , and Everything is either  $A$  or not  $A$ ) are untrue, because they exclude degrees and also the mixed modes and double aspects under which truth is so often presented to us. To assert that man is man is unmeaning; to say that he is free or necessary and cannot be both is a half truth only. These are a few of the entanglements which impede the natural course of human thought. Lastly, there is the fallacy which lies still deeper, of regarding the individual mind apart from the universal, or either, as a self-existent entity apart from the ideas which are contained in them.

In ancient philosophies the analysis of the mind is still rudimentary and imperfect. It naturally began with an effort to disengage the universal from sense — this was the first lifting up of the mist. It wavered between object and subject, passing imperceptibly from one or Being to mind and thought. Appearance in the outward object was for a time indistinguishable from opinion in the subject. At length mankind spoke of knowing as well as of opining or perceiving. But when the word 'knowledge' was found how was it to be explained or defined? It was not an error, it was a step in the right direction, when Protagoras said that 'Man is the measure of all things,' and that 'All knowledge is perception.' This was the subjective which corresponded to the objective 'All is flux.' But the thoughts of men deepened, and soon they began to be aware that knowledge was neither sense, nor yet opinion — with or without explanation; nor the expression of thought, nor the enumeration of parts, nor the addition of characteristic marks. Motion and rest were equally ill adapted to express its nature, although both must in some sense be attributed to it; it might be described more truly as the mind conversing with herself; the discourse of reason; the hymn of dialectic, the science of relations, of ideas, of the so-called arts and sciences, of the one, of the good, of the all: — this is the way along which Plato is leading us in his later dialogues. In its higher signification it was the knowledge, not of men, but of gods, perfect and all sufficing: — like other ideals always passing out of sight, and nevertheless present to the mind of Aristotle as well as Plato, and

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the reality to which they were both tending. For Aristotle as well as Plato would in modern phraseology have been termed a mystic; and like him would have defined the higher philosophy to be 'Knowledge of being or essence,'—words to which in our own day we have a difficulty in attaching a meaning.

Yet, in spite of Plato and his followers, mankind have again and again returned to a sensational philosophy. As to some of the early thinkers, amid the fleetings of sensible objects, ideas alone seemed to be fixed, so to a later generation amid the fluctuation of philosophical opinions the only fixed points appeared to be outward objects. Any pretence of knowledge which went beyond them implied logical processes, of the correctness of which they had no assurance and which at best were only probable. The mind, tired of wandering, sought to rest on firm ground; when the idols of philosophy and language were stripped off, the perception of outward objects alone remained. The ancient Epicureans never asked whether the comparison of these with one another did not involve principles of another kind which were above and beyond them. In like manner the modern inductive philosophy forgot to enquire into the meaning of experience, and did not attempt to form a conception of outward objects apart from the mind, or of the mind apart from them. Soon objects of sense were merged in sensations and feelings, but feelings and sensations were still unanalyzed. At last we return to the doctrine attributed by Plato to Protagoras, that the mind is only a succession of momentary perceptions. At this point the modern philosophy of experience forms an alliance with ancient scepticism.

The higher truths of philosophy and religion are very far removed from sense. Admitting that, like all other knowledge, they are derived from experience, and that experience is ultimately resolvable into facts which come to us through the eye and ear, still their origin is a mere accident which has nothing to do with their true nature. They are universal and unseen; they belong to all times—past, present, and future. Any worthy notion of mind or reason includes them. The proof of them is, 1st, their comprehensiveness and consistency with one another; 2ndly, their agreement with history and experience. But sensation is of the present only, is isolated, is and is not in successive moments.

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It takes the passing hour as it comes, following the lead of the eye or ear instead of the command of reason. It is a faculty which man has in common with the animals, and in which he is inferior to many of them. The importance of the senses in us is that they are the apertures of the mind, doors and windows through which we take in and make our own the materials of knowledge. Regarded in any other point of view sensation is of all mental acts the most trivial and superficial. Hence the term 'sensational' is rightly used to express what is shallow in thought and feeling.

We propose in what follows, first of all, like Plato in the *Theaetetus*, to analyse sensation, and secondly to trace the connexion between theories of sensation and a sensational or Epicurean philosophy.

§ I. We, as well as the ancients, speak of the five senses, and of a sense, or common sense, which is the abstraction of them. The term 'sense' is also used metaphorically, both in ancient and modern philosophy, to express the operations of the mind which are immediate or intuitive. Of the five senses, two—the sight and the hearing—are of a more subtle and complex nature, while two others—the smell and the taste—seem to be only more refined varieties of touch. All of them are passive, and by this are distinguished from the active faculty of speech: they receive impressions, but do not produce them, except in so far as they are objects of sense themselves.

Physiology speaks to us of the wonderful apparatus of nerves, muscles, tissues, by which the senses are enabled to fulfil their functions. It traces the connexion, though imperfectly, of the bodily organs with the operations of the mind. Of these latter, it seems rather to know the conditions than the causes. It can prove to us that without the brain we cannot think, and that without the eye we cannot see: and yet there is far more in thinking and seeing than is given by the brain and the eye. It observes the 'concomitant variations' of body and mind. Psychology, on the other hand, treats of the same subject regarded from another point of view. It speaks of the relation of the senses to one another; it shows how they meet the mind; it analyzes the transition from sense to thought. The one describes their

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nature as apparent to the outward eye; by the other they are regarded only as the instruments of the mind. It is in this latter point of view that we propose to consider them.

The simplest sensation involves an unconscious or nascent operation of the mind; it implies objects of sense, and objects of sense have differences of form, number, colour. But the conception of an object without us, or the power of discriminating numbers, forms, colours, is not given by the sense, but by the mind. A mere sensation does not attain to distinctness: it is a confused impression, *συγκεχυμένον τι*, as Plato says (*Rep.* vii. 524 B), until number introduces light and order into the confusion. At what point confusion becomes distinctness is a question of degree which cannot be precisely determined. The distant object, the undefined notion, come out into relief as we approach them or attend to them. Or we may assist the analysis by attempting to imagine the world first dawning upon the eye of the infant or of a person newly restored to sight. Yet even with them the mind as well as the eye opens or enlarges. For all three are inseparably bound together — the object would be nowhere and nothing, if not perceived by the sense, and the sense would have no power of distinguishing without the mind.

But prior to objects of sense there is a third nature in which they are contained — that is to say, space, which may be explained in various ways. It is the element which surrounds them; it is the vacuum or void which they leave or occupy when passing from one portion of space to another. It might be described in the language of ancient philosophy, as ‘the Not-being’ of objects. It is a negative idea which in the course of ages has become positive. It is originally derived from the contemplation of the world without us — the boundless earth or sea, the vacant heaven, and is therefore acquired chiefly through the sense of sight: to the blind the conception of space is feeble and inadequate, derived for the most part from touch or from the descriptions of others. At first it appears to be continuous; afterwards we perceive it to be capable of division by lines or points, real or imaginary. By the help of mathematics we form another idea of space, which is altogether independent of experience. Geometry teaches us that the innumerable lines and figures by which space is or may be intersected are absolutely true in all their combinations and



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consequences. New and unchangeable properties of space are thus developed, which are proved to us in a thousand ways by mathematical reasoning as well as by common experience. Through quantity and measure we are conducted to our simplest and purest notion of matter, which is to the cube or solid what space is to the square or surface. And all our applications of mathematics are applications of our ideas of space to matter. No wonder then that they seem to have a necessary existence to us. Being the simplest of our ideas, space is also the one of which we have the most difficulty in ridding ourselves. Neither can we set a limit to it, for wherever we fix a limit, space is springing up beyond. Neither can we conceive a smallest or indivisible portion of it; for within the smallest there is a smaller still; and even these inconceivable qualities of space, whether the infinite or the infinitesimal, may be made the subject of reasoning and have a certain truth to us.

Whether space exists in the mind or out of it, is a question which has no meaning. We should rather say that without it the mind is incapable of conceiving the body, and therefore of conceiving itself. The mind may be indeed imagined to contain the body, in the same way that Aristotle (partly following Plato) supposes God to be the outer heaven or circle of the universe. But how can the individual mind carry about the universe of space packed up within, or how can separate minds have either a universe of their own or a common universe? In such conceptions there seems to be a confusion of the individual and the universal. To say that we can only have a true idea of ourselves when we deny the reality of that by which we have any idea of ourselves is an absurdity. The earth which is our habitation and 'the starry heaven above' and we ourselves are equally an illusion, if space is only a quality or condition of our minds.

Again, we may compare the truths of space with other truths derived from experience, which seem to have a necessity to us in proportion to the frequency of their recurrence or the truth of the consequences which may be inferred from them. We are thus led to remark that the necessity in our ideas of space on which much stress has been laid, differs in a slight degree only from the necessity which appears to belong to other of our ideas, e.g. weight, motion, and the like. And there is another way in which this

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necessity may be explained. We have been taught it, and the truth which we were taught or which we inherited has never been contradicted in all our experience and is therefore confirmed by it. Who can resist an idea which is presented to him in a general form in every moment of his life and of which he finds no instance to the contrary? The greater part of what is sometimes regarded as the *a priori* intuition of space is really the conception of the various geometrical figures of which the properties have been revealed by mathematical analysis. And the certainty of these properties is immeasurably increased to us by our finding that they hold good not only in every instance, but in all the consequences which are supposed to flow from them.

Neither must we forget that our idea of space, like our other ideas, has a history. The Homeric poems contain no word for it; even the later Greek philosophy has not the Kantian notion of space, but only the definite 'place' or 'the infinite.' To Plato, in the *Timaeus*, it is known only as the 'nurse of generation.' When therefore we speak of the necessity of our ideas of space we must remember that this is a necessity which has grown up with the growth of the human mind, and has been made by ourselves. We can free ourselves from the perplexities which are involved in it by ascending to a time in which they did not as yet exist. And when space or time are described as '*a priori* forms or intuitions added to the matter given in sensation,' we should consider that such expressions belong really to the 'pre-historic study' of philosophy, i. e. to the eighteenth century, when men sought to explain the human mind without regard to history or language or the social nature of man.

In every act of sense there is a latent perception of space, of which we only become conscious when objects are withdrawn from it. There are various ways in which we may trace the connexion between them. We may think of space as unresisting matter, and of matter as divided into objects; or of objects again as formed by abstraction into a collective notion of matter, and of matter as rarefied into space. And motion may be conceived as the union of there and not there in space, and force as the materializing or solidification of motion. Space again is the individual and universal in one; or, in other words, a perception and

also a conception. So easily do what are sometimes called our simple ideas pass into one another, and differences of kind resolve themselves into differences of degree.

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Within or behind space there is another abstraction in many respects similar to it—time, the form of the inward, as space is the form of the outward. As we cannot think of outward objects of sense or of outward sensations without space, so neither can we think of a succession of sensations without time. It is the vacancy of thoughts or sensations, as space is the void of outward objects, and we can no more imagine the mind without the one than the world without the other. It is to arithmetic what space is to geometry; or, more strictly, arithmetic may be said to be equally applicable to both. It is defined in our minds, partly by the analogy of space and partly by the recollection of events which have happened to us, or the consciousness of feelings which we are experiencing. Like space, it is without limit, for whatever beginning or end of time we fix, there is a beginning and end before them, and so on without end. We speak of a past, present, and future, and again the analogy of space assists us in conceiving of them as coexistent. When the limit of time is removed there arises in our minds the idea of eternity, which at first, like time itself, is only negative, but gradually, when connected with the world and the divine nature, like the other negative infinity of space, becomes positive. Whether time is prior to the mind and to experience, or coeval with them, is (like the parallel question about space) unmeaning. Like space it has been realized gradually: in the Homeric poems, or even in the Hesiodic cosmogony, there is no more notion of time than of space. The conception of being is more general than either, and might therefore with greater plausibility be affirmed to be a condition or quality of the mind. The *a priori* intuitions of Kant would have been as unintelligible to Plato as his *a priori* *synthetical propositions* to Aristotle. The philosopher of Königsberg supposed himself to be analyzing a necessary mode of thought: he was not aware that he was dealing with a mere abstraction. But now that we are able to trace the gradual developement of ideas through religion, through language, through abstractions, why should we interpose the fiction of time between ourselves and realities? Why should we single out one of these

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abstractions to be the *a priori* condition of all the others? It comes last and not first in the order of our thoughts, and is not the condition precedent of them, but the last generalization of them. Nor can any principle be imagined more suicidal to philosophy than to assume that all the truth which we are capable of attaining is seen only through an unreal medium. If all that exists in time is illusion, we may well ask with Plato, 'What becomes of the mind?'

Leaving the *a priori* conditions of sensation we may proceed to consider acts of sense. These admit of various degrees of duration or intensity; they admit also of a greater or less extension from one object, which is perceived directly, to many which are perceived indirectly or in a less degree, and to the various associations of the object which are latent in the mind. In general the greater the intension the less the extension of them. The simplest sensation implies some relation of objects to one another, some position in space, some relation to a previous or subsequent sensation. The acts of seeing and hearing may be almost unconscious and may pass away unnoted; they may also leave an impression behind them or power of recalling them. If, after seeing an object we shut our eyes, the object remains dimly seen in the same or about the same place, but with form and lineaments half filled up. This is the simplest act of memory. And as we cannot see one thing without at the same time seeing another, different objects hang together in recollection, and when we call for one the other quickly follows. To think of the place in which we have last seen a thing is often the best way of recalling it to the mind. Hence memory is dependent on association. The act of recollection may be compared to the sight of an object at a great distance which we have previously seen near and seek to bring near to us in thought. Memory is to sense as dreaming is to waking; and like dreaming has a wayward and uncertain power of recalling impressions from the past.

Thus begins the passage from the outward to the inward sense. But as yet there is no conception of a universal—the mind only remembers the individual object or objects, and is always attaching to them some colour or association of sense. The power of recollection seems to depend on the intensity or



largeness of the perception, or on the strength of some emotion with which it is inseparably connected. This is the natural memory which is allied to sense, such as children appear to have and barbarians and animals. It is necessarily limited in range, and its limitation is its strength. In later life, when the mind has become crowded with names, acts, feelings, images innumerable, we acquire by education another memory of system and arrangement which is both stronger and weaker than the first — weaker in the recollection of sensible impressions as they are represented to us by eye or ear — stronger by the natural connexion of ideas with objects or with one another. And many of the notions which form a part of the train of our thoughts are hardly realized by us at the time, but, like numbers or algebraical symbols, are used as signs only, thus lightening the labour of recollection.

And now we may suppose that numerous images present themselves to the mind, which begins to act upon them and to arrange them in various ways. Besides the impression of external objects present with us or just absent from us, we have a dimmer conception of other objects which have disappeared from our immediate recollection and yet continue to exist in us. The mind is full of fancies which are passing to and fro before it. Some feeling or association calls them up, and they are uttered by the lips. This is the first rudimentary imagination, which may be truly described in the language of Hobbes, as ‘decaying sense,’ an expression which may be applied with equal truth to memory as well. For memory and imagination, though we sometimes oppose them, are nearly allied; the difference between them seems chiefly to lie in the activity of the one compared with the passivity of the other. The sense decaying in memory receives a flash of light or life from imagination. Dreaming is a link of connexion between them; for in dreaming we feebly recollect and also feebly imagine at one and the same time. When reason is asleep the lower part of the mind wanders at will amid the images which have been received from without, the intelligent element retires, and the sensual or sensuous takes its place. And so in the first efforts of imagination reason is latent or set aside; and images, in part disorderly, but also having a unity (however imperfect) of their

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own, pour like a flood over the mind. And if we could penetrate into the heads of animals we should probably find that their intelligence, or the state of what in them is analogous to our intelligence, is of this nature.

Thus far we have been speaking of men, rather in the points in which they resemble animals than in the points in which they differ from them. The animal too has memory in various degrees, and the elements of imagination, if, as appears to be the case, he dreams. How far their powers or instincts are educated by the circumstances of their lives or by intercourse with one another or with mankind, we cannot precisely tell. They, like ourselves, have the physical inheritance of form, scent, hearing, sight, and other qualities or instincts. But they have not the mental inheritance of thoughts and ideas handed down by tradition, 'the slow additions that build up the mind' of the human race. And language, which is the great educator of mankind, is wanting in them; whereas in us language is ever present — even in the infant the latent power of naming is almost immediately observable. And therefore the description which has been already given of the nascent power of the faculties is in reality an anticipation. For simultaneous with their growth in man a growth of language must be supposed. The child of two years old sees the fire once and again, and the feeble observation of the same recurring object is associated with the feeble utterance of the name by which he is taught to call it. Soon he learns to utter the name when the object is no longer there, but the desire or imagination of it is present to him. At first in every use of the word there is a colour of sense, an indistinct picture of the object which accompanies it. But in later years he sees in the name only the universal or class word, and the more abstract the notion becomes, the more vacant is the image which is presented to him. Henceforward all the operations of his mind, including the perceptions of sense, are a synthesis of sensations, words, conceptions. In seeing or hearing or looking or listening the sensible impression prevails over the conception and the word. In reflection the process is reversed — the outward object fades away into nothingness, the name or the conception or both together are everything. Language, like number, is intermediate between the two, partaking of the definiteness of

the outer and of the universality of the inner world. For logic teaches us that every word is really a universal, and only condescends by the help of position or circumlocution to become the expression of individuals or particulars. And sometimes by using words as symbols we are able to give a 'local habitation and a name' to the infinite and inconceivable.

Thus we see that no line can be drawn between the powers of sense and of reflection—they pass imperceptibly into one another. We may indeed distinguish between the seeing and the closed eye—between the sensation and the recollection of it. But this distinction carries us a very little way, for recollection is present in sight as well as sight in recollection. There is no impression of sense which does not simultaneously recall differences of form, number, colour, and the like. Neither is such a distinction applicable at all to our internal bodily sensations, which give no sign of themselves when unaccompanied with pain, and even when we are most conscious of them, have often no assignable place in the human frame. Who can divide the nerves or great nervous centres from the mind which uses them? Who can separate the pains and pleasures of the mind from the pains and pleasures of the body? The words 'inward and outward,' 'active and passive,' 'mind and body,' are best conceived by us as differences of degree passing into differences of kind, and at one time and under one aspect acting in harmony and then again opposed. They introduce a system and order into the knowledge of our being; and yet, like many other general terms, are often in advance of our actual analysis or observation.

According to some writers the inward sense is only the fading away or imperfect realization of the outward. But this leaves out of sight one half of the phenomenon. For the mind is not only withdrawn from the world of sense but introduced to a higher world of thought and reflection, in which, like the outward sense, she is trained and educated. By use the outward sense becomes keener and more intense, especially when confined within narrow limits. The savage with little or no thought has a quicker discernment of the track than the civilized man; in like manner the dog, having the help of scent as well as of sight, is superior to the savage. By use again the inward thought becomes more defined and distinct; what was at first an effort is made easy by the

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natural instrumentality of language, and the mind learns to grasp universals with no more exertion than is required for the sight of an outward object. There is a natural connexion and arrangement of them, like the association of objects in a landscape. Just as a note or two of music suffices to recall a whole piece to the musician's or composer's mind, so a great principle or leading thought suggests and arranges a world of particulars. The power of reflection is not feebler than the faculty of sense, but of a higher and more comprehensive nature. It not only receives the universals of sense, but gives them a new content by comparing and combining them with one another. It withdraws from the seen that it may dwell in the unseen. The sense only presents us with a flat and impenetrable surface: the mind takes the world to pieces and puts it together on a new pattern. The universals which are detached from sense are reconstructed in science. They and not the mere impressions of sense are the truth of the world in which we live; and (as an argument to those who will only believe 'what they can hold in their hands') we may further observe that they are the source of our power over it. To say that the outward sense is stronger than the inward is like saying that the arm of the workman is stronger than the constructing or directing mind.

Returning to the senses we may briefly consider two questions — first their relation to the mind, secondly, their relation to outward objects: —

1. The senses are not merely 'holes set in a wooden horse' (*Theaet.* 184 D), but instruments of the mind with which they are organically connected. There is no use of them without some use of words—some natural or latent logic—some previous experience or observation. Sensation, like all other mental processes, is complex and relative, though apparently simple. The senses mutually confirm and support one another; it is hard to say how much our impressions of hearing may be affected by those of sight, or how far our impressions of sight may be corrected by the touch, especially in infancy. The confirmation of them by one another cannot of course be given by any one of them. Many intuitions which are inseparable from the act of sense are really the result of complicated reasonings. The most cursory glance at objects enables the experienced eye to judge approximately of their relations and distance, although nothing is impressed upon the



retina except colour, including gradations of light and shade. From these delicate and almost imperceptible differences we seem chiefly to derive our ideas of distance and position. By comparison of what is near with what is distant we learn that the tree, house, river, &c. which are a long way off are objects of a like nature with those which are seen by us in our immediate neighbourhood, although the actual impression made on the eye is very different in one case and in the other. This is a language of 'large and small letters' (Rep. 2. 368 D), slightly differing in form and exquisitely graduated by distance, which we are learning all our life long, and which we attain in various degrees according to our powers of sight or observation. There is another consideration. The greater or less strain upon the nerves of the eye or ear is communicated to the mind and silently informs the judgment. We have also the use not of one eye only, but of two, which give us a wider range, and help us to discern, by the greater or less acuteness of the angle which the rays of sight form, the distance of an object and its relation to other objects. But we are already passing beyond the limits of our actual knowledge on a subject which has given rise to many conjectures. More important than the addition of another conjecture is the observation, whether in the case of sight or of any other sense, of the great complexity of the causes and the great simplicity of the effect.

The sympathy of the mind and the ear is no less striking than the sympathy of the mind and the eye. Do we not seem to perceive instinctively and as an act of sense the differences of articulate speech and of musical notes? Yet how small a part of speech or of music is produced by the impression of the ear compared with that which is furnished by the mind !

Again : the more refined faculty of sense, as in animals so also in man, seems often to be transmitted by inheritance. Neither must we forget that in the use of the senses, as in his whole nature, man is a social being, who is always being educated by language, habit, and the teaching of other men as well as by his own observation. He knows distance because he is taught it by a more experienced judgment than his own ; he distinguishes sounds because he is told to remark them by a person of a more discerning ear. And as we inherit from our parents or other ancestors peculiar powers of sense or feeling, so we improve and

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strengthen them, not only by regular teaching, but also by sympathy and communion with other persons. •

2. The second question, namely, that concerning the relation of the mind to external objects, is really a trifling one, though it has been made the subject of a famous philosophy. We may if we like, with Berkeley, resolve objects of sense into sensations; but the change is one of name only, and nothing is gained and something is lost by such a resolution or confusion of them. For we have not really made a single step towards idealism, and any arbitrary inversion of our ordinary modes of speech is disturbing to the mind. The youthful metaphysician is delighted at his marvellous discovery that nothing is, and that what we see or feel is our sensation only: for a day or two the world has a new interest to him; he alone knows the secret which has been communicated to him by the philosopher, that mind is all — when in fact he is going out of his mind in the first intoxication of a great thought. But he soon finds that all things remain as they were — the laws of motion, the properties of matter, the qualities of substances. After having inflicted his theories on any one who is willing to receive them, ‘first on his father and mother, secondly on some other patient listener, thirdly on his dog,’ he finds that he only differs from the rest of mankind in the use of a word. He had once hoped that by getting rid of the solidity of matter he might open a passage to worlds beyond. He liked to think of the world as the representation of the divine nature, and delighted to imagine angels and spirits wandering through space, present in the room in which he is sitting without coming through the door, nowhere and everywhere at the same instant. At length he finds that he has been the victim of his own fancies; he has neither more nor less evidence of the supernatural than he had before. He himself has become unsettled, but the laws of the world remain fixed as at the beginning. He has discovered that his appeal to the fallibility of sense was really an illusion. For whatever uncertainty there may be in the appearances of nature, arises only out of the imperfection or variation of the human senses, or possibly from the deficiency of certain branches of knowledge; when science is able to apply her tests, the uncertainty is at an end. We are apt sometimes to think that moral and metaphysical philosophy are lowered by the influence which is exercised over them by physical science.

But any interpretation of nature by physical science is far in advance of such idealism. The philosophy of Berkeley, while giving unbounded license to the imagination, is still grovelling on the level of sense.

We may, if we please, carry this scepticism a step further, and deny, not only objects of sense, but the continuity of our sensations themselves. We may say with Protagoras and Hume that what is appears, and that what appears appears only to individuals, and to the same individual only at one instant. But then, as Plato asks, —and we must repeat the question, —What becomes of the mind? Experience tells us by a thousand proofs that our sensations of colour, taste, and the like, are the same as they were an instant ago — that the act which we are performing one minute is continued by us in the next — and also supplies abundant proof that the perceptions of other men are, speaking generally, the same or nearly the same with our own. After having slowly and laboriously in the course of ages gained a conception of a whole and parts, of the constitution of the mind, of the relation of man to God and nature, imperfect indeed, but the best we can, we are asked to return again to the ‘beggarly elements’ of ancient scepticism, and acknowledge only atoms and sensations devoid of life or unity. Why should we not go a step further still and doubt the existence of the senses or of all things? We are but ‘such stuff as dreams are made of;’ for we have left ourselves no instruments of thought by which we can distinguish man from the animals, or conceive of the existence even of a mollusc. And observe, this extreme scepticism has been allowed to spring up among us, not, like the ancient scepticism, in an age when nature and language really seemed to be full of illusions, but in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when men walk in the daylight of inductive science.

The attractiveness of such speculations arises out of their true nature not being perceived. They are veiled in graceful language; they are not pushed to extremes; they stop where the human mind is disposed also to stop — short of a manifest absurdity. Their inconsistency is not observed by their authors or by mankind in general, who are equally inconsistent themselves. They leave on the mind a pleasing sense of wonder and novelty: in youth they seem to have a natural affinity to one class of persons

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as poetry has to another; but in later life either we drift back into common sense, or we make them the starting-points of a higher philosophy.

We are often told that we should enquire into all things before we accept them; — with what limitations is this true? For we cannot use our senses without admitting that we have them, or think without presupposing that there is in us a power of thought, or affirm that all knowledge is derived from experience without implying that this first principle of knowledge is prior to experience. The truth seems to be that we begin with the natural use of the mind as of the body, and we seek to describe this as well as we can. We eat before we know the nature of digestion; we think before we know the nature of reflection. As our knowledge increases, our perception of the mind enlarges also. We cannot indeed get beyond facts, but neither can we draw any line which separates facts from ideas. And the mind is not something separate from them but included in them, and they in the mind, both having a distinctness and individuality of their own. To reduce our conception of mind to a succession of feelings and sensations is like the attempt to view a wide prospect by inches through a microscope, or to calculate a period of chronology by minutes. The mind ceases to exist when it loses its continuity, which though far from being its highest determination, is yet necessary to any conception of it. Even an inanimate nature cannot be adequately represented as an endless succession of states or conditions.

§ II. Another division of the subject has yet to be considered: Why should the doctrine that knowledge is sensation, in ancient times, or of sensationalism or materialism in modern times, be allied to the lower rather than to the higher view of ethical philosophy? At first sight the nature and origin of knowledge appear to be wholly disconnected from ethics and religion, nor can we deny that the ancient Stoics were materialists, or that the materialist doctrines prevalent in modern times have been associated with great virtues, or that both religious and philosophical idealism have not unfrequently parted company with practice. Still upon the whole it must be admitted that the higher standard of duty has gone hand in hand with the higher conception of knowledge.



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It is Protagoras who is seeking to adapt himself to the opinions of the world; it is Plato who rises above them: the one maintaining that all knowledge is sensation; the other basing the virtues on the idea of good. The reason of this phenomenon has now to be examined.

By those who rest knowledge immediately upon sense, that explanation of human action is deemed to be the truest which is nearest to sense. As knowledge is reduced to sensation, so virtue is reduced to feeling, happiness or good to pleasure. The different virtues — the various characters which exist in the world — are the disguises of self-interest. Human nature is dried up; there is no place left for imagination, or in any higher sense for religion. Ideals of a whole, or of a state, or of a law of duty, or of a divine perfection, are out of place in an Epicurean philosophy. The very terms in which they are expressed are suspected of having no meaning. Man is to bring himself back as far as he is able to the condition of a rational beast. He is to limit himself to the pursuit of pleasure, but of this he is to make a far-sighted calculation; — he is to be rationalized, secularized, animalized: or he is to be an amiable sceptic, better than his own philosophy, and not falling below the opinions of the world.

Imagination has been called that 'busy faculty' which is always intruding upon us in the search after truth. But imagination is also that higher power by which we rise above ourselves and the commonplaces of thought and life. The philosophical imagination is another name for reason finding an expression of herself in the outward world. To deprive life of ideals is to deprive it of all higher and comprehensive aims and of the power of imparting and communicating them to others. For men are taught, not by those who are on a level with them, but by those who rise above them, who see the distant hills, who soar into the empyrean. Like a bird in a cage, the mind confined to sense is always being brought back from the higher to the lower, from the wider to the narrower view of human knowledge. It seeks to fly but cannot: instead of aspiring towards perfection, 'it hovers about this lower world and the earthly nature.' It loses the religious sense which more than any other seems to take a man out of himself. Weary of asking 'What is truth?' it accepts the 'blind witness of eyes and ears;' it draws around itself the curtain of the physical world

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and is satisfied. The strength of a sensational philosophy lies in the ready accommodation of it to the minds of men; many who have been metaphysicians in their youth, as they advance in years are prone to acquiesce in things as they are, or rather appear to be. They are spectators, not thinkers, and the best philosophy is that which requires of them the least amount of mental effort.

As a lower philosophy is easier to apprehend than a higher, so a lower way of life is easier to follow; and therefore such a philosophy seems to derive a support from the general practice of mankind. It appeals to principles which they all know and recognize: it gives back to them in a generalized form the results of their own experience. To the man of the world they are the quintessence of his own reflections upon life. To follow custom, to have no new ideas or opinions, not to be straining after impossibilities, to enjoy to-day with just so much forethought as is necessary to provide for the morrow, this is regarded by the greater part of the world as the natural way of passing through existence. And many who have lived thus have attained to a lower kind of happiness or equanimity. They have possessed their souls in peace without ever allowing them to wander into the region of religious or political controversy, and without any care for the higher interests of man. But nearly all the good (as well as some of the evil) which has ever been done in this world has been the work of another spirit, the work of enthusiasts and idealists, of apostles and martyrs. The leaders of mankind have not been of the gentle Epicurean type; they have personified ideas; they have sometimes also been the victims of them. But they have always been seeking after a truth or ideal of which they fell short; and have died in a manner disappointed of their hopes that they might lift the human race out of the slough in which they found them. They have done little compared with their own visions and aspirations; but they have done that little, only because they sought to do, and once perhaps thought that they were doing, a great deal more.

The philosophies of Epicurus or Hume give no adequate or dignified conception of the mind. There is no organic unity in a succession of feeling or sensations; no comprehensiveness in an infinity of separate actions. The individual never reflects upon himself as a whole; he can hardly regard one act or part of his

life as the cause or effect of any other act or part. Whether in practice or speculation, he is to himself only in successive instants. To such thinkers, whether in ancient or in modern times, the mind is only the poor recipient of impressions — not the heir of all the ages, or connected with all other minds. It begins again with its own modicum of experience having only such vague conceptions of the wisdom of the past as are inseparable from language and popular opinion. It seeks to explain from the experience of the individual what can only be learned from the history of the world. It has no conception of obligation, duty, conscience — these are to the Epicurean or Utilitarian philosopher only names which interfere with our natural perceptions of pleasure and pain.

There seem then to be several answers to the question, Why the theory that all knowledge is sensation is allied to the lower rather than to the higher view of ethical philosophy: — 1st, Because it is easier to understand and practise; 2ndly, Because it is fatal to the pursuit of ideals, moral, political, or religious; 3rdly, Because it deprives us of the means and instruments of higher thought, of any adequate conception of the mind, of knowledge, of conscience, of moral obligation.

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*On the nature and limits of Psychology.*

ὃ γὰρ ἀρχὴ μὲν ὃ μὴ οἶδε, τελευτὴ δὲ καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ ἐξ οὗ μὴ οἶδε συμπλέκεται, τίς μηχανὴ τὴν τοιαύτην ὁμολογίαν ποτὲ ἐπιστήμην γενέσθαι; Plat. Rep. VII. 533 C.

μόνον γὰρ αὐτὸ λέγειν, ὥσπερ γυμνὸν καὶ ἀπηρημωμένον ἀπὸ τῶν ὀντων ἀπάντων, ἀδύνατον. Soph. 237 D.

Since the above essay first appeared, many books on Psychology have been given to the world, partly based upon the views of Herbart and other German philosophers, partly independent of them. The subject has gained in bulk and extent; whether it has had any true growth is more doubtful. It begins to assume the language and claim the authority of a science; but it is only an hypothesis or outline, which may be filled up in many ways according to the fancy of individual thinkers. The basis of it is a

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precarious one,—consciousness of ourselves and a somewhat uncertain observation of the rest of mankind. Its relations to other sciences are not yet determined: they seem to be almost too complicated to be ascertained. It may be compared to an irregular building, run up hastily and not likely to last, because its foundations are weak, and in many places rest only on the surface of the ground. It has sought rather to put together scattered observations and to make them into a system than to describe or prove them. It has never severely drawn the line between facts and opinions. It has substituted a technical phraseology for the common use of language, being neither able to win acceptance for the one nor to get rid of the other.

The system which has thus arisen appears to be a kind of metaphysic narrowed to the point of view of the individual mind, through which, as through some new optical instrument limiting the sphere of vision, the interior of thought and sensation is examined. But the individual mind in the abstract, as distinct from the mind of a particular individual and separated from the environment of circumstances, is a fiction only. Yet facts which are partly true gather around this fiction and are naturally described by the help of it. There is also a common type of the mind which is derived from the comparison of many minds with one another and with our own. The phenomena of which Psychology treats are familiar to us, but they are for the most part indefinite; they relate to a something inside the body, which seems also to overleap the limits of space. The operations of this something, when isolated, cannot be analyzed by us or subjected to observation and experiment. And there is another point to be considered. The mind, when thinking, cannot survey that part of itself which is used in thought. It can only be contemplated in the past, that is to say, in the history of the individual or of the world. This is the scientific method of studying the mind. But Psychology has also some other supports, specious rather than real. It is partly sustained by the false analogy of Physical Science and has great expectations from its near relationship to Physiology. We truly remark that there is an infinite complexity of the body corresponding to the infinite subtlety of the mind; we are conscious that they are very nearly connected. But in endeavouring to trace



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the nature of the connexion we are baffled and disappointed. In our knowledge of them the gulf remains the same: no microscope has ever seen into thought; no reflection on ourselves has supplied the missing link between mind and matter. . . . These are the conditions of this very inexact science, and we shall only know less of it by pretending to know more, or by assigning to it a form or style to which it has not yet attained and is not really entitled.

Experience shows that any system, however baseless and ineffectual, in our own or in any other age, may be accepted and continue to be studied, if it seeks to satisfy some unanswered question or is based upon some ancient tradition, especially if it takes the form and uses the language of inductive philosophy. The fact therefore that such a science exists and is popular, affords no evidence of its truth or value. Many who have pursued it far into detail have never examined the foundations on which it rests. There have been many imaginary subjects of knowledge of which enthusiastic persons have made a lifelong study, without ever asking themselves what is the evidence for them, what is the use of them, how long they will last? They may pass away, like the authors of them, and 'leave not a wrack behind;' or they may survive in fragments. Nor is it only in the Middle Ages, or in the literary desert of China or of India, that such systems have arisen; in our own enlightened age, growing up by the side of Physics, Ethics, and other really progressive sciences, there is a weary waste of knowledge, falsely so-called. There are sham sciences which no logic has ever put to the test, in which the desire for knowledge invents the materials of it.

And therefore it is expedient once more to review the bases of Psychology, lest we should be imposed upon by its pretensions. The study of it may have done good service by awakening us to the sense of inveterate errors familiarized by language, yet it may have fallen into still greater ones; under the pretence of new investigations it may be wasting the lives of those who are engaged in it. It may also be found that the discussion of it will throw light upon some points in the *Theaetetus* of Plato,—the oldest work on Psychology which has come down to us. The imaginary science may be called, in the language of ancient philosophy, 'a shadow of a part of Dialectic or Metaphysic' (*Gorg.* 463).

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In this postscript or appendix we propose to treat, first, of the true bases of Psychology; secondly, of the errors into which the students of it are most likely to fall; thirdly, of the principal subjects which are usually comprehended under it; fourthly, of the form which facts relating to the mind most naturally assume.

We may preface the enquiry by two or three remarks:—

(1) We do not claim for the popular Psychology the position of a science at all; it cannot, like the Physical Sciences, proceed by the Inductive Method: it has not the necessity of Mathematics: it does not, like Metaphysic, argue from abstract notions or from internal coherence. It is made up of scattered observations. A few of these, though they may sometimes appear to be truisms, are of the greatest value, and free from all doubt. We are conscious of them in ourselves; we observe them working in others; we are assured of them at all times. For example, we are absolutely certain, (a) of the influence exerted by the mind over the body or by the body over the mind: (b) of the power of association, by which the appearance of some person or the occurrence of some event recalls to mind, not always but often, other persons and events: (c) of the effect of habit, which is strongest when least disturbed by reflection, and is to the mind what the bones are to the body: (d) of the real, though not unlimited, freedom of the human will: (e) of the reference, more or less distinct, of our sensations, feelings, thoughts, actions, to ourselves, which is called consciousness, or, when in excess, self-consciousness: (f) of the distinction of the 'I' and 'Not I,' of ourselves and outward objects. But when we attempt to gather up these elements in a single system, we discover that the links by which we combine them are apt to be mere words. We are in a country which has never been cleared or surveyed; here and there only does a gleam of light come through the darkness of the forest.

(2) These fragments, although they can never become science in the ordinary sense of the word, are a real part of knowledge and may be of great value in education. We may be able to add a good deal to them from our own experience, and we may verify them by it. Self-examination is one of those studies which a man can pursue alone, by attention to himself and the processes of his individual mind. He may learn much about his own

character and about the character of others, if he will 'make his mind sit down' and look at itself in the glass. The great, if not the only use of such a study is a practical one,—to know, first, human nature, and, secondly, our own nature, as it truly is.

(3) Hence it is important that we should conceive of the mind in the noblest and simplest manner. While acknowledging that language has been the greatest factor in the formation of human thought, we must endeavour to get rid of the disguises, oppositions, contradictions, which arise out of it. We must disengage ourselves from the ideas which the customary use of words has implanted in us. To avoid error as much as possible when we are speaking of things unseen, the principal terms which we use should be few, and we should not allow ourselves to be enslaved by them. Instead of seeking to frame a technical language, we should vary our forms of speech, lest they should degenerate into formulas. A difficult philosophical problem is better understood when translated into the vernacular.

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I. *a.* Psychology is inseparable from language, and early language contains the first impressions or the oldest experience of man respecting himself. These impressions are not accurate representations of the truth; they are the reflections of a rudimentary age of philosophy. The first and simplest forms of thought are rooted so deep in human nature that they can never be got rid of; but they have been perpetually enlarged and elevated, and the use of many words has been transferred from the body to the mind. The spiritual and intellectual have thus become separated from the material — there is a cleft between them; and the heart and the conscience of man rise above the dominion of the appetites and create a new language in which they too find expression. As the differences of actions begin to be perceived, more and more names are needed. This is the first analysis of the human mind; having a general foundation in popular experience, it is moulded to a certain extent by hierophants and philosophers. (See *Intro. to Cratylus.*)

*β.* This primitive psychology is continually receiving additions from the first thinkers, who in return take a colour from the popular language of the time. The mind is regarded from new points of view, and becomes adapted to new conditions of

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knowledge. It seeks to isolate itself from matter and sense, and to assert its independence in thought. It recognizes that it is independent of the external world. It has five or six natural states or stages:— (1) sensation, in which it is almost latent or quiescent: (2) feeling, or inner sense, when the mind is just awakening: (3) memory, which is decaying sense, and from time to time, as with a spark or flash, has the power of recollecting or reanimating the buried past: (4) thought, in which images pass into abstract notions or are intermingled with them: (5) action, in which the mind moves forward, of itself, or under the impulse of want or desire or pain, to attain or avoid some end or consequence: and (6) there is the composition of these or the admixture or assimilation of them in various degrees. We never see these processes of the mind, nor can we tell the causes of them. But we know them by their results, and learn from other men that so far as we can describe to them or they to us the workings of the mind, their experience is the same or nearly the same with our own.

γ. But the knowledge of the mind is not to any great extent derived from the observation of the individual by himself. It is the growing consciousness of the human race, embodied in language, acknowledged by experience, and corrected from time to time by the influence of literature and philosophy. A great, perhaps the most important, part of it is to be found in early Greek thought. In the *Theaetetus* of Plato it has not yet become fixed: we are still stumbling on the threshold. In Aristotle the process is more nearly completed, and has gained innumerable abstractions, of which many have had to be thrown away because relative only to the controversies of the time. In the interval between Thales and Aristotle were realized the distinctions of mind and body, of universal and particular, of infinite and infinitesimal, of idea and phenomenon; the class conceptions of faculties and virtues, the antagonism of the appetites and the reason; and connected with this, at a higher stage of development, the opposition of moral and intellectual virtue; also the primitive conceptions of unity, being, rest, motion, and the like. These divisions were not really scientific, but rather based on popular experience. They were not held with the precision of modern thinkers, but taken all together they gave a new existence



to the mind in thought, and greatly enlarged and more accurately defined man's knowledge of himself and of the world. The majority of them have been accepted by Christian and Western nations. Yet in modern times we have also drifted so far away from Aristotle, that if we were to frame a system on his lines we should be at war with ordinary language and untrue to our own consciousness. And there have been a few both in mediaeval times and since the Reformation who have rebelled against the Aristotelian point of view. Of these eccentric thinkers there have been various types, but they have all a family likeness. According to them, there has been too much analysis and too little synthesis, too much division of the mind into parts and too little conception of it as a whole or in its relation to God and the laws of the universe. They have thought that the elements of plurality and unity have not been duly adjusted. The tendency of such writers has been to allow the personality of man to be absorbed in the universal, or in the divine nature, and to deny the distinction between matter and mind, or to substitute one for the other. They have broken some of the idols of Psychology: they have challenged the received meaning of words: they have regarded the mind under many points of view. But though they may have shaken the old, they have not established the new; their views of philosophy, which seem like the echo of some voice from the East, have been alien to the mind of Europe.

δ. The Psychology which is found in common language is in some degree verified by experience, but not in such a manner as to give it the character of an exact science. We cannot say that words always correspond to facts. Common language represents the mind from different and even opposite points of view, which cannot be all of them equally true (cp. *Cratylus* 436-7). Yet from diversity of statements and opinions may be obtained a nearer approach to the truth than is to be gained from any one of them. It also tends to correct itself, because it is gradually brought nearer to the common sense of mankind. There are some leading categories or classifications of thought, which, though unverified, must always remain the elements from which the science or study of the mind proceeds. For example, we must assume ideas before we can analyze them, and also a continuing mind to which they belong; the resolution of it into

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successive moments, which would say, with Protagoras, that the man is not the same person which he was a minute ago, is, as Plato implies in the *Theaetetus* (166 B), an absurdity.

ε. The growth of the mind, which may be traced in the histories of religions and philosophies and in the thoughts of nations, is one of the deepest and noblest modes of studying it. Here we are dealing with the reality, with the greater and, as it may be termed, the most sacred part of history. We study the mind of man as it begins to be inspired by a human or divine reason, as it is modified by circumstances, as it is distributed in nations, as it is renovated by great movements, which go beyond the limits of nations and affect human society on a scale still greater, as it is created or renewed by great minds, who, looking down from above, have a wider and more comprehensive vision. This is an ambitious study, of which most of us rather 'entertain conjecture' than arrive at any detailed or accurate knowledge. Later arises the reflection how these great ideas or movements of the world have been appropriated by the multitude and found a way to the minds of individuals. The real Psychology is that which shows how the increasing knowledge of nature and the increasing experience of life have always been slowly transforming the mind, how religions too have been modified in the course of ages 'that God may be all and in all.' Ἡ πολλὰ πλάσιον, ἐφη, τὸ ἔργον ἢ ὥς νῦν ζητεῖται προστάττεις.

ζ. Lastly, though we speak of the study of mind in a special sense, it may also be said that there is no science which does not contribute to our knowledge of it. The methods of science and their analogies are new faculties, discovered by the few and imparted to the many. They are to the mind, what the senses are to the body; or better, they may be compared to instruments such as the telescope or microscope by which the discriminating power of the senses, or to other mechanical inventions, by which the strength and skill of the human body is so immeasurably increased.

II. The new Psychology, whatever may be its claim to the authority of a science, has called attention to many facts and corrected many errors, which without it would have been unexamined. Yet it is also itself very liable to illusion. The evidence

on which it rests is vague and indefinite. The field of consciousness is never seen by us as a whole, but only at particular points, which are always changing. The veil of language intercepts facts. Hence it is desirable that in making an approach to the study we should consider at the outset what are the kinds of error which most easily affect it, and note the differences which separate it from other branches of knowledge.

*a.* First, we observe the mind by the mind. It would seem therefore that we are always in danger of leaving out the half of that which is the subject of our enquiry. We come at once upon the difficulty of what is the meaning of the word. Does it differ as subject and object in the same manner? Can we suppose one set of feelings or one part of the mind to interpret another? Is the introspecting thought the same with the thought which is introspected? Has the mind the power of surveying its whole domain at one and the same time? — No more than the eye can take in the whole human body at a glance. Yet there may be a glimpse round the corner, or a thought transferred in a moment from one point of view to another, which enables us to see nearly the whole, if not at once, at any rate in succession. Such glimpses will hardly enable us to contemplate from within the mind in its true proportions. Hence the firmer ground of Psychology is not the consciousness of inward feelings but the observation of external actions, being the actions not only of ourselves, but of the innumerable persons whom we come across in life.

*β.* The error of supposing partial or occasional explanation of mental phenomena to be the only or complete ones. For example, we are disinclined to admit of the spontaneity or discontinuity of the mind — it seems to us like an effect without a cause, and therefore we suppose the train of our thoughts to be always called up by association. Yet it is probable, or indeed certain, that of many mental phenomena there are no mental antecedents, but only bodily ones.

*γ.* The false influence of language. We are apt to suppose that when there are two or more words describing faculties or processes of the mind, there are real differences corresponding to them. But this is not the case. Nor can we determine how far they do or do not exist, or by what degree or kind of difference

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they are distinguished. The same remark may be made about figures of speech. They fill up the vacancy of knowledge; they are to the mind what too much colour is to the eye; but the truth is rather concealed than revealed by them.

δ. The uncertain meaning of terms, such as Consciousness, Conscience, Will, Law, Knowledge, Internal and External Sense; these, in the language of Plato, 'we shamelessly use, without ever having taken the pains to analyze them.'

ε. A science such as Psychology is not merely an hypothesis, but an hypothesis which, unlike the hypotheses of Physics, can never be verified. It rests only on the general impressions of mankind, and there is little or no hope of adding in any considerable degree to our stock of mental facts.

ς. The parallelism of the Physical Sciences, which lead us to analyze the mind on the analogy of the body, and so to reduce mental operations to the level of bodily ones, or to confound one with the other.

ζ. That the progress of Physiology may throw a new light on Psychology is a dream in which scientific men are always tempted to indulge. But however certain we may be of the connexion between mind and body, the explanation of the one by the other is a hidden place of nature which has hitherto been investigated with little or no success.

θ. The impossibility of distinguishing between mind and body. Neither in thought nor in experience can we separate them. They seem to act together; yet we feel that we are sometimes under the dominion of the one, sometimes of the other, and sometimes, both in the common use of language and in fact, they transform themselves, the one into the good principle, the other into the evil principle; and then again the 'I' comes in and mediates between them. It is also difficult to distinguish outward facts from the ideas of them in the mind, or to separate the external stimulus to a sensation from the activity of the organ, or this from the invisible agencies by which it reaches the mind, or any process of sense from its mental antecedent, or any mental energy from its nervous expression.

ι. The fact that mental divisions tend to run into one another, and that in speaking of the mind we cannot always distinguish differences of kind from differences of degree; nor have we



any measure of the strength and intensity of our ideas or feelings. *Theactctus.*

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κ. Although heredity has been always known to the ancients as well as ourselves to exercise a considerable influence on human character, yet we are unable to calculate what proportion this birth-influence bears to nurture and education. But this is the real question. We cannot pursue the mind into embryology: we can only trace how, after birth, it begins to grow. But how much is due to the soil, how much to the original latent seed, it is impossible to distinguish. And because we are certain that heredity exercises a considerable, but undefined influence, we must not increase the wonder by exaggerating it.

λ. The love of system is always tending to prevail over the historical investigation of the mind, which is our chief means of knowing it. It equally tends to hinder the other great source of our knowledge of the mind, the observation of its workings and processes which we can make for ourselves.

μ. The mind, when studied through the individual, is apt to be isolated — this is due to the very form of the enquiry; whereas, in truth, it is indistinguishable from circumstances, the very language which it uses being the result of the instincts of long-forgotten generations, and every word which a man utters being the answer to some other word spoken or suggested by somebody else.

III. The tendency of the preceding remarks has been to show that Psychology is necessarily a fragment, and is not and cannot be a connected system. We cannot define or limit the mind, but we can describe it. We can collect information about it; we can enumerate the principal subjects which are included in the study of it. Thus we are able to rehabilitate Psychology to some extent, not as a branch of science, but as a collection of facts bearing on human life, as a part of the history of philosophy, as an aspect of Metaphysic. It is a fragment of a science only, which in all probability can never make any great progress or attain to much clearness or exactness. It is however a kind of knowledge which has a great interest for us and is always present to us, and of which we carry about the materials in our own bosoms. We can observe our minds and we can experiment upon them, and the

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knowledge thus acquired is not easily forgotten, and is a help to us in study as well as in conduct.

The principal subjects of Psychology may be summed up as follows:—

*a.* The relation of man to the world around him,— in what sense and within what limits can he withdraw from its laws or assert himself against them (Freedom and Necessity), and what is that which we suppose to be thus independent and which we call ourselves? How does the inward differ from the outward and what is the relation between them, and where do we draw the line by which we separate mind from matter, the soul from the body? Is the mind active or passive, or partly both? Are its movements identical with those of the body, or only preconcerted and coincident with them, or is one simply an aspect of the other?

*β.* What are we to think of time and space? Time seems to have a nearer connexion with the mind, space with the body; yet time, as well as space, is necessary to our idea of either. We see also that they have an analogy with one another, and that in Mathematics they often interpenetrate. Space or place has been said by Kant to be the form of the outward, time of the inward sense. He regards them as parts or forms of the mind. But this is an unfortunate and inexpressive way of describing their relation to us. For of all the phenomena present to the human mind they seem to have most the character of objective existence. There is no use in asking what is beyond or behind them; we cannot get rid of them. And to throw the laws of external nature which to us are the type of the immutable into the subjective side of the antithesis seems to be equally inappropriate.

*γ.* When in imagination we enter into the closet of the mind and withdraw ourselves from the external world, we seem to find there more or less distinct processes which may be described by the words, 'I perceive,' 'I feel,' 'I think,' 'I want,' 'I wish,' 'I like,' 'I dislike,' 'I fear,' 'I know,' 'I remember,' 'I imagine,' 'I dream,' 'I act,' 'I endeavour,' 'I hope.' These processes would seem to have the same notions attached to them in the minds of all educated persons. They are distinguished from one another in thought, but they intermingle. It is possible to reflect upon them or to become conscious of them in a greater or less degree, or with a greater or less continuity or attention, and thus arise the

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intermittent phenomena of consciousness or self-consciousness. The use of all of them is possible to us at all times; and therefore in any operation of the mind the whole are latent. But we are able to characterise them sufficiently by that part of the complex action which is the most prominent. We have no difficulty in distinguishing an act of sight or an act of will from an act of thought, although thought is present in both of them. Hence the conception of different faculties or different virtues is precarious, because each of them is passing into the other, and they are all one in the mind itself; they appear and reappear, and may all be regarded as the ever-varying phases or aspects or differences of the same mind or person.

δ. Nearest the sense in the scale of the intellectual faculties is memory, which is a mode rather than a faculty of the mind, and accompanies all mental operations. There are two principal kinds of it, recollection and recognition,—recollection in which forgotten things are recalled or return to the mind, recognition in which the mind finds itself again among things once familiar. The simplest way in which we can represent the former to ourselves is by shutting our eyes and trying to recall in what we term the mind's eye the picture of the surrounding scene, or by laying down the book which we are reading and recapitulating what we can remember of it. But many times more powerful than recollection is recognition, perhaps because it is more assisted by association. We have known and forgotten, and after a long interval the thing which we have seen once is seen again by us, but with a different feeling, and comes back to us, not as new knowledge, but as a thing to which we ourselves impart a notion already present to us; in Plato's words, we set the stamp upon the wax. Every one is aware of the difference between the first and second sight of a place, between a scene clothed with associations or bare and divested of them. We say to ourselves on revisiting a spot after a long interval: How many things have happened since I last saw this! There is probably no impression ever received by us of which we can venture to say that the vestiges are altogether lost, or that we might not, under some circumstances, recover it. A long-forgotten knowledge may be easily renewed and therefore is very different from ignorance. Of the language learnt in childhood not a word may be remem-

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bered, and yet, when a new beginning is made, the old habit soon returns, the neglected organs come back into use, and the river of speech finds out the dried-up channel.

ε. 'Consciousness' is the most treacherous word which is employed in the study of the mind, for it is used in many senses, and has rarely, if ever, been minutely analyzed. Like memory, it accompanies all mental operations, but not always continuously, and it exists in various degrees. It may be imperceptible or hardly perceptible: it may be the living sense that our thoughts, actions, sufferings, are our own. It is a kind of attention which we pay to ourselves, and is intermittent rather than continuous. Its sphere has been exaggerated. It is sometimes said to assure us of our freedom; but this is an illusion: as there may be a real freedom without consciousness of it, so there may be a consciousness of freedom without the reality. It may be regarded as a higher degree of knowledge when we not only know but know that we know. Consciousness is opposed to habit, inattention, sleep, death. It may be illustrated by its derivative conscience, which speaks to men, not only of right and wrong in the abstract, but of right and wrong actions in reference to themselves and their circumstances.

ζ. Association is another of the ever-present phenomena of the human mind. We speak of the laws of association, but this is an expression which is confusing, for the phenomenon itself is of the most capricious and uncertain sort. It may be briefly described as follows. The simplest case of association is that of sense. When we see or hear separately one of two things, which we have previously seen or heard together, the occurrence of the one has a tendency to suggest the other. So the sight or name of a house may recall to our minds the memory of those who once lived there. Like may recall like and everything its opposite. The parts of a whole, the terms of a series, objects lying near, words having a customary order stick together in the mind. A word may bring back a passage of poetry or a whole system of philosophy; from one end of the world or from one pole of knowledge we may travel to the other in an indivisible instant. The long train of association by which we pass from one point to the other, involving every sort of complex relation, so sudden, so accidental, is one of the greatest wonders of mind. . . . This process however is not always con-



tinuous, but often intermittent: we can think of things in isolation as well as in association; we do not mean that they must all hang from one another. We can begin again after an interval of rest or vacancy, as a new train of thought suddenly arises, as, for example, when we wake of a morning or after violent exercise. Time, place, the same colour or sound or smell or taste, will often call up some thought or recollection either accidentally or naturally associated with them. But it is equally noticeable that the new thought may occur to us, we cannot tell how or why, by the spontaneous action of the mind itself or by the latent influence of the body. Both science and poetry are made up of associations or recollections, but we must observe also that the mind is not wholly dependent on them, having also the power of origination.

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There are other processes of the mind which it is good for us to study when we are at home and by ourselves,—the manner in which thought passes into act, the conflict of passion and reason in many stages, the transition from sensuality to love or sentiment and from earthly love to heavenly, the slow and silent influence of habit, which little by little changes the nature of men, the sudden change of the old nature of man into a new one, wrought by shame or by some other overwhelming impulse. These are the greater phenomena of mind, and he who has thought of them for himself will live and move in a better-ordered world, and will himself be a better-ordered man.

At the other end of the 'globus intellectualis,' nearest, not to earth and sense, but to heaven and God, is the personality of man, by which he holds communion with the unseen world. Somehow, he knows not how, somewhere, he knows not where, under this higher aspect of his being he grasps the ideas of God, freedom and immortality; he sees the forms of truth, holiness and love, and is satisfied with them. No account of the mind can be complete which does not admit the reality or the possibility of another life. Whether regarded as an ideal or as a fact, the highest part of man's nature and that in which it seems most nearly to approach the divine, is a phenomenon which exists, and must therefore be included within the domain of Psychology.

IV. We admit that there is no perfect or ideal Psychology. It is not a whole in the same sense in which Chemistry, Physiology,

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or Mathematics are wholes: that is to say, it is not a connected unity of knowledge. Compared with the wealth of other sciences, it rests upon a small number of facts; and when we go beyond these, we fall into conjectures and verbal discussions. The facts themselves are disjointed; the causes of them run up into other sciences, and we have no means of tracing them from one to the other. Yet it may be true of this, as of other beginnings of knowledge, that the attempt to put them together has tested the truth of them, and given a stimulus to the enquiry into them.

Psychology should be natural, not technical. It should take the form which is the most intelligible to the common understanding, because it has to do with common things, which are familiar to us all. It should aim at no more than every reflecting man knows or can easily verify for himself. When simple and unpretentious, it is least obscured by words, least liable to fall under the influence of Physiology or Metaphysic. It should argue, not from exceptional, but from ordinary phenomena. It should be careful to distinguish the higher and the lower elements of human nature, and not allow one to be veiled in the disguise of the other, lest through the slippery nature of language we should pass imperceptibly from good to evil, from nature in the higher to nature in the neutral or lower sense. It should assert consistently the unity of the human faculties, the unity of knowledge, the unity of God and law. The difference between the will and the affections and between the reason and the passions should also be recognized by it.

Its sphere is supposed to be narrowed to the individual soul; but it cannot be thus separated in fact. It goes back to the beginnings of things, to the first growth of language and philosophy, and to the whole science of man. There can be no truth or completeness in any study of the mind which is confined to the individual. The nature of language, though not the whole, is perhaps at present the most important element in our knowledge of it. It is not impossible that some numerical laws may be found to have a place in the relations of mind and matter, as in the rest of nature. The old Pythagorean fancy that the soul 'is or has in it harmony' may in some degree be realized. But the indications of such numerical harmonies are faint; either the secret of them lies deeper than we can discover, or nature may have rebelled against

the use of them in the composition of men and animals. It is with qualitative rather than with quantitative differences that we are concerned in Psychology. The facts relating to the mind which we obtain from Physiology are negative rather than positive. They show us, not the processes of mental action, but the conditions of which when deprived the mind ceases to act. It would seem as if the time had not yet arrived when we can hope to add anything of much importance to our knowledge of the mind from the investigations of the microscope. The elements of Psychology can still only be learnt from reflections on ourselves, which interpret and are also interpreted by our experience of others. The history of language, of philosophy, and religion, the great thoughts or inventions or discoveries which move mankind, furnish the larger moulds or outlines in which the human mind has been cast. From these the individual derives so much as he is able to comprehend or has the opportunity of learning.

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# THEAETETUS.

## PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES.

THEODORUS.

THEAETETUS.

Euclid and Terpsion meet in front of Euclid's house in Megara; they enter the house, and the dialogue is read to them by a servant.

teph. *Euclid.* HAVE you only just arrived from the country,  
42 *Terpsion?*

*Terpsion.* No, I came some time ago: and I have been in the Agora looking for you, and wondering that I could not find you.

*Euc.* But I was not in the city.

*Terp.* Where then?

*Euc.* As I was going down to the harbour, I met Theaetetus — he was being carried up to Athens from the army at Corinth.

*Terp.* Was he alive or dead?

*Euc.* He was scarcely alive, for he has been badly wounded; but he was suffering even more from the sickness which has broken out in the army.

*Terp.* The dysentery, you mean?

*Euc.* Yes.

*Terp.* Alas! what a loss he will be!

*Euc.* Yes, Terpsion, he is a noble fellow; only to-day I heard some people highly praising his behaviour in this very battle.

*Terp.* No wonder; I should rather be surprised at hearing

*Theaetetus.*

EUCLID,  
TERPSION.

*The Preface.*

Euclid and Terpsion meet in front of Euclid's house in Megara: they converse about the dangerous condition of Theaetetus, who had been carried away dying from the camp at Corinth.

*Theaetetus.*

EUCLID,  
TERPSION.

Euclid calls to mind the great things which Socrates had early prophesied of him: and he has preserved the report of a conversation of Theaetetus with Socrates which took place just before the latter's death.

anything else of him. But why did he go on, instead of stopping at Megara?

*Euc.* He wanted to get home: although I entreated and advised him to remain, he would not listen to me; so I set him on his way, and turned back, and then I remembered what Socrates had said of him, and thought how remarkably this, like all his predictions, had been fulfilled. I believe that he had seen him a little before his own death, when Theaetetus was a youth, and he had a memorable conversation with him, which he repeated to me when I came to Athens; he was full of admiration of his genius, and said that he would most certainly be a great man, if he lived.

*Terp.* The prophecy has certainly been fulfilled; but what was the conversation? can you tell me?

*Euc.* No, indeed, not offhand; but I took notes of it as soon as I got home; these I filled up from memory, writing them out at leisure; and whenever I went to Athens, I asked Socrates about any point which I had forgotten, and on my return I made corrections; thus I have nearly the whole conversation written down. 143

*Terp.* I remember — you told me; and I have always been intending to ask you to show me the writing, but have put off doing so; and now, why should we not read it through? — having just come from the country, I should greatly like to rest.

*Euc.* I too shall be very glad of a rest, for I went with Theaetetus as far as Erineum. Let us go in, then, and, while we are reposing, the servant shall read to us.

*Terp.* Very good.

*Euc.* Here is the roll, Terpsion; I may observe that I have introduced Socrates, not as narrating to me, but as actually conversing with the persons whom he mentioned — these were, Theodorus the geometrician (of Cyrene), and Theaetetus. I have omitted, for the sake of convenience, the interlocutory words 'I said,' 'I remarked,' which he used when he spoke of himself, and again, 'he agreed,' or 'dis-agreed,' in the answer, lest the repetition of them should be troublesome.

*Terp.* Quite right, Euclid.

*Euc.* And now, boy, you may take the roll and read.

They enter the house, and Euclid produces the roll, which his servant reads to them.

*Euclid's servant reads.*

*Socrates.* If I cared enough about the Cyrenians, Theodorus, I would ask you whether there are any rising geometricians or philosophers in that part of the world. But I am more interested in our own Athenian youth, and I would rather know who among them are likely to do well. I observe them as far as I can myself, and I enquire of any one whom they follow, and I see that a great many of them follow you, in which they are quite right, considering your eminence in geometry and in other ways. Tell me then, if you have met with any one who is good for anything.

*Theodorus.* Yes, Socrates, I have become acquainted with one very remarkable Athenian youth, whom I commend to you as well worthy of your attention. If he had been a beauty I should have been afraid to praise him, lest you should suppose that I was in love with him; but he is no beauty, and you must not be offended if I say that he is very like you; for he has a snub nose and projecting eyes, although these features are less marked in him than in you.

44 Seeing, then, that he has no personal attractions, I may freely say, that in all my acquaintance, which is very large, I never knew any one who was his equal in natural gifts: for he has a quickness of apprehension which is almost unrivalled, and he is exceedingly gentle, and also the most courageous of men; there is a union of qualities in him such as I have never seen in any other, and should scarcely have thought possible; for those who, like him, have quick and ready and retentive wits, have generally also quick tempers; they are ships without ballast, and go darting about, and are mad rather than courageous; and the steadier sort, when they have to face study, prove stupid and cannot remember. Whereas he moves surely and smoothly and successfully in the path of knowledge and enquiry; and he is full of gentleness, flowing on silently like a river of oil; at his age, it is wonderful.

*Soc.* That is good news; whose son is he?

*Theod.* The name of his father I have forgotten, but the youth himself is the middle one of those who are approaching us; he and his companions have been anointing them-

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEODORUS.

*The Dialogue.*

Socrates,  
meeting  
Theodorus of  
Cyrene in an  
Athenian  
palaestra,  
asks what  
youths of  
promise he  
has discovered  
at Athens.

Theodorus  
in answer  
expatiates on  
the merits of  
Theaetetus,  
who is how-  
ever no  
beauty, but  
ugly, like  
Socrates.

The youth,  
who is the  
son of Eu-  
phronius,

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEODORUS,  
THEAETETUS.

the Sunian,  
here enters,  
and he and  
Socrates  
converse.

selves in the outer court, and now they seem to have finished, and are coming towards us. Look and see whether you know him.

*Soc.* I know the youth, but I do not know his name; he is the son of Euphronius the Sunian, who was himself an eminent man, and such another as his son is, according to your account of him; I believe that he left a considerable fortune.

*Theod.* Theaetetus, Socrates, is his name; but I rather think that the property disappeared in the hands of trustees; notwithstanding which he is wonderfully liberal.

*Soc.* He must be a fine fellow; tell him to come and sit by me.

*Theod.* I will. Come hither, Theaetetus, and sit by Socrates.

Theodorus  
says that  
Socrates and  
Theaetetus  
are alike.

*Soc.* By all means, Theaetetus, in order that I may see the reflection of myself in your face, for Theodorus says that we are alike; and yet if each of us held in his hands a lyre, and he said that they were tuned alike, should we at once take his word, or should we ask whether he who said so was or was not a musician?

*Theaetetus.* We should ask.

*Soc.* And if we found that he was, we should take his word; and if not, not?

*Theaet.* True.

*Soc.* And if this supposed likeness of our faces is a matter of any interest to us, we should enquire whether he who says that we are alike is a painter or not?

*Theaet.* Certainly we should.

*Soc.* And is Theodorus a painter?

*Theaet.* I never heard that he was.

*Soc.* Is he a geometrician?

*Theaet.* Of course he is, Socrates.

*Soc.* And is he an astronomer and calculator and musician, and in general an educated man?

*Theaet.* I think so.

*Soc.* If, then, he remarks on a similarity in our persons, either by way of praise or blame, there is no particular reason why we should attend to him.

*Theaet.* I should say not.

But he is a  
geometrician  
and philoso-  
pher, not a  
painter, and  
therefore he  
need not be  
believed.



*Soc.* But if he praises the virtue or wisdom which are the mental endowments of either of us, then he who hears the praises will naturally desire to examine him who is praised: and he again should be willing to exhibit himself.

*Theaet.* Very true, Socrates.

*Soc.* Then now is the time, my dear Theaetetus, for me to examine, and for you to exhibit; since although Theodorus has praised many a citizen and stranger in my hearing, never did I hear him praise any one as he has been praising you.

*Theaet.* I am glad to hear it, Socrates; but what if he was only in jest?

*Soc.* Nay, Theodorus is not given to jesting; and I cannot allow you to retract your consent on any such pretence as that. If you do, he will have to swear to his words; and we are perfectly sure that no one will be found to impugn him. Do not be shy then, but stand to your word.

*Theaet.* I suppose I must, if you wish it.

*Soc.* In the first place, I should like to ask what you learn of Theodorus: something of geometry, perhaps?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* And astronomy and harmony and calculation?

*Theaet.* I do my best.

*Soc.* Yes, my boy, and so do I; and my desire is to learn of him, or of anybody who seems to understand these things. And I get on pretty well in general; but there is a little difficulty which I want you and the company to aid me in investigating. Will you answer me a question: 'Is not learning growing wiser about that which you learn?'

*Theaet.* Of course.

*Soc.* And by wisdom the wise are wise?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* And is that different in any way from knowledge?

*Theaet.* What?

*Soc.* Wisdom; are not men wise in that which they know?

*Theaet.* Certainly they are.

*Soc.* Then wisdom and knowledge are the same?

*Theaet.* Yes.

146 *Soc.* Herein lies the difficulty which I can never solve to my satisfaction — What is knowledge? Can we answer that question? What say you? which of us will speak first?

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

He also praised Theaetetus' intellect and disposition; and so Theaetetus must be examined, that Theodorus' praises may be shown to be well-deserved or not.

Socrates' difficulty. What is knowledge?

It is wisdom.

Socrates proposes a discussion on the subject.

*Theaetetus.*SOCRATES,  
THEODORUS,  
THEAETETUS.Who will  
answer?—  
A pause.

whoever misses shall sit down, as at a game of ball, and shall be donkey, as the boys say; he who lasts out his competitors in the game without missing, shall be our king, and shall have the right of putting to us any questions which he pleases . . . Why is there no reply? I hope, Theodorus, that I am not betrayed into rudeness by my love of conversation? I only want to make us talk and be friendly and sociable.

*Theod.* The reverse of rudeness, Socrates: but I would rather that you would ask one of the young fellows; for the truth is, that I am unused to your game of question and answer, and I am too old to learn; the young will be more suitable, and they will improve more than I shall, for youth is always able to improve. And so having made a beginning with Theaetetus, I would advise you to go on with him and not let him off.

At the suggestion of  
Theodorus  
Theaetetus  
is invited to  
reply and  
consents.

*Soc.* Do you hear, Theaetetus, what Theodorus says? The philosopher, whom you would not like to disobey, and whose word ought to be a command to a young man, bids me interrogate you. Take courage, then, and nobly say what you think that knowledge is.

*Theaet.* Well, Socrates, I will answer as you and he bid me; and if I make a mistake, you will doubtless correct me.

*Soc.* We will, if we can.

In his answer,  
instead of  
giving a general  
definition  
of knowledge,  
he enumerates  
its parts.

*Theaet.* Then, I think that the sciences which I learn from Theodorus — geometry, and those which you just now mentioned — are knowledge; and I would include the art of the cobbler and other craftsmen; these, each and all of them, are knowledge.

*Soc.* Too much, Theaetetus, too much; the nobility and liberality of your nature make you give many and diverse things, when I am asking for one simple thing.

*Theaet.* What do you mean, Socrates?

*Soc.* Perhaps nothing. I will endeavour, however, to explain what I believe to be my meaning: When you speak of cobbling, you mean the art or science of making shoes?

*Theaet.* Just so.

*Soc.* And when you speak of carpentering, you mean the art of making wooden implements?

*Theaet.* I do.

*Soc.* In both cases you define the subject-matter of each of the two arts?

*Theaet.* True.

*Soc.* But that, Theaetetus, was not the point of my question: we wanted to know not the subjects, nor yet the number of the arts or sciences, for we were not going to count them, but we wanted to know the nature of knowledge in the abstract. Am I not right?

*Theaet.* Perfectly right.

147 *Soc.* Let me offer an illustration: Suppose that a person were to ask about some very trivial and obvious thing — for example, What is clay? and we were to reply, that there is a clay of potters, there is a clay of oven-makers, there is a clay of brick-makers; would not the answer be ridiculous?

*Theaet.* Truly.

*Soc.* In the first place, there would be an absurdity in assuming that he who asked the question would understand from our answer the nature of 'clay,' merely because we added 'of the image-makers,' or of any other workers. How can a man understand the name of anything, when he does not know the nature of it?

*Theaet.* He cannot.

*Soc.* Then he who does not know what science or knowledge is, has no knowledge of the art or science of making shoes?

*Theaet.* None.

*Soc.* Nor of any other science?

*Theaet.* No.

*Soc.* And when a man is asked what science or knowledge is, to give in answer the name of some art or science is ridiculous; for the question is, 'What is knowledge?' and he replies, 'A knowledge of this or that.'

*Theaet.* True.

*Soc.* Moreover, he might answer shortly and simply, but he makes an enormous circuit. For example, when asked about the clay, he might have said simply, that clay is moistened earth — what sort of clay is not to the point. ✓

*Theaet.* Yes, Socrates, there is no difficulty as you put the question. You mean, if I am not mistaken, something like

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

Such enumeration  
is not  
definition.

Socrates indicates by an illustration the sort of answer required.

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

*Theaetetus* sees Socrates' drift, and tells how he had invented general terms for the two kinds of roots, lengths and powers.

what occurred to me and to my friend here, your namesake Socrates, in a recent discussion.

*Soc.* What was that, Theaetetus?

*Theaet.* Theodorus was writing out for us something about roots, such as the roots of three or five, showing that they are incommensurable by the unit: he selected other examples up to seventeen — there he stopped. Now as there are innumerable roots, the notion occurred to us of attempting to include them all under one name or class.

*Soc.* And did you find such a class?

*Theaet.* I think that we did; but I should like to have your opinion.

*Soc.* Let me hear.

*Theaet.* We divided all numbers into two classes: those which are made up of equal factors multiplying into one another, which we compared to square figures and called square or equilateral numbers; — that was one class.

*Soc.* Very good.

*Theaet.* The intermediate numbers, such as three and five, and every other number which is made up of unequal factors, 148 either of a greater multiplied by a less, or of a less multiplied by a greater, and when regarded as a figure, is contained in unequal sides; — all these we compared to oblong figures, and called them oblong numbers.

*Soc.* Capital; and what followed?

*Theaet.* The lines, or sides, which have for their squares the equilateral plane numbers, were called by us lengths or magnitudes; and the lines which are the roots of (or whose squares are equal to) the oblong numbers, were called powers or roots; the reason of this latter name being, that they are commensurable with the former [i. e. with the so-called lengths or magnitudes] not in linear measurement, but in the value of the superficial content of their squares; and the same about solids.

*Soc.* Excellent, my boys; I think that you fully justify the praises of Theodorus, and that he will not be found guilty of false witness.

*Theaet.* But I am unable, Socrates, to give you a similar answer about knowledge, which is what you appear to want; and therefore Theodorus is a deceiver after all.

But he cannot give a definition of knowledge.



*Soc.* Well, but if some one were to praise you for running, and to say that he never met your equal among boys, and afterwards you were beaten in a race by a grown-up man, who was a great runner — would the praise be any the less true?

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

*Theaet.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* And is the discovery of the nature of knowledge so small a matter, as I just now said? Is it not one which would task the powers of men perfect in every way?

*Theaet.* By heaven, they should be the top of all perfection!

*Soc.* Well, then, be of good cheer; do not say that Theodorus was mistaken about you, but do your best to ascertain the true nature of knowledge, as well as of other things.

*Theaet.* I am eager enough, Socrates, if that would bring to light the truth.

*Soc.* Come, you made a good beginning just now; let your own answer about roots be your model, and as you comprehended them all in one class, try and bring the many sorts of knowledge under one definition.

*Theaet.* I can assure you, Socrates, that I have tried very often, when the report of questions asked by you was brought to me; but I can neither persuade myself that I have a satisfactory answer to give, nor hear of any one who answers as you would have him; and I cannot shake off a feeling of anxiety.

*Soc.* These are the pangs of labour, my dear Theaetetus; you have something within you which you are bringing to the birth.

Socrates  
recognises  
the pangs  
of labour.

*Theaet.* I do not know, Socrates; I only say what I feel.

49 *Soc.* And have you never heard, simpleton, that I am the son of a midwife, brave and burly, whose name was Phaenarete?

*Theaet.* Yes, I have.

*Soc.* And that I myself practise midwifery?

*Theaet.* No, never.

*Soc.* Let me tell you that I do though, my friend: but you must not reveal the secret, as the world in general have not found me out; and therefore they only say of me, that I am

Socrates a  
midwife.  
But this is  
a secret.

*Theaetetus.* the strangest of mortals and drive men to their wits' end.  
*SOCRATES,* Did you ever hear that too?

*THEAETETUS.*

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* Shall I tell you the reason?

*Theaet.* By all means.

*Soc.* Bear in mind the whole business of the midwives, and then you will see my meaning better:—No woman, as you are probably aware, who is still able to conceive and bear, attends other women, but only those who are past bearing.

*Theaet.* Yes, I know.

Like the  
midwives,  
he is past  
bearing.

*Soc.* The reason of this is said to be that Artemis—the goddess of childbirth—is not a mother, and she honours those who are like herself; but she could not allow the barren to be midwives, because human nature cannot know the mystery of an art without experience; and therefore she assigned this office to those who are too old to bear.

*Theaet.* I dare say.

*Soc.* And I dare say too, or rather I am absolutely certain, that the midwives know better than others who is pregnant and who is not?

*Theaet.* Very true.

*Soc.* And by the use of potions and incantations they are able to arouse the pangs and to soothe them at will; they can make those bear who have a difficulty in bearing, and if they think fit they can smother the embryo in the womb.

*Theaet.* They can.

*Soc.* Did you ever remark that they are also most cunning matchmakers, and have a thorough knowledge of what unions are likely to produce a brave brood?

*Theaet.* No, never.

*Soc.* Then let me tell you that this is their greatest pride, more than cutting the umbilical cord. And if you reflect, you will see that the same art which cultivates and gathers in the fruits of the earth, will be most likely to know in what soils the several plants or seeds should be deposited.

*Theaet.* Yes, the same art.

*Soc.* And do you suppose that with women the case is otherwise?

*Theaet.* I should think not.

*Soc.* Certainly not; but midwives are respectable women who have a character to lose, and they avoid this department of their profession, because they are afraid of being called procuresses, which is a name given to those who join together man and woman in an unlawful and unscientific way; and yet the true midwife is also the true and only match-maker.

*Theæt.* Clearly.

*Soc.* Such are the midwives, whose task is a very important one, but not so important as mine; for women do not bring into the world at one time real children, and at another time counterfeits which are with difficulty distinguished from them; if they did, then the discernment of the true and false birth would be the crowning achievement of the art of midwifery — you would think so?

*Theæt.* Indeed I should.

*Soc.* Well, my art of midwifery is in most respects like theirs; but differs, in that I attend men and not women, and I look after their souls when they are in labour, and not after their bodies: and the triumph of my art is in thoroughly examining whether the thought which the mind of the young man brings forth is a false idol or a noble and true birth. And like the midwives, I am barren, and the reproach which is often made against me, that I ask questions of others and have not the wit to answer them myself, is very just — the reason is, that the god compels me to be a midwife, but does not allow me to bring forth. And therefore I am not myself at all wise, nor have I anything to show which is the invention or birth of my own soul, but those who converse with me profit. Some of them appear dull enough at first, but afterwards, as our acquaintance ripens, if the god is gracious to them, they all make astonishing progress; and this is in the opinion of others as well as in their own. It is quite clear that they never learned anything from me; the many fine discoveries to which they cling are of their own making. But to me and the god they owe their delivery. And the proof of my words is, that many of them in their ignorance, either in their self-conceit despising me, or falling under the influence of others<sup>1</sup>, have gone away

*Theætetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEÆTETUS.

His business is more important than theirs, yet generally similar. He attends men, they women; he takes care of the mind, they of the body. But, unlike the midwives, he distinguishes the true birth from the counterfeit.

The behaviour  
of his patients.

<sup>1</sup> Reading with the Bodleian MS. ἡ αὐτοῖς ὑπ' ἄλλων πεισθέντες.

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES.

too soon; and have not only lost the children of whom I had previously delivered them by an ill bringing up, but have stifled whatever else they had in them by evil communications, being fonder of lies and shams than of the truth; and they have at last ended by seeing themselves, as others see them, to be great fools. Aristoides, the son of Lysimachus, is one of them, and there are many others. 151  
The truants often return to me, and beg that I would consort with them again — they are ready to go to me on their knees — and then, if my familiar allows, which is not always the case, I receive them, and they begin to grow again. Dire are the pangs which my art is able to arouse and to allay in those who consort with me, just like the pangs of women in childbirth; night and day they are full of perplexity and travail which is even worse than that of the women. So much for them. And there are others, Theaetetus, who come to me apparently having nothing in them; and as I know that they have no need of my art, I coax them into marrying some one, and by the grace of God I can generally tell who is likely to do them good. Many of them I have given away to Prodicus, and many to other inspired sages. I tell you this long story, friend Theaetetus, because I suspect, as indeed you seem to think yourself, that you are in labour — great with some conception. Come then to me, who am a midwife's son and myself a midwife, and do your best to answer the questions which I will ask you. And if I abstract and expose your first-born, because I discover upon inspection that the conception which you have formed is a vain shadow, do not quarrel with me on that account, as the manner of women is when their first children are taken from them. For I have actually known some who were ready to bite me when I deprived them of a darling folly; they did not perceive that I acted from goodwill, not knowing that no god is the enemy of man — that was not within the range of their ideas; neither am I their enemy in all this, but it would be wrong for me to admit falsehood, or to stifle the truth. Once more, then, Theaetetus, I repeat my old question, 'What is knowledge?' — and do not say that you cannot tell; but quit yourself like a man, and by the help of God you will be able to tell.

Like mid-  
wives, he is a  
matchmaker

Theaetetus is  
exhorted to  
submit him-  
self to the  
treatment,  
and not to  
wax wroth if  
some darling  
idol is taken  
from him.



*Theæt.* At any rate, Socrates, after such an exhortation I should be ashamed of not trying to do my best. Now he who knows perceives what he knows, and, as far as I can see at present, knowledge is perception.

*Soc.* Bravely said, boy; that is the way in which you should express your opinion. And now, let us examine together this conception of yours, and see whether it is a true birth or a mere wind-egg:— You say that knowledge is perception?

*Theæt.* Yes.

152 *Soc.* Well, you have delivered yourself of a very important doctrine about knowledge; it is indeed the opinion of Protagoras, who has another way of expressing it. Man, he says, is the measure of all things, of the existence of things that are, and of the non-existence of things that are not:— You have read him?

*Theæt.* O yes, again and again.

*Soc.* Does he not say that things are to you such as they appear to you, and to me such as they appear to me, and that you and I are men?

*Theæt.* Yes, he says so.

*Soc.* A wise man is not likely to talk nonsense. Let us try to understand him: the same wind is blowing, and yet one of us may be cold and the other not, or one may be slightly and the other very cold?

*Theæt.* Quite true.

*Soc.* Now is the wind, regarded not in relation to us but absolutely, cold or not; or are we to say, with Protagoras, that the wind is cold to him who is cold, and not to him who is not?

*Theæt.* I suppose the last.

*Soc.* Then it must appear so to each of them?

*Theæt.* Yes.

*Soc.* And 'appears to him' means the same as 'he perceives.'

*Theæt.* True.

*Soc.* Then appearing and perceiving coincide in the case of hot and cold, and in similar instances; for things appear, or may be supposed to be, to each one such as he perceives them?

*Theæternus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEÆTETUS.

In answer to the invitation he boldly replies: Knowledge is perception.

This is only another way of expressing Protagoras' doctrine, 'Man is the measure of all things,' i. e. things are as they appear to you or me at any moment.

This is true in some cases.

*Theaetetus.**Theaet.* Yes.SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.*Soc.* Then perception is always of existence, and being the same as knowledge is unerring?*Theaet.* Clearly.

But Protagoras had also a hidden meaning, — 'All things are relative and in motion.' In this the ancients agree with him.

*Soc.* In the name of the Graces, what an almighty wise man Protagoras must have been! He spoke these things in a parable to the common herd, like you and me, but told the truth, 'his Truth<sup>1</sup>,' in secret to his own disciples.*Theaet.* What do you mean, Socrates?*Soc.* I am about to speak of a high argument, in which all things are said to be relative; you cannot rightly call anything by any name, such as great or small, heavy or light, for the great will be small and the heavy light — there is no single thing or quality, but out of motion and change and admixture all things are becoming relatively to one another, which 'becoming' is by us incorrectly called being, but is really becoming, for nothing ever is, but all things are becoming. Summon all philosophers — Protagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and the rest of them, one after another, and with the exception of Parmenides they will agree with you in this. Summon the great masters of either kind of poetry — Epicharmus, the prince of Comedy, and Homer of Tragedy; when the latter sings of

' Ocean whence sprang the gods, and mother Tethys,'

does he not mean that all things are the offspring of flux and motion?

*Theaet.* I think so.*Soc.* And who could take up arms against such a great army having Homer for its general, and not appear ridiculous?<sup>2</sup> 153*Theaet.* Who indeed, Socrates?The praises  
of motion.*Soc.* Yes, Theaetetus; and there are plenty of other proofs which will show that motion is the source of what is called being and becoming, and inactivity of not-being and destruction; for fire and warmth, which are supposed to be the parent and guardian of all other things, are born of move-<sup>1</sup> In allusion to a book of Protagoras' which bore this title.<sup>2</sup> Cp. Cratylus 401 E ff.

ment and of friction, which is a kind of motion<sup>1</sup>;—is not this the origin of fire?

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

By motion all things are generated, and body and soul, water and air, are alike preserved by it.

*Theaet.* It is.

*Soc.* And the race of animals is generated in the same way?

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And is not the bodily habit spoiled by rest and idleness, but preserved for a long time<sup>2</sup> by motion and exercise?

*Theaet.* True.

*Soc.* And what of the mental habit? Is not the soul informed, and improved, and preserved by study and attention, which are motions; but when at rest, which in the soul only means want of attention and study, is uninformed, and speedily forgets whatever she has learned?

*Theaet.* True.

*Soc.* Then motion is a good, and rest an evil, to the soul as well as to the body?

*Theaet.* Clearly.

*Soc.* I may add, that breathless calm, stillness and the like waste and impair, while wind and storm preserve; and the palmary argument of all, which I strongly urge, is the golden chain in Homer, by which he means the sun, thereby indicating that so long as the sun and the heavens go round in their orbits, all things human and divine are and are preserved, but if they were chained up and their motions ceased, then all things would be destroyed, and, as the saying is, turned upside down.

The clinching argument of the golden chain.

*Theaet.* I believe, Socrates, that you have truly explained his meaning.

*Soc.* Then now apply his doctrine to perception, my good friend, and first of all to vision; that which you call white colour is not in your eyes, and is not a distinct thing which exists out of them. And you must not assign any place to it: for if it had position it would be, and be at rest, and there would be no process of becoming.

Again, colour is a motion passing between the eye and its object.

*Theaet.* Then what is colour?

*Soc.* Let us carry out the principle which has just been affirmed, that nothing is self-existent, and then we shall see

<sup>1</sup> Reading τοῦτο δὲ κίνησις.

<sup>2</sup> Reading ἐπὶ πολὺ.

*Theaetetus.*  
 SOCRATES,  
 THEAETETUS.

that white, black, and every other colour, arises out of the eye meeting the appropriate motion, and that what we call a colour is in each case neither the active nor the passive element, but something which passes between them, and is peculiar to each percipient; are you quite certain that the several colours appear to a dog or to any animal whatever as they appear to you? 154

*Theaet.* Far from it.

Nothing which is perceived by different men or by the same man at different times is the same.

*Soc.* Or that anything appears the same to you as to another man? Are you so profoundly convinced of this? Rather would it not be true that it never appears exactly the same to you, because you are never exactly the same?

*Theaet.* The latter.

*Soc.* And if that with which I compare myself in size<sup>1</sup>, or which I apprehend by touch, were great or white or hot, it could not become different by mere contact with another unless it actually changed; nor again, if the comparing or apprehending subject were great or white or hot, could this, when unchanged from within, become changed by any approximation or affection of any other thing. The fact is that in our ordinary way of speaking we allow ourselves to be driven into most ridiculous and wonderful contradictions, as Protagoras and all who take his line of argument would remark.

*Theaet.* How? and of what sort do you mean?

Contradictions arising out of relations of numbers.

*Soc.* A little instance will sufficiently explain my meaning: Here are six dice, which are more by a half when compared with four, and fewer by a half than twelve — they are more and also fewer. How can you or any one maintain the contrary?

*Theaet.* Very true.

*Soc.* Well, then, suppose that Protagoras or some one asks whether anything can become greater or more if not by increasing, how would you answer him, Theaetetus?

*Theaet.* I should say 'No,' Socrates, if I were to speak my mind in reference to this last question, and if I were not afraid of contradicting my former answer.

*Soc.* Capital! excellent! spoken like an oracle, my boy!

<sup>1</sup> Reading with the MSS. ὃ παραμετρούμεθα.



And if you reply 'Yes,' there will be a case for Euripides; for our tongue will be unconvinced, but not our mind<sup>1</sup>.

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

*Theaet.* Very true.

*Soc.* The thoroughbred Sophists, who know all that can be known about the mind, and argue only out of the superfluity of their wits, would have had a regular sparring-match over this, and would have knocked their arguments together finely. But you and I, who have no professional aims, only desire to see what is the mutual relation of these principles, — whether they are consistent with each other or not.

*Theaet.* Yes, that would be my desire.

155 *Soc.* And mine too. But since this is our feeling, and there is plenty of time, why should we not calmly and patiently review our own thoughts, and thoroughly examine and see what these appearances in us really are? If I am not mistaken, they will be described by us as follows: — first, that nothing can become greater or less, either in number or magnitude, while remaining equal to itself — you would agree?

Three laws of thought:—

(1) Nothing, while remaining equal to itself, can become fewer or more, greater or less.

(2) Without addition or subtraction nothing can increase or diminish.

(3) Nothing can be what it was not without becoming.

These axioms seem to jar in certain cases.

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* Secondly, that without addition or subtraction there is no increase or diminution of anything, but only equality.

*Theaet.* Quite true.

*Soc.* Thirdly, that what was not before cannot be afterwards, without becoming and having become.

*Theaet.* Yes, truly.

*Soc.* These three axioms, if I am not mistaken, are fighting with one another in our minds in the case of the dice, or, again, in such a case as this — if I were to say that I, who am of a certain height and taller than you, may within a year, without gaining or losing in height, be not so tall — not that I should have lost, but that you would have increased. In such a case, I am afterwards what I once was not, and yet I have not become; for I could not have become without becoming, neither could I have become less without losing somewhat of my height; and I could give you ten thousand examples of similar contradictions, if we admit them at all. I believe that you follow me, Theaetetus; for

<sup>1</sup> In allusion to the well-known line of Euripides, Hippol. 612:

ἡ γλῶσσ' ὁμώμοχ', ἡ δὲ φρενὶν ἀνώμοτος.

*Theaetetus.* I suspect that you have thought of these questions before now.

SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

*Theaet.* Yes, Socrates, and I am amazed when I think of them; by the Gods I am! and I want to know what on earth they mean; and there are times when my head quite swims with the contemplation of them.

*Soc.* I see, my dear Theaetetus, that Theodorus had a true insight into your nature when he said that you were a philosopher, for wonder is the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder. He was not a bad genealogist who said that Iris (the messenger of heaven) is the child of Thaumias (wonder). But do you begin to see what is the explanation of this perplexity on the hypothesis which we attribute to Protagoras?

*Theaet.* Not as yet.

*Soc.* Then you will be obliged to me if I help you to unearth the hidden 'truth' of a famous man or school.

*Theaet.* To be sure, I shall be very much obliged.

*Soc.* Take a look round, then, and see that none of the uninitiated are listening. Now by the uninitiated I mean the people who believe in nothing but what they can grasp in their hands, and who will not allow that action or generation or anything invisible can have real existence.

*Theaet.* Yes, indeed, Socrates, they are very hard and impenetrable mortals.

*Soc.* Yes, my boy, outer barbarians. Far more ingenious 156 are the brethren whose mysteries I am about to reveal to you. Their first principle is, that all is motion, and upon this all the affections of which we were just now speaking are supposed to depend: there is nothing but motion, which has two forms, one active and the other passive, both in endless number; and out of the union and friction of them there is generated a progeny endless in number, having two forms, sense and the object of sense, which are ever breaking forth and coming to the birth at the same moment. The senses are variously named hearing, seeing, smelling; there is the sense of heat, cold, pleasure, pain, desire, fear, and many more which have names, as well as innumerable others which are without them; each has its kindred object,—each variety of colour has a corresponding variety of sight, and so with

Further development of the doctrine of Protagoras to meet the difficulty.—The uninitiated who believe only in what they can hold in their hands are to be kept out of the secret.

sound and hearing, and with the rest of the senses and the objects akin to them. Do you see, Theaetetus, the bearings of this tale on the preceding argument?

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

*Theaet.* Indeed I do not.

*Soc.* Then attend, and I will try to finish the story. The purport is that all these things are in motion, as I was saying, and that this motion is of two kinds, a slower and a quicker; and the slower elements have their motions in the same place and with reference to things near them, and so they beget; but what is begotten is swifter, for it is carried to and fro, and moves from place to place. Apply this to sense:—When the eye and the appropriate object meet together and give birth to whiteness and the sensation connatural with it, which could not have been given by either of them going elsewhere, then, while the sight is flowing from the eye, whiteness proceeds from the object which combines in producing the colour; and so the eye is fulfilled with sight, and really sees, and becomes, not sight, but a seeing eye; and the object which combined to form the colour is fulfilled with whiteness, and becomes not whiteness but a white thing, whether wood or stone or whatever the object may be which happens to be coloured white<sup>1</sup>. And this is true of all sensible objects, hard, warm, and the like, which are similarly to be regarded, as I was saying before, not as having any absolute existence, but as being all of them of whatever kind generated by motion in their intercourse with one another; for of the agent and patient, as existing in separation, no trustworthy conception, as they say, can be formed, for the agent has no existence until united with the patient, and the patient has no existence until united with the agent; and that which by uniting with something becomes an agent, by meeting with some other thing is converted into a patient. And from all these considerations, as I said at first, there arises a general reflection, that there is no one self-existent thing, but everything is becoming and in relation; and being must be altogether abolished, although from habit and ignorance we are compelled even in this discussion to retain the use of the term. But great philosophers tell us that we are not to allow either the word 'something,' or 'belonging to something,' or 'to me,' or 'this' or 'that,' or

All things are in motion, of a slower and of a swifter kind. The slower objects move without changing place, and produce the swifter, which are in locomotion.

Application of the theory to vision.

Everything becomes, and becomes relatively to something else.

<sup>1</sup> Reading ὁτιοῦν or ὁτιφοῦν and omitting χρῶμα.

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

This applies  
not only to  
individuals,  
but also to  
classes.

any other detaining name to be used; in the language of nature all things are being created and destroyed, coming into being and passing into new forms; nor can any name fix or detain them; he who attempts to fix them is easily refuted. And this should be the way of speaking, not only of particulars but of aggregates; such aggregates as are expressed in the word 'man,' or 'stone,' or any name of an animal or of a class. O Theaetetus, are not these speculations sweet as honey? And do you not like the taste of them in the mouth?

*Theat.* I do not know what to say, Socrates; for, indeed, I cannot make out whether you are giving your own opinion or only wanting to draw me out.

Socrates is  
repeating  
these  
'charming  
speculations'  
only to  
draw out  
Theaetetus.

*Soc.* You forget, my friend, that I neither know, nor profess to know, anything of these matters; you are the person who is in labour, I am the barren midwife; and this is why I soothe you, and offer you one good thing after another, that you may taste them. And I hope that I may at last help to bring your own opinion into the light of day: when this has been accomplished, then we will determine whether what you have brought forth is only a wind-egg or a real and genuine birth. Therefore, keep up your spirits, and answer like a man what you think.

*Theat.* Ask me.

*Soc.* Then once more: Is it your opinion that nothing is but what becomes?—the good and the noble, as well as all the other things which we were just now mentioning?

*Theat.* When I hear you discoursing in this style, I think that there is a great deal in what you say, and I am very ready to assent.

Dreams and  
illusions are  
a stumbling-  
block to the  
theory, as  
they imply  
falseness in  
perception.

*Soc.* Let us not leave the argument unfinished, then; for there still remains to be considered an objection which may be raised about dreams and diseases, in particular about madness, and the various illusions of hearing and sight, or of other senses. For you know that in all these cases the *esse-percipi* theory appears to be unmistakably refuted, since 158 in dreams and illusions we certainly have false perceptions; and far from saying that everything is which appears, we should rather say that nothing is which appears.

*Theat.* Very true, Socrates.



*Soc.* But then, my boy, how can any one contend that knowledge is perception, or that to every man what appears is? *Theaetetus.*  
SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

*Theaet.* I am afraid to say, Socrates, that I have nothing to answer, because you rebuked me just now for making this excuse; but I certainly cannot undertake to argue that madmen or dreamers think truly, when they imagine, some of them that they are gods, and others that they can fly, and are flying in their sleep.

*Soc.* Do you see another question which can be raised about these phenomena, notably about dreaming and waking?

*Theaet.* What question?

*Soc.* A question which I think that you must often have heard persons ask:—How can you determine whether at this moment we are sleeping, and all our thoughts are a dream; or whether we are awake, and talking to one another in the waking state? How, when awake, can we be sure that we are not asleep, and *vice versa*?

*Theaet.* Indeed, Socrates, I do not know how to prove the one any more than the other, for in both cases the facts precisely correspond; and there is no difficulty in supposing that during all this discussion we have been talking to one another in a dream; and when in a dream<sup>1</sup> we seem to be narrating dreams, the resemblance of the two states is quite astonishing.

*Soc.* You see, then, that a doubt about the reality of sense is easily raised, since there may even be a doubt whether we are awake or in a dream. And as our time is equally divided between sleeping and waking, in either sphere of existence the soul contends that the thoughts which are present to our minds at the time are true; and during one half of our lives we affirm the truth of the one, and, during the other half, of the other; and are equally confident of both.

*Theaet.* Most true.

*Soc.* And may not the same be said of madness and other disorders? the difference is only that the times are not equal.

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And is truth or falsehood to be determined by duration of time?

*Theaet.* That would be in many ways ridiculous.

<sup>1</sup> Or perhaps, reading *ἵπαρα*, 'in our waking state.'

*Theaetetus.*SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.Resolution  
of the diffi-  
culty by the  
champions  
of appear-  
ance:—  
What is  
wholly other  
can in no way  
be the same,

*Soc.* But can you certainly determine by any other means which of these opinions is true?

*Theaet.* I do not think that I can.

*Soc.* Listen, then, to a statement of the other side of the argument, which is made by the champions of appearance. They would say, as I imagine—Can that which is wholly other than something, have the same quality as that from which it differs? and observe, Theaetetus, that the word 'other' means not 'partially,' but 'wholly other.'

*Theaet.* Certainly, putting the question as you do, that 159 which is wholly other cannot either potentially or in any other way be the same.

*Soc.* And must therefore be admitted to be unlike?

*Theaet.* True.

*Soc.* If, then, anything happens to become like or unlike itself or another, when it becomes like we call it the same—when unlike, other?

*Theaet.* Certainly.

and different  
agents and  
patients, in  
conjunction,  
produce dif-  
ferent results.

*Soc.* Were we not saying that there are agents many and infinite, and patients many and infinite?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* And also that different combinations will produce results which are not the same, but different?

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Let us take you and me, or anything as an example:—There is Socrates in health, and Socrates sick—Are they like or unlike?

*Theaet.* You mean to compare Socrates in health as a whole, and Socrates in sickness as a whole?

*Soc.* Exactly; that is my meaning.

*Theaet.* I answer, they are unlike.

*Soc.* And if unlike, they are other?

*Theaet.* Certainly.

Socrates in  
health is un-  
like Socrates  
in sickness;

*Soc.* And would you not say the same of Socrates sleeping and waking, or in any of the states which we were mentioning?

*Theaet.* I should.

*Soc.* All agents have a different patient in Socrates, accordingly as he is well or ill.

*Theaet.* Of course.

*Soc.* And I who am the patient, and that which is the

agent, will produce something different in each of the two cases?

*Theaetetus.*

*Theaet.* Certainly.

SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

*Soc.* The wine which I drink when I am in health, appears sweet and pleasant to me?

*Theaet.* True.

*Soc.* For, as has been already acknowledged, the patient and agent meet together and produce sweetness and a perception of sweetness, which are in simultaneous motion, and the perception which comes from the patient makes the tongue percipient, and the quality of sweetness which arises out of and is moving about the wine, makes the wine both to be and to appear sweet to the healthy tongue.

and therefore it is only natural that the same draught of wine should produce a sweet taste in the one case, a bitter in the other.

*Theaet.* Certainly; that has been already acknowledged.

*Soc.* But when I am sick, the wine really acts upon another and a different person?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* The combination of the draught of wine, and the Socrates who is sick, produces quite another result; which is the sensation of bitterness in the tongue, and the motion and creation of bitterness in and about the wine, which becomes not bitterness but something bitter; as I myself become not perception but percipient?

*Theaet.* True.

160 *Soc.* There is no other object of which I shall ever have the same perception, for another object would give another perception, and would make the percipient other and different; nor can that object which affects me, meeting another subject, produce the same, or become similar, for that too will produce another result from another subject, and become different.

*Theaet.* True.

*Soc.* Neither can I by myself, have this sensation, nor the object by itself, this quality.

*Theaet.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* When I perceive I must become percipient of something — there can be no such thing as perceiving and perceiving nothing; the object, whether it become sweet, bitter, or of any other quality, must have relation to a percipient; nothing can become sweet which is sweet to no one.

*Theaetetus.**Theaet.* Certainly not.SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS,  
THEODORUS.

*Soc.* Then the inference is, that we [the agent and patient] are or become in relation to one another; there is a law which binds us one to the other, but not to any other existence, nor each of us to himself; and therefore we can only be bound to one another; so that whether a person says that a thing is or becomes, he must say that it is or becomes to or of or in relation to something else; but he must not say or allow any one else to say that anything is or becomes absolutely:—such is our conclusion.

*Theaet.* Very true, Socrates.

Each object is relative to one percipient only, and he alone can judge of its truth.

*Soc.* Then, if that which acts upon me has relation to me and to no other, I and no other am the percipient of it?

*Theaet.* Of course.

*Soc.* Then my perception is true to me, being inseparable from my own being; and, as Protagoras says, to myself I am judge of what is and what is not to me.

*Theaet.* I suppose so.

*Soc.* How then, if I never err, and if my mind never trips in the conception of being or becoming, can I fail of knowing that which I perceive?

*Theaet.* You cannot.

Thus knowledge is perception. Homer, Heracleitus, and their company agree in this with Protagoras.

*Soc.* Then you were quite right in affirming that knowledge is only perception; and the meaning turns out to be the same, whether with Homer and Heracleitus, and all that company, you say that all is motion and flux, or with the great sage Protagoras, that man is the measure of all things; or with Theaetetus, that, given these premises, perception is knowledge. Am I not right, Theaetetus, and is not this your new-born child, of which I have delivered you? What say you?

*Theaet.* I cannot but agree, Socrates.

Let us inspect the new-born babe.

*Soc.* Then this is the child, however he may turn out, which you and I have with difficulty brought into the world. And now that he is born, we must run round the hearth with him, and see whether he is worth rearing, or is only a wind-egg and a sham. Is he to be reared in any case, and not exposed? or will you bear to see him rejected, and not get into a passion if I take away your first-born?



*Theod.* Theaetetus will not be angry, for he is very good-natured. But tell me, Socrates, in heaven's name, is this, after all, not the truth?

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEODORUS.

*Soc.* You, Theodorus, are a lover of theories, and now you innocently fancy that I am a bag full of them, and can easily pull one out which will overthrow its predecessor. But you do not see that in reality none of these theories come from me; they all come from him who talks with me. I only know just enough to extract them from the wisdom of another, and to receive them in a spirit of fairness. And now I shall say nothing myself, but shall endeavour to elicit something from our young friend.

*Theod.* Do as you say, Socrates; you are quite right.

*Soc.* Shall I tell you, Theodorus, what amazes me in your acquaintance Protagoras?

*Theod.* What is it?

*Soc.* I am charmed with his doctrine, that what appears is to each one, but I wonder that he did not begin his book on Truth with a declaration that a pig or a dog-faced baboon, or some other yet stranger monster which has sensation, is the measure of all things; then he might have shown a magnificent contempt for our opinion of him by informing us at the outset that while we were reverencing him like a God for his wisdom he was no better than a tadpole, not to speak of his fellow-men — would not this have produced an overpowering effect? For if truth is only sensation, and no man can discern another's feelings better than he, or has any superior right to determine whether his opinion is true or false, but each, as we have several times repeated, is to himself the sole judge, and everything that he judges is true and right, why, my friend, should Protagoras be preferred to the place of wisdom and instruction, and deserve to be well paid, and we poor ignoramuses have to go to him, if each one is the measure of his own wisdom? Must he not be talking 'ad captandum' in all this? I say nothing of the ridiculous predicament in which my own midwifery and the whole art of dialectic is placed; for the attempt to supervise or refute the notions or opinions of others would be a tedious and enormous piece of folly, if to each man his own are right; and this must be the case if Protagoras' Truth is the real

Why did not Protagoras say, 'A pig is the measure of all things? — for a pig has sensation.

His doctrine is suicidal, and cuts away his own and all other claims to superior wisdom.

*Theaetetus.*SOCRATES,  
THEODORUS,  
THEAETETUS.

truth, and the philosopher is not merely amusing himself by giving oracles out of the shrine of his book.

*Theod.* He was a friend of mine, Socrates, as you were saying, and therefore I cannot have him refuted by my lips, nor can I oppose you when I agree with you; please, then, to take Theaetetus again; he seemed to answer very nicely.

*Soc.* If you were to go into a Lacedaemonian palaestra, Theodorus, would you have a right to look on at the naked wrestlers, some of them making a poor figure, if you did not strip and give them an opportunity of judging of your own person?

*Theod.* Why not, Socrates, if they would allow me, as I think you will, in consideration of my age and stiffness; let some more supple youth try a fall with you, and do not drag me into the gymnasium.

*Soc.* Your will is my will, Theodorus, as the proverbial philosophers say, and therefore I will return to the sage Theaetetus: Tell me, Theaetetus, in reference to what I was saying, are you not lost in wonder, like myself, when you find that all of a sudden you are raised to the level of the wisest of men, or indeed of the gods?—for you would assume the measure of Protagoras to apply to the gods as well as men?

*Theaet.* Certainly I should, and I confess to you that I am lost in wonder. At first hearing, I was quite satisfied with the doctrine, that whatever appears is to each one, but now the face of things has changed.

*Soc.* Why, my dear boy, you are young, and therefore your ear is quickly caught and your mind influenced by popular arguments. Protagoras, or some one speaking on his behalf, will doubtless say in reply,—Good people, young and old, you meet and harangue, and bring in the gods, whose existence or non-existence I banish from writing and speech, or you talk about the reason of man being degraded to the level of the brutes, which is a telling argument with the multitude, but not one word of proof or demonstration do you offer. All is probability with you, and yet surely you and Theodorus had better reflect whether you are disposed to admit of probability and figures of speech in matters of such importance. 163  
He or any other mathematician who argued from proba-

Theaetetus is shaken in his opinion of Protagoras' theory.

But Protagoras would say that he had been influenced by mere clap-trap.

bilities and likelihoods in geometry, would not be worth an ace. *Theaetetus.*

*Theaet.* But neither you nor we, Socrates, would be satisfied with such arguments. *SOCRATES, THEAETETUS.*

*Soc.* Then you and Theodorus mean to say that we must look at the matter in some other way? *A new start.*

*Theaet.* Yes, in quite another way.

*Soc.* And the way will be to ask whether perception is or is not the same as knowledge; for this was the real point of our argument, and with a view to this we raised (did we not?) those many strange questions. *Is perception knowledge?*

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Shall we say that we know everything which we see and hear? for example, shall we say that not having learned, we do not hear the language of foreigners when they speak to us? or shall we say that we not only hear, but know what they are saying? Or again, if we see letters which we do not understand, shall we say that we do not see them? or shall we aver that, seeing them, we must know them? *We know what we see and hear: but we see only certain forms or colours, and hear only sounds of different pitch. Yet it is possible to know more than this.*

*Theaet.* We shall say, Socrates, that we know what we actually see and hear of them—that is to say, we see and know the figure and colour of the letters, and we hear and know the elevation or depression of the sound of them; but we do not perceive by sight and hearing, or know, that which grammarians and interpreters teach about them.

*Soc.* Capital, Theaetetus; and about this there shall be no dispute, because I want you to grow; but there is another difficulty coming, which you will also have to repulse.

*Theaet.* What is it?

*Soc.* Some one will say, Can a man who has ever known anything, and still has and preserves a memory of that which he knows, not know that which he remembers at the time when he remembers? I have, I fear, a tedious way of putting a simple question, which is only, whether a man who has learned, and remembers, can fail to know? *Again, according to the theory, a man cannot know what he remembers;*

*Theaet.* Impossible, Socrates; the supposition is monstrous.

*Soc.* Am I talking nonsense, then? Think: is not seeing perceiving, and is not sight perception?

*Theaet.* True.

*Theaetetus.*SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

*Soc.* And if our recent definition holds, every man knows that which he has seen?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* And you would admit that there is such a thing as memory?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* And is memory of something or of nothing?

*Theaet.* Of something, surely.

*Soc.* Of things learned and perceived, that is?

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Often a man remembers that which he has seen?

*Theaet.* True.

*Soc.* And if he closed his eyes, would he forget?

*Theaet.* Who, Socrates, would dare to say so?

*Soc.* But we must say so, if the previous argument is to be maintained.

*Theaet.* What do you mean? I am not quite sure that I understand you, though I have a strong suspicion that you are right.

*Soc.* As thus: he who sees knows, as we say, that which he sees; for perception and sight and knowledge are admitted to be the same.

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Soc.* But he who saw, and has knowledge of that which he saw, remembers, when he closes his eyes, that which he no longer sees.

*Theaet.* True.

*Soc.* And seeing is knowing, and therefore not-seeing is not-knowing?

*Theaet.* Very true.

*Soc.* Then the inference is, that a man may have attained the knowledge of something, which he may remember and yet not know, because he does not see; and this has been affirmed by us to be a monstrous supposition.

*Theaet.* Most true.

*Soc.* Thus, then, the assertion that knowledge and perception are one, involves a manifest impossibility?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then they must be distinguished?

*Theaet.* I suppose that they must.

for, when remembering something which he has seen, he does not see, and not-seeing is not-knowing.

And it would be ridiculous to say that what is remembered is not known.



*Soc.* Once more we shall have to begin, and ask 'What is knowledge?' and yet, Theaetetus, what are we going to do?

*Theaetetus.*

*Theaet.* About what?

SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS,  
THEODORUS.

*Soc.* Like a good-for-nothing cock, without having won the victory, we walk away from the argument and crow.

Socrates is  
dissatisfied  
with the  
mode of  
argument.

*Theaet.* How do you mean?

*Soc.* After the manner of disputers<sup>1</sup>, we were satisfied with mere verbal consistency, and were well pleased if in this way we could gain an advantage. Although professing not to be mere Eristics, but philosophers, I suspect that we have unconsciously fallen into the error of that ingenious class of persons.

*Theaet.* I do not as yet understand you.

*Soc.* Then I will try to explain myself: just now we asked the question, whether a man who had learned and remembered could fail to know, and we showed that a person who had seen might remember when he had his eyes shut and could not see, and then he would at the same time remember and not know. But this was an impossibility. And so the Protagorean fable came to nought, and yours also, who maintained that knowledge is the same as perception.

*Theaet.* True.

*Soc.* And yet, my friend, I rather suspect that the result would have been different if Protagoras, who was the father of the first of the two brats, had been alive; he would have had a great deal to say on their behalf. But he is dead, and we insult over his orphan child; and even the guardians whom he left, and of whom our friend Theodorus is one, are unwilling to give any help, and therefore I suppose that I must take up his cause myself, and see justice done?

If Protagoras  
had been alive  
he would not  
have allowed  
us to throw  
ridicule on  
his brats.

*Theod.* Not I, Socrates, but rather Callias, the son of Hipponicus, is guardian of his orphans. I was too soon diverted from the abstractions of dialectic to geometry. Nevertheless, I shall be grateful to you if you assist him.

As Theo-  
dorus, their  
guardian,  
declines to  
protect them,  
Socrates takes  
up their  
defence.

*Soc.* Very good, Theodorus; you shall see how I will come to the rescue. If a person does not attend to the meaning of terms as they are commonly used in argument, he may be involved even in greater paradoxes

<sup>1</sup> Lys. 216 A; Phaedo 90 B, 101 E; Rep. V, 453 E ff.

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEODORUS,  
THEAETETUS.

Another  
difficulty :—  
A man can  
know and not  
know the same  
thing at the  
same time,  
if seeing is  
knowing.

than these. Shall I explain this matter to you or to Theaetetus?

*Theod.* To both of us, and let the younger answer; he will incur less disgrace if he is discomfited.

*Soc.* Then now let me ask the awful question, which is this:— Can a man know and also not know that which he knows?

*Theod.* How shall we answer, Theaetetus?

*Theaet.* He cannot, I should say.

*Soc.* He can, if you maintain that seeing is knowing. When you are imprisoned in a well, as the saying is, and the self-assured adversary closes one of your eyes with his hand, and asks whether you can see his cloak with the eye which he has closed, how will you answer the inevitable man?

*Theaet.* I should answer, 'Not with that eye but with the other.'

*Soc.* Then you see and do not see the same thing at the same time.

*Theaet.* Yes, in a certain sense.

*Soc.* None of that, he will reply; I do not ask or bid you answer in what sense you know, but only whether you know that which you do not know. You have been proved to see that which you do not see; and you have already admitted that seeing is knowing, and that not-seeing is not-knowing: I leave you to draw the inference.

*Theaet.* Yes; the inference is the contradictory of my assertion.

*Soc.* Yes, my marvel, and there might have been yet worse things in store for you, if an opponent had gone on to ask whether you can have a sharp and also a dull knowledge, and whether you can know near, but not at a distance, or know the same thing with more or less intensity, and so on without end. Such questions might have been put to you by a light-armed mercenary, who argued for pay. He would have lain in wait for you, and when you took up the position, that sense is knowledge, he would have made an assault upon hearing, smelling, and the other senses;—he would have shown you no mercy; and while you were lost in envy and admiration of his wisdom, he

But the case  
might have  
been made  
still more  
ridiculous by  
applying to  
knowledge  
terms proper  
to sense.

would have got you into his net, out of which you would not have escaped until you had come to an understanding about the sum to be paid for your release. Well, you ask, and how will Protagoras reinforce his position? Shall I answer for him?

*Theæt.* By all means.

166 *Soc.* He will repeat all those things which we have been urging on his behalf, and then he will close with us in disdain, and say:—The worthy Socrates asked a little boy, whether the same man could remember and not know the same thing, and the boy said No, because he was frightened, and could not see what was coming, and then Socrates made fun of poor me. The truth is, O slatternly Socrates, that when you ask questions about any assertion of mine, and the person asked is found tripping, if he has answered as I should have answered, then I am refuted, but if he answers something else, then he is refuted and not I. For do you really suppose that any one would admit the memory which a man has of an impression which has passed away to be the same with that which he experienced at the time? Assuredly not. Or would he hesitate to acknowledge that the same man may know and not know the same thing? Or, if he is afraid of making this admission, would he ever grant that one who has become unlike is the same as before he became unlike? Or would he admit that a man is one at all, and not rather many and infinite as the changes which take place in him? I speak by the card in order to avoid entanglements of words. But, O my good sir, he will say, come to the argument in a more generous spirit; and either show, if you can, that our sensations are not relative and individual, or, if you admit them to be so, prove that this does not involve the consequence that the appearance becomes, or, if you will have the word, is, to the individual only. As to your talk about pigs and baboons, you are yourself behaving like a pig, and you teach your hearers to make sport of my writings in the same ignorant manner; but this is not to your credit. For I declare that the truth is as I have written, and that each of us is a measure of existence and of non-existence. Yet one man may be a thousand times better than another in proportion as

*Theætetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEÆTETUS.

Protagoras to the rescue:—  
'If Socrates frightens a boy into admitting just what he pleases, I must not be held responsible.

'What I maintain is, that sensations are relative and individual; that consequently what appears is.

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES.

'A wise man is not he who has certain impressions, but he who can make what appears evil appear good.

different things are and appear to him. And I am far from saying that wisdom and the wise man have no existence; but I say that the wise man is he who makes the evils which appear and are to a man, into goods which are and appear to him. And I would beg you not to press my words in the letter, but to take the meaning of them as I will explain them. Remember what has been already said,—that to the sick man his food appears to be and is bitter, and to the man in health the opposite of bitter. Now I cannot conceive that one of these men can be or ought to be made wiser than the other: nor can you assert that the sick man 167 because he has one impression is foolish, and the healthy man because he has another is wise; but the one state requires to be changed into the other, the worse into the better. As in education, a change of state has to be effected, and the sophist accomplishes by words the change which the physician works by the aid of drugs. Not that any one ever made another think truly, who previously thought falsely. For no one can think what is not, or, think anything different from that which he feels; and this is always true. But as the inferior habit of mind has thoughts of a kindred nature, so I conceive that a good mind causes men to have good thoughts; and these which the inexperienced call true, I maintain to be only better, and not truer than others. And, O my dear Socrates, I do not call wise men tadpoles: far from it; I say that they are the physicians of the human body, and the husbandmen of plants—for the husbandmen also take away the evil and disordered sensations of plants, and infuse into them good and healthy sensations—aye and true ones<sup>1</sup>; and the wise and good rhetoricians make the good instead of the evil to seem just to states; for whatever appears to a state to be just and fair, so long as it is regarded as such, is just and fair to it; but the teacher of wisdom causes the good to take the place of the evil, both in appearance and in reality. And in like manner the Sophist who is able to train his pupils in this spirit is a wise man, and deserves to be well paid by them. And so one man is wiser than another; and no one thinks

'This is what the Sophists attempt to do.

<sup>1</sup> Reading ἀληθεῖς, but? Cp. supra 167 A: τὰυτα δὲ ἀεὶ ἀληθῆς.



falsely, and you, whether you will or not, must endure to be a measure. On these foundations the argument stands firm, which you, Socrates, may, if you please, overthrow by an opposite argument, or if you like you may put questions to me — a method to which no intelligent person will object, quite the reverse. But I must beg you to put fair questions: for there is great inconsistency in saying that you have a zeal for virtue, and then always behaving unfairly in argument. The unfairness of which I complain is that you do not distinguish between mere disputation and dialectic: the disputer may trip up his opponent as often as he likes, and make fun; but the dialectician will be in earnest, and only correct his adversary when necessary, telling him the errors into which he has fallen through his own fault, or that of the company which he has previously kept. If you do so, 168 your adversary will lay the blame of his own confusion and perplexity on himself, and not on you. He will follow and love you, and will hate himself, and escape from himself into philosophy, in order that he may become different from what he was. But the other mode of arguing, which is practised by the many, will have just the opposite effect upon him; and as he grows older, instead of turning philosopher, he will come to hate philosophy. I would recommend you, therefore, as I said before, not to encourage yourself in this polemical and controversial temper, but to find out, in a friendly and congenial spirit, what we really mean when we say that all things are in motion, and that to every individual and state what appears, is. In this manner you will consider whether knowledge and sensation are the same or different, but you will not argue, as you were just now doing, from the customary use of names and words, which the vulgar pervert in all sorts of ways, causing infinite perplexity to one another. Such, Theodorus, is the very slight help which I am able to offer to your old friend<sup>1</sup>; had he been living, he would have helped himself in a far more gloriose style.

*Theod.* You are jesting, Socrates; indeed, your defence of him has been most valorous.

*Soc.* Thank you, friend; and I hope that you observed

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEODORUS.

‘Let Socrates in his reply argue fairly, like a dialectician, not like a mere disputer.’

‘He should not misrepresent when he ought to be trying to understand his adversary.’

<sup>1</sup> Reading *προσῆρκεσα*.

*Theaetetus.*SOCRATES,  
THEODORUS.

Socrates insists that out of respect for his old friend, Theodorus must reply instead of Theaetetus.

Protagoras bidding us be serious, as the text, 'Man is the measure of all things,' was a solemn one; and he reproached us with making a boy the medium of discourse, and said that the boy's timidity was made to tell against his argument; he also declared that we made a joke of him.

*Theod.* How could I fail to observe all that, Socrates?

*Soc.* Well, and shall we do as he says?

*Theod.* By all means.

*Soc.* But if his wishes are to be regarded, you and I must take up the argument, and in all seriousness<sup>1</sup>, and ask and answer one another, for you see that the rest of us are nothing but boys. In no other way can we escape the imputation, that in our fresh analysis of his thesis we are making fun with boys.

*Theod.* Well, but is not Theaetetus better able to follow a philosophical enquiry than a great many men who have long beards?

*Soc.* Yes, Theodorus, but not better than you; and therefore please not to imagine that I am to defend by every means in my power your departed friend; and that you are to defend nothing and nobody. At any rate, my good man, 169 do not sheer off until we know whether you are a true measure of diagrams, or whether all men are equally measures and sufficient for themselves in astronomy and geometry, and the other branches of knowledge in which you are supposed to excel them.

Theodorus compares Socrates to Scirrhon and Antaeus.

*Theod.* He who is sitting by you, Socrates, will not easily avoid being drawn into an argument; and when I said just now that you would excuse me, and not, like the Lacedaemonians, compel me to strip, I was talking nonsense—I should rather compare you to Scirrhon—for the Lacedaemonian rule is 'strip or depart,' but you seem to go about your work more after the fashion of Antaeus: you will not allow any one who approaches you to depart until you have not only stripped him, but have also compelled him to try a fall with you in argument.

Socrates replies that he often

*Soc.* There, Theodorus, you have hit off precisely the nature of my complaint; but I am even more pugnacious than the

<sup>1</sup> Reading αὐτοῦ τῶν λόγων.

giants of old, for I have met with no end of heroes; many a Heracles, many a Theseus, mighty in words, has broken my head; nevertheless I am always at this rough exercise, which inspires me like a passion. Please, then, to try a fall with me, whereby you will do yourself good as well as me.

*Theod.* I consent; lead me whither you will, for I know that you are like destiny; no man can escape from any argument which you may weave for him. But I am not disposed to go further than you suggest.

*Soc.* Once will be enough; and now take particular care that we do not again unwittingly expose ourselves to the reproach of talking childishly.

*Theod.* I will do my best to avoid that error.

*Soc.* In the first place, let us return to our old objection, and see whether we were right in blaming and taking offence at Protagoras on the ground that he assumed all to be equal and sufficient in wisdom; although he admitted that there was a better and worse, and that in respect of this, some, who, as he said, were the wise, excelled others.

*Theod.* Very true.

*Soc.* Had Protagoras been living and answered for himself, instead of our answering for him, there would have been no need of our reviewing or reinforcing the argument. But as he is not here, and some one may accuse us of speaking without authority on his behalf, had we not better come to a clearer agreement about his meaning, for a great deal may be at stake?

*Theod.* True.

170 *Soc.* Then let us obtain, not through any third person, but from his own statement and in the fewest words possible, the basis of agreement.

*Theod.* In what way?

*Soc.* In this way:—His words are, 'What seems to a man, is to him.'

*Theod.* Yes, so he says.

*Soc.* And are not we, Protagoras, uttering the opinion of man, or rather of all mankind, when we say that every one thinks himself wiser than other men in some things, and their inferior in others? In the hour of danger, when they are in perils of war, or of the sea, or of sickness, do they not look

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEODORUS.

gets a broken head for his pains, but that he can never have enough of fighting.

We must be serious.

Protagoras' thesis: 'What appears to each man is to him.'

Now every man will admit that some know more,

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEODORUS.

some less  
than he;

up to their commanders as if they were gods, and expect salvation from them, only because they excel them in knowledge? Is not the world full of men in their several employments, who are looking for teachers and rulers of themselves and of the animals? and there are plenty who think that they are able to teach and able to rule. Now, in all this is implied that ignorance and wisdom exist among them, at least in their own opinion.

*Theod.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And wisdom is assumed by them to be true thought, and ignorance to be false opinion.

*Theod.* Exactly.

and this is  
enough to  
show that  
opinions  
clash,—  
a fact de-  
nied by  
Protagoras,

*Soc.* How then, Protagoras, would you have us treat the argument? Shall we say that the opinions of men are always true, or sometimes true and sometimes false? In either case, the result is the same, and their opinions are not always true, but sometimes true and sometimes false. For tell me, Theodorus, do you suppose that you yourself, or any other follower of Protagoras, would contend that no one deems another ignorant or mistaken in his opinion?

*Theod.* The thing is incredible, Socrates.

*Soc.* And yet that absurdity is necessarily involved in the thesis which declares man to be the measure of all things.

*Theod.* How so?

though very  
obvious.

*Soc.* Why, suppose that you determine in your own mind something to be true, and declare your opinion to me; let us assume, as he argues, that this is true to you. Now, if so, you must either say that the rest of us are not the judges of this opinion or judgment of yours, or that we judge you always to have a true opinion? But are there not thousands upon thousands who, whenever you form a judgment, take up arms against you and are of an opposite judgment and opinion, deeming that you judge falsely?

*Theod.* Yes, indeed, Socrates, thousands and tens of thousands, as Homer says, who give me a world of trouble.

*Soc.* Well, but are we to assert that what you think is true to you and false to the ten thousand others?

*Theod.* No other inference seems to be possible.

When  
opinions  
conflict,

*Soc.* And how about Protagoras himself? If neither he nor the multitude thought, as indeed they do not think, that



171 man is the measure of all things, must it not follow that the truth of which Protagoras wrote would be true to no one? But if you suppose that he himself thought this, and that the multitude does not agree with him, you must begin by allowing that in whatever proportion the many are more than one, in that proportion his truth is more untrue than true.

*Theod.* That would follow if the truth is supposed to vary with individual opinion.

*Soc.* And the best of the joke is, that he acknowledges the truth of their opinion who believe his own opinion to be false; for he admits that the opinions of all men are true.

*Theod.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And does he not allow that his own opinion is false, if he admits that the opinion of those who think him false is true?

*Theod.* Of course.

*Soc.* Whereas the other side do not admit that they speak falsely?

*Theod.* They do not.

*Soc.* And he, as may be inferred from his writings, agrees that this opinion is also true.

*Theod.* Clearly.

*Soc.* Then all mankind, beginning with Protagoras, will contend, or rather, I should say that he will allow, when he concedes that his adversary has a true opinion — Protagoras, I say, will himself allow that neither a dog nor any ordinary man is the measure of anything which he has not learned — am I not right?

*Theod.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the truth of Protagoras being doubted by all, will be true neither to himself nor to any one else?

*Theod.* I think, Socrates, that we are running my old friend too hard.

*Soc.* But I do not know that we are going beyond the truth. Doubtless, as he is older, he may be expected to be wiser than we are. And if he could only just get his head out of the world below, he would have overthrown both of us again and again, me for talking nonsense and you for assenting to me, and have been off and underground in a trice. But as he is not within call, we must make the best use of

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEODORUS.

numbers  
ought to de-  
cide: this  
goes all  
against  
Protagoras.

In any case  
he acknow-  
ledges that  
their opinion  
is true who  
declare his to  
be false,

and so denies  
the truth of  
his own  
doctrine.

But are we  
doing him  
justice?

*Theaetetus.*SOCRATES,  
THEODORUS.

our own faculties, such as they are, and speak out what appears to us to be true. And one thing which no one will deny is, that there are great differences in the understandings of men.

A concession.

*Theod.* In that opinion I quite agree.

His position is only true, if at all, in reference to sensible things;

*Soc.* And is there not most likely to be firm ground in the distinction which we were indicating on behalf of Protagoras, viz. that most things,\* and all immediate sensations, such as hot, dry, sweet, are only such as they appear; if however difference of opinion is to be allowed at all, surely we must allow it in respect of health or disease? for every woman, child, or living creature has not such a knowledge of what conduces to health as to enable them to cure themselves.

*Theod.* I quite agree.

and he himself admits that in politics one man is wiser than another.

*Soc.* Or again, in politics, while affirming that just and unjust, honourable and disgraceful, holy and unholy, are in reality to each state such as the state thinks and makes lawful, and that in determining these matters no individual or state is wiser than another, still the followers of Protagoras will not deny that in determining what is or is not expedient for the community one state is wiser and one counsellor better than another — they will scarcely venture to maintain, that what a city enacts in the belief that it is expedient will always be really expedient. But in the other case, I mean when they speak of justice and injustice, piety and impiety, they are confident that in nature these have no existence or essence of their own — the truth is that which is agreed on at the time of the agreement, and as long as the agreement lasts; and this is the philosophy of many who do not altogether go along with Protagoras. Here arises a new question, Theodorus, which threatens to be more serious than the last. 172

A larger question appears.

*Theod.* Well, Socrates, we have plenty of leisure.

*Soc.* That is true, and your remark recalls to my mind an observation which I have often made, that those who have passed their days in the pursuit of philosophy are ridiculously at fault when they have to appear and speak in court. How natural is this!

*Theod.* What do you mean?*Soc.* I mean to say, that those who have been trained in

philosophy and liberal pursuits are as unlike those who from their youth upwards have been knocking about in the courts and such places, as a freeman is in breeding unlike a slave.

*Theod.* In what is the difference seen?

*Soc.* In the leisure spoken of by you, which a freeman can always command: he has his talk out in peace, and, like ourselves, he wanders at will from one subject to another, and from a second to a third,—if the fancy takes him, he begins again, as we are doing now, caring not whether his words are many or few; his only aim is to attain the truth. But the lawyer is always in a hurry; there is the water of the clepsydra driving him on, and not allowing him to expatiate at will: and there is his adversary standing over him, enforcing his rights; the indictment, which in their phraseology is termed the affidavit, is recited at the time: and from this he must not deviate. He is a servant, and is continually disputing about a fellow-servant before his master, who is seated, and has the cause in his hands; the trial is never about some indifferent matter, but always concerns himself; and often the race is for his life. The consequence has been, that he has become keen and shrewd; he has learned how to flatter his master in word and indulge him in deed; but his soul is small and unrighteous. His condition, which has been that of a slave from his youth upwards, has deprived him of growth and uprightness and independence; dangers and fears, which were too much for his truth and honesty, came upon him in early years, when the tenderness of youth was unequal to them, and he has been driven into crooked ways; from the first he has practised deception and retaliation, and has become stunted and warped. And so he has passed out of youth into manhood, having no soundness in him; and is now, as he thinks, a master in wisdom. Such is the lawyer, Theodorus. Will you have the companion picture of the philosopher, who is of our brotherhood; or shall we return to the argument? Do not let us abuse the freedom of digression which we claim.

*Theod.* Nay, Socrates, not until we have finished what we are about; for you truly said that we belong to a brotherhood which is free, and are not the servants of the argument; but the argument is our servant, and must wait our leisure.

*Theætetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEODORUS.

An apparent digression, in which is set forth, not the opposition of sense and knowledge, but a parallel contrast between the ways of the lawyer and philosopher.

The lawyer is the slave of this world, the philosopher is the freeman.

*Theætetus.*SOCRATES,  
THEODORUS.The simplicity  
of the philo-  
sopher.

Who is our judge? Or where is the spectator having any right to censure or control us, as he might the poets?

*Soc.* Then, as this is your wish, I will describe the leaders; for there is no use in talking about the inferior sort. In the first place, the lords of philosophy have never, from their youth upwards, known their way to the Agora, or the dicastery, or the council, or any other political assembly; they neither see nor hear the laws or decrees, as they are called, of the state written or recited; the eagerness of political societies in the attainment of offices — clubs, and banquets, and revels, and flute-girls,—do not enter even into their dreams. Whether any event has turned out well or ill in the city, what disgrace may have descended to any one from his ancestors, male or female, are matters of which the philosopher no more knows than he can tell, as they say, how many pints are contained in the ocean. Neither is he conscious of his ignorance. For he does not hold aloof in order that he may gain a reputation; but the truth is, that the outer form of him only is in the city: his mind, disdaining the littlenesses and nothingnesses of human things, is 'flying all abroad' as Pindar says, measuring earth and heaven and the things which are under and on the earth and above the heaven, interrogating the whole nature of each and all in their entirety, but not condescending to anything which is 174 within reach.

*Theod.* What do you mean, Socrates?

He cannot see  
what is tum-  
bling out at  
his feet.

*Soc.* I will illustrate my meaning, Theodorus, by the jest which the clever witty Thracian handmaid is said to have made about Thales, when he fell into a well as he was looking up at the stars. She said, that he was so eager to know what was going on in heaven, that he could not see what was before his feet. This is a jest which is equally applicable to all philosophers. For the philosopher is wholly unacquainted with his next-door neighbour; he is ignorant, not only of what he is doing, but he hardly knows whether he is a man or an animal; he is searching into the essence of man, and busy in enquiring what belongs to such a nature to do or suffer different from any other;—I think that you understand me, Theodorus?

*Theod.* I do, and what you say is true.



*Soc.* And thus, my friend, on every occasion, private as well as public, as I said at first, when he appears in a law-court, or in any place in which he has to speak of things which are at his feet and before his eyes, he is the jest, not only of Thracian handmaids but of the general herd, tumbling into wells and every sort of disaster through his inexperience. His awkwardness is fearful, and gives the impression of imbecility. When he is reviled, he has nothing personal to say in answer to the civilities of his adversaries, for he knows no scandals of any one, and they do not interest him; and therefore he is laughed at for his sheepishness; and when others are being praised and glorified, in the simplicity of his heart he cannot help going into fits of laughter, so that he seems to be a downright idiot. When he hears a tyrant or king eulogized, he fancies that he is listening to the praises of some keeper of cattle—a swineherd, or shepherd, or perhaps a cowherd, who is congratulated on the quantity of milk which he squeezes from them; and he remarks that the creature whom they tend, and out of whom they squeeze the wealth, is of a less tractable and more insidious nature. Then, again, he observes that the great man is of necessity as ill-mannered and uneducated as any shepherd—for he has no leisure, and he is surrounded by a wall, which is his mountain-pen. Hearing of enormous landed proprietors of ten thousand acres or more, our philosopher deems this to be a trifle, because he has been accustomed to think of the whole earth; and when they sing the praises of family, and say that some one is a gentleman because he can show seven generations of wealthy ancestors, he thinks that their sentiments only betray a dull and narrow vision in those who utter them, and who are not educated enough to look at the whole, nor to consider that every man has had thousands and ten thousands of progenitors, and among them have been rich and poor, kings and slaves, Hellenes and barbarians, innumerable. And when people pride themselves on having a pedigree of twenty-five ancestors, which goes back to Heracles, the son of Amphitryon, he cannot understand their poverty of ideas. Why are they unable to calculate that Amphitryon had a twenty-fifth ancestor, who might have been anybody, and was such as fortune made him, and he

*Theætetetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEODORUS.

He is the laughing-stock of mankind whenever he appears in public.

His irony: his ideas of kings and tyrants,

of landed property, and of long pedigrees.

*Theætetus.*SOCRATES,  
THEODORUS.To the world  
he is a fool.

had a fiftieth, and so on? He amuses himself with the notion that they cannot count, and thinks that a little arithmetic would have got rid of their senseless vanity. Now, in all these cases our philosopher is derided by the vulgar, partly because he is thought to despise them, and also because he is ignorant of what is before him, and always at a loss.

*Theod.* That is very true, Socrates.He has his  
revenge upon  
the lawyer.

*Soc.* But, O my friend, when he draws the other into upper air, and gets him out of his pleas and rejoinders into the contemplation of justice and injustice in their own nature and in their difference from one another and from all other things; or from the commonplaces about the happiness of a king or of a rich man to the consideration of government, and of human happiness and misery in general — what they are, and how a man is to attain the one and avoid the other — when that narrow, keen, little legal mind is called to account about all this, he gives the philosopher his revenge; for dizzied by the height at which he is hanging, whence he looks down into space, which is a strange experience to him, he being dismayed, and lost, and stammering broken words, is laughed at, not by Thracian handmaidens or any other uneducated persons, for they have no eye for the situation, but by every man who has not been brought up a slave. Such are the two characters, Theodorus: the one of the freeman, who has been trained in liberty and leisure, whom you call the philosopher,—him we cannot blame because he appears simple and of no account when he has to perform some menial task, such as packing up bed-clothes, or flavouring a sauce or fawning speech; the other character is that of the man who is able to do all this kind of service smartly and neatly, but knows not how to wear his cloak like a gentleman; still less with the music of discourse can he hymn the true life aright which is lived by immortals or men blessed of heaven. 176

*Theod.* If you could only persuade everybody, Socrates, as you do me, of the truth of your words, there would be more peace and fewer evils among men.

Evil a neces-  
sary part of

*Soc.* Evils, Theodorus, can never pass away; for there must always remain something which is antagonistic to good.

Having no place among the gods in heaven, of necessity they hover around the mortal nature, and this earthly sphere. Wherefore we ought to fly away from earth to heaven as quickly as we can; and to fly away is to become like God, as far as this is possible; and to become like him, is to become holy, just, and wise. But, O my friend, you cannot easily convince mankind that they should pursue virtue or avoid vice, not merely in order that a man may seem to be good, which is the reason given by the world, and in my judgment is only a repetition of an old wives' fable. Whereas, the truth is that God is never in any way unrighteous—he is perfect righteousness; and he of us who is the most righteous is most like him. Herein is seen the true cleverness of a man, and also his nothingness and want of manhood. For to know this is true wisdom and virtue, and ignorance of this is manifest folly and vice. All other kinds of wisdom or cleverness, which seem only, such as the wisdom of politicians, or the wisdom of the arts, are coarse and vulgar. The unrighteous man, or the sayer and doer of unholy things, had far better not be encouraged in the illusion that his roguery is clever; for men glory in their shame—they fancy that they hear others saying of them, 'These are not mere good-for-nothing persons, mere burdens of the earth, but such as men should be who mean to dwell safely in a state.' Let us tell them that they are all the more truly what they do not think they are because they do not know it; for they do not know the penalty of injustice, which above all things they ought to know—not stripes and death, as they suppose, which evil-doers often escape, but a penalty which cannot be escaped.

*Theod.* What is that?

*Soc.* There are two patterns eternally set before them; the one blessed and divine, the other godless and wretched: but they do not see them, or perceive that in their utter folly and infatuation they are growing like the one and unlike the other, by reason of their evil deeds; and the penalty is, that they lead a life answering to the pattern which they are growing like. And if we tell them, that unless they depart from their cunning, the place of innocence will not receive them after death; and that here on earth, they will live ever

*Theætetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEODORUS.

human nature.  
from which  
men can only  
fly away  
when they  
become like  
God.

The wicked  
will only  
laugh at  
the truth.

*Theætetus.*SOCRATES,  
THEODORUS.

in the likeness of their own evil selves, and with evil friends — when they hear this they in their superior cunning will seem to be listening to the talk of idiots.

*Theod.* Very true, Socrates.

A strange thing: when they consent to reason about philosophy, they are as helpless as children.

*Soc.* Too true, my friend, as I well know; there is, however, one peculiarity in their case: when they begin to reason in private about their dislike of philosophy, if they have the courage to hear the argument out, and do not run away, they grow at last strangely discontented with themselves; their rhetoric fades away, and they become helpless as children. These however are digressions from which we must now desist, or they will overflow, and drown the original argument; to which, if you please, we will now return.

End of digression.

*Theod.* For my part, Socrates, I would rather have the digressions, for at my age I find them easier to follow; but if you wish, let us go back to the argument.

The partisans of the flux were saying that the ordinances of a state were always just, but they did not venture to affirm that they were always good.

*Soc.* Had we not reached the point at which the partisans of the perpetual flux, who say that things are as they seem to each one, were confidently maintaining that the ordinances which the state commanded and thought just, were just to the state which imposed them, while they were in force; this was especially asserted of justice; but as to the good, no one had any longer the hardihood to contend of any ordinances which the state thought and enacted to be good that these, while they were in force, were really good; — he who said so would be playing with the name 'good,' and would not touch the real question — it would be a mockery, would it not?

*Theod.* Certainly it would.

*Soc.* He ought not to speak of the name, but of the thing which is contemplated under the name.

*Theod.* Right.

*Soc.* Whatever be the term used, the good or expedient is the aim of legislation, and as far as she has an opinion, the state imposes all laws with a view to the greatest expediency; can legislation have any other aim?

*Theod.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* But is the aim attained always? do not mistakes often happen?

*Theod.* Yes, I think that there are mistakes.

*Soc.* The possibility of error will be more distinctly recog-



nized, if we put the question in reference to the whole class under which the good or expedient falls. That whole class has to do with the future, and laws are passed under the idea that they will be useful in after-time ; which, in other words, is the future.

*Theod.* Very true.

*Soc.* Suppose now, that we ask Protagoras, or one of his disciples, a question:—O, Protagoras, we will say to him, Man is, as you declare, the measure of all things—white, heavy, light: of all such things he is the judge; for he has the criterion of them in himself, and when he thinks that things are such as he experiences them to be, he thinks what is and is true to himself. Is it not so?

*Theod.* Yes.

*Soc.* And do you extend your doctrine, Protagoras (as we shall further say), to the future as well as to the present; and has he the criterion not only of what in his opinion is but of what will be, and do things always happen to him as he expected? For example, take the case of heat:—When an ordinary man thinks that he is going to have a fever, and that this kind of heat is coming on, and another person, who is a physician, thinks the contrary, whose opinion is likely to prove right? Or are they both right?—he will have a heat and fever in his own judgment, and not have a fever in the physician's judgment?

*Theod.* How ludicrous!

*Soc.* And the vinegrower, if I am not mistaken, is a better judge of the sweetness or dryness of the vintage which is not yet gathered than the harp-player?

*Theod.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And in musical composition the musician will know better than the training master what the training master himself will hereafter think harmonious or the reverse?

*Theod.* Of course.

*Soc.* And the cook will be a better judge than the guest, who is not a cook, of the pleasure to be derived from the dinner which is in preparation; for of present or past pleasure we are not as yet arguing; but can we say that every one will be to himself the best judge of the pleasure which will seem to be and will be to him in the future?—nay,

*Theætetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEODORUS.

Is every man  
equally a  
judge of the  
expedient, or,  
to speak gen-  
erally, of the  
future?

Certainly not  
in the case  
of medicine;

nor of vine-  
growing;

nor of  
cookery:

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEODORUS.

nor of  
rhetoric,  
legislation,  
&c.

Protagoras  
himself was  
wiser than  
the ordinary  
man about  
the future,  
and was well  
paid for it.

would not you, Protagoras, better guess which arguments in a court would convince any one of us than the ordinary man?

*Theod.* Certainly, Socrates, he used to profess in the strongest manner that he was the superior of all men in this respect.

*Soc.* To be sure, friend: who would have paid a large sum 179 for the privilege of talking to him, if he had really <sup>1</sup> persuaded his visitors that neither a prophet nor any other man was better able to judge what will be and seem to be in the future than every one could for himself?

*Theod.* Who indeed?

*Soc.* And legislation and expediency are all concerned with the future; and every one will admit that states, in passing laws, must often fail of their highest interests?

*Theod.* Quite true.

*Soc.* Then we may fairly argue against your master, that he must admit one man to be wiser than another, and that the wiser is a measure: but I, who know nothing, am not at all obliged to accept the honour which the advocate of Protagoras was just now forcing upon me, whether I would or not, of being a measure of anything.

*Theod.* That is the best refutation of him, Socrates; although he is also caught when he ascribes truth to the opinions of others, who give the lie direct to his own opinion.

*Soc.* There are many ways, Theodorus, in which the doctrine that every opinion of every man is true may be refuted; but there is more difficulty in proving that states of feeling, which are present to a man, and out of which arise sensations and opinions in accordance with them, are also untrue. And very likely I have been talking nonsense about them; for they may be unassailable, and those who say that there is clear evidence of them, and that they are matters of knowledge, may probably be right; in which case our friend Theaetetus was not so far from the mark when he identified perception and knowledge. And therefore let us draw nearer, as the advocate of Protagoras desires, and give the truth of the universal flux a ring: is the theory sound or not? at any rate, no small war is raging about it, and there are combatants not a few.

<sup>1</sup> Reading  $\delta\eta$ .

The refutation  
is complete.

*Theod.* No small war, indeed, for in Ionia the sect makes rapid strides; the disciples of Heracleitus are most energetic upholders of the doctrine.

*Soc.* Then we are the more bound, my dear Theodorus, to examine the question from the foundation as it is set forth by themselves.

*Theod.* Certainly we are. About these speculations of Heracleitus, which, as you say, are as old as Homer, or even older still, the Ephesians themselves, who profess to know them, are downright mad, and you cannot talk with them on the subject. For, in accordance with their text-books, they are always in motion; but as for dwelling upon an argument or a question, and quietly asking and answering in turn, they can no more do so than they can fly; or rather, the determination of these fellows not to have a particle of rest in them is more than the utmost powers of negation can express. If you ask any of them a question, he will produce, as from a quiver, sayings brief and dark, and shoot them at you; and if you enquire the reason of what he has said, you will be hit by some other new-fangled word, and will make no way with any of them, nor they with one another; their great care is, not to allow of any settled principle either in their arguments or in their minds, conceiving, as I imagine, that any such principle would be stationary; for they are at war with the stationary, and do what they can to drive it out everywhere.

*Soc.* I suppose, Theodorus, that you have only seen them when they were fighting, and have never stayed with them in time of peace, for they are no friends of yours; and their peace doctrines are only communicated by them at leisure, as I imagine, to those disciples of theirs whom they want to make like themselves.

*Theod.* Disciples! my good sir, they have none; men of their sort are not one another's disciples, but they grow up at their own sweet will, and get their inspiration anywhere, each of them saying of his neighbour that he knows nothing. From these men, then, as I was going to remark, you will never get a reason, whether with their will or without their will; we must take the question out of their hands, and make the analysis ourselves, as if we were doing a geometrical problem.

*Theactetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEODORUS.

The friends of Heracleitus wage a violent controversy about the universal flux. But we must take the argument out of the hands of these lunatics and fanatics, if we would test it.

*Theaetetus.*SOCRATES,  
THEODORUS.

The ancients  
held similar  
views, which  
they veiled  
in poetical  
figures.

Then came  
the opposite  
doctrine of  
Parmenides  
and Melissus.

*Soc.* Quite right too; but as touching the aforesaid problem, have we not heard from the ancients, who concealed their wisdom from the many in poetical figures, that Oceanus and Tethys, the origin of all things, are streams, and that nothing is at rest? And now the moderns, in their superior wisdom, have declared the same openly, that the cobbler too may hear and learn of them, and no longer foolishly imagine that some things are at rest and others in motion—having learned that all is motion, he will duly honour his teachers. I had almost forgotten the opposite doctrine, Theodorus,

'Alone Being remains unmoved, which is the name for the all.'

This is the language of Parmenides, Melissus, and their followers, who stoutly maintain that all being is one and self-contained, and has no place in which to move. What shall we do, friend, with all these people; for, advancing step by step, we have imperceptibly got between the combatants, and, unless we can protect our retreat, we shall pay the 181 penalty of our rashness—like the players in the palaestra who are caught upon the line, and are dragged different ways by the two parties. Therefore I think that we had better begin by considering those whom we first accosted, 'the river-gods,' and, if we find any truth in them, we will help them to pull us over, and try to get away from the others. But if the partisans of 'the whole' appear to speak more truly, we will fly off from the party which would move the immovable, to them. And if we find that neither of them have anything reasonable to say, we shall be in a ridiculous position, having so great a conceit of our own poor opinion and rejecting that of ancient and famous men. O Theodorus, do you think that there is any use in proceeding when the danger is so great?

*Theod.* Nay, Socrates, not to examine thoroughly what the two parties have to say would be quite intolerable.

*Soc.* Then examine we must, since you, who were so reluctant to begin, are so eager to proceed. The nature of motion appears to be the question with which we begin. What do they mean when they say that all things are in motion? Is there only one kind of motion, or, as I rather

Which side  
shall we  
take—motion  
or rest?



incline to think, two? I should like to have your opinion upon this point in addition to my own, that I may err, if I must err, in your company; tell me, then, when a thing changes from one place to another, or goes round in the same place, is not that what is called motion?

*Theætetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEODORUS.

*Theod.* Yes.

*Soc.* Here then we have one kind of motion. But when a thing, remaining on the same spot, grows old, or becomes black from being white, or hard from being soft, or undergoes any other change, may not this be properly called motion of another kind?

The advocates of motion must of necessity maintain that all things partake of all kinds of motion.

*Theod.* I think so.

*Soc.* Say rather that it must be so. Of motion then there are these two kinds, 'change,' and 'motion in place<sup>1</sup>.'

*Theod.* You are right.

*Soc.* And now, having made this distinction, let us address ourselves to those who say that all is motion, and ask them whether all things according to them have the two kinds of motion, and are changed as well as move in place, or is one thing moved in both ways, and another in one only?

*Theod.* Indeed, I do not know what to answer; but I think they would say that all things are moved in both ways.

*Soc.* Yes, comrade; for, if not, they would have to say that the same things are in motion and at rest, and there would be no more truth in saying that all things are in motion, than that all things are at rest.

*Theod.* To be sure.

*Soc.* And if they are to be in motion, and nothing is to be devoid of motion, all things must always have every sort of motion?

*Theod.* Most true.

*Soc.* Consider a further point: did we not understand them to explain the generation of heat, whiteness, or anything else, in some such manner as the following:—were they not saying that each of them is moving between the agent and the patient, together with a perception, and that the patient ceases to be a perceiving power and becomes a

Recapitulation of the Heraclitean theory of sensation and qualities.

<sup>1</sup> Reading *φορὰν*: Lib. *περιφορὰν*.

*Theaetetus.*SOCRATES,  
THEODORUS.

percipient, and the agent a quale instead of a quality? I suspect that quality may appear a strange and uncouth term to you, and that you do not understand the abstract expression. Then I will take concrete instances: I mean to say that the producing power or agent becomes neither heat nor whiteness, but hot and white, and the like of other things. For I must repeat what I said before, that neither the agent nor patient have any absolute existence, but when they come together and generate sensations and their objects, the one becomes a thing of a certain quality, and the other a percipient. You remember?

*Theod.* Of course.

*Soc.* We may leave the details of their theory unexamined, but we must not forget to ask them the only question with which we are concerned: Are all things in motion and flux?

*Theod.* Yes, they will reply.

*Soc.* And they are moved in both those ways which we distinguished; that is to say, they move in place and are also changed?

*Theod.* Of course, if the motion is to be perfect.

*Soc.* If they only moved in place and were not changed, we should be able to say what is the nature of the things which are in motion and flux?

*Theod.* Exactly.

*Soc.* But now, since not even white continues to flow white, and whiteness itself is a flux or change which is passing into another colour, and is never to be caught standing still, can the name of any colour be rightly used at all?

*Theod.* How is that possible, Socrates, either in the case of this or of any other quality — if while we are using the word the object is escaping in the flux?

*Soc.* And what would you say of perceptions, such as sight and hearing, or any other kind of perception? Is there any stopping in the act of seeing and hearing?

*Theod.* Certainly not, if all things are in motion.

*Soc.* Then we must not speak of seeing any more than of not-seeing, nor of any other perception more than of any non-perception, if all things partake of every kind of motion?

Since each quality not only moves in place, but changes at the same time, one name cannot be more appropriate to it than another.

So too with sensations: seeing might just as well be called not-

*Theod.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Yet perception is knowledge: so at least Theaetetus and I were saying.

*Theod.* Very true.

*Soc.* Then when we were asked what is knowledge, we no more answered what is knowledge than what is not knowledge?

*Theod.* I suppose not.

183 *Soc.* Here, then, is a fine result: we corrected our first answer in our eagerness to prove that nothing is at rest. But if nothing is at rest, every answer upon whatever subject is equally right: you may say that a thing is or is not thus; or, if you prefer, 'becomes' thus; and if we say 'becomes,' we shall not then hamper them with words expressive of rest.

*Theod.* Quite true.

*Soc.* Yes, Theodorus, except in saying 'thus' and 'not thus.' But you ought not to use the word 'thus,' for there is no motion in 'thus' or in 'not thus.' The maintainers of the doctrine have as yet no words in which to express themselves, and must get a new language. I know of no word that will suit them, except perhaps 'no how,' which is perfectly indefinite.

*Theod.* Yes, that is a manner of speaking in which they will be quite at home.

*Soc.* And so, Theodorus, we have got rid of your friend without assenting to his doctrine, that every man is the measure of all things—a wise man only is a measure; neither can we allow that knowledge is perception, certainly not on the hypothesis of a perpetual flux, unless perchance our friend Theaetetus is able to convince us that it is.

*Theod.* Very good, Socrates; and now that the argument about the doctrine of Protagoras has been completed, I am absolved from answering; for this was the agreement.

*Theact.* Not, Theodorus, until you and Socrates have discussed the doctrine of those who say that all things are at rest, as you were proposing.

*Theod.* You, Theaetetus, who are a young rogue, must not instigate your elders to a breach of faith, but should prepare to answer Socrates in the remainder of the argument.

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEODORUS,  
THEAETETUS.

seeing; and,  
to come to  
our definition,  
knowledge is  
no more percep-  
tion than  
non-percep-  
tion.

The theory is  
refuted so far  
as it is based  
on a per-  
petual flux.

Theaetetus  
wishes to  
hear a discus-  
sion of the  
opposite doc-  
trine of rest.

*Theaetetus.*

*Theaet.* Yes, if he wishes; but I would rather have heard about the doctrine of rest.

SOCRATES,  
THEODORUS,  
THEAETETUS.

*Theod.* Invite Socrates to an argument — invite horsemen to the open plain; do but ask him, and he will answer.

*Soc.* Nevertheless, Theodorus, I am afraid that I shall not be able to comply with the request of Theaetetus.

*Theod.* Not comply! for what reason?

Socrates is afraid of entering on the question. He has so great an awe of Parmenides, and he has not yet 'delivered' Theaetetus of his conception of knowledge.

*Soc.* My reason is that I have a kind of reverence; not so much for Melissus and the others, who say that 'All is one and at rest,' as for the great leader himself, Parmenides, venerable and awful, as in Homeric language he may be called;—him I should be ashamed to approach in a spirit unworthy of him. I met him when he was an old man, and I was a mere youth, and he appeared to me to have a glorious depth of mind. And I am afraid that we may not understand his words, and may be still further from understanding his meaning; above all I fear that the nature of knowledge, which is the main subject of our discussion, may be thrust out of sight by the unbidden guests who will come pouring in upon our feast of discourse, if we let them in—besides, the question which is now stirring is of immense extent, and will be treated unfairly if only considered by the way; or if treated adequately and at length, will put into the shade the other question of knowledge. Neither the one nor the other can be allowed; but I must try by my art of midwifery to deliver Theaetetus of his conceptions about knowledge.

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*Theaet.* Very well; do so if you will.

*Soc.* Then now, Theaetetus, take another view of the subject: you answered that knowledge is perception?

*Theaet.* I did.

Another point of view.

*Soc.* And if any one were to ask you: With what does a man see black and white colours? and with what does he hear high and low sounds?—you would say, if I am not mistaken, 'With the eyes and with the ears.'

*Theaet.* I should.

*Soc.* The free use of words and phrases, rather than minute precision, is generally characteristic of a liberal education, and the opposite is pedantic; but sometimes precision is necessary, and I believe that the answer which



you have just given is open to the charge of incorrectness; for which is more correct, to say that we see or hear with the eyes and with the ears, or through the eyes and through the ears?

*Theæt.* I should say 'through,' Socrates, rather than 'with.'

*Soc.* Yes, my boy, for no one can suppose that in each of us, as in a sort of Trojan horse, there are perched a number of unconnected senses, which do not all meet in some one nature, the mind, or whatever we please to call it, of which they are the instruments, and with which through them we perceive objects of sense.

*Theæt.* I agree with you in that opinion.

*Soc.* The reason why I am thus precise is, because I want to know whether, when we perceive black and white through the eyes, and again, other qualities through other organs, we do not perceive them with one and the same part of ourselves, and, if you were asked, you might refer all such perceptions to the body. Perhaps, however, I had better allow you to answer for yourself and not interfere. Tell me, then, are not the organs through which you perceive warm and hard and light and sweet, organs of the body?

*Theæt.* Of the body, certainly.

185 *Soc.* And you would admit that what you perceive through one faculty you cannot perceive through another; the objects of hearing, for example, cannot be perceived through sight, or the objects of sight through hearing?

*Theæt.* Of course not.

*Soc.* If you have any thought about both of them, this common perception cannot come to you, either through the one or the other organ?

*Theæt.* It cannot.

*Soc.* How about sounds and colours: in the first place you would admit that they both exist?

*Theæt.* Yes.

*Soc.* And that either of them is different from the other, and the same with itself?

*Theæt.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And that both are two and each of them one?

*Theæt.* Yes.

*Theætetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEÆTETUS.

We perceive sensible things not through, but with the mind, and not with, but through the senses.

The senses differ from each other, and have no objects in common.

*Theaetetus.*SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

*Soc.* You can further observe whether they are like of unlike one another?

*Theaet.* I dare say.

*Soc.* But\* through what do you perceive all this about them? for neither through hearing nor yet through seeing can you apprehend that which they have in common. Let me give you an illustration of the point at issue:—If there were any meaning in asking whether sounds and colours are saline or not, you would be able to tell me what faculty would consider the question. It would not be sight or hearing, but some other.

*Theaet.* Certainly; the faculty of taste.

*Soc.* Very good; and now tell me what is the power which discerns, not only in sensible objects, but in all things, universal notions, such as those which are called being and not-being, and those others about which we were just asking—what organs will you assign for the perception of these notions?

General  
ideas are  
perceived  
by the mind  
alone without  
the help of  
the senses.

*Theaet.* You are thinking of being and not-being, likeness and unlikeness, sameness and difference, and also of unity and other numbers which are applied to objects of sense; and you mean to ask, through what bodily organ the soul perceives odd and even numbers and other arithmetical conceptions.

*Soc.* You follow me excellently, Theaetetus; that is precisely what I am asking.

*Theaet.* Indeed, Socrates, I cannot answer; my only notion is, that these, unlike objects of sense, have no separate organ, but that the mind, by a power of her own, contemplates the universals in all things.

*Soc.* You are a beauty, Theaetetus, and not ugly, as Theodorus was saying; for he who utters the beautiful is himself beautiful and good. And besides being beautiful, you have done me a kindness in releasing me from a very long discussion, if you are clear that the soul views some things by herself and others through the bodily organs. For that was my own opinion, and I wanted you to agree with me.

*Theaet.* I am quite clear.

*Soc.* And to which class would you refer being or essence; 186 for this, of all our notions, is the most universal?

*Theæt.* I should say, to that class which the soul aspires to know of herself.

*Theætetus.*

*Soc.* And would you say this also of like and unlike, same and other?

SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

*Theæt.* Yes.

*Soc.* And would you say the same of the noble and base, and of good and evil?

*Theæt.* These I conceive to be notions which are essentially relative, and which the soul also perceives by comparing in herself things past and present with the future.

*Soc.* And does she not perceive the hardness of that which is hard by the touch, and the softness of that which is soft equally by the touch?

The senses perceive objects of sense, but the mind alone can compare them.

*Theæt.* Yes.

*Soc.* But their essence and what they are, and their opposition to one another, and the essential nature of this opposition, the soul herself endeavours to decide for us by the review and comparison of them?

• *Theæt.* Certainly.

*Soc.* The simple sensations which reach the soul through the body are given at birth to men and animals by nature, but their reflections on the being and use of them are slowly and hardly gained, if they are ever gained, by education and long experience.

Sensations are given at birth, but truth and being, which are essential to knowledge, are acquired by reflection later on.

*Theæt.* Assuredly.

*Soc.* And can a man attain truth who fails of attaining being?

*Theæt.* Impossible.

*Soc.* And can he who misses the truth of anything, have a knowledge of that thing?

*Theæt.* He cannot.

*Soc.* Then knowledge does not consist in impressions of sense, but in reasoning about them; in that only, and not in the mere impression, truth and being can be attained?

*Theæt.* Clearly.

*Soc.* And would you call the two processes by the same name, when there is so great a difference between them?

*Theæt.* That would certainly not be right.

*Soc.* And what name would you give to seeing, hearing, smelling, being cold and being hot?

*Theaetetus.*SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.*Theaet.* I should call all of them perceiving — what other name could be given to them?*Soc.* Perception would be the collective name of them?*Theaet.* Certainly.*Soc.* Which, as we say, has no part in the attainment of truth any more than of being?*Theaet.* Certainly not.*Soc.* And therefore not in science or knowledge?*Theaet.* No.*Soc.* Then perception, Theaetetus, can never be the same as knowledge or science?*Theaet.* Clearly not, Socrates; and knowledge has now been most distinctly proved to be different from perception.We have  
found out  
then what  
knowledge  
is not. But  
what is it?*Soc.* But the original aim of our discussion was to find out 187  
rather what knowledge is than what it is not; at the same time we have made some progress, for we no longer seek for knowledge in perception at all, but in that other process, however called, in which the mind is alone and engaged with being.*Theaet.* You mean, Socrates, if I am not mistaken, what is called thinking or opining.*Soc.* You conceive truly. And now, my friend, please to begin again at this point; and having wiped out of your memory all that has preceded, see if you have arrived at any clearer view, and once more say what is knowledge.Theaetetus  
boldly an-  
swers, 'True  
opinion.'*Theaet.* I cannot say, Socrates, that all opinion is knowledge, because there may be a false opinion; but I will venture to assert, that knowledge is true opinion: let this then be my reply; and if this is hereafter disproved, I must try to find another.*Soc.* That is the way in which you ought to answer, Theaetetus, and not in your former hesitating strain, for if we are bold we shall gain one of two advantages; either we shall find what we seek, or we shall be less likely to think that we know what we do not know — in either case we shall be richly rewarded. And now, what are you saying?—Are there two sorts of opinion, one true and the other false; and do you define knowledge to be the true?*Theaet.* Yes, according to my present view.



*Soc.* Is it still worth our while to resume the discussion touching opinion? *Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

*Theaet.* To what are you alluding?

*Soc.* There is a point which often troubles me, and is a great perplexity to me, both in regard to myself and others. I cannot make out the nature or origin of the mental experience to which I refer.

*Theaet.* Pray what is it?

*Soc.* How there can be false opinion — that difficulty still troubles the eye of my mind; and I am uncertain whether I shall leave the question, or begin over again in a new way. But false opinion is impossible, (1) in the sphere of knowledge:

*Theaet.* Begin again, Socrates,— at least if you think that there is the slightest necessity for doing so. Were not you and Theodorus just now remarking very truly, that in discussions of this kind we may take our own time?

*Soc.* You are quite right, and perhaps there will be no harm in retracing our steps and beginning again. Better a little which is well done, than a great deal imperfectly.

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Well, and what is the difficulty? Do we not speak of false opinion, and say that one man holds a false and another a true opinion, as though there were some natural distinction between them?

*Theaet.* We certainly say so.

*Soc.* All things and everything are either known or not known. I leave out of view the intermediate conceptions of learning and forgetting, because they have nothing to do with our present question. for all things are either known or not known;

*Theaet.* There can be no doubt, Socrates, if you exclude these, that there is no other alternative but knowing or not knowing a thing.

*Soc.* That point being now determined, must we not say that he who has an opinion, must have an opinion about something which he knows or does not know?

*Theaet.* He must.

*Soc.* He who knows, cannot but know; and he who does not know, cannot know?

*Theaet.* Of course.

*Soc.* What shall we say then? When a man has a false

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

and a man  
cannot think  
one thing,  
which he  
knows or does  
not know, to  
be another  
thing which  
he knows or  
does not  
know; nor  
what he does  
not know to  
be what he  
knows, or  
*vice versa* :

opinion does he think that which he knows to be some other thing which he knows, and knowing both, is he at the same time ignorant of both?

*Theaet.* That, Socrates, is impossible.

*Soc.* But perhaps he thinks of something which he does not know as some other thing which he does not know; for example, he knows neither Theaetetus nor Socrates, and yet he fancies that Theaetetus is Socrates, or Socrates Theaetetus?

*Theaet.* How can he?

*Soc.* But surely he cannot suppose what he knows to be what he does not know, or what he does not know to be what he knows?

*Theaet.* That would be monstrous.

*Soc.* Where, then, is false opinion? For if all things are either known or unknown, there can be no opinion which is not comprehended under this alternative, and so false opinion is excluded.

*Theaet.* Most true.

and (2) in  
the sphere  
of being :

*Soc.* Suppose that we remove the question out of the sphere of knowing or not knowing, into that of being and not-being.

*Theaet.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* May we not suspect the simple truth to be that he who thinks about anything, that which is not, will necessarily think what is false, whatever in other respects may be the state of his mind?

*Theaet.* That, again, is not unlikely, Socrates.

*Soc.* Then suppose some one to say to us, Theaetetus:— Is it possible for any man to think that which is not, either as a self-existent substance or as a predicate of something else? And suppose that we answer, 'Yes, he can, when he thinks what is not true.'— That will be our answer?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* But is there any parallel to this?

*Theaet.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* Can a man see something and yet see nothing?

*Theaet.* Impossible.

for it is im-  
possible when  
seeing or  
hearing not  
to see or hear  
some exist-  
ing thing.

*Soc.* But if he sees any one thing, he sees something that exists. Do you suppose that what is one is ever to be found among non-existing things?

*Theaet.* I do not.

*Theaetetus.*

*Soc.* He then who sees some one thing, sees something which is?

SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

*Theaet.* Clearly.

189 *Soc.* And he who hears anything, hears some one thing, and hears that which is?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* And he who touches anything, touches something which is one and therefore is?

*Theaet.* That again is true.

*Soc.* And does not he who thinks, think some one thing?

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And does not he who thinks some one thing, think something which is?

*Theaet.* I agree.

*Soc.* Then he who thinks of that which is not, thinks of nothing?

To think  
what is not  
is not to  
think.

*Theaet.* Clearly.

*Soc.* And he who thinks of nothing, does not think at all?

*Theaet.* Obviously.

*Soc.* Then no one can think that which is not, either as a self-existent substance or as a predicate of something else?

*Theaet.* Clearly not.

*Soc.* Then to think falsely is different from thinking that which is not?

*Theaet.* It would seem so.

*Soc.* Then false opinion has no existence in us, either in the sphere of being or of knowledge?

False opinion  
must be  
sought  
elsewhere.

*Theaet.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* But may not the following be the description of what we express by this name?

*Theaet.* What?

*Soc.* May we not suppose that false opinion or thought is a sort of heterodoxy; a person may make an exchange in his mind, and say that one real object is another real object. For thus he always thinks that which is, but he puts one thing in place of another, and missing the aim of his thoughts, he may be truly said to have false opinion.

One real ob-  
ject may be  
thought to be  
some other  
real object.—  
This Theae-  
tetus emphat-  
ically affirms  
to be truly  
false.

*Theaet.* Now you appear to me to have spoken the exact

*Theaetetus.*SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

truth: when a man puts the base in the place of the noble, or the noble in the place of the base, then he has truly false opinion.

*Soc.* I see, Theaetetus, that your fear has disappeared, and that you are beginning to despise me.

*Theaet.* What makes you say so?

Socrates allows this contradiction to pass, and proceeds to ask whether a man ever believed one of two things which he had in his mind to be the other.

*Soc.* You think, if I am not mistaken, that your 'truly false' is safe from censure, and that I shall never ask whether there can be a swift which is slow, or a heavy which is light, or any other self-contradictory thing, which works, not according to its own nature, but according to that of its opposite. But I will not insist upon this, for I do not wish needlessly to discourage you. And so you are satisfied that false opinion is heterodoxy, or the thought of something else?

*Theaet.* I am.

*Soc.* It is possible then upon your view for the mind to conceive of one thing as another?

*Theaet.* True.

*Soc.* But must not the mind, or thinking power, which misplaces them, have a conception either of both objects or of one of them?

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Either together or in succession?

*Theaet.* Very good.

*Soc.* And do you mean by conceiving, the same which I mean?

*Theaet.* What is that?

*Soc.* I mean the conversation which the soul holds with herself in considering of anything. I speak of what I scarcely understand; but the soul when thinking appears 190 to me to be just talking—asking questions of herself and answering them, affirming and denying. And when she has arrived at a decision, either gradually or by a sudden impulse, and has at last agreed, and does not doubt, this is called her opinion. I say, then, that to form an opinion is to speak, and opinion is a word spoken,—I mean, to oneself and in silence, not aloud or to another: What think you?

*Theaet.* I agree.



*Soc.* Then when any one thinks of one thing as another, he is saying to himself that one thing is another?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* But do you ever remember saying to yourself that the noble is certainly base, or the unjust just; or, best of all — have you ever attempted to convince yourself that one thing is another? Nay, not even in sleep, did you ever venture to say to yourself that odd is even, or anything of the kind?

*Theaet.* Never.

*Soc.* And do you suppose that any other man, either in his senses or out of them, ever seriously tried to persuade himself that an ox is a horse, or that two are one?

*Theaet.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* But if thinking is talking to oneself, no one speaking and thinking of two objects, and apprehending them both in his soul, will say and think that the one is the other of them, and I must add, that even you, lover of dispute as you are, had better let the word 'other' alone [i. e. not insist that 'one' and 'other' are the same<sup>1</sup>]. I mean to say, that no one thinks the noble to be 'base, or anything of the kind.

*Theaet.* I will give up the word 'other,' Socrates; and I agree to what you say.

*Soc.* If a man has both of them in his thoughts, he cannot think that the one of them is the other?

*Theaet.* True.

*Soc.* Neither, if he has one of them only in his mind and not the other, can he think that one is the other?

*Theaet.* True; for we should have to suppose that he apprehends that which is not in his thoughts at all.

*Soc.* Then no one who has either both or only one of the two objects in his mind can think that the one is the other. And therefore, he who maintains that false opinion is heterodoxy is talking nonsense; for neither in this, any more than in the previous way, can false opinion exist in us.

*Theaet.* No.

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

But how can one thing be thought to be another?

e. g. no one ever says to himself that the noble is the base, or that odd is even.

It is admitted on all hands that no one can confuse two things, either when he has both in his mind, or when he has only one.

<sup>1</sup> Both words in Greek are called *ἑτερον*: cp. Parm. 147 C; Euthyd. 301 A.

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

*Soc.* But if, Theaetetus, this is not admitted, we shall be driven into many absurdities.

*Theact.* What are they?

We are in  
great straits.

*Soc.* I will not tell you until I have endeavoured to consider the matter from every point of view. For I should be 191  
ashamed of us if we were driven in our perplexity to admit the absurd consequences of which I speak. But if we find the solution, and get away from them, we may regard them only as the difficulties of others, and the ridicule will not attach to us. On the other hand, if we utterly fail, I suppose that we must be humble, and allow the argument to trample us under foot, as the sea-sick passenger is trampled upon by the sailor, and to do anything to us. Listen, then, while I tell you how I hope to find a way out of our difficulty.

A way out of  
the difficulty :  
Theaetetus  
may know  
Socrates, and  
yet mistake  
another whom  
he sees, but  
does not  
know, for  
him.

*Theact.* Let me hear.

*Soc.* I think that we were wrong in denying that a man could think what he knew to be what he did not know; and that there is a way in which such a deception is possible.

*Theact.* You mean to say, as I suspected at the time, that I may know Socrates, and at a distance see some one who is unknown to me, and whom I mistake for him — then the deception will occur?

*Soc.* But has not that position been relinquished by us, because involving the absurdity that we should know and not know the things which we know?

*Theact.* True.

*Soc.* Let us make the assertion in another form, which may or may not have a favourable issue; but as we are in a great strait, every argument should be turned over and tested. Tell me, then, whether I am right in saying that you may learn a thing which at one time you did not know?

*Theact.* Certainly you may.

*Soc.* And another and another?

*Theact.* Yes.

*Soc.* I would have you imagine, then, that there exists in the mind of man a block of wax, which is of different sizes in different men; harder, moister, and having more or less of purity in one than another, and in some of an intermediate quality.

*Theact.* I see.

*Soc.* Let us say that this tablet is a gift of Memory, the mother of the Muses; and that when we wish to remember anything which we have seen, or heard, or thought in our own minds, we hold the wax to the perceptions and thoughts, and in that material receive the impression of them as from the seal of a ring; and that we remember and know what is imprinted as long as the image lasts; but when the image is effaced, or cannot be taken, then we forget and do not know.

*Theæt.* Very good.

*Soc.* Now, when a person has this knowledge, and is considering something which he sees or hears, may not false opinion arise in the following manner?

*Theæt.* In what manner?

*Soc.* When he thinks what he knows, sometimes to be what he knows, and sometimes to be what he does not know. We were wrong before in denying the possibility of this.

*Theæt.* And how would you amend the former statement?

192 *Soc.* I should begin by making a list of the impossible cases which must be excluded. (1) No one can think one thing to be another when he does not perceive either of them, but has the memorial or seal of both of them in his mind; nor can any mistaking of one thing for another occur, when he only knows one, and does not know, and has no impression of the other; nor can he think that one thing which he does not know is another thing which he does not know, or that what he does not know is what he knows; nor (2) that one thing which he perceives is another thing which he perceives, or that something which he perceives is something which he does not perceive; or that something which he does not perceive is something else which he does not perceive; or that something which he does not perceive is something which he perceives; nor again (3) can he think that something which he knows and perceives, and of which he has the impression coinciding with sense, is something else which he knows and perceives, and of which he has the impression coinciding with sense;—this last case, if possible, is still more inconceivable than the others; nor (4) can he think that something which he knows and perceives, and of which he has the memorial coinciding with sense, is something else which he knows; nor so long as these agree, can

*Theætetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEÆTETUS.

The image of  
the waxen  
tablet.

Confusion is impossible,  
(1) between two things not perceived by sense, when we know one or both or neither of them;  
(2) between two things when we have a sensible impression of one or both or neither of them;  
(3) still more impossible between two things, both of which are known and perceived, and of which the impression coincides, with sense;

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

(4) between two things of which both or one only or neither are known and perceived and have an impression corresponding to sense.

he think that a thing which he knows and perceives is another thing which he perceives; or that a thing which he does not know and does not perceive, is the same as another thing which he does not know and does not perceive;—nor again, can he suppose that a thing which he does not know and does not perceive is the same as another thing which he does not know; or that a thing which he does not know and does not perceive is another thing which he does not perceive:—All these utterly and absolutely exclude the possibility of false opinion. The only cases, if any, which remain, are the following.

*Theaet.* What are they? If you tell me, I may perhaps understand you better; but at present I am unable to follow you.

Confusion arises when for things already known and perceived we mistake other things, either known, or perceived and not known, or both known and perceived.

*Soc.* A person may think that some things which he knows, or which he perceives and does not know, are some other things which he knows and perceives; or that some things which he knows and perceives, are other things which he knows and perceives.

*Theaet.* I understand you less than ever now.

*Soc.* Hear me once more, then:—I, knowing Theodorus, and remembering in my own mind what sort of person he is, and also what sort of person Theaetetus is, at one time see them, and at another time do not see them, and sometimes I touch them, and at another time not, or at one time I may hear them or perceive them in some other way, and at another time not perceive them, but still I remember them, and know them in my own mind.

*Theaet.* Very true.

*Soc.* Then, first of all, I want you to understand that a man may or may not perceive sensibly that which he knows.

*Theaet.* True.

*Soc.* And that which he does not know will sometimes not be perceived by him and sometimes will be perceived and only perceived?

*Theaet.* That is also true.

Recapitulation.

*Soc.* See whether you can follow me better now: Socrates 193 can recognize Theodorus and Theaetetus, but he sees neither of them, nor does he perceive them in any other way; he



cannot then by any possibility imagine in his own mind that Theaetetus is Theodorus. Am I not right? *Theaetetus.*

*Theaet.* You are quite right.

SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

*Soc.* Then that was the first case of which I spoke.

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* The second case was, that I, knowing one of you and not knowing the other, and perceiving neither, can never think him whom I know to be him whom I do not know.

*Theaet.* True.

*Soc.* In the third case, not knowing and not perceiving either of you, I cannot think that one of you whom I do not know is the other whom I do not know. I need not again go over the catalogue of excluded cases, in which I cannot form a false opinion about you and Theodorus, either when I know both or when I am in ignorance of both, or when I know one and not the other. And the same of perceiving: do you understand me?

*Theaet.* I do.

*Soc.* The only possibility of erroneous opinion is, when knowing you and Theodorus, and having on the waxen block the impression of both of you given as by a seal, but seeing you imperfectly and at a distance, I try to assign the right impression of memory to the right visual impression, and to fit this into its own print: if I succeed, recognition will take place; but if I fail and transpose them, putting the foot into the wrong shoe — that is to say, putting the vision of either of you on to the wrong impression, or if my mind, like the sight in a mirror, which is transferred from right to left, err by reason of some similar affection, then 'heterodoxy' and false opinion ensues.

False opinion  
is the erroneous  
combination of  
sensation and  
thought.

*Theaet.* Yes, Socrates, you have described the nature of opinion with wonderful exactness.

*Soc.* Or again, when I know both of you, and perceive as well as know one of you, but not the other, and my knowledge of him does not accord with perception — that was the case put by me just now which you did not understand.

*Theaet.* No, I did not.

*Soc.* I meant to say, that when a person knows and perceives one of you, and his knowledge coincides with his perception, he will never think him to be some other person,

*Theaetetus.*SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

whom he knows and perceives, and the knowledge of whom coincides with his perception—for that also was a case supposed.

*Theaet.* True.

*Soc.* But there was an omission of the further case, in which, as we now say, false opinion may arise, when know- 194  
ing both, and seeing, or having some other sensible perception of both, I fail in holding the seal over against the corresponding sensation; like a bad archer, I miss and fall wide of the mark—and this is called falsehood.

*Theaet.* Yes; it is rightly so called.

*Soc.* When, therefore, perception is present to one of the seals or impressions but not to the other, and the mind fits the seal of the absent perception on the one which is present, in any case of this sort the mind is deceived; in a word, if our view is sound, there can be no error or deception about things which a man does not know and has never perceived, but only in things which are known and perceived; in these alone opinion turns and twists about, and becomes alternately true and false;—true when the seals and impressions of sense meet straight and opposite—false when they go awry and are crooked.

*Theaet.* And is not that, Socrates, nobly said?

*Soc.* Nobly! yes; but wait a little and hear the explanation, and then you will say so with more reason; for to think truly is noble and to be deceived is base.

*Theaet.* Undoubtedly.

The differences in the kinds and degrees of knowledge depend on the extent and the qualities of the wax.

*Soc.* And the origin of truth and error is as follows:—When the wax in the soul of any one is deep and abundant, and smooth and perfectly tempered, then the impressions which pass through the senses and sink into the heart of the soul, as Homer says in a parable, meaning to indicate the likeness of the soul to wax (*κῆρ κηρόεις*); these, I say, being pure and clear, and having a sufficient depth of wax, are also lasting, and minds, such as these, easily learn and easily retain, and are not liable to confusion, but have true thoughts, for they have plenty of room, and having clear impressions of things, as we term them, quickly distribute them into their proper places on the block. And such men are called wise. Do you agree?

*Theaet.* Entirely.

*Theaetetus.*

*Soc.* But when the heart of any one is shaggy — a quality which the all-wise poet commends, or muddy and of impure wax, or very soft, or very hard, then there is a corresponding defect in the mind — the soft are good at learning, but apt to forget; and the hard are the reverse; the shaggy and rugged and gritty, or those who have an admixture of earth or dung in their composition, have the impressions indistinct, as also the hard, for there is no depth in them; and the soft too are indistinct, for their impressions are easily confused and effaced. Yet greater is the indistinctness when they are all jostled together in a little soul, which has no room. These are the natures which have false opinion; for when they see or hear or think of anything, they are slow in assigning the right objects to the right impressions — in their stupidity they confuse them, and are apt to see and hear and think amiss — and such men are said to be deceived in their knowledge of objects, and ignorant.

*Theaet.* No man, Socrates, can say anything truer than that.

*Soc.* Then now we may admit the existence of false opinion in us?

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And of true opinion also?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* We have at length satisfactorily proven that beyond a doubt there are these two sorts of opinion?

*Theaet.* Undoubtedly.

*Soc.* Alas, Theaetetus, what a tiresome creature is a man who is fond of talking!

*Theaet.* What makes you say so?

*Soc.* Because I am disheartened at my own stupidity and tiresome garrulity; for what other term will describe the habit of a man who is always arguing on all sides of a question; whose dulness cannot be convinced, and who will never leave off?

*Theaet.* But what puts you out of heart?

*Soc.* I am not only out of heart, but in positive despair; for I do not know what to answer if any one were to ask me:—O Socrates, have you indeed discovered that false opinion arises neither in the comparison of perceptions with

SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

Our simile  
does not  
explain all  
the facts;  
for error  
may arise

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

not only in  
the combina-  
tion of thought  
and sense,  
but in pure  
thought.

one another nor yet in thought, but in the union of thought and perception? Yes, I shall say, with the complacency of one who thinks that he has made a noble discovery.

*Theaet.* I see no reason why we should be ashamed of our demonstration, Socrates.

*Soc.* He will say: You mean to argue that the man whom we only think of and do not see, cannot be confused with the horse which we do not see or touch, but only think of and do not perceive? That I believe to be my meaning, I shall reply.

*Theaet.* Quite right.

*Soc.* Well, then, he will say, according to that argument, the number eleven, which is only thought, can never be mistaken for twelve, which is only thought: How would you answer him?

*Theaet.* I should say that a mistake may very likely arise between the eleven or twelve which are seen or handled, but that no similar mistake can arise between the eleven and twelve which are in the mind.

*Soc.* Well, but do you think that no one ever put before his own mind five and seven,—I do not mean five or seven 196  
men or horses, but five or seven in the abstract, which, as we say, are recorded on the waxen block, and in which false opinion is held to be impossible;—did no man ever ask himself how many these numbers make when added together, and answer that they are eleven, while another thinks that they are twelve, or would all agree in thinking and saying that they are twelve?

*Theaet.* Certainly not; many would think that they are eleven, and in the higher numbers the chance of error is greater still; for I assume you to be speaking of numbers in general.

*Soc.* Exactly; and I want you to consider whether this does not imply that the twelve in the waxen block are supposed to be eleven?

*Theaet.* Yes, that seems to be the case.

*Soc.* Then do we not come back to the old difficulty? For he who makes such a mistake does think one thing which he knows to be another thing which he knows; but this, as we said, was impossible, and afforded an irresistible

For example,  
a man may  
think that  
 $5 + 7 = 11$ ,  
instead of  
 $12$ , and so  
confuse two  
impressions  
on the wax.



proof of the non-existence of false opinion, because otherwise the same person would inevitably know and not know the same thing at the same time.

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

*Theaet.* Most true.

*Soc.* Then false opinion cannot be explained as a confusion of thought and sense, for in that case we could not have been mistaken about pure conceptions of thought; and thus we are obliged to say, either that false opinion does not exist, or that a man may not know that which he knows;—which alternative do you prefer?

We must therefore admit either that false opinion does not exist, or that a man may not know what he knows.

*Theaet.* It is hard to determine, Socrates.

*Soc.* And yet the argument will scarcely admit of both. But, as we are at our wits' end, suppose that we do a shameless thing?

*Theaet.* What is it?

*Soc.* Let us attempt to explain the verb 'to know.'

*Theaet.* And why should that be shameless?

As a last resource let us ask, What is the meaning of 'knowing'?

*Soc.* You seem not to be aware that the whole of our discussion from the very beginning has been a search after knowledge, of which we are assumed not to know the nature.

*Theaet.* Nay, but I am well aware.

*Soc.* And is it not shameless when we do not know what knowledge is, to be explaining the verb 'to know'? The truth is, Theaetetus, that we have long been infected with logical impurity. Thousands of times have we repeated the words 'we know,' and 'do not know,' and 'we have or have not science or knowledge,' as if we could understand what we are saying to one another, so long as we remain ignorant about knowledge; and at this moment we are using the words 'we understand,' 'we are ignorant,' as though we could still employ them when deprived of knowledge or science.

But how can we answer the question while we are still ignorant of what knowledge is?

*Theaet.* But if you avoid these expressions, Socrates, how will you ever argue at all?

197 *Soc.* I could not, being the man I am. The case would be different if I were a true hero of dialectic: and O that such an one were present! for he would have told us to avoid the use of these terms; at the same time he would not have spared in you and me the faults which I have noted. But, seeing that we are no great wits, shall I venture to say

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES,

THEAETETUS.

Still we had  
better try.

what knowing is? for I think that the attempt may be worth making.

*Theaet.* Then by all means venture, and no one shall find fault with you for using the forbidden terms.

*Soc.* You have heard the common explanation of the verb 'to know'?

*Theaet.* I think so, but I do not remember it at the moment.

*Soc.* They explain the word 'to know' as meaning 'to have knowledge.'

*Theaet.* True.

*Soc.* I should like to make a slight change, and say 'to possess' knowledge.

*Theaet.* How do the two expressions differ?

*Soc.* Perhaps there may be no difference; but still I should like you to hear my view, that you may help me to test it.

*Theaet.* I will, if I can.

*Soc.* I should distinguish 'having' from 'possessing': for example, a man may buy and keep under his control a garment which he does not wear; and then we should say, not that he has, but that he possesses the garment.

*Theaet.* It would be the correct expression.

*Soc.* Well, may not a man 'possess' and yet not 'have' knowledge in the sense of which I am speaking? As you may suppose a man to have caught wild birds — doves or any other birds — and to be keeping them in an aviary which he has constructed at home; we might say of him in one sense, that he always has them because he possesses them, might we not?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* And yet, in another sense, he has none of them; but they are in his power, and he has got them under his hand in an enclosure of his own, and can take and have them whenever he likes; — he can catch any which he likes, and let the bird go again, and he may do so as often as he pleases.

*Theaet.* True.

*Soc.* Once more, then, as in what preceded we made a sort of waxen figment in the mind, so let us now suppose that in the mind of each man there is an aviary of all sorts of birds — some flocking together apart from the rest, others in

To illustrate  
this distinc-  
tion let us  
compare the  
mind to an  
aviary which  
is gradually  
filled with  
different kinds  
of birds, cor-  
responding to  
the varieties  
of knowledge.

'To know'  
is not 'to  
have,' but  
'to possess'  
knowledge.'

small groups, others solitary, flying anywhere and everywhere.

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

*Theaet.* Let us imagine such an aviary — and what is to follow?

*Soc.* We may suppose that the birds are kinds of knowledge, and that when we were children, this receptacle was empty; whenever a man has gotten and detained in the enclosure a kind of knowledge, he may be said to have learned or discovered the thing which is the subject of the knowledge: and this is to know.

Three stages  
of possession:—

(1) the original capture;  
(2) the detention in the cage;  
(3) the second capture for use.

*Theaet.* Granted.

198 *Soc.* And further, when any one wishes to catch any of these knowledges or sciences, and having taken, to hold it, and again to let them go, how will he express himself?—will he describe the 'catching' of them and the original 'possession' in the same words? I will make my meaning clearer by an example:—You admit that there is an art of arithmetic?

*Theaet.* To be sure.

*Soc.* Conceive this under the form of a hunt after the science of odd and even in general.

*Theaet.* I follow.

*Soc.* Having the use of the art, the arithmetician, if I am not mistaken, has the conceptions of number under his hand, and can transmit them to another.

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* And when transmitting them he may be said to teach them, and when receiving to learn them, and when having them in possession in the aforesaid aviary he may be said to know them.

*Theaet.* Exactly.

*Soc.* Attend to what follows: must not the perfect arithmetician know all numbers, for he has the science of all numbers in his mind?

*Theaet.* True.

*Soc.* And he can reckon abstract numbers in his head, or things about him which are numerable?

*Theaet.* Of course he can.

*Soc.* And to reckon is simply to consider how much such and such a number amounts to?

*Theaetetus.*

*Theaet.* Very true.

SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

*Soc.* And so he appears to be searching into something which he knows, as if he did not know it, for we have already admitted that he knows all numbers;—you have heard these perplexing questions raised?

*Theaet.* I have.

The three  
stages of  
knowledge:—  
(1) acquisition;  
(2) latent  
possession;  
(3) conscious  
possession  
and use.

*Soc.* May we not pursue the image of the doves, and say that the chase after knowledge is of two kinds? one kind is prior to possession and for the sake of possession, and the other for the sake of taking and holding in the hands that which is possessed already. And thus, when a man has learned and known something long ago, he may resume and get hold of the knowledge which he has long possessed, but has not at hand in his mind.

*Theaet.* True.

*Soc.* That was my reason for asking how we ought to speak when an arithmetician sets about numbering, or a grammarian about reading? Shall we say, that although he knows, he comes back to himself to learn what he already knows?

*Theaet.* It would be too absurd, Socrates.

*Soc.* Shall we say then that he is going to read or number what he does not know, although we have admitted that he 199 knows all letters and all numbers?

*Theaet.* That, again, would be an absurdity.

False opinion  
arises if the  
arithmetician,  
when search-  
ing for a cer-  
tain number,  
catches the  
wrong one.

*Soc.* Then shall we say that about names we care nothing?—any one may twist and turn the words 'knowing' and 'learning' in any way which he likes, but since we have determined that the possession of knowledge is not the having or using it, we do assert that a man cannot not possess that which he possesses; and, therefore, in no case can a man not know that which he knows, but he may get a false opinion about it; for he may have the knowledge, not of this particular thing, but of some other;—when the various numbers and forms of knowledge are flying about in the aviary, and wishing to capture a certain sort of knowledge out of the general store, he takes the wrong one by mistake, that is to say, when he thought eleven to be twelve, he got hold of the ring-dove which he had in his mind, when he wanted the pigeon.



*Theaet.* A very rational explanation.

*Soc.* But when he catches the one which he wants, then he is not deceived, and has an opinion of what is, and thus false and true opinion may exist, and the difficulties which were previously raised disappear. I dare say that you agree with me, do you not?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* And so we are rid of the difficulty of a man's not knowing what he knows, for we are not driven to the inference that he does not possess what he possesses, whether he be or be not deceived. And yet I fear that a greater difficulty is looking in at the window.

*Theaet.* What is it?

*Soc.* How can the exchange of one knowledge for another ever become false opinion?

*Theaet.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* In the first place, how can a man who has the knowledge of anything be ignorant of that which he knows, not by reason of ignorance, but by reason of his own knowledge? And, again, is it not an extreme absurdity that he should suppose another thing to be this, and this to be another thing;—that, having knowledge present with him in his mind, he should still know nothing and be ignorant of all things?—you might as well argue that ignorance may make a man know, and blindness make him see, as that knowledge can make him ignorant.

*Theaet.* Perhaps, Socrates, we may have been wrong in making only forms of knowledge our birds: whereas there ought to have been forms of ignorance as well, flying about together in the mind, and then he who sought to take one of them might sometimes catch a form of knowledge, and sometimes a form of ignorance; and thus he would have a false opinion from ignorance, but a true one from knowledge, about the same thing.

*Soc.* I cannot help praising you, Theaetetus, and yet I must beg you to reconsider your words. Let us grant what you say—then, according to you, he who takes ignorance will have a false opinion—am I right?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* He will certainly not think that he has a false opinion?

*Theaetetus*

SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

For a moment  
the explanation  
appears  
satisfactory.

But again the  
old difficulty  
returns; for  
when a man  
has know-  
ledge in his  
hand, how can  
he mistake it  
for ignorance?

Theaetetus  
suggests that  
there are forms  
of ignorance,  
as well as of  
knowledge,  
flying about  
in the aviary.  
But the man  
who makes a  
mistake will  
take a form of  
ignorance for  
a form of  
knowledge;  
and so we

*Theaetetus.**Theaet.* Of course not.SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUSare brought  
back to the  
original  
difficulty.*Soc.* He will think that his opinion is true, and he will fancy that he knows the things about which he has been deceived?*Theaet.* Certainly.*Soc.* Then he will think that he has captured knowledge and not ignorance?*Theaet.* Clearly.*Soc.* And thus, after going a long way round, we are once more face to face with our original difficulty. The hero of dialectic will retort upon us:—'O my excellent friends, he will say, laughing, if a man knows the form of ignorance and the form of knowledge, can he think that one of them which he knows is the other which he knows? or, if he knows neither of them, can he think that the one which he knows not is another which he knows not? or, if he knows one and not the other, can he think the one which he knows to be the one which he does not know? or the one which he does not know to be the one which he knows? or will you tell me that there are other forms of knowledge which distinguish the right and wrong birds, and which the owner keeps in some other aviary, or graven on waxen blocks according to your foolish images, and which he may be said to know while he possesses them, even though he have them not at hand in his mind? And thus, in a perpetual circle, you will be compelled to go round and round, and you will make no progress.' What are we to say in reply, Theaetetus?It will be  
ridiculous to  
attempt to  
get rid of this  
by the help of  
another  
aviary, con-  
taining other  
birds, i. e.  
forms of  
knowledge.Our discom-  
fiture is due  
to the fact  
that we seek  
false opinion  
before know-  
ledge.*Theaet.* Indeed, Socrates, I do not know what we are to say.*Soc.* Are not his reproaches just, and does not the argument truly show that we are wrong in seeking for false opinion until we know what knowledge is; that must be first ascertained; then, the nature of false opinion?*Theaet.* I cannot but agree with you, Socrates, so far as we have yet gone.What then is  
knowledge?*Soc.* Then, once more, what shall we say that knowledge is?—for we are not going to lose heart as yet.*Theaet.* Certainly, I shall not lose heart, if you do not.*Soc.* What definition will be most consistent with our former views?

*Theaet.* I cannot think of any but our old one, Socrates.

*Theaetetus.*

*Soc.* What was it?

SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS

*Theaet.* Knowledge was said by us to be true opinion; and true opinion is surely unerring, and the results which follow from it are all noble and good.

An old friend  
reappears:  
'Knowledge  
is true  
opinion.'

*Soc.* He who led the way into the river, Theaetetus, said  
201 'The experiment will show;' and perhaps if we go forward in the search, we may stumble upon the thing which we are looking for; but if we stay where we are, nothing will come to light.

*Theaet.* Very true; let us go forward and try.

*Soc.* The trail soon comes to an end, for a whole profession is against us.

*Theaet.* How is that, and what profession do you mean?

*Soc.* The profession of the great wise ones who are called orators and lawyers; for these persuade men by their art and make them think whatever they like, but they do not teach them. Do you imagine that there are any teachers in the world so clever as to be able to convince others of the truth about acts of robbery or violence, of which they were not eye-witnesses, while a little water is flowing in the clepsydra?

But true  
opinion is not  
always know-  
ledge; e. g.  
in the law  
courts.

*Theaet.* Certainly not, they can only persuade them.

*Soc.* And would you not say that persuading them is making them have an opinion?

*Theaet.* To be sure.

*Soc.* When, therefore, judges are justly persuaded about matters which you can know only by seeing them, and not in any other way, and when thus judging of them from report they attain a true opinion about them, they judge without knowledge, and yet are rightly persuaded, if they have judged well.

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And yet, O my friend, if true opinion in law courts<sup>1</sup> and knowledge are the same, the perfect judge could not have judged rightly without knowledge; and therefore I must infer that they are not the same.

*Theaet.* That is a distinction, Socrates, which I have heard

<sup>1</sup> Reading κατὰ δικαστήρια: an emendation suggested by Professor Campbell.

*Theaetetus.*SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.Another  
notion :  
Knowledge is  
true opinion  
accompanied  
by a reason.

made by some one else, but I had forgotten it. He said that true opinion, combined with reason, was knowledge, but that the opinion which had no reason was out of the sphere of knowledge; and that things of which there is no rational account are not knowable — such was the singular expression which he used — and that things which have a reason or explanation are knowable.

*Soc.* Excellent; but then, how did he distinguish between things which are and are not 'knowable'? I wish that you would repeat to me what he said, and then I shall know whether you and I have heard the same tale.

*Theaet.* I do not know whether I can recall it; but if another person would tell me, I think that I could follow him.

The same  
notion ex-  
pressed by  
Socrates in  
a different  
manner.

*Soc.* Let me give you, then, a dream in return for a dream : — Methought that I too had a dream, and I heard in my dream that the primeval letters or elements out of which you and I and all other things are compounded, have no reason or explanation; you can only name them, but no predicate can be either affirmed or denied of them, for in the one case existence, in the other non-existence is already implied, neither of which must be added, if you mean to speak of this or that thing by itself alone. It should not be called itself, or that, or each, or alone, or this, or the like; for these go about everywhere and are applied to all things, but are distinct from them; whereas, if the first elements could be described, and had a definition of their own, they would be spoken of apart from all else. But none of these primeval elements can be defined; they can only be named, for they have nothing but a name, and the things which are compounded of them, as they are complex, are expressed by a combination of names, for the combination of names is the essence of a definition. Thus, then, the elements or letters are only objects of perception, and cannot be defined or known; but the syllables or combinations of them are known and expressed, and are apprehended by true opinion. When, therefore, any one forms the true opinion of anything without rational explanation, you may say that his mind is truly exercised, but has no knowledge; for he who cannot give and receive a reason for a thing, has no knowledge of that

202

The simple  
and primeval  
elements can  
only be  
named; it is  
the combina-  
tion of them  
in the propo-  
sition which  
gives know-  
ledge.



thing; but when he adds rational explanation, then, he is perfected in knowledge and may be all that I have been denying of him. Was that the form in which the dream appeared to you?

*Theaetetus.*  
SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

*Theaet.* Precisely.

*Soc.* And you allow and maintain that true opinion, combined with definition or rational explanation, is knowledge?

*Theaet.* Exactly.

*Soc.* Then may we assume, Theaetetus, that to-day, and in this casual manner, we have found a truth which in former times many wise men have grown old and have not found?

*Theaet.* At any rate, Socrates, I am satisfied with the present statement.

*Soc.* Which is probably correct—for how can there be knowledge apart from definition and true opinion? And yet there is one point in what has been said which does not quite satisfy me.

*Theaet.* What was it?

*Soc.* What might seem to be the most ingenious notion of all:—That the elements or letters are unknown, but the combination or syllables known.

The theory states that the elements are unknown, but that the combination of them is known. Can this be true?

*Theaet.* And was that wrong?

*Soc.* We shall soon know; for we have as hostages the instances which the author of the argument himself used.

*Theaet.* What hostages?

*Soc.* The letters, which are the elements; and the syllables, which are the combinations;—he reasoned, did he not, from the letters of the alphabet?

203 *Theaet.* Yes; he did.

*Soc.* Let us take them and put them to the test, or rather, test ourselves:—What was the way in which we learned letters? and, first of all, are we right in saying that syllables have a definition, but that letters have no definition?

We are, at any rate, right in saying that the elements have no definition.

*Theaet.* I think so.

*Soc.* I think so too; for, suppose that some one asks you to spell the first syllable of my name:—Theaetetus, he says, what is SO?

*Theaetetus.**Theaet.* I should reply S and O.SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.*Soc.* That is the definition which you would give of the syllable?*Theaet.* I should.*Soc.* I wish that you would give me a similar definition of the S.*Theaet.* But how can any one, Socrates, tell the elements of an element? I can only reply, that S is a consonant, a mere noise, as of the tongue hissing; B, and most other letters, again, are neither vowel-sounds nor noises. Thus letters may be most truly said to be undefined; for even the most distinct of them, which are the seven vowels, have a sound only, but no definition at all.*Soc.* Then, I suppose, my friend, that we have been so far right in our idea about knowledge?*Theaet.* Yes; I think that we have.But are they  
therefore un-  
known?*Soc.* Well, but have we been right in maintaining that the syllables can be known, but not the letters?*Theaet.* I think so.*Soc.* And do we mean by a syllable two letters, or if there are more, all of them, or a single idea which arises out of the combination of them?If by syllable  
we mean the  
letters which  
compose it,*Theaet.* I should say that we mean all the letters.*Soc.* Take the case of the two letters S and O, which form the first syllable of my own name; must not he who knows the syllable, know both of them?*Theaet.* Certainly.*Soc.* He knows, that is, the S and O?*Theaet.* Yes.a man cannot  
know the syl-  
lable without  
knowing the  
letters of it.*Soc.* But can he be ignorant of either singly and yet know both together?*Theaet.* Such a supposition, Socrates, is monstrous and unmeaning.*Soc.* But if he cannot know both without knowing each, then if he is ever to know the syllable, he must know the letters first; and thus the fine theory has again taken wings and departed.*Theaet.* Yes, with wonderful celerity.But we may  
mean some-  
thing over*Soc.* Yes, we did not keep watch properly. Perhaps we ought to have maintained that a syllable is not the letters,

but rather one single idea framed out of them, having a separate form distinct from them. *Theaetetus.*

*Theaet.* Very true; and a more likely notion than the other.

*Soc.* Take care; let us not be cowards and betray a great and imposing theory.

204 *Theaet.* No, indeed.

*Soc.* Let us assume then, as we now say, that the syllable is a simple form arising out of the several combinations of harmonious elements — of letters or of any other elements.

*Theaet.* Very good.

*Soc.* And it must have no parts.

*Theaet.* Why?

*Soc.* Because that which has parts must be a whole of all the parts. Or would you say that a whole, although formed out of the parts, is a single notion different from all the parts?

*Theaet.* I should.

*Soc.* And would you say that all and the whole are the same, or different?

*This implies that the whole differs from the all.*

*Theaet.* I am not certain; but, as you like me to answer at once, I shall hazard the reply, that they are different.

*Soc.* I approve of your readiness, Theaetetus, but I must take time to think whether I equally approve of your answer.

*Theaet.* Yes; the answer is the point.

*Soc.* According to this new view, the whole is supposed to differ from all?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* Well, but is there any difference between all [in the plural] and the all [in the singular]? Take the case of number:— When we say one, two, three, four, five, six; or when we say twice three, or three times two, or four and two, or three and two and one, are we speaking of the same or of different numbers?

*But all in the singular does not differ from all in the plural; e. g. all of 6 = all 6;*

*Theaet.* Of the same.

*Soc.* That is of six?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* And in each form of expression we spoke of all the six?

*Theaet.* True.

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

*Soc.* Again, in speaking of all [in the plural], is there not one thing which we express<sup>1</sup>?

*Theaet.* Of course there is.

*Soc.* And that is six?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then in predicating the word 'all' of things measured by number, we predicate at the same time a singular and a plural?

*Theaet.* Clearly we do.

*Soc.* Again, the number of the acre and the acre are the same; are they not?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the number of the stadium in like manner is the stadium?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the army is the number of the army; and in all similar cases, the entire number of anything is the entire thing?

*Theaet.* True.

*Soc.* And the number of each is the parts of each?

*Theaet.* Exactly.

*Soc.* Then as many things as have parts are made up of parts?

*Theaet.* Clearly.

*Soc.* But all the parts are admitted to be the all, if the entire number is the all?

*Theaet.* True.

*Soc.* Then the whole is not made up of parts, for it would be the all, if consisting of all the parts?

*Theaet.* That is the inference.

*Soc.* But is a part a part of anything but the whole?

*Theaet.* Yes, of the all.

*Soc.* You make a valiant defence, Theaetetus. And yet is not the all that of which nothing is wanting?

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And is not a whole likewise that from which nothing is absent? but that from which anything is absent is neither a whole nor all;—if wanting in anything, both equally lose their entirety of nature.

<sup>1</sup> Reading *ὅνδ' ἐν*.

and therefore  
it implies  
parts.

But the whole  
being different  
from the all,  
cannot have  
parts;

which is  
absurd.



*Theaet.* I now think that there is no difference between a whole and all.

*Soc.* But were we not saying that when a thing has parts, all the parts will be a whole and all?

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then, as I was saying before, must not the alternative be that either the syllable is not the letters, and then the letters are not parts of the syllable, or that the syllable will be the same with the letters, and will therefore be equally known with them?

*Theaet.* You are right.

*Soc.* And, in order to avoid this, we suppose it to be different from them?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* But if letters are not parts of syllables, can you tell me of any other parts of syllables, which are not letters?

*Theaet.* No, indeed, Socrates; for if I admit the existence of parts in a syllable, it would be ridiculous in me to give up letters and seek for other parts.

*Soc.* Quite true, Theaetetus, and therefore, according to our present view, a syllable must surely be some indivisible form?

*Theaet.* True.

*Soc.* But do you remember, my friend, that only a little while ago we admitted and approved the statement, that of the first elements out of which all other things are compounded there could be no definition, because each of them when taken by itself is uncompounded; nor can one rightly attribute to them the words 'being' or 'this,' because they are alien and inappropriate words, and for this reason the letters or elements were indefinable and unknown?

*Theaet.* I remember.

*Soc.* And is not this also the reason why they are simple and indivisible? I can see no other.

*Theaet.* No other reason can be given.

*Soc.* Then is not the syllable in the same case as the elements or letters, if it has no parts and is one form?

*Theaet.* To be sure.

*Soc.* If, then, a syllable is a whole, and has many parts or letters, the letters as well as the syllable must be intelligible

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

Accordingly there can be no difference between the whole and the all. But the whole, if distinct from the elements, cannot have these for its parts;

and, since it can have no other parts, it must be without parts altogether. The syllable is therefore an un-compounded element, and consequently unknown.

If the syllable is the sum of its

*Theaetetus.*SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

letters, letters  
and syllable  
must be  
equally  
intelligible.  
If it is indi-  
visible, letters  
and syllable  
must be  
equally un-  
known. It is  
untrue to say  
that the syl-  
lables are  
known, but  
the letters  
unknown.

And in learn-  
ing to read  
and play on  
the lyre we  
are taught the  
elements,  
which are  
the letters  
or notes,  
first of all.

and expressible, since all the parts are acknowledged to be the same as the whole?

*Theaet.* True.

*Soc.* But if it be one and indivisible, then the syllables and the letters are alike undefined and unknown, and for the same reason?

*Theaet.* I cannot deny that.

*Soc.* We cannot, therefore, agree in the opinion of him who says that the syllable can be known and expressed, but not the letters. 206

*Theaet.* Certainly not; if we may trust the argument.

*Soc.* Well, but will you not be equally inclined to disagree with him, when you remember your own experience in learning to read?

*Theaet.* What experience?

*Soc.* Why, that in learning you were kept trying to distinguish the separate letters both by the eye and by the ear, in order that, when you heard them spoken or saw them written, you might not be confused by their position.

*Theaet.* Very true.

*Soc.* And is the education of the harp-player complete unless he can tell what string answers to a particular note; the notes, as every one would allow, are the elements or letters of music?

*Theaet.* Exactly.

*Soc.* Then, if we argue from the letters and syllables which we know to other simples and compounds, we shall say that the letters or simple elements as a class are much more certainly known than the syllables, and much more indispensable to a perfect knowledge of any subject; and if some one says that the syllable is known and the letter unknown, we shall consider that either intentionally or unintentionally he is talking nonsense?

*Theaet.* Exactly.

*Soc.* And there might be given other proofs of this belief, if I am not mistaken. But do not let us in looking for them, lose sight of the question before us, which is the meaning of the statement, that right opinion with rational definition or explanation is the most perfect form of knowledge.

*Theaet.* We must not.

We said that  
knowledge  
is right  
opinion with  
rational  
explanation.

*Soc.* Well, and what is the meaning of the term 'explanation'? I think that we have a choice of three meanings.

*Theaet.* What are they?

*Soc.* In the first place, the meaning may be, manifesting one's thought by the voice with verbs and nouns, imaging an opinion in the stream which flows from the lips, as in a mirror or water. Does not explanation appear to be of this nature?

*Theaet.* Certainly; he who so manifests his thought, is said to explain himself.

*Soc.* And every one who is not born deaf or dumb is able sooner or later to manifest what he thinks of anything; and if so, all those who have a right opinion about anything will also have right explanation; nor will right opinion be anywhere found to exist apart from knowledge.

*Theaet.* True.

*Soc.* Let us not, therefore, hastily charge him who gave this account of knowledge with uttering an unmeaning word; for perhaps he only intended to say, that when a person was  
207 asked what was the nature of anything, he should be able to answer his questioner by giving the elements of the thing.

*Theaet.* As for example, Socrates . . . ?

*Soc.* As, for example, when Hesiod says that a waggon is made up of a hundred planks. Now, neither you nor I could describe all of them individually; but if any one asked what is a waggon, we should be content to answer, that a waggon consists of wheels, axle, body, rims, yoke.

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And our opponent will probably laugh at us, just as he would if we professed to be grammarians and to give a grammatical account of the name of Theaetetus, and yet could only tell the syllables and not the letters of your name — that would be true opinion, and not knowledge; for knowledge, as has been already remarked, is not attained until, combined with true opinion, there is an enumeration of the elements out of which anything is composed.

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* In the same general way, we might also have true opinion about a waggon; but he who can describe its essence by an enumeration of the hundred planks, adds

*Theaetetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

But what is  
explanation?

(1) The re-  
flection of  
thought in  
speech.—  
But this is  
not peculiar  
to those who  
know.

(2) The  
enumeration  
of the parts  
of a thing.

*Theaetetus.*SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

rational explanation to true opinion, and instead of opinion has art and knowledge of the nature of a waggon, in that he attains to the whole through the elements.

*Theaet.* And do you not agree in that view, Socrates?

*Soc.* If you do, my friend; but I want to know first, whether you admit the resolution of all things into their elements to be a rational explanation of them, and the consideration of them in syllables or larger combinations of them to be irrational—is this your view?

*Theaet.* Precisely.

But there may  
be enumera-  
tion of parts  
without know-  
ledge

*Soc.* Well, and do you conceive that a man has knowledge of any element who at one time affirms and at another time denies that element of something, or thinks that the same thing is composed of different elements at different times?

*Theaet.* Assuredly not.

*Soc.* And do you not remember that in your case and in that of others this often occurred in the process of learning to read?

*Theaet.* You mean that I mistook the letters and misspelt the syllables?

*Soc.* Yes.

*Theaet.* To be sure; I perfectly remember, and I am very far from supposing that they who are in this condition have knowledge.

*Soc.* When a person at the time of learning writes the name of Theaetetus, and thinks that he ought to write and does write *Th* and *e*; but, again, meaning to write the name of Theodorus, thinks that he ought to write and does write *T* and *e*—can we suppose that he knows the first syllables of your two names? 208

*Theaet.* We have already admitted that such a one has not yet attained knowledge.

*Soc.* And in like manner he may enumerate without knowing them the second and third and fourth syllables of your name?

*Theaet.* He may.

*Soc.* And in that case, when he knows the order of the letters and can write them out correctly, he has right opinion?

*Theaet.* Clearly.



*Soc.* But although we admit that he has right opinion, he will still be without knowledge?

*Theæt.* Yes.

*Soc.* And yet he will have explanation, as well as right opinion, for he knew the order of the letters when he wrote; and this we admit to be explanation.

*Theæt.* True.

*Soc.* Then, my friend, there is such a thing as right opinion united with definition or explanation, which does not as yet attain to the exactness of knowledge.

*Theæt.* It would seem so.

*Soc.* And what we fancied to be a perfect definition of knowledge is a dream only. But perhaps we had better not say so as yet, for were there not three explanations of knowledge, one of which must, as we said, be adopted by him who maintains knowledge to be true opinion combined with rational explanation? And very likely there may be found some one who will not prefer this but the third.

*Theæt.* You are quite right; there is still one remaining. The first was the image or expression of the mind in speech; the second, which has just been mentioned, is a way of reaching the whole by an enumeration of the elements. But what is the third definition?

*Soc.* There is, further, the popular notion of telling the mark or sign of difference which distinguishes the thing in question from all others.

*Theæt.* Can you give me any example of such a definition?

*Soc.* As, for example, in the case of the sun, I think that you would be contented with the statement that the sun is the brightest of the heavenly bodies which revolve about the earth.

*Theæt.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Understand why:—the reason is, as I was just now saying, that if you get at the difference and distinguishing characteristic of each thing, then, as many persons affirm, you will get at the definition or explanation of it; but while you lay hold only of the common and not of the characteristic notion, you will only have the definition of those things to which this common quality belongs.

*Theætetus.*

SOCRATES,  
THEÆTETUS.

This is right  
opinion only.

(3) True  
opinion about  
a thing with  
the addition  
of a mark  
or sign of  
difference.

*Theaetetus.*

*Theaet.* I understand you, and your account of definition is in my judgment correct.

SOCRATES,

THEAETETUS.

*Soc.* But he, who having right opinion about anything, can find out the difference which distinguishes it from other things will know that of which before he had only an opinion.

*Theaet.* Yes; that is what we are maintaining.

*Soc.* Nevertheless, Theaetetus, on a nearer view, I find myself quite disappointed; the picture, which at a distance was not so bad, has now become altogether unintelligible.

*Theaet.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* I will endeavour to explain: I will suppose myself to 209 have true opinion of you, and if to this I add your definition, then I have knowledge, but if not, opinion only.

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* The definition was assumed to be the interpretation of your difference.

*Theaet.* True.

*Soc.* But when I had only opinion, I had no conception of your distinguishing characteristics.

*Theaet.* I suppose not.

*Soc.* Then I must have conceived of some general or common nature which no more belonged to you than to another.

*Theaet.* True.

*Soc.* Tell me, now — How in that case could I have formed a judgment of you any more than of any one else? Suppose that I imagine Theaetetus to be a man who has nose, eyes, and mouth, and every other member complete; how would that enable me to distinguish Theaetetus from Theodorus, or from some outer barbarian?

*Theaet.* How could it?

*Soc.* Or if I had further conceived of you, not only as having nose and eyes, but as having a snub nose and prominent eyes, should I have any more notion of you than of myself and others who resemble me?

*Theaet.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Surely I can have no conception of Theaetetus until your snub-nosedness has left an impression on my mind different from the snub-nosedness of all others whom I have ever seen, and until your other peculiarities have a like

But right  
opinion al-  
ready implies  
a knowledge  
of difference.

distinctness; and so when I meet you to-morrow the right opinion will be re-called?

*Theaetetus.*

*Theaet.* Most true.

SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.

*Soc.* Then right opinion implies the perception of differences?

*Theaet.* Clearly.

*Soc.* What, then, shall we say of adding reason or explanation to right opinion? If the meaning is, that we should form an opinion of the way in which something differs from another thing, the proposal is ridiculous.

*Theaet.* How so?

*Soc.* We are supposed to acquire a right opinion of the differences which distinguish one thing from another when we have already a right opinion of them, and so we go round and round;—the revolution of the scytal, or pestle, or any other rotatory machine, in the same circles, is as nothing compared with such a requirement; and we may be truly described as the blind directing the blind; for to add those things which we already have, in order that we may learn what we already think, is like a soul utterly benighted.

*Theaet.* Tell me; what were you going to say just now, when you asked the question?

How absurd it would be to repeat the word we are defining in our definition, and say that knowledge is knowledge of difference!

*Soc.* If, my boy, the argument, in speaking of adding the definition, had used the word to 'know,' and not merely 'have an opinion' of the difference, this which is the most promising of all the definitions of knowledge would have come to a pretty end, for to know is surely to acquire knowledge.

210 *Theaet.* True.

*Soc.* And so, when the question is asked, What is knowledge? this fair argument will answer 'Right opinion with knowledge,'—knowledge, that is, of difference, for this, as the said argument maintains, is adding the definition.

*Theaet.* That seems to be true.

*Soc.* But how utterly foolish, when we are asking what is knowledge, that the reply should only be, right opinion with knowledge of difference or of anything! And so, Theaetetus, knowledge is neither sensation nor true opinion, nor yet definition and explanation accompanying and added to true opinion?

*Theaetetus.**Theact.* I suppose not.SOCRATES,  
THEAETETUS.*Soc.* And are you still in labour and travail, my dear friend, or have you brought all that you have to say about knowledge to the birth?*Theact.* I am sure, Socrates, that you have elicited from me a good deal more than ever was in me.Theaetetus  
has brought  
forth wind.  
But to know  
that they  
know nothing  
makes men  
better and  
humbler.*Soc.* And does not my art show that you have brought forth wind, and that the offspring of your brain are not worth bringing up?*Theact.* Very true.*Soc.* But if, Theaetetus, you should ever conceive afresh, you will be all the better for the present investigation, and if not, you will be soberer and humbler and gentler to other men, and will be too modest to fancy that you know what you do not know. These are the limits of my art; I can no further go, nor do I know aught of the things which great and famous men know or have known in this or former ages. The office of a midwife I, like my mother, have received from God; she delivered women, and I deliver men; but they must be young and noble and fair.Socrates is  
expecting his  
trial (cp.  
Euthyph. *sub*  
*fin.*; Meno  
*sub fin.*).

And now I have to go to the porch of the King Archon, where I am to meet Meletus and his indictment. To-morrow morning, Theodorus, I shall hope to see you again at this place.



SOPHIST.



## INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.

THE dramatic power of the dialogues of Plato appears to diminish as the metaphysical interest of them increases (cp. Introd. to the *Philebus*). There are no descriptions of time, place or persons, in the *Sophist* and *Statesman*, but we are plunged at once into philosophical discussions; the poetical charm has disappeared, and those who have no taste for abstruse metaphysics will greatly prefer the earlier dialogues to the later ones. Plato is conscious of the change, and in the *Statesman* (286 B) expressly accuses himself of a tediousness in the two dialogues, which he ascribes to his desire of developing the dialectical method. On the other hand, the kindred spirit of Hegel seemed to find in the *Sophist* the crown and summit of the Platonic philosophy — here is the place at which Plato most nearly approaches to the Hegelian identity of Being and Not-being. Nor will the great importance of the two dialogues be doubted by any one who forms a conception of the state of mind and opinion which they are intended to meet. The sophisms of the day were undermining philosophy; the denial of the existence of Not-being, and of the connexion of ideas, was making truth and falsehood equally impossible. It has been said that Plato would have written differently, if he had been acquainted with the *Organon* of Aristotle. But could the *Organon* of Aristotle ever have been written unless the *Sophist* and *Statesman* had preceded? The swarm of fallacies which arose in the infancy of mental science, and which was born and bred in the decay of the pre-Socratic philosophies, was not dispelled by Aristotle, but by Socrates and Plato. The *summa genera* of thought, the nature of the proposition, of definition, of generalization, of synthesis and analysis, of division and cross-division, are clearly described, and the processes of induction and deduction are constantly employed

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in the dialogues of Plato. The 'slippery' nature of comparison, the danger of putting words in the place of things, the fallacy of arguing 'a dicto secundum,' and in a circle, are frequently indicated by him. To all these processes of truth and error, Aristotle, in the next generation, gave distinctness; he brought them together in a separate science. But he is not to be regarded as the original inventor of any of the great logical forms, with the exception of the syllogism.

There is little worthy of remark in the characters of the Sophist. The most noticeable point is the final retirement of Socrates from the field of argument, and the substitution for him of an Eleatic stranger, who is described as a pupil of Parmenides and Zeno, and is supposed to have descended from a higher world in order to convict the Socratic circle of error. As in the *Timaeus*, Plato seems to intimate by the withdrawal of Socrates that he is passing beyond the limits of his teaching; and in the *Sophist* and *Statesman*, as well as in the *Parmenides*, he probably means to imply that he is making a closer approach to the schools of Elea and Megara. He had much in common with them, but he must first submit their ideas to criticism and revision. He had once thought as he says, speaking by the mouth of the Eleatic, that he understood their doctrine of Not-being; but now he does not even comprehend the nature of Being. The friends of ideas (*Soph.* 248) are alluded to by him as distant acquaintances, whom he criticizes *ab extra*; we do not recognize at first sight that he is criticizing himself. The character of the Eleatic stranger is colourless; he is to a certain extent the reflection of his father and master, Parmenides, who is the protagonist in the dialogue which is called by his name. Theaetetus himself is not distinguished by the remarkable traits which are attributed to him in the preceding dialogue. He is no longer under the spell of Socrates, or subject to the operation of his midwifery, though the fiction of question and answer is still maintained, and the necessity of taking Theaetetus along with him is several times insisted upon by his partner in the discussion. There is a reminiscence of the old Theaetetus in his remark that he will not tire of the argument, and in his conviction, which the Eleatic thinks likely to be permanent, that the course of events is governed by the will of God. Throughout the two dialogues Socrates continues a silent auditor, in the *Statesman*



just reminding us of his presence, at the commencement, by a characteristic jest about the statesman and the philosopher, and by an allusion to his namesake, with whom on that ground he claims relationship, as he had already claimed an affinity with Theaetetus, grounded on the likeness of his ugly face. But in neither dialogue, any more than in the Timaeus, does he offer any criticism on the views which are propounded by another.

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The style, though wanting in dramatic power,—in this respect resembling the Philebus and the Laws,—is very clear and accurate, and has several touches of humour and satire. The language is less fanciful and imaginative than that of the earlier dialogues; and there is more of bitterness, as in the Laws, though traces of a similar temper may also be observed in the description of the ‘great brute’ in the Republic, and in the contrast of the lawyer and philosopher in the Theaetetus. The following are characteristic passages: ‘The ancient philosophers, of whom we may say, without offence, that they went on their way rather regardless of whether we understood them or not;’ the picture of the materialists, or earth-born giants, ‘who grasped oaks and rocks in their hands,’ and who must be improved before they can be reasoned with; and the equally humorous delineation of the friends of ideas, who defend themselves from a fastness in the invisible world; or the comparison of the Sophist to a painter or maker (cp. Rep. x.), and the hunt after him in the rich meadow-lands of youth and wealth; or, again, the light and graceful touch with which the older philosophies are painted (‘Ionian and Sicilian muses’), the comparison of them to mythological tales, and the fear of the Eleatic that he will be counted a parricide if he ventures to lay hands on his father Parmenides; or, once more, the likening of the Eleatic stranger to a god from heaven.—All these passages, notwithstanding the decline of the style, retain the impress of the great master of language. But the equably diffused grace is gone; instead of the endless variety of the early dialogues, traces of the rhythmical monotonous cadence of the Laws begin to appear; and already an approach is made to the technical language of Aristotle, in the frequent use of the words ‘essence,’ ‘power,’ ‘generation,’ ‘motion,’ ‘rest,’ ‘action,’ ‘passion,’ and the like.

The Sophist, like the Phaedrus, has a double character, and unites two enquiries, which are only in a somewhat forced manner

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connected with each other. The first is the search after the Sophist, the second is the enquiry into the nature of Not-being, which occupies the middle part of the work. For 'Not-being' is the hole or division of the dialectical net in which the Sophist has hidden himself. He is the imaginary impersonation of false opinion. Yet he denies the possibility of false opinion; for falsehood is that which is not, and therefore has no existence. At length the difficulty is solved; the answer, in the language of the Republic, appears 'tumbling out at our feet.' Acknowledging that there is a communion of kinds with kinds, and not merely one Being or Good having different names, or several isolated ideas or classes incapable of communion, we discover 'Not-being' to be the other of 'Being.' Transferring this to language and thought, we have no difficulty in apprehending that a proposition may be false as well as true. The Sophist, drawn out of the shelter which Cynic and Megarian paradoxes have temporarily afforded him, is proved to be a dissembler and juggler with words.

The chief points of interest in the dialogue are: (I) the character attributed to the Sophist: (II) the dialectical method: (III) the nature of the puzzle about 'Not-being:' (IV) the battle of the philosophers: (V) the relation of the Sophist to other dialogues.

I. The Sophist in Plato is the master of the art of illusion; the charlatan, the foreigner, the prince of esprits-faux, the hireling who is not a teacher, and who, from whatever point of view he is regarded, is the opposite of the true teacher. He is the 'evil one,' the ideal representative of all that Plato most disliked in the moral and intellectual tendencies of his own age; the adversary of the almost equally ideal Socrates. He seems to be always growing in the fancy of Plato, now boastful, now eristic, now clothing himself in rags of philosophy, now more akin to the rhetorician or lawyer, now haranguing, now questioning, until the final appearance in the Politicus of his departing shadow in the disguise of a statesman. We are not to suppose that Plato intended by such a description to depict Protagoras or Gorgias, or even Thrasymachus, who all turn out to be 'very good sort of people when we know them,' and all of them part on good terms with Socrates. But he is speaking of a being as imaginary as the wise man of the Stoics, and whose character varies in different dialogues. Like mythology, Greek philosophy

has a tendency to personify ideas. And the Sophist is not merely a teacher of rhetoric for a fee of one or fifty drachmae (Crat. 384 B), but an ideal of Plato's in which the falsehood of all mankind is reflected.

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A milder tone is adopted towards the Sophists in a well-known passage of the Republic (vi. 492), where they are described as the followers rather than the leaders of the rest of mankind. Plato ridicules the notion that any individuals can corrupt youth to a degree worth speaking of in comparison with the greater influence of public opinion. But there is no real inconsistency between this and other descriptions of the Sophist which occur in the Platonic writings. For Plato is not justifying the Sophists in the passage just quoted, but only representing their power to be contemptible; they are to be despised rather than feared, and are no worse than the rest of mankind. But a teacher or statesman may be justly condemned, who is on a level with mankind when he ought to be above them. There is another point of view in which this passage should also be considered. The great enemy of Plato is the world, not exactly in the theological sense, yet in one not wholly different — the world as the hater of truth and lover of appearance, occupied in the pursuit of gain and pleasure rather than of knowledge, banded together against the few good and wise men, and devoid of true education. This creature has many heads: rhetoricians, lawyers, statesmen, poets, sophists. But the Sophist is the Proteus who takes the likeness of all of them; all other deceivers have a piece of him in them. And sometimes he is represented as the corrupter of the world; and sometimes the world as the corrupter of him and of itself.

Of late years the Sophists have found an enthusiastic defender in the distinguished historian of Greece. He appears to maintain (1) that the term 'Sophist' is not the name of a particular class, and would have been applied indifferently to Socrates and Plato, as well as to Gorgias and Protagoras; (2) that the bad sense was imprinted on the word by the genius of Plato; (3) that the principal Sophists were not the corrupters of youth (for the Athenian youth were no more corrupted in the age of Demosthenes than in the age of Pericles), but honourable and estimable persons, who supplied a training in literature which was generally wanted at the time. We will briefly consider how far these statements

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appear to be justified by facts: and, 1, about the meaning of the word there arises an interesting question: —

Many words are used both in a general and a specific sense, and the two senses are not always clearly distinguished. Sometimes the generic meaning has been narrowed to the specific, while in other cases the specific meaning has been enlarged or altered. Examples of the former class are furnished by some ecclesiastical terms: apostles, prophets, bishops, elders, catholics. Examples of the latter class may also be found in a similar field: jesuits, puritans, methodists, and the like. Sometimes the meaning is both narrowed and enlarged; and a good or bad sense will subsist side by side with a neutral one. A curious effect is produced on the meaning of a word when the very term which is stigmatized by the world (e. g. Methodists) is adopted by the obnoxious or derided class; this tends to define the meaning. Or, again, the opposite result is produced, when the world refuses to allow some sect or body of men the possession of an honourable name which they have assumed, or applies it to them only in mockery or irony.

The term 'Sophist' is one of those words of which the meaning has been both contracted and enlarged. Passages may be quoted from Herodotus and the tragedians, in which the word is used in a neutral sense for a contriver or deviser or inventor, without including any ethical idea of goodness or badness. Poets as well as philosophers were called Sophists in the fifth century before Christ. In Plato himself the term is applied in the sense of a 'master in art,' without any bad meaning attaching to it (*Symp.* 208 C; *Meno* 85 B). In the later Greek, again, 'sophist' and 'philosopher' became almost indistinguishable. There was no reproach conveyed by the word; the additional association, if any, was only that of rhetorician or teacher. Philosophy had become eclecticism and imitation: in the decline of Greek thought there was no original voice lifted up 'which reached to a thousand years because of the god.' Hence the two words, like the characters represented by them, tended to pass into one another. Yet even here some differences appeared; for the term 'Sophist' would hardly have been applied to the greater names, such as Plotinus, and would have been more often used of a professor of philosophy in general than of a maintainer of particular tenets.



But the real question is, not whether the word 'Sophist' has all these senses, but whether there is not also a specific bad sense in which the term is applied to certain contemporaries of Socrates. Would an Athenian, as Mr. Grote supposes, in the fifth century before Christ, have included Socrates and Plato, as well as Gorgias and Protagoras, under the specific class of Sophists? To this question we must answer, No: if ever the term is applied to Socrates and Plato, either the application is made by an enemy out of mere spite, or the sense in which it is used is neutral. Plato, Xenophon, Isocrates, Aristotle, all give a bad import to the word; and the Sophists are regarded as a separate class in all of them. And in later Greek literature, the distinction is quite marked between the succession of philosophers from Thales to Aristotle, and the Sophists of the age of Socrates, who appeared like meteors for a short time in different parts of Greece. For the purposes of comedy, Socrates may have been identified with the Sophists, and he seems to complain of this in the Apology. But there is no reason to suppose that Socrates, differing by so many outward marks, would really have been confounded in the mind of Anytus, or Callicles, or of any intelligent Athenian, with the splendid foreigners who from time to time visited Athens, or appeared at the Olympic games. The man of genius, the great original thinker, the disinterested seeker after truth, the master of repartee whom no one ever defeated in an argument, was separated, even in the mind of the vulgar Athenian, by an 'interval which no geometry can express,' from the balancer of sentences, the interpreter and reciter of the poets, the divider of the meanings of words, the teacher of rhetoric, the professor of morals and manners.

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2. The use of the term 'Sophist' in the dialogues of Plato also shows that the bad sense was not affixed by his genius, but already current. When Protagoras says, 'I confess that I am a Sophist,' he implies that the art which he professes has already a bad name; and the words of the young Hippocrates, when with a blush upon his face which is just seen by the light of dawn he admits that he is going to be made a 'Sophist,' would lose their point, unless the term had been discredited. There is nothing surprising in the Sophists having an evil name; that, whether deserved or not, was a natural consequence of their vocation.

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That they were foreigners, that they made fortunes, that they taught novelties, that they excited the minds of youth, are quite sufficient reasons to account for the opprobrium which attached to them. The genius of Plato could not have stamped the word anew, or have imparted the associations which occur in contemporary writers, such as Xenophon and Isocrates. Changes in the meaning of words can only be made with great difficulty, and not unless they are supported by a strong current of popular feeling. There is nothing improbable in supposing that Plato may have extended and envenomed the meaning, or that he may have done the Sophists the same kind of disservice with posterity which Pascal did to the Jesuits. But the bad sense of the word was not and could not have been invented by him, and is found in his earlier dialogues, e. g. the *Protagoras*, as well as in the later.

3. There is no ground for disbelieving that the principal Sophists, Gorgias, Protagoras, Prodicus, Hippias, were good and honourable men. The notion that they were corrupters of the Athenian youth has no real foundation, and partly arises out of the use of the term 'Sophist' in modern times. The truth is, that we know little about them; and the witness of Plato in their favour is probably not much more historical than his witness against them. Of that national decline of genius, unity, political force, which has been sometimes described as the corruption of youth, the Sophists were one among many signs;—in these respects Athens may have degenerated; but, as Mr. Grote remarks, there is no reason to suspect any greater moral corruption in the age of Demosthenes than in the age of Pericles. The Athenian youth were not corrupted in this sense, and therefore the Sophists could not have corrupted them. It is remarkable, and may be fairly set down to their credit, that Plato nowhere attributes to them that peculiar Greek sympathy with youth, which he ascribes to Parmenides, and which was evidently common in the Socratic circle. Plato delights to exhibit them in a ludicrous point of view, and to show them always rather at a disadvantage in the company of Socrates. But he has no quarrel with their characters, and does not deny that they are respectable men.

The Sophist, in the dialogue which is called after him, is exhibited in many different lights, and appears and reappears in a variety of forms. There is some want of the higher Platonic

art in the Eleatic Stranger eliciting his true character by a laborious process of enquiry, when he had already admitted that he knew quite well the difference between the Sophist and the Philosopher, and had often heard the question discussed; — such an anticipation would hardly have occurred in the earlier dialogues. But Plato could not altogether give up his Socratic method, of which another trace may be thought to be discerned in his adoption of a common instance before he proceeds to the greater matter in hand. Yet the example is also chosen in order to damage the ‘hooker of men’ as much as possible; each step in the pedigree of the angler suggests some injurious reflection about the Sophist. They are both hunters after a living prey, nearly related to tyrants and thieves, and the Sophist is the cousin of the parasite and flatterer. The effect of this is heightened by the accidental manner in which the discovery is made, as the result of a scientific division. His descent in another branch affords the opportunity of more ‘unsavoury comparisons.’ For he is a retail trader, and his wares are either imported or home-made, like those of other retail traders; his art is thus deprived of the character of a liberal profession. But the most distinguishing characteristic of him is, that he is a disputant, and higgles over an argument. A feature of the Eristic here seems to blend with Plato’s usual description of the Sophists, who in the early dialogues, and in the Republic, are frequently depicted as endeavouring to save themselves from disputing with Socrates by making long orations. In this character he parts company from the vain and impertinent talker in private life, who is a loser of money, while he is a maker of it.

But there is another general division under which his art may be also supposed to fall, and that is purification; and from purification is descended education, and the new principle of education is to interrogate men after the manner of Socrates, and make them teach themselves. Here again we catch a glimpse rather of a Socratic or Eristic than of a Sophist in the ordinary sense of the term. And Plato does not on this ground reject the claim of the Sophist to be the true philosopher. One more feature of the Eristic rather than of the Sophist is the tendency of the troublesome animal to run away into the darkness of Not-being. Upon the whole, we detect in him a sort of hybrid or double nature, of

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which, except perhaps in the Euthydemus of Plato, we find no other trace in Greek philosophy; he combines the teacher of virtue with the Eristic; while in his omniscience, in his ignorance of himself, in his arts of deception, and in his lawyer-like habit of writing and speaking about all things, he is still the antithesis of Socrates and of the true teacher.

II. The question has been asked, whether the method of 'abscissio infiniti,' by which the Sophist is taken, is a real and valuable logical process. Modern science feels that this, like other processes of formal logic, presents a very inadequate conception of the actual complex procedure of the mind by which scientific truth is detected and verified. Plato himself seems to be aware that mere division is an unsafe and uncertain weapon, first, in the Statesman, when he says that we should divide in the middle, for in that way we are more likely to attain species; secondly, in the parallel precept of the Philebus, that we should not pass from the most general notions to infinity, but include all the intervening middle principles, until, as he also says in the Statesman, we arrive at the infima species; thirdly, in the Phaedrus, when he says that the dialectician will carve the limbs of truth without mangling them; and once more in the Statesman, if we cannot bisect species, we must carve them as well as we can. No better image of nature or truth, as an organic whole, can be conceived than this. So far is Plato from supposing that mere division and subdivision of general notions will guide men into all truth.

Plato does not really mean to say that the Sophist or the Statesman can be caught in this way. But these divisions and subdivisions were favourite logical exercises of the age in which he lived; and while indulging his dialectical fancy, and making a contribution to logical method, he delights also to transfix the Eristic Sophist with weapons borrowed from his own armoury. As we have already seen, the division gives him the opportunity of making the most damaging reflections on the Sophist and all his kith and kin, and to exhibit him in the most discreditable light.

Nor need we seriously consider whether Plato was right in assuming that an animal so various could not be confined within the limits of a single definition. In the infancy of logic, men sought



only to obtain a definition of an unknown or uncertain term; the after reflection scarcely occurred to them that the word might have several senses, which shaded off into one another, and were not capable of being comprehended in a single notion. There is no trace of this reflection in Plato. But neither is there any reason to think, even if the reflection had occurred to him, that he would have been deterred from carrying on the war with weapons fair or unfair against the outlaw Sophist.

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III. The puzzle about 'Not-being' appears to us to be one of the most unreal difficulties of ancient philosophy. We cannot understand the attitude of mind which could imagine that falsehood had no existence, if reality was denied to Not-being: How could such a question arise at all, much less become of serious importance? The answer to this, and to nearly all other difficulties of early Greek philosophy, is to be sought for in the history of ideas, and the answer is only unsatisfactory because our knowledge is defective. In the passage from the world of sense and imagination and common language to that of opinion and reflection the human mind was exposed to many dangers, and often

'Found no end in wandering mazes lost.'

On the other hand, the discovery of abstractions was the great source of all mental improvement in after ages. It was the pushing aside of the old, the revelation of the new. But each one of the company of abstractions, if we may speak in the metaphorical language of Plato, became in turn the tyrant of the mind, the dominant idea, which would allow no other to have a share in the throne. This is especially true of the Eleatic philosophy: while the absoluteness of Being was asserted in every form of language, the sensible world and all the phenomena of experience were comprehended under Not-being. Nor was any difficulty or perplexity thus created, so long as the mind, lost in the contemplation of Being, asked no more questions, and never thought of applying the categories of Being or Not-being to mind or opinion or practical life.

But the negative as well as the positive idea had sunk deep into the intellect of man. The effect of the paradoxes of Zeno extended far beyond the Eleatic circle. And now an unforeseen consequence began to arise. If the Many were not, if all things

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were names of the One, and nothing could be predicated of any other thing, how could truth be distinguished from falsehood? The Eleatic philosopher would have replied that Being is alone true. But mankind had got beyond his barren abstractions: they were beginning to analyze, to classify, to define, to ask what is the nature of knowledge, opinion, sensation. Still less could they be content with the description which Achilles gives in Homer of the man whom his soul hates —

ὅς χ' ἕτερον μὲν κείθῃ ἐνὶ φρεσὶν, ἄλλο δὲ εἶπῃ.

For their difficulty was not a practical but a metaphysical one; and their conception of falsehood was really impaired and weakened by a metaphysical illusion.

The strength of the illusion seems to lie in the alternative: If we once admit the existence of Being and Not-being, as two spheres which exclude each other, no Being or reality can be ascribed to Not-being, and therefore not to falsehood, which is the image or expression of Not-being. Falsehood is wholly false; and to speak of true falsehood, as Theaetetus does (*Theaet.* 189 C), is a contradiction in terms. The fallacy to us is ridiculous and transparent,—no better than those which Plato satirizes in the *Euthydemus*. It is a confusion of falsehood and negation, from which Plato himself is not entirely free. Instead of saying, 'This is not in accordance with facts,' 'This is proved by experience to be false,' and from such examples forming a general notion of falsehood, the mind of the Greek thinker was lost in the mazes of the Eleatic philosophy. And the greater importance which Plato attributes to this fallacy, compared with others, is due to the influence which the Eleatic philosophy exerted over him. He sees clearly to a certain extent; but he has not yet attained a complete mastery over the ideas of his predecessors—they are still ends to him, and not mere instruments of thought. They are too rough-hewn to be harmonized in a single structure, and may be compared to rocks which project or overhang in some ancient city's walls. There are many such imperfect syncretisms or eclecticisms in the history of philosophy. A modern philosopher, though emancipated from scholastic notions of essence or substance, might still be seriously affected by the abstract idea of necessity; or though accustomed, like Bacon, to criticize abstract notions, might not extend his criticism to the syllogism.

The saying or thinking the thing that is not, would be the popular definition of falsehood or error. If we were met by the Sophist's objection, the reply would probably be an appeal to experience. Ten thousands, as Homer would say (*μάλα μυρίοι*), tell falsehoods and fall into errors. And this is Plato's reply, both in the *Cratylus* (429 D) and *Sophist*. 'Theaetetus is flying,' is a sentence in form quite as grammatical as 'Theaetetus is sitting'; the difference between the two sentences is, that the one is true and the other false. But, before making this appeal to common sense, Plato propounds for our consideration a theory of the nature of the negative.

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The theory is, that Not-being is relation. Not-being is the other of Being, and has as many kinds as there are differences in Being. This doctrine is the simple converse of the famous proposition of Spinoza,—not 'Omnis determinatio est negatio,' but 'Omnis negatio est determinatio';—not, All distinction is negation, but, All negation is distinction. Not-being is the unfolding or determining of Being, and is a necessary element in all other things that are. We should be careful to observe, first, that Plato does not identify Being with Not-being; he has no idea of progression by antagonism, or of the Hegelian vibration of moments: he would not have said with Heracleitus, 'All things are and are not, and become and become not.' Secondly, he has lost sight altogether of the other sense of Not-being, as the negative of Being; although he again and again recognizes the validity of the law of contradiction. Thirdly, he seems to confuse falsehood with negation. Nor is he quite consistent in regarding Not-being as one class of Being, and yet as coextensive with Being in general. Before analyzing further the topics thus suggested, we will endeavour to trace the manner in which Plato arrived at his conception of Not-being.

In all the later dialogues of Plato, the idea of mind or intelligence becomes more and more prominent. That idea which Anaxagoras employed inconsistently in the construction of the world, Plato, in the *Philebus*, the *Sophist*, and the *Laws*, extends to all things, attributing to Providence a care, infinitesimal as well as infinite, of all creation. The divine mind is the leading religious thought of the later works of Plato. The human mind is a sort of reflection of this, having ideas of Being, Sameness, and the like.

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At times they seem to be parted by a great gulf (Parmenides); at other times they have a common nature, and the light of a common intelligence.

But this ever-growing idea of mind is really irreconcilable with the abstract Pantheism of the Eleatics. To the passionate language of Parmenides, Plato replies in a strain equally passionate:—What! has not Being mind? and is not Being capable of being known? and, if this is admitted, then capable of being affected or acted upon?—in motion, then, and yet not wholly incapable of rest. Already we have been compelled to attribute opposite determinations to Being. And the answer to the difficulty about Being may be equally the answer to the difficulty about Not-being.

The answer is, that in these and all other determinations of any notion we are attributing to it 'Not-being.' We went in search of Not-being and seemed to lose Being, and now in the hunt after Being we recover both. Not-being is a kind of Being, and in a sense co-extensive with Being. And there are as many divisions of Not-being as of Being. To every positive idea—'just,' 'beautiful,' and the like, there is a corresponding negative idea—'not-just,' 'not-beautiful,' and the like.

A doubt may be raised whether this account of the negative is really the true one. The common logicians would say that the 'not-just,' 'not-beautiful,' are not really classes at all, but are merged in one great class of the infinite or negative. The conception of Plato, in the days before logic, seems to be more correct than this. For the word 'not' does not altogether annihilate the positive meaning of the word 'just': at least, it does not prevent our looking for the 'not-just' in or about the same class in which we might expect to find the 'just.' 'Not-just is not-honourable' is neither a false nor an unmeaning proposition. The reason is that the negative proposition has really passed into an undefined positive. To say that 'not-just' has no more meaning than 'not-honourable'—that is to say, that the two cannot in any degree be distinguished, is clearly repugnant to the common use of language.

The ordinary logic is also jealous of the explanation of negation as relation, because seeming to take away the principle of contradiction. Plato, as far as we know, is the first philosopher who



distinctly enunciated this principle; and though we need not suppose him to have been always consistent with himself, there is no real inconsistency between his explanation of the negative and the principle of contradiction. Neither the Platonic notion of the negative as the principle of difference, nor the Hegelian identity of Being and Not-being, at all touch the principle of contradiction. For what is asserted about Being and Not-Being only relates to our most abstract notions, and in no way interferes with the principle of contradiction employed in the concrete. Because Not-being is identified with Other, or Being with Not-being, this does not make the proposition 'Some have not eaten' any the less a contradiction of 'All have eaten.'

The explanation of the negative given by Plato in the *Sophist* is a true but partial one; for the word 'not,' besides the meaning of 'other,' may also imply 'opposition.' And difference or opposition may be either total or partial: the not-beautiful may be other than the beautiful, or in no relation to the beautiful, or a specific class in various degrees opposed to the beautiful. And the negative may be a negation of fact or of thought (*οὐ* and *μή*). Lastly, there are certain ideas, such as 'beginning,' 'becoming,' 'the finite,' 'the abstract,' in which the negative cannot be separated from the positive, and 'Being' and 'Not-being' are inextricably blended.

Plato restricts the conception of Not-being to difference. Man is a rational animal, and is not — as many other things as are not included under this definition. He is and is not, and is because he is not. Besides the positive class to which he belongs, there are endless negative classes to which he may be referred. This is certainly intelligible, but useless. To refer a subject to a negative class is unmeaning, unless the 'not' is a mere modification of the positive, as in the example of 'not honourable' and 'dishonourable'; or unless the class is characterized by the absence rather than the presence of a particular quality.

Nor is it easy to see how Not-being any more than Sameness or Otherness is one of the classes of Being. They are aspects rather than classes of Being. Not-being can only be included in Being, as the denial of some particular class of Being. If we attempt to pursue such airy phantoms at all, the Hegelian identity of Being and Not-being is a more apt and intelligible expression of the same mental phenomenon. For Plato has not distinguished between

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the Being which is prior to Not-being, and the Being which is the negation of Not-being (cf. Parm. 162 A, B).

But he is not thinking of this when he says that Being comprehends Not-being. Again, we should probably go back for the true explanation to the influence which the Eleatic philosophy exercised over him. Under 'Not-being' the Eleatic had included all the realities of the sensible world. Led by this association and by the common use of language, which has been already noticed, we cannot be much surprised that Plato should have made classes of Not-being. It is observable that he does not absolutely deny that there is an opposite of Being. He is inclined to leave the question, merely remarking that the opposition, if admissible at all, is not expressed by the term 'Not-being.'

On the whole, we must allow that the great service rendered by Plato to metaphysics in the *Sophist*, is not his explanation of 'Not-being' as difference. With this he certainly laid the ghost of 'Not-being'; and we may attribute to him in a measure the credit of anticipating Spinoza and Hegel. But his conception is not clear or consistent; he does not recognize the different senses of the negative, and he confuses the different classes of Not-being with the abstract notion. As the Pre-Socratic philosopher failed to distinguish between the universal and the true, while he placed the particulars of sense under the false and apparent, so Plato appears to identify negation with falsehood, or is unable to distinguish them. The greatest service rendered by him to mental science is the recognition of the communion of classes, which, although based by him on his account of 'Not-being,' is independent of it. He clearly saw that the isolation of ideas or classes is the annihilation of reasoning. Thus, after wandering in many diverging paths, we return to common sense. And for this reason we may be inclined to do less than justice to Plato,—because the truth which he attains by a real effort of thought is to us a familiar and unconscious truism, which no one would any longer think either of doubting or examining.

IV. The later dialogues of Plato contain many references to contemporary philosophy. Both in the *Theaetetus* and in the *Sophist* he recognizes that he is in the midst of a fray; a huge irregular battle everywhere surrounds him (*Theaet.* 153 A). First, there are the two great philosophies going back into

cosmogony and poetry: the philosophy of Heracleitus, supposed to have a poetical origin in Homer, and that of the Eleatics, which in a similar spirit he conceives to be even older than Xenophanes (compare Protag. 316 E). Still older were theories of two and three principles, hot and cold, moist and dry, which were ever marrying and being given in marriage: in speaking of these, he is probably referring to Pherecydes and the early Ionians. In the philosophy of motion there were different accounts of the relation of plurality and unity, which were supposed to be joined and severed by love and hate, some maintaining that this process was perpetually going on (e. g. Heracleitus); others (e. g. Empedocles) that there was an alternation of them. Of the Pythagoreans or of Anaxagoras he makes no distinct mention. His chief opponents are, first, Eristics or Megarians; secondly, the Materialists.

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The picture which he gives of both these latter schools is indistinct; and he appears reluctant to mention the names of their teachers. Nor can we easily determine how much is to be assigned to the Cynics, how much to the Megarians, or whether the 'repellent Materialists' (Theact. 156 A) are Cynics or Atomists, or represent some unknown phase of opinion at Athens. To the Cynics and Antisthenes is commonly attributed, on the authority of Aristotle, the denial of predication, while the Megarians are said to have been Nominalists, asserting the One Good under many names to be the true Being of Zeno and the Eleatics, and, like Zeno, employing their negative dialectic in the refutation of opponents. But the later Megarians also denied predication; and this tenet, which is attributed to all of them by Simplicius, is certainly in accordance with their over-refining philosophy. The 'tyros young and old,' of whom Plato speaks (*infra* 251 B), probably include both. At any rate, we shall be safer in accepting the general description of them which he has given, and in not attempting to draw a precise line between them.

Of these Eristics, whether Cynics or Megarians, several characteristics are found in Plato:—

1. They pursue verbal oppositions; 2. they make reasoning impossible by their over-accuracy in the use of language;
3. they deny predication; 4. they go from unity to plurality,

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without passing through the intermediate stages; 5. they refuse to attribute motion or power to Being; 6. they are the enemies of sense;—whether they are the ‘friends of ideas,’ who carry on the polemic against sense, is uncertain; probably under this remarkable expression Plato designates those who more nearly approached himself, and may be criticizing an earlier form of his own doctrines. We may observe (1) that he professes only to give us a few opinions out of many which were at that time current in Greece; (2) that he nowhere alludes to the ethical teaching of the Cynics—unless the argument in the Protagoras, that the virtues are one and not many, may be supposed to contain a reference to their views, as well as to those of Socrates; and unless they are the school alluded to in the Philebus, which is described as ‘being very skilful in physics, and as maintaining pleasure to be the absence of pain.’ That Antisthenes wrote a book called ‘Physicus,’ is hardly a sufficient reason for describing them as skilful in physics, which appear to have been very alien to the tendency of the Cynics.

The Idealism of the fourth century before Christ in Greece, as in other ages and countries, seems to have provoked a reaction towards Materialism. The maintainers of this doctrine are described in the Theaetetus as obstinate persons who will believe in nothing which they cannot hold in their hands, and in the Sophist (246 D) as incapable of argument. They are probably the same who are said in the Tenth Book of the Laws (888 E) to attribute the course of events to nature, art, and chance. Who they were, we have no means of determining except from Plato’s description of them. His silence respecting the Atomists might lead us to suppose that here we have a trace of them. But the Atomists were not Materialists in the grosser sense of the term, nor were they incapable of reasoning; and Plato would hardly have described a great genius like Democritus in the disdainful terms which he uses of the Materialists. Upon the whole, we must infer that the persons here spoken of are unknown to us, like the many other writers and talkers at Athens and elsewhere, of whose endless activity of mind Aristotle in his Metaphysics has preserved an anonymous memorial.

V. The Sophist is the sequel of the Theaetetus, and is connected with the Parmenides by a direct allusion (cp. Introductions



to Theaetetus and Parmenides). In the Theaetetus we sought to discover the nature of knowledge and false opinion. But the nature of false opinion seemed impenetrable; for we were unable to understand how there could be any reality in Not-being. In the Sophist the question is taken up again; the nature of Not-being is detected, and there is no longer any metaphysical impediment in the way of admitting the possibility of falsehood. To the Parmenides, the Sophist stands in a less defined and more remote relation. There human thought is in process of disorganization; no absurdity or inconsistency is too great to be elicited from the analysis of the simple ideas of Unity or Being. In the Sophist the same contradictions are pursued to a certain extent, but only with a view to their resolution. The aim of the dialogue is to show how the few elemental conceptions of the human mind admit of a natural connexion in thought and speech, which Megarian or other sophistry vainly attempts to deny.

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Steph. True to the appointment of the previous day, Theodorus and  
 216 Theaetetus meet Socrates at the same spot, bringing with them an Eleatic Stranger, whom Theodorus introduces as a true philosopher. Socrates, half in jest, half in earnest, declares that he must be a god in disguise, who, as Homer would say, has come to earth that he may visit the good and evil among men, and detect the foolishness of Athenian wisdom. At any rate he is a divine person, one of a class who are hardly recognized on earth; who appear in divers forms—now as statesmen, now as sophists, and are often deemed madmen. ‘Philosopher, statesman, sophist,’ says Socrates, repeating the words—  
 217 to ask our Eleatic friend what his countrymen think of them; do they regard them as one, or three?’

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The Stranger has been already asked the same question by Theodorus and Theaetetus; and he at once replies that they are thought to be three; but to explain the difference fully would take time. He is pressed to give this fuller explanation, either in the form of a speech or of question and answer. He prefers the latter, and chooses as his respondent Theaetetus, whom he  
 218 already knows, and who is recommended to him by Socrates.

We are agreed, he says, about the name Sophist, but we may

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not be equally agreed about his nature. Great subjects should be approached through familiar examples, and, considering that he is a creature not easily caught, I think that, before approaching him, we should try our hand upon some more obvious animal, who may be made the subject of logical experiment; shall we say an angler? 'Very good.'

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In the first place, the angler is an artist; and there are two kinds of art,—productive art, which includes husbandry, manufactures, imitations; and acquisitive art, which includes learning, trading, fighting, hunting. The angler's is an acquisitive art, and acquisition may be effected either by exchange or by conquest; in the latter case, either by force or craft. Conquest by craft is called hunting, and of hunting there is one kind which pursues inanimate, and another which pursues animate objects; and animate objects may be either land animals or water animals, and water animals either fly over the water or live in the water. The hunting of the last is called fishing; and of fishing, one kind uses enclosures, catching the fish in nets and baskets, and another kind strikes them either with spears by night or with barbed spears or barbed hooks by day; the barbed spears are impelled from above, the barbed hooks are jerked into the head and lips of the fish, which are then drawn from below upwards. Thus, by a series of divisions, we have arrived at the definition of the angler's art.

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And now by the help of this example we may proceed to bring to light the nature of the Sophist. Like the angler, he is an artist, and the resemblance does not end here. For they are both hunters, and hunters of animals; the one of water, and the other of land animals. But at this point they diverge, the one going to the sea and the rivers, and the other to the rivers of wealth and rich meadow-lands, in which generous youth abide. On land you may hunt tame animals, or you may hunt wild animals. And man is a tame animal, and he may be hunted either by force or persuasion;—either by the pirate, man-stealer, soldier, or by the lawyer, orator, talker. The latter use persuasion, and persuasion is either private or public. Of the private practitioners of the art, some bring gifts to those whom they hunt: these are lovers. And others take hire; and some of these flatter, and in return are fed; others profess to teach virtue and receive a round

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sum. And who are these last? Tell me who? Have we not unearthed the Sophist?

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But he is a many-sided creature, and may still be traced in another line of descent. The acquisitive art had a branch of exchange as well as of hunting, and exchange is either giving or selling; and the seller is either a manufacturer or a merchant; 224 and the merchant either retails or exports; and the exporter may export either food for the body or food for the mind. And of this trading in food for the mind, one kind may be termed the art of display, and another the art of selling learning; and learning may be a learning of the arts or of virtue. The seller of the arts may be called an art-seller; the seller of virtue, a Sophist.

Again, there is a third line, in which a Sophist may be traced. For is he less a Sophist when, instead of exporting his wares to another country, he stays at home, and retails goods, which he not only buys of others, but manufactures himself?

Or he may be descended from the acquisitive art in the comba- 225 tive line, through the pugnacious, the controversial, the disputatious arts; and he will be found at last in the eristic section of the 226 latter, and in that division of it which disputes in private for gain about the general principles of right and wrong.

And still there is a track of him which has not yet been followed out by us. Do not our household servants talk of sifting, straining, winnowing? And they also speak of carding, spinning, and the like. All these are processes of division; and of division there are two kinds,—one in which like is divided from like, and another in which the good is separated from the bad. The latter of the two is termed purification; and again, of puri- 227 fication, there are two sorts,—of animate bodies (which may be internal or external), and of inanimate. Medicine and gymnastic are the internal purifications of the animate, and bathing the external; and of the inanimate, fulling and cleaning and other humble processes, some of which have ludicrous names. Not 228 that dialectic is a respecter of names or persons, or a despiser of humble occupations; nor does she think much of the greater or less benefits conferred by them. For her aim is knowledge; she wants to know how the arts are related to one another, and would quite as soon learn the nature of hunting from the vermin-destroyer as from the general. And she only desires to have

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a general name, which shall distinguish purifications of the soul from purifications of the body.

Now purification is the taking away of evil; and there are two kinds of evil in the soul,—the one answering to disease in the 228 body, and the other to deformity. Disease is the discord or war of opposite principles in the soul; and deformity is the want of symmetry, or failure in the attainment of a mark or measure. The latter arises from ignorance, and no one is voluntarily ignorant; ignorance is only the aberration of the soul moving towards knowledge. And as medicine cures the diseases, and gymnastic the deformity, of the body, so correction cures the in- 229 justice, and education (which differs among the Hellenes from mere instruction in the arts) cures the ignorance of the soul. Again, ignorance is twofold, simple ignorance, and ignorance having the conceit of knowledge. And education is also twofold: there is the old-fashioned moral training of our forefathers, which was very troublesome and not very successful; and another, of 230 a more subtle nature, which proceeds upon a notion that all ignorance is involuntary. The latter convicts a man out of his own mouth, by pointing out to him his inconsistencies and contradictions; and the consequence is that he quarrels with himself, instead of quarrelling with his neighbours, and is cured of prejudices and obstructions by a mode of treatment which is equally entertaining and effectual. The physician of the soul is aware that his patient will receive no nourishment unless he has been cleaned out; and the soul of the Great King himself, if he has not undergone this purification, is unclean and impure.

And who are the ministers of the purification? Sophists I may 231 not call them. Yet they bear about the same likeness to Sophists as the dog, who is the gentlest of animals, does to the wolf, who is the fiercest. Comparisons are slippery things; but for the present let us assume the resemblance of the two, which may probably be disallowed hereafter. And so, from division comes purification; and from this, mental purification; and from mental purification, instruction; and from instruction, education; and from education, the nobly-descended art of Sophistry, which is engaged in the detection of conceit. I do not however think that we have yet found the Sophist, or that his will ultimately prove to be the desired art of education; but neither do I think that he



can long escape me, for every way is blocked. Before we make the final assault, let us take breath, and reckon up the many forms which he has assumed: (1) he was the paid hunter of wealth and birth; (2) he was the trader in the goods of the soul; (3) he was the retailer of them; (4) he was the manufacturer of his own learned wares; (5) he was the disputant; and (6) he was the purger away of prejudices — although this latter point is admitted to be doubtful.

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- 232 Now, there must surely be something wrong in the professor of any art having so many names and kinds of knowledge. Does not the very number of them imply that the nature of his art is not understood? And that we may not be involved in the misunderstanding, let us observe which of his characteristics is the most prominent. Above all things he is a disputant. He will dispute and teach others to dispute about things visible and invisible — about man, about the gods, about politics, about law, about wrestling, about all things. But can he know all things?
- 233 'He cannot.' How then can he dispute satisfactorily with any one who knows? 'Impossible.' Then what is the trick of his art, and why does he receive money from his admirers? 'Because he is believed by them to know all things.' You mean to say that he seems to have a knowledge of them? 'Yes.'

- Suppose a person were to say, not that he would dispute about all things, but that he would make all things, you and me, and all other creatures, the earth and the heavens and the gods, and
- 234 would sell them all for a few pence — this would be a great jest; but not greater than if he said that he knew all things, and could teach them in a short time, and at a small cost. For all imitation is a jest, and the most graceful form of jest. Now the painter is a man who professes to make all things, and children, who see his pictures at a distance, sometimes take them for realities: and the Sophist pretends to know all things, and he, too, can deceive young men, who are still at a distance from the truth, not through their eyes, but through their ears, by the mummerly of words, and induce them to believe him. But as they grow older, and come into contact with realities, they learn by experience the futility of
- 235 his pretensions. The Sophist, then, has not real knowledge; he is only an imitator, or image-maker.

And now, having got him in a corner of the dialectical net, let

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us divide and subdivide until we catch him. Of image-making there are two kinds, — the art of making likenesses, and the art of making appearances. The latter may be illustrated by sculpture 236 and painting, which often use illusions, and alter the proportions of figures, in order to adapt their works to the eye. And the Sophist also uses illusions, and his imitations are apparent and not real. But how can any thing be an appearance only? Here arises a difficulty which has always beset the subject of appear- 237 ances. For the argument is asserting the existence of not-being. And this is what the great Parmenides was all his life denying in prose and also in verse. 'You will never find,' he says, 'that not-being is.' And the words prove themselves! Not-being cannot be attributed to any being; for how can any being be wholly abstracted from being? Again, in every predication there is an attribution of singular or plural. But number is the most real of 238 all things, and cannot be attributed to not-being. Therefore not-being cannot be predicated or expressed; for how can we say 'is,' 'are not,' without number?

And now arises the greatest difficulty of all. If not-being is 239 inconceivable, how can not-being be refuted? And am I not contradicting myself at this moment, in speaking either in the singular or the plural of that to which I deny both plurality and unity? You, Theaetetus, have the might of youth, and I conjure you to exert yourself, and, if you can, to find an expression for not-being which does not imply being and number. 'But I cannot.' Then the Sophist must be left in his hole. We may call him an image-maker if we please, but he will only say, 'And pray, what is an image?' And we shall reply, 'A reflection in the water, or in a mirror'; and he will say, 'Let us shut our eyes 240 and open our minds; what is the common notion of all images?' 'I should answer, Such another, made in the likeness of the true.' Real or not real? 'Not real; at least, not in a true sense.' And the real 'is,' and the not-real 'is not'? 'Yes.' Then a likeness is really unreal, and essentially not. Here is a pretty complication of being and not-being, in which the many-headed Sophist has entangled us. He will at once point out that he is compelling us 241 to contradict ourselves, by affirming being of not-being. I think that we must cease to look for him in the class of imitators.

But ought we to give him up? 'I should say, certainly not.'

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Then I fear that I must lay hands on my father Parmenides; but do not call me a parricide; for there is no way out of the difficulty except to show that in some sense not-being is; and if this is not admitted, no one can speak of falsehood, or false  
 242 opinion, or imitation, without falling into a contradiction. You observe how unwilling I am to undertake the task; for I know that I am exposing myself to the charge of inconsistency in asserting the being of not-being. But if I am to make the attempt, I think that I had better begin at the beginning.

Lightly in the days of our youth, Parmenides and others told us tales about the origin of the universe: one spoke of three principles warring and at peace again, marrying and begetting children; another of two principles, hot and cold, dry and moist, which also formed relationships. There were the Eleatics in our part of the world, saying that all things are one; whose doctrine begins with Xenophanes, and is even older. Ionian, and, more recently, Sicilian muses speak of a one and many which are held together by enmity and friendship, ever parting, ever meeting.  
 243 Some of them do not insist on the perpetual strife, but adopt a gentler strain, and speak of alternation only. Whether they are right or not, who can say? But one thing we can say—that they went on their way without much caring whether we understood them or not. For tell me, Theaetetus, do you understand what they mean by their assertion of unity, or by their combinations and separations of two or more principles? I used to think, when I was young, that I knew all about not-being, and now  
 I am in great difficulties even about being.

Let us proceed first to the examination of being. Turning to the dualist philosophers, we say to them: Is being a third element besides hot and cold? or do you identify one or both of the two  
 244 elements with being? At any rate, you can hardly avoid resolving them into one. Let us next interrogate the patrons of the one. To them we say: Are being and one two different names for the same thing? But how can there be two names when there is nothing but one? Or you may identify them; but then the name will be either the name of nothing or of itself, i. e. of a name. Again, the notion of being is conceived of as a whole—in the  
 245 words of Parmenides, 'like every way unto a rounded sphere.' And a whole has parts; but that which has parts is not one, for

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unity has no parts. Is being, then, one, because the parts of being are one, or shall we say that being is not a whole? In the former case, one is made up of parts; and in the latter there is still plurality, viz. being, and a whole which is apart from being. And being, if not all things, lacks something of the nature of being, and becomes not-being. Nor can being ever have come into existence, for nothing comes into existence except as a whole; nor can being have number, for that which has number is a whole or sum of number. These are a few of the difficulties which are accumulating one upon another in the consideration of being.

We may proceed now to the less exact sort of philosophers. 246  
Some of them drag down everything to earth, and carry on a war like that of the giants, grasping rocks and oaks in their hands. Their adversaries defend themselves warily from an invisible world, and reduce the substances of their opponents to the minutest fractions, until they are lost in generation and flux. The latter sort are civil people enough; but the materialists are rude and ignorant of dialectics; they must be taught how to argue before they can answer. Yet, for the sake of the argument, we may assume them to be better than they are, and able to give an account of themselves. They admit the existence of a mortal living creature, which is a body containing a soul, and 247  
to this they would not refuse to attribute qualities—wisdom, folly, justice and injustice. The soul, as they say, has a kind of body, but they do not like to assert of these qualities of the soul, either that they are corporeal, or that they have no existence; at this point they begin to make distinctions. ‘Sons of earth,’ we say to them, ‘if both visible and invisible qualities exist, what is the common nature which is attributed to them by the term “being” or “existence”?’ And, as they are incapable of answering this question, we may as well reply for them, that being is the power of doing or suffering. Then we turn to the friends of ideas: 248  
to them we say, ‘You distinguish becoming from being?’ ‘Yes,’ they will reply. ‘And in becoming you participate through the bodily senses, and in being, by thought and the mind?’ ‘Yes.’ And you mean by the word ‘participation’ a power of doing or suffering? To this they answer—I am acquainted with them, Theaetetus, and know their ways better than you do—that being



can neither do nor suffer, though becoming may. And we rejoin: *Sophist.*  
 Does not the soul know? And is not 'being' known? And are *ANALYSIS*  
 not 'knowing' and 'being known' active and passive? That  
 which is known is affected by knowledge, and therefore is in  
 249 motion. And, indeed, how can we imagine that perfect being is  
 a mere everlasting form, devoid of motion and soul? for there  
 can be no thought without soul, nor can soul be devoid of motion.  
 But neither can thought or mind be devoid of some principle  
 of rest or stability. And as children say entreatingly, 'Give us  
 both,' so the philosopher must include both the moveable and  
 immoveable in his idea of being. And yet, alas! he and we  
 are in the same difficulty with which we reproached the dualists;  
 250 for motion and rest are contradictions — how then can they both  
 exist? Does he who affirms this mean to say that motion is rest,  
 or rest motion? 'No; he means to assert the existence of some  
 third thing, different from them both, which neither rests nor  
 moves.' But how can there be anything which neither rests  
 nor moves? Here is a second difficulty about being, quite as  
 great as that about not-being. And we may hope that any light  
 251 which is thrown upon the one may extend to the other.

Leaving them for the present, let us enquire what we mean by  
 giving many names to the same thing, e. g. white, good, tall, to  
 man; out of which tyros old and young derive such a feast of  
 amusement. Their meagre minds refuse to predicate anything of  
 anything; they say that good is good, and man is man; and that  
 to affirm one of the other would be making the many one and the  
 one many. Let us place them in a class with our previous  
 opponents, and interrogate both of them at once. Shall we  
 assume (1) that being and rest and motion, and all other things,  
 252 are incommunicable with one another? or (2) that they all have  
 indiscriminate communion? or (3) that there is communion of  
 some and not of others? And we will consider the first hypothesis  
 first of all.

(1) If we suppose the universal separation of kinds, all theories  
 alike are swept away; the patrons of a single principle of rest or  
 of motion, or of a plurality of immutable ideas — all alike have the  
 ground cut from under them; and all creators of the universe  
 by theories of composition and division, whether out of or into  
 a finite or infinite number of elemental forms, in alternation or

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continuance, share the same fate. Most ridiculous is the discomfiture which attends the opponents of predication, who, like the ventriloquist Eurycles, have the voice that answers them in their own breast. For they cannot help using the words 'is,' 'apart,' 'from others,' and the like; and their adversaries are thus saved the trouble of refuting them. But (2) if all things have communion with all things, motion will rest, and rest will move; here is a *reductio ad absurdum*. Two out of the three hypotheses are thus seen to be false. The third (3) remains, which affirms that only certain things communicate with certain other things. In the alphabet and the scale there are some letters and notes 253 which combine with others, and some which do not; and the laws according to which they combine or are separated are known to the grammarian and musician. And there is a science which teaches not only what notes and letters, but what classes admit of combination with one another, and what not. This is a noble science, on which we have stumbled unawares; in seeking after the Sophist we have found the philosopher. He is the master who discerns one whole or form pervading a scattered multitude, and many such wholes combined under a higher one, and many entirely apart — he is the true dialectician. Like the Sophist, he is hard to recognize, though for the opposite reasons; the Sophist runs away into the obscurity of not-being, 254 the philosopher is dark from excess of light. And now, leaving him, we will return to our pursuit of the Sophist.

Agreeing in the truth of the third hypothesis, that some things have communion and others not, and that some may have communion with all, let us examine the most important kinds which are capable of admixture; and in this way we may perhaps find out a sense in which not-being may be affirmed to have being. Now the highest kinds are being, rest, motion; and of these, rest and motion exclude each other, but both of them are included in being; and again, they are the same with themselves and the other of each other. What is the meaning of these words, 'same' and 'other'? Are there two more kinds to be added to the three others? For sameness cannot be either rest or 255 motion, because predicated both of rest and motion; nor yet being, because if being were attributed to both of them we should attribute sameness to both of them. Nor can other be identified

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with being; for then other, which is relative, would have the absoluteness of being. Therefore we must assume a fifth principle, which is universal, and runs through all things, for each thing is other than all other things. Thus there are five principles: (1) being, (2) motion, which is not (3) rest, and because participating both in the same and other, is and is not (4) the same with itself, and is and is not (5) other than the other. And motion is not being, but partakes of being, and therefore is and is not in the most absolute sense. Thus we have discovered that not-being is the principle of the other which runs through all things, being not excepted. And 'being' is one thing, and 'not-being' includes and is all other things. And not-being is not the opposite of being, but only the other. Knowledge has many branches, and the other or difference has as many, each of which is described by prefixing the word 'not' to some kind of knowledge. The not-beautiful is as real as the beautiful, the not-just as the just. And the essence of the not-beautiful is to be separated from and opposed to a certain kind of existence which is termed beautiful. And this opposition and negation is the not-being of which we are in search, and is one kind of being. Thus, in spite of Parmenides, we have not only discovered the existence, but also the nature of not-being—that nature we have found to be relation. In the communion of different kinds, being and other mutually interpenetrate; other is, but is other than being, and other than each and all of the remaining kinds, and therefore in an infinity of ways 'is not.' And the argument has shown that the pursuit of contradictions is childish and useless, and the very opposite of that higher spirit which criticizes the words of another according to the natural meaning of them. Nothing can be more unphilosophical than the denial of all communion of kinds. And we are fortunate in having established such a communion for another reason, because in continuing the hunt after the Sophist we have to examine the nature of discourse, and there could be no discourse if there were no communion. For the Sophist, although he can no longer deny the existence of not-being, may still affirm that not-being cannot enter into discourse, and as he was arguing before that there could be no such thing as falsehood, because there was no such thing as not-being, he may continue to argue that there is no such

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thing as the art of image-making and phantastic, because not-being has no place in language. Hence arises the necessity of examining speech, opinion, and imagination.

And first concerning speech; let us ask the same question 261  
about words which we have already answered about the kinds of being and the letters of the alphabet: To what extent do they admit of combination? Some words have a meaning when combined, and others have no meaning. One class of words describes action, another class agents: 'walks,' 'runs,' 'sleeps' 262  
are examples of the first; 'stag,' 'horse,' 'lion' of the second. But no combination of words can be formed without a verb and a noun, e. g. 'A man learns'; the simplest sentence is composed of two words, and one of these must be a subject. For example, in the sentence, 'Theaetetus sits,' which is not 263  
very long, 'Theaetetus' is the subject, and in the sentence 'Theaetetus flies,' 'Theaetetus' is again the subject. But the two sentences differ in quality, for the first says of you that which is true, and the second says of you that which is not true, or, in other words, attributes to you things which are not as though they were. Here is false discourse in the shortest form. And thus not only speech, but thought and opinion and imagination are proved to be both true and false. For thought is only the process of silent speech, and opinion is only the silent assent 264  
or denial which follows this, and imagination is only the expression of this in some form of sense. All of them are akin to speech, and therefore, like speech, admit of true and false. And we have discovered false opinion, which is an encouraging sign of our probable success in the rest of the enquiry.

Then now let us return to our old division of likeness-making and phantastic. When we were going to place the Sophist in one of them, a doubt arose whether there could be such a thing as an appearance, because there was no such thing as falsehood. At length falsehood has been discovered by us to exist, and we have acknowledged that the Sophist is to be found in the class of imitators. All art was divided originally by us into two 265  
branches—productive and acquisitive. And now we may divide both on a different principle into the creations or imitations which are of human, and those which are of divine, origin. For we must admit that the world and ourselves and the animals did



not come into existence by chance, or the spontaneous working  
 266 of nature, but by divine reason and knowledge. And there are  
 not only divine creations but divine imitations, such as apparitions  
 and shadows and reflections, which are equally the work of  
 a divine mind. And there are human creations and human  
 imitations too,—there is the actual house and the drawing of it.  
 Nor must we forget that image-making may be an imitation of  
 267 realities or an imitation of appearances, which last has been called  
 by us phantastic. And this phantastic may be again divided  
 into imitation by the help of instruments and impersonations.  
 And the latter may be either dissembling or unconscious, either  
 with or without knowledge. A man cannot imitate you, Theae-  
 tetus, without knowing you, but he can imitate the form of  
 justice or virtue if he have a sentiment or opinion about them.  
 Not being well provided with names, the former I will venture  
 to call the imitation of science, and the latter the imitation of  
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The latter is our present concern, for the Sophist has no claims  
 to science or knowledge. Now the imitator, who has only opinion,  
 268 may be either the simple imitator, who thinks that he knows, or  
 the dissembler, who is conscious that he does not know, but dis-  
 guises his ignorance. And the last may be either a maker of long  
 speeches, or of shorter speeches which compel the person con-  
 versing to contradict himself. The maker of longer speeches is  
 the popular orator; the maker of the shorter is the Sophist, whose  
 art may be traced as being the

|  
 contradictory  
 |  
 dissembling  
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 without knowledge  
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 human and not divine  
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 juggling with words  
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 phantastic or unreal  
 |  
 art of image-making.

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In commenting on the dialogue in which Plato most nearly  
 approaches the great modern master of metaphysics there are

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several points which it will be useful to consider, such as the unity of opposites, the conception of the ideas as causes, and the relation of the Platonic and Hegelian dialectic.

The unity of opposites was the crux of ancient thinkers in the age of Plato: How could one thing be or become another? That substances have attributes was implied in common language; that heat and cold, day and night, pass into one another was a matter of experience 'on a level with the cobbler's understanding' (Theaet. 180 D). But how could philosophy explain the connexion of ideas, how justify the passing of them into one another? The abstractions of one, other, being, not-being, rest, motion, individual, universal, which successive generations of philosophers had recently discovered, seemed to be beyond the reach of human thought, like stars shining in a distant heaven. They were the symbols of different schools of philosophy: but in what relation did they stand to one another and to the world of sense? It was hardly conceivable that one could be other, or the same different. Yet without some reconciliation of these elementary ideas thought was impossible. There was no distinction between truth and falsehood, between the Sophist and the philosopher. Everything could be predicated of everything, or nothing of anything. To these difficulties Plato finds what to us appears to be the answer of common sense—that Not-being is the relative or other of Being, the defining and distinguishing principle, and that some ideas combine with others, but not all with all. It is remarkable however that he offers this obvious reply only as the result of a long and tedious enquiry; by a great effort he is able to look down as 'from a height' on the 'friends of the ideas' (248 A) as well as on the pre-Socratic philosophies. Yet he is merely asserting principles which no one who could be made to understand them would deny.

The Platonic unity of differences or opposites is the beginning of the modern view that all knowledge is of relations; it also anticipates the doctrine of Spinoza that all determination is negation. Plato takes or gives so much of either of these theories as was necessary or possible in the age in which he lived. In the *Sophist*, as in the *Cratylus*, he is opposed to the Heraclitean flux and equally to the Megarian and Cynic denial of predication, because he regards both of them as making knowledge impossible. He does not assert that everything is and is not, or

that the same thing can be affected in the same and in opposite ways at the same time and in respect of the same part of itself. The law of contradiction is as clearly laid down by him in the Republic (iv. 436 ff.; v. 454 C, D), as by Aristotle in his Organon. Yet he is aware that in the negative there is also a positive element, and that oppositions may be only differences. And in the Parmenides he deduces the many from the one and Not-being from Being, and yet shows that the many are included in the one, and that Not-being returns to Being.

In several of the later dialogues Plato is occupied with the connexion of the sciences, which in the Philebus he divides into two classes of pure and applied, adding to them there as elsewhere (Phaedr., Crat., Rep., Statesm.) a superintending science of dialectic. This is the origin of Aristotle's Architectonic, which seems, however, to have passed into an imaginary science of essence, and no longer to retain any relation to other branches of knowledge. Of such a science, whether described as 'philosophia prima,' the science of *οὐσία*, logic or metaphysics, philosophers have often dreamed. But even now the time has not arrived when the anticipation of Plato can be realized. Though many a thinker has framed a 'hierarchy of the sciences,' no one has as yet found the higher science which arrays them in harmonious order, giving to the organic and inorganic, to the physical and moral, their respective limits, and showing how they all work together in the world and in man.

Plato arranges in order the stages of knowledge and of existence. They are the steps or grades by which he rises from sense and the shadows of sense to the idea of beauty and good. Mind is in motion as well as at rest (Soph. 249 B); and may be described as a dialectical progress which passes from one limit or determination of thought to another and back again to the first. This is the account of dialectic given by Plato in the Sixth Book of the Republic (511), which regarded under another aspect is the mysticism of the Symposium (Symp. 211). He does not deny the existence of objects of sense, but according to him they only receive their true meaning when they are incorporated in a principle which is above them (Rep. vi. 511 A, B). In modern language they might be said to come first in the order of experience, last in the order of nature and reason. They are assumed, as he is fond of

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repeating, upon the condition that they shall give an account of themselves and that the truth of their existence shall be hereafter proved. For philosophy must begin somewhere and may begin anywhere,—with outward objects, with statements of opinion, with abstract principles. But objects of sense must lead us onward to the ideas or universals which are contained in them; the statements of opinion must be verified; the abstract principles must be filled up and connected with one another. In Plato we find, as we might expect, the germs of many thoughts which have been further developed by the genius of Spinoza and Hegel. But there is a difficulty in separating the germ from the flower, or in drawing the line which divides ancient from modern philosophy. Many coincidences which occur in them are unconscious, seeming to show a natural tendency in the human mind towards certain ideas and forms of thought. And there are many speculations of Plato which would have passed away unheeded, and their meaning, like that of some hieroglyphic, would have remained undeciphered, unless two thousand years or more afterwards an interpreter had arisen of a kindred spirit and of the same intellectual family. For example, in the *Sophist* Plato begins with the abstract and goes on to the concrete, not in the lower sense of returning to outward objects, but to the Hegelian concrete or unity of abstractions. In the intervening period hardly any importance would have been attached to the question which is so full of meaning to Plato and Hegel.

They differ however in their manner of regarding the question. For Plato is answering a difficulty; he is seeking to justify the use of common language and of ordinary thought into which philosophy had introduced a principle of doubt and dissolution. Whereas Hegel tries to go beyond common thought, and to combine abstractions in a higher unity: the ordinary mechanism of language and logic is carried by him into another region in which all oppositions are absorbed and all contradictions affirmed, only that they may be done away with. But Plato, unlike Hegel, nowhere bases his system on the unity of opposites, although in the *Parmenides* he shows an Hegelian subtlety in the analysis of one and Being.

It is difficult within the compass of a few pages to give even a faint outline of the Hegelian dialectic. No philosophy which is



worth understanding can be understood in a moment; common sense will not teach us metaphysics any more than mathematics. If all sciences demand of us protracted study and attention, the highest of all can hardly be matter of immediate intuition. Neither can we appreciate a great system without yielding a half assent to it — like flies we are caught in the spider's web; and we can only judge of it truly when we place ourselves at a distance from it. Of all philosophies Hegelianism is the most obscure: and the difficulty inherent in the subject is increased by the use of a technical language. The saying of Socrates respecting the writings of Heraclitus — 'Noble is that which I understand, and that which I do not understand may be as noble; but the strength of a Delian diver is needed to swim through it' — expresses the feeling with which the reader rises from the perusal of Hegel. We may truly apply to him the words in which Plato describes the Pre-Socratic philosophers: 'He went on his way rather regardless of whether we understood him or not'; or, as he is reported himself to have said of his own pupils: 'There is only one of you who understands me, and he does *not* understand me.'

Nevertheless the consideration of a few general aspects of the Hegelian philosophy may help to dispel some errors and to awaken an interest about it. (i) It is an ideal philosophy which, in popular phraseology, maintains not matter but mind to be the truth of things, and this not by a mere crude substitution of one word for another, but by showing either of them to be the complement of the other. Both are creations of thought, and the difference in kind which seems to divide them may also be regarded as a difference of degree. One is to the other as the real to the ideal, and both may be conceived together under the higher form of the notion. (ii) Under another aspect it views all the forms of sense and knowledge as stages of thought which have always existed implicitly and unconsciously, and to which the mind of the world, gradually disengaged from sense, has become awakened. The present has been the past. The succession in time of human ideas is also the eternal 'now'; it is historical and also a divine ideal. The history of philosophy stripped of personality and of the other accidents of time and place is gathered up into philosophy, and again philosophy clothed in circumstance expands into history. (iii) Whether regarded as present or past, under the

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form of time or of eternity, the spirit of dialectic is always moving onwards from one determination of thought to another, receiving each successive system of philosophy and subordinating it to that which follows — impelled by an irresistible necessity from one idea to another until the cycle of human thought and existence is complete. It follows from this that all previous philosophies which are worthy of the name are not mere opinions or speculations, but stages or moments of thought which have a necessary place in the world of mind. They are no longer the last word of philosophy, for another and another has succeeded them, but they still live and are mighty; in the language of the Greek poet, 'There is a great God in them, and he grows not old.' (iv) This vast ideal system is supposed to be based upon experience. At each step it professes to carry with it the 'witness of eyes and ears' and of common sense, as well as the internal evidence of its own consistency; it has a place for every science, and affirms that no philosophy of a narrower type is capable of comprehending all true facts.

The Hegelian dialectic may be also described as a movement from the simple to the complex. Beginning with the generalizations of sense, (1) passing through ideas of quality, quantity, measure, number, and the like, (2) ascending from presentations, that is pictorial forms of sense, to representations in which the picture vanishes and the essence is detached in thought from the outward form, (3) combining the I and the not-I, or the subject and object, the natural order of thought is at last found to include the leading ideas of the sciences and to arrange them in relation to one another. Abstractions grow together and again become concrete in a new and higher sense. They also admit of development from within in their own spheres. Everywhere there is a movement of attraction and repulsion going on — an attraction or repulsion of ideas of which the physical phenomenon described under a similar name is a figure. Freedom and necessity, mind and matter, the continuous and the discrete, cause and effect, are perpetually being severed from one another in thought, only to be perpetually reunited. The finite and infinite, the absolute and relative are not really opposed; the finite and the negation of the finite are alike lost in a higher or positive infinity, and the absolute is the sum or correlation of all relatives. When this

reconciliation of opposites is finally completed in all its stages, the mind may come back again and review the things of sense, the opinions of philosophers, the strife of theology and politics, without being disturbed by them. Whatever is, if not the very best—and what is the best, who can tell?—is, at any rate, historical and rational, suitable to its own age, unsuitable to any other. Nor can any efforts of speculative thinkers or of soldiers and statesmen materially quicken the ‘process of the suns.’

Hegel was quite sensible how great would be the difficulty of presenting philosophy to mankind under the form of opposites. Most of us live in the one-sided truth which the understanding offers to us, and if occasionally we come across difficulties like the time-honoured controversy of necessity and free-will, or the Eleatic puzzle of Achilles and the tortoise, we relegate some of them to the sphere of mystery, others to the book of riddles, and go on our way rejoicing. Most men (like Aristotle) have been accustomed to regard a contradiction in terms as the end of strife; to be told that contradiction is the life and mainspring of the intellectual world is indeed a paradox to them. Every abstraction is at first the enemy of every other, yet they are linked together, each with all, in the chain of Being. The struggle for existence is not confined to the animals, but appears in the kingdom of thought. The divisions which arise in thought between the physical and moral and between the moral and intellectual, and the like, are deepened and widened by the formal logic which elevates the defects of the human faculties into Laws of Thought; they become a part of the mind which makes them and is also made up of them. Such distinctions become so familiar to us that we regard the thing signified by them as absolutely fixed and defined. These are some of the illusions from which Hegel delivers us by placing us above ourselves, by teaching us to analyze the growth of ‘what we are pleased to call our minds,’ by reverting to a time when our present distinctions of thought and language had no existence.

Of the great dislike and childish impatience of his system which would be aroused among his opponents, he was fully aware, and would often anticipate the jests which the rest of the world, ‘in the superfluity of their wits,’ were likely to make upon him. Men are annoyed at what puzzles them; they think what

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they cannot easily understand to be full of danger. Many a sceptic has stood, as he supposed, firmly rooted in the categories of the understanding which Hegel resolves into their original nothingness. For, like Plato, he 'leaves no stone unturned' in the intellectual world. Nor can we deny that he is unnecessarily difficult, or that his own mind, like that of all metaphysicians, was too much under the dominion of his system and unable to see beyond: or that the study of philosophy, if made a serious business (cp. Rep. vii. 538), involves grave results to the mind and life of the student. For it may encumber him without enlightening his path; and it may weaken his natural faculties of thought and expression without increasing his philosophical power. The mind easily becomes entangled among abstractions, and loses hold of facts. The glass which is adapted to distant objects takes away the vision of what is near and present to us.

To Hegel, as to the ancient Greek thinkers, philosophy was a religion, a principle of life as well as of knowledge, like the idea of good in the Sixth Book of the Republic, a cause as well as an effect, the source of growth as well as of light. In forms of thought which by most of us are regarded as mere categories, he saw or thought that he saw a gradual revelation of the Divine Being. He would have been said by his opponents to have confused God with the history of philosophy, and to have been incapable of distinguishing ideas from facts. And certainly we can scarcely understand how a deep thinker like Hegel could have hoped to revive or supplant the old traditional faith by an unintelligible abstraction: or how he could have imagined that philosophy consisted only or chiefly in the categories of logic. For abstractions, though combined by him in the notion, seem to be never really concrete; they are a metaphysical anatomy, not a living and thinking substance. Though we are reminded by him again and again that we are gathering up the world in ideas, we feel after all that we have not really spanned the gulf which separates *φανόμενα* from *ὄντα*.

Having in view some of these difficulties, he seeks — and we may follow his example — to make the understanding of his system easier (*a*) by illustrations, and (*b*) by pointing out the coincidence of the speculative idea and the historical order of thought.

(*a*) If we ask how opposites can coexist, we are told that many



different qualities inhere in a flower or a tree or in any other concrete object, and that any conception of space or matter or time involves the two contradictory attributes of divisibility and continuousness. We may ponder over the thought of number, reminding ourselves that every unit both implies and denies the existence of every other, and that the one is many—a sum of fractions, and the many one—a sum of units. We may be reminded that in nature there is a centripetal as well as a centrifugal force, a regulator as well as a spring, a law of attraction as well as of repulsion. The way to the West is the way also to the East; the north pole of the magnet cannot be divided from the south pole; two *minus* signs make a *plus* in Arithmetic and Algebra. Again, we may liken the successive layers of thought to the deposits of geological strata which were once fluid and are now solid, which were at one time uppermost in the series and are now hidden in the earth; or to the successive rinds or barks of trees which year by year pass inward; or to the ripple of water which appears and reappears in an ever widening circle. Or our attention may be drawn to ideas which the moment we analyze them involve a contradiction, such as ‘beginning’ or ‘becoming,’ or to the opposite poles, as they are sometimes termed, of necessity and freedom, of idea and fact. We may be told to observe that every negative is a positive, that differences of kind are resolvable into differences of degree, and that differences of degree may be heightened into differences of kind. We may remember the common remark that there is much to be said on both sides of a question. We may be recommended to look within and to explain how opposite ideas can coexist in our own minds; and we may be told to imagine the minds of all mankind as one mind in which the true ideas of all ages and countries inhere. In our conception of God in his relation to man or of any union of the divine and human nature, a contradiction appears to be unavoidable. Is not the reconciliation of mind and body a necessity, not only of speculation but of practical life? Reflections such as these will furnish the best preparation and give the right attitude of mind for understanding the Hegelian philosophy.

(b) Hegel’s treatment of the early Greek thinkers affords the readiest illustration of his meaning in conceiving all philosophy

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under the form of opposites. The first abstraction is to him the beginning of thought. Hitherto there had only existed a tumultuous chaos of mythological fancy, but when Thales said 'All is water' a new era began to dawn upon the world. Man was seeking to grasp the universe under a single form which was at first simply a material element, the most equable and colourless and universal which could be found. But soon the human mind became dissatisfied with the emblem, and after ringing the changes on one element after another, demanded a more abstract and perfect conception, such as one or Being, which was absolutely at rest. But the positive had its negative, the conception of Being involved Not-being, the conception of one, many, the conception of a whole, parts. Then the pendulum swung to the other side, from rest to motion, from Xenophanes to Heracleitus. The opposition of Being and Not-being projected into space became the atoms and void of Leucippus and Democritus. Until the Atomists, the abstraction of the individual did not exist; in the philosophy of Anaxagoras the idea of mind, whether human or divine, was beginning to be realized. The pendulum gave another swing, from the individual to the universal, from the object to the subject. The Sophist first uttered the word 'Man is the measure of all things,' which Socrates presented in a new form as the study of ethics. Once more we return from mind to the object of mind, which is knowledge, and out of knowledge the various degrees or kinds of knowledge more or less abstract were gradually developed. The threefold division of logic, physic, and ethics, foreshadowed in Plato, was finally established by Aristotle and the Stoics. Thus, according to Hegel, in the course of about two centuries by a process of antagonism and negation the leading thoughts of philosophy were evolved.

There is nothing like this progress of opposites in Plato, who in the Symposium denies the possibility of reconciliation until the opposition has passed away. In his own words, there is an absurdity in supposing that 'harmony is discord; for in reality harmony consists of notes of a higher and lower pitch which disagreed once, but are now reconciled by the art of music' (Symp. 187 A, B). He does indeed describe objects of sense as regarded by us sometimes from one point of view and sometimes from another. As he says at the end of the Fifth Book of the Republic,

'There is nothing light which is not heavy, or great which is not small.' And he extends this relativity to the conceptions of just and good, as well as to great and small. In like manner he acknowledges that the same number may be more or less in relation to other numbers without any increase or diminution (Theæt. 155 A, B). But the perplexity only arises out of the confusion of the human faculties; the art of measuring shows us what is truly great and truly small. Though the just and good in particular instances may vary, the *idea* of good is eternal and unchangeable. And the *idea* of good is the source of knowledge and also of Being, in which all the stages of sense and knowledge are gathered up and from being hypotheses become realities.

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Leaving the comparison with Plato we may now consider the value of this invention of Hegel. There can be no question of the importance of showing that two contraries or contradictories may in certain cases be both true. The silliness of the so-called laws of thought ('All  $A = A$ ,' or, in the negative form, 'Nothing can at the same time be both  $A$ , and not  $A$ ') has been well exposed by Hegel himself (Wallace's Hegel, p. 184), who remarks that 'the form of the maxim is virtually self-contradictory, for a proposition implies a distinction between subject and predicate, whereas the maxim of identity, as it is called,  $A = A$ , does not fulfil what its form requires. Nor does any mind ever think or form conceptions in accordance with this law, nor does any existence conform to it.' Wisdom of this sort is well parodied in Shakespeare<sup>1</sup>. Unless we are willing to admit that two contradictories may be true, many questions which lie at the threshold of mathematics and of morals will be insoluble puzzles to us.

The influence of opposites is felt in practical life. The understanding sees one side of a question only — the common sense of mankind joins one of two parties in politics, in religion, in philosophy. Yet, as everybody knows, truth is not wholly the possession of either. But the characters of men are one-sided and accept this or that aspect of the truth. The understanding is strong in a single abstract principle and with this lever moves mankind. Few attain to a balance of principles or recognize

<sup>1</sup> Twelfth Night, Act iv. Sc. 2: 'Clown. For as the old hermit of Prague, that never saw pen and ink, very wittily said to a niece of King Gorboduc, "That that is is" . . . for what is "that" but "that," and "is" but "is"?'

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truly how in all human things there is a thesis and antithesis, a law of action and of reaction. In politics we require order as well as liberty, and have to consider the proportions in which under given circumstances they may be safely combined. In religion there is a tendency to lose sight of morality, to separate goodness from the love of truth, to worship God without attempting to know him. In philosophy again there are two opposite principles, of immediate experience and of those general or *a priori* truths which are supposed to transcend experience. But the common sense or common opinion of mankind is incapable of apprehending these opposite sides or views — men are determined by their natural bent to one or other of them; they go straight on for a time in a single line, and may be many things by turns but not at once.

Hence the importance of familiarizing the mind with forms which will assist us in conceiving or expressing the complex or contrary aspects of life and nature. The danger is that they may be too much for us, and obscure our appreciation of facts. As the complexity of mechanics cannot be understood without mathematics, so neither can the many-sidedness of the mental and moral world be truly apprehended without the assistance of new forms of thought. One of these forms is the unity of opposites. Abstractions have a great power over us, but they are apt to be partial and one-sided, and only when modified by other abstractions do they make an approach to the truth. Many a man has become a fatalist because he has fallen under the dominion of a single idea. He says to himself, for example, that he must be either free or necessary — he cannot be both. Thus in the ancient world whole schools of philosophy passed away in the vain attempt to solve the problem of the continuity or divisibility of matter. And in comparatively modern times, though in the spirit of an ancient philosopher, Bishop Berkeley, feeling a similar perplexity, is inclined to deny the truth of infinitesimals in mathematics. Many difficulties arise in practical religion from the impossibility of conceiving body and mind at once and in adjusting their movements to one another. There is a border ground between them which seems to belong to both; and there is as much difficulty in conceiving the body without the soul as the soul without the body. To the 'either' and 'or' philosophy ('Everything is either A or not A') should at least be added the clause 'or neither,' 'or both.'



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The double form makes reflection easier and more conformable to experience, and also more comprehensive. But in order to avoid paradox and the danger of giving offence to the unmetaphysical part of mankind, we may speak of it as due to the imperfection of language or the limitation of human faculties. It is nevertheless a discovery which, in Platonic language, may be termed a 'most gracious aid to thought.'

The doctrine of opposite moments of thought or of progression by antagonism, further assists us in framing a scheme or system of the sciences. The negation of one gives birth to another of them. The double notions are the joints which hold them together. The simple is developed into the complex, the complex returns again into the simple. Beginning with the highest notion of mind or thought, we may descend by a series of negations to the first generalizations of sense. Or again we may begin with the simplest elements of sense and proceed upwards to the highest being or thought. Metaphysic is the negation or absorption of physiology—physiology of chemistry—chemistry of mechanical philosophy. Similarly in mechanics, when we can no further go we arrive at chemistry—when chemistry becomes organic we arrive at physiology: when we pass from the outward and animal to the inward nature of man we arrive at moral and metaphysical philosophy. These sciences have each of them their own methods and are pursued independently of one another. But to the mind of the thinker they are all one—latent in one another—developed out of one another.

This method of opposites has supplied new instruments of thought for the solution of metaphysical problems, and has thrown down many of the walls within which the human mind was confined. Formerly when philosophers arrived at the infinite and absolute, they seemed to be lost in a region beyond human comprehension. But Hegel has shown that the absolute and infinite are no more true than the relative and finite, and that they must alike be negated before we arrive at a true absolute or a true infinite. The conceptions of the infinite and absolute as ordinarily understood are tiresome because they are unmeaning, but there is no peculiar sanctity or mystery in them. We might as well make an infinitesimal series of fractions or a perpetually recurring decimal the object of our worship. They are the widest and also

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the thinnest of human ideas, or, in the language of logicians, they have the greatest extension and the least comprehension. Of all words they may be truly said to be the most inflated with a false meaning. They have been handed down from one philosopher to another until they have acquired a religious character. They seem also to derive a sacredness from their association with the Divine Being. Yet they are the poorest of the predicates under which we describe him — signifying no more than this, that he is not finite, that he is not relative, and tending to obscure his higher attributes of wisdom, goodness, truth.

The system of Hegel frees the mind from the dominion of abstract ideas. We acknowledge his originality, and some of us delight to wander in the mazes of thought which he has opened to us. For Hegel has found admirers in England and Scotland when his popularity in Germany has departed, and he, like the philosophers whom he criticizes, is of the past. No other thinker has ever dissected the human mind with equal patience and minuteness. He has lightened the burden of thought because he has shown us that the chains which we wear are of our own forging. To be able to place ourselves not only above the opinions of men but above their modes of thinking, is a great height of philosophy. This dearly obtained freedom, however, we are not disposed to part with, or to allow him to build up in a new form the 'beggarly elements' of scholastic logic which he has thrown down. So far as they are aids to reflection and expression, forms of thought are useful, but no further: — we may easily have too many of them.

And when we are asked to believe the Hegelian to be the sole or universal logic, we naturally reply that there are other ways in which our ideas may be connected. The triplets of Hegel, the division into being, essence, and notion, are not the only or necessary modes in which the world of thought can be conceived. There may be an evolution by degrees as well as by opposites. The word 'continuity' suggests the possibility of resolving all differences into differences of quantity. Again, the opposites themselves may vary from the least degree of diversity up to contradictory opposition. They are not like numbers and figures, always and everywhere of the same value. And therefore the edifice which is constructed out of them has merely an imaginary

symmetry, and is really irregular and out of proportion. The spirit of Hegelian criticism should be applied to his own system, and the terms Being, Not-being, existence, essence, notion, and the like challenged and defined. For if Hegel introduces a great many distinctions, he obliterates a great many others by the help of the universal solvent 'is not,' which appears to be the simplest of negations, and yet admits of several meanings. Neither are we able to follow him in the play of metaphysical fancy which conducts him from one determination of thought to another. But we begin to suspect that this vast system is not God within us, or God immanent in the world, and may be only the invention of an individual brain. The 'beyond' is always coming back upon us however often we expel it. We do not easily believe that we have within the compass of the mind the form of universal knowledge. We rather incline to think that the method of knowledge is inseparable from actual knowledge, and wait to see what new forms may be developed out of our increasing experience and observation of man and nature. We are conscious of a Being who is without us as well as within us. Even if inclined to Pantheism we are unwilling to imagine that the meagre categories of the understanding, however ingeniously arranged or displayed, are the image of God; — that what all religions were seeking after from the beginning was the Hegelian philosophy which has been revealed in the latter days. The great metaphysician, like a prophet of old, was naturally inclined to believe that his own thoughts were divine realities. We may almost say that whatever came into his head seemed to him to be a necessary truth. He never appears to have criticized himself, or to have subjected his own ideas to the process of analysis which he applies to every other philosopher.

Hegel would have insisted that his philosophy should be accepted as a whole or not at all. He would have urged that the parts derived their meaning from one another and from the whole. He thought that he had supplied an outline large enough to contain all future knowledge, and a method to which all future philosophies must conform. His metaphysical genius is especially shown in the construction of the categories — a work which was only begun by Kant, and elaborated to the utmost by himself. But is it really true that the part has no meaning when separated

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from the whole, or that knowledge to be knowledge at all must be universal? Do all abstractions shine only by the reflected light of other abstractions? May they not also find a nearer explanation in their relation to phenomena? If many of them are correlatives they are not all so, and the relations which subsist between them vary from a mere association up to a necessary connexion. Nor is it easy to determine how far the unknown element affects the known, whether, for example, new discoveries may not one day supersede our most elementary notions about nature. To a certain extent all our knowledge is conditional upon what may be known in future ages of the world. We must admit this hypothetical element, which we cannot get rid of by an assumption that we have already discovered the method to which all philosophy must conform. Hegel is right in preferring the concrete to the abstract, in setting actuality before possibility, in excluding from the philosopher's vocabulary the word 'inconceivable.' But he is too well satisfied with his own system ever to consider the effect of what is unknown on the element which is known. To the Hegelian all things are plain and clear, while he who is outside the charmed circle is in the mire of ignorance and 'logical impurity': he who is within is omniscient, or at least has all the elements of knowledge under his hand.

Hegelianism may be said to be a transcendental defence of the world as it is. There is no room for aspiration and no need of any: 'what is actual is rational, what is rational is actual.' But a good man will not readily acquiesce in this aphorism. He knows of course that all things proceed according to law whether for good or evil. But when he sees the misery and ignorance of mankind he is convinced that without any interruption of the uniformity of nature the condition of the world may be indefinitely improved by human effort. There is also an adaptation of persons to times and countries, but this is very far from being the fulfilment of their higher natures. The man of the seventeenth century is unfitted for the eighteenth, and the man of the eighteenth for the nineteenth, and most of us would be out of place in the world of a hundred years hence. But all higher minds are much more akin than they are different: genius is of all ages, and there is perhaps more uniformity in excellence than in mediocrity. The sublimer intelligences of mankind — Plato, Dante,



Sir Thomas More — meet in a higher sphere above the ordinary ways of men; they understand one another from afar, notwithstanding the interval which separates them. They are 'the spectators of all time and of all existence'; their works live for ever; and there is nothing to prevent the force of their individuality breaking through the uniformity which surrounds them. But such disturbers of the order of thought Hegel is reluctant to acknowledge.

The doctrine of Hegel will to many seem the expression of an indolent conservatism, and will at any rate be made an excuse for it. The mind of the patriot rebels when he is told that the worst tyranny and oppression has a natural fitness; he cannot be persuaded, for example, that the conquest of Prussia by Napoleon I. was either natural or necessary, or that any similar calamity befalling a nation should be a matter of indifference to the poet or philosopher. We may need such a philosophy or religion to console us under evils which are irremediable, but we see that it is fatal to the higher life of man. It seems to say to us, 'The world is a vast system or machine which can be conceived under the forms of logic, but in which no single man can do any great good or any great harm. Even if it were a thousand times worse than it is, it could be arranged in categories and explained by philosophers. And what more do we want?'

The philosophy of Hegel appeals to an historical criterion: the ideas of men have a succession in time as well as an order of thought. But the assumption that there is a correspondence between the succession of ideas in history and the natural order of philosophy is hardly true even of the beginnings of thought. And in later systems forms of thought are too numerous and complex to admit of our tracing in them a regular succession. They seem also to be in part reflections of the past, and it is difficult to separate in them what is original and what is borrowed. Doubtless they have a relation to one another — the transition from Descartes to Spinoza or from Locke to Berkeley is not a matter of chance, but it can hardly be described as an alternation of opposites or figured to the mind by the vibrations of a pendulum. Even in Aristotle and Plato, rightly understood, we cannot trace this law of action and reaction. They are both idealists, although to the one the idea is actual and immanent,— to

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the other only potential and transcendent, as Hegel himself has pointed out (Wallace's Hegel, p. 223). The true meaning of Aristotle has been disguised from us by his own appeal to fact and the opinions of mankind in his more popular works, and by the use made of his writings in the Middle Ages. No book, except the Scriptures, has been so much read, and so little understood. The Pre-Socratic philosophies are simpler, and we may observe a progress in them; but is there any regular succession? The ideas of Being, change, number, seem to have sprung up contemporaneously in different parts of Greece and we have no difficulty in constructing them out of one another — we can see that the union of Being and Not-being gave birth to the idea of change or Becoming and that one might be another aspect of Being. Again, the Eleatics may be regarded as developing in one direction into the Megarian school, in the other into the Atomists, but there is no necessary connexion between them. Nor is there any indication that the deficiency which was felt in one school was supplemented or compensated by another. They were all efforts to supply the want which the Greeks began to feel at the beginning of the sixth century before Christ,—the want of abstract ideas. Nor must we forget the uncertainty of chronology; — if, as Aristotle says, there were Atomists before Leucippus, Eleatics before Xenophanes, and perhaps 'patrons of the flux' before Heraclitus, Hegel's order of thought in the history of philosophy would be as much disarranged as his order of religious thought by recent discoveries in the history of religion.

Hegel is fond of repeating that all philosophies still live and that the earlier are preserved in the later; they are refuted, and they are not refuted, by those who succeed them. Once they reigned supreme, now they are subordinated to a power or idea greater or more comprehensive than their own. The thoughts of Socrates and Plato and Aristotle have certainly sunk deep into the mind of the world, and have exercised an influence which will never pass away; but can we say that they have the same meaning in modern and ancient philosophy? Some of them, as for example the words 'Being,' 'essence,' 'matter,' 'form,' either have become obsolete, or are used in new senses, whereas 'individual,' 'cause,' 'motive,' have acquired an exaggerated importance. Is the manner in which the logical de-

terminations of thought, or 'categories' as they may be termed, have been handed down to us, really different from that in which other words have come down to us? Have they not been equally subject to accident, and are they not often used by Hegel himself in senses which would have been quite unintelligible to their original inventors—as for example, when he speaks of the 'ground' of Leibnitz ('Everything has a sufficient ground') as identical with his own doctrine of the 'notion' (Wallace's Hegel, p. 195), or the 'Being and Not-being' of Heracleitus as the same with his own 'Becoming'?

As the historical order of thought has been adapted to the logical, so we have reason for suspecting that the Hegelian logic has been in some degree adapted to the order of thought in history. There is unfortunately no criterion to which either of them can be subjected, and not much forcing was required to bring either into near relations with the other. We may fairly doubt whether the division of the first and second parts of logic in the Hegelian system has not really arisen from a desire to make them accord with the first and second stages of the early Greek philosophy. Is there any reason why the conception of measure in the first part, which is formed by the union of quality and quantity, should not have been equally placed in the second division of mediate or reflected ideas? The more we analyze them the less exact does the coincidence of philosophy and the history of philosophy appear. Many terms which were used absolutely in the beginning of philosophy, such as 'Being,' 'matter,' 'cause,' and the like, became relative in the subsequent history of thought. But Hegel employs some of them absolutely, some relatively, seemingly without any principle and without any regard to their original significance.

The divisions of the Hegelian logic bear a superficial resemblance to the divisions of the scholastic logic. The first part answers to the term, the second to the proposition, the third to the syllogism. These are the grades of thought under which we conceive the world, first, in the general terms of quality, quantity, measure; secondly, under the relative forms of 'ground' and existence, substance and accidents, and the like; thirdly in syllogistic forms of the individual mediated with the universal by the help of the particular. Of syllogisms there are various

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kinds,—qualitative, quantitative, inductive, mechanical, teleological,—which are developed out of one another. But is there any meaning in reintroducing the forms of the old logic? Who ever thinks of the world as a syllogism? What connexion is there between the proposition and our ideas of reciprocity, cause and effect, and similar relations? It is difficult enough to conceive all the powers of nature and mind gathered up in one. The difficulty is greatly increased when the new is confused with the old, and the common logic is the Procrustes' bed into which they are forced.

The Hegelian philosophy claims, as we have seen, to be based upon experience: it abrogates the distinction of *a priori* and *a posteriori* truth. It also acknowledges that many differences of kind are resolvable into differences of degree. It is familiar with the terms 'evolution,' 'development,' and the like. Yet it can hardly be said to have considered the forms of thought which are best adapted for the expression of facts. It has never applied the categories to experience; it has not defined the differences in our ideas of opposition, or development, or cause and effect, in the different sciences which make use of these terms. It rests on a knowledge which is not the result of exact or serious enquiry, but is floating in the air; the mind has been imperceptibly informed of some of the methods required in the sciences. Hegel boasts that the movement of dialectic is at once necessary and spontaneous: in reality it goes beyond experience and is unverified by it. Further, the Hegelian philosophy, while giving us the power of thinking a great deal more than we are able to fill up, seems to be wanting in some determinations of thought which we require. We cannot say that physical science, which at present occupies so large a share of popular attention, has been made easier or more intelligible by the distinctions of Hegel. Nor can we deny that he has sometimes interpreted physics by metaphysics, and confused his own philosophical fancies with the laws of nature. The very freedom of the movement is not without suspicion, seeming to imply a state of the human mind which has entirely lost sight of facts. Nor can the necessity which is attributed to it be very stringent, seeing that the successive categories or determinations of thought in different parts of his writings are arranged by the philosopher



in different ways. What is termed necessary evolution seems to be only the order in which a succession of ideas presented themselves to the mind of Hegel at a particular time.

The nomenclature of Hegel has been made by himself out of the language of common life. He uses a few words only which are borrowed from his predecessors, or from the Greek philosophy, and these generally in a sense peculiar to himself. The first stage of his philosophy answers to the word 'is,' the second to the word 'has been,' the third to the words 'has been' and 'is' combined. In other words, the first sphere is immediate, the second mediated by reflection, the third or highest returns into the first, and is both mediate and immediate. As Luther's Bible was written in the language of the common people, so Hegel seems to have thought that he gave his philosophy a truly German character by the use of idiomatic German words. But it may be doubted whether the attempt has been successful. First because such words as 'in sich seyn,' 'an sich seyn,' 'an und für sich seyn,' though the simplest combinations of nouns and verbs, require a difficult and elaborate explanation. The simplicity of the words contrasts with the hardness of their meaning. Secondly, the use of technical phraseology necessarily separates philosophy from general literature; the student has to learn a new language of uncertain meaning which he with difficulty remembers. No former philosopher had ever carried the use of technical terms to the same extent as Hegel. The language of Plato or even of Aristotle is but slightly removed from that of common life, and was introduced naturally by a series of thinkers; the language of the scholastic logic has become technical to us, but in the Middle Ages was the vernacular Latin of priests and students. The higher spirit of philosophy, the spirit of Plato and Socrates, rebels against the Hegelian use of language as mechanical and technical.

Hegel is fond of etymologies and often seems to trifle with words. He gives etymologies which are bad, and never considers that the meaning of a word may have nothing to do with its derivation. He lived before the days of Comparative Philology or of Comparative Mythology and Religion, which would have opened a new world to him. He makes no allowance for the element of chance either in language or thought; and perhaps

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there is no greater defect in his system than the want of a sound theory of language. He speaks as if thought, instead of being identical with language, was wholly independent of it. It is not the actual growth of the mind, but the imaginary growth of the Hegelian system, which is attractive to him.

Neither are we able to say why of the common forms of thought some are rejected by him, while others have an undue prominence given to them. Some of them, such as 'ground' and 'existence,' have hardly any basis either in language or philosophy, while others, such as 'cause' and 'effect,' are but slightly considered. All abstractions are supposed by Hegel to derive their meaning from one another. This is true of some, but not of all, and in different degrees. There is an explanation of abstractions by the phenomena which they represent, as well as by their relation to other abstractions. If the knowledge of all were necessary to the knowledge of any one of them, the mind would sink under the load of thought. Again, in every process of reflection we seem to require a standing ground, and in the attempt to obtain a complete analysis we lose all fixedness. If, for example, the mind is viewed as the complex of ideas, or the difference between things and persons denied, such an analysis may be justified from the point of view of Hegel: but we shall find that in the attempt to criticize thought we have lost the power of thinking, and, like the Heracliteans of old, have no words in which our meaning can be expressed. Such an analysis may be of value as a corrective of popular language or thought, but should still allow us to retain the fundamental distinctions of philosophy.

In the Hegelian system ideas supersede persons. The world of thought, though sometimes described as Spirit or 'Geist,' is really impersonal. The minds of men are to be regarded as one mind, or more correctly as a succession of ideas. Any comprehensive view of the world must necessarily be general, and there may be a use with a view to comprehensiveness in dropping individuals and their lives and actions. In all things, if we leave out details, a certain degree of order begins to appear; at any rate we can make an order which, with a little exaggeration or disproportion in some of the parts, will cover the whole field of philosophy. But are we therefore justified in saying that ideas are the causes

of the great movement of the world rather than the personalities which conceived them? The great man is the expression of his time, and there may be peculiar difficulties in his age which he cannot overcome. He may be out of harmony with his circumstances, too early or too late, and then all his thoughts perish; his genius passes away unknown. But not therefore is he to be regarded as a mere waif or stray in human history, any more than he is the mere creature or expression of the age in which he lives. His ideas are inseparable from himself, and would have been nothing without him. Through a thousand personal influences they have been brought home to the minds of others. He starts from antecedents, but he is great in proportion as he disengages himself from them or absorbs himself in them. Moreover the types of greatness differ; while one man is the expression of the influences of his age, another is in antagonism to them. One man is borne on the surface of the water; another is carried forward by the current which flows beneath. The character of an individual, whether he be independent of circumstances or not, inspires others quite as much as his words. What is the teaching of Socrates apart from his personal history, or the doctrines of Christ apart from the Divine life in which they are embodied? Has not Hegel himself delineated the greatness of the life of Christ as consisting in his 'Schicksalslosigkeit' or independence of the destiny of his race? Do not persons become ideas, and is there any distinction between them? Take away the five greatest legislators, the five greatest warriors, the five greatest poets, the five greatest founders or teachers of a religion, the five greatest philosophers, the five greatest inventors,—where would have been all that we most value in knowledge or in life? And can that be a true theory of the history of philosophy which, in Hegel's own language, 'does not allow the individual to have his right'?

Once more, while we readily admit that the world is relative to the mind, and the mind to the world, and that we must suppose a common or correlative growth in them, we shrink from saying that this complex nature can contain, even in outline, all the endless forms of Being and knowledge. Are we not 'seeking the living among the dead' and dignifying a mere logical skeleton with the name of philosophy and almost of God? When we look

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far away into the primeval sources of thought and belief, do we suppose that the mere accident of our being the heirs of the Greek philosophers can give us a right to set ourselves up as having the true and only standard of reason in the world? Or when we contemplate the infinite worlds in the expanse of heaven can we imagine that a few meagre categories derived from language and invented by the genius of one or two great thinkers contain the secret of the universe? Or, having regard to the ages during which the human race may yet endure, do we suppose that we can anticipate the proportions human knowledge may attain even within the short space of one or two thousand years?

Again, we have a difficulty in understanding how ideas can be causes, which to us seems to be as much a figure of speech as the old notion of a creator artist, 'who makes the world by the help of the demigods' (Plato, *Tim.*), or with 'a golden pair of compasses' measures out the circumference of the universe (Milton, *P. L.*). We can understand how the idea in the mind of an inventor is the cause of the work which is produced by it; and we can dimly imagine how this universal frame may be animated by a divine intelligence. But we cannot conceive how all the thoughts of men that ever were, which are themselves subject to so many external conditions of climate, country, and the like, even if regarded as the single thought of a Divine Being, can be supposed to have made the world. We appear to be only wrapping up ourselves in our own conceits — to be confusing cause and effect — to be losing the distinction between reflection and action, between the human and divine.

These are some of the doubts and suspicions which arise in the mind of a student of Hegel, when, after living for a time within the charmed circle, he removes to a little distance and looks back upon what he has learnt, from the vantage-ground of history and experience. The enthusiasm of his youth has passed away, the authority of the master no longer retains a hold upon him. But he does not regret the time spent in the study of him. He finds that he has received from him a real enlargement of mind, and much of the true spirit of philosophy, even when he has ceased to believe in him. He returns again and again to his writings as to the recollections of a first love, not undeserving of his



admiration still. Perhaps if we were asked how he can admire without believing, or what value he can attribute to what he knows to be erroneous, he might answer in some such manner as the following : —

1. That in Hegel he finds glimpses of the genius of the poet and of the common sense of the man of the world. His system is not cast in a poetic form, but neither has all this load of logic extinguished in him the feeling of poetry. He is the true countryman of his contemporaries Goethe and Schiller. Many fine expressions are scattered up and down in his writings, as when he tells us that ‘the Crusaders went to the Sepulchre but found it empty.’ He delights to find vestiges of his own philosophy in the older German mystics. And though he can be scarcely said to have mixed much in the affairs of men, for, as his biographer tells us, ‘he lived for thirty years in a single room,’ yet he is far from being ignorant of the world. No one can read his writings without acquiring an insight into life. He loves to touch with the spear of logic the follies and self-deceptions of mankind, and make them appear in their natural form, stripped of the disguises of language and custom. He will not allow men to defend themselves by an appeal to one-sided or abstract principles. In this age of reason any one can too easily find a reason for doing what he likes (Wallace, p. 197). He is suspicious of a distinction which is often made between a person’s character and his conduct. His spirit is the opposite of that of Jesuitism or casuistry (Wallace, p. 181). He affords an example of a remark which has been often made, that in order to know the world it is not necessary to have had a great experience of it.

2. Hegel, if not the greatest philosopher, is certainly the greatest critic of philosophy who ever lived. No one else has equally mastered the opinions of his predecessors or traced the connexion of them in the same manner. No one has equally raised the human mind above the trivialities of the common logic and the unmeaningness of ‘mere’ abstractions, and above imaginary possibilities, which, as he truly says, have no place in philosophy. No one has won so much for the kingdom of ideas. Whatever may be thought of his own system it will hardly be denied that he has overthrown Locke, Kant, Hume, and the so-called philosophy of common sense. He shows us that only by the study of meta-

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physics can we get rid of metaphysics, and that those who are in theory most opposed to them are in fact most entirely and hopelessly enslaved by them: 'die reinen Physiker sind nur die Thiere.' The disciple of Hegel will hardly become the slave of any other system-maker. What Bacon seems to promise him he will find realized in the great German thinker, an emancipation nearly complete from the influences of the scholastic logic.

3. Many of those who are least disposed to become the votaries of Hegelianism nevertheless recognize in his system a new logic supplying a variety of instruments and methods hitherto unemployed. We may not be able to agree with him in assimilating the natural order of human thought with the history of philosophy, and still less in identifying both with the divine idea or nature. But we may acknowledge that the great thinker has thrown a light on many parts of human knowledge, and has solved many difficulties. We cannot receive his doctrine of opposites as the last word of philosophy, but still we may regard it as a very important contribution to logic. We cannot affirm that words have no meaning when taken out of their connexion in the history of thought. But we recognize that their meaning is to a great extent due to association, and to their correlation with one another. We see the advantage of viewing in the concrete what mankind regard only in the abstract. There is much to be said for his faith or conviction, that God is immanent in the world,—within the sphere of the human mind, and not beyond it. It was natural that he himself, like a prophet of old, should regard the philosophy which he had invented as the voice of God in man. But this by no means implies that he conceived himself as creating God in thought. He was the servant of his own ideas and not the master of them. The philosophy of history and the history of philosophy may be almost said to have been discovered by him. He has done more to explain Greek thought than all other writers put together. Many ideas of development, evolution, reciprocity, which have become the symbols of another school of thinkers may be traced to his speculations. In the theology and philosophy of England as well as of Germany, and also in the lighter literature of both countries, there are always appearing 'fragments of the great banquet' of Hegel.

# SOPHIST.

## PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

THEODORUS.

THEAETETUS.

SOCRATES.

AN ELEATIC STRANGER, whom Theodorus and Theaetetus bring with them.  
The younger SOCRATES, who is a silent auditor.

Steph. *Theodorus.* HERE we are, Socrates, true to our agreement  
216 of yesterday; and we bring with us a stranger from Elea, who is a disciple of Parmenides and Zeno, and a true philosopher.

*Socrates.* Is he not rather a god, Theodorus, who comes to us in the disguise of a stranger? For Homer says that all the gods, and especially the god of strangers, are companions of the meek and just, and visit the good and evil among men. And may not your companion be one of those higher powers, a cross-examining deity, who has come to spy out our weakness in argument, and to cross-examine us?

*Theod.* Nay, Socrates, he is not one of the disputatious sort—he is too good for that. And, in my opinion, he is not a god at all; but divine he certainly is, for this is a title which I should give to all philosophers.

*Soc.* Capital, my friend! and I may add that they are almost as hard to be discerned as the gods. For the true philosophers, and such as are not merely made up for the occasion, appear in various forms unrecognized by the ignorance of men, and they 'hover about cities,' as Homer declares, looking from above upon human life; and some think nothing of them, and others can never think enough; and sometimes they appear as statesmen, and sometimes as sophists; and then, again, to many they seem to be no better

*Sophist.*

THEODORUS,  
SOCRATES.

The Eleatic stranger, who is introduced by Theodorus, is taken by Socrates for some cross-examining deity; and Theodorus acknowledges that, though not a god, he is at any rate a divine man.

*Sophist.*SOCRATES,  
THEODORUS,  
STRANGER.A question is  
put to him :Are the  
sophist,  
statesman,  
and philoso-  
pher different,  
or the same ?

than madmen. I should like to ask our Eleatic friend, if he would tell us, what is thought about them in Italy, and to whom the terms are applied. 217

*Theod.* What terms?*Soc.* Sophist, statesman, philosopher.*Theod.* What is your difficulty about them, and what made you ask?*Soc.* I want to know whether by his countrymen they are regarded as one or two ; or do they, as the names are three, distinguish also three kinds, and assign one to each name?*Theod.* I dare say that the Stranger will not object to discuss the question. What do you say, Stranger?*Stranger.* I am far from objecting, Theodorus, nor have I any difficulty in replying that by us they are regarded as three. But to define precisely the nature of each of them is by no means a slight or easy task.*Theod.* You have happened to light, Socrates, almost on the very question which we were asking our friend before we came hither, and he excused himself to us, as he does now to you ; although he admitted that the matter had been fully discussed, and that he remembered the answer.*Soc.* Then do not, Stranger, deny us the first favour which we ask of you : I am sure that you will not, and therefore I shall only beg of you to say whether you like and are accustomed to make a long oration on a subject which you want to explain to another, or to proceed by the method of question and answer. I remember hearing a very noble discussion in which Parmenides employed the latter of the two methods, when I was a young man, and he was far advanced in years<sup>1</sup>.*Str.* I prefer to talk with another when he responds pleasantly, and is light in hand ; if not, I would rather have my own say.*Soc.* Any one of the present company will respond kindly to you, and you can choose whom you like of them ; I should recommend you to take a young person — Theaetetus, for example — unless you have a preference for some one else.*Str.* I feel ashamed, Socrates, being a new-comer into your society, instead of talking a little and hearing others talk, to<sup>1</sup> Cp. Parm., 137 ff.The stranger  
may either  
speak at  
length or  
adopt the  
method of  
question  
and answer.



be spinning out a long soliloquy or address, as if I wanted to show off. For the true answer will certainly be a very long one, a great deal longer than might be expected from such a short and simple question. At the same time, I fear that I may seem rude and ungracious if I refuse your courteous  
218 request, especially after what you have said. For I certainly cannot object to your proposal, that Theaetetus should respond, having already conversed with him myself, and being recommended by you to take him.

*Sophist.*

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

On the present occasion he prefers the latter, and accepts the proposal of Socrates that Theaetetus should be his respondent.

*Theaetetus.* But are you sure, Stranger, that this will be quite so acceptable to the rest of the company as Socrates imagines?

*Str.* You hear them applauding, Theaetetus; after that, there is nothing more to be said. Well then, I am to argue with you, and if you tire of the argument, you may complain of your friends and not of me.

*Theat.* I do not think that I shall tire, and if I do, I shall get my friend here, young Socrates, the namesake of the elder Socrates, to help; he is about my own age, and my partner at the gymnasium, and is constantly accustomed to work with me.

*Str.* Very good; you can decide about that for yourself as we proceed. Meanwhile you and I will begin together and enquire into the nature of the Sophist, first of the three: I should like you to make out what he is and bring him to light in a discussion; for at present we are only agreed about the name, but of the thing to which we both apply the name possibly you have one notion and I another; whereas we ought always to come to an understanding about the thing itself in terms of a definition, and not merely about the name minus the definition. Now the tribe of Sophists which we are investigating is not easily caught or defined; and the world has long ago agreed, that if great subjects are to be adequately treated, they must be studied in the lesser and easier instances of them before we proceed to the greatest of all. And as I know that the tribe of Sophists is troublesome and hard to be caught, I should recommend that we practise beforehand the method which is to be applied to him on some simple and smaller thing, unless you can suggest a better way.

First of all.  
What is the  
Sophist?

As he is not  
easy to catch,  
we had better  
begin with  
something  
simpler;

*Sophist.**Theaet.* Indeed I cannot.STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.*Str.* Then suppose that we work out some lesser example which will be a pattern of the greater?*Theaet.* Good.e. g. with  
the angler.*Str.* What is there which is well known and not great, and is yet as susceptible of definition as any larger thing? Shall I say an angler? He is familiar to all of us, and not a very interesting or important person.*Theaet.* He is not.*Str.* Yet I suspect that he will furnish us with the sort of 219 definition and line of enquiry which we want.*Theaet.* Very good.He is an artist,  
and all art is  
either creative  
or acquisitive.*Str.* Let us begin by asking whether he is a man having art or not having art, but some other power.*Theaet.* He is clearly a man of art.*Str.* And of arts there are two kinds?*Theaet.* What are they?*Str.* There is agriculture, and the tending of mortal creatures, and the art of constructing or moulding vessels, and there is the art of imitation — all these may be appropriately called by a single name.*Theaet.* What do you mean? And what is the name?*Str.* He who brings into existence something that did not exist before is said to be a producer, and that which is brought into existence is said to be produced.*Theaet.* True.*Str.* And all the arts which were just now mentioned are characterized by this power of producing?*Theaet.* They are.*Str.* Then let us sum them up under the name of productive or creative art.*Theaet.* Very good.*Str.* Next follows the whole class of learning and cognition; then comes trade, fighting, hunting. And since none of these produces anything, but is only engaged in conquering by word or deed, or in preventing others from conquering, things which exist and have been already produced — in each and all of these branches there appears to be an art which may be called acquisitive.*Theaet.* Yes, that is the proper name.

*Str.* Seeing, then, that all arts are either acquisitive or creative, in which class shall we place the art of the angler?

*Theaet.* Clearly in the acquisitive class.

*Str.* And the acquisitive may be subdivided into two parts: there is exchange, which is voluntary and is effected by gifts, hire, purchase; and the other part of acquisitive, which takes by force of word or deed, may be termed conquest?

*Theaet.* That is implied in what has been said.

*Str.* And may not conquest be again subdivided?

*Theaet.* How?

*Str.* Open force may be called fighting, and secret force may have the general name of hunting?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Str.* And there is no reason why the art of hunting should not be further divided.

*Theaet.* How would you make the division?

*Str.* Into the hunting of living and of lifeless prey.

*Theaet.* Yes, if both kinds exist.

220 *Str.* Of course they exist; but the hunting after lifeless things having no special name, except some sorts of diving, and other small matters, may be omitted; the hunting after living things may be called animal hunting.

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Str.* And animal hunting may be truly said to have two divisions, land-animal hunting, which has many kinds and names, and water-animal hunting, or the hunting after animals who swim?

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* And of swimming animals, one class lives on the wing and the other in the water?

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Str.* Fowling is the general term under which the hunting of all birds is included.

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* The hunting of animals who live in the water has the general name of fishing.

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Str.* And this sort of hunting may be further divided also into two principal kinds?

*Theaet.* What are they?

*Sophist.*

STRANGER.  
THEAETETUS.

The angler is to be placed in the acquisitive class.

Acquisition is voluntary (= exchange) or forcible (= conquest).

Conquest is open (= fighting) or secret (= hunting).

There is hunting of animals, and of lifeless prey;

the former includes the hunting of land animals and of water animals.

Water animals live on the wing or in the water: the fowler hunts the former, the fisherman the latter.

There are two kinds of fishing —

*Sophist.*

*Str.* There is one kind which takes them in nets, another which takes them by a blow.

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

*Theact.* What do you mean, and how do you distinguish them?

fishing with  
enclosures and  
by striking.

*Str.* As to the first kind — all that surrounds and encloses anything to prevent egress, may be rightly called an enclosure.

*Theact.* Very true.

*Str.* For which reason twig baskets, casting-nets, nooses, creels, and the like may all be termed 'enclosures'?

*Theact.* True.

*Str.* And therefore this first kind of capture may be called by us capture with enclosures, or something of that sort?

*Theact.* Yes.

*Str.* The other kind, which is practised by a blow with hooks and three-pronged spears, when summed up under one name, may be called striking, unless you, Theaetetus, can find some better name?

*Theact.* Never mind the name — what you suggest will do very well.

*Str.* There is one mode of striking, which is done at night, and by the light of a fire, and is by the hunters themselves called firing, or spearing by firelight.

*Theact.* True.

*Str.* And the fishing by day is called by the general name of barbing, because the spears, too, are barbed at the point.

*Theact.* Yes, that is the term.

*Str.* Of this barb-fishing, that which strikes the fish who is below from above is called spearing, because this is the way in which the three-pronged spears are mostly used.

*Theact.* Yes, it is often called so.

*Str.* Then now there is only one kind remaining.

*Theact.* What is that?

*Str.* When a hook is used, and the fish is not struck in any chance part of his body, as he is with the spear, but only about the head and mouth, and is then drawn out from below upwards with reeds and rods:—What is the right name of that mode of fishing, Theaetetus? 221

*Theact.* I suspect that we have now discovered the object of our search.

*Str.* Then now you and I have come to an understanding

There is  
striking by  
day, and  
striking by  
night: the  
former is  
called  
barbing.Barbing is of  
two kinds,—  
spearing and  
ANGLING.Recapitu-  
lation.



not only about the name of the angler's art, but about the definition of the thing itself. One half of all art was acquisitive — half of the acquisitive art was conquest or taking by force, half of this was hunting, and half of hunting was hunting animals, half of this was hunting water animals — of this again, the under half was fishing, half of fishing was striking; a part of striking was fishing with a barb, and one half of this again, being the kind which strikes with a hook and draws the fish from below upwards, is the art which we have been seeking, and which from the nature of the operation is denoted angling or drawing up (*ἀσπαλιευτική, ἀνασπᾶσθαι*).

*Sophist.*

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

*Theaet.* The result has been quite satisfactorily brought out.

*Str.* And now, following this pattern, let us endeavour to find out what a Sophist is.

The definition  
of the Sophist:

*Theaet.* By all means.

*Str.* The first question about the angler was, whether he was a skilled artist or unskilled?

Like the  
angler, he  
is a skilled  
person

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* And shall we call our new friend unskilled, or a thorough master of his craft?

*Theaet.* Certainly not unskilled, for his name, as, indeed, you imply, must surely express his nature.

*Str.* Then he must be supposed to have some art.

*Theaet.* What art?

*Str.* By heaven, they are cousins! it never occurred to us.

*Theaet.* Who are cousins?

*Str.* The angler and the Sophist.

*Theaet.* In what way are they related?

*Str.* They both appear to me to be hunters.

*Theaet.* How the Sophist? Of the other we have spoken.

*Str.* You remember our division of hunting, into hunting after swimming animals and land animals?

and a hunter,  
—not however  
of a swim-  
ming, but  
of a land ani-  
mal—man.

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Str.* And you remember that we subdivided the swimming and left the land animals, saying that there were many kinds of them?

222 *Theaet.* Certainly.

*Str.* Thus far, then, the Sophist and the angler, starting from the art of acquiring, take the same road?

*Sophist.*

*Theæt.* So it would appear.

STRANGER,  
THEÆTETUS.

*Str.* Their paths diverge when they reach the art of animal hunting; the one going to the sea-shore, and to the rivers and to the lakes, and angling for the animals which are in them.

The angler goes to the rivers and to the sea; the Sophist to the broad meadow-lands of youth.

*Theæt.* Very true.

*Str.* While the other goes to land and water of another sort — rivers of wealth and broad meadow-lands of generous youth; and he also is intending to take the animals which are in them.

*Theæt.* What do you mean?

Hunting on land is of tame and of wild animals.

*Str.* Of hunting on land there are two principal divisions.

*Theæt.* What are they?

*Str.* One is the hunting of tame, and the other of wild animals.

*Theæt.* But are tame animals ever hunted?

Under tame animals man is included.

*Str.* Yes, if you include man under tame animals. But if you like you may say that there are no tame animals, or that, if there are, man is not among them; or you may say that man is a tame animal but is not hunted — you shall decide which of these alternatives you prefer.

*Theæt.* I should say, Stranger, that man is a tame animal, and I admit that he is hunted.

Tame animals are hunted with violence, or by persuasion.

*Str.* Then let us divide the hunting of tame animals into two parts.

*Theæt.* How shall we make the division?

*Str.* Let us define piracy, man-stealing, tyranny, the whole military art, by one name, as hunting with violence.

*Theæt.* Very good.

*Str.* But the art of the lawyer, of the popular orator, and the art of conversation may be called in one word the art of persuasion.

*Theæt.* True.

Persuasion is public or private.

*Str.* And of persuasion, there may be said to be two kinds?

*Theæt.* What are they?

*Str.* One is private, and the other public.

*Theæt.* Yes; each of them forms a class.

The hunter in private brings gifts, like the

*Str.* And of private hunting, one sort receives hire, and the other brings gifts.

*Theæt.* I do not understand you.

*Str.* You seem never to have observed the manner in which lovers hunt.

*Sophist.*

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

lover, or  
receives hire.

*Theaet.* To what do you refer?

*Str.* I mean that they lavish gifts on those whom they hunt in addition to other inducements.

*Theaet.* Most true.

*Str.* Let us admit this, then, to be the amatory art.

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Str.* But that sort of hireling whose conversation is pleasing and who baits his hook only with pleasure and exacts nothing but his maintenance in return, we should all, if I am not mistaken, describe as possessing flattery or an art of making things pleasant.

The hireling  
may seek to  
give pleasure,  
or to teach  
virtue.

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Str.* And that sort, which professes to form acquaintances only for the sake of virtue, and demands a reward in the shape of money, may be fairly called by another name?

*Theaet.* To be sure.

*Str.* And what is the name? Will you tell me?

*Theaet.* It is obvious enough; for I believe that we have discovered the Sophist: which is, as I conceive, the proper name for the class described.

The latter is  
the SOPHIST.

*Str.* Then now, Theaetetus, his art may be traced as a branch of the appropriative<sup>1</sup>, acquisitive family — which hunts animals,—living — land — tame animals; which hunts man,—privately — for hire,—taking money in exchange — having the semblance of education; and this is termed Sophistry, and is a hunt after young men of wealth and rank — such is the conclusion.

Recapitu-  
lation.

*Theaet.* Just so.

*Str.* Let us take another branch of his genealogy; for he is a professor of a great and many-sided art; and if we look back at what has preceded we see that he presents another aspect, besides that of which we are speaking.

A new defi-  
nition:

*Theaet.* In what respect?

*Str.* There were two sorts of acquisitive art; the one concerned with hunting, the other with exchange.

Acquisition  
is partly  
hunting,  
partly  
exchange;

*Theaet.* There were.

<sup>1</sup> Omitting χειρωτικῆς and πεζοθηρίας.

*Sophist.*STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.and the latter  
partly giving,  
partly selling.The seller  
may sell his  
own produc-  
tions, or ex-  
change those  
of others: the  
exchanger  
may be a  
retailer or a  
merchant.The merchant  
may sell food  
for the body  
or food for  
the soul.*Str.* And of the art of exchange there are two divisions, the one of giving, and the other of selling.*Theaet.* Let us assume that.*Str.* Next, we will suppose the art of selling to be divided into two parts.*Theaet.* How?*Str.* There is one part which is distinguished as the sale of a man's own productions; another, which is the exchange of the works of others.*Theaet.* Certainly.*Str.* And is not that part of exchange which takes place in the city, being about half of the whole, termed retailing?*Theaet.* Yes.*Str.* And that which exchanges the goods of one city for those of another by selling and buying is the exchange of the merchant?*Theaet.* To be sure.*Str.* And you are aware that this exchange of the merchant is of two kinds: it is partly concerned with food for the use of the body, and partly with the food of the soul which is bartered and received in exchange for money.*Theaet.* What do you mean?*Str.* You want to know what is the meaning of food for the soul; the other kind you surely understand.*Theaet.* Yes.*Str.* Take music in general and painting and marionette playing and many other things, which are purchased in one city, and carried away and sold in another — wares of the soul which are hawked about either for the sake of instruction or amusement; — may not he who takes them about and sells them be quite as truly called a merchant as he who sells meats and drinks? 224*Theaet.* To be sure he may.*Str.* And would you not call by the same name him who buys up knowledge and goes about from city to city exchanging his wares for money?*Theaet.* Certainly I should.*Str.* Of this merchandise of the soul, may not one part be fairly termed the art of display? And there is another part which is certainly not less ridiculous, but being a trade inThe latter  
may be sup-  
plied by the  
art of dis-



learning must be called by some name germane to the matter? *Sophist.*

*Theæt.* Certainly.

*Str.* The latter should have two names,—one descriptive of the sale of the knowledge of virtue, and the other of the sale of other kinds of knowledge. *STRANGER, THEAETETUS.*  
play or by a trade in learning.

*Theæt.* Of course.

*Str.* The name of art-seller corresponds well enough to the latter; but you must try and tell me the name of the other. *The trader in learning is the art-seller, or the seller of virtue—the SOPHIST.*

*Theæt.* He must be the Sophist, whom we are seeking; no other name can possibly be right.

*Str.* No other; and so this trader in virtue again turns out to be our friend the Sophist, whose art may now be traced from the art of acquisition through exchange, trade, merchandise, to a merchandise of the soul which is concerned with speech and the knowledge of virtue.

*Theæt.* Quite true.

*Str.* And there may be a third reappearance of him;—for he may have settled down in a city, and may fabricate as well as buy these same wares, intending to live by selling them, and he would still be called a Sophist? *The Sophist may fabricate, as well as buy, his wares.*

*Theæt.* Certainly.

*Str.* Then that part of the acquisitive art which exchanges, and of exchange which either sells a man's own productions or retails those of others, as the case may be, and in either way sells the knowledge of virtue, you would again term Sophistry?

*Theæt.* I must, if I am to keep pace with the argument.

*Str.* Let us consider once more whether there may not be yet another aspect of sophistry. *A fresh start.*

*Theæt.* What is it?

225 *Str.* In the acquisitive there was a subdivision of the combative or fighting art. *The fighting art is a part of the acquisitive, and is either competitive or contentious.*

*Theæt.* There was.

*Str.* Perhaps we had better divide it.

*Theæt.* What shall be the divisions?

*Str.* There shall be one division of the competitive, and another of the pugnacious.

*Theæt.* Very good.

*Str.* That part of the pugnacious which is a contest of

*Sophist.*STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

Contention is either of bodily strength, or of words. The latter is controversy, which is also of two kinds, public (forensic) and private (disputation).

bodily strength may be properly called by some such name as violent.

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* And when the war is one of words, it may be termed controversy?

*Theaet.* Yes.*Str.* And controversy may be of two kinds.*Theaet.* What are they?

*Str.* When long speeches are answered by long speeches, and there is public discussion about the just and unjust, that is forensic controversy.

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Str.* And there is a private sort of controversy, which is cut up into questions and answers, and this is commonly called disputation?

*Theaet.* Yes, that is the name.

*Str.* And of disputation, that sort which is only a discussion about contracts, and is carried on at random, and without rules of art, is recognized by the reasoning faculty to be a distinct class, but has hitherto had no distinctive name, and does not deserve to receive one from us.

*Theaet.* No; for the different sorts of it are too minute and heterogeneous.

*Str.* But that which proceeds by rules of art to dispute about justice and injustice in their own nature, and about things in general, we have been accustomed to call argumentation (*Eristic*)?

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Str.* And of argumentation, one sort wastes money, and the other makes money.

*Theaet.* Very true.

*Str.* Suppose we try and give to each of these two classes a name.

*Theaet.* Let us do so.

*Str.* I should say that the habit which leads a man to neglect his own affairs for the pleasure of conversation, of which the style is far from being agreeable to the majority of his hearers, may be fairly termed loquacity: such is my opinion.

*Theaet.* That is the common name for it.

Disputation, when proceeding by rules of art, is called argumentation; and this either wastes or makes money.

*Str.* But now who the other is, who makes money out of private disputation, it is your turn to say. *Sophist.*

*Theaet.* There is only one true answer: he is the wonderful Sophist, of whom we are in pursuit, and who reappears again for the fourth time.

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

That which  
makes money  
is the art of  
the SOPHIST.

226 *Str.* Yes, and with a fresh pedigree, for he is the money-making species of the Eristic, disputatious, controversial, pugnacious, combative, acquisitive family, as the argument has already proven.

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Str.* How true was the observation that he was a many-sided animal, and not to be caught with one hand, as they say!

*Theaet.* Then you must catch him with two.

*Str.* Yes, we must, if we can. And therefore let us try another track in our pursuit of him: You are aware that there are certain menial occupations which have names among servants?

Another  
track:  
There are arts  
of dividing  
used by  
servants.

*Theaet.* Yes, there are many such; which of them do you mean?

*Str.* I mean such as sifting, straining, winnowing, threshing<sup>1</sup>.

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Str.* And besides these there are a great many more, such as carding, spinning, adjusting the warp and the woof; and thousands of similar expressions are used in the arts.

*Theaet.* Of what are they to be patterns, and what are we going to do with them all?

*Str.* I think that in all of these there is implied a notion of division.

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Str.* Then if, as I was saying, there is one art which includes all of them, ought not that art to have one name?

*Theaet.* And what is the name of the art?

*Str.* The art of discerning or discriminating.

*Theaet.* Very good.

*Str.* Think whether you cannot divide this.

*Theaet.* I should have to think a long while.

These afford  
examples of  
the great art  
of discerning,

<sup>1</sup> Reading *δίνειν*, a conjecture of Professor Campbell's.

*Sophist.*STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

which either  
separates like  
from like, or  
the better  
from the  
worse.

In the latter  
case it is called  
purification.

*Str.* In all the previously named processes either like has been separated from like or the better from the worse.

*Theaet.* I see now what you mean.

*Str.* There is no name for the first kind of separation; of the second, which throws away the worse and preserves the better, I do know a name.

*Theaet.* What is it?

*Str.* Every discernment or discrimination of that kind, as I have observed, is called a purification.

*Theaet.* Yes, that is the usual expression.

*Str.* And any one may see that purification is of two kinds.

*Theaet.* Perhaps so, if he were allowed time to think; but I do not see at this moment.

*Str.* There are many purifications of bodies which may with propriety be comprehended under a single name.

*Theaet.* What are they, and what is their name?

Purification  
is of bodies  
animate  
(which may  
be internal  
or external),  
and of bodies  
inanimate:  
the latter sort  
has ridiculous  
names ap-  
plied to it.

*Str.* There is the purification of living bodies in their 227  
inward and in their outward parts, of which the former is duly effected by medicine and gymnastic, the latter by the not very dignified art of the bath-man; and there is the purification of inanimate substances—to this the arts of fulling and of furbishing in general attend in a number of minute particulars, having a variety of names which are thought ridiculous.

*Theaet.* Very true.

But scientific  
method ig-  
nores dis-  
tinctions of  
high and low.

*Str.* There can be no doubt that they are thought ridiculous, Theaetetus; but then the dialectical art never considers whether the benefit to be derived from the purge is greater or less than that to be derived from the sponge, and has not more interest in the one than in the other; her endeavour is to know what is and is not kindred in all arts, with a view to the acquisition of intelligence; and having this in view, she honours them all alike, and when she makes comparisons, she counts one of them not a whit more ridiculous than another; nor does she esteem him who adduces as his example of hunting, the general's art, at all more decorous than another who cites that of the vermin-destroyer, but only as the greater pretender of the two. And as to your question concerning the name which was to



comprehend all these arts of purification, whether of animate or inanimate bodies, the art of dialectic is in no wise particular about fine words, if she may be only allowed to have a general name for all other purifications, binding them up together and separating them off from the purification of the soul or intellect. For this is the purification at which she wants to arrive, and this we should understand to be her aim.

*Sophist.*

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

There is also  
a purification  
of the soul.

*Theaet.* Yes, I understand; and I agree that there are two sorts of purification, and that one of them is concerned with the soul, and that there is another which is concerned with the body.

*Str.* Excellent; and now listen to what I am going to say, and try to divide further the first of the two.

*Theaet.* Whatever line of division you suggest, I will endeavour to assist you.

*Str.* Do we admit that virtue is distinct from vice in the soul?

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Str.* And purification was to leave the good and to cast out whatever is bad?

Purification  
is to take  
away evils.

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* Then any taking away of evil from the soul may be properly called purification?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Str.* And in the soul there are two kinds of evil.

*Theaet.* What are they?

228 *Str.* The one may be compared to disease in the body, the other to deformity.

*Theaet.* I do not understand.

*Str.* Perhaps you have never reflected that disease and discord are the same.

*Theaet.* To this, again, I know not what I should reply.

*Str.* Do you not conceive discord to be a dissolution of kindred elements, originating in some disagreement?

*Theaet.* Just that.

*Str.* And is deformity anything but the want of measure, which is always unsightly?

*Theaet.* Exactly.

*Str.* And do we not see that opinion is opposed to

There are two  
evils of the  
body,—dis-  
ease or dis-  
cord, and  
deformity  
or want of  
measure :

*Sophist.*

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

and two  
corresponding  
evils of the  
soul,—vice  
and igno-  
rance.

desire, pleasure to anger, reason to pain, and that all these elements are opposed to one another in the souls of bad men?

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Str.* And yet they must all be akin?

*Theaet.* Of course.

*Str.* Then we shall be right in calling vice a discord and disease of the soul?

*Theaet.* Most true.

*Str.* And when things having motion, and aiming at an appointed mark, continually miss their aim and glance aside, shall we say that this is the effect of symmetry among them, or of the want of symmetry?

*Theaet.* Clearly of the want of symmetry.

*Str.* But surely we know that no soul is voluntarily ignorant of anything?

*Theaet.* Certainly not.

*Str.* And what is ignorance but the aberration of a mind which is bent on truth, and in which the process of understanding is perverted?

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* Then we are to regard an unintelligent soul as deformed and devoid of symmetry?

*Theaet.* Very true.

*Str.* Then there are these two kinds of evil in the soul—the one which is generally called vice, and is obviously a disease of the soul . . .

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Str.* And there is the other, which they call ignorance, and which, because existing only in the soul<sup>1</sup>, they will not allow to be vice.

*Theaet.* I certainly admit what I at first disputed—that there are two kinds of vice in the soul, and that we ought to consider cowardice, intemperance, and injustice to be all alike forms of disease in the soul, and ignorance, of which there are all sorts of varieties, to be deformity.

*Str.* And in the case of the body are there not two arts which have to do with the two bodily states?

*Theaet.* What are they?

<sup>1</sup> Or, 'although there is no other vice in the soul but this.'

*Str.* There is gymnastic, which has to do with deformity, and medicine, which has to do with disease.

*Theaet.* True.

229 *Str.* And where there is insolence and injustice and cowardice, is not chastisement the art which is most required<sup>1</sup>?

*Theaet.* That certainly appears to be the opinion of mankind.

*Str.* Again, of the various kinds of ignorance, may not instruction be rightly said to be the remedy?

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* And of the art of instruction, shall we say that there is one or many kinds? At any rate there are two principal ones. Think.

*Theaet.* I will.

*Str.* I believe that I can see how we shall soonest arrive at the answer to this question.

*Theaet.* How?

*Str.* If we can discover a line which divides ignorance into two halves. For a division of ignorance into two parts will certainly imply that the art of instruction is also twofold, answering to the two divisions of ignorance.

*Theaet.* Well, and do you see what you are looking for?

*Str.* I do seem to myself to see one very large and bad sort of ignorance which is quite separate, and may be weighed in the scale against all other sorts of ignorance put together.

*Theaet.* What is it?

*Str.* When a person supposes that he knows, and does not know; this appears to be the great source of all the errors of the intellect.

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* And this, if I am not mistaken, is the kind of ignorance which specially earns the title of stupidity.

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* What name, then, shall be given to the sort of instruction which gets rid of this?

*Theaet.* The instruction which you mean, Stranger, is, I

*Sophist.*

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

medicine and  
gymnastic.

The arts  
which take  
away the  
evils of the  
soul are cor-  
rection and  
instruction.

A division of  
instruction  
can only be  
obtained by  
dividing  
ignorance.

One sort of  
ignorance  
is uncon-  
scious.

<sup>1</sup> Omitting *δίκη*, or reading *δίκη*.

*Sophist.*

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

The instruction corresponding to this is called education.

should imagine, not the teaching of handicraft arts, but what, thanks to us, has been termed education in this part of the world.

*Str.* Yes, Theaetetus, and by nearly all Hellenes. But we have still to consider whether education admits of any further division.

*Theaet.* We have.

*Str.* I think that there is a point at which such a division is possible.

*Theaet.* Where?

*Str.* Of education, one method appears to be rougher, and another smoother.

*Theaet.* How are we to distinguish the two?

*Str.* There is the time-honoured mode which our fathers commonly practised towards their sons, and which is still adopted by many — either of roughly reproving their errors, 230 or of gently advising them; which varieties may be correctly included under the general term of admonition.

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* But whereas some appear to have arrived at the conclusion that all ignorance is involuntary, and that no one who thinks himself wise is willing to learn any of those things in which he is conscious of his own cleverness, and that the admonitory sort of instruction gives much trouble and does little good —

*Theaet.* There they are quite right.

*Str.* Accordingly, they set to work to eradicate the spirit of conceit in another way.

*Theaet.* In what way?

*Str.* They cross-examine a man's words, when he thinks that he is saying something and is really saying nothing, and easily convict him of inconsistencies in his opinions; these they then collect by the dialectical process, and placing them side by side, show that they contradict one another about the same things, in relation to the same things, and in the same respect. He, seeing this, is angry with himself, and grows gentle towards others, and thus is entirely delivered from great prejudices and harsh notions, in a way which is most amusing to the hearer, and produces the most lasting good effect on the person who is the subject of the operation.

Of education there are two kinds: the old admonitory system, based on the doctrine that ignorance is voluntary, and another, based on the opposite doctrine, which proceeds by driving men into contradictions and so teaching them to think; and by refuting them and purging away their prejudices and vanity.



For as the physician considers that the body will receive no benefit from taking food until the internal obstacles have been removed, so the purifier of the soul is conscious that his patient will receive no benefit from the application of knowledge until he is refuted, and from refutation learns modesty; he must be purged of his prejudices first and made to think that he knows only what he knows, and no more.

*Sophist.*

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

*Theaet.* That is certainly the best and wisest state of mind.

*Str.* For all these reasons, Theaetetus, we must admit that refutation is the greatest and chiefest of purifications, and he who has not been refuted, though he be the Great King himself, is in an awful state of impurity; he is uninstructed and deformed in those things in which he who would be truly blessed ought to be fairest and purest.

Refutation is  
the greatest of  
purifications.

*Theaet.* Very true.

*Str.* And who are the ministers of this art? I am afraid  
231 to say the Sophists.

*Theaet.* Why.

*Str.* Lest we should assign to them too high a prerogative.

*Theaet.* Yet the Sophist has a certain likeness to our minister of purification.

*Str.* Yes, the same sort of likeness which a wolf, who is the fiercest of animals, has to a dog, who is the gentlest. But he who would not be found tripping, ought to be very careful in this matter of comparisons, for they are most slippery things. Nevertheless, let us assume that the Sophists are the men. I say this provisionally, for I think that the line which divides them will be marked enough if proper care is taken.

Let us  
assume that  
the Sophist  
practises  
this art.

*Theaet.* Likely enough.

*Str.* Let us grant, then, that from the discerning art comes purification, and from purification let there be separated off a part which is concerned with the soul; of this mental purification instruction is a portion, and of instruction education, and of education, that refutation of vain conceit which has been discovered in the present argument; and let this be called by you and me the nobly-descended art of Sophistry.

Recapitu-  
lation.

*Theaet.* Very well; and yet, considering the number of forms in which he has presented himself, I begin to doubt

*Sophist.*STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

how I can with any truth or confidence describe the real nature of the Sophist.

*Str.* You naturally feel perplexed; and yet I think that he must be still more perplexed in his attempt to escape us, for as the proverb says, when every way is blocked, there is no escape; now, then, is the time of all others to set upon him.

*Theaet.* True.

Thus far  
the Sophist  
has been  
(1) a paid  
hunter of  
wealth and  
youth;

*Str.* First let us wait a moment and recover breath, and while we are resting, we may reckon up in how many forms he has appeared. In the first place, he was discovered to be a paid hunter after wealth and youth.

*Theaet.* Yes.

(2) a merchant  
in the goods  
of the soul;

*Str.* In the second place, he was a merchant in the goods of the soul.

*Theaet.* Certainly.

(3) a retailer,

*Str.* In the third place, he has turned out to be a retailer of the same sort of wares.

and (4) a man-  
ufacturer of  
learned wares;

*Theaet.* Yes; and in the fourth place, he himself manufactured the learned wares which he sold.

(5) a hero of  
debate;

*Str.* Quite right; I will try and remember the fifth myself. He belonged to the fighting class, and was further distinguished as a hero of debate, who professed the eristic art.

*Theaet.* True.

(6) a purger  
of souls.

*Str.* The sixth point was doubtful, and yet we at last agreed that he was a purger of souls, who cleared away notions obstructive to knowledge.

*Theaet.* Very true.

But what is  
the common  
principle  
which unites  
his many  
callings?

*Str.* Do you not see that when the professor of any art has one name and many kinds of knowledge, there must be something wrong? The multiplicity of names which is applied to him shows that the common principle to which all these branches of knowledge are tending, is not understood.

*Theaet.* I should imagine this to be the case.

His chief  
characteristic  
is disputation  
and the teach-  
ing of disputa-  
tion.

*Str.* At any rate we will understand him, and no indolence shall prevent us. Let us begin again, then, and re-examine some of our statements concerning the Sophist; there was one thing which appeared to me especially characteristic of him.

*Theaet.* To what are you referring?

*Str.* We were saying of him, if I am not mistaken, that he was a disputer? *Sophist.*

*Theaet.* We were.

*Str.* And does he not also teach others the art of disputation?

*Theaet.* Certainly he does.

*Str.* And about what does he profess that he teaches men to dispute? To begin at the beginning — Does he make them able to dispute about divine things, which are invisible to men in general?

*Theaet.* At any rate, he is said to do so.

*Str.* And what do you say of the visible things in heaven and earth, and the like?

*Theaet.* Certainly he disputes, and teaches to dispute about them.

*Str.* Then, again, in private conversation, when any universal assertion is made about generation and essence, we know that such persons are tremendous argufiers, and are able to impart their own skill to others.

*Theaet.* Undoubtedly.

*Str.* And do they not profess to make men able to dispute about law and about politics in general?

*Theaet.* Why, no one would have anything to say to them, if they did not make these professions.

*Str.* In all and every art, what the craftsman ought to say in answer to any question is written down in a popular form, and he who likes may learn.

*Theaet.* I suppose that you are referring to the precepts of Protagoras about wrestling and the other arts?

*Str.* Yes, my friend, and about a good many other things. In a word, is not the art of disputation a power of disputing about all things? He can dispute about all things.

*Theaet.* Certainly; there does not seem to be much which is left out.

*Str.* But oh! my dear youth, do you suppose this possible? for perhaps your young eyes may see things which to our duller sight do not appear.

233 *Theaet.* To what are you alluding? I do not think that I understand your present question.

*Str.* I ask whether anybody can understand all things.

*Sophist.*STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.But he cannot know  
all things.Then why is  
he held in  
such esteem?Because he  
is supposed  
to know,and has the  
appearance of  
knowledge.Let us, as an  
illustration,  
imagine a  
creator of all  
things, which  
he makes by a  
single art and*Theaet.* Happy would mankind be if such a thing were possible!*Str.* But how can any one who is ignorant dispute in a rational manner against him who knows?*Theaet.* He cannot.*Str.* Then why has the sophistical art such a mysterious power?*Theaet.* To what do you refer?*Str.* How do the Sophists make young men believe in their supreme and universal wisdom? For if they neither disputed nor were thought to dispute rightly, or being thought to do so were deemed no wiser for their controversial skill, then, to quote your own observation, no one would give them money or be willing to learn their art.*Theaet.* They certainly would not.*Str.* But they are willing.*Theaet.* Yes, they are.*Str.* Yes, and the reason, as I should imagine, is that they are supposed to have knowledge of those things about which they dispute?*Theaet.* Certainly.*Str.* And they dispute about all things?*Theaet.* True.*Str.* And therefore, to their disciples, they appear to be all-wise?*Theaet.* Certainly.*Str.* But they are not; for that was shown to be impossible.*Theaet.* Impossible, of course.*Str.* Then the Sophist has been shown to have a sort of conjectural or apparent knowledge only of all things, which is not the truth?*Theaet.* Exactly; no better description of him could be given.*Str.* Let us now take an illustration, which will still more clearly explain his nature.*Theaet.* What is it?*Str.* I will tell you, and you shall answer me, giving your very closest attention. Suppose that a person were to profess, not that he could speak or dispute, but that he knew how to make and do all things, by a single art.



*Theaet.* All things?

*Str.* I see that you do not understand the first word that I utter, for you do not understand the meaning of 'all.'

*Theaet.* No, I do not.

*Str.* Under all things, I include you and me, and also animals and trees.

*Theaet.* What do you mean?

*Str.* Suppose a person to say that he will make you and me, and all creatures.

234 *Theaet.* What would he mean by 'making'? He cannot be a husbandman;—for you said that he is a maker of animals.

*Str.* Yes; and I say that he is also the maker of the sea, and the earth, and the heavens, and the gods, and of all other things; and, further, that he can make them in no time, and sell them for a few pence.

*Theaet.* That must be a jest.

*Str.* And when a man says that he knows all things, and can teach them to another at a small cost, and in a short time, is not that a jest?

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Str.* And is there any more artistic or graceful form of jest than imitation?

*Theaet.* Certainly not; and imitation is a very comprehensive term, which includes under one class the most diverse sorts of things.

*Str.* We know, of course, that he who professes by one art to make all things is really a painter, and by the painter's art makes resemblances of real things which have the same name with them; and he can deceive the less intelligent sort of young children, to whom he shows his pictures at a distance, into the belief that he has the absolute power of making whatever he likes.

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Str.* And may there not be supposed to be an imitative art of reasoning? Is it not possible to enchant the hearts of young men by words poured through their ears, when they are still at a distance from the truth of facts, by exhibiting to them fictitious arguments, and making them think that they are true, and that the speaker is the wisest of men in all things?

*Sophist.*

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS

with the  
greatest  
ease.—

What would  
he be?

Not really a  
maker, but a  
painter or  
imitator.

So there is an  
imitative art  
of reasoning  
which imposes  
upon youth,  
who see truth  
only at a  
distance.

*Sophist.*

*Theaet.* Yes; why should there not be another such art?

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

*Str.* But as time goes on, and their hearers advance in years, and come into closer contact with realities, and have learnt by sad experience to see and feel the truth of things, are not the greater part of them compelled to change many opinions which they formerly entertained, so that the great appears small to them, and the easy difficult, and all their dreamy speculations are overturned by the facts of life?

*Theaet.* That is my view, as far as I can judge, although, at my age, I may be one of those who see things at a distance only.

*Str.* And the wish of all of us, who are your friends, is and always will be to bring you as near to the truth as we can 235 without the sad reality. And now I should like you to tell me, whether the Sophist is not visibly a magician and imitator of true being; or are we still disposed to think that he may have a true knowledge of the various matters about which he disputes?

The Sophist  
is a magician  
and imitator.

*Theaet.* But how can he, Stranger? Is there any doubt, after what has been said, that he is to be located in one of the divisions of children's play?

*Str.* Then we must place him in the class of magicians and mimics.

*Theaet.* Certainly we must.

*Str.* And now our business is not to let the animal out, for we have got him in a sort of dialectical net, and there is one thing which he decidedly will not escape.

*Theaet.* What is that?

*Str.* The inference that he is a juggler.

*Theaet.* Precisely my own opinion of him.

Accordingly  
we must  
subdivide  
imitation.

*Str.* Then, clearly, we ought as soon as possible to divide the image-making art, and go down into the net, and, if the Sophist does not run away from us, to seize him according to orders and deliver him over to reason, who is the lord of the hunt, and proclaim the capture of him; and if he creeps into the recesses of the imitative art, and secretes himself in one of them, to divide again and follow him up until in some sub-section of imitation he is caught. For our method of tackling each and all is one which neither he nor any other creature will ever escape in triumph.

*Theæt.* Well said; and let us do as you propose.

*Str.* Well, then, pursuing the same analytic method as before, I think that I can discern two divisions of the imitative art, but I am not as yet able to see in which of them the desired form is to be found.

*Theæt.* Will you tell me first what are the two divisions of which you are speaking?

*Str.* One is the art of likeness-making;—generally a likeness of anything is made by producing a copy which is executed according to the proportions of the original, similar in length and breadth and depth, each thing receiving also its appropriate colour.

*Theæt.* Is not this always the aim of imitation?

236 *Str.* Not always; in works either of sculpture or of painting, which are of any magnitude, there is a certain degree of deception; for if artists were to give the true proportions of their fair works, the upper part, which is farther off, would appear to be out of proportion in comparison with the lower, which is nearer; and so they give up the truth in their images and make only the proportions which appear to be beautiful, disregarding the real ones.

*Theæt.* Quite true.

*Str.* And that which being other is also like, may we not fairly call a likeness or image?

*Theæt.* Yes.

*Str.* And may we not, as I did just now, call that part of the imitative art which is concerned with making such images the art of likeness-making?

*Theæt.* Let that be the name.

*Str.* And what shall we call those resemblances of the beautiful, which appear such owing to the unfavourable position of the spectator, whereas if a person had the power of getting a correct view of works of such magnitude, they would appear not even like that to which they profess to be like? May we not call these 'appearances,' since they appear only and are not really like?

*Theæt.* Certainly.

*Str.* There is a great deal of this kind of thing in painting, and in all imitation.

*Sophist.*

STRANGER,  
THEÆTETUS.

Two kinds of  
imitation:—  
There is  
(1) likeness-  
making,  
which repro-  
duces exactly  
the propor-  
tions of the  
original.

But in colossal  
works of paint-  
ing and sculp-  
ture a certain  
amount of  
deception is  
necessary:

*Sophist.**Theaet.* Of course.STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.*Str.* And may we not fairly call the sort of art, which produces an appearance and not an image, phantastic art?and therefore  
(2) there is  
another kind  
of imitation,  
phantastic,  
which makes  
appearances.*Theaet.* Most fairly.*Str.* These then are the two kinds of image-making — the art of making likenesses, and phantastic or the art of making appearances?*Theaet.* True.In which shall  
we place the  
Sophist?*Str.* I was doubtful before in which of them I should place the Sophist, nor am I even now able to see clearly; verily he is a wonderful and inscrutable creature. And now in the cleverest manner he has got into an impossible place.*Theaet.* Yes, he has.*Str.* Do you speak advisedly, or are you carried away at the moment by the habit of assenting into giving a hasty answer?*Theaet.* May I ask to what you are referring?A grave  
difficulty:  
If falsehood  
can exist, then  
what is not  
must be.*Str.* My dear friend, we are engaged in a very difficult speculation — there can be no doubt of that; for how a thing can appear and seem, and not be, or how a man can say a thing which is not true, has always been and still remains a very perplexing question. Can any one say or think that falsehood really exists, and avoid being caught in a contradiction? Indeed, Theaetetus, the task is a difficult one. 237*Theaet.* Why?But Par-  
menides  
always denied  
the existence  
of not-being.*Str.* He who says that falsehood exists has the audacity to assert the being of not-being; for this is implied in the possibility of falsehood. But, my boy, in the days when I was a boy, the great Parmenides protested against this doctrine, and to the end of his life he continued to inculcate the same lesson — always repeating both in verse and out of verse:‘Keep your mind from this way of enquiry, for never will you show<sup>1</sup> that not-being is.’

Such is his testimony, which is confirmed by the very expression when sifted a little. Would you object to begin with the consideration of the words themselves?

<sup>1</sup> Reading τοῦτο φανῆναι.



*Theact.* Never mind about me; I am only desirous that you should carry on the argument in the best way, and that you should take me with you. *Sophist.*  
STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

*Str.* Very good; and now say, do we venture to utter the forbidden word 'not-being'?

*Theact.* Certainly we do.

*Str.* Let us be serious then, and consider the question neither in strife nor play: suppose that one of the hearers of Parmenides was asked, 'To what is the term "not-being" to be applied?'—do you know what sort of object he would single out in reply, and what answer he would make to the enquirer? Let us ask:  
Of what is  
not-being  
predicable?

*Theact.* That is a difficult question, and one not to be answered at all by a person like myself.

*Str.* There is at any rate no difficulty in seeing that the predicate 'not-being' is not applicable to any being. Certainly not  
of any being,

*Theact.* None, certainly.

*Str.* And if not to being, then not to something. and therefore  
not of some-  
thing, or of  
two or more  
things.

*Theact.* Of course not.

*Str.* It is also plain, that in speaking of something we speak of being, for to speak of an abstract something naked and isolated from all being is impossible.

*Theact.* Impossible.

*Str.* You mean by assenting to imply that he who says something must say some one thing?

*Theact.* Yes.

*Str.* Some in the singular ( $\tau\iota$ ) you would say is the sign of one, some in the dual ( $\tau\iota\nu\grave{\epsilon}$ ) of two, some in the plural ( $\tau\iota\nu\grave{\epsilon}\varsigma$ ) of many?

*Theact.* Exactly.

*Str.* Then he who says 'not something' must say absolutely nothing.

*Theact.* Most assuredly.

*Str.* And as we cannot admit that a man speaks and says nothing, he who says 'not-being' does not speak at all. It is nothing:

*Theact.* The difficulty of the argument can no further go.

238 *Str.* Not yet, my friend, is the time for such a word; for there still remains of all perplexities the first and greatest, touching the very foundation of the matter.

*Theact.* What do you mean? Do not be afraid to speak.

*Sophist.*STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.and nothing  
that is can be  
predicated of  
it; and there-  
fore not num-  
ber either  
singular  
or plural.*Str.* To that which is, may be attributed some other thing which is?*Theaet.* Certainly.*Str.* But can anything which is, be attributed to that which is not?*Theaet.* Impossible.*Str.* And all number is to be reckoned among things which are?*Theaet.* Yes, surely number, if anything, has a real existence.*Str.* Then we must not attempt to attribute to not-being number either in the singular or plural?*Theaet.* The argument implies that we should be wrong in doing so.*Str.* But how can a man either express in words or even conceive in thought things which are not or a thing which is not without number?*Theaet.* How indeed?*Str.* When we speak of things which are not, are we not attributing plurality to not-being?*Theaet.* Certainly.*Str.* But, on the other hand, when we say 'what is not,' do we not attribute unity?*Theaet.* Manifestly.*Str.* Nevertheless, we maintain that you may not and ought not to attribute being to not-being?*Theaet.* Most true.*Str.* Do you see, then, that not-being in itself can neither be spoken, uttered, or thought, but that it is unthinkable, unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable?*Theaet.* Quite true.*Str.* But, if so, I was wrong in telling you just now that the difficulty which was coming is the greatest of all.*Theaet.* What! is there a greater still behind?*Str.* Well, I am surprised, after what has been said already, that you do not see the difficulty in which he who would refute the notion of not-being is involved. For he is compelled to contradict himself as soon as he makes the attempt.*Theaet.* What do you mean? Speak more clearly.*Str.* Do not expect clearness from me. For I, who main-The greatest  
difficulty :  
The mere use  
of the word is  
a contra-  
diction.

tain that not-being has no part either in the one or many, just now spoke and am still speaking of not-being as one; for I say 'not-being.' Do you understand? *Sophist.*  
STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Str.* And a little while ago I said that not-being is unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable: do you follow?

*Theaet.* I do after a fashion.

*Str.* When I introduced the word 'is,' did I not contradict what I said before?

239 *Theaet.* Clearly.

*Str.* And in using the singular verb, did I not speak of not-being as one?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Str.* And when I spoke of not-being as indescribable and unspeakable and unutterable, in using each of these words in the singular, did I not refer to not-being as one?

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Str.* And yet we say that, strictly speaking, it should not be defined either as one or many, and should not even be called 'it,' for the use of the word 'it' would imply a form of unity.

*Theaet.* Quite true.

*Str.* How, then, can any one put any faith in me? For now, as always, I am unequal to the refutation of not-being. And therefore, as I was saying, do not look to me for the right way of speaking about not-being; but come, let us try the experiment with you.

*Theaet.* What do you mean?

*Str.* Make a noble effort, as becomes youth, and endeavour with all your might to speak of not-being in a right manner, without introducing into it either existence or unity or plurality.

Let the youthful might of Theaetetus try to find some better expression.

*Theaet.* It would be a strange boldness in me which would attempt the task when I see you thus discomfited.

*Str.* Say no more of ourselves; but until we find some one or other who can speak of not-being without number, we must acknowledge that the Sophist is a clever rogue who will not be got out of his hole.

*Theaet.* Most true.

*Str.* And if we say to him that he professes an art of

*Sophist.*STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

If we call the Sophist an image-maker, he will ask us, out of his hole, 'What is an image?'—and will be satisfied with nothing short of a definition of the idea of it.

making appearances, he will grapple with us and retort our argument upon ourselves; and when we call him an image-maker he will say, 'Pray what do you mean at all by an image?'—and I should like to know, Theaetetus, how we can possibly answer the younker's question?

*Theaet.* We shall doubtless tell him of the images which are reflected in water or in mirrors; also of sculptures, pictures, and other duplicates.

*Str.* I see, Theaetetus, that you have never made the acquaintance of the Sophist. \*

*Theaet.* Why do you think so?

*Str.* He will make believe to have his eyes shut, or to have none.

*Theaet.* What do you mean?

*Str.* When you tell him of something existing in a mirror, or in sculpture, and address him as though he had eyes, he will laugh you to scorn, and will pretend that he knows nothing of mirrors and streams, or of sight at all; he will say that he is asking about an idea. 240

*Theaet.* What can he mean?

*Str.* The common notion pervading all these objects, which you speak of as many, and yet call by the single name of image, as though it were the unity under which they were all included. How will you maintain your ground against him?

*Theaet.* How, Stranger, can I describe an image except as something fashioned in the likeness of the true?

*Str.* And do you mean this something to be some other true thing, or what do you mean?

*Theaet.* Certainly not another true thing, but only a resemblance.

*Str.* And you mean by true that which really is?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Str.* And the not true is that which is the opposite of the true?

*Theaet.* Exactly.

*Str.* A resemblance, then, is not really real, if, as you say, not true?

*Theaet.* Nay, but it is in a certain sense.

*Str.* You mean to say, not in a true sense?

It is a resemblance of the true or real, and is not itself real.

Yet it has a sort of reality.



*Theaet.* Yes; it is in reality only an image.

*Str.* Then what we call an image is in reality really unreal.

*Theaet.* In what a strange complication of being and not-being we are involved!

*Str.* Strange! I should think so. See how, by his reciprocation of opposites, the many-headed Sophist has compelled us, quite against our will, to admit the existence of not-being.

*Theaet.* Yes, indeed, I see.

*Str.* The difficulty is how to define his art without falling into a contradiction.

*Theaet.* How do you mean? And where does the danger lie?

*Str.* When we say that he deceives us with an illusion, and that his art is illusory, do we mean that our soul is led by his art to think falsely, or what do we mean?

*Theaet.* There is nothing else to be said.

*Str.* Again, false opinion is that form of opinion which thinks the opposite of the truth:— You would assent?

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Str.* You mean to say that false opinion thinks what is not?

*Theaet.* Of course.

*Str.* Does false opinion think that things which are not are not, or that in a certain sense they are?

*Theaet.* Things that are not must be imagined to exist in a certain sense, if any degree of falsehood is to be possible.

*Str.* And does not false opinion also think that things which most certainly exist do not exist at all?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Str.* And here, again, is falsehood?

*Theaet.* Falsehood — yes.

*Str.* And in like manner, a false proposition will be deemed to be one which asserts the non-existence of things which are, and the existence of things which are not.

*Theaet.* There is no other way in which a false proposition can arise.

241 *Str.* There is not; but the Sophist will deny these statements. And indeed how can any rational man assent to

*Sophist.*

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS

It is really  
unreal.

And thus we  
are forced to  
admit the  
existence of  
not-being.

Our defini-  
tion of the  
Sophist's art,  
which creates  
false opinion,  
or again of  
a false propo-  
sition will  
contain the  
same paradox.

The Sophist  
will show us  
no mercy.

*Sophist.*STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

them, when the very expressions which we have just used were before acknowledged by us to be unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable, unthinkable? Do you see his point, Theaetetus?

*Theaet.* Of course he will say that we are contradicting ourselves when we hazard the assertion, that falsehood exists in opinion and in words; for in maintaining this, we are compelled over and over again to assert being of not-being, which we admitted just now to be an utter impossibility.

*Str.* How well you remember! And now it is high time to hold a consultation as to what we ought to do about the Sophist; for if we persist in looking for him in the class of false workers and magicians, you see that the handles for objection and the difficulties which will arise are very numerous and obvious.

*Theaet.* They are indeed.

*Str.* We have gone through but a very small portion of them, and they are really infinite.

*Theaet.* If that is the case, we cannot possibly catch the Sophist.

*Str.* Shall we then be so faint-hearted as to give him up?

*Theaet.* Certainly not, I should say, if we can get the slightest hold upon him.

*Str.* Will you then forgive me, and, as your words imply, not be altogether displeased if I flinch a little from the grasp of such a sturdy argument?

*Theaet.* To be sure I will.

*Str.* I have a yet more urgent request to make.

*Theaet.* Which is —?

*Str.* That you will promise not to regard me as a parricide.

*Theaet.* And why?

There is one way of escape: we must put the revered words of Parmenides to the test, and prove that there is a sense in which

*Str.* Because, in self-defence, I must test the philosophy of my father Parmenides, and try to prove by main force that in a certain sense not-being is, and that being, on the other hand, is not.

*Theaet.* Some attempt of the kind is clearly needed.

*Str.* Yes, a blind man, as they say, might see that, and, unless these questions are decided in one way or another, no one when he speaks of false words, or false opinion, or idols, or images, or imitations, or appearances, or about the

arts which are concerned with them, can avoid falling into ridiculous contradictions.

*Theæt.* Most true.

242 *Str.* And therefore I must venture to lay hands on my father's argument; for if I am to be over-scrupulous, I shall have to give the matter up.

*Theæt.* Nothing in the world should ever induce us to do so.

*Str.* I have a third little request which I wish to make.

*Theæt.* What is it?

*Str.* You heard me say what I have always felt and still feel — that I have no heart for this argument?

*Theæt.* I did.

*Str.* I tremble at the thought of what I have said, and expect that you will deem me mad, when you hear of my sudden changes and shiftings; let me therefore observe, that I am examining the question entirely out of regard for you.

*Theæt.* There is no reason for you to fear that I shall impute any impropriety to you, if you attempt this refutation and proof; take heart, therefore, and proceed.

*Str.* And where shall I begin the perilous enterprise? I think that the road which I must take is —

*Theæt.* Which?— Let me hear.

*Str.* I think that we had better, first of all, consider the points which at present are regarded as self-evident, lest we may have fallen into some confusion, and be too ready to assent to one another, fancying that we are quite clear about them.

*Theæt.* Say more distinctly what you mean.

*Str.* I think that Parmenides, and all who ever yet undertook to determine the number and nature of existences, talked to us in rather a light and easy strain.

*Theæt.* How?

*Str.* As if we had been children, to whom they repeated each his own mythus or story;—one said that there were three principles, and that at one time there was war between certain of them; and then again there was peace, and they were married and begat children, and brought them up; and another spoke of two principles,—a moist and a dry, or a hot and a cold, and made them marry and cohabit. The Eleatics,

*Sophist.*  
STRANGER,  
THEÆTETUS.  
not-being is  
and being  
is not.

We must examine some ideas which are thought to be clear, but may prove to be confused.

The early Greek philosophers and their doctrines.

*Sophist.*STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

however, in our part of the world, say that all things are many in name, but in nature one; this is their mythus, which goes back to Xenophanes, and is even older. Then there are in Ionian, and more recent times Sicilian muses, who have arrived at the conclusion that to unite the two principles is safer, and to say that being is one and many, and that these are held together by enmity and friendship, ever parting, ever meeting, as the severer Muses assert, while the gentler ones do not insist on the perpetual strife and peace, but admit a relaxation and alternation of them; peace and unity some- 243 times prevailing under the sway of Aphrodite, and then again plurality and war, by reason of a principle of strife. Whether any of them spoke the truth in all this is hard to determine; besides, antiquity and famous men should have reverence, and not be liable to accusations so serious. Yet one thing may be said of them without offence —

*Theaet.* What thing?

These great men did not care to explain themselves to the common herd.

*Str.* That they went on their several ways disdaining to notice people like ourselves; they did not care whether they took us with them, or left us behind them.

*Theaet.* How do you mean?

In the days of our youth we seemed to understand what not-being meant: now we are in difficulties about being.

*Str.* I mean to say, that when they talk of one, two, or more elements, which are or have become or are becoming, or again of heat mingling with cold, assuming in some other part of their works separations and mixtures,—tell me, Theaetetus, do you understand what they mean by these expressions? When I was a younger man, I used to fancy that I understood quite well what was meant by the term 'not-being,' which is our present subject of dispute; and now you see in what a fix we are about it.

*Theaet.* I see.

*Str.* And very likely we have been getting into the same perplexity about 'being,' and yet may fancy that when anybody utters the word, we understand him quite easily, although we do not know about not-being. But we may be equally ignorant of both.

*Theaet.* I dare say.

*Str.* And the same may be said of all the terms just mentioned.

*Theaet.* True.



*Str.* The consideration of most of them may be deferred ; but we had better now discuss the chief captain and leader of them.

*Sophist.*

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

*Theaet.* Of what are you speaking? You clearly think that we must first investigate what people mean by the word 'being.'

Let us examine the notion in the light of existing philosophies. First, let us ask the dualists whether being is a third principle over and above the other two, or one of them or both. In any case the two principles will be resolved into one.

*Str.* You follow close at my heels, Theaetetus. For the right method, I conceive, will be to call into our presence the dualistic philosophers and to interrogate them. 'Come,' we will say, 'Ye, who affirm that hot and cold or any other two principles are the universe, what is this term which you apply to both of them, and what do you mean when you say that both and each of them "are"? How are we to understand the word "are"? Upon your view, are we to suppose that there is a third principle over and above the other two,—three in all, and not two? For clearly you cannot say that one of the two principles is being, and yet attribute being equally to both of them; for, if you did, whichever of the two is identified with being, will comprehend the other; and so they will be one and not two.'

*Theaet.* Very true.

*Str.* But perhaps you mean to give the name of 'being' to both of them together?

*Theaet.* Quite likely.

244 *Str.* 'Then, friends,' we shall reply to them, 'the answer is plainly that the two will still be resolved into one.'

*Theaet.* Most true.

*Str.* 'Since, then, we are in a difficulty, please to tell us what you mean, when you speak of being; for there can be no doubt that you always from the first understood your own meaning, whereas we once thought that we understood you, but now we are in a great strait. Please to begin by explaining this matter to us, and let us no longer fancy that we understand you, when we entirely misunderstand you.' There will be no impropriety in our demanding an answer to this question, either of the dualists or of the pluralists?

*Theaet.* Certainly not.

*Str.* And what about the assertors of the oneness of the all—must we not endeavour to ascertain from them what they mean by 'being'?

What again do those who assert the oneness

*Sophist.*

*Theaet.* By all means.

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

*Str.* Then let them answer this question: One, you say, alone is? 'Yes,' they will reply.

of the all  
mean by  
being? Are  
being and  
unity two  
names for the  
same thing?—  
But to admit  
this, or to  
admit that  
the name is  
different from  
the thing, is  
to admit  
plurality.

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* And there is something which you call 'being'?

*Theaet.* 'Yes.'

*Str.* And is being the same as one, and do you apply two names to the same thing?

*Theaet.* What will be their answer, Stranger?

*Str.* It is clear, Theaetetus, that he who asserts the unity of being will find a difficulty in answering this or any other question.

*Theaet.* Why so?

*Str.* To admit of two names, and to affirm that there is nothing but unity, is surely ridiculous?

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Str.* And equally irrational to admit that a name is anything?

*Theaet.* How so?

*Str.* To distinguish the name from the thing, implies duality.

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Str.* And yet he who identifies the name with the thing will be compelled to say that it is the name of nothing, or if he says that it is the name of something, even then the name will only be the name of a name, and of nothing else.

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* And the one will turn out to be only one of one,<sup>1</sup> and being absolute unity, will represent a mere name<sup>1</sup>.

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Str.* And would they say that the whole is other than the one that is, or the same with it?

*Theaet.* To be sure they would, and they actually say so.

*Str.* If being is a whole, as Parmenides sings,—

'Every way like unto the fullness of a well-rounded sphere,  
Evenly balanced from the centre on every side,  
And must needs be neither greater nor less in any way,  
Neither on this side nor on that —'

<sup>1</sup> Reading with the MSS. καὶ τοῦ ὁνόματος αὐτὸ ἐν ὅν.

And if the  
name be  
identified  
with the  
thing, it is  
either the  
name of  
nothing or  
of a name.  
This is true  
of the one.

They identify  
the whole with  
the one which  
is: but a  
whole, as  
having parts,  
cannot be  
absolute  
unity, which  
is indivisible.

then being has a centre and extremes, and, having these, must also have parts. *Sophist.*

*Theaet.* True.

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

245 *Str.* Yet that which has parts may have the attribute of unity in all the parts, and in this way being all and a whole, may be one?

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Str.* But that of which this is the condition cannot be absolute unity?

*Theaet.* Why not?

*Str.* Because, according to right reason, that which is truly one must be affirmed to be absolutely indivisible.

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Str.* But this indivisible, if made up of many parts, will contradict reason.

*Theaet.* I understand.

*Str.* Shall we say that being<sup>1</sup> is one and a whole, because it has the attribute of unity? Or shall we say that being is not a whole at all?

Is being, then, one by participation in unity, or is it not a whole?

*Theaet.* That is a hard alternative to offer.

*Str.* Most true; for being, having in a certain sense the attribute of one, is yet proved not to be the same as one, and the all is therefore more than one.

In either case we have to admit plurality.

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Str.* And yet if being be not a whole, through having the attribute of unity, and there be such a thing as an absolute whole, being lacks something of its own nature?

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Str.* Upon this view, again, being, having a defect of being, will become not-being?

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* And, again, the all becomes more than one, for being and the whole will each have their separate nature.

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Str.* But if the whole does not exist at all, all the previous difficulties remain the same, and there will be the further difficulty, that besides having no being, being can never have come into being.

And if the whole does not exist at all, being cannot have come into being;

*Theaet.* Why so?

<sup>1</sup> Reading τὸ ὅν.

*Sophist.*STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.for everything  
which comes  
into being,  
comes into  
being as a  
whole.Nor can it  
partake of  
quantity.

*Str.* Because that which comes into being always comes into being as a whole, so that he who does not give whole a place among beings, cannot speak either of essence or generation as existing.

*Theaet.* Yes, that certainly appears to be true.

*Str.* Again; how can that which is not a whole have any quantity? For that which is of a certain quantity must necessarily be the whole of that quantity.

*Theaet.* Exactly.

*Str.* And there will be innumerable other points, each of them causing infinite trouble to him who says that being is either one or two.

*Theaet.* The difficulties which are dawning upon us prove this; for one objection connects with another, and they are always involving what has preceded in a greater and worse perplexity.

*Str.* We are far from having exhausted the more exact thinkers who treat of being and not-being. But let us be content to leave them, and proceed to view those who speak less precisely; and we shall find as the result of all, that the nature of being is quite as difficult to comprehend as that of not-being. 246

*Theaet.* Then now we will go to the others.

*Str.* There appears to be a sort of war of Gods and Giants going on amongst them; they are fighting with one another about the nature of essence.

*Theaet.* How is that?

*Str.* Some of them are dragging down all things from heaven and from the unseen to earth, and they literally grasp in their hands rocks and oaks; of these they lay hold, and obstinately maintain, that the things only which can be touched or handled have being or essence, because they define being and body as one, and if any one else says that what is not a body exists they altogether despise him, and will hear of nothing but body.

*Theaet.* I have often met with such men, and terrible fellows they are.

*Str.* And that is the reason why their opponents cautiously defend themselves from above; out of an unseen world, mightily contending that true essence consists of certain

Let us now  
ask the Ma-  
terialists and  
Idealists to  
give an ac-  
count of  
essence.



intelligible and incorporeal ideas; the bodies of the materialists, which by them are maintained to be the very truth, they break up into little bits by their arguments, and affirm them to be, not essence, but generation and motion. Between the two armies, Theaetetus, there is always an endless conflict raging concerning these matters.

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* Let us ask each party in turn, to give an account of that which they call essence.

*Theaet.* How shall we get it out of them?

*Str.* With those who make being to consist in ideas, there will be less difficulty, for they are civil people enough; but there will be very great difficulty, or rather an absolute impossibility, in getting an opinion out of those who drag everything down to matter. Shall I tell you what we must do?

*Theaet.* What?

*Str.* Let us, if we can, really improve them; but if this is not possible, let us imagine them to be better than they are, and more willing to answer in accordance with the rules of argument, and then their opinion will be more worth having; for that which better men acknowledge has more weight than that which is acknowledged by inferior men. Moreover we are no respecters of persons, but seekers after truth.

*Theaet.* Very good.

*Str.* Then now, on the supposition that they are improved, let us ask them to state their views, and do you interpret them.

*Theaet.* Agreed.

*Str.* Let them say whether they would admit that there is such a thing as a mortal animal.

*Theaet.* Of course they would.

*Str.* And do they not acknowledge this to be a body having a soul?

*Theaet.* Certainly they do.

*Str.* Meaning to say that the soul is something which exists?

247 *Theaet.* True.

*Str.* And do they not say that one soul is just, and another unjust, and that one soul is wise, and another foolish?

*Sophist.*

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

The Idealists are civil enough, but the Materialists must be improved before they can be reasoned with.

The latter would admit that in the mortal animal there is a soul, and that the soul may be just and wise; and whatever they may say of soul, they would

*Sophist.*STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.never venture  
to assert that  
the moral  
qualities are  
corporeal.*Theæt.* Certainly.*Str.* And that the just and wise soul becomes just and wise by the possession of justice and wisdom<sup>1</sup>, and the opposite under opposite circumstances?*Theæt.* Yes, they do.*Str.* But surely that which may be present or may be absent will be admitted by them to exist?*Theæt.* Certainly.*Str.* And, allowing that justice, wisdom, the other virtues, and their opposites exist, as well as a soul in which they inhere, do they affirm any of them to be visible and tangible, or are they all invisible?*Theæt.* They would say that hardly any of them are visible.*Str.* And would they say that they are corporeal?*Theæt.* They would distinguish: the soul would be said by them to have a body; but as to the other qualities of justice, wisdom, and the like, about which you asked, they would not venture either to deny their existence, or to maintain that they were all corporeal.*Str.* Verily, Theaetetus, I perceive a great improvement in them; the real aborigines, children of the dragon's teeth, would have been deterred by no shame at all, but would have obstinately asserted that nothing is which they are not able to squeeze in their hands. .*Theæt.* That is pretty much their notion.*Str.* Let us push the question; for if they will admit that any, even the smallest particle of being, is incorporeal, it is enough; they must then say what that nature is which is common to both the corporeal and incorporeal, and which they have in their mind's eye when they say of both of them that they 'are.' Perhaps they may be in a difficulty; and if this is the case, there is a possibility that they may accept a notion of ours respecting the nature of being, having nothing of their own to offer.*Theæt.* What is the notion? Tell me, and we shall soon see.*Str.* My notion would be, that anything which possesses any sort of power to affect another, or to be affected by<sup>1</sup> Reading with Professor Campbell *δικαιοσύνης ἔξει καὶ φρονήσεως*.What is the  
nature, com-  
mon to the  
corporeal and  
incorporeal,  
which we  
indicate when  
we say that  
both 'are'?It is a power  
of affecting

another, if only for a single moment, however trifling the cause and however slight the effect, has real existence; and I hold that the definition of being is simply power.

*Theæt.* They accept your suggestion, having nothing better of their own to offer.

248 *Str.* Very good; perhaps we, as well as they, may one day change our minds; but, for the present, this may be regarded as the understanding which is established with them.

*Theæt.* Agreed.

*Str.* Let us now go to the friends of ideas; of their opinions, too, you shall be the interpreter.

*Theæt.* I will.

*Str.* To them we say — You would distinguish essence from generation?

*Theæt.* 'Yes,' they reply.

*Str.* And you would allow that we participate in generation with the body, and through perception, but we participate with the soul through thought in true essence; and essence you would affirm to be always the same and immutable, whereas generation or becoming varies?

*Theæt.* Yes; that is what we should affirm.

*Str.* Well, fair sirs, we say to them, what is this participation, which you assert of both? Do you agree with our recent definition?

*Theæt.* What definition?

*Str.* We said that being was an active or passive energy, arising out of a certain power which proceeds from elements meeting with one another. Perhaps your ears, Theætetus, may fail to catch their answer, which I recognize because I have been accustomed to hear it.

*Theæt.* And what is their answer?

*Str.* They deny the truth of what we were just now saying to the aborigines about existence.

*Theæt.* What was that?

*Str.* Any power of doing or suffering in a degree however slight was held by us to be a sufficient definition of being?

*Theæt.* True.

*Str.* They deny this, and say that the power of doing or suffering is confined to becoming, and that neither power is applicable to being.

*Sophist.*

STRANGER,  
THEÆTETUS.

and being  
affected by  
another.

Now we turn  
to the friends  
of ideas.—  
They ac-  
knowledge a  
distinction  
between gen-  
eration and  
essence, and  
that we par-  
ticipate in the  
former with  
the body and  
in the latter  
with the soul.

And what  
is this partici-  
pation?  
Is it to be  
defined, like  
being, to be  
a power of  
doing and  
suffering?

But they deny  
the appropri-  
ateness of this  
definition  
of being.

*Sophist.*

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

They admit however that the soul knows and that being is known. But knowing and being known are active and passive.

If being is acted upon, it must be in motion,—an attribute which, with life and soul, certainly belongs to perfect being.

*Theæt.* And is there not some truth in what they say?

*Str.* Yes; but our reply will be, that we want to ascertain from them more distinctly, whether they further admit that the soul knows, and that being or essence is known.

*Theæt.* There can be no doubt that they say so.

*Str.* And is knowing and being known doing or suffering, or both, or is the one doing and the other suffering, or has neither any share in either?

*Theæt.* Clearly, neither has any share in either; for if they say anything else, they will contradict themselves.

*Str.* I understand; but they will allow that if to know is active, then, of course, to be known is passive. And on this view being, in so far as it is known, is acted upon by knowledge, and is therefore in motion; for that which is in a state of rest cannot be acted upon, as we affirm.

*Theæt.* True.

*Str.* And, O heavens, can we ever be made to believe that motion and life and soul and mind are not present with perfect being? Can we imagine that being is devoid of life and mind, and exists in awful unmeaningness an everlasting fixture? 249

*Theæt.* That would be a dreadful thing to admit, Stranger.

*Str.* But shall we say that being has mind and not life?

*Theæt.* How is that possible?

*Str.* Or shall we say that both inhere in perfect being; but that it has no soul which contains them?

*Theæt.* And in what other way can it contain them?

*Str.* Or that being has mind and life and soul, but although endowed with soul remains absolutely unmoved?

*Theæt.* All three suppositions appear to me to be irrational.

*Str.* Under being, then, we must include motion, and that which is moved.

*Theæt.* Certainly.

*Str.* Then, Theaetetus, our inference is, that if there is no motion, neither is there any mind anywhere, or about anything or belonging to any one.

*Theæt.* Quite true.

*Str.* And yet this equally follows, if we grant that all things are in motion — upon this view too mind has no existence.

But rest,  
as well as  
motion, is



*Theæt.* How so?

*Sophist.*

*Str.* Do you think that sameness of condition and mode and subject could ever exist without a principle of rest?

STRANGER,  
THEÆTETUS.

*Theæt.* Certainly not.

necessary to  
the existence  
of mind ;

*Str.* Can you see how without them mind could exist, or come into existence anywhere?

*Theæt.* No.

*Str.* And surely contend we must in every possible way against him who would annihilate knowledge and reason and mind, and yet ventures to speak confidently about anything.

*Theæt.* Yes, with all our might.

*Str.* Then the philosopher, who has the truest reverence for these qualities, cannot possibly accept the notion of those who say that the whole is at rest, either as unity or in many forms: and he will be utterly deaf to those who assert universal motion. As children say entreatingly 'Give us both,' so he will include both the movable and immovable in his definition of being and all.

and the philo-  
sopher will  
demand both.

*Theæt.* Most true.

*Str.* And now, do we not seem to have gained a fair notion of being?

*Theæt.* Yes truly.

*Str.* Alas, Theætetus, methinks that we are now only beginning to see the real difficulty of the enquiry into the nature of it.

*Theæt.* What do you mean?

*Str.* O my friend, do you not see that nothing can exceed our ignorance, and yet we fancy that we are saying something good?

*Theæt.* I certainly thought that we were; and I do not at all understand how we never found out our desperate case.

250 *Str.* Reflect: after having made these admissions, may we not be justly asked the same questions which we ourselves were asking of those who said that all was hot and cold?

We must  
question our-  
selves as we  
questioned the  
Dualists.—  
Rest and mo-  
tion, we say,  
both exist:  
but what is  
existence?

*Theæt.* What were they? Will you recall them to my mind?

*Str.* To be sure I will, and I will remind you of them, by putting the same questions to you which I did to them, and then we shall get on.

*Theæt.* True.

*Sophist.*STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.*Str.* Would you not say that rest and motion are in the most entire opposition to one another?*Theaet.* Of course.*Str.* And yet you would say that both and either of them equally are?*Theaet.* I should.*Str.* And when you admit that both or either of them are, do you mean to say that both or either of them are in motion?*Theaet.* Certainly not.*Str.* Or do you wish to imply that they are both at rest, when you say that they are?*Theaet.* Of course not.It is some  
third thing  
including  
rest and mo-  
tion, yet  
neither of  
them.*Str.* Then you conceive of being as some third and distinct nature, under which rest and motion are alike included; and, observing that they both participate in being, you declare that they are.*Theaet.* Truly we seem to have an intimation that being is some third thing, when we say that rest and motion are.*Str.* Then being is not the combination of rest and motion, but something different from them.*Theaet.* So it would appear.*Str.* Being, then, according to its own nature, is neither in motion nor at rest.*Theaet.* That is very much the truth.*Str.* Where, then, is a man to look for help who would have any clear or fixed notion of being in his mind?*Theaet.* Where, indeed?But how can  
a thing be  
neither at  
rest nor in  
motion?*Str.* I scarcely think that he can look anywhere; for that which is not in motion must be at rest, and again, that which is not at rest must be in motion; but being is placed outside of both these classes. Is this possible?*Theaet.* Utterly impossible.*Str.* Here, then, is another thing which we ought to bear in mind.*Theaet.* What?We are as  
perplexed  
about exist-  
ence or  
being as  
we were*Str.* When we were asked to what we were to assign the appellation of not-being, we were in the greatest difficulty:—do you remember?*Theaet.* To be sure.

*Str.* And are we not now in as great a difficulty about being?

*Sophist.*

*Theæt.* I should say, Stranger, that we are in one which is, if possible, even greater.

STRANGER,  
THEÆTETUS.  
about not-  
being.

251

*Str.* Then let us acknowledge the difficulty; and as being and not-being are involved in the same perplexity, there is hope that when the one appears more or less distinctly, the other will equally appear; and if we are able to see neither, there may still be a chance of steering our way in between them, without any great discredit.

*Theæt.* Very good.

*Str.* Let us enquire, then, how we come to predicate many names of the same thing.

A way of  
escape:  
How is  
predication  
possible?

*Theæt.* Give an example.

*Str.* I mean that we speak of man, for example, under many names — that we attribute to him colours and forms and magnitudes and virtues and vices, in all of which instances and in ten thousand others we not only speak of him as a man, but also as good, and having numberless other attributes; and in the same way anything else which we originally supposed to be one is described by us as many, and under many names.

*Theæt.* That is true.

*Str.* And thus we provide a rich feast for tyros, whether young or old; for there is nothing easier than to argue that the one cannot be many, or the many one; and great is their delight in denying that a man is good; for man, they insist, is man and good is good. I dare say that you have met with persons who take an interest in such matters — they are often elderly men, whose meagre sense is thrown into amazement by these discoveries of theirs, which they believe to be the height of wisdom.

*Theæt.* Certainly, I have.

*Str.* Then, not to exclude any one who has ever speculated at all upon the nature of being, let us put our questions to them as well as to our former friends.

Let us inter-  
rogate those  
who deny it.

*Theæt.* What questions?

*Str.* Shall we refuse to attribute being to motion and rest, or anything to anything, and assume that they do not mingle, and are incapable of participating in one another? Or shall

There are  
three alter-  
natives:—

*Sophist.*STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.(1) no participation;  
(2) indiscriminate participation;  
(3) participation of some with some.

The first cannot be accepted: it is disastrous to all philosophies,

and those who assert it, contradict themselves.

we gather all into one class of things communicable with one another? Or are some things communicable and others not?—Which of these alternatives, Theaetetus, will they prefer?

*Theaet.* I have nothing to answer on their behalf. Suppose that you take all these hypotheses in turn, and see what are the consequences which follow from each of them.

*Str.* Very good, and first let us assume them to say that nothing is capable of participating in anything else in any respect; in that case rest and motion cannot participate in being at all. 252

*Theaet.* They cannot.

*Str.* But would either of them be if not participating in being?

*Theaet.* No.

*Str.* Then by this admission everything is instantly overturned, as well the doctrine of universal motion as of universal rest, and also the doctrine of those who distribute being into immutable and everlasting kinds; for all these add on a notion of being, some affirming that things 'are' truly in motion, and others that they 'are' truly at rest.

*Theaet.* Just so.

*Str.* Again, those who would at one time compound, and at another resolve all things, whether making them into one and out of one creating infinity, or dividing them into finite elements, and forming compounds out of these; whether they suppose the processes of creation to be successive or continuous, would be talking nonsense in all this if there were no admixture.

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* Most ridiculous of all will the men themselves be who want to carry out the argument and yet forbid us to call anything, because participating in some affection from another, by the name of that other.

*Theaet.* Why so?

*Str.* Why, because they are compelled to use the words 'to be,' 'apart,' 'from others,' 'in itself,' and ten thousand more, which they cannot give up, but must make the connecting links of discourse; and therefore they do not require to be refuted by others, but their enemy, as the saying is, inhabits



the same house with them; they are always carrying about with them an adversary, like the wonderful ventriloquist, Eurycles, who out of their own bellies audibly contradicts them.

*Sophist.*

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

*Theaet.* Precisely so; a very true and exact illustration.

*Str.* And now, if we suppose that all things have the power of communion with one another — what will follow?

The second alternative is impossible; for if it were true, rest would move and motion would rest.

*Theaet.* Even I can solve that riddle.

*Str.* How?

*Theaet.* Why, because motion itself would be at rest, and rest again in motion, if they could be attributed to one another.

*Str.* But this is utterly impossible.

*Theaet.* Of course.

*Str.* Then only the third hypothesis remains.

*Theaet.* True.

The third alternative of communion of some with some.

*Str.* For, surely, either all things have communion with all; or nothing with any other thing; or some things communicate with some things and others not.

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Str.* And two out of these three suppositions have been found to be impossible.

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Str.* Every one then, who desires to answer truly, will adopt the third and remaining hypothesis of the communion of some with some.

*Theaet.* Quite true.

253 *Str.* This communion of some with some may be illustrated by the case of letters; for some letters do not fit each other, while others do.

The analogy of letters,— vowels and consonants,

*Theaet.* Of course.

*Str.* And the vowels, especially, are a sort of bond which pervades all the other letters, so that without a vowel one consonant cannot be joined to another.

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* But does every one know what letters will unite with what? Or is art required in order to do so <sup>1</sup>?

*Theaet.* Art is required.

<sup>1</sup> Reading *δρᾶν ἰκανῶς αὐτὰ* (? *αὐτό*).

*Sophist.*

*Str.* What art?

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

*Theaet.* The art of grammar.

and of musical  
notes.

*Str.* And is not this also true of sounds high and low?—

Is not he who has the art to know what sounds mingle, a musician, and he who is ignorant, not a musician?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Str.* And we shall find this to be generally true of art or the absence of art.

*Theaet.* Of course.

As the grammarian and musician know what letters and notes rightly combine with one another, so the dialectician knows what classes have communion with each other and what not.

*Str.* And as classes are admitted by us in like manner to be some of them capable and others incapable of intermixture, must not he who would rightly show what kinds will unite and what will not, proceed by the help of science in the path of argument? And will he not ask if the connecting links are universal, and so capable of intermixture with all things; and again, in divisions, whether there are not other universal classes, which make them possible?

*Theaet.* To be sure he will require science, and, if I am not mistaken, the very greatest of all sciences.

*Str.* How are we to call it? By Zeus, have we not lighted unwittingly upon our free and noble science, and in looking for the Sophist have we not entertained the philosopher unawares?

*Theaet.* What do you mean?

*Str.* Should we not say that the division according to classes, which neither makes the same other, nor makes other the same, is the business of the dialectical science?

*Theaet.* That is what we should say.

He is the classifier and only true philosopher.

*Str.* Then, surely, he who can divide rightly is able to see clearly one form pervading a scattered multitude, and many different forms contained under one higher form; and again, one form knit together into a single whole and pervading many such wholes, and many forms, existing only in separation and isolation. This is the knowledge of classes which determines where they can have communion with one another and where not.

*Theaet.* Quite true.

*Str.* And the art of dialectic would be attributed by you only to the philosopher pure and true?

*Theaet.* Who but he can be worthy?

254 *Str.* In this region we shall always discover the philosopher, if we look for him; like the Sophist, he is not easily discovered, but for a different reason.

*Sophist.*

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

*Theaet.* For what reason?

*Str.* Because the Sophist runs away into the darkness of not-being, in which he has learned by habit to feel about, and cannot be discovered because of the darkness of the place. Is not that true?

*Theaet.* It seems to be so.

*Str.* And the philosopher, always holding converse through reason with the idea of being, is also dark from excess of light; for the souls of the many have no eye which can endure the vision of the divine.

The philosopher is hidden from excess of light: the Sophist from the darkness of the place in which he lives.

*Theaet.* Yes; that seems to be quite as true as the other.

*Str.* Well, the philosopher may hereafter be more fully considered by us, if we are disposed; but the Sophist must clearly not be allowed to escape until we have had a good look at him.

*Theaet.* Very good.

*Str.* Since, then, we are agreed that some classes have a communion with one another, and others not, and some have communion with a few and others with many, and that there is no reason why some should not have universal communion with all, let us now pursue the enquiry, as the argument suggests, not in relation to all ideas, lest the multitude of them should confuse us, but let us select a few of those which are reckoned to be the principal ones, and consider their several natures and their capacity of communion with one another, in order that if we are not able to apprehend with perfect clearness the notions of being and not-being, we may at least not fall short in the consideration of them, so far as they come within the scope of the present enquiry, if peradventure we may be allowed to assert the reality of not-being, and yet escape unscathed.

Let us examine some of the principal kinds, with reference to their power of intercommunion.

*Theaet.* We must do so.

*Str.* The most important of all the genera are those which we were just now mentioning — being and rest and motion.

Most important of all are being, rest, and motion, of which the two

*Theaet.* Yes, by far.

*Str.* And two of these are, as we affirm, incapable of communion with one another.

*Sophist.*

*Theaet.* Quite incapable.

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

*Str.* Whereas being surely has communion with both of them, for both of them are?

latter hold  
communion  
with being,  
but not with  
one another.

*Theaet.* Of course.

*Str.* That makes up three of them.

*Theaet.* To be sure.

They are  
other than  
one another,  
but the same  
with them-  
selves.

*Str.* And each of them is other than the remaining two, but the same with itself.

*Theaet.* True.

'Same' and  
'other' again  
are two  
new kinds.

*Str.* But then, what is the meaning of these two words, 'same' and 'other'? Are they two new kinds other than the three, and yet always of necessity intermingling with them, and are we to have five kinds instead of three; or when we speak of the same and other, are we unconsciously speaking of one of the three first kinds?

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*Theaet.* Very likely we are.

For they are  
not identical  
with motion  
and rest;

*Str.* But, surely, motion and rest are neither the other nor the same.

*Theaet.* How is that?

*Str.* Whatever we attribute to motion and rest in common, cannot be either of them.

*Theaet.* Why not?

*Str.* Because motion would be at rest and rest in motion, for either of them, being predicated of both, will compel the other to change into the opposite of its own nature, because partaking of its opposite.

*Theaet.* Quite true.

*Str.* Yet they surely both partake of the same and of the other?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Str.* Then we must not assert that motion, any more than rest, is either the same or the other.

*Theaet.* No; we must not.

nor is being  
identical with  
'the same';

*Str.* But are we to conceive that being and the same are identical?

*Theaet.* Possibly.

*Str.* But if they are identical, then again in saying that motion and rest have being, we should also be saying that they are the same.

*Theaet.* Which surely cannot be.



*Str.* Then being and the same cannot be one.

*Theaet.* Scarcely.

*Str.* Then we may suppose the same to be a fourth class, which is now to be added to the three others.

*Theaet.* Quite true.

*Str.* And shall we call the other a fifth class? Or should we consider being and other to be two names of the same class?

*Theaet.* Very likely.

*Str.* But you would agree, if I am not mistaken, that existences are relative as well as absolute?

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Str.* And the other is always relative to other?

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* But this would not be the case unless being and the other entirely differed; for, if the other, like being, were absolute as well as relative, then there would have been a kind of other which was not other than other. And now we find that what is other must of necessity be what it is in relation to some other.

*Theaet.* That is the true state of the case.

*Str.* Then we must admit the other as the fifth of our selected classes.

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Str.* And the fifth class pervades all classes, for they all differ from one another, not by reason of their own nature, but because they partake of the idea of the other.

*Theaet.* Quite true.

*Str.* Then let us now put the case with reference to each of the five.

*Theaet.* How?

*Str.* First there is motion, which we affirm to be absolutely 'other' than rest: what else can we say?

*Theaet.* It is so.

*Str.* And therefore is not rest!

*Theaet.* Certainly not.

*Str.* And yet is, because partaking of being.

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* Again, motion is other than the same?

*Theaet.* Just so.

*Sophist.*

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

not yet with  
'the other,'  
which is rel-  
ative only,  
and never  
absolute.

This fifth class  
of 'the other'  
pervades all  
classes, and  
helps to dis-  
tinguish them.

Thus motion  
is other than  
rest,—i. e. is  
not rest; yet  
it *is*, since it  
partakes of  
being.

It is other  
than the  
same and

*Sophist.**Str.* And is therefore not the same.STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.*Theaet.* It is not.not the same,  
but in dif-  
ferent senses.*Str.* Yet, surely, motion is the same, because all things partake of the same.*Theaet.* Very true.*Str.* Then we must admit, and not object to say, that motion is the same and is not the same, for we do not apply the terms 'same' and 'not the same,' in the same sense; but we call it the 'same,' in relation to itself, because partaking of the same; and not the same, because having communion with the other, it is thereby severed from the same, and has become not that but other, and is therefore rightly spoken of as 'not the same.'*Theaet.* To be sure.*Str.* And if absolute motion in any point of view partook of rest, there would be no absurdity in calling motion stationary.*Theaet.* Quite right,—that is, on the supposition that some classes mingle with one another, and others not.*Str.* That such a communion of kinds is according to nature, we had already proved<sup>1</sup> before we arrived at this part of our discussion.*Theaet.* Certainly.Again, mo-  
tion is other  
than the  
other; and  
therefore  
other and  
not other.*Str.* Let us proceed, then. May we not say that motion is other than the other, having been also proved by us to be other than the same and other than rest?*Theaet.* That is certain.*Str.* Then, according to this view, motion is other and also not other?*Theaet.* True.*Str.* What is the next step? Shall we say that motion is other than the three and not other than the fourth,—for we agreed that there are five classes about and in the sphere of which we proposed to make enquiry?*Theaet.* Surely we cannot admit that the number is less than it appeared to be just now.Once more,  
motion is  
other than  
being, yet  
partakes of*Str.* Then we may without fear contend that motion is other than being?<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, 252.

*Theæt.* Without the least fear.

*Str.* The plain result is that motion, since it partakes of being, really is and also is not?

*Theæt.* Nothing can be plainer.

*Str.* Then not-being necessarily exists in the case of motion and of every class; for the nature of the other entering into them all, makes each of them other than being, and so non-existent; and therefore of all of them, in like manner, we may truly say that they are not; and again, inasmuch as they partake of being, that they are and are existent.

*Theæt.* So we may assume.

*Str.* Every class, then, has plurality of being and infinity of not-being.

257 *Theæt.* So we must infer.

*Str.* And being itself may be said to be other than the other kinds.

*Theæt.* Certainly.

*Str.* Then we may infer that being is not, in respect of as many other things as there are; for not being these it is itself one, and is not the other things, which are infinite in number.

*Theæt.* That is not far from the truth.

*Str.* And we must not quarrel with this result, since it is of the nature of classes to have communion with one another; and if any one denies our present statement [viz. that being is not, etc.], let him first argue with our former conclusion [i. e. respecting the communion of ideas], and then he may proceed to argue with what follows.

*Theæt.* Nothing can be fairer.

*Str.* Let me ask you to consider a further question.

*Theæt.* What question?

*Str.* When we speak of not-being, we speak, I suppose, not of something opposed to being, but only different.

*Theæt.* What do you mean?

*Str.* When we speak of something as not great, does the expression seem to you to imply what is little any more than what is equal?

*Theæt.* Certainly not.

*Str.* The negative particles, *οὐ* and *μή*, when prefixed to words, do not imply opposition, but only difference from the

*Sophist.*

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

being, and  
therefore is  
and is not.

Thus there  
is found to be  
an existence  
of not-being  
in the case  
of motion,  
occasioned by  
the nature of  
the other, and  
in every  
other kind,  
being not  
excepted.  
For being is  
itself, but is  
not all other  
things.

A negative  
particle  
does not

*Sophist.*STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.imply oppo-  
sition, but  
only dif-  
ference.The parts of  
otherness or  
difference and  
of knowledge  
correspond :  
the former are  
expressed by  
prefixing  
'not' to the  
names of the  
corresponding  
parts of  
knowledge.Thus the not-  
beautiful is the  
other of the  
beautiful, and  
is equally  
real with it.And so of  
other things.

words, or more correctly from the things represented by the words, which follow them.

*Theaet.* Quite true.*Str.* There is another point to be considered, if you do not object.*Theaet.* What is it?*Str.* The nature of the other appears to me to be divided into fractions like knowledge.*Theaet.* How so?*Str.* Knowledge, like the other, is one ; and yet the various parts of knowledge have each of them their own particular name, and hence there are many arts and kinds of knowledge.*Theaet.* Quite true.*Str.* And is not the case the same with the parts of the other, which is also one?*Theaet.* Very likely ; but will you tell me how?*Str.* There is some part of the other which is opposed to the beautiful?*Theaet.* There is.*Str.* Shall we say that this has or has not a name?*Theaet.* It has ; for whatever we call not-beautiful is other than the beautiful, not than something else*Str.* And now tell me another thing.*Theaet.* What?*Str.* Is the not-beautiful anything but this — an existence parted off from a certain kind of existence, and again from another point of view opposed to an existing something?*Theaet.* True.*Str.* Then the not-beautiful turns out to be the opposition of being to being?*Theaet.* Very true.*Str.* But upon this view, is the beautiful a more real and the not-beautiful a less real existence?*Theaet.* Not at all.*Str.* And the not-great may be said to exist, equally with the great? 258*Theaet.* Yes.*Str.* And, in the same way, the just must be placed in the same category with the not-just — the one cannot be said to have any more existence than the other.



*Theaet.* True.

*Sophist.*

*Str.* The same may be said of other things; seeing that the nature of the other has a real existence, the parts of this nature must equally be supposed to exist.

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

*Theaet.* Of course.

*Str.* Then, as would appear, the opposition of a part of the other, and of a part of being, to one another, is, if I may venture to say so, as truly essence as being itself, and implies not the opposite of being, but only what is other than being.

The opposition between the parts of being and other is also being.

*Theaet.* Beyond question.

*Str.* What then shall we call it?

*Theaet.* Clearly, not-being; and this is the very nature for which the Sophist compelled us to search.

*Str.* And has not this, as you were saying, as real an existence as any other class? May I not say with confidence that not-being has an assured existence, and a nature of its own? Just as the great was found to be great and the beautiful beautiful, and the not-great not-great, and the not-beautiful not-beautiful, in the same manner not-being has been found to be and is not-being, and is to be reckoned one among the many classes of being. Do you, Theaetetus, still feel any doubt of this?

Not-being is a kind of being,

*Theaet.* None whatever.

*Str.* Do you observe that our scepticism has carried us beyond the range of Parmenides' prohibition?

*Theaet.* In what?

*Str.* We have advanced to a further point, and shown him more than he forbade us to investigate.

*Theaet.* How is that?

*Str.* Why, because he says —

Not-being never is<sup>1</sup>, and do thou keep thy thoughts from this way of enquiry.'

*Theaet.* Yes, he says so.

*Str.* Whereas, we have not only proved that things which are not are, but we have shown what form of being not-being is; for we have shown that the nature of the other is, and is

which includes all things other than some given thing.

<sup>1</sup> Reading τοῦτο φανῆ.

*Sophist.*STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

distributed over all things in their relations to one another, and whatever part of the other is contrasted with being, this is precisely what we have ventured to call not-being.

*Theaet.* And surely, Stranger, we were quite right.

Our theory  
rests upon the  
communion  
of kinds.

*Str.* Let not any one say, then, that while affirming the opposition of not-being to being, we still assert the being of not-being; for as to whether there is an opposite of being, to that enquiry we have long said good-bye—it may or may not be, and may or may not be capable of definition. But as touching our present account of not-being, let a man either convince us of error, or, so long as he cannot, he too must say, as we are saying, that there is a communion of classes, and that being, and difference or other, traverse all things and mutually interpenetrate, so that the other partakes of being, and by reason of this participation is, and yet is not that of which it partakes, but other, and 'being other than being, it is clearly a necessity that not-being should be. And again, being, through partaking of the other, becomes a class other than the remaining classes, and being other than all of them, is not each one of them, and is not all the rest, so that undoubtedly there are thousands upon thousands of cases in which being is not, and all other things, whether regarded individually or collectively, in many respects are, and in many respects are not. 259

*Theaet.* True.

We should let  
alone verbal  
puzzles.

*Str.* And he who is sceptical of this contradiction, must think how he can find something better to say; or if he sees a puzzle, and his pleasure is to drag words this way and that, the argument will prove to him, that he is not making a worthy use of his faculties; for there is no charm in such puzzles, and there is no difficulty in detecting them; but we can tell him of something else the pursuit of which is noble and also difficult.

*Theaet.* What is it?

*Str.* A thing of which I have already spoken;—letting alone these puzzles as involving no difficulty, he should be able to follow and criticize in detail every argument, and when a man says that the same is in a manner other, or that other is the same, to understand and refute him from his own point of view, and in the same respect in which he asserts

either of these affections. But to show that somehow and in some sense the same is other, or the other same, or the great small, or the like unlike; and to delight in always bringing forward such contradictions, is no real refutation, but is clearly the new-born babe of some one who is only beginning to approach the problem of being.

*Theaet.* To be sure.

*Str.* For certainly, my friend, the attempt to separate all existences from one another is a barbarism and utterly unworthy of an educated or philosophical mind.

*Theaet.* Why so?

*Str.* The attempt at universal separation is the final annihilation of all reasoning; for only by the union of conceptions with one another do we attain to discourse of reason.

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* And, observe that we were only just in time in making a resistance to such separatists, and compelling them to admit that one thing mingles with another.

*Theaet.* Why so?

*Str.* Why, that we might be able to assert discourse to be a kind of being; for if we could not, the worst of all consequences would follow; we should have no philosophy. Moreover, the necessity for determining the nature of discourse presses upon us at this moment; if utterly deprived of it, we could no more hold discourse; and deprived of it we should be if we admitted that there was no admixture of natures at all.

The utter separation of all existences would deprive us of discourse, and without discourse we could have no philosophy.

*Theaet.* Very true. But I do not understand why at this moment we must determine the nature of discourse.

*Str.* Perhaps you will see more clearly by the help of the following explanation.

*Theaet.* What explanation?

*Str.* Not-being has been acknowledged by us to be one among many classes diffused over all being.

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* And thence arises the question, whether not-being mingles with opinion and language.

*Theaet.* How so?

*Str.* If not-being has no part in the proposition, then all things must be true; but if not-being has a part, then false opinion and false speech are possible, for to think or to say

*Sophist.*STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

what is not — is falsehood, which thus arises in the region of thought and in speech.

*Theaet.* That is quite true.

*Str.* And where there is falsehood surely there must be deceit.

*Theaet.* Yes.

We left the Sophist, in the region of images, denying the possibility of falsehood.

But now that not-being has been shown to partake of being, this line of defence can no longer be maintained. Yet he will still evade us by denying that opinion and language partake of not-being.

*Str.* And if there is deceit, then all things must be full of idols and images and fancies.

*Theaet.* To be sure.

*Str.* Into that region the Sophist, as we said, made his escape, and, when he had got there, denied the very possibility of falsehood; no one, he argued, either conceived or uttered falsehood, inasmuch as not-being did not in any way partake of being.

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* And now, not-being has been shown to partake of being, and therefore he will not continue fighting in this direction, but he will probably say that some ideas partake of not-being, and some not, and that language and opinion are of the non-partaking class; and he will still fight to the death against the existence of the image-making and phantastic art, in which we have placed him, because, as he will say, opinion and language do not partake of not-being, and unless this participation exists, there can be no such thing as falsehood. And, with the view of meeting this evasion, we must begin by enquiring into the nature of language, opinion, and imagination, in order that when we find them we may find also that they have communion with not-being, and, having made out 261 the connexion of them, may thus prove that falsehood exists; and therein we will imprison the Sophist, if he deserves it, or, if not, we will let him go again and look for him in another class.

*Theaet.* Certainly, Stranger, there appears to be truth in what was said about the Sophist at first, that he was of a class not easily caught, for he seems to have abundance of defences, which he throws up, and which must every one of them be stormed before we can reach the man himself. And even now, we have with difficulty got through his first defence, which is the not-being of not-being, and lo! here is another; for we have still to show that falsehood exists in



the sphere of language and opinion, and there will be another and another line of defence without end. *Sophist.*

*Str.* Any one, Theaetetus, who is able to advance even a little ought to be of good cheer, for what would he who is dispirited at a little progress do, if he were making none at all, or even undergoing a repulse? Such a faint heart, as the proverb says, will never take a city: but now that we have succeeded thus far, the citadel is ours, and what remains is easier.

*Theaet.* Very true.

*Str.* Then, as I was saying, let us first of all obtain a conception of language and opinion, in order that we may have clearer grounds for determining, whether not-being has any concern with them, or whether they are both always true, and neither of them ever false.

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* Then, now, let us speak of names, as before we were speaking of ideas and letters; for that is the direction in which the answer may be expected.

*Theaet.* And what is the question at issue about names?

*Str.* The question at issue is whether all names may be connected with one another, or none, or only some of them.

*Theaet.* Clearly the last is true.

*Str.* I understand you to say that words which have a meaning when in sequence may be connected, but that words which have no meaning when in sequence cannot be connected?

*Theaet.* What are you saying?

*Str.* What I thought that you intended when you gave your assent; for there are two sorts of intimation of being which are given by the voice.

*Theaet.* What are they?

*Str.* One of them is called nouns, and the other verbs.

*Theaet.* Describe them.

262 *Str.* That which denotes action we call a verb.

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* And the other, which is an articulate mark set on those who do the actions, we call a noun.

*Theaet.* Quite true.

*Str.* A succession of nouns only is not a sentence, any more than of verbs without nouns.

We want to obtain a clear conception of language and opinion.

As with letters, so with names: only some can be connected.

Neither nouns alone nor verbs

*Sophist.**Theaet.* I do not understand you.STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.  
alone make  
a sentence.*Str.* I see that when you gave your assent you had something else in your mind. But what I intended to say was, that a mere succession of nouns or of verbs is not discourse.*Theaet.* What do you mean?*Str.* I mean that words like 'walks,' 'runs,' 'sleeps,' or any other words which denote action, however many of them you string together, do not make discourse.*Theaet.* How can they?*Str.* Or, again, when you say 'lion,' 'stag,' 'horse,' or any other words which denote agents—neither in this way of stringing words together do you attain to discourse; for there is no expression of action or inaction, or of the existence of existence or non-existence indicated by the sounds, until verbs are mingled with nouns; then the words fit, and the smallest combination of them forms language, and is the simplest and least form of discourse.*Theaet.* Again I ask, What do you mean?*Str.* When any one says 'A man learns,' should you not call this the simplest and least of sentences?*Theaet.* Yes.*Str.* Yes, for he now arrives at the point of giving an intimation about something which is, or is becoming, or has become, or will be. And he not only names, but he does something, by connecting verbs with nouns; and therefore we say that he discourses, and to this connexion of words we give the name of discourse.*Theaet.* True.*Str.* And as there are some things which fit one another, and other things which do not fit, so there are some vocal signs which do, and others which do not, combine and form discourse.*Theaet.* Quite true.*Str.* There is another small matter.*Theaet.* What is it?*Str.* A sentence must and cannot help having a subject.*Theaet.* True.*Str.* And must be of a certain quality.*Theaet.* Certainly.*Str.* And now let us mind what we are about.A sentence  
must have a  
subject, and  
be of a cer-  
tain quality,—  
i. e. true or  
false.

*Theaet.* We must do so.

*Sophist.*

*Str.* I will repeat a sentence to you in which a thing and an action are combined, by the help of a noun and a verb; and you shall tell me of whom the sentence speaks.

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.  
Examples.

*Theaet.* I will, to the best of my power.

63 *Str.* 'Theaetetus sits' — not a very long sentence.

*Theaet.* Not very.

*Str.* Of whom does the sentence speak, and who is the subject? that is what you have to tell.

*Theaet.* Of me; I am the subject.

*Str.* Or this sentence, again —

*Theaet.* What sentence?

*Str.* 'Theaetetus, with whom I am now speaking, is flying.'

*Theaet.* That also is a sentence which will be admitted by every one to speak of me, and to apply to me.

*Str.* We agreed that every sentence must necessarily have a certain quality.

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Str.* And what is the quality of each of these two sentences?

*Theaet.* The one, as I imagine, is false, and the other true.

*Str.* The true says what is true about you?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Str.* And the false says what is other than true?

*Theaet.* Yes.

A true sentence says what is true of its subject, a false sentence what is false.

*Str.* And therefore speaks of things which are not as if they were?

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* And says that things are real of you which are not; for, as we were saying, in regard to each thing or person, there is much that is and much that is not.

*Theaet.* Quite true.

*Str.* The second of the two sentences which related to you was first of all an example of the shortest form consistent with our definition.

*Theaet.* Yes, this was implied in our recent admission.

*Str.* And, in the second place, it related to a subject?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Str.* Who must be you, and can be nobody else?

*Theaet.* Unquestionably.

*Str.* And it would be no sentence at all if there were

*Sophist.*

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

Thus false discourse is possible, and therefore false thought, opinion, imagination, which are akin to it, are also possible.

Thought is the unuttered conversation of the soul, which, when uttered, becomes speech.

Opinion is silent affirmation or denial.

Imagination ? is opinion expressed in a form of sense.

no subject, for, as we proved, a sentence which has no subject is impossible.

*Theaet.* Quite true.

*Str.* When other, then, is asserted of you as the same, and not-being as being, such a combination of nouns and verbs is really and truly false discourse.

*Theaet.* Most true.

*Str.* And therefore thought, opinion, and imagination are now proved to exist in our minds both as true and false.

*Theaet.* How so?

*Str.* You will know better if you first gain a knowledge of what they are, and in what they severally differ from one another.

*Theaet.* Give me the knowledge which you would wish me to gain.

*Str.* Are not thought and speech the same, with this exception, that what is called thought is the unuttered conversation of the soul with herself?

*Theaet.* Quite true.

*Str.* But the stream of thought which flows through the lips and is audible is called speech?

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* And we know that there exists in speech . . .

*Theaet.* What exists?

*Str.* Affirmation.

*Theaet.* Yes, we know it.

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*Str.* When the affirmation or denial takes place in silence and in the mind only, have you any other name by which to call it but opinion?

*Theaet.* There can be no other name.

*Str.* And when opinion is presented, not simply, but in some form of sense, would you not call it imagination?

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Str.* And seeing that language is true and false, and that thought is the conversation of the soul with herself, and opinion is the end of thinking, and imagination or phantasy is the union of sense and opinion, the inference is that some of them, since they are akin to language, should have an element of falsehood as well as of truth?

*Theaet.* Certainly.



*Str.* Do you perceive, then, that false opinion and speech have been discovered sooner than we expected?—For just now we seemed to be undertaking a task which would never be accomplished.

*Theaet.* I perceive.

*Str.* Then let us not be discouraged about the future; but now having made this discovery, let us go back to our previous classification.

*Theaet.* What classification?

*Str.* We divided image-making into two sorts; the one likeness-making, the other imaginative or phantastic.

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* And we said that we were uncertain in which we should place the Sophist.

*Theaet.* We did say so.

*Str.* And our heads began to go round more and more when it was asserted that there is no such thing as an image or idol or appearance, because in no manner or time or place can there ever be such a thing as falsehood.

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* And now, since there has been shown to be false speech and false opinion, there may be imitations of real existences, and out of this condition of the mind an art of deception may arise.

*Theaet.* Quite possible.

*Str.* And we have already admitted, in what preceded, that the Sophist was lurking in one of the divisions of the likeness-making art?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Str.* Let us, then, renew the attempt, and in dividing any class, always take the part to the right, holding fast to that which holds the Sophist, until we have stripped him of all his common properties, and reached his difference or  
265 peculiar. Then we may exhibit him in his true nature, first to ourselves and then to kindred dialectical spirits.

*Theaet.* Very good.

*Str.* You may remember that all art was originally divided by us into creative and acquisitive.

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Str.* And the Sophist was flitting before us in the acquisitive

*Sophist.*  
STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS,  
  
Recapitu-  
lation from  
235 ff.  
(*supra*).—  
We divided  
image-making  
into likeness-  
making and  
phantastic,  
and then the  
difficulty  
which we  
have just  
solved arose.

*Sophist.*

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

We have traced the Sophist's descent through the subdivisions of acquisitive : let us now look for him in the branches of creative, of which imitation is one. Creative art is (1) human, (2) divine.

class, in the subdivisions of hunting, contests, merchandize, and the like.

*Theaet.* Very true.

*Str.* But now that the imitative art has enclosed him, it is clear that we must begin by dividing the art of creation ; for imitation is a kind of creation — of images, however, as we affirm, and not of real things.

*Theaet.* Quite true.

*Str.* In the first place, there are two kinds of creation.

*Theaet.* What are they?

*Str.* One of them is human and the other divine.

*Theaet.* I do not follow.

*Str.* Every power, as you may remember our saying originally, which causes things to exist, not previously existing, was defined by us as creative.

*Theaet.* I remember.

*Str.* Looking, now, at the world and all the animals and plants, at things which grow upon the earth from seeds and roots, as well as at inanimate substances which are formed within the earth, fusile or non-fusile, shall we say that they come into existence — not having existed previously — by the creation of God, or shall we agree with vulgar opinion about them?

*Theaet.* What is it?

*Str.* The opinion that nature brings them into being from some spontaneous and unintelligent cause. Or shall we say that they are created by a divine reason and a knowledge which comes from God?

*Theaet.* I dare say that, owing to my youth, I may often waver in my view, but now when I look at you and see that you incline to refer them to God, I defer to your authority.

*Str.* Nobly said, Theaetetus, and if I thought that you were one of those who would hereafter change your mind, I would have gently argued with you, and forced you to assent ; but as I perceive that you will come of yourself and without any argument of mine, to that belief which, as you say, attracts you, I will not forestall the work of time. Let me suppose, then, that things which are said to be made by nature are the work of divine art, and that things which are

Nature is to be attributed to an intelligent cause, not to an unintelligent.

made by man out of these are works of human art. And so there are two kinds of making and production, the one human and the other divine.

*Sophist.*

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* Then, now, subdivide each of the two sections which we have already.

*Theaet.* How do you mean?

266 *Str.* I mean to say that you should make a vertical division of production or invention, as you have already made a lateral one.

*Theaet.* I have done so.

*Str.* Then, now, there are in all four parts or segments — two of them have reference to us and are human, and two of them have reference to the gods and are divine.

Both in divine and in human creation there is a division for realities and a division for images and likenesses.

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* And, again, in the division which was supposed to be made in the other way, one part in each subdivision is the making of the things themselves, but the two remaining parts may be called the making of likenesses; and so the productive art is again divided into two parts.

*Theaet.* Tell me the divisions once more.

*Str.* I suppose that we, and the other animals, and the elements out of which things are made — fire, water, and the like — are known by us to be each and all the creation and work of God.

*Theaet.* True.

*Str.* And there are images of them, which are not them, but which correspond to them; and these are also the creation of a wonderful skill.

Divinely made images are such as dreams, shadows, transposed likenesses.

*Theaet.* What are they?

*Str.* The appearances which spring up of themselves in sleep or by day, such as a shadow when darkness arises in a fire, or the reflection which is produced when the light in bright and smooth objects meets on their surface with an external light, and creates a perception the opposite of our ordinary sight.

*Theaet.* Yes; and the images as well as the creation are equally the work of a divine hand.

*Str.* And what shall we say of human art? Do we not make one house by the art of building, and another by the

A human image is (e. g.) the

*Sophist.*STRANGER,  
THEÆTETUS.drawing of a  
house.

art of drawing, which is a sort of dream created by man for those who are awake?

*Theæt.* Quite true.

*Str.* And other products of human creation are also twofold and go in pairs; there is the thing, with which the art of making the thing is concerned, and the image, with which imitation is concerned.

*Theæt.* Now I begin to understand, and am ready to acknowledge that there are two kinds of production, and each of them twofold; in the lateral division there is both a divine and a human production; in the vertical there are realities and a creation of a kind of similitudes.

Such unreali-  
ties are  
produced by  
phantastic.

*Str.* And let us not forget that of the imitative class the one part was to have been likeness-making, and the other phantastic, if it could be shown that falsehood is a reality and belongs to the class of real being.

*Theæt.* Yes.

*Str.* And this appeared to be the case; and therefore now, without hesitation, we shall number the different kinds as two.

*Theæt.* True.Phantastic  
is further  
divided into  
mimicry or  
imitation and  
a nameless  
section.*Str.* Then, now, let us again divide the phantastic art.

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*Theæt.* Where shall we make the division?

*Str.* There is one kind which is produced by an instrument, and another in which the creator of the appearance is himself the instrument.

*Theæt.* What do you mean?

*Str.* When any one makes himself appear like another in his figure or his voice, imitation is the name for this part of the phantastic art.

*Theæt.* Yes.

*Str.* Let this, then, be named the art of mimicry, and this the province assigned to it; as for the other division, we are weary and will give that up, leaving to some one else the duty of making the class and giving it a suitable name.

*Theæt.* Let us do as you say — assign a sphere to the one and leave the other.

A further dis-  
tinction is  
to be drawn

*Str.* There is a further distinction, Theætetus, which is worthy of our consideration, and for a reason which I will tell you.



*Theæt.* Let me hear.

*Str.* There are some who imitate, knowing what they imitate, and some who do not know. And what line of distinction can there possibly be greater than that which divides ignorance from knowledge?

*Theæt.* There can be no greater.

*Str.* Was not the sort of imitation of which we spoke just now the imitation of those who know? For he who would imitate you would surely know you and your figure?

*Theæt.* Naturally.

*Str.* And what would you say of the figure or form of justice or of virtue in general? Are we not well aware that many, having no knowledge of either, but only a sort of opinion, do their best to show that this opinion is really entertained by them, by expressing it, as far as they can, in word and deed?

*Theæt.* Yes, that is very common.

*Str.* And do they always fail in their attempt to be thought just, when they are not? Or is not the very opposite true?

*Theæt.* The very opposite.

*Str.* Such a one, then, should be described as an imitator — to be distinguished from the other, as he who is ignorant is distinguished from him who knows?

*Theæt.* True.

*Str.* Can we find a suitable name for each of them? This is clearly not an easy task; for among the ancients there was some confusion of ideas, which prevented them from attempting to divide genera into species; wherefore there is no great abundance of names. Yet, for the sake of distinctness, I will make bold to call the imitation which coexists with opinion, the imitation of appearance — that which coexists with science, a scientific or learned imitation.

*Theæt.* Granted.

*Str.* The former is our present concern, for the Sophist was classed with imitators indeed, but not among those who have knowledge.

*Theæt.* Very true.

*Str.* Let us, then, examine our imitator of appearance, and

*Sophist.*

STRANGER,  
THEÆTETUS.

between the  
mimic who  
knows, and  
the mimic who  
is ignorant.

The latter is  
the mimic of  
appearance;  
the former, the  
learned mimic.

*Sophist.*

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

The mimic of  
appearance  
may be uncon-  
scious of his  
ignorance or  
a dissembler.

see whether he is sound, like a piece of iron, or whether there is still some crack in him.

*Theaet.* Let us examine him.

*Str.* Indeed there is a very considerable crack; for if you look, you find that one of the two classes of imitators is a simple creature, who thinks that he knows that which he only 268  
fancies; the other sort has knocked about among arguments, until he suspects and fears that he is ignorant of that which to the many he pretends to know.

*Theaet.* There are certainly the two kinds which you describe.

*Str.* Shall we regard one as the simple imitator — the other as the dissembling or ironical imitator?

*Theaet.* Very good.

*Str.* And shall we further speak of this latter class as having one or two divisions?

*Theaet.* Answer yourself.

*Str.* Upon consideration, then, there appear to me to be two; there is the dissembler, who harangues a multitude in public in a long speech, and the dissembler, who in private and in short speeches compels the person who is conversing with him to contradict himself.

*Theaet.* What you say is most true.

*Str.* And who is the maker of the longer speeches? Is he the statesman or the popular orator?

*Theaet.* The latter.

*Str.* And what shall we call the other? Is he the philosopher or the Sophist?

*Theaet.* The philosopher he cannot be, for upon our view he is ignorant; but since he is an imitator of the wise he will have a name which is formed by an adaptation of the word σοφός. What shall we name him? I am pretty sure that I cannot be mistaken in terming him the true and very Sophist.

*Str.* Shall we bind up his name as we did before, making a chain from one end of his genealogy to the other?

*Theaet.* By all means.

*Str.* He, then<sup>1</sup>, who traces the pedigree of his art as follows — who, belonging to the conscious or dissembling

There is a  
dissembler in  
public and a  
dissembler in  
private. The  
latter is the  
SOPHIST.

His full  
genealogy.

<sup>1</sup> Reading τὸν ὄγ.

section of the art of causing self-contradiction, is an imitator of appearance, and is separated from the class of phantastic which is a branch of image-making into that further division of creation, the juggling of words, a creation human, and not divine — any one who affirms the real Sophist to be of this blood and lineage will say the very truth.

*Sophist.*

STRANGER,  
THEAETETUS.

*Theaet.* Undoubtedly.





STATESMAN.



## INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.

IN the *Phaedrus*, the *Republic*, the *Philebus*, the *Parmenides*, and the *Sophist*, we may observe the tendency of Plato to combine two or more subjects or different aspects of the same subject in a single dialogue. In the *Sophist* and *Statesman* especially we note that the discussion is partly regarded as an illustration of method, and that analogies are brought from afar which throw light on the main subject. And in his later writings generally we further remark a decline of style, and of dramatic power; the characters excite little or no interest, and the digressions are apt to overlay the main thesis; there is not the 'callida junctura' of an artistic whole. Both the serious discussions and the jests are sometimes out of place. The invincible Socrates is withdrawn from view; and new foes begin to appear under old names. Plato is now chiefly concerned, not with the original *Sophist*, but with the sophistry of the schools of philosophy, which are making reasoning impossible; and is driven by them out of the regions of transcendental speculation back into the path of common sense. A logical or psychological phase takes the place of the doctrine of Ideas in his mind. He is constantly dwelling on the importance of regular classification, and of not putting words in the place of things. He has banished the poets, and is beginning to use a technical language. He is bitter and satirical, and seems to be sadly conscious of the realities of human life. Yet the ideal glory of the Platonic philosophy is not extinguished. He is still looking for a city in which kings are either philosophers or gods (cp. *Laws*, iv. 713).

The *Statesman* has lost the grace and beauty of the earlier dialogues. The mind of the writer seems to be so overpowered in the effort of thought as to impair his style; at least his gift of expression does not keep up with the increasing difficulty of his

*Statesman.*

INTRODUC-  
TION.

Statesman.  
INTRODUC-  
TION.

theme. The idea of the king or statesman and the illustration of method are connected, not like the love and rhetoric of the Phaedrus, by 'little invisible pegs,' but in a confused and inartistic manner, which fails to produce any impression of a whole on the mind of the reader. Plato apologizes for his tediousness, and acknowledges that the improvement of his audience has been his only aim in some of his digressions. His own image may be used as a motto of his style: like an inexpert statuary he has made the figure or outline too large (277 A), and is unable to give the proper colours or proportions to his work. He makes mistakes only to correct them — this seems to be his way of drawing attention to common dialectical errors. The Eleatic stranger, here, as in the Sophist, has no appropriate character, and appears only as the expositor of a political ideal, in the delineation of which he is frequently interrupted by purely logical illustrations. The younger Socrates resembles his namesake in nothing but a name. The dramatic character is so completely forgotten, that a special reference is twice made to discussions in the Sophist; and this, perhaps, is the strongest ground which can be urged for doubting the genuineness of the work. But, when we remember that a similar allusion is made in the Laws (v. 739) to the Republic, we see that the entire disregard of dramatic propriety is not always a sufficient reason for doubting the genuineness of a Platonic writing (see *infra*).

The search after the Statesman, which is carried on, like that for the Sophist, by the method of dichotomy, gives an opportunity for many humorous and satirical remarks. Several of the jests are mannered and laboured: for example, the turn of words with which the dialogue opens; or the clumsy joke about man being an animal, who has a power of two-feet — both which are suggested by the presence of Theodorus, the geometrician. There is political as well as logical insight in refusing to admit the division of mankind into Hellenes and Barbarians: 'if a crane could speak, he would in like manner oppose men and all other animals to cranes.' The pride of the Hellene is further humbled, by being compared to a Phrygian or Lydian. Plato glories in this impartiality of the dialectical method, which places birds in juxtaposition with men, and the king side by side with the bird-catcher; king or vermin-destroyer are objects of equal interest to science (cp. Parmen.



130 D, E). There are other passages which show that the irony of Socrates was a lesson which Plato was not slow in learning — as, for example, the passing remark, that ‘the kings and statesmen of our day are in their breeding and education very like their subjects;’ or the anticipation that the rivals of the king will be found in the class of servants; or the imposing attitude of the priests, who are the established interpreters of the will of heaven, authorized by law. Nothing is more bitter in all his writings than his comparison of the contemporary politicians to lions, centaurs, satyrs, and other animals of a feebler sort, who are ever changing their forms and natures. But, as in the later dialogues generally, the play of humour and the charm of poetry have departed, never to return.

Statesman  
INTRODUC-  
TION.

Still the Politicus contains a higher and more ideal conception of politics than any other of Plato's writings. The city of which there is a pattern in heaven (Rep. ix), is here described as a Paradisiacal state of human society. In the truest sense of all, the ruler is not man but God; and such a government existed in a former cycle of human history, and may again exist when the gods resume their care of mankind. In a secondary sense, the true form of government is that which has scientific rulers, who are irresponsible to their subjects. Not power but knowledge is the characteristic of a king or royal person. And the rule of a man is better and higher than law, because he is more able to deal with the infinite complexity of human affairs. But mankind, in despair of finding a true ruler, are willing to acquiesce in any law or custom which will save them from the caprice of individuals. They are ready to accept any of the six forms of government which prevail in the world. To the Greek, *nomos* was a sacred word, but the political idealism of Plato soars into a region beyond; for the laws he would substitute the intelligent will of the legislator. Education is originally to implant in men's minds a sense of truth and justice, which is the divine bond of states, and the legislator is to contrive human bonds, by which dissimilar natures may be united in marriage and supply the deficiencies of one another. As in the Republic, the government of philosophers, the causes of the perversion of states, the regulation of marriages, are still the political problems with which Plato's mind is occupied. He treats them more slightly, partly because the dialogue is

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shorter, and also because the discussion of them is perpetually crossed by the other interest of dialectic, which has begun to absorb him.

The plan of the Politicus or Statesman may be briefly sketched as follows: (1) By a process of division and subdivision we discover the true herdsman or king of men. But before we can rightly distinguish him from his rivals, we must view him, (2) as he is presented to us in a famous ancient tale: the tale will also enable us to distinguish the divine from the human herdsman or shepherd: (3) and besides our fable, we must have an example; for our example we will select the art of weaving, which will have to be distinguished from the kindred arts; and then, following this pattern, we will separate the king from his subordinates or competitors. (4) But are we not exceeding all due limits; and is there not a measure of all arts and sciences, to which the art of discourse must conform? There is; but before we can apply this measure, we must know what is the aim of discourse: and our discourse only aims at the dialectical improvement of ourselves and others.—Having made our apology, we return once more to the king or statesman, and proceed to contrast him with pretenders in the same line with him, under their various forms of government. (5) His characteristic is, that he alone has science, which is superior to law and written enactments; these do but spring out of the necessities of mankind, when they are in despair of finding the true king. (6) The sciences which are most akin to the royal are the sciences of the general, the judge, the orator, which minister to him, but even these are subordinate to him. (7) Fixed principles are implanted by education, and the king or statesman completes the political web by marrying together dissimilar natures, the courageous and the temperate, the bold and the gentle, who are the warp and the woof of society.

The outline may be filled up as follows:—

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*Soc.* I have reason to thank you, Theodorus, for the acquaint- *Steph.*  
ance of Theaetetus and the Stranger. *Theod.* And you will have <sup>257</sup>  
three times as much reason to thank me when they have de-  
lineated the Statesman and Philosopher, as well as the Sophist.  
*Soc.* Does the great geometrician apply the same measure to all  
three? Are they not divided by an interval which no geometrical

ratio can express? *Theod.* By the god Ammon, Socrates, you are right; and I am glad to see that you have not forgotten your geometry. But before I retaliate on you, I must request the Stranger to finish the argument. . . . The Stranger suggests that Theaetetus shall be allowed to rest, and that Socrates the younger shall respond in his place; Theodorus agrees to the suggestion, and Socrates remarks that the name of the one and the face of the other give him a right to claim relationship with both of them. They propose to take the Statesman after the Sophist; his path they must determine, and part off all other ways, stamping upon them a single negative form (cp. *Soph.* 257).

The Stranger begins the enquiry by making a division of the arts and sciences into theoretical and practical—the one kind concerned with knowledge exclusively, and the other with action; arithmetic and the mathematical sciences are examples of the former, and carpentering and handicraft arts of the latter (cp. *Philebus*, 55 ff.). Under which of the two shall we place the Statesman? Or rather, shall we not first ask, whether the king, statesman, master, householder, practise one art or many? As the adviser of a physician may be said to have medical science and to be a physician, so the adviser of a king has royal science and is a king. And the master of a large household may be compared to the ruler of a small state. Hence we conclude that the science of the king, statesman, and householder is one and the same. And this science is akin to knowledge rather than to action. For a king rules with his mind, and not with his hands.

But theoretical science may be a science either of judging, like arithmetic, or of ruling and superintending, like that of the architect or master-builder. And the science of the king is of the latter nature; but the power which he exercises is underived and uncontrolled,—a characteristic which distinguishes him from heralds, prophets, and other inferior officers. He is the wholesale dealer in command, and the herald, or other officer, retails his commands to others. Again, a ruler is concerned with the production of some object, and objects may be divided into living and lifeless, and rulers into the rulers of living and lifeless objects. And the king is not like the master-builder, concerned with lifeless matter, but has the task of managing living animals.

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And the tending of living animals may be either a tending of individuals, or a managing of herds. And the Statesman is not a groom, but a herdsman, and his art may be called either the art of managing a herd, or the art of collective management:—Which do you prefer? ‘No matter.’ Very good, Socrates, and if you are not too particular about words you will be all the richer some day in true wisdom. But how would you subdivide the herdsman’s art? ‘I should say, that there is one management of men, and another of beasts.’ Very good, but you are in too great a hurry to get to man. All divisions which are rightly made should cut through the middle; if you attend to this rule, you will be more likely to arrive at classes. ‘I do not understand the nature of my mistake.’ Your division was like a division of the human race into Hellenes and Barbarians, or into Lydians or Phrygians and all other nations, instead of into male and female; or like a division of number into ten thousand and all other numbers, instead of into odd and even. And I should like you to observe further, that though I maintain a class to be a part, there is no similar necessity for a part to be a class. But to return to your division, you spoke of men and other animals as two classes—the second of which you comprehended under the general name of beasts. This is the sort of division which an intelligent crane would make: he would put cranes into a class by themselves for their special glory, and jumble together all others, including man, in the class of beasts. An error of this kind can only be avoided by a more regular subdivision. Just now we divided the whole class of animals into gregarious and non-gregarious, omitting the previous division into tame and wild. We forgot this in our hurry to arrive at man, and found by experience, as the proverb says, that ‘the more haste the worse speed.’

And now let us begin again at the art of managing herds. You have probably heard of the fish-preserves in the Nile and in the ponds of the Great King, and of the nurseries of geese and cranes in Thessaly. These suggest a new division into the rearing or management of land-herds and of water-herds:—I need not say with which the king is concerned. And land-herds may be divided into walking and flying; and every idiot knows that the political animal is a pedestrian. At this point we may take a longer or a shorter road, and as we are already near the end,



I see no harm in taking the longer, which is the way of mesotomy, and accords with the principle which we were laying down. The tame, walking, herding animal, may be divided into two classes — the horned and the hornless, and the king is concerned with the hornless; and these again may be subdivided into animals having or not having cloven feet, or mixing or not mixing the breed; and the king or statesman has the care of animals which have not cloven feet, and which do not mix the breed.

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266 And now, if we omit dogs, who can hardly be said to herd, I think that we have only two species left which remain undivided: and how are we to distinguish them? To geometricians, like you and Theaetetus, I can have no difficulty in explaining that man is a diameter, having a power of two feet; and the power of four-legged creatures, being the double of two feet, is the diameter of our diameter. There is another excellent jest which I spy in the two remaining species. Men and birds are both bipeds, and human beings are running a race with the airiest and freest of creation, in which they are far behind their competitors; — this is a great joke, and there is a still better in the juxtaposition of the bird-taker and the king, who may be seen scampering after them. For, as we remarked in discussing the Sophist, the dialectical method is no respecter of persons. But we might have proceeded, as I was saying, by another and a shorter road. In that case we should have begun by dividing land animals into bipeds and quadrupeds, and bipeds into winged and wingless; we should then have taken the Statesman and set him over the ‘bipes implume,’ and put the reins of government into his hands.

267 Here let us sum up:—The science of pure knowledge had a part which was the science of command, and this had a part which was a science of wholesale command; and this was divided into the management of animals, and was again parted off into the management of herds of animals, and again of land animals, and these into hornless, and these into bipeds; and so at last we arrived at man, and found the political and royal science. And yet we have not clearly distinguished the political shepherd from his  
268 rivals. No one would think of usurping the prerogatives of the ordinary shepherd, who on all hands is admitted to be the trainer, matchmaker, doctor, musician of his flock. But the royal shepherd has numberless competitors, from whom he must be

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distinguished ; there are merchants, husbandmen, physicians, who will all dispute his right to manage the flock. I think that we can best distinguish him by having recourse to a famous old tradition, which may amuse as well as instruct us ; the narrative is perfectly true, although the scepticism of mankind is prone to doubt the tales of old. You have heard what happened in the quarrel of Atreus and Thyestes ? ‘ You mean about the golden lamb ? ’ No, not that ; but another part of the story, which tells 269 how the sun and stars once arose in the west and set in the east, and that the god reversed their motion, as a witness to the right of Atreus. ‘ There is such a story.’ And no doubt you have heard of the empire of Cronos, and of the earthborn men ? The origin of these and the like stories is to be found in the tale which I am about to narrate.

There was a time when God directed the revolutions of the world, but at the completion of a certain cycle he let go ; and the world, by a necessity of its nature, turned back, and went round the other way. For divine things alone are unchangeable ; but the earth and heavens, although endowed with many glories, have a body, and are therefore liable to perturbation. In the case of the world, the perturbation is very slight, and amounts only to a reversal of motion. For the lord of moving things is alone self-moved ; neither can piety allow that he goes at one time in one direction and at another time in another ; or that God has given the universe opposite motions ; or that there are two gods, one turning it in one direction, another in another. But the truth 270 is, that there are two cycles of the world, and in one of them it is governed by an immediate Providence, and receives life and immortality, and in the other is let go again, and has a reverse action during infinite ages. This new action is spontaneous, and is due to exquisite perfection of balance, to the vast size of the universe, and to the smallness of the pivot upon which it turns. All changes in the heaven affect the animal world, and this being the greatest of them, is most destructive to men and animals. At the beginning of the cycle before our own very few of them had survived ; and on these a mighty change passed. For their life was reversed like the motion of the world, and first of all coming to a stand then quickly returned to youth and beauty. The white locks of the aged became black ; the cheeks of the bearded man

were restored to their youth and fineness; the young men grew softer and smaller, and, being reduced to the condition of children in mind as well as body, began to vanish away; and the bodies of those who had died by violence, in a few moments underwent  
 271 a parallel change and disappeared. In that cycle of existence there was no such thing as the procreation of animals from one another, but they were born of the earth, and of this our ancestors, who came into being immediately after the end of the last cycle and at the beginning of this, have preserved the recollection. Such traditions are often now unduly discredited, and yet they may be proved by internal evidence. For observe how consistent the narrative is; as the old returned to youth, so the dead returned to life; the wheel of their existence having been reversed, they rose again from the earth: a few only were reserved by God for another destiny. Such was the origin of the earthborn men.

‘And is this cycle, of which you are speaking, the reign of Cronos, or our present state of existence?’ No, Socrates, that blessed and spontaneous life belongs not to this, but to the previous state, in which God was the governor of the whole world, and other gods subject to him ruled over parts of the world, as is still the case in certain places. They were shepherds of men and animals, each of them sufficing for those of whom he had the care. And there was no violence among them, or war, or devouring of one another. Their life was spontaneous, because in those days God ruled over man; and he was to man what man is now to the animals. Under his government there were no estates, or  
 272 private possessions, or families; but the earth produced a sufficiency of all things, and men were born out of the earth, having no traditions of the past; and as the temperature of the seasons was mild, they took no thought for raiment, and had no beds, but lived and dwelt in the open air.

Such was the age of Cronos, and the age of Zeus is our own. Tell me, which is the happier of the two? Or rather, shall I tell you that the happiness of these children of Cronos must have depended on how they used their time? If having boundless leisure, and the power of discoursing not only with one another but with the animals, they had employed these advantages with a view to philosophy, gathering from every nature some addition to

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their store of knowledge ; — or again, if they had merely eaten and drunk, and told stories to one another, and to the beasts ; — in either case, I say, there would be no difficulty in answering the question. But as nobody knows which they did, the question must remain unanswered. And here is the point of my tale. In the fulness of time, when the earthborn men had all passed away, the ruler of the universe let go the helm, and became a spectator ; and destiny and natural impulse swayed the world. At the same instant all the inferior deities gave up their hold ; the whole 273 universe rebounded, and there was a great earthquake, and utter ruin of all manner of animals. After a while the tumult ceased, and the universal creature settled down in his accustomed course, having authority over all other creatures, and following the instructions of his God and Father, at first more precisely, afterwards with less exactness. The reason of the falling off was the disengagement of a former chaos ; ‘a muddy vesture of decay’ was a part of his original nature, out of which he was brought by his Creator, under whose immediate guidance, while he remained in that former cycle, the evil was minimized and the good increased to the utmost. And in the beginning of the new cycle all was well enough, but as time went on, discord entered in ; at length the good was minimized and the evil everywhere diffused, and there was a danger of universal ruin. Then the Creator, seeing the world in great straits, and fearing that chaos and infinity would come again, in his tender care again placed himself at the helm and restored order, and made the world immortal and imperishable. Once more the cycle of life and generation was reversed ; the infants grew into young men, and the young men became greyheaded ; no longer did the animals spring out of the earth ; as the whole world was now lord of its own progress, so 274 the parts were to be self-created and self-nourished. At first the case of men was very helpless and pitiable ; for they were alone among the wild beasts, and had to carry on the struggle for existence without arts or knowledge, and had no food, and did not know how to get any. That was the time when Prometheus brought them fire, Hephaestus and Athene taught them arts, and other gods gave them seeds and plants. Out of these human life was framed ; for mankind were left to themselves, and ordered their own ways, living, like the universe,



in one cycle after one manner, and in another cycle after another manner. Statesman.

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Enough of the myth, which may show us two errors of which  
 275 we were guilty in our account of the king. The first and grand  
 error was in choosing for our king a god, who belongs to the other  
 cycle, instead of a man from our own; there was a lesser error  
 also in our failure to define the nature of the royal functions.  
 The myth gave us only the image of a divine shepherd, whereas  
 the statesmen and kings of our own day very much resemble  
 their subjects in education and breeding. On retracing our steps  
 we find that we gave too narrow a designation to the art which  
 was concerned with command-for-self over living creatures, when  
 we called it the 'feeding' of animals in flocks. This would apply  
 to all shepherds, with the exception of the Statesman; but if we  
 say 'managing' or 'tending' animals, the term would include him  
 276 as well. Having remodelled the name, we may subdivide as  
 before, first separating the human from the divine shepherd or  
 manager. Then we may subdivide the human art of governing  
 into the government of willing and unwilling subjects — royalty  
 and tyranny — which are the extreme opposites of one another,  
 277 although we in our simplicity have hitherto confounded them.

And yet the figure of the king is still defective. We have taken  
 up a lump of fable, and have used more than we needed. Like  
 statuaries, we have made some of the features out of proportion,  
 and shall lose time in reducing them. Or our mythus may be  
 compared to a picture, which is well drawn in outline, but is not  
 yet enlivened by colour. And to intelligent persons language is,  
 or ought to be, a better instrument of description than any picture.  
 'But what, Stranger, is the deficiency of which you speak?' No  
 278 higher truth can be made clear without an example; every man  
 seems to know all things in a dream, and to know nothing when  
 he is awake. And the nature of example can only be illustrated  
 by an example. Children are taught to read by being made to  
 compare cases in which they do not know a certain letter with  
 cases in which they know it, until they learn to recognize it in all  
 its combinations. Example comes into use when we identify  
 something unknown with that which is known, and form a com-  
 mon notion of both of them. Like the child who is learning his  
 letters, the soul recognizes some of the first elements of things;

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and then again is at fault and unable to recognize them when they are translated into the difficult language of facts. Let us, then, 279  
take an example, which will illustrate the nature of example, and will also assist us in characterizing the political science, and in separating the true king from his rivals.

I will select the example of weaving, or, more precisely, weaving of wool. In the first place, all possessions are either productive or preventive; of the preventive sort are spells and antidotes, divine and human, and also defences, and defences are either arms or screens, and screens are veils and also shields against heat and cold, and shields against heat and cold are shelters and coverings, and coverings are blankets or garments, and garments are in one piece or have many parts; and of these latter, some are stitched and others are fastened, and of these again some are made of fibres of plants and some of hair, and of these some are cemented with water and earth, and some are fastened with their own material; the latter are called clothes, 280  
and are made by the art of clothing, from which the art of weaving differs only in name, as the political differs from the royal science. Thus we have drawn several distinctions, but as yet have not distinguished the weaving of garments from the kindred and co-operative arts. For the first process to which the material 281  
is subjected is the opposite of weaving—I mean carding. And the art of carding, and the whole art of the fuller and the mender, are concerned with the treatment and production of clothes, as well as the art of weaving. Again, there are the arts which make the weaver's tools. And if we say that the weaver's art is the greatest and noblest of those which have to do with woollen garments,—this, although true, is not sufficiently distinct; because these other arts require to be first cleared away. Let us proceed, then, by regular steps:—There are causal or principal, and co-operative or subordinate arts. To the causal class belong the arts 282  
of washing and mending, of carding and spinning the threads, and the other arts of working in wool; these are chiefly of two kinds, falling under the two great categories of composition and division. Carding is of the latter sort. But our concern is chiefly with that part of the art of wool-working which composes, and of which one kind twists and the other interlaces the threads, whether the firmer texture of the warp or the looser texture of the woof.

283 These are adapted to each other, and the orderly composition of them forms a woollen garment. And the art which presides over these operations is the art of weaving. *Statesman.*  
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But why did we go through this circuitous process, instead of saying at once that weaving is the art of entwining the warp and the woof? In order that our labour may not seem to be lost, I must explain the whole nature of excess and defect. There are two arts of measuring — one is concerned with relative size, and the other has reference to a mean or standard of what is meet. The difference between good and evil is the difference between a mean or measure and excess or defect. All things require to be compared, not only with one another, but with the mean, without which there would be no beauty and no art, whether the art of the statesman or the art of weaving or any other; for all the arts guard against excess or defect, which are real evils. This we must endeavour to show, if the arts are to exist; and the proof of this will be a harder piece of work than the demonstration of the existence of not-being which we proved in our discussion about the Sophist. At present I am content with the indirect proof that the existence of such a standard is necessary to the existence of the arts. The standard or measure, which we are now only applying to the arts, may be some day required with a view to the demonstration of absolute truth.

We may now divide this art of measurement into two parts; placing in the one part all the arts which measure the relative size or number of objects, and in the other all those which depend upon a mean or standard. Many accomplished men say that the art of measurement has to do with all things, but these persons, although in this notion of theirs they may very likely be right, are apt to fail in seeing the differences of classes — they jumble together in one the 'more' and the 'too much,' which are very different things. Whereas the right way is to find the differences of classes, and to comprehend the things which have any affinity under the same class.

I will make one more observation by the way. When a pupil at a school is asked the letters which make up a particular word, is he not asked with a view to his knowing the same letters in all words? And our enquiry about the Statesman in like manner is

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intended not only to improve our knowledge of politics, but our reasoning powers generally. Still less would any one analyze the nature of weaving for its own sake. There is no difficulty in exhibiting sensible images, but the greatest and noblest truths have no outward form adapted to the eye of sense, and are only revealed in thought. And all that we are now saying is said 286 for the sake of them. I make these remarks, because I want you to get rid of any impression that our discussion about weaving and about the reversal of the universe, and the other discussion about the Sophist and not-being, were tedious and irrelevant. Please to observe that they can only be fairly judged when compared with what is meet; and yet not with what is meet for producing pleasure, nor even meet for making discoveries, but for the great end of developing the dialectical method and sharpening the wits of the auditors. He who censures us, should prove that, if our words had been fewer, they would have been 287 better calculated to make men dialecticians.

And now let us return to our king or statesman, and transfer to him the example of weaving. The royal art has been separated from that of other herdsmen, but not from the causal and co-operative arts which exist in states; these do not admit of dichotomy, and therefore they must be carved neatly, like the limbs of a victim, not into more parts than are necessary. And first (1) we have the large class of instruments, which includes almost everything in the world; from these may be parted off (2) vessels which are framed for the preservation of things, moist or dry, prepared in the fire or out of the fire. The royal or 288 political art has nothing to do with either of these, any more than with the arts of making (3) vehicles, or (4) defences, whether dresses, or arms, or walls, or (5) with the art of making ornaments, whether pictures or other playthings, as they may be fitly called, for they have no serious use. Then (6) there are the arts which furnish gold, silver, wood, bark, and other materials, which should have been put first; these, again, have no concern with the kingly science; any more than the arts (7) which provide food and nourishment for the human body, 289 and which furnish occupation to the husbandman, huntsman, doctor, cook, and the like, but not to the king or statesman. Further, there are small things, such as coins, seals, stamps,



which may with a little violence be comprehended in one of the above-mentioned classes. Thus they will embrace every species of property with the exception of animals,—but these have been already included in the art of tending herds. There remains only the class of slaves or ministers, among whom I expect that the real rivals of the king will be discovered. I am not speaking of the veritable slave bought with money, nor of the hireling who lets himself out for service, nor of the trader or merchant, who at best can only lay claim to economical and not to royal science. Nor am I referring to government officials, such as heralds and scribes, for these are only the servants of the rulers, and not the rulers themselves. I admit that there may be something strange in any servants pretending to be masters, but I hardly think that I could have been wrong in supposing that the principal claimants to the throne will be of this class. Let us try once more: There are diviners and priests, who are full of pride and prerogative; these, as the law declares, know how to give acceptable gifts to the gods, and in many parts of Hellas the duty of performing solemn sacrifices is assigned to the chief magistrate, as at Athens to the King Archon. At last, then, we have found a trace of those whom we were seeking. But still they are only servants and ministers.

291 And who are these who next come into view in various forms of men and animals and other monsters appearing—lions and centaurs and satyrs—who are these? I did not know them at first, for every one looks strange when he is unexpected. But now I recognize the politician and his troop, the chief of Sophists, the prince of charlatans, the most accomplished of wizards, who must be carefully distinguished from the true king or statesman. And here I will interpose a question: What are the true forms of government? Are they not three—monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy? and the distinctions of freedom and compulsion, law and no law, poverty and riches expand these three into six. Monarchy may be divided into royalty and tyranny; oligarchy 292 into aristocracy and plutocracy; and democracy may observe the law or may not observe it. But are any of these governments worthy of the name? Is not government a science, and are we to suppose that scientific government is secured by the rulers being many or few, rich or poor, or by the rule being compulsory

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or voluntary? Can the many attain to science? In no Hellenic city are there fifty good draught players, and certainly there are not as many kings, for by kings we mean all those who are possessed of the political science. A true government must therefore be the government of one, or of a few. And they may govern us either with or without law, and whether they are poor or rich, and however they govern, provided they govern on some scientific principle,—it makes no difference. And as the physician may cure us with our will, or against our will, and by any mode of treatment, burning, bleeding, lowering, fattening, if he only proceeds scientifically: so the true governor may reduce or fatten or bleed the body corporate, while he acts according to the rules of his art, and with a view to the good of the state, whether according to law or without law. 293

‘I do not like the notion, that there can be good government without law.’

I must explain: Law-making certainly is the business of a king; and yet the best thing of all is, not that the law should rule, but that the king should rule, for the varieties of circumstances are endless, and no simple or universal rule can suit them all, or last for ever. The law is just an ignorant brute of a tyrant, who insists always on his commands being fulfilled under all circumstances. ‘Then why have we laws at all?’ I will answer that question by asking you whether the training master gives a different discipline to each of his pupils, or whether he has a general rule of diet and exercise which is suited to the constitutions of the majority? ‘The latter.’ The legislator, too, is obliged to lay down general laws, and cannot enact what is precisely suitable to each particular case. He cannot be sitting at every man’s side all his life, and prescribe for him the minute particulars of his duty, and therefore he is compelled to impose on himself and others the restriction of a written law. Let me suppose now, that a physician or trainer, having left directions for his patients or pupils, goes into a far country, and comes back sooner than he intended; owing to some unexpected change in the weather, the patient or pupil seems to require a different mode of treatment: Would he persist in his old commands, under the idea that all others are noxious and heterodox? Viewed in the light of science, would not the continuance of such regulations be ridiculous? And if the legislator, 294 295

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296 or another like him, comes back from a far country, is he to be prohibited from altering his own laws? The common people say: Let a man persuade the city first, and then let him impose new laws. But is a physician only to cure his patients by persuasion, and not by force? Is he a worse physician who uses a little gentle violence in effecting the cure? Or shall we say, that the violence is just, if exercised by a rich man, and unjust, if by a poor man? May not any man, rich or poor, with or without law, and  
 297 whether the citizens like or not, do what is for their good? The pilot saves the lives of the crew, not by laying down rules, but by making his art a law, and, like him, the true governor has a strength of art which is superior to the law. This is scientific government, and all others are imitations only. Yet no great number of persons can attain to this science. And hence follows an important result. The true political principle is to assert the inviolability of the law, which, though not the best thing possible, is best for the imperfect condition of man.

298 I will explain my meaning by an illustration:—Suppose that mankind, indignant at the rogueries and caprices of physicians and pilots, call together an assembly, in which all who like may speak, the skilled as well as the unskilled, and that in their assembly they make decrees for regulating the practice of navigation and medicine which are to be binding on these professions for all time. Suppose that they elect annually by vote or lot those to whom authority in either department is to be delegated. And  
 299 let us further imagine, that when the term of their magistracy has expired, the magistrates appointed by them are summoned before an ignorant and unprofessional court, and may be condemned and punished for breaking the regulations. They even go a step further, and enact, that he who is found enquiring into the truth of navigation and medicine, and is seeking to be wise above what is written, shall be called not an artist, but a dreamer, a prating Sophist and a corrupter of youth; and if he try to persuade others to investigate those sciences in a manner contrary to the law, he shall be punished with the utmost severity. And like rules might be extended to any art or science. But what would be the consequence?

‘The arts would utterly perish, and human life, which is bad enough already, would become intolerable.’

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But suppose, once more, that we were to appoint some one as 300  
the guardian of the law, who was both ignorant and interested,  
and who perverted the law : would not this be a still worse evil  
than the other? 'Certainly.' For the laws are based on some  
experience and wisdom. Hence the wiser course is, that they  
should be observed, although this is not the best thing of all, but  
only the second best. And whoever, having skill, should try to  
improve them, would act in the spirit of the law-giver. But then,  
as we have seen, no great number of men, whether poor or rich,  
can be makers of laws. And so, the nearest approach to true  
government is, when men do nothing contrary to their own 301  
written laws and national customs. When the rich preserve  
their customs and maintain the law, this is called aristocracy, or  
if they neglect the law, oligarchy. When an individual rules  
according to law, whether by the help of science or opinion, this  
is called monarchy ; and when he has royal science he is a king,  
whether he be so in fact or not ; but when he rules in spite of law,  
and is blind with ignorance and passion, he is called a tyrant.  
These forms of government exist, because men despair of the  
true king ever appearing among them ; if he were to appear, they  
would joyfully hand over to him the reins of government. But, as  
there is no natural ruler of the hive, they meet together and make  
laws. And do we wonder, when the foundation of politics is in  
the letter only, at the miseries of states? Ought we not rather to 302  
admire the strength of the political bond? For cities have endured  
the worst of evils time out of mind ; many cities have been ship-  
wrecked, and some are like ships foundering, because their pilots  
are absolutely ignorant of the science which they profess.

Let us next ask, which of these untrue forms of government is  
the least bad, and which of them is the worst? I said at the  
beginning, that each of the three forms of government, royalty,  
aristocracy, and democracy, might be divided into two, so that the  
whole number of them, including the best, will be seven. Under  
monarchy we have already distinguished royalty and tyranny ; of  
oligarchy there were two kinds, aristocracy and plutocracy ; and  
democracy may also be divided, for there is a democracy which  
observes, and a democracy which neglects, the laws. The govern-  
ment of one is the best and the worst — the government of a few is 303  
less bad and less good — the government of the many is the least



bad and least good of them all, being the best of all lawless governments, and the worst of all lawful ones. But the rulers of all these states, unless they have knowledge, are maintainers of idols, and themselves idols — wizards, and also Sophists; for, after many windings, the term 'Sophist' comes home to them.

And now enough of centaurs and satyrs: the play is ended, and they may quit the political stage. Still there remain some other and better elements, which adhere to the royal science, and must be drawn off in the refiner's fire before the gold can become quite  
 304 pure. The arts of the general, the judge, and the orator, will have to be separated from the royal art; when the separation has been made, the nature of the king will be unalloyed. Now there are inferior sciences, such as music and others; and there is a superior science, which determines whether music is to be learnt or not, and this is different from them, and the governor of them. The science which determines whether we are to use persuasion, or not, is higher than the art of persuasion; the science which  
 305 determines whether we are to go to war, is higher than the art of the general. The science which makes the laws, is higher than that which only administers them. And the science which has this authority over the rest, is the science of the king or statesman.

Once more we will endeavour to view this royal science by the  
 306 light of our example. We may compare the state to a web, and I will show you how the different threads are drawn into one. You would admit — would you not? — that there are parts of virtue (although this position is sometimes assailed by Eristics), and one part of virtue is temperance, and another courage. These are two principles which are in a manner antagonistic to one another; and they pervade all nature; the whole class of the good and beautiful is included under them. The beautiful may be subdivided into two lesser classes: one of these is described by us  
 307 in terms expressive of motion or energy, and the other in terms expressive of rest and quietness. We say, how manly! how vigorous! how ready! and we say also, how calm! how temperate! how dignified! This opposition of terms is extended by us to all actions, to the tones of the voice, the notes of music, the workings of the mind, the characters of men. The two classes both have their exaggerations; and the exaggerations of the one are termed 'hardness,' 'violence,' 'madness;' of the other 'cowardliness,' or

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‘sluggishness.’ And if we pursue the enquiry, we find that these opposite characters are naturally at variance, and can hardly be reconciled. In lesser matters the antagonism between them is ludicrous, but in the State may be the occasion of grave disorders, and may disturb the whole course of human life. For the orderly class are always wanting to be at peace, and hence they pass imperceptibly into the condition of slaves; and the courageous 308 sort are always wanting to go to war, even when the odds are against them, and are soon destroyed by their enemies. But the true art of government, first preparing the material by education, weaves the two elements into one, maintaining authority over the carders of the wool, and selecting the proper subsidiary arts which are necessary for making the web. The royal science is queen of educators, and begins by choosing the natures which she is to train, punishing with death and exterminating those who are violently carried away to atheism and injustice, and enslaving 309 those who are wallowing in the mire of ignorance. The rest of the citizens she blends into one, combining the stronger element of courage, which we may call the warp, with the softer element of temperance, which we may imagine to be the woof. These she binds together, first taking the eternal elements of the honourable, the good, and the just, and fastening them with a divine cord in a heaven-born nature, and then fastening the animal elements with a human cord. The good legislator can implant by education the higher principles; and where they exist there is no difficulty 310 in inserting the lesser human bonds, by which the State is held together; these are the laws of intermarriage, and of union for the sake of offspring. Most persons in their marriages seek after wealth or power; or they are clannish, and choose those who are like themselves,—the temperate marrying the temperate, and the courageous the courageous. The two classes thrive and flourish at first, but they soon degenerate; the one become mad, and the other feeble and useless. This would not have been the case, if they had both originally held the same notions about the honourable and the good; for then they never would have allowed the temperate natures to be separated from the courageous, but they would have bound them together by common honours and 311 reputations, by intermarriages, and by the choice of rulers who combine both qualities. The temperate are careful and just, but

are wanting in the power of action; the courageous fall short of them in justice, but in action are superior to them: and no state can prosper in which either of these qualities is wanting. The noblest and best of all webs or states is that which the royal science weaves, combining the two sorts of natures in a single texture, and in this enfolding freeman and slave and every other social element, and presiding over them all.

‘Your picture, Stranger, of the king and statesman, no less than of the Sophist, is quite perfect.’

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The principal subjects in the *Statesman* may be conveniently embraced under six or seven heads: — (1) the myth; (2) the dialectical interest; (3) the political aspects of the dialogue; (4) the satirical and paradoxical vein; (5) the necessary imperfection of law; (6) the relation of the work to the other writings of Plato; lastly (7), we may briefly consider the genuineness of the *Sophist* and *Statesman*, which can hardly be assumed without proof, since the two dialogues have been questioned by three such eminent Platonic scholars as Socher, Schaarschmidt, and Ueberweg.

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I. The hand of the master is clearly visible in the myth. First in the connexion with mythology; — he wins a kind of verisimilitude for this as for his other myths, by adopting received traditions, of which he pretends to find an explanation in his own larger conception (cp. *Introduction to Critias*). The young Socrates has heard of the sun rising in the west and setting in the east, and of the earth-born men; but he has never heard the origin of these remarkable phenomena. Nor is Plato, here or elsewhere, wanting in denunciations of the incredulity of ‘this latter age,’ on which the lovers of the marvellous have always delighted to enlarge. And he is not without express testimony to the truth of his narrative; — such testimony as, in the *Timaeus* (40 D), the first men gave of the names of the gods (‘They must surely have known their own ancestors’). For the first generation of the new cycle, who lived near the time, are supposed to have preserved a recollection of a previous one. He also appeals to internal evidence, viz. the perfect coherence of the tale, though he is very well aware, as he says in the *Cratylus* (436 C, D), that

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there may be consistency in error as well as in truth. The gravity and minuteness with which some particulars are related also lend an artful aid. The profound interest and ready assent of the young Socrates, who is not too old to be amused 'with a tale which a child would love to hear,' are a further assistance. To those who were naturally inclined to believe that the fortunes of mankind are influenced by the stars, or who maintained that some one principle, like the principle of the Same and the Other in the *Timaeus*, pervades all things in the world, the reversal of the motion of the heavens seemed necessarily to produce a reversal of the order of human life. The spheres of knowledge, which to us appear wide asunder as the poles, astronomy and medicine, were naturally connected in the minds of early thinkers, because there was little or nothing in the space between them. Thus there is a basis of philosophy, on which the improbabilities of the tale may be said to rest. These are some of the devices by which Plato, like a modern novelist, seeks to familiarize the marvellous.

The myth, like that of the *Timaeus* and *Critias*, is rather historical than poetical, in this respect corresponding to the general change in the later writings of Plato, when compared with the earlier ones. It is hardly a myth in the sense in which the term might be applied to the myth of the *Phaedrus*, the *Republic*, the *Phaedo*, or the *Gorgias*, but may be more aptly compared with the didactic tale in which Protagoras describes the fortunes of primitive man, or with the description of the gradual rise of a new society in the Third Book of the *Laws*. Some discrepancies may be observed between the mythology of the *Statesman* and the *Timaeus*, and between the *Timaeus* and the *Republic*. But there is no reason to expect that all Plato's visions of a former, any more than of a future, state of existence, should conform exactly to the same pattern. We do not find perfect consistency in his philosophy; and still less have we any right to demand this of him in his use of mythology and figures of speech. And we observe that while employing all the resources of a writer of fiction to give credibility to his tales, he is not disposed to insist upon their literal truth. Rather, as in the *Phaedo* (114 D), he says, 'Something of the kind is true;' or, as in the *Gorgias* (527 A), 'This you will think to be an old wife's tale, but you can



think of nothing truer;’ or, as in the *Statesman* (277 B), he describes his work as a ‘mass of mythology,’ which was introduced in order to teach certain lessons; or, as in the *Phaedrus* (230 A), he secretly laughs at such stories while refusing to disturb the popular belief in them.

The greater interest of the myth consists in the philosophical lessons which Plato presents to us in this veiled form. Here, as in the tale of Er, the son of Armenius, he touches upon the question of freedom and necessity, both in relation to God and nature. For at first the universe is governed by the immediate providence of God,—this is the golden age,—but after a while the wheel is reversed, and man is left to himself. Like other theologians and philosophers, Plato relegates his explanation of the problem to a transcendental world; he speaks of what in modern language might be termed ‘impossibilities in the nature of things,’ hindering God from continuing immanent in the world. But there is some inconsistency; for the ‘letting go’ is spoken of as a divine act, and is at the same time attributed to the necessary imperfection of matter; there is also a numerical necessity for the successive births of souls. At first, man and the world retain their divine instincts, but gradually degenerate. As in the Book of Genesis, the first fall of man is succeeded by a second; the misery and wickedness of the world increase continually. The reason of this further decline is supposed to be the disorganisation of matter: the latent seeds of a former chaos are disengaged, and envelope all things. The condition of man becomes more and more miserable; he is perpetually waging an unequal warfare with the beasts. At length he obtains such a measure of education and help as is necessary for his existence. Though deprived of God’s help, he is not left wholly destitute; he has received from Athene and Hephaestus a knowledge of the arts; other gods give him seeds and plants; and out of these human life is reconstructed. He now eats bread in the sweat of his brow, and has dominion over the animals, subjected to the conditions of his nature, and yet able to cope with them by divine help. Thus Plato may be said to represent in a figure—(1) the state of innocence; (2) the fall of man; (3) the still deeper decline into barbarism; (4) the restoration of man by the partial interference of God, and the natural growth of the arts and of civilised society.

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Two lesser features of this description should not pass unnoticed: — (1) the primitive men are supposed to be created out of the earth, and not after the ordinary manner of human generation—half the causes of moral evil are in this way removed; (2) the arts are attributed to a divine revelation: and so the greatest difficulty in the history of pre-historic man is solved. Though no one knew better than Plato that the introduction of the gods is not a reason, but an excuse for not giving a reason (*Cratylus*, 426), yet, considering that more than two thousand years later mankind are still discussing these problems, we may be satisfied to find in Plato a statement of the difficulties which arise in conceiving the relation of man to God and nature, without expecting to obtain from him a solution of them. In such a tale, as in the *Phaedrus*, various aspects of the Ideas were doubtless indicated to Plato's own mind, as the corresponding theological problems are to us. The immanence of things in the Ideas, or the partial separation of them, and the self-motion of the supreme Idea, are probably the forms in which he would have interpreted his own parable.

He touches upon another question of great interest — the consciousness of evil — what in the Jewish Scriptures is called 'eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.' At the end of the narrative (272 B), the Eleatic asks his companion whether this life of innocence, or that which men live at present, is the better of the two. He wants to distinguish between the mere animal life of innocence, the 'city of pigs,' as it is comically termed by Glaucon in the *Republic*, and the higher life of reason and philosophy. But as no one can determine the state of man in the world before the Fall, 'the question must remain unanswered.' Similar questions have occupied the minds of theologians in later ages; but they can hardly be said to have found an answer. Professor Campbell well observes, that the general spirit of the myth may be summed up in the words of the *Lysis* (221): 'If evil were to perish, should we hunger any more, or thirst any more, or have any similar sensations? Yet perhaps the question what will or will not be is a foolish one, for who can tell?' As in the *Theaetetus*, evil is supposed to continue,—here, as the consequence of a former state of the world, a sort of mephitic vapour exhaling from some ancient chaos,—there, as involved

in the possibility of good, and incident to the mixed state of man. Statesman.

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Once more—and this is the point of connexion with the rest of the dialogue—the myth is intended to bring out the difference between the ideal and the actual state of man. In all ages of the world men have dreamed of a state of perfection, which has been, and is to be, but never is, and seems to disappear under the necessary conditions of human society. The uselessness, the danger, the true value of such political ideals have often been discussed; youth is too ready to believe in them; age to disparage them. Plato's 'prudens quaestio' respecting the comparative happiness of men in this and in a former cycle of existence is intended to elicit this contrast between the golden age and 'the life under Zeus' which is our own. To confuse the divine and human, or hastily apply one to the other, is a 'tremendous error.' Of the ideal or divine government of the world we can form no true or adequate conception; and this our mixed state of life, in which we are partly left to ourselves, but not wholly deserted by the gods, may contain some higher elements of good and knowledge than could have existed in the days of innocence under the rule of Cronos. So we may venture slightly to enlarge a Platonic thought which admits of a further application to Christian theology. Here are suggested also the distinctions between God causing and permitting evil, and between his more and less immediate government of the world.

II. The dialectical interest of the Statesman seems to contend in Plato's mind with the political; the dialogue might have been designated by two equally descriptive titles—either the 'Statesman,' or 'Concerning Method.' Dialectic, which in the earlier writings of Plato is a revival of the Socratic question and answer applied to definition, is now occupied with classification; there is nothing in which he takes greater delight than in processes of division (cp. Phaedr. 266 B); he pursues them to a length out of proportion to his main subject, and appears to value them as a dialectical exercise, and for their own sake. A poetical vision of some order or hierarchy of ideas or sciences has already been floating before us in the Symposium and the Republic. And in the Phaedrus this aspect of dialectic is further sketched out, and the art of rhetoric is based on the division of

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the characters of mankind into their several classes. The same love of divisions is apparent in the *Gorgias*. But in a well-known passage of the *Philebus* occurs the first criticism on the nature of classification. There we are exhorted not to fall into the common error of passing from unity to infinity, but to find the intermediate classes; and we are reminded that in any process of generalization, there may be more than one class to which individuals may be referred, and that we must carry on the process of division until we have arrived at the *infima species*.

These precepts are not forgotten, either in the *Sophist* or in the *Statesman*. The *Sophist* contains four examples of division, carried on by regular steps, until in four different lines of descent we detect the *Sophist*. In the *Statesman* the king or statesman is discovered by a similar process; and we have a summary, probably made for the first time, of possessions appropriated by the labour of man, which are distributed into seven classes. We are warned against preferring the shorter to the longer method; —if we divide in the middle, we are most likely to light upon species; at the same time, the important remark is made, that ‘a part is not to be confounded with a class.’ Having discovered the genus under which the king falls, we proceed to distinguish him from the collateral species. To assist our imagination in making this separation, we require an example. The higher ideas, of which we have a dreamy knowledge, can only be represented by images taken from the external world. But, first of all, the nature of example is explained by an example. The child is taught to read by comparing the letters in words which he knows with the same letters in unknown combinations; and this is the sort of process which we are about to attempt. As a parallel to the king we select the worker in wool, and compare the art of weaving with the royal science, trying to separate either of them from the inferior classes to which they are akin. This has the incidental advantage, that weaving and the web furnish us with a figure of speech, which we can afterwards transfer to the State.

There are two uses of examples or images — in the first place, they suggest thoughts — secondly, they give them a distinct form. In the infancy of philosophy, as in childhood, the language of pictures is natural to man: truth in the abstract is hardly won, and only by use familiarized to the mind. Examples are akin to



analogies, and have a reflex influence on thought; they people the vacant mind, and may often originate new directions of enquiry. Plato seems to be conscious of the suggestiveness of imagery; the general analogy of the arts is constantly employed by him as well as the comparison of particular arts — weaving, the refining of gold, the learning to read, music, statuary, painting, medicine, the art of the pilot — all of which occur in this dialogue alone: though he is also aware that ‘comparisons are slippery things,’ and may often give a false clearness to ideas. We shall find, in the *Philebus*, a division of sciences into practical and speculative, and into more or less speculative: here we have the idea of master-arts, or sciences which control inferior ones. Besides the supreme science of dialectic, ‘which will forget us, if we forget her,’ another master-science for the first time appears in view — the science of government, which fixes the limits of all the rest. This conception of the political or royal science as, from another point of view, the science of sciences, which holds sway over the rest, is not originally found in Aristotle, but in Plato.

The doctrine that virtue and art are in a mean, which is familiarized to us by the study of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, is also first distinctly asserted in the *Statesman* of Plato. The too much and the too little are in restless motion: they must be fixed by a mean, which is also a standard external to them. The art of measuring or finding a mean between excess and defect, like the principle of division in the *Phaedrus*, receives a particular application to the art of discourse. The excessive length of a discourse may be blamed; but who can say what is excess, unless he is furnished with a measure or standard? Measure is the life of the arts, and may some day be discovered to be the single ultimate principle in which all the sciences are contained. Other forms of thought may be noted — the distinction between causal and co-operative arts, which may be compared with the distinction between primary and co-operative causes in the *Timæus* (46 D); or between cause and condition in the *Phædo* (99); the passing mention of economical science; the opposition of rest and motion, which is found in all nature; the general conception of two great arts of composition and division, in which are contained weaving, politics, dialectic; and in connexion with the conception of a mean, the two arts of measuring.

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In the Theaetetus, Plato remarks that precision in the use of terms, though sometimes pedantic, is sometimes necessary. Here he makes the opposite reflection, that there may be a philosophical disregard of words. The evil of mere verbal oppositions, the requirement of an impossible accuracy in the use of terms, the error of supposing that philosophy was to be found in language, the danger of word-catching, have frequently been discussed by him in the previous dialogues, but nowhere has the spirit of modern inductive philosophy been more happily indicated than in the words of the Statesman: — ‘If you think more about things, and less about words, you will be richer in wisdom as you grow older’ (261 E). A similar spirit is discernible in the remarkable expressions, ‘the long and difficult language of facts’ (278 D); and ‘the interrogation of every nature, in order to obtain the particular contribution of each to the store of knowledge’ (272 C). Who has described ‘the feeble intelligence of all things’ given by metaphysics better than the Eleatic Stranger in the words — ‘The higher ideas can hardly be set forth except through the medium of examples; every man seems to know all things in a kind of dream, and then again nothing when he is awake’ (277 D)? Or where is the value of metaphysical pursuits more truly expressed than in the words, — ‘The greatest and noblest things have no outward image of themselves visible to man: therefore we should learn to give a rational account of them’ (286 A)?

III. The political aspects of the dialogue are closely connected with the dialectical. As in the Cratylus, the legislator has ‘the dialectician standing on his right hand;’ so in the Statesman, the king or statesman is the dialectician, who, although he may be in a private station, is still a king. Whether he has the power or not, is a mere accident; or rather he has the power, for what ought to be is (‘Was ist vernünftig, das ist wirklich’); and he ought to be and is the true governor of mankind. There is a reflection in this idealism of the Socratic ‘Virtue is knowledge;’ and, without idealism, we may remark that knowledge is a great part of power. Plato does not trouble himself to construct a machinery by which ‘philosophers shall be made kings,’ as in the Republic: he merely holds up the ideal, and affirms that in some sense science is really supreme over human life.

He is struck by the observation 'quam parvâ sapientiâ regitur mundus,' and is touched with a feeling of the ills which afflict states. The condition of Megara before and during the Peloponnesian War, of Athens under the Thirty and afterwards, of Syracuse and the other Sicilian cities in their alternations of democratic excess and tyranny, might naturally suggest such reflections. Some states he sees already shipwrecked, others foundering for want of a pilot; and he wonders not at their destruction, but at their endurance. For they ought to have perished long ago, if they had depended on the wisdom of their rulers. The mingled pathos and satire of this remark is characteristic of Plato's later style.

The king is the personification of political science. And yet he is something more than this,—the perfectly good and wise tyrant of the *Laws* (iv. 710), whose will is better than any law. He is the special providence who is always interfering with and regulating all things. Such a conception has sometimes been entertained by modern theologians, and by Plato himself, of the Supreme Being. But whether applied to Divine or to human governors the conception is faulty for two reasons, neither of which are noticed by Plato:—first, because all good government supposes a degree of co-operation in the ruler and his subjects,—an 'education in politics' as well as in moral virtue; secondly, because government, whether Divine or human, implies that the subject has a previous knowledge of the rules under which he is living. There is a fallacy, too, in comparing unchangeable laws with a personal governor. For the law need not necessarily be an 'ignorant and brutal tyrant,' but gentle and humane, capable of being altered in the spirit of the legislator, and of being administered so as to meet the cases of individuals. Not only in fact, but in idea, both elements must remain—the fixed law and the living will; the written word and the spirit; the principles of obligation and of freedom; and their applications whether made by law or equity in particular cases.

There are two sides from which positive laws may be attacked:—either from the side of nature, which rises up and rebels against them in the spirit of Callicles in the *Gorgias*; or from the side of idealism, which attempts to soar above them,—and this is the spirit of Plato in the *Statesman*. But he soon falls, like Icarus,

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and is content to walk instead of flying; that is, to accommodate himself to the actual state of human things. Mankind have long been in despair of finding the true ruler; and therefore are ready to acquiesce in any of the five or six received forms of government as better than none. And the best thing which they can do (though only the second best in reality), is to reduce the ideal state to the conditions of actual life. Thus in the *Statesman*, as in the *Laws*, we have three forms of government, which we may venture to term, (1) the ideal, (2) the practical, (3) the sophistical — what ought to be, what might be, what is. And thus Plato seems to stumble, almost by accident, on the notion of a constitutional monarchy, or of a monarchy ruling by laws.

The divine foundations of a State are to be laid deep in education (*Rep.* iv. 423), and at the same time some little violence may be used in exterminating natures which are incapable of education (*cp.* *Laws*, x). Plato is strongly of opinion that the legislator, like the physician, may do men good against their will (*cp.* *Gorgias*, 522 foll.). The human bonds of states are formed by the intermarriage of dispositions adapted to supply the defects of each other. As in the *Republic*, Plato has observed that there are opposite natures in the world, the strong and the gentle, the courageous and the temperate, which, borrowing an expression derived from the image of weaving, he calls the warp and the woof of human society. To interlace these is the crowning achievement of political science. In the *Protagoras*, Socrates was maintaining that there was only one virtue, and not many: now Plato is inclined to think that there are not only parallel, but opposite virtues, and seems to see a similar opposition pervading all art and nature. But he is satisfied with laying down the principle, and does not inform us by what further steps the union of opposites is to be effected.

In the loose framework of a single dialogue Plato has thus combined two distinct subjects — politics and method. Yet they are not so far apart as they appear: in his own mind there was a secret link of connexion between them. For the philosopher or dialectician is also the only true king or statesman. In the execution of his plan Plato has invented or distinguished several important forms of thought, and made incidentally many valuable remarks. Questions of interest both in ancient and modern politics



also arise in the course of the dialogue, which may with advantage be further considered by us:—

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*a.* The imaginary ruler, whether God or man, is above the law, and is a law to himself and to others. Among the Greeks as among the Jews, law was a sacred name, the gift of God, the bond of states. But in the Statesman of Plato, as in the New Testament, the word has also become the symbol of an imperfect good, which is almost an evil. The law sacrifices the individual to the universal, and is the tyranny of the many over the few (cp. Rep. i. 359). It has fixed rules which are the props of order, and will not swerve or bend in extreme cases. It is the beginning of political society, but there is something higher—an intelligent ruler, whether God or man, who is able to adapt himself to the endless varieties of circumstances. Plato is fond of picturing the advantages which would result from the union of the tyrant who has power with the legislator who has wisdom: he regards this as the best and speediest way of reforming mankind. But institutions cannot thus be artificially created, nor can the external authority of a ruler impose laws for which a nation is unprepared. The greatest power, the highest wisdom, can only proceed one or two steps in advance of public opinion. In all stages of civilization human nature, after all our efforts, remains intractable,—not like clay in the hands of the potter, or marble under the chisel of the sculptor. Great changes occur in the history of nations, but they are brought about slowly, like the changes in the frame of nature, upon which the puny arm of man hardly makes an impression. And, speaking generally, the slowest growths, both in nature and in politics, are the most permanent.

*b.* Whether the best form of the ideal is a person or a law may fairly be doubted. The former is more akin to us: it clothes itself in poetry and art, and appeals to reason more in the form of feeling: in the latter there is less danger of allowing ourselves to be deluded by a figure of speech. The ideal of the Greek state found an expression in the deification of law: the ancient Stoic spoke of a wise man perfect in virtue, who was fancifully said to be a king; but neither they nor Plato had arrived at the conception of a person who was also a law. Nor is it easy for the Christian to think of God as wisdom, truth, holiness, and also as the wise, true, and holy one. He is always wanting to break

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through the abstraction and interrupt the law, in order that he may present to himself the more familiar image of a divine friend. While the impersonal has too slender a hold upon the affections to be made the basis of religion, the conception of a person on the other hand tends to degenerate into a new kind of idolatry. Neither criticism nor experience allows us to suppose that there are interferences with the laws of nature; the idea is inconceivable to us and at variance with facts. The philosopher or theologian who could realize to mankind that a person is a law, that the higher rule has no exception, that goodness, like knowledge, is also power, would breathe a new religious life into the world.

c. Besides the imaginary rule of a philosopher or a God, the actual forms of government have to be considered. In the infancy of political science, men naturally ask whether the rule of the many or of the few is to be preferred. If by 'the few' we mean 'the good' and by 'the many,' 'the bad,' there can be but one reply: 'The rule of one good man is better than the rule of all the rest, if they are bad.' For, as Heracleitus says, 'One is ten thousand if he be the best.' If, however, we mean by the rule of the few the rule of a class neither better nor worse than other classes, not devoid of a feeling of right, but guided mostly by a sense of their own interests, and by the rule of the many the rule of all classes, similarly under the influence of mixed motives, no one would hesitate to answer—'The rule of all rather than one, because all classes are more likely to take care of all than one of another; and the government has greater power and stability when resting on a wider basis.' Both in ancient and modern times the best balanced form of government has been held to be the best; and yet it should not be so nicely balanced as to make action and movement impossible.

The statesman who builds his hope upon the aristocracy, upon the middle classes, upon the people, will probably, if he have sufficient experience of them, conclude that all classes are much alike, and that one is as good as another, and that the liberties of no class are safe in the hands of the rest. The higher ranks have the advantage in education and manners, the middle and lower in industry and self-denial; in every class, to a certain extent, a natural sense of right prevails, sometimes communicated from

the lower to the higher, sometimes from the higher to the lower, which is too strong for class interests. There have been crises in the history of nations, as at the time of the Crusades or the Reformation, or the French Revolution, when the same inspiration has taken hold of whole peoples, and permanently raised the sense of freedom and justice among mankind.

But even supposing the different classes of a nation, when viewed impartially, to be on a level with each other in moral virtue, there remain two considerations of opposite kinds which enter into the problem of government. Admitting of course that the upper and lower classes are equal in the eye of God and of the law, yet the one may be by nature fitted to govern and the other to be governed. A ruling caste does not soon altogether lose the governing qualities, nor a subject class easily acquire them. Hence the phenomenon so often observed in the old Greek revolutions, and not without parallel in modern times, that the leaders of the democracy have been themselves of aristocratic origin. The people are expecting to be governed by representatives of their own, but the true man of the people either never appears, or is quickly altered by circumstances. Their real wishes hardly make themselves felt, although their lower interests and prejudices may sometimes be flattered and yielded to for the sake of ulterior objects by those who have political power. They will often learn by experience that the democracy has become a plutocracy. The influence of wealth, though not the enjoyment of it, has become diffused among the poor as well as among the rich; and society, instead of being safer, is more at the mercy of the tyrant, who, when things are at the worst, obtains a guard — that is, an army — and announces himself as the saviour.

The other consideration is of an opposite kind. Admitting that a few wise men are likely to be better governors than the unwise many, yet it is not in their power to fashion an entire people according to their behest. When with the best intentions the benevolent despot begins his régime, he finds the world hard to move. A succession of good kings has at the end of a century left the people an inert and unchanged mass. The Roman world was not permanently improved by the hundred years of Hadrian and the Antonines. The kings of Spain during the last century

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were at least equal to any contemporary sovereigns in virtue and ability. In certain states of the world the means are wanting to render a benevolent power effectual. These means are not a mere external organization of posts or telegraphs, hardly the introduction of new laws or modes of industry. A change must be made in the spirit of a people as well as in their externals. The ancient legislator did not really take a blank tablet and inscribe upon it the rules which reflection and experience had taught him to be for a nation's interest; no one would have obeyed him if he had. But he took the customs which he found already existing in a half-civilized state of society: these he reduced to form and inscribed on pillars; he defined what had before been undefined, and gave certainty to what was uncertain. No legislation ever sprang, like Athene, in full power out of the head either of God or man.

Plato and Aristotle are sensible of the difficulty of combining the wisdom of the few with the power of the many. According to Plato, he is a physician who has the knowledge of a physician, and he is a king who has the knowledge of a king. But how the king, one or more, is to obtain the required power, is hardly at all considered by him. He presents the idea of a perfect government, but except the regulation for mixing different tempers in marriage, he never makes any provision for the attainment of it. Aristotle, casting aside ideals, would place the government in a middle class of citizens, sufficiently numerous for stability, without admitting the populace; and such appears to have been the constitution which actually prevailed for a short time at Athens—the rule of the Five Thousand—characterized by Thucydides as the best government of Athens which he had known. It may however be doubted how far, either in a Greek or modern state, such a limitation is practicable or desirable; for those who are left outside the pale will always be dangerous to those who are within, while on the other hand the leaven of the mob can hardly affect the representation of a great country. There is reason for the argument in favour of a property qualification; there is reason also in the arguments of those who would include all and so exhaust the political situation.

The true answer to the question is relative to the circumstances of nations. How can we get the greatest intelligence combined



with the greatest power? The ancient legislator would have found this question more easy than we do. For he would have required that all persons who had a share of government should have received their education from the state and have borne her burdens, and should have served in her fleets and armies. But though we sometimes hear the cry that we must 'educate the masses, for they are our masters,' who would listen to a proposal that the franchise should be confined to the educated or to those who fulfil political duties? Then again, we know that the masses are not our masters, and that they are more likely to become so if we educate them. In modern politics so many interests have to be consulted that we are compelled to do, not what is best, but what is possible.

d. Law is the first principle of society, but it cannot supply all the wants of society, and may easily cause more evils than it cures. Plato is aware of the imperfection of law in failing to meet the varieties of circumstances: he is also aware that human life would be intolerable if every detail of it were placed under legal regulation. It may be a great evil that physicians should kill their patients or captains cast away their ships, but it would be a far greater evil if each particular in the practice of medicine or seamanship were regulated by law. Much has been said in modern times about the duty of leaving men to themselves, which is supposed to be the best way of taking care of them. The question is often asked, What are the limits of legislation in relation to morals? And the answer is to the same effect, that morals must take care of themselves. There is a one-sided truth in these answers, if they are regarded as condemnations of the interference with commerce in the last century or of clerical persecution in the Middle Ages. But 'laissez-faire' is not the best but only the second best. What the best is, Plato does not attempt to determine; he only contrasts the imperfection of law with the wisdom of the perfect ruler.

Laws should be just, but they must also be certain, and we are obliged to sacrifice something of their justice to their certainty. Suppose a wise and good judge, who paying little or no regard to the law, attempted to decide with perfect justice the cases that were brought before him. To the uneducated person he would appear to be the ideal of a judge. Such justice has been often

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exercised in primitive times, or at the present day among eastern rulers. But in the first place it depends entirely on the personal character of the judge. He may be honest, but there is no check upon his dishonesty, and his opinion can only be overruled, not by any principle of law, but by the opinion of another judging like himself without law. In the second place, even if he be ever so honest, his mode of deciding questions would introduce an element of uncertainty into human life; no one would know beforehand what would happen to him, or would seek to conform in his conduct to any rule of law. For the compact which the law makes with men, that they shall be protected if they observe the law in their dealings with one another, would have to be substituted another principle of a more general character, that they shall be protected by the law if they act rightly in their dealings with one another. The complexity of human actions and also the uncertainty of their effects would be increased tenfold. For one of the principal advantages of law is not merely that it enforces honesty, but that it makes men act in the same way, and requires them to produce the same evidence of their acts. Too many laws may be the sign of a corrupt and overcivilized state of society, too few are the sign of an uncivilized one; as soon as commerce begins to grow, men make themselves customs which have the validity of laws. Even equity, which is the exception to the law, conforms to fixed rules and lies for the most part within the limits of previous decisions.

IV. The bitterness of the Statesman is characteristic of Plato's later style, in which the thoughts of youth and love have fled away, and we are no longer attended by the Muses or the Graces. We do not venture to say that Plato was soured by old age, but certainly the kindliness and courtesy of the earlier dialogues have disappeared. He sees the world under a harder and grimmer aspect: he is dealing with the reality of things, not with visions or pictures of them: he is seeking by the aid of dialectic only, to arrive at truth. He is deeply impressed with the importance of classification: in this alone he finds the true measure of human things; and very often in the process of division curious results are obtained. For the dialectical art is no respecter of persons: king and vermin-taker are all alike to the philosopher. There may have been a time when the king

was a god, but he now is pretty much on a level with his subjects in breeding and education. Man should be well advised that he is only one of the animals, and the Hellene in particular should be aware that he himself was the author of the distinction between Hellene and Barbarian, and that the Phrygian would equally divide mankind into Phrygians and Barbarians, and that some intelligent animal, like a crane, might go a step further, and divide the animal world into cranes and all other animals. Plato cannot help laughing (cp. Theaet. 174) when he thinks of the king running after his subjects, like the pig-driver or the bird-taker. He would seriously have him consider how many competitors there are to his throne, chiefly among the class of serving-men. A good deal of meaning is lurking in the expression—‘There is no art of feeding mankind worthy the name.’ There is a similar depth in the remark,—‘The wonder about states is not that they are short-lived, but that they last so long in spite of the badness of their rulers.’

V. There is also a paradoxical element in the Statesman which delights in reversing the accustomed use of words. The law which to the Greek was the highest object of reverence is an ignorant and brutal tyrant—the tyrant is converted into a beneficent king. The sophist too is no longer, as in the earlier dialogues, the rival of the statesman, but assumes his form. Plato sees that the ideal of the state in his own day is more and more severed from the actual. From such ideals as he had once formed, he turns away to contemplate the decline of the Greek cities which were far worse now in his old age than they had been in his youth, and were to become worse and worse in the ages which followed. He cannot contain his disgust at the contemporary statesmen, sophists who had turned politicians, in various forms of men and animals, appearing, some like lions and centaurs, others like satyrs and monkeys. In this new disguise the Sophists make their last appearance on the scene: in the *Laws* Plato appears to have forgotten them, or at any rate makes only a slight allusion to them in a single passage (*Laws* x, 908 D).

VI. The Statesman is naturally connected with the Sophist. At first sight we are surprised to find that the Eleatic Stranger discourses to us, not only concerning the nature of Being and

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Not-being, but concerning the king and statesman. We perceive, however, that there is no inappropriateness in his maintaining the character of chief speaker, when we remember the close connexion which is assumed by Plato to exist between politics and dialectic. In both dialogues the Proteus Sophist is exhibited, first, in the disguise of an Eristic, secondly, of a false statesman. There are several lesser features which the two dialogues have in common. The styles and the situations of the speakers are very similar; there is the same love of division, and in both of them the mind of the writer is greatly occupied about method, to which he had probably intended to return in the projected 'Philosopher.'

The Statesman stands midway between the Republic and the Laws, and is also related to the Timaeus. The mythical or cosmical element reminds us of the Timaeus, the ideal of the Republic. A previous chaos in which the elements as yet were not, is hinted at both in the Timaeus and Statesman. The same ingenious arts of giving verisimilitude to a fiction are practised in both dialogues, and in both, as well as in the myth at the end of the Republic, Plato touches on the subject of necessity and free-will. The words in which he describes the miseries of states seem to be an amplification of the 'Cities will never cease from ill' of the Republic. The point of view in both is the same; and the differences not really important, e. g. in the myth, or in the account of the different kinds of states. But the treatment of the subject in the Statesman is fragmentary, and the shorter and later work, as might be expected, is less finished, and less worked out in detail. The idea of measure and the arrangement of the sciences supply connecting links both with the Republic and the Philebus.

More than any of the preceding dialogues, the Statesman seems to approximate in thought and language to the Laws. There is the same decline and tendency to monotony in style, the same self-consciousness, awkwardness, and over-civility (cp. 257 A, 263 B, 265 B, 277 A, B, 283 C, 286 B, 293 A); and in the Laws is contained the pattern of that second best form of government, which, after all, is admitted to be the only attainable one in this world. The 'gentle violence,' the marriage of dissimilar natures, the figure of the warp and the woof, are also found



in the Laws. Both expressly recognize the conception of a first or ideal state, which has receded into an invisible heaven. Nor does the account of the origin and growth of society really differ in them, if we make allowance for the mythic character of the narrative in the Statesman. The virtuous tyrant is common to both of them; and the Eleatic Stranger takes up a position similar to that of the Athenian Stranger in the Laws.

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VII. There would have been little disposition to doubt the genuineness of the Sophist and Statesman, if they had been compared with the Laws rather than with the Republic, and the Laws had been received, as they ought to be, on the authority of Aristotle and on the ground of their intrinsic excellence, as an undoubted work of Plato. The detailed consideration of the genuineness and order of the Platonic dialogues has been reserved for another place: a few of the reasons for defending the Sophist and Statesman may be given here.

1. The excellence, importance, and metaphysical originality of the two dialogues: no works at once so good and of such length are known to have proceeded from the hands of a forger.

2. The resemblances in them to other dialogues of Plato are such as might be expected to be found in works of the same author, and not in those of an imitator, being too subtle and minute to have been invented by another. The similar passages and turns of thought are generally inferior to the parallel passages in his earlier writings; and we might *a priori* have expected that, if altered, they would have been improved. But the comparison of the Laws proves that this repetition of his own thoughts and words in an inferior form is characteristic of Plato's later style.

3. The close connexion of them with the Theaetetus, Parmenides, and Philebus, involves the fate of these dialogues, as well as of the two suspected ones.

4. The suspicion of them seems mainly to rest on a presumption that in Plato's writings we may expect to find an uniform type of doctrine and opinion. But however we arrange the order, or narrow the circle of the dialogues, we must admit that they exhibit a growth and progress in the mind of Plato. And the appearance of change or progress is not to be regarded as impugning the

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genuineness of any particular writings, but may be even an argument in their favour. If we suppose the *Sophist* and *Politicus* to stand halfway between the *Republic* and the *Laws*, and in near connexion with the *Theaetetus*, the *Parmenides*, the *Philebus*, the arguments against them derived from differences of thought and style disappear or may be said without paradox in some degree to confirm their genuineness. There is no such interval between the *Republic* or *Phaedrus* and the two suspected dialogues, as that which separates all the earlier writings of Plato from the *Laws*. And the *Theaetetus*, *Parmenides*, and *Philebus*, supply links, by which, however different from them, they may be reunited with the great body of the Platonic writings.

# STATESMAN.

## PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

THEODORUS.  
SOCRATES.

THE ELEATIC STRANGER.  
THE YOUNGER SOCRATES.

**Steph.** *Socrates.* I OWE you many thanks, indeed, Theodorus, for  
<sup>257</sup> the acquaintance both of Theaetetus and of the Stranger.

*Theodorus.* And in a little while, Socrates, you will owe me three times as many, when they have completed for you the delineation of the Statesman and of the Philosopher, as well as of the Sophist.

*Soc.* Sophist, statesman, philosopher! O my dear Theodorus, do my ears truly witness that this is the estimate formed of them by the great calculator and geometrician?

*Theod.* What do you mean, Socrates?

*Soc.* I mean that you rate them all at the same value, whereas they are really separated by an interval, which no geometrical ratio can express.

*Theod.* By Ammon, the god of Cyrene, Socrates, that is a very fair hit; and shows that you have not forgotten your geometry. I will retaliate on you at some other time, but I must now ask the Stranger, who will not, I hope, tire of his goodness to us, to proceed either with the Statesman or with the Philosopher, whichever he prefers.

*Stranger.* That is my duty, Theodorus; having begun I must go on, and not leave the work unfinished. But what shall be done with Theaetetus?

*Theod.* In what respect?

*Str.* Shall we relieve him, and take his companion, the Young Socrates, instead of him? What do you advise?

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SOCRATES,  
THEODORUS,  
STRANGER.

Only a third of our task is done, or rather much less than a third; such a geometrician as Theodorus must know that the Statesman rises above the Sophist, and the Philosopher above the Statesman, in more than a geometrical ratio.

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SOCRATES,  
THEODORUS,  
STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.

Socrates  
encourages  
his young  
namesake to  
discourse with  
the Stranger.

After the  
Sophist  
comes the  
Statesman.

Where among  
the sciences  
shall we dis-  
cover his  
path?

*Theod.* Yes, give the other a turn, as you propose. The young always do better when they have intervals of rest.

*Soc.* I think, Stranger, that both of them may be said to be in some way related to me; for the one, as you affirm, has the cut of my ugly face<sup>1</sup>, the other is called by my name. 258 And we should always be on the look-out to recognize a kinsman by the style of his conversation. I myself was discoursing with Theaetetus yesterday, and I have just been listening to his answers; my namesake I have not yet examined, but I must. Another time will do for me; to-day let him answer you.

*Str.* Very good. Young Socrates, do you hear what the elder Socrates is proposing?

*Young Socrates.* I do.

*Str.* And do you agree to his proposal?

*Y. Soc.* Certainly.

*Str.* As you do not object, still less can I. After the Sophist, then, I think that the Statesman naturally follows next in the order of enquiry. And please to say, whether he, too, should be ranked among those who have science.

*Y. Soc.* Yes.

*Str.* Then the sciences must be divided as before?

*Y. Soc.* I dare say.

*Str.* But yet the division will not be the same?

*Y. Soc.* How then?

*Str.* They will be divided at some other point.

*Y. Soc.* Yes.

*Str.* Where shall we discover the path of the Statesman? We must find and separate off, and set our seal upon this, and we will set the mark of another class upon all diverging paths. Thus the soul will conceive of all kinds of knowledge under two classes.

*Y. Soc.* To find the path is your business, Stranger, and not mine.

*Str.* Yes, Socrates, but the discovery, when once made, must be yours as well as mine.

*Y. Soc.* Very good.

*Str.* Well, and are not arithmetic and certain other

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Theaet. 143 E.



kindred arts, merely abstract knowledge, wholly separated from action?

*Y. Soc.* True.

*Str.* But in the art of carpentering and all other handicrafts, the knowledge of the workman is merged in his work; he not only knows, but he also makes things which previously did not exist.

*Y. Soc.* Certainly.

*Str.* Then let us divide sciences in general into those which are practical and those which are purely intellectual.

*Y. Soc.* Let us assume these two divisions of science, which is one whole.

*Str.* And are 'statesman,' 'king,' 'master,' or 'householder,' one and the same; or is there a science or art answering to each of these names? Or rather, allow me to put the matter in another way.

259 *Y. Soc.* Let me hear.

*Str.* If any one who is in a private station has the skill to advise one of the public physicians, must not he also be called a physician?

*Y. Soc.* Yes.

*Str.* And if any one who is in a private station is able to advise the ruler of a country, may not he be said to have the knowledge which the ruler himself ought to have?

*Y. Soc.* True.

*Str.* But surely the science of a true king is royal science?

*Y. Soc.* Yes.

*Str.* And will not he who possesses this knowledge, whether he happens to be a ruler or a private man, when regarded only in reference to his art, be truly called 'royal'?

*Y. Soc.* He certainly ought to be.

*Str.* And the householder and master are the same?

*Y. Soc.* Of course.

*Str.* Again, a large household may be compared to a small state:—will they differ at all, as far as government is concerned?

*Y. Soc.* They will not.

*Str.* Then, returning to the point which we were just now discussing, do we not clearly see that there is one science of all of them; and this science may be called either royal or

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STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.

Sciences are  
practical or  
intellectual.

We note that royal science may be possessed by a private man as well as by a king, and that a large household is like a small state; whence we draw the inference that king, statesman, master, householder are the same.

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political or economical; we will not quarrel with any one about the name.

*Y. Soc.* Certainly not.

*Str.* This, too, is evident, that the king cannot do much with his hands, or with his whole body, towards the maintenance of his empire, compared with what he does by the intelligence and strength of his mind.

*Y. Soc.* Clearly not.

*Str.* Then, shall we say that the king has a greater affinity to knowledge than to manual arts and to practical life in general?

*Y. Soc.* Certainly he has.

*Str.* Then we may put all together as one and the same — statesmanship and the statesman — the kingly science and the king.

*Y. Soc.* Clearly.

*Str.* And now we shall only be proceeding in due order if we go on to divide the sphere of knowledge?

*Y. Soc.* Very good.

*Str.* Think whether you can find any joint or parting in knowledge.

*Y. Soc.* Tell me of what sort.

*Str.* Such as this: You may remember that we made an art of calculation?

*Y. Soc.* Yes.

*Str.* Which was, unmistakably, one of the arts of knowledge?

*Y. Soc.* Certainly.

*Str.* And to this art of calculation which discerns the differences of numbers shall we assign any other function except to pass judgment on their differences?

*Y. Soc.* How could we?

*Str.* You know that the master-builder does not work himself, but is the ruler of workmen?

*Y. Soc.* Yes.

*Str.* He contributes knowledge, not manual labour?

*Y. Soc.* True.

*Str.* And may therefore be justly said to share in theoretical science? 260

*Y. Soc.* Quite true.

The royal science has a greater affinity to knowledge than to the manual arts or to practical life.

Arithmetic is the type of one kind of abstract science, — which judges: the art of building of another, — which commands.

*Str.* But he ought not, like the calculator, to regard his functions as at an end when he has formed a judgment;— he must assign to the individual workmen their appropriate task until they have completed the work.

*Statesman.*  
*STRANGER,*  
*YOUNG*  
*SOCRATES.*

*Y. Soc.* True.

*Str.* Are not all such sciences, no less than arithmetic and the like, subjects of pure knowledge; and is not the difference between the two classes, that the one sort has the power of judging only, and the other of ruling as well?

*Y. Soc.* That is evident.

*Str.* May we not very properly say, that of all knowledge, there are two divisions—one which rules, and the other which judges?

*Y. Soc.* I should think so.

*Str.* And when men have anything to do in common, that they should be of one mind is surely a desirable thing?

*Y. Soc.* Very true.

*Str.* Then while we are at unity among ourselves, we need not mind about the fancies of others?

*Y. Soc.* Certainly not.

*Str.* And now, in which of these divisions shall we place the king?—Is he a judge and a kind of spectator? Or shall we assign to him the art of command—for he is a ruler?

The king's knowledge is of the commanding sort, and falls in that division of it which is supreme, not subordinate.

*Y. Soc.* The latter, clearly.

*Str.* Then we must see whether there is any mark of division in the art of command too. I am inclined to think that there is a distinction similar to that of manufacturer and retail dealer, which parts off the king from the herald.

*Y. Soc.* How is this?

*Str.* Why, does not the retailer receive and sell over again the productions of others, which have been sold before?

*Y. Soc.* Certainly he does.

*Str.* And is not the herald under command, and does he not receive orders, and in his turn give them to others?

*Y. Soc.* Very true.

*Str.* Then shall we mingle the kingly art in the same class with the art of the herald, the interpreter, the boatswain, the prophet, and the numerous kindred arts which exercise command; or, as in the preceding comparison we spoke of manufacturers, or sellers for themselves, and of retailers,—

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 STRANGER,  
 YOUNG  
 SOCRATES.

seeing, too, that the class of supreme rulers, or rulers for themselves, is almost nameless—shall we make a word following the same analogy, and refer kings to a supreme or ruling-for-self science, leaving the rest to receive a name from some one else? For we are seeking the ruler; and our enquiry is not concerned with him who is not a ruler.

*Y. Soc.* Very good.

*Str.* Thus a very fair distinction has been attained between 261 the man who gives his own commands, and him who gives another's. And now let us see if the supreme power allows of any further division.

*Y. Soc.* By all means.

*Str.* I think that it does; and please to assist me in making the division.

*Y. Soc.* At what point?

Command is  
 for the sake of  
 production,

*Str.* May not all rulers be supposed to command for the sake of producing something?

*Y. Soc.* Certainly.

*Str.* Nor is there any difficulty in dividing the things produced into two classes.

*Y. Soc.* How would you divide them?

*Str.* Of the whole class, some have life and some are without life.

*Y. Soc.* True.

*Str.* And by the help of this distinction we may make, if we please, a subdivision of the section of knowledge which commands.

*Y. Soc.* At what point?

which is  
 either (1) of  
 lifeless, or (2)  
 of living  
 objects.—  
 The latter is  
 the function  
 of the king;

*Str.* One part may be set over the production of lifeless, the other of living objects; and in this way the whole will be divided.

*Y. Soc.* Certainly.

*Str.* That division, then, is complete; and now we may leave one half, and take up the other; which may also be divided into two.

*Y. Soc.* Which of the two halves do you mean?

*Str.* Of course that which exercises command about animals. For, surely, the royal science is not like that of a master-workman, a science presiding over lifeless objects;—



the king has a nobler function, which is the management and control of living beings.

*Y. Soc.* True.

*Str.* And the breeding and tending of living beings may be observed to be sometimes a tending of the individual; in other cases, a common care of creatures in flocks?

*Y. Soc.* True.

*Str.* But the statesman is not a tender of individuals — not like the driver or groom of a single ox or horse; he is rather to be compared with the keeper of a drove of horses or oxen.

*Y. Soc.* Yes, I see, thanks to you.

*Str.* Shall we call this art of tending many animals together, the art of managing a herd, or the art of collective management?

*Y. Soc.* No matter; — whichever suggests itself to us in the course of conversation.

*Str.* Very good, Socrates; and, if you continue to be not too particular about names, you will be all the richer in wisdom when you are an old man. And now, as you say, leaving the discussion of the name, — can you see a way in which a person, by showing the art of herding to be of two kinds, may cause that which is now sought amongst twice the number of things, to be then sought amongst half that number?

*Y. Soc.* I will try; — there appears to me to be one management of men and another of beasts.

*Str.* You have certainly divided them in a most straightforward and manly style; but you have fallen into an error which hereafter I think that we had better avoid.

*Y. Soc.* What is the error?

*Str.* I think that we had better not cut off a single small portion which is not a species, from many larger portions; the part should be a species. To separate off at once the subject of investigation, is a most excellent plan, if only the separation be rightly made; and you were under the impression that you were right, because you saw that you would come to man; and this led you to hasten the steps. But you should not chip off too small a piece, my friend; the safer way is to cut through the middle; which is also the

*Statesman.*

STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.

and he is the manager, not merely of individuals, but of creatures united in flocks.

It matters not whether we call his art managing a herd or collective management. If a man is not too particular about words, he will be all the richer in wisdom when he grows old.

Management of herds is of two kinds, — of men, and of beasts. — But not so fast.

We have omitted intermediate steps, having only cut off one class from all the rest.

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more likely way of finding classes. Attention to this principle makes all the difference in a process of enquiry.

*Y. Soc.* What do you mean, Stranger?

*Str.* I will endeavour to speak more plainly out of love to your good parts, Socrates; and, although I cannot at present entirely explain myself, I will try, as we proceed, to make my meaning a little clearer.

*Y. Soc.* What was the error of which, as you say, we were guilty in our recent division?

Hellenes and barbarians is a similar example of false division.

*Str.* The error was just as if some one who wanted to divide the human race, were to divide them after the fashion which prevails in this part of the world; here they cut off the Hellenes as one species, and all the other species of mankind, which are innumerable, and have no ties or common language, they include under the single name of 'barbarians,' and because they have one name they are supposed to be of one species also. Or suppose that in dividing numbers you were to cut off ten thousand from all the rest, and make of it one species, comprehending the rest under another separate name, you might say that here too was a single class, because you had given it a single name. Whereas you would make a much better and more equal and logical classification of numbers, if you divided them into odd and even; or of the human species, if you divided them into male and female; and only separated off Lydians or Phrygians, or any other tribe, and arrayed them against the rest of the world, when you could no longer make a division into parts which were also classes.

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Part and class.

*Y. Soc.* Very true; but I wish that this distinction between a part and a class could still be made somewhat plainer.

*Str.* O Socrates, best of men, you are imposing upon me a very difficult task. We have already digressed further from our original intention than we ought, and you would have us wander still further away. But we must now return to our subject; and hereafter, when there is a leisure hour, we will follow up the other track; at the same time, I wish you to guard against imagining that you ever heard me declare —

*Y. Soc.* What?

*Str.* That a class and a part are distinct.

*Y. Soc.* What did I hear, then?

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*Str.* That a class is necessarily a part, but there is no similar necessity that a part should be a class; that is the view which I should always wish you to attribute to me, Socrates.

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*Y. Soc.* So be it.

*Str.* There is another thing which I should like to know.

*Y. Soc.* What is it?

*Str.* The point at which we digressed; for, if I am not mistaken, the exact place was at the question, Where you would divide the management of herds. To this you appeared rather too ready to answer that there were two species of animals; man being one, and all brutes making up the other.

*Y. Soc.* True.

*Str.* I thought that in taking away a part, you imagined that the remainder formed a class, because you were able to call them by the common name of brutes.

*Y. Soc.* That again is true.

*Str.* Suppose now, O most courageous of dialecticians, that some wise and understanding creature, such as a crane is reputed to be, were, in imitation of you, to make a similar division, and set up cranes against all other animals to their own special glorification, at the same time jumbling together all the others, including man, under the appellation of brutes,—here would be the sort of error which we must try to avoid.

The crane would divide living creatures into 'cranes and all other animals.'

*Y. Soc.* How can we be safe?

*Str.* If we do not divide the whole class of animals, we shall be less likely to fall into that error.

*Y. Soc.* We had better not take the whole?

*Str.* Yes, there lay the source of error in our former division.

*Y. Soc.* How?

*Str.* You remember how that part of the art of knowledge which was concerned with command, had to do with the rearing of living creatures,—I mean, with animals in herds?

*Y. Soc.* Yes.

264 *Str.* In that case, there was already implied a division of all animals into tame and wild; those whose nature can be

In our haste we omitted the

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division of  
animals into  
tame and wild.

tamed are called tame, and those which cannot be tamed are called wild.

*Y. Soc.* True.

*Str.* And the political science of which we are in search, is and ever was concerned with tame animals, and is also confined to gregarious animals.

*Y. Soc.* Yes.

*Str.* But then we ought not to divide, as we did, taking the whole class at once. Neither let us be in too great haste to arrive quickly at the political science; for this mistake has already brought upon us the misfortune of which the proverb speaks.

*Y. Soc.* What misfortune?

*Str.* The misfortune of too much haste, which is too little speed.

*Y. Soc.* And all the better, Stranger; we got what we deserved.

*Str.* Very well: Let us then begin again, and endeavour to divide the collective rearing of animals; for probably the completion of the argument will best show what you are so anxious to know. Tell me, then —

*Y. Soc.* What?

The collective rearing of animals includes the rearing of both land and water herds.

*Str.* Have you ever heard, as you very likely may — for I do not suppose that you ever actually visited them — of the preserves of fishes in the Nile, and in the ponds of the Great King; or you may have seen similar preserves in wells at home?

*Y. Soc.* Yes, to be sure, I have seen them, and I have often heard the others described.

*Str.* And you may have heard also, and may have been assured by report, although you have not travelled in those regions, of nurseries of geese and cranes in the plains of Thessaly?

*Y. Soc.* Certainly.

*Str.* I asked you, because here is a new division of the management of herds, into the management of land and of water herds.

*Y. Soc.* There is.

*Str.* And do you agree that we ought to divide the collective rearing of herds into two corresponding parts, the



one the rearing of water, and the other the rearing of land herds?

*Statesman.*

*Y. Soc.* Yes.

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*Str.* There is surely no need to ask which of these two contains the royal art, for it is evident to everybody.

*Y. Soc.* Certainly.

*Str.* Any one can divide the herds which feed on dry land?

Land herds are of flying or walking animals.

*Y. Soc.* How would you divide them?

*Str.* I should distinguish between those which fly and those which walk.

*Y. Soc.* Most true.

*Str.* And where shall we look for the political animal? Might not an idiot, so to speak, know that he is a pedestrian?

*Y. Soc.* Certainly.

*Str.* The art of managing the walking animal has to be further divided, just as you might halve an even number.

*Y. Soc.* Clearly.

265 *Str.* Let me note that here appear in view two ways to that part or class which the argument aims at reaching,—the one a speedier way, which cuts off a small portion and leaves a large; the other agrees better with the principle which we were laying down, that as far as we can we should divide in the middle; but it is longer. We can take either of them, whichever we please.

At this point we may take either a shorter or a longer way.

*Y. Soc.* Cannot we have both ways?

*Str.* Together? What a thing to ask! but, if you take them in turn, you clearly may.

*Y. Soc.* Then I should like to have them in turn.

*Str.* There will be no difficulty, as we are near the end; if we had been at the beginning, or in the middle, I should have demurred to your request; but now, in accordance with your desire, let us begin with the longer way; while we are fresh, we shall get on better. And now attend to the division.

Let us begin with the longer one.

*Y. Soc.* Let me hear.

*Str.* The tame walking herding animals are distributed by nature into two classes.

The tame walking and herding

*Y. Soc.* Upon what principle?

*Statesman.*

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animals fall  
into two  
classes, as  
they are with  
or without  
horns ;

and the latter  
into those who  
do and do not  
mix the breed.

The States-  
man has to  
do with the  
unmixed.

Dogs are not  
herding ani-  
mals, and  
may therefore  
be excluded.

*Str.* The one grows horns; and the other is without horns.

*Y. Soc.* Clearly.

*Str.* Suppose that you divide the science which manages pedestrian animals into two corresponding parts, and define them; for if you try to invent names for them, you will find the intricacy too great.

*Y. Soc.* How must I speak of them, then?

*Str.* In this way: let the science of managing pedestrian animals be divided into two parts, and one part assigned to the horned herd, and the other to the herd that has no horns.

*Y. Soc.* All that you say has been abundantly proved, and may therefore be assumed.

*Str.* The king is clearly the shepherd of a polled herd, who have no horns.

*Y. Soc.* That is evident.

*Str.* Shall we break up this hornless herd into sections, and endeavour to assign to him what is his?

*Y. Soc.* By all means.

*Str.* Shall we distinguish them by their having or not having cloven feet, or by their mixing or not mixing the breed? You know what I mean.

*Y. Soc.* What?

*Str.* I mean that horses and asses naturally breed from one another.

*Y. Soc.* Yes.

*Str.* But the remainder of the hornless herd of tame animals will not mix the breed.

*Y. Soc.* Very true.

*Str.* And of which has the Statesman charge,—of the mixed or of the unmixed race?

*Y. Soc.* Clearly of the unmixed.

*Str.* I suppose that we must divide this again as before.

*Y. Soc.* We must.

*Str.* Every tame and herding animal has now been split up, with the exception of two species; for I hardly think that dogs should be reckoned among gregarious animals. \*

*Y. Soc.* Certainly not; but how shall we divide the two remaining species?

*Str.* There is a measure of difference which may be appropriately employed by you and Theaetetus, who are students of geometry.

*Statesman.*

*Y. Soc.* What is that?

*Str.* The diameter; and, again, the diameter of a diameter<sup>1</sup>.

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YOUNG  
SOCRATES.

*Y. Soc.* What do you mean?

*Str.* How does man walk, but as a diameter whose power is two feet?

*Y. Soc.* Just so.

*Str.* And the power of the remaining kind, being the power of twice two feet, may be said to be the diameter of our diameter.

Next follows the division into bipeds and quadrupeds, who may be described mathematically as having a power of two and four feet.

*Y. Soc.* Certainly; and now I think that I pretty nearly understand you.

*Str.* In these divisions, Socrates, I descry what would make another famous jest.

*Y. Soc.* What is it?

*Str.* Human beings have come out in the same class with the freest and airiest of creation, and have been running a race with them.

What fun! Men and birds alone remain, and the bird-catcher is running a race with the king.

*Y. Soc.* I remark that very singular coincidence.

*Str.* And would you not expect the slowest to arrive last?

*Y. Soc.* Indeed I should.

*Str.* And there is a still more ridiculous consequence, that the king is found running about with the herd, and in close competition with the bird-catcher, who of all mankind is most of an adept at the airy life<sup>2</sup>.

*Y. Soc.* Certainly.

*Str.* Then here, Socrates, is still clearer evidence of the truth of what was said in the enquiry about the Sophist<sup>3</sup>.

*Y. Soc.* What?

Truly dialectic is no regarder of persons.

*Str.* That the dialectical method is no respecter of persons,

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Meno 82 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Plato is here introducing a new subdivision, i. e. that of bipeds into men and birds. Others however refer the passage to the division into quadrupeds and bipeds, making pigs compete with human beings and the pig-driver with the king. According to this explanation we must translate the words above, 'freest and airiest of creation,' 'worthiest and laziest of creation.'

<sup>3</sup> Cp. Soph. 227 B.

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The shorter  
road.—Land-animals  
are bipeds or  
quadrupeds,  
and bipeds  
feathered  
or without  
feathers :  
the latter  
= man.

and does not set the great above the small, but always arrives in her own way at the truest result.

*Y. Soc.* Clearly.

*Str.* And now, I will not wait for you to ask me, but will of my own accord take you by the shorter road to the definition of a king.

*Y. Soc.* By all means.

*Str.* I say that we should have begun at first by dividing land animals into biped and quadruped; and since the winged herd, and that alone, comes out in the same class with man, we should divide bipeds into those which have feathers and those which have not, and when they have been divided, and the art of the management of mankind is brought to light, the time will have come to produce our Statesman and ruler, and set him like a charioteer in his place, and hand over to him the reins of state, for that too is a vocation which belongs to him.

*Y. Soc.* Very good; you have paid me the debt,—I mean, <sup>267</sup> that you have completed the argument, and I suppose that you added the digression by way of interest<sup>1</sup>.

*Str.* Then now, let us go back to the beginning, and join the links, which together make the definition of the name of the Statesman's art.

*Y. Soc.* By all means.

Recapitu-  
lation.

*Str.* The science of pure knowledge had, as we said originally, a part which was the science of rule or command, and from this was derived another part, which was called command-for-self, on the analogy of selling-for-self; an important section of this was the management of living animals, and this again was further limited to the management of them in herds, and again in herds of pedestrian animals. The chief division of the latter was the art of managing pedestrian animals which are without horns; this again has a part which can only be comprehended under one term by joining together three names,—shepherding pure-bred animals. The only further subdivision is the art of man-herding,—this has to do with bipeds, and is what we were seeking after, and have now found, being at once the royal and political.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. VI. 507 A.



*Y. Soc.* To be sure.

*Statesman.*

*Str.* And do you think, Socrates, that we really have done as you say?

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YOUNG  
SOCRATES.

*Y. Soc.* What?

*Str.* Do you think, I mean, that we have really fulfilled our intention?—There has been a sort of discussion, and yet the investigation seems to me not to be perfectly worked out: this is where the enquiry fails.

But the  
argument  
is not ready  
at an end

*Y. Soc.* I do not understand.

*Str.* I will try to make the thought, which is at this moment present in my mind, clearer to us both.

*Y. Soc.* Let me hear.

*Str.* There were many arts of shepherding, and one of them was the political, which had the charge of one particular herd?

*Y. Soc.* Yes.

*Str.* And this the argument defined to be the art of rearing, not horses or other brutes, but the art of rearing man collectively?

*Y. Soc.* True.

*Str.* Note, however, a difference which distinguishes the king from all other shepherds.

*Y. Soc.* To what do you refer?

*Str.* I want to ask, whether any one of the other herdsmen has a rival who professes and claims to share with him in the management of the herd?

*Y. Soc.* What do you mean?

*Str.* I mean to say that merchants, husbandmen, providers of food, and also training-masters and physicians, will all contend with the herdsmen of humanity, whom we call Statesmen, declaring that they themselves have the care of rearing or managing mankind, and that they rear not only the common herd, but also the rulers themselves.

The king,  
unlike other  
herdsmen,  
has many  
rivals, who  
dispute his  
claims to the  
management  
of the herd.

*Y. Soc.* Are they not right in saying so?

*Str.* Very likely they may be, and we will consider their claim. But we are certain of this,—that no one will raise a similar claim as against the herdsman, who is allowed on all hands to be the sole and only feeder and physician of his

<sup>1</sup> Reading εἰ τις τῶν ἀλλῶν τρω.

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herd; he is also their match-maker and accoucheur; no one else knows that department of science. And he is their merry-maker and musician, as far as their nature is susceptible of such influences, and no one can console and soothe his own herd better than he can, either with the natural tones of his voice or with instruments. And the same may be said of tenders of animals in general.

*Y. Soc.* Very true.

*Str.* But if this is as you say, can our argument about the king be true and unimpeachable? Were we right in selecting him out of ten thousand other claimants to be the shepherd and rearer of the human flock?

*Y. Soc.* Surely not.

How then can  
we maintain  
his position?

*Str.* Had we not reason just now<sup>1</sup> to apprehend, that although we may have described a sort of royal form, we have not as yet accurately worked out the true image of the Statesman? and that we cannot reveal him as he truly is in his own nature, until we have disengaged and separated him from those who hang about him and claim to share in his prerogatives?

*Y. Soc.* Very true.

*Str.* And that, Socrates, is what we must do, if we do not mean to bring disgrace upon the argument at its close.

*Y. Soc.* We must certainly avoid that.

*Str.* Then let us make a new beginning, and travel by a different road.

*Y. Soc.* What road?

We reply  
by telling  
a famous  
tale, which  
is amusing  
as well as  
instructive.

*Str.* I think that we may have a little amusement; there is a famous tale, of which a good portion may with advantage be interwoven, and then we may resume our series of divisions, and proceed in the old path until we arrive at the desired summit. Shall we do as I say?

*Y. Soc.* By all means.

*Str.* Listen, then, to a tale which a child would love to hear; and you are not too old for childish amusement.

*Y. Soc.* Let me hear.

*Str.* There did really happen, and will again happen, like many other events of which ancient tradition has preserved

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, 267 C, D.

the record, the portent which is traditionally said to have occurred in the quarrel of Atreus and Thyestes. You have heard, no doubt, and remember what they say happened at that time?

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*STRANGER,*  
*YOUNG*  
*SOCRATES.*

*Y. Soc.* I suppose you to mean the token of the birth of the golden lamb.

269 *Str.* No, not that; but another part of the story, which tells how the sun and the stars once rose in the west, and set in the east, and that the god reversed their motion, and gave them that which they now have as a testimony to the right of Atreus.

We have all heard fragments of it, such as the reversal of the motion of sun and stars, the reign of Cronus, and the story of the earth-born men.

*Y. Soc.* Yes; there is that legend also.

*Str.* Again, we have been often told of the reign of Cronos.

*Y. Soc.* Yes, very often.

*Str.* Did you ever hear that the men of former times were earth-born, and not begotten of one another?

*Y. Soc.* Yes, that is another old tradition.

*Str.* All these stories, and ten thousand others which are still more wonderful, have a common origin; many of them have been lost in the lapse of ages, or are repeated only in a disconnected form; but the origin of them is what no one has told, and may as well be told now; for the tale is suited to throw light on the nature of the king.

*Y. Soc.* Very good; and I hope that you will give the whole story, and leave out nothing.

*Str.* Listen, then. There is a time when God himself guides and helps to roll the world in its course; and there is a time, on the completion of a certain cycle, when he lets go, and the world being a living creature, and having originally received intelligence from its author and creator, turns about and by an inherent necessity revolves in the opposite direction.

The whole of the story.— There is a time when God moves and guides the world, and there is a time when he lets go, and the world moves itself but in an opposite direction. This change of motion, which is the

*Y. Soc.* Why is that?

*Str.* Why, because only the most divine things of all remain ever unchanged and the same, and body is not included in this class. Heaven and the universe, as we have termed them, although they have been endowed by the Creator with many glories, partake of a bodily nature, and therefore cannot be entirely free from perturbation. But their motion is, as far as possible, single and in the same

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slightest  
possible, is  
due to the  
material  
element in  
the world.

place, and of the same kind; and is therefore only subject to a reversal, which is the least alteration possible. For the lord of all moving things is alone able to move of himself; and to think that he moves them at one time in one direction and at another time in another is blasphemy. Hence we must not say that the world is either self-moved always, or all made to go round by God in two opposite courses; or that two Gods, having opposite purposes, make it move round. But as I have already said (and this is the only remaining alternative) the world is guided at one time by an external power which is divine and receives fresh life and immortality from the renewing hand of the Creator, and again, when let go, moves spontaneously, being set free at such a time as to have, during infinite cycles of years, a reverse movement: this is due to its perfect balance, to its vast size, and to the fact that it turns on the smallest pivot. 270

*Y. Soc.* Your account of the world seems to be very reasonable indeed.

*Str.* Let us now reflect and try to gather from what has been said the nature of the phenomenon which we affirmed to be the cause of all these wonders. It is this.

*Y. Soc.* What?

*Str.* The reversal which takes place from time to time of the motion of the universe.

*Y. Soc.* How is that the cause?

*Str.* Of all changes of the heavenly motions, we may consider this to be the greatest and most complete.

*Y. Soc.* I should imagine so.

*Str.* And it may be supposed to result in the greatest changes to the human beings who are the inhabitants of the world at the time.

*Y. Soc.* Such changes would naturally occur.

*Str.* And animals, as we know, survive with difficulty great and serious changes of many different kinds when they come upon them at once.

*Y. Soc.* Very true.

*Str.* Hence there necessarily occurs a great destruction of them, which extends also to the life of man; few survivors of the race are left, and those who remain become the subjects of several novel and remarkable phenomena, and of one in



particular, which takes place at the time when the transition is made to the cycle opposite to that in which we are now living.

*Y. Soc.* What is it?

*Str.* The life of all animals first came to a standstill, and the mortal nature ceased to be or look older, and was then reversed and grew young and delicate; the white locks of the aged darkened again, and the cheeks of the bearded man became smooth, and recovered their former bloom; the bodies of youths in their prime grew softer and smaller, continually by day and night returning and becoming assimilated to the nature of a newly-born child in mind as well as body; in the succeeding stage they wasted away and wholly disappeared. And the bodies of those who died by violence at that time quickly passed through the like changes, and in a few days were no more seen.

271 *Y. Soc.* Then how, Stranger, were the animals created in those days; and in what way were they begotten of one another?

*Str.* It is evident, Socrates, that there was no such thing in the then order of nature as the procreation of animals from one another; the earth-born race, of which we hear in story, was the one which existed in those days—they rose again from the ground; and of this tradition, which is now-a-days often unduly discredited, our ancestors, who were nearest in point of time to the end of the last period and came into being at the beginning of this, are to us the heralds. And mark how consistent the sequel of the tale is; after the return of age to youth, follows the return of the dead, who are lying in the earth, to life; simultaneously with the reversal of the world the wheel of their generation has been turned back, and they are put together and rise and live in the opposite order, unless God has carried any of them away to some other lot. According to this tradition they of necessity sprang from the earth and have the name of earth-born, and so the above legend clings to them.

*Y. Soc.* Certainly that is quite consistent with what has preceded; but tell me, was the life which you said existed in the reign of Cronos in that cycle of the world, or in this? For the change in the course of the stars and the sun must have occurred in both.

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YOUNG  
SOCRATES.

At the time of transition from our cycle to the opposite, a retrogression takes place in the life of men and animals.

Men, in the age of Cronus, sprang, not from one another but from the earth.

The tale is so consistent that it must be true

*Statesman.*STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.Description  
of the life of  
innocence  
which pre-  
vailed in the  
days when  
God governed  
the world.

*Str.* I see that you enter into my meaning;—no, that blessed and spontaneous life does not belong to the present cycle of the world, but to the previous one, in which God superintended the whole revolution of the universe; and the several parts of the universe were distributed under the rule of certain inferior deities, as is the way in some places still. There were demigods, who were the shepherds of the various species and herds of animals, and each one was in all respects sufficient for those of whom he was the shepherd; neither was there any violence, or devouring of one another, or war or quarrel among them; and I might tell of ten thousand other blessings, which belonged to that dispensation. The reason why the life of man was, as tradition says, spontaneous, is as follows: In those days God himself was their shepherd, and ruled over them, just as man, who is by comparison a divine being, still rules over the lower animals. Under him there were no forms of government or separate possession of women and children; for all men rose again from the earth, having no memory of the past. And although they had nothing of this sort, the earth gave them fruits in abundance, which grew on trees and shrubs unbidden, and were not planted by the hand of man. And they dwelt naked, and mostly in the open air, for the temperature of their seasons was mild; and they had no beds, but lay on soft couches of grass, which grew plentifully out of the earth. Such was the life of man in the days of Cronos, Socrates; the character of our present life, which is said to be under Zeus, you know from your own experience. Can you, and will you, determine which of them you deem the happier? 272

Which would  
you call hap-  
pier, that life  
or our own?*Y. Soc.* Impossible.*Str.* Then shall I determine for you as well as I can?*Y. Soc.* By all means.We cannot  
say; for the  
life of inno-  
cence might  
be a life of  
philosophy,  
or of mere  
eating and  
drinking.

*Str.* Suppose that the nurslings of Cronos, having this boundless leisure, and the power of holding intercourse, not only with men, but with the brute creation, had used all these advantages with a view to philosophy, conversing with the brutes as well as with one another, and learning of every nature which was gifted with any special power, and was able to contribute some special experience to the store of

wisdom, there would be no difficulty in deciding that they would be a thousand times happier than the men of our own day. Or, again, if they had merely eaten and drunk until they were full, and told stories to one another and to the animals — such stories as are now attributed to them — in this case also, as I should imagine, the answer would be easy. But until some satisfactory witness can be found of the love of that age for knowledge and discussion, we had better let the matter drop, and give the reason why we have unearthed this tale, and then we shall be able to get on. In the fulness of time, when the change was to take place, and the earth-born race had all perished, and every soul had completed its proper cycle of births and been sown in the earth her appointed number of times, the pilot of the universe let the helm go, and retired to his place of view; and then Fate and innate desire reversed the motion of the world. Then also all the inferior deities who share the rule of the supreme power, being informed of what was happening, let go the parts of the world which were under their

273 control. And the world turning round with a sudden shock, being impelled in an opposite direction from beginning to end, was shaken by a mighty earthquake, which wrought a new destruction of all manner of animals. Afterwards, when sufficient time had elapsed, the tumult and confusion and earthquake ceased, and the universal creature, once more at peace, attained to a calm, and settled down into his own orderly and accustomed course, having the charge and rule of himself and of all the creatures which are contained in him, and executing, as far as he remembered them, the instructions of his Father and Creator, more precisely at first, but afterwards with less exactness. The reason of the falling off was the admixture of matter in him; this was inherent in the primal nature, which was full of disorder, until attaining to the present order. From God, the constructor, the world received all that is good in him, but from a previous state came elements of evil and unrighteousness, which, thence derived, first of all passed into the world, and were then transmitted to the animals. While the world was aided by the pilot in nurturing the animals, the evil was small, and great the good which he produced, but after the

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YOUNG  
SOCRATES

When God let the world go, at first there was a great earthquake, but things soon settled down.

The creature at first remembered his Creator, but afterwards forgot him. And so there arose great disorder, which continued until God once more took the helm and the old order was reinstated.

*Statesman.*  
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 YOUNG  
 SOCRATES.

separation, when the world was let go, at first all proceeded well enough; but, as time went on, there was more and more forgetting, and the old discord again held sway and burst forth in full glory; and at last small was the good, and great was the admixture of evil, and there was a danger of universal ruin to the world, and to the things contained in him. Wherefore God, the orderer of all, in his tender care, seeing that the world was in great straits, and fearing that all might be dissolved in the storm and disappear in infinite chaos, again seated himself at the helm; and bringing back the elements which had fallen into dissolution and disorder to the motion which had prevailed under his dispensation, he set them in order and restored them, and made the world imperishable and immortal. And this is the whole tale, of which the first part will suffice to illustrate the nature of the king. For when the world turned towards the present cycle of generation, the age of man again stood still, and a change opposite to the previous one was the result. The small creatures which had almost disappeared grew in stature, and the newly-born children of the earth became grey and died and sank into the earth again. All things changed, imitating and following the condition of the universe, and of necessity agreeing with that in their mode of conception and generation and nurture; for no animal was any longer allowed to come into being in the earth through the agency of other creative beings, but as the world was ordained to be the lord of his own progress, in like manner the parts were ordained to grow and generate and give nourishment, as far as they could, of themselves, impelled by a similar movement. And so we have arrived at the real end of this discourse; for although there might be much to tell of the lower animals, and of the condition out of which they changed and of the causes of the change, about men there is not much, and that little is more to the purpose. Deprived of the care of God, who had possessed and tended them, they were left helpless and defenceless, and were torn in pieces by the beasts, who were naturally fierce and had now grown wild. And in the first ages they were still without skill or resource; the food which once grew spontaneously had failed, and as yet they knew not how to procure it, because they had never felt

274

At the beginning of our cycle there was another change in the life of man, opposite to the former.

Man, being found unequal to the struggle for existence, is helped by Prometheus, Hephaestus, and Athene.



the pressure of necessity. For all these reasons they were in a great strait; wherefore also the gifts spoken of in the old tradition were imparted to man by the gods, together with so much teaching and education as was indispensable; fire was given to them by Prometheus, the arts by Hephaestus and his fellow-worker, Athene, seeds and plants by others. From these is derived all that has helped to frame human life; since the care of the Gods, as I was saying, had now failed men, and they had to order their course of life for themselves, and were their own masters, just like the universal creature whom they imitate and follow, ever changing, as he changes, and ever living and growing, at one time in one manner, and at another time in another. Enough of the story, which may be of use in showing us how greatly we erred in the delineation of the king and the statesman in our previous discourse.

*Y. Soc.* What was this great error of which you speak?

*Str.* There were two; the first a lesser one, the other was an error on a much larger and grander scale.

*Y. Soc.* What do you mean?

275 *Str.* I mean to say that when we were asked about a king and statesman of the present cycle and generation, we told of a shepherd of a human flock who belonged to the other cycle, and of one who was a god when he ought to have been a man; and this was a great error. Again, we declared him to be the ruler of the entire State, without explaining how: this was not the whole truth, nor very intelligible; but still it was true, and therefore the second error was not so great as the first.

*Y. Soc.* Very good.

*Str.* Before we can expect to have a perfect description of the statesman we must define the nature of his office.

*Y. Soc.* Certainly.

*Str.* And the myth was introduced in order to show, not only that all others are rivals of the true shepherd who is the object of our search, but in order that we might have a clearer view of him who is alone worthy to receive this appellation, because he alone of shepherds and herdsmen, according to the image which we have employed, has the care of human beings.

*Statesman.*

*STRANGER.*

*YOUNG*

*SOCRATES.*

Two mistakes made by us:—  
(1) we did not speak of a king or statesman of the present cycle; or (2) define the nature of his rule.

Statesman.

*Y. Soc.* Very true.

STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.

The true shepherd is greater even than a king; for now-a-days kings and their subjects are much upon a level.

*Str.* And I cannot help thinking, Socrates, that the form of the divine shepherd is even higher than that of a king; whereas the statesmen who are now on earth seem to be much more like their subjects in character, and much more nearly to partake of their breeding and education.

*Y. Soc.* Certainly.

*Str.* Still they must be investigated all the same, to see whether, like the divine shepherd, they are above their subjects or on a level with them.

*Y. Soc.* Of course.

Command-for-self over herds should be called not 'rearing of herds,' but by some more general term, such as 'tending' or 'management' of herds, which will include the king.

*Str.* To resume:—Do you remember that we spoke of a command-for-self exercised over animals, not singly but collectively, which we called the art of rearing a herd?

*Y. Soc.* Yes, I remember.

*Str.* There, somewhere, lay our error; for we never included or mentioned the Statesman; and we did not observe that he had no place in our nomenclature.

*Y. Soc.* How was that?

*Str.* All other herdsmen 'rear' their herds, but this is not a suitable term to apply to the Statesman; we should use a name which is common to them all.

*Y. Soc.* True, if there be such a name.

*Str.* Why, is not 'care' of herds applicable to all? For this implies no feeding, or any special duty; if we say either 'tending' the herds, or 'managing' the herds, or 'having the care' of them, the same word will include all, and then we may wrap up the Statesman with the rest, as the argument seems to require.

*Y. Soc.* Quite right; but how shall we take the next step 276 in the division?

We may then subdivide the 'tending' of herds as we subdivided the 'rearing' of herds.

*Str.* As before we divided the art of 'rearing' herds accordingly as they were land or water herds, winged and wingless, mixing or not mixing the breed, horned and hornless, so we may divide by these same differences the 'tending' of herds, comprehending in our definition the kingship of to-day and the rule of Cronos.

*Y. Soc.* That is clear; but I still ask, what is to follow.

*Str.* If the word had been 'managing' herds, instead of feeding or rearing them, no one would have argued that

there was no care of men in the case of the politician, although it was justly contended, that there was no human art of feeding them which was worthy of the name, or at least, if there were, many a man had a prior and greater right to share in such an art than any king.

*Y. Soc.* True.

*Str.* But no other art or science will have a prior or better right than the royal science to care for human society and to rule over men in general.

*Y. Soc.* Quite true.

*Str.* In the next place, Socrates, we must surely notice that a great error was committed at the end of our analysis.

*Y. Soc.* What was it?

*Str.* Why, supposing we were ever so sure that there is such an art as the art of rearing or feeding bipeds, there was no reason why we should call this the royal or political art, as though there were no more to be said.

*Y. Soc.* Certainly not.

*Str.* Our first duty, as we were saying, was to remodel the name, so as to have the notion of care rather than of feeding, and then to divide, for there may be still considerable divisions.

*Y. Soc.* How can they be made?

*Str.* First, by separating the divine shepherd from the human guardian or manager.

*Y. Soc.* True.

*Str.* And the art of management which is assigned to man would again have to be subdivided.

*Y. Soc.* On what principle?

*Str.* On the principle of voluntary and compulsory.

*Y. Soc.* Why?

*Str.* Because, if I am not mistaken, there has been an error here; for our simplicity led us to rank king and tyrant together, whereas they are utterly distinct, like their modes of government.

*Y. Soc.* True.

*Str.* Then, now, as I said, let us make the correction and divide human care into two parts, on the principle of voluntary and compulsory.

*Y. Soc.* Certainly.

*Statesman.*

STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.

But we should not, as before, hastily call the art of managing bipeds the royal art.

It must first be subdivided into divine and human management; and the latter into voluntary and compulsory, that the king may be distinguished from the tyrant.

*Statesman.*STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.

*Str.* And if we call the management of violent rulers tyranny, and the voluntary management of herds of voluntary bipeds politics, may we not further assert that he who has this latter art of management is the true king and statesman?

*Y. Soc.* I think, Stranger, that we have now completed the account of the Statesman. 277

Alas! the picture of the king is both overdone and defective.

*Str.* Would that we had, Socrates, but I have to satisfy myself as well as you; and in my judgment the figure of the king is not yet perfected; like statuaries who, in their too great haste, having overdone the several parts of their work, lose time in cutting them down, so too we, partly out of haste, partly out of a magnanimous desire to expose our former error, and also because we imagined that a king required grand illustrations, have taken up a marvellous lump of fable, and have been obliged to use more than was necessary. This made us discourse at large, and, nevertheless, the story never came to an end. And our discussion might be compared to a picture of some living being which had been fairly drawn in outline, but had not yet attained the life and clearness which is given by the blending of colours. Now to intelligent persons a living being had better be delineated by language and discourse than by any painting or work of art: to the duller sort by works of art.

*Y. Soc.* Very true; but what is the imperfection which still remains? I wish that you would tell me.

We seem only to know the higher ideas through examples dimly.

*Str.* The higher ideas, my dear friend, can hardly be set forth except through the medium of examples; every man seems to know all things in a dreamy sort of way, and then again to wake up and to know nothing.

*Y. Soc.* What do you mean?

*Str.* I fear that I have been unfortunate in raising a question about our experience of knowledge.

*Y. Soc.* Why so?

*Str.* Why, because my 'example' requires the assistance of another example.

*Y. Soc.* Proceed; you need not fear that I shall tire.

The use of examples illustrated by the way

*Str.* I will proceed, finding, as I do, such a ready listener in you: when children are beginning to know their letters —



*Y. Soc.* What are you going to say?

278 *Str.* That they distinguish the several letters well enough in very short and easy syllables, and are able to tell them correctly.

*Y. Soc.* Certainly.

*Str.* Whereas in other syllables they do not recognize them, and think and speak falsely of them.

*Y. Soc.* Very true.

*Str.* Will not the best and easiest way of bringing them to a knowledge of what they do not as yet know be —

*Y. Soc.* Be what?

*Str.* To refer them first of all to cases in which they judge correctly about the letters in question, and then to compare these with the cases in which they do not as yet know, and to show them that the letters are the same, and have the same character in both combinations, until all cases in which they are right have been placed side by side with all cases in which they are wrong. In this way they have examples, and are made to learn that each letter in every combination is always the same and not another, and is always called by the same name.

*Y. Soc.* Certainly.

*Str.* Are not examples formed in this manner? We take a thing and compare it with another distinct instance of the same thing, of which we have a right conception, and out of the comparison there arises one true notion, which includes both of them.

*Y. Soc.* Exactly.

*Str.* Can we wonder, then, that the soul has the same uncertainty about the alphabet of things, and sometimes and in some cases is firmly fixed by the truth in each particular, and then, again, in other cases is altogether at sea; having somehow or other a correct notion of combinations; but when the elements are transferred into the long and difficult language (syllables) of facts, is again ignorant of them?

*Y. Soc.* There is nothing wonderful in that.

*Str.* Could any one, my friend, who began with false opinion ever expect to arrive even at a small portion of truth and to attain wisdom?

*Y. Soc.* Hardly.

*Statesman.*

STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.

in which  
children  
learn to know  
letters in  
different  
combinations.

The method  
by which we  
learn 'the  
long and  
difficult lan-  
guage of  
facts' is  
similar.

*Statesman.*STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.

*Str.* Then you and I will not be far wrong in trying to see the nature of example in general in a small and particular instance; afterwards from lesser things we intend to pass to the royal class, which is the highest form of the same nature, and endeavour to discover by rules of art what the management of cities is; and then the dream will become a reality to us.

*Y. Soc.* Very true.

*Str.* Then, once more, let us resume the previous argument, and as there were innumerable rivals of the royal race who claim to have the care of states, let us part them all off, and leave him alone; and, as I was saying, a model or example of this process has first to be framed.

*Y. Soc.* Exactly.

Weaving may be made a model of the Statesman's art.

*Str.* What model is there which is small, and yet has any analogy with the political occupation? Suppose, Socrates, that if we have no other example at hand, we choose weaving, or, more precisely, weaving of wool — this will be quite enough, without taking the whole of weaving, to illustrate our meaning?

*Y. Soc.* Certainly.

*Str.* Why should we not apply to weaving the same processes of division and subdivision which we have already applied to other classes; going once more as rapidly as we can through all the steps until we come to that which is needed for our purpose?

*Y. Soc.* How do you mean?

*Str.* I shall reply by actually performing the process.

*Y. Soc.* Very good.

Partings-off of larger classes from which weaving is descended.

*Str.* All things which we make or acquire are either creative or preventive; of the preventive class are antidotes, divine and human, and also defences; and defences are either military weapons or protections; and protections are veils, and also shields against heat and cold; and shields against heat and cold are shelters and coverings; and coverings are blankets and garments; and garments are some of them in one piece, and others of them are made in several parts; and of these latter some are stitched, others are fastened and not stitched; and of the not stitched, some are made of the sinews of plants, and some of hair; and of these, again, some are

cemented with water and earth, and others are fastened together by themselves. And these last defences and coverings which are fastened together by themselves are called clothes, and the art which superintends them we may call, from the nature of the operation, the art of clothing, just as  
 280 before the art of the Statesman was derived from the State; and may we not say that the art of weaving, at least that largest portion of it which was concerned with the making of clothes (cp. 279 B), differs only in name from this art of clothing, in the same way that, in the previous case, the royal science differed from the political?

*Y. Soc.* Most true.

*Str.* In the next place, let us make the reflection, that the art of weaving clothes, which an incompetent person might fancy to have been sufficiently described, has been separated off from several others which are of the same family, but not from the co-operative arts.

*Y. Soc.* And which are the kindred arts?

*Str.* I see that I have not taken you with me. So I think that we had better go backwards, starting from the end. We just now parted off from the weaving of clothes, the making of blankets, which differ from each other in that one is put under and the other is put around: and these are what I termed kindred arts.

*Y. Soc.* I understand.

*Str.* And we have subtracted the manufacture of all articles made of flax and cords, and all that we just now metaphorically termed the sinews of plants, and we have also separated off the process of felting and the putting together of materials by stitching and sewing, of which the most important part is the cobbler's art.

*Y. Soc.* Precisely.

*Str.* Then we separated off the currier's art, which prepared coverings in entire pieces, and the art of sheltering, and subtracted the various arts of making water-tight which are employed in building, and in general in carpentering, and in other crafts, and all such arts as furnish impediments to thieving and acts of violence, and are concerned with making the lids of boxes and the fixing of doors, being divisions of the art of joining; and we also cut off the manu-

*Statesman.*

STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.

The art of weaving and the art of making clothes differ only in name, like the royal and the political sciences.

Recapitulation of the arts which have been parted off from weaving.

*Statesman.*

STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.

Weaving is an art of protection against cold, which fabricates woollen defences. But it must be further distinguished.

facture of arms, which is a section of the great and manifold art of making defences; and we originally began by parting off the whole of the magic art which is concerned with antidotes, and have left, as would appear, the very art of which we were in search, the art of protection against winter cold, which fabricates woollen defences, and has the name of weaving.

*Y. Soc.* Very true.

*Str.* Yes, my boy, but that is not all; for the first process to which the material is subjected is the opposite of weaving.

*Y. Soc.* How so?

*Str.* Weaving is a sort of uniting?

*Y. Soc.* Yes.

*Str.* But the first process is a separation of the clotted and matted fibres?

*Y. Soc.* What do you mean?

Weaving is not carding;

*Str.* I mean the work of the carder's art; for we cannot say that carding is weaving, or that the carder is a weaver.

*Y. Soc.* Certainly not.

nor making the warp or the woof;

*Str.* Again, if a person were to say that the art of making the warp and the woof was the art of weaving, he would say what was paradoxical and false.

*Y. Soc.* To be sure.

nor fulling, nor mending;

*Str.* Shall we say that the whole art of the fuller or of the mender has nothing to do with the care and treatment of clothes, or are we to regard all these as arts of weaving?

*Y. Soc.* Certainly not.

*Str.* And yet surely all these arts will maintain that they are concerned with the treatment and production of clothes; they will dispute the exclusive prerogative of weaving, and though assigning a larger sphere to that, will still reserve a considerable field for themselves.

*Y. Soc.* Very true.

nor any art which makes tools for weaving.

*Str.* Besides these, there are the arts which make tools and instruments of weaving, and which will claim at least to be co-operative causes in every work of the weaver.

*Y. Soc.* Most true.

*Str.* Well, then, suppose that we define weaving, or rather that part of it which has been selected by us, to be the greatest and noblest of arts which are concerned with woollen



garments—shall we be right? Is not the definition, although true, wanting in clearness and completeness: for do not all those other arts require to be first cleared away?

*Y. Soc.* True.

*Str.* Then the next thing will be to separate them, in order that the argument may proceed in a regular manner?

*Y. Soc.* By all means.

*Str.* Let us consider, in the first place, that there are two kinds of arts entering into everything which we do.

*Y. Soc.* What are they?

*Str.* The one kind is the conditional or co-operative, the other the principal cause.

*Y. Soc.* What do you mean?

*Str.* The arts which do not manufacture the actual thing, but which furnish the necessary tools for the manufacture, without which the several arts could not fulfil their appointed work, are co-operative; but those which make the things themselves are causal.

*Y. Soc.* A very reasonable distinction.

*Str.* Thus the arts which make spindles, combs, and other instruments of the production of clothes, may be called co-operative, and those which treat and fabricate the things themselves, causal.

*Y. Soc.* Very true.

282 *Str.* The arts of washing and mending, and the other preparatory arts which belong to the causal class, and form a division of the great art of adornment, may be all comprehended under what we call the fuller's art.

*Y. Soc.* Very good.

*Str.* Carding and spinning threads and all the parts of the process which are concerned with the actual manufacture of a woollen garment form a single art, which is one of those universally acknowledged,—the art of working in wool.

*Y. Soc.* To be sure.

*Str.* Of working in wool, again, there are two divisions, and both these are parts of two arts at once.

*Y. Soc.* How is that?

*Str.* Carding and one half of the use of the comb, and the other processes of wool-working which separate the composite, may be classed together as belonging both to the art

*Statesman.*  
*STRANGER,*  
*YOUNG*  
*SOCRATES.*

All arts are either causal or co-operative.

Co-operative arts make tools, the causal use them in production.

In the case of working in wool, washing, mending, carding, spinning, etc., belong to the causal class.

Of wool-working there are two great sections, which fall respectively under the

*Statesman.*

STRANGER,

YOUNG

SOCRATES.

art of composition  
and the art  
of division.

We are concerned with  
the former, of  
which there  
are two parts,  
one which  
twists, and  
another which  
combines.

Both warp and  
woof are made  
by twisting ;  
but the thread  
of the warp is  
firm, whereas  
the thread of  
the woof is  
loose and soft.

of wool-working, and also to one of the two great arts which are of universal application — the art of composition and the art of division.

*Y. Soc.* Yes.

*Str.* To the latter belong carding and the other processes of which I was just now speaking ; the art of discernment or division in wool and yarn, which is effected in one manner with the comb and in another with the hands, is variously described under all the names which I just now mentioned.

*Y. Soc.* Very true.

*Str.* Again, let us take some process of wool-working which is also a portion of the art of composition, and, dismissing the elements of division which we found there<sup>1</sup>, make two halves, one on the principle of composition, and the other on the principle of division.

*Y. Soc.* Let that be done.

*Str.* And once more, Socrates, we must divide the part which belongs at once both to wool-working and composition, if we are ever to discover satisfactorily the aforesaid art of weaving.

*Y. Soc.* We must.

*Str.* Yes, certainly, and let us call one part of the art the art of twisting threads, the other the art of combining them.

*Y. Soc.* Do I understand you, in speaking of twisting, to be referring to manufacture of the warp?

*Str.* Yes, and of the woof too ; how, if not by twisting, is the woof made?

*Y. Soc.* There is no other way.

*Str.* Then suppose that you define the warp and the woof, for I think that the definition will be of use to you.

*Y. Soc.* How shall I define them?

*Str.* As thus : A piece of carded wool which is drawn out lengthwise and breadthwise is said to be pulled out.

*Y. Soc.* Yes.

*Str.* And the wool thus prepared, when twisted by the spindle, and made into a firm thread, is called the warp, and the art which regulates these operations the art of spinning the warp.

<sup>1</sup> Reading ὅσα δὲ τῆς διακριτικῆς ἦν αἰτίοι, μεθιῶμεν ξήμπαντα.

*Y. Soc.* True.

*Statesman.*

283 *Str.* And the threads which are more loosely spun, having a softness proportioned to the intertexture of the warp and to the degree of force used in dressing the cloth,—the threads which are thus spun are called the woof, and the art which is set over them may be called the art of spinning the woof.

STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.

*Y. Soc.* Very true.

*Str.* And, now, there can be no mistake about the nature of the part of weaving which we have undertaken to define. For when that part of the art of composition which is employed in the working of wool forms a web by the regular intertexture of warp and woof, the entire woven substance is called by us a woollen garment, and the art which presides over this is the art of weaving.

Weaving is that portion of the art of composition which forms a web by the intertexture of warp and woof.

*Y. Soc.* Very true.

*Str.* But why did we not say at once that weaving is the art of entwining warp and woof, instead of making a long and useless circuit?

But could we not have defined it more speedily?—

*Y. Soc.* I thought, Stranger, that there was nothing useless in what was said.

This question cannot be answered until we have considered the whole nature of excess and defect.

*Str.* Very likely, but you may not always think so, my sweet friend; and in case any feeling of dissatisfaction should hereafter arise in your mind, as it very well may, let me lay down a principle which will apply to arguments in general.

*Y. Soc.* Proceed.

*Str.* Let us begin by considering the whole nature of excess and defect, and then we shall have a rational ground on which we may praise or blame too much length or too much shortness in discussions of this kind.

*Y. Soc.* Let us do so.

*Str.* The points on which I think that we ought to dwell are the following:—

*Y. Soc.* What?

*Str.* Length and shortness, excess and defect; with all of these the art of measurement is conversant.

*Y. Soc.* Yes.

*Str.* And the art of measurement has to be divided into two parts, with a view to our present purpose.

There are two divisions of the art of

*Y. Soc.* Where would you make the division?

*Statesman.*STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.measurement;  
the first com-  
pares excess  
and defect  
with each  
other;the second,  
with the  
principle of  
the mean.The excel-  
lence of the  
arts depends  
on their ob-  
servance of  
the mean; the  
neglect of it  
is their ruin.It is no easy  
matter to  
show the  
truth of the  
statement  
that excess

*Str.* As thus: I would make two parts, one having regard to the relativity of greatness and smallness to each other; and there is another, without which the existence of production would be impossible.

*Y. Soc.* What do you mean?

*Str.* Do you not think that it is only natural for the greater to be called greater with reference to the less alone, and the less less with reference to the greater alone?

*Y. Soc.* Yes.

*Str.* Well, but is there not also something exceeding and exceeded by the principle of the mean, both in speech and action, and is not this a reality, and the chief mark of difference between good and bad men?

*Y. Soc.* Plainly.

*Str.* Then we must suppose that the great and small exist and are discerned in both these ways, and not, as we were saying before, only relatively to one another, but there must also be another comparison of them with the mean or ideal standard; would you like to hear the reason why?

*Y. Soc.* Certainly.

*Str.* If we assume the greater to exist only in relation to the less, there will never be any comparison of either with the mean. 284

*Y. Soc.* True.

*Str.* And would not this doctrine be the ruin of all the arts and their creations; would not the art of the Statesman and the aforesaid art of weaving disappear? For all these arts are on the watch against excess and defect, not as unrealities, but as real evils, which occasion a difficulty in action; and the excellence or beauty of every work of art is due to this observance of measure.

*Y. Soc.* Certainly.

*Str.* But if the science of the Statesman disappears, the search for the royal science will be impossible.

*Y. Soc.* Very true.

*Str.* Well, then, as in the case of the Sophist we extorted the inference that not-being had an existence, because here was the point at which the argument eluded our grasp, so in this we must endeavour to show that the greater and less are not only to be measured with one another, but also have to



do with the production of the mean; for if this is not admitted, neither a statesman nor any other man of action can be an undisputed master of his science.

*Y. Soc.* Yes, we must certainly do again what we did then.

*Str.* But this, Socrates, is a greater work than the other, of which we only too well remember the length. I think, however, that we may fairly assume something of this sort:—

*Y. Soc.* What?

*Str.* That we shall some day require this notion of a mean with a view to the demonstration of absolute truth; meanwhile, the argument that the very existence of the arts must be held to depend on the possibility of measuring more or less, not only with one another, but also with a view to the attainment of the mean, seems to afford a grand support and satisfactory proof of the doctrine which we are maintaining; for if there are arts, there is a standard of measure, and if there is a standard of measure, there are arts; but if either is wanting, there is neither.

*Y. Soc.* True; and what is the next step?

*Str.* The next step clearly is to divide the art of measurement into two parts, as we have said already, and to place in the one part all the arts which measure number, length, depth, breadth, swiftness<sup>1</sup> with their opposites; and to have another part in which they are measured with the mean, and the fit, and the opportune, and the due, and with all those words, in short, which denote a mean or standard removed from the extremes.

*Y. Soc.* Here are two vast divisions, embracing two very different spheres.

285 *Str.* There are many accomplished men, Socrates, who say, believing themselves to speak wisely, that the art of measurement is universal, and has to do with all things. And this means what we are now saying; for all things which come within the province of art do certainly in some sense partake of measure. But these persons, because they are not accustomed to distinguish classes according to real forms, jumble together two widely different things, relation to one another, and to a standard, under the idea that they are the same, and

*Statesman.*

STRANGER,

YOUNG

SOCRATES.

and defect are relative to a mean, as well as to each other.

At present we will not attempt the task; it is enough that the existence of the arts depends on the possibility of a mean standard.

The art of measurement is said by many to be universal, and with a certain amount of truth; but they confuse the two divisions of

<sup>1</sup> Reading ταχύτης.

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the art and  
also make  
false distinctions.

also fall into the converse error of dividing other things not according to their real parts. Whereas the right way is, if a man has first seen the unity of things, to go on with the enquiry and not desist until he has found all the differences contained in it which form distinct classes; nor again should he be able to rest contented with the manifold diversities which are seen in a multitude of things until he has comprehended all of them that have any affinity within the bounds of one similarity and embraced them within the reality of a single kind. But we have said enough on this head, and also of excess and defect; we have only to bear in mind that two divisions of the art of measurement have been discovered which are concerned with them, and not forget what they are.

*Y. Soc.* We will not forget.

*Str.* And now that this discussion is completed, let us go on to consider another question, which concerns not this argument only but the conduct of such arguments in general.

*Y. Soc.* What is this new question?

*Str.* Take the case of a child who is engaged in learning his letters: when he is asked what letters make up a word, should we say that the question is intended to improve his grammatical knowledge of that particular word, or of all words?

*Y. Soc.* Clearly, in order that he may have a better knowledge of all words.

*Str.* And is our enquiry about the Statesman intended only to improve our knowledge of politics, or our power of reasoning generally?

*Y. Soc.* Clearly, as in the former example, the purpose is general.

*Str.* Still less would any rational man seek to analyse the notion of weaving for its own sake. But people seem to forget that some things have sensible images, which are readily known, and can be easily pointed out when any one desires to answer an enquirer without any trouble or argument; whereas the greatest and highest truths have no outward image of themselves visible to man, which he who wishes to satisfy the soul of the enquirer can adapt to the

Our enquiry about the Statesman is intended to make us better dialecticians; and the illustrations and analogies which we employ in order to throw light upon it have the same purpose.

eye of sense<sup>1</sup>, and therefore we ought to train ourselves to give and accept a rational account of them; for immaterial things, which are the noblest and greatest, are shown only in thought and idea, and in no other way, and all that we are now saying is said for the sake of them. Moreover, there is always less difficulty in fixing the mind on small matters than on great.

*Y. Soc.* Very good.

*Str.* Let us call to mind the bearing of all this.

*Y. Soc.* What is it?

*Str.* I wanted to get rid of any impression of tediousness which we may have experienced in the discussion about weaving, and the reversal of the universe, and in the discussion concerning the Sophist and the being of not-being. I know that they were felt to be too long, and I reproached myself with this, fearing that they might be not only tedious but irrelevant; and all that I have now said is only designed to prevent the recurrence of any such disagreeables for the future.

*Y. Soc.* Very good. Will you proceed?

*Str.* Then I would like to observe that you and I, remembering what has been said, should praise or blame the length or shortness of discussions, not by comparing them with one another, but with what is fitting, having regard to the part of measurement, which, as we said, was to be borne in mind.

*Y. Soc.* Very true.

*Str.* And yet, not everything is to be judged even with a view to what is fitting; for we should only want such a length as is suited to give pleasure, if at all, as a secondary matter; and reason tells us, that we should be contented to make the ease or rapidity of an enquiry, not our first, but our second object; the first and highest of all being to assert the great method of division according to species—whether the discourse be shorter or longer is not to the point. No offence should be taken at length, but the longer and shorter are to be employed indifferently, according as either of them is better calculated to sharpen the wits of the auditors. Reason would also say to him who censures the length of discourses

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The standard by which excess and defect should be determined is what is fitting, but not what is fitting to give pleasure; for the chief aim of an enquiry should be, not to give pleasure, but to assert the method of division according to species.

Statesman.

STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.

Would our  
discourse, if  
shorter, have  
made the  
listeners better  
dialecticians?

Let us now  
apply our  
example of  
weaving to the  
Statesman.

From king-  
ship the other  
arts of tending  
herds have  
been sepa-  
rated: certain  
causal and  
co-operative  
arts remain.  
These cannot  
be bisected,  
and must  
therefore be  
nearly carved.

Thus we set  
aside the arts  
which provide  
(1) instru-  
ments,—  
under this  
head we  
might place  
anything;

on such occasions and cannot away with their circumlocution, that he should not be in such a hurry to have done with them, when he can only complain that they are tedious, but 287 he should prove that if they had been shorter they would have made those who took part in them better dialecticians, and more capable of expressing the truth of things; about any other praise and blame, he need not trouble himself—he should pretend not to hear them. But we have had enough of this, as you will probably agree with me in thinking. Let us return to our Statesman, and apply to his case the afore-said example of weaving.

*Y. Soc.* Very good;—let us do as you say.

*Str.* The art of the king has been separated from the similar arts of shepherds, and, indeed, from all those which have to do with herds at all. There still remain, however, of the causal and co-operative arts those which are immediately concerned with States, and which must first be distinguished from one another.

*Y. Soc.* Very good.

*Str.* You know that these arts cannot easily be divided into two halves; the reason will be very evident as we proceed.

*Y. Soc.* Then we had better do so.

*Str.* We must carve them like a victim into members or limbs, since we cannot bisect them<sup>1</sup>. For we certainly should divide everything into as few parts as possible.

*Y. Soc.* What is to be done in this case?

*Str.* What we did in the example of weaving—all those arts which furnished the tools were regarded by us as co-operative.

*Y. Soc.* Yes.

*Str.* So now, and with still more reason, all arts which make any implement in a State, whether great or small, may be regarded by us as co-operative, for without them neither State nor Statesmanship would be possible; and yet we are not inclined to say that any of them is a product of the kingly art.

*Y. Soc.* No, indeed.

*Str.* The task of separating this class from others is not an

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Phaedr. 265 E.



easy one; for there is plausibility in saying that anything in the world is the instrument of doing something. But there is another class of possessions in a city, of which I have a word to say.

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SOCRATES.

*Y. Soc.* What class do you mean?

*Str.* A class which may be described as not having this power<sup>1</sup>; that is to say, not like an instrument, framed for production, but designed for the preservation of that which is produced. (2) vessels;

*Y. Soc.* To what do you refer?

*Str.* To the class of vessels, as they are comprehensively termed, which are constructed for the preservation of things moist and dry, of things prepared in the fire or out of the fire; this is a very large class, and has, if I am not mistaken, literally nothing to do with the royal art of which we are in search.

*Y. Soc.* Certainly not.

*Str.* There is also a third class of possessions to be noted, different from these and very extensive, moving or resting on land or water, honourable and also dishonourable. The whole of this class has one name, because it is intended to be sat upon, being always a seat for something. (3) seats or vehicles;

*Y. Soc.* What is it?

*Str.* A vehicle, which is certainly not the work of the Statesman, but of the carpenter, potter, and coppersmith.

*Y. Soc.* I understand.

*Str.* And is there not a fourth class which is again different, and in which most of the things formerly mentioned are contained,—every kind of dress, most sorts of arms, walls and enclosures, whether of earth or stone, and ten thousand other things? all of which being made for the sake of defence, may be truly called defences, and are for the most part to be regarded as the work of the builder or of the weaver, rather than of the Statesman. (4) defences;

*Y. Soc.* Certainly.

*Str.* Shall we add a fifth class, of ornamentation and drawing, and of the imitations produced by drawing and music, (5) play-things;

<sup>1</sup> Or, taking the words in a different context, 'As not having political power—I say another class, because not like an instrument,' &c.

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which are designed for amusement only, and may be fairly comprehended under one name?

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*Y. Soc.* What is it?*Str.* Plaything is the name.*Y. Soc.* Certainly.

*Str.* That one name may be fitly predicated of all of them, for none of these things have a serious purpose — amusement is their sole aim.

*Y. Soc.* That again I understand.

(6) materials (metal, wood, &c.);

*Str.* Then there is a class which provides materials for all these, out of which and in which the arts already mentioned fabricate their works; — this manifold class, I say, which is the creation and offspring of many other arts, may I not rank sixth?

*Y. Soc.* What do you mean?

*Str.* I am referring to gold, silver, and other metals, and all that wood-cutting and shearing of every sort provides for the art of carpentry and plaiting; and there is the process of barking and stripping the cuticle of plants, and the currier's art, which strips off the skins of animals, and other similar arts which manufacture corks and papyri and cords, and provide for the manufacture of composite species out of simple kinds — the whole class may be termed the primitive and simple possession of man, and with this the kingly science has no concern at all.

*Y. Soc.* True.

(7) food.

*Str.* The provision of food and of all other things which mingle their particles with the particles of the human body, and minister to the body, will form a seventh class, which may be called by the general term of nourishment, unless you have any better name to offer. This, however, appertains rather to the husbandman, huntsman, trainer, doctor, cook, and is not to be assigned to the Statesman's art. 289

*Y. Soc.* Certainly not.

These seven classes include almost all possessions, except tame animals;

*Str.* These seven classes include nearly every description of property, with the exception of tame animals. Consider; — there was the original material, which ought to have been placed first; next come instruments, vessels, vehicles, defences, playthings, nourishment; small things, which may be included under one of these — as for example, coins, seals

and stamps, are omitted, for they have not in them the character of any larger kind which includes them; but some of them may, with a little forcing, be placed among ornaments, and others may be made to harmonize with the class of implements. The art of herding, which has been already divided into parts, will include all property in tame animals, except slaves.

*Y. Soc.* Very true.

*Str.* The class of slaves and ministers only remains, and I suspect that in this the real aspirants for the throne, who are the rivals of the king in the formation of the political web, will be discovered; just as spinners, carders, and the rest of them, were the rivals of the weaver. All the others, who were termed co-operators, have been got rid of among the occupations already mentioned, and separated from the royal and political science.

*Y. Soc.* I agree.

*Str.* Let us go a little nearer, in order that we may be more certain of the complexion of this remaining class.

*Y. Soc.* Let us do so.

*Str.* We shall find from our present point of view that the greatest servants are in a case and condition which is the reverse of what we anticipated.

*Y. Soc.* Who are they?

*Str.* Those who have been purchased, and have so become possessions; these are unmistakably slaves, and certainly do not claim royal science.

*Y. Soc.* Certainly not.

*Str.* Again, freemen who of their own accord become the servants of the other classes in a State, and who exchange and equalise the products of husbandry and the other arts, some sitting in the market-place, others going from city to city by land or sea, and giving money in exchange for money or for other productions — the money-changer, the merchant, the ship-owner, the retailer, will not put in any claim to statecraft or politics?

*Y. Soc.* No; unless, indeed, to the politics of commerce.

*Str.* But surely men whom we see acting as hirelings and serfs, and too happy to turn their hand to anything, will not profess to share in royal science?

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and all tame animals, except slaves, have been included under herding.

Thus slaves and ministers alone remain; and among them we must look for the rivals of the king.

But slaves certainly do not claim royal science;

nor traders;

nor hirelings;

*Statesman.**Y. Soc.* Certainly not.STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.*Str.* But what would you say of some other serviceable officials?nor state  
officials;*Y. Soc.* Who are they, and what services do they perform?*Str.* There are heralds, and scribes perfected by practice, and divers others who have great skill in various sorts of business connected with the government of states — what shall we call them?*Y. Soc.* They are the officials, and servants of the rulers, as you just now called them, but not themselves rulers.*Str.* There may be something strange in any servant pretending to be a ruler, and yet I do not think that I could have been dreaming when I imagined that the principal claimants to political science would be found somewhere in this neighbourhood.*Y. Soc.* Very true.

nor diviners ;

*Str.* Well, let us draw nearer, and try the claims of some who have not yet been tested : in the first place, there are diviners, who have a portion of servile or ministerial science, and are thought to be the interpreters of the gods to men.*Y. Soc.* True.

nor priests.

*Str.* There is also the priestly class, who, as the law declares, know how to give the gods gifts from men in the form of sacrifices which are acceptable to them, and to ask on our behalf blessings in return from them. Now both these are branches of the servile or ministerial art.*Y. Soc.* Yes, clearly.But here we  
are getting  
on the right  
track ; for  
both priest  
and diviner  
are ambitious.*Str.* And here I think that we seem to be getting on the right track ; for the priest and the diviner are swollen with pride and prerogative, and they create an awful impression of themselves by the magnitude of their enterprises ; in Egypt, the king himself is not allowed to reign, unless he have priestly powers, and if he should be of another class and has thrust himself in, he must get enrolled in the priesthood. In many parts of Hellas, the duty of offering the most solemn propitiatory sacrifices is assigned to the highest magistracies, and here, at Athens, the most solemn and national of the ancient sacrifices are supposed to be celebrated by him who has been chosen by lot to be the King Archon.*Y. Soc.* Precisely.



291 *Str.* But who are these other kings and priests elected by lot who now come into view followed by their retainers and a vast throng, as the former class disappears and the scene changes?

*Y. Soc.* Whom can you mean?

*Str.* They are a strange crew.

*Y. Soc.* Why strange?

*Str.* A minute ago I thought that they were animals of every tribe; for many of them are like lions and centaurs, and many more like satyrs and such weak and shifty creatures;—Protean shapes quickly changing into one another's forms and natures; and now, Socrates, I begin to see who they are.

*Y. Soc.* Who are they? You seem to be gazing on some strange vision.

*Str.* Yes; every one looks strange when you do not know him; and just now I myself fell into this mistake—at first sight, coming suddenly upon him, I did not recognize the politician and his troop.

*Y. Soc.* Who is he?

*Str.* The chief of Sophists and most accomplished of wizards, who must at any cost be separated from the true king or Statesman, if we are ever to see daylight in the present enquiry.

*Y. Soc.* That is a hope not lightly to be renounced.

*Str.* Never, if I can help it; and, first, let me ask you a question.

*Y. Soc.* What?

*Str.* Is not monarchy a recognized form of government?

*Y. Soc.* Yes.

*Str.* And, after monarchy, next in order comes the government of the few?

*Y. Soc.* Of course.

*Str.* Is not the third form of government the rule of the multitude, which is called by the name of democracy?

*Y. Soc.* Certainly.

*Str.* And do not these three expand in a manner into five, producing out of themselves two other names?

*Y. Soc.* What are they?

*Str.* There is a criterion of voluntary and involuntary,

*Statesman.*

STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.

At last the false politician, the greatest of Sophists and wizards, appears in view, surrounded by his troop who take Protean shapes.

He must be separated from the king at any cost.

There are three chief forms of government: monarchy, the rule of the few, and democracy; these expand into five by the division of monarchy into royalty and

*Statesman.*STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.tyranny, and  
of the govern-  
ment of the  
few into aris-  
tocracy and  
oligarchy.

poverty and riches, law and the absence of law, which men now-a-days apply to them; the two first they subdivide accordingly, and ascribe to monarchy two forms and two corresponding names, royalty and tyranny.

*Y. Soc.* Very true.

*Str.* And the government of the few they distinguish by the names of aristocracy and oligarchy.

*Y. Soc.* Certainly.

*Str.* Democracy alone, whether rigidly observing the laws 292 or not, and whether the multitude rule over the men of property with their consent or against their consent, always in ordinary language has the same name.

*Y. Soc.* True.But these  
forms of gov-  
ernment are  
based on false  
principles.

*Str.* But do you suppose that any form of government which is defined by these characteristics of the one, the few, or the many, of poverty or wealth, of voluntary or compulsory submission, of written law or the absence of law, can be a right one?

*Y. Soc.* Why not?*Str.* Reflect; and follow me.*Y. Soc.* In what direction?

*Str.* Shall we abide by what we said at first, or shall we retract our words?

*Y. Soc.* To what do you refer?

*Str.* If I am not mistaken, we said that royal power was a science?

*Y. Soc.* Yes.

*Str.* And a science of a peculiar kind, which was selected out of the rest as having a character which is at once judicial and authoritative?

*Y. Soc.* Yes.

*Str.* And there was one kind of authority over lifeless things and another over living animals; and so we proceeded in the division step by step up to this point, not losing the idea of science, but unable as yet to determine the nature of the particular science?

*Y. Soc.* True.The charac-  
teristic of a  
true govern-

*Str.* Hence we are led to observe that the distinguishing principle of the State cannot be the few or many, the voluntary or involuntary, poverty or riches; but some notion of

science must enter into it, if we are to be consistent with what has preceded.

*Y. Soc.* And we must be consistent.

*Str.* Well, then, in which of these various forms of States may the science of government, which is among the greatest of all sciences and most difficult to acquire, be supposed to reside? That we must discover, and then we shall see who are the false politicians who pretend to be politicians but are not, although they persuade many, and shall separate them from the wise king.

*Y. Soc.* That, as the argument has already intimated, will be our duty.

*Str.* Do you think that the multitude in a State can attain political science?

*Y. Soc.* Impossible.

*Str.* But, perhaps, in a city of a thousand men, there would be a hundred, or say fifty, who could?

*Y. Soc.* In that case political science would certainly be the easiest of all sciences; there could not be found in a city of that number as many really first-rate draught-players, if judged by the standard of the rest of Hellas, and there would certainly not be as many kings. For kings we may truly call those who possess royal science, whether they rule or not, as was shown in the previous argument<sup>1</sup>.

293 *Str.* Thank you for reminding me; and the consequence is that any true form of government can only be supposed to be the government of one, two, or, at any rate, of a few.

*Y. Soc.* Certainly.

*Str.* And these, whether they rule with the will, or against the will, of their subjects, with written laws or without written laws, and whether they are poor or rich, and whatever be the nature of their rule, must be supposed, according to our present view, to rule on some scientific principle; just as the physician, whether he cures us against our will or with our will, and whatever be his mode of treatment,—incision, burning, or the infliction of some other pain,—whether he practises out of a book or not out of a book, and whether he be rich or poor, whether he purges or reduces

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YOUNG

SOCRATES.

ment is not that it is of few or many, voluntary or involuntary, but that it is scientific.

The science of government can only be attained by a very few.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, 259 A.

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YOUNG  
SOCRATES.

in some other way, or even fattens his patients, is a physician all the same, so long as he exercises authority over them according to rules of art, if he only does them good and heals and saves them. And this we lay down to be the only proper test of the art of medicine, or of any other art of command.

*Y. Soc.* Quite true.

So long as the governors rule scientifically, it matters not whether they rule with or without law, over willing or unwilling subjects.

*Str.* Then that can be the only true form of government in which the governors are really found to possess science, and are not mere pretenders, whether they rule according to law or without law, over willing or unwilling subjects, and are rich or poor themselves — none of these things can with any propriety be included in the notion of the ruler.

*Y. Soc.* True.

*Str.* And whether with a view to the public good they purge the State by killing some, or exiling some; whether they reduce the size of the body corporate by sending out from the hive swarms of citizens, or, by introducing persons from without, increase it; while they act according to the rules of wisdom and justice, and use their power with a view to the general security and improvement, the city over which they rule, and which has these characteristics, may be described as the only true State. All other governments are not genuine or real, but only imitations of this, and some of them are better and some of them are worse; the better are said to be well governed, but they are mere imitations like the others.

Young Socrates objects to government without laws.

*Y. Soc.* I agree, Stranger, in the greater part of what you say; but as to their ruling without laws — the expression has a harsh sound.

*Str.* You have been too quick for me, Socrates; I was just going to ask you whether you objected to any of my statements. And now I see that we shall have to consider this notion of there being good government without laws. 294

*Y. Soc.* Certainly.

He is answered that the rule of a wise man is better than the

*Str.* There can be no doubt that legislation is in a manner the business of a king, and yet the best thing of all is not that the law should rule, but that a man should rule supposing him to have wisdom and royal power. Do you see why this is?



*Y. Soc.* Why?

*Str.* Because the law does not perfectly comprehend what is noblest and most just for all and therefore cannot enforce what is best. The differences of men and actions, and the endless irregular movements of human things, do not admit of any universal and simple rule. And no art whatsoever can lay down a rule which will last for all time.

*Y. Soc.* Of course not.

*Str.* But the law is always striving to make one;—like an obstinate and ignorant tyrant, who will not allow anything to be done contrary to his appointment, or any question to be asked—not even in sudden changes of circumstances, when something happens to be better than what he commanded for some one.

*Y. Soc.* Certainly; the law treats us all precisely in the manner which you describe.

*Str.* A perfectly simple principle can never be applied to a state of things which is the reverse of simple.

*Y. Soc.* True.

*Str.* Then if the law is not the perfection of right, why are we compelled to make laws at all? The reason of this has next to be investigated.

*Y. Soc.* Certainly.

*Str.* Let me ask, whether you have not meetings for gymnastic contests in your city, such as there are in other cities, at which men compete in running, wrestling, and the like?

*Y. Soc.* Yes; they are very common among us.

*Str.* And what are the rules which are enforced on their pupils by professional trainers or by others having similar authority? Can you remember?

*Y. Soc.* To what do you refer?

*Str.* The training-masters do not issue minute rules for individuals, or give every individual what is exactly suited to his constitution; they think that they ought to go more roughly to work, and to prescribe generally the regimen which will benefit the majority.

*Y. Soc.* Very true.

*Str.* And therefore they assign equal amounts of exercise to them all; they send them forth together, and let them rest

*Statesman.*

STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.

rule of law :  
for the com-  
plexity of  
human affairs  
cannot be met  
by legislation.

Law is like  
an obstinate  
and ignorant  
tyrant.

Why then are  
laws made?

As the train-  
ing-master  
makes rules,  
not for each  
particular  
case—that  
would be  
impossible—  
but for the  
generality.

*Statesman.*

STRANGER,

YOUNG

SOCRATES.

so too the  
legislator  
enacts what  
is generally  
for the best;  
for he cannot  
sit by each  
man's side  
through life  
and direct  
him.

together from their running, wrestling, or whatever the form of bodily exercise may be.

*Y. Soc.* True.

*Str.* And now observe that the legislator who has to pre- 295  
side over the herd, and to enforce justice in their dealings  
with one another, will not be able, in enacting for the general  
good, to provide exactly what is suitable for each particular  
case.

*Y. Soc.* He cannot be expected to do so.

*Str.* He will lay down laws in a general form for the  
majority, roughly meeting the cases of individuals; and  
some of them he will deliver in writing, and others will be  
unwritten; and these last will be traditional customs of the  
country.

*Y. Soc.* He will be right.

*Str.* Yes, quite right; for how can he sit at every man's  
side all through his life, prescribing for him the exact par-  
ticulars of his duty? Who, Socrates, would be equal to such  
a task? No one who really had the royal science, if he had  
been able to do this, would have imposed upon himself the  
restriction of a written law.

*Y. Soc.* So I should infer from what has now been said.

*Str.* Or rather, my good friend, from what is going to be  
said.

*Y. Soc.* And what is that?

*Str.* Let us put to ourselves the case of a physician, or  
trainer, who is about to go into a far country, and is expect-  
ing to be a long time away from his patients — thinking that  
his instructions will not be remembered unless they are  
written down, he will leave notes of them for the use of his  
pupils or patients.

*Y. Soc.* True.

*Str.* But what would you say, if he came back sooner than  
he had intended, and, owing to an unexpected change of the  
winds or other celestial influences, something else happened  
to be better for them, — would he not venture to suggest this  
new remedy, although not contemplated in his former pre-  
scription? Would he persist in observing the original law,  
neither himself giving any new commandments, nor the  
patient daring to do otherwise than was prescribed, under

Again, a  
physician,  
who is going  
to a foreign  
country will  
leave direc-  
tions in writ-  
ing for his  
patients.

But if he  
should re-  
turn sooner  
than he ex-  
pected and  
find a change  
of treatment  
necessary  
he will

the idea that this course only was healthy and medicinal, all others noxious and heterodox? Viewed in the light of science and true art, would not all such enactments be utterly ridiculous?

*Y. Soc.* Utterly.

296 *Str.* And if he who gave laws, written or unwritten, determining what was good or bad, honourable or dishonourable, just or unjust, to the tribes of men who flock together in their several cities, and are governed in accordance with them; if, I say, the wise legislator were suddenly to come again, or another like to him, is he to be prohibited from changing them?—would not this prohibition be in reality quite as ridiculous as the other?

*Y. Soc.* Certainly.

*Str.* Do you know a plausible saying of the common people which is in point?

*Y. Soc.* I do not recall what you mean at the moment.

*Str.* They say that if any one knows how the ancient laws may be improved, he must first persuade his own State of the improvement, and then he may legislate, but not otherwise.

*Y. Soc.* And are they not right?

*Str.* I dare say. But supposing that he does use some gentle violence for their good, what is this violence to be called? Or rather, before you answer, let me ask the same question in reference to our previous instances.

*Y. Soc.* What do you mean?

*Str.* Suppose that a skilful physician has a patient, of whatever sex or age, whom he compels against his will to do something for his good which is contrary to the written rules; what is this compulsion to be called? Would you ever dream of calling it a violation of the art, or a breach of the laws of health? Nothing could be more unjust than for the patient to whom such violence is applied, to charge the physician who practises the violence with wanting skill or aggravating his disease.

*Y. Soc.* Most true.

*Str.* In the political art error is not called disease, but evil, or disgrace, or injustice.

*Y. Soc.* Quite true.

*Statesman.*

STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.

disregard  
his former  
prescription.

The legislator,  
in like man-  
ner, would  
not hesitate  
to change his  
own laws, if  
he came to  
life again.

A reformer  
should carry  
mankind with  
him; but  
even if he  
use a little  
violence,  
what harm?

A physician  
is not blamed  
for curing a  
patient  
against  
his will;

*Statesman.*STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.and we should  
not condemn  
any one who  
compels men  
to act more  
justly.In govern-  
ment, as in  
seamanship,  
art is superior  
to law.The true form  
of govern-  
ment, as we  
said, is of few  
or of an indi-  
vidual: other  
forms are  
imitations  
of this.

*Str.* And when the citizen, contrary to law and custom, is compelled to do what is juster and better and nobler than he did before, the last and most absurd thing which he could say about such violence is that he has incurred disgrace or evil or injustice at the hands of those who compelled him.

*Y. Soc.* Very true.

*Str.* And shall we say that the violence, if exercised by a rich man, is just, and if by a poor man, unjust? May not any man, rich or poor, with or without laws, with the will of the citizens or against the will of the citizens, do what is for their interest? Is not this the true principle of government, according to which the wise and good man will order the affairs of his subjects? As the pilot, by watching continually over the interests of the ship and of the crew,—not by laying down rules, but by making his art a law,—preserves the lives of his fellow-sailors, even so, and in the self-same way, may there not be a true form of polity created by those who are able to govern in a similar spirit, and who show a strength of art which is superior to the law? Nor can wise rulers ever err while they observing the one great rule of distributing justice to the citizens with intelligence and skill, are able to preserve them, and, as far as may be, to make them better from being worse.

*Y. Soc.* No one can deny what has been now said.

*Str.* Neither, if you consider, can any one deny the other statement.

*Y. Soc.* What was it?

*Str.* We said that no great number of persons, whoever they may be, can attain political knowledge, or order a State wisely, but that the true government is to be found in a small body, or in an individual, and that other States are but imitations of this, as we said a little while ago, some for the better and some for the worse.

*Y. Soc.* What do you mean? I cannot have understood your previous remark about imitations.

*Str.* And yet the mere suggestion which I hastily threw out is highly important, even if we leave the question where it is, and do not seek by the discussion of it to expose the error which prevails in this matter.

*Y. Soc.* What do you mean?



*Str.* The idea which has to be grasped by us is not easy or familiar: but we may attempt to express it thus:—Supposing the government of which I have been speaking to be the only true model, then the others must use the written laws of this—in no other way can they be saved; they will have to do what is now generally approved, although not the best thing in the world.

*Y. Soc.* What is this?

*Str.* No citizen should do anything contrary to the laws, and any infringement of them should be punished with death and the most extreme penalties; and this is very right and good when regarded as the second best thing, if you set aside the first, of which I was just now speaking. Shall I explain the nature of what I call the second best?

*Y. Soc.* By all means.

*Str.* I must again have recourse to my favourite images; through them, and them alone, can I describe kings and rulers.

*Y. Soc.* What images?

*Str.* The noble pilot and the wise physician, who 'is worth many another man'—in the similitude of these let us endeavour to discover some image of the king.

*Y. Soc.* What sort of an image?

298 *Str.* Well, such as this:—Every man will reflect that he suffers strange things at the hands of both of them; the physician saves any whom he wishes to save, and any whom he wishes to maltreat he maltreats—cutting or burning them, and at the same time requiring them to bring him payments, which are a sort of tribute, of which little or nothing is spent upon the sick man, and the greater part is consumed by him and his domestics; and the finale is that he receives money from the relations of the sick man or from some enemy of his, and puts him out of the way. And the pilots of ships are guilty of numberless evil deeds of the same kind; they intentionally play false and leave you ashore when the hour of sailing arrives; or they cause mishaps at sea and cast away their freight; and are guilty of other rogueries. Now suppose that we, bearing all this in mind, were to determine, after consideration, that neither of these arts shall any longer be allowed to exercise absolute control either over freemen

*Statesman.*

STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.

They copy its laws and punish very severely the infringement of them.—Yet this is not the best thing, but only the second best.

The real nature of this second best may be shown with the help of our favourite images.

Suppose the crimes of physicians and pilots to be such that it is necessary to put some check upon them: an assembly of non-professional persons is called to make minute regulations which must be observed in the practice of

*Statesman.*STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.medicine or  
seamanship.

or over slaves, but that we will summon an assembly either of all the people, or of the rich only, and that anybody who likes, whatever may be his calling, or even if he have no calling, may offer an opinion either about seamanship or about diseases — whether as to the manner in which physic or surgical instruments are to be applied to the patient, or again about the vessels and the nautical implements which are required in navigation, and how to meet the dangers of winds and waves which are incidental to the voyage, how to behave when encountering pirates, and what is to be done with the old-fashioned galleys, if they have to fight with others of a similar build — and that, whatever shall be decreed by the multitude on these points, upon the advice of persons skilled or unskilled, shall be written down on triangular tablets and columns, or enacted although unwritten to be national customs; and that in all future time vessels shall be navigated and remedies administered to the patient after this fashion.

*Y. Soc.* What a strange notion!

Pilots and  
physicians  
are elected  
annually  
and called  
to account  
at the end of  
their year of  
office, and  
punished if  
they have  
violated  
any of the  
written rules.

*Str.* Suppose further, that the pilots and physicians are appointed annually, either out of the rich, or out of the whole people, and that they are elected by lot; and that after their election they navigate vessels and heal the sick according to the written rules.

*Y. Soc.* Worse and worse.

*Str.* But hear what follows:—When the year of office has expired, the pilot or physician has to come before a court of review, in which the judges are either selected from the 299 wealthy classes or chosen by lot out of the whole people; and anybody who pleases may be their accuser, and may lay to their charge, that during the past year they have not navigated their vessels or healed their patients according to the letter of the law and the ancient customs of their ancestors; and if either of them is condemned, some of the judges must fix what he is to suffer or pay.

*Y. Soc.* He who is willing to take a command under such conditions, deserves to suffer any penalty.

Speculation  
about medi-  
cine or  
seaman-

*Str.* Yet once more, we shall have to enact that if any one is detected enquiring into piloting and navigation, or into health and the true nature of medicine, or about the winds,

or other conditions of the atmosphere, contrary to the written rules, and has any ingenious notions about such matters, he is not to be called a pilot or physician, but a cloudy prating sophist;—further, on the ground that he is a corrupter of the young, who would persuade them to follow the art of medicine or piloting in an unlawful manner, and to exercise an arbitrary rule over their patients or ships, any one who is qualified by law may inform against him, and indict him in some court, and then if he is found to be persuading any, whether young or old, to act contrary to the written law, he is to be punished with the utmost rigour; for no one should presume to be wiser than the laws; and as touching healing and health and piloting and navigation, the nature of them is known to all, for anybody may learn the written laws and the national customs. If such were the mode of procedure, Socrates, about these sciences and about generalship, and any branch of hunting, or about painting or imitation in general, or carpentry, or any sort of handicraft, or husbandry, or planting, or if we were to see an art of rearing horses, or tending herds, or divination, or any ministerial service, or draught-playing, or any science conversant with number, whether simple or square or cube, or comprising motion,—I say, if all these things were done in this way according to written regulations, and not according to art, what would be the result?

*Statesman.*

STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.

ship is to be  
forbidden on  
pain of death.

What would  
be the conse-  
quence of such  
procedure to  
these or to  
other arts?

*Y. Soc.* All the arts would utterly perish, and could never be recovered, because enquiry would be unlawful. And human life, which is bad enough already, would then become utterly unendurable.

They would  
utterly perish.

300 *Str.* But what, if while compelling all these operations to be regulated by written law, we were to appoint as the guardian of the laws some one elected by a show of hands, or by lot, and he caring nothing about the laws, were to act contrary to them from motives of interest or favour; and without knowledge,—would not this be a still worse evil than the former?

But the conse-  
quence if the  
guardians of  
the laws broke  
them in their  
own interest  
would be  
still worse.

*Y. Soc.* Very true.

*Str.* To go against the laws, which are based upon long experience, and the wisdom of counsellors who have graciously recommended them and persuaded the multitude to pass

For laws  
are based on  
experience

*Statesman.*

STRANGER,

YOUNG

SOCRATES.

and are made  
by wise men.

them, would be a far greater and more ruinous error than any adherence to written law?

*Y. Soc.* Certainly.

*Str.* Therefore, as there is a danger of this, the next best thing in legislating is not to allow either the individual or the multitude to break the law in any respect whatever.

*Y. Soc.* True.

*Str.* The laws would be copies of the true particulars of action as far as they admit of being written down from the lips of those who have knowledge?

*Y. Soc.* Certainly they would.

But in certain  
cases there  
may be some-  
thing better  
than what the  
law prescribes,  
and this the  
scientific  
ruler will  
have in view.

*Str.* And, as we were saying, he who has knowledge and is a true Statesman, will do many things within his own sphere of action by his art without regard to the laws, when he is of opinion that something other than that which he has written down and enjoined to be observed during his absence would be better.

*Y. Soc.* Yes, we said so.

*Str.* And any individual or any number of men, having fixed laws, in acting contrary to them with a view to something better, would only be acting, as far as they are able, like the true Statesman?

*Y. Soc.* Certainly.

*Str.* If they had no knowledge of what they were doing, they would imitate the truth, and they would always imitate ill; but if they had knowledge, the imitation would be the perfect truth, and an imitation no longer.

*Y. Soc.* Quite true.

*Str.* And the principle that no great number of men are able to acquire a knowledge of any art has been already admitted by us.

*Y. Soc.* Yes, it has.

*Str.* Then the royal or political art, if there be such an art, will never be attained either by the wealthy or by the other mob.

*Y. Soc.* Impossible.

The lower  
forms of gov-  
ernment are  
better if they

*Str.* Then the nearest approach which these lower forms of government can ever make to the true government of the one scientific ruler, is to do nothing contrary to their own written laws and national customs.



*Y. Soc.* Very good.

*Statesman.*

*Str.* When the rich imitate the true form, such a government is called aristocracy; and when they are regardless of the laws, oligarchy.

STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.

*Y. Soc.* True.

observe the  
law.

*Str.* Or again, when an individual rules according to law in imitation of him who knows, we call him a king; and if he rules according to law, we give him the same name, whether he rules with opinion or with knowledge.

Thus  
aristocracy is  
better than  
oligarchy,  
royalty than  
tyranny.

*Y. Soc.* To be sure.

*Str.* And when an individual truly possessing knowledge rules, his name will surely be the same—he will be called a king; and thus the five names of governments, as they are now reckoned, become one.

*Y. Soc.* That is true.

*Str.* And when an individual ruler governs neither by law nor by custom, but following in the steps of the true man of science pretends that he can only act for the best by violating the laws, while in reality appetite and ignorance are the motives of the imitation, may not such an one be called a tyrant?

*Y. Soc.* Certainly.

*Str.* And this we believe to be the origin of the tyrant and the king, of oligarchies, and aristocracies, and democracies,—because men are offended at the one monarch, and can never be made to believe that any one can be worthy of such authority, or is able and willing in the spirit of virtue and knowledge to act justly and holily to all; they fancy that he will be a despot who will wrong and harm and slay whom he pleases of us; for if there could be such a despot as we describe, they would acknowledge that we ought to be too glad to have him, and that he alone would be the happy ruler of a true and perfect State.

The lower  
forms of  
government  
arise because  
the rule of one  
man is re-  
garded with  
suspicion.

*Y. Soc.* To be sure.

*Str.* But then, as the State is not like a beehive, and has no natural head who is at once recognized to be the superior both in body and in mind, mankind are obliged to meet and make laws, and endeavour to approach as nearly as they can to the true form of government.

In them law  
and custom  
are supreme.

*Y. Soc.* True.

*Statesman.*STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.What wonder  
if there is  
misery where  
custom rules?  
Yet, in spite  
of it, states  
survive.

*Str.* And when the foundation of politics is in the letter only and in custom, and knowledge is divorced from action, can we wonder, Socrates, at the miseries which there are, and always will be, in States? Any other art, built on such a foundation and thus conducted, would ruin all that it touched. Ought we not rather to wonder at the natural strength of the political bond? For States have endured all this, time out of mind, and yet some of them still remain and are not overthrown, though many of them, like ships at sea, founder from time to time, and perish and have perished and will hereafter perish, through the badness of their pilots and crews, who have the worst sort of ignorance of the highest truths — I mean to say, that they are wholly unacquainted with politics, of which, above all other sciences, they believe themselves to have acquired the most perfect knowledge.

*Y. Soc.* Very true.Which of the  
untrue forms  
of govern-  
ment is best,  
which worst?

*Str.* Then the question arises:—which of these untrue forms of government is the least oppressive to their subjects, though they are all oppressive; and which is the worst of them? Here is a consideration which is beside our present purpose, and yet having regard to the whole it seems to influence all our actions: we must examine it.

*Y. Soc.* Yes, we must.One of the  
three chief  
forms is best  
and worst.

*Str.* You may say that of the three forms, the same is at once the hardest and the easiest.

*Y. Soc.* What do you mean?

*Str.* I am speaking of the three forms of government, which I mentioned at the beginning of this discussion — monarchy, the rule of the few, and the rule of the many.

*Y. Soc.* True.If we divide  
these three  
forms and  
add the per-  
fect state,  
there will be,  
altogether,  
seven forms.

*Str.* If we divide each of these we shall have six, from which the true one may be distinguished as a seventh.

*Y. Soc.* How would you make the division?

*Str.* Monarchy divides into royalty and tyranny; the rule of the few into aristocracy, which has an auspicious name, and oligarchy; and democracy or the rule of the many, which before was one, must now be divided.

*Y. Soc.* On what principle of division?*Str.* On the same principle as before, although the name

is now discovered to have a twofold meaning. For the distinction of ruling with law or without law, applies to this as well as to the rest.

*Y. Soc.* Yes.

*Str.* The division made no difference when we were looking for the perfect State, as we showed before. But now that this has been separated off, and, as we said, the others alone are left for us, the principle of law and the absence of law will bisect them all.

*Y. Soc.* That would seem to follow, from what has been said.

*Str.* Then monarchy, when bound by good prescriptions or laws, is the best of all the six, and when lawless is the most bitter and oppressive to the subject.

*Y. Soc.* True.

303 *Str.* The government of the few, which is intermediate between that of the one and many, is also intermediate in good and evil; but the government of the many is in every respect weak and unable to do either any great good or any great evil, when compared with the others, because the offices are too minutely subdivided and too many hold them. And this therefore is the worst of all lawful governments, and the best of all lawless ones. If they are all without the restraints of law, democracy is the form in which to live is best; if they are well ordered, then this is the last which you should choose, as royalty, the first form, is the best, with the exception of the seventh, for that excels them all, and is among States what God is among men.

*Y. Soc.* You are quite right, and we should choose that above all.

*Str.* The members of all these States, with the exception of the one which has knowledge, may be set aside as being not Statesmen but partisans,—upholders of the most monstrous idols, and themselves idols; and, being the greatest imitators and magicians, they are also the greatest of Sophists.

*Y. Soc.* The name of Sophist after many windings in the argument appears to have been most justly fixed upon the politicians, as they are termed.

*Str.* And so our satyric drama has been played out; and the troop of Centaurs and Satyrs, however unwilling to leave

*Statesman.*

STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.

Monarchy,  
in the form  
of royalty,  
is the best;  
and in the  
form of  
tyranny  
the worst.

The govern-  
ment of the  
few is inter-  
mediate in  
good and evil.  
Democracy  
is the best of  
lawless and  
the worst of  
lawful gov-  
ernments.  
The seventh  
form is among  
states what  
God is among  
men.

The upholders  
of the untrue  
forms of gov-  
ernment are  
mere parti-  
sans and the  
greatest of  
Sophists.

The impos-  
sibles depart.

*Statesman.*

STRANGER,

YOUNG

SOCRATES.

Like refiners of gold, we have now got rid of the earth and dross: there remain the arts of the general, judge, orator, which are nearly akin to Statesmanship, and for that reason difficult to separate from it.

the stage, have at last been separated from the political science.

*Y. Soc.* So I perceive.

*Str.* There remain, however, natures still more troublesome, because they are more nearly akin to the king, and more difficult to discern; the examination of them may be compared to the process of refining gold.

*Y. Soc.* What is your meaning?

*Str.* The workmen begin by sifting away the earth and stones and the like; there remain in a confused mass the valuable elements akin to gold, which can only be separated by fire,—copper, silver, and other precious metal; these are at last refined away by the use of tests, until the gold is left quite pure.

*Y. Soc.* Yes, that is the way in which these things are said to be done.

*Str.* In like manner, all alien and uncongenial matter has been separated from political science, and what is precious and of a kindred nature has been left; there remain the nobler arts of the general and the judge, and the higher sort of oratory which is an ally of the royal art, and persuades men to do justice, and assists in guiding the helm of States:—  
How can we best clear away all these, leaving him whom we seek alone and unalloyed? 304

*Y. Soc.* That is obviously what has in some way to be attempted.

The case of music may help us.

*Str.* If the attempt is all that is wanting, he shall certainly be brought to light; and I think that the illustration of music may assist in exhibiting him. Please to answer me a question.

*Y. Soc.* What question?

*Str.* There is such a thing as learning music or handicraft arts in general?

*Y. Soc.* There is.

The art which decides whether music shall be learnt or not, is above music.

*Str.* And is there any higher art or science, having power to decide which of these arts are and are not to be learned;—what do you say?

*Y. Soc.* I should answer that there is.

*Str.* And do we acknowledge this science to be different from the others?



*Y. Soc.* Yes.

*Statesman.*

*Str.* And ought the other sciences to be superior to this, or no single science to any other? Or ought this science to be the overseer and governor of all the others?

STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.

*Y. Soc.* The latter.

*Str.* You mean to say that the science which judges whether we ought to learn or not, must be superior to the science which is learned or which teaches?

*Y. Soc.* Far superior.

*Str.* And the science which determines whether we ought to persuade or not, must be superior to the science which is able to persuade?

*Y. Soc.* Of course.

*Str.* Very good; and to what science do we assign the power of persuading a multitude by a pleasing tale and not by teaching?

*Y. Soc.* That power, I think, must clearly be assigned to rhetoric.

*Str.* And to what science do we give the power of determining whether we are to employ persuasion or force towards any one, or to refrain altogether?

*Y. Soc.* To that science which governs the arts of speech and persuasion.

*Str.* Which, if I am not mistaken, will be politics?

*Y. Soc.* Very good.

*Str.* Rhetoric seems to be quickly distinguished from politics, being a different species, yet ministering to it.

*Y. Soc.* Yes.

*Str.* But what would you think of another sort of power or science?

*Y. Soc.* What science?

*Str.* The science which has to do with military operations against our enemies — is that to be regarded as a science or not?

*Y. Soc.* How can generalship and military tactics be regarded as other than a science?

*Str.* And is the art which is able and knows how to advise when we are to go to war, or to make peace, the same as this or different?

*Y. Soc.* If we are to be consistent, we must say different.

In the same way the art of politics, which decides whether persuasion shall or shall not be employed, is superior to rhetoric;

and, for a like reason, to generalship.

*Statesman.*

*Str.* And we must also suppose that this rules the other, if we are not to give up our former notion? 305

STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.

*Y. Soc.* True.

*Str.* And, considering how great and terrible the whole art of war is, can we imagine any which is superior to it but the truly royal?

*Y. Soc.* No other.

*Str.* The art of the general is only ministerial, and therefore not political?

*Y. Soc.* Exactly.

and to the  
administra-  
tion of justice.

*Str.* Once more let us consider the nature of the righteous judge.

*Y. Soc.* Very good.

*Str.* Does he do anything but decide the dealings of men with one another to be just or unjust in accordance with the standard which he receives from the king and legislator,—showing his own peculiar virtue only in this, that he is not perverted by gifts, or fears, or pity, or by any sort of favour or enmity, into deciding the suits of men with one another contrary to the appointment of the legislator?

*Y. Soc.* No; his office is such as you describe.

*Str.* Then the inference is that the power of the judge is not royal, but only the power of a guardian of the law which ministers to the royal power?

*Y. Soc.* True.

The political  
or royal art  
commands all  
the others;

*Str.* The review of all these sciences shows that none of them is political or royal. For the truly royal ought not itself to act, but to rule over those who are able to act; the king ought to know what is and what is not a fitting opportunity for taking the initiative in matters of the greatest importance, whilst others should execute his orders.

*Y. Soc.* True.

*Str.* And, therefore, the arts which we have described, as they have no authority over themselves or one another, but are each of them concerned with some special action of their own, have, as they ought to have, special names corresponding to their several actions.

*Y. Soc.* I agree.

*Str.* And the science which is over them all, and has

charge of the laws, and of all matters affecting the State, and truly weaves them all into one, if we would describe under a name characteristic of their common nature, most truly we may call politics.

*Y. Soc.* Exactly so.

*Str.* Then, now that we have discovered the various classes in a State<sup>1</sup>, shall I analyse politics after the pattern which weaving supplied?

306 *Y. Soc.* I greatly wish that you would.

*Str.* Then I must describe the nature of the royal web, and show how the various threads are woven into one piece.

*Y. Soc.* Clearly.

*Str.* A task has to be accomplished, which, although difficult, appears to be necessary.

*Y. Soc.* Certainly the attempt must be made.

*Str.* To assume that one part of virtue differs in kind from another, is a position easily assailable by contentious disputants, who appeal to popular opinion.

*Y. Soc.* I do not understand.

*Str.* Let me put the matter in another way: I suppose that you would consider courage to be a part of virtue?

*Y. Soc.* Certainly I should.

*Str.* And you would think temperance to be different from courage; and likewise to be a part of virtue?

*Y. Soc.* True.

*Str.* I shall venture to put forward a strange theory about them.

*Y. Soc.* What is it?

*Str.* That they are two principles which thoroughly hate one another and are antagonistic throughout a great part of nature.

*Y. Soc.* How singular!

*Str.* Yes, very — for all the parts of virtue are commonly said to be friendly to one another.

*Y. Soc.* Yes.

*Str.* Then let us carefully investigate whether this is universally true, or whether there are not parts of virtue which are at war with their kindred in some respect.

*Statesman.*

STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.

and weaves  
them together  
in the politi-  
cal web.

The nature  
of this web  
must now be  
considered.

Certain parts  
of virtue, such  
as courage and  
temperance,  
are antago-  
nistic.

Common  
opinion how-  
ever does not  
allow this.

Let us  
investigate  
the matter.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, 287-90, 303-5.

*Statesman.**Y. Soc.* Tell me how we shall consider that question.

STRANGER,

YOUNG

SOCRATES.

*Str.* We must extend our enquiry to all those things which we consider beautiful and at the same time place in two opposite classes.*Y. Soc.* Explain; what are they?*Str.* Acuteness and quickness, whether in body or soul or in the movement of sound, and the imitations of them which painting and music supply, you must have praised yourself before now, or been present when others praised them.*Y. Soc.* Certainly.*Str.* And do you remember the terms in which they are praised?*Y. Soc.* I do not.*Str.* I wonder whether I can explain to you in words the thought which is passing in my mind.*Y. Soc.* Why not?

We express  
our admiration  
for quick  
and energetic  
action by  
applying the  
epithet  
'brave'  
to it,

*Str.* You fancy that this is all so easy: Well, let us consider these notions with reference to the opposite classes of action under which they fall. When we praise quickness and energy and acuteness, whether of mind or body or sound, we express our praise of the quality which we admire by one word, and that one word is manliness or courage.*Y. Soc.* How?*Str.* We speak of an action as energetic and brave, quick and manly, and vigorous too; and when we apply the name of which I speak as the common attribute of all these natures, we certainly praise them.*Y. Soc.* True.*Str.* And do we not often praise the quiet strain of action also?*Y. Soc.* To be sure.

and for gentle  
and quiet  
action by  
calling it  
'calm' or  
'temperate.'

*Str.* And do we not then say the opposite of what we said of the other?*Y. Soc.* How do you mean?*Str.* We exclaim How calm! How temperate! in admiration of the slow and quiet working of the intellect, and of steadiness and gentleness in action, of smoothness and depth of voice, and of all rhythmical movement and of music in general, when these have a proper solemnity. Of



all such actions we predicate not courage, but a name indicative of order. *Statesman.*

*Y. Soc.* Very true.

*Str.* But when, on the other hand, either of these is out of place, the names of either are changed into terms of censure.

*Y. Soc.* How so?

*Str.* Too great sharpness or quickness or hardness is termed violence or madness; too great slowness or gentleness is called cowardice or sluggishness; and we may observe, that for the most part these qualities, and the temperance and manliness of the opposite characters, are arrayed as enemies on opposite sides, and do not mingle with one another in their respective actions; and if we pursue the enquiry, we shall find that men who have these different qualities of mind differ from one another.

But when these qualities are in excess, we call them violence or madness, cowardice or sluggishness. —These extremes do not meet in the same persons.

*Y. Soc.* In what respect?

*Str.* In respect of all the qualities which I mentioned, and very likely of many others. According to their respective affinities to either class of actions they distribute praise and blame,—praise to the actions which are akin to their own, blame to those of the opposite party—and out of this many quarrels and occasions of quarrel arise among them.

*Y. Soc.* True.

*Str.* The difference between the two classes is often a trivial concern; but in a state, and when affecting really important matters, becomes of all disorders the most hateful.

*Y. Soc.* To what do you refer?

*Str.* To nothing short of the whole regulation of human life. For the orderly class are always ready to lead a peaceful life, quietly doing their own business; this is their manner of behaving with all men at home, and they are equally ready to find some way of keeping the peace with foreign States. And on account of this fondness of theirs for peace, which is often out of season where their influence prevails, they become by degrees unwarlike, and bring up their young men to be like themselves; they are at the mercy of their enemies; whence in a few years they and their children and the whole city often pass imperceptibly from the condition of freemen into that of slaves.

The gentle are willing to pay any price for peace:

*Statesman.**Y. Soc.* What a cruel fate!STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.the cour-  
ageous are  
always  
anxious  
for war.*Str.* And now think of what happens with the more courageous natures. Are they not always inciting their country to go to war, owing to their excessive love of the military life? they raise up enemies against themselves many and mighty, and either utterly ruin their native-land or enslave and subject it to its foes?*Y. Soc.* That, again, is true.These two  
classes are  
always an-  
tagonistic.  
And so we  
have found  
what we  
sought.*Str.* Must we not admit, then, that where these two classes exist, they always feel the greatest antipathy and antagonism towards one another?*Y. Soc.* We cannot deny it.*Str.* And returning to the enquiry with which we began, have we not found that considerable portions of virtue are at variance with one another, and give rise to a similar opposition in the characters who are endowed with them?*Y. Soc.* True.A further  
point.  
No con-  
structive art  
will use bad  
material,  
if this can  
be avoided.*Str.* Let us consider a further point.*Y. Soc.* What is it?*Str.* I want to know, whether any constructive art will make any, even the most trivial thing, out of bad and good materials indifferently, if this can be helped? does not all art rather reject the bad as far as possible, and accept the good and fit materials, and from these elements, whether like or unlike, gathering them all into one, work out some nature or idea?*Y. Soc.* To be sure.And states-  
manship will  
not weave  
bad men into  
the political  
web. She  
will select and  
train suitable  
natures,*Str.* Then the true and natural art of statesmanship will never allow any State to be formed by a combination of good and bad men, if this can be avoided; but will begin by testing human natures in play, and after testing them will entrust them to proper teachers who are the ministers of her purposes — she will herself give orders, and maintain authority; just as the art of weaving continually gives orders and maintains authority over the carders and all the others who prepare the material for the work, commanding the subsidiary arts to execute the works which she deems necessary for making the web.*Y. Soc.* Quite true.*Str.* In like manner, the royal science appears to me to be

the mistress of all lawful educators and instructors, and having this queenly power, will not permit them to train men in what will produce characters unsuited to the political constitution which she desires to create, but only in what will produce such as are suitable. Those which have no share of manliness and temperance, or any other virtuous inclination, and, from the necessity of an evil nature, are violently carried away to godlessness and insolence and injustice, she gets rid of by death and exile, and punishes them with the greatest of disgraces.

*Y. Soc.* That is commonly said.

309 *Str.* But those who are wallowing in ignorance and base-ness she bows under the yoke of slavery.

*Y. Soc.* Quite right.

*Str.* The rest of the citizens, out of whom, if they have education, something noble may be made, and who are capable of being united by the statesman, the kingly art blends and weaves together; taking on the one hand those whose natures tend rather to courage, which is the stronger element and may be regarded as the warp, and on the other hand those which incline to order and gentleness, and which are represented in the figure as spun thick and soft, after the manner of the woof — these, which are naturally opposed, she seeks to bind and weave together in the following manner:

*Y. Soc.* In what manner?

*Str.* First of all, she takes the eternal element of the soul and binds it with a divine cord, to which it is akin, and then the animal nature, and binds that with human cords.

*Y. Soc.* I do not understand what you mean.

*Str.* The meaning is, that the opinion about the honourable and the just and good and their opposites, which is true and confirmed by reason, is a divine principle, and when implanted in the soul, is implanted, as I maintain, in a nature of heavenly birth.

*Y. Soc.* Yes; what else should it be?

*Str.* Only the Statesman and the good legislator, having the inspiration of the royal muse, can implant this opinion, and he, only in the rightly educated, whom we were just now describing.

*Y. Soc.* Likely enough.

*Statesman.*

STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.

but will ex-  
terminate  
the evil,

and enslave  
the ignorant.

The rest of  
the citizens  
she will weave  
into one, com-  
bining cour-  
age, which is  
the warp, with  
gentleness  
and order  
which form  
the woof.

She binds the  
divine element  
with a divine,  
the human  
with a  
human cord.  
True opinion  
about the just  
and good,  
when con-  
firmed by  
reason, is a  
divine prin-  
ciple, and  
the statesman  
alone can  
implant it in  
the citizen.

*Statesman.*STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.The courageous soul is  
civilized by it,the peaceful  
is rendered  
temperate  
and wise.Where the  
divine bond  
exists it is  
easy to create  
the human  
bonds, i. e.  
ties of inter-  
marriage.—  
The true  
object of  
marriage is  
the procrea-  
tion of chil-  
dren, not  
wealth or  
power or rank.*Str.* But him who cannot, we will not designate by any of the names which are the subject of the present enquiry.*Y. Soc.* Very right.*Str.* The courageous soul when attaining this truth becomes civilized, and rendered more capable of partaking of justice; but when not partaking, is inclined to brutality. Is not that true?*Y. Soc.* Certainly.*Str.* And again, the peaceful and orderly nature, if sharing in these opinions, becomes temperate and wise, as far as this may be in a State, but if not, deservedly obtains the ignominious name of silliness.*Y. Soc.* Quite true.*Str.* Can we say that such a connexion as this will lastingly unite the evil with one another or with the good, or that any science would seriously think of using a bond of this kind to join such materials?*Y. Soc.* Impossible.*Str.* But in those who were originally of a noble nature, 310 and who have been nurtured in noble ways, and in those only, may we not say that union is implanted by law, and that this is the medicine which art prescribes for them, and of all the bonds which unite the dissimilar and contrary parts of virtue is not this, as I was saying, the divinest?*Y. Soc.* Very true.*Str.* Where this divine bond exists there is no difficulty in imagining, or when you have imagined, in creating the other bonds, which are human only.*Y. Soc.* How is that, and what bonds do you mean?*Str.* Rights of intermarriage, and ties which are formed between States by giving and taking children in marriage, or between individuals by private betrothals and espousals. For most persons form marriage connexions without due regard to what is best for the procreation of children.*Y. Soc.* In what way?*Str.* They seek after wealth and power, which in matrimony are objects not worthy even of a serious censure.*Y. Soc.* There is no need to consider them at all.*Str.* More reason is there to consider the practice of those who make family their chief aim, and to indicate their error.



*Y. Soc.* Quite true.

*Str.* They act on no true principle at all; they seek their ease and receive with open arms those who are like themselves, and hate those who are unlike them, being too much influenced by feelings of dislike.

*Y. Soc.* How so?

*Str.* The quiet orderly class seek for natures like their own, and as far as they can they marry and give in marriage exclusively in this class, and the courageous do the same; they seek natures like their own, whereas they should both do precisely the opposite.

*Y. Soc.* How and why is that?

*Str.* Because courage, when untempered by the gentler nature during many generations, may at first bloom and strengthen, but at last bursts forth into downright madness.

*Y. Soc.* Like enough.

*Str.* And then, again, the soul which is over-full of modesty and has no element of courage in many successive generations, is apt to grow too indolent, and at last to become utterly paralyzed and useless.

*Y. Soc.* That, again, is quite likely.

*Str.* It was of these bonds I said that there would be no difficulty in creating them, if only both classes originally held the same opinion about the honourable and good;—indeed, in this single work, the whole process of royal weaving is comprised—never to allow temperate natures to be separated from the brave, but to weave them together, like the warp and the woof, by common sentiments and honours and reputation, and by the giving of pledges to one another; and out of them forming one smooth and even web, to entrust to them the offices of State.

*Y. Soc.* How do you mean?

*Str.* Where one officer only is needed, you must choose a ruler who has both these qualities—when many, you must mingle some of each, for the temperate ruler is very careful and just and safe, but is wanting in thoroughness and go.

*Y. Soc.* Certainly, that is very true.

*Str.* The character of the courageous, on the other hand, falls short of the former in justice and caution, but has the power of action in a remarkable degree, and where either of

*Statesman.*

STRANGER,  
YOUNG  
SOCRATES.

Like should not consort with like, or courage will degenerate into madness and modesty into helplessness.

Royal science prevents this by weaving together the temperate and courageous.

*Statesman.*

these two qualities is wanting, there cities cannot altogether prosper either in their public or private life.

STRANGER,

YOUNG

SOCRATES.

*Y. Soc.* Certainly they cannot.

And thus  
the political  
web is com-  
pleted.

*Str.* This then we declare to be the completion of the web of political action, which is created by a direct intertexture of the brave and temperate natures, whenever the royal science has drawn the two minds into communion with one another by unanimity and friendship, and having perfected the noblest and best of all the webs which political life admits, and enfolding therein all other inhabitants of cities, whether slaves or freemen, binds them in one fabric and governs and presides over them, and, in so far as to be happy is vouchsafed to a city, in no particular fails to secure their happiness.

*Y. Soc.* Your picture, Stranger, of the king and statesman, no less than of the Sophist, is quite perfect.

PHILEBUS.





## INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.

THE *Philebus* appears to be one of the later writings of Plato, in which the style has begun to alter, and the dramatic and poetical element has become subordinate to the speculative and philosophical. In the development of abstract thought great advances have been made on the *Protagoras* or the *Phaedrus*, and even on the *Republic*. But there is a corresponding diminution of artistic skill, a want of character in the persons, a laboured march in the dialogue, and a degree of confusion and incompleteness in the general design. As in the speeches of *Thucydides*, the multiplication of ideas seems to interfere with the power of expression. Instead of the equally diffused grace and ease of the earlier dialogues there occur two or three highly-wrought passages (pp. 15, 16, 63); instead of the ever-flowing play of humour, now appearing, now concealed, but always present, are inserted a good many bad jests, as we may venture to term them (cp. 17 E, 23 B, D, 28 C, 29 B, 30 E, 34 D, 36 B, 43 A, 46 A, 62 B). We may observe an attempt at artificial ornament (43 E, 53 D, E), and far-fetched modes of expression (48 D, 65 A); also clamorous demands on the part of his companions, that *Socrates* shall answer his own questions (54 B, 57 A), as well as other defects of style, which remind us of the *Laws*. The connexion is often abrupt and inharmonious (24 C, &c.), and at 42 D, E, 43 A, 48 A, B, 49, 50, far from clear. Many points require further explanation; e. g. the reference of pleasure to the indefinite class (31 A), compared with the assertion which almost immediately follows, that pleasure and pain naturally have their seat in the third or mixed class: these two statements are unreconciled. In like manner, the table of goods does not distinguish between the two heads of measure and symmetry (66 A, B); and though a hint is given that the divine mind has the first place (22 C), nothing is said of this in

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the final summing up. The relation of the goods to the sciences does not appear; though dialectic may be thought to correspond to the highest good, the sciences and arts and true opinions are enumerated in the fourth class. At p. 50 D, 67 B, we seem to have an intimation of a further discussion, in which some topics lightly passed over were to receive a fuller consideration. The various uses of the word 'mixed,' for the mixed life, the mixed class of elements, the mixture of pleasures, or of pleasure and pain, are a further source of perplexity. Our ignorance of the opinions which Plato is attacking is also an element of obscurity. Many things in a controversy might seem relevant, if we knew to what they were intended to refer. But no conjecture will enable us to supply what Plato has not told us; or to explain, from our fragmentary knowledge of them, the relation in which his doctrine stood to the Eleatic Being or the Megarian good, or to the theories of Aristippus or Antisthenes respecting pleasure. Nor are we able to say how far Plato in the *Philebus* conceives the finite and infinite (which occur both in the fragments of Philolaus and in the Pythagorean table of opposites) in the same manner as contemporary Pythagoreans.

There is little in the characters which is worthy of remark. The Socrates of the *Philebus* is devoid of any touch of Socratic irony, though here, as in the *Phaedrus* (235 C), he twice attributes the flow of his ideas to a sudden inspiration (20 B, 25 B, C). The interlocutor Protarchus, the son of Callias, who has been a hearer of Gorgias (58 A), is supposed to begin as a disciple of the partisans of pleasure, but is drawn over to the opposite side by the arguments of Socrates. The instincts of ingenuous youth are easily induced to take the better part. *Philebus*, who has withdrawn from the argument, is several times brought back again (pp. 18, 19, 22, 28), that he may support pleasure, of which he remains to the end the uncompromising advocate. On the other hand, the youthful group of listeners by whom he is surrounded, '*Philebus*' boys' as they are termed, whose presence is several times intimated (16 A, B, 19 D, 67 B), are described as all of them at last convinced by the arguments of Socrates. They bear a very faded resemblance to the interested audiences of the Charmides, *Lysis*, or *Protagoras*. Other signs of relation to external life in the dialogue, or references to contemporary things and persons, with the single

exception of the allusions to the anonymous enemies of pleasure (44 B, C), and the teachers of the flux (43 A), there are none.

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The omission of the doctrine of recollection, derived from a previous state of existence, is a note of progress in the philosophy of Plato. The transcendental theory of pre-existent ideas, which is chiefly discussed by him in the *Meno*, the *Phaedo*, and the *Phaedrus*, has given way to a psychological one. The omission is rendered more significant by his having occasion to speak of memory as the basis of desire. Of the ideas he treats in the same sceptical spirit (15 A, B) which appears in his criticism of them in the *Parmenides* (131 ff.). He touches on the same difficulties and he gives no answer to them. His mode of speaking of the analytical and synthetical processes (16 B ff.) may be compared with his discussion of the same subject in the *Phaedrus* (265, 6); here he dwells on the importance of dividing the genera into all the species, while in the *Phaedrus* he conveys the same truth in a figure, when he speaks of carving the whole, which is described under the image of a victim, into parts or members, 'according to their natural articulation, without breaking any of them.' There is also a difference, which may be noted, between the two dialogues. For whereas in the *Phaedrus*, and also in the *Symposium*, the dialectician is described as a sort of enthusiast or lover, in the *Philebus*, as in all the later writings of Plato, the element of love is wanting; the topic is only introduced, as in the *Republic*, by way of illustration (cp. 53 D, *Rep.* v. 474 D, E). On other subjects of which they treat in common, such as the nature and kinds of pleasure, true and false opinion, the nature of the good, the order and relation of the sciences, the *Republic* is less advanced than the *Philebus*, which contains, perhaps, more metaphysical truth more obscurely expressed than any other Platonic dialogue. Here, as Plato expressly tells us, he is 'forging weapons of another make' (23 B), i. e. new categories and modes of conception, though 'some of the old ones might do again.'

But if superior in thought and dialectical power, the *Philebus* falls very far short of the *Republic* in fancy and feeling. The development of the reason undisturbed by the emotions seems to be the ideal at which Plato aims in his later dialogues. There is no mystic enthusiasm or rapturous contemplation of ideas. Whether we attribute this change to the greater feebleness of

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age, or to the development of the quarrel between philosophy and poetry in Plato's own mind, or perhaps, in some degree, to a carelessness about artistic effect, when he was absorbed in abstract ideas, we can hardly be wrong in assuming, amid such a variety of indications, derived from style as well as subject, that the *Philebus* belongs to the later period of his life and authorship. But in this, as in all the later writings of Plato, there are not wanting thoughts and expressions in which he rises to his highest level (15, 16, 17, 63, 67).

The plan is complicated, or rather, perhaps, the want of plan renders the progress of the dialogue difficult to follow. A few leading ideas seem to emerge: the relation of the one and many, the four original elements, the kinds of pleasure, the kinds of knowledge, the scale of goods. These are only partially connected with one another. The dialogue is not rightly entitled 'Concerning pleasure' or 'Concerning good,' but should rather be described as treating of the relations of pleasure and knowledge, after they have been duly analyzed, to the good. (1) The question is asked, whether pleasure or wisdom is the chief good, or some nature higher than either; and if the latter, how pleasure and wisdom are related to this higher good. (2) Before we can reply with exactness, we must know the kinds of pleasure and the kinds of knowledge. (3) But still we may affirm generally, that the combined life of pleasure and wisdom or knowledge has more of the character of the good than either of them when isolated. (4) To determine which of them partakes most of the higher nature, we must know under which of the four unities or elements they respectively fall. These are, first, the infinite; secondly, the finite; thirdly, the union of the two; fourthly, the cause of the union. Pleasure is of the first, wisdom or knowledge of the third class, while reason or mind is akin to the fourth or highest.

(5) Pleasures are of two kinds, the mixed and unmixed. Of mixed pleasures there are three classes — (a) those in which both the pleasures and pains are corporeal, as in eating and hunger; (β) those in which there is a pain of the body and pleasure of the mind, as when you are hungry and are looking forward to a feast; (γ) those in which the pleasure and pain are both mental. Of unmixed pleasures there are four kinds: those of sight, hearing, smell, knowledge.



(6) The sciences are likewise divided into two classes, theoretical and productive: of the latter, one part is pure, the other impure. The pure part consists of arithmetic, mensuration, and weighing. Arts like carpentering, which have an exact measure, are to be regarded as higher than music, which for the most part is mere guess-work. But there is also a higher arithmetic, and a higher mensuration, which is exclusively theoretical; and a dialectical science, which is higher still and the truest and purest knowledge.

(7) We are now able to determine the composition of the perfect life. First, we admit the pure pleasures and the pure sciences; secondly, the impure sciences, but not the impure pleasures. We have next to discover what element of goodness is contained in this mixture. There are three criteria of goodness—beauty, symmetry, truth. These are clearly more akin to reason than to pleasure, and will enable us to fix the places of both of them in the scale of good. First in the scale is measure; the second place is assigned to symmetry: the third, to reason and wisdom; the fourth, to knowledge and true opinion; the fifth, to pure pleasures; and here the Muse says ‘Enough.’

‘Bidding farewell to Philebus and Socrates,’ we may now consider the metaphysical conceptions which are presented to us. These are (I) the paradox of unity and plurality; (II) the table of categories or elements; (III) the kinds of pleasure; (IV) the kinds of knowledge; (V) the conception of the good. We may then proceed to examine (VI) the relation of the Philebus to the Republic, and to other dialogues.

I. The paradox of the one and many originated in the restless dialectic of Zeno, who sought to prove the absolute existence of the one by showing the contradictions that are involved in admitting the existence of the many (cp. Parm. 128 ff.). Zeno illustrated the contradiction by well-known examples taken from outward objects. But Socrates seems to intimate that the time had arrived for discarding these hackneyed illustrations; such difficulties had long been solved by common sense (‘*solvitur ambulando*’); the fact of the coexistence of opposites was a sufficient answer to them. He will leave them to Cynics and Eristics; the youth of Athens may discourse of them to their parents. To no rational man

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could the circumstance that the body is one, but has many members, be any longer a stumbling-block.

Plato's difficulty seems to begin in the region of ideas. He cannot understand how an absolute unity, such as the Eleatic Being, can be broken up into a number of individuals, or be in and out of them at once. Philosophy had so deepened or intensified the nature of one or Being, by the thoughts of successive generations, that the mind could no longer imagine 'Being' as in a state of change or division. To say that the verb of existence is the copula, or that unity is a mere unit, is to us easy; but to the Greek in a particular stage of thought such an analysis involved the same kind of difficulty as the conception of God existing both in and out of the world would to ourselves. Nor was he assisted by the analogy of sensible objects. The sphere of mind was dark and mysterious to him; but instead of being illustrated by sense, the greatest light appeared to be thrown on the nature of ideas when they were contrasted with sense.

Both here and in the *Parmenides* (129 ff.), where similar difficulties are raised, Plato seems prepared to desert his ancient ground. He cannot tell the relation in which abstract ideas stand to one another, and therefore he transfers the one and many out of his transcendental world, and proceeds to lay down practical rules for their application to different branches of knowledge. As in the *Republic* he supposes the philosopher to proceed by regular steps, until he arrives at the idea of good: as in the *Sophist* and *Politicus* he insists that in dividing the whole into its parts we should bisect in the middle in the hope of finding species; as in the *Phaedrus* (see above) he would have 'no limb broken' of the organism of knowledge; — so in the *Philebus* he urges the necessity of filling up all the intermediate links which occur (compare Bacon's 'media axiomata') in the passage from unity to infinity. With him the idea of science may be said to anticipate science; at a time when the sciences were not yet divided, he wants to impress upon us the importance of classification; neither neglecting the many individuals, nor attempting to count them all, but finding the genera and species under which they naturally fall. Here, then, and in the parallel passages of the *Phaedrus* and of the *Sophist*, is found the germ of the most fruitful notion of modern science.

At p. 15 Plato describes with ludicrous exaggeration the influence exerted by the one and many on the minds of young men in their first fervour of metaphysical enthusiasm (cp. *Rep.*, Book vii. 539). But they are none the less an everlasting quality of reason or reasoning which never grows old in us. At first we have but a confused conception of them, analogous to the eyes blinking at the light in the Republic. To this Plato opposes the revelation from Heaven of the real relations of them, which some Prometheus, who gave the true fire from heaven, is supposed to have imparted to us. Plato is speaking at pp. 15, 16 of two things—(1) the crude notion of the one and many, which powerfully affects the ordinary mind when first beginning to think (15 D–16 A); (2) the same notion when cleared up by the help of dialectic (16 C–E).

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To us the problem of the one and many has lost its chief interest and perplexity. We readily acknowledge that a whole has many parts, that the continuous is also the divisible, that in all objects of sense there is a one and many, and that a like principle may be applied by analogy to purely intellectual conceptions. If we attend to the meaning of the words, we are compelled to admit that two contradictory statements are true. But the antinomy is so familiar as to be scarcely observed by us. Our sense of the contradiction, like Plato's, only begins in a higher sphere, when we speak of necessity and free-will, of mind and body, of Three Persons and One Substance, and the like. The world of knowledge is always dividing more and more; every truth is at first the enemy of every other truth. Yet without this division there can be no truth; nor any complete truth without the reunion of the parts into a whole. And hence the coexistence of opposites in the unity of the idea is regarded by Hegel as the supreme principle of philosophy; and the law of contradiction, which is affirmed by logicians to be an ultimate principle of the human mind, is displaced by another law, which asserts the coexistence of contradictories as imperfect and divided elements of the truth. Without entering further into the depths of Hegelianism, we may remark that this and all similar attempts to reconcile antinomies have their origin in the old Platonic problem of the 'One and Many.'

II. 1. The first of Plato's categories or elements is the infinite. This is the negative of measure or limit; the unthinkable, the

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unknowable; of which nothing can be affirmed; the mixture or chaos which preceded distinct kinds in the creation of the world; the first vague impression of sense; the more or less which refuses to be reduced to rule, having certain affinities with evil, with pleasure, with ignorance, and which in the scale of being is farthest removed from the beautiful and good. To a Greek of the age of Plato, the idea of an infinite mind would have been an absurdity. He would have insisted that 'the good is of the nature of the finite,' and that the infinite is a mere negative, which is on the level of sensation, and not of thought. He was aware that there was a distinction between the infinitely great and the infinitely small, but he would have equally denied the claim of either to true existence. Of that positive infinity, or infinite reality, which we attribute to God, he had no conception.

The Greek conception of the infinite would be more truly described, in our way of speaking, as the indefinite. To us, the notion of infinity is subsequent rather than prior to the finite, expressing not absolute vacancy or negation, but only the removal of limit or restraint, which we suppose to exist not before but after we have already set bounds to thought and matter, and divided them after their kinds. From different points of view, either the finite or infinite may be looked upon respectively both as positive and negative (cp. 'Omnis determinatio est negatio'); and the conception of the one determines that of the other. The Greeks and the moderns seem to be nearly at the opposite poles in their manner of regarding them. And both are surprised when they make the discovery, as Plato has done in the *Sophist*, how large an element negation forms in the framework of their thoughts.

2, 3. The finite element which mingles with and regulates the infinite is best expressed to us by the word 'law.' It is that which measures all things and assigns to them their limit; which preserves them in their natural state, and brings them within the sphere of human cognition. This is described by the terms harmony, health, order, perfection, and the like. All things, in as far as they are good, even pleasures, which are for the most part indefinite, partake of this element. We should be wrong in attributing to Plato the conception of laws of nature derived



from observation and experiment. And yet he has as intense a conviction as any modern philosopher that nature does not proceed by chance. But observing that the wonderful construction of number and figure, which he had within himself, and which seemed to be prior to himself, explained a part of the phenomena of the external world, he extended their principles to the whole, finding in them the true type both of human life and of the order of nature.

Two other points may be noticed respecting the third class. First, that Plato seems to be unconscious of any interval or chasm which separates the finite from the infinite. The one is in various ways and degrees working in the other. Hence he has implicitly answered the difficulty with which he started, of how the one could remain one and yet be divided among many individuals, or 'how ideas could be in and out of themselves,' and the like. Secondly, that in this mixed class we find the idea of beauty. Good, when exhibited under the aspect of measure or symmetry, becomes beauty (64 E). And if we translate his language into corresponding modern terms, we shall not be far wrong in saying that here, as well as in the Republic, Plato conceives beauty under the idea of proportion.

4. Last and highest in the list of principles or elements is the cause of the union of the finite and infinite, to which Plato ascribes the order of the world. Reasoning from man to the universe, he argues that as there is a mind in the one, there must be a mind in the other, which he identifies with the royal mind of Zeus. This is the first cause of which 'our ancestors spoke,' as he says, appealing to tradition, in the *Philebus* as well as in the *Timaeus*. The 'one and many' is also supposed to have been revealed by tradition. For the mythical element has not altogether disappeared.

Some characteristic differences may here be noted, which distinguish the ancient from the modern mode of conceiving God.

a. To Plato, the idea of God or mind is both personal and impersonal. Nor in ascribing, as appears to us, both these attributes to him, and in speaking of God both in the masculine and neuter gender, did he seem to himself inconsistent. For the difference between the personal and impersonal was not

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marked to him as to ourselves. We make a fundamental distinction between a thing and a person, while to Plato, by the help of various intermediate abstractions, such as end, good, cause, they appear almost to meet in one, or to be two aspects of the same. Hence, without any reconciliation or even remark, in the Republic he speaks at one time of God or Gods, and at another time of the Good. So in the Phaedrus he seems to pass unconsciously from the concrete to the abstract conception of the Ideas in the same dialogue. Nor in the Philebus is he careful to show in what relation the idea of the divine mind stands to the supreme principle of measure.

β. Again, to us there is a strongly-marked distinction between a first cause and a final cause. And we should commonly identify a first cause with God, and the final cause with the world, which is His work. But Plato, though not a Pantheist, and very far from confounding God with the world, tends to identify the first with the final cause. The cause of the union of the finite and infinite might be described as a higher law; the final measure which is the highest expression of the good may also be described as the supreme law. Both these conceptions are realized chiefly by the help of the material world: and therefore when we pass into the sphere of ideas can hardly be distinguished.

The four principles are required for the determination of the relative places of pleasure and wisdom. Plato has been saying that we should proceed by regular steps from the one to the many. Accordingly, before assigning the precedence either to good or pleasure, he must first find out and arrange in order the general principles of things. Mind is ascertained to be akin to the nature of the cause, while pleasure is found in the infinite or indefinite class. We may now proceed to divide pleasure and knowledge after their kinds.

III. 1. Plato speaks of pleasure as indefinite, as relative, as a generation, and in all these points of view as in a category distinct from good. For again we must repeat, that to the Greek 'the good is of the nature of the finite,' and, like virtue, either is, or is nearly allied to, knowledge. The modern philosopher would remark that the indefinite is equally real with the definite. Health and mental qualities are in the concrete undefined; they

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are nevertheless real goods, and Plato rightly regards them as falling under the finite class. Again, we are able to define objects or ideas, not in so far as they are in the mind, but in so far as they are manifested externally, and can therefore be reduced to rule and measure. And if we adopt the test of definiteness, the pleasures of the body are more capable of being defined than any other pleasures. As in art and knowledge generally, we proceed from without inwards, beginning with facts of sense, and passing to the more ideal conceptions of mental pleasure, happiness, and the like.

2. Pleasure is depreciated as relative, while good is exalted as absolute. But this distinction seems to arise from an unfair mode of regarding them; the abstract idea of the one is compared with the concrete experience of the other. For all pleasure and all knowledge may be viewed either abstracted from the mind, or in relation to the mind (cp. Aristot. Nic. Ethics, x. 3, 4). The first is an idea only, which may be conceived as absolute and unchangeable, and then the abstract idea of pleasure will be equally unchangeable with that of knowledge. But when we come to view either as phenomena of consciousness, the same defects are for the most part incident to both of them. Our hold upon them is equally transient and uncertain; the mind cannot be always in a state of intellectual tension, any more than capable of feeling pleasure always. The knowledge which is at one time clear and distinct, at another seems to fade away, just as the pleasure of health after sickness, or of eating after hunger, soon passes into a neutral state of unconsciousness and indifference. Change and alternation are necessary for the mind as well as for the body; and in this is to be acknowledged, not an element of evil, but rather a law of nature. The chief difference between subjective pleasure and subjective knowledge in respect of permanence is that the latter, when our feeble faculties are able to grasp it, still conveys to us an idea of unchangeableness which cannot be got rid of.

3. In the language of ancient philosophy, the relative character of pleasure is described as becoming or generation. This is relative to Being or Essence, and from one point of view may be regarded as the Heraclitean flux in contrast with the Eleatic Being; from another, as the transient enjoyment of eating and

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drinking compared with the supposed permanence of intellectual pleasures. But to us the distinction is unmeaning, and belongs to a stage of philosophy which has passed away. Plato himself seems to have suspected that the continuance or life of things is quite as much to be attributed to a principle of rest as of motion (cp. Charm. 159, 160; Crat. 437). A later view of pleasure is found in Aristotle, who agrees with Plato in many points, e. g. in his view of pleasure as a restoration to nature, in his distinction between bodily and mental, between necessary and non-necessary pleasures. But he is also in advance of Plato; for he affirms that pleasure is not in the body at all; and hence not even the bodily pleasures are to be spoken of as generations, but only as accompanied by generation (Nic. Eth. x. 3, 6; I. 8, 10).

4. Plato attempts to identify vicious pleasures with some form of error, and insists that the term false may be applied to them: in this he appears to be carrying out in a confused manner the Socratic doctrine, that virtue is knowledge, vice ignorance. He will allow of no distinction between the pleasures and the erroneous opinions on which they are founded, whether arising out of the illusion of distance or not. But to this we naturally reply with Protarchus, that the pleasure is what it is, although the calculation may be false, or the after-effects painful. It is difficult to acquit Plato, to use his own language, of being a 'tyro in dialectics,' when he overlooks such a distinction. Yet, on the other hand, we are hardly fair judges of confusions of thought in those who view things differently from ourselves.

5. There appears also to be an incorrectness in the notion which occurs both here and in the Gorgias, of the simultaneousness of merely bodily pleasures and pains. We may, perhaps, admit, though even this is not free from doubt, that the feeling of pleasurable hope or recollection is, or rather may be, simultaneous with acute bodily suffering. But there is no such co-existence of the pain of thirst with the pleasures of drinking; they are not really simultaneous, for the one expels the other. Nor does Plato seem to have considered that the bodily pleasures, except in certain extreme cases, are unattended with pain. Few philosophers will deny that a degree of pleasure attends eating and drinking; and yet surely we might as well speak of the pains of digestion which follow, as of the pains of hunger and thirst



which precede them. Plato's conception is derived partly from the extreme case of a man suffering pain from hunger or thirst, partly from the image of a full and empty vessel. But the truth is rather, that while the gratification of our bodily desires constantly affords some degree of pleasure, the antecedent pains are scarcely perceived by us, being almost done away with by use and regularity.

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6. The desire to classify pleasures as accompanied or not accompanied by antecedent pains, has led Plato to place under one head the pleasures of smell and sight, as well as those derived from sounds of music and from knowledge. He would have done better to make a separate class of the pleasures of smell, having no association of mind, or perhaps to have divided them into natural and artificial. The pleasures of sight and sound might then have been regarded as being the expression of ideas. But this higher and truer point of view never appears to have occurred to Plato. Nor has he any distinction between the fine arts and the mechanical; and, neither here nor anywhere, an adequate conception of the beautiful in external things.

7. Plato agrees partially with certain 'surly or fastidious' philosophers, as he terms them, who defined pleasure to be the absence of pain. They are also described as eminent in physics. There is unfortunately no school of Greek philosophy known to us which combined these two characteristics. Antisthenes, who was an enemy of pleasure, was not a physical philosopher; the atomists, who were physical philosophers, were not enemies of pleasure. Yet such a combination of opinions is far from being impossible. Plato's omission to mention them by name has created the same uncertainty respecting them which also occurs respecting the 'friends of the ideas' and the 'materialists' in the Sophist.

On the whole, this discussion is one of the least satisfactory in the dialogues of Plato. While the ethical nature of pleasure is scarcely considered, and the mere physical phenomenon imperfectly analysed, too much weight is given to ideas of measure and number, as the sole principle of good. The comparison of pleasure and knowledge is really a comparison of two elements, which have no common measure, and which cannot be excluded from each other. Feeling is not opposed to know-

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ledge, and in all consciousness there is an element of both. The most abstract kinds of knowledge are inseparable from some pleasure or pain, which accompanies the acquisition or possession of them: the student is liable to grow weary of them, and soon discovers that continuous mental energy is not granted to men. The most sensual pleasure, on the other hand, is inseparable from the consciousness of pleasure; no man can be happy who, to borrow Plato's illustration, is leading the life of an oyster. Hence (by his own confession) the main thesis is not worth determining; the real interest lies in the incidental discussion. We can no more separate pleasure from knowledge in the *Philebus* than we can separate justice from happiness in the *Republic*.

IV. An interesting account is given in the *Philebus* of the rank and order of the sciences or arts, which agrees generally with the scheme of knowledge in the Sixth Book of the *Republic*. The chief difference is, that the position of the arts is more exactly defined. They are divided into an empirical part and a scientific part, of which the first is mere guess-work, the second is determined by rule and measure. Of the more empirical arts, music is given as an example; this, although affirmed to be necessary to human life (62 B), is depreciated. Music is regarded from a point of view entirely opposite to that of the *Republic*, not as a sublime science, coördinate with astronomy, but as full of doubt and conjecture. According to the standard of accuracy which is here adopted, it is rightly placed lower in the scale than carpentering, because the latter is more capable of being reduced to measure.

The theoretical element of the arts may also become a purely abstract science, when separated from matter, and is then said to be pure and unmixed. The distinction which Plato here makes seems to be the same as that between pure and applied mathematics, and may be expressed in the modern formula — science is art theoretical, art is science practical. In the reason which he gives for the superiority of the pure science of number over the mixed or applied, we can only agree with him in part. He says that the numbers which the philosopher employs are always the same, whereas the numbers which are used in practice represent different sizes or quantities. He does not see that this power of

expressing different quantities by the same symbol is the characteristic and not the defect of numbers, and is due to their abstract nature; — although we admit of course what Plato seems to feel in his distinctions between pure and impure knowledge, that the imperfection of matter enters into the applications of them.

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Above the other sciences, as in the Republic, towers dialectic, which is the science of eternal Being, apprehended by the purest mind and reason. The lower sciences, including the mathematical, are akin to opinion rather than to reason, and are placed together in the fourth class of goods. The relation in which they stand to dialectic is obscure in the Republic, and is not cleared up in the *Philebus*.

V. Thus far we have only attained to the vestibule or antechamber of the good; for there is a good exceeding knowledge, exceeding essence, which, like Glaucon in the Republic (Book vi. 509), we find a difficulty in apprehending. This good is now to be exhibited to us under various aspects and gradations. The relative dignity of pleasure and knowledge has been determined; but they have not yet received their exact position in the scale of goods. Some difficulties occur to us in the enumeration: First, how are we to distinguish the first from the second class of goods, or the second from the third? Secondly, why is there no mention of the supreme mind? Thirdly, the nature of the fourth class. Fourthly, the meaning of the allusion to a sixth class, which is not further investigated.

(1) Plato seems to proceed in his table of goods, from the more abstract to the less abstract; from the subjective to the objective; until at the lower end of the scale we fairly descend into the region of human action and feeling. To him, the greater the abstraction the greater the truth, and he is always tending to see abstractions within abstractions; which, like the ideas in the Parmenides, are always appearing one behind another. Hence we find a difficulty in following him into the sphere of thought which he is seeking to attain. First in his scale of goods he places measure, in which he finds the eternal nature: this would be more naturally expressed in modern language as eternal law, and seems to be akin both to the finite and to the mind or cause, which were two of the elements in the former table. Like the supreme nature in the *Timaeus*, like the ideal beauty in the

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Symposium or the *Phaedrus*, or like the ideal good in the *Republic*, this is the absolute and unapproachable being. But this being is manifested in symmetry and beauty everywhere, in the order of nature and of mind, in the relations of men to one another. For the word 'measure' he now substitutes the word 'symmetry,' as if intending to express measure conceived as relation. He then proceeds to regard the good no longer in an objective form, but as the human reason seeking to attain truth by the aid of dialectic; such at least we naturally infer to be his meaning, when we consider that both here and in the *Republic* the sphere of *νοῦς* or mind is assigned to dialectic. (2) It is remarkable (see above) that this personal conception of mind is confined to the human mind, and not, as at p. 22 C, extended to the divine. (3) If we may be allowed to interpret one dialogue of Plato by another, the sciences of figure and number are probably classed with the arts and true opinions, because they proceed from hypotheses (cp. *Rep.* Book vi. 511). (4) The sixth class, if a sixth class is to be added, is playfully set aside by a quotation from *Orpheus*: Plato means to say that a sixth class, if there be such a class, is not worth considering, because pleasure, having only gained the fifth place in the scale of goods, is already out of the running.

VI. We may now endeavour to ascertain the relation of the *Philebus* to the other dialogues. Here Plato shows the same indifference to his own doctrine of Ideas which he has already manifested in the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist*. The principle of the one and many of which he here speaks, is illustrated by examples in the *Sophist* and *Statesman*. Notwithstanding the differences of style, many resemblances may be noticed between the *Philebus* and *Gorgias*. The theory of the simultaneousness of pleasure and pain is common to both of them (*Phil.* 36 B. *Gorg.* 496 E); there is also a common tendency in them to take up arms against pleasure, although the view of the *Philebus*, which is probably the later of the two dialogues, is the more moderate. At p. 46 A, B, there seems to be an allusion to the passage in the *Gorgias* (494), in which Socrates dilates on the pleasures of itching and scratching. Nor is there any real discrepancy in the manner in which *Gorgias* and his art are spoken of in the two dialogues. For Socrates, at p. 58, is far from implying that the art of rhetoric has a real sphere



of practical usefulness: he only means that the refutation of the claims of Gorgias is not necessary for his present purpose. He is saying in effect: 'Admit, if you please, that rhetoric is the greatest and usefulest of sciences:—this does not prove that dialectic is not the purest and most exact.' From the Sophist and Statesman we know that his hostility towards the sophists and rhetoricians was not mitigated in later life; although both in the Statesman and Laws he admits of a higher use of rhetoric.

Reasons have been already given for assigning a late date to the Philebus. That the date is probably later than that of the Republic, may be further argued on the following grounds:—  
1. The general resemblance to the later dialogues and to the Laws: 2. The more complete account of the nature of good and pleasure: 3. The distinction between perception, memory, recollection, and opinion (pp. 34–38) which indicates a great progress in psychology; also between understanding and imagination, which is described under the figure of the scribe and the painter (p. 39). A superficial notion may arise that Plato probably wrote shorter dialogues, such as the Philebus, the Sophist, and the Statesman, as studies or preparations for longer ones. This view may be natural; but on further reflection is seen to be fallacious, because these three dialogues are found to make an advance upon the metaphysical conceptions of the Republic. And we can more easily suppose that Plato composed shorter writings after longer ones, than suppose that he lost hold of further points of view which he had once attained.

It is more easy to find traces of the Pythagoreans, Eleatics, Megarians, Cynics, Cyrenaics and of the ideas of Anaxagoras, in the Philebus, than to say how much is due to each of them. Had we fuller records of those old philosophers, we should probably find Plato in the midst of the fray attempting to combine Eleatic and Pythagorean doctrines, and seeking to find a truth beyond either Being or number; setting up his own concrete conception of good against the abstract practical good of the Cynics, or the abstract intellectual good of the Megarians, and his own idea of classification against the denial of plurality in unity which is also attributed to them; warring against the Eristics as destructive of truth, as he had formerly fought against the Sophists; taking up a middle position between the Cynics and

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Cyrenaics in his doctrine of pleasure; asserting with more consistency than Anaxagoras the existence of an intelligent mind and cause. Of the Heracliteans, whom he is said by Aristotle to have cultivated in his youth, he speaks in the *Philebus*, as in the *Theaetetus* and *Cratylus*, with irony and contempt. But we have not the knowledge which would enable us to pursue further the line of reflection here indicated; nor can we expect to find perfect clearness or order in the first efforts of mankind to understand the working of their own minds. The ideas which they are attempting to analyse, they are also in process of creating; the abstract universals of which they are seeking to adjust the relations have been already excluded by them from the category of relation.

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The *Philebus*, like the *Cratylus*, is supposed to be the continuation of a previous discussion. An argument respecting the comparative claims of pleasure and wisdom to rank as the chief good has been already carried on between *Philebus* and Socrates. The argument is now transferred to Protarchus, the son of Callias<sup>Steph.</sup> (19 B), a noble Athenian youth, sprung from a family which had<sup>11</sup> spent 'a world of money' on the Sophists (cp. *Apol.* 20 A, B; *Crat.* 391 C; *Protag.* 337 D). *Philebus*, who appears to be the teacher (16 B, 36 D), or elder friend, and perhaps the lover (53 D), of Protarchus, takes no further part in the discussion beyond asserting in the strongest manner his adherence, under all circumstances, to the cause of pleasure.

Socrates suggests that they shall have a first and second palm of victory. For there may be a good higher than either pleasure or wisdom, and then neither of them will gain the first prize, but whichever of the two is more akin to this higher good will have a<sup>12</sup> right to the second. They agree, and Socrates opens the game by enlarging on the diversity and opposition which exists among pleasures. For there are pleasures of all kinds, good and bad, wise and foolish—pleasures of the temperate as well as of the intemperate. Protarchus replies that although pleasures may be opposed in so far as they spring from opposite sources, nevertheless as pleasures they are alike. Yes, retorts Socrates, pleasure is like pleasure, as figure is like figure and colour like colour;

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yet we all know that there is great variety among figures and  
 13 colours. Protarchus does not see the drift of this remark; and  
 Socrates proceeds to ask how he can have a right to attribute a  
 new predicate (i. e. 'good') to pleasures in general, when he  
 cannot deny that they are different? What common property in  
 all of them does he mean to indicate by the term 'good?' If he  
 continues to assert that there is some trivial sense in which  
 pleasure is one, Socrates may retort by saying that knowledge is  
 14 one, but the result will be that such merely verbal and trivial  
 conceptions, whether of knowledge or pleasure, will spoil the  
 discussion, and will prove the incapacity of the two disputants.  
 In order to avoid this danger, he proposes that they shall beat a  
 retreat, and, before they proceed, come to an understanding about  
 the 'high argument' of the one and the many.

Protarchus agrees to the proposal, but he is under the im-  
 pression that Socrates means to discuss the common question —  
 how a sensible object can be one, and yet have opposite attributes,  
 such as 'great' and 'small,' 'light' and 'heavy,' or how there can  
 be many members in one body, and the like wonders. Socrates  
 15 has long ceased to see any wonder in these phenomena; his diffi-  
 culties begin with the application of number to abstract unities  
 (e. g. 'man,' 'good') and with the attempt to divide them. For  
 have these unities of idea any real existence? How, if imperish-  
 able, can they enter into the world of generation? How, as units,  
 can they be divided and dispersed among different objects? Or  
 do they exist in their entirety in each object? These difficulties  
 are but imperfectly answered by Socrates in what follows.

We speak of a one and many, which is ever flowing in and out  
 of all things, concerning which a young man often runs wild in  
 his first metaphysical enthusiasm, talking about analysis and  
 16 synthesis to his father and mother and the neighbors, hardly  
 sparing even his dog. This 'one in many' is a revelation of the  
 order of the world, which some Prometheus first made known to  
 our ancestors; and they, who were better men and nearer the  
 gods than we are, have handed it down to us. To know how to  
 17 proceed by regular steps from one to many, and from many to  
 one, is just what makes the difference between eristic and  
 dialectic. And the right way of proceeding is to look for one  
 idea or class in all things, and when you have found one to look

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for more than one, and for all that there are, and when you have found them all and regularly divided a particular field of knowledge into classes, you may leave the further consideration of individuals. But you must not pass at once either from unity to infinity, or from infinity to unity. In music, for example, you may begin with the most general notion, but this alone will not make you a musician: you must know also the number and nature of the intervals, and the systems which are framed out of them, and the rhythms of the dance which correspond to them. And when you have a similar knowledge of any other subject, you may be said to know that subject. In speech again there are infinite varieties of sound, and some one who was a wise man, or more than man, comprehended them all in the classes of mutes, vowels, and semivowels, and gave to each of them a name, and assigned them to the art of grammar.

‘But whither, Socrates, are you going? And what has this to do with the comparative eligibility of pleasure and wisdom?’ Socrates replies, that before we can adjust their respective claims, we want to know the number and kinds of both of them. What are they? He is requested to answer the question himself. That he will, if he may be allowed to make one or two preliminary remarks. In the first place he has a dreamy recollection of hearing that neither pleasure nor knowledge is the highest good, for the good should be perfect and sufficient. But is the life of pleasure perfect and sufficient, when deprived of memory, consciousness, anticipation? Is not this the life of an oyster? Or is the life of mind sufficient, if devoid of any particle of pleasure? Must not the union of the two be higher and more eligible than either separately? And is not the element which makes this mixed life eligible more akin to mind than to pleasure? Thus pleasure is rejected and mind is rejected. And yet there may be a life of mind, not human but divine, which conquers still.

But, if we are to pursue this argument further, we shall require some new weapons; and by this, I mean a new classification of existence. (1) There is a finite element of existence, and (2) an infinite, and (3) the union of the two, and (4) the cause of the union. More may be added if they are wanted. but at present we can do without them. And first of the infinite or indefinite: — That is the class which is denoted by the terms more or less, and is always in



25 a state of comparison. All words or ideas to which the words *Philebus.*  
 'gently,' 'extremely,' and other comparative expressions are ap- *ANALYSIS.*  
 plied, fall under this class. The infinite would be no longer  
 infinite, if limited or reduced to measure by number and quantity.  
 The opposite class is the limited or finite, and includes all things  
 which have number and quantity. And there is a third class of  
 generation into essence by the union of the finite and infinite, in  
 which the finite gives law to the infinite; — under this are compre-  
 26 hended health, strength, temperate seasons, harmony, beauty, and  
 the like. The goddess of beauty saw the universal wantonness of  
 all things, and gave law and order to be the salvation of the soul.  
 But no effect can be generated without a cause, and therefore there  
 27 must be a fourth class, which is the cause of generation; for the  
 cause or agent is not the same as the patient or effect.

And now, having obtained our classes, we may determine in  
 which our conqueror life is to be placed: Clearly in the third or  
 mixed class, in which the finite gives law to the infinite. And in  
 which is pleasure to find a place? As clearly in the infinite or in-  
 definite, which alone, as Protarchus thinks (who seems to confuse  
 the infinite with the superlative), gives to pleasure the character of  
 28 the absolute good. Yes, retorts Socrates, and also to pain the  
 character of absolute evil. And therefore the infinite cannot be  
 that which imparts to pleasure the nature of the good. But where  
 shall we place mind? That is a very serious and awful question,  
 which may be prefaced by another. Is mind or chance the lord  
 of the universe? All philosophers will say the first, and yet,  
 perhaps, they may be only magnifying themselves. And for this  
 29 reason I should like to consider the matter a little more deeply,  
 even though some lovers of disorder in the world should ridicule  
 my attempt.

Now the elements earth, air, fire, water, exist in us, and they  
 exist in the cosmos; but they are purer and fairer in the cosmos  
 30 than they are in us, and they come to us from thence. And as we  
 have a soul as well as a body, in like manner the elements of the  
 finite, the infinite, the union of the two, and the cause, are found to  
 exist in us. And if they, like the elements, exist in us, and the  
 three first exist in the world, must not the fourth or cause which  
 is the noblest of them, exist in the world? And this cause is  
 wisdom or mind, the royal mind of Zeus, who is the king of all, as

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there are other gods who have other noble attributes. Observe how well this agrees with the testimony of men of old, who affirmed mind to be the ruler of the universe. And remember that mind belongs to the class which we term the cause, and pleasure to the infinite or indefinite class. We will examine the place and origin of both. 31

What is the origin of pleasure? Her natural seat is the mixed class, in which health and harmony were placed. Pain is the violation, and pleasure the restoration of limit. There is a natural union of finite and infinite, which in hunger, thirst, heat, cold, is impaired—this is painful, but the return to nature, in which the elements are restored to their normal proportions, is pleasant. Here is our first class of pleasures. And another class of pleasures and pains are hopes and fears; these are in the mind only. And inasmuch as the pleasures are unalloyed by pains and the pains by pleasures, the examination of them may show us whether all pleasure is to be desired, or whether this entire desireableness is not rather the attribute of another class. But if pleasures and pains consist in the violation and restoration of limit, may there not be a neutral state, in which there is neither dissolution nor restoration? That is a further question, and admitting, as we must, the possibility of such a state, there seems to be no reason why the life of wisdom should not exist in this neutral state, which is, moreover, the state of the gods, who cannot, without indecency, be supposed to feel either joy or sorrow. 32 33

The second class of pleasures involves memory. There are affections which are extinguished before they reach the soul, and of these there is no consciousness, and therefore no memory. And there are affections which the body and soul feel together, and this feeling is termed consciousness. And memory is the preservation of consciousness, and reminiscence is the recovery of consciousness. Now the memory of pleasure, when a man is in pain, is the memory of the opposite of his actual bodily state, and is therefore not in the body, but in the mind. And there may be an intermediate state, in which a person is balanced between pleasure and pain; in his body there is want which is a cause of pain, but in his mind a sure hope of replenishment, which is pleasant. (But if the hope be converted into despair, he has two pains and not a balance of pain and pleasure.) Another question 34 35 36

37 is raised: May not pleasures, like opinions, be true and false? *Philebus.*  
 In the sense of being real, both must be admitted to be true: nor *ANALYSIS.*  
 can we deny that to both of them qualities may be attributed; for  
 38 pleasures as well as opinions may be described as good or bad.  
 And though we do not all of us allow that there are true and false  
 pleasures, we all acknowledge that there are some pleasures asso-  
 ciated with right opinion, and others with falsehood and ignorance.  
 Let us endeavour to analyze the nature of this association.

Opinion is based on perception, which may be correct or mis-  
 taken. You may see a figure at a distance, and say first of all,  
 'This is a man,' and then say, 'No, this is an image made by the  
 shepherds.' And you may affirm this in a proposition to your  
 39 companion, or make the remark mentally to yourself. Whether  
 the words are actually spoken or not, on such occasions there is a  
 scribe within who registers them, and a painter who paints the  
 images of the things which the scribe has written down in the soul,  
 —at least that is my own notion of the process; and the words and  
 images which are inscribed by them may be either true or false;  
 and they may represent either past, present, or future. And, re-  
 presenting the future, they must also represent the pleasures and  
 40 pains of anticipation — the visions of gold and other fancies which  
 are never wanting in the mind of man. Now these hopes, as they  
 are termed, are propositions, which are sometimes true, and some-  
 times false; for the good, who are the friends of the gods, see  
 true pictures of the future, and the bad false ones. And as  
 there may be opinion about things which are not, were not, and  
 will not be, which is opinion still, so there may be pleasure  
 about things which are not, were not, and will not be, which is  
 pleasure still,—that is to say, false pleasure; and only when false,  
 41 can pleasure, like opinion, be vicious. Against this conclusion  
 Protarchus reclaims.

Leaving his denial for the present, Socrates proceeds to show  
 that some pleasures are false from another point of view. In de-  
 sire, as we admitted, the body is divided from the soul, and hence  
 pleasures and pains are often simultaneous. And we further ad-  
 mitted that both of them belonged to the infinite class. How, then,  
 42 can we compare them? Are we not liable, or rather certain, as  
 in the case of sight, to be deceived by distance and relation? In  
 this case the pleasures and pains are not false because based upon

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false opinion, but are themselves false. And there is another illusion: pain has often been said by us to arise out of the derangement—pleasure out of the restoration—of our nature. But in passing from one to the other, do we not experience neutral states, which although they appear pleasurable or painful are really neither? For even if we admit, with the wise man whom Protarchus loves (and only a wise man could have ever entertained such a notion), that all things are in a perpetual flux, still these changes are often unconscious, and devoid either of pleasure or pain. We assume, then, that there are three states—pleasurable, painful, neutral; we may embellish a little by calling them gold, silver, and that which is neither.

But there are certain natural philosophers who will not admit a third state. Their instinctive dislike to pleasure leads them to affirm that pleasure is only the absence of pain. They are noble fellows, and, although we do not agree with them, we may use them as diviners who will indicate to us the right track. They will say, that the nature of anything is best known from the examination of extreme cases, e. g. the nature of hardness from the examination of the hardest things; and that the nature of pleasure will be best understood from an examination of the most intense pleasures. Now these are the pleasures of the body, not of the mind; the pleasures of disease and not of health, the pleasures of the intemperate and not of the temperate. I am speaking, not of the frequency or continuance, but only of the intensity of such pleasures, and this is given them by contrast with the pain or sickness of body which precedes them. Their morbid nature is illustrated by the lesser instances of itching and scratching, respecting which I swear that I cannot tell whether they are a pleasure or a pain. (1) Some of these arise out of a transition from one state of the body to another, as from cold to hot; (2) others are caused by the contrast of an internal pain and an external pleasure in the body: sometimes the feeling of pain predominates, as in itching and tingling, when they are relieved by scratching; sometimes the feeling of pleasure: or the pleasure which they give may be quite overpowering, and is then accompanied by all sorts of unutterable feelings which have a death of delights in them. But there are also mixed pleasures which are in the mind only. For are not love and sorrow as well as anger 'sweeter than honey,' and also



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full of pain? Is there not a mixture of feelings in the spectator of tragedy? and of comedy also? 'I do not understand that last.' Well, then, with the view of lighting up the obscurity of these mixed feelings, let me ask whether envy is painful. 'Yes.' And yet the envious man finds something pleasing in the misfortunes of others? 'True.' And ignorance is a misfortune? 'Certainly.' And one form of ignorance is self-conceit—a man may fancy  
49 himself richer, fairer, better, wiser than he is? 'Yes.' And he who thus deceives himself may be strong or weak? 'He may.' And if he is strong we fear him, and if he is weak we laugh at  
50 him, which is a pleasure, and yet we envy him, which is a pain? These mixed feelings are the rationale of tragedy and comedy, and equally the rationale of the greater drama of human life.<sup>1</sup> Having shown how sorrow, anger, envy, are feelings of a mixed nature, I will reserve the consideration of the remainder for another occasion.  
51 Next follow the unmixed pleasures; which, unlike the philosophers of whom I was speaking, I believe to be real. These unmixed pleasures are: (1) The pleasures derived from beauty of form, colour, sound, smell, which are absolutely pure; and in  
52 general those which are unalloyed with pain: (2) The pleasures derived from the acquisition of knowledge, which in themselves are pure, but may be attended by an accidental pain of forgetting; this, however, arises from a subsequent act of reflection, of which we need take no account. At the same time, we admit that the latter pleasures are the property of a very few. To these pure and unmixed pleasures we ascribe measure, whereas all others belong to the class of the infinite, and are liable to every species of excess. And here several questions arise for consideration:—  
53 What is the meaning of pure and impure, of moderate and immoderate? We may answer the question by an illustration: Purity of white paint consists in the clearness or quality of the

<sup>1</sup> There appears to be some confusion in this passage. There is no difficulty in seeing that in comedy, as in tragedy, the spectator may view the performance with mixed feelings of pain as well as of pleasure; nor is there any difficulty in understanding that envy is a mixed feeling, which rejoices not without pain at the misfortunes of others, and laughs at their ignorance of themselves. But Plato seems to think further that he has explained the feeling of the spectator in comedy sufficiently by a theory which only applies to comedy in so far as in comedy we laugh at the conceit or weakness of others. He has certainly given a very partial explanation of the ridiculous.

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white, and this is distinct from the quantity or amount of white paint; a little pure white is fairer than a great deal which is impure. But there is another question: — Pleasure is affirmed by ingenious philosophers to be a generation; they say that there are two natures — one self-existent, the other dependent; the one noble and majestic, the other failing in both these qualities. ‘I do not understand.’ There are lovers and there are loves. ‘Yes, I know, but what is the application?’ The argument is in play, and desires to intimate that there are relatives and there are absolutes, and that the relative is for the sake of the absolute; and generation is for the sake of essence. Under relatives I class all things done with a view to generation; and essence is of the class of good. But if essence is of the class of good, generation must be of some other class; and our friends, who affirm that pleasure is a generation, would laugh at the notion that pleasure is a good; and at that other notion, that pleasure is produced by generation, which is only the alternative of destruction. Who would prefer such an alternation to the equable life of pure thought? Here is one absurdity, and not the only one, to which the friends of pleasure are reduced. For is there not also an absurdity in affirming that good is of the soul only; or in declaring that the best of men, if he be in pain, is bad?

And now, from the consideration of pleasure, we pass to that of knowledge. Let us reflect that there are two kinds of knowledge — the one creative or productive, and the other educational and philosophical. Of the creative arts, there is one part purer or more akin to knowledge than the other. There is an element of guess-work and an element of number and measure in them. In music, for example, especially in flute-playing, the conjectural element prevails; while in carpentering there is more application of rule and measure. Of the creative arts, then, we may make two classes — the less exact and the more exact. And the exacter part of all of them is really arithmetic and mensuration. But arithmetic and mensuration again may be subdivided with reference either to their use in the concrete, or to their nature in the abstract — as they are regarded popularly in building and trading, or theoretically by philosophers. And, borrowing the analogy of pleasure, we may say that the philosophical use of them is purer than the other. Thus we have two arts of arithmetic, and two of

mensuration. And truest of all sciences in the estimation of every rational man is dialectic, or the science of being, which will forget and disown us, if we forget and disown her.

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- 58 'But, Socrates, I have heard Gorgias say that rhetoric is the greatest and usefulest of arts; and I should not like to quarrel either with him or you.' Neither is there any inconsistency, Protarchus, with his statement in what I am now saying; for I am not maintaining that dialectic is the greatest or usefulest, but only that she is the truest of arts: my remark is not quantitative but qualitative, and refers not to the advantage or reputation of either, but to the degree of truth which they attain — here Gorgias will not care to compete; this is what we affirm to be possessed in the
- 59 highest degree by dialectic. And do not let us appeal to Gorgias or Philebus or Socrates, but ask, on behalf of the argument, what are the highest truths which the soul has the power of attaining. And is not this the science which has a firmer grasp of them than any other? For the arts generally are only occupied with matters of opinion, and with the production and action and passion of this sensible world. But the highest truth is that which is eternal and unchangeable. And reason and wisdom are concerned with the eternal; and these are the very claimants, if not for the first, at least for the second place, whom I propose as rivals to pleasure.

- And now, having the materials, we may proceed to mix them —
- 60 first recapitulating the question at issue.

- Philebus affirmed pleasure to be the good, and assumed them to be one nature; I affirmed that they were two natures, and declared that knowledge was more akin to the good than pleasure. I said that the two together were more eligible than either taken singly;
- 61 and to this we adhere. Reason intimates, as at first, that we should seek the good not in the unmixed life, but in the mixed.

- The cup is ready, waiting to be mingled, and here are two fountains, one of honey, the other of pure water, out of which to make the fairest possible mixture. There are pure and impure pleasures — pure and impure sciences. Let us consider the sections of each which have the most of purity and truth; to admit them all
- 62 indiscriminately would be dangerous. First we will take the pure sciences; but shall we mingle the impure — the art which uses the false rule and the false measure? That we must, if we are any of us to find our way home; man cannot live upon pure mathematics

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alone. And must I include music, which is admitted to be guess-work? 'Yes, you must, if human life is to have any humanity.' Well, then, I will open the door and let them all in; they shall mingle in an Homeric 'meeting of the waters.' And now we turn to the pleasures; shall I admit them? 'Admit first of all the pure pleasures; secondly, the necessary.' And what shall we say about the rest? First, ask the pleasures—they will be too happy to dwell with wisdom. Secondly, ask the arts and sciences—they reply that the excesses of intemperance are the ruin of them; and that they would rather only have the pleasures of health and temperance, which are the handmaidens of virtue. But still we want truth? That is now added; and so the argument is complete, and may be compared to an incorporeal law, which is to hold fair rule over a living body. And now we are at the vestibule of the good, in which there are three chief elements—truth, symmetry, and beauty. These will be the criterion of the comparative claims of pleasure and wisdom. 63 64 65

Which has the greater share of truth? Surely wisdom; for pleasure is the veriest impostor in the world, and the perjuries of lovers have passed into a proverb.

Which of symmetry? Wisdom again; for nothing is more immoderate than pleasure.

Which of beauty? Once more, wisdom; for pleasure is often unseemly, and the greatest pleasures are put out of sight. 66

Not pleasure, then, ranks first in the scale of good, but measure, and eternal harmony.

Second comes the symmetrical and beautiful and perfect.

Third, mind and wisdom.

Fourth, sciences and arts and true opinions.

Fifth, painless pleasures.

Of a sixth class, I have no more to say. Thus, pleasure and mind may both renounce the claim to the first place. But mind is ten thousand times nearer to the chief good than pleasure. Pleasure ranks fifth and not first, even though all the animals in the world assert the contrary. 67

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From the days of Aristippus and Epicurus to our own times the nature of pleasure has occupied the attention of philosophers. 'Is



pleasure an evil? a good? the only good?' are the simple forms which the enquiry assumed among the Socratic schools. But at an early stage of the controversy another question was asked: 'Do pleasures differ in kind? and are some bad, some good, and some neither bad nor good?' There are bodily and there are mental pleasures, which were at first confused but afterwards distinguished. A distinction was also made between necessary and unnecessary pleasures; and again between pleasures which had or had not corresponding pains. The ancient philosophers were fond of asking, in the language of their age, 'Is pleasure a "becoming" only, and therefore transient and relative, or do some pleasures partake of truth and Being?' To these ancient speculations the moderns have added a further question: — 'Whose pleasure? The pleasure of yourself, or of your neighbour, — of the individual, or of the world?' This little addition has changed the whole aspect of the discussion: the same word is now supposed to include two principles as widely different as benevolence and self-love. Some modern writers have also distinguished between pleasure the test, and pleasure the motive of actions. For the universal test of right actions (how I know them) may not always be the highest or best motive of them (why I do them).

Socrates, as we learn from the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon, first drew attention to the consequences of actions. Mankind were said by him to act rightly when they knew what they were doing, or, in the language of the *Gorgias*, 'did what they would.' He seems to have been the first who maintained that the good was the useful (*Mem.* iv. 6, 8). In his eagerness for generalization, seeking, as Aristotle says, for the universal in *Ethics* (*Metaph.* i. 6. §§2, 3), he took the most obvious intellectual aspect of human action which occurred to him. He meant to emphasize, not pleasure, but the calculation of pleasure; neither is he arguing that pleasure is the chief good, but that we should have a principle of choice. He did not intend to oppose 'the useful' to some higher conception, such as the Platonic ideal, but to chance and caprice. The Platonic Socrates pursues the same vein of thought in the *Protagoras* (351 foll.), where he argues against the so-called sophist that pleasure and pain are the final standards and motives of good and evil, and that the salvation of human life depends upon a right estimate of pleasures greater or less when seen near and at a distance. The

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testimony of Xenophon is thus confirmed by that of Plato, and we are therefore justified in calling Socrates the first utilitarian; as indeed there is no side or aspect of philosophy which may not with reason be ascribed to him—he is Cynic and Cyrenaic, Platonist and Aristotelian in one. But in the *Phaedo* the Socratic has already passed into a more ideal point of view (pp. 68, 69); and he, or rather Plato speaking in his person, expressly repudiates the notion that the exchange of a less pleasure for a greater can be an exchange of virtue. Such virtue is the virtue of ordinary men who live in the world of appearance; they are temperate only that they may enjoy the pleasures of intemperance, and courageous from fear of danger. Whereas the philosopher is seeking after wisdom and not after pleasure, whether near or distant: he is the mystic, the initiated, who has learnt to despise the body and is yearning all his life long for a truth which will hereafter be revealed to him. In the *Republic* (ix. 582) the pleasures of knowledge are affirmed to be superior to other pleasures, because the philosopher so estimates them; and he alone has had experience of both kinds. (Compare a similar argument urged by one of the latest defenders of Utilitarianism, Mill's *Utilitarianism*, p. 12.) In the *Philebus*, Plato, although he regards the enemies of pleasure with complacency, still further modifies the transcendentalism of the *Phaedo*. For he is compelled to confess, rather reluctantly, perhaps, that some pleasures, i. e. those which have no antecedent pains, claim a place in the scale of goods.

There have been many reasons why not only Plato but mankind in general have been unwilling to acknowledge that 'pleasure is the chief good.' Either they have heard a voice calling to them out of another world; or the life and example of some great teacher has cast their thoughts of right and wrong in another mould; or the word 'pleasure' has been associated in their mind with merely animal enjoyment. They could not believe that what they were always striving to overcome, and the power or principle in them which overcame, were of the same nature. The pleasure of doing good to others and of bodily self-indulgence, the pleasures of intellect and the pleasures of sense, are so different:—Why then should they be called by a common name? Or, if the equivocal or metaphorical use of the word is justified by custom (like the use of other words which at first referred only to

the body, and then by a figure have been transferred to the mind), still, why should we make an ambiguous word the corner-stone of moral philosophy? To the higher thinker the Utilitarian or hedonistic mode of speaking has been at variance with religion and with any higher conception both of politics and of morals. It has not satisfied their imagination; it has offended their taste. To elevate pleasure, 'the most fleeting of all things,' into a general idea seems to such men a contradiction. They do not desire to bring down their theory to the level of their practice. The simplicity of the 'greatest happiness' principle has been acceptable to philosophers, but the better part of the world has been slow to receive it.

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Before proceeding, we may make a few admissions which will narrow the field of dispute; and we may as well leave behind a few prejudices, which intelligent opponents of Utilitarianism have by this time 'agreed to discard' (Phil. 14 D). We admit that Utility is coextensive with right, and that no action can be right which does not tend to the happiness of mankind; we acknowledge that a large class of actions are made right or wrong by their consequences only; we say further that mankind are not too mindful, but that they are far too regardless of consequences, and that they need to have the doctrine of utility habitually inculcated on them. We recognize the value of a principle which can supply a connecting link between Ethics and Politics, and under which all human actions are or may be included. The desire to promote happiness is no mean preference of expediency to right, but one of the highest and noblest motives by which human nature can be animated. Neither in referring actions to the test of utility have we to make a laborious calculation, any more than in trying them by other standards of morals. For long ago they have been classified sufficiently for all practical purposes by the thinker, by the legislator, by the opinion of the world. Whatever may be the hypothesis on which they are explained, or which in doubtful cases may be applied to the regulation of them, we are very rarely, if ever, called upon at the moment of performing them to determine their effect upon the happiness of mankind.

There is a theory which has been contrasted with Utility by Paley and others—the theory of a moral sense: Are our ideas of right and wrong innate or derived from experience? This, perhaps, is another of those speculations which intelligent men might

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‘agree to discard.’ For it has been worn threadbare ; and either alternative is equally consistent with a transcendental or with an eudaemonistic system of ethics, with a greatest happiness principle or with Kant’s law of duty. Yet to avoid misconception, what appears to be the truth about the origin of our moral ideas may be shortly summed up as follows : — To each of us individually our moral ideas come first of all in childhood through the medium of education, from parents and teachers, assisted by the unconscious influence of language ; they are impressed upon a mind which at first is like a waxen tablet, adapted to receive them ; but they soon become fixed or set, and in after life are strengthened, or perhaps weakened by the force of public opinion. They may be corrected and enlarged by experience, they may be reasoned about, they may be brought home to us by the circumstances of our lives, they may be intensified by imagination, by reflection, by a course of action likely to confirm them. Under the influence of religious feeling or by an effort of thought, any one beginning with the ordinary rules of morality may create out of them for himself ideals of holiness and virtue. They slumber in the minds of most men, yet in all of us there remains some tincture of affection, some desire of good, some sense of truth, some fear of the law. Of some such state or process each individual is conscious in himself, and if he compares his own experience with that of others he will find the witness of their consciences to coincide with that of his own. All of us have entered into an inheritance which we have the power of appropriating and making use of. No great effort of mind is required on our part ; we learn morals, as we learn to talk, instinctively, from conversing with others, in an enlightened age, in a civilized country, in a good home. A well-educated child of ten years old already knows the essentials of morals : ‘Thou shalt not steal,’ ‘thou shalt speak the truth,’ ‘thou shalt love thy parents,’ ‘thou shalt fear God.’ What more does he want ?

But whence comes this common inheritance or stock of moral ideas ? Their beginning, like all other beginnings of human things, is obscure, and is the least important part of them. Imagine, if you will, that Society originated in the herding of brutes, in their parental instincts, in their rude attempts at self-preservation : — Man is not man in that he resembles, but in that



he differs from them. We must pass into another cycle of existence, before we can discover in him by any evidence accessible to us even the germs of our moral ideas. In the history of the world, which viewed from within is the history of the human mind, they have been slowly created by religion, by poetry, by law, having their foundation in the natural affections and in the necessity of some degree of truth and justice in a social state; they have been deepened and enlarged by the efforts of great thinkers who have idealized and connected them — by the lives of saints and prophets who have taught and exemplified them. The schools of ancient philosophy which seem so far from us — Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, the Epicureans, and a few modern teachers, such as Kant and Bentham, have each of them supplied ‘moments’ of thought to the world. The life of Christ has embodied a divine love, wisdom, patience, reasonableness. From his image, however imperfectly handed down to us, the modern world has received a standard more perfect in idea than the societies of ancient times, but also further removed from practice. For there is certainly a greater interval between the theory and practice of Christians than between the theory and practice of the Greeks and Romans; the ideal is more above us, and the aspiration after good has often lent a strange power to evil. And sometimes, as at the Reformation, or French Revolution, when the upper classes of a so-called Christian country have become corrupted by priestcraft, by casuistry, by licentiousness, by despotism, the lower have risen up and re-asserted the natural sense of religion and right.

We may further remark that our moral ideas, as the world grows older, perhaps as we grow older ourselves, unless they have been undermined in us by false philosophy or the practice of mental analysis, or infected by the corruption of society or by some moral disorder in the individual, are constantly assuming a more natural and necessary character. The habit of the mind, the opinion of the world, familiarizes them to us; and they take more and more the form of immediate intuition. The moral sense comes last and not first in the order of their development, and is the instinct which we have inherited or acquired, not the nobler effort of reflection which created them and which keeps them alive. We do not stop to reason about common honesty. When-

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ever we are not blinded by self-deceit, as for example in judging the actions of others, we have no hesitation in determining what is right and wrong. The principles of morality, when not at variance with some desire or worldly interest of our own, or with the opinion of the public, are hardly perceived by us; but in the conflict of reason and passion they assert their authority and are not overcome without remorse.

Such is a brief outline of the history of our moral ideas. We have to distinguish, first of all, the manner in which they have grown up in the world from the manner in which they have been communicated to each of us. We may represent them to ourselves as flowing out of the boundless ocean of language and thought in little rills, which convey them to the heart and brain of each individual. But neither must we confound the theories or aspects of morality with the origin of our moral ideas. These are not the roots or 'origines' of morals, but the latest efforts of reflection, the lights in which the whole moral world has been regarded by different thinkers and successive generations of men. If we ask: Which of these many theories is the true one? we may answer: All of them — moral sense, innate ideas, *a priori*, *a posteriori* notions, the philosophy of experience, the philosophy of intuition — all of them have added something to our conception of Ethics; no one of them is the whole truth. But to decide how far our ideas of morality are derived from one source or another; to determine what history, what philosophy has contributed to them; to distinguish the original, simple elements from the manifold and complex applications of them, would be a long enquiry too far removed from the question which we are now pursuing.

Bearing in mind the distinction which we have been seeking to establish between our earliest and our most mature ideas of morality, we may now proceed to state the theory of Utility, not exactly in the words, but in the spirit of one of its ablest and most moderate supporters<sup>1</sup>: — 'That which alone makes actions either right or desirable is their utility, or tendency to promote the happiness of mankind, or, in other words, to increase the sum of pleasure in the world. But all pleasures are not the same: they differ in quality as well as in quantity, and the pleasure which is superior in quality is incommensurable with the inferior. Neither is the pleasure or

<sup>1</sup> Mill's Utilitarianism.

happiness, which we seek, our own pleasure, but that of others,— of our family, of our country, of mankind. The desire of this, and even the sacrifice of our own interest to that of other men, may become a passion to a rightly educated nature. The Utilitarian finds a place in his system for this virtue and for every other.’

Good or happiness or pleasure is thus regarded as the true and only end of human life. To this all our desires will be found to tend, and in accordance with this all the virtues, including justice, may be explained. Admitting that men rest for a time in inferior ends, and do not cast their eyes beyond them, these ends are really dependent on the greater end of happiness, and would not be pursued, unless in general they had been found to lead to it. The existence of such an end is proved, as in Aristotle’s time, so in our own, by the universal fact that men desire it. The obligation to promote it is based upon the social nature of man; this sense of duty is shared by all of us in some degree, and is capable of being greatly fostered and strengthened. So far from being inconsistent with religion, the greatest happiness principle is in the highest degree agreeable to it. For what can be more reasonable than that God should will the happiness of all his creatures? and in working out their happiness we may be said to be ‘working together with him.’ Nor is it inconceivable that a new enthusiasm of the future, far stronger than any old religion, may be based upon such a conception.

But then for the familiar phrase of the ‘greatest happiness principle,’ it seems as if we ought now to read ‘the noblest happiness principle,’ ‘the happiness of others principle’—the principle not of the greatest, but of the highest pleasure, pursued with no more regard to our own immediate interest than is required by the law of self-preservation. Transfer the thought of happiness to another life, dropping the external circumstances which form so large a part of our idea of happiness in this, and the meaning of the word becomes indistinguishable from holiness, harmony, wisdom, love. By the slight addition ‘of others,’ all the associations of the word are altered; we seem to have passed over from one theory of morals to the opposite. For allowing that the happiness of others is reflected on ourselves, and also that every man must live before he can do good to others, still the last limitation is a very trifling exception, and the happiness of another is very far from

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compensating for the loss of our own. According to Mr. Mill, he would best carry out the principle of utility who sacrificed his own pleasure most to that of his fellow-men. But if so, Hobbes and Butler, Shaftesbury and Hume, are not so far apart as they and their followers imagine. The thought of self and the thought of others are alike superseded in the more general notion of the happiness of mankind at large. But in this composite good, until society becomes perfected, the friend of man himself has generally the least share, and may be a great sufferer.

And now what objection have we to urge against a system of moral philosophy so beneficent, so enlightened, so ideal, and at the same time so practical,—so Christian, as we may say without exaggeration,—and which has the further advantage of resting morality on a principle intelligible to all capacities? Have we not found that which Socrates and Plato ‘grew old in seeking’? Are we not desirous of happiness, at any rate for ourselves and our friends, if not for all mankind? If, as is natural, we begin by thinking of ourselves first, we are easily led on to think of others; for we cannot help acknowledging that what is right for us is the right and inheritance of others. We feel the advantage of an abstract principle wide enough and strong enough to override all the particularisms of mankind; which acknowledges a universal good, truth, right; which is capable of inspiring men like a passion, and is the symbol of a cause for which they are ready to contend to their life’s end.

And if we test this principle by the lives of its professors, it would certainly appear inferior to none as a rule of action. From the days of Eudoxus (Arist. Ethics, x. 2) and Epicurus to our own, the votaries of pleasure have gained belief for their principles by their practice. Two of the noblest and most disinterested men who have lived in this century, Bentham and J. S. Mill, whose lives were a long devotion to the service of their fellows, have been among the most enthusiastic supporters of utility; while among their contemporaries, some who were of a more mystical turn of mind, have ended rather in aspiration than in action, and have been found unequal to the duties of life. Looking back on them now that they are removed from the scene, we feel that mankind has been the better for them. The world was against them while they lived; but this



is rather a reason for admiring than for depreciating them. Nor can any one doubt that the influence of their philosophy on politics—especially on foreign politics, on law, on social life, has been upon the whole beneficial. Nevertheless, they will never have justice done to them, for they do not agree either with the better feeling of the multitude or with the idealism of more refined thinkers. Without Bentham, a great word in the history of philosophy would have remained unspoken. Yet to this day it is rare to hear his name received with any mark of respect such as would be freely granted to the ambiguous memory of some father of the Church. The odium which attached to him when alive has not been removed by his death. For he shocked his contemporaries by egotism and want of taste; and this generation which has reaped the benefit of his labours has inherited the feeling of the last. He was before his own age, and is hardly remembered in this.

While acknowledging the benefits which the greatest happiness principle has conferred upon mankind, the time appears to have arrived, not for denying its claims, but for criticizing them and comparing them with other principles which equally claim to lie at the foundation of ethics. Any one who adds a general principle to knowledge has been a benefactor to the world. But there is a danger that, in his first enthusiasm, he may not recognize the proportions or limitations to which his truth is subjected; he does not see how far he has given birth to a truism, or how that which is a truth to him is a truism to the rest of the world; or may degenerate in the next generation. He believes that to be the whole which is only a part,—to be the necessary foundation which is really only a valuable aspect of the truth. The systems of all philosophers require the criticism of ‘the morrow,’ when the heat of imagination which forged them has cooled, and they are seen in the temperate light of day. All of them have contributed to enrich the mind of the civilized world; none of them occupy that supreme or exclusive place which their authors would have assigned to them.

We may preface the criticism with a few preliminary remarks:—

Mr. Mill, Mr. Austin, and others. in their eagerness to maintain the doctrine of utility, are fond of repeating that we are in a

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lamentable state of uncertainty about morals. While other branches of knowledge have made extraordinary progress, in moral philosophy we are supposed by them to be no better than children, and with few exceptions—that is to say, Bentham and his followers—to be no further advanced than men were in the age of Socrates and Plato, who, in their turn, are deemed to be as backward in ethics as they necessarily were in physics. But this, though often asserted, is recanted almost in a breath by the same writers who speak thus depreciatingly of our modern ethical philosophy. For they are the first to acknowledge that we have not now to begin classifying actions under the head of utility; they would not deny that about the general conceptions of morals there is a practical agreement. There is no more doubt that falsehood is wrong than that a stone falls to the ground, although the first does not admit of the same ocular proof as the second. There is no greater uncertainty about the duty of obedience to parents and to the law of the land than about the properties of triangles. Unless we are looking for a new moral world which has no marrying and giving in marriage, there is no greater disagreement in theory about the right relations of the sexes than about the composition of water. These and a few other simple principles, as they have endless applications in practice, so also may be developed in theory into counsels of perfection.

To what then is to be attributed this opinion which has been often entertained about the uncertainty of morals? Chiefly to this,—that philosophers have not always distinguished the theoretical and the casuistical uncertainty of morals from the practical certainty. There is an uncertainty about details,—whether, for example, under given circumstances such and such a moral principle is to be enforced, or whether in some cases there may not be a conflict of duties: these are the exceptions to the ordinary rules of morality, important, indeed, but not extending to the one thousandth or one ten-thousandth part of human actions. This is the domain of casuistry. Secondly, the aspects under which the most general principles of morals may be presented to us are many and various. The mind of man has been more than usually active in thinking about man. The conceptions of harmony, happiness, right, freedom, benevolence, self-love, have

all of them seemed to some philosopher or other the truest and most comprehensive expression of morality. There is no difference, or at any rate no great difference, of opinion about the right and wrong of actions, but only about the general notion which furnishes the best explanation or gives the most comprehensive view of them. This, in the language of Kant, is the sphere of the metaphysic of ethics. But these two uncertainties at either end, *ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα καθόλου* and *ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἑκάστα*, leave space enough for an intermediate principle which is practically certain.

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The rule of human life is not dependent on the theories of philosophers: we know what our duties are for the most part before we speculate about them. And the use of speculation is not to teach us what we already know, but to inspire in our minds an interest about morals in general, to strengthen our conception of the virtues by showing that they confirm one another, to prove to us, as Socrates would have said, that they are not many, but one. There is the same kind of pleasure and use in reducing morals, as in reducing physics, to a few very simple truths. And not unfrequently the more general principle may correct prejudices and misconceptions, and enable us to regard our fellow-men in a larger and more generous spirit.

The two qualities which seem to be most required in first principles of ethics are, (1) that they should afford a real explanation of the facts, (2) that they should inspire the mind,—should harmonize, strengthen, settle us. We can hardly estimate the influence which a simple principle such as 'Act so as to promote the happiness of mankind,' or 'Act so that the rule on which thou actest may be adopted as a law by all rational beings,' may exercise on the mind of an individual. They will often seem to open a new world to him, like the religious conceptions of faith or the spirit of God. The difficulties of ethics disappear when we do not suffer ourselves to be distracted between different points of view. But to maintain their hold on us, the general principles must also be psychologically true—they must agree with our experience, they must accord with the habits of our minds.

When we are told that actions are right or wrong only in

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so far as they tend towards happiness, we naturally ask what is meant by 'happiness.' For the term in the common use of language is only to a certain extent commensurate with moral good and evil. We should hardly say that a good man could be utterly miserable (Arist. Ethics, i. 10. §§ 12, 13), or place a bad man in the first rank of happiness. But yet, from various circumstances, the measure of a man's happiness may be out of all proportion to his desert. And if we insist on calling the good man alone happy, we shall be using the term in some new and transcendental sense, as synonymous with well-being. We have already seen that happiness includes the happiness of others as well as our own; we must now comprehend unconscious as well as conscious happiness under the same word. There is no harm in this extension of the meaning, but a word which admits of such an extension can hardly be made the basis of a philosophical system. The exactness which is required in philosophy will not allow us to comprehend under the same term two ideas so different as the subjective feeling of pleasure or happiness and the objective reality of a state which receives our moral approval.

Like Protarchus in the *Philebus*, we can give no answer to the question, 'What is that common quality which in all states of human life we call happiness? which includes the lower and the higher kind of happiness, and is the aim of the noblest, as well as of the meanest of mankind?' If we say 'Not pleasure, not virtue, not wisdom, nor yet any quality which we can abstract from these'—what then? After seeming to hover for a time on the verge of a great truth, we have gained only a truism.

Let us ask the question in another form. What is that which constitutes happiness, over and above the several ingredients of health, wealth, pleasure, virtue, knowledge, which are included under it? Perhaps we answer, 'The subjective feeling of them.' But this is very far from being coextensive with right. Or we may reply that happiness is the whole of which the above-mentioned are the parts. Still the question recurs, 'In what does the whole differ from all the parts?' And if we are unable to distinguish them, happiness will be the mere aggregate of the goods of life.



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Again, while admitting that in all right action there is an element of happiness, we cannot help seeing that the utilitarian theory supplies a much easier explanation of some virtues than of others. Of many patriotic or benevolent actions we can give a straightforward account by their tendency to promote happiness. For the explanation of justice, on the other hand, we have to go a long way round. No man is indignant with a thief because he has not promoted the greatest happiness of the greatest number, but because he has done him a wrong. There is an immeasurable interval between a crime against property or life, and the omission of an act of charity or benevolence. Yet of this interval the utilitarian theory takes no cognizance. The greatest happiness principle strengthens our sense of positive duties towards others, but weakens our recognition of their rights. To promote in every way possible the happiness of others may be a counsel of perfection, but hardly seems to offer any ground for a theory of obligation. For admitting that our ideas of obligation are partly derived from religion and custom, yet they seem also to contain other essential elements which cannot be explained by the tendency of actions to promote happiness. Whence comes the necessity of them? Why are some actions rather than others which equally tend to the happiness of mankind imposed upon us with the authority of law? 'You ought' and 'you had better' are fundamental distinctions in human thought; and having such distinctions, why should we seek to efface and unsettle them?

Bentham and Mr. Mill are earnest in maintaining that happiness includes the happiness of others as well as of ourselves. But what two notions can be more opposed in many cases than these? Granting that in a perfect state of the world my own happiness and that of all other men would coincide, in the imperfect state they often diverge, and I cannot truly bridge over the difficulty by saying that men will always find pleasure in sacrificing themselves or in suffering for others. Upon the greatest happiness principle it is admitted that I am to have a share, and in consistency I should pursue my own happiness as impartially as that of my neighbour. But who can decide what proportion should be mine and what his, except on the principle that I am most likely to be deceived in my own

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favour, and had therefore better give the larger share, if not all, to him?

Further, it is admitted that utility and right coincide, not in particular instances, but in classes of actions. But is it not distracting to the conscience of a man to be told that in the particular case they are opposed? Happiness is said to be the ground of moral obligation, yet he must not do what clearly conduces to his own happiness if it is at variance with the good of the whole. Nay, further, he will be taught that when utility and right are in apparent conflict any amount of utility does not alter by a hair's-breadth the morality of actions, which cannot be allowed to deviate from established law or usage; and that the non-detection of an immoral act, say of telling a lie, which may often make the greatest difference in the consequences, not only to himself, but to all the world, makes none whatever in the act itself.

Again, if we are concerned not with particular actions but with classes of actions, is the tendency of actions to happiness a principle upon which we can classify them? There is a universal law which imperatively declares certain acts to be right or wrong:—can there be any universality in the law which measures actions by their tendencies towards happiness? For an act which is the cause of happiness to one person may be the cause of unhappiness to another; or an act which if performed by one person may increase the happiness of mankind may have the opposite effect if performed by another. Right can never be wrong, or wrong right, but there are no actions which tend to the happiness of mankind which may not under other circumstances tend to their unhappiness. Unless we say not only that all right actions tend to happiness, but that they tend to happiness in the same degree in which they are right (and in that case the word 'right' is plainer), we weaken the absoluteness of our moral standard; we reduce differences in kind to differences in degree; we obliterate the stamp which the authority of ages has set upon vice and crime.

Once more: turning from theory to practice we feel the importance of retaining the received distinctions of morality. Words such as truth, justice, honesty, virtue, love, have a simple meaning; they have become sacred to us,—'the word of God' written on

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the human heart : to no other words can the same associations be attached. We cannot explain them adequately on principles of utility ; in attempting to do so we rob them of their true character. We give them a meaning often paradoxical and distorted, and generally weaker than their signification in common language. And as words influence men's thoughts, we fear that the hold of morality may also be weakened, and the sense of duty impaired, if virtue and vice are explained only as the qualities which do or do not contribute to the pleasure of the world. In that very expression we seem to detect a false ring, for pleasure is individual not universal ; we speak of eternal and immutable justice, but not of eternal and immutable pleasure ; nor by any refinement can we avoid some taint of bodily sense adhering to the meaning of the word.

Again : the higher the view which men take of life, the more they lose sight of their own pleasure or interest. True religion is not working for a reward only, but is ready to work equally without a reward. It is not 'doing the will of God for the sake of eternal happiness,' but doing the will of God because it is best, whether rewarded or unrewarded. And this applies to others as well as to ourselves. For he who sacrifices himself for the good of others, does not sacrifice himself that they may be saved from the persecution which he endures for their sakes, but rather that they in their turn may be able to undergo similar sufferings, and like him stand fast in the truth. To promote their happiness is not his first object, but to elevate their moral nature. Both in his own case and that of others there may be happiness in the distance, but if there were no happiness he would equally act as he does. We are speaking of the highest and noblest natures ; and a passing thought naturally arises in our minds, 'Whether that can be the first principle of morals which is hardly regarded in their own case by the greatest benefactors of mankind?'

The admissions that pleasures differ in kind, and that actions are already classified ; the acknowledgment that happiness includes the happiness of others, as well as of ourselves ; the confusion (not made by Aristotle) between conscious and unconscious happiness, or between happiness the energy and happiness the result of the energy, introduce uncertainty and inconsistency into the whole enquiry. We reason readily

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and cheerfully from a greatest happiness principle. But we find that utilitarians do not agree among themselves about the meaning of the word. Still less can they impart to others a common conception or conviction of the nature of happiness. The meaning of the word is always insensibly slipping away from us, into pleasure, out of pleasure, now appearing as the motive, now as the test of actions, and sometimes varying in successive sentences. And as in a mathematical demonstration an error in the original number disturbs the whole calculation which follows, this fundamental uncertainty about the word vitiates all the applications of it. Must we not admit that a notion so uncertain in meaning, so void of content, so at variance with common language and opinion, does not comply adequately with either of our two requirements? It can neither strike the imaginative faculty, nor give an explanation of phenomena which is in accordance with our individual experience. It is indefinite; it supplies only a partial account of human actions: it is one among many theories of philosophers. It may be compared with other notions, such as the chief good of Plato, which may be best expressed to us under the form of a harmony, or with Kant's obedience to law, which may be summed up under the word 'duty,' or with the Stoical 'Follow nature,' and seems to have no advantage over them. All of these present a certain aspect of moral truth. None of them are, or indeed profess to be, the only principle of morals.

And this brings us to speak of the most serious objection to the utilitarian system — its exclusiveness. There is no place for Kant or Hegel, for Plato and Aristotle alongside of it. They do not reject the greatest happiness principle, but it rejects them. Now the phenomena of moral action differ, and some are best explained upon one principle and some upon another: the virtue of justice seems to be naturally connected with one theory of morals, the virtues of temperance and benevolence with another. The characters of men also differ; and some are more attracted by one aspect of the truth, some by another. The firm stoical nature will conceive virtue under the conception of law, the philanthropist under that of doing good, the quietist under that of resignation, the enthusiast under that of faith or love. The upright man of the world will desire above all things that morality



should be plain and fixed, and should use language in its ordinary sense. Persons of an imaginative temperament will generally be dissatisfied with the words 'utility' or 'pleasure': their principle of right is of a far higher character — what or where to be found they cannot always distinctly tell; — deduced from the laws of human nature, says one; resting on the will of God, says another; based upon some transcendental idea which animates more worlds than one, says a third:

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ὦν νόμοι πρόκεινται ὑψίποδες, οὐρανίαν  
δὲ αἰθέρα τεκνωθέντες.

To satisfy an imaginative nature in any degree, the doctrine of utility must be so transfigured that it becomes altogether different and loses all simplicity.

But why, since there are different characters among men, should we not allow them to envisage morality accordingly, and be thankful to the great men who have provided for all of us modes and instruments of thought? Would the world have been better if there had been no Stoics or Kantists, no Platonists or Cartesians? No more than if the other pole of moral philosophy had been excluded. All men have principles which are above their practice; they admit premises which, if carried to their conclusions, are a sufficient basis of morals. In asserting liberty of speculation we are not encouraging individuals to make right or wrong for themselves, but only conceding that they may choose the form under which they prefer to contemplate them. Nor do we say that one of these aspects is as true and good as another; but that they all of them, if they are not mere sophisms and illusions, define and bring into relief some part of the truth which would have been obscure without their light. Why should we endeavour to bind all men within the limits of a single metaphysical conception? The necessary imperfection of language seems to require that we should view the same truth under more than one aspect.

We are living in the second age of utilitarianism, when the charm of novelty and the fervour of the first disciples has passed away. The doctrine is no longer stated in the forcible paradoxical manner of Bentham, but has to be adapted to meet objections; its corners are rubbed off, and the meaning of its most characteristic expressions is softened. The array of the enemy melts away

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when we approach him. The greatest happiness of the greatest number was a great original idea when enunciated by Bentham, which leavened a generation and has left its mark on thought and civilization in all succeeding times. His grasp of it had the intensity of genius. In the spirit of an ancient philosopher he would have denied that pleasures differed in kind, or that by happiness he meant anything but pleasure. He would perhaps have revolted us by his thoroughness. The 'guardianship of his doctrine' has passed into other hands; and now we seem to see its weak points, its ambiguities, its want of exactness while assuming the highest exactness, its one-sidedness, its paradoxical explanation of several of the virtues. No philosophy has ever stood this criticism of the next generation, though the founders of all of them have imagined that they were built upon a rock. And the utilitarian system, like others, has yielded to the inevitable analysis. Even in the opinion of 'her admirers she has been terribly damaged' (Phil. 23 A), and is no longer the only moral philosophy, but one among many which have contributed in various degrees to the intellectual progress of mankind.

But because the utilitarian philosophy can no longer claim 'the prize,' we must not refuse to acknowledge the great benefits conferred by it on the world. All philosophies are refuted in their turn, says the sceptic, and he looks forward to all future systems sharing the fate of the past. All philosophies remain, says the thinker; they have done a great work in their own day, and they supply posterity with aspects of the truth and with instruments of thought. Though they may be shorn of their glory, they retain their place in the organism of knowledge.

And still there remain many rules of morals which are better explained and more forcibly inculcated on the principle of utility than on any other. The question Will such and such an action promote the happiness of myself, my family, my country, the world? may check the rising feeling of pride or honour which would cause a quarrel, an estrangement, a war. 'How can I contribute to the greatest happiness of others?' is another form of the question which will be more attractive to the minds of many than a deduction of the duty of benevolence from a *a priori* principles. In politics especially hardly any other argument can be allowed to have weight except the happiness of a people. All

parties alike profess to aim at this, which though often used only as the disguise of self-interest has a great and real influence on the minds of statesmen. In religion, again, nothing can more tend to mitigate superstition than the belief that the good of man is also the will of God. This is an easy test to which the prejudices and superstitions of men may be brought : — whatever does not tend to the good of men is not of God. And the ideal of the greatest happiness of mankind, especially if believed to be the will of God, when compared with the actual fact, will be one of the strongest motives to do good to others.

On the other hand, when the temptation is to speak falsely, to be dishonest or unjust, or in any way to interfere with the rights of others, the argument that these actions regarded as a class will not conduce to the happiness of mankind, though true enough, seems to have less force than the feeling which is already implanted in the mind by conscience and authority. To resolve this feeling into the greatest happiness principle takes away from its sacred and authoritative character. The martyr will not go to the stake in order that he may promote the happiness of mankind, but for the sake of the truth : neither will the soldier advance to the cannon's mouth merely because he believes military discipline to be for the good of mankind. It is better for him to know that he will be shot, that he will be disgraced, if he runs away — he has no need to look beyond military honour, patriotism, ' England expects every man to do his duty.' These are stronger motives than the greatest happiness of the greatest number, which is the thesis of a philosopher, not the watchword of an army. For in human actions men do not always require broad principles ; duties often come home to us more when they are limited and defined, and sanctioned by custom and public opinion.

Lastly, if we turn to the history of ethics, we shall find that our moral ideas have originated not in utility but in religion, in law, in conceptions of nature, of an ideal good, and the like. And many may be inclined to think that this conclusively disproves the claim of utility to be the basis of morals. But the utilitarian will fairly reply (see above) that we must distinguish the origin of ethics from the principles of them — the historical germ from the later growth of reflection. And he may also truly add that for two thousand years and more, utility, if not the originating, has been

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the great corrective principle in law, in politics, in religion, leading men to ask how evil may be diminished and good increased — by what course of policy the public interest may be promoted, and to understand that God wills the happiness, not of some of his creatures and in this world only, but of all of them and in every stage of their existence.

‘What is the place of happiness or utility in a system of moral philosophy?’ is analogous to the question asked in the *Philebus*, ‘What rank does pleasure hold in the scale of goods?’ Admitting the greatest happiness principle to be true and valuable, and the necessary foundation of that part of morals which relates to the consequences of actions, we still have to consider whether this or some other general notion is the highest principle of human life. We may try them in this comparison by three tests — definiteness, comprehensiveness, and motive power.

There are three subjective principles of morals,—sympathy, benevolence, self-love. But sympathy seems to rest morality on feelings which differ widely even in good men; benevolence and self-love torture one half of our virtuous actions into the likeness of the other. The greatest happiness principle, which includes both, has the advantage over all these in comprehensiveness, but the advantage is purchased at the expense of definiteness.

Again, there are the legal and political principles of morals — freedom, equality, rights of persons; ‘Every man to count for one and no man for more than one,’ ‘Every man equal in the eye of the law and of the legislator.’ There is also the other sort of political morality, which if not beginning with ‘*Might is right*,’ at any rate seeks to deduce our ideas of justice from the necessities of the state and of society. According to this view the greatest good of men is obedience to law: the best human government is a rational despotism, and the best idea which we can form of a divine being is that of a despot acting not wholly without regard to law and order. To such a view the present mixed state of the world, not wholly evil or wholly good, is supposed to be a witness. More we might desire to have, but are not permitted. Though a human tyrant would be intolerable, a divine tyrant is a very tolerable governor of the universe. This is the doctrine of *Thrasymachus* adapted to the public opinion of modern times.

There is yet a third view which combines the two:—freedom is



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obedience to the law, and the greatest order is also the greatest freedom; 'Act so that thy action may be the law of every intelligent being.' This view is noble and elevating; but it seems to err, like other transcendental principles of ethics, in being too abstract. For there is the same difficulty in connecting the idea of duty with particular duties as in bridging the gulf between *φαινόμενα* and *ὄντα*; and when, as in the system of Kant, this universal idea or law is held to be independent of space and time, such a *μάταιον εἶδος* becomes almost unmeaning.

Once more there are the religious principles of morals: — the will of God revealed in Scripture and in nature. No philosophy has supplied a sanction equal in authority to this, or a motive equal in strength to the belief in another life. Yet about these too we must ask What will of God? how revealed to us, and by what proofs? Religion, like happiness, is a word which has great influence apart from any consideration of its content: it may be for great good or for great evil. But true religion is the synthesis of religion and morality, beginning with divine perfection in which all human perfection is embodied. It moves among ideas of holiness, justice, love, wisdom, truth; these are to God, in whom they are personified, what the Platonic ideas are to the idea of good. It is the consciousness of the will of God that all men should be as he is. It lives in this world and is known to us only through the phenomena of this world, but it extends to worlds beyond. Ordinary religion which is alloyed with motives of this world may easily be in excess, may be fanatical, may be interested, may be the mask of ambition, may be perverted in a thousand ways. But of that religion which combines the will of God with our highest ideas of truth and right there can never be too much. This impossibility of excess is the note of divine moderation.

So then, having briefly passed in review the various principles of moral philosophy, we may now arrange our goods in order, though, like the reader of the Philebus, we have a difficulty in distinguishing the different aspects of them from one another, or defining the point at which the human passes into the divine.

First, the eternal will of God in this world and in another, — justice, holiness, wisdom, love, without succession of acts (*οἷχα ἡ γένεσις πρόσεστιν*), which is known to us in part only, and revered by us as divine perfection.

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Secondly, human perfection, or the fulfilment of the will of God in this world, and co-operation with his laws revealed to us by reason and experience, in nature, history, and in our own minds.

Thirdly, the elements of human perfection,— virtue, knowledge, and right opinion.

Fourthly, the external conditions of perfection,— health and the goods of life.

Fifthly, beauty and happiness,— the inward enjoyment of that which is best and fairest in this world and in the human soul.

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THE *Philebus* is probably the latest in time of the writings of Plato with the exception of the *Laws*. We have in it therefore the last development of his philosophy. The extreme and one-sided doctrines of the Cynics and Cyrenaics are included in a larger whole (pp. 20, 21, 44, &c.); the relations of pleasure and knowledge to each other and to the good are authoritatively determined (63 ff.); the Eleatic Being and the Heraclitean Flux no longer divide the empire of thought (25 ff.); the Mind of Anaxagoras has become the Mind of God and of the World. The great distinction between pure and applied science for the first time has a place in philosophy; the natural claim of dialectic to be the Queen of the Sciences is once more affirmed. This latter is the bond of union which pervades the whole or nearly the whole of the Platonic writings. And here as in several other dialogues (*Phaedrus* 265, *Rep.* 534 ff., *Symp.* 210 ff., &c.) it is presented to us in a manner playful yet also serious, and sometimes as if the thought of it were too great for human utterance and came down from heaven direct (16 C, 25 B). It is the organization of knowledge wonderful to think of at a time when knowledge itself could hardly be said to exist. It is this more than any other element which distinguishes Plato, not only from the presocratic philosophers, but from Socrates himself.

We have not yet reached the confines of Aristotle, but we make a somewhat nearer approach to him in the *Philebus* than in the earlier Platonic writings. The germs of logic are beginning to appear, but they are not collected into a whole, or made a separate science or system. Many thinkers of many different schools have to be interposed between the *Parmenides* or *Philebus* of Plato,

and the Physics or Metaphysics of Aristotle. It is this interval upon which we have to fix our minds if we would rightly understand the character of the transition from one to the other. Plato and Aristotle do not dovetail into one another; nor does the one begin where the other ends; there is a gulf between them not to be measured by time, which in the fragmentary state of our knowledge it is impossible to bridge over. It follows that the one cannot be interpreted by the other. At any rate, it is not Plato who is to be interpreted by Aristotle, but Aristotle by Plato. Of all philosophy and of all art the true understanding is to be sought not in the afterthoughts of posterity, but in the elements out of which they have arisen. For the previous stage is a tendency towards the ideal at which they are aiming; the later is a declination or deviation from them, or even a perversion of them. No man's thoughts were ever so well expressed by his disciples as by himself.

But although Plato in the *Philebus* does not come into any close connexion with Aristotle, he is now a long way from himself and from the beginnings of his own philosophy. At the time of his death he left his system still incomplete; or he may be more truly said to have had no system, but to have lived in the successive stages or moments of metaphysical thought which presented themselves from time to time. The earlier discussions about universal ideas and definitions seem to have died away; the correlation of ideas has taken their place. The flowers of rhetoric and poetry have lost their freshness and charm; and a technical language has begun to supersede and overgrow them. But the power of thinking tends to increase with age, and the experience of life to widen and deepen. The good is summed up under categories which are not *summa genera*, but heads or gradations of thought. The question of pleasure and the relation of bodily pleasures to mental, which is hardly treated of elsewhere in Plato, is here analysed with great subtlety. The mean or measure is now made the first principle of good. Some of these questions reappear in Aristotle, as does also the distinction between metaphysics and mathematics. But there are many things in Plato which have been lost in Aristotle; and many things in Aristotle not to be found in Plato. The most remarkable deficiency in Aristotle is the disappearance of the Platonic dialectic, which in

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the Aristotelian school is only used in a comparatively unimportant and trivial sense. The most remarkable additions are the invention of the Syllogism, the conception of happiness as the foundation of morals, the reference of human actions to the standard of the better mind of the world, or of the one 'sensible man' or 'superior person.' His conception of *οὐσία*, or essence, is not an advance upon Plato, but a return to the poor and meagre abstractions of the Eleatic philosophy. The dry attempt to reduce the presocratic philosophy by his own rather arbitrary standard of the four causes, contrasts unfavourably with Plato's general discussion of the same subject (Sophist 242, 243). To attempt further to sum up the differences between the two great philosophers would be out of place here. Any real discussion of their relation to one another must be preceded by an examination into the nature and character of the Aristotelian writings and the form in which they have come down to us. This enquiry is not really separable from an investigation of Theophrastus as well as Aristotle and of the remains of other schools of philosophy as well as of the Peripatetics. But, without entering on this wide field, even a superficial consideration of the logical and metaphysical works which pass under the name of Aristotle, whether we suppose them to have come directly from his hand or to be the tradition of his school, is sufficient to show how great was the mental activity which prevailed in the latter half of the fourth century B. C. ; what eddies and whirlpools of controversies were surging in the chaos of thought, what transformations of the old philosophies were taking place everywhere, what eclecticisms and syncretisms and realisms and nominalisms were affecting the mind of Hellas. The decline of philosophy during this period is no less remarkable than the loss of freedom ; and the two are not unconnected with each other. But of the multitudinous sea of opinions which were current in the age of Aristotle we have no exact account. We know of them from allusions only. And we cannot with advantage fill up the void of our knowledge by conjecture : we can only make allowance for our ignorance.

There are several passages in the *Philebus* which are very characteristic of Plato, and which we shall do well to consider not only in their connexion, but apart from their connexion as inspired



sayings or oracles which receive their full interpretation only from the history of philosophy in later ages. The more serious attacks on traditional beliefs which are often veiled under an unusual simplicity or irony are of this kind. Such, for example, is the excessive and more than human awe which Socrates expresses about the names of the gods (12 C), which may be not unaptly compared with the importance attached by mankind to theological terms in other ages; for this also may be comprehended under the satire of Socrates. Let us observe the religious and intellectual enthusiasm which shines forth in the following, 'The power and faculty of loving the truth, and of doing all things for the sake of the truth' (58 E): or, again, the singular acknowledgment in 23 C, which may be regarded as the anticipation of a new logic, that 'In going to war for mind I must have weapons of a different make from those which I used before, although some of the old ones may do again.' Let us pause awhile to reflect on a sentence (29 A) which is full of meaning to reformers of religion or to the original thinker of all ages: 'Shall we then agree with them of old time, and merely reassert the notions of others without risk to ourselves; or shall we venture also to share in the risk and bear the reproach which will await us': i. e. if we assert mind to be the author of nature. Let us note the remarkable words (30 C), 'That in the divine nature of Zeus there is the soul and mind of a King, because there is in him the power of the cause,' a saying in which theology and philosophy are blended and reconciled; not omitting to observe the deep insight into human nature which is shown by the repetition of the same thought (28 C) 'All philosophers are agreed that mind is the king of heaven and earth' with the ironical addition, 'in this way truly they magnify themselves.' Nor let us pass unheeded the indignation felt by the generous youth (29 A) at the 'blasphemy' of those who say that Chaos and Chance Medley created the world; or the significance of the words 'those who said *of old time* that mind rules the universe' (30 D); or the pregnant observation (43 C) that 'we are not always conscious of what we are doing or of what happens to us,' a chance expression to which if philosophers had attended they would have escaped many errors in psychology. We may contrast the contempt which is poured upon the verbal difficulty of the one and many, and the seriousness with

*Philebus.*

INTRODUC-  
TION.

*Philebus.*INTRODUC-  
TION.

which the unity of opposites is regarded from the higher point of view of abstract ideas (14 C, 15) : or compare the simple manner in which the question of cause and effect (p. 27) and their mutual dependence is regarded by Plato (to which modern science has returned in Mill and Bacon), and the cumbrous fourfold division of causes in the Physics and Metaphysics of Aristotle, for which it has puzzled the world to find a use in so many centuries. When we consider the backwardness of knowledge in the age of Plato, the boldness with which he looks forward into the distance, the many questions of modern philosophy which are anticipated in his writings, may we not truly describe him in his own words as a 'spectator of all time and of all existence'?

# PHILEBUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES.

PROTARCHUS.

PHILEBUS.

**Steph.** *Socrates.* OBSERVE, Protarchus, the nature of the position which you are now going to take from Philebus, and what the other position is which I maintain, and which, if you do not approve of it, is to be controverted by you. Shall you and I sum up the two sides?

*Philebus.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS,  
PHILEBUS.

Philebus, who is now to be succeeded by Protarchus, maintains that pleasure is the good; Socrates prefers wisdom.

*Protarchus.* By all means.

*Soc.* Philebus was saying that enjoyment and pleasure and delight, and the class of feelings akin to them, are a good to every living being, whereas I contend, that not these, but wisdom and intelligence and memory, and their kindred, right opinion and true reasoning, are better and more desirable than pleasure for all who are able to partake of them, and that to all such who are or ever will be they are the most advantageous of all things. Have I not given, Philebus, a fair statement of the two sides of the argument?

*Philebus.* Nothing could be fairer, Socrates.

*Soc.* And do you, Protarchus, accept the position which is assigned to you?

*Pro.* I cannot do otherwise, since our excellent Philebus has left the field.

*Soc.* Surely the truth about these matters ought, by all means, to be ascertained.

Which of these two positions is the truer?

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Shall we further agree —

*Pro.* To what?

*Philebus.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS,  
PHILEBUS.

*Soc.* That you and I must now try to indicate some state and disposition of the soul which has the property of making all men happy.

*Pro.* Yes, by all means.

*Soc.* And you say that pleasure, and I say that wisdom, is such a state?

*Pro.* True.

*Soc.* And what if there be a third state, which is better than either? Then both of us are vanquished — are we not? But if this life, which really has the power of making men happy, turn out to be more akin to pleasure than to wisdom, the life of pleasure may still have the advantage over the life of wisdom.

*Pro.* True.

*Soc.* Or suppose that the better life is more nearly allied to wisdom, then wisdom conquers, and pleasure is defeated; — do you agree?

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And what do you say, Philebus?

*Phi.* I say, and shall always say, that pleasure is easily the conqueror; but you must decide for yourself, Protarchus.

*Pro.* You, Philebus, have handed over the argument to me, and have no longer a voice in the matter?

*Phi.* True enough. Nevertheless I would clear myself and deliver my soul of you; and I call the goddess herself to witness that I now do so.

*Pro.* You may appeal to us; we too will be the witnesses of your words. And now, Socrates, whether Philebus is pleased or displeased, we will proceed with the argument.

*Soc.* Then let us begin with the goddess herself, of whom Philebus says that she is called Aphrodite, but that her real name is Pleasure.

*Pro.* Very good.

*Soc.* The awe which I always feel, Protarchus, about the names of the gods is more than human — it exceeds all other fears. And now I would not sin against Aphrodite by naming her amiss; let her be called what she pleases. But Pleasure I know to be manifold, and with her, as I was just now saying, we must begin, and consider what her nature is. She has one name, and therefore you would imagine that she

In the course of our enquiry something superior both to pleasure and to wisdom may appear. In that case, if pleasure be more akin to this superior nature, pleasure must be adjudged conqueror; but if wisdom, wisdom.

We will begin with pleasure, which is one, but also has many varieties, some of them being mutually opposed.



is one; and yet surely she takes the most varied and even unlike forms. For do we not say that the intemperate has pleasure, and that the temperate has pleasure in his very temperance,—that the fool is pleased when he is full of foolish fancies and hopes, and that the wise man has pleasure in his wisdom? and how foolish would any one be who affirmed that all these opposite pleasures are severally alike!

*Pro.* Why, Socrates, they are opposed in so far as they spring from opposite sources, but they are not in themselves opposite. For must not pleasure be of all things most absolutely like pleasure,—that is, like itself?

*Soc.* Yes, my good friend, just as colour is like colour;—in so far as colours are colours, there is no difference between them; and yet we all know that black is not only unlike, but even absolutely opposed to white: or again, as figure is like figure, for all figures are comprehended under one class; and yet particular figures may be absolutely opposed to one another, and there is an infinite diversity of them. And we might find similar examples in many other things; therefore do not rely upon this argument, which would go to prove the unity of the most extreme opposites. And I suspect that we shall find a similar opposition among pleasures.

*Pro.* Very likely; but how will this invalidate the argument?

*Soc.* Why, I shall reply, that dissimilar as they are, you apply to them a new predicate, for you say that all pleasant things are good; now although no one can argue that pleasure is not pleasure, he may argue, as we are doing, that pleasures are oftener bad than good; but you call them all good, and at the same time are compelled, if you are pressed, to acknowledge that they are unlike. And so you must tell us what is the identical quality existing alike in good and bad pleasures, which makes you designate all of them as good.

*Pro.* What do you mean, Socrates? Do you think that any one who asserts pleasure to be the good, will tolerate the notion that some pleasures are good and others bad?

*Soc.* And yet you will acknowledge that they are different from one another, and sometimes opposed?

*Philebus.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

Pleasures are opposed when springing from opposite sources: in themselves they are all alike.

But this proves only that all pleasures are pleasures, and not that all pleasures are good.

*Philebus.**Pro.* Not in so far as they are pleasures.SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.We shall not  
be able to  
proceed, if  
obvious facts  
are ignored.

*Soc.* That is a return to the old position, Protarchus, and so we are to say (are we?) that there is no difference in pleasures, but that they are all alike; and the examples which have just been cited do not pierce our dull minds, but we go on arguing all the same, like the weakest and most inexperienced reasoners<sup>1</sup>?

*Pro.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* Why, I mean to say, that in self-defence I may, if I like, follow your example, and assert boldly that the two things most unlike are most absolutely alike; and the result will be that you and I will prove ourselves to be very tyros in the art of disputing; and the argument will be blown away and lost. Suppose that we put back, and return to the old position; then perhaps we may come to an understanding with one another.

*Pro.* How do you mean?

*Soc.* Shall I, Protarchus, have my own question asked of me by you?

*Pro.* What question?To say that  
there are no  
differences  
between  
pleasures, is  
as absurd as  
to say that  
there are no  
differences  
between  
sciences.

*Soc.* Ask me whether wisdom and science and mind, and those other qualities which I, when asked by you at first what is the nature of the good, affirmed to be good, are not in the same case with the pleasures of which you spoke.

*Pro.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* The sciences are a numerous class, and will be found to present great differences. But even admitting that, like the pleasures, they are opposite as well as different, should I 14  
be worthy of the name of dialectician if, in order to avoid this difficulty, I were to say (as you are saying of pleasure) that there is no difference between one science and another; — would not the argument founder and disappear like an idle tale, although we might ourselves escape drowning by clinging to a fallacy?

*Pro.* May none of this befall us, except the deliverance! Yet I like the even-handed justice which is applied to both our arguments. Let us assume, then, that there are many and diverse pleasures, and many and different sciences.

<sup>1</sup> Probably corrupt.

*Soc.* And let us have no concealment, Protarchus, of the differences between my good and yours; but let us bring them to the light in the hope that, in the process of testing them, they may show whether pleasure is to be called the good, or wisdom, or some third quality; for surely we are not now simply contending in order that my view or that yours may prevail, but I presume that we ought both of us to be fighting for the truth.

*Pro.* Certainly we ought.

*Soc.* Then let us have a more definite understanding and establish the principle on which the argument rests.

*Pro.* What principle?

*Soc.* A principle about which all men are always in a difficulty, and some men sometimes against their will.

*Pro.* Speak plainer.

*Soc.* The principle which has just turned up, which is a marvel of nature; for that one should be many or many one, are wonderful propositions; and he who affirms either is very open to attack.

*Pro.* Do you mean, when a person says that I, Protarchus, am by nature one and also many, dividing the single 'me' into many 'me's,' and even opposing them as great and small, light and heavy, and in ten thousand other ways?

*Soc.* Those, Protarchus, are the common and acknowledged paradoxes about the one and many, which I may say that everybody has by this time agreed to dismiss as childish and obvious and detrimental to the true course of thought; and no more favour is shown to that other puzzle, in which a person proves the members and parts of anything to be divided, and then confessing that they are all one, says laughingly in disproof of his own words: Why, here is a miracle, the one is many and infinite, and the many are only one.

*Pro.* But what, Socrates, are those other marvels connected with this subject which, as you imply, have not yet become  
15 common and acknowledged?

*Soc.* When, my boy, the one does not belong to the class of things that are born and perish, as in the instances which we were giving, for in those cases, and when unity is of this concrete nature, there is, as I was saying, a universal consent

*Philebus.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

We have  
lighted upon  
the old prob-  
lem of the  
One and  
Many.

The co-  
existence of  
the One and  
Many in con-  
crete objects  
presents no  
difficulty.

Our troubles  
begin with  
abstract  
unities.

*Philebus.*SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

that no refutation is needed; but when the assertion is made that man is one, or ox is one, or beauty one, or the good one, then the interest which attaches to these and similar unities and the attempt which is made to divide them gives birth to a controversy.

*Pro.* Of what nature?

What is the  
relation of  
ideas and  
phenomena?

*Soc.* In the first place, as to whether these unities have a real existence; and then how each individual unity, being always the same, and incapable either of generation or of destruction, but retaining a permanent individuality, can be conceived either as dispersed and multiplied in the infinity of the world of generation, or as still entire and yet divided from itself, which latter would seem to be the greatest impossibility of all, for how can one and the same thing be at the same time in one and in many things? These, Protarchus, are the real difficulties, and this is the one and many to which they relate; they are the source of great perplexity if ill decided, and the right determination of them is very helpful.

*Pro.* Then, Socrates, let us begin by clearing up these questions.

*Soc.* That is what I should wish.

*Pro.* And I am sure that all my other friends will be glad to hear them discussed; Philebus, fortunately for us, is not disposed to move, and we had better not stir him up with questions.

*Soc.* Good; and where shall we begin this great and multifarious battle, in which such various points are at issue? Shall we begin thus?

*Pro.* How?

The co-existence of one and many is a consequence of thought.—The enthusiasm of young men when they first discover the puzzle.

*Soc.* We say that the one and many become identified by thought, and that now, as in time past, they run about together, in and out of every word which is uttered, and that this union of them will never cease, and is not now beginning, but is, as I believe, an everlasting quality of thought itself, which never grows old. Any young man, when he first tastes these subtleties, is delighted, and fancies that he has found a treasure of wisdom; in the first enthusiasm of his joy he leaves no stone, or rather no thought unturned, now rolling up the many into the one, and kneading them together, now unfolding and dividing them; he puzzles himself first and



above all, and then he proceeds to puzzle his neighbours,  
 16 whether they are older or younger, or of his own age — that makes no difference; neither father nor mother does he spare; no human being who has ears is safe from him, hardly even his dog, and a barbarian would have no chance of escaping him, if an interpreter could only be found.

*Philebus.*

SOCRATES,  
 PROTARCHUS.

*Pro.* Considering, Socrates, how many we are, and that all of us are young men, is there not a danger that we and Philebus may all set upon you, if you abuse us? We understand what you mean; but is there no charm by which we may dispel all this confusion, no more excellent way of arriving at the truth? If there is, we hope that you will guide us into that way, and we will do our best to follow, for the enquiry in which we are engaged, Socrates, is not unimportant.

What we want is to find a path to the truth.

*Soc.* The reverse of unimportant, my boys, as Philebus calls you, and there neither is nor ever will be a better than my own favourite way, which has nevertheless already often deserted me and left me helpless in the hour of need.

*Pro.* Tell us what that is.

*Soc.* One which may be easily pointed out, but is by no means easy of application; it is the parent of all the dis-

1 coveries in the arts.

*Pro.* Tell us what it is.

*Soc.* A gift of heaven, which, as I conceive, the gods tossed among men by the hands of a new Prometheus, and therewith a blaze of light; and the ancients, who were our betters and nearer the gods than we are, handed down the tradition, that whatever things are said to be are composed of one and many, and have the finite and infinite implanted in them: seeing, then, that such is the order of the world, we too ought in every enquiry to begin by laying down one idea of that which is the subject of enquiry; this unity we shall find in everything. Having found it, we may next proceed to look for two, if there be two, or, if not, then for three or some other number, subdividing each of these units, until at last the unity with which we began is seen not only to be one and many and infinite, but also a definite number; the infinite must not be suffered to approach the many until the entire number of the species intermediate

Socrates' favourite method is to proceed from unity to infinity, from the one to the many, by regular steps, omitting none of the intermediate species.

We must go on defining while anything remains to be defined.

*Philebus.*SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

between unity and infinity has been discovered,— then, and not till then, we may rest from division, and without further troubling ourselves about the endless individuals may allow them to drop into infinity. This, as I was saying, is the way of considering and learning and teaching one another, which the gods have handed down to us. But the wise men 17 of our time are either too quick or too slow in conceiving plurality in unity. Having no method, they make their one and many anyhow, and from unity pass at once to infinity; the intermediate steps never occur to them. And this, I repeat, is what makes the difference between the mere art of disputation and true dialectic.

*Pro.* I think that I partly understand you, Socrates, but I should like to have a clearer notion of what you are saying.

*Soc.* I may illustrate my meaning by the letters of the alphabet, Protarchus, which you were made to learn as a child.

*Pro.* How do they afford an illustration?

*Soc.* The sound which passes through the lips whether of an individual or of all men is one and yet infinite.

*Pro.* Very true.

*Soc.* And yet not by knowing either that sound is one or that sound is infinite are we perfect in the art of speech, but the knowledge of the number and nature of sounds is what makes a man a grammarian.

*Pro.* Very true.

*Soc.* And the knowledge which makes a man a musician is of the same kind.

*Pro.* How so?

*Soc.* Sound is one in music as well as in grammar?

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And there is a higher note and a lower note, and a note of equal pitch:—may we affirm so much?

*Pro.* Yes.

*Soc.* But you would not be a real musician if this was all that you knew; though if you did not know this you would know almost nothing of music.

*Pro.* Nothing.

*Soc.* But when you have learned what sounds are high and what low, and the number and nature of the intervals

The true  
method  
applied to  
grammar,

and to music.

and their limits or proportions, and the systems compounded out of them, which our fathers discovered, and have handed down to us who are their descendants under the name of harmonies; and the affections corresponding to them in the movements of the human body, which when measured by numbers ought, as they say, to be called rhythms and measures; and they tell us that the same principle should be applied to every one and many;—when, I say, you have learned all this, then, my dear friend, you are perfect; and you may be said to understand any other subject, when you have a similar grasp of it. But the infinity of kinds and the infinity of individuals which there is in each of them, when not classified, creates in every one of us a state of infinite ignorance; and he who never looks for number in anything, will not himself be looked for in the number of famous men.

18 *Pro.* I think that what Socrates is now saying is excellent, Philebus.

*Phi.* I think so too, but how do his words bear upon us and upon the argument?

*Soc.* Philebus is right in asking that question of us, Protarchus.

*Pro.* Indeed he is, and you must answer him.

*Soc.* I will; but you must let me make one little remark first about these matters; I was saying, that he who begins with any individual unity, should proceed from that, not to infinity, but to a definite number, and now I say conversely, that he who has to begin with infinity should not jump to unity, but he should look about for some number representing a certain quantity, and thus out of all end in one. And now let us return for an illustration of our principle to the case of letters.

*Pro.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* Some god or divine man, who in the Egyptian legend is said to have been Theuth, observing that the human voice was infinite, first distinguished in this infinity a certain number of vowels, and then other letters which had sound, but were not pure vowels (i. e. the semivowels); these too exist in a definite number; and lastly, he distinguished a third class of letters which we now call mutes, without voice and without sound, and divided these, and likewise the two other

*Philebus.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS,  
PHILEBUS.

If a man has to start with infinity, he should not jump at once to unity, but should proceed first to some definite quantity.—An illustration of this process taken from grammar.

*Philebus.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS,  
PHILEBUS.

classes of vowels and semivowels, into the individual sounds, and told the number of them, and gave to each and all of them the name of letters; and observing that none of us could learn any one of them and not learn them all, and in consideration of this common bond which in a manner united them, he assigned to them all a single art, and this he called the art of grammar or letters.

*Phi.* The illustration, Protarchus, has assisted me in understanding the original statement, but I still feel the defect of which I just now complained.

*Soc.* Are you going to ask, Philebus, what this has to do with the argument?

*Phi.* Yes, that is a question which Protarchus and I have been long asking.

*Soc.* Assuredly you have already arrived at the answer to the question which, as you say, you have been so long asking?

*Phi.* How so?

*Soc.* Did we not begin by enquiring into the comparative eligibility of pleasure and wisdom?

*Phi.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And we maintain that they are each of them one?

*Phi.* True.

*Soc.* And the precise question to which the previous discussion desires an answer is, how they are one and also many [i. e. how they have one genus and many species], and are not at once infinite, and what number of species is to be assigned to either of them before they pass into infinity<sup>1</sup>.

*Pro.* That is a very serious question, Philebus, to which 19 Socrates has ingeniously brought us round, and please to consider which of us shall answer him; there may be something ridiculous in my being unable to answer, and therefore imposing the task upon you, when I have undertaken the whole charge of the argument, but if neither of us were able to answer, the result methinks would be still more ridiculous. Let us consider, then, what we are to do:—Socrates, if I understood him rightly, is asking whether there are not kinds of pleasure, and what is the number and nature of them, and the same of wisdom.

<sup>1</sup> i. e. into the infinite number of individuals.

We wish to compare pleasure and wisdom. If then we would follow the true method of investigation, we must seek to discover the number and nature of their kinds.



*Soc.* Most true, O son of Callias; and the previous argument showed that if we are not able to tell the kinds of everything that has unity, likeness, sameness, or their opposites, none of us will be of the smallest use in any enquiry.

*Philebus.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS,  
PHILEBUS.

*Pro.* That seems to be very near the truth, Socrates. Happy would the wise man be if he knew all things, and the next best thing for him is that he should know himself. Why do I say so at this moment? I will tell you. You, Socrates, have granted us this opportunity of conversing with you, and are ready to assist us in determining what is the best of human goods. For when Philebus said that pleasure and delight and enjoyment and the like were the chief good, you answered — No, not those, but another class of goods; and we are constantly reminding ourselves of what you said, and very properly, in order that we may not forget to examine and compare the two. And these goods, which in your opinion are to be designated as superior to pleasure, and are the true objects of pursuit, are mind and knowledge and understanding and art, and the like. There was a dispute about which were the best, and we playfully threatened that you should not be allowed to go home until the question was settled; and you agreed, and placed yourself at our disposal. And now, as children say, what has been fairly given cannot be taken back; cease then to fight against us in this way.

*Soc.* In what way?

20 *Phi.* Do not perplex us, and keep asking questions of us to which we have not as yet any sufficient answer to give: let us not imagine that a general puzzling of us all is to be the end of our discussion, but if we are unable to answer, do you answer, as you have promised. Consider, then, whether you will divide pleasure and knowledge according to their kinds; or you may let the matter drop, if you are able and willing to find some other mode of clearing up our controversy.

Philebus and  
Protarchus  
confess them-  
selves inca-  
pable of doing  
this. They  
therefore ask  
help of  
Socrates.

*Soc.* If you say that, I have nothing to apprehend, for the words 'if you are willing' dispel all my fear; and, moreover, a god seems to have recalled something to my mind.

*Phi.* What is that?

*Philebus.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

Socrates has heard some one say that neither pleasure nor wisdom is the good, but some third thing.

If this be brought to light, there will be no need to distinguish the kinds of pleasure and wisdom.

Let us first admit that the good is perfect, and sufficient, and above all things to be desired.

Next let us separate the life of pleasure from the life of wisdom, and examine each apart.

*Soc.* I remember to have heard long ago certain discussions about pleasure and wisdom, whether awake or in a dream I cannot tell; they were to the effect that neither the one nor the other of them was the good, but some third thing, which was different from them, and better than either. If this be clearly established, then pleasure will lose the victory, for the good will cease to be identified with her:—Am I not right?

*Pro.* Yes.

*Soc.* And there will cease to be any need of distinguishing the kinds of pleasures, as I am inclined to think, but this will appear more clearly as we proceed.

*Pro.* Capital, Socrates; pray go on as you propose.

*Soc.* But, let us first agree on some little points.

*Pro.* What are they?

*Soc.* Is the good perfect or imperfect?

*Pro.* The most perfect, Socrates, of all things.

*Soc.* And is the good sufficient?

*Pro.* Yes, certainly, and in a degree surpassing all other things.

*Soc.* And no one can deny that all percipient beings desire and hunt after good, and are eager to catch and have the good about them, and care not for the attainment of anything which is not accompanied by good.

*Pro.* That is undeniable.

*Soc.* Now let us part off the life of pleasure from the life of wisdom, and pass them in review.

*Pro.* How do you mean?

*Soc.* Let there be no wisdom in the life of pleasure, nor any pleasure in the life of wisdom, for if either of them is the chief good, it cannot be supposed to want anything, but if either is shown to want anything, then it cannot really be the chief good.

*Pro.* Impossible.

*Soc.* And will you help us to test these two lives?

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then answer.

*Pro.* Ask.

*Soc.* Would you choose, Protarchus, to live all your life long in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures?

*Pro.* Certainly I should.

*Soc.* Would you consider that there was still anything wanting to you if you had perfect pleasure?

*Pro.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Reflect; would you not want wisdom and intelligence and forethought, and similar qualities? would you not at any rate want sight?

*Pro.* Why should I? Having pleasure I should have all things.

*Soc.* Living thus, you would always throughout your life enjoy the greatest pleasures?

*Pro.* I should.

*Soc.* But if you had neither mind, nor memory, nor knowledge, nor true opinion, you would in the first place be utterly ignorant of whether you were pleased or not, because you would be entirely devoid of intelligence.

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And similarly, if you had no memory you would not recollect that you had ever been pleased, nor would the slightest recollection of the pleasure which you feel at any moment remain with you; and if you had no true opinion you would not think that you were pleased when you were; and if you had no power of calculation you would not be able to calculate on future pleasure, and your life would be the life, not of a man, but of an oyster or 'pulmo marinus.' Could this be otherwise?

*Pro.* No.

*Soc.* But is such a life eligible?

*Pro.* I cannot answer you, Socrates; the argument has taken away from me the power of speech.

*Soc.* We must keep up our spirits;—let us now take the life of mind and examine it in turn.

*Pro.* And what is this life of mind?

*Soc.* I want to know whether any one of us would consent to live, having wisdom and mind and knowledge and memory of all things, but having no sense of pleasure or pain, and wholly unaffected by these and the like feelings?

*Pro.* Neither life, Socrates, appears eligible to me, nor is likely, as I should imagine, to be chosen by any one else.

22 *Soc.* What would you say, Protarchus, to both of these

*Philebus.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

Pleasure without knowledge is pleasure of which we are unconscious, — the life of an oyster.

And knowledge, without pleasure, is equally undesirable.

*Philebus.*SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS,  
PHILEBUS.The mixed  
life of plea-  
sure and  
wisdom is to  
be preferred.

in one, or to one that was made out of the union of the two?

*Pro.* Out of the union, that is, of pleasure with mind and wisdom?

*Soc.* Yes, that is the life which I mean.

*Pro.* There can be no difference of opinion; not some but all would surely choose this third rather than either of the other two, and in addition to them.

*Soc.* But do you see the consequence?

*Pro.* To be sure I do. The consequence is, that two out of the three lives which have been proposed are neither sufficient nor eligible for man or for animal.

*Soc.* Then now there can be no doubt that neither of them has the good, for the one which had would certainly have been sufficient and perfect and eligible for every living creature or thing that was able to live such a life; and if any of us had chosen any other, he would have chosen contrary to the nature of the truly eligible, and not of his own free will, but either through ignorance or from some unhappy necessity.

*Pro.* Certainly that seems to be true.

*Soc.* And now have I not sufficiently shown that Philebus' goddess is not to be regarded as identical with the good?

*Phi.* Neither is your 'mind' the good, Socrates, for that will be open to the same objections.

*Soc.* Perhaps, Philebus, you may be right in saying so of my 'mind'; but of the true, which is also the divine mind, far otherwise. However, I will not at present claim the first place for mind as against the mixed life; but we must come to some understanding about the second place. For you might affirm pleasure and I mind to be the cause of the mixed life; and in that case although neither of them would be the good, one of them might be imagined to be the cause of the good. And I might proceed further to argue in opposition to Philebus, that the element which makes this mixed life eligible and good, is more akin and more similar to mind than to pleasure. And if this is true, pleasure cannot be truly said to share either in the first or second place, and does not, if I may trust my own mind, attain even to the third.

'And so  
pleasure,'  
says Socrates,  
'is not the  
same with the  
good.'—  
'Nor your  
mind,' rejoins  
Philebus.—  
'Not my  
mind, cer-  
tainly, but the  
divine, Yes.  
And I might  
add that the  
excellence of  
the mixed life  
is due rather  
to wisdom  
than to  
pleasure.'



23 *Pro.* Truly, Socrates, pleasure appears to me to have had a fall; in fighting for the palm, she has been smitten by the argument, and is laid low. I must say that mind would have fallen too, and may therefore be thought to show discretion in not putting forward a similar claim. And if pleasure were deprived not only of the first but of the second place, she would be terribly damaged in the eyes of her admirers, for not even to them would she still appear as fair as before.

*Soc.* Well, but had we not better leave her now, and not pain her by applying the crucial test, and finally detecting her?

*Pro.* Nonsense, Socrates.

*Soc.* Why? because I said that we had better not pain pleasure, which is an impossibility?

*Pro.* Yes, and more than that, because you do not seem to be aware that none of us will let you go home until you have finished the argument.

*Soc.* Heavens! Protarchus, that will be a tedious business, and just at present not at all an easy one. For in going to war in the cause of mind, who is aspiring to the second prize, I ought to have weapons of another make from those which I used before; some, however, of the old ones may do again. And must I then finish the argument?

*Pro.* Of course you must.

*Soc.* Let us be very careful in laying the foundation.

*Pro.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* Let us divide all existing things into two, or rather, if you do not object, into three classes.

*Pro.* Upon what principle would you make the division?

*Soc.* Let us take some of our newly-found notions.

*Pro.* Which of them?

*Soc.* Were we not saying that God revealed a finite element of existence, and also an infinite?

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Let us assume these two principles, and also a third, which is compounded out of them; but I fear that I am ridiculously clumsy at these processes of division and enumeration.

*Pro.* What do you mean, my good friend?

*Philebus.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

In supporting the claims of mind to the second place, some new weapons will be required.

All things may be divided into three or four classes:  
(1) the finite,  
(2) the infinite,  
(3) the union of the two,  
and (4) the cause of the union.

*Philebus.**Soc.* I say that a fourth class is still wanted.

SOCRATES,

*Pro.* What will that be?

PROTARCHUS.

*Soc.* Find the cause of the third or compound, and add this as a fourth class to the three others.*Pro.* And would you like to have a fifth class or cause of resolution as well as a cause of composition?*Soc.* Not, I think, at present; but if I want a fifth at some future time you shall allow me to have it.*Pro.* Certainly.*Soc.* Let us begin with the first three; and as we find two out of the three greatly divided and dispersed, let us endeavour to reunite them, and see how in each of them there is a one and many.*Pro.* If you would explain to me a little more about them, 24 perhaps I might be able to follow you.*Soc.* Well, the two classes are the same which I mentioned before, one the finite, and the other the infinite; I will first show that the infinite is in a certain sense many, and the finite may be hereafter discussed.*Pro.* I agree.

The class of the infinite contains all things into which the more and the less enter; for the more and the less are without limit and measure.

*Soc.* And now consider well; for the question to which I invite your attention is difficult and controverted. When you speak of hotter and colder, can you conceive any limit in those qualities? Does not the more and less, which dwells in their very nature, prevent their having any end? for if they had an end, the more and less would themselves have an end.*Pro.* That is most true.*Soc.* Ever, as we say, into the hotter and the colder there enters a more and a less.*Pro.* Yes.*Soc.* Then, says the argument, there is never any end of them, and being endless they must also be infinite.*Pro.* Yes, Socrates, that is exceedingly true.*Soc.* Yes, my dear Protarchus, and your answer reminds me that such an expression as 'exceedingly,' which you have just uttered, and also the term 'gently,' have the same significance as more or less; for whenever they occur they do not allow of the existence of quantity — they are always introducing degrees into actions, instituting a comparison

of a more or a less excessive or a more or a less gentle, and at each creation of more or less, quantity disappears. For, as I was just now saying, if quantity and measure did not disappear, but were allowed to intrude in the sphere of more and less and the other comparatives, these last would be driven out of their own domain. When definite quantity is once admitted, there can be no longer a 'hotter' or a 'colder' (for these are always progressing, and are never in one stay); but definite quantity is at rest, and has ceased to progress. Which proves that comparatives, such as the hotter and the colder, are to be ranked in the class of the infinite.

*Philebus.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

*Pro.* Your remark certainly has the look of truth, Socrates; but these subjects, as you were saying, are difficult to follow at first. I think, however, that if I could hear the argument repeated by you once or twice, there would be a substantial agreement between us.

*Soc.* Yes, and I will try to meet your wish; but, as I would rather not waste time in the enumeration of endless particulars, let me know whether I may not assume as a note of the infinite —

25 *Pro.* What?

*Soc.* I want to know whether such things as appear to us to admit of more or less, or are denoted by the words 'exceedingly,' 'gently,' 'extremely,' and the like, may not be referred to the class of the infinite, which is their unity, for, as was asserted in the previous argument, all things that were divided and dispersed should be brought together, and have the mark or seal of some one nature, if possible, set upon them — do you remember?

*Pro.* Yes.

*Soc.* And all things which do not admit of more or less, but admit their opposites, that is to say, first of all, equality, and the equal, or again, the double, or any other ratio of number and measure — all these may, I think, be rightly reckoned by us in the class of the limited or finite; what do you say?

But all things which admit of equality, number and measure, fall under the class of the finite.

*Pro.* Excellent, Socrates.

*Soc.* And now what nature shall we ascribe to the third or compound kind?

*Philebus.**Pro.* You, I think, will have to tell me that.SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.*Soc.* Rather God will tell you, if there be any God who will listen to my prayers.*Pro.* Offer up a prayer, then, and think.*Soc.* I am thinking, Protarchus, and I believe that some God has befriended us.*Pro.* What do you mean, and what proof have you to offer of what you are saying?*Soc.* I will tell you, and do you listen to my words.*Pro.* Proceed.*Soc.* Were we not speaking just now of hotter and colder?*Pro.* True.*Soc.* Add to them drier, wetter, more, less, swifter, slower, greater, smaller, and all that in the preceding argument we placed under the unity of more and less.*Pro.* In the class of the infinite, you mean?*Soc.* Yes; and now mingle this with the other.*Pro.* What is the other?The union of  
finite and in-  
finite gives  
rise to the  
third class,*Soc.* The class of the finite which we ought to have brought together as we did the infinite; but, perhaps, it will come to the same thing if we do so now;—when the two are combined, a third will appear.*Pro.* What do you mean by the class of the finite?*Soc.* The class of the equal and the double, and any class which puts an end to difference and opposition, and by introducing number creates harmony and proportion among the different elements.*Pro.* I understand; you seem to me to mean that the various opposites, when you mingle with them the class of the finite, take certain forms.*Soc.* Yes, that is my meaning.*Pro.* Proceed.under which  
are included  
health and  
harmony and  
beauty and  
the seasons  
and every  
sort of good.*Soc.* Does not the right participation in the finite give health—in disease, for instance?*Pro.* Certainly.*Soc.* And whereas the high and low, the swift and the 26 slow are infinite or unlimited, does not the addition of the principles aforesaid introduce a limit, and perfect the whole frame of music?*Pro.* Yes, certainly.



*Soc.* Or, again, when cold and heat prevail, does not the introduction of them take away excess and indefiniteness, and infuse moderation and harmony? *Philebus.*

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And from a like admixture of the finite and infinite come the seasons, and all the delights of life?

*Pro.* Most true.

*Soc.* I omit ten thousand other things, such as beauty and health and strength, and the many beauties and high perfections of the soul: O my beautiful Philebus, the goddess, methinks, seeing the universal wantonness and wickedness of all things, and that there was in them no limit to pleasures and self-indulgence, devised the limit of law and order, whereby, as you say, Philebus, she torments, or as I maintain, delivers the soul.—What think you, Protarchus?

*Pro.* Her ways are much to my mind, Socrates.

*Soc.* You will observe that I have spoken of three classes?

*Pro.* Yes, I think that I understand you: you mean to say that the infinite is one class, and that the finite is a second class of existences; but what you would make the third I am not so certain.

*Soc.* That is because the amazing variety of the third class is too much for you, my dear friend; but there was not this difficulty with the infinite, which also comprehended many classes, for all of them were sealed with the note of more and less, and therefore appeared one.

*Pro.* True.

*Soc.* And the finite or limit had not many divisions, and we readily acknowledged it to be by nature one?

*Pro.* Yes.

*Soc.* Yes, indeed; and when I speak of the third class, understand me to mean any offspring of these, being a birth into true being, effected by the measure which the limit introduces.

*Pro.* I understand.

*Soc.* Still there was, as we said, a fourth class to be investigated, and you must assist in the investigation; for does not everything which comes into being, of necessity come into being through a cause?

The third class takes an amazing variety of forms, and is therefore more difficult to conceive than the two first classes.

The fourth class is the cause of the union of finite and infinite.

*Philebus.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

*Pro.* Yes, certainly; for how can there be anything which has no cause?

*Soc.* And is not the agent the same as the cause in all except name; the agent and the cause may be rightly called one?

*Pro.* Very true.

*Soc.* And the same may be said of the patient, or effect; we shall find that they too differ, as I was saying, only in name — shall we not?

*Pro.* We shall.

*Soc.* The agent or cause always naturally leads, and the patient or effect naturally follows it?

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then the cause and what is subordinate to it in generation are not the same, but different?

*Pro.* True.

*Soc.* Did not the things which were generated, and the things out of which they were generated, furnish all the three classes?

*Pro.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the creator or cause of them has been satisfactorily proven to be distinct from them,— and may therefore be called a fourth principle?

*Pro.* So let us call it.

*Soc.* Quite right; but now, having distinguished the four, I think that we had better refresh our memories by recapitulating each of them in order.

*Pro.* By all means.

*Soc.* Then the first I will call the infinite or unlimited, and the second the finite or limited; then follows the third, an essence compound and generated; and I do not think that I shall be far wrong in speaking of the cause of mixture and generation as the fourth.

*Pro.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* And now what is the next question, and how came we hither? Were we not enquiring whether the second place belonged to pleasure or wisdom?

*Pro.* We were.

*Soc.* And now, having determined these points, shall we not be better able to decide about the first and second place, which was the original subject of dispute?

Order of  
the classes:  
(1) the infinite;  
(2) the finite;  
(3) the union  
of these;  
(4) the cause  
of the union.

*Pro.* I dare say.

*Soc.* We said, if you remember, that the mixed life of pleasure and wisdom was the conqueror — did we not?

*Pro.* True.

*Soc.* And we see what is the place and nature of this life and to what class it is to be assigned?

*Pro.* Beyond a doubt.

*Soc.* This is evidently comprehended in the third or mixed class; which is not composed of any two particular ingredients, but of all the elements of infinity, bound down by the finite, and may therefore be truly said to comprehend the conqueror life.

*Pro.* Most true.

*Soc.* And what shall we say, Philebus, of your life which is all sweetness; and in which of the aforesaid classes is that to be placed? Perhaps you will allow me to ask you a question before you answer?

*Phi.* Let me hear.

*Soc.* Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the class which admits of more and less?

*Phi.* They belong to the class which admits of more, Socrates; for pleasure would not be perfectly good if she were not infinite in quantity and degree.

28. *Soc.* Nor would pain, Philebus, be perfectly evil. And therefore the infinite cannot be that element which imparts to pleasure some degree of good. But now — admitting, if you like, that pleasure is of the nature of the infinite — in which of the aforesaid classes, O Protarchus and Philebus, can we without irreverence place wisdom and knowledge and mind? And let us be careful, for I think that the danger will be very serious if we err on this point.

*Phi.* You magnify, Socrates, the importance of your favourite god.

*Soc.* And you, my friend, are also magnifying your favourite goddess; but still I must beg you to answer the question.

*Pro.* Socrates is quite right, Philebus, and we must submit to him.

*Phi.* And did not you, Protarchus, propose to answer in my place?

*Philebus.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS,  
PHILEBUS.

To the third  
belongs the  
mixed life  
of pleasure  
and wisdom.

Pleasure and  
also pain be-  
long to the  
first class.

To which does  
mind belong?

*Philebus.*SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS,  
PHILEBUS.

*Pro.* Certainly I did; but I am now in a great strait, and I must entreat you, Socrates, to be our spokesman, and then we shall not say anything wrong or disrespectful of your favourite.

*Soc.* I must obey you, Protarchus; nor is the task which you impose a difficult one; but did I really, as Philebus implies, disconcert you with my playful solemnity, when I asked the question to what class mind and knowledge belong?

*Pro.* You did, indeed, Socrates.

To the  
highest, as  
philosophers  
declare.

But they are  
interested  
witnesses,  
and therefore  
further proof  
is needed.

*Soc.* Yet the answer is easy, since all philosophers assert with one voice that mind is the king of heaven and earth—in reality they are magnifying themselves. And perhaps they are right. But still I should like to consider the class of mind, if you do not object, a little more fully.

*Phi.* Take your own course, Socrates, and never mind length; we shall not tire of you.

*Soc.* Very good; let us begin then, Protarchus, by asking a question.

*Pro.* What question?

First, we  
agree that  
the world is  
governed by  
mind, and not  
by chance.

*Soc.* Whether all this which they call the universe is left to the guidance of unreason and chance medley, or, on the contrary, as our fathers have declared, ordered and governed by a marvellous intelligence and wisdom.

*Pro.* Wide asunder are the two assertions, illustrious Socrates, for that which you were just now saying to me appears to be blasphemy; but the other assertion, that mind orders all things, is worthy of the aspect of the world, and of the sun, and of the moon, and of the stars and of the whole circle of the heavens; and never will I say or think otherwise.

*Soc.* Shall we then <sup>1</sup>agree with them of old time in maintaining <sup>1</sup>this doctrine,—not merely reasserting the notions of others, without risk to ourselves,—but shall we share in <sup>29</sup>the danger, and take our part of the reproach which will await us, when an ingenious individual declares that all is disorder?

*Pro.* That would certainly be my wish.

<sup>1</sup> Or, 'maintain in accordance with our previous statements:' but cf. supra 28 D, and infra 30 D.



*Soc.* Then now please to consider the next stage of the argument.

*Pro.* Let me hear.

*Soc.* We see that the elements which enter into the nature of the bodies of all animals, fire, water, air, and, as the storm-tossed sailor cries, 'land' [i. e. earth], reappear in the constitution of the world.

*Pro.* The proverb may be applied to us; for truly the storm gathers over us, and we are at our wit's end.

*Soc.* There is something to be remarked about each of these elements.

*Pro.* What is it?

*Soc.* Only a small fraction of any one of them exists in us, and that of a mean sort, and not in any way pure, or having any power worthy of its nature. One instance will prove this of all of them; there is fire within us, and in the universe.

*Pro.* True.

*Soc.* And is not our fire small and weak and mean? But the fire in the universe is wonderful in quantity and beauty, and in every power that fire has.

*Pro.* Most true.

*Soc.* And is the fire in the universe nourished and generated and ruled by the fire in us, or is the fire in you and me, and in other animals, dependent on the universal fire?

*Pro.* That is a question which does not deserve an answer.

*Soc.* Right; and you would say the same, if I am not mistaken, of the earth which is in animals and the earth which is in the universe, and you would give a similar reply about all the other elements?

*Pro.* Why, how could any man who gave any other be deemed in his senses?

*Soc.* I do not think that he could — but now go on to the next step. When we saw those elements of which we have been speaking gathered up in one, did we not call them a body?

*Pro.* We did.

*Soc.* And the same may be said of the cosmos, which for the same reason may be considered to be a body, because made up of the same elements.

*Pro.* Very true.

*Philebus.*

*SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.*

Next, our bodies are dependent on the body of the universe, whence the elements, which compose them, are derived.

*Philebus.*SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

*Soc.* But is our body nourished wholly by this body, or is this body nourished by our body, thence deriving and having the qualities of which we were just now speaking?

*Pro.* That again, Socrates, is a question which does not deserve to be asked.

*Soc.* Well, tell me, is this question worth asking?

*Pro.* What question?

*Soc.* May our body be said to have a soul?

*Pro.* Clearly.

*Soc.* And whence comes that soul, my dear Protarchus, unless the body of the universe, which contains elements like those in our bodies but in every way fairer, had also a soul? Can there be another source?

*Pro.* Clearly, Socrates, that is the only source.

*Soc.* Why, yes, Protarchus; for surely we cannot imagine that of the four classes, the finite, the infinite, the composition of the two, and the cause, the fourth, which enters into all things, giving to our bodies souls, and the art of self-management, and of healing disease, and operating in other ways to heal and organize, having too all the attributes of wisdom; — we cannot, I say, imagine that whereas the self-same elements exist, both in the entire heaven and in great provinces of the heaven, only fairer and purer, this last should not also in that higher sphere have designed the noblest and fairest things?

*Pro.* Such a supposition is quite unreasonable.

*Soc.* Then if this be denied, should we not be wise in adopting the other view and maintaining that there is in the universe a mighty infinite and an adequate limit, of which we have often spoken, as well as a presiding cause of no mean power, which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom and mind?

*Pro.* Most justly.

*Soc.* And wisdom and mind cannot exist without soul?

*Pro.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* And in the divine nature of Zeus would you not say that there is the soul and mind of a king, because there is in him the power of the cause? And other gods have other attributes, by which they are pleased to be called.

*Pro.* Very true.

And, following out the analogy, we must conclude that our souls and minds come from the soul or mind of the Universe,

which is the supreme cause.

*Soc.* Do not then suppose that these words are rashly spoken by us, O Protarchus, for they are in harmony with the testimony of those who said of old time that mind rules the universe.

*Philebus.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

*Pro.* True.

*Soc.* And they furnish an answer to my enquiry (cp. 28 A); for they imply that mind is the parent of that class of the four which we called the cause of all; and I think that you now have my answer.

Thus mind  
is shown to  
belong to  
the fourth or  
causal class.

*Pro.* I have indeed, and yet I did not observe that you had answered.

*Soc.* A jest is sometimes refreshing, Protarchus, when it interrupts earnest.

31 *Pro.* Very true.

*Soc.* I think, friend, that we have now pretty clearly set forth the class to which mind belongs and what is the power of mind.

*Pro.* True.

*Soc.* And the class to which pleasure belongs has also been long ago discovered?

*Pro.* Yes.

*Soc.* And let us remember, too, of both of them, (1) that mind was akin to the cause and of this family; and (2) that pleasure is infinite and belongs to the class which neither has, nor ever will have in itself, a beginning, middle, or end of its own.

*Pro.* I shall be sure to remember.

*Soc.* We must next examine what is their place and under what conditions they are generated. And we will begin with pleasure, since her class was first examined; and yet pleasure cannot be rightly tested apart from pain.

How do  
pleasures  
and pains  
originate?

*Pro.* If this is the road, let us take it.

*Soc.* I wonder whether you would agree with me about the origin of pleasure and pain.

*Pro.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* I mean to say that their natural seat is in the mixed class.

*Pro.* And would you tell me again, sweet Socrates, which of the aforesaid classes is the mixed one?

*Soc.* I will, my fine fellow, to the best of my ability.

*Philebus.**Pro.* Very good.SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.*Soc.* Let us then understand the mixed class to be that which we placed third in the list of four.*Pro.* That which followed the infinite and the finite; and in which you ranked health, and, if I am not mistaken, harmony.*Soc.* Capital; and now will you please to give me your best attention?*Pro.* Proceed; I am attending.*Soc.* I say that when the harmony in animals is dissolved, there is also a dissolution of nature and a generation of pain.*Pro.* That is very probable.*Soc.* And the restoration of harmony and return to nature is the source of pleasure, if I may be allowed to speak in the fewest and shortest words about matters of the greatest moment.*Pro.* I believe that you are right, Socrates; but will you try to be a little plainer?*Soc.* Do not obvious and every-day phenomena furnish the simplest illustration?*Pro.* What phenomena do you mean?*Soc.* Hunger, for example, is a dissolution and a pain.*Pro.* True.*Soc.* Whereas eating is a replenishment and a pleasure?*Pro.* Yes.*Soc.* Thirst again is a destruction and a pain, but the effect of moisture replenishing the dry place is a pleasure: once more, the unnatural separation and dissolution caused by heat is painful, and the natural restoration and refrigeration is pleasant.*Pro.* Very true.*Soc.* And the unnatural freezing of the moisture in an animal is pain, and the natural process of resolution and return of the elements to their original state is pleasure. And would not the general proposition seem to you to hold, that the destroying of the natural union of the finite and infinite, which, as I was observing before, make up the class of living beings, is pain, and that the process of return of all things to their own nature is pleasure?*Pro.* Granted; what you say has a general truth.In the body  
they arise  
through the  
restoration  
and dissolu-  
tion of the  
harmony of  
finite and  
infinite.



*Soc.* Here then is one kind of pleasures and pains originating severally in the two processes which we have described?

*Philebus.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

*Pro.* Good.

*Soc.* Let us next assume that in the soul herself there is an antecedent hope of pleasure which is sweet and refreshing, and an expectation of pain, fearful and anxious.

In the soul there are pleasures and pains of expectation corresponding to these.

*Pro.* Yes; this is another class of pleasures and pains, which is of the soul only, apart from the body, and is produced by expectation.

*Soc.* Right; for in the analysis of these, pure, as I suppose them to be, the pleasures being unalloyed with pain and the pains with pleasure, methinks that we shall see clearly whether the whole class of pleasure is to be desired, or whether this quality of entire desirableness is not rather to be attributed to another of the classes which have been mentioned; and whether pleasure and pain, like heat and cold, and other things of the same kind, are not sometimes to be desired and sometimes not to be desired, as being not in themselves good, but only sometimes and in some instances admitting of the nature of good.

*Pro.* You say most truly that this is the track which the investigation should pursue.

*Soc.* Well, then, assuming that pain ensues on the dissolution, and pleasure on the restoration of the harmony, let us now ask what will be the condition of animated beings who are neither in process of restoration nor of dissolution. And mind what you say: I ask whether any animal who is in that condition can possibly have any feeling of pleasure or pain, great or small?

But besides dissolution and restoration, there is a neutral state of the body,

*Pro.* Certainly not.

33 *Soc.* Then here we have a third state, over and above that of pleasure and of pain?

*Pro.* Very true.

*Soc.* And do not forget that there is such a state; it will make a great difference in our judgment of pleasure, whether we remember this or not. And I should like to say a few words about it.

*Pro.* What have you to say?

*Soc.* Why, you know that if a man chooses the life of

in which, if he pleases,

*Philebus.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

the man who  
chooses the  
life of wisdom  
may live, like  
the Gods,  
having  
neither joy  
nor sorrow.

wisdom, there is no reason why he should not live in this neutral state.

*Pro.* You mean that he may live neither rejoicing nor sorrowing?

*Soc.* Yes; and if I remember rightly, when the lives were compared, no degree of pleasure, whether great or small, was thought to be necessary to him who chose the life of thought and wisdom.

*Pro.* Yes, certainly, we said so.

*Soc.* Then he will live without pleasure; and who knows whether this may not be the most divine of all lives?

*Pro.* If so, the gods, at any rate, cannot be supposed to have either joy or sorrow.

*Soc.* Certainly not—there would be a great impropriety in the assumption of either alternative. But whether the gods are or are not indifferent to pleasure is a point which may be considered hereafter if in any way relevant to the argument, and whatever is the conclusion we will place it to the account of mind in her contest for the second place, should she have to resign the first.

*Pro.* Just so.

*Soc.* The other class of pleasures, which as we were saying is purely mental, is entirely derived from memory.

*Pro.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* I must first of all analyze memory, or rather perception which is prior to memory, if the subject of our discussion is ever to be properly cleared up.

*Pro.* How will you proceed?

*Soc.* Let us imagine affections of the body which are extinguished before they reach the soul, and leave her unaffected; and again, other affections which vibrate through both soul and body, and impart a shock to both and to each of them.

*Pro.* Granted.

*Soc.* And the soul may be truly said to be oblivious of the first but not of the second?

*Pro.* Quite true.

*Soc.* When I say oblivious, do not suppose that I mean forgetfulness in a literal sense; for forgetfulness is the exit of memory, which in this case has not yet entered; and to

Let us con-  
sider the  
pleasures of  
memory.

Some affec-  
tions of the  
body do not  
reach the soul;  
those which  
do are  
conscious  
affections.

speak of the loss of that which is not yet in existence, and never has been, is a contradiction; do you see? *Philebus.*

*Pro.* Yes.

*Soc.* Then just be so good as to change the terms.

*Pro.* How shall I change them?

- 34 *Soc.* Instead of the oblivion of the soul, when you are describing the state in which she is unaffected by the shocks of the body, say unconsciousness.

*Pro.* I see.

*Soc.* And the union or communion of soul and body in one feeling and motion would be properly called consciousness?

*Pro.* Most true.

*Soc.* Then now we know the meaning of the word?

*Pro.* Yes.

*Soc.* And memory may, I think, be rightly described as the preservation of consciousness? *Memory is the preservation of conscious affections; recollection is the recovery of them.*

*Pro.* Right.

*Soc.* But do we not distinguish memory from recollection?

*Pro.* I think so.

*Soc.* And do we not mean by recollection the power which the soul has of recovering, when by herself, some feeling which she experienced when in company with the body?

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And when she recovers of herself the lost recollection of some consciousness or knowledge, the recovery is termed recollection and reminiscence?

*Pro.* Very true.

*Soc.* There is a reason why I say all this.

*Pro.* What is it?

*Soc.* I want to attain the plainest possible notion of pleasure and desire, as they exist in the mind only, apart from the body; and the previous analysis helps to show the nature of both.

*These preliminary remarks will help us to understand the nature of pleasure and desire.*

*Pro.* Then now, Socrates, let us proceed to the next point.

*Soc.* There are certainly many things to be considered in discussing the generation and whole complexion of pleasure. At the outset we must determine the nature and seat of desire.

*Pro.* Ay; let us enquire into that, for we shall lose nothing.

*Philebus.*SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.What is  
desire?—  
The wish for  
replenish-  
ment.

*Soc.* Nay, Protarchus, we shall surely lose the puzzle if we find the answer.

*Pro.* A fair retort; but let us proceed.

*Soc.* Did we not place hunger, thirst, and the like, in the class of desires?

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And yet they are very different; what common nature have we in view when we call them by a single name?

*Pro.* By heavens, Socrates, that is a question which is not easily answered; but it must be answered.

*Soc.* Then let us go back to our examples.

*Pro.* Where shall we begin?

*Soc.* Do we mean anything when we say 'a man thirsts'?

*Pro.* Yes.

*Soc.* We mean to say that he 'is empty'?

*Pro.* Of course.

*Soc.* And is not thirst desire?

*Pro.* Yes, of drink.

*Soc.* Would you say of drink, or of replenishment with 35 drink?

*Pro.* I should say, of replenishment with drink.

*Soc.* Then he who is empty desires, as would appear, the opposite of what he experiences; for he is empty and desires to be full?

*Pro.* Clearly so.

But how can  
a man, when  
first empty,  
desire replen-  
ishment of  
which he  
has no ex-  
perience?

*Soc.* But how can a man who is empty for the first time, attain either by perception or memory to any apprehension of replenishment, of which he has no present or past experience?

*Pro.* Impossible.

*Soc.* And yet he who desires, surely desires something?

*Pro.* Of course.

Yet he does  
desire it,

*Soc.* He does not desire that which he experiences, for he experiences thirst, and thirst is emptiness; but he desires replenishment?

*Pro.* True.

*Soc.* Then there must be something in the thirsty man which in some way apprehends replenishment?

*Pro.* There must.



*Soc.* And that cannot be the body, for the body is supposed to be emptied?

*Pro.* Yes.

*Soc.* The only remaining alternative is that the soul apprehends the replenishment by the help of memory; as is obvious, for what other way can there be?

*Pro.* I cannot imagine any other.

*Soc.* But do you see the consequence?

*Pro.* What is it?

*Soc.* That there is no such thing as desire of the body.

*Pro.* Why so?

*Soc.* Why, because the argument shows that the endeavour of every animal is to the reverse of his bodily state.

*Pro.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the impulse which leads him to the opposite of what he is experiencing proves that he has a memory of the opposite state.

*Pro.* True.

*Soc.* And the argument, having proved that memory attracts us towards the objects of desire, proves also that the impulses and the desires and the moving principle in every living being have their origin in the soul.

*Pro.* Most true.

*Soc.* The argument will not allow that our body either hungers or thirsts or has any similar experience.

*Pro.* Quite right.

*Soc.* Let me make a further observation; the argument appears to me to imply that there is a kind of life which consists in these affections.

*Pro.* Of what affections, and of what kind of life, are you speaking?

*Soc.* I am speaking of being emptied and replenished, and of all that relates to the preservation and destruction of living beings, as well as of the pain which is felt in one of these states and of the pleasure which succeeds to it.

*Pro.* True.

*Soc.* And what would you say of the intermediate state?

*Pro.* What do you mean by 'intermediate'?

*Soc.* I mean when a person is in actual suffering and yet remembers past pleasures which, if they would only return,

*Philebus.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

not however  
with his body,  
but with his  
mind by the  
help of  
memory.

The mind,  
then, is the  
seat of desire.

There is an  
intermediate  
life, which  
combines a  
bodily pain

*Philebus.*

would relieve him; but as yet he has them not. May we not say of him, that he is in an intermediate state?

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS,

*Pro.* Certainly.

with the  
mental  
pleasure of  
hope.

*Soc.* Would you say that he was wholly pained or wholly pleased?

*Pro.* Nay, I should say that he has two pains; in his body there is the actual experience of pain, and in his soul longing and expectation.

*Soc.* What do you mean, Protarchus, by the two pains? May not a man who is empty have at one time a sure hope of being filled, and at other times be quite in despair?

*Pro.* Very true.

*Soc.* And has he not the pleasure of memory when he is hoping to be filled, and yet in that he is empty is he not at the same time in pain?

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then man and the other animals have at the same time both pleasure and pain?

*Pro.* I suppose so.

But when  
the hope is  
turned into  
despair,  
there is a  
double pain.

*Soc.* But when a man is empty and has no hope of being filled, there will be the double experience of pain. You observed this and inferred that the double experience was the single case possible.

*Pro.* Quite true, Socrates.

*Soc.* Shall the enquiry into these states of feeling be made the occasion of raising a question?

*Pro.* What question?

A question.—  
Can there  
be false  
pleasures,  
as there are  
false opinions?  
'No,' rejoins  
Protarchus;  
'opinions may  
be false, but  
not pleasures.'

*Soc.* Whether we ought to say that the pleasures and pains of which we are speaking are true or false? or some true and some false?

*Pro.* But how, Socrates, can there be false pleasures and pains?

*Soc.* And how, Protarchus, can there be true and false fears, or true and false expectations, or true and false opinions?

*Pro.* I grant that opinions may be true or false, but not pleasures.

*Soc.* What do you mean? I am afraid that we are raising a very serious enquiry.

*Pro.* There I agree.

*Soc.* And yet, my boy, for you are one of Philebus' boys (cp. 16 A), the point to be considered, is, whether the enquiry is relevant to the argument.

*Philebus.*  
*SOCRATES,*  
*PROTARCHUS.*

*Pro.* Surely.

*Soc.* No tedious and irrelevant discussion can be allowed; what is said should be pertinent.

*Pro.* Right.

*Soc.* I am always wondering at the question which has now been raised.

*Pro.* How so?

*Soc.* Do you deny that some pleasures are false, and others true?

*Pro.* To be sure I do.

*Soc.* Would you say that no one ever seemed to rejoice and yet did not rejoice, or seemed to feel pain and yet did not feel pain, sleeping or waking, mad or lunatic?

*Pro.* So we have always held, Socrates.

37 *Soc.* But were you right? Shall we enquire into the truth of your opinion?

Socrates proceeds to discuss the question.

*Pro.* I think that we should.

*Soc.* Let us then put into more precise terms the question which has arisen about pleasure and opinion. Is there such a thing as opinion?

*Pro.* Yes.

*Soc.* And such a thing as pleasure?

*Pro.* Yes.

*Soc.* And an opinion must be of something?

*Pro.* True.

*Soc.* And a man must be pleased by something?

*Pro.* Quite correct.

*Soc.* And whether the opinion be right or wrong, makes no difference; it will still be an opinion?

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And he who is pleased, whether he is rightly pleased or not, will always have a real feeling of pleasure?

*Pro.* Yes; that is also quite true.

*Soc.* Then, how can opinion be both true and false, and pleasure true only, although pleasure and opinion are both equally real?

*Pro.* Yes; that is the question.

All pleasures and opinions, whether right or wrong, are real.

*Philebus.*SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

*Soc.* You mean that opinion admits of truth and falsehood, and hence becomes not merely opinion, but opinion of a certain quality; and this is what you think should be examined?

*Pro.* Yes.

But do pleasures, like opinions, admit of quality? Certainly they do.

*Soc.* And further, even if we admit the existence of qualities in other objects, may not pleasure and pain be simple and devoid of quality?

*Pro.* Clearly.

*Soc.* But there is no difficulty in seeing that pleasure and pain as well as opinion have qualities, for they are great or small, and have various degrees of intensity; as was indeed said long ago by us.

*Pro.* Quite true.

*Soc.* And if badness attaches to any of them, Protarchus, then we should speak of a bad opinion or of a bad pleasure?

*Pro.* Quite true, Socrates.

*Soc.* And if rightness attaches to any of them, should we not speak of a right opinion or right pleasure; and in like manner of the reverse of rightness?

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And if the thing opined be erroneous, might we not say that the opinion, being erroneous, is not right or rightly opined?

*Pro.* Certainly.

False pleasures are pleasures based on false opinion.

*Soc.* And if we see a pleasure or pain which errs in respect of its object, shall we call that right or good, or by any honourable name?

*Pro.* Not if the pleasure is mistaken; how could we?

*Soc.* And surely pleasure often appears to accompany an opinion which is not true, but false?

*Pro.* Certainly it does; and in that case, Socrates, as we were saying, the opinion is false, but no one could call the actual pleasure false. 38

*Soc.* How eagerly, Protarchus, do you rush to the defence of pleasure!

*Pro.* Nay, Socrates, I only repeat what I hear.

How do these differ from pleasures based on true opinion?

*Soc.* And is there no difference, my friend, between that pleasure which is associated with right opinion and knowledge, and that which is often found in all of us associated with falsehood and ignorance?



*Pro.* There must be a very great difference between them. *Philebus.*

*Soc.* Then, now let us proceed to contemplate this difference. *SOCRATES, PROTARCHUS.*

*Pro.* Lead, and I will follow.

*Soc.* Well, then, my view is —

*Pro.* What is it?

*Soc.* We agree — do we not? — that there is such a thing as false, and also such a thing as true opinion?

*Pro.* Yes.

*Soc.* And pleasure and pain, as I was just now saying, are often consequent upon these — upon true and false opinion, I mean.

*Pro.* Very true.

*Soc.* And do not opinion and the endeavour to form an opinion always spring from memory and perception? *Opinions spring from memory and perception,*

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Might we imagine the process to be something of this nature?

*Pro.* Of what nature?

*Soc.* An object may be often seen at a distance not very clearly, and the seer may want to determine what it is which he sees.

*Pro.* Very likely.

*Soc.* Soon he begins to interrogate himself.

*Pro.* In what manner?

*Soc.* He asks himself — ‘What is that which appears to be standing by the rock under the tree?’ This is the question which he may be supposed to put to himself when he sees such an appearance.

*Pro.* True.

*Soc.* To which he may guess the right answer, saying as if in a whisper to himself — ‘It is a man.’

*Pro.* Very good.

*Soc.* Or again, he may be misled, and then he will say — ‘No, it is a figure made by the shepherds.’

*Pro.* Yes.

*Soc.* And if he has a companion, he repeats his thought to him in articulate sounds, and what was before an opinion, has now become a proposition.

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Philebus.*SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

*Soc.* But if he be walking alone when these thoughts occur to him, he may not unfrequently keep them in his mind for a considerable time.

*Pro.* Very true.

*Soc.* Well, now, I wonder whether you would agree in my explanation of this phenomena.

*Pro.* What is your explanation?

*Soc.* I think that the soul at such times is like a book.

*Pro.* How so?

*Soc.* Memory and perception meet, and they and their attendant feelings seem to me almost to write down words in the soul, and when the inscribing feeling writes truly, then true opinion and true propositions which are the expressions of opinion, come into our souls—but when the scribe within us writes falsely, the result is false.

*Pro.* I quite assent and agree to your statement.

*Soc.* I must bespeak your favour also for another artist, who is busy at the same time in the chambers of the soul.

*Pro.* Who is he?

*Soc.* The painter, who, after the scribe has done his work, draws images in the soul of the things which he has described.

*Pro.* But when and how does he do this?

*Soc.* When a man, besides receiving from sight or some other sense certain opinions or statements, sees in his mind the images of the subjects of them;—is not this a very common mental phenomenon?

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And the images answering to true opinions and words are true, and to false opinions and words false; are they not?

*Pro.* They are.

*Soc.* If we are right so far, there arises a further question.

*Pro.* What is it?

*Soc.* Whether we experience the feeling of which I am speaking only in relation to the present and the past, or in relation to the future also?

*Pro.* I should say in relation to all times alike.

*Soc.* Have not purely mental pleasures and pains been described already as in some cases anticipations of the bodily

which write down in the soul propositions relating to objects perceived. Imagination at the same time draws pictures of them. These propositions and pictures may be true or false.

Do the propositions and pictures refer to the future, as well as to the past and present?

ones; from which we may infer that anticipatory pleasures and pains have to do with the future?

*Philebus.*

*Pro.* Most true.

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

*Soc.* And do all those writings and paintings which, as we were saying a little while ago, are produced in us, relate to the past and present only, and not to the future?

*Pro.* To the future, very much.

*Soc.* When you say 'Very much,' you mean to imply that all these representations are hopes about the future, and that mankind are filled with hopes in every stage of existence?

Certainly  
they do;  
and then  
they are  
hopes.

*Pro.* Exactly.

*Soc.* Answer me another question.

*Pro.* What question?

*Soc.* A just and pious and good man is the friend of the gods; is he not?

*Pro.* Certainly he is.

*Soc.* And the unjust and utterly bad man is the reverse?

40 *Pro.* True.

*Soc.* And all men, as we were saying just now, are always filled with hopes?

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And these hopes, as they are termed, are propositions which exist in the minds of each of us?

*Pro.* Yes.

*Soc.* And the fancies of hope are also pictured in us; a man may often have a vision of a heap of gold, and pleasures ensuing, and in the picture there may be a likeness of himself mightily rejoicing over his good fortune.

*Pro.* True.

*Soc.* And may we not say that the good, being friends of the gods, have generally true pictures presented to them, and the bad false pictures?

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* The bad, too, have pleasures painted in their fancy as well as the good; but I presume that they are false pleasures.

And the good  
have true  
hopes pre-  
sented to their  
minds by the  
gods, the bad  
have false  
pleasures  
painted in  
their fancies.

*Pro.* They are.

*Soc.* The bad then commonly delight in false pleasures, and the good in true pleasures?

*Pro.* Doubtless.

*Philebus.*SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

*Soc.* Then upon this view there are false pleasures in the souls of men which are a ludicrous imitation of the true, and there are pains of a similar character?

*Pro.* There are.

*Soc.* And did we not allow that a man who had an opinion at all had a real opinion, but often about things which had no existence either in the past, present, or future?

*Pro.* Quite true.

*Soc.* And this was the source of false opinion and opining; am I not right?

*Pro.* Yes.

*Soc.* And must we not attribute to pleasure and pain a similar real but illusory character?

*Pro.* How do you mean?

*Soc.* I mean to say that a man must be admitted to have real pleasure who is pleased with anything or anyhow; and he may be pleased about things which neither have nor have ever had any real existence, and, more often than not, are never likely to exist.

*Pro.* Yes, Socrates, that again is undeniable.

*Soc.* And may not the same be said about fear and anger and the like; are they not often false?

*Pro.* Quite so.

*Soc.* And can opinions be good or bad except in as far as they are true or false?

*Pro.* In no other way.

*Soc.* Nor can pleasures be conceived to be bad except in 41  
so far as they are false.

*Pro.* Nay, Socrates, that is the very opposite of the truth; for no one would call pleasures and pains bad because they are false, but by reason of some other great corruption to which they are liable.

*Soc.* Well, of pleasures which are corrupt and caused by corruption we will hereafter speak, if we care to continue the enquiry; for the present I would rather show by another argument that there are many false pleasures existing or coming into existence in us, because this may assist our final decision.

*Pro.* Very true; that is to say, if there are such pleasures.

*Soc.* I think that there are, Protarchus; but this is an

But these  
false pleasures  
have a real  
existence.

Opinions are  
only bad if  
they are false:  
Is this the  
case with  
pleasures?  
—Protarchus  
reclaims  
against the  
notion.



opinion which should be well assured, and not rest upon a mere assertion.

*Philebus.*

*Pro.* Very good.

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

*Soc.* Then now, like wrestlers, let us approach and grasp this new argument.

*Pro.* Proceed.

*Soc.* We were maintaining a little while since, that when desires, as they are termed, exist in us, then the body has separate feelings apart from the soul — do you remember?

Recapitulation.

*Pro.* Yes, I remember that you said so.

*Soc.* And the soul was supposed to desire the opposite of the bodily state, while the body was the source of any pleasure or pain which was experienced.

*Pro.* True.

*Soc.* Then now you may infer what happens in such cases.

*Pro.* What am I to infer?

*Soc.* That in such cases pleasures and pains come simultaneously; and there is a juxtaposition of the opposite sensations which correspond to them, as has been already shown.

*Pro.* Clearly.

*Soc.* And there is another point to which we have agreed.

*Pro.* What is it?

*Soc.* That pleasure and pain both admit of more and less, and that they are of the class of infinites.

*Pro.* Certainly, we said so.

*Soc.* But how can we rightly judge of them?

*Pro.* How can we?

*Soc.* Is it our intention to judge of their comparative importance and intensity, measuring pleasure against pain, and pain against pain, and pleasure against pleasure?

*Pro.* Yes, such is our intention, and we shall judge of them accordingly.

42 *Soc.* Well, take the case of sight. Does not the nearness or distance of magnitudes obscure their true proportions, and make us opine falsely; and do we not find the same illusion happening in the case of pleasures and pains?

*Pro.* Yes, Socrates, and in a degree far greater.

*Soc.* Then what we are now saying is the opposite of what we were saying before.

*Philebus.**Pro.* What was that?SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.*Soc.* Then the opinions were true and false, and infected the pleasures and pains with their own falsity.*Pro.* Very true.Pleasures  
and pains  
are often false,  
because they  
are seen at  
various dis-  
tances and  
in various  
relations.*Soc.* But now it is the pleasures which are said to be true and false because they are seen at various distances, and subjected to comparison; the pleasures appear to be greater and more vehement when placed side by side with the pains, and the pains when placed side by side with the pleasures.*Pro.* Certainly, and for the reason which you mention.*Soc.* And suppose you part off from pleasures and pains the element which makes them appear to be greater or less than they really are: you will acknowledge that this element is illusory, and you will never say that the corresponding excess or defect of pleasure or pain is real or true.*Pro.* Certainly not.These are not  
the only in-  
stances of false  
pleasures and  
pains.  
Pleasure and  
pain may  
arise from  
certain  
changes in  
the bodily  
constitution.*Soc.* Next let us see whether in another direction we may not find pleasures and pains existing and appearing in living beings, which are still more false than these.*Pro.* What are they, and how shall we find them?*Soc.* If I am not mistaken, I have often repeated that pains and aches and suffering and uneasiness of all sorts arise out of a corruption of nature caused by concretions, and dissolutions, and repletions, and evacuations, and also by growth and decay?*Pro.* Yes, that has been often said.*Soc.* And we have also agreed that the restoration of the natural state is pleasure?*Pro.* Right.*Soc.* But now let us suppose an interval of time at which the body experiences none of these changes.*Pro.* When can that be, Socrates?*Soc.* Your question, Protarchus, does not help the argument.*Pro.* Why not, Socrates?*Soc.* Because it does not prevent me from repeating mine.*Pro.* And what was that?*Soc.* Why, Protarchus, admitting that there is no such interval, I may ask what would be the necessary consequence if there were?

*Pro.* You mean, what would happen if the body were not changed either for good or bad?

*Soc.* Yes.

*Philebus.*  
SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS

*Pro.* Why then, Socrates, I should suppose that there would be neither pleasure nor pain.

43 *Soc.* Very good; but still, if I am not mistaken, you do assert that we must always be experiencing one of them; that is what the wise tell us; for, say they, all things are ever flowing up and down.

Such changes are always going on, though they are not always perceptible; only the greatest are accompanied by pleasure and pain.

*Pro.* Yes, and their words are of no mean authority.

*Soc.* Of course, for they are no mean authorities themselves; and I should like to avoid the brunt of their argument. Shall I tell you how I mean to escape from them? And you shall be the partner of my flight.

*Pro.* How?

*Soc.* To them we will say: 'Good; but are we, or living things in general, always conscious of what happens to us — for example, of our growth, or the like? Are we not, on the contrary, almost wholly unconscious of this and similar phenomena?' You must answer for them.

*Pro.* The latter alternative is the true one.

*Soc.* Then we were not right in saying, just now, that motions going up and down cause pleasures and pains?

*Pro.* True.

*Soc.* A better and more unexceptionable way of speaking will be —

*Pro.* What?

*Soc.* If we say that the great changes produce pleasures and pains, but that the moderate and lesser ones do neither.

*Pro.* That, Socrates, is the more correct mode of speaking.

*Soc.* But if this be true, the life to which I was just now referring again appears.

Thus the neutral life reappears.

*Pro.* What life?

*Soc.* The life which we affirmed to be devoid either of pain or of joy.

*Pro.* Very true.

*Soc.* We may assume then that there are three lives, one pleasant, one painful, and the third which is neither; what say you?

*Pro.* I should say as you do that there are three of them.

*Philebus.*SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.This neutral  
life, though  
painless, is  
not pleasant.*Soc.* But if so, the negation of pain will not be the same with pleasure.*Pro.* Certainly not.*Soc.* Then when you hear a person saying, that always to live without pain is the pleasantest of all things, what would you understand him to mean by that statement?*Pro.* I think that by pleasure he must mean the negative of pain.*Soc.* Let us take any three things; or suppose that we embellish a little and call the first gold, the second silver, and there shall be a third which is neither.*Pro.* Very good.*Soc.* Now, can that which is neither be either gold or silver?*Pro.* Impossible.*Soc.* No more can that neutral or middle life be rightly or reasonably spoken or thought of as pleasant or painful.*Pro.* Certainly not.Yet some  
people think  
that it is.*Soc.* And yet, my friend, there are, as we know, persons 44 who say and think so.*Pro.* Certainly.*Soc.* And do they think that they have pleasure when they are free from pain?*Pro.* They say so.*Soc.* And they must think or they would not say that they have pleasure.*Pro.* I suppose not.*Soc.* And yet if pleasure and the negation of pain are of distinct natures, they are wrong.*Pro.* But they are undoubtedly of distinct natures.*Soc.* Then shall we take the view that they are three, as we were just now saying, or that they are two only — the one being a state of pain, which is an evil, and the other a cessation of pain, which is of itself a good, and is called pleasant?*Pro.* But why, Socrates, do we ask the question at all? I do not see the reason.*Soc.* You, Protarchus, have clearly never heard of certain enemies of our friend Philebus.*Pro.* And who may they be?



*Soc.* Certain persons who are reputed to be masters in natural philosophy, who deny the very existence of pleasure.

*Pro.* Indeed!

*Soc.* They say that what the school of Philebus calls pleasures are all of them only avoidances of pain.

*Pro.* And would you, Socrates, have us agree with them?

*Soc.* Why, no, I would rather use them as a sort of diviners, who divine the truth, not by rules of art, but by an instinctive repugnance and extreme detestation which a noble nature has of the power of pleasure, in which they think that there is nothing sound, and her seductive influence is declared by them to be witchcraft, and not pleasure. This is the use which you may make of them. And when you have considered the various grounds of their dislike, you shall hear from me what I deem to be true pleasures. Having thus examined the nature of pleasure from both points of view, we will bring her up for judgment.

*Pro.* Well said.

*Soc.* Then let us enter into an alliance with these philosophers and follow in the track of their dislike. I imagine that they would say something of this sort; they would begin at the beginning, and ask whether, if we wanted to know the nature of any quality, such as hardness, we should be more likely to discover it by looking at the hardest things, rather than at the least hard? You, Protarchus, shall answer these severe gentlemen as you answer me.

*Pro.* By all means, and I reply to them, that you should look at the greatest instances.

*Soc.* Then if we want to see the true nature of pleasures  
45 as a class, we should not look at the most diluted pleasures, but at the most extreme and most vehement?

*Pro.* In that every one will agree.

*Soc.* And the obvious instances of the greatest pleasures, as we have often said, are the pleasures of the body?

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And are they felt by us to be or become greater, when we are sick or when we are in health? And here we must be careful in our answer, or we shall come to grief.

*Pro.* How will that be?

*Philebus.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

They are certain physical philosophers who affirm pleasure to be only the absence of pain.

The grounds of their dislike to pleasure may throw light on our present enquiry.

The nature of things is best seen in their greatest instances.

The greatest pleasures are of the body, not in a healthy,

*Philebus.*

*Soc.* Why, because we might be tempted to answer, 'When we are in health.'

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

*Pro.* Yes, that is the natural answer.

*Soc.* Well, but are not those pleasures the greatest of which mankind have the greatest desires?

*Pro.* True.

but in a  
morbid state.

*Soc.* And do not people who are in a fever, or any similar illness, feel cold or thirst or other bodily affections more intensely? Am I not right in saying that they have a deeper want and greater pleasure in the satisfaction of their want?

*Pro.* That is obvious as soon as it is said.

*Soc.* Well, then, shall we not be right in saying, that if a person would wish to see the greatest pleasures he ought to go and look, not at health, but at disease? And here you must distinguish:—do not imagine that I mean to ask whether those who are very ill have more pleasures than those who are well, but understand that I am speaking of the magnitude of pleasure; I want to know where pleasures are found to be most intense. For, as I say, we have to discover what is pleasure, and what they mean by pleasure who deny her very existence.

*Pro.* I think I follow you.

The pleasures  
of wantonness  
are more in-  
tense than  
those of tem-  
perance.

*Soc.* You will soon have a better opportunity of showing whether you do or not, Protarchus. Answer now, and tell me whether you see, I will not say more, but more intense and excessive pleasures in wantonness than in temperance? Reflect before you speak.

*Pro.* I understand you, and see that there is a great difference between them; the temperate are restrained by the wise man's aphorism of 'Never too much,' which is their rule, but excess of pleasure possessing the minds of fools and wantons becomes madness and makes them shout with delight.

*Soc.* Very good, and if this be true, then the greatest pleasures and pains will clearly be found in some vicious state of soul and body, and not in a virtuous state.

*Pro.* Certainly.

46

*Soc.* And ought we not to select some of these for examination, and see what makes them the greatest?

*Pro.* To be sure we ought.

*Soc.* Take the case of the pleasures which arise out of certain disorders. *Philebus.*

*Pro.* What disorders?

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

*Soc.* The pleasures of unseemly disorders, which our severe friends utterly detest.

*Pro.* What pleasures?

*Soc.* Such, for example, as the relief of itching and other ailments by scratching, which is the only remedy required. For what in Heaven's name is the feeling to be called which is thus produced in us?—Pleasure or pain?

Morbid pleasures are such as those of scratching, which are of a mixed character.

*Pro.* A villainous mixture of some kind, Socrates, I should say.

*Soc.* I did not introduce the argument, O Protarchus, with any personal reference to Philebus, but because, without the consideration of these and similar pleasures, we shall not be able to determine the point at issue.

*Pro.* Then we had better proceed to analyze this family of pleasures.

*Soc.* You mean the pleasures which are mingled with pain?

*Pro.* Exactly.

*Soc.* There are some mixtures which are of the body, and only in the body, and others which are of the soul, and only in the soul; while there are other mixtures of pleasures with pains, common both to soul and body, which in their composite state are called sometimes pleasures and sometimes pains.

Mixed pleasures may be of the body, of the soul, or common to both.

*Pro.* How is that?

*Soc.* Whenever, in the restoration or in the derangement of nature, a man experiences two opposite feelings; for example, when he is cold and is growing warm, or again, when he is hot and is becoming cool, and he wants to have the one and be rid of the other;—the sweet has a bitter, as the common saying is, and both together fasten upon him and create irritation and in time drive him to distraction.

*Pro.* That description is very true to nature.

*Soc.* And in these sorts of mixtures the pleasures and pains are sometimes equal, and sometimes one or other of them predominates?

Either element may predominate in the mixture.

*Pro.* True.

*Soc.* Of cases in which the pain exceeds the pleasure, an example is afforded by itching, of which we were just now

*Philebus.*SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.Instances  
of mixed  
pleasures:  
(1) of the  
body only —  
the relief of  
itching by  
scratching;

speaking, and by the tingling which we feel when the boiling and fiery element is within, and the rubbing and motion<sup>1</sup> only relieves the surface, and does not reach the parts affected; then if you put them to the fire, and as a last resort apply cold to them, you may often produce the most intense pleasure or pain in the inner parts, which contrasts and mingles with the pain or pleasure, as the case may be, of the outer parts; and this is due to the forcible separation of 47 what is united, or to the union of what is separated, and to the juxtaposition of pleasure and pain.

*Pro.* Quite so.

*Soc.* Sometimes the element of pleasure prevails in a man, and the slight undercurrent of pain makes him tingle, and causes a gentle irritation; or again, the excessive infusion of pleasure creates an excitement in him,— he even leaps for joy, he assumes all sorts of attitudes, he changes all manner of colours, he gasps for breath, and is quite amazed, and utters the most irrational exclamations.

*Pro.* Yes, indeed.

*Soc.* He will say of himself, and others will say of him, that he is dying with these delights; and the more dissipated and good-for-nothing he is, the more vehemently he pursues them in every way; of all pleasures he declares them to be the greatest; and he reckons him who lives in the most constant enjoyment of them to be the happiest of mankind.

*Pro.* That, Socrates, is a very true description of the opinions of the majority about pleasures.

(2) common  
to body and  
mind — vacu-  
ity accom-  
panied by  
hope;

*Soc.* Yes, Protarchus, quite true of the mixed pleasures, which arise out of the communion of external and internal sensations in the body: there are also cases in which the mind contributes an opposite element to the body<sup>2</sup>, whether of pleasure or pain, and the two unite and form one mixture. Concerning these I have already remarked, that when a man is empty he desires to be full, and has pleasure in hope and pain in vacuity. But now I must further add what I omitted before, that in all these and similar emotions in which body and mind are opposed (and they are innumerable), pleasure and pain coalesce in one.

<sup>1</sup> Reading with the MSS. *κινήσει.*<sup>2</sup> Reading *περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν αἷς ψυχῇ σώματι τὰναντία ξυμβάλλεται.*



*Pro.* I believe that to be quite true.

*Soc.* There still remains one other sort of admixture of pleasures and pains.

*Pro.* What is that?

*Soc.* The union which, as we were saying, the mind often experiences of purely mental feelings.

*Pro.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* Why, do we not speak of anger, fear, desire, sorrow, love, emulation, envy, and the like, as pains which belong to the soul only?

*Pro.* Yes.

*Soc.* And shall we not find them also full of the most wonderful pleasures? need I remind you of the anger

‘Which stirs even a wise man to violence,  
And is sweeter than honey and the honeycomb?’

48 And you remember how pleasures mingle with pains in lamentation and bereavement?

*Pro.* Yes, there is a natural connexion between them.

*Soc.* And you remember also how at the sight of tragedies the spectators smile through their tears?

*Pro.* Certainly I do.

*Soc.* And are you aware that even at a comedy the soul experiences a mixed feeling of pain and pleasure?

*Pro.* I do not quite understand you.

*Soc.* I admit, Protarchus, that there is some difficulty in recognizing this mixture of feelings at a comedy.

*Pro.* There is, I think.

*Soc.* And the greater the obscurity of the case the more desirable is the examination of it, because the difficulty in detecting other cases of mixed pleasures and pains will be less.

*Pro.* Proceed.

*Soc.* I have just mentioned envy; would you not call that a pain of the soul?

*Pro.* Yes.

*Soc.* And yet the envious man finds something in the misfortunes of his neighbours at which he is pleased?

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And ignorance, and what is termed clownishness, are surely an evil?

*Philebus.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

(3) of the  
mind only —

*b.* sorrow;

*c.* the mixed  
feelings with  
which specta-  
tors regard  
tragedy and  
comedy;

*d.* envy.

*Philebus.*

*Pro.* To be sure.

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

*Soc.* From these considerations learn to know the nature of the ridiculous.

From envy we proceed to the consideration of the ridiculous.

*Pro.* Explain.

*Soc.* The ridiculous is in short the specific name which is used to describe the vicious form of a certain habit; and of vice in general it is that kind which is most at variance with the inscription at Delphi.

The sense of the ridiculous is excited by self-deception,

*Pro.* You mean, Socrates, 'Know thyself.'

*Soc.* I do; and the opposite would be, 'Know not thyself.'

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And now, O Protarchus, try to divide this into three.

*Pro.* Indeed I am afraid that I cannot.

*Soc.* Do you mean to say that I must make the division for you?

*Pro.* Yes, and what is more, I beg that you will.

*Soc.* Are there not three ways in which ignorance of self may be shown?

*Pro.* What are they?

which may be shown (1) about money,

*Soc.* In the first place, about money; the ignorant may fancy himself richer than he is.

*Pro.* Yes, that is a very common error.

(2) about beauty,

*Soc.* And still more often he will fancy that he is taller or fairer than he is, or that he has some other advantage of person which he really has not.

*Pro.* Of course.

and (3) about wisdom and virtue.

*Soc.* And yet surely by far the greatest number err about the goods of the mind; they imagine themselves to be much better men than they are.

*Pro.* Yes, that is by far the commonest delusion.

*Soc.* And of all the virtues, is not wisdom the one which the mass of mankind are always claiming, and which most arouses in them a spirit of contention and lying conceit of wisdom?

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And may not all this be truly called an evil condition?

*Pro.* Very evil.

*Soc.* But we must pursue the division a step further, Protarchus, if we would see in envy of the childish sort a singular mixture of pleasure and pain.

*Philebus.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

*Pro.* How can we make the further division which you suggest?

*Soc.* All who are silly enough to entertain this lying conceit of themselves may of course be divided, like the rest of mankind, into two classes — one having power and might; and the other the reverse.

Those who deceive themselves may be powerful or powerless: in the latter case they are ridiculous.

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Let this, then, be the principle of division; those of them who are weak and unable to revenge themselves, when they are laughed at, may be truly called ridiculous, but those who can defend themselves may be more truly described as strong and formidable; for ignorance in the powerful is hateful and horrible, because hurtful to others both in reality and in fiction, but powerless ignorance may be reckoned, and in truth is, ridiculous.

*Pro.* That is very true, but I do not as yet see where is the admixture of pleasures and pains.

But how is there a combination of pleasure and pain in the ridiculous?

*Soc.* Well, then, let us examine the nature of envy.

*Pro.* Proceed.

*Soc.* Is not envy an unrighteous pleasure, and also an unrighteous pain?

*Pro.* Most true.

*Soc.* There is nothing envious or wrong in rejoicing at the misfortunes of enemies?

*Pro.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* But to feel joy instead of sorrow at the sight of our friends' misfortunes — is not that wrong?

We laugh at a friend's misfortunes through envy. Laughter is pleasant, envy is painful.

*Pro.* Undoubtedly.

*Soc.* Did we not say that ignorance was always an evil?

*Pro.* True.

*Soc.* And the three kinds of vain conceit in our friends which we enumerated — the vain conceit of beauty, of wisdom, and of wealth, are ridiculous if they are weak, and detestable when they are powerful: May we not say, as I was saying before, that our friends who are in this state of mind, when harmless to others, are simply ridiculous?

*Pro.* They are ridiculous.

*Philebus.*SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

*Soc.* And do we not acknowledge this ignorance of theirs to be a misfortune?

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And do we feel pain or pleasure in laughing at it?

*Pro.* Clearly we feel pleasure.

*Soc.* And was not envy the source of this pleasure which 50 we feel at the misfortunes of friends?

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then the argument shows that when we laugh at the folly of our friends, pleasure, in mingling with envy, mingles with pain, for envy has been acknowledged by us to be mental pain, and laughter is pleasant; and so we envy and laugh at the same instant.

*Pro.* True.

Combinations of pleasure and pain take place, not only on the stage, but in human life, and arise out of many other causes besides sorrow, envy, and anger.

*Soc.* And the argument implies that there are combinations of pleasure and pain in lamentations, and in tragedy and comedy, not only on the stage, but on the greater stage of human life; and so in endless other cases.

*Pro.* I do not see how any one can deny what you say, Socrates, however eager he may be to assert the opposite opinion.

*Soc.* I mentioned anger, desire, sorrow, fear, love, emulation, envy, and similar emotions, as examples in which we should find a mixture of the two elements so often named; did I not?

*Pro.* Yes.

*Soc.* We may observe that our conclusions hitherto have had reference only to sorrow and envy and anger.

*Pro.* I see.

*Soc.* Then many other cases still remain?

*Pro.* Certainly.

But these instances will suffice.

*Soc.* And why do you suppose me to have pointed out to you the admixture which takes place in comedy? Why but to convince you that there was no difficulty in showing the mixed nature of fear and love and similar affections; and I thought that when I had given you the illustration, you would have let me off, and have acknowledged as a general truth that the body without the soul, and the soul without the body, as well as the two united, are susceptible of all sorts of admixtures of pleasures and pains; and so further



discussion would have been unnecessary. And now I want to know whether I may depart; or will you keep me here until midnight? I fancy that I may obtain my release without many words;—if I promise that to-morrow I will give you an account of all these cases. But at present I would rather sail in another direction, and go to other matters which remain to be settled, before the judgment can be given which Philebus demands.

*Pro.* Very good, Socrates; in what remains take your own course.

*Soc.* Then after the mixed pleasures the unmixed should have their turn; this is the natural and necessary order.

51 *Pro.* Excellent.

*Soc.* These, in turn, then, I will now endeavour to indicate; for with the maintainers of the opinion that all pleasures are a cessation of pain, I do not agree, but, as I was saying, I use them as witnesses, that there are pleasures which seem only and are not, and there are others again which have great power and appear in many forms, yet are intermingled with pains, and are partly alleviations of agony and distress, both of body and mind.

*Pro.* Then what pleasures, Socrates, should we be right in conceiving to be true?

*Soc.* True pleasures are those which are given by beauty of colour and form, and most of those which arise from smells; those of sound, again, and in general those of which the want is painless and unconscious, and of which the fruition is palpable to sense and pleasant and unalloyed with pain.

*Pro.* Once more, Socrates, I must ask what you mean.

*Soc.* My meaning is certainly not obvious, and I will endeavour to be plainer. I do not mean by beauty of form such beauty as that of animals or pictures, which the many would suppose to be my meaning; but, says the argument, understand me to mean straight lines and circles, and the plane or solid figures which are formed out of them by turning-lathes and rulers and measurers of angles; for these I affirm to be not only relatively beautiful, like other things, but they are eternally and absolutely beautiful, and they have peculiar pleasures, quite unlike the pleasures of scratching.

*Philebus.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

After the mixed pleasures we must consider the unmixed or true.

True pleasures are given (1) by beauty of form,

*Philebus.*

And there are colours which are of the same character, and have similar pleasures; now do you understand my meaning?

(2) colour,

*Pro.* I am trying to understand, Socrates, and I hope that you will try to make your meaning clearer.

(3) sound;

*Soc.* When sounds are smooth and clear, and have a single pure tone, then I mean to say that they are not relatively but absolutely beautiful, and have natural pleasures associated with them.

*Pro.* Yes, there are such pleasures.

(4) by sweet smells,

*Soc.* The pleasures of smell are of a less ethereal sort, but they have no necessary admixture of pain; and all pleasures, however and wherever experienced, which are unattended by pains, I assign to an analogous class. Here then are two kinds of pleasures.

*Pro.* I understand.

and (5) by knowledge.

*Soc.* To these may be added the pleasures of knowledge, if 52 no hunger of knowledge and no pain caused by such hunger precede them.

*Pro.* And this is the case.

*Soc.* Well, but if a man who is full of knowledge loses his knowledge, are there not pains of forgetting?

*Pro.* Not necessarily, but there may be times of reflection, when he feels grief at the loss of his knowledge.

*Soc.* Yes, my friend, but at present we are enumerating only the natural perceptions, and have nothing to do with reflection.

*Pro.* In that case you are right in saying that the loss of knowledge is not attended with pain.

*Soc.* These pleasures of knowledge, then, are unmixed with pain; and they are not the pleasures of the many but of a very few.

*Pro.* Quite true.

Excessive pleasures are infinite; moderate pleasures have measure or limit.

*Soc.* And now, having fairly separated the pure pleasures and those which may be rightly termed impure, let us further add to our description of them, that the pleasures which are in excess have no measure, but that those which are not in excess have measure; the great, the excessive, whether more or less frequent, we shall be right in referring to the class of the infinite, and of the more and less, which pours through

body and soul alike; and the others we shall refer to the class which has measure. *Philebus.*

*Pro.* Quite right, Socrates.

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

*Soc.* Still there is something more to be considered about pleasures.

*Pro.* What is it?

*Soc.* When you speak of purity and clearness, or of excess, abundance, greatness and sufficiency, in what relation do these terms stand to truth?

*Pro.* Why do you ask, Socrates?

*Soc.* Because, Protarchus, I should wish to test pleasure and knowledge in every possible way, in order that if there be a pure and impure element in either of them, I may present the pure element for judgment, and then they will be more easily judged of by you and by me and by all of us.

We must select the pure and not the impure kinds of pleasure and knowledge for comparison.

*Pro.* Most true.

*Soc.* Let us investigate all the pure kinds; first selecting for consideration a single instance.

*Pro.* What instance shall we select?

53 *Soc.* Suppose that we first of all take whiteness.

*Pro.* Very good.

*Soc.* How can there be purity in whiteness, and what purity? Is that purest which is greatest or most in quantity, or that which is most unadulterated and freest from any admixture of other colours?

Purity is given, not by quantity, but by quality.

*Pro.* Clearly that which is most unadulterated.

*Soc.* True, Protarchus; and so the purest white, and not the greatest or largest in quantity, is to be deemed truest and most beautiful?

*Pro.* Right.

*Soc.* And we shall be quite right in saying that a little pure white is whiter and fairer and truer than a great deal that is mixed.

*Pro.* Perfectly right.

*Soc.* There is no need of adducing many similar examples in illustration of the argument about pleasure; one such is sufficient to prove to us that a small pleasure or a small amount of pleasure, if pure or unalloyed with pain, is always pleasanter and truer and fairer than a great pleasure or a great amount of pleasure of another kind.

*Philebus.*SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.Wise men say  
that pleasure  
is a genera-  
tion. What  
does this  
mean?There are two  
natures, the  
absolute and  
the relative:  
the latter is  
for the sake  
of the former.*Pro.* Assuredly; and the instance you have given is quite sufficient.*Soc.* But what do you say of another question:—have we not heard that pleasure is always a generation, and has no true being? Do not certain ingenious philosophers teach this doctrine, and ought not we to be grateful to them?*Pro.* What do they mean?*Soc.* I will explain to you, my dear Protarchus, what they mean, by putting a question.*Pro.* Ask, and I will answer.*Soc.* I assume that there are two natures, one self-existent, and the other ever in want of something.*Pro.* What manner of natures are they?*Soc.* The one majestic ever, the other inferior.*Pro.* You speak riddles.*Soc.* You have seen loves good and fair, and also brave lovers of them.*Pro.* I should think so.*Soc.* Search the universe for two terms which are like these two and are present everywhere.*Pro.* Yet a third time I must say<sup>1</sup>, Be a little plainer, Socrates.*Soc.* There is no difficulty, Protarchus; the argument is only in play, and insinuates that some things are for the sake of something else (relatives), and that other things are the ends to which the former class subserve (absolutes).*Pro.* Your many repetitions make me slow to understand.*Soc.* As the argument proceeds, my boy, I dare say that 54 the meaning will become clearer.*Pro.* Very likely.*Soc.* Here are two new principles.*Pro.* What are they?*Soc.* One is the generation of all things, and the other is essence.*Pro.* I readily accept from you both generation and essence.*Soc.* Very right; and would you say that generation is for the sake of essence, or essence for the sake of generation?Generation is  
relative to<sup>1</sup> Reading τὸ τρίτον ἔτ' ἐπὶ (conj. Badham).



*Pro.* You want to know whether that which is called essence is, properly speaking, for the sake of generation?

*Soc.* Yes.

*Pro.* By the gods, I wish that you would repeat your question.

*Soc.* I mean, O my Protarchus, to ask whether you would tell me that ship-building is for the sake of ships, or ships for the sake of ship-building? and in all similar cases I should ask the same question.

*Pro.* Why do you not answer yourself, Socrates?

*Soc.* I have no objection, but you must take your part.

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* My answer is, that all things instrumental, remedial, material, are given to us with a view to generation, and that each generation is relative to, or for the sake of, some being or essence, and that the whole of generation is relative to the whole of essence.

*Pro.* Assuredly.

*Soc.* Then pleasure, being a generation, must surely be for the sake of some essence?

*Pro.* True.

*Soc.* And that for the sake of which something else is done must be placed in the class of good, and that which is done for the sake of something else, in some other class, my good friend.

*Pro.* Most certainly.

*Soc.* Then pleasure, being a generation, will be rightly placed in some other class than that of good?

*Pro.* Quite right.

*Soc.* Then, as I said at first, we ought to be very grateful to him who first pointed out that pleasure was a generation only, and had no true being at all; for he is clearly one who laughs at the notion of pleasure being a good.

*Pro.* Assuredly.

*Soc.* And he would surely laugh also at those who make generation their highest end.

*Pro.* Of whom are you speaking, and what do they mean?

*Soc.* I am speaking of those who when they are cured of hunger or thirst or any other defect by some process of generation are delighted at the process as if it were pleasure;

*Philebus.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

essence,  
which is an  
absolute.

Absolutes are to be placed in the class of good, relatives in some other class. Thus pleasure, which is a generation and relative, is not a good. (Many thanks to him who first pointed this out.)

It is absurd to make pleasure consist in

*Philebus.*SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.generation  
and destruc-  
tion;

and they say that they would not wish to live without these and other feelings of a like kind which might be mentioned.

*Pro.* That is certainly what they appear to think.

55

*Soc.* And is not destruction universally admitted to be the opposite of generation?

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then he who chooses thus, would choose generation and destruction rather than that third sort of life, in which, as we were saying, was neither pleasure nor pain, but only the purest possible thought.

*Pro.* He who would make us believe pleasure to be a good is involved in great absurdities, Socrates.

*Soc.* Great, indeed; and there is yet another of them.

*Pro.* What is it?

and absurd to say (1) that in the body there is nothing good; (2) that the only good of the soul is pleasure; (3) that a man is vicious when in pain and virtuous when he is pleased.

*Soc.* Is there not an absurdity in arguing that there is nothing good or noble in the body, or in anything else, but that good is in the soul only, and that the only good of the soul is pleasure; and that courage or temperance or understanding, or any other good of the soul, is not really a good? — and is there not yet a further absurdity in our being compelled to say that he who has a feeling of pain and not of pleasure is bad at the time when he is suffering pain, even though he be the best of men; and again, that he who has a feeling of pleasure, in so far as he is pleased at the time when he is pleased, in that degree excels in virtue?

*Pro.* Nothing, Socrates, can be more irrational than all this.

And now for knowledge: Are some kinds purer than others?

*Soc.* And now, having subjected pleasure to every sort of test, let us not appear to be too sparing of mind and knowledge: let us ring their metal bravely, and see if there be unsoundness in any part, until we have found out what in them is of the purest nature; and then the truest elements both of pleasure and knowledge may be brought up for judgment.

*Pro.* Right.

Knowledge is (1) productive and (2) educational; of the former

*Soc.* Knowledge has two parts,—the one productive, and the other educational?

*Pro.* True.

*Soc.* And in the productive or handicraft arts, is not one part more akin to knowledge, and the other less; and may

not the one part be regarded as the pure and the other as the impure?

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Let us separate the superior or dominant elements in each of them.

*Pro.* What are they, and how do you separate them?

*Soc.* I mean to say, that if arithmetic, mensuration, and weighing be taken away from any art, that which remains will not be much.

*Pro.* Not much, certainly.

*Soc.* The rest will be only conjecture, and the better use of the senses which is given by experience and practice, in addition to a certain power of guessing, which is commonly  
56 called art, and is perfected by attention and pains.

*Pro.* Nothing more, assuredly.

*Soc.* Music, for instance, is full of this empiricism; for sounds are harmonized, not by measure, but by skilful conjecture; the music of the flute is always trying to guess the pitch of each vibrating note, and is therefore mixed up with much that is doubtful and has little which is certain.

*Pro.* Most true.

*Soc.* And the same will be found to hold good of medicine and husbandry and piloting and generalship.

*Pro.* Very true.

*Soc.* The art of the builder, on the other hand, which uses a number of measures and instruments, attains by their help to a greater degree of accuracy than the other arts.

*Pro.* How is that?

*Soc.* In ship-building and house-building, and in other branches of the art of carpentering, the builder has his rule, lathe, compass, line, and a most ingenious machine for straightening wood.

*Pro.* Very true, Socrates.

*Soc.* Then now let us divide the arts of which we were speaking into two kinds,—the arts which, like music, are less exact in their results, and those which, like carpentering, are more exact.

*Pro.* Let us make that division.

*Soc.* Of the latter class, the most exact of all are those which we just now spoke of as primary.

*Philebus.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

there is a pure  
and impure  
sort.

The pure  
elements in  
the produc-  
tive arts are  
arithmetic,  
mensuration,  
and weigh-  
ing: the rest  
is guesswork  
and experi-  
ence.

Music, medi-  
cine, etc. are  
less accurate  
than the art  
of building.

Arts may be  
divided into  
more and less  
exact.

*Philebus.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

Of arithmetic  
and mensura-  
tion, which  
belong to the  
former class,  
there are two  
kinds,—one  
pure, the  
other impure.

*Pro.* I see that you mean arithmetic, and the kindred arts of weighing and measuring.

*Soc.* Certainly, Protarchus; but are not these also distinguishable into two kinds?

*Pro.* What are the two kinds?

*Soc.* In the first place, arithmetic is of two kinds, one of which is popular, and the other philosophical.

*Pro.* How would you distinguish them?

*Soc.* There is a wide difference between them, Protarchus; some arithmeticians reckon unequal units; as for example, two armies, two oxen, two very large things or two very small things. The party who are opposed to them insist that every unit in ten thousand must be the same as every other unit.

*Pro.* Undoubtedly there is, as you say, a great difference among the votaries of the science; and there may be reasonably supposed to be two sorts of arithmetic.

*Soc.* And when we compare the art of mensuration which is used in building with philosophical geometry, or the art of computation which is used in trading with exact calculation, shall we say of either of the pairs that it is one or two? 57

*Pro.* On the analogy of what has preceded, I should be of opinion that they were severally two.

*Soc.* Right; but do you understand why I have discussed the subject?

*Pro.* I think so, but I should like to be told by you.

*Soc.* The argument has all along been seeking a parallel to pleasure, and true to that original design, has gone on to ask whether one sort of knowledge is purer than another, as one pleasure is purer than another.

*Pro.* Clearly; that was the intention.

*Soc.* And has not the argument in what has preceded, already shown that the arts have different provinces, and vary in their degrees of certainty?

*Pro.* Very true.

*Soc.* And just now did not the argument first designate a particular art by a common term, thus making us believe in the unity of that art; and then again, as if speaking of two different things, proceed to enquire whether the art as

Thus we see  
that as of  
pleasure, so  
of knowledge,  
there are two  
sorts, and one  
is purer than  
the other.



pursued by philosophers, or as pursued by non-philosophers, has more of certainty and purity? *Philebus.*

*Pro.* That is the very question which the argument is asking. *SOCRATES, PROTARCHUS.*

*Soc.* And how, Protarchus, shall we answer the enquiry?

*Pro.* O Socrates, we have reached a point at which the difference of clearness in different kinds of knowledge is enormous.

*Soc.* Then the answer will be the easier.

*Pro.* Certainly; and let us say in reply, that those arts into which arithmetic and mensuration enter, far surpass all others; and that of these the arts or sciences which are animated by the pure philosophic impulse are infinitely superior in accuracy and truth. *The purer sort consists of those arts into which mathematics enter; and of mathematics themselves there is a purer and an impurer kind.*

*Soc.* Then this is your judgment; and this is the answer which, upon your authority, we will give to all masters of the art of misinterpretation?

*Pro.* What answer?

*Soc.* That there are two arts of arithmetic, and two of mensuration; and also several other arts which in like manner have this double nature, and yet only one name.

*Pro.* Let us boldly return this answer to the masters of whom you speak, Socrates, and hope for good luck.

*Soc.* We have explained what we term the most exact arts or sciences.

*Pro.* Very good.

*Soc.* And yet, Protarchus, dialectic will refuse to acknowledge us, if we do not award to her the first place. *Where shall we place dialectic, the truest of sciences?*

58 *Pro.* And pray, what is dialectic?

*Soc.* Clearly the science which has to do with all that knowledge of which we are now speaking; for I am sure that all men who have a grain of intelligence will admit that the knowledge which has to do with being and reality, and sameness and unchangeableness, is by far the truest of all. But how would you decide this question, Protarchus?

*Pro.* I have often heard Gorgias maintain, Socrates, that the art of persuasion far surpassed every other; this, as he says, is by far the best of them all, for to it all things submit, not by compulsion, but of their own free will. Now, I should not like to quarrel either with you or with him. *Protarchus is afraid that he will offend Gorgias, if he assigns*

*Philebus.*SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.the first place  
to dialectic,  
and Socrates,  
if to rhetoric.Socrates  
assures him  
that if he does  
not deny that  
rhetoric is the  
most useful  
of arts and  
sciences,  
Gorgias will  
not quarrel  
with him for  
saying that  
dialectic is  
the truest.*Soc.* You mean to say that you would like to desert, if you were not ashamed?*Pro.* As you please.*Soc.* May I not have led you into a misapprehension?*Pro.* How?*Soc.* Dear Protarchus, I never asked which was the greatest or best or usefulest of arts or sciences, but which had clearness and accuracy, and the greatest amount of truth, however humble and little useful an art. And as for Gorgias, if you do not deny that his art has the advantage in usefulness to mankind, he will not quarrel with you for saying that the study of which I am speaking is superior in this particular of essential truth; as in the comparison of white colours, a little whiteness, if that little be only pure, was said to be superior in truth to a great mass which is impure. And now let us give our best attention and consider well, not the comparative use or reputation of the sciences, but the power or faculty, if there be such, which the soul has of loving the truth, and of doing all things for the sake of it; let us search into the pure element of mind and intelligence, and then we shall be able to say whether the science of which I have been speaking is most likely to possess the faculty, or whether there be some other which has higher claims.*Pro.* Well, I have been considering, and I can hardly think that any other science or art has a firmer grasp of the truth than this.*Soc.* Do you say so because you observe that the arts in general and those engaged<sup>1</sup> in them make use of opinion, and are resolutely engaged in the investigation of matters of opinion? Even he who supposes himself to be occupied with nature is really occupied with the things of this world, how created, how acting or acted upon. Is not this the sort of enquiry in which his life is spent? 59*Pro.* True.*Soc.* He is labouring, not after eternal being, but about things which are becoming, or which will or have become.*Pro.* Very true.<sup>1</sup> Reading ὁσοι.Dialectic  
differs from  
the generality  
of arts which  
have to do  
with the  
changeable  
and therefore  
never attain  
certainty.

*Soc.* And can we say that any of these things which neither are nor have been nor will be unchangeable, when judged by the strict rule of truth ever become certain?

*Philebus..*

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

*Pro.* Impossible.

*Soc.* How can anything fixed be concerned with that which has no fixedness?

*Pro.* How indeed?

*Soc.* Then mind and science when employed about such changing things do not attain the highest truth?

*Pro.* I should imagine not.

*Soc.* And now let us bid farewell, a long farewell, to you or me or Philebus or Gorgias, and urge on behalf of the argument a single point.

*Pro.* What point?

*Soc.* Let us say that the stable and pure and true and unalloyed has to do with the things which are eternal and unchangeable and unmixed, or if not, at any rate what is most akin to them has; and that all other things are to be placed in a second or inferior class.

Being concerned with the eternal and unchangeable, it ranks first.

*Pro.* Very true.

*Soc.* And of the names expressing cognition, ought not the fairest to be given to the fairest things?

The fairest names should be given to the fairest things—therefore mind and wisdom are to be assigned to the contemplation of true being.

*Pro.* That is natural.

*Soc.* And are not mind and wisdom the names which are to be honoured most?

*Pro.* Yes.

*Soc.* And these names may be said to have their truest and most exact application when the mind is engaged in the contemplation of true being?

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And these were the names which I adduced of the rivals of pleasure?

*Pro.* Very true, Socrates.

*Soc.* In the next place, as to the mixture, here are the ingredients, pleasure and wisdom, and we may be compared to artists who have their materials ready to their hands.

*Pro.* Yes.

*Soc.* And now we must begin to mix them?

*Pro.* By all means.

*Philebus.*

*Soc.* But had we not better have a preliminary word and refresh our memories?

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

*Pro.* Of what?

Before mixing  
let us sum up.

*Soc.* Of that which I have already mentioned. Well says the proverb, that we ought to repeat twice and even thrice 60 that which is good.

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Well then, by Zeus, let us proceed, and I will make what I believe to be a fair summary of the argument.

*Pro.* Let me hear.

By Philebus  
pleasure was  
affirmed to be  
the good:  
Socrates pre-  
ferred wisdom.

*Soc.* Philebus says that pleasure is the true end of all living beings, at which all ought to aim, and moreover that it is the chief good of all, and that the two names 'good' and 'pleasant' are correctly given to one thing and one nature; Socrates, on the other hand, begins by denying this, and further says, that in nature as in name they are two, and that wisdom partakes more than pleasure of the good. Is not and was not this what we were saying, Protarchus?

*Pro.* Certainly.

We agreed  
that the good  
must be char-  
acterised by  
self-suffi-  
ciency;

*Soc.* And is there not and was there not a further point which was conceded between us?

*Pro.* What was it?

*Soc.* That the good differs from all other things.

*Pro.* In what respect?

*Soc.* In that the being who possesses good always everywhere and in all things has the most perfect sufficiency, and is never in need of anything else.

*Pro.* Exactly.

but we found  
that both plea-  
sure and wis-  
dom by them-  
selves are  
devoid of this  
quality.

*Soc.* And did we not endeavour to make an imaginary separation of wisdom and pleasure, assigning to each a distinct life, so that pleasure was wholly excluded from wisdom, and wisdom in like manner had no part whatever in pleasure?

*Pro.* We did.

*Soc.* And did we think that either of them alone would be sufficient?

*Pro.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* And if we erred in any point, then let any one who will, take up the enquiry again and set us right; and assuming memory and wisdom and knowledge and true



opinion to belong to the same class, let him consider whether he would desire to possess or acquire,—I will not say pleasure, however abundant or intense, if he has no real perception that he is pleased, nor any consciousness of what he feels, nor any recollection, however momentary, of the feeling,—but would he desire to have anything at all, if these faculties were wanting to him? And about wisdom I ask the same question: can you conceive that any one would choose to have all wisdom absolutely devoid of pleasure, rather than with a certain degree of pleasure, or all pleasure devoid of wisdom, rather than with a certain degree of wisdom?

*Philebus.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

*Pro.* Certainly not, Socrates; but why repeat such questions any more?

61 *Soc.* Then the perfect and universally eligible and entirely good cannot possibly be either of them?

*Pro.* Impossible.

*Soc.* Then now we must ascertain the nature of the good more or less accurately, in order, as we were saying, that the second place may be duly assigned?

*Pro.* Right.

*Soc.* Have we not found a road which leads towards the good?

*Pro.* What road?

*Soc.* Supposing that a man had to be found, and you could discover in what house he lived, would not that be a great step towards the discovery of the man himself?

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And now reason intimates to us, as at our first beginning, that we should seek the good, not in the unmixed life but in the mixed.

*Pro.* True.

*Soc.* There is greater hope of finding that which we are seeking in the life which is well mixed than in that which is not?

*Pro.* Far greater.

*Soc.* Then now let us mingle, Protarchus, at the same time offering up a prayer to Dionysus or Hephaestus, or whoever is the god who presides over the ceremony of mingling.

Neither therefore ranks first. And before the second place can be assigned, we must discover the nature of the good.

Reason tells us that we should look for it in the mixed class.

*Philebus.*

*Pro.* By all means.

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

Let us then  
mingle pleasure  
and wisdom.

*Soc.* Are not we the cup-bearers? and here are two fountains which are flowing at our side: one, which is pleasure, may be likened to a fountain of honey; the other, wisdom, a sober draught in which no wine mingles, is of water unpleasant but healthful; out of these we must seek to make the fairest of all possible mixtures.

*Pro.* Certainly.

Shall we  
mingle all  
kinds of  
them, or the  
pure only?

*Soc.* Tell me first;—should we be most likely to succeed if we mingled every sort of pleasure with every sort of wisdom?

*Pro.* Perhaps we might.

*Soc.* But I should be afraid of the risk, and I think that I can show a safer plan.

*Pro.* What is it?

*Soc.* One pleasure was supposed by us to be truer than another, and one art to be more exact than another.

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* There was also supposed to be a difference in sciences; some of them regarding only the transient and perishing, and others the permanent and imperishable and everlasting and immutable; and when judged by the standard of truth, the latter, as we thought, were truer than the former.

*Pro.* Very good and right.

*Soc.* If, then, we were to begin by mingling the sections of each class which have the most of truth, will not the union suffice to give us the loveliest of lives, or shall we still want some elements of another kind?

*Pro.* I think that we ought to do what you suggest.

62

*Soc.* Let us suppose a man who understands justice, and has reason as well as understanding about the true nature of this and of all other things.

*Pro.* We will suppose such a man.

We cannot  
exclude the  
impure kinds  
of knowledge,  
for they are  
required by

*Soc.* Will he have enough of knowledge if he is acquainted only with the divine circle and sphere, and knows nothing of our human spheres and circles, but uses only divine circles and measures in the building of a house?

*Pro.* The knowledge which is only superhuman, Socrates, is ridiculous in man.

*Soc.* What do you mean? Do you mean that you are to throw into the cup and mingle the impure and uncertain art which uses the false measure and the false circle?

*Philebus.*  
SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.  
the needs  
of every-day  
life.

*Pro.* Yes, we must, if any of us is ever to find his way home.

*Soc.* And am I to include music, which, as I was saying just now, is full of guesswork and imitation, and is wanting in purity?

*Pro.* Yes, I think that you must, if human life is to be a life at all.

*Soc.* Well, then, suppose that I give way, and, like a doorkeeper who is pushed and overborne by the mob, I open the door wide, and let knowledge of every sort stream in, and the pure mingle with the impure?

*Pro.* I do not know, Socrates, that any great harm would come of having them all, if only you have the first sort.

All the  
sciences may  
be admitted,  
but the plea-  
sures require  
more consid-  
eration.

*Soc.* Well, then, shall I let them all flow into what Homer poetically terms 'a meeting of the waters'?

*Pro.* By all means.

*Soc.* There — I have let them in, and now I must return to the fountain of pleasure. For we were not permitted to begin by mingling in a single stream the true portions of both according to our original intention; but the love of all knowledge constrained us to let all the sciences flow in together before the pleasures.

*Pro.* Quite true.

*Soc.* And now the time has come for us to consider about the pleasures also, whether we shall in like manner let them go all at once, or at first only the true ones.

*Pro.* It will be by far the safer course to let flow the true ones first.

First, let  
us have the  
true ones;  
secondly, we  
must have  
the necessary.

*Soc.* Let them flow, then; and now, if there are any necessary pleasures, as there were arts and sciences necessary, must we not mingle them?

*Pro.* Yes; the necessary pleasures should certainly be allowed to mingle.

63 *Soc.* The knowledge of the arts has been admitted to be innocent and useful always; and if we say of pleasures in like manner that all of them are good and innocent for all of us at all times, we must let them all mingle?

*Philebus.*SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.Let us  
consult the  
pleasures and  
wisdom.*Pro.* What shall we say about them, and what course shall we take?*Soc.* Do not ask me, Protarchus; but ask the daughters of pleasure and wisdom to answer for themselves.*Pro.* How?*Soc.* Tell us, O beloved—shall we call you pleasures or by some other name?—would you rather live with or without wisdom? I am of opinion that they would certainly answer as follows:*Pro.* How?The pleasures  
say that they  
cannot live  
alone or  
without  
knowledge;*Soc.* They would answer, as we said before, that for any single class to be left by itself pure and isolated is not good, nor altogether possible; and that if we are to make comparisons of one class with another and choose, there is no better companion than knowledge of things in general, and likewise the perfect knowledge, if that may be, of ourselves in every respect<sup>1</sup>.*Pro.* And our answer will be:—In that ye have spoken well.*Soc.* Very true. And now let us go back and interrogate wisdom and mind: Would you like to have any pleasures in the mixture? And they will reply:—‘What pleasures do you mean?’*Pro.* Likely enough.and wisdom,  
that she  
desires only  
true and  
virtuous pleasures,  
not all  
of them.*Soc.* And we shall take up our parable and say: Do you wish to have the greatest and most vehement pleasures for your companions in addition to the true ones? ‘Why, Socrates,’ they will say, ‘how can we? seeing that they are the source of ten thousand hindrances to us; they trouble the souls of men, which are our habitation, with their madness; they prevent us from coming to the birth, and are commonly the ruin of the children which are born to us, causing them to be forgotten and unheeded; but the true and pure pleasures, of which you spoke, know to be of our family, and also those pleasures which accompany health and temperance, and which every Virtue, like a goddess, has in her train to follow her about wherever she goes,—mingle these and not the others; there would be great want<sup>1</sup> Reading αὐτῶν ἡμῶν.



64 of sense in any one who desires to see a fair and perfect mixture, and to find in it what is the highest good in man and in the universe, and to divine what is the true form of good — there would be great want of sense in his allowing the pleasures, which are always in the company of folly and vice, to mingle with mind in the cup.' — Is not this a very rational and suitable reply, which mind has made, both on her own behalf, as well as on the behalf of memory and true opinion?

*Pro.* Most certainly.

*Soc.* And still there must be something more added, which is a necessary ingredient in every mixture.

*Pro.* What is that?

*Soc.* Unless truth enter into the composition, nothing can truly be created or subsist.

*Pro.* Impossible.

*Soc.* Quite impossible; and now you and Philebus must tell me whether anything is still wanting in the mixture, for to my way of thinking the argument is now completed, and may be compared to an incorporeal law, which is going to hold fair rule over a living body.

*Pro.* I agree with you, Socrates.

*Soc.* And may we not say with reason that we are now at the vestibule of the habitation of the good?

*Pro.* I think that we are.

*Soc.* What, then, is there in the mixture which is most precious, and which is the principal cause why such a state is universally beloved by all? When we have discovered it, we will proceed to ask whether this omnipresent nature is more akin to pleasure or to mind.

*Pro.* Quite right; in that way we shall be better able to judge.

*Soc.* And there is no difficulty in seeing the cause which renders any mixture either of the highest value or of none at all.

*Pro.* What do you mean?

*Soc.* Every man knows it.

*Pro.* What?

*Soc.* He knows that any want of measure and symmetry in any mixture whatever must always of necessity be fatal,

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*Philebus.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

Truth is an  
indispensable  
element in the  
mixture.

We are now  
at the vesti-  
bule of the  
good.

What is the  
most precious  
element in  
the mixture?

*Philebus.*SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.Measure,  
which is the  
essence of  
beauty and  
virtue.Symmetry,  
beauty, and  
truth are the  
cause of the  
mixture and  
of the good  
in it.Of each of  
these three  
elements  
wisdom has a  
larger share  
than pleasure.

both to the elements and to the mixture, which is then not a mixture, but only a confused medley which brings confusion on the possessor of it.

*Pro.* Most true.

*Soc.* And now the power of the good has retired into the region of the beautiful; for measure and symmetry are beauty and virtue all the world over.

*Pro.* True.

*Soc.* Also we said that truth was to form an element in the mixture.

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Then, if we are not able to hunt the good with one idea only, with three we may catch our prey; Beauty, Symmetry, Truth are the three, and these taken together we may regard as the single cause of the mixture, and the mixture as being good by reason of the infusion of them.

*Pro.* Quite right.

*Soc.* And now, Protarchus, any man could decide well enough whether pleasure or wisdom is more akin to the highest good, and more honourable among gods and men.

*Pro.* Clearly, and yet perhaps the argument had better be pursued to the end.

*Soc.* We must take each of them separately in their relation to pleasure and mind, and pronounce upon them; for we ought to see to which of the two they are severally most akin.

*Pro.* You are speaking of beauty, truth, and measure?

*Soc.* Yes, Protarchus, take truth first, and, after passing in review mind, truth, pleasure, pause awhile and make answer to yourself,—as to whether pleasure or mind is more akin to truth.

*Pro.* There is no need to pause, for the difference between them is palpable; pleasure is the veriest impostor in the world; and it is said that in the pleasures of love, which appear to be the greatest, perjury is excused by the gods; for pleasures, like children, have not the least particle of reason in them; whereas mind is either the same as truth, or the most like truth, and the truest.

*Soc.* Shall we next consider measure, in like manner, and

ask whether pleasure has more of this than wisdom, or wisdom than pleasure? *Philebus.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.

*Pro.* Here is another question which may be easily answered; for I imagine that nothing can ever be more immoderate than the transports of pleasure, or more in conformity with measure than mind and knowledge.

*Soc.* Very good; but there still remains the third test: Has mind a greater share of beauty than pleasure, and is mind or pleasure the fairer of the two?

*Pro.* No one, Socrates, either awake or dreaming, ever saw or imagined mind or wisdom to be in aught unseemly, at any time, past, present, or future.

*Soc.* Right.

*Pro.* But when we see some one indulging in pleasures, 66 perhaps in the greatest of pleasures, the ridiculous or disgraceful nature of the action makes us ashamed; and so we put them out of sight, and consign them to darkness, under the idea that they ought not to meet the eye of day.

*Soc.* Then, Protarchus, you will proclaim everywhere, by word of mouth to this company, and by messengers bearing the tidings far and wide, that pleasure is not the first of possessions, nor yet the second, but that in measure, and the mean, and the suitable, and the like, the eternal nature has been found.

The order  
of goods:—  
(1) measure,  
the eternal  
nature;

*Pro.* Yes, that seems to be the result of what has been now said.

*Soc.* In the second class is contained the symmetrical and beautiful and perfect or sufficient, and all which are of that family.

(2) the sym-  
metrical and  
perfect;

*Pro.* True.

*Soc.* And if you reckon in the third class mind and wisdom, you will not be far wrong, if I divine aright.

(3) mind and  
wisdom;

*Pro.* I dare say.

*Soc.* And would you not put in the fourth class the goods which we were affirming to appertain specially to the soul—sciences and arts and true opinions as we call them? These come after the third class, and form the fourth, as they are certainly more akin to good than pleasure is.

(4) sciences,  
arts, and true  
opinions;

*Pro.* Surely.

*Soc.* The fifth class are the pleasures which were defined

(5) pure  
pleasures.

*Philebus.* by us as painless, being the pure pleasures of the soul herself, as we termed them, which accompany, some the sciences, and some the senses<sup>1</sup>.

*Pro.* Perhaps.

*Soc.* And now, as Orpheus says,

‘ With the sixth generation cease the glory of my song.’

Here, at the sixth award, let us make an end; all that remains is to set the crown on our discourse.

*Pro.* True.

Final recapitulation.

*Soc.* Then let us sum up and reassert what has been said, thus offering the third libation to the saviour Zeus.

*Pro.* How?

*Soc.* Philebus affirmed that pleasure was always and absolutely the good.

*Pro.* I understand; this third libation, Socrates, of which you spoke, meant a recapitulation.

*Soc.* Yes, but listen to the sequel; convinced of what I have just been saying, and feeling indignant at the doctrine, which is maintained, not by Philebus only, but by thousands of others, I affirmed that mind was far better and far more excellent, as an element of human life, than pleasure.

*Pro.* True.

*Soc.* But, suspecting that there were other things which were also better, I went on to say that if there was anything better than either, then I would claim the second place for mind over pleasure, and pleasure would lose the second place as well as the first.

*Pro.* You did.

*Soc.* Nothing could be more satisfactorily shown than the 67 unsatisfactory nature of both of them.

*Pro.* Very true.

*Soc.* The claims both of pleasure and mind to be the absolute good have been entirely disproven in this argument, because they are both wanting in self-sufficiency and also in adequacy and perfection.

*Pro.* Most true.

*Soc.* But, though they must both resign in favour of

<sup>1</sup> Reading *ἐπιστήμῃς, τὰς δὲ κ.τ.λ.*



another, mind is ten thousand times nearer and more akin to the nature of the conqueror than pleasure.

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And, according to the judgment which has now been given, pleasure will rank fifth.

*Pro.* True.

*Soc.* But not first; no, not even if all the oxen and horses and animals in the world by their pursuit of enjoyment proclaim her to be so;—although the many trusting in them, as diviners trust in birds, determine that pleasures make up the good of life, and deem the lusts of animals to be better witnesses than the inspirations of divine philosophy.

*Pro.* And now, Socrates, we tell you that the truth of what you have been saying is approved by the judgment of all of us.

*Soc.* And will you let me go?

*Pro.* There is a little which yet remains, and I will remind you of it, for I am sure that you will not be the first to give up the argument.

*Philibus.*

SOCRATES,  
PROTARCHUS.


Pleasure is the last and lowest of goods, and not first, even if asserted to be so by all the animals in the world.














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








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THE  
DIALOGUES OF PLATO  
*JOWETT*

VOL. V.





THE  
DIALOGUES OF PLATO

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

WITH ANALYSES AND INTRODUCTIONS

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## INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.

THE genuineness of the *Laws* is sufficiently proved (1) by more than twenty citations of them in the writings of Aristotle, who was residing at Athens during the last twenty years of the life of Plato, and who, having left it after his death (B. C. 347), returned thither twelve years later (B. C. 335); (2) by the allusion of Isocrates<sup>1</sup>—writing 346 B. C., a year after the death of Plato, and probably not more than three or four years after the composition of the *Laws*—who speaks of the *Laws* and *Republics* written by philosophers (ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν); (3) by the reference (Athen. 226 A) of the comic poet Alexis, a younger contemporary of Plato (fl. B. C. 356–306), to the enactment about prices, which occurs in *Laws* xi. 917 B foll., viz. that the same goods should not be offered at two prices on the same day<sup>2</sup>; (4) by the unanimous voice of later antiquity and the absence

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<sup>1</sup> Oratio ad Philippum missa, p. 84: Τὸ μὲν ταῖς πανηγύρεσιν ἐνοχλεῖν καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας λέγειν τοὺς συντρέχοντας ἐν αὐταῖς πρὸς οὐδένα λέγειν ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν λόγων (sc. speeches in the assembly) ἄκνυροι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες τοῖς νόμοις καὶ ταῖς πολιτείαις ταῖς ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν γεγραμμέναις.

<sup>2</sup> Οὐ γέγονε κρείττων νομοθέτης τοῦ πλουσίου  
'Ἀριστονίκου' τίθησι γὰρ νυνὶ νόμον,  
τῶν ἰχθυοπωλῶν ὅστις ἂν πωλῶν τινὶ  
ἰχθὺν ὑποτιμήσας ἀποδῶτ' ἐλάττονος  
ἧς εἶπε τιμῆς, εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον  
εὐθὺς ἀπάγεσθαι τοῦτον, ἵνα δεδοικότες  
τῆς ἀξίας ἀγαπῶσιν, ἢ τῆς ἐσπέρας  
σαπρούς ἅπαντας ἀποφέρωσιν οἴκαδε.

Meineke, Frag. Com. Graec. vol. iii. p. 438.

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of any suspicion among ancient writers worth speaking of to the contrary: for it is not said of Philippus of Opus that he composed any part of the Laws, but only that he copied them out of the waxen tablets, and was thought by some to have written the *Epinomis* (Diog. Laert. iii. 25). That the longest and one of the best writings bearing the name of Plato should be a forgery, even if its genuineness were unsupported by external testimony, would be a singular phenomenon in ancient literature; and although the critical worth of the consensus of late writers is generally not to be compared with the express testimony of contemporaries, yet a somewhat greater value may be attributed to their consent in the present instance, because the admission of the *Laws* is combined with doubts about the *Epinomis*, a spurious writing, which is a kind of epilogue to the larger work probably of a much later date. This shows that the reception of the *Laws* was not altogether indiscriminating.

The suspicion which has attached to the *Laws* of Plato in the judgment of some modern writers appears to rest partly (1) on differences in the style and form of the work, and (2) on differences of thought and opinion which they observe in them. Their suspicion is increased by the fact that these differences are accompanied by resemblances as striking to passages in other Platonic writings. They are sensible of a want of point in the dialogue and a general inferiority in the ideas, plan, manners, and style. They miss the poetical flow, the dramatic verisimilitude, the life and variety of the characters, the dialectic subtlety, the Attic purity, the luminous order, the exquisite urbanity; instead of which they find tautology, obscurity, self-sufficiency, sermonizing, rhetorical declamation, pedantry, egotism, uncouth forms of sentences, and peculiarities in the use of words and idioms. They are unable to discover any unity in the patched, irregular structure. The speculative element both in government and education is superseded by a narrow economical or religious vein. The grace and cheerfulness of Athenian life have disappeared; and a spirit of moroseness and religious intolerance has taken their place. The charm of youth is no longer there; the mannerism of age makes itself unpleasantly felt. The connexion is often imperfect; and there is a want of arrangement, exhibited especially in the enumeration of the laws towards the

end of the work. The *Laws* are full of flaws and repetitions. The Greek is in places very ungrammatical and intractable. A cynical levity is displayed in some passages, and a tone of disappointment and lamentation over human things in others. The critics seem also to observe in them bad imitations of thoughts which are better expressed in Plato's other writings. Lastly, they wonder how the mind which conceived the *Republic* could have left the *Critias*, *Hermocrates*, and *Philosophus* incomplete or unwritten, and have devoted the last years of life to the *Laws*.

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The questions which have been thus indirectly suggested may be considered by us under five or six heads: I, the characters; II, the plan; III, the style; IV, the imitations of other writings of Plato; V, the more general relation of the *Laws* to the *Republic* and the other dialogues; and VI, to the existing Athenian and Spartan states.

I. Already in the *Philebus* the distinctive character of Socrates has disappeared; and in the *Timaeus*, *Sophist*, and *Statesman* his function of chief speaker is handed over to the Pythagorean philosopher *Timaeus*, and to the Eleatic Stranger, at whose feet he sits, and is silent. More and more Plato seems to have felt in his later writings that the character and method of Socrates were no longer suited to be the vehicle of his own philosophy. He is no longer interrogative but dogmatic; not 'a hesitating enquirer,' but one who speaks with the authority of a legislator. Even in the *Republic* we have seen that the argument which is carried on by Socrates in the old style with *Thrasymachus* in the first book, soon passes into the form of exposition. In the *Laws* he is nowhere mentioned. Yet so completely in the tradition of antiquity is Socrates identified with Plato, that in the criticism of the *Laws* which we find in the so-called *Politics* of Aristotle he is supposed by the writer still to be playing his part of the chief speaker (cp. *Pol.* ii. 6, § 8 foll.).

The *Laws* are discussed by three representatives of Athens, Crete, and Sparta. The Athenian, as might be expected, is the protagonist or chief speaker, while the second place is assigned to the Cretan, who, as one of the leaders of a new colony, has a special interest in the conversation. At least four-fifths of the answers are put into his mouth. The Spartan is every



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inch a soldier, a man of few words himself, better at deeds than words. The Athenian talks to the two others, although they are his equals in age, in the style of a master discoursing to his scholars; he frequently praises himself; he entertains a very poor opinion of the understanding of his companions. Certainly the boastfulness and rudeness of the Laws is the reverse of the refined irony and courtesy which characterize the earlier dialogues. We are no longer in such good company as in the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*. Manners are lost sight of in the earnestness of the speakers, and dogmatic assertions take the place of poetical fancies.

The scene is laid in Crete, and the conversation is held in the course of a walk from Cnosus to the cave and temple of Zeus, which takes place on one of the longest and hottest days of the year (iii. 683 C). The companions start at dawn, and arrive at the point in their conversation which terminates the fourth book, about noon (iv. 722 C). The God to whose temple they are going is the lawgiver of Crete, and this may be supposed to be the very cave at which he gave his oracles to Minos. But the externals of the scene, which are briefly and inartistically described, soon disappear, and we plunge abruptly into the subject of the dialogue. We are reminded by contrast of the higher art of the *Phaedrus*, in which the summer's day, and the cool stream, and the chirping of the grasshoppers, and the fragrance of the agnus castus, and the legends of the place are present to the imagination throughout the discourse.

The typical Athenian apologizes for the tendency of his countrymen 'to spin a long discussion out of slender materials' (i. 642 A), and in a similar spirit the Lacedaemonian Megillus apologizes for the Spartan brevity (cp. *Thucyd.* iv. 17), acknowledging at the same time that there may be occasions when long discourses are necessary (iv. 721 E). The family of Megillus is the proxenus of Athens at Sparta (i. 642 B); and he pays a beautiful compliment to the Athenian, significant of the character of the work, which, though borrowing many elements from Sparta, is also pervaded by an Athenian spirit. A good Athenian, he says, is more than ordinarily good, because he is inspired by nature and not manufactured by law (642 C). The love of listening which is attributed to the Timocrat in the *Republic* (viii. 548 E) is also exhibited in



him (iii. 683 B, C). The Athenian on his side has a pleasure in speaking to the Lacedaemonian of the struggle in which their ancestors were jointly engaged against the Persians (iii. 699 D). A connexion with Athens is likewise intimated by the Cretan Cleinias. He is the relative of Epimenides (i. 642 D), whom, by an anachronism of a century,—perhaps arising as Zeller suggests (Plat. Stud. p. 111) out of a confusion of the visit of Epimenides and Diotima (Symp. 201 D),—he describes as coming to Athens, not after the attempt of Cylon (596 B. C.), but ten years before the Persian war. The Cretan and Lacedaemonian hardly contribute at all to the argument of which the Athenian is the expounder; they only supply information when asked about the institutions of their respective countries (i. 625 A; iv. 712 C). A kind of simplicity or stupidity is ascribed to them (x. 885 ff., 888 E). At first, they are dissatisfied with the free criticisms which the Athenian passes upon the laws of Minos and Lycurgus, but they acquiesce in his greater experience and knowledge of the world. They admit that there can be no objection to the enquiry; for in the spirit of the legislator himself, they are discussing his laws when there are no young men present to listen (i. 635 A). They are unwilling to allow that the Spartan and Cretan lawgivers can have been mistaken in honouring courage as the first part of virtue (ii. 667 A), and are puzzled at hearing for the first time (ii. 661 D) that ‘Goods are only evil to the evil.’ Several times they are on the point of quarrelling, and by an effort learn to restrain their natural feeling (cp. Shakespeare, *Henry V*, act iii. sc. 2). In Book vii. (806 C), the Lacedaemonian expresses a momentary irritation at the accusation which the Athenian brings against the Spartan institutions, of encouraging licentiousness in their women, but he is reminded by the Cretan that the permission to criticize them freely has been given, and cannot be retracted. His only criterion of truth is the authority of the Spartan lawgiver; he is ‘interested’ (i. 636 E) in the novel speculations of the Athenian, but inclines to prefer the ordinances of Lycurgus.

The three interlocutors all of them speak in the character of old men, which forms a pleasant bond of union between them. They have the feelings of old age about youth, about the state, about human things in general. Nothing in life seems to be of much importance to them; they are spectators rather

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than actors, and men in general appear to the Athenian speaker to be the playthings of the Gods and of circumstances. Still they have a fatherly care of the young, and are deeply impressed by sentiments of religion. They would give confidence to the aged by an increasing use of wine, which, as they get older, is to unloose their tongues and make them sing. The prospect of the existence of the soul after death is constantly present to them; though they can hardly be said to have the cheerful hope and resignation which animates Socrates in the *Phaedo* or *Cephalus* in the *Republic*. Plato appears to be expressing his own feelings in remarks of this sort. For at the time of writing the first book of the *Laws* he was at least seventy-four years of age, if we suppose him, at p. 638 A, to allude to the victory of the Syracusans under Dionysius the Younger over the Locrians, which occurred in the year 356. Such a sadness was the natural effect of declining years and failing powers, which make men ask, 'After all, what profit is there in life?' They feel that their work is beginning to be over, and are ready to say, 'All the world is a stage'; or, in the actual words of Plato, 'Let us play as good plays as we can,' though 'we must be sometimes serious, which is not agreeable, but necessary' (vii. 803 B, C). These are feelings which have crossed the minds of reflective persons in all ages. And there is no reason to connect the *Laws* any more than other parts of Plato's writings with the very uncertain narrative of his life, or to imagine that this melancholy tone is attributable to disappointment at having failed to convert a Sicilian tyrant into a philosopher.

II. The plan of the *Laws* is more irregular and has less connexion than any other of the writings of Plato. As Aristotle says in the *Politics* (ii. 6, § 4), 'The greater part consists of laws'; in Books v, vi, xi, xii the dialogue almost entirely disappears. Large portions of them are rather the materials for a work than a finished composition which may rank with the other Platonic dialogues. To use his own image, 'Some stones are regularly inserted in the building; others are lying on the ground ready for use' (ix. 858 B). There is probably truth in the tradition that the *Laws* were not published until after the death of Plato. We can easily believe that he has left imperfections, which would have been removed if he had lived a few years longer. The arrange-

ment might have been improved; the connexion of the argument might have been made plainer, and the sentences more accurately framed. Something also may be attributed to the feebleness of old age. Even a rough sketch of the *Phaedrus* or *Symposium* would have had a very different look. There is, however, an interest in possessing one writing of Plato which is in the process of creation.

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We must endeavour to find a thread of order which will carry us through this comparative disorder. The first four books are described by Plato himself as the preface or preamble. Having arrived at the conclusion that each law should have a preamble, the lucky thought occurs to him at the end of the fourth book that the preceding discourse is the preamble of the whole. This preamble or introduction may be abridged as follows:—

The institutions of Sparta and Crete are admitted by the Lacedaemonian and Cretan to have one aim only: they were intended by the legislator to inspire courage in war. To this the Athenian objects that the true lawgiver should frame his laws with a view to all the virtues and not to one only. Better is he who has temperance as well as courage, than he who has courage only; better is he who is faithful in civil broils, than he who is a good soldier only. Better, too, is peace than war; the reconciliation than the defeat of an enemy. And he who would attain all virtue should be trained amid pleasures as well as pains. Hence there should be convivial intercourse among the citizens, and a man's temperance should be tested in his cups, as we test his courage amid dangers. He should have a fear of the right sort, as well as a courage of the right sort.

At the beginning of the second book the subject of pleasure leads to education, which in the early years of life is wholly a discipline imparted by the means of pleasure and pain. The discipline of pleasure is implanted chiefly by the practice of the song and the dance. Of these the forms should be fixed, and not allowed to depend on the fickle breath of the multitude. There will be choruses of boys, girls, and grown-up persons, and all will be heard repeating the same strain, that 'virtue is happiness.' One of them will give the law to the rest; this will be the chorus of aged minstrels, who will sing the most beautiful and the most useful of songs. They will require a little wine,



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to mellow the austerity of age, and make them amenable to the laws.

After having laid down as the first principle of politics, that peace, and not war, is the true aim of the legislator, and briefly discussed music and festive intercourse, at the commencement of the third book Plato makes a digression, in which he speaks of the origin of society. He describes, first of all, the family; secondly, the patriarchal stage, which is an aggregation of families; thirdly, the founding of regular cities, like Ilium; fourthly, the establishment of a military and political system, like that of Sparta, with which he identifies Argos and Messene, dating from the return of the Heraclidae. But the aims of states should be good, or else, like the prayer of Theseus, they may be ruinous to themselves. This was the case in two out of three of the Heracleid kingdoms. They did not understand that the powers in a state should be balanced. The balance of powers saved Sparta, while the excess of tyranny in Persia and the excess of liberty at Athens have been the ruin of both. . . . This discourse on politics is suddenly discovered to have an immediate practical use; for Cleinias the Cretan is about to give laws to a new colony.

At the beginning of the fourth book, after enquiring into the circumstances and situation of the colony, the Athenian proceeds to make further reflections. Chance, and God, and the skill of the legislator, all co-operate in the formation of states. And the most favourable condition for the foundation of a new one is when the government is in the hands of a virtuous tyrant who has the good fortune to be the contemporary of a great legislator. But a virtuous tyrant is a contradiction in terms; we can at best only hope to have magistrates who are the servants of reason and the law. This leads to the enquiry, what is to be the polity of our new state. And the answer is, that we are to fear God, and honour our parents, and to cultivate virtue and justice; these are to be our first principles. Laws must be definite, and we should create in the citizens a predisposition to obey them. The legislator will teach as well as command; and with this view he will prefix preambles to his principal laws.

The fifth book commences in a sort of dithyramb with another and higher preamble about the honour due to the soul, whence



are deduced the duties of a man to his parents and his friends, to the suppliant and stranger. He should be true and just, free from envy and excess of all sorts, forgiving to crimes which are not incurable and are partly involuntary; and he should have a true taste. The noblest life has the greatest pleasures and the fewest pains. . . Having finished the preamble, and touched on some other preliminary considerations, we proceed to the Laws, beginning with the constitution of the state. This is not the best or ideal state, having all things common, but only the second-best, in which the land and houses are to be distributed among 5040 citizens divided into four classes. There is to be no gold or silver among them, and they are to have moderate wealth, and to respect number and numerical order in all things.

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In the first part of the sixth book, Plato completes his sketch of the constitution by the appointment of officers. He explains the manner in which guardians of the law, generals, priests, wardens of town and country, ministers of education, and other magistrates are to be appointed; and also in what way courts of appeal are to be constituted, and omissions in the law to be supplied. Next — and at this point (p. 772) the Laws strictly speaking begin — there follow enactments respecting marriage and the procreation of children, respecting property in slaves as well as of other kinds, respecting houses, married life, common tables for men and women. The question of age in marriage suggests the consideration of a similar question about the time for holding offices, and for military service, which had been previously omitted.

Resuming the order of the discussion, which was indicated in the previous book, from marriage and birth we proceed to education in the seventh book. Education is to begin at or rather before birth; to be continued for a time by mothers and nurses under the supervision of the state; finally, to comprehend music and gymnastics. Under music is included reading, writing, playing on the lyre, arithmetic, geometry, and a knowledge of astronomy sufficient to preserve the minds of the citizens from impiety in after-life. Gymnastics are to be practised chiefly with a view to their use in war. The discussion of education, which was lightly touched upon in Book ii, is here completed.

The eighth book contains regulations for civil life, beginning with festivals, games, and contests, military exercises and the

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like. On such occasions Plato seems to see young men and maidens meeting together, and hence he is led into discussing the relations of the sexes, the evil consequences which arise out of the indulgence of the passions, and the remedies for them. Then he proceeds to speak of agriculture, of arts and trades, of buying and selling, and of foreign commerce.

The remaining books of the *Laws*, ix–xii, are chiefly concerned with criminal offences. In the first class are placed offences against the Gods, especially sacrilege or robbery of temples: next follow offences against the state,—conspiracy, treason, theft. The mention of thefts suggests a distinction between voluntary and involuntary, curable and incurable offences. Proceeding to the greater crime of homicide, Plato distinguishes between mere homicide, manslaughter, which is partly voluntary and partly involuntary, and murder, which arises from avarice, ambition, fear. He also enumerates murders by kindred, murders by slaves, wounds with or without intent to kill, wounds inflicted in anger, crimes of or against slaves, insults to parents. To these, various modes of purification or degrees of punishment are assigned, and the terrors of another world are also invoked against them.

At the beginning of Book x, all acts of violence, including sacrilege, are summed up in a single law. The law is preceded by an admonition, in which the offenders are informed that no one ever did an unholy act or said an unlawful word while he retained his belief in the existence of the Gods; but either he denied their existence, or he believed that they took no care of man, or that they might be turned from their course by sacrifices and prayers. The remainder of the book is devoted to the refutation of these three classes of unbelievers, and concludes with the means to be taken for their reformation, and the announcement of their punishments if they continue obstinate and impenitent.

The eleventh book is taken up with laws and with admonitions relating to individuals, which follow one another without any exact order. There are laws concerning deposits and the finding of treasure; concerning slaves and freedmen; concerning retail trade, bequests, divorces, enchantments, poisonings, magical arts, and the like. In the twelfth book the same subjects are continued. Laws are passed concerning violations of military discipline, concerning the high office of the examiners and their burial; con-

cerning oaths and the violation of them, and the punishments of those who neglect their duties as citizens. Foreign travel is then discussed, and the permission to be accorded to citizens of journeying in foreign parts; the strangers who may come to visit the city are also spoken of, and the manner in which they are to be received. Laws are added respecting sureties, searches for property, right of possession by prescription, abduction of witnesses, theatrical competition, waging of private warfare, and bribery in offices. Rules are laid down respecting taxation, respecting economy in sacred rites, respecting judges, their duties and sentences, and respecting sepulchral places and ceremonies. Here (at p. 960) the Laws end. Lastly, a Nocturnal Council is instituted for the preservation of the state, consisting of older and younger members, who are to exhibit in their lives that virtue which is the basis of the state, to know the one in many, and to be educated in divine and every other kind of knowledge which will enable them to fulfil their office.

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III. The style of the Laws differs in several important respects from that of the other dialogues of Plato: (1) in the want of character, power, and lively illustration; (2) in the frequency of mannerisms (cp. *Introd. to the Philebus, sub init.*); (3) in the form and rhythm of the sentences; (4) in the use of words. On the other hand, there are many passages (5) which are characterized by a sort of ethical grandeur; and (6) in which, perhaps, a greater insight into human nature, and a greater reach of practical wisdom is shown, than in any other of Plato's writings.

I. The discourse of the three old men is described by themselves as an old man's game of play (iv. 769 A). Yet there is little of the liveliness of a game in their mode of treating the subject. They do not throw the ball to and fro, but two out of the three are listeners to the third, who is constantly asserting his superior wisdom and opportunities of knowledge (i. 639 D, E), and apologizing (not without reason) for his own want of clearness of speech. He will 'carry them over the stream' (x. 892 D foll.); he will answer for them when the argument is beyond their comprehension; he is afraid of their ignorance of mathematics, and thinks that gymnastic is likely to be more intelligible to them; — he has repeated his words several times, and yet they cannot understand him (ii. 664 D). The subject did not properly take the form of



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dialogue, and also the literary vigour of Plato had passed away. The old men speak as they might be expected to speak, and in this there is a touch of dramatic truth. Plato has given the Laws that form or want of form which indicates the failure of natural power. There is no regular plan — none of that consciousness of what has preceded and what is to follow, which makes a perfect style,— but there are several attempts at a plan; the argument is ‘pulled up’ (iii. 701 C, D), and frequent explanations are offered why a particular topic was introduced (iv. 713 B).

The fictions of the Laws have no longer the verisimilitude which is characteristic of the *Phaedrus* and the *Timaeus*, or even of the *Statesman*. We can hardly suppose that an educated Athenian would have placed the visit of Epimenides to Athens ten years before the Persian war (i. 642 D), or have imagined that a war with Messene prevented the Lacedaemonians from coming to the rescue of Hellas (iii. 692 D). The narrative of the origin of the Dorian institutions (iii. 685 foll.), which are said to have been due to a fear of the growing power of the Assyrians, is a plausible invention, which may be compared with the tale of the island of Atlantis and the poem of Solon, but is not accredited by similar arts of deception. The other statement that the Dorians were Achaean exiles assembled by Dorieus (iii. 682 E), and the assertion that Troy was included in the Assyrian Empire (iii. 685 C), were traditional (cp. for the latter, *Diod. Sicul.* ii. 2), but have no historical foundation. Nor is there anywhere in the Laws that lively *ἐνάρπεια*, that vivid *mise en scène*, which is as characteristic of Plato as of some modern novelists.

The old men are afraid of the ridicule which ‘will fall on their heads more than enough’ (vi. 781 C; vii. 790 A, 800 B; x. 885 C), and they do not often indulge in a joke. In one of the few which occur, the book of the Laws, if left incomplete, is compared to a monster wandering about without a head (vi. 752 A). But we no longer breathe the atmosphere of humour which pervades the *Symposium* and the *Euthydemus*, in which we pass within a few sentences from the broadest Aristophanic joke to the subtlest refinement of wit and fancy; instead of this, in the Laws an impression of baldness and feebleness is often left upon our minds. Some of the most amusing descriptions, as, for example, of children roaring for the first three years of life (vii. 792 A); or of the



Athenians walking into the country with fighting-cocks under their arms (vii. 789 B, C); or of the slave doctor who knocks about his patients finely (iv. 720 C); and the gentleman doctor who courteously persuades them; or of the way of keeping order in the theatre, 'by a hint from a stick' (iii. 700 C), are narrated with a commonplace gravity; but where we find this sort of dry humour we shall not be far wrong in thinking that the writer intended to make us laugh. The seriousness of age takes the place of the jollity of youth. Life should have holidays and festivals; yet we rebuke ourselves when we laugh, and take our pleasures sadly. The irony of the earlier dialogues, of which some traces occur in the tenth book, is replaced by a severity which hardly condescends to regard human things. 'Let us say, if you please, that man is of some account; but I was speaking of him in comparison with God' (vii. 804 B).

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The imagery and illustrations are poor in themselves, and are not assisted by the surrounding phraseology. We have seen how in the Republic, and in the earlier dialogues, figures of speech such as 'the wave,' 'the drone,' 'the chase,' 'the bride,' appear and reappear at intervals. Notes are struck which are repeated from time to time, as in a strain of music. There is none of this subtle art in the Laws. The illustrations, such as the two kinds of doctors (iv. 720 C), 'the three kinds of funerals' (iv. 719 D), the fear potion (i. 647 E), the puppet (i. 644 D), the painter leaving a successor to restore his picture (vi. 769), the 'person stopping to consider where three ways meet' (vii. 799 C), the 'old laws about water of which he will not divert the course' (viii. 844 A), can hardly be said to do much credit to Plato's invention. The citations from the poets have lost that fanciful character which gave them their charm in the earlier dialogues. We are tired of images taken from the arts of navigation, or archery, or weaving, or painting, or medicine, or music. Yet the comparisons of life to a tragedy (vii. 817), or of the working of mind to the revolution of the self-moved (x. 897), or of the aged parent to the image of a God dwelling in the house (xi. 931), or the reflection that 'man is made to be the plaything of God, and that this rightly considered is the best of him' (vii. 803 C), have great beauty.

2. The clumsiness of the style is exhibited in frequent mannerisms and repetitions. The perfection of the Platonic dialogue

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consists in the accuracy with which the question and answer are fitted into one another, and the regularity with which the steps of the argument succeed one another. This finish of style is no longer discernible in the *Laws*. There is a want of variety in the answers; nothing can be drawn out of the respondents but 'Yes' or 'No,' 'True,' 'To be sure,' etc.; the insipid forms, 'What do you mean?' 'To what are you referring?' are constantly returning. Again and again the speaker is charged, or charges himself, with obscurity; and he repeats again and again that he will explain his views more clearly. The process of thought which should be latent in the mind of the writer appears on the surface (iv. 719 A, 713 B). In several passages the Athenian praises himself in the most unblushing manner, very unlike the irony of the earlier dialogues, as when he declares that 'the laws are a divine work given by some inspiration of the Gods,' and that 'youth should commit them to memory instead of the compositions of the poets' (vii. 811). The *prosopopoeia* which is adopted by Plato in the *Protagoras* and other dialogues is repeated until we grow weary of it. The legislator is always addressing the speakers or the youth of the state, and the speakers are constantly making addresses to the legislator. A tendency to a paradoxical manner of statement is also observable. 'We must have drinking' (i. 646 B), 'we must have a virtuous tyrant' (iv. 710 C) — this is too much for the duller wits of the Lacedaemonian and Cretan, who at first start back in surprise. More than in any other writing of Plato the tone is hortatory; the laws are sermons as well as laws; they are considered to have a religious sanction, and to rest upon a religious sentiment in the mind of the citizens. The words of the Athenian are attributed to the Lacedaemonian and Cretan, who are supposed to have made them their own, after the manner of the earlier dialogues. Resumptions of subjects which have been half disposed of in a previous passage constantly occur (vii. 796 E; xii. 956): the arrangement has neither the clearness of art nor the freedom of nature. Irrelevant remarks are made here and there, or illustrations used which are not properly fitted in. The dialogue is generally weak and laboured, and is in the later books fairly given up, apparently, because unsuited to the subject of the work. The long speeches or sermons of the Athenian, often extending over several pages, have never the grace and

harmony which are exhibited in the earlier dialogues. For Plato is incapable of sustained composition; his genius is dramatic rather than oratorical; he can converse, but he cannot make a speech. Even the Timaeus, which is one of his most finished works, is full of abrupt transitions. There is the same kind of difference between the dialogue and the continuous discourse of Plato as between the narrative and speeches of Thucydides.

3. The perfection of style is variety in unity, freedom, ease, clearness, the power of saying anything, and of striking any note in the scale of human feelings without impropriety; and such is the divine gift of language possessed by Plato in the Symposium and Phaedrus. From this there are many fallings-off in the Laws: first, in the structure of the sentences, which are rhythmical and monotonous,—the formal and sophistical manner of the age is superseding the natural genius of Plato: secondly, many of them are of enormous length, and the latter end often forgets the beginning of them,—they seem never to have received the second thoughts of the author; either the emphasis is wrongly placed, or there is a want of point in a clause; or an absolute case occurs which is not properly separated from the rest of the sentence; or words are aggregated in a manner which fails to show their relation to one another; or the connecting particles are omitted at the beginning of sentences; the uses of the relative and antecedent are more indistinct, the changes of person and number more frequent, examples of pleonasm, tautology, and periphrasis, antitheses of positive and negative, false emphasis, and other affectations, are more numerous than in the other writings of Plato; there is also a more common and sometimes unmeaning use of qualifying formulae, *ὡς ἔπος εἰπείν, κατὰ δύναμιν*, and of double expressions, *πάντη πάντως, οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς, ὅπως καὶ ὅπη*—these are too numerous to be attributed to errors in the text; again, there is an over-curious adjustment of verb and participle, noun and epithet, and other artificial forms of cadence and expression take the place of natural variety: thirdly, the absence of metaphorical language is remarkable—the style is not devoid of ornament, but the ornament is of a debased rhetorical kind, patched on to instead of growing out of the subject; there is a great command of words, and a laboured use of them; forced attempts at metaphor occur in several passages,—e. g. viii. 844 A, *παροχετεύειν*

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λόγοις; ix. 858 B, τὰ μὲν ὥς τιθέμενα τὰ δ' ὥς παρατιθέμενα; vi. 773 D, οἶνος κολαζόμενος ὑπὸ νήφοντος ἑτέρου θεοῦ; the plays on the word νόμος = νοῦ διανομή, iv. 714 A, ὥδῃ ἑτέρα, iii. 700 B: fourthly, there is a foolish extravagance of language in other passages,—‘the swinish ignorance of arithmetic,’ vii. 819 D; ‘the justice and suitableness of the discourse on laws,’ vii. 811 C foll.; over-emphasis at ix. 861 D; ‘best of Greeks,’ vii. 820 B, said of all the Greeks, and the like: fifthly, poor and insipid illustrations are also common, e. g. i. 638 C, 639 A, ii. 644 E: sixthly, we may observe an excessive use of climax and hyperbole, vii. 808 A, αἰσχρὸν λέγειν χρὴ πρὸς αὐτοὺς δοῦλόν τε καὶ δούλην καὶ παῖδα καὶ εἰ πως οἶόν τε ὅλην τὴν οἰκίαν: i. 636 B, δοκεῖ τοῦτο τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα κατὰ φύσιν τὰς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἡδονὰς οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ καὶ θηρίων διεφθαρκεῖναι.

4. The peculiarities in the use of words which occur in the Laws have been collected by Zeller (Platonische Studien, p. 85) and Stallbaum (Legg. vol. ii. p. lvii): first, in the use of nouns, such as ἀλλοδημία, ἀπενιάντησις, γλυκυθυμία, διαθετήρ, θρασυξενία, κόρος, μεγαλόνοια, παιδουργία: secondly, in the use of adjectives, such as αἰστωρ, βιοδότης, ἐχθοδοπός, ἡίθεος, χρόνιος, and of adverbs, such as ἀνιδιτί, ἀνατεί, νηποινεί: thirdly, in the use of verbs, such as ἀθύρειν, αἰσσεῖν (αἰξείειν εἰπεῖν, iv. 709 A), εὐθημονεῖσθαι, παραποδίζεσθαι, σέβειν, τημελεῖν, τητᾶν. These words however, as Stallbaum remarks, are formed according to analogy, and nearly all of them have the support of some poetical or other authority.

Zeller and Stallbaum have also collected forms of words in the Laws, differing from the forms of the same words which occur in other places: e. g. βλάβος for βλάβη, ἄβιος for ἀβίωτος, ἀχάριστος for ἄχαρις, δούλειος for δουλικός, παίδειος for παιδικός, ἐξαγριῶ for ἐξαγριαίνω, ἰλεοῦμαι for ἰλάσκομαι, and the Ionic word σωφρονιστής, meaning ‘correction.’ Zeller has noted a fondness for substantives ending in -μα and -σις, such as γεώργημα, διάπανμα, ἐπιθύμημα, ζημίωμα, κωμώδημα, ὁμίλημα; βλάβις, λοιδόρησις, παράγγελσις, and others; also a use of substantives in the plural, which are commonly found only in the singular, μανίαι, ἀθεότητες, φθόνοι, φόβοι, φύσεις; also, a peculiar use of prepositions in composition, as in ἐνείργω, ἀποβλάπτω, διανομοθετέω, διείρηται, διενλαβεῖσθαι, and other words; also, a frequent occurrence of the Ionic datives plural in -αισι and -οισι, perhaps used for the sake of giving an ancient or archaic effect.

To these peculiarities of words he has added a list of peculiar



expressions and constructions. Among the most characteristic are the following: viii. 841 D, ἄνυτὰ παλλακῶν σπέρματα; ix. 855 C, ἄμορφοι ἔδραι; iii. 690 D, ὅσα ἀξιώματα πρὸς ἄρχοντας; vi. 744 B, οἱ κατὰ πόλιν καιροί; μῦθος, used in several places of 'the discourse about laws'; and connected with this the frequent use of παραμύθιον and παραμυθεῖσθαι in the general sense of 'address,' 'addressing'; vii. 823 E, αἰμύλος ἔρω; xii. 960 B, ἄταφοι πράξεις; vi. 752 A, μῦθος ἀκέφαλος; vi. 775 D, ἦθος εὐθύπορον. He remarks also on the frequent employment of the abstract for the concrete; e. g. ὑπηρεσία for ὑπηρετάι, φυγαί for φυγάδες, μηχαναί in the sense of 'contrivers,' δουλεία for δούλοι, βασιλεῖαι for βασιλεῖς, μαινόμενα κηδεύματα for γυναικα μαινομένην; ἡ χρεία τῶν παίδων in the sense of 'indigent children,' and παίδων ἱκανότης; τὸ ἔθος τῆς ἀπειρίας for ἡ εἰωθὺν ἀπειρία; κυπαρίττων ὑψη τε καὶ κάλλη θανμάσια for κυπάριττοι μάλα ὑψηλαὶ καὶ καλά. He further notes some curious uses of the genitive case, e. g. φιλίας ὁμολογίαι, μανίαι ὀργῆς, λαιμαργίαι ἡδονῆς, χειμῶνων ἀννποδησίαι, ἀνόσιοι πληγῶν τόλμαι; and of the dative, ὁμιλίας ἐχθροῖς, νομοθεσίαι ἐπιτρόποις; and also some rather uncommon periphrases, θρέμματα Νείλον, ξυγγενήτωρ τέκνων for ἄλοχος, Μούσης λέξις for ποίησις, ζωγράφων παῖδες, ἀνθρώπων σπέρματα and the like; the fondness for particles of limitation, especially τις and γε, σύν τισι χάρισι, τοῖς γε δυναμένοις and the like; the pleonastic use of τανῦν, of ὡς, of ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, of ἐκάστοτε; and the periphrastic use of the preposition περί. Lastly, he observes the tendency to hyperbata or transpositions of words, and to rhythmical uniformity as well as grammatical irregularity in the structure of the sentences.

For nearly all the expressions which are adduced by Zeller as arguments against the genuineness of the Laws, Stallbaum finds some sort of authority. There is no real ground for doubting that the work was written by Plato, merely because several words occur in it which are not found in his other writings. An imitator may preserve the usual phraseology of a writer better than he would himself. But, on the other hand, the fact that authorities may be quoted in support of most of these uses of words, does not show that the diction is not peculiar. Several of them seem to be poetical or dialectical, and exhibit an attempt to enlarge the limits of Greek prose by the introduction of Homeric and tragic expressions. Most of them do not appear to have retained any hold on the later

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language of Greece. Like several experiments in language of the writers of the Elizabethan age, they were afterwards lost; and though occasionally found in Plutarch and imitators of Plato, they have not been accepted by Aristotle or passed into the common dialect of Greece.

5. Unequal as the Laws are in style, they contain a few passages which are very grand and noble. For example, the address to the poets at vii. 817: 'Best of strangers, we also are poets of the best and noblest tragedy; for our whole state is an imitation of the best and noblest life, which we affirm to be indeed the very truth of tragedy.' Or again, the sight of young men and maidens in friendly intercourse with one another, suggesting the dangers to which youth is liable from the violence of passion (viii. 835-841); or the eloquent denunciation of unnatural lusts in the same passage; or the charming thought that the best legislator 'orders war for the sake of peace and not peace for the sake of war' (i. 628 E); or the pleasant allusion, 'O Athenian—inhabitant of Attica, I will not say, for you seem to me worthy to be named after the Goddess Athene because you go back to first principles' (i. 626 D); or the pithy saying, 'Many a victory has been and will be suicidal to the victors, but education is never suicidal' (i. 641 C); or the fine expression that 'the walls of a city should be allowed to sleep in the earth, and that we should not attempt to disinter them' (vi. 778 D); or the remark that 'God is the measure of all things in a sense far higher than any man can be' (iv. 716 C); or that 'a man should be from the first a partaker of the truth, that he may live a true man as long as possible' (v. 730 C); or the principle repeatedly laid down, that 'the sins of the fathers are not to be visited on the children,' e. g. ix. 856 C; or the description of the funeral rites of those priestly sages who depart in innocence (xii. 947 B, foll.); or the noble sentiment, that we should do more justice to slaves than to equals (vi. 777 D); or the curious observation founded, perhaps, on his own experience, that there are a few 'divine men in every state however corrupt, whose conversation is of inestimable value' (xii. 951 B); or the acute remark, that public opinion is to be respected, because the 'judgments of mankind about virtue are better than their practice (xii. 950 B); or the deep

religious and also modern feeling which pervades the tenth book (whatever may be thought of the arguments); the sense of the duty of living as a part of a whole, and in dependence on the will of God (x. 903 D), who takes care of the least things as well as the greatest (x. 900 C); and the picture of parents praying for their children (x. 887 D, foll.) — not as we may say, slightly altering the words of Plato, as if there were no truth or reality in the Gentile religions, but as if there were the greatest—are very striking to us. We must remember that the *Laws*, unlike the *Republic*, do not exhibit an ideal state, but are supposed to be on the level of human motives and feelings; they are also on the level of the popular religion, though elevated and purified: hence there is an attempt made to show that the pleasant is also just. But, on the other hand, the priority of the soul to the body, and of God to the soul, is always insisted upon as the true incentive to virtue; especially with great force and eloquence at the commencement of Book v. And the work of legislation is carried back to the first principles of morals (i. 630 E).

6. No other writing of Plato shows so profound an insight into the world and into human nature as the *Laws*. That ‘cities will never cease from ill until they are better governed,’ is the text of the laws as well as of the *Statesman* and *Republic*. The principle that the balance of power preserves states (iii. 691, 692); the reflection that no one ever passed his whole life in disbelief of the Gods (x. 888 C); the remark that the characters of men are best seen in convivial intercourse (i. 649); the observation that the people must be allowed to share not only in the government, but in the administration of justice (vi. 768 A, foll.); the desire to make laws, not with a view to courage only, but to all virtue (i. 630 D); the clear perception that education begins with birth, or even, as he would say, before birth (vii. 789 A); the attempt to purify religion; the modern reflections, that punishment is not vindictive (ix. 854 D), and that limits must be set to the power of bequest (xi. 922, 923); the impossibility of undeceiving the victims of quacks and jugglers (xi. 933 A); the provision for water (vi. 761 B), and for other requirements of health (vi. 761), and for concealing the bodies of the dead with as little hurt as possible to the living (xii. 958

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D, E); above all, perhaps, the distinct consciousness that under the actual circumstances of mankind the ideal cannot be carried out (v. 739 B, 746 B), and yet may be a guiding principle — will appear to us, if we remember that we are still in the dawn of politics, to show a great depth of political wisdom.

IV. The *Laws* of Plato contain numerous passages which closely resemble other passages in his writings. And at first sight a suspicion arises that the repetition shows the unequal hand of the imitator. For why should a writer say over again, in a more imperfect form, what he had already said in his most finished style and manner? And yet it may be urged on the other side that an author whose original powers are beginning to decay will be very liable to repeat himself, as in conversation, so in books. He may have forgotten what he had written before; he may be unconscious of the decline of his own powers. Hence arises a question of great interest, bearing on the genuineness of ancient writers. Is there any criterion by which we can distinguish the genuine resemblance from the spurious, or, in other words, the repetition of a thought or passage by an author himself from the appropriation of it by another? The question has, perhaps, never been fully discussed; and, though a real one, does not admit of a precise answer. A few general considerations on the subject may be offered: —

(a) Is the difference such as might be expected to arise at different times of life or under different circumstances? — There would be nothing surprising in a writer, as he grew older, losing something of his own originality, and falling more and more under the spirit of his age. ‘What a genius I had when I wrote that book!’ was the pathetic exclamation of a famous English author, when in old age he chanced to take up one of his early works. There would be nothing surprising again in his losing somewhat of his powers of expression, and becoming less capable of framing language into a harmonious whole. There would also be a strong presumption that if the variation of style was uniform, it was attributable to some natural cause, and not to the arts of the imitator. The inferiority might be the result of feebleness and of want of activity of mind. But the natural weakness of a great author would commonly be different from the artificial weakness of an imitator; it would be continuous



and uniform. The latter would be apt to fill his work with irregular patches, sometimes taken verbally from the writings of the author whom he personated, but rarely acquiring his spirit. His imitation would be obvious, irregular, superficial. The patches of purple would be easily detected among his threadbare and tattered garments. He would seldom take the pains to put the same thought into other words. There were many forgeries in English literature which attained a considerable degree of success 50 or 100 years ago; but it is doubtful whether attempts such as these could now escape detection, if there were any writings of the same author or of the same age to be compared with them. And ancient forgers were much less skilful than modern; they were far from being masters in the art of deception, and had rarely any motive for being so.

(b) But, secondly, the imitator will commonly be least capable of understanding or imitating that part of a great writer which is most characteristic of him. In every man's writings there is something like himself and unlike others, which gives individuality. To appreciate this latent quality would require a kindred mind, and minute study and observation. There are a class of similarities which may be called undesigned coincidences, which are so remote as to be incapable of being borrowed from one another, and yet, when they are compared, find a natural explanation in their being the work of the same mind. The imitator might copy the turns of style—he might repeat images or illustrations, but he could not enter into the inner circle of Platonic philosophy. He would understand that part of it which became popular in the next generation, as for example, the doctrine of ideas or of numbers: he might approve of communism. But the higher flights of Plato about the science of dialectic, or the unity of virtue, or a person who is above the law, would be unintelligible to him.

(c) The argument from imitation assumes a different character when the supposed imitations are associated with other passages having the impress of original genius. The strength of the argument from undesigned coincidences of style is much increased when they are found side by side with thoughts and expressions which can only have come from a great original writer. The great excellence, not only of the whole, but even of the parts of

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writings, is a strong proof of their genuineness—for although the great writer may fall below, the forger or imitator cannot rise much above himself. Whether we can attribute the worst parts of a work to a forger and the best to a great writer,—as for example, in the case of some of Shakespeare's plays,—depends upon the probability that they have been interpolated, or have been the joint work of two writers; and this can only be established either by express evidence or by a comparison of other writings of the same class. If the interpolation or double authorship of Greek writings in the time of Plato could be shown to be common, then a question, perhaps insoluble, would arise, not whether the whole, but whether parts of the Platonic dialogues are genuine, and, if parts only, which parts. Hebrew prophecies and Homeric poems and Laws of Manu may have grown together in early times, but there is no reason to think that any of the dialogues of Plato is the result of a similar process of accumulation. It is therefore rash to say with Oncken (*Die Staatslehre des Aristoteles*) that the form in which Aristotle knew the Laws of Plato must have been different from that in which they have come down to us.

It must be admitted that these principles are difficult of application. Yet a criticism may be worth making which rests only on probabilities or impressions. Great disputes will arise about the merits of different passages, about what is truly characteristic and original or trivial and borrowed. Many have thought the Laws to be one of the greatest of Platonic writings, while in the judgment of Mr. Grote they hardly rise above the level of the forged epistles. The manner in which a writer would or would not have written at a particular time of life must be acknowledged to be a matter of conjecture. But enough has been said to show that similarities of a certain kind, whether criticism is able to detect them or not, may be such as must be attributed to an original writer, and not to a mere imitator.

(d) Applying these principles to the case of the Laws, we have now to point out that they contain the class of refined or unconscious similarities which are indicative of genuineness. The parallelisms are like the repetitions of favourite thoughts into which every one is apt to fall unawares in conversation or in writing. They are found in a work which contains many beautiful

and remarkable passages, as will be admitted by any one who refers back to § III. 5, 6. We may therefore begin by claiming this presumption in their favour. Such undesigned coincidences, as we may venture to call them, are the following. The conception of justice as the union of temperance, wisdom, courage (Laws i. 631 C; Rep. iv. 433): the latent idea of dialectic implied in the notion of dividing laws after the kinds of virtue (Laws i. 630 E); and again (Laws xii. 965 C), the approval of the method of looking at one idea gathered from many things, 'than which a truer was never discovered by any man' (cp. Rep. vii. 525 A): or again the description of the Laws as parents (Laws ix. 859 A; Rep. vii. 538 D): the assumption that religion has been already settled by the oracle of Delphi (Laws v. 738 B; Rep. iv. 427 B), to which an appeal is also made in special cases (Laws xi. 914 A): the notion of the battle with self, a paradox for which Plato in a manner apologizes both in the Laws and the Republic (Laws i. 626 E; Rep. iv. 430 E foll.): the remark (Laws ix. 859 D) that just men, even when they are deformed in body, may still be perfectly beautiful in respect of the excellent justice of their minds (cp. Rep. iii. 402 D, E): the argument that ideals are none the worse because they cannot be carried out (Laws v. 746 B, foll.; Rep. v. 472 D): the near approach to the idea of good in 'the principle which is common to all the four virtues,' a truth which the guardians must be compelled to recognize (Laws xii. 965 D; cp. Rep. vii. 534 C): or again the recognition by reason of the right pleasure and pain, which had previously been matter of habit (Laws ii. 653 B; Rep. iii. 402 A): or the blasphemy of saying that the excellency of music is to give pleasure (Laws ii. 655 D; Rep. vi. 509 A): again the story of the Sidonian Cadmus (Laws ii. 663 E), which is a variation of the Phoenician tale of the earth-born men (Rep. iii. 414 C): the comparison of philosophy to a yelping she-dog, both in the Republic and in the Laws (Laws xii. 967 D; Rep. x. 607 C): the remark that no man can practise two trades (Laws viii. 846 D; Rep. iii. 394 E, etc.): or the advantage of the middle condition (Laws v. 736 E; Rep. iv. 421 foll.): the tendency to speak of principles as moulds or forms; compare the ἐκμαγεία of song (Laws vii. 800 foll.), and the τέτοι of religion (Rep. ii. 379 foll.): or the remark (Laws xii. 945 E) that 'the

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relaxation of justice makes many cities out of one,' which may be compared with the Republic (Rep. iv. 422 E): or the description of lawlessness 'creeping in little by little in the fashions of music and overturning all things,' — to us a paradox, but to Plato's mind a fixed idea, which is found in the Laws (iii. 701 foll.) as well as in the Republic (iv. 424): or the figure of the parts of the human body under which the parts of the state are described (Laws v. 739; Rep. v. 462): the apology for delay and diffuseness, which occurs not unfrequently in the Republic, is carried to an excess in the Laws (i. 641 E foll.; ix. 857 E foll.; cp. Theaet. 172 C foll.): the remarkable thought (Laws x. 899 B) that the soul of the sun is better than the sun, agrees with the relation in which the idea of good stands to the sun in the Republic, and with the substitution of mind for the idea of good in the Philebus (30 foll.): the passage about the tragic poets (Laws vii. 817 A foll.) agrees generally with the treatment of them in the Republic, but is more finely conceived, and worked out in a nobler spirit. Some lesser similarities of thought and manner should not be omitted, such as the mention of the thirty years' old students in the Republic (vii. 539 A), and the fifty years' old choristers in the Laws (ii. 670 A); or the making of the citizens out of wax (Laws v. 746 A) compared with the other image (Rep. ix. 588); or the number of the tyrant (729), which is *nearly* equal with the number of days and nights in the year (730), compared with the 'slight correction' of the sacred number 5040, which is divisible by all the numbers from 1 to 12 except 11, and divisible by 11, if two families be deducted; or once more, we may compare the ignorance of solid geometry of which he complains in the Republic (vii. 528 B, C) and the puzzle about fractions (vii. 525 E) with the difficulty in the Laws about commensurable and incommensurable quantities (Laws vii. 819, 820) — and the malicious emphasis on the word *γυναικεῖος* (Laws vii. 790 A) with the use of the same word (Rep. v. 469 D). These and similar passages tend to show that the author of the Republic is also the author of the Laws. They are echoes of the same voice, expressions of the same mind, coincidences too subtle to have been invented by the ingenuity of any imitator. The force of the argument is increased, if we remember that no passage in the Laws is exactly copied, — nowhere do five or



six words occur together which are found together elsewhere in Plato's writings.

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In other dialogues of Plato, as well as in the Republic, there are to be found parallels with the Laws. Such resemblances, as we might expect, occur chiefly (but not exclusively) in the dialogues which, on other grounds, we may suppose to be of later date. The punishment of evil is to be like evil men (Laws v. 728 B), as he says also in the Theaetetus (176 E). Compare again the dependence of tragedy and comedy on one another, of which he gives the reason in the Laws (vii. 816 D)—‘For serious things cannot be understood without laughable, nor opposites at all without opposites, if a man is really to have intelligence of either’; here he puts forward the principle which is the groundwork of the thesis of Socrates in the Symposium (223 D), ‘that the genius of tragedy is the same as that of comedy, and that the writer of comedy ought to be a writer of tragedy also.’ There is a truth and right which is above Law (Laws ix. 875 C), as we learn also from the Statesman (297 A). That men are the possession of the Gods (Laws x. 902 C), is a reflection which likewise occurs in the Phaedo (62 B). The remark, whether serious or ironical (Laws xii. 948 B), that ‘the sons of the Gods naturally believed in the Gods, because they had the means of knowing about them,’ is found in the Timaeus (40 D). The reign of Cronos, who is the divine ruler (Laws iv. 713 B), is a reminiscence of the Statesman (269 A, foll.). It is remarkable that in the Sophist and Statesman (Soph. 232 E), Plato, speaking in the character of the Eleatic Stranger, has already put on the old man. The madness of the poets, again, is a favourite notion of Plato’s, which occurs also in the Laws (iv. 719 C), as well as in the Phaedrus (245 A), Ion, and elsewhere. There are traces in the Laws (iii. 685 A, foll.) of the same desire to base speculation upon history which we find in the Critias. Once more, there is a striking parallel with the paradox of the Gorgias (472 E, foll.), that ‘if you do evil, it is better to be punished than to be unpunished,’ in the Laws (ii. 661 C): ‘To live having all goods without justice and virtue is the greatest of evils if life be immortal, but not so great if the bad man lives but a short time.’

The point to be considered is whether these are the kind of

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parallels which would be the work of an imitator. Would a forger have had the wit to select the most peculiar and characteristic thoughts of Plato; would he have caught the spirit of his philosophy; would he, instead of openly borrowing, have half concealed his favourite ideas; would he have formed them into a whole such as the *Laws*; would he have given another the credit which he might have obtained for himself; would he have remembered and made use of other passages of the Platonic writings and have never deviated into the phraseology of them? Without pressing such arguments as absolutely certain, we must acknowledge that such a comparison affords a new ground of real weight for believing the *Laws* to be a genuine writing of Plato.

V. The relation of the *Republic* to the *Laws* is clearly set forth by Plato in *Laws* v. 739. The *Republic* is the best state, the *Laws* is the best possible under the existing conditions of the Greek world. The *Republic* is the ideal, in which no man calls anything his own, which may or may not have existed in some remote clime, under the rule of some God, or son of a God (who can say?), but is, at any rate, the pattern of all other states and the exemplar of human life. The *Laws* distinctly acknowledge what the *Republic* partly admits, that the ideal is inimitable by us, but that we should 'lift up our eyes to the heavens' and try to regulate our lives according to the divine image. The citizens are no longer to have wives and children in common, and are no longer to be under the government of philosophers. But the spirit of communism or communion is to continue among them, though reverence for the sacredness of the family, and respect of children for parents, not promiscuous hymeneals, are now the foundation of the state; the sexes are to be as nearly on an equality as possible; they are to meet at common tables (vii. 806 E), and to share war-like pursuits (if the women will consent), and to have a common education. The legislator has taken the place of the philosopher, but a council of elders is retained, who are to fulfil the duties of the legislator when he has passed out of life. The addition of younger persons to this council by co-optation is an improvement on the governing body of the *Republic*. The scheme of education in the *Laws* is of a far lower kind than that which Plato had conceived in the *Republic*. There he would have his rulers trained in all knowledge meeting in the idea of good, of which the

different branches of mathematical science are but the handmaidens or ministers; here he treats chiefly of popular education, stopping short with the preliminary sciences,—these are to be studied partly with a view to their practical usefulness, which in the Republic he holds cheap, and even more with a view to avoiding impiety, of which in the Republic he says nothing; he touches very lightly on dialectic, which is still to be retained for the rulers. Yet in the Laws there remain traces of the old educational ideas. He is still for banishing the poets (vii. 817); and as he finds the works of prose writers equally dangerous, he would substitute for them the study of his own laws (vii. 810, 811). He insists strongly on the importance of mathematics as an educational instrument (v. 747 A, B). He is no more reconciled to the Greek mythology than in the Republic, though he would rather say nothing about it out of a reverence for antiquity (x. 886 D); and he is equally willing to have recourse to fictions, if they have a moral tendency (ii. 663 D). His thoughts recur to a golden age in which the sanctity of oaths was respected and in which men living nearer the Gods were more disposed to believe in them; but we must legislate for the world as it is, now that the old beliefs have passed away (xii. 948 C). Though he is no longer fired with dialectical enthusiasm, he would compel the guardians to ‘look at one idea gathered from many things,’ and to ‘perceive the principle which is the same in all the four virtues’ (xii. 965 C). He still recognizes the enormous influence of music, in which every youth is to be trained for three years; and he seems to attribute the existing degeneracy of the Athenian state and the laxity of morals partly to musical innovation, manifested in the unnatural divorce of the instrument and the voice, of the rhythm from the words (ii. 669 D), and partly to the influence of the mob who ruled at the theatres (iii. 700 E). He assimilates the education of the two sexes, as far as possible, both in music and gymnastic, and, as in the Republic, he would give to gymnastic a purely military character. In marriage, his object is still to produce the finest children for the state. As in the Statesman, he would unite in wedlock dissimilar natures—the passionate with the dull, the courageous with the gentle. And the virtuous tyrant of the Statesman, who has no place in the Republic, again appears (iv. 709 E). In this, as in all his writings, he has the strongest

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sense of the degeneracy and incapacity of the rulers of his own time.

In the *Laws*, the philosophers, if not banished, like the poets, are at least ignored; and religion takes the place of philosophy in the regulation of human life. It must however be remembered that the religion of Plato is co-extensive with morality, and is that purified religion and mythology of which he speaks in the second book of the *Republic*. There is no real discrepancy in the two works. In a practical treatise, he speaks of religion rather than of philosophy; just as he appears to identify virtue with pleasure, and rather seeks to find the common element of the virtues than to maintain his old paradoxical theses that they are one, or that they are identical with knowledge. The dialectic and the idea of good, which even Glaucon in the *Republic* could not understand, would be out of place in a less ideal work. There may also be a change in his own mind, the purely intellectual aspect of philosophy having a diminishing interest to him in his old age.

Some confusion occurs in the passage in which Plato speaks of the *Republic*, occasioned by his reference to a third state, which he proposes (D.V.) hereafter to expound (v. 739 E). Like many other thoughts in the *Laws*, the allusion is obscure from not being worked out. Aristotle (*Polit.* iv. 1) speaks of a state which is neither the best absolutely, nor the best under existing conditions, but an imaginary state, inferior to either, destitute, as he supposes, of the necessities of life — apparently such a beginning of primitive society as is described in *Laws* iii. But it is not clear that by this the third state of Plato is intended. It is possible that Plato may have meant by his third state an historical sketch, bearing the same relation to the *Laws* which the unfinished *Critias* would have borne to the *Republic*; or he may, perhaps, have intended to describe a state more nearly approximating than the *Laws* to existing Greek states.

The *Statesman* is a mere fragment when compared with the *Laws*, yet combining a second interest of dialectic as well as politics, which is wanting in the larger work. Several points of similarity and contrast may be observed between them. In some respects the *Statesman* is even more ideal than the *Republic*, looking back to a former state of paradisiacal life, in which the Gods ruled over mankind, as the *Republic* looks forward to a



coming kingdom of philosophers. Of this kingdom of Cronos there is also mention in the *Laws* (iv. 713 B). Again, in the *Statesman*, the Eleatic Stranger rises above law to the conception of the living voice of the lawgiver, who is able to provide for individual cases. A similar thought is repeated in the *Laws* (ix. 875 C): 'If in the order of nature, and by divine destiny, a man were able to apprehend the truth about these things, he would have no need of laws to rule over him; for there is no law or order above knowledge, nor can mind without impiety be deemed the subject or slave of any, but rather the lord of all.' The union of opposite natures, who form the warp and the woof of the political web, is a favourite thought which occurs in both dialogues (*Laws* vi. 773; *Statesman* 310 E).

The *Laws* are confessedly a Second-best, an inferior Ideal, to which Plato has recourse, when he finds that the city of Philosophers is no longer 'within the horizon of practical politics.' But it is curious to observe that the higher Ideal is always returning (cp. *Arist. Polit.* ii. 6, § 4), and that he is not much nearer the actual fact, nor more on the level of ordinary life in the *Laws* than in the *Republic*. It is also interesting to remark that the new Ideal is always falling away, and that he hardly supposes the one to be more capable of being realized than the other. Human beings are troublesome to manage; and the legislator cannot adapt his enactments to the infinite variety of circumstances; after all he must leave the administration of them to his successors; and though he would have liked to make them as permanent as they are in Egypt, he cannot escape from the necessity of change. At length Plato is obliged to institute a Nocturnal Council which is supposed to retain the mind of the legislator, and of which some of the members are even supposed to go abroad and inspect the institutions of foreign countries, as a foundation for changes in their own. The spirit of such changes, though avoiding the extravagance of a popular assembly, being only so much change as the conservative temper of old members is likely to allow, is nevertheless inconsistent with the fixedness of Egypt which Plato wishes to impress upon Hellenic institutions. He is inconsistent with himself as the truth begins to dawn upon him that 'in the execution things for the most part fall short of our conception of them' (*Rep.* v. 473 A).

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And is not this true of ideals of government in general? We are always disappointed in them. Nothing great can be accomplished in the short space of human life; wherefore also we look forward to another (Rep. x. 608 C). As we grow old, we are sensible that we have no power actively to pursue our ideals any longer. We have had our opportunity and do not aspire to be more than men: we have received our 'wages and are going home.' Neither do we despair of the future of mankind, because we have been able to do so little in comparison of the whole. We look in vain for consistency either in men or things. But we have seen enough of improvement in our own time to justify us in the belief that the world is worth working for and that a good man's life is not thrown away. Such reflections may help us to bring home to ourselves by inward sympathy the language of Plato in the Laws, and to combine into something like a whole his various and at first sight inconsistent utterances.

VI. The Republic may be described as the Spartan constitution appended to a government of philosophers. But in the Laws an Athenian element is also introduced. Many enactments are taken from the Athenian; the four classes are borrowed from the constitution of Solon, which is regarded by Plato as the best form of Athenian government (iii. 698), and the guardians of the law bear a certain resemblance to the archons. In the constitution of the Laws nearly all officers are elected by a vote more or less popular and by lot. But the assembly only exists for the purposes of election, and has no legislative or executive powers. The Nocturnal Council, which is the highest body in the state, has several of the functions of the ancient Athenian Areopagus, after which it appears to be modelled. Life is to wear, as at Athens, a joyous and festive look; there are to be Bacchic choruses, and men of mature age are encouraged in moderate potations. On the other hand, the common meals, the public education, the crypteia are borrowed from Sparta and not from Athens, and the superintendence of private life, which was to be practised by the governors, has also its prototype in Sparta. The extravagant dislike which Plato shows both to a naval power (iv. 705-707) and to extreme democracy (iii. 701) is the reverse of Athenian.

The best-governed Hellenic states traced the origin of their laws to individual lawgivers. These were real persons, though

we are uncertain how far they originated or only modified the institutions which are ascribed to them. But the lawgiver, though not a myth, was a fixed idea in the mind of the Greek,—as fixed as the Trojan war or the earth-born Cadmus. ‘This was what Solon meant or said’—was the form in which the Athenian expressed his own conception of right and justice, or argued a disputed point of law. And the constant reference in the Laws of Plato to the lawgiver is altogether in accordance with Greek modes of thinking and speaking.

There is also, as in the Republic, a Pythagorean element. The highest branch of education is arithmetic; to know the order of the heavenly bodies, and to reconcile the apparent contradiction of their movements, is an important part of religion; the lives of the citizens are to have a common measure, as also their vessels and coins; the great blessing of the state is the number 5040. Plato is deeply impressed by the antiquity of Egypt, and the unchangeableness of her ancient forms of song and dance. And he is also struck by the progress which the Egyptians had made in the mathematical sciences—in comparison of them the Greeks appeared to him to be little better than swine. Yet he censures the Egyptian meanness and inhospitality to strangers. He has traced the growth of states from their rude beginnings in a philosophical spirit; but of any life or growth of the Hellenic world in future ages he is silent. He has made the reflection that past time is the maker of states (Book iii. *sub init.*); but he does not argue from the past to the future, that the process is always going on, or that the institutions of nations are relative to their stage of civilization. If he could have stamped indelibly upon Hellenic states the will of the legislator, he would have been satisfied. The utmost which he expects of future generations is that they should supply the omissions, or correct the errors which younger statesmen detect in his enactments. When institutions have been once subjected to this process of criticism, he would have them fixed for ever (vi. 772 C, D; viii. 846 C, D).

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## THE PREAMBLE.

ph. BOOK I. Strangers, let me ask a question of you — Was a God  
4 or a man the author of your laws? ‘A God, Stranger. In Crete,

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Zeus is said to have been the author of them; in Sparta, as Megillus will tell you, Apollo.' You Cretans believe, as Homer says, that Minos went every ninth year to converse with his Olympian sire, and gave you laws which he brought from him. 'Yes; and there was Rhadamanthus, his brother, who is reputed among us to have been a most righteous judge.' That is a 625 reputation worthy of the son of Zeus. And as you and Megillus have been trained under these laws, I may ask you to give me an account of them. We can talk about them in our walk from Cnosus to the cave and temple of Zeus. I am told that the distance is considerable, but probably there are shady places under the trees, where, being no longer young, we may often rest and converse. 'Yes, Stranger, a little onward there are beautiful groves of cypresses, and green meadows in which we may repose.'

My first question is, Why has the law ordained that you should have common meals, and practise gymnastics, and bear arms? 'My answer is, that all our institutions are of a military character. 626 We lead the life of the camp even in time of peace, keeping up the organization of an army, and having meals in common; and as our country, owing to its ruggedness, is ill-suited for heavy-armed cavalry or infantry, our soldiers are archers, equipped with bows and arrows. The legislator was under the idea that war was the natural state of all mankind, and that peace is only a pretence; he thought that no possessions had any value which were not secured against enemies.' And do you think that superiority in war is the proper aim of government? 'Certainly I do, and my Spartan friend will agree with me.' And are there wars, not only of state against state, but of village against village, of family against family, of individual against individual? 'Yes.' And is a man his own enemy? 'There you come to first principles, like a true votary of the goddess Athene; and this is all the better, for you will the sooner recognize the truth of what I am saying—that all men everywhere are the enemies of all, and each individual of every other and of himself; and, further, that there is a victory and defeat—the best and the worst—which each man sustains, not at the hands of another, but of himself.' And does this extend to states and villages as 627 well as to individuals? 'Certainly; there is a better in them



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which conquers or is conquered by the worse.' Whether the worse ever really conquers the better, is a question which may be left for the present; but your meaning is, that bad citizens do sometimes overcome the good, and that the state is then conquered by herself, and that when they are defeated the state is victorious over herself. Or, again, in a family there may be several brothers, and the bad may be a majority; and when the bad majority conquer the good minority, the family are worse than themselves. The use of the terms 'better or worse than himself or themselves' may be doubtful, but about the thing meant there can be no dispute. 'Very true.' Such a struggle might be determined by a judge. And which will be the better judge — he who destroys the worse and lets the better rule, or he who lets the better rule and makes the others voluntarily obey; or, 8 thirdly, he who destroys no one, but reconciles the two parties? 'The last, clearly.' But the object of such a judge or legislator would not be war. 'True.' And as there are two kinds of war, one without and one within a state, of which the internal is by far the worse, will not the legislator chiefly direct his attention to this latter? He will reconcile the contending factions, and unite them against their external enemies. 'Certainly.' Every legislator will aim at the greatest good, and the greatest good is not victory in war, whether civil or external, but mutual peace and good-will, as in the body health is preferable to the purification of disease. He who makes war his object instead of peace, or who pursues war except for the sake of peace, is not a true statesman. 'And yet, Stranger, the laws both of Crete and 9 Sparta aim entirely at war.' Perhaps so; but do not let us quarrel about your legislators — let us be gentle; they were in earnest quite as much as we are, and we must try to discover their meaning. The poet Tyrtaeus (you know his poems in Crete, and my Lacedaemonian friend is only too familiar with them) — he was an Athenian by birth, and a Spartan citizen: — 'Well,' he says, 'I sing not, I care not about any man, however rich or happy, unless he is brave in war.' Now I should like, in the name of us all, to ask the poet a question. O Tyrtaeus, I would say to him, we agree with you in praising those who excel in war, but which kind of war do you mean? — that dreadful war which is termed civil, or the milder sort which is waged

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against foreign enemies? You say that you abominate ‘those who are not eager to taste their enemies’ blood,’ and you seem to mean chiefly their foreign enemies. ‘Certainly he does.’ 630 But we contend that there are men better far than your heroes, Tyrtaeus, concerning whom another poet, Theognis the Sicilian, says that ‘in a civil broil they are worth their weight in gold and silver.’ For in a civil war, not only courage, but justice and temperance and wisdom are required, and all virtue is better than a part. The mercenary soldier is ready to die at his post; yet he is commonly a violent, senseless creature. And the legislator, whether inspired or uninspired, will make laws with a view to the highest virtue; and this is not brute courage, but loyalty in the hour of danger. The virtue of Tyrtaeus, although needful enough in his own time, is really of a fourth-rate description. ‘You are degrading our legislator to a very low level.’ Nay, we degrade not him, but ourselves, if we believe that the laws of Lycurgus and Minos had a view to war only. A divine lawgiver would have had regard to all the different kinds of virtue, and have arranged his laws in corresponding classes, and not in the modern fashion, which only makes them after the want of them is felt,—about inheritances and heiresses and assaults, and the like. As you truly said, virtue is the business of the legis- 631 lator; but you went wrong when you referred all legislation to a part of virtue, and to an inferior part. For the object of laws, whether the Cretan or any other, is to make men happy. Now happiness or good is of two kinds—there are divine and there are human goods. He who has the divine has the human added to him; but he who has lost the greater is deprived of both. The lesser goods are health, beauty, strength, and, lastly, wealth; not the blind God, Pluto, but one who has eyes to see and follow wisdom. For mind or wisdom is the most divine of all goods; and next comes temperance, and justice springs from the union of wisdom and temperance with courage, which is the fourth or last. These four precede other goods, and the legislator will arrange all his ordinances accordingly, the human going back to the divine, and the divine to their leader mind. There will be enactments about marriage, about education, about all the states and feelings and experiences of men and women, at every age, in weal and woe, in war and peace; upon all the law 632

will fix a stamp of praise and blame. There will also be regulations about property and expenditure, about contracts, about rewards and punishments, and finally about funeral rites and honours of the dead. The lawgiver will appoint guardians to preside over these things; and mind will harmonize his ordinances, and show them to be in agreement with temperance and justice. Now I want to know whether the same principles are observed in the laws of Lycurgus and Minos, or, as I should rather say, of Apollo and Zeus. We must go through the virtues, beginning with courage, and then we will show that what has preceded has relation to virtue.

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33 'I wish,' says the Lacedaemonian, 'that you, Stranger, would first criticize Cleinias and the Cretan laws.' Yes, is the reply, and I will criticize you and myself, as well as him. Tell me, Megillus, were not the common meals and gymnastic training instituted by your legislator with a view to war? 'Yes; and next in the order of importance comes hunting, and fourth the endurance of pain in boxing contests, and in the beatings which are the punishment of theft. There is, too, the so-called Crypteia or secret service, in which our youth wander about the country night and day unattended, and even in winter go unshod and have no beds to lie on. Moreover they wrestle and exercise under a blazing sun, and they have many similar customs.' Well, but is courage only a combat against fear and pain, and not against pleasure and flattery? 'Against both, I should say.' And which is worse,—to be overcome by pain, or by pleasure? 'The latter.' But did the lawgivers  
34 of Crete and Sparta legislate for a courage which is lame of one leg,—able to meet the attacks of pain but not those of pleasure, or for one which can meet both? 'For a courage which can meet both, I should say.' But if so, where are the institutions which train your citizens to be equally brave against pleasure and pain, and superior to enemies within as well as without? 'We confess that we have no institutions worth mentioning which are of this character.' I am not surprised, and will therefore only request forbearance on the part of us all, in case the love of truth should lead any of us to censure the laws of the others. Remember that I am more in the way of hearing criticisms of your laws than you can be; for in well-ordered states like Crete and Sparta, although an old man may sometimes speak of them in.



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private to a ruler or elder, a similar liberty is not allowed to the young. But now being alone we shall not offend your legislator by a friendly examination of his laws. 'Take any freedom which you like.'

My first observation is, that your lawgiver ordered you to endure hardships, because he thought that those who had not this discipline would run away from those who had. But he ought to have considered further, that those who had never learned to resist pleasure would be equally at the mercy of those who had, and these are often among the worst of mankind. Pleasure, like fear, would overcome them, and take away their courage and freedom. 'Perhaps; but I must not be hasty in giving my assent.'

Next as to temperance: what institutions have you which are adapted to promote temperance? 'There are the common meals and gymnastic exercises.' These are partly good and partly bad, and, as in medicine, what is good at one time and for one person, is bad at another time and for another person. Now although gymnastics and common meals do good, they are also a cause of evil in civil troubles, and they appear to encourage unnatural love, as has been shown at Miletus, in Boeotia, and at Thurii. And the Cretans are said to have invented the tale of Zeus and Ganymede in order to justify their evil practices by the example of the God who was their lawgiver. Leaving the story, we may observe that all law has to do with pleasure and pain; these are two fountains which are ever flowing in human nature, and he who drinks of them when and as much as he ought, is happy, and he who indulges in them to excess, is miserable. 'You may be right, but I still incline to think that the Lacedaemonian lawgiver did well in forbidding pleasure, if I may judge from the result. For there is no drunken revelry in Sparta, and any one found in a state of intoxication is severely punished; he is not excused as an Athenian would be at Athens on account of a festival. I myself have seen the Athenians drunk at the Dionysia—and at our colony, Tarentum, on a similar occasion, I have beheld the whole city in a state of intoxication.' I admit that these festivals should be properly regulated. Yet I might reply, 'Yes, Spartans, that is not your vice; but look at home and remember the licentiousness of your women.' And to



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all such accusations every one of us may reply in turn: — ‘Wonder not, Stranger; there are different customs in different countries.’ Now this may be a sufficient answer; but we are speaking about the wisdom of lawgivers and not about the customs of men. To return to the question of drinking: shall we entirely avoid intoxication, as you Spartans do, or allow hard drinking, like the  
538 Scythians and Thracians, or have moderate potations like the Persians? ‘Give us arms, and we send all these nations flying before us.’ My good friend, be modest; victories and defeats often arise from unknown causes, and afford no proof of the goodness or badness of institutions. The stronger overcomes the weaker, as the Athenians have overcome the Cæans, or the Syracusans the Locrians, who are, perhaps, the best governed state in that part of the world. People are apt to praise or censure practices without enquiring into the nature of them. This is the way with drink: one person brings many witnesses, who sing the praises of wine; another declares that sober men defeat drunkards in battle; and he again is refuted in turn. I should like to conduct the argument on some other method; for if you regard numbers, there are two cities on one side, and ten thousand on the other.  
539 ‘I am ready to pursue any method which is likely to lead us to the truth.’ Let me put the matter thus: Somebody praises the useful qualities of a goat; another has seen goats running about wild in a garden, and blames a goat or any other animal which happens to be without a keeper. ‘How absurd!’ Would a pilot who is sea-sick be a good pilot? ‘No.’ Or a general who is sick and drunk with fear and ignorant of war a good general? ‘A general of old women he ought to be.’ But can any one form an estimate of any society, which is intended to have a ruler, and which he only sees in an unruly and lawless state? ‘No.’ There is a convivial form of society — is there not? ‘Yes.’ And has this convivial society ever been rightly ordered? Of course you Spartans and Cretans have never seen anything of the kind, but I have had wide experience, and made many enquiries about such societies, and have hardly ever found anything right or good  
540 in them. ‘We acknowledge our want of experience, and desire to learn of you.’ Will you admit that in all societies there must be a leader? ‘Yes.’ And in time of war he must be a man of courage and absolutely devoid of fear, if this be possible?

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‘Certainly.’ But we are talking now of a general who shall preside at meetings of friends — and as these have a tendency to be uproarious, they ought above all others to have a governor. ‘Very good.’ He should be a sober man and a man of the world, who will keep, make, and increase the peace of the society; a drunkard in charge of drunkards would be singularly fortunate if he avoided doing a serious mischief. ‘Indeed he would.’ Suppose a person 641 to censure such meetings — he may be right, but also he may have known them only in their disorderly state, under a drunken master of the feast; and a drunken general or pilot cannot save his army or his ships. ‘True; but although I see the advantage of an army having a good general, I do not equally see the good of a feast being well managed.’ If you mean to ask what good accrues to the state from the right training of a single youth or a single chorus, I should reply, ‘Not much’; but if you ask what is the good of education in general, I answer, that education makes good men, and that good men act nobly and overcome their enemies in battle. Victory is often suicidal to the victors, because it creates forgetfulness of education, but education itself is never suicidal. ‘You imply that the regulation of convivial meetings is a part of education; how will you prove this?’ I will tell you. But first let me offer a word of apology. We Athenians are always thought to be fond of talking, whereas the Lacedaemonian is celebrated for brevity, and the Cretan is considered to be sagacious and reserved. Now I fear that I may be charged 642 with spinning a long discourse out of slender materials. For drinking cannot be rightly ordered without correct principles of music, and music runs up into education generally, and to discuss all these matters may be tedious; if you like, therefore, we will pass on to another part of our subject. ‘Are you aware, Athenian, that our family is your proxenus at Sparta, and that from my boyhood I have regarded Athens as a second country, and having often fought your battles in my youth, I have become attached to you, and love the sound of the Attic dialect? The saying is true, that the best Athenians are more than ordinarily good, because they are good by nature; therefore, be assured that I shall be glad to hear you talk as much as you please.’ ‘I, too,’ adds Cleinias, ‘have a tie which binds me to you. You knew that Epimenides, the Cretan prophet, came and offered

sacrifices in your city by the command of an oracle ten years before the Persian war. He told the Athenians that the Persian host would not come for ten years, and would go away again, having suffered more harm than they had inflicted. Now Epimenides was of my family, and when he visited Athens he entered into friendship with your forefathers.' I see that you are willing to listen, and I have the will to speak, if I had only the ability. But, first, I must define the nature and power of education, and by this road we will travel on to the God Dionysus. The man who is to be good at anything must have early training; — the future builder must play at building, and the husbandman at digging; the soldier must learn to ride, and the carpenter to measure and use the rule,—all the thoughts and pleasures of children should bear on their after-profession.—Do you agree with me? 'Certainly.' And we must remember further that we are speaking of the education, not of a trainer, or of the captain of a ship, but of a perfect citizen who knows how to rule and how to obey; and such an education aims at virtue, and not at wealth or strength or mere cleverness. To the good man, education is of all things the most precious, and is also in constant need of renovation. 'We agree.' And we have before agreed that good men are those who are able to control themselves, and bad men are those who are not. Let me offer you an illustration which will assist our argument. Man is one; but in one and the same man are two foolish counsellors who contend within him—pleasure and pain, and of either he has expectations which we call hope and fear; and he is able to reason about good and evil, and reason, when affirmed by the state, becomes law. 'We cannot follow you.' Let me put the matter in another way: Every creature is a puppet of the Gods—whether he is a mere plaything or has any serious use we do not know; but this we do know, that he is drawn different ways by cords and strings. There is a soft golden cord which draws him towards virtue—this is the law of the state; and there are other cords made of iron and hard materials drawing him other ways. The golden reasoning influence has nothing of the nature of force, and therefore requires ministers in order to vanquish the other principles. This explains the doctrine that cities and citizens both conquer and are conquered by themselves. The individual

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follows reason, and the city law, which is embodied reason, either derived from the Gods or from the legislator. When virtue and vice are thus distinguished, education will be better understood, and in particular the relation of education to convivial intercourse. And now let us set wine before the puppet. You admit that wine stimulates the passions? 'Yes.' And does wine equally stimulate the reasoning faculties? 'No; it brings the soul back to a state of childhood.' In such a state a man has the least control over himself, and is, therefore, worst. 'Very true.' 646 Then how can we believe that drinking should be encouraged? 'You seem to think that it ought to be.' And I am ready to maintain my position. 'We should like to hear you prove that a man ought to make a beast of himself.' You are speaking of the degradation of the soul: but how about the body? Would any man willingly degrade or weaken that? 'Certainly not.' And yet if he goes to a doctor or a gymnastic master, does he not make himself ill in the hope of getting well? for no one would like to be always taking medicine, or always to be in training. 'True.' And may not convivial meetings have a similar remedial use? And if so, are they not to be preferred to other modes of training because they are painless? 'But have they any such use?' Let us see: Are there not two kinds of fear — fear of evil and fear of an evil reputation? 'There are.' The latter kind of fear is opposed both to the fear of pain and to the love of pleasure. This is called by the legislator reverence, and is greatly honoured by him and by every good man; whereas confidence, which is the opposite quality, is the worst fault both of individuals and of states. This sort of fear or reverence is one of the two chief causes of victory in war, fearlessness of enemies being the other. 'True.' Then every one should be both fearful and fearless? 'Yes.' The right sort of fear is infused into a man when he comes face to face with shame, or cowardice, or the temptations of pleasure, and has to conquer them. He must learn by many trials to win the victory over himself, if he is ever to be made perfect. 'That is reasonable enough.' And now, suppose that the Gods had given mankind a drug, of which the effect was to exaggerate every sort of evil and danger, so that the bravest man entirely lost his presence 648 of mind and became a coward for a time: — would such a drug have any value? 'But is there such a drug?' No; but suppose



that there were; might not the legislator use such a mode of testing courage and cowardice? 'To be sure.' The legislator would induce fear in order to implant fearlessness; and would give rewards or punishments to those who behaved well or the reverse, under the influence of the drug? 'Certainly.' And this mode of training, whether practised in the case of one or many, whether in solitude or in the presence of a large company—if a man have sufficient confidence in himself to drink the potion amid his boon companions, leaving off in time and not taking too much,—would be an equally good test of temperance? 'Very true.' Let us return to the lawgiver and say to him, 'Well, lawgiver, no such fear-producing potion has been given by God or invented by man, but there is a potion which will make men fearless.' 'You mean wine.' Yes; has not wine an effect the contrary of that which I was just now describing,—first mellowing and humanizing a man, and then filling him with confidence, making him ready to say or do anything? 'Certainly.' Let us not forget that there are two qualities which should be cultivated in the soul—first, the greatest fearlessness, and, secondly, the greatest fear, which are both parts of reverence. Courage and fearlessness are trained amid dangers; but we have still to consider how fear is to be trained. We desire to attain fearlessness and confidence without the insolence and boldness which commonly attend them. For do not love, ignorance, avarice, wealth, beauty, strength, while they stimulate courage, also madden and intoxicate the soul? What better and more innocent test of character is there than festive intercourse? Would you make a bargain with a man in order to try whether he is honest? or would you ascertain whether he is licentious by putting your wife or daughter into his hands? No one would deny that the test proposed is fairer, speedier, and safer than any other. And such a test will be particularly useful in the political science, which desires to know human natures and characters. 'Very true.'

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**BOOK II.** And are there any other uses of well-ordered potations? There are; but in order to explain them, I must repeat what I mean by right education; which, if I am not mistaken, depends on the due regulation of convivial intercourse.

'A high assumption.' I believe that virtue and vice are originally

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present to the mind of children in the form of pleasure and pain, reason and fixed principles come later, and happy is he who acquires them even in declining years; for he who possesses them is the perfect man. When pleasure and pain, and love and hate, are rightly implanted in the yet unconscious soul, and after the attainment of reason are discovered to be in harmony with her, this harmony of the soul is virtue, and the preparatory stage, anticipating reason, I call education. But the finer sense of pleasure and pain is apt to be impaired in the course of life; and therefore the Gods, pitying the toils and sorrows of mortals, have allowed them to have holidays, and given them the Muses and Apollo and Dionysus for leaders and playfellows. All young creatures love motion and frolic, and utter sounds of delight; but man only is capable of taking pleasure in rhythmical and harmonious movements. With these education begins; and the uneducated is he who has never known the discipline of the chorus, and the educated is he who has. The chorus is partly dance and partly song, and therefore the well-educated must sing and dance well. But when we say, 'He sings and dances well,' we mean that he sings and dances what is good. And if he thinks that to be good which is really good, he will have a much higher music and harmony in him, and be a far greater master of imitation in sound and gesture than he who is not of this opinion. 'True.' Then, if we know what is good and bad in song and dance, we shall know what education is? 'Very true.' Let us now consider the beauty of figure, melody, song, and dance. Will the same figures or sounds be equally well adapted to the manly and the cowardly when they are in trouble? 'How can they be, when the very colours of their faces are different?' Figures and melodies have a rhythm and harmony which are adapted to the expression of different feelings (I may remark, by the way, that the term 'colour,' which is a favourite word of music-masters, is not really applicable to music). And one class of harmonies is akin to courage and all virtue, the other to cowardice and all vice. 'We agree.' And do all men equally like all dances? 'Far otherwise.' Do some figures, then, appear to be beautiful which are not? For no one will admit that the forms of vice are more beautiful than the forms of virtue, or that he prefers the first kind to the second. And yet most persons say that the merit of

music is to give pleasure. But this is impiety. There is, however, a more plausible account of the matter given by others, who make their likes or dislikes the criterion of excellence. Sometimes nature crosses habit, or conversely, and then they say that such and such fashions or gestures are pleasant, but they do not like to exhibit them before men of sense, although they enjoy them in private. 'Very true.' And do vicious measures and strains do any harm, or good measures any good to the lovers of them? 'Probably.' Say, rather, 'Certainly': for the gentle indulgence which we often show to vicious men inevitably makes us become like them. And what can be worse than this? 'Nothing.' Then in a well-administered city, the poet will not be allowed to make the songs of the people just as he pleases, or to train his choruses without regard to virtue and vice. 'Certainly not.' And yet he may do this anywhere except in Egypt; for there ages ago they discovered the great truth which I am now asserting, that the young should be educated in forms and strains of virtue. These they fixed and consecrated in their temples; and no artist or musician is allowed to deviate from them. They are literally the same which they were ten thousand years ago. And this practice of theirs suggests the reflection that legislation about music is not an impossible thing. But the particular enactments must be the work of God or of some God-inspired man, as in Egypt their ancient chants are said to be the composition of the goddess Isis. The melodies which have a natural truth and correctness should be embodied in a law, and then the desire of novelty is not strong enough to change the old fashions. Is not the origin of music as follows? We rejoice when we think that we prosper, and we think that we prosper when we rejoice, and at such times we cannot rest, but our young men dance dances and sing songs, and our old men, who have lost the elasticity of youth, regale themselves with the memory of the past, while they contemplate the life and activity of the young. 'Most true.' People say that he who gives us most pleasure at such festivals is to win the palm: are they right? 'Possibly.' Let us not be hasty in deciding, but first imagine a festival at which the lord of the festival, having assembled the citizens, makes a proclamation that he shall be crowned victor who gives the most pleasure, from whatever source derived. We will further suppose that there are



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exhibitions of rhapsodists and musicians, tragic and comic poets, and even marionette-players — which of the pleasure-makers will win? Shall I answer for you?—The marionette-players will please the children; youths will decide for comedy; young men, educated women, and people in general will prefer tragedy; we old men are lovers of Homer and Hesiod. Now which of them is right? If you and I are asked, we shall certainly say that the old men's way of thinking ought to prevail. 'Very true.' So far I agree with the many that the excellence of music is to be measured by pleasure; but then the pleasure must be that of the good and educated, or better still, of one supremely virtuous and educated man. The true judge must have both wisdom and courage. For he must lead the multitude and not be led by them, and must not weakly yield to the uproar of the theatre, nor give false judgment out of that mouth which has just appealed to the Gods. The ancient custom of Hellas, which still prevails in Italy and Sicily, left the judgment to the spectators, but this custom has been the ruin of the poets, who seek only to please their patrons, and has degraded the audience by the representation of inferior characters. What is the inference? The same which we have often drawn, that education is the training of the young idea in what the law affirms and the elders approve. And as the soul of a child is too young to be trained in earnest, a kind of education has been invented which tempts him with plays and songs, as the sick are tempted by pleasant meats and drinks. And the wise legislator will compel the poet to express in his poems noble thoughts in fitting words and rhythms. 'But is this the practice elsewhere than in Crete and Lacedaemon? In other states, as far as I know, dances and music are constantly changed at the pleasure of the hearers.' I am afraid that I misled you; not liking to be always finding fault with mankind as they are, I described them as they ought to be. But let me understand: you say that such customs exist among the Cretans and Lacedaemonians, and that the rest of the world would be improved by adopting them? 'Much improved.' And you compel your poets to declare that the righteous are happy, and that the wicked man, even if he be as rich as Midas, is unhappy? Or, in the words of Tyrtaeus, 'I sing not, I care not about him' who is a great warrior not having justice; if he be unjust, 'I would not have him look

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calmly upon death or be swifter than the wind'; and may he be deprived of every good—that is, of every true good. For even if he have the goods which men regard, these are not really goods: first health; beauty next; thirdly wealth; and there are others. A man may have every sense purged and improved; he may be a tyrant, and do what he likes, and live for ever: but you and I will maintain that all these things are goods to the just, but to the unjust the greatest of evils, if life be immortal; not so great if he live for a short time only. If a man had health and wealth, and power, and was insolent and unjust, his life would still be miserable; he might be fair and rich, and do what he liked, but he would live basely, and if basely evilly, and if evilly painfully. 'There I cannot agree with you.' Then may heaven give us the spirit of agreement, for I am as convinced of the truth of what I say as that Crete is an island; and, if I were a lawgiver, I would exercise a censorship over the poets, and I would punish them if they said that the wicked are happy, or that injustice is profitable. And these are not the only matters in which I should make my citizens talk in a different way to the world in general. If I asked Zeus and Apollo, the divine legislators of Crete and Sparta,—‘Are the just and pleasant life the same or not the same’?—and they replied,—‘Not the same’; and I asked again—‘Which is the happier’? and they said—‘The pleasant life,’ this is an answer not fit for a God to utter, and therefore I ought rather to put the same question to some legislator. And if he replies ‘The pleasant,’ then I should say to him, ‘O my father, did you not tell me that I should live as justly as possible’? and if to be just is to be happy, what is that principle of happiness or good which is superior to pleasure? Is the approval of gods and men to be deemed good and honourable, but unpleasant, and their disapproval the reverse? Or is the neither doing nor suffering evil good and honourable, although not pleasant? But you cannot make men like what is not pleasant, and therefore you must make them believe that the just is pleasant. The business of the legislator is to clear up this confusion. He will show that the just and the unjust are identical with the pleasurable and the painful, from the point of view of the just man, of the unjust the reverse. And which is the truer judgment? Surely that of the better soul. For if not the truth, it is the best and most moral of fictions; and the

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legislator who desires to propagate this useful lie, may be encouraged by remarking that mankind have believed the story of Cadmus and the dragon's teeth, and therefore he may be assured that he can make them believe anything, and need only consider what fiction will do the greatest good. That the happiest is also the holiest, this shall be our strain, which shall be sung by all three choruses alike. First will enter the choir of children, who will lift up their voices on high; and after them the young men, who will pray the God Paean to be gracious to the youth, and to testify to the truth of their words; then will come the chorus of elder men, between thirty and sixty; and, lastly, there will be the old men, and they will tell stories enforcing the same virtues, as with the voice of an oracle. 'Whom do you mean by the third chorus?' You remember how I spoke at first of the restless nature of young creatures, who jumped about and called out in a disorderly manner, and I said that no other animal attained any perception of rhythm; but that to us the Gods gave Apollo and the Muses and Dionysus to be our playfellows. Of the two first choruses I have already spoken, and I have now to speak of the third, or Dionysian chorus, which is composed of those who are between thirty and sixty years old. 'Let us hear.' We are agreed (are we not?) that men, women, and children should be always charming themselves with strains of virtue, and that there should be a variety in the strains, that they may not weary of them? Now the fairest and most useful of strains will be uttered by the elder men, and therefore we cannot let them off. But how can we make them sing? For a discreet elderly man is ashamed to hear the sound of his own voice in private, and still more in public. The only way is to give them drink; this will mellow the sourness of age. No one should be allowed to taste wine until they are eighteen; from eighteen to thirty they may take a little; but when they have reached forty years, they may be initiated into the mystery of drinking. Thus they will become softer and more impressible; and when a man's heart is warm within him, he will be more ready to charm himself and others with song. And what songs shall he sing? 'At Crete and Lacedaemon we only know choral songs.' Yes; that is because your way of life is military. Your young men are like wild colts feeding in a herd together; no one takes the individual colt and trains him apart,

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and tries to give him the qualities of a statesman as well as of a soldier. He who was thus trained would be a greater warrior  
67 than those of whom Tyrtaeus speaks, for he would be courageous, and yet he would know that courage was only fourth in the scale of virtue. ‘Once more, I must say, Stranger, that you run down our lawgivers.’ Not intentionally, my good friend, but whither the argument leads I follow; and I am trying to find some style of poetry suitable for those who dislike the common sort. ‘Very good.’ In all things which have a charm, either this charm is their good, or they have some accompanying truth or advantage. For example, in eating and drinking there is pleasure and also profit, that is to say, health; and in learning there is a pleasure and also truth. There is a pleasure or charm, too, in the imitative arts, as well as a law of proportion or equality; but the pleasure which they afford, however innocent, is not the criterion of their  
68 truth. The test of pleasure cannot be applied except to that which has no other good or evil, no truth or falsehood. But that which has truth must be judged of by the standard of truth, and therefore imitation and proportion are to be judged of by their truth alone. ‘Certainly.’ And as music is imitative, it is not to be judged by the criterion of pleasure, and the Muse whom we seek is the muse not of pleasure but of truth, for imitation has a truth. ‘Doubtless.’ And if so, the judge must know what is being imitated before he decides on the quality of the imitation, and he who does not know what is true will not know what is good. ‘He will not.’ Will any one be able to imitate the human body, if he does not know the number, proportion, colour, or figure of the limbs? ‘How can he?’ But suppose we know some picture or figure to be an exact resemblance of a man, should we not also require to know whether the picture is  
69 beautiful or not? ‘Quite right.’ The judge of the imitation is required to know, therefore, first the original, secondly the truth, and thirdly the merit of the execution? ‘True.’ Then let us not weary in the attempt to bring music to the standard of the Muses and of truth. The Muses are not like human poets; they never spoil or mix rhythms or scales, or mingle instruments and human voices, or confuse the manners and strains of men and women, or of freemen and slaves, or of rational beings and brute animals. They do not practise the baser sort of musical arts, such as the



*Larus II.*

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‘matured judgments,’ of whom Orpheus speaks, would ridicule. But modern poets separate metre from music, and melody and rhythm from words, and use the instrument alone without the voice. The consequence is, that the meaning of the rhythm and of the time is not understood. I am endeavouring to show how 67  
 our fifty-year-old choristers are to be trained, and what they are to avoid. The opinion of the multitude about these matters is worthless; they who are only made to step in time by sheer force cannot be critics of music. ‘Impossible.’ Then our newly-appointed minstrels must be trained in music sufficiently to understand the nature of rhythms and systems; and they should select such as are suitable to men of their age, and will enable them to give and receive innocent pleasure. This is a knowledge which goes beyond that either of the poets or of their auditors in general. For although the poet must understand rhythm and music, he need not necessarily know whether the imitation is good or not, which was the third point required in a judge; but 67  
 our chorus of elders must know all three, if they are to be the instructors of youth.

And now we will resume the original argument, which may be summed up as follows: A convivial meeting is apt to grow tumultuous as the drinking proceeds; every man becomes light-headed, and fancies that he can rule the whole world. ‘Doubtless.’ And did we not say that the souls of the drinkers, when subdued by wine, are made softer and more malleable at the hand of the legislator? the docility of childhood returns to them. At times however they become too valiant and disorderly, drinking out of their turn, and interrupting one another. And the business of the legislator is to infuse into them that divine fear, which we call shame, in opposition to this disorderly boldness. But in order to discipline them there must be guardians of the law of drinking, and sober generals who shall take charge of the private soldiers; they are as necessary in drinking as in fighting, and he who disobeys these Dionysiac commanders will be equally disgraced. ‘Very good.’ If a drinking festival were well regulated, men would go away, not as they now do, greater enemies, but better friends. Of the greatest 67  
 gift of Dionysus I hardly like to speak, lest I should be misunderstood. ‘What is that?’ According to tradition Dionysus



was driven mad by his stepmother Herè, and in order to revenge himself he inspired mankind with Bacchic madness. But these are stories which I would rather not repeat. However I do acknowledge that all men are born in an imperfect state, and are at first restless, irrational creatures: this, as you will remember, has been already said by us. 'I remember.' And that Apollo and the Muses and Dionysus gave us harmony and rhythm? 'Very true.' The other story implies that wine was given to punish us and make us mad; but we contend that wine is a balm and a cure; a spring of modesty in the soul, and of health and strength in the body. Again, the work of the chorus is co-extensive with the work of education; rhythm and melody answer to the voice, and the motions of the body correspond to all three, and the sound enters in and educates the soul in virtue. 'Yes.' And the movement which, when pursued as an amusement, is termed dancing, when studied with a view to the improvement of the body, becomes gymnastic. Shall we now proceed to speak of this? 'What Cretan or Lacedaemonian would approve of your omitting gymnastic?' Your question implies assent; and you will easily understand a subject which is familiar to you. Gymnastic is based on the natural tendency of every animal to rapid motion; and man adds a sense of rhythm, which is awakened by music; music and dancing together form the choral art. But before proceeding I must add a crowning word about drinking. Like other pleasures, it has a lawful use; but if a state or an individual is inclined to drink at will, I cannot allow them. I would go further than Crete or Lacedaemon and have the law of the Carthaginians, that no slave of either sex should drink wine at all, and no soldier while he is on a campaign, and no magistrate or officer while he is on duty, and that no one should drink by daylight or on a bridal night. And there are so many other occasions on which wine ought to be prohibited, that there will not be many vines grown or vineyards required in the state.

*Laws II.*

ANALYSIS.

**BOOK III.** If a man wants to know the origin of states and societies, he should behold them from the point of view of time. Thousands of cities have come into being and as many have passed away in infinite ages, every one of them having had endless

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forms of government; and if we can ascertain the cause of these changes in states, that will probably explain their origin. What do you think of ancient traditions about deluges and destructions of mankind, and the preservation of a remnant? 'Every one 677 believes in them.' Then let us suppose the world to have been destroyed by a deluge. The survivors would be hill-shepherds, small sparks of the human race, dwelling in isolation, and unacquainted with the arts and vices of civilization. We may further suppose that the cities on the plain and on the coast have been swept away, and that all inventions, and every sort of knowledge, have perished. 'Why, if all things were as they now are, nothing would have ever been invented. All our famous discoveries have been made within the last thousand years, and many of them are but of yesterday.' Yes, Cleinias, and you must not forget Epimenides, who was really of yesterday; he practised the lesson of moderation and abstinence which Hesiod only preached. 'True.' After the great destruction we may imagine that the earth was a desert, in which there were 678 a herd or two of oxen and a few goats, hardly enough to support those who tended them; while of politics and governments the survivors would know nothing. And out of this state of things have arisen arts and laws, and a great deal of virtue and a great deal of vice; little by little the world has come to be what it is. At first, the few inhabitants would have had a natural fear of descending into the plains; although they would want to have intercourse with one another, they would have a difficulty in getting about, having lost the arts, and having no means of extracting metals from the earth, or of felling timber; for even if they had saved any tools, these would soon have been worn out, and they could get no more until the art of metallurgy had been again revived. Faction and war would be extinguished among them, for being solitary they would incline to be friendly; and having abundance of pasture and plenty of milk and flesh, they would have nothing to quarrel 679 about. We may assume that they had also dwellings, clothes, pottery, for the weaving and plastic arts do not require the use of metals. In those days they were neither poor nor rich, and there was no insolence or injustice among them; for they were of noble natures, and lived up to their principles, and believed

what they were told; knowing nothing of land or naval warfare, or of legal practices or party conflicts, they were simpler and more temperate, and also more just than the men of our day.

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580 'Very true.' I am showing whence the need of lawgivers arises, for in primitive ages they neither had nor wanted them. Men lived according to the customs of their fathers, in a simple manner, under a patriarchal government, such as still exists both among Hellenes and barbarians, and is described in Homer as prevailing among the Cyclopes:—

'They have no laws, and they dwell in rocks or on the tops of mountains, and every one is the judge of his wife and children, and they do not trouble themselves about one another.'

'That is a charming poet of yours, though I know little of him, for in Crete foreign poets are not much read.' 'But he is well known in Sparta, though he describes Ionian rather than Dorian manners, and he seems to take your view of primitive society.' May we not suppose that government arose out of the union of single families who survived the destruction, and were under the rule of patriarchs, because they had originally descended from a single father and mother? 'That is very probable.' As time went on, men increased in number, and tilled the ground, living in a common habitation, which they protected by walls against wild beasts; but the several families retained the laws and customs which they separately received from their first parents. They would naturally like their own laws better than any others, and would be already formed by them when they met in a common society: thus legislation imperceptibly began among them. For in the next stage the associated families would appoint plenipotentiaries, who would select and present to the chiefs those of all their laws which they thought best. The chiefs in turn would make a further selection, and would thus become the lawgivers of the state, which they would form into an aristocracy or a monarchy. 'Probably.' In the third stage various other forms of government would arise. This state of society is described by Homer in speaking of the foundation of Dardania, which, he says,

'was built at the foot of many-fountained Ida, for Ilium, the city of the plain, as yet was not.'



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Here, as also in the account of the Cyclopes, the poet by some divine inspiration has attained truth. But to proceed with our tale. Ilium was built in a wide plain, on a low hill, which was surrounded by streams descending from Ida. This shows that many ages must have passed; for the men who remembered the deluge would never have placed their city at the mercy of the waters. When mankind began to multiply, many other cities were built in similar situations. These cities carried on a ten years' war against Troy, by sea as well as land, for men were ceasing to be afraid of the sea, and, in the meantime, while the chiefs of the army were at Troy, their homes fell into confusion. The youth revolted and refused to receive their own fathers; deaths, murders, exiles ensued. Under the new name of Dorians, which they received from their chief Dorieus, the exiles returned: the rest of the story is part of the history of Sparta.

Thus, after digressing from the subject of laws into music and drinking, we return to the settlement of Sparta, which in laws and institutions is the sister of Crete. We have seen the rise of a first, second, and third state, during the lapse of ages; and now we arrive at a fourth state, and out of the comparison of all four we propose to gather the nature of laws and governments, and the changes which may be desirable in them. 'If,' replies the Spartan, 'our new discussion is likely to be as good as the last, I would think the longest day too short for such an employment.'

Let us imagine the time when Lacedaemon, and Argos, and Messenè were all subject, Megillus, to your ancestors. Afterwards, they distributed the army into three portions, and made three cities—Argos, Messenè, Lacedaemon. 'Yes.' Temenus was the king of Argos, Cresphontes of Messenè, Procles and Eurysthenes ruled at Lacedaemon. 'Just so.' And they all swore to assist any one of their number whose kingdom was subverted. 'Yes.' But did we not say that kingdoms or governments can only be subverted by themselves? 'That is true.' Yes, and the truth is now proved by facts: there were certain conditions upon which the three kingdoms were to assist one another; the government was to be mild and the people obedient, and the kings and people were to unite in assisting either of the



two others when they were wronged. This latter condition was a great security. ‘Clearly.’ Such a provision is in opposition to the common notion that the lawgiver should make only such laws as the people like; but we say that he should rather be like a physician, prepared to effect a cure even at the cost of considerable suffering. ‘Very true.’ The early lawgivers had another great advantage—they were saved from the reproach which attends a division of land and the abolition of debts. No one could quarrel with the Dorians for dividing the territory, and they had no debts of long standing. ‘They had not.’ Then what was the reason why their legislation signally failed? For there were three kingdoms, and two of them quickly lost their original constitution. That is a question which we cannot refuse to answer, if we mean to proceed with our old man’s game of enquiring into laws and institutions. And the Dorian institutions are more worthy of consideration than any other, having been evidently intended to be a protection not only to the Peloponnese, but to all the Hellenes against the Barbarians. For the capture of Troy by the Achaeans had given great offence to the Assyrians, of whose empire it then formed part, and they were likely to retaliate. Accordingly the royal Heraclid brothers devised their military constitution, which was organised on a far better plan than the old Trojan expedition; and the Dorians themselves were far superior to the Achaeans, who had taken part in that expedition, and had been conquered by them. Such a scheme, undertaken by men who had shared with one another toils and dangers, sanctioned by the Delphian oracle, under the guidance of the Heraclidae, seemed to have a promise of permanence. ‘Naturally.’ Yet this has not proved to be the case. Instead of the three being one, they have always been at war; had they been united, in accordance with the original intention, they would have been invincible.

And what caused their ruin? Did you ever observe that there are beautiful things of which men often say, ‘What wonders they would have effected if rightly used!’ and yet, after all, this may be a mistake. And so I say of the Heraclidae and their expedition, which I may perhaps have been justified in admiring, but which nevertheless suggests to me the general reflection,—‘What wonders might not strength and military resources have accomplished, if the possessor had only known how to use them!’ For

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consider: if the generals of the army had only known how to, arrange their forces, might they not have given their subjects everlasting freedom, and the power of doing what they would in all the world? ‘Very true.’ Suppose a person to express his admiration of wealth or rank, does he not do so under the idea that by the help of these he can attain his desires? All men wish to obtain the control of all things, and they are always praying for what they desire. ‘Certainly.’ And we ask for our friends what they ask for themselves. ‘Yes.’ Dear is the son to the father, and yet the son, if he is young and foolish, will often pray to obtain what the father will pray that he may not obtain. ‘True.’ And when the father, in the heat of youth or the dotage of age, makes some rash prayer, the son, like Hippolytus, may have reason to pray that the word of his father may be ineffectual. ‘You mean that a man should pray to have right desires, before he prays that his desires may be fulfilled; and that wisdom should be the first object of our prayers?’ Yes; and you will remember my saying that wisdom should be the principal aim of the legislator; but you said that defence in war came first. And I replied, that there were four virtues, whereas you acknowledged one only — courage, and not wisdom which is the guide of all the rest. And I repeat — in jest if you like, but I am willing that you should receive my words in earnest — that ‘the prayer of a fool is full of danger.’ I will prove to you, if you will allow me, that the ruin of those states was not caused by cowardice or ignorance in war, but by ignorance of human affairs. ‘Pray proceed: our attention will show better than compliments that we prize your words.’ I maintain that ignorance is, and always has been, the ruin of states; wherefore the legislator should seek to banish it from the state; and the greatest ignorance is the love of what is known to be evil, and the hatred of what is known to be good; this is the last and greatest conflict of pleasure and reason in the soul. I say the greatest, because affecting the greater part of the soul; for the passions are in the individual what the people are in a state. And when they become opposed to reason or law, and instruction no longer avails — that is the last and greatest ignorance of states and men. ‘I agree.’ Let this, then, be our first principle: — That the citizen who does not know how to choose between good and evil must not have authority, although he possess great mental

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590 gifts, and many accomplishments; for he is really a fool. On the other hand, he who has this knowledge may be unable either to read or swim; nevertheless, he shall be counted wise and permitted to rule. For how can there be wisdom where there is no harmony? — the wise man is the saviour, and he who is devoid of wisdom is the destroyer of states and households. There are rulers and there are subjects in states. And the first claim to rule is that of parents to rule over their children; the second, that of the noble to rule over the ignoble; thirdly, the elder must govern the younger; in the fourth place, the slave must obey his master; fifthly, there is the power of the stronger, which the poet Pindar declares to be according to nature; sixthly, there is the rule of the wiser, which is also according to nature, as I must inform Pindar, if he does not know, and is the rule of law over obedient subjects. ‘Most true.’ And there is a seventh kind of rule which the Gods love,—in this the ruler is elected by lot.

691 Then, now, we playfully say to him who fancies that it is easy to make laws: — You see, legislator, the many and inconsistent claims to authority; here is a spring of troubles which you must stay. And first of all you must help us to consider how the kings of Argos and Messenè in olden days destroyed their famous empire — did they forget the saying of Hesiod, that ‘the half is better than the whole’? And do we suppose that the ignorance of this truth is less fatal to kings than to peoples? ‘Probably the evil is increased by their way of life.’ The kings of those days transgressed the laws and violated their oaths. Their deeds were not in harmony with their words, and their folly, which seemed to them wisdom, was the ruin of the state. And how could the legislator have prevented this evil? — The remedy is easy to see now, but was not easy to foresee at the time. ‘What is the remedy?’ The institutions of Sparta may teach you, Megillus. Wherever there is excess, whether the vessel has too large a sail, or the body too much food, or the mind too much power, there destruction is certain. And similarly, a man who possesses arbitrary power is soon corrupted, and grows hateful to his dearest friends. In order to guard against this evil, the God who watched over Sparta gave you two kings instead of one, that they might balance one another; and further to lower the pulse of your body politic, some human wisdom, mingled with divine



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power, tempered the strength and self-sufficiency of youth with the moderation of age in the institution of your senate. A third saviour bridled your rising and swelling power by ephors, whom he assimilated to officers elected by lot: and thus the kingly power was preserved, and became the preserver of all the rest. Had the constitution been arranged by the original legislators, not even the portion of Aristodemus would have been saved; for they had no political experience, and imagined that a youthful spirit invested with power could be restrained by oaths. Now that God has instructed us in the arts of legislation, there is no merit in seeing all this, or in learning wisdom after the event. But if the coming danger could have been foreseen, and the union preserved, then no Persian or other enemy would have dared to attack Hellas; and indeed there was not so much credit to us in defeating the enemy, as discredit in our disloyalty to one another. For of the three cities one only fought on behalf of Hellas; and of the two others, Argos refused her aid; and Mesenia was actually at war with Sparta: and if the Lacedaemonians and Athenians had not united, the Hellenes would have been absorbed in the Persian empire, and dispersed among the barbarians. We make these reflections upon past and present legislators because we desire to find out what other course could have been followed. We were saying just now, that a state can only be free and wise and harmonious when there is a balance of powers. There are many words by which we express the aims of the legislator,—temperance, wisdom, friendship; but we need not be disturbed by the variety of expression,—these words have all the same meaning. ‘I should like to know at what in your opinion the legislator should aim.’” Hear me, then. There are two mother forms of states—one monarchy, and the other democracy: the Persians have the first in the highest form, and the Athenians the second; and no government can be well administered which does not include both. There was a time when both the Persians and Athenians had more the character of a constitutional state than they now have. In the days of Cyrus the Persians were freemen as well as lords of others, and their soldiers were free and equal, and the kings used and honoured all the talent which they could find, and so the nation waxed great, because there was freedom and friendship and com-



munion of soul. But Cyrus, though a wise general, never troubled himself about the education of his family. He was a soldier from his youth upward, and left his children who were born in the purple to be educated by women, who humoured and spoilt them. 'A rare education, truly!' Yes, such an education as princesses who had recently grown rich might be expected to give them in a country where the men were solely occupied with warlike pursuits. 'Likely enough.' Their father had possessions of men and animals, and never considered that the race to whom he was about to make them over had been educated in a very different school, not like the Persian shepherd, who was well able to take care of himself and his own. He did not see that his children had been brought up in the Median fashion, by women and eunuchs. The end was that one of the sons of Cyrus slew the other, and lost the kingdom by his own folly. Observe, again, that Darius, who restored the kingdom, had not received a royal education. He was one of the seven chiefs, and when he came to the throne he divided the empire into seven provinces; and he made equal laws, and implanted friendship among the people. Hence his subjects were greatly attached to him, and cheerfully helped him to extend his empire. Next followed Xerxes, who had received the same royal education as CambySES, and met with a similar fate. The reflection naturally occurs to us — How could Darius, with all his experience, have made such a mistake!

The ruin of Xerxes was not a mere accident, but the evil life which is generally led by the sons of very rich and royal persons; and this is what the legislator has seriously to consider. Justly may the Lacedaemonians be praised for not giving special honour to birth or wealth; for such advantages are not to be highly esteemed without virtue, and not even virtue is to be esteemed unless it be accompanied by temperance. 'Explain.' No one would like to live in the same house with a courageous man who had no control over himself, nor with a clever artist who was a rogue. Nor can justice and wisdom ever be separated from temperance. But considering these qualities with reference to the honour and dishonour which is to be assigned to them in states, would you say, on the other hand, that temperance, if existing without the other virtues in the soul, is worth anything or nothing? 'I cannot tell.' You have answered well. It would be absurd to speak of

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temperance as belonging to the class of honourable or of dishonourable qualities, because all other virtues in their various classes require temperance to be added to them; having the addition, they are honoured not in proportion to that, but to their own excellence. And ought not the legislator to determine these classes? ‘Certainly.’ Suppose then that, without going into details, we make three great classes of them. Most honourable are the goods of the soul, always assuming temperance as a condition of them; secondly, those of the body; thirdly, external possessions. The legislator who puts them in another order is doing an unholy and unpatriotic thing. 697

These remarks were suggested by the history of the Persian kings; and to them I will now return. The ruin of their empire was caused by the loss of freedom and the growth of despotism; all community of feeling disappeared. Hatred and spoliation took the place of friendship; the people no longer fought heartily for their masters; the rulers, finding their myriads useless on the field of battle, resorted to mercenaries as their only salvation, and were thus compelled by their circumstances to proclaim the stupidest of falsehoods—that virtue is a trifle in comparison of money. 698

But enough of the Persians: a different lesson is taught by the Athenians, whose example shows that a limited freedom is far better than an unlimited. Ancient Athens, at the time of the Persian invasion, had such a limited freedom. The people were divided into four classes, according to the amount of their property, and the universal love of order, as well as the fear of the approaching host, made them obedient and willing citizens. For Darius had sent Datis and Artaphernes, commanding them under pain of death to subjugate the Eretrians and Athenians. A report, whether true or not, came to Athens that all the Eretrians had been ‘netted’; and the Athenians in terror sent all over Hellas for assistance. None came to their relief except the Lacedaemonians, and they arrived a day too late, when the battle of Marathon had been already fought. In process of time Xerxes came to the throne, and the Athenians heard of nothing but the bridge over the Hellespont, and the canal of Athos, and the innumerable host and fleet. They knew that these were intended to avenge the defeat of Marathon. 699

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Their case seemed desperate, for there was no Hellene likely to assist them by land, and at sea they were attacked by more than a thousand vessels;—their only hope, however slender, was in victory; so they relied upon themselves and upon the Gods. Their common danger, and the influence of their ancient constitution, greatly tended to promote harmony among them. Reverence and fear—that fear which the coward never knows—made them fight for their altars and their homes, and saved them from being dispersed all over the world. ‘Your words, Athenian, are worthy of your country.’ And you, Megillus, who have inherited the virtues of your ancestors, are worthy to hear them. Let me ask you to take the moral of my tale. The Persians have lost their liberty in absolute slavery, and we in absolute freedom. In ancient times the Athenian people were not the masters, but the servants of the laws. ‘Of what laws?’ In the first place, there were laws about music, and the music was of various kinds: there was one kind which consisted of hymns, another of lamentations; there was also the pæan and the dithyramb, and the so-called ‘laws’ (*νόμοι*) or strains, which were played upon the harp. The regulation of such matters was not left to the whistling and clapping of the crowd; there was silence while the judges decided, and the boys, and the audience in general, were kept in order by raps of a stick. But after a while there arose a new race of poets, men of genius certainly, however careless of musical truth and propriety, who made pleasure the only criterion of excellence. That was a test which the spectators could apply for themselves; the whole audience, instead of being mute, became vociferous, and a theatrocracy took the place of an aristocracy. Could the judges have been free, there would have been no great harm done; a musical democracy would have been well enough—but conceit has been our ruin. Everybody knows everything, and is ready to say anything; the age of reverence is gone, and the age of irreverence and licentiousness has succeeded. ‘Most true.’ And with this freedom comes disobedience to rulers, parents, elders,—in the latter days to the law also; the end returns to the beginning, and the old Titanic nature reappears—men have no regard for the Gods or for oaths; and the evils of the human race seem as if they would never cease. Whither are we



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running away? Once more we must pull up the argument with bit and curb, lest, as the proverb says, we should fall off our ass. ‘Good.’ Our purpose in what we have been saying is to prove that the legislator ought to aim at securing for a state three things—freedom, friendship, wisdom. And we chose two states;—one was the type of freedom, and the other of despotism; and we showed that when in a mean they attained their highest perfection. In a similar spirit we spoke of the Dorian expedition, and of the foundation of Dardania and the removal of cities to the sea-shore; and of music, and the use of wine, and of all that preceded. 702

And now, has our discussion been of any use? ‘Yes, Stranger; for by a singular coincidence the Cretans are about to send out a colony, of which the settlement has been confided to the Cnosians. Ten commissioners, of whom I am one, are to give laws to the colonists, and we may give any which we please—Cretan or foreign. And therefore let us make a selection from what has been said, and then proceed with the construction of the state.’ Very good: I am quite at your service. ‘And I too,’ says Megillus.

**BOOK IV.** And now, what is this city? I do not want to know what is to be the name of the place (for some accident,—a river or a local deity, will determine that), but what the situation is, whether maritime or inland. ‘The city will be about eleven miles from the sea.’ Are there harbours? ‘Excellent.’ And is the surrounding country self-supporting? ‘Almost.’ Any neighbouring states? ‘No; and that is the reason for choosing the place, which has been deserted from time immemorial.’ And is there a fair proportion of hill and plain and wood? ‘Like Crete in general, more hill than plain.’ Then there is some hope for your citizens; had the city been on the sea, and dependent for support on other countries, no human power could have preserved you from corruption. Even the distance of eleven miles is hardly enough. For the sea, although an agreeable, is a dangerous companion, and a highway of strange morals and manners as well as of commerce. But as the country is only moderately fertile there will be no great export trade and no great returns of gold and silver, which are the ruin of states. Is there timber 704 705



for ship-building? 'There is no pine, nor much cypress; and very little stone-pine or planewood for the interior of ships.' That is good. 'Why?' Because the city will not be able to imitate the bad ways of her enemies. 'What is the bearing of that remark?' To explain my meaning, I would ask you to remember what we said about the Cretan laws, that they had an eye to war only; whereas I maintained that they ought to have included all virtue. And I hope that you in your turn will retaliate upon me if

06 I am false to my own principle. For I consider that the lawgiver should go straight to the mark of virtue and justice, and disregard wealth and every other good when separated from virtue. What further I mean, when I speak of the imitation of enemies, I will illustrate by the story of Minos, if our Cretan friend will allow me to mention it. Minos, who was a great sea-king, imposed upon the Athenians a cruel tribute, for in those days they were not a maritime power; they had no timber for ship-building, and therefore they could not 'imitate their enemies'; and better far, as I maintain, would it have been for them to have lost many times over the lives which they devoted to the tribute than to have turned soldiers into sailors. Naval warfare is not a very praiseworthy art; men should not be taught to leap on shore, and then again to hurry back to their ships, or to find specious excuses for throwing away their arms; bad customs ought not to be gilded with fine words. And retreat is always bad, as we are taught in Homer, when he introduces Odysseus, setting forth to Agamemnon the danger of

07 ships being at hand when soldiers are disposed to fly. An army of lions trained in such ways would fly before a herd of deer. Further, a city which owes its preservation to a crowd of pilots and oarsmen and other undeserving persons, cannot bestow rewards of honour properly; and this is the ruin of states. 'Still, in Crete we say that the battle of Salamis was the salvation of Hellas.' Such is the prevailing opinion. But I and Megillus say that the battle of Marathon began the deliverance, and that the battle of Plataea completed it; for these battles made men better, whereas the battles of Salamis and Artemisium made them no better. And we further affirm that mere existence is not the great political good of individuals or states, but the continuance of the best existence. 'Certainly.' Let us then endeavour to follow this principle in colonization and legislation.

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And first, let me ask you who are to be the colonists? May any one come from any city of Crete? for you would surely not send a general invitation to all Hellas. Yet I observe that in Crete there are people who have come from Argos and Aegina and other places. 'Our recruits will be drawn from all Crete, and of other Hellenes we should prefer Peloponnesians. As you observe, there are Argives among the Cretans; moreover the Gortynians, who are the best of all Cretans, have come from Gortys in Peloponnesus.'

Colonization is in some ways easier when the colony goes out in a swarm from one country, owing to the pressure of population, or revolution, or war. In this case there is the advantage that the new colonists have a community of race, language, and laws. But then again, they are less obedient to the legislator; and often they are anxious to keep the very laws and customs which caused their ruin at home. A mixed multitude, on the other hand, is more tractable, although there is a difficulty in making them pull together. There is nothing, however, which perfects men's virtue more than legislation and colonization. And yet I have a word to say which may seem to be depreciatory of legislators. 'What is that?'

I was going to make the saddening reflection, that accidents of all sorts are the true legislators,—wars and pestilences and famines and the frequent recurrence of bad seasons. The observer will be inclined to say that almost all human things are chance; and this is certainly true about navigation and medicine, and the art of the general. But there is another thing which may equally be said. 'What is it?' That God governs all things, and that chance and opportunity co-operate with Him. And according to yet a third view, art has part with them, for surely in a storm it is well to have a pilot? And the same is true of legislation: even if circumstances are favourable, a skilful lawgiver is still necessary. 'Most true.' All artists would pray for certain conditions under which to exercise their art: and would not the legislator do the same? 'Certainly?' Come, legislator, let us say to him, and what are the conditions which you would have? He will answer, Grant me a city which is ruled by a tyrant; and let the tyrant be young, mindful, teachable, courageous, magnanimous; and let him have the inseparable condition of all virtue, which is temper-

ance—not prudence, but that natural temperance which is the gift of children and animals, and is hardly reckoned among goods—with this he must be endowed, if the state is to acquire the form most conducive to happiness in the speediest manner. And I must add one other condition: the tyrant must be fortunate, and his good fortune must consist in his having the co-operation of a great legislator. When God has done all this, He has done the best which He can for a state; not so well if He has given them two legislators instead of one, and less and less well if He has given them a great many. An orderly tyranny most easily passes into the perfect state; in the second degree, a monarchy; in the third degree, a democracy; an oligarchy is worst of all. ‘I do not understand.’ I suppose that you have never seen a city which is subject to a tyranny? ‘I have no desire to see one.’ You would have seen what I am describing, if you ever had. The tyrant can speedily change the manners of a state, and affix the stamp of praise or blame on any action which he pleases; for the citizens readily follow the example which he sets. There is no quicker way of making changes; but there is a counterbalancing difficulty. It is hard to find the divine love of temperance and justice existing in any powerful form of government, whether in a monarchy or an oligarchy. In olden days there were chiefs like Nestor, who was the most eloquent and temperate of mankind, but there is no one his equal now. If such an one ever arises among us, blessed will he be, and blessed they who listen to his words. For where power and wisdom and temperance meet in one, there are the best laws and constitutions. I am endeavouring to show you how easy under the conditions supposed, and how difficult under any other, is the task of giving a city good laws. ‘How do you mean?’ Let us old men attempt to mould in words a constitution for your new state, as children make figures out of wax. ‘Proceed. What constitution shall we give—democracy, oligarchy, or aristocracy?’ To which of these classes, Megillus, do you refer your own state? ‘The Spartan constitution seems to me to contain all these elements. Our state is a democracy and also an aristocracy; the power of the Ephors is tyrannical, and we have an ancient monarchy.’ ‘Much the same,’ adds Cleinias, ‘may be said of Cnosus.’ The reason is that you have polities, but other states are mere aggregations of

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men dwelling together, which are named after their several ruling powers; whereas a state, if an 'ocracy' at all, should be called a theocracy. A tale of old will explain my meaning. There is a tradition of a golden age, in which all things were spontaneous and abundant. Cronos, then lord of the world, knew that no mortal nature could endure the temptations of power, and therefore he appointed demons or demi-gods, who are of a superior race, to have dominion over man, as man has dominion over the animals. They took care of us with great ease and pleasure to themselves, and no less to us; and the tradition says that only when God, and not man, is the ruler, can the human race cease from ill. This was the manner of life which prevailed under Cronos, and which we must strive to follow so far as the principle of immortality still abides in us and we live according to law and the dictates of right reason. But in an oligarchy or democracy, when the governing principle is athirst for pleasure, the laws are trampled under foot, and there is no possibility of salvation. Is it not often said that there are as many forms of laws as there are governments, and that they have no concern either with any one virtue or with all virtue, but are relative to the will of the government? Which is as much as to say that 'might makes right.' 'What do you mean?' I mean that governments enact their own laws, and that every government makes self-preservation its principal aim. He who transgresses the laws is regarded as an evil-doer, and punished accordingly. This was one of the unjust principles of government which we mentioned when speaking of the different claims to rule. We were agreed that parents should rule their children, the elder the younger, the noble the ignoble. But there were also several other principles, and among them Pindar's 'law of violence.' To whom then is our state to be entrusted? For many a government is only a victorious faction which has a monopoly of power, and refuses any share to the conquered, lest when they get into office they should remember their wrongs. Such governments are not politics, but parties; nor are any laws good which are made in the interest of particular classes only, and not of the whole. And in our state I mean to protest against making any man a ruler because he is rich, or strong, or noble. But those who are obedient to the laws, and who win the victory of obedience, shall be promoted to the service of the Gods according to



the degree of their obedience. When I call the ruler the servant *Laws IV.*

or minister of the law, this is not a mere paradox, but I mean to *ANALYSIS.*

say that upon a willingness to obey the law the existence of the state depends. 'Truly, Stranger, you have a keen vision.' Why,

yes; every man when he is old has his intellectual vision most keen.

And now shall we call in our colonists and make a speech to them?

Friends, we say to them, God holds in His hand the beginning,

16 middle, and end of all things, and He moves in a straight line

towards the accomplishment of His will. Justice always bears

Him company, and punishes those who fall short of His laws.

He who would be happy follows humbly in her train; but he who

is lifted up with pride, or wealth, or honour, or beauty, is soon

deserted by God, and, being deserted, he lives in confusion and

disorder. To many he seems a great man; but in a short time

he comes to utter destruction. Wherefore, seeing these things,

what ought we to do or think? 'Every man ought to follow God.'

What life, then, is pleasing to God? There is an old saying that

'like agrees with like, measure with measure,' and God ought to be

our measure in all things. The temperate man is the friend of God

because he is like Him, and the intemperate man is not His friend,

because he is not like Him. And the conclusion is, that the best of

all things for a good man is to pray and sacrifice to the Gods; but

17 the bad man has a polluted soul; and therefore his service is

wasted upon the Gods, while the good are accepted of them. I have

told you the mark at which we ought to aim. You will say, How,

and with what weapons? In the first place we affirm, that after

the Olympian Gods and the Gods of the state, honour should be

given to the Gods below, and to them should be offered everything

in even numbers and of the second choice; the auspicious odd

numbers and everything of the first choice are reserved for the

Gods above. Next demi-gods or spirits must be honoured, and

then heroes, and after them family gods, who will be worshipped

at their local seats according to law. Further, the honour due to

parents should not be forgotten; children owe all that they have

to them, and the debt must be repaid by kindness and attention in

old age. No unbecoming word must be uttered before them; for

there is an avenging angel who hears them when they are angry,

and the child should consider that the parent when he has been

wronged has a right to be angry. After their death let them have

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a moderate funeral, such as their fathers have had before them; and there shall be an annual commemoration of them. Living on this wise, we shall be accepted of the Gods, and shall pass our days in good hope. The law will determine all our various duties towards relatives and friends and other citizens, and the whole state will be happy and prosperous. But if the legislator would persuade as well as command, he will add prefaces to his laws which will predispose the citizens to virtue. Even a little accomplished in the way of gaining the hearts of men is of great value. For most men are in no particular haste to become good. As Hesiod says:

‘Long and steep is the first half of the way to virtue,  
But when you have reached the top the rest is easy.’

‘Those are excellent words.’ Yes; but may I tell you the effect which the preceding discourse has had upon me? I will express my meaning in an address to the lawgiver:—O lawgiver, if you know what we ought to do and say, you can surely tell us;—you are not like the poet, who, as you were just now saying, does not know the effect of his own words. And the poet may reply, that when he sits down on the tripod of the Muses he is not in his right mind, and that being a mere imitator he may be allowed to say all sorts of opposite things, and cannot tell which of them is true. But this licence cannot be allowed to the lawgiver. For example, there are three kinds of funerals; one of them is excessive, another mean, a third moderate, and you say that the last is right. Now if I had a rich wife, and she told me to bury her, and I were to sing of her burial, I should praise the extravagant kind; a poor man would commend a funeral of the meaner sort, and a man of moderate means would prefer a moderate funeral. But you, as legislator, would have to say exactly what you meant by ‘moderate.’ ‘Very true.’ And is our lawgiver to have no preamble or interpretation of his laws, never offering a word of advice to his subjects, after the manner of some doctors? For of doctors are there not two kinds? the one gentle and the other rough, doctors who are freemen and learn themselves and teach their pupils scientifically, and doctors’ assistants who get their knowledge empirically by attending on their masters? ‘Of course there are.’ And did you ever observe that the gentlemen doctors practise upon freemen, and that slave doctors confine themselves

to slaves? The latter go about the country or wait for the slaves at the dispensaries. They hold no parley with their patients about their diseases or the remedies of them; they practise by the rule of thumb, and give their decrees in the most arbitrary manner. When they have doctored one patient they run off to another, whom they treat with equal assurance, their duty being to relieve the master of the care of his sick slaves. But the other doctor, who practises on freemen, proceeds in quite a different way. He takes counsel with his patient and learns from him, and never does anything until he has persuaded him of what he is doing. He trusts to influence rather than force. Now is not the use of both methods far better than the use of either alone? And both together may be advantageously employed by us in legislation.

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We may illustrate our proposal by an example. The laws  
 21 relating to marriage naturally come first, and therefore we may begin with them. The simple law would be as follows: — A man shall marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five; if he do not, he shall be fined or deprived of certain privileges. The double law would add the reason why: Forasmuch as man desires immortality, which he attains by the procreation of children, no one should deprive himself of his share in this good. He who obeys the law is blameless, but he who disobeys must not be a gainer by his celibacy; and therefore he shall pay a yearly fine, and shall not be allowed to receive honour from the young. That is an example of what I call the double law,  
 22 which may enable us to judge how far the addition of persuasion to threats is desirable. ‘Lacedaemonians in general, Stranger, are in favour of brevity; in this case, however, I prefer length. But Cleinias is the real lawgiver, and he ought to be first consulted.’ ‘Thank you, Megillus.’ Whether words are to be many or few, is a foolish question: — the best and not the shortest forms are always to be approved. And legislators have never thought of the advantages which they might gain by using persuasion as well as force, but trust to force only. And I have something else to say about the matter. Here have we been from early dawn until noon, discoursing about laws, and all that we have been saying is only the preamble of the laws which we are about to give. I tell you this, because I want you to observe that songs



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and strains have all of them preludes, but that laws, though called by the same name (*νόμοι*), have never any prelude. Now I am 72.  
disposed to give preludes to laws, dividing them into two parts — one containing the despotic command, which I described under the image of the slave doctor — the other the persuasive part, which I term the preamble. The legislator should give preludes or preambles to his laws. ‘That shall be the way in my colony.’ I am glad that you agree with me; this is a matter which it is important to remember. A preamble is not always necessary to a law: the lawgiver must determine when it is needed, as the musician determines when there is to be a prelude to a song. ‘Most true: and now, having a preamble, let us recommence our discourse.’ Enough has been said of Gods and parents, and we 72.  
may proceed to consider what relates to the citizens — their souls, bodies, properties, — their occupations and amusements; and so arrive at the nature of education.

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The first word of the *Laws* somewhat abruptly introduces the thought which is present to the mind of Plato throughout the work, namely, that Law is of divine origin. In the words of a great English writer — ‘Her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world.’ Though the particular laws of Sparta and Crete had a narrow and imperfect aim, this is not true of divine laws, which are based upon the principles of human nature, and not framed to meet the exigencies of the moment. They have their natural divisions, too, answering to the kinds of virtue (i. 630 E); very unlike the discordant enactments of an Athenian assembly or of an English Parliament. Yet we may observe two inconsistencies in Plato’s treatment of the subject: first, a lesser, inasmuch as he does not clearly distinguish the Cretan and Spartan laws, of which the exclusive aim is war, from those other laws of Zeus and Apollo which are said to be divine, and to comprehend all virtue. Secondly, we may retort on him his own complaint against Sparta and Crete (i. 628 D, E), that he has himself given us a code of laws, which for the most part have a military character; and that we cannot point to ‘obvious examples of similar institutions which are concerned with pleasure’ (i. 634 A foll.); at least there is only one such, that which relates to the regulation of convivial intercourse. The military spirit which is condemned



by him in the beginning of the Laws, reappears in the seventh and eighth books.

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The mention of Minos the great lawgiver, and of Rhadamanthus the righteous administrator of the law (i. 624), suggests the two divisions of the laws into enactments and appointments of officers (vi. 751). The legislator and the judge stand side by side, and their functions cannot be wholly distinguished. For the judge is in some sort a legislator, at any rate in small matters (cp. ix. 875 E foll.); and his decisions growing into precedents, must determine the innumerable details which arise out of the conflict of circumstances. These Plato proposes to leave to a younger generation of legislators. The action of courts of law in making law seems to have escaped him, probably because the Athenian law-courts were popular assemblies; and, except in a mythical form, he can hardly be said to have had before his eyes the ideal of a judge. In reading the Laws of Plato, or any other ancient writing about Laws, we should consider how gradual the process is by which not only a legal system, but the administration of a court of law, becomes perfected.

There are other subjects on which Plato breaks ground, as his manner is, early in the work. First, he gives a sketch of the subject of laws (i. 631, 632); they are to comprehend the whole of human life, from infancy to age, and from birth to death, although the proposed plan is far from being regularly executed in the books which follow, partly owing to the necessity of describing the constitution as well as the laws of his new colony. Secondly, he touches on the power of music, which may exercise so great an influence on the character of men for good or evil; he refers especially to the great offence — which he mentions again (vii. 812 D, E), and which he had condemned in the Republic (iii. 397) — of varying the modes and rhythms, as well as to that of separating the words from the music (Laws ii. 669). Thirdly, he reprobates the prevalence of unnatural loves in Sparta and Crete, which he attributes to the practice of syssitia and gymnastic exercises, and considers to be almost inseparable from them (i. 636 B). To this subject he again returns in the eighth book (836 foll.). Fourthly, the virtues are affirmed to be inseparable from one another (i. 630 B), even if not absolutely one; this, too, is a principle which he reasserts at the conclusion of the work (xii. 963 foll.). As in the

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beginnings of Plato's other writings, we have here several 'notes' struck, which form the preludes of longer discussions, although the hint is less ingeniously given, and the promise more imperfectly fulfilled than in the earlier dialogues.

The distinction between ethics and politics has not yet dawned upon Plato's mind. To him, law is still floating in a region between the two. He would have desired that all the acts and laws of a state should have regard to all virtue (i. 630 E). But he did not see that politics and law are subject to their own conditions, and are distinguished from ethics by natural differences. The actions of which politics take cognisance are necessarily collective or representative; and law is limited to external acts which affect others as well as the agents. Ethics, on the other hand, include the whole duty of man in relation both to himself and others. But Plato has never reflected on these differences. He fancies that the life of the state can be as easily fashioned as that of the individual. He is favourable to a balance of power (iii. 691), but never seems to have considered that power might be so balanced as to produce an absolute immobility in the state. Nor is he alive to the evils of confounding vice and crime; or to the necessity of governments abstaining from excessive interference with their subjects.

Yet this confusion of ethics and politics has also a better and a truer side. If unable to grasp some important distinctions, Plato is at any rate seeking to elevate the lower to the higher; he does not pull down the principles of men to their practice, or narrow the conception of the state to the immediate necessities of politics. Political ideals of freedom and equality, of a divine government which has been or will be in some other age or country, have greatly tended to educate and ennoble the human race. And if not the first author of such ideals (for they are as old as Hesiod), Plato has done more than any other writer to impress them on the world. To those who censure his idealism we may reply in his own words — 'He is not the worse painter who draws a perfectly beautiful figure, because no such figure of a man could ever have existed' (Rep. v. 472 D).

A new thought about education suddenly occurs to him, and for a time exercises a sort of fascination over his mind, though in the later books of the *Laws* it is forgotten or overlooked. As true courage is allied to temperance, so there must be an education

which shall train mankind to resist pleasure as well as to endure pain (i. 633 foll.). No one can be on his guard against that of which he has no experience. The perfectly trained citizen should have been accustomed to look his enemy in the face, and to measure his strength against her. This education in pleasure is to be given, partly by festive intercourse, but chiefly by the song and dance (ii. 653). Youth are to learn music and gymnastics; their elders are to be trained and tested at drinking parties. According to the old proverb, *in vino veritas*, they will then be open and visible to the world in their true characters; and also they will be more amenable to the laws, and more easily moulded by the hand of the legislator (i. 649 E; ii. 671 C). The first reason is curious enough, though not important; the second can hardly be thought deserving of much attention. Yet if Plato means to say that society is one of the principal instruments of education in after-life, he has expressed in an obscure fashion a principle which is true, and to his contemporaries was also new. That at a banquet a degree of moral discipline might be exercised is an original thought, but Plato has not yet learnt to express his meaning in an abstract form. He is sensible that moderation is better than total abstinence, and that asceticism is but a one-sided training. He makes the sagacious remark, that 'those who are able to resist pleasure may often be among the worst of mankind' (i. 635 D). He is as much aware as any modern utilitarian that the love of pleasure is the great motive of human action. This cannot be eradicated, and must therefore be regulated,—the pleasure must be of the right sort (v. 732 E foll.). Some reflections seem to be the real, though imperfectly expressed, groundwork of the discussion. As in the juxtaposition of the Bacchic madness and the great gift of Dionysus (ii. 672), or where he speaks of the different senses in which pleasure is and is not the object of imitative art (ii. 667 foll.), or in the illustration of the failure of the Dorian institutions from the prayer of Theseus (iii. 687), we have to gather his meaning as well as we can from the connexion.

The feeling of old age is discernible in this as well as in several other passages of the *Laws*. Plato has arrived at the time when men sit still and look on at life (ii. 657 D); and he is willing to allow himself and others the few pleasures which remain to them. Wine is to cheer them now that their limbs are old and their blood runs cold. They are the best critics of dancing

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and music (ii. 665 D), but cannot be induced to join in song unless they have been enlivened by drinking. Youth has no need of the stimulus of wine, but age can only be made young again by its invigorating influence. Total abstinence for the young, moderate and increasing potations for the old, is Plato's principle. The fire, of which there is too much in the one, has to be brought to the other (ii. 666). Drunkenness, like madness, had a sacredness and mystery to the Greek; if, on the one hand, as in the case of the Tarentines (i. 637 B), it degraded a whole population, it was also a mode of worshipping the god Dionysus, which was to be practised on certain occasions. Moreover, the intoxication produced by the fruit of the vine was very different from the grosser forms of drunkenness which prevail among some modern nations.

The physician in modern times would restrict the old man's use of wine within narrow limits. He would tell us that you cannot restore strength by a stimulus. Wine may call back the vital powers in disease, but cannot reinvigorate old age. In his maxims of health and longevity, though aware of the importance of a simple diet, Plato has omitted to dwell on the perfect rule of moderation. His commendation of wine is probably a passing fancy, and may have arisen out of his own habits or tastes. If so, he is not the only philosopher whose theory has been based upon his practice.

Plato's denial of wine to the young and his approval of it for their elders has some points of view which may be illustrated by the temperance controversy of our own times. Wine may be allowed to have a religious as well as a festive use; it is commended both in the Old and New Testament; it has been sung of by nearly all poets; and it may be truly said to have a healing influence both on body and mind. Yet it is also very liable to excess and abuse, and for this reason is prohibited by Mahometans, and of late years by many Christians, as drunkenness was by the ancient Spartans; and to sound its praises seriously seems to partake of the nature of a paradox. But we may rejoice with Plato that the abuse of a good thing does not take away the use of it (i. 639). Total abstinence, as we often say, is not the best rule, but moderate indulgence; and it is probably true that a temperate use of wine may contribute some elements of character



to social life which we can ill afford to lose. It draws men out of their reserve; it helps them to forget themselves and to appear as they by nature are when not on their guard, and therefore to make them more human and greater friends to their fellow-men. It gives them a new experience; it teaches them to combine self-control with a measure of indulgence; it may sometimes restore to them the simplicity of childhood. We entirely agree with Plato in forbidding the use of wine to the young; but when we are of mature age there are occasions on which we derive refreshment and strength from moderate potations. It is well to make abstinence the rule, but the rule may sometimes admit of an exception. We are in a higher, as well as in a lower sense, the better for the use of wine. The question runs up into wider ones—What is the general effect of asceticism on human nature? and, Must there not be a certain proportion between the aspirations of man and his powers?—questions which have been often discussed both by ancient and modern philosophers. So by comparing things old and new we may sometimes help to realize to ourselves the meaning of Plato in the altered circumstances of our own life.

Like the importance which he attaches to festive entertainments, his depreciation of courage to the fourth place in the scale of virtue (i. 631 C) appears to be somewhat rhetorical and exaggerated. But he is speaking of courage in the lower sense of the term, not as including loyalty or temperance. He does not insist in this passage, as in the Protagoras (329 foll.), on the unity of the virtues; or, as in the Laches (195 foll.), on the identity of wisdom and courage. But he says that they all depend upon their leader mind, and that, out of the union of wisdom and temperance with courage, springs justice. Elsewhere he is disposed to regard temperance rather as a condition of all virtue than as a particular virtue (iii. 696). He generalizes temperance, as in the Republic he generalizes justice. The nature of the virtues is to run up into one another, and in many passages Plato makes but a faint effort to distinguish them. He still quotes the poets, somewhat enlarging, as his manner is, or playing with their meaning. The martial poet Tyrtaeus (i. 629 foll.), and the oligarch Theognis (i. 630 A), furnish him with happy illustrations of the two sorts of courage. The fear of fear (i. 647 A, B).

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the division of goods into human and divine (i. 631 B), the acknowledgment that peace and reconciliation are better than the appeal to the sword (i. 628), the analysis of temperance into resistance of pleasure as well as endurance of pain (i. 634), the distinction between the education which is suitable for a trade or profession, and for the whole of life (i. 643, 644), are important and probably new ethical conceptions. Nor has Plato forgotten his old paradox (Gorg. 509 D foll.), that to be punished is better than to be unpunished, when he says, that to the bad man death is the only mitigation of his evil (ii. 661 B, C). He is not less ideal in many passages of the *Laws* than in the *Gorgias* or *Republic*. But his wings are heavy, and he is unequal to any sustained flight.

There is more attempt at dramatic effect in the first book than in the later parts of the work. The outburst of martial spirit in the Lacedaemonian, at p. 638 A, 'O best of men'; the protest which the Cretan makes against the supposed insult to his law-giver (i. 630 D); the cordial acknowledgment on the part of both of them that laws should not be discussed publicly by those who live under their rule (i. 634, 635); the difficulty which they alike experience in following the speculations of the Athenian, are highly characteristic (i. 635 E, 636 D).

In the second book, Plato pursues further his notion of educating by a right use of pleasure. He begins by conceiving an endless power of youthful life, which is to be reduced to rule and measure by harmony and rhythm (ii. 653 foll.). Men differ from the lower animals in that they are capable of musical discipline. But music, like all art, must be truly imitative, and imitative of what is true and good. Art and morality agree in rejecting pleasure as the criterion of good. True art is inseparable from the highest and most ennobling ideas (ii. 654 foll.). Plato only recognizes the identity of pleasure and good when the pleasure is of the higher kind (ii. 658 E). He is the enemy of 'songs without words' (ii. 669 E), which he supposes to have some confusing or enervating effect on the mind of the hearer; and he is also opposed to the modern degeneracy of the drama (ii. 659 foll.), which he would probably have illustrated, like Aristophanes, from Euripides and Agathon. From this passage may be gathered a more perfect conception of art than from any other of Plato's writings. He understands that art is at once imitative and ideal, an exact representation

of truth, and also a representation of the highest truth. The same double view of art may be gathered from a comparison of the third and tenth books of the Republic, but is here more clearly and pointedly expressed.

We are inclined to suspect that both here and in the Republic Plato exaggerates the influence really exercised by the song and the dance. But we must remember also the susceptible nature of the Greek, and the perfection to which these arts were carried by him. Further, the music had a sacred and Pythagorean character; the dance too was part of a religious festival. And only at such festivals the sexes mingled in public, and the youths passed under the eyes of their elders.

At the beginning of the third book, Plato abruptly asks the question, What is the origin of states? The answer is, Infinite time. We have already seen — in the Theaetetus (175 A, B), where he supposes that in the course of ages every man has had numberless progenitors, kings and slaves, Greeks and barbarians; and in the Critias (108 D), where he says that nine thousand years have elapsed since the island of Atlantis fought with Athens — that Plato is no stranger to the conception of long periods of time. He imagines human society to have been interrupted by natural convulsions; and beginning from the last of these, he traces the steps by which the family has grown into the state, and the original scattered society, becoming more and more civilized, has finally passed into military organizations like those of Crete and Sparta. His conception of the origin of states is far truer in the Laws than in the Republic; but it must be remembered that here he is giving an historical, there an ideal picture of the growth of society.

Modern enquirers, like Plato, have found in infinite ages the explanation not only of states, but of languages, men, animals, the world itself; like him, also, they have detected in later institutions the vestiges of a patriarchal state still surviving. Thus far Plato speaks as ‘the spectator of all time and all existence,’ who may be thought by some divine instinct to have guessed at truths which were hereafter to be revealed. He is far above the vulgar notion that Hellas is the civilized world (Statesman 262, 263), or that civilization only began when the Hellenes appeared on the scene. But he has no special knowledge of ‘the

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days before the flood'; and when he approaches more historical times, in preparing the way for his own theory of mixed government, he argues partially and erroneously. He is desirous of showing that unlimited power is ruinous to any state, and hence he is led to attribute a tyrannical spirit to the first Dorian kings (iii. 691 A). The decay of Argos and the destruction of Messenè are adduced by him as a manifest proof of their failure; and Sparta, he thinks, was only preserved by the limitations which the wisdom of successive legislators introduced into the government. But there is no more reason to suppose that the Dorian rule of life which was followed at Sparta ever prevailed in Argos and Messenè, than to assume that Dorian institutions were framed to protect the Greeks against the power of Assyria; or that the empire of Assyria was in any way affected by the Trojan war; or that the return of the Heraclidae was only the return of Achæan exiles, who received a new name from their leader Dorieus. Such fancies were chiefly based, as far as they had any foundation, on the use of analogy, which played a great part in the dawn of historical and geographical research. Because there was a Persian empire which was the natural enemy of the Greek, there must also have been an Assyrian empire, which had a similar hostility; and not only the fable of the island of Atlantis, but the Trojan war, in Plato's mind derived some features from the Persian struggle. So Herodotus makes the Nile answer to the Ister, and the valley of the Nile to the Red Sea (ii. 33, 34; 11). In the Republic, Plato is flying in the air regardless of fact and possibility—in the Laws, he is making history by analogy. In the former, he appears to be like some modern philosophers, absolutely devoid of historical sense; in the latter, he is on a level, not with Thucydides, or the critical historians of Greece, but with Herodotus, or even with Ctesias.

The chief object of Plato in tracing the origin of society is to show the point at which regular government superseded the patriarchal authority, and the separate customs of different families were systematized by legislators, and took the form of laws consented to by them all. According to Plato, the only sound principle on which any government could be based was a mixture or balance of power. The balance of power saved Sparta, when the two other Heraclid states fell into disorder. Here is probably



the first trace of a political idea, which has exercised a vast influence both in ancient and modern times. And yet we might fairly ask, a little parodying the language of Plato—O legislator, is unanimity only ‘the struggle for existence’; or is the balance of powers in a state better than the harmony of them?

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In the fourth book we approach the realities of politics, and Plato begins to ascend to the height of his great argument. The reign of Cronos has passed away (iv. 713), and various forms of government have succeeded, which are all based on self-interest and self-preservation. Right and wrong, instead of being measured by the will of God, are created by the law of the state (iv. 714). The strongest assertions are made of the purely spiritual nature of religion—‘Without holiness no man is accepted of God’ (iv. 716); and of the duty of filial obedience,—‘Honour thy parents’ (iv. 717 C). The legislator must teach these precepts as well as command them (iv. 722). He is to be the educator as well as the lawgiver of future ages, and his laws are themselves to form a part of the education of the state. Unlike the poet, he must be definite and rational (iv. 719 B foll.); he cannot be allowed to say one thing at one time, and another thing at another—he must know what he is about. And yet legislation has a poetical or rhetorical element, and must find words which will wing their way to the hearts of men. Laws must be promulgated before they are put in execution, and mankind must be reasoned with before they are punished. The legislator, when he promulgates a particular law, will courteously entreat those who are willing to hear his voice. Upon the rebellious only does the heavy blow descend. A sermon and a law in one, blending the secular punishment with the religious sanction, appeared to Plato a new idea which might have a great result in reforming the world. The experiment had never been tried of reasoning with mankind; the laws of others had never had any preambles, and Plato seems to have great pleasure in contemplating his discovery (iv. 719–724).

In these quaint forms of thought and language, great principles of morals and legislation are enunciated by him for the first time. They all go back to mind (iii. 688 A) and God, who holds the beginning, middle, and end of all things in His hand (iv. 715 E). The adjustment of the divine and human elements in the world is conceived in the spirit of modern popular philosophy, differing

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not much in the mode of expression. At first sight the legislator appears to be impotent, for all things are the sport of chance. But we admit also that God governs all things, and that chance and opportunity co-operate with Him (compare the saying, that chance is the name of the unknown cause). Lastly, while we acknowledge that God and chance govern mankind and provide the conditions of human action, experience will not allow us to deny a place to art. We know that there is a use in having a pilot, though the storm may overwhelm him; and a legislator is required to provide for the happiness of a state, although he will pray for favourable conditions under which he may exercise his art (iv. 709).

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**BOOK V.** Hear now, all ye who heard the laws about Gods and Step  
ancestors: Of all human possessions the soul is most divine, and 72  
most truly a man's own. For in every man there are two parts —  
a better which rules, and an inferior which serves; and the ruler  
is to be preferred to the servant. Wherefore I bid every one next 72  
after the Gods to honour his own soul, and he can only honour  
her by making her better. A man does not honour his soul by  
flattery, or gifts, or self-indulgence, or conceit of knowledge, nor  
when he blames others for his own errors; nor when he indulges  
in pleasure or refuses to bear pain; nor when he thinks that life  
at any price is a good, because he fears the world below, which,  
far from being an evil, may be the greatest good; nor when he  
prefers beauty to virtue — not reflecting that the soul, which came  
from heaven, is more honourable than the body, which is earth-  
born; nor when he covets dishonest gains, of which no amount is 72  
equal in value to virtue; — in a word, when he counts that which  
the legislator pronounces evil to be good, he degrades his soul,  
which is the divinest part of him. He does not consider that the  
real punishment of evil-doing is to grow like evil men, and to  
shun the conversation of the good: and that he who is joined  
to such men must do and suffer what they by nature do and say  
to one another, which suffering is not justice but retribution. For  
justice is noble, but retribution is only the companion of injustice.  
And whether a man escapes punishment or not, he is equally  
miserable; for in the one case he is not cured, and in the other  
case he perishes that the rest may be saved.

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The glory of man is to follow the better and improve the inferior. And the soul is that part of man which is most inclined to avoid the evil and dwell with the good. Wherefore also the soul is second only to the Gods in honour, and in the third place the body is to be esteemed, which often has a false honour. For honour is not to be given to the fair or the strong, or the swift or the tall, or to the healthy, any more than to their opposites, but to the mean states of all these habits; and so of property and external goods. No man should heap up riches that he may leave them to his children. The best condition for them as for the state is a middle one, in which there is a freedom without luxury. And the best inheritance of children is modesty. But modesty cannot be implanted by admonition only — the elders must set the example. He who would train the young must first train himself.

He who honours his kindred and family may fairly expect that the Gods will give him children. He who would have friends must think much of their favours to him, and little of his to them. He who prefers to an Olympic, or any other victory, to win the palm of obedience to the laws, serves best both the state and his fellow-citizens. Engagements with strangers are to be deemed most sacred, because the stranger, having neither kindred nor friends, is immediately under the protection of Zeus, the God of strangers. A prudent man will not sin against the stranger; and still more carefully will he avoid sinning against the suppliant, which is an offence never passed over by the Gods.

I will now speak of those particulars which are matters of praise and blame only, and which, although not enforced by the law, greatly affect the disposition to obey the law. Truth has the first place among the gifts of Gods and men, for truth begets trust; but he is not to be trusted who loves voluntary falsehood, and he who loves involuntary falsehood is a fool. Neither the ignorant nor the untrustworthy man is happy; for they have no friends in life, and die unlamented and untended. Good is he who does no injustice — better who prevents others from doing any — best of all who joins the rulers in punishing injustice. And this is true of goods and virtues in general; he who has and communicates them to others is the man of men; he who would, if he could, is second-best; he who has them and is jealous of imparting them to others is to be blamed, but the good or virtue which he has is to be



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valued still. Let every man contend in the race without envy; for the unenvious man increases the strength of the city; himself foremost in the race, he harms no one with calumny. Whereas the envious man is weak himself, and drives his rivals to despair with his slanders, thus depriving the whole city of incentives to the exercise of virtue, and tarnishing her glory. Every man should be gentle, but also passionate; for he must have the spirit to fight against incurable and malignant evil. But the evil which is remediable should be dealt with more in sorrow than anger. He who is unjust is to be pitied in any case; for no man voluntarily does evil or allows evil to exist in his soul. And therefore he who deals with the curable sort must be long-suffering and forbearing; but the incurable shall have the vials of our wrath poured out upon him. The greatest of all evils is self-love, which is thought to be natural and excusable, and is enforced as a duty, and yet is the cause of many errors. The lover is blinded about the beloved, and prefers his own interests to truth and right; but the truly great man seeks justice before all things. Self-love is the source of that ignorant conceit of knowledge which is always doing and never succeeding. Wherefore let every man avoid self-love, and follow the guidance of those who are better than himself. There are lesser matters which a man should recall to mind; for wisdom is like a stream, ever flowing in and out, and recollection flows in when knowledge is failing. Let no man either laugh or grieve overmuch; but let him control his feelings in the day of good- or ill-fortune, believing that the Gods will diminish the evils and increase the blessings of the righteous. These are thoughts which should ever occupy a good man's mind; he should remember them both in lighter and in more serious hours, and remind others of them.

So much of divine matters and the relation of man to God. But man is man, and dependent on pleasure and pain; and therefore to acquire a true taste respecting either is a great matter. And what is a true taste? This can only be explained by a comparison of one life with another. Pleasure is an object of desire, pain of avoidance; and the absence of pain is to be preferred to pain, but not to pleasure. There are infinite kinds and degrees of both of them, and we choose the life which has more pleasure and avoid that which has less; but we do not choose that life in which the elements of pleasure are either feeble or equally balanced with pain.



All the lives which we desire are pleasant ; the choice of any others is due to inexperience.

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Now there are four lives — the temperate, the rational, the courageous, the healthful ; and to these let us oppose four others — the intemperate, the foolish, the cowardly, the diseased. The temperate life has gentle pains and pleasures and placid desires, the intemperate life has violent delights, and still more violent desires. And the pleasures of the temperate exceed the pains, while the pains of the intemperate exceed the pleasures. But if this is true, none are voluntarily intemperate, but all who lack temperance are either ignorant or wanting in self-control : for men always choose the life which (as they think) exceeds in pleasure. The wise, the healthful, the courageous life have a similar advantage — they also exceed their opposites in pleasure. And, generally speaking, the life of virtue is far more pleasurable and honourable, fairer and happier far, than the life of vice. Let this be the preamble of our laws ; the strain will follow.

As in a web the warp is stronger than the woof, so should the rulers be stronger than their half-educated subjects. Let us suppose, then, that in the constitution of a state there are two parts, the appointment of the rulers, and the laws which they have to administer. But, before going further, there are some preliminary matters which have to be considered.

As of animals, so also of men, a selection must be made ; the bad breed must be got rid of, and the good retained. The legislator must purify them, and if he be not a despot he will find this task to be a difficult one. The severer kinds of purification are practised when great offenders are punished by death or exile, but there is a milder process which is necessary when the poor show a disposition to attack the property of the rich, for then the legislator will send them off to another land, under the name of a colony. In our case, however, we shall only need to purify the streams before they meet. This is often a troublesome business, but in theory we may suppose the operation performed, and the desired purity attained. Evil men we will hinder from coming, and receive the good as friends.

Like the old Heraclid colony, we are fortunate in escaping the abolition of debts and the distribution of land, which are difficult and dangerous questions. But, perhaps, now that we are speaking

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of the subject, we ought to say how, if the danger existed, the legislator should try to avert it. He would have recourse to prayers, and trust to the healing influence of time. He would create a kindly spirit between creditors and debtors: those who have should give to those who have not, and poverty should be held to be rather the increase of a man's desires than the diminution of his property.

Good-will is the only safe and enduring foundation of the political society; and upon this our city shall be built. The lawgiver, if he is wise, will not proceed with the arrangement of the state until all disputes about property are settled. And for him to introduce fresh grounds of quarrel would be madness. 737

Let us now proceed to the distribution of our state, and determine the size of the territory and the number of the allotments. The territory should be sufficient to maintain the citizens in moderation, and the population should be numerous enough to defend themselves, and sometimes to aid their neighbours. We will fix the number of citizens at 5040, to which the number of houses and portions of land shall correspond. Let the number be divided into two parts and then into three; for it is very convenient for the purposes of distribution, and is capable of fifty-nine divisions, ten of which proceed without interval from one to ten. Here are numbers enough for war and peace, and for all contracts and dealings. These properties of numbers are true, and should be ascertained with a view to use. 738

In carrying out the distribution of the land, a prudent legislator will be careful to respect any provision for religious worship which has been sanctioned by ancient tradition or by the oracles of Delphi, Dodona, or Ammon. All sacrifices, and altars, and temples, whatever may be their origin, should remain as they are. Every division should have a patron God or hero; to these a portion of the domain should be appropriated, and at their temples the inhabitants of the districts should meet together from time to time, for the sake of mutual help and friendship. All the citizens of a state should be known to one another; for where men are in the dark about each other's characters, there can be no justice or right administration. Every man should be true and single-minded, and should not allow himself to be deceived by others.

And now the game opens, and we begin to move the pieces. At first sight, our constitution may appear singular and ill-adapted to 739

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a legislator who has not despotic power; but on second thoughts will be deemed to be, if not the very best, the second best. For there are three forms of government, a first, a second, and a third best, out of which Cleinias has now to choose. The first and highest form is that in which friends have all things in common, including wives and property,—in which they have common fears, hopes, desires, and do not even call their eyes or their hands their own. This is the ideal state; than which there never can be a truer or better—a state which, whether governed by Gods or sons of Gods, will make the dwellers therein blessed. Here is the pattern on which we must ever fix our eyes; but we are now concerned with another, which comes next to it, and we will afterwards proceed to a third.

Inasmuch as our citizens are not fitted either by nature or education to receive the saying, Friends have all things in common, let them retain their houses and private property, but use them in the service of their country, who is their God and parent, and of the Gods and demigods of the land. Their first care should be to preserve the number of their lots. This may be secured in the following manner: when the possessor of a lot dies, he shall leave his lot to his best-beloved child, who will become the heir of all duties and interests, and will minister to the Gods and to the family, to the living and to the dead. Of the remaining children, the females must be given in marriage according to the law to be hereafter enacted; the males may be assigned to citizens who have no children of their own. How to equalize families and allotments will be one of the chief cares of the guardians of the laws. When parents have too many children they may give to those who have none, or couples may abstain from having children, or, if there is a want of offspring, special care may be taken to obtain them; or if the number of citizens becomes excessive, we may send away the surplus to found a colony. If, on the other hand, a war or plague diminishes the number of inhabitants, new citizens must be introduced; and these ought not, if possible, to be men of low birth or inferior training; but even God, it is said, cannot always fight against necessity.

Wherefore we will thus address our citizens:—Good friends, honour order and equality, and above all the number 5040. Secondly, respect the original division of the lots, which must



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not be infringed by buying and selling; for the law says that the land which a man has is sacred and is given to him by God. And priests and priestesses will offer frequent sacrifices and pray that he who alienates either house or lot may receive the punishment which he deserves, and their prayers shall be inscribed on tablets of cypress-wood for the instruction of posterity. The guardians will keep a vigilant watch over the citizens, and they will punish those who disobey God and the law.

To appreciate the benefit of such an institution a man requires to be well educated; for he certainly will not make a fortune in our state, in which all illiberal occupations are forbidden to freemen. The law also provides that no private person shall have gold or silver, except a little coin for daily use, which will not pass current in other countries. The state must also possess a common Hellenic currency, but this is only to be used in defraying the expenses of expeditions, or of embassies, or while a man is on foreign travels; but in the latter case he must deliver up what is over, when he comes back, to the treasury in return for an equal amount of local currency, on pain of losing the sum in question; and he who does not inform against an offender is to be mulcted in a like sum. No money is to be given or taken as a dowry, or to be lent on interest. The law will not protect a man in recovering either interest or principal. All these regulations imply that the aim of the legislator is not to make the city as rich or as mighty as possible, but the best and happiest. Now men can hardly be at the same time very virtuous and very rich. And why? Because he who makes twice as much and saves twice as much as he ought, receiving where he ought not and not spending where he ought, will be at least twice as rich as he who makes money where he ought, and spends where he ought. On the other hand, an utterly bad man is generally profligate and poor, while he who acquires honestly, and spends what he acquires on noble objects, can hardly be very rich. A very rich man is therefore not a good man, and therefore not a happy one. But the object of our laws is to make the citizens as friendly and happy as possible, which they cannot be if they are always at law and injuring each other in the pursuit of gain. And therefore we say that there is to be no silver or gold in the state, nor usury, nor the rearing of the meaner



kinds of live-stock, but only agriculture, and only so much of this as will not lead men to neglect that for the sake of which money is made, first the soul and afterwards the body; neither of which are good for much without music and gymnastic. Money is to be held in honour last or third; the highest interests being those of the soul, and in the second class are to be ranked those of the body. This is the true order of legislation, which would be inverted by placing health before temperance, and wealth before health.

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It might be well if every man could come to the colony having equal property; but equality is impossible, and therefore we must avoid causes of offence by having property valued and by equalizing taxation. To this end, let us make four classes in which the citizens may be placed according to the measure of their original property, and the changes of their fortune. The greatest of evils is revolution; and this, as the law will say, is caused by extremes of poverty or wealth. The limit of poverty shall be the lot, which must not be diminished, and may be increased fivefold, but not more. He who exceeds the limit must give up the excess to the state; but if he does not, and is informed against, the surplus shall be divided between the informer and the Gods, and he shall pay a sum equal to the surplus out of his own property. All property other than the lot must be inscribed in a register, so that any disputes which arise may be easily determined.

The city shall be placed in a suitable situation, as nearly as possible in the centre of the country, and shall be divided into twelve wards. First, we will erect an acropolis, encircled by a wall, within which shall be placed the temples of Hestia, and Zeus, and Athene. From this shall be drawn lines dividing the city, and also the country, into twelve sections, and the country shall be subdivided into 5040 lots. Each lot shall contain two parts, one at a distance, the other near the city; and the distance of one part shall be compensated by the nearness of the other, the badness and goodness by the greater or less size. Twelve lots will be assigned to twelve Gods, and they will give their names to the tribes. The divisions of the city shall correspond to those of the country; and every man shall have two habitations, one near the centre of the country, the other at the extremity.

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The objection will naturally arise, that all the advantages of which we have been speaking will never concur. The citizens will not tolerate a settlement in which they are deprived of gold 746 and silver, and have the number of their families regulated, and the sites of their houses fixed by law. It will be said that our city is a mere image of wax. And the legislator will answer: 'I know it, but I maintain that we ought to set forth an ideal which is as perfect as possible. If difficulties arise in the execution of the plan, we must avoid them and carry out the remainder. But the legislator must first be allowed to complete his idea without interruption.'

The number twelve, which we have chosen for the number of division, must run through all parts of the state,—phratries, villages, ranks of soldiers, coins, and measures wet and dry, which are all to be made commensurable with one another. There is no meanness in requiring that the smallest vessels should have a common measure; for the divisions of number 74 are useful in measuring height and depth, as well as sounds and motions, upwards or downwards, or round and round. The legislator should impress on his citizens the value of arithmetic. No instrument of education has so much power; nothing more tends to sharpen and inspire the dull intellect. But the legislator must be careful to instil a noble and generous spirit into the students, or they will tend to become cunning rather than wise. This may be proved by the example of the Egyptians and Phoenicians, who, notwithstanding their knowledge of arithmetic, are degraded in their general character; whether this defect in them is due to some natural cause or to a bad legislator. For it is clear that there are great differences in the power of regions to produce good men: heat and cold, and water and food, have great effects both on body and soul; and those spots are peculiarly fortunate in which the air is holy, and the Gods are pleased to dwell. To all this the legislator must attend, so far as in him lies.

**BOOK VI.** And now we are about to consider (1) the appoint- 75 ment of magistrates; (2) the laws which they will have to administer must be determined. I may observe by the way that laws, however good, are useless and even injurious unless the

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magistrates are capable of executing them. And therefore (1) the intended rulers of our imaginary state should be tested from their youth upwards until the time of their election; and (2) those who are to elect them ought to be trained in habits of law, that they may form a right judgment of good and bad men. But uneducated colonists, who are unacquainted with each other, will not be likely to choose well. What, then, shall we do? I will tell you: The colony will have to be intrusted to the ten commissioners, of whom you are one, and I will help you and them, which is my reason for inventing this romance. And I cannot bear that the tale should go wandering about the world without a head,—it will be such an ugly monster. ‘Very good.’ Yes; and I will be as good as my word, if God be gracious and old age permit. But let us not forget what a courageously mad creation this our city is. ‘What makes you say so?’ Why, surely our courage is shown in imagining that the new colonists will quietly receive our laws? for no man likes to receive laws when they are first imposed: could we only wait until those who had been educated under them were grown up, and of an age to vote in the public elections, there would be far greater reason to expect permanence in our institutions. ‘Very true.’ The Cnosian founders should take the utmost pains in the matter of the colony, and in the election of the higher officers, particularly of the guardians of the law. The latter should be appointed in this way: The Cnosians, who take the lead in the colony, together with the colonists, will choose thirty-seven persons, of whom nineteen will be colonists, and the remaining eighteen Cnosians—you must be one of the eighteen yourself, and become a citizen of the new state. ‘Why do not you and Megillus join us?’ Athens is proud, and Sparta too; and they are both a long way off. But let me proceed with my scheme. When the state is permanently established, the mode of election will be as follows: All who are serving, or have served, in the army will be electors; and the election will be held in the most sacred of the temples. The voter will place on the altar a tablet, inscribing thereupon the name of the candidate whom he prefers, and of his father, tribe, and ward, writing at the side of them his own name in like manner; and he may take away any tablet which does not appear written to his mind, and place it



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in the Agora for thirty days. The 300 who obtain the greatest number of votes will be publicly announced, and out of them there will be a second election of 100; and out of the 100 a third and final election of thirty-seven, accompanied by the solemnity of the electors passing through victims. But then who is to arrange all this? There is a common saying, that the beginning is half the whole; and I should say a good deal more than half. 'Most true.' The only way of making a beginning is from the parent city; and though in after ages the tie may be broken, and quarrels may arise between them, yet in early days the child naturally looks to the mother for care and education. And, as I said before, the Cnosians ought to take an interest in the colony, and select 100 elders of their own citizens, to whom shall be added 100 of the colonists, to arrange and supervise the first elections and scrutinies; and when the colony has been started, the Cnosians may return home and leave the colonists to themselves. 75

The thirty-seven magistrates who have been elected in the manner described, shall have the following duties: first, they shall be guardians of the law; secondly, of the registers of property in the four classes — not including the one, two, three, four minae, which are allowed as a surplus. He who is found to possess what is not entered in the registers, in addition to the confiscation of such property shall be proceeded against by law, and if he be cast he shall lose his share in the public property and in distributions of money; and his sentence shall be inscribed in some public place. The guardians are to continue in office twenty years only, and to commence holding office at fifty years, or if elected at sixty, they are not to remain after seventy. 75

Generals have now to be elected, and commanders of horse and brigadiers of foot. The generals shall be natives of the city, proposed by the guardians of the law, and elected by those who are or have been of the age for military service. Any one may challenge the person nominated and start another candidate, whom he affirms upon oath to be better qualified. The three who obtain the greatest number of votes shall be elected. The generals thus elected shall propose the taxiarchs or brigadiers, and the challenge may be made, and the voting shall take place, in the same manner as before. The elective assembly will



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be presided over in the first instance, and until the prytanes and council come into being, by the guardians of the law in some holy place; and they shall divide the citizens into three divisions, —hoplites, cavalry, and the rest of the army—placing each of them by itself. All are to vote for generals and cavalry officers. The brigadiers are to be voted for only by the hoplites. Next, the cavalry are to choose phylarchs for the generals; but captains of archers and other irregular troops are to be appointed by the generals themselves. The cavalry-officers shall be proposed and voted upon by the same persons who vote for the generals. The two who have the greatest number of votes shall be leaders of all the horse. Disputes about the voting may be raised once or twice, but, if a third time, the presiding officers shall decide.

The council shall consist of 360, who may be conveniently divided into four sections, making ninety councillors of each class. In the first place, all the citizens shall select candidates from the first class; and they shall be compelled to vote under pain of a fine. This shall be the business of the first day. On the second day a similar selection shall be made from the second class under the same conditions. On the third day, candidates shall be selected from the third class; but the compulsion to vote shall only extend to the voters of the first three classes. On the fourth day, members of the council shall be selected from the fourth class; they shall be selected by all, but the compulsion to vote shall only extend to the second class, who, if they do not vote, shall pay a fine of triple the amount which was exacted at first, and to the first class, who shall pay a quadruple fine. On the fifth day, the names shall be exhibited, and out of them shall be chosen by all the citizens 180 of each class: these are severally to be reduced by lot to ninety, and  $90 \times 4$  will form the council for the year.

The mode of election which has been described is a mean between monarchy and democracy, and such a mean should ever be observed in the state. For servants and masters cannot be friends, and, although equality makes friendship, we must remember that there are two sorts of equality. One of them is the rule of number and measure; but there is also a higher equality, which is the judgment of Zeus. Of this he grants but

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little to mortal men; yet that little is the source of the greatest good to cities and individuals. It is proportioned to the nature of each man; it gives more to the better and less to the inferior, and is the true political justice; to this we in our state desire to look, as every legislator should, not to the interests either of tyrants or mobs. But justice cannot always be strictly enforced, and then equity and mercy have to be substituted: and for a similar reason, when true justice will not be endured, we must have recourse to the rougher justice of the lot, which God must be entreated to guide.

These are the principal means of preserving the state, but perpetual care will also be required. When a ship is sailing 7 on the sea, vigilance must not be relaxed night or day; and the vessel of state is tossing in a political sea, and therefore watch must continually succeed watch, and rulers must join hands with rulers. A small body will best perform this duty, and therefore the greater part of the 360 senators may be permitted to go and manage their own affairs, but a twelfth portion must be set aside in each month for the administration of the state. Their business will be to receive information and answer embassies; also they must endeavour to prevent or heal internal disorders; and with this object they must have the control of all assemblies of the citizens.

Besides the council, there must be wardens of the city and of the agora, who will superintend houses, ways, harbours, markets, and fountains, in the city and the suburbs, and prevent any injury being done to them by man or beast. The temples, also, will 7 require priests and priestesses. Those who hold the priestly office by hereditary tenure shall not be disturbed; but as there will probably be few or none such in a new colony, priests and priestesses shall be appointed for the Gods who have no servants. Some of these officers shall be elected by vote, some by lot; and all classes shall mingle in a friendly manner at the elections. The appointment of priests should be left to God,—that is, to the lot; but the person elected must prove that he is himself sound in body and of legitimate birth, and that his family has been free from homicide or any other stain of impurity. Priests and priestesses are to be not less than sixty years of age, and shall hold office for a year only. The laws which are to regulate

matters of religion shall be brought from Delphi, and interpreters appointed to superintend their execution. These shall be elected in the following manner: — The twelve tribes shall be formed into three bodies of four, each of which shall select four candidates, and this shall be done three times: of each twelve thus selected the three who receive the largest number of votes, nine in all, after undergoing a scrutiny shall go to Delphi, in order that the God may elect one out of each triad. They shall be appointed for life; and when any of them dies, another shall be elected by the four tribes who made the original appointment. There shall also be treasurers of the temples; three for the greater temples, two for the lesser, and one for those of least importance.

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The defence of the city should be committed to the generals and other officers of the army, and to the wardens of the city and agora. The defence of the country shall be on this wise: — The twelve tribes shall allot among themselves annually the twelve divisions of the country, and each tribe shall appoint five wardens and commanders of the watch. The five wardens in each division shall choose out of their own tribe twelve guards, who are to be between twenty-five and thirty years of age. Both the wardens and the guards are to serve two years; and they shall make a round of the divisions, staying a month in each. They shall go from West to East during the first year, and back from East to West during the second. Thus they will gain a perfect knowledge of the country at every season of the year.

While on service, their first duty will be to see that the country is well protected by means of fortifications and entrenchments; they will use the beasts of burden and the labourers whom they find on the spot, taking care however not to interfere with the regular course of agriculture. But while they thus render the country as inaccessible as possible to enemies, they will also make it as accessible as possible to friends by constructing and maintaining good roads. They will restrain and preserve the rain which comes down from heaven, making the barren places fertile, and the wet places dry. They will ornament the fountains with plantations and buildings, and provide water for irrigation. They will also guide the streams to the temples and groves of the Gods, and so beautify them at all seasons of the year. In such spots the youth shall make gymnasia for themselves, and warm baths for



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the aged; there the rustic worn with toil will receive a kindly welcome, and be far better treated than at the hands of an unskilful doctor.

These works will be both useful and ornamental; but the sixty wardens must not fail to give serious attention to other duties. For they must watch over the districts assigned to them, and also act as judges. In small matters the five commanders shall decide: in greater matters up to three minae, the five commanders and the twelve guards. Like all other judges, except those who have the final decision, they shall be liable to give an account. If the wardens impose unjust tasks on the villagers, or take by force their crops or implements, or yield to flattery or bribes in deciding suits, let them be publicly dishonoured. In regard to any other wrong-doing, if the question be of a mina, let the neighbours decide; but if the accused person will not submit, trusting that his monthly removals will enable him to escape payment, and also in suits about a larger amount, the injured party may have recourse to the common court; in the former case, if successful, he may exact a double penalty. 76

The wardens and guards, while on their two years' service, shall live and eat together, and the guard who is absent from the daily meals without permission or sleeps out at night, shall be regarded as a deserter, and may be punished by any one who meets him. If any of the commanders is guilty of such an irregularity, the whole sixty shall have him punished; and he of them who screens him shall suffer a still heavier penalty than the offender himself. Now by service a man learns to rule; and he should pride himself upon serving well the laws and the Gods all his life, and upon having served ancient and honourable men in his youth. The twelve and the five should be their own servants, and use the labour of the villagers only for the good of the public. Let them search the country through, and acquire a perfect knowledge of every locality; with this view, hunting and field sports should be encouraged. 71

Next we have to speak of the elections of the wardens of the agora and of the city. The wardens of the city shall be three in number, and they shall have the care of the streets, roads, buildings, and also of the water-supply. They shall be chosen out of



the highest class, and when the number of candidates has been reduced to six who have the greatest number of votes, three out of the six shall be taken by lot, and, after a scrutiny, shall be admitted to their office. The wardens of the agora shall be five in number — ten are to be first elected, and every one shall vote for all the vacant places; the ten shall be afterwards reduced to five by lot, as in the former election. The first and second class shall be compelled to go to the assembly, but not the third and fourth, unless they are specially summoned. The wardens of the agora shall have the care of the temples and fountains which are in the agora, and shall punish those who injure them by stripes and bonds, if they be slaves or strangers; and by fines, if they be citizens. And the wardens of the city shall have a similar power of inflicting punishment and fines in their own department.

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In the next place, there must be directors of music and gymnastic; one class of them superintending gymnasia and schools, and the attendance of boys and girls and the school-buildings — the other having to do with contests of music and gymnastic. In musical contests there shall be one kind of judges of solo singing or playing, who will judge of rhapsodists, flute-players, harp-players and the like, and another of choruses. There shall be choruses of men and boys and maidens — one director will be enough to introduce them all, and he should not be less than forty years of age; secondly, of solos also there shall be one director, aged not less than thirty years; he will introduce the competitors and give judgment upon them. The director of the choruses is to be elected in an assembly at which all who take an interest in music are compelled to attend, and no one else. Candidates must only be proposed for their fitness, and opposed on the ground of unfitness. Ten are to be elected by vote, and the one of these on whom the lot falls shall be director for a year. Next shall be elected out of the second and third classes the judges of gymnastic contests, who are to be three in number, and are to be tested, after being chosen by lot out of twenty who have been elected by the three highest classes — these being compelled to attend at the election.

One minister remains, who will have the general superintendence of education. He must be not less than fifty years old, and be himself the father of children born in wedlock. His office must be regarded by all as the highest in the state. For the

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right growth of the first shoot in plants and animals is the chief cause of matured perfection. Man is supposed to be a tame animal, but he becomes either the gentlest or the fiercest of creatures, accordingly as he is well or ill educated. Wherefore he who is elected to preside over education should be the best man possible. He shall hold office for five years, and shall be elected out of the guardians of the law, by the votes of the other magistrates with the exception of the senate and prytanes; and the election shall be held by ballot in the temple of Apollo. 76

When a magistrate dies before his term of office has expired, another shall be elected in his place; and, if the guardian of an orphan dies, the relations shall appoint another within ten days, or be fined a drachma a day for neglect.

The city which has no courts of law will soon cease to be a city; and a judge who sits in silence and leaves the enquiry to the litigants, as in arbitrations, is not a good judge. A few judges are better than many, but the few must be good. The matter in dispute should be clearly elicited; time and examination will find out the truth. Causes should first be tried before a court of neighbours: if the decision is unsatisfactory, let them be referred to a higher court; or, if necessary, to a higher still, of which the decision shall be final. 76

Every magistrate is a judge, and every judge is a magistrate, on the day on which he is deciding a suit. This will therefore be an appropriate place to speak of judges and their functions. The supreme tribunal will be that on which the litigants agree; and let there be two other tribunals, one for public and the other for private causes. The high court of appeal shall be composed as follows:—All the officers of state shall meet on the last day but one of the year in some temple, and choose for a judge the best man out of every magistracy: and those who are elected, after they have undergone a scrutiny, shall be judges of appeal. They shall give their decisions openly, in the presence of the magistrates who have elected them; and the public may attend. If anybody charges one of them with having intentionally decided wrong, he shall lay his accusation before the guardians of the law, and if the judge be found guilty he shall pay damages to the extent of half the injury, unless the guardians of the law deem that he deserves a severer punishment, in which case the judges shall assess the penalty.

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As the whole people are injured by offences against the state, they should share in the trial of them. Such causes should originate with the people and be decided by them: the enquiry shall take place before any three of the highest magistrates upon whom the defendant and plaintiff can agree. Also in private suits all should judge as far as possible, and therefore there should be a court of law in every ward; for he who has no share in the administration of justice, believes that he has no share in the state. The judges in these courts shall be elected by lot and give their decision at once. The final judgment in all cases shall rest with the court of appeal. And so, having done with the appointment of courts and the election of officers, we will now make our laws.

‘Your way of proceeding, Stranger, is admirable.’

Then so far our old man’s game of play has gone off well.

‘Say, rather, our serious and noble pursuit.’

Perhaps; but let me ask you whether you have ever observed the manner in which painters put in and rub out colour: yet their endless labour will last but a short time, unless they leave behind them some successor who will restore the picture and remove its defects. ‘Certainly.’ And have we not a similar object at the present moment? We are old ourselves, and therefore we must leave our work of legislation to be improved and perfected by the next generation; not only making laws for our guardians, but making them lawgivers. ‘We must at least do our best.’ Let us address them as follows. Beloved saviours of the laws, we give you an outline of legislation which you must fill up, according to a rule which we will prescribe for you. Megillus and Cleinias and I are agreed, and we hope that you will agree with us in thinking, that the whole energies of a man should be devoted to the attainment of manly virtue, whether this is to be gained by study, or habit, or desire, or opinion. And rather than accept institutions which tend to degrade and enslave him, he should fly his country and endure any hardship. These are our principles, and we would ask you to judge of our laws, and praise or blame them, accordingly as they are or are not capable of improving our citizens.

And first of laws concerning religion. We have already said that the number 5040 has many convenient divisions: and we



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took a twelfth part of this (420), which is itself divisible by twelve, for the number of the tribe. Every divisor is a gift of God, and corresponds to the months of the year and to the revolution of the universe. All cities have a number, but none is more fortunate than our own, which can be divided by all numbers up to 12, with the exception of 11, and even by 11, if two families are deducted. And now let us divide the state, assigning to each division some God or demigod, who shall have altars raised to them, and sacrifices offered twice a month; and assemblies shall be held in their honour, twelve for the tribes, and twelve for the city, corresponding to their divisions. The object of them will be first to promote religion, secondly to encourage friendship and intercourse between families; for families must be acquainted before they marry into one another, or great mistakes will occur. At these festivals there shall be innocent dances of young men and maidens, who may have the opportunity of seeing one another in modest undress. To the details of all this the masters of choruses and the guardians will attend, embodying in laws the results of their experience; and, after ten years, making the laws permanent, with the consent of the legislator, if he be alive, or, if he be not alive, of the guardians of the law, who shall perfect them and settle them once for all. At least, if any further changes are required, the magistrates must take the whole people into counsel, and obtain the sanction of all the oracles.

Whenever any one who is between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-five wants to marry, let him do so; but first let him hear the strain which we will address to him:—

My son, you ought to marry, but not in order to gain wealth or to avoid poverty; neither should you, as men are wont to do, choose a wife who is like yourself in property and character. You ought to consult the interests of the state rather than your own pleasure; for by equal marriages a society becomes unequal. And yet to enact a law that the rich and mighty shall not marry the rich and mighty, that the quick shall be united to the slow, and the slow to the quick, will arouse anger in some persons and laughter in others; for they do not understand that opposite elements ought to be mingled in the state, as wine should be mingled with water. The object at which we aim must therefore be left to the influence of public opinion. And do not forget our former precept, that



every one should seek to attain immortality and raise up a fair posterity to serve God.— Let this be the prelude of the law about the duty of marriage. But if a man will not listen, and at thirty-five years of age is still unmarried, he shall pay an annual fine: if he be of the first class, 100 drachmas; if of the second, 70; if of the third, 60; and if of the fourth, 30. This fine shall be sacred to Herè; and if he refuse to pay, a tenfold penalty shall be exacted by the treasurer of Herè, who shall be responsible for the payment. Further, the unmarried man shall receive no honour or obedience from the young, and he shall not retain the right of punishing others. A man is neither to give nor receive a dowry beyond a certain fixed sum; and for his consolation, if he be poor, let him know that in our state he need neither receive nor give one, for every citizen is provided with the necessaries of life. Again, if the woman is not rich, her husband will not be her humble servant. He who disobeys this law shall pay a fine according to his class, which shall be exacted by the treasurers of Herè and Zeus.

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The betrothal of the parties shall be made by the next of kin, or if there are none, by the guardians. The offerings and ceremonies of marriage shall be determined by the interpreters of sacred rites. Let the wedding party be moderate; five male and five female friends, and a like number of kinsmen, will be enough. The expense should not exceed, for the first class, a mina; and for the second, half a mina; and should be in like proportion for the other classes. Extravagance is to be regarded as vulgarity and ignorance of nuptial proprieties. Much wine is only to be drunk at the festivals of Dionysus, and certainly not on the occasion of a marriage. The bride and bridegroom, who are taking a great step in life, ought to have all their wits about them; they should be especially careful of the night on which God may give them increase, and which this will be none can say. Their bodies and souls should be in the most temperate condition; they should abstain from all that partakes of the nature of disease or vice, which will otherwise become hereditary. There is an original divinity in man which preserves all things, if used with proper respect. He who marries should make one of the two houses on the lot the nest and nursery of his young; he should leave his father and mother, and then his affection for them will be only increased by

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absence. He will go forth as to a colony, and will there rear up his offspring, handing on the torch of life to another generation.

About property in general there is little difficulty, with the exception of property in slaves, which is an institution of a very doubtful character. The slavery of the Helots is approved by some and condemned by others; and there is some doubt even about the slavery of the Mariandynians at Heraclea and of the Thessalian Penestae. This makes us ask, What shall we do about slaves? to which every one would agree in replying,—Let us have the best and most attached whom we can get. All of us have heard stories of slaves who have been better to their masters than sons or brethren. Yet there is an opposite doctrine, that slaves are never to be trusted; as Homer says, ‘Slavery takes away half a man’s understanding.’ And different persons treat them in different ways: there are some who never trust them, and beat them like dogs, until they make them many times more slavish than they were before; and others pursue the opposite plan. Man is a troublesome animal, as has been often shown, Megillus, notably in the revolts of the Messenians; and great mischiefs have arisen in countries where there are large bodies of slaves of one nationality. Two rules may be given for their management: first that they should not, if possible, be of the same country or have a common language; and secondly, that they should be treated by their master with more justice even than equals, out of regard to himself quite as much as to them. For he who is righteous in the treatment of his slaves, or of any inferiors, will sow in them the seed of virtue. Masters should never jest with their slaves: this, which is a common but foolish practice, increases the difficulty and painfulness of managing them.

Next as to habitations. These ought to have been spoken of before; for no man can marry a wife, and have slaves, who has not a house for them to live in. Let us supply the omission. The temples should be placed round the Agora, and the city built in a circle on the heights. Near the temples, which are holy places and the habitations of the Gods, should be buildings for the magistrates, and the courts of law, including those in which capital offences are to be tried. As to walls, Megillus, I agree with Sparta that they should sleep in the earth; ‘cold steel is the best wall,’ as the poet finely says. Besides, how absurd

to be sending out our youth to fortify and guard the borders of our country, and then to build a city wall, which is very unhealthy, and is apt to make people fancy that they may run there and rest in idleness, not knowing that true repose comes from labour, and that idleness is only a renewal of trouble. If, however, there must be a wall, the private houses had better be so arranged as to form one wall; this will have an agreeable aspect, and the building will be safer and more defensible. These objects should be attended to at the foundation of the city. The wardens of the city must see that they are carried out; and they must also enforce cleanliness, and preserve the public buildings from encroachments. Moreover, they must take care to let the rain flow off easily, and must regulate other matters concerning the general administration of the city. If any further enactments prove to be necessary, the guardians of the law must supply them.

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And now, having provided buildings, and having married our citizens, we will proceed to speak of their mode of life. In a well-constituted state, individuals cannot be allowed to live as they please. Why do I say this? Because I am going to enact that the bridegroom shall not absent himself from the common meals. They were instituted originally on the occasion of some war, and, though deemed singular when first founded, they have tended greatly to the security of states. There was a difficulty in introducing them, but there is no difficulty in them now. There is, however, another institution about which I would speak, if I dared. I may preface my proposal by remarking that disorder in a state is the source of all evil, and order of all good. Now in Sparta and Crete there are common meals for men, and this, as I was saying, is a divine and natural institution. But the women are left to themselves; they live in dark places, and, being weaker, and therefore wickeder, than men, they are at the bottom of a good deal more than half the evil of states. This must be corrected, and the institution of common meals extended to both sexes. But, in the present unfortunate state of opinion, who would dare to establish them? And still more, who can compel women to eat and drink in public? They will defy the legislator to drag them out of their holes. And in any other state such a proposal would be drowned in clamour, but in our own I think that I can show the attempt to be just and reasonable.



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‘There is nothing which we should like to hear better.’ Listen, then; having plenty of time, we will go back to the beginning of things, which is an old subject with us. ‘Right.’ Either the race of mankind never had a beginning and will never have an end, or the time which has elapsed since man first came into being is all but infinite. ‘No doubt.’ And in this infinity of time there have been changes of every kind, both in the order of the seasons and in the government of states and in the customs of eating and drinking. Vines and olives were at length discovered, and the blessings of Demeter and Persephone, of which one Triptolemus is said to have been the minister; before his time the animals had been eating one another. And there are nations in which mankind still sacrifice their fellow-men, and we have heard of other nations in which they led an Orphic existence, and would not sacrifice animals, or so much as taste of a cow — but they offered fruits or cakes moistened with honey. Perhaps you will ask me what is the bearing of these remarks? ‘We would gladly hear.’ I will endeavour to explain their drift. I see that the virtue of human life depends on the due regulation of three wants or desires. The first is the desire of meat, the second of drink; these begin with birth, and make us disobedient to any voice other than that of pleasure. The third and fiercest and greatest need is felt latest; this is love, which is a madness setting men’s whole nature on fire. These three disorders of mankind we must endeavour to restrain by three mighty influences — fear, and law, and reason, which, with the aid of the Muses and the Gods of contests, may extinguish our lusts. 78

But to return. After marriage let us proceed to the generation of children, and then to their nurture and education — thus gradually approaching the subject of syssitia. There are, however, some other points which are suggested by the three words — meat, drink, love. ‘Proceed.’ The bride and bridegroom ought to set their mind on having a brave offspring. Now a man only succeeds when he takes pains; wherefore the bridegroom ought to take special care of the bride, and the bride of the bridegroom, at the time when their children are about to be born. And let there be a committee of matrons who shall meet every day at the temple of Eilithyia at a time fixed by the magistrates, and inform against any man or woman who does not observe the 7



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laws of married life. The time of begetting children and the supervision of the parents shall last for ten years only; if at the expiration of this period they have no children, they may part, with the consent of their relatives and the official matrons, and with a due regard to the interests of either; if a dispute arise, ten of the guardians of the law shall be chosen as arbiters. The matrons shall also have power to enter the houses of the young people, if necessary, and to advise and threaten them. If their efforts fail, let them go to the guardians of the law; and if they too fail, the offender, whether man or woman, shall be forbidden to be present at all family ceremonies. If when the time for begetting children has ceased, either husband or wife have connexion with others who are of an age to beget children, they shall be liable to the same penalties as those who are still having a family. But when both parties have ceased to beget children there shall be no penalties. If men and women live soberly, the enactments of law may be left to slumber; punishment is necessary only when there is great disorder of manners.

The first year of children's lives is to be registered in their ancestral temples; the name of the archon of the year is to be inscribed on a whited wall in every phratry, and the names of the living members of the phratry close to them, to be erased at their decease. The proper time of marriage for a woman shall be from sixteen years to twenty; for a man, from thirty to thirty-five (cp. Rep. v. 460 E). The age of holding office for a woman is to be forty, for a man thirty years. The time for military service for a man is to be from twenty years to sixty; for a woman, from the time that she has ceased to bear children until fifty.

**BOOK VII.** Now that we have married our citizens and brought their children into the world, we have to find nurture and education for them. This is a matter of precept rather than of law, and cannot be precisely regulated by the legislator. For minute regulations are apt to be transgressed, and frequent transgressions impair the habit of obedience to the laws. I speak darkly, but I will also try to exhibit my wares in the light of day. Am I not right in saying that a good education tends to the improvement of body and mind? 'Certainly.' And the body is fairest which grows up straight and well-formed from the time

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of birth. 'Very true.' And we observe that the first shoot of every living thing is the greatest; many even contend that man is not at twenty-five twice the height that he was at five. 'True.' And growth without exercise of the limbs is the source of endless evils in the body. 'Yes.' The body should have the most exercise 789 when growing most. 'What, the bodies of young infants?' Nay, the bodies of unborn infants. I should like to explain to you this singular kind of gymnastics. The Athenians are fond of cock-fighting, and the people who keep cocks carry them about in their hands or under their arms, and take long walks, to improve, not their own health, but the health of the birds. Here is a proof of the usefulness of motion, whether of rocking, swinging, riding, or tossing upon the wave; for all these kinds of motion greatly increase strength and the powers of digestion. Hence we infer that our women, when they are with child, should walk about and fashion the embryo; and the children, when born, should be carried by strong nurses,—there must be more than one of them,—and should not be suffered to walk until they are three years old. Shall we impose penalties for the neglect of these rules? The greatest penalty, that is, ridicule, and the difficulty of making the nurses do as we bid them, will be incurred by ourselves. 'Then why speak of such matters?' In the hope that heads of families may learn that the due regulation of them is the foundation of law and order in the state. 790

And now, leaving the body, let us proceed to the soul; but we must first repeat that perpetual motion by night and by day is good for the young creature. This is proved by the Corybantian cure of motion, and by the practice of nurses who rock children in their arms, lapping them at the same time in sweet strains. And the reason of this is obvious. The affections, both of the Bacchantes and of the children, arise from fear, and this fear is occasioned by something wrong which is going on within them. Now 791 a violent external commotion tends to calm the violent internal one; it quiets the palpitation of the heart, giving to the children sleep, and bringing back the Bacchantes to their right minds by the help of dances and acceptable sacrifices. But if fear has such power, will not a child who is always in a state of terror grow up timid and cowardly, whereas if he learns from the first to resist fear he will develop a habit of courage? 'Very true.' And we

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may say that the use of motion will inspire the souls of children with cheerfulness and therefore with courage. 'Of course.' Softness enervates and irritates the temper of the young, and violence renders them mean and misanthropical. 'But how is the state to educate them when they are as yet unable to understand the meaning of words?' Why, surely they roar and cry, like the young of any other animal, and the nurse knows the meaning of these intimations of the child's likes or dislikes, and the occasions which call them forth. About three years is passed by children in a state of imperfect articulation, which is quite long enough time to make them either good- or ill-tempered. And, therefore, during these first three years, the infant should be as free as possible from fear and pain. 'Yes, and he should have as much pleasure as possible.' There, I think, you are wrong; for the influence of pleasure in the beginning of education is fatal. A man should neither pursue pleasure nor wholly avoid pain. He should embrace the mean, and cultivate that state of calm which mankind, taught by some inspiration, attribute to God; and he who would be like God should neither be too fond of pleasure himself, nor should he permit any other to be thus given; above all, not the infant, whose character is just in the making. It may sound ridiculous, but I affirm that a woman in her pregnancy should be carefully tended, and kept from excessive pleasures and pains.

3 'I quite agree with you about the duty of avoiding extremes and following the mean.'

Let us consider a further point. The matters which are now in question are generally called customs rather than laws; and we have already made the reflection that, though they are not, properly speaking, laws, yet neither can they be neglected. For they fill up the interstices of law, and are the props and ligatures on which the strength of the whole building depends. Laws without customs never last; and we must not wonder if habit and custom sometimes lengthen out our laws. 'Very true.' Up to their third year, then, the life of children may be regulated by customs such as we have described. From three to six their minds have to be amused; but they must not be allowed to become self-willed and spoilt. If punishment is necessary, the same rule will hold as in the case of slaves; they must neither be  
4 punished in hot blood nor ruined by indulgence. The children



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of that age will have their own modes of amusing themselves; they should be brought for their play to the village temples, and placed under the care of nurses, who will be responsible to twelve matrons annually chosen by the women who have authority over marriage. These shall be appointed, one out of each tribe, and their duty shall be to keep order at the meetings: slaves who break the rules laid down by them, they shall punish by the help of some of the public slaves; but citizens who dispute their authority shall be brought before the magistrates. After six years of age there shall be a separation of the sexes; the boys will go to learn riding and the use of arms, and the girls may, if they please, also learn. Here I note a practical error in early training. Mothers and nurses foolishly believe that the left hand is by nature different from the right, whereas the left leg and foot are acknowledged to be the same as the right. But the truth is that nature made all things to balance, and the power of using the left hand, which is of little importance in the case of the plectrum of the lyre, may make a great difference in the art of the warrior, who should be a skilled gymnast and able to fight and balance himself in any position. If a man were a Briareus, he should use all his hundred hands at once; at any rate, let everybody employ the two which they have. To these matters the magistrates, male and female, should attend; the women superintending the nursing and amusement of the children, and the men superintending their education, that all of them, boys and girls alike, may be sound, wind and limb, and not spoil the gifts of nature by bad habits.

Education has two branches — gymnastic, which is concerned with the body; and music, which improves the soul. And gymnastic has two parts, dancing and wrestling. Of dancing one kind imitates musical recitation and aims at stateliness and freedom; another kind is concerned with the training of the body, and produces health, agility, and beauty. There is no military use in the complex systems of wrestling which pass under the names of Antaeus and Cercyon, or in the tricks of boxing, which are attributed to Amycus and Epeius; but good wrestling and the habit of extricating the neck, hands, and sides, should be diligently learnt and taught. In our dances imitations of war should be practised, as in the dances of the Curetes in Crete and of the Dioscuri at Sparta, or as in the dances in complete armour which were taught us Athenians



by the goddess Athene. Youths who are not yet of an age to go to war should make religious processions armed and on horseback; and they should also engage in military games and contests. These exercises will be equally useful in peace and war, and will benefit both states and families.

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Next follows music, to which we will once more return; and here I shall venture to repeat my old paradox, that amusements have great influence on laws. He who has been taught to play at the same games and with the same playthings will be content with the same laws. There is no greater evil in a state than the spirit of innovation. In the case of the seasons and winds, in the management of our bodies and in the habits of our minds, change is a dangerous thing. And in everything but what is bad the same rule holds. We all venerate and acquiesce in the laws to which we are accustomed; and if they have continued during long periods of time, and there is no remembrance of their ever having been otherwise, people are absolutely afraid to change them. Now how can we create this quality of immobility in the laws? I say, by not allowing innovations in the games and plays of children. The children who are always having new plays, when grown up will be always having new laws. Changes in mere fashions are not serious evils, but changes in our estimate of men's characters are most serious; and rhythms and music are representations of characters, and therefore we must avoid novelties in dance and song. For securing permanence no better method can be imagined than that of the Egyptians. 'What is their method?' They make a calendar for the year, arranging on what days the festivals of the various Gods shall be celebrated, and for each festival they consecrate an appropriate hymn and dance. In our state a similar arrangement shall in the first instance be framed by certain individuals, and afterwards solemnly ratified by all the citizens. He who introduces other hymns or dances shall be excluded by the priests and priestesses and the guardians of the law; and if he refuses to submit, he may be prosecuted for impiety. But we must not be too ready to speak about such great matters. Even a young man, when he hears something unaccustomed, stands and looks this way and that, like a traveller at a place where three ways meet; and at our age a man ought to be very sure of his ground in so singular an argument. 'Very true.' Then, leaving the subject for further

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examination at some future time, let us proceed with our laws about education, for in this manner we may probably throw light upon our present difficulty. 'Let us do as you say.' The ancients used the term νόμοι to signify harmonious strains, and perhaps they 800  
 fancied that there was a connexion between the songs and laws of a country. And we say — Whosoever shall transgress the strains by law established is a transgressor of the laws, and shall be punished by the guardians of the law and by the priests and priestesses. 'Very good.' How can we legislate about these consecrated strains without incurring ridicule? Moulds or types must be first framed, and one of the types shall be — Abstinence from evil words at sacrifices. When a son or brother blasphemes at a sacrifice there is a sound of ill-omen heard in the family; and many a chorus stands by the altar uttering inauspicious words, and he is crowned victor who excites the hearers most with lamentations. Such lamentations should be reserved for evil days, and should be uttered only by hired mourners; and let the singers not wear circlets or ornaments of gold. To avoid every evil word, 801  
 then, shall be our first type. 'Agreed.' Our second law or type shall be, that prayers ever accompany sacrifices; and our third, that, inasmuch as all prayers are requests, they shall be only for good; this the poets must be made to understand. 'Certainly.' Have we not already decided that no gold or silver Plutus shall be allowed in our city? and did not this show that we were dissatisfied with the poets? and may we not fear that, if they are allowed to utter injudicious prayers, they will bring the greatest misfortunes on the state? And we must therefore make a law that the poet is not to contradict the laws or ideas of the state; nor is he to show his poems to any private persons until they have first received the *imprimatur* of the director of education. A fourth musical law will be to the effect that hymns and praises shall be offered to Gods, and to heroes and demigods. Still another law will permit eulogies of eminent citizens, whether men or women, but only 802  
 after their death. As to songs and dances, we will enact as follows: — There shall be a selection made of the best ancient musical compositions and dances; these shall be chosen by judges, who ought not to be less than fifty years of age. They will accept some, and reject or amend others, for which purpose they will call, if necessary, the poets themselves into council. The

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severe and orderly music is the style in which to educate children, who, if they are accustomed to this, will deem the opposite kind to be illiberal, but if they are accustomed to the other, will count this to be cold and unpleasing. ‘True.’ Further, a distinction should be made between the melodies of men and women. Nature herself teaches that the grand or manly style should be assigned to men, and to women the moderate and temperate. So much for the subjects of education. But to whom are they to be taught, and when? I must try, like the shipwright, who lays down the keel of a vessel, to build a secure foundation for the vessel of the soul in her voyage through life. Human affairs are hardly serious, and yet a sad necessity compels us to be serious about them. Let us, therefore, do our best to bring the matter to a conclusion. ‘Very good.’ I say then, that God is the object of a man’s most serious endeavours. But man is created to be the plaything of the Gods; and therefore the aim of every one should be to pass through life, not in grim earnest, but playing at the noblest of pastimes, in another spirit from that which now prevails. For the common opinion is, that work is for the sake of play, war of peace; whereas in war there is neither amusement nor instruction worth speaking of. The life of peace is that which men should chiefly desire to lengthen out and improve. They should live sacrificing, singing, and dancing, with the view of propitiating the Gods and so obtaining victory over their enemies. I have already told you the types of song and dance which they should follow: and

‘Some things,’ as the poet well says, ‘you will devise for yourself — others, God will suggest to you.’

These words of his may be applied to our pupils. They will partly teach themselves, and partly will be taught by God, the art of propitiating Him; for they are His puppets, and have only a small portion in truth. ‘You have a poor opinion of man.’ No wonder, when I compare him with God; but, if you are offended, I will place him a little higher.

Next follow the building for gymnasia and schools; these will be in the midst of the city, and outside will be riding-schools and archery-grounds. In all of them there ought to be instructors of the young, drawn from foreign parts by pay, and they will teach them music and war. Education shall be compulsory; the children must attend school, whether their parents like it or



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not; for they belong to the state more than to their parents. And I say further, without hesitation, that the same education in riding and gymnastic shall be given both to men and women. The ancient tradition about the Amazons confirms my view, and at 805 the present day there are myriads of women, called Sauromatides, dwelling near the Pontus, who practise the art of riding as well as archery and the use of arms. But if I am right, nothing can be more foolish than our modern fashion of training men and women differently, whereby the power of the city is reduced to a half. For reflect—if women are not to have the education of men, some other must be found for them, and what other can we propose? Shall they, like the women of Thrace, tend cattle and till the ground; or, like our own, spin and weave, and take care of the house? or shall they follow the Spartan custom, which 806 is between the two?—there the maidens share in gymnastic exercises and in music; and the grown women, no longer engaged in spinning, weave the web of life, although they are not skilled in archery, like the Amazons, nor can they imitate our warrior goddess and carry shield or spear, even in the extremity of their country's need. Compared with our women, the Sauromatides are like men. But your legislators, Megillus, as I maintain, only half did their work; they took care of the men, and left the women to take care of themselves.

‘Shall we suffer the Stranger, Cleinias, to run down Sparta in this way?’

‘Why, yes; for we cannot withdraw the liberty which we have already conceded to him.’

What will be the manner of life of men in moderate circumstances, freed from the toils of agriculture and business, and having common tables for themselves and their families which are under the inspection of magistrates, male and female? Are men 807 who have these institutions only to eat and fatten like beasts? If they do, how can they escape the fate of a fatted beast, which is to be torn in pieces by some other beast more valiant than himself? True, theirs is not the perfect way of life, for they have not all things in common; but the second best way of life also confers great blessings. Even those who live in the second state have a work to do twice as great as the work of any Pythian or Olympic victor; for their labour is for the body only, but ours both for



body and soul. And this higher work ought to be pursued night and day to the exclusion of every other. The magistrates who keep the city should be wakeful, and the master of the household should be up early and before all his servants; and the mistress, too, should awaken her handmaidens, and not be awakened by them. Much sleep is not required either for our souls or bodies. When a man is asleep, he is no better than if he were dead; and he who loves life and wisdom will take no more sleep than is necessary for health. Magistrates who are wide awake at night are terrible to the bad; but they are honoured by the good, and are useful to themselves and the state.

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When the morning dawns, let the boy go to school. As the sheep need the shepherd, so the boy needs a master; for he is at once the most cunning and the most insubordinate of creatures. Let him be taken away from mothers and nurses, and tamed with bit and bridle, being treated as a freeman in that he learns and is taught, but as a slave in that he may be chastised by all other freemen; and the freeman who neglects to chastise him shall be disgraced. All these matters will be under the supervision of the Director of Education.

Him we will address as follows: We have spoken to you, O illustrious teacher of youth, of the song, the time, and the dance, and of martial strains; but of the learning of letters and of prose writings, and of music, and of the use of calculation for military and domestic purposes we have not spoken, nor yet of the higher use of numbers in reckoning divine things—such as the revolutions of the stars, or the arrangements of days, months, and years, of which the true calculation is necessary in order that seasons and festivals may proceed in regular course, and arouse and enliven the city, rendering to the Gods their due, and making men know them better. There are, we say, many things about which we have not as yet instructed you—and first, as to reading and music: Shall the pupil be a perfect scholar and musician, or not even enter on these studies? He should certainly enter on both:—to letters he will apply himself from the age of ten to thirteen, and at thirteen he will begin to handle the lyre, and continue to learn music until he is sixteen; no shorter and no longer time will be allowed, however fond he or his parents may be of the pursuit. The study of letters he should carry to

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the extent of simple reading and writing, but he need not care for calligraphy and tachygraphy, if his natural gifts do not enable him to acquire them in the three years. And here arises a question as to the learning of compositions when unaccompanied with music, I mean, prose compositions. They are a dangerous species of literature. Speak then, O guardians of the law, and tell us what we shall do about them. 'You seem to be in a difficulty.' Yes; it is difficult to go against the opinion of all the world. 'But have we not often already done so?' Very true. And you imply that the road which we are taking, though disagreeable to many, is approved by those whose judgment is most worth having. 'Certainly.' Then I would first observe that we have many poets, comic as well as tragic, with whose compositions, as people say, youth are to be imbued and saturated. 8 Some would have them learn by heart entire poets; others prefer extracts. Now I believe, and the general opinion is, that some of the things which they learn are good, and some bad. 'Then how shall we reject some and select others?' A happy thought occurs to me; this long discourse of ours is a sample of what we want, and is moreover an inspired work and a kind of poem. I am naturally pleased in reflecting upon all our words, which appear to me to be just the thing for a young man to hear and learn. I would venture, then, to offer to the Director of Education this treatise of laws as a pattern for his guidance; and in case he should find any similar compositions, written or oral, I would have him carefully preserve them, and commit them in the first place to the teachers who are willing to learn them (he should turn off the teacher who refuses), and let them communicate the lesson to the young.

I have said enough to the teacher of letters; and now we will proceed to the teacher of the lyre. He must be reminded of the advice which we gave to the sexagenarian minstrels; like them he should be quick to perceive the rhythms suited to the expression of virtue, and to reject the opposite. With a view to the attainment of this object, the pupil and his instructor are to use the lyre because its notes are pure; the voice and string should coincide note for note: nor should there be complex harmonies and contrasts of intervals, or variations of times or rhythms. Three years' study is not long enough to give a knowledge of these intricacies; and our pupils

will have many things of more importance to learn. The tunes and hymns which are to be consecrated for each festival have been already determined by us.

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Having given these instructions to the Director of Music, let us now proceed to dancing and gymnastic, which must also be taught to boys and girls by masters and mistresses. Our minister of education will have a great deal to do; and being an old man, how will he get through so much work? There is no difficulty;—the law will provide him with assistants, male and female; and he will consider how important his office is, and how great the responsibility of choosing them. For if education prospers, the vessel of state sails merrily along; or if education fails, the consequences are not even to be mentioned. Of dancing and gymnastics something has been said already. We include under the latter military exercises, the various uses of arms, all that relates to horsemanship, and military evolutions and tactics. There should be public teachers of both arts, paid by the state, and women as well as men should be trained in them. The maidens should learn the armed dance, and the grown-up women be practised in drill and the use of arms, if only in case of extremity, when the men are gone out to battle, and they are left to guard their families. Birds and beasts defend their young, but women instead of fighting run to the altars, thus degrading man below the level of the animals. ‘Such a lack of education, Stranger, is both unseemly and dangerous.’

Wrestling is to be pursued as a military exercise, but the meaning of this, and the nature of the art, can only be explained when action is combined with words. Next follows dancing, which is of two kinds; imitative, first, of the serious and beautiful; and, secondly, of the ludicrous and grotesque. The first kind may be further divided into the dance of war and the dance of peace. The former is called the Pyrrhic; in this the movements of attack and defence are imitated in a direct and manly style, which indicates strength and sufficiency of body and mind. The latter of the two, the dance of peace, is suitable to orderly and law-abiding men. These must be distinguished from the Bacchic dances which imitate drunken revelry, and also from the dances by which purifications are effected and mysteries celebrated. Such dances cannot be characterized either as warlike or peaceful, and are unsuited to a civilized state. Now the dances of peace are of two classes:—the



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first of them is the more violent, being an expression of joy and triumph after toil and danger; the other is more tranquil, symbolizing the continuance and preservation of good. In speaking or singing we naturally move our bodies, and as we have more or less courage or self-control we become less or more violent and excited. Thus from the imitation of words in gestures the art of dancing arises. Now one man imitates in an orderly, another in a disorderly manner: and so the peaceful kinds of dance have been appropriately called *Emmeleiai*, or dances of order, as the warlike have been called *Pyrrhic*. In the latter a man imitates all sorts of blows and the hurling of weapons and the avoiding of them; in the former he learns to bear himself gracefully and like a gentleman. The types of these dances are to be fixed by the legislator, and when the guardians of the law have assigned them to the several festivals, and consecrated them in due order, no further change shall be allowed.

Thus much of the dances which are appropriate to fair forms and noble souls. Comedy, which is the opposite of them, remains to be considered. For the serious implies the ludicrous, and opposites cannot be understood without opposites. But a man of repute will desire to avoid doing what is ludicrous. He should leave such performances to slaves,—they are not fit for freemen; and there should be some element of novelty in them. Concerning tragedy, let our law be as follows: When the inspired poet comes to us with a request to be admitted into our state, we will reply in courteous words—We also are tragedians and your rivals; and the drama which we enact is the best and noblest, being the imitation of the truest and noblest life, with a view to which our state is ordered. And we cannot allow you to pitch your stage in the agora, and make your voices to be heard above ours, or suffer you to address our women and children and the common people on opposite principles to our own. Come then, ye children of the Lydian Muse, and present yourselves first to the magistrates, and if they decide that your hymns are as good or better than ours, you shall have your chorus; but if not, not.

There remain three kinds of knowledge which should be learnt by freemen—arithmetic, geometry of surfaces and of solids, and thirdly, astronomy. Few need make an accurate study of such sciences; and of special students we will speak at another time. But most persons must be content with the study of them which i



absolutely necessary, and may be said to be a necessity of that nature against which God himself is unable to contend. ‘What are these divine necessities of knowledge?’ Necessities of a knowledge without which neither gods, nor demigods, can govern mankind. And far is he from being a divine man who cannot distinguish one, two, odd and even; who cannot number day and night, and is ignorant of the revolutions of the sun and stars; for to every higher knowledge a knowledge of number is necessary—a fool may see this; how much, is a matter requiring more careful consideration. ‘Very true.’ But the legislator cannot enter into such details, and therefore we must defer the more careful consideration of these matters to another occasion. ‘You seem to fear our habitual want of training in these subjects.’ Still more do I fear the danger of bad training, which is often worse than none at all. ‘Very true.’ I think that a gentleman and a freeman may be expected to know as much as an Egyptian child. In Egypt, arithmetic is taught to children in their sports by a distribution of apples or garlands among a greater or less number of people; or a calculation is made of the various combinations which are possible among a set of boxers or wrestlers; or they distribute cups among the children, sometimes of gold, brass, and silver intermingled, sometimes of one metal only. The knowledge of arithmetic which is thus acquired is a great help, either to the general or to the manager of a household; wherever measure is employed, men are more wide-awake in their dealings, and they get rid of their ridiculous ignorance. ‘What do you mean?’ I have observed this ignorance among my countrymen—they are like pigs—and I am heartily ashamed both on my own behalf and on that of all the Hellenes. ‘In what respect?’ Let me ask you a question. You know that there are such things as length, breadth, and depth? ‘Yes.’ And the Hellenes imagine that they are commensurable (1) with themselves, and (2) with each other; whereas they are only commensurable with themselves. But if this is true, then we are in an unfortunate case, and may well say to our compatriots that not to possess necessary knowledge is a disgrace, though to possess such knowledge is nothing very grand. ‘Certainly.’ The discussion of arithmetical problems is a much better amusement for old men than their favourite game of draughts. ‘True.’ Mathematics, then, will be one of the subjects in which youth should be trained.

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They may be regarded as an amusement, as well as a useful and innocent branch of knowledge ; — I think that we may include them provisionally. ‘Yes; that will be the way.’ The next question is, whether astronomy shall be made a part of education. About the stars there is a strange notion prevalent. Men often suppose that it is impious to enquire into the nature of God and the world, whereas the very reverse is the truth. ‘How do you mean?’ What I am going to say may seem absurd and at variance with the usual language of age, and yet if true and advantageous to the state, and pleasing to God, ought not to be withheld. ‘Let us hear.’ My dear friend, how falsely do we and all the Hellenes speak about the sun and moon! ‘In what respect?’ We are always saying that they and certain of the other stars do not keep the same path, and we term them planets. ‘Yes; and I have seen the morning and evening stars go all manner of ways, and the sun and moon doing what we know that they always do. But I wish that you would explain your meaning further.’ You will easily understand what I have had no difficulty in understanding myself, though we are both of us past the time of learning. ‘True; but what is this marvellous knowledge which youth are to acquire, and of which we are ignorant?’ Men say that the sun, moon, and stars are planets or wanderers; but this is the reverse of the fact. Each of them moves in one orbit only, which is circular, and not in many; nor is the swiftest of them the slowest, as appears to human eyes. What an insult should we offer to Olympian runners if we were to put the first last and the last first! And if that is a ridiculous error in speaking of men, how much more in speaking of the Gods? They cannot be pleased at our telling falsehoods about them. ‘They cannot.’ Then people should at least learn so much about them as will enable them to avoid impiety.

Enough of education. Hunting and similar pursuits now claim our attention. These require for their regulation that mixture of law and admonition of which we have often spoken; e. g., in what we were saying about the nurture of young children. And therefore the whole duty of the citizen will not consist in mere obedience to the laws; he must regard not only the enactments but also the precepts of the legislator. I will illustrate my meaning by an example. Of hunting there are many kinds — hunting of fish and fowl, man and beast, enemies and friends; and the legislator can neither

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omit to speak about these things, nor make penal ordinances about them all. ‘What is he to do then?’ He will praise and blame hunting, having in view the discipline and exercise of youth. And the young man will listen obediently and will regard his praises and censures; neither pleasure nor pain should hinder him. The legislator will express himself in the form of a pious wish for the welfare of the young: —O my friends, he will say, may you never be induced to hunt for fish in the waters, either by day or night; or for men, whether by sea or land. Never let the wish to steal enter into your minds; neither be ye fowlers, which is not an occupation for gentlemen. As to land animals, the legislator will discourage hunting by night, and also the use of nets and snares by day; for these are indolent and unmanly methods. The only mode of hunting which he can praise is with horses and dogs, running, shooting, striking at close quarters. Enough of the prelude: the law shall be as follows:—

Let no one hinder the holy order of huntsmen; but let the nightly hunters who lay snares and nets be everywhere prohibited. Let the fowler confine himself to waste places and to the mountains. The fisherman is also permitted to exercise his calling, except in harbours and sacred streams, marshes and lakes; in all other places he may fish, provided he does not make use of poisonous mixtures.

**BOOK VIII.** Next, with the help of the Delphian Oracle, we will appoint festivals and sacrifices. There shall be 365 of them, one for every day in the year; and one magistrate, at least, shall offer sacrifice daily according to rites prescribed by a convocation of priests and interpreters, who shall co-operate with the guardians of the law, and supply what the legislator has omitted. Moreover there shall be twelve festivals to the twelve Gods after whom the twelve tribes are named: these shall be celebrated every month with appropriate musical and gymnastic contests. There shall also be festivals for women, to be distinguished from the men’s festivals. Nor shall the Gods below be forgotten, but they must be separated from the Gods above — Pluto shall have his own in the twelfth month. He is not the enemy, but the friend of man, who releases the soul from the body, which is at least as good a work as to unite them. Further, those who have to regulate these



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matters should consider that our state has leisure and abundance, and wishing to be happy, like an individual, should lead a good life; for he who leads such a life neither does nor suffers injury, of which the first is very easy, and the second very difficult of attainment, and is only to be acquired by perfect virtue. A good city has peace, but the evil city is full of wars within and without. To guard against the danger of external enemies the citizens should practise war at least one day in every month; they should go out *en masse*, including their wives and children, or in divisions, as the magistrates determine, and have mimic contests, imitating in a lively manner real battles; they should also have prizes and encomiums of valour, both for the victors in these contests, and for the victors in the battle of life. The poet who celebrates the victors should be fifty years old at least, and himself a man who has done great deeds. Of such an one the poems may be sung, even though he is not the best of poets. To the director of education and the guardians of the law shall be committed the judgment, and no song, however sweet, which has not been licensed by them shall be recited. These regulations about poetry, and about military expeditions, apply equally to men and to women.

The legislator may be conceived to make the following address to himself: — With what object am I training my citizens? Are they not strivers for mastery in the greatest of combats? Certainly, will be the reply. And if they were boxers or wrestlers, would they think of entering the lists without many days' practice? Would they not as far as possible imitate all the circumstances of the contest; and if they had no one to box with, would they not practise on a lifeless image, heedless of the laughter of the spectators? And shall our soldiers go out to fight for life and kindred and property unprepared, because sham fights are thought to be ridiculous? Will not the legislator require that his citizens shall practise war daily, performing lesser exercises without arms while the combatants on a greater scale will carry arms, and take up positions, and lie in ambuscade? And let their combats be no without danger, that opportunity may be given for distinction, and the brave man and the coward may receive their meed of honour or disgrace. If occasionally a man is killed, there is no great harm done — there are others as good as he is who will replace him; and



the state can better afford to lose a few of her citizens than to lose the only means of testing them.

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‘We agree, Stranger, that such warlike exercises are necessary.’ But why are they so rarely practised? Or rather, do we not all know the reasons? One of them (1) is the inordinate love of wealth. This absorbs the soul of a man, and leaves him no time for any other pursuit. Knowledge is valued by him only as it tends to the attainment of wealth. All is lost in the desire of heaping up gold and silver; anybody is ready to do anything, right or wrong, for the sake of eating and drinking, and the indulgence of his animal passions. ‘Most true.’ This is one of the causes which prevents a man being a good soldier, or anything else which is good; it converts the temperate and orderly into shopkeepers or servants, and the brave into burglars or pirates. Many of these latter are men of ability, and are greatly to be pitied, because their souls are hungering and thirsting all their lives long. The bad forms of government (2) are another reason—democracy, oligarchy, tyranny, which, as I was saying, are not states, but states of discord, in which the rulers are afraid of their subjects, and therefore do not like them to become rich, or noble, or valiant. Now our state will escape both these causes of evil; the society is perfectly free, and has plenty of leisure, and is not allowed by the laws to be absorbed in the pursuit of wealth; hence we have an excellent field for a perfect education, and for the introduction of martial pastimes. Let us proceed to describe the character of these pastimes. All gymnastic exercises in our state must have a military character; no other will be allowed. Activity and quickness are most useful in war; and yet these qualities do not attain their greatest efficiency unless the competitors are armed. The runner should enter the lists in armour, and in the races which our heralds proclaim, no prize is to be given except to armed warriors. Let there be six courses—first, the stadium; secondly, the diaulos or double course; thirdly, the horse course; fourthly, the long course; fifthly, races (1) between heavy-armed soldiers who shall pass over sixty stadia and finish at a temple of Ares, and (2) between still more heavily-armed competitors who run over smoother ground; sixthly, a race for archers, who shall run over hill and dale a distance of a hundred stadia, and their goal shall be a temple of Apollo and Artemis. There shall be three contests of each kind—

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one for boys, another for youths, a third for men ; the course for the boys we will fix at half, and that for the youths at two-thirds of the entire length. Women shall join in the races ; young girls who are not grown up shall run naked ; but after thirteen they shall be suitably dressed ; from thirteen to eighteen they shall be obliged to share in these contests, and from eighteen to twenty they may if they please and if they are unmarried. As to trials of strength, single combats in armour, or battles between two and two, or of any number up to ten, shall take the place of wrestling and the heavy exercises. And there must be umpires, as there are now in wrestling, to determine what is a fair hit and who is conqueror. Instead of the pancratium, let there be contests in which the combatants carry bows and wear light shields and hurl javelins and throw stones. The next provision of the law will relate to horses, which, as we are in Crete, need be rarely used by us, and chariots never ; our horse-racing prizes will only be given to single horses, whether colts, half-grown, or full-grown. Their riders are to wear armour, and there shall also be a competition between mounted archers. Women, if they have a mind, may join in the exercises of men.

But enough of gymnastics, and nearly enough of music. All musical contests will take place at festivals, whether every third or every fifth year, which are to be fixed by the guardians of the law, the judges of the games, and the director of education, who for this purpose shall become legislators and arrange times and conditions. The principles on which such contests are to be ordered have been often repeated by the first legislator ; no more need be said of them, nor are the details of them important. But there is another subject of the highest importance, which, if possible, should be determined by the laws, not of man, but of God ; or, if a direct revelation is impossible, there is need of some bold man who, alone against the world, will speak plainly of the corruption of human nature, and go to war with the passions of mankind. 'We do not understand you.' I will try to make my meaning plainer. In speaking of education, I seemed to see young men and maidens in friendly intercourse with one another ; and there arose in my mind a natural fear about a state, in which the young of either sex are well nurtured, and have little to do, and occupy themselves chiefly with festivals and dances. How can they be saved from those

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passions which reason forbids them to indulge, and which are the ruin of so many? The prohibition of wealth, and the influence of education, and the all-seeing eye of the ruler, will alike help to promote temperance; but they will not wholly extirpate the unnatural loves which have been the destruction of states; and against this evil what remedy can be devised? Lacedaemon and Crete give no assistance here; on the subject of love, as I may whisper in your ear, they are against us. Suppose a person were to urge that you ought to restore the natural use which existed before the days of Laius; he would be quite right, but he would not be supported by public opinion in either of your states. Or try the matter by the test which we apply to all laws,—who will say that the permission of such things tends to virtue? Will he who is seduced learn the habit of courage; or will the seducer acquire temperance? And will any legislator be found to make such actions legal?

But to judge of this matter truly, we must understand the nature of love and friendship, which may take very different forms. For we speak of friendship, first, when there is some similarity or equality of virtue; secondly, when there is some want; and either of these, when in excess, is termed love. The first kind is gentle and sociable; the second is fierce and unmanageable; and there is also a third kind, which is akin to both, and is under the dominion of opposite principles. The one is of the body, and has no regard for the character of the beloved; but he who is under the influence of the other disregards the body, and is a looker rather than a lover, and desires only with his soul to be knit to the soul of his friend; while the intermediate sort is both of the body and of the soul. Here are three kinds of love: ought the legislator to prohibit all of them equally, or to allow the virtuous love to remain? ‘The latter, clearly.’ I expected to gain your approval; but I will reserve the task of convincing our friend Cleinias for another occasion. ‘Very good.’ To make right laws on this subject is in one point of view easy, and in another most difficult; for we know that in some cases most men abstain willingly from intercourse with the fair. The unwritten law which prohibits members of the same family from such intercourse is strictly obeyed, and no thought of anything else ever enters into the minds of men in general. A little word puts out the fire of their lusts. ‘What is it?’ The declaration that such things are hateful to the Gods, and most abominable



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and unholy. The reason is that everywhere, in jest and earnest alike, this is the doctrine which is repeated to all from their earliest youth. They see on the stage that an Oedipus or a Thyestes or a Macareus, when undeceived, are ready to kill themselves. There is an undoubted power in public opinion when no breath is heard adverse to the law; and the legislator who would enslave these enslaving passions must consecrate such a public opinion all through the city. 'Good: but how can you create it?' A fair objection; but I promised to try and find some means of restraining loves to their natural objects. A law which would extirpate 8. unnatural love as effectually as incest is at present extirpated, would be the source of innumerable blessings, because it would be in accordance with nature, and would get rid of excess in eating and drinking and of adulteries and frenzies, making men love their wives, and having other excellent effects. I can imagine that some lusty youth overhears what we are saying, and roars out in abusive terms that we are legislating for impossibilities. And so a person might have said of the *syssitia*, or common meals; but this is refuted by facts, although even now they are not extended to women. 'True.' There is no impossibility or super-humanity in my proposed law, as I shall endeavour to prove. 'Do so.' Will not a man find abstinence more easy when his body is sound than when he is in ill-condition? 'Yes.' Have we not heard of 8. *Iccus* of Tarentum and other wrestlers who abstained wholly for a time? Yet they were infinitely worse educated than our citizens, and far more lusty in their bodies. And shall they have abstained for the sake of an athletic contest, and our citizens be incapable of a similar endurance for the sake of a much nobler victory,—the victory over pleasure, which is true happiness? Will not the fear of impiety enable them to conquer that which many who were inferior to them have conquered? 'I dare say.' And therefore the law must plainly declare that our citizens should not fall below the other animals, who live all together in flocks, and yet remain pure and chaste until the time of procreation comes, when they pair, and are ever after faithful to their compact. But if the corruption of public opinion is too great to allow our first law to be carried out, then our guardians of the law must turn legislators, and try their hand at a second law. They must minimize the appetites, diverting the vigour of youth into



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other channels, allowing the practice of love in secret, but making detection shameful. Three higher principles may be brought to bear on all these corrupt natures. 'What are they?' Religion, honour, and the love of the higher qualities of the soul. Perhaps this is a dream only, yet it is the best of dreams; and if not the whole, still, by the grace of God, a part of what we desire may be realized. Either men may learn to abstain wholly from any loves, natural or unnatural, except of their wedded wives; or, at least, they may give up unnatural loves; or, if detected, they shall be punished with loss of citizenship, as aliens from the state in their morals. 'I entirely agree with you,' said Megillus, 'but Cleinias must speak for himself.' 'I will give my opinion by-and-by.'

We were speaking of the *syssitia*, which will be a natural institution in a Cretan colony. Whether they shall be established after the model of Crete or Lacedaemon, or shall be different from either, is an unimportant question which may be determined without difficulty. We may, therefore, proceed to speak of the mode of life among our citizens, which will be far less complex than in other cities; a state which is inland and not maritime requires only half the number of laws. There is no trouble about trade and commerce, and a thousand other things. The legislator has only to regulate the affairs of husbandmen and shepherds, which will be easily arranged, now that the principal questions, such as marriage, education, and government, have been settled.

Let us begin with husbandry: First, let there be a law of Zeus against removing a neighbour's landmark, whether he be a citizen or stranger. For this is 'to move the immoveable'; and Zeus, the God of kindred, witnesses to the wrongs of citizens, and Zeus, the God of strangers, to the wrongs of strangers. The offence of removing a boundary shall receive two punishments — the first will be inflicted by the God himself; the second by the judges. In the next place, the differences between neighbours about encroachments must be guarded against. He who encroaches shall pay twofold the amount of the injury; of all such matters the wardens of the country shall be the judges, in lesser cases the officers, and in greater the whole number of them belonging to any one division. Any injury done by cattle, the decoying of bees, the careless firing of woods, the planting unduly near a neighbour's ground, shall all be visited with proper damages. Such details have been determined

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by previous legislators, and need not now be mixed up with greater matters. Husbandmen have had of old excellent rules about streams and waters; and we need not 'divert their course.' Anybody may take water from a common stream, if he does not thereby cut off a private spring; he may lead the water in any direction, except through a house or temple, but he must do no harm beyond the channel. If land is without water the occupier shall dig down to the clay, and if at this depth he find no water, he shall have a right of getting water from his neighbours for his household; and if their supply is limited, he shall receive from them a measure of water fixed by the wardens of the country. If there be heavy rains, the dweller on the higher ground must not recklessly suffer the water to flow down upon a neighbour beneath him, nor must he who lives upon lower ground or dwells in an adjoining house refuse an outlet. If the two parties cannot agree, they shall go before the wardens of the city or country, and if a man refuse to abide by their decision, he shall pay double the damage which he has caused.

In autumn God gives us two boons — one the joy of Dionysus not to be laid up — the other to be laid up. About the fruits of autumn let the law be as follows: He who gathers the storing fruits of autumn, whether grapes or figs, before the time of the vintage, which is the rising of Arcturus, shall pay fifty drachmas as a fine to Dionysus, if he gathers on his own ground; if on his neighbour's ground, a mina, and two-thirds of a mina if on that of any one else. The grapes or figs not used for storing a man may gather when he pleases on his own ground, but on that of others he must pay the penalty of removing what he has not laid down. If he be a slave who has gathered, he shall receive a stroke for every grape or fig. A metic must purchase the choice fruit; but a stranger may pluck for himself and his attendant. This right of hospitality, however, does not extend to storing grapes. A slave who eats of the storing grapes or figs shall be beaten, and the freeman be dismissed with a warning. Pears, apples, pomegranates, may be taken secretly, but he who is detected in the act of taking them shall be lightly beaten off, if he be not more than thirty years of age. The stranger and the elder may partake of them, but not carry any away; the latter, if he does not obey the law, shall fail in the com-

petition of virtue, if anybody brings up his offence against him.

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Water is also in need of protection, being the greatest element of nutrition, and, unlike the other elements — soil, air, and sun — which conspire in the growth of plants, easily polluted. And therefore he who spoils another's water, whether in springs or reservoirs, either by trenching, or theft, or by means of poisonous substances, shall pay the damage and purify the stream. At the getting-in of the harvest everybody shall have a right of way over his neighbour's ground, provided he is careful to do no damage beyond the trespass, or if he himself will gain three times as much as his neighbour loses. Of all this the magistrates are to take cognizance, and they are to assess the damage where the injury does not exceed three minae; cases of greater damage can be tried only in the public courts. A charge against a magistrate is to be referred to the public courts, and any one who is found guilty of deciding corruptly shall pay twofold to the aggrieved person. Matters of detail relating to punishments and modes of procedure, and summonses, and witnesses to summonses, do not require the mature wisdom of the aged legislator; the younger generation may determine them according to their experience; but when once determined, they shall remain unaltered.

The following are to be the regulations respecting handicrafts:— No citizen, or servant of a citizen, is to practise them. For the citizen has already an art and mystery, which is the care of the state; and no man can practise two arts, or practise one and superintend another. No smith should be a carpenter, and no carpenter, having many slaves who are smiths, should look after them himself; but let each man practise one art which shall be his means of livelihood. The wardens of the city should see to this, punishing the citizen who offends with temporary deprivation of his rights — the foreigner shall be imprisoned, fined, exiled. Any disputes about contracts shall be determined by the wardens of the city up to fifty drachmae — above that sum by the public courts. No customs are to be exacted either on imports or exports. Nothing unnecessary is to be imported from abroad, whether for the service of the Gods or for the use of man — neither purple, nor other dyes, nor frankincense,—and nothing needed in the



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country is to be exported. These things are to be decided on by the twelve guardians of the law who are next in seniority to the five elders. Arms and the materials of war are to be imported and exported only with the consent of the generals, and then only by the state. There is to be no retail trade either in these or any other articles. For the distribution of the produce of the country, the Cretan laws afford a rule which may be usefully followed. All shall be required to distribute corn, grain, animals, and other valuable produce, into twelve portions. Each of these shall be subdivided into three parts—one for freemen, another for servants, and the third shall be sold for the supply of artisans, strangers, and metics. These portions must be equal whether the produce be much or little; and the master of a household may distribute the two portions among his family and his slaves as he pleases—the remainder is to be measured out to the animals.

Next as to the houses in the country—there shall be twelve villages, one in the centre of each of the twelve portions; and in every village there shall be temples and an agora—also shrines for heroes or for any old Magnesian deities who linger about the place. In every division there shall be temples of Hestia, Zeus, and Athenè, as well as of the local deity, surrounded by buildings on eminences, which will be the guard-houses of the rural police. The dwellings of the artisans will be thus arranged:—The artisans shall be formed into thirteen guilds, one of which will be divided into twelve parts and settled in the city; of the rest there shall be one in each division of the country. And the magistrates will fix them on the spots where they will cause the least inconvenience and be most serviceable in supplying the wants of the husbandmen.

The care of the agora will fall to the wardens of the agora. 8 Their first duty will be the regulation of the temples which surround the market-place; and their second to see that the markets are orderly and that fair dealing is observed. They will also take care that the sales which the citizens are required to make to strangers are duly executed. The law shall be, that on the first day of each month the auctioneers to whom the sale is entrusted shall offer grain; and at this sale a twelfth part of the whole shall be exposed, and the foreigner shall supply his wants for a month. On the tenth, there shall be a sale of liquids, and



on the twenty-third of animals, skins, woven or woollen stuffs, and other things which husbandmen have to sell and foreigners want to buy. None of these commodities, any more than barley or flour, or any other food, may be retailed by a citizen to a citizen; but foreigners may sell them to one another in the foreigners' market. There must also be butchers who will sell parts of animals to foreigners and craftsmen, and their servants; and foreigners may buy firewood wholesale of the commissioners of woods, and may sell retail to foreigners. All other goods must be sold in the market, at some place indicated by the magistrates, and shall be paid for on the spot. He who gives credit, and is cheated, will have no redress. In buying or selling, any excess or diminution of what the law allows shall be registered. The same rule is to be observed about the property of metics. Anybody who practises a handicraft may come and remain twenty years from the day on which he is enrolled; at the expiration of this time he shall take what he has and depart. The only condition which is to be imposed upon him as the tax of his sojourn is good conduct; and he is not to pay any tax for being allowed to buy or sell. But if he wants to extend the time of his sojourn, and has done any service to the state, and he can persuade the council and assembly to grant his request, he may remain. The children of metics may also be metics; and the period of twenty years, during which they are permitted to sojourn, is to count, in their case, from their fifteenth year.

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ANALYSIS.

No mention occurs in the *Laws* of the doctrine of Ideas. The will of God, the authority of the legislator, and the dignity of the soul, have taken their place in the mind of Plato. If we ask what is that truth or principle which, towards the end of his life, seems to have absorbed him most, like the idea of good in the *Republic*, or of beauty in the *Symposium*, or of the unity of virtue in the *Protagoras*, we should answer — The priority of the soul to the body: his later system mainly hangs upon this. In the *Laws*, as in the *Sophist* and *Statesman*, we pass out of the region of metaphysical or transcendental ideas into that of psychology.

INTRODUCTION.

The opening of the fifth book, though abrupt and unconnected in style, is one of the most elevated passages in Plato. The

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religious feeling which he seeks to diffuse over the commonest actions of life, the blessedness of living in the truth, the great mistake of a man living for himself, the pity as well as anger which should be felt at evil, the kindness due to the suppliant and the stranger, have the temper of Christian philosophy. The remark that elder men, if they want to educate others, should begin by educating themselves; the necessity of creating a spirit of obedience in the citizens; the desirableness of limiting property; the importance of parochial districts, each to be placed under the protection of some God or demigod, have almost the tone of a modern writer. In many of his views of politics, Plato seems to us, like some politicians of our own time, to be half socialist, half conservative.

In the *Laws*, we remark a change in the place assigned by him to pleasure and pain. There are two ways in which even the ideal systems of morals may regard them: either like the Stoics, and other ascetics, we may say that pleasure must be eradicated; or if this seems unreal to us, we may affirm that virtue is the true pleasure; and then, as Aristotle says, 'to be brought up to take pleasure in what we ought, exercises a great and paramount influence on human life (Arist. Eth. Nic. x. 1). Or as Plato says in the *Laws*, 'A man will recognize the noblest life as having the greatest pleasure and the least pain, if he have a true taste' (v. 732 E foll.). If we admit that pleasures differ in kind, the opposition between these two modes of speaking is rather verbal than real; and in the greater part of the writings of Plato they alternate with each other. In the *Republic*, the mere suggestion that pleasure may be the chief good, is received by Socrates with a cry of abhorrence (vi. 509 A); but in the *Philebus*, innocent pleasures vindicate their right to a place in the scale of goods (66 D). In the *Protagoras* (357), speaking in the person of Socrates rather than in his own, Plato admits the calculation of pleasure to be the true basis of ethics, while in the *Phaedo* (68, 69) he indignantly denies that the exchange of one pleasure for another is the exchange of virtue. So wide of the mark are they who would attribute to Plato entire consistency in thoughts or words.

He acknowledges that the second state is inferior to the first — in this, at any rate, he is consistent; and he still casts longing

eyes upon the ideal (v. 739). Several features of the first are retained in the second: the education of men and women is to be as far as possible the same (vii. 804 foll. ; especially 805 C); they are to have common meals, though separate, the men by themselves, the women with their children (vii. 806 E); and they are both to serve in the army (vii. 805,806); the citizens, if not actually communists, are in spirit communistic; they are to be lovers of equality (v. 741 A); only a certain amount of wealth is permitted to them (vi. 754), and their burdens and also their privileges are to be proportioned to this (vi. 765 C; xii. 955 D). The constitution in the Laws is a timocracy of wealth (v. 744 D), modified by an aristocracy of merit (vi. 755; xii. 951). Yet the political philosopher will observe that the first of these two principles is fixed and permanent, while the latter is uncertain and dependent on the opinion of the multitude. Wealth, after all, plays a great part in the Second Republic of Plato. Like other politicians, he deems that a property qualification will contribute stability to the state (iii. 698 B, C). The four classes are derived from the constitution of Athens, just as the form of the city, which is clustered around a citadel set on a hill (vi. 778 C), is suggested by the Acropolis at Athens. Plato, writing under Pythagorean influences, seems really to have supposed that the well-being of the city depended almost as much on the number 5040 as on justice and moderation (v. 741 A, B). But he is not prevented by Pythagoreanism from observing the effects which climate and soil exercise on the characters of nations (v. 747).

He was doubtful in the Republic whether the ideal or communistic state could be realized, but was at the same time prepared to maintain that whether it existed or not made no difference to the philosopher, who will in any case regulate his life by it (Rep. ix. 592 B). He has now lost faith in the practicability of his scheme—he is speaking to ‘men, and not to Gods or sons of Gods’ (Laws ix. 853 C). Yet he still maintains it to be the true pattern of the state, which we must approach as nearly as possible (v. 739 E): as Aristotle says, ‘After having created a more general form of state, he gradually brings it round to the other’ (Pol. ii. 6, § 4). He does not observe, either here or in the Republic, that in such a commonwealth there would be little room for the development of individual character. In several respects the second state is an im-

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provement on the first, especially in being based more distinctly on the dignity of the soul. The standard of truth, justice, temperance, is as high as in the Republic; — in one respect higher, for temperance is now regarded, not as a virtue, but as the condition of all virtue (iii. 696). It is finally acknowledged that the virtues are all one and connected (i. 630 A), and that if they are separated, courage is the lowest of them (i. 631 C). The treatment of moral questions is less speculative but more human. The idea of good has disappeared; the excellences of individuals — of him who is faithful in a civil broil (i. 630), of the examiner who is incorruptible (xii. 947), are the patterns to which the lives of the citizens are to conform. Plato is never weary of speaking of the honour of the soul, which can only be honoured truly by being improved (v. 727 foll.). To make the soul as good as possible, and to prepare her for communion with the Gods in another world by communion with divine virtue in this, is the end of life (x. 904 D). If the Republic is far superior to the Laws in form and style, and perhaps in reach of thought, the Laws leave on the mind of the modern reader much more strongly the impression of a struggle against evil, and an enthusiasm for human improvement. When Plato says that he must carry out that part of his ideal which is practicable (Laws v. 746), he does not appear to have reflected that part of an ideal cannot be detached from the whole.

The great defect of both his constitutions is the fixedness which he seeks to impress upon them. He had seen the Athenian empire, almost within the limits of his own life, wax and wane, but he never seems to have asked himself what would happen if, a century from the time at which he was writing, the Greek character should have as much changed as in the century which had preceded. He fails to perceive that the greater part of the political life of a nation is not that which is given them by their legislators, but that which they give themselves. He has never reflected that without progress there cannot be order, and that mere order can only be preserved by an unnatural and despotic repression. The possibility of a great nation or of an universal empire arising never occurred to him. He sees the enfeebled and distracted state of the Hellenic world in his own later life, and thinks that the remedy is to make the laws unchangeable. The same want of insight is apparent in his judgments about art. He



would like to have the forms of sculpture and of music fixed as in Egypt. He does not consider that this would be fatal to the true principles of art, which, as Socrates had himself taught, was to give life (Xen. Mem. iii. 10. 6). We wonder how, familiar as he was with the statues of Pheidias, he could have endured the lifeless and half-monstrous works of Egyptian sculpture. The 'chants of Isis' (Laws ii. 657 B), we might think, would have been barbarous in an Athenian ear. But although he is aware that there are some things which are not so well among 'the children of the Nile' (xii. 953 E; v. 747 C), he is deeply struck with the stability of Egyptian institutions. Both in politics and in art Plato seems to have seen no way of bringing order out of disorder, except by taking a step backwards. Antiquity, compared with the world in which he lived, had a sacredness and authority for him: the men of a former age were supposed by him to have had a sense of reverence which was wanting among his contemporaries (xii. 948 B, C). He could imagine the early stages of civilization; he never thought of what the future might bring forth. His experience is confined to two or three centuries, to a few Greek states, and to an uncertain report of Egypt and the East. There are many ways in which the limitations of their knowledge affected the genius of the Greeks. In criticism they were like children, having an acute vision of things which were near to them, blind to possibilities which were in the distance.

The colony is to receive from the mother-country her original constitution, and some of the first guardians of the law (vi. 752). The guardians of the law are to be ministers of justice (ix. 855 D), and the president of education is to take precedence of them all (vi. 765 E). They are to keep the registers of property (vi. 754 D), to make regulations for trade (xi. 920 C), and they are to be superannuated at seventy years of age (vi. 755 B). Several questions of modern politics, such as the limitation of property (vi. 754 D), the enforcement of education (vii. 804 D), the relations of classes (vi. 759 B), are anticipated by Plato. He hopes that in his state will be found neither poverty nor riches; every man having the necessities of life, he need not go fortune-hunting in marriage (vi. 774 C). Almost in the spirit of the Gospel he would say, 'How hardly can a rich man dwell in a perfect state.' For he cannot be a good man who is always gaining too much and

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spending too little (Laws v. 742 E. foll. ; cp. Arist. Eth. Nic. iv. 2, § 3). Plato, though he admits wealth as a political element, would deny that material prosperity can be the foundation of a really great community. A man's soul, as he often says, is more to be esteemed than his body ; and his body than external goods (v. 743). He repeats (iv. 705 B) the complaint which has been made in all ages, that the love of money is the corruption of states. He has a sympathy with thieves and burglars, 'many of whom are men of ability and greatly to be pitied, because their souls are hungering and thirsting all their lives long' (v. 831 E foll.) ; but he has little sympathy with shopkeepers or retailers, although he makes the reflection, which sometimes occurs to ourselves, that such occupations, if they were carried on honestly by the best men and women, would be delightful and honourable (xi. 918 D). For traders and artisans a moderate gain was, in his opinion, best (xi. 920 C). He has never, like modern writers, idealized the wealth of nations (v. 742 C foll.), any more than he has worked out the problems of political economy, which among the ancients had not yet grown into a science. The isolation of Greek states, their constant wars, the want of a free industrial population, and of the modern methods and instruments of 'credit,' prevented any great extension of commerce among them ; and so hindered them from forming a theory of the laws which regulate the accumulation and distribution of wealth.

The constitution of the army is aristocratic and also democratic ; official appointment is combined with popular election. The two principles are carried out as follows : The guardians of the law nominate generals out of whom three are chosen by those who are or have been of the age for military service ; and the generals elected have the nomination of certain of the inferior officers. But if either in the case of the generals or of the inferior officers any one is ready to swear that he knows of a better man than those nominated, he may put the claims of his candidate to the vote of the whole army, or of the division of the service which he will, if elected, command (vi. 755). There is a general assembly, but its functions, except at elections, are hardly noticed (cp. vi. 758 D and 764 A). In the election of the Boulè, Plato again attempts to mix aristocracy and democracy. This is effected, first, as in the Servian constitution, by balancing wealth and numbers ;

for it cannot be supposed that those who possessed a higher qualification were equal in number with those who had a lower, and yet they have an equal number of representatives. In the second place, all classes are compelled to vote in the election of senators from the first and second class; but the fourth class is not compelled to elect from the third, nor the third and fourth from the fourth. Thirdly, out of the 180 persons who are thus chosen from each of the four classes, 720 in all, 360 are to be taken by lot; these form the council for the year (vi. 756).

These political adjustments of Plato's will be criticised by the practical statesman as being for the most part fanciful and ineffectual. He will observe, first of all, that the only real check on democracy is the division into classes. The second of the three proposals, though ingenious, and receiving some light from the apathy to politics which is often shown by the higher classes in a democracy, would have little power in times of excitement and peril, when the precaution was most needed. At such political crises, all the lower classes would vote equally with the higher. The subtraction of half the persons chosen at the first election by the chances of the lot would not raise the character of the senators, and is open to the objection of uncertainty, which necessarily attends this and similar schemes of double representative government. Nor can the voters be expected to retain the continuous political interest required for carrying out such a proposal as Plato's. Who could select 180 persons of each class, fitted to be senators? And whoever were chosen by the voter in the first instance, his wishes might be neutralized by the action of the lot. Yet the scheme of Plato is not really so extravagant as the actual constitution of Athens, in which all the senators appear to have been elected by lot (*ἀπὸ κνάμων βουλευταί*), at least, after the revolution made by Cleisthenes; for the constitution of the senate which was established by Solon probably had some aristocratic features, though their precise nature is unknown to us. The ancients knew that election by lot was the most democratic of all modes of appointment, seeming to say in the objectionable sense, that 'one man is as good as another.' Plato, who is desirous of mingling different elements, makes a partial use of the lot, which he applies to candidates already elected by vote. He attempts also to devise a system of checks

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and balances such as he supposes to have been intended by the ancient legislators. We are disposed to say to him, as he himself says in a remarkable passage (iv. 709 A), that 'no man ever legislates, but accidents of all sorts, which legislate for us in all sorts of ways. The violence of war and the hard necessity of poverty are constantly overturning governments and changing laws.' And yet, as he adds, the true legislator is still required: he must co-operate with circumstances. Many things which are ascribed to human foresight are the result of chance. Ancient, and in a less degree modern political constitutions, are never consistent with themselves, because they are never framed on a single design, but are added to from time to time as new elements arise and gain the preponderance in the state. We often attribute to the wisdom of our ancestors great political effects which have sprung unforeseen from the accident of the situation. Power, not wisdom, is most commonly the source of political revolutions. And the result, as in the Roman Republic, of the co-existence of opposite elements in the same state is, not a balance of power or an equable progress of liberal principles, but a conflict of forces, of which one or other may happen to be in the ascendant. In Greek history, as well as in Plato's conception of it, this 'progression by antagonism' involves reaction: the aristocracy expands into democracy and returns again to tyranny.

The constitution of the Laws may be said to consist, besides the magistrates, mainly of three elements,—an administrative Council, the judiciary, and the Nocturnal Council, which is an intellectual aristocracy, composed of priests and the ten eldest guardians of the law and some younger co-opted members. To this latter chiefly are assigned the functions of legislation, but to be exercised with a sparing hand. The powers of the ordinary council are administrative rather than legislative. The whole number of 360, as in the Athenian constitution, is distributed among the months of the year according to the number of the tribes. Not more than one-twelfth is to be in office at once, so that the government would be made up of twelve administrations succeeding one another in the course of the year. They are to exercise a general superintendence, and, like the Athenian counsellors, are to preside in monthly divisions over all assemblies (vi. 758). Of the ecclesia over which they presided



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(vi. 758 D, see above) little is said, and that little relates to comparatively trifling duties (viii. 850). Nothing is less present to the mind of Plato than a House of Commons, carrying on year by year the work of legislation. For he supposes the laws to be already provided. As little would he approve of a body like the Roman Senate. The people and the aristocracy alike are to be represented, not by assemblies, but by officers elected for one or two years, except the guardians of the law, who are elected for twenty years (vi. 755 B).

The evils of this system are obvious. If in any state, as Plato says in the *Statesman* (292 E), it is easier to find fifty good draught-players than fifty good rulers, the greater part of the 360 who compose the council must be unfitted to rule. The unfitness would be increased by the short period during which they held office. There would be no traditions of government among them, as in a Greek or Italian oligarchy, and no individual would be responsible for any of their acts. Everything seems to have been sacrificed to a false notion of equality, according to which all have a turn of ruling and being ruled. In the constitution of the *Magnesian state* Plato has not emancipated himself from the limitations of ancient politics. His government may be described as a democracy of magistrates elected by the people. He never troubles himself about the political consistency of his scheme. He does indeed say that the greater part of the good of this world arises, not from equality, but from proportion, which he calls the judgment of Zeus (vi. 757; cp. Aristotle's *Distributive Justice*, N. E. v. 5), but he hardly makes any attempt to carry out the principle in practice. There is no attempt to proportion representation to merit; nor is there any body in his commonwealth which represents the life either of a class or of the whole state. The manner of appointing magistrates is taken chiefly from the old democratic constitution of Athens, of which it retains some of the worst features, such as the use of the lot, while by doing away with the political character of the popular assembly the mainspring of the machine is taken out. The guardians of the law, thirty-seven in number, of whom the ten eldest reappear as a part of the *Nocturnal Council* at the end of the twelfth book (951 E), are to be elected by the whole military class (vi. 753 B), but they are to hold office for twenty

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years, and would therefore have an oligarchical rather than a democratic character. Nothing is said of the manner in which the functions of the Nocturnal Council are to be harmonized with those of the guardians of the law, or as to how the ordinary council is related to it.

Similar principles are applied to inferior offices. To some the appointment is made by vote, to others by lot (vi. 759). In the elections to the priesthood, Plato endeavours to mix or balance in a friendly manner 'demus and not demus' (vi. 759 B). The commonwealth of the Laws, like the Republic, cannot dispense with a spiritual head, which is the same in both — the oracle of Delphi. From this the laws about all divine things are to be derived. The final selection of the Interpreters (vi. 759), the choice of an heir for a vacant lot (ix. 856), the punishment for removing a deposit (xi. 913, 914), are also to be determined by it. Plato is not disposed to encourage amateur attempts to revive religion in states. For, as he says in the Laws, 'To institute religious rites is the work of a great intelligence' (x. 909 E).

Though the council is framed on the model of the Athenian Boulé, the law courts of Plato do not equally conform to the pattern of the Athenian dicasteries. Plato thinks that the judges should speak and ask questions:—this is not possible if they are numerous; he would, therefore, have a few judges only, but good ones (vi. 766 D, E; ix. 855 D, E). He is nevertheless aware that both in public and private suits there must be a popular element (vi. 768 A, B). He insists that the whole people must share in the administration of justice—in public causes they are to take the first step, and the final decision is to remain with them. In private suits they are also to retain a share; 'for the citizen who has no part in the administration of justice is apt to think that he has no share in the state. For this reason there is to be a court of law in every tribe (i. e. for about every 2,000 citizens), and the judges are to be chosen by lot.' Of the courts of law he gives what he calls a superficial sketch. Nor, indeed, is it easy to reconcile his various accounts of them. It is however clear that although some officials, like the guardians of the law, the wardens of the agora, city, and country have power to inflict minor penalties, the administration of justice is in the main popular. The ingenious expedient of dividing the questions of law and fact between a judge and jury,

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which would have enabled Plato to combine the popular element with the judicial, did not occur to him or to any other ancient political philosopher. Though desirous of limiting the number of judges, and thereby confining the office to persons specially fitted for it, he does not seem to have understood that a body of law must be formed by decisions as well as by legal enactments.

He would have men in the first place seek justice from their friends and neighbours, because, as he truly remarks, they know best the questions at issue (vi. 766 E) ; these are called in another passage (xii. 956 B) arbiters rather than judges. But if they cannot settle the matter, it is to be referred to the courts of the tribes, and a higher penalty is to be paid by the party who is unsuccessful in the suit (xii. 956 C, D). There is a further appeal allowed to the select judges, with a further increase of penalty. The select judges are to be appointed by the magistrates, who are to choose one from every magistracy (vi. 767 C). They are to be elected annually, and therefore probably for a year only, and are liable to be called to account before the guardians of the law (vi. 767 E). In cases of which death is the penalty, the trial takes place before a special court, which is composed of the guardians of the law and of the judges of appeal (ix. 855 C, D).

In treating of the subject in Book ix. (855 ; cp. xii. 956 E), he proposes to leave for the most part the methods of procedure to a younger generation of legislators ; the procedure in capital causes he determines himself. He insists that the vote of the judges shall be given openly, and before they vote they are to hear speeches from the plaintiff and defendant. They are then to take evidence in support of what has been said, and to examine witnesses. The eldest judge is to ask his questions first, and then the second, and then the third. The interrogatories are to continue for three days, and the evidence is to be written down (ix. 855, 856). Apparently he does not expect the judges to be professional lawyers, any more than he expects the members of the council to be trained statesmen.

In forming marriage connexions, Plato supposes that the public interest will prevail over private inclination (vi. 773). There was nothing in this very shocking to the notions of Greeks, among whom the feeling of love towards the other sex was almost



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deprived of sentiment or romance. Married life is to be regulated solely with a view to the good of the state. The newly-married couple are not allowed to absent themselves from their respective *syssitia*, even during their honeymoon (vi. 780 B); they are to give their whole mind to the procreation of children (vi. 775 D, E; 783 D, E); their duties to one another at a later period of life are not a matter about which the state is equally solicitous (vi. 784). Divorces are readily allowed for incompatibility of temper (xi. 929, 930). As in the Republic, physical considerations seem almost to exclude moral and social ones. To modern feelings there is a degree of coarseness in Plato's treatment of the subject. Yet he also makes some shrewd remarks on marriage, as for example, that a man who does not marry for money will not be the humble servant of his wife (vi. 774 C). And he shows a true conception of the nature of the family, when he requires that the newly-married couple 'should leave their father and mother,' and have a separate home (vi. 776 B). He also provides against extravagance in marriage festivals (vi. 775 A), which in some states of society, for instance in the case of the Hindoos, has been a social evil of the first magnitude.

In treating of property, Plato takes occasion to speak of property in slaves (vi. 776, 777). They are to be treated with perfect justice; but, for their own sake, to be kept at a distance. The motive is not so much humanity to the slave, of which there are hardly any traces (although Plato allows that many in the hour of peril have found a slave more attached than members of their own family), but the self-respect which the freeman and citizen owes to himself (cp. Rep. viii. 549 A). If they commit crimes, they are doubly punished (ix. 867, 868; viii. 844 E foll.); if they inform against illegal practices of their masters, they are to receive a protection, which would probably be ineffectual, from the guardians of the law; in rare cases they are to be set free (xi. 932 D, E). Plato still breathes the spirit of the old Hellenic world, in which slavery was a necessity, because leisure must be provided for the citizen.

The education propounded in the Laws differs in several points from that of the Republic. Plato seems to have reflected as deeply and earnestly on the importance of infancy as Rousseau, or Jean Paul (cp. the saying of the latter—'Not the moment of death, but the moment of birth, is probably the more important').



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He would fix the amusements of children in the hope of fixing their characters in after-life (vii. 797, 8). In the spirit of the statesman who said, 'Let me make the ballads of a country, and I care not who make their laws,' Plato would say, 'Let the amusements of children be unchanged, and they will not want to change the laws' (vii. 798 C). The 'Goddess Harmonia' plays a great part in Plato's ideas of education. The natural restless force of life in children, 'who do nothing but roar until they are three years old,' is gradually to be reduced to law and order (vii. 792 A; cp. ii. 653 E foll.). As in the Republic, he fixes certain forms in which songs are to be composed: (1) they are to be strains of cheerfulness and good omen; (2) they are to be hymns or prayers addressed to the Gods; (3) they are to sing only of the lawful and good (vii. 800, 801). The poets are again expelled, or rather ironically invited to depart; and those who remain are required to submit their poems to the censorship of the magistrates (vii. 817). Youth are no longer compelled to commit to memory many thousand lyric and tragic Greek verses; yet, perhaps, a worse fate is in store for them. Plato has no belief in the 'liberty of prophesying'; and having guarded against the dangers of lyric poetry, he remembers that there is an equal danger in other writings. He cannot leave his old enemies, the Sophists, in possession of the field; and therefore he proposes that youth shall learn by heart, instead of the compositions of poets or prose writers, his own inspired work on laws (vii. 810, 811). These, and music and mathematics, are the chief parts of his education.

Mathematics are to be cultivated, not as in the Republic with a view to the science of the idea of good,—though the higher use of them is not altogether excluded (vii. 818 C, D),—but rather with a religious and political aim. They are a sacred study which teaches men how to distribute the portions of a state (v. 737, 8; 746 D foll.), and which is to be pursued in order that they may learn not to blaspheme about astronomy (vii. 821 C). Against three mathematical errors Plato is in profound earnest. First, the error of supposing that the three dimensions of length, breadth, and height, are really commensurable with one another (vii. 820). The difficulty which he feels is analogous to the difficulty which he formerly felt about the

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connexion of ideas, and is equally characteristic of ancient philosophy: he fixes his mind on the point of difference, and cannot at the same time take in the similarity. Secondly, he is puzzled about the nature of fractions: in the Republic (vii. 525 E), he is disposed to deny the possibility of their existence. Thirdly, his optimism leads him to insist (unlike the Spanish king who thought that he could have improved on the mechanism of the heavens) on the perfect or circular movement of the heavenly bodies (vii. 821, 822). He appears to mean, that instead of regarding the stars as overtaking or being overtaken by one another, or as planets wandering in many paths, a more comprehensive survey of the heavens would enable us to infer that they all alike moved in a circle around a centre (cp. Timaeus 40 foll.; Rep. x.617). He probably suspected, though unacquainted with the true cause, that the appearance of the heavens did not agree with the reality: at any rate, his notions of what was right or fitting easily overpowered the results of actual observation. To the early astronomers, who lived at the revival of science, as to Plato, there was nothing absurd in *a priori* astronomy, and they would probably have made fewer real discoveries if they had followed any other track. (Cp. Introduction to the Republic, p. cix foll.).

The science of dialectic is nowhere mentioned by name in the Laws, nor is anything said of the education of after-life. The child is to begin to learn at ten years of age: he is to be taught reading and writing for three years, from ten to thirteen, and no longer; and for three years more, from thirteen to sixteen, he is to be instructed in music (vii. 810). The great fault which Plato finds in the contemporary education is the almost total ignorance of arithmetic and astronomy, in which the Greeks would do well to take a lesson from the Egyptians (vii. 819 A, B; cp. Rep. vii. 525 foll.). Dancing and wrestling are to have a military character (vii. 796), and women as well as men are to be taught the use of arms (vii. 794 D, 804 E). The military spirit which Plato has vainly endeavoured to expel in the first two books returns again in the seventh and eighth. He has evidently a sympathy with the soldier, as well as with the poet, and he is no mean master of the art, or at least of the theory, of war (cp. Laws vi. 760 foll.; vii. 813; viii. 829; Rep. v. 467-470), though

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inclining rather to the Spartan than to the Athenian practice of it (*Laws* iv. 706, 707). Of a supreme or master science which was to be the 'coping-stone' of the rest, few traces appear in the *Laws*. He seems to have lost faith in it, or perhaps to have realized that the time for such a science had not yet come, and that he was unable to fill up the outline which he had sketched. There is no requirement that the guardians of the law shall be philosophers, although they are to know the unity of virtue (xii. 965), and the connexion of the sciences (967, 968). Nor are we told that the leisure of the citizens, when they are grown up, is to be devoted to any intellectual employment. In this respect we note a falling off from the *Republic*, but also there is 'the returning to it' of which Aristotle speaks in the *Politics*. The public and family duties of the citizens are to be their main business, and these would, no doubt, take up a great deal more time than in the modern world we are willing to allow to either of them (vii. 807). Plato no longer entertains the idea of any regular training to be pursued under the superintendence of the state from eighteen to thirty, or from thirty to thirty-five; he has taken the first step downwards on 'Constitution Hill' (*Rep.* viii. 547, 548). But he maintains as earnestly as ever that 'to men living under this second polity there remains the greatest of all works, the education of the soul,' and that no bye-work should be allowed to interfere with it. Night and day are not long enough for the consummation of it (vii. 807 D).

Few among us are either able or willing to carry education into later life; five or six years spent at school, three or four at a university, or in the preparation for a profession, an occasional attendance at a lecture to which we are invited by friends when we have an hour to spare from house-keeping or money-making — these comprise, as a matter of fact, the education even of the educated; and then the lamp is extinguished 'more truly than Heracleitus' sun, never to be lighted again' (*Rep.* vi. 497 B). The description which Plato gives in the *Republic* of the state of adult education among his contemporaries may be applied almost word for word to our own age. He does not however acquiesce in this widely-spread want of a higher education; he would rather seek to make every man something of a philosopher before he enters on the duties of active life.



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But in the *Laws* he no longer prescribes any regular course of study which is to be pursued in mature years. Nor does he remark that the education of after-life is of another kind, and must consist with the majority of the world rather in the improvement of character than in the acquirement of knowledge. It comes from the study of ourselves and other men: from moderation and experience: from reflection on circumstances: from the pursuit of high aims: from a right use of the opportunities of life. It is the preservation of what we have been, and the addition of something more. The power of abstract study or continuous thought is very rare, but such a training as this can be given by every one to himself.

The singular passage in Book vii. (803 C), in which Plato describes life as a pastime, like many other passages in the *Laws*, is imperfectly expressed. Two thoughts seem to be struggling in his mind: first, the reflection, to which he returns at the end of the passage (804 B), that men are playthings or puppets, and that God only is the serious aim of human endeavours; this suggests to him the afterthought that, although playthings, they are the playthings of the Gods, and that this is the best of them. The cynical, ironical fancy of the moment insensibly passes into a religious sentiment. In another passage he says that life is a game of which God, who is the player, shifts the pieces so as to procure the victory of good on the whole (x. 903 D foll.). Or once more: Tragedies are acted on the stage; but the best and noblest of them is the imitation of the noblest life, which we affirm to be the life of our whole state (vii. 817). Again, life is a chorus, as well as a sort of mystery, in which we have the Gods for playmates (ii. 653 C, D; 655 A). Men imagine that war is their serious pursuit, and they make war that they may return to their amusements. But neither wars nor amusements are the true satisfaction of men, which is to be found only in the society of the Gods, in sacrificing to them and propitiating them (vii. 803 D, E). Like a Christian ascetic, Plato seems to suppose that life should be passed wholly in the enjoyment of divine things. And after meditating in amazement on the sadness and unreality of the world, he adds, in a sort of parenthesis, 'Be cheerful, Sirs' (Shakespeare, *Tempest*, act iv. sc. 1).



In one of the noblest passages of Plato, he speaks of the relation of the sexes (viii. 835-842). Natural relations between members of the same family have been established of old; a 'little word' has put a stop to incestuous connexions. But unnatural unions of another kind continued to prevail at Crete and Lacedaemon, and were even justified by the example of the Gods (i. 636 C). They, too, might be banished, if the feeling that they were unholy and abominable could sink into the minds of men. The legislator is to cry aloud, and spare not, 'Let not men fall below the level of the beasts' (viii. 840 D). Plato does not shrink, like some modern philosophers, from 'carrying on war against the mightiest lusts of mankind' (viii. 835 C); neither does he expect to extirpate them, but only to confine them to their natural use and purpose, by the enactments of law, and by the influence of public opinion. He will not feed them by an over-luxurious diet, nor allow the healthier instincts of the soul to be corrupted by music and poetry. The prohibition of excessive wealth is, as he says, a very considerable gain in the way of temperance (viii. 836 A), nor does he allow of those enthusiastic friendships between older and younger persons which in his earlier writings appear to be alluded to with a certain degree of amusement and without reproof (cp. Introduction to the Symposium, *sub fin.*). Sappho and Anacreon are celebrated by him in the Charmides and the Phaedrus; but they would have been expelled from the Magnesian state.

Yet he does not suppose that the rule of absolute purity can be enforced on all mankind. Something must be conceded to the weakness of human nature. He therefore adopts a 'second legal standard of honourable and dishonourable, having a second standard of right.' He would abolish altogether 'the connexion of men with men. . . . As to women, if any man has to do with any but those who come into his house duly married by sacred rites, and he offends publicly in the face of all mankind, we shall be right in enacting that he be deprived of civic honours and privileges.' But feeling also that it is impossible wholly to control 'the mightiest passions of mankind,' Plato, like other legislators, makes a compromise. The offender must not be found out; decency, if not morality, must be respected. In this he appears to agree with the practice of all civilized ages and

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countries. Much may be truly said by the moralist on the comparative harm of open and concealed vice. Nor do we deny that some moral evils are better turned out to the light, because, like diseases, when exposed, they are more easily cured. And secrecy introduces mystery which enormously exaggerates their power; a mere animal want is thus elevated into a sentimental ideal. It may very well be that a word spoken in season about things which are commonly concealed may have an excellent effect. But having regard to the education of youth, to the innocence of children, to the sensibilities of women, to the decencies of society, Plato and the world in general are not wrong in insisting that some of the worst vices, if they must exist, should be kept out of sight; this, though only a second-best rule, is a support to the weakness of human nature. There are some things which may be whispered in the closet, but should not be shouted on the housetop. It may be said of this, as of many other things, that it is a great part of education to know to whom they are to be spoken of, and when, and where.

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**BOOK IX.** Punishments of offences and modes of procedure come next in order. We have a sense of disgrace in making regulations for all the details of crime in a virtuous and well-ordered state. But seeing that we are legislating for men and not for Gods, there is no uncharitableness in apprehending that some one of our citizens may have a heart, like the seed which has touched the ox's horn, so hard as to be impenetrable to the law. Let our first enactment be directed against the robbing of temples. No well-educated citizen will be guilty of such a crime, but one of their servants, or some stranger, may, and with a view to him, and at the same time with a remoter eye to the general infirmity of human nature, I will lay down the law, beginning with a prelude. To the intending robber we will say — O sir, the complaint which troubles you is not human; but some curse has fallen upon you, inherited from the crimes of your ancestors, of which you must purge yourself: go and sacrifice to the Gods, associate with the good, avoid the wicked; and if you are cured of the fatal impulse, well; but if not, acknowledge death to be better than life, and depart.

These are the accents, soft and low, in which we address the

would-be criminal. And if he will not listen, then cry aloud as with the sound of a trumpet: Whosoever robs a temple, if he be a slave or a foreigner shall be branded in the face and hands, and scourged, and cast naked beyond the border. And perhaps this may improve him: for the law aims either at the reformation of the criminal, or the repression of crime. No punishment is designed to inflict useless injury. But if the offender be a citizen, he must be incurable, and for him death is the only fitting penalty. His iniquity, however, shall not be visited on his children, nor shall his property be confiscated.

As to the exaction of penalties, any person who is fined for an offence shall not be liable to pay the fine, unless he have property in excess of his lot. For the lots must never go uncultivated for lack of means; the guardians of the law are to provide against this. If a fine is inflicted upon a man which he cannot pay, and for which his friends are unwilling to give security, he shall be imprisoned and otherwise dishonoured. But no criminal shall go unpunished:—whether death, or imprisonment, or stripes, or fines, or the stocks, or banishment to a remote temple, be the penalty. Capital offences shall come under the cognizance of the guardians of the law, and a college of the best of the last year's magistrates. The order of suits and similar details we shall leave to the lawgivers of the future, and only determine the mode of voting. The judges are to sit in order of seniority, and the proceedings shall begin with the speeches of the plaintiff and the defendant; and then the judges, beginning with the eldest, shall ask questions and collect evidence during three days, which, at the end of each day, shall be deposited in writing under their seals on the altar of Hestia; and when they have evidence enough, after a solemn declaration that they will decide justly, they shall vote and end the case. The votes are to be given openly in the presence of the citizens.

Next to religion, the preservation of the constitution is the first object of the law. The greatest enemy of the state is he who attempts to set up a tyrant, or breeds plots and conspiracies; not far below him in guilt is a magistrate who either knowingly, or in ignorance, fails to bring the offender to justice. Any one who is good for anything will give information against traitors. The mode of proceeding at such trials will be the same as at trials for sacrilege; the penalty, death. But neither in this case nor in any

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other is the son to bear the iniquity of the father, unless father, grandfather, great-grandfather, have all of them been capitally convicted, and then the family of the criminal are to be sent off to the country of their ancestor, retaining their property, with the exception of the lot and its fixtures. And ten are to be selected from the younger sons of the other citizens—one of whom is to be chosen by the oracle of Delphi to be heir of the lot.

Our third law will be a general one, concerning the procedure and the judges in cases of treason. As regards the remaining or departure of the family of the offender, the same law shall apply equally to the traitor, the sacrilegious, and the conspirator.

A thief, whether he steals much or little, must refund twice the amount, if he can do so without impairing his lot; if he cannot, he must go to prison until he either pays the plaintiff, or in case of a public theft, the city, or they agree to forgive him. ‘But should all kinds of theft incur the same penalty?’ You remind me of what I know—that legislation is never perfect. The men for whom laws are now made may be compared to the slave who is being doctored, according to our old image, by the unscientific doctor. For the empirical practitioner, if he chance to meet the educated physician talking to his patient, and entering into the philosophy of his disease, would burst out laughing and say, as doctors delight in doing, ‘Foolish fellow, instead of curing the patient you are educating him!’ ‘And would he not be right?’ Perhaps; and he might add, that he who discourses in our fashion preaches to the citizens instead of legislating for them. ‘True.’ There is, however, one advantage which we possess—that being amateurs only, we may either take the most ideal, or the most necessary and utilitarian view. ‘But why offer such an alternative? as if all our legislation must be done to-day, and nothing put off until the morrow. We may surely rough-hew our materials first, and shape and place them afterwards.’ That will be the natural way of proceeding. There is a further point. Of all writings either in prose or verse the writings of the legislator are the most important. For it is he who has to determine the nature of good and evil, and how they should be studied with a view to our instruction. And is it not as disgraceful for Solon and Lycurgus to lay down false precepts about the institutions of life as for Homer and Tyrtaeus? The laws of states ought to be the models of writing, and what is



at variance with them should be deemed ridiculous. And we may further imagine them to express the affection and good sense of a father or mother, and not to be the fiat of a tyrant. ‘Very true.’

Let us enquire more particularly about sacrilege, theft and other crimes, for which we have already legislated in part. And this leads us to ask, first of all, whether we are agreed or disagreed about the nature of the honourable and just. ‘To what are you referring?’ I will endeavour to explain. All are agreed that justice is honourable, whether in men or things, and no one who maintains that a very ugly man who is just, is in his mind fair, would be thought extravagant. ‘Very true.’ But if honour is to be attributed to justice, are just sufferings honourable, or only just actions? ‘What do you mean?’ Our laws supply a case in point; for we enacted that the robber of temples and the traitor should die; and this was just, but the reverse of honourable. In this way does the language of the many rend asunder the just and honourable. ‘That is true.’ But is our own language consistent? I have already said that the evil are involuntarily evil (v. 731 C); and the evil are the unjust. Now the voluntary cannot be the involuntary; and if you two come to me and say, ‘Then shall we legislate for our city?’ Of course, I shall reply.—‘Then will you distinguish what crimes are voluntary and what involuntary, and shall we impose lighter penalties on the latter, and heavier on the former? Or shall we refuse to determine what is the meaning of voluntary and involuntary, and maintain that our words have come down from heaven, and that they should be at once embodied in a law?’ All states legislate under the idea that there are two classes of actions, the voluntary and the involuntary, but there is great confusion about them in the minds of men; and the law can never act unless they are distinguished. Either we must abstain from affirming that unjust actions are involuntary, or explain the meaning of this statement. Believing, then, that acts of injustice cannot be divided into voluntary and involuntary, I must endeavour to find some other mode of classifying them. Hurts are voluntary and involuntary, but all hurts are not injuries: on the other hand, a benefit when wrongly conferred may be an injury. An act which gives or takes away anything is not simply just; but the legislator who has to decide whether the case is one of hurt or injury, must consider the animus of the agent; and when there is hurt, he must, as far as

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possible, provide a remedy and reparation: but if there is injustice, he must, when compensation has been made, further endeavour to reconcile the two parties. 'Excellent.' Where injustice, like disease, is remediable, there the remedy must be applied in word or deed, with the assistance of pleasures and pains, of bounties and penalties, or any other influence which may inspire man with the love of justice, or hatred of injustice; and this is the noblest work of law. But when the legislator perceives the evil to be incurable, he will consider that the death of the offender will be a good to himself, and in two ways a good to society: first, as he becomes an example to others; secondly, because the city will be quit of a rogue; and in such a case, but in no other, the legislator will punish with death. 'There is some truth in what you say. I wish, however, that you would distinguish more clearly the difference of injury and hurt, and the complications of voluntary and involuntary.' You will admit that anger is of a violent and destructive nature? 'Certainly.' And further, that pleasure is different from anger, and has an opposite power, working by persuasion and deceit? 'Yes.' Ignorance is the third source of crimes; this is of two kinds—simple ignorance and ignorance doubled by conceit of knowledge; the latter, when accompanied with power, is a source of terrible errors, but is excusable when only weak and childish. 'True.' We often say that one man masters, and another is mastered by pleasure and anger. 'Just so.' But no one says that one man masters, and another is mastered by ignorance. 'You are right.' All these motives actuate men and sometimes drive them in different ways. 'That is so.' Now, then, I am in a position to define the nature of just and unjust. By injustice I mean the dominion of anger and fear, pleasure and pain, envy and desire, in the soul, whether doing harm or not: by justice I mean the rule of the opinion of the best, whether in states or individuals, extending to the whole of life; although actions done in error are often thought to be involuntary injustice. No controversy need be raised about names at present; we are only desirous of fixing in our memories the heads of error. And the pain which is called fear and anger is our first head of error; the second is the class of pleasures and desires; and the third, of hopes which aim at true opinion about the best;—this latter falls into three divisions [i.e. (1) when accompanied by simple ignorance,

a person here to think that all men are not ignorant

(2) when accompanied by conceit of wisdom combined with power, or (3) with weakness], so that there are in all five. And the laws relating to them may be summed up under two heads, laws which deal with acts of open violence and with acts of deceit; to which may be added acts both violent and deceitful, and these last should be visited with the utmost rigour of the law. 'Very properly.'

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Let us now return to the enactment of laws. We have treated of sacrilege, and of conspiracy, and of treason. Any of these crimes may be committed by a person not in his right mind, or in the second childhood of old age. If this is proved to be the fact before the judges, the person in question shall only have to pay for the injury, and not be punished further, unless he have on his hands the stain of blood. In this case he shall be exiled for a year, and if he return before the expiration of the year, he shall be retained in the public prison two years.

Homicides may be divided into voluntary and involuntary: and first of involuntary homicide. He who unintentionally kills another man at the games or in military exercises duly authorized by the magistrates, whether death follow immediately or after an interval, shall be acquitted, subject only to the purification required by the Delphian Oracle. Any physician whose patient dies against his will shall in like manner be acquitted. Any one who unintentionally kills the slave of another, believing that he is his own, with or without weapons, shall bear the master of the slave harmless, or pay a penalty amounting to twice the value of the slave, and to this let him add a purification greater than in the case of homicide at the games. If a man kill his own slave, a purification only is required of him. If he kill a freeman unintentionally, let him also make purification; and let him remember the ancient tradition which says that the murdered man is indignant when he sees the murderer walk about in his own accustomed haunts, and that he terrifies him with the remembrance of his crime. And therefore the homicide should keep away from his native land for a year, or, if he have slain a stranger, let him avoid the land of the stranger for a like period. If he complies with this condition, the nearest kinsman of the deceased shall take pity upon him and be reconciled to him; but if he refuses to remain in exile, or visits the temples unpurified, then let the kinsman proceed against him, and demand a double



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penalty. The kinsman who neglects this duty shall himself incur the curse, and any one who likes may proceed against him, and compel him to leave his country for five years. If a stranger involuntarily kill a stranger, any one may proceed against him in the same manner; and the homicide, if he be a metic, shall be banished for a year; but if he be an entire stranger, whether he have murdered metic, citizen, or stranger, he shall be banished for ever; and if he return, he shall be punished with death, and his property shall go to the next of kin of the murdered man. If he come back by sea against his will, he shall remain on the seashore, wetting his feet in the water while he waits for a vessel to sail; or if he be brought back by land, the magistrates shall send him unharmed beyond the border.

Next follows murder done from anger, which is of two kinds — either arising out of a sudden impulse, and attended with remorse; or committed with premeditation, and unattended with remorse. The cause of both is anger, and both are intermediate between voluntary and involuntary. The one which is committed from sudden impulse, though not wholly involuntary, bears the image of the involuntary, and is therefore the more excusable of the two, and should receive a gentler punishment. The act of him who nurses his wrath is more voluntary, and therefore more culpable. The degree of culpability depends on the presence or absence of intention, to which the degree of punishment should correspond. For the first kind of murder, that which is done on a momentary impulse, let two years' exile be the penalty; for the second, that which is accompanied with malice prepense, three. When the time of any one's exile has expired, the guardians shall send twelve judges to the borders of the land, who shall have authority to decide whether he may return or not. He who after returning repeats the offence, shall be exiled and return no more, and, if he return, shall be put to death, like the stranger in a similar case. He who in a fit of anger kills his own slave, shall purify himself; and he who kills another man's slave, shall pay to his master double the value. Any one may proceed against the offender if he appear in public places, not having been purified; and may bring to trial both the next of kin to the dead man and the homicide, and compel the one to exact, and the other to pay, a double penalty. If a



slave kill his master, or a freeman who is not his master, in anger, the kinsmen of the murdered person may do with the murderer whatever they please, but they must not spare his life. If a father or mother kill their son or daughter in anger, let the slayer remain in exile for three years; and on the return of the exile let the parents separate, and no longer continue to cohabit, or have the same sacred rites with those whom he or she has deprived of a brother or sister. The same penalty is decreed against the husband who murders his wife, and also against the wife who murders her husband. Let them be absent three years, and on their return never again share in the same sacred rites with their children, or sit at the same table with them. Nor is a brother or sister who have lifted up their hands against a brother or sister, ever to come under the same roof or share in the same rites with those whom they have robbed of a child. If a son feels such hatred against his father or mother as to take the life of either of them, then, if the parent before death forgive him, he shall only suffer the penalty due to involuntary homicide; but if he be unforgiven, there are many laws against which he has offended; he is guilty of outrage, impiety, sacrilege all in one, and deserves to be put to death many times over. For if the law will not allow a man to kill the authors of his being even in self-defence, what other penalty than death can be inflicted upon him who in a fit of passion wilfully slays his father or mother? If a brother kill a brother in self-defence during a civil broil, or a citizen a citizen, or a slave a slave, or a stranger a stranger, let them be free from blame, as he is who slays an enemy in battle. But if a slave kill a freeman, let him be as a parricide. In all cases, however, the forgiveness of the injured party shall acquit the agents; and then they shall only be purified, and remain in exile for a year.

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Enough of actions that are involuntary, or done in anger; let us proceed to voluntary and premeditated actions. The great source of voluntary crime is the desire of money, which is begotten by evil education; and this arises out of the false praise of riches, common both among Hellenes and barbarians; they think that to be the first of goods which is really the third. For the body is not for the sake of wealth, but wealth for the body, as the body is for the soul. If this were better understood, the

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crime of murder, of which avarice is the chief cause, would soon cease among men. Next to avarice, ambition is a source of crime, troublesome to the ambitious man himself, as well as to the chief men of the state. And next to ambition, base fear is a motive, which has led many an one to commit murder in order that he may get rid of the witnesses of his crimes. Let this be said as a prelude to all enactments about crimes of violence; and the tradition must not be forgotten, which tells that the murderer is punished in the world below, and that when he returns to this world he meets the fate which he has dealt out to others. If a man is deterred by the prelude and the fear of future punishment, he will have no need of the law; but in case he disobey, let the law be declared against him as follows: — He 8  
who of malice prepense kills one of his kindred, shall in the first place be outlawed; neither temple, harbour, nor agora shall be polluted by his presence. And if a kinsman of the deceased refuse to proceed against his slayer, he shall take the curse of pollution upon himself, and also be liable to be prosecuted by any one who will avenge the dead. The prosecutor, however, must observe the customary ceremonial before he proceeds against the offender. The details of these observances will be best determined by a conclave of prophets and interpreters and guardians of the law, and the judges of the cause itself shall be the same as in cases of sacrilege. He who is convicted shall be punished with death, and not be buried within the country of the murdered person. He who flies from the law shall undergo perpetual banishment; if he return, he may be put to death with impunity by any relative of the murdered man or by any other citizen, or bound and delivered to the magistrates. He who accuses a man of murder shall demand satisfactory bail of the accused, and if this is not forthcoming, the magistrate shall keep him in prison against the day of trial. If a man commit murder by the hand of another, he shall be tried in the same way as in the cases previously supposed, but if the offender be a citizen, his body after execution shall be buried within the land.

If a slave kill a freeman, either with his own hand or by contrivance, let him be led either to the grave or to a place whence he can see the grave of the murdered man, and there receive as many stripes at the hand of the public executioner as the

person who took him pleases; and if he survive he shall be put to death. If a slave be put out of the way to prevent his informing of some crime, his death shall be punished like that of a citizen. If there are any of those horrible murders of kindred which sometimes occur even in well-regulated societies, and of which the legislator, however unwilling, cannot avoid taking cognizance, he will repeat the old myth of the divine vengeance against the perpetrators of such atrocities. The myth will say that the murderer must suffer what he has done: if he have slain his father, he must be slain by his children; if his mother, he must become a woman and perish at the hands of his offspring in another age of the world. Such a preamble may terrify him; but if, notwithstanding, in some evil hour he murders father or mother or brethren or children, the mode of proceeding shall be as follows:—Him who is convicted, the officers of the judges shall lead to a spot without the city where three ways meet, and there slay him and expose his body naked; and each of the magistrates shall cast a stone upon his head and justify the city, and he shall be thrown unburied beyond the border. But what shall we say of him who takes the life which is dearest to him, that is to say, his own; and this not from any disgrace or calamity, but from cowardice and indolence? The manner of his burial and the purification of his crime is a matter for God and the interpreters to decide and for his kinsmen to execute. Let him, at any rate, be buried alone in some uncultivated and nameless spot, and be without name or monument. If a beast kill a man, not in a public contest, let it be prosecuted for murder, and after condemnation slain and cast without the border. Also inanimate things which have caused death, except in the case of lightning and other visitations from heaven, shall be carried without the border. If the body of a dead man be found, and the murderer remain unknown, the trial shall take place all the same, and the unknown murderer shall be warned not to set foot in the temples or come within the borders of the land; if discovered, he shall die, and his body shall be cast out. A man is justified in taking the life of a burglar, of a footpad, of a violator of women or youth; and he may take the life of another with impunity in defence of father, mother, brother, wife, or other relations.

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The nurture and education which are necessary to the existence of men have been considered, and the punishment of acts of violence which destroy life. There remain maiming, wounding, and the like, which admit of a similar division into voluntary and involuntary. About this class of actions the preamble shall be: Whereas men would be like wild beasts unless they obeyed the laws, the first duty of citizens is the care of the public interests, which unite and preserve states, as private interests distract them. A man may know what is for the public good, but if he have absolute power, human nature will impel him to seek pleasure instead of virtue, and so darkness will come over his soul and over the state. If he had mind, he would have no need of law; for mind is the perfection of law. But such a freeman, 'whom the truth makes free,' is hardly to be found; and therefore law and order are necessary, which are the second-best, and they regulate things as they exist in part only, but cannot take in the whole. For actions have innumerable characteristics, which must be partly determined by the law and partly left to the judge. The judge must determine the fact; and to him also the punishment must sometimes be left. What shall the law prescribe, and what shall be left to the judge? A city is unfortunate in which the tribunals are either secret and speechless, or, what is worse, noisy and public, when the people, as if they were in a theatre, clap and hoot the various speakers. Such courts a legislator would rather not have; but if he is compelled to have them, he will speak distinctly, and leave as little as possible to their discretion. But where the courts are good, and presided over by well-trained judges, the penalties to be inflicted may be in a great measure left to them; and as there are to be good courts among our colonists, we need not determine beforehand the exact proportion of the penalty and the crime. Returning, then, to our legislator, let us indite a law about wounding, which shall run as follows:—He who wounds with intent to kill, and fails in his object, shall be tried as if he had succeeded. But since God has favoured both him and his victim instead of being put to death, he shall be allowed to go into exile and take his property with him, the damage due to the sufferer having been previously estimated by the court, which shall be the same as would have tried the case if death had ensued. If a child should intentionally wound a parent, or a servant his master, c



brother or sister wound brother or sister with malice prepense, the penalty shall be death. If a husband or wife wound one another with intent to kill, the penalty which is inflicted upon them shall be perpetual exile; and if they have young children, the guardians shall take care of them and administer their property as if they were orphans. If they have no children, their kinsmen male and female shall meet, and after a consultation with the priests and guardians of the law, shall appoint an heir of the house; for the house and family belong to the state, being a 5040th portion of the whole. And the state is bound to preserve her families happy and holy; therefore, when the heir of a house has committed a capital offence, or is in exile for life, the house is to be purified, and then the kinsmen of the house and the guardians of the law are to find out a family which has a good name and in which there are many sons, and introduce one of them to be the heir and priest of the house. He shall assume the fathers and ancestors of the family, while the first son dies in dishonour and his name is blotted out.

Some actions are intermediate between the voluntary and involuntary. Those done from anger are of this class. If a man wound another in anger, let him pay double the damage, if the injury is curable; or fourfold, if curable, and at the same time dishonourable; and fourfold, if incurable; the amount is to be assessed by the judges. If the wounded person is rendered incapable of military service, the injurer, besides the other penalties, shall serve in his stead, or be liable to a suit for refusing to serve. If brother wounds brother, then their parents and kindred, of both sexes, shall meet and judge the crime. The damages shall be assessed by the parents; and if the amount fixed by them is disputed, an appeal shall be made to the male kindred; or in the last resort to the guardians of the law. Parents who wound their children are to be tried by judges of at least sixty years of age, who have children of their own; and they are to determine whether death, or some lesser punishment, is to be inflicted upon them—no relatives are to take part in the trial. If a slave in anger smite a freeman, he is to be delivered up by his master to the injured person. If the master suspect collusion between the slave and the injured person, he may bring the matter to trial: and if he fail he shall pay three times the injury; or if he obtain a

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conviction, the contriver of the conspiracy shall be liable to an action for kidnapping. He who wounds another unintentionally shall only pay for the actual harm done.

In all outrages and acts of violence, the elder is to be more regarded than the younger. An injury done by a younger man to an elder is abominable and hateful; but the younger man who is struck by an elder is to bear with him patiently, considering that he who is twenty years older is *loco parentis*, and remembering the reverence which is due to the Gods who preside over birth. Let him keep his hands, too, from the stranger; instead of taking upon himself to chastise him when he is insolent, he shall bring him before the wardens of the city, who shall examine into the case, and if they find him guilty, shall scourge him with as many blows as he has given; or if he be innocent, they shall warn and threaten his accuser. When an equal strikes an equal, whether an old man an old man, or a young man a young man, let them use only their fists and have no weapons. He who being above forty years of age commences a fight, or retaliates, shall be counted mean and base.

To this preamble, let the law be added: If a man smite another who is his elder by twenty years or more, let the bystander, in case he be older than the combatants, part them; or if he be younger than the person struck, or of the same age with him, let him defend him as he would a father or brother; and let the striker be brought to trial, and if convicted imprisoned for a year or more at the discretion of the judges. If a stranger smite one who is his elder by twenty years or more, he shall be imprisoned for two years, and a metic, in like case, shall suffer three years' imprisonment. He who is standing by and gives no assistance, shall be punished according to his class in one of four penalties—a mina, fifty, thirty, twenty drachmas. The generals and other superior officers of the army shall form the court which tries this class of offences.

Laws are made to instruct the good, and in the hope that there may be no need of them; also to control the bad, whose hardness of heart will not be hindered from crime. The uttermost penalty will fall upon those who lay violent hands upon a parent, having no fear of the Gods above, or of the punishments which will pursue them in the world below. They are too wise in their own

conceit to believe in such things: wherefore the tortures which await them in another life must be anticipated in this. Let the law be as follows:—

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If a man, being in his right mind, dare to smite his father and mother, or his grandfather and grandmother, let the passer-by come to the rescue; and if he be a metic or stranger who comes to the rescue, he shall have the first place at the games; or if he do not come to the rescue, he shall be a perpetual exile. Let the citizen in the like case be praised or blamed, and the slave receive freedom or a hundred stripes. The wardens of the agora, the city, or the country, as the case may be, shall see to the execution of the law. And he who is an inhabitant of the same place and is present shall come to the rescue, or he shall fall under a curse.

If a man be convicted of assaulting his parents, let him be banished for ever from the city into the country, and let him abstain from all sacred rites; and if he do not abstain, let him be punished by the wardens of the country; and if he return to the city, let him be put to death. If any freeman consort with him, let him be purified before he returns to the city. If a slave strike a freeman, whether citizen or stranger, let the bystander be obliged to seize and deliver him into the hands of the injured person, who may inflict upon him as many blows as he pleases, and shall then return him to his master. The law will be as follows:—The slave who strikes a freeman shall be bound by his master, and not set at liberty without the consent of the person whom he has injured. All these laws apply to women as well as to men.

**BOOK X.** The greatest wrongs arise out of youthful insolence, and the greatest of all are committed against public temples; they are in the second degree great when private rites and sepulchres are insulted; in the third degree, when committed against parents; in the fourth degree, when they are done against the authority or property of the rulers; in the fifth degree, when the rights of individuals are violated. Most of these offences have been already considered; but there remains the question of admonition and punishment of offences against the Gods. Let the admonition be in the following terms:—No man who ever intentionally did or said anything impious, had a true belief in the existence of the Gods; but either he thought that there were no Gods, or that



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they did not care about men, or that they were easily appeased by sacrifices and prayers. ‘What shall we say or do to such persons?’ My good sir, let us first hear the jests which they in their superiority will make upon us. ‘What will they say?’ Probably something of this kind:—‘Strangers, you are right in thinking that some of us do not believe in the existence of the Gods; while others assert that they do not care for us, and others that they are propitiated by prayers and offerings. But we want you to argue with us before you threaten; you should prove to us by reasonable evidence that there are Gods, and that they are too good to be bribed. Poets, priests, prophets, rhetoricians, even the best of them, speak to us of atoning for evil, and not of avoiding it. From legislators who profess to be gentle we ask for instruction, which may, at least, have the persuasive power of truth, if no other.’ What have you to say? ‘Well, there is no difficulty in proving the being of the Gods. The sun, and earth, and stars, moving in their courses, the recurring seasons, furnish proofs of their existence; and there is the general opinion of mankind.’ I fear that the unbelievers—not that I care for their opinion—will despise us. You are not aware that their impiety proceeds, not from sensuality, but from ignorance taking the garb of wisdom. ‘What do you mean?’ At Athens there are tales current both in prose and verse of a kind which are not tolerated in a well-regulated state like yours. The oldest of them relate the origin of the world, and the birth and life of the Gods. These narratives have a bad influence on family relations; but as they are old we will let them pass, and consider another kind of tales, invented by the wisdom of a younger generation, who, if any one argues for the existence of the Gods and claims that the stars have a divine being, insist that these are mere earth and stones, which can have no care of human things, and that all theology is a cooking up of words. Now what course ought we to take? Shall we suppose some impious man to charge us with assuming the existence of the Gods, and make a defence? Or shall we leave the preamble and go on to the laws? ‘There is no hurry, and we have often said that the shorter and worse method should not be preferred to the longer and better. The proof that there are Gods who are good, and the friends of justice, is the best preamble of all our laws. Come, let us talk with the impious, who have been brought u



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from their infancy in the belief of religion, and have heard their own fathers and mothers praying for them and talking with the Gods as if they were absolutely convinced of their existence; who have seen mankind prostrate in prayer at the rising and setting of the sun and moon and at every turn of fortune, and have dared to despise and disbelieve all this. Can we keep our temper with them, when they compel us to argue on such a theme? We must; or like them we shall go mad, though with more reason. Let us select one of them and address him as follows:

O my son, you are young; time and experience will make you change many of your opinions. Do not be hasty in forming a conclusion about the divine nature; and let me mention to you a fact which I know. You and your friends are not the first or the only persons who have had these notions about the Gods. There are always a considerable number who are infected by them: I have known many myself, and can assure you that no one who was an unbeliever in his youth ever persisted till he was old in denying the existence of the Gods. The two other opinions, first, that the Gods exist and have no care of men, secondly, that they care for men, but may be propitiated by sacrifices and prayers, may indeed last through life in a few instances, but even this is not common. I would beg of you to be patient, and learn the truth of the legislator and others; in the mean time abstain from impiety. ‘So far, our discourse has gone well.’

I will now speak of a strange doctrine, which is regarded by many as the crown of philosophy. They affirm that all things come into being either by art or nature or chance, and that the greater things are done by nature and chance, and the lesser things by art, which receiving from nature the greater creations, moulds and fashions all those lesser works which are termed works of art. Their meaning is that fire, water, earth, and air all exist by nature and chance, and not by art; and that out of these, according to certain chance affinities of opposites, the sun, the moon, the stars, and the earth have been framed, not by any action of mind, but by nature and chance only. Thus, in their opinion, the heaven and earth were created, as well as the animals and plants. Art came later, and is of mortal birth; by her power were invented certain images and very partial imitations of the truth, of which kind are the creations of musicians and painters: but

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they say that there are other arts which combine with nature, and have a deeper truth, such as medicine, husbandry, gymnastic. Also the greater part of politics they imagine to co-operate with nature, but in a less degree, having more of art, while legislation is declared by them to be wholly a work of art. ‘How do you mean?’ In the first place, they say that the Gods exist neither by nature nor by art, but by the laws of states, which are different in different countries; and that virtue is one thing by nature and another by convention; and that justice is altogether conventional, made by law, and having authority for the moment only. This is repeated to young men by sages and poets, and leads to impiety, and the pretended life according to nature and in disobedience to law; for nobody believes the Gods to be such as the law affirms. ‘How true! and oh! how injurious to states and to families!’ But then, what should the lawgiver do? Should he stand up in the state and threaten mankind with the severest penalties if they persist in their unbelief, while he makes no attempt to win them by persuasion? ‘Nay, Stranger, the legislator ought never to weary of trying to persuade the world that there are Gods; and he should declare that law and art exist by nature.’ Yes, Cleinias; but these are difficult and tedious questions. ‘And shall our patience, which was not exhausted in the enquiry about music or drink, fail now that we are discoursing about the Gods? There may be a difficulty in framing laws, but when written down they remain, and time and diligence will make them clear; if they are useful there would be neither reason nor religion in rejecting them on account of their length.’ Most true. And the general spread of unbelief shows that the legislator should do something in vindication of the laws, when they are being undermined by bad men. ‘He should.’ You agree with me, Cleinias, that the heresy consists in supposing earth, air, fire, and water to be the first of all things. These the heretics call nature, conceiving them to be prior to the soul. ‘I agree.’ You would further agree that natural philosophy is the source of this impiety—the study appears to be pursued in a wrong way. ‘In what way do you mean?’ The error consists in transposing first and second causes. They do not see that the soul is before the body, and before all other things, and the author and ruler of them all. And if the soul is prior to the body, then the things of the soul are prior

to the things of the body. In other words, opinion, attention, mind, art, law, are prior to sensible qualities; and the first and greater works of creation are the results of art and mind, whereas the works of nature, as they are improperly termed, are secondary and subsequent. ‘Why do you say “improperly”?’ Because when they speak of nature they seem to mean the first creative power. But if the soul is first, and not fire and air, then the soul above all things may be said to exist by nature. And this can only be on the supposition that the soul is prior to the body. Shall we try to prove that it is so? ‘By all means.’ I fear that the greenness of our argument will ludicrously contrast with the ripeness of our ages. But as we must go into the water, and the stream is strong, I will first attempt to cross by myself, and if I arrive at the bank, you shall follow. Remembering that you are unaccustomed to such discussions, I will ask and answer the questions myself, while you listen in safety. But first I must pray the Gods to assist at the demonstration of their own existence—if ever we are to call upon them, now is the time. Let me hold fast to the rope, and enter into the depths: Shall I put the question to myself in this form?—Are all things at rest, and is nothing in motion? or are some things in motion, and some things at rest? ‘The latter.’ And do they move and rest, some in one place, some in more? ‘Yes.’ There may be (1) motion in the same place, as in revolution on an axis, which is imparted swiftly to the larger and slowly to the lesser circle; and there may be motion in different places, having sometimes (2) one centre of motion and sometimes (3) more. (4) When bodies in motion come against other bodies which are at rest, they are divided by them, and (5) when they are caught between other bodies coming from opposite directions they unite with them; and (6) they grow by union and (7) waste by dissolution while their constitution remains the same, but are (8) destroyed when their constitution fails. There is a growth from one dimension to two, and from a second to a third, which then becomes perceptible to sense; this process is called generation, and the opposite, destruction. We have now enumerated all possible motions with the exception of two. ‘What are they?’ Just the two with which our enquiry is concerned; for our enquiry relates to the soul. There is one kind of motion which is only able to move other things; there is another which can move itself

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as well, working in composition and decomposition, by increase and diminution, by generation and destruction. 'Granted.' (9) That which moves and is moved by another is the ninth kind of motion; (10) that which is self-moved and moves others is the tenth. And this tenth kind of motion is the mightiest, and is really the first, and is followed by that which was improperly called the ninth. 'How do you mean?' Must not that which is moved by others finally depend upon that which is moved by itself? Nothing can be affected by any transition prior to self-motion. Then the first and eldest principle of motion, whether in things at rest or not at rest, will be the principle of self-motion; and that which is moved by others and can move others will be the second. 'True.' Let me ask another question:

What is the name which is given to self-motion when manifested in any material substance? 'Life.' And soul too is life? 'Very good.' And are there not three kinds of knowledge—a knowledge (1) of the essence, (2) of the definition, (3) of the name? And sometimes the name leads us to ask the definition, sometimes the definition to ask the name. For example, number can be divided into equal parts, and when thus divided is termed even, and the definition of even and the word 'even' refer to the same thing. 'Very true.' And what is the definition of the thing which is named 'soul'? Must we not reply, 'The self-moved'? And have we not proved that the self-moved is the source of motion in other things? 'Yes.' And the motion which is not self-moved will be inferior to this? 'True.' And if so, we shall be right in saying that the soul was prior and superior to the body, and the body by nature subject and inferior to the soul? 'Quite right.' And we agreed that if the soul was prior to the body, the things of the soul were prior to the things of the body? 'Certainly.' And therefore desires, and manners, and thoughts, and true opinions, and recollections, are prior to the length and breadth and force of bodies. 'To be sure.' In the next place, we acknowledge that the soul is the cause of good and evil, just and unjust, if we suppose her to be the cause of all things? 'Certainly.' And the soul which orders all things must also order the heavens? 'Of course.' One soul or more? More; for less than two are inconceivable, one good, the other evil. 'Most true.' The soul directs all things by her movements, which we call will, consideration,



attention, deliberation, opinion true and false, joy, sorrow, courage, fear, hatred, love, and similar affections. These are the primary movements, and they receive the secondary movements of bodies, and guide all things to increase and diminution, separation and union, and to all the qualities which accompany them—cold, hot, heavy, light, hard, soft, white, black, sweet, bitter; these and other such qualities the soul, herself a goddess, uses, when truly receiving the divine mind she leads all things rightly to their happiness; but under the impulse of folly she works out an opposite result. For the controller of heaven and earth and the circle of the world is either the wise and good soul, or the foolish and vicious soul, working in them. ‘What do you mean?’ If we say that the whole course and motion of heaven and earth is in accordance with the workings and reasonings of mind, clearly the best soul must have the care of the heaven, and guide it along that better way. ‘True.’ But if the heavens move wildly and disorderly, then they must be under the guidance of the evil soul. ‘True again.’ What is the nature of the movement of the soul? We must not suppose that we can see and know the soul with our bodily eyes, any more than we can fix them on the midday sun; it will be safer to look at an image only. ‘How do you mean?’ Let us find among the ten kinds of motion an image of the motion of the mind. You remember, as we said, that all things are divided into two classes; and some of them were moved and some at rest. ‘Yes.’ And of those which were moved, some were moved in the same place, others in more places than one. ‘Just so.’ The motion which was in one place was circular, like the motion of a spherical body; and such a motion in the same place, and in the same relations, is an excellent image of the motion of mind. ‘Very true.’ The motion of the other sort, which has no fixed place or manner or relation or order or proportion, is akin to folly and nonsense. ‘Very true.’ After what has been said, it is clear that, since the soul carries round all things, some soul which is either very good or the opposite carries round the circumference of heaven. But that soul can be no other than the best. Again, the soul carries round the sun, moon, and stars, and if the sun has a soul, then either the soul of the sun is within and moves the sun as the human soul moves the body; or, secondly, the sun is contained in some external air or fire, which the soul provides and through which

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she operates; or, thirdly, the course of the sun is guided by the soul acting in a wonderful manner without a body. ‘Yes, in one of those ways the soul must guide all things.’ And this soul of the sun, which is better than the sun, whether driving him in a chariot or employing any other agency, is by every man called a God? ‘Yes, by every man who has any sense.’ And of the seasons, stars, moon, and year, in like manner, it may be affirmed that the soul or souls from which they derive their excellence are divine; and without insisting on the manner of their working, no one can deny that all things are full of Gods. ‘No one.’ And now let us offer an alternative to him who denies that there are Gods. Either he must show that the soul is not the origin of all things, or he must live for the future in the belief that there are Gods.

Next, as to the man who believes in the Gods, but refuses to acknowledge that they take care of human things—let him too have a word of admonition. ‘Best of men,’ we will say to him, ‘some affinity to the Gods leads you to honour them and to believe in them. But you have heard the happiness of wicked men sung by poets and admired by the world, and this has drawn you away from your natural piety. Or you have seen the wicked growing old in prosperity, and leaving great offices to their children; or you have watched the tyrant succeeding in his career of crime; and considering all these things you have been led to believe in an irrational way that the Gods take no care of human affairs. That your error may not increase, I will endeavour to purify your soul.’ Do you, Megillus and Cleinias, make answer for the youth, and when we come to a difficulty, I will carry you over the water as I did before. ‘Very good.’ He will easily be convinced that the Gods care for the small as well as the great; for he heard what was said of their goodness and of their having all things under their care. ‘He certainly heard.’ Then now let us enquire what is meant by the virtue of the Gods. To possess mind belongs to virtue, and the contrary to vice. ‘That is what we say.’ And is not courage a part of virtue, and cowardice of vice? ‘Certainly.’ And to the Gods we ascribe virtues; but idleness and indolence are not virtues. ‘Of course not.’ And is God to be conceived of as a careless, indolent fellow, such as the poet would compare to a stingless drone? ‘Impossible.’ Can we be right in praising any one who cares for great matters and leaves the small to take care

of themselves? Whether God or man, he who does so, must either think the neglect of such matters to be of no consequence, or he is indolent and careless. For surely neither of them can be charged with neglect if they fail to attend to something which is beyond their power? 'Certainly not.'

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And now we will examine the two classes of offenders who admit that there are Gods, but say,—the one that they may be appeased, the other that they take no care of small matters: do they not acknowledge that the Gods are omnipotent and omniscient, and also good and perfect? 'Certainly.' Then they cannot be indolent, for indolence is the offspring of idleness, and idleness of cowardice, and there is no cowardice in God. 'True.'

02 If the Gods neglect small matters, they must either know or not know that such things are not to be regarded. But of course they know that they should be regarded, and knowing, they cannot be supposed to neglect their duty, overcome by the seductions of pleasure or pain. 'Impossible.' And do not all human things share in soul, and is not man the most religious of animals and the possession of the Gods? And the Gods, who are the best of owners, will surely take care of their property, small or great. Consider further, that the greater the power of perception, the less the power of action. For it is harder to see and hear the small than the great, but easier to control them. Suppose a physician who had to cure a patient — would he ever succeed if he attended to the great and neglected the little? 'Impossible.' Is not life made up of littles? — the pilot, general, householder, statesman, all attend to small matters; and the builder will tell you that large stones do not lie well without small ones. And God is not inferior to mortal

03 craftsmen, who in proportion to their skill are careful in the details of their work; we must not imagine the best and wisest to be a lazy good-for-nothing, who wearies of his work and hurries over small and easy matters. 'Never, never!' He who charges the Gods with neglect has been forced to admit his error; but I should like further to persuade him that the author of all has made every part for the sake of the whole, and that the smallest part has an appointed state of action or passion, and that the least action or passion of any part has a presiding minister. You, we say to him, are a minute fraction of this universe, created with a view to the whole; the world is not made for you, but you for the world; for



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the good artist considers the whole first, and afterwards the parts. And you are annoyed at not seeing how you and the universe are all working together for the best, so far as the laws of the common creation admit. The soul undergoes many changes from her contact with bodies; and all that the player does is to put the pieces into their right places. 'What do you mean?' I mean that God acts in the way which is simplest and easiest. Had each thing been formed without any regard to the rest, the transposition of the Cosmos would have been endless; but now there is not much trouble in the government of the world. For when the king saw the actions of the living souls and bodies, and the virtue and vice which were in them, and the indestructibility of the soul and body (although they were not eternal), he contrived so to arrange them that virtue might conquer and vice be overcome as far as possible; giving them a seat and room adapted to them, but leaving the direction of their separate actions to men's own wills, which make our characters to be what they are. 'That is very probable.' All things which have a soul possess in themselves the principle of change, and in changing move according to fate and law; natures which have undergone lesser changes move on the surface; but those which have changed utterly for the worse, sink into Hades and the infernal world. And in all great changes for good and evil which are produced either by the will of the soul or the influence of others, there is a change of place. The good soul, which has intercourse with the divine nature, passes into a holier and better place; and the evil soul, as she grows worse, changes her place for the worse. This,—as we declare to the youth who fancies that he is neglected of the Gods,—is the law of divine justice—the worse to the worse, the better to the better, like to like, in life and in death. And from this law no man will ever boast that he has escaped. Even if you say—'I am small, and will creep into the earth,' or 'I am high, and will mount to heaven'—you are not so small or so high that you shall not pay the fitting penalty, either here or in the world below. This is also the explanation of the seeming prosperity of the wicked, in whose actions as in a mirror you imagined that you saw the neglect of the Gods, not considering that they make all things contribute to the whole. And how then could you form any idea of true happiness?—If Cleinias and Megillus and I have succeeded in persuading you



that you know not what you say about the Gods, God will help you; but if there is still any deficiency of proof, hear our answer to the third opponent.

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Enough has been said to prove that the Gods exist and care for us; that they can be propitiated, or that they receive gifts, is not to be allowed or admitted for an instant. 'Let us proceed with the argument.' Tell me, by the Gods, I say, how the Gods are to be propitiated by us? Are they not rulers, who may be compared to charioteers, pilots, perhaps generals, or physicians providing against the assaults of disease, husbandmen observing the perils of the seasons, shepherds watching their flocks? To whom shall we compare them? We acknowledged that the world is full both of good and evil, but having more of evil than of good. There is an immortal conflict going on, in which Gods and demigods are our allies, and we their property; for injustice and folly and wickedness make war in our souls upon justice and temperance and wisdom. There is little virtue to be found on earth; and evil natures fawn upon the Gods, like wild beasts upon their keepers, and believe that they can win them over by flattery and prayers. And this sin, which is termed dishonesty, is to the soul what disease is to the body, what pestilence is to the seasons, what injustice is to states. 'Quite so.' And they who maintain that the Gods can be appeased must say that they forgive the sins of men, if they are allowed to share in their spoils; as you might suppose wolves to mollify the dogs by throwing them a portion of the prey. 'That is the argument.' But let us apply our images to the Gods—are they the pilots who are won by gifts to wreck their own ships—or the charioteers who are bribed to lose the race—or the generals, or doctors, or husbandmen, who are perverted from their duty—or the dogs who are silenced by wolves? 'God forbid.' Are they not rather our best guardians; and shall we suppose them to fall short even of a moderate degree of human or even canine virtue, which will not betray justice for reward? 'Impossible.' He, then, who maintains such a doctrine, is the most blasphemous of mankind.

And now our three points are proven; and we are agreed (1) that there are Gods, (2) that they care for men, (3) that they cannot be bribed to do injustice. I have spoken warmly, from a fear lest this impiety of theirs should lead to a perversion of life. And our

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warmth will not have been in vain, if we have succeeded in persuading these men to abominate themselves, and to change their ways. ‘So let us hope.’ Then now that the preamble is completed, we will make a proclamation commanding the impious to renounce their evil ways; and in case they refuse, the law shall be added:—If a man is guilty of impiety in word or deed, let the bystander inform the magistrates, and let the magistrates bring the offender before the court; and if any of the magistrates refuses to act, he likewise shall be tried for impiety. Any one who is found guilty of such an offence shall be fined at the discretion of the court, and shall also be punished by a term of imprisonment. There shall be three prisons—one for common offences against 90 life and property; another, near by the spot where the Nocturnal Council will assemble, which is to be called the ‘House of Reformation’; the third, to be situated in some desolate region in the centre of the country, shall be called by a name indicating retribution. There are three causes of impiety, and from each of them spring impieties of two kinds, six in all. First, there is the impiety of those who deny the existence of the Gods; these may be honest men, haters of evil, who are only dangerous because they talk loosely about the Gods and make others like themselves; but there is also a more vicious class, who are full of craft and licentiousness. To this latter belong diviners, jugglers, despots, demagogues, generals, hierophants of private mysteries, and sophists. The first class shall be only imprisoned and admonished. The second class should be put to death, if they could be, many times over. The two other sorts of impiety, first of those who deny the care of the Gods, and secondly, of those who affirm that they may be propitiated, have similar subdivisions, 91 varying in degree of guilt. Those who have learnt to blaspheme from mere ignorance shall be imprisoned in the House of Reformation for five years at least, and not allowed to see any one but members of the Nocturnal Council, who shall converse with them touching their souls’ health. If any of the prisoners come to their right mind, at the end of five years let them be restored to sane company; but he who again offends shall die. As to that class of monstrous natures who not only believe that the Gods are negligent, or may be propitiated, but pretend to practise on the souls of quick and dead, and promise to charm the Gods, and to

effect the ruin of houses and states—he, I say, who is guilty of these things, shall be bound in the central prison, and shall have no intercourse with any freeman, receiving only his daily rations of food from the public slaves; and when he dies, let him be cast beyond the border; and if any freeman assist to bury him, he shall be liable to a suit for impiety. But the sins of the father shall not be visited upon his children, who, like other orphans, shall be educated by the state. Further, let there be a general law which will have a tendency to repress impiety. No man shall have religious services in his house, but he shall go with his friends to pray and sacrifice in the temples. The reason of this is, that religious institutions can only be framed by a great intelligence. But women and weak men are always consecrating the event of the moment; they are under the influence of dreams and apparitions, and they build altars and temples in every village and in any place where they have had a vision. The law is designed to prevent this, and also to deter men from attempting to propitiate the Gods by secret sacrifices, which only multiply their sins. Therefore let the law run:—No one shall have private religious rites; and if a man or woman who has not been previously noted for any impiety offend in this way, let them be admonished to remove their rites to a public temple; but if the offender be one of the obstinate sort, he shall be brought to trial before the guardians, and if he be found guilty, let him die.

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**BOOK XI.** As to dealings between man and man, the principle of them is simple—Thou shalt not take what is not thine; and shalt do to others as thou wouldst that they should do to thee. First, of treasure trove:—May I never desire to find, or lift, if I find, or be induced by the counsel of diviners to lift, a treasure which one who was not my ancestor has laid down; for I shall not gain so much in money as I shall lose in virtue. The saying, ‘Move not the immovable,’ may be repeated in a new sense; and there is a common belief which asserts that such deeds prevent a man from having a family. To him who is careless of such consequences, and, despising the word of the wise, takes up a treasure which is not his—what will be done by the hand of the Gods, God only knows,—but I would have the first person who sees the offender, inform the wardens of the city or the country;



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and they shall send to Delphi for a decision, and whatever the oracle orders, they shall carry out. If the informer be a freeman, 91 he shall be honoured, and if a slave, set free; but he who does not inform, if he be a freeman, shall be dishonoured, and if a slave, shall be put to death. If a man leave anywhere anything great or small, intentionally or unintentionally, let him who may find the property deem the deposit sacred to the Goddess of ways. And he who appropriates the same, if he be a slave, shall be beaten with many stripes; if a freeman, he shall pay tenfold, and be held to have done a dishonourable action. If a person says that another has something of his, and the other allows that he has the property in dispute, but maintains it to be his own, let the ownership be proved out of the registers of property. If the property is registered as belonging to some one who is absent, possession shall be given to him who offers sufficient security on behalf of the absentee; or if the property is not registered, let it remain with the three eldest magistrates, and if it should be an animal, the defeated party must pay the cost of its keep. A man may arrest his own slave, and he may also imprison for safe-keeping the runaway slave of a friend. Any one interfering with him must produce three sureties; otherwise, he will be liable to an action for violence, and if he be cast, must pay a double amount of damages to him from whom he has taken the slave. A freedman 95 who does not pay due respect to his patron, may also be seized. Due respect consists in going three times a month to the house of his patron, and offering to perform any lawful service for him; he must also marry as his master pleases; and if his property be greater than his master's, he must hand over to him the excess. A freedman may not remain in the state, except with the consent of the magistrates and of his master, for more than twenty years; and whenever his census exceeds that of the third class, he must in any case leave the country within thirty days, taking his property with him. If he break this regulation, the penalty shall be death, and his property shall be confiscated. Suits about these matters are to be decided in the courts of the tribes, unless the parties have settled the matter before a court of neighbours or before arbiters. If anybody claim a beast, or anything else, let the possessor refer to the seller or giver of the property within thirty days, if the latter reside in the city, or, if the goods have been received from a



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stranger, within five months, of which the middle month shall include the summer solstice. All purchases and exchanges are to be made in the agora, and paid for on the spot; the law will not allow credit to be given. No law shall protect the money subscribed for clubs. He who sells anything of greater value than fifty drachmas shall abide in the city for ten days, and let his whereabouts be known to the buyer, in case of any reclamation. When a slave is sold who is subject to epilepsy, stone, or any other invisible disorder, the buyer, if he be a physician or trainer, or if he be warned, shall have no redress; but in other cases within six months, or within twelve months in epileptic disorders, he may bring the matter before a jury of physicians to be agreed upon by both parties; and the seller who loses the suit, if he be an expert, shall pay twice the price; or if he be a private person, the bargain shall be rescinded, and he shall simply refund. If a person knowingly sells a homicide to another, who is informed of his character, there is no redress. But if the judges—who are to be the five youngest guardians of the law—decide that the purchaser was not aware, then the seller is to pay threefold, and to purify the house of the buyer.

He who exchanges money for money, or beast for beast, must warrant either of them to be sound and good. As in the case of other laws, let us have a preamble, relating to all this class of crime. Adulteration is a kind of falsehood about which the many commonly say that at proper times the practice may often be right, but they do not define at what times. But the legislator will tell them, that no man should invoke the Gods when he is practising deceit or fraud, in word or deed. For he is the enemy of heaven, first, who swears falsely, not thinking of the Gods by whom he swears, and secondly, he who lies to his superiors. (Now the superiors are the betters of inferiors,—the elder of the younger, parents of children, men of women, and rulers of subjects.) The trader who cheats in the agora is a liar and is perjured—he respects neither the name of God nor the regulations of the magistrates. If after hearing this he will still be dishonest, let him listen to the law:—The seller shall not have two prices on the same day, neither must he puff his goods, nor offer to swear about them. If he break the law, any citizen not less than thirty years of age may smite him. If he sell adulterated goods, the slave or metic who

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informs against him shall have the goods; the citizen who brings such a charge, if he prove it, shall offer up the goods in question to the Gods of the agora; or if he fail to prove it, shall be dishonoured. He who is detected in selling adulterated goods shall be deprived of them, and shall receive a stripe for every drachma of their value. The wardens of the agora and the guardians of the law shall take experienced persons into counsel, and draw up regulations for the agora. These shall be inscribed on a column in front of the court of the wardens of the agora.—As to the wardens of the city, enough has been said already. But if any omissions in the law are afterwards discovered, the wardens and the guardians shall supply them, and have them inscribed after the original regulations on a column before the court of the wardens of the city.

Next in order follows the subject of retail trades, which in their natural use are the reverse of mischievous; for every man is a benefactor who reduces what is unequal to symmetry and proportion. Money is the instrument by which this is accomplished, and the shop-keeper, the merchant, and hotel-keeper do but supply the wants and equalize the possessions of mankind. Why, then, does any dishonour attach to a beneficent occupation? Let us consider the nature of the accusation first, and then see whether it can be removed. 'What is your drift?' Dear Cleinias, there are few men who are so gifted by nature, and improved by education, as to be able to control the desire of making money; or who are sober in their wishes and prefer moderation to accumulation. The great majority think that they can never have enough, and the consequence is that retail trade has become a reproach. Whereas, however ludicrous the idea may seem, if noble men and noble women could be induced to open a shop, and to trade upon incorruptible principles, then the aspect of things would change, and retail traders would be regarded as nursing fathers and mothers. In our own day the trader goes and settles in distant places, and receives the weary traveller hospitably at first, but in the end treats him as an enemy and a captive, whom he only liberates for an enormous ransom. This is what has brought retail trade into disrepute, and against this the legislator ought to provide. We have said of old, that to fight against two opponents is hard and the two opponents of whom I am thinking are wealth and

poverty — the one corrupting men by luxury; the other, through misery, depriving them of the sense of shame. What remedies can a city find for this disease? First, to have as few retail traders as possible; secondly, to give retail trade over to a class whose corruption will not injure the state; and thirdly, to restrain the insolence and meanness of the retailers.

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Let us make the following laws:—(1) In the city of the Magnetes none of the 5040 citizens shall be a retailer or merchant, or do any service to any private persons who do not equally serve him, except to his father and mother and their fathers and mothers, and generally to his elders who are freemen, and whom he serves as a freeman. He who follows an illiberal pursuit may be cited for dishonouring his family, and kept in bonds for a year; and if he offend again, he shall be bound for two years; and for every offence his punishment shall be doubled: (2) Every retailer shall be a metic or a foreigner: (3) The guardians of the law shall have a special care of this part of the community, whose calling exposes them to peculiar temptations. They shall consult with persons of experience, and find out what prices will yield the traders a moderate profit, and fix them.

When a man does not fulfil his contract, he being under no legal or other impediment, the case shall be brought before the court of the tribes, if not previously settled by arbitration. The class of artisans is consecrated to Hephaestus and Athene; the military class to Ares and Athene: all of whom, remembering that the Gods are their ancestors, should be ashamed to deceive in the practice of their craft. If any man is lazy in the fulfilment of his work, and fancies, foolish fellow, that his patron God will not deal hardly with him, he will be punished by the God; and let the law follow: — He who fails in his undertaking shall pay the value, and do the work gratis in a specified time. The contractor, like the seller, is enjoined by law to charge the simple value of his work; in a free city, art should be a true thing, and the artist must not practise on the ignorance of others. On the other hand, he who has ordered any work and does not pay the workman according to agreement, dishonours Zeus and Athene, and breaks the bonds of society. And if he does not pay at the time agreed, let him pay double; and although interest is forbidden in other cases, let the workman receive after the



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expiration of a year interest at the rate of an obol a month for every drachma (equal to 200 per cent. per ann.). And we may observe by the way, in speaking of craftsmen, that if our military craft do their work well, the state will praise those who honour them, and blame those who do not honour them. Not that the first place of honour is to be assigned to the warrior; a higher still is reserved for those who obey the laws.

Most of the dealings between man and man are now settled, with the exception of such as relate to orphans and guardian-ships. These lead us to speak of the intentions of the dying, about which we must make regulations. I say 'must'; for mankind cannot be allowed to dispose of their property as they please, in ways at variance with one another and with law and custom. But a dying person is a strange being, and is not easily managed; he wants to be master of all he has, and is apt to use angry words. He will say,—'May I not do what I will with my own, and give much to my friends, and little to my enemies?' 'There is reason in that.' O Cleinias, in my judgment the older lawgivers were too soft-hearted, and wanting in insight into human affairs. They were too ready to listen to the outcry of a dying man, and hence they were induced to give him an absolute power of bequest. But I would say to him:—O creature of a day, you know neither what is yours nor yourself: for you and your property are not your own, but belong to your whole family, past and to come, and property and family alike belong to the State. And therefore I must take out of your hands the charge of what you leave behind you, with a view to the interests of all. And I hope that you will not quarrel with us, now that you are going the way of all mankind; we will do our best for you and yours when you are no longer here. Let this be our address to the living and dying, and let the law be as follows:—The father who has sons shall appoint one of them to be the heir of the lot; and if he has given any other son to be adopted by another, the adoption shall also be recorded; and if he has still a son who has no lot, and has a chance of going to a colony, he may give him what he has more than the lot; or if he has more than one son unprovided for, he may divide the money between them. A son who has a house of his own, and a daughter who is betrothed, are not to share in the bequest of



money; and the son or daughter who, having inherited one lot, acquires another, is to bequeath the new inheritance to the next of kin. If a man have only daughters, he may adopt the husband of any one of them; or if he have lost a son, let him make mention of the circumstance in his will and adopt another. If he have no children, he may give away a tenth of his acquired property to whomsoever he likes; but he must adopt an heir to inherit the lot, and may leave the remainder to him. Also he may appoint guardians for his children; or if he die without appointing them or without making a will, the nearest kinsmen,—two on the father's and two on the mother's side,—and one friend of the departed, shall be appointed guardians. The fifteen eldest guardians of the law are to have special charge of all orphans, the whole number of fifteen being divided into bodies of three, who will succeed one another according to seniority, every year for five years. If a man dying intestate leave daughters, he must pardon the law which marries them for looking, first to kinship, and secondly to the preservation of the lot. The legislator cannot regard the character of the heir, which to the father is the first consideration. The law will therefore run as follows:—If the intestate leave daughters, husbands are to be found for them among their kindred according to the following table of affinity: first, their father's brothers; secondly, the sons of their father's brothers; thirdly, of their father's sisters; fourthly, their great-uncles; fifthly, the sons of a great-uncle; sixthly, the sons of a great-aunt. The kindred in such cases shall always be reckoned in this way; the relationship shall proceed upwards through brothers and sisters and brothers' and sisters' children, and first the male line must be taken and then the female. If there is a dispute in regard to fitness of age for marriage, this the judge shall decide, after having made an inspection of the youth naked, and of the maiden naked down to the waist. If the maiden has no relations within the degree of third cousin, she may choose whom she likes, with the consent of her guardians; or she may even select some one who has gone to a colony, and he, if he be a kinsman, will take the lot by law; if not, he must have her guardians' consent, as well as hers. When a man dies without children and without a will, let a young man and a young woman go forth from the family and take up their

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abode in the desolate house. The woman shall be selected from the kindred in the following order of succession:—first, a sister of the deceased; second, a brother's daughter; third, a sister's daughter; fourth, a father's sister; fifth, a daughter of a father's brother; sixth, a daughter of a father's sister. For the man the same order shall be observed as in the preceding case. The legislator foresees that laws of this kind will sometimes press heavily, and that his intention cannot always be fulfilled; as for example, when there are mental and bodily defects in the persons who are enjoined to marry. But he must be excused for not being always able to reconcile the general principles of public interest with the particular circumstances of individuals; and he is willing to allow, in like manner, that the individual cannot always do what the lawgiver wishes. And then arbiters must be chosen, who will determine equitably the cases which may arise under the law: e. g. a rich cousin may sometimes desire a grander match, or the requirements of the law can only be fulfilled by marrying a madwoman. To meet such cases let the following law be enacted:—If any one comes forward and says that the lawgiver, had he been alive, would not have required the carrying out of the law in a particular case, let him go to the fifteen eldest guardians of the law who have the care of orphans; but if he thinks that too much power is thus given to them, he may bring the case before the court of select judges.

Thus will orphans have a second birth. In order to make their sad condition as light as possible, the guardians of the law shall be their parents, and shall be admonished to take care of them. And what admonition can be more appropriate than the assurance which we formerly gave, that the souls of the dead watch over mortal affairs? About this there are many ancient traditions, which may be taken on trust from the legislator. Let men fear, in the first place, the Gods above; secondly, the souls of the departed, who naturally care for their own descendants; thirdly, the aged living, who are quick to hear of any neglect of family duties, especially in the case of orphans. For they are the holiest and most sacred of all deposits, and the peculiar care of guardians and magistrates; and those who try to bring them up well will contribute to their own good and to that of their families. He who listens to the preamble of the law will never

know the severity of the legislator; but he who disobeys, and injures the orphan, will pay twice the penalty he would have paid if the parents had been alive. More laws might have been made about orphans, did we not suppose that the guardians have children and property of their own which are protected by the laws; and the duty of the guardian in our state is the same as that of a father, though his honour or disgrace is greater. A legal admonition and threat may, however, be of service: the guardian of the orphan and the guardian of the law who is over him, shall love the orphan as their own children, and take more care of his or her property than of their own. If the guardian of the child neglect his duty, the guardian of the law shall fine him; and the guardian may also have the magistrate tried for neglect in the court of select judges, and he shall pay, if convicted, a double penalty. Further, the guardian of the orphan who is careless or dishonest may be fined on the information of any of the citizens in a fourfold penalty, half to go to the orphan and half to the prosecutor of the suit. When the orphan is of age, if he thinks that he has been ill-used, his guardian may be brought to trial by him within five years, and the penalty shall be fixed by the court. Or if the magistrate has neglected the orphan, he shall pay damages to him; but if he have defrauded him, he shall make compensation and also be deposed from his office of guardian of the law.

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If irremediable differences arise between fathers and sons, the father may want to renounce his son, or the son may indict his father for imbecility: such violent separations only take place when the family are 'a bad lot'; if only one of the two parties is bad, the differences do not grow to so great a height. But here arises a difficulty. Although in any other state a son who is disinherited does not cease to be a citizen, in ours he does; for the number of citizens cannot exceed 5040. And therefore he who is to suffer such a penalty ought to be abjured, not only by his father, but by the whole family. The law, then, should run as follows:— If any man's evil fortune or temper incline him to disinherit his son, let him not do so lightly or on the instant; but let him have a council of his own relations and of the maternal relations of his son, and set forth to them the propriety of disinheriting him, and allow his son to answer. And if more than half of the kindred male and



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female, being of full age, condemn the son, let him be disinherited. If any other citizen desires to adopt him, he may, for young men's characters often change in the course of life. But if, after ten years, he remains unadopted, let him be sent to a colony. If disease, or old age, or evil disposition cause a man to go out of his mind, and he is ruining his house and property, and his son doubts about indicting him for insanity, let him lay the case before the eldest guardians of the law, and consult with them. And if they advise him to proceed, and the father is decided to be imbecile, he shall have no more control over his property, but shall live henceforward like a child in the house.

If a man and his wife are of incompatible tempers, ten guardians of the law and ten of the matrons who regulate marriage shall take their case in hand, and reconcile them, if possible. If, however, their swelling souls cannot be pacified, the wife may try and find a new husband, and the husband a new wife; probably they are not very gentle creatures, and should therefore be joined to milder natures. The younger of those who are separated should also select their partners with a view to the procreation of children; while the older should seek a companion for their declining years. If a woman dies, leaving children male or female, the law will advise, but not compel, the widower to abstain from a second marriage; if she leave no children, he shall be compelled to marry. Also a widow, if she is not old enough to live honestly without marriage, shall marry again; and in case she have no children, she should marry for the sake of them. There is sometimes an uncertainty which parent the offspring is to follow: in unions of a female slave with a male slave, or with a freedman or freeman, or of a freewoman with a male slave, the offspring is to belong to the master; but if the master or mistress be themselves the parent of the child, the slave and the child are to be sent away to another land.

Concerning duty to parents, let the preamble be as follows:— We honour the Gods in their lifeless images, and believe that we thus propitiate them. But he who has an aged father or mother has a living image, which if he cherish it will do him far more good than any statue. 'What do you mean by cherishing them?' I will tell you. Oedipus and Amyntor and Theseus cursed their children, and their curses took effect. This proves that the Gods



hear the curses of parents who are wronged; and shall we doubt that they hear and fulfil their blessings too? 'Surely not.' And, as we were saying, no image is more honoured by the Gods than an aged father and mother; to whom when honour is done, the God who hears their prayers is rejoiced, and their influence is greater than that of the lifeless statue; for they pray that good or evil may come to us in proportion as they are honoured or dishonoured, but the statue is silent. 'Excellent.' Good men are glad when their parents live to extreme old age, or if they depart early, lament their loss; but to bad men their parents are always terrible. Wherefore let every one honour his parents, and if this preamble fails of influencing him, let him hear the law:—If any one does not take sufficient care of his parents, let the aggrieved person inform the three eldest guardians of the law and three of the women who are concerned with marriages. Women up to forty years of age, and men up to thirty, who thus offend, shall be beaten and imprisoned. After that age they are to be brought before a court composed of the eldest citizens, who may inflict any punishment upon them which they please. If the injured party cannot inform, let any freeman who hears of the case inform; a slave who does so shall be set free,—if he be the slave of one of the parties, by the magistrate,—if owned by another, at the cost of the state; and let the magistrates take care that he is not wronged by any one out of revenge.

The injuries which one person does to another by the use of poisons are of two kinds;—one affects the body by the employment of drugs and potions; the other works on the mind by the practice of sorcery and magic. Fatal cases of either sort have been already mentioned; and now we must have a law respecting cases which are not fatal. There is no use in arguing with a man whose mind is disturbed by waxen images placed at his own door, or on the sepulchre of his father or mother, or at a spot where three ways meet. But to the wizards themselves we must address a solemn preamble, begging them not to treat the world as if they were children, or compel the legislator to expose them, and to show men that the poisoner who is not a physician and the wizard who is not a prophet or diviner are equally ignorant of what they are doing. Let the law be as follows:—He who by the use of poison does any injury not fatal to a man or his servants, or any injury

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whether fatal or not to another's cattle or bees, is to be punished with death if he be a physician, and if he be not a physician he is to suffer the punishment awarded by the court : and he who injures another by sorcery, if he be a diviner or prophet, shall be put to death ; and, if he be not a diviner, the court shall determine what he ought to pay or suffer.

Any one who injures another by theft or violence shall pay damages at least equal to the injury ; and besides the compensation, a suitable punishment shall be inflicted. The foolish youth who is the victim of others is to have a lighter punishment ; he whose folly is occasioned by his own jealousy or desire or anger is to suffer more heavily. Punishment is to be inflicted, not for the sake of vengeance, for what is done cannot be undone, but for the sake of prevention and reformation. And there should be a proportion between the punishment and the crime, in which the judge, having a discretion left him, must, by estimating the crime, second the legislator, who, like a painter, furnishes outlines for him to fill up.

A madman is not to go about at large in the city, but is to be taken care of by his relatives. Neglect on their part is to be punished in the first class by a fine of a hundred drachmas, and proportionally in the others. Now madness is of various kinds ; in addition to that which arises from disease there is the madness which originates in a passionate temperament, and makes men when engaged in a quarrel use foul and abusive language against each other. This is intolerable in a well-ordered state ; and therefore our law shall be as follows :—No one is to speak evil of another, but when men differ in opinion they are to instruct one another without speaking evil. Nor should any one seek to rouse the passions which education has calmed ; for he who feeds and nurses his wrath is apt to make ribald jests at his opponent, with a loss of character or dignity to himself. And for this reason no one may use any abusive word in a temple, or at sacrifices, or games, or in any public assembly, and he who offends shall be censured by the proper magistrate ; and the magistrate, if he fail to censure him, shall not claim the prize of virtue. In any other place the angry man who indulges in revilings, whether he be the beginner or not may be chastised by an elder. The reviler is always trying to make his opponent ridiculous ; and the use of ridicule in anger w

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cannot allow. We forbid the comic poet to ridicule our citizens, under a penalty of expulsion from the country or a fine of three minae. Jest in which there is no offence may be allowed; but the question of offence shall be determined by the director of education, who is to be the licenser of theatrical performances.

The righteous man who is in adversity will not be allowed to starve in a well-ordered city; he will never be a beggar. Nor is a man to be pitied, merely because he is hungry, unless he be temperate. Therefore let the law be as follows: — Let there be no beggars in our state; and he who begs shall be expelled by the magistrates both from town and country.

If a slave, male or female, does any harm to the property of another, who is not himself a party to the harm, the master shall compensate the injury or give up the offending slave. But if the master argue that the charge has arisen by collusion, with the view of obtaining the slave, he may put the plaintiff on his trial for malpractices, and recover from him twice the value of the slave; or if he is cast he must make good the damage and deliver up the slave. The injury done by a horse or other animal shall be compensated in like manner.

A witness who will not come of himself may be summoned, and if he fail in appearing, he shall be liable for any harm which may ensue: if he swears that he does not know, he may leave the court. A judge who is called upon as a witness must not vote. A free woman, if she is over forty, may bear witness and plead, and, if she have no husband, she may also bring an action. A slave, male or female, and a child may witness and plead only in case of murder, but they must give sureties that they will appear at the trial, if they should be charged with false witness. Such charges must be made pending the trial, and the accusations shall be sealed by both parties and kept by the magistrates until the trial for perjury comes off. If a man is twice convicted of perjury, he is not to be required, if three times, he is not to be allowed to bear witness, or, if he persists in bearing witness, is to be punished with death. When more than half the evidence is proved to be false there must be a new trial.

The best and noblest things in human life are liable to be defiled and perverted. Is not justice the civilizer of mankind? and yet upon the noble profession of the advocate has come an



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evil name. For he is said to make the worse appear the better cause, and only requires money in return for his services. Such an art will be forbidden by the legislator, and if existing among us will be requested to depart to another city. To the disobedient let the voice of the law be heard saying:—He who tries to pervert justice in the minds of the judges, or to increase litigation, shall be brought before the supreme court. If he does so from contentiousness, let him be silenced for a time, and, if he offend again, put to death. If he have acted from a love of gain, let him be sent out of the country if he be a foreigner, or if he be a citizen let him be put to death.

**BOOK XII.** If a false message be taken to or brought from other states, whether friendly or hostile, by ambassadors or heralds, they shall be indicted for having dishonoured their sacred office, and, if convicted, shall suffer a penalty.—Stealing is mean; robbery is shameless. Let no man deceive himself by the supposed example of the Gods, for no God or son of a God ever really practised either force or fraud. On this point the legislator is better informed than all the poets put together. He who listens to him shall be for ever happy, but he who will not listen shall have the following law directed against him:—He who steals much, or he who steals little of the public property is deserving of the same penalty; for they are both impelled by the same evil motive. When the law punishes one man more lightly than another, this is done under the idea, not that he is less guilty, but that he is more curable. Now a thief who is a foreigner or slave may be curable; but the thief who is a citizen, and has had the advantages of education, should be put to death, for he is incurable.

Much consideration and many regulations are necessary about military expeditions; the great principle of all is that no one, male or female, in war or peace, in great matters or small, shall be without a commander. Whether men stand or walk, or drill, or pursue, or retreat, or wash, or eat, they should all act together and in obedience to orders. We should practise from our youth upwards the habits of command and obedience. All dances and relaxations, the endurance of hunger and thirst, of cold and heat, and of hard couches, should have a view to war, and care



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should be taken not to destroy the natural covering and use of the head and feet by wearing shoes and caps; for the head is the lord of the body, and the feet are the best of servants. The soldier should have thoughts like these; and let him hear the law:—He who is enrolled shall serve, and if he absent himself without leave he shall be indicted for failure of service before his own branch of the army when the expedition returns, and if he be found guilty he shall suffer the penalty which the courts award, and never be allowed to contend for any prize of valour, or to accuse another of misbehaviour in military matters. Desertion shall also be tried and punished in the same manner. After the courts for trying failure of service and desertion have been held, the generals shall hold another court, in which the several arms of the service will award prizes for the expedition which has just concluded. The prize is to be a crown of olive, which the victor shall offer up at the temple of his favourite war God. . . . In any suit which a man brings, let the indictment be scrupulously true, for justice is an honourable maiden, to whom falsehood is naturally hateful. For example, when men are prosecuted for having lost their arms, great care should be taken by the witnesses to distinguish between cases in which they have been lost from necessity and from cowardice. If the hero Patroclus had not been killed but had been brought back alive from the field, he might have been reproached with having lost the divine armour. And a man may lose his arms in a storm at sea, or from a fall, and under many other circumstances. There is a distinction of language to be observed in the use of the two terms, ‘thrower away of a shield’ (ρίψασπις), and ‘loser of arms’ (ἀποβολεὺς ὅπλων), one being the voluntary, the other the involuntary relinquishment of them. Let the law then be as follows:—If any one is overtaken by the enemy, having arms in his hands, and he leaves them behind him voluntarily, choosing base life instead of honourable death, let justice be done. The old legend of Caeneus, who was changed by Poseidon from a woman into a man, may teach by contraries the appropriate punishment. Let the thrower away of his shield be changed from a man into a woman—that is to say, let him be all his life out of danger, and never again be admitted by any commander into the ranks of his army; and let him pay a heavy fine according to his class. And any com-

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mander who permits him to serve shall also be punished by a fine.

All magistrates, whatever be their tenure of office, must give an account of their magistracy. But where shall we find the magistrate who is worthy to supervise them or look into their short-comings and crooked ways? The examiner must be more than man who is sufficient for these things. For the truth is that there are many causes of the dissolution of states; which, like ships or animals, have their cords, and girders, and sinews easily relaxed, and nothing tends more to their welfare and preservation than the supervision of them by examiners who are better than the magistrates; failing in this they fall to pieces, and each becomes many instead of one. Wherefore let the people meet after the summer solstice, in the precincts of Apollo and the Sun, and appoint three men of not less than fifty years of age. They shall proceed as follows:—Each citizen shall select some one, not himself, whom he thinks the best. The persons selected shall be reduced to one half, who have the greatest number of votes, if they are an even number; but if an odd number, he who has the smallest number of votes shall be previously withdrawn. The voting shall continue in the same manner until three only remain; and if the number of votes cast for them be equal, a distinction between the first, second, and third shall be made by lot. The three shall be crowned with an olive wreath, and proclamation made, that the city of the Magnetes, once more preserved by the Gods, presents her three best men to Apollo and the Sun, to whom she dedicates them as long as their lives answer to the judgment formed of them. They shall choose in the first year of their office twelve examiners, to continue until they are seventy-five years of age; afterwards three shall be added annually. While they hold office, they shall dwell within the precinct of the God. They are to divide all the magistracies into twelve classes, and may apply any methods of enquiry, and inflict any punishments which they please; in some cases singly, in other cases together, announcing the acquittal or punishment of the magistrate on a tablet which they will place in the agora. A magistrate who has been condemned by the examiners may appeal to the select judges, and, if he gain his suit, may in turn prosecute the examiners; but if the appellant

is cast, his punishment shall be doubled, unless he was previously condemned to death.

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And what honours shall be paid to these examiners, whom the whole state counts worthy of the rewards of virtue? They shall have the first place at all sacrifices and other ceremonies, and in all assemblies and public places; they shall go on sacred embassies, and have the exclusive privilege of wearing a crown of laurel. They are priests of Apollo and the Sun, and he of their number who is judged first shall be high priest, and give his name to the year. The manner of their burial, too, shall be different from that of the other citizens. The colour of their funeral array shall be white, and, instead of the voice of lamentation, around the bier shall stand a chorus of fifteen boys and fifteen maidens, chanting hymns in honour of the deceased in alternate strains during an entire day; and at dawn a band of a hundred youths shall carry the bier to the grave, marching in the garb of warriors, and the boys in front of the bier shall sing their national hymn, while the maidens and women past child-bearing follow after. Priests and priestesses may also follow, unless the Pythian oracle forbids. The sepulchre shall be a vault built underground, which will last for ever, having couches of stone placed side by side; on one of these they shall lay the departed saint, and then cover the tomb with a mound, and plant trees on every side except one, where an opening shall be left for other interments. Every year there shall be games—musical, gymnastic, or equestrian, in honour of those who have passed every ordeal. But if any of them, after having been acquitted on any occasion, begin to show the wickedness of human nature, he who pleases may bring them to trial before a court composed of the guardians of the law, and of the select judges, and of any of the examiners who are alive. If he be convicted he shall be deprived of his honours, and if the accuser do not obtain a fifth part of the votes, he shall pay a fine according to his class.

What is called the judgment of Rhadamanthus is suited to 'ages of faith,' but not to our days. He knew that his contemporaries believed in the Gods, for many of them were the sons of Gods; and he thought that the easiest and surest method of ending litigation was to commit the decision to Heaven. In our own day, men either deny the existence of Gods or their care of men, or maintain



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that they may be bribed by attentions and gifts; and the procedure of Rhadamanthus would therefore be out of date. When the religious ideas of mankind change, their laws should also change. Thus oaths should no longer be taken from plaintiff and defendant; simple statements of affirmation and denial should be substituted. For there is something dreadful in the thought, that nearly half the citizens of a state are perjured men. There is no objection to an oath, where a man has no interest in forswearing himself; as, for example, when a judge is about to give his decision, or in voting at an election, or in the judgment of games and contests. But where there would be a premium on perjury, oaths and imprecations should be prohibited as irrelevant, like appeals to feeling. Let the principles of justice be learned and taught without words of evil omen. The oaths of a stranger against a stranger may be allowed, because strangers are not permitted to become permanent residents in our state.

Trials in private causes are to be decided in the same manner as lesser offences against the state. The non-attendance at a chorus or sacrifice, or the omission to pay a war-tax, may be regarded as in the first instance remediable, and the defaulter may give security; but if he forfeits the security, the goods pledged shall be sold and the money given to the state. And for obstinate disobedience, the magistrate shall have the power of inflicting greater penalties.

A city which is without trade or commerce must consider what it will do about the going abroad of its own people and the admission of strangers. For out of intercourse with strangers there arises great confusion of manners, which in most states is not of any consequence, because the confusion exists already; but in a well-ordered state it may be a great evil. Yet the absolute prohibition of foreign travel, or the exclusion of strangers, is impossible, and would appear barbarous to the rest of mankind. Public opinion should never be lightly regarded, for the many are not so far wrong in their judgments as in their lives. Even the worst of men have often a divine instinct, which enables them to judge of the differences between the good and bad. States are rightly advised when they desire to have the praise of men; and the greatest and truest praise is that of virtue. And our Cretan colony should, and probably will, have a character for virtue, such



as few cities have. Let this, then, be our law about foreign travel and the reception of strangers : — No one shall be allowed to leave the country who is under forty years of age — of course military service abroad is not included in this regulation — and no one at all except in a public capacity. To the Olympic, and Pythian, and Nemean, and Isthmian games, shall be sent the fairest and best and bravest, who shall support the dignity of the city in time of peace. These, when they come home, shall teach the youth the inferiority of all other governments. Besides those who go on sacred missions, other persons shall be sent out by permission of the guardians to study the institutions of foreign countries. For a people which has no experience, and no knowledge of the characters of men or the reason of things, but lives by habit only, can never be perfectly civilized. Moreover, in all states, bad as well as good, there are holy and inspired men ; these the citizen of a well ordered city should be ever seeking out ; he should go forth to find them over sea and over land, that he may more firmly establish institutions in his own state which are good already and amend the bad. ‘ What will be the best way of accomplishing such an object ? ’ In the first place, let the visitor of foreign countries be between fifty and sixty years of age, and let him be a citizen of repute, especially in military matters. On his return he shall appear before the Nocturnal Council : this is a body which sits from dawn to sunrise, and includes amongst its members the priests who have gained the prize of virtue, and the ten oldest guardians of the law, and the director and past directors of education ; each of whom has power to bring with him a younger friend of his own selection, who is between thirty and forty. The assembly thus constituted shall consider the laws of their own and other states, and gather information relating to them. Anything of the sort which is approved by the elder members of the council shall be studied with all diligence by the younger ; who are to be specially watched by the rest of the citizens, and shall receive honour, if they are deserving of honour, or dishonour, if they prove inferior. This is the assembly to which the visitor of foreign countries shall come and tell anything which he has heard from others in the course of his travels, or which he has himself observed. If he be made neither better nor worse, let him at least be praised for his zeal ; and let him

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receive still more praise, and special honour after death, if he be improved. But if he be deteriorated by his travels, let him be prohibited from speaking to any one; and if he submit, he may live as a private individual: but if he be convicted of attempting to make innovations in education and the laws, let him die.

Next, as to the reception of strangers. Of these there are four classes: — First, merchants, who, like birds of passage, find their way over the sea at a certain time of the year, that they may exhibit their wares. These should be received in markets and public buildings without the city, by proper officers, who shall see that justice is done them, and shall also watch against any political designs which they may entertain; no more intercourse is to be held with them than is absolutely necessary. Secondly, there are the visitors at the festivals, who shall be entertained by hospitable persons at the temples for a reasonable time; the priests and ministers of the temples shall have a care of them. In small suits brought by them or against them, the priests shall be the judges; but in the more important, the wardens of the agora. Thirdly, there are ambassadors of foreign states; these are to be honourably received by the generals and commanders, and placed under the care of the Prytanes and of the persons with whom they are lodged. Fourthly, there is the philosophical stranger, who, like our own spectators, from time to time goes to see what is rich and rare in foreign countries. Like them he must be fifty years of age: and let him go unbidden to the doors of the wise and rich, that he may learn from them, and they from him.

These are the rules of missions into foreign countries, and of the reception of strangers. Let Zeus, the God of hospitality, be honoured; and let not the stranger be excluded, as in Egypt, from meals and sacrifices, or, [as at Sparta,] driven away by savage proclamations.

Let guarantees be clearly given in writing and before witnesses. The number of witnesses shall be three when the sum lent is under a thousand drachmas, or five when above. The agent and principal at a fraudulent sale shall be equally liable. He who would search another man's house for anything must swear that he expects to find it there; and he shall enter naked, or having on a single garment and no girdle. The owner shall place at the disposal of the searcher all his goods, sealed as well as unsealed; if

he refuse, he shall be liable in double the value of the property, if it shall prove to be in his possession. If the owner be absent, the searcher may counter-seal the property which is under seal, and place watchers. If the owner remain absent more than five days, the searcher shall take the magistrates, and open the sealed property, and seal it up again in their presence. The recovery of goods disputed, except in the case of lands and houses, (about which there can be no dispute in our state), is to be barred by time. The public and unimpeached use of anything for a year in the city, or for five years in the country, or the private possession and domestic use for three years in the city, or for ten years in the country, is to give a right of ownership. But if the possessor have the property in a foreign country, there shall be no bar as to time. The proceedings of any trial are to be void, in which either the parties or the witnesses, whether bond or free, have been prevented by violence from attending:—if a slave be prevented, the suit shall be invalid; or if a freeman, he who is guilty of the violence shall be imprisoned for a year, and shall also be liable to an action for kidnapping. If one competitor forcibly prevents another from attending at the games, the other may be inscribed as victor in the temples, and the first, whether victor or not, shall be liable to an action for damages. The receiver of stolen goods shall undergo the same punishment as the thief. The receiver of an exile shall be punished with death. A man ought to have the same friends and enemies as his country; and he who makes war or peace for himself shall be put to death. And if a party in the state make war or peace, their leaders shall be indicted by the generals, and, if convicted, they shall be put to death. The ministers and officers of a country ought not to receive gifts, even as the reward of good deeds. He who disobeys shall die.

With a view to taxation a man should have his property and income valued: and the government may, at their discretion, levy the tax upon the annual return, or take a portion of the whole.

The good man will offer moderate gifts to the Gods; his land or hearth cannot be offered, because they are already consecrated to all Gods. Gold and silver, which arouse envy, and ivory, which is taken from the dead body of an animal, are unsuitable offerings; iron and brass are materials of war. Wood and stone of a single piece may be offered; also woven work which has not occupied

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one woman more than a month in making. White is a colour which is acceptable to the Gods; figures of birds and similar offerings are the best of gifts, but they must be such as the painter can execute in a day.

Next concerning lawsuits. Judges, or rather arbiters, may be agreed upon by the plaintiff and defendant; and if no decision is obtained from them, their fellow-tribesmen shall judge. At this stage there shall be an increase of the penalty: the defendant, if he be cast, shall pay a fifth more than the damages claimed. If he further persist, and appeal a second time, the case shall be heard before the select judges; and he shall pay, if defeated, the penalty and half as much again. And the pursuer, if on the first appeal he is defeated, shall pay one fifth of the damages claimed by him; and if on the second, one half. Other matters relating to trials, such as the assignment of judges to courts, the times of sitting, the number of judges, the modes of pleading and procedure, as we have already said, may be determined by younger legislators.

These are to be the rules of private courts. As regards public courts, many states have excellent modes of procedure which may serve for models; these, when duly tested by experience, should be ratified and made permanent by us.

Let the judge be accomplished in the laws. He should possess writings about them, and make a study of them; for laws are the highest instrument of mental improvement, and derive their name from mind (*νοῦς*, *νόμος*). They afford a measure of all censure and praise, whether in verse or prose, in conversation or in books, and are an antidote to the vain disputes of men and their equally vain acquiescence in each other's opinions. The just judge, who imbibes their spirit, makes the city and himself to stand upright. He establishes justice for the good, and cures the tempers of the bad, if they can be cured; but denounces death, which is the only remedy, to the incurable, the threads of whose life cannot be reversed.

When the suits of the year are completed, execution is to follow. The court is to award to the plaintiff the property of the defendant, if he is cast, reserving to him only his lot of land. If the plaintiff is not satisfied within a month, the court shall put into his hands the property of the defendant. If the defendant fails in payment to the amount of a drachma, he shall lose the use and protection



of the court; or if he rebel against the authority of the court, he shall be brought before the guardians of the law, and if found guilty he shall be put to death.

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Man having been born, educated, having begotten and brought up children, and gone to law, fulfils the debt of nature. The rites which are to be celebrated after death in honour of the Gods above and below shall be determined by the Interpreters. The dead shall be buried in uncultivated places, where they will be out of the way and do least injury to the living. For no one either in life or after death has any right to deprive other men of the sustenance which mother earth provides for them. No sepulchral mound is to be piled higher than five men can raise it in five days, and the grave-stone shall not be larger than is sufficient to contain an inscription of four heroic verses. The dead are only to be exposed for three days, which is long enough to test the reality of death. The legislator will instruct the people that the body is a mere shadow or image, and that the soul, which is our true being, is gone to give an account of herself before the Gods below. When they hear this, the good are full of hope, and the evil are terrified. It is also said that not much can be done for any one after death. And therefore while in life all men should be helped by their kindred to pass their days justly and holily, that they may depart in peace. When a man loses a son or a brother, he should consider that the beloved one has gone away to fulfil his destiny in another place, and should not waste money over his lifeless remains. Let the law then order a moderate funeral of five minae for the first class, of three for the second, of two for the third, of one for the fourth. One of the guardians of the law, to be selected by the relatives, shall assist them in arranging the affairs of the deceased. There would be a want of delicacy in prescribing that there should or should not be mourning for the dead. But, at any rate, such mourning is to be confined to the house; there must be no processions in the streets, and the dead body shall be taken out of the city before daybreak. Regulations about other forms of burial and about the non-burial of parricides and other sacrilegious persons have already been laid down. The work of legislation is therefore nearly completed; its end will be finally accomplished when we have provided for the continuance of the state.

Do you remember the names of the Fates? Lachesis, the giver

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of the lots, is the first of them; Clotho, the spinster, the second; Atropos, the unchanging one, is the third and last, who makes the threads of the web irreversible. And we too want to make our laws irreversible, for the unchangeable quality in them will be the salvation of the state, and the source of health and order in the bodies and souls of our citizens. 'But can such a quality be implanted?' I think that it may; and at any rate we must try; for, after all our labour, to have been piling up a fabric which has no foundation would be too ridiculous. 'What foundation would you lay?' We have already instituted an assembly which was composed of the ten oldest guardians of the law, and secondly, of those who had received prizes of virtue, and thirdly, of the travellers who had gone abroad to enquire into the laws of other countries. Moreover, each of the members was to choose a young man, of not less than thirty years of age, to be approved by the rest; and they were to meet at dawn, when all the world is at leisure. This assembly will be an anchor to the vessel of state, and provide the means of permanence; for the constitutions of states, like all other things, have their proper saviours, which are to them what the head and soul are to the living being. 'How do you mean?' Mind in the soul, and sight and hearing in the head, or rather, the perfect union of mind and sense, may be justly called every man's salvation. 'Certainly.' Yes; but of what nature is this union? In the case of a ship, for example, the senses of the sailors are added to the intelligence of the pilot, and the two together save the ship and the men in the ship. Again, the physician and the general have their objects; and the object of the one is health, of the other victory. States, too, have their objects, and the ruler must understand, first, their nature, and secondly, the means of attaining them, whether in laws or men. The state which is wanting in this knowledge cannot be expected to be wise when the time for action arrives. Now what class or institution is there in our state which has such a saving power? 'I suspect that you are referring to the Nocturnal Council.' Yes, to that council which is to have all virtue, and which should aim directly at the mark. 'Very true.' The inconsistency of legislation in most states is not surprising, when the variety of their objects is considered. One of them makes their rule of justice the government of a class; another aims at wealth; another at

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freedom, or at freedom and power; and some who call themselves philosophers maintain that you should seek for all of them at once. But our object is unmistakeably virtue, and virtue is of four kinds. 'Yes; and we said that mind is the chief and ruler of the three other kinds of virtue and of all else.' True, Cleinias; and now, having already declared the object which is present to the mind of the pilot, the general, the physician, we will interrogate the mind of the statesman. Tell me, I say, as the physician and general have told us their object, what is the object of the statesman. Can you tell me? 'We cannot.' Did we not say that there are four virtues — courage, wisdom, and two others, all of which are called by the common name of virtue, and are in a sense one? 'Certainly we did.' The difficulty is, not in understanding the differences of the virtues, but in apprehending their unity. Why do we call virtue, which is a single thing, by the two names of wisdom and courage? The reason is that courage is concerned with fear, and is found both in children and in brutes; for the soul may be courageous without reason, but no soul was, or ever will be, wise without reason. 'That is true.' I have explained to you the difference, and do you in return explain to me the unity. But first let us consider whether any one who knows the name of a thing without the definition has any real knowledge of it. Is not such knowledge a disgrace to a man of sense, especially where great and glorious truths are concerned? and can any subject be more worthy of the attention of our legislators than the four virtues of which we are speaking — courage, temperance, justice, wisdom? Ought not the magistrates and officers of the state to instruct the citizens in the nature of virtue and vice, instead of leaving them to be taught by some chance poet or sophist? A city which is without instruction suffers the usual fate of cities in our day. What then shall we do? How shall we perfect the ideas of our guardians about virtue? how shall we give our state a head and eyes? Yes, but how do you apply the figure?' The city will be the body or trunk; the best of our young men will mount into the head or acropolis and be our eyes; they will look about them, and inform the elders, who are the mind and use the younger men as their instruments: together they will save the state. Shall this be our constitution, or shall all be educated alike, and the



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special training be given up? 'That is impossible.' Let us then endeavour to attain to some more exact idea of education. Did we not say that the true artist or guardian ought to have an eye, not only to the many, but to the one, and to order all things with a view to the one? Can there be any more philosophical speculation than how to reduce many things which are unlike to one idea? 'Perhaps not.' Say rather, 'Certainly not.' And the rulers of our divine state ought to have an exact knowledge of the common principle in courage, temperance, justice, wisdom, which is called by the name of virtue; and unless we know whether virtue is one or many, we shall hardly know what virtue is. Shall we contrive some means of engrafting this knowledge on our state, or give the matter up? 'Anything rather than that.' Let us begin by making an agreement. 'By all means, if we can.' Well, are we not agreed that our guardians ought to know, not only how the good and the honourable are many, but also how they are one? 'Yes, certainly.' The true guardian of the laws ought to know their truth, and should also be able to interpret and execute them? 'He should.' And is there any higher knowledge than the knowledge of the existence and power of the Gods? The people may be excused for following tradition; but the guardian must be able to give a reason of the faith which is in him. And there are two great evidences of religion — the priority of the soul and the order of the heavens. For no man of sense, when he contemplates the universe, will be likely to substitute necessity for reason and will. Those who maintain that the sun and the stars are inanimate beings are utterly wrong in their opinions. The men of a former generation had a suspicion, which has been confirmed by later thinkers, that things inanimate could never without mind have attained such scientific accuracy; and some [Anaxagoras] even in those days ventured to assert that mind had ordered all things in heaven; but they had no idea of the priority of mind, and they turned the world, or more properly themselves, upside down, and filled the universe with stones, and earth, and other inanimate bodies. This led to great impiety, and the poets said many foolish things against the philosophers, whom they compared to 'yelping she-dogs,' besides making other abusive remarks. No man can now truly worship the Gods who does not believe that the soul is eternal, and prior to the body, and the ruler of all bodies, and does



not perceive also that there is mind in the stars; or who has not heard the connexion of these things with music, and has not harmonized them with manners and laws, giving a reason of things which are matters of reason. He who is unable to acquire this knowledge, as well as the ordinary virtues of a citizen, can only be a servant, and not a ruler in the state.

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Let us then add another law to the effect that the Nocturnal Council shall be a guard set for the salvation of the state. 'Very good.' To establish this will be our aim, and I hope that others besides myself will assist. 'Let us proceed along the road in which God seems to guide us.' We cannot, Megillus and Cleinias, anticipate the details which will hereafter be needed; they must be supplied by experience. 'What do you mean?' First of all a register will have to be made of all those whose age, character, or education would qualify them to be guardians. The subjects which they are to learn, and the order in which they are to be learnt, are mysteries which cannot be explained beforehand, but not mysteries in any other sense. 'If that is the case, what is to be done?' We must stake our all on a lucky throw, and I will share the risk by stating my views on education. And I would have you, Cleinias, who are the founder of the Magnesian state, and will obtain the greatest glory if you succeed, and will at least be praised for your courage, if you fail, take especial heed of this matter. If we can only establish the Nocturnal Council, we will hand over the city to its keeping; none of the present company will hesitate about that. Our dream will then become a reality; and our citizens, if they are carefully chosen and well educated, will be saviours and guardians such as the world hitherto has never seen.

The want of completeness in the *Laws* becomes more apparent in the later books. There is less arrangement in them, and the transitions are more abrupt from one subject to another. Yet they contain several noble passages, such as the 'prelude to the discourse concerning the honour and dishonour of parents' (xi. 931), or the picture of the dangers attending the 'friendly intercourse of young men and maidens with one another' (viii. 835 D ff.), or the soothing remonstrance which is addressed to the dying man respecting his right to do what he will with his own (xi. 922 ff.), or

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the fine description of the burial of the dead (xii. 958 C ff.). The subject of religion in Book X is introduced as a prelude to offences against the Gods, and this portion of the work appears to be executed in Plato's best manner.

In the last four books, several questions occur for consideration: among them are (I) the detection and punishment of offences; (II) the nature of the voluntary and involuntary; (III) the arguments against atheism, and against the opinion that the Gods have no care of human affairs; (IV) the remarks upon retail trade; (V) the institution of the Nocturnal Council.

I. A weak point in the *Laws* of Plato is the amount of inquisition into private life which is to be made by the rulers. The magistrate is always watching and waylaying the citizens. He is constantly to receive information against improprieties of life, Plato does not seem to be aware that espionage can only have a negative effect. He has not yet discovered the boundary line which parts the domain of law from that of morality or social life. Men will not tell of one another; nor will he ever be the most honoured citizen, who gives the most frequent information about offenders to the magistrates (v. 730 D, E).

As in some writers of fiction, so also in philosophers, we may observe the effect of age. Plato becomes more conservative as he grows older, and he would govern the world entirely by men like himself, who are above fifty years of age (cp. vi. 755 A); for in them he hopes to find a principle of stability. He does not remark that, in destroying the freedom he is destroying also the life of the State. In reducing all the citizens to rule and measure, he would have been depriving the Magnesian colony of those great men 'whose acquaintance is beyond all price' (xii. 951 B); and he would have found that in the worst-governed Hellenic State, there was more of a *carrière ouverte* for extraordinary genius and virtue than in his own.

Plato has an evident dislike of the Athenian dicasteries; he prefers a few judges who take a leading part in the conduct of trials to a great number who only listen in silence (vi. 766 D; cf. also ix. 855 D). He allows of two appeals — in each case however with an increase of the penalty (xii. 956). Modern jurists would disapprove of the redress of injustice being purchased only at an increasing risk; though indirectly the burden of legal ex-

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penses, which seems to have been little felt among the Athenians, has a similar effect. The love of litigation, which is a remnant of barbarism quite as much as a corruption of civilization, and was innate in the Athenian people, is diminished in the new state by the imposition of severe penalties (xi. 938). If persevered in, it is to be punished with death.

In the *Laws* murder and homicide besides being crimes, are also pollutions. Regarded from this point of view, the estimate of such offences is apt to depend on accidental circumstances, such as the shedding of blood, and not on the real guilt of the offender or the injury done to society. They are measured by the horror which they arouse in a barbarous age. For there is a superstition in law as well as in religion, and the feelings of a primitive age have a traditional hold on the mass of the people. On the other hand, Plato is innocent of the barbarity which would visit the sins of the fathers upon the children, and he is quite aware that punishment has an eye to the future, and not to the past (ix. 854 D ff.). Compared with that of most European nations in the last century his penal code, though sometimes capricious, is reasonable and humane.

A defect in Plato's criminal jurisprudence is his remission of the punishment when the homicide has obtained the forgiveness of the murdered person (ix. 869 E); as if crime were a personal affair between individuals, and not an offence against the State. There is a ridiculous disproportion in his punishments. Because a slave may fairly receive a blow for stealing one fig or one bunch of grapes, or a tradesman for selling adulterated goods to the value of one drachma, it is rather hard upon the slave that he should receive as many blows as he has taken grapes or figs (viii. 845 A), or upon the tradesman who has sold adulterated goods to the value of a thousand drachmas that he should receive a thousand blows (xi. 917).

II. But before punishment can be inflicted at all, the legislator must determine the nature of the voluntary and involuntary. The great question of the freedom of the will, which in modern times has been worn threadbare with purely abstract discussion, was approached both by Plato and Aristotle—first, from the judicial; secondly, from the sophistical point of view. They were puzzled by the degrees and kinds of crime; they observed also that the



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law only punished hurts which are inflicted by a voluntary agent on an involuntary patient.

In attempting to distinguish between hurt and injury (ix. 859 ff.; cp. also 870), Plato says that mere hurt is not injury; but that a benefit when done in a wrong spirit may sometimes injure, e. g. when conferred without regard to right and wrong, or to the good or evil consequences which may follow. He means to say that the good or evil disposition of the agent is the principle which characterizes actions; and this is not sufficiently described by the terms voluntary and involuntary. You may hurt another involuntarily, and no one would suppose that you had injured him; and you may hurt him voluntarily, as in inflicting punishment — neither is this injury; but if you hurt him from motives of avarice, ambition, or cowardly fear, this is injury. Injustice is also described as the victory of desire or passion or self-conceit over reason, as justice is the subordination of them to reason. In some paradoxical sense Plato is disposed to affirm all injustice to be involuntary; because no man would do injustice who knew that it never paid and could calculate the consequences of what he was doing. Yet, on the other hand, he admits that the distinction of voluntary and involuntary, taken in another and more obvious sense, is the basis of legislation. His conception of justice and injustice is complicated (1) by the want of a distinction between justice and virtue, that is to say, between the quality which primarily regards others, and the quality in which self and others are equally regarded; (2) by the confusion of doing and suffering justice; (3) by the unwillingness to renounce the old Socratic paradox, that evil is involuntary.

III. The Laws rest on a religious foundation; in this respect they bear the stamp of primitive legislation. They do not escape the almost inevitable consequence of making irreligion penal. If laws are based upon religion, the greatest offence against them must be irreligion. Hence the necessity for what in modern language, and according to a distinction which Plato would scarcely have understood, might be termed persecution. But the spirit of persecution in Plato, unlike that of modern religious bodies, arises out of the desire to enforce a true and simple form of religion, and is directed against the superstitions which tend to degrade mankind. Sir Thomas More, in his *Utopia*, is in favour of tolerating



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all except the intolerant, though he would not promote to high offices those who disbelieved in the immortality of the soul. Plato has not advanced quite so far as this in the path of toleration. But in judging of his enlightenment, we must remember that the evils of necromancy and divination were far greater than those of intolerance in the ancient world. Human nature is always having recourse to the first; but only when organized into some form of priesthood falls into the other; although in primitive as in later ages the institution of a priesthood may claim probably to be an advance on some form of religion which preceded. The *Laws* would have rested on a sounder foundation, if Plato had ever distinctly realized to his mind the difference between crime and sin or vice. Of this, as of many other controversies, a clear definition might have been the end. But such a definition belongs to a later age of philosophy.

The arguments which Plato uses for the being of a God, have an extremely modern character: first, the *consensus gentium*; secondly, the argument which has already been adduced in the *Phaedrus* (245 C), of the priority of the self-moved. The answer to those who say that God 'cares not,' is, that He governs by general laws; and that he who takes care of the great will assuredly take care of the small. Plato did not feel, and has not attempted to consider, the difficulty of reconciling the special with the general providence of God. Yet he is on the road to a solution, when he regards the world as a whole, of which all the parts work together towards the final end.

We are surprised to find that the scepticism, which we attribute to young men in our own day, existed then (cp. *Rep.* vii. 538); that the Epicureanism expressed in the line of Horace (borrowed from Lucretius) —

'Namque Deos didici securum agere aevum,'

was already prevalent in the age of Plato; and that the terrors of another world were freely used in order to gain advantages over other men in this. The same objection which struck the Psalmist — 'when I saw the prosperity of the wicked' (73. 3) — is supposed to lie at the root of the better sort of unbelief. And the answer is substantially the same which the modern theologian would offer: — that the ways of God in this world cannot be

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justified unless there be a future state of rewards and punishments. Yet this future state of rewards and punishments is in Plato's view not any addition of happiness or suffering imposed from without, but the permanence of good and evil in the soul: here he is in advance of many modern theologians. The Greek, too, had his difficulty about the existence of evil, which in one solitary passage, remarkable for being inconsistent with his general system, Plato explains, after the Magian fashion, by a good and evil spirit (x. 896 E; cp. Theaet. 176, Statesman 269 E). This passage is also remarkable for being at variance with the general optimism of the Tenth Book—not 'all things are ordered by God for the best,' but some things by a good, others by an evil spirit.

The Tenth Book of the *Laws* presents a picture of the state of belief among the Greeks singularly like that of the world in which we live. Plato is disposed to attribute the incredulity of his own age to several causes. First, to the bad effect of mythological tales, of which he retains his disapproval; but he has a weak side for antiquity, and is unwilling, as in the *Republic* (Books II and III), wholly to proscribe them (*Laws* x. 886). Secondly, he remarks the self-conceit of a newly-fledged generation of philosophers, who declare that the sun, moon, and stars, are earth and stones only; and who also maintain that the Gods are made by the laws of the state. Thirdly, he notes a confusion in the minds of men arising out of their misinterpretation of the appearances of the world around them: they do not always see the righteous rewarded and the wicked punished. So in modern times there are some whose infidelity has arisen from doubts about the inspiration of ancient writings; others who have been made unbelievers by physical science, or again by the seemingly political character of religion; while there is a third class to whose minds the difficulty of 'justifying the ways of God to man' has been the chief stumblingblock. Plato is very much out of temper at the impiety of some of his contemporaries (x. 888); yet he is determined to reason with the victims, as he regards them, of these illusions before he punishes them. His answer to the unbelievers is twofold: first, that the soul is prior to the body (x. 891 E); secondly, that the ruler of the universe being perfect has made all things with a view to their perfection (x. 903 C, 904).

The difficulties arising out of ancient sacred writings were far less serious in the age of Plato than in our own. *Laws.*

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We too have our popular Epicureanism, which would allow the world to go on as if there were no God. When the belief in Him, whether of ancient or modern times, begins to fade away, men relegate Him, either in theory or practice, into a distant heaven. They do not like expressly to deny God when it is more convenient to forget Him; and so the theory of the Epicurean becomes the practice of mankind in general. Nor can we be said to be free from that which Plato justly considers to be the worst unbelief—of those who put superstition in the place of true religion. For the larger half of Christians continue to assert that the justice of God may be turned aside by gifts, and, if not by the ‘odour of fat, and the sacrifice steaming to heaven,’ still by another kind of sacrifice placed upon the altar—by masses for the quick and dead, by dispensations, by building churches, by rites and ceremonies—by the same means which the heathen used, taking other names and shapes. And the indifference of Epicureanism and unbelief is in two ways the parent of superstition, partly because it permits, and also because it creates, a necessity for its development in religious and enthusiastic temperaments. If men cannot have a rational belief, they will have an irrational. And hence the most superstitious countries are also at a certain point of civilization the most unbelieving, and the revolution which takes one direction is quickly followed by a reaction in the other. So we may read ‘between the lines’ ancient history and philosophy into modern, and modern into ancient. Whether we compare the theory of Greek philosophy with the Christian religion, or the practice of the Gentile world with the practice of the Christian world, they will be found to differ more in words and less in reality than we might have supposed. The greater opposition which is sometimes made between them seems to arise chiefly out of a comparison of the ideal of the one with the practice of the other.

To the errors of superstition and unbelief Plato opposes the simple and natural truth of religion; the best and highest, whether conceived in the form of a person or a principle—as the divine mind or as the idea of good—is believed by him to be the basis of human life. That all things are working together for good



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to the good and evil to the evil in this or in some other world to which human actions are transferred, is the sum of his faith or theology. Unlike Socrates, he is absolutely free from superstition. Religion and morality are one and indivisible to him. He dislikes the 'heathen mythology,' which, as he significantly remarks, was not tolerated in Crete, and perhaps (for the meaning of his words is not quite clear) at Sparta (x. 886 B, C: cp. iii. 680 C). He gives no encouragement to individual enthusiasm; 'the establishment of religion could only be the work of a mighty intellect' (x. 909 E). Like the Hebrews, he prohibits private rites; for the avoidance of superstition, he would transfer all worship of the Gods to the public temples (x. 909 D). He would not have men and women consecrating the accidents of their lives (x. 909 E). He trusts to human punishments and not to divine judgments; though he is not unwilling to repeat the old tradition that certain kinds of dishonesty 'prevent a man from having a family' (xi. 913 C). He considers that the 'ages of faith' have passed away and cannot now be recalled (xii. 948 B). Yet he is far from wishing to extirpate the sentiment of religion, which he sees to be common to all mankind — Barbarians as well as Hellenes (x. 886 A). He remarks that no one passes through life without, sooner or later, experiencing its power (x. 888 B, C). To which we may add the further remark that the greater the irreligion, the more violent has often been the religious reaction.

It is remarkable that Plato's account of mind at the end of the *Laws* goes beyond Anaxagoras, and beyond himself in any of his previous writings. Aristotle, in a well-known passage (*Met.* i. 4) which is an echo of the *Phaedo* (97, 98), remarks on the inconsistency of Anaxagoras in introducing the agency of mind, and yet having recourse to other and inferior, probably material causes. But Plato makes the further criticism, that the error of Anaxagoras consisted, not in denying the universal agency of mind, but in denying the priority, or, as we should say, the eternity of it (xii. 967). Yet in the *Timaeus* (31 ff.) he had himself allowed that God made the world out of pre-existing materials: in the *Statesman* (273 B) he says that there were seeds of evil in the world arising out of the remains of a former chaos which could not be got rid of; and even in the Tenth Book of the *Laws* (896 E) he has admitted that there are two souls, a good and evil. In the *Meno*, the *Phaedrus*, and



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the Phaedo, he had spoken of the recovery of ideas from a former state of existence. But now he has attained to a clearer point of view: he has discarded these fancies. From meditating on the priority of the human soul to the body, he has learnt the nature of soul absolutely. The power of the best, of which he gave an intimation in the Phaedo and in the Republic, now, as in the Philebus, takes the form of an intelligence or person. He no longer, like Anaxagoras, supposes mind to be introduced at a certain time into the world and to give order to a pre-existing chaos, but to be prior to the chaos, everlasting and evermoving, and the source of order and intelligence in all things. This appears to be the last form of Plato's religious philosophy, which might almost be summed up in the words of Kant, 'the starry heaven above and the moral law within.' Or rather, perhaps, 'the starry heaven above and mind prior to the world.'

IV. The remarks about retail trade, about adulteration, and about mendicity, have a very modern character. Greek social life was more like our own than we are apt to suppose. There was the same division of ranks, the same aristocratic and democratic feeling, and, even in a democracy, the same preference for land and for agricultural pursuits. Plato may be claimed as the first free-trader, when he prohibits the imposition of customs on imports and exports, though he was clearly not aware of the importance of the principle which he enunciated (viii. 847 B, C). The discredit of retail trade he attributes to the rogueries of traders, and is inclined to believe that if a nobleman would keep a shop, which heaven forbid! retail trade might become honourable (xi. 918). He has hardly lighted upon the true reason, which appears to be the essential distinction between buyers and sellers, the one class being necessarily in some degree dependent on the other. When he proposes to fix prices 'which would allow a moderate gain' (xi. 920), and to regulate trade in several minute particulars, we must remember that this is by no means so absurd in a city consisting of 5040 citizens, in which almost every one would know and become known to everybody else, as in our own vast population. Among ourselves we are very far from allowing every man to charge what he pleases. Of many things the prices are fixed by law. Do we not often hear of wages being adjusted in proportion to the profits of employers? The objection to regulating them by

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law and thus avoiding the conflicts which continually arise between the buyers and sellers of labour, is not so much the undesirableness as the impossibility of doing so. Wherever free competition is not reconcileable either with the order of society, or, as in the case of adulteration, with common honesty, the government may lawfully interfere. The only question is,—Whether the interference will be effectual, and whether the evil of interference may not be greater than the evil which is prevented by it.

He would prohibit beggars, because in a well-ordered state no good man would be left to starve (xi. 936 B). This again is a prohibition which might have been easily enforced, for there is no difficulty in maintaining the poor when the population is small. In our own times the difficulty of pauperism is rendered far greater, (1) by the enormous numbers, (2) by the facility of locomotion, (3) by the increasing tenderness for human life and suffering. And the only way of meeting the difficulty seems to be by modern nations subdividing themselves into small bodies having local knowledge and acting together in the spirit of ancient communities (cp. Arist. Pol. vi. 5, §§ 5-11).

V. Regarded as the framework of a polity the *Laws* are deemed by Plato to be a decline from the Republic, which is the dream of his earlier years (*Laws* v. 739). He nowhere imagines that he has reached a higher point of speculation. He is only descending to the level of human things, and he often returns to his original idea. For the guardians of the Republic, who were the elder citizens, and were all supposed to be philosophers, is now substituted a special body, who are to review and amend the laws, preserving the spirit of the legislator. These are the Nocturnal Council, who, although they are not specially trained in dialectic, are not wholly destitute of it; for they must know the relation of particular virtues to the general principle of virtue (xii. 965). Plato has been arguing throughout the *Laws* that temperance is higher than courage, peace than war, that the love of both must enter into the character of the good citizen. And at the end the same thought is summed up by him in an abstract form. The true artist or guardian must be able to reduce the many to the one, than which, as he says with an enthusiasm worthy of the Phaedrus or Philebus, 'no more philosophical method was ever devised by the wit of man' (xii. 965 C). But the sense of unity in

difference can only be acquired by study; and Plato does not explain to us the nature of this study, which we may reasonably infer, though there is a remarkable omission of the word, to be akin to the dialectic of the Republic.

The Nocturnal Council is to consist of the priests who have obtained the rewards of virtue, of the ten eldest guardians of the law, and of the director and ex-directors of education; each of whom is to select for approval a younger coadjutor. To this council the 'Spectator,' who is sent to visit foreign countries, has to make his report (xii. 951 ff.). It is not an administrative body, but an assembly of sages who are to make legislation their study. Plato is not altogether disinclined to changes in the law where experience shows them to be necessary; but he is also anxious that the original spirit of the constitution should never be lost sight of.

The Laws of Plato contain the latest phase of his philosophy, showing in many respects an advance, and in others a decline, in his views of life and the world. His Theory of Ideas in the next generation passed into one of Numbers, the nature of which we gather chiefly from the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle. Of the speculative side of this theory there are no traces in the Laws, but doubtless Plato found the practical value which he attributed to arithmetic greatly confirmed by the possibility of applying number and measure to the revolution of the heavens, and to the regulation of human life. In the return to a doctrine of numbers there is a retrogression rather than an advance; for the most barren logical abstraction is of a higher nature than number and figure. Philosophy fades away into the distance; in the Laws it is confined to the members of the Nocturnal Council. The speculative truth which was the food of the guardians in the Republic, is for the majority of the citizens to be superseded by practical virtues. The law, which is the expression of mind written down, takes the place of the living word of the philosopher. (Compare the contrast of *Phaedrus* 275 E, and *Laws* x. 91 A; also the plays on the words *νόμος*, *νόμ*, *διανομή* (*Laws* . 714 A; xii. 957 C); and the discussion in the *Statesman* (293 ff.) of the difference between the personal rule of a king and the impersonal reign of law). The State is based on virtue and religion rather than on knowledge; and virtue is no longer

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identified with knowledge, being of the commoner sort, and spoken of in the sense generally understood. Yet there are many traces of advance as well as retrogression in the Laws of Plato. The attempt to reconcile the ideal with actual life is an advance; to 'have brought philosophy down from heaven to earth,' is a praise which may be claimed for him as well as for his master Socrates. And the members of the Nocturnal Council are to continue students of the 'one in many' and of the nature of God. Education is the last word with which Plato supposes the theory of the Laws to end and the reality to begin (*Laws, sub fin.*).

Plato's increasing appreciation of the difficulties of human affairs, and of the element of chance which so largely influences them, is an indication not of a narrower, but of a maturer mind, which had become more conversant with realities. Nor can we fairly attribute any want of originality to him, because he has borrowed many of his provisions from Sparta and Athens. Laws and institutions grow out of habits and customs; and they have 'better opinion, better confirmation,' if they have come down from antiquity and are not mere literary inventions. Plato would have been the first to acknowledge that the Book of Laws was not the creation of his fancy, but a collection of enactments which had been devised by inspired legislators, like Minos, Lycurgus, and Solon, to meet the actual needs of men, and had been approved by time and experience.

In order to do justice therefore to the design of the work, it is necessary to examine how far it rests on an historical foundation and coincides with the actual laws of Sparta and Athens. The consideration of the historical aspect of the Laws has been reserved for this place. In working out the comparison the writer has been greatly assisted by the excellent essays of C. F. Hermann ('*De vestigiis institutorum veterum, imprimis Atticorum per Platonis de Legibus libros indagandis*,' and '*Juris domestic et familiaris apud Platonem in Legibus cum veteris Graeciae inque primis Athenarum institutis comparatio*'; Marburg, 1836) and by J. B. Telfy's '*Corpus Juris Attici*' (Leipzig, 1868).



EXCURSUS ON THE RELATION OF THE LAWS OF PLATO TO  
THE INSTITUTIONS OF CRETE AND LACEDAEMON AND TO  
THE LAWS AND CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS.

The Laws of Plato are essentially Greek: unlike Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, they contain nothing foreign or oriental. Their aim is to reconstruct the work of the great lawgivers of Hellas in a literary form. They partake both of an Athenian and a Spartan character. Some of them too are derived from Crete, and are appropriately transferred to a Cretan colony. But of Crete so little is known to us, that although, as Montesquieu (*Esprit des Lois*, iv. 6) remarks, 'the Laws of Crete are the original of those of Sparta and the Laws of Plato the correction of these latter,' there is only one point, viz. the common meals, in which they can be compared. Most of Plato's provisions resemble the laws and customs which prevailed in these three states (especially in the two former), and which the personifying instinct of the Greeks attributed to Minos, Lycurgus, and Solon. A very few particulars may have been borrowed from Zaleucus (*Cic. de Legibus*, ii. 6), and Charondas, who is said to have first made laws against perjury (*Arist. Pol.* ii. 12, § 11) and to have forbidden credit (*Stob. Florileg.* 44, p. 204, Gaisford). Some enactments are Plato's own, and were suggested by his experience of defects in the Athenian and other Greek states. The Laws also contain many lesser provisions, which are not found in the ordinary codes of nations, because they cannot be properly defined, and are therefore better left to custom and common sense. 'The greater part of the work,' as Aristotle remarks (*Pol.* ii. 6, § 4), 'is taken up with laws': yet this is not wholly true, and applies to the latter rather than to the first half of it. The book rests on an ethical and religious foundation: the actual laws begin with a hymn of praise to the honour of the soul (v. 726 foll.). And the same lofty aspiration after the good is perpetually recurring, especially in Books X, XI, XII, and whenever Plato's mind is filled with his highest themes. In prefixing to most of his laws a prooemium he has two ends in view, to persuade and also to threaten. They are to have the function of laws and the effect of sermons. And Plato's 'Book of Laws,' if described in the language of modern philosophy, may be

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said to be as much an ethical and educational, as a political or legal treatise.

But although the Laws partake both of an Athenian and a Spartan character, the elements which are borrowed from either state are necessarily very different, because the character and origin of the two governments themselves differed so widely. Sparta was the more ancient and primitive: Athens was suited to the wants of a later stage of society. The relation of the two states to the Laws may be conceived in this manner:—The foundation and ground-plan of the work are more Spartan, while the superstructure and details are more Athenian. At Athens the laws were written down and were voluminous; more than a thousand fragments of them have been collected by Telfy. Like the Roman or English law, they contained innumerable particulars. Those of them which regulated daily life were familiarly known to the Athenians; for every citizen was his own lawyer, and also a judge, who decided the rights of his fellow-citizens according to the laws, often after hearing speeches from the parties interested or from their advocates. It is to Rome and not to Athens that the invention of law, in the modern sense of the term, is commonly ascribed. But it must be remembered that long before the times of the Twelve Tables (B. C. 451), regular courts and forms of law had existed at Athens and probably in the Greek colonies. And we may reasonably suppose, though without any express proof of the fact, that many Roman institutions and customs, like Latin literature and mythology, were partly derived from Hellas and had imperceptibly drifted from one shore of the Ionian Sea to the other (cp. especially the constitutions of Servius Tullius and of Solon).

It is not proved that the laws of Sparta were in ancient times either written down in books or engraved on tablets of marble or brass. Nor is it certain that, if they had been, the Spartans could have read them. They were ancient customs, some of them older probably than the settlement in Laconia, of which the origin is unknown; they occasionally received the sanction of the Delphic oracle, but there was a still stronger obligation by which they were enforced,—the necessity of self-defence: the Spartans were always living in the presence of their enemies. They belonged to an age when written law had not yet taken the place of custom.

and tradition. The old constitution was very rarely affected by new enactments, and these only related to the duties of the Kings or Ephors, or the new relations of classes which arose as time went on. Hence there was as great a difference as could well be conceived between the laws of Athens and Sparta: the one was the creation of a civilized state, and did not differ in principle from our modern legislation, the other of an age in which the people were held together and also kept down by force of arms, and which afterwards retained many traces of its barbaric origin 'surviving in culture.'

Nevertheless the Lacedaemonian was the ideal of a primitive Greek state. According to Thucydides (i. 18) it was the first which emerged out of confusion and became a regular government. It was also an army devoted to military exercises, but organized with a view to self-defence and not to conquest. It was not quick to move or easily excited; but stolid, cautious, unambitious, procrastinating. For many centuries it retained the same character which was impressed upon it by the hand of the legislator. This singular fabric was partly the result of circumstances, partly the invention of some unknown individual in prehistoric times, whose ideal of education was military discipline, and who, by the ascendancy of his genius, made a small tribe into a nation which became famous in the world's history. The other Hellenes wondered at the strength and stability of his work. The rest of Hellas, says Thucydides (iii. 93; cp. iv. 108), undertook the colonisation of Heraclea the more readily, having a feeling of security now that they saw the Lacedaemonians taking part in it. The Spartan state appears to us in the dawn of history as a vision of armed men, irresistible by any other power then existing in the world. It can hardly be said to have understood at all the rights or duties of nations to one another, or indeed to have had any moral principle except patriotism and obedience to commanders. Men were so trained to act together that they lost the freedom and spontaneity of human life in cultivating the qualities of the soldier and ruler. The Spartan state was a composite body in which kings, nobles, citizens, perioeci, artisans, slaves, had to find '*modus vivendi*' with one another. All of them were taught the use of arms. The strength of the family tie was diminished among them by an enforced absence from home and by common

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meals. Sparta had no life or growth; no poetry or tradition of the past; no art, no thought. The Athenians started on their great career some centuries later, but the Spartans would have been easily conquered by them, if Athens had not been deficient in the qualities which constituted the strength (and also the weakness) of her rival.

The ideal of Athens has been pictured for all time in the speech which Thucydides puts into the mouth of Pericles, called the Funeral Oration. He contrasts the activity and freedom and pleasantness of Athenian life with the immobility and severe looks and incessant drill of the Spartans. The citizens of no city were more versatile, or more readily changed from land to sea or more quickly moved about from place to place. They 'took their pleasures' merrily, and yet, when the time for fighting arrived, were not a whit behind the Spartans, who were like men living in a camp, and, though always keeping guard, were often too late for the fray. Any foreigner might visit Athens; her ships found a way to the most distant shores; the riches of the whole earth poured in upon her. Her citizens had their theatres and festivals; they 'provided their souls with many relaxations'; yet they were not less manly than the Spartans or less willing to sacrifice this enjoyable existence for their country's good. The Athenian was a nobler form of life than that of their rivals, a life of music as well as of gymnastic, the life of a citizen as well as of a soldier. Such is the picture which Thucydides has drawn of the Athenians in their glory. It is the spirit of this life which Plato would infuse into the Magnesian state and which he seeks to combine with the common meals and gymnastic discipline of Sparta.

The two great types of Athens and Sparta had deeply entered into his mind. He had heard of Sparta at a distance and from common Hellenic fame: he was a citizen of Athens and an Athenian of noble birth. He must often have sat in the law-courts, and may have had personal experience of the duties of offices such as he is establishing. There is no need to ask the question, whence he derived his knowledge of the Laws of Athens; they were a part of his daily life. Many of his enactments are recognized to be Athenian laws from the fragments preserved in the Orators and elsewhere: many more would be found to be so if we had better information. Probably also still



more of them would have been incorporated in the Magnesian code, if the work had ever been finally completed. But it seems to have come down to us in a form which is partly finished and partly unfinished, having a beginning and end, but wanting arrangement in the middle. The Laws answer to Plato's own description of them, in the comparison (ix. 858 B) which he makes of himself and his two friends to gatherers of stones or the beginners of some composite work, 'who are providing materials and partly putting them together:—having some of their laws, like stones, already fixed in their places, while others lie about.'

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Plato's own life coincided with the period at which Athens rose to her greatest heights and sank to her lowest depths. It was impossible that he should regard the blessings of democracy in the same light as the men of a former generation, whose view was not intercepted by the evil shadow of the taking of Athens, and who had only the glories of Marathon and Salamis and the administration of Pericles to look back upon. On the other hand the fame and prestige of Sparta, which had outlived so many crimes and blunders, was not altogether lost at the end of the life of Plato. Hers was the only great Hellenic government which preserved something of its ancient form; and although the Spartan citizens were reduced to almost one-tenth of their original number (Arist. Pol. ii. 9, §§ 16, 17), she still retained, until the rise of Thebes and Macedon, a certain authority and predominance due to her final success in the struggle with Athens and to the victories which Agesilaus won in Asia Minor.

Plato, like Aristotle, had in his mind some form of a mean state which should escape the evils and secure the advantages of both aristocracy and democracy. It may however be doubted whether the creation of such a state is not beyond the legislator's art (cp. iv. 709), although there have been examples in history of forms of government, which through some community of interest or of origin, through a balance of parties in the state itself, or through the fear of a common enemy, have for a while preserved such a character of moderation. But in general there arises a time in the history of a state when the struggle between the few and the many has to be fought out. No system of checks and balances, such as Plato has devised in the Laws, could have given equipoise and stability to an ancient state, any more than the skill of the

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legislator could have withstood the tide of democracy in England or France during the last hundred years, or have given life to China or India.

The basis of the Magnesian constitution is the equal division of land (v. 737 foll.). In the new state (v. 744 D), as in the Republic (iv. 421, 422), there was to be neither poverty nor riches. Every citizen under all circumstances retained his lot, and as much money as was necessary for the cultivation of it (ix. 855 B), and no one was allowed to accumulate property to the amount of more than five times the value of the lot, inclusive of it (v. 744 D, E). The equal division of land was a Spartan institution, not known to have existed elsewhere in Hellas. The mention of it in the Laws of Plato affords considerable presumption that it was of ancient origin, and not first introduced, as Mr. Grote and others have imagined, in the reformation of Cleomenes III. But at Sparta, if we may judge from the frequent complaints of the accumulation of property in the hands of a few persons (Arist. Pol. ii. 9, § 14), no provision could have been made for the maintenance of the lot. Plutarch indeed speaks of a law introduced by the Ephor Epitadeus soon after the Peloponnesian War, which first allowed the Spartans to sell their land (Agis, c. 5): but from the manner in which Aristotle refers to the subject, we should imagine this evil in the state to be of a much older standing. Like some other countries in which small proprietors have been numerous, the original equality passed into inequality, and, instead of a large middle class, there was probably at Sparta greater disproportion in the property of the citizens than in any other state of Hellas. Plato was aware of the danger, and has improved on the Spartan custom. The land, as at Sparta, must have been tilled by slaves, since other occupations were found for the citizens (vii. 806 E; viii. 835 E). Bodies of young men between the ages of twenty-five and thirty were engaged in making biennial peregrinations of the country. They and their officers are to be the magistrates, police, engineers, aediles, of the twelve districts into which the colony was divided (vi. 760 ff.). Their way of life may be compared with that of the Spartan secret police or Crypteia, a name which Plato freely applies to them (vi. 763 B) without apparently any consciousness of the odium which has attached to the word in history.

Another great institution which Plato borrowed from Sparta (or Crete) is the Syssitia or common meals. These were established in both states, and in some respects were considered by Aristotle to be better managed in Crete than at Lacedaemon (Pol. ii. 10, §§ 7–10). In the Laws (viii. 842 B) the Cretan custom appears to be adopted<sup>1</sup>: that is to say, if we may interpret Plato by Aristotle, the cost of them was defrayed by the state and not by the individuals (Arist. Pol. ii. 9, §§ 31, 32); so that the members of the mess, who could not pay for their quota, still retained their rights of citizenship. But this explanation is hardly consistent with Laws xii. 955 D, E, where contributions to the Syssitia from private estates are expressly mentioned. Plato goes further than the legislators of Sparta and Crete, and would extend the common meals to women as well as men: he desires to curb the disorders, which existed among the female sex in both states (vi. 781), by the application to women of the same military discipline to which the men were already subject. It was an extension of the custom of Syssitia from which the ancient legislators shrank, and which Plato himself believed to be very difficult of enforcement.

Like Sparta, the new colony was not to be surrounded by walls,—a state should learn to depend upon the bravery of its citizens only (vi. 778 D, E)—a fallacy or paradox, if it is not to be regarded as a poetical fancy, which is fairly enough ridiculed by Aristotle (Pol. vii. 11, § 8). Women, too, must be ready to assist in the defence of their country: they are not to rush to the temples and altars, but to arm themselves with shield and spear (vii. 794 D). In the regulation of the Syssitia, in at least one of his enactments respecting property, and in the attempt to correct the licence of women, Plato shows, that while he borrowed from the institutions of Sparta and favoured the Spartan mode of life, he also sought to improve upon them.

The enmity to the sea is another Spartan feature which is transferred by Plato to the Magnesians (iv. 704 foll.). He did not reflect that a non-maritime power would always be at the mercy of one which had a command of the great highway. Their many island homes, the vast extent of coast which had to be protected by them, their struggles first of all with the Phoenicians

<sup>1</sup> This is not proved by viii. 847 E, as Hermann supposes ('De Vestigiis,' p. 29).



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and Carthaginians, and secondly with the Persian fleets, forced the Greeks, mostly against their will, to devote themselves to the sea. The islanders before the inhabitants of the continent, the maritime cities before the inland, the Corinthians and Athenians before the Spartans, were compelled to fit out ships: last of all the Spartans, by the pressure of the Peloponnesian War, were driven to establish a naval force, which, after the battle of Aegospotami, for more than a generation commanded the Aegean. Plato, like the Spartans, had a prejudice against a navy, because he regarded it as the nursery of democracy (iv. 704-707). But he either never considered, or did not care to explain, how a city, set upon an island and 'distant not more than ten miles from the sea, having a seaboard provided with excellent harbours' (iv. 704), could have safely subsisted without one.

Neither the Spartans nor the Magnesians colonists (xi. 919 D) were permitted to engage in trade or commerce. In order to limit their dealings as far as possible to their own country, they had a separate coinage; the Magnesians were only allowed to use the common currency of Hellas when they travelled abroad, which they were forbidden to do unless they received permission from the government (v. 742: cp. xii. 949 E ff.). Like the Spartans, Plato was afraid of the evils which might be introduced into his state by intercourse with foreigners (iv. 704 D); but he also shrinks from the utter exclusiveness of Sparta (xii. 950 B), and is not unwilling to allow visitors of a suitable age and rank to come from other states to his own, as he also allows citizens of his own state to go to foreign countries and bring back a report of them. Such international communication seemed to him both honourable and useful.

We may now notice some points in which the commonwealth of the *Laws* approximates to the Athenian model. These are much more numerous than the previous class of resemblances; we are better able to compare the laws of Plato with those of Athens, because a good deal more is known to us of Athens than of Sparta.

The information which we possess about Athenian law, though comparatively fuller, is still fragmentary. The sources from which our knowledge is derived are chiefly the following:—



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(1) The Orators,—Antiphon, Andocides, Lysias, Isocrates, Demosthenes, Aeschines, Lycurgus, and others.

(2) Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, as well as later writers, such as Cicero de Legibus, Plutarch, Aelian, Pausanias.

(3) Lexicographers, such as Harpocration, Pollux, Hesychius, Suidas, and the compiler of the Etymologicum Magnum, many of whom are of uncertain date, and to a great extent based upon one another. Their writings extend altogether over more than eight hundred years, from the second to the tenth century.

(4) The Scholia on Aristophanes, Plato, Demosthenes.

(5) A few inscriptions.

Our knowledge of a subject derived from such various sources and for the most part of uncertain date and origin, is necessarily precarious. No critic can separate the actual laws of Solon from those which passed under his name in later ages. Nor do the Scholiasts and Lexicographers attempt to distinguish how many of these laws were still in force at the time when they wrote, or when they fell into disuse and were to be found in books only. Nor can we hastily assume that enactments which occur in the Laws of Plato were also a part of Athenian law, however probable this may appear.

There are two classes of similarities between Plato's Laws and those of Athens: (i) of institutions; (ii) of minor enactments.

(i) The constitution of the Laws in its general character resembles much more nearly the Athenian constitution of Solon's time than that which succeeded it, or the extreme democracy which prevailed in Plato's own day (iii. 698 ff.). It was a mean state which he hoped to create, equally unlike a Syracusan tyranny or the mob-government of the Athenian assembly. There are various expedients by which he sought to impart to it the quality of moderation. (1) The whole people were to be educated: they could not all be trained in philosophy, but they were to acquire the simple elements of music, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy (vii. 809 ff.); they were also to be subject to military discipline, ἀρχοντες καὶ ἀρχόμενοι (xii. 942 C). (2) The majority of them were, or had been at some time in their lives, magistrates, and had the experience which is given by office. (3) The persons who held the highest offices were to have a

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further education, not much inferior to that provided for the guardians in the Republic, though the range of their studies is narrowed to the nature and divisions of virtue (xii. 965): here their philosophy comes to an end. (4) The entire number of the citizens (5040) rarely, if ever, assembled, except for purposes of elections. The whole people were divided into four classes, each having the right to be represented by the same number of members in the Council. The result of such an arrangement would be, as in the constitution of Servius Tullius, to give a disproportionate share of power to the wealthier classes, who may be supposed to be always much fewer in number than the poorer. This tendency was qualified by the complicated system of selection by vote, previous to the final election by lot, of which the object seems to be to hand over to the wealthy few the power of selecting from the many poor, and *vice versa* (vi. 756). (5) The most important body in the state was the Nocturnal Council, which is borrowed from the Areopagus at Athens, as it existed, or was supposed to have existed, in the days before Ephialtes and the Eumenides of Aeschylus, when its power was undiminished. In some particulars Plato appears to have copied exactly the customs and procedure of the Areopagus: both assemblies sat at night (xii. 968 A: Telfy, 836). There was a resemblance also in more important matters. Like the Areopagus, the Nocturnal Council was partly composed of magistrates and other state officials, whose term of office had expired (xii. 951). (7) The constitution included several diverse and even opposing elements, such as the Assembly and the Nocturnal Council. (8) There was much less exclusiveness than at Sparta; the citizens were to have an interest in the government of neighbouring states, and to know what was going on in the rest of the world.—All these were moderating influences.

A striking similarity between Athens and the constitution of the Magnesians is the use of the lot in the election of judges and other magistrates (vi. 756, 759; 768). That such a mode of election should have been resorted to in any civilized state, or that it should have been transferred by Plato to an ideal or imaginary one, is very singular to us. The most extreme democracy of modern times has never thought of leaving government wholly to chance. It was natural that Socrates should scoff

at it, and ask, 'Who would choose a pilot or carpenter or flute-player by lot' (Xen. Mem. i. 2, § 9)? Yet there were many considerations which made this mode of choice attractive both to the oligarch and to the democrat:—(1) It seemed to recognize that one man was as good as another, and that all the members of the governing body, whether few or many, were on a perfect equality in every sense of the word. (2) To the pious mind it appeared to be a choice made, not by man, but by heaven (cp. Laws iii. 690 C). (3) It afforded a protection against corruption and intrigue. . . . It must also be remembered that, although elected by lot, the persons so elected were subject to a scrutiny before they entered on their office, and were therefore liable, after election, if disqualified, to be rejected (Laws vi. 756 E). They were, moreover, liable to be called to account after the expiration of their office. In the election of councillors Plato introduces a further check: they are not to be chosen directly by lot from all the citizens, but from a select body previously elected by vote. In Plato's state at least, as we may infer from his silence on this point, judges and magistrates performed their duties without pay, which was a guarantee both of their disinterestedness and of their belonging probably to the higher class of citizens (cp. Arist. Pol. v. 8, § 15 foll.). Hence we are not surprised that the use of the lot prevailed, not only in the election of the Athenian Council, but also in many oligarchies, and even in Plato's colony. The evil consequences of the lot are to a great extent avoided, if the magistrates so elected do not, like the dicasts at Athens, receive pay from the state.

Another parallel is that of the Popular Assembly, which at Athens was omnipotent, but in the Laws has only a faded and secondary existence. In Plato it was chiefly an elective body, having apparently no judicial and little political power entrusted to it. At Athens it was the mainspring of the democracy; it had the decision of war or peace, of life and death; the acts of generals or statesmen were authorized or condemned by it; no office or person was above its control. Plato was far from allowing such despotic power to exist in his model community, and therefore he minimizes the importance of the Assembly and narrows its functions. He probably never asked himself a question, which naturally occurs to the modern reader, where was to be the central authority in this new community, and by what supreme

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power would the differences of inferior powers be decided. At the same time he magnifies and brings into prominence the Nocturnal Council (which is in many respects a reflection of the Areopagus), but does not make it the governing body of the state.

Between the judicial system of the Laws and that of Athens there was very great similarity, and a difference almost equally great. Plato not unfrequently adopts the details when he rejects the principle. At Athens any citizen might be a judge and member of the great court of the Heliaea. This was ordinarily subdivided into a number of inferior courts, but an occasion is recorded on which the whole body, in number six thousand, met in a single court (Andoc. de Myst. § 17). Plato significantly remarks that a few judges, if they are good, are better than a great number (vi. 766 D). He also, at least in capital cases, confines the plaintiff and defendant to a single speech each, instead of allowing two apiece, as was the common practice at Athens (ix. 855). On the other hand, in all private suits he gives two appeals, from the arbiters to the courts of the tribes, and from the courts of the tribes to the final or supreme court (xii. 956). There was nothing answering to this at Athens. The three courts were appointed in the following manner:—the arbiters were to be agreed upon by the parties to the cause; the judges of the tribes to be elected by lot; the highest tribunal to be chosen at the end of each year by the great officers of state out of their own number—they were to serve for a year, to undergo a scrutiny, and, unlike the Athenian judges, to vote openly (vi. 767, 768). Plato does not dwell upon methods of procedure: these are the lesser matters which he leaves to the younger legislators (xii. 956). In cases of murder and some other capital offences, the cause was to be tried by a special tribunal (ix. 855), as was the custom at Athens: military offences, too, as at Athens, were decided by the soldiers (xii. 943 ff.). Public causes in the Laws, as sometimes at Athens were voted upon by the whole people: because, as Plato remarks, they are all equally concerned in them (vi. 768). They were to be previously investigated by three of the principal magistrates. He believes also that in private suits all should take part; ‘for he who has no share in the administration of justice is apt to imagine that he has no share in the state at all (vi. 768 B). The wardens of the country (vi. 761), like the



Forty at Athens, also exercised judicial power in small matters, as well as the wardens of the agora and city (vi. 764). The department of justice is better organized in Plato than in an ordinary Greek state, proceeding more by regular methods, and being more restricted to distinct duties.

The executive of Plato's Laws, like the Athenian, was different from that of a modern civilized state. The difference chiefly consists in this, that whereas among ourselves there are certain persons or classes of persons set apart for the execution of the duties of government, in ancient Greece, as in all other communities in the earlier stages of their development, they were not equally distinguished from the rest of the citizens. The machinery of government was never so well organized as in the best modern states. The judicial department was not so completely separated from the legislative, nor the executive from the judicial, nor the people at large from the professional soldier, lawyer, or priest. To Aristotle (Pol. vi. c. 8) it was a question requiring serious consideration—Who should execute a sentence? There was probably no body of police to whom were entrusted the lives and properties of the citizens in any Hellenic state. Hence it might be reasonably expected that every man should be the watchman of every other, and in turn be watched by him. The ancients do not seem to have remembered the homely adage that, 'What is every man's business is no man's business,' or always to have thought of applying the principle of a division of labour to the administration of law and to government. Every Athenian was at some time or on some occasion in his life a magistrate, judge, advocate, soldier, sailor, policeman. He had not necessarily any private business; a good deal of his time was taken up with the duties of office and other public occupations. So, too, in Plato's Laws. A citizen was to interfere in a quarrel, if older than the combatants, or to defend the outraged party, if his junior (ix. 880). He was especially bound to come to the rescue of a parent who was ill-treated by his children (ix. 881). He was also required to prosecute the murderer of a kinsman (ix. 866). In certain cases he was allowed to arrest an offender (xi. 914). He might even use violence to an abusive person (xi. 935). Any citizen who was not less than thirty years of age at times exercised a magisterial authority, to be enforced even by blows (xi. 917 C). Both in the Magnesian

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state and at Athens many thousand persons must have shared in the highest duties of government, if a section only of the Council, consisting of thirty or of fifty persons, as in the Laws, or at Athens after the days of Cleisthenes, held office for a month, or for thirty-five days only. It was almost as if, in our own country, the Ministry or the Houses of Parliament were to change every month. The average ability of the Athenian and Magnesians could not have been very high, considering there were so many of them. And yet they were entrusted with the performance of the most important executive duties. In these respects the constitution of the Laws resembles Athens far more than Sparta. All the citizens were to be, not merely soldiers, but politicians and administrators.

(ii) There are numerous minor particulars in which the Laws of Plato resemble those of Athens. These are less interesting than the preceding, but they show even more strikingly how closely in the composition of his work Plato has followed the laws and customs of his own country.

(1) Evidence. (a) At Athens a child was not allowed to give evidence (Telfy, 684). Plato has a similar law: 'A child shall be allowed to give evidence only in cases of murder' (xi. 937 B). (b) At Athens an unwilling witness might be summoned; but he was not required to appear if he was ready to declare on oath that he knew nothing about the matter in question (Telfy, 695). So in Laws xi. 936 E. (c) Athenian law enacted that when more than half the witnesses in a case had been convicted of perjury, there was to be a new trial (*ανάδικος κρίσις* — Telfy, 779, 780). There is a similar provision in Laws xi. 937. (d) False-witness was punished at Athens by *ἀτιμία* and a fine (Telfy, 1106). Plato (xi. 937) is at once more lenient and more severe: 'If a man be twice convicted of false-witness, he shall not be required, and if thrice, he shall not be allowed to bear witness; and if he dare to witness after he has been convicted three times, . . . he shall be punished with death.'

(2) Murder. (a) Wilful murder was punished in Athenian law by death, perpetual exile, and confiscation of property (Telfy, 1124). Plato, too, has the alternative of death or exile (ix. 871 D), but he does not confiscate the murderer's property (ix. 855 A). (b) The parricide was not allowed to escape by going into exile at Athens

(Telfy, 1125), nor, apparently, in the Laws (ix. 869). (c) A homicide, if forgiven by his victim before death, received no punishment, either at Athens (Telfy, 1136), or in the Magnesian state (ix. 869 D). In both (Telfy, 1009: Laws ix. 872 A, B) the contriver of a murder is punished as severely as the doer; and persons accused of the crime are forbidden to enter temples or the agora until they have been tried (Telfy, 829: Laws ix. 871, 874). (d) At Athens slaves who killed their masters and were caught red-handed, were not to be put to death by the relations of the murdered man, but to be handed over to the magistrates (Telfy, 1133). So in the Laws (ix. 872), the slave who is guilty of wilful murder has a public execution: but if the murder is committed in anger, it is punished by the kinsmen of the victim (ix. 868 B, C).

(3) Involuntary homicide. (a) The guilty person, according to the Athenian law, had to go into exile, and might not return, until the family of the man slain were conciliated. Then he must be purified (Telfy, 1134). If he is caught before he has obtained forgiveness, he may be put to death (1136). These enactments reappear in the Laws (ix. 865, 866). (b) The curious provision of Plato, that a stranger who has been banished for involuntary homicide and is subsequently wrecked upon the coast, must 'take up his abode on the sea-shore, wetting his feet in the sea, and watching for an opportunity of sailing' (ix. 866 D), recalls the procedure of the *Judicium Phreatteum* at Athens, according to which an involuntary homicide, who, having gone into exile, is accused of a wilful murder, was tried at Phreatto for this offence in a boat by magistrates on the shore. (c) A still more singular law, occurring both in the Athenian and Magnesian code, enacts that a stone or other inanimate object which kills a man is to be tried, and cast over the border (Telfy, 590, 591: Laws ix. 873 E ff.).

(4) Justifiable or excusable homicide. Plato and Athenian law agree in making homicide justifiable or excusable in the following cases:—(1) at the games (Telfy, 1137: Laws ix. 865 A, B); (2) in war (Telfy, 1137: Laws ix. 869 C); (3) if the person slain was found doing violence to a free woman (Telfy, 1169: Laws ix. 874); (4) if a doctor's patient dies (Telfy, 1138: Laws ix. 865); (5) in the case of a robber (Telfy, 1150: Laws ix. 874); (6) in self-defence (Telfy, 132: Laws ix. 869).

(5) Impiety. Death or expulsion was the Athenian penalty for

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impiety (Telfy, 1078, 1080). In the *Laws* it is punished in various cases by imprisonment for five years, for life, and by death (x. 908, 909).

(6) Sacrilege. Robbery of temples at Athens was punished by death, refusal of burial in the land, and confiscation of property (Telfy, 1148). In the *Laws* (ix. 854, 855) the citizen who is guilty of such a crime is to 'perish ingloriously and be cast beyond the borders of the land,' but his property is not confiscated.

(7) Sorcery. The sorcerer at Athens was to be executed (Telfy, 1156): cp. *Laws* xi. 933, where it is enacted that the physician who poisons and the professional sorcerer shall be punished with death.

(8) Treason. Both at Athens and in the *Laws* the penalty for treason was death (Telfy, 1027: *Laws* ix. 856 E), and refusal of burial in the country (Telfy, 1028: *Laws* ix. 855 A).

(9) Sheltering exiles. 'If a man receives an exile, he shall be punished with death' (*Laws* xii. 955 B). So, too, in Athenian law (Telfy, 1034).

(10) Wounding. Athenian law compelled a man who had wounded another to go into exile; if he returned, he was to be put to death (Telfy, 1142). Plato only punishes the offence with death when children wound their parents or one another, or a slave wounds his master (*Laws* ix. 877).

(11) Bribery. Death was the punishment for taking a bribe, both at Athens (Telfy, 1054) and in the *Laws* (xii. 955); but Athenian law offered an alternative—the payment of a fine of ten times the amount of the bribe.

(12) Theft. Plato, like Athenian law (Telfy, 1150 ff.), punishes the theft of public property by death (*Laws* xii. 941: cp., however, ix. 857); the theft of private property in both involves a fine of double the value of the stolen goods (Telfy, 1575: *Laws* ix. 857).

(13) Suicide. He 'who slays him who of all men, as they say, is his own best friend,' is regarded in the same spirit by Plato and by Athenian law. Plato (*Laws* ix. 873) would have him 'buried ingloriously on the borders of the twelve portions of the land, in such places as are uncultivated and nameless,' and 'no column or inscription is to mark the place of his interment. Athenian law enacted that the hand which did the deed should be separated from the body and be buried apart (Telfy, 1141).



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(14) Injury. In cases of wilful injury, Athenian law compelled the guilty person to pay double the damage; in cases of involuntary injury, simple damages (Telfy, 1552). Plato (Laws ix. 878) enacts that if a man wounds another in passion, and the wound is curable, he shall pay double the damage, if incurable or disfiguring, fourfold damages. If, however, the wounding is accidental, he shall simply pay for the harm done (ix. 879).

(15) Treatment of parents. Athenian law allowed any one to indict another for neglect or illtreatment of parents (Telfy, 1164). So Plato bids bystanders assist a father who is assaulted by his son (ix. 881), and allows any one to give information against children who neglect their parents (xi. 932).

(16) Execution of sentences. Both Plato and Athenian law give to the winner of a suit power to seize the goods of the loser, if he does not pay within the appointed time (Telfy, 763 n.: Laws xii. 958). At Athens the penalty was also doubled (Telfy, 761); not so in Plato. Plato however punishes contempt of court by death (xii. 958), which at Athens seems only to have been visited with a further fine (Telfy, 768).

(17) Property. (a) Both at Athens and in the Laws a man who has disputed property in his possession must give the name of the person from whom he received it (Telfy, 1458: Laws xi. 915 C, D); and any one searching for lost property must enter a house naked (Telfy, 1579), or, as Plato says (Laws xii. 954 A), 'naked, or wearing only a short tunic and without a girdle.' (b) Athenian law, as well as Plato, did not allow a father to disinherit his son without good reason and the consent of impartial persons (Telfy, 1329: Laws xi. 929). Neither grants to the eldest son any special claim on the paternal estate (Telfy, 1386: Laws xi. 923 C). In the law of inheritance both prefer males to females (Telfy, 1387: Laws xi. 925 A). (c) Plato and Athenian law enacted that a tree should be planted at a fair distance from a neighbour's property (Telfy, 1463: Laws viii. 843), and that when a man could not get water, his neighbour must supply him (Telfy, 1462: Laws viii. 844). Both at Athens and in Plato there is a law about bees, the former providing that a beehive must be set up at not less a distance than 100 feet from a neighbour's (Telfy, 1464), and the latter forbidding the decoying of bees (Laws viii. 843).

(18) Orphans. A ward must proceed against a guardian whom

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he suspects of fraud within five years of the expiration of the guardianship. This provision is common to Plato (Laws xi. 928 C) and to Athenian law (Telfy, 1584). Further, the latter enacted that the nearest male relation should marry or provide a husband for an heiress (Telfy, 1046),—a point in which Plato follows it closely (Laws xi. 925 ff.).

(19) Contracts. Plato's law (xi. 920 D) that 'when a man makes an agreement which he does not fulfil, unless the agreement be of a nature which the law or a vote of the assembly does not allow, or which he has made under the influence of some unjust compulsion, or which he is prevented from fulfilling against his will by some unexpected chance,—the other party may go to law with him,' according to Pollux (quoted in Telfy's note on 1492) prevailed also at Athens.

(20) Trade regulations. (a) Lying was forbidden in the agora both by Plato and at Athens (Laws xi. 917: Telfy, 1543). (b) Athenian law allowed an action of recovery against a man who sold an unsound slave as sound (Telfy, 1499). Plato's enactment is more explicit: he allows only an unskilled person (i. e. one who is not a trainer or physician) to take proceedings in such a case (xi. 916). (c) Plato diverges from Athenian practice in the disapproval of credit, and does not even allow the supply of goods on the deposit of a percentage of their value (Telfy, 1495, 1496). He enacts that 'when goods are exchanged by buying and selling, a man shall deliver them and receive the price of them at a fixed place in the agora, and have done with the matter' (xi. 915 D), and that 'he who gives credit must be satisfied whether he obtain his money or not, for in such exchanges he will not be protected by law' (viii. 850 A). (d) Athenian law forbade an extortionate rate of interest (Telfy, 1505); Plato allows interest in one case only—if a contractor does not receive the price of his work within a year of the time agreed—and at the rate of 200 per cent. per annum ('for every drachma a monthly interest of an obol'; Laws xi. 921). (e) Both at Athens and in the Laws sales were to be registered (Telfy, 1496: Laws xi. 914 C), as well as births (Telfy, 1324: Laws vi. 785).

(21) Sumptuary laws. Extravagance at weddings (Telfy, 1357, 1359: Laws vi. 774), and at funerals (Laws xii. 959: Telfy, note on 1443) was forbidden at Athens and also in the Magnesian state.

There remains the subject of family life, which in Plato's *Laws* partakes both of an Athenian and Spartan character. Under this head may conveniently be included the condition of women and of slaves. To family life may be added citizenship.

As at Sparta, marriages are to be contracted for the good of the state (vi. 773 E); and they may be dissolved on the same ground, where there is a failure of issue (vi. 784 B),—the interest of the state requiring that every one of the 5040 lots should have an heir. Divorces are likewise permitted by Plato where there is an incompatibility of temper (xi. 929 E), as at Athens by mutual consent. The duty of having children is also enforced by a still higher motive, expressed by Plato in the noble words:—A man should cling to immortality, and leave behind him children's children to be the servants of God in his place' (vi. 774 A; cp. iv. 721 C). Again, as at Athens, the father is allowed to put away his undutiful son, but only with the consent of impartial persons (xi. 929: Telfy, 1329), and the only suit which may be brought by a son against a father is for imbecility (xi. 929). The class of elder and younger men and women are still to regard one another, as in the Republic, as standing in the relation of parents and children. This is a trait of Spartan character rather than of Athenian. A peculiar sanctity and tenderness was to be shown towards the aged; the parent or grandparent stricken with years was to be loved and worshipped like the image of a God, and was to be deemed far more able than any lifeless statue to bring good or ill to his descendants (xi. 931). Great care is to be taken of orphans: they are entrusted to the fifteen eldest Guardians of the Law, who are to be 'lawgivers and fathers to them not inferior to their natural fathers' (xi. 926 E), as at Athens they were entrusted to the Archons. Plato wishes to make the misfortune of orphanhood as little sad to them as possible.

Plato, seeing the disorder into which half the human race had fallen at Athens and Sparta, is minded to frame for them a new rule of life. He renounces his fanciful theory of communism, but still desires to place women as far as possible on an equality with men. They were to be trained in the use of arms, they are to live in public. Their time was partly taken up with gymnastic exercises; there could have been little family or private life among them. Their lot was to be neither like that of Spartan women,

*Laws.*INTRODUC-  
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who were made hard and common by excessive practice of gymnastic and the want of all other education,—nor yet like that of Athenian women, who, at least among the upper classes, retired into a sort of oriental seclusion,—but something better than either. They were to be the perfect mothers of perfect children, yet not wholly taken up with the duties of motherhood, which were to be made easy to them as far as possible (vii. 789; cp. Rep. v. 460), but able to share in the perils of war and to be the companions of their husbands. Here, more than anywhere else, the spirit of the Laws reverts to the Republic. In speaking of them as the companions of their husbands we must remember that it is an Athenian and not a Spartan way of life which they are invited to share, a life of gaiety and brightness, not of austerity and abstinence, which often by a reaction degenerated into licence and grossness.

In Plato's age the subject of slavery greatly interested the minds of thoughtful men (vi. 776); and how best to manage this 'troublesome piece of goods' exercised his own mind a good deal. He admits that they have often been found better than brethren or sons in the hour of danger (vi. 776 D), and are capable of rendering important public services by informing against offenders—for this they are to be rewarded; and the master who puts a slave to death for the sake of concealing some crime which he has committed, is held guilty of murder (ix. 872 C). But they are not always treated with equal consideration. The punishments inflicted on them bear no proportion to their crimes. They are to be addressed only in the language of command. Their master are not to jest with them, lest they should increase the hardship of their lot (vi. 778 A). Some privileges were granted to them by Athenian law of which there is no mention in Plato; they were allowed to purchase their freedom from their master, and if they despaired of being liberated by him they could demand to be sold, on the chance of falling into better hands. But there is no suggestion in the Laws that a slave who tried to escape should be branded with the words—*κατέχε με, φεύγω*, or that evidence should be extracted from him by torture, or that the whole household was to be executed if the master was murdered and the perpetrator remained undetected: all these were provisions of Athenian law. Plato is more consistent than either the Athenians or the Spartans; for at Sparta too the Helots were treated in



manner almost unintelligible to us. On the one hand, they had arms put into their hands, and served in the army, not only, as at Plataea, in attendance on their masters, but, after they had been manumitted, as a separate body of troops called Neodamodes: on the other hand, they were the victims of one of the greatest crimes recorded in Greek history (Thucyd. iv. 80). The two great philosophers of Hellas sought to extricate themselves from this cruel condition of human life, but acquiesced in the necessity of it. A noble and pathetic sentiment of Plato, suggested by the thought of their misery, may be quoted in this place:—‘The right treatment of slaves is to behave properly to them, and to do to them, if possible, even more justice than to those who are our equals; for he who naturally and genuinely reverences justice, and hates injustice, is discovered in his dealings with any class of men to whom he can easily be unjust. And he who in regard to the natures and actions of his slaves is undefiled by impiety and injustice, will best sow the seeds of virtue in them; and this may be truly said of every master, and tyrant, and of every other having authority in relation to his inferiors’ (vi. 777 D, E).

All the citizens of the Magnesian state were free and equal; there was no distinction of rank among them, such as is believed to have prevailed at Sparta. Their number was a fixed one, corresponding to the 5040 lots. One of the results of this is the requirement that younger sons or those who have been disinherited shall go out to a colony (Laws xi. 929). At Athens, where there was not the same religious feeling against increasing the size of the city, the number of the citizens must have been liable to considerable fluctuations. Several classes of persons, who were not citizens by birth, were admitted to the privilege. Perpetual exiles from other countries, people who settled there to practise a trade (Eelfy, 17), any one who had shown distinguished valour in the cause of Athens (18), the Plataeans who escaped from the siege (20), metics and strangers who offered to serve in the army (27), the slaves who fought at Arginusae (45),—all these could or did become citizens. Even those who were only on one side of Athenian parentage were at more than one period accounted citizens. But at times there seems to have arisen a feeling against this promiscuous extension of the citizen body, an expression of which is to be found in the law of Pericles—*μόνονος Ἀθηναίωνς εἶναι*

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τοὺς ἐκ δνοῖν Ἀθηναίων γεγονότας (Plutarch, Pericles 37); and at no time did the adopted citizen enjoy the full rights of citizenship—e. g. he might not be elected archon or to the office of priest (Telfy, 19, 20), although this prohibition did not extend to his children, if born of a citizen wife. Plato never thinks of making the metic, much less the slave, a citizen. His treatment of the former class is at once more gentle and more severe than that which prevailed at Athens. He imposes upon them no tax but good behaviour (viii. 850), whereas at Athens they were required to pay twelve drachmae *per annum*, and to have a patron: on the other hand, he only allows them to reside in the Magnesian state on condition of following a trade; they were required to depart when their property exceeded that of the third class, and in any case after a residence of twenty years, unless they could show that they had conferred some great benefit on the state (viii. 850). This privileged position reflects that of the *ισοτελεῖς* at Athens, who were excused from the *μετοίκιον*. It is Plato's greatest concession to the metic, as the bestowal of freedom is his greatest concession to the slave.

Lastly, there is a more general point of view under which the Laws of Plato may be considered,—the principles of Jurisprudence which are contained in them. These are not formally announced, but are scattered up and down, to be observed by the reflective reader for himself. Some of them are only the common principles which all courts of justice have gathered from experience; others are peculiar and characteristic. That judges should sit at fixed times and hear causes in a regular order (xii. 956), that evidence should be laid before them, that false witnesses should be disallowed (xi. 937), and corruption punished (xii. 955 C), that defendants should be heard before they are convicted,—these are the rules, not only of the Hellenic courts, but of courts of law in all ages and countries. But there are also points which are peculiar, and in which ancient jurisprudence differs considerably from modern; some of them are of great importance. . . . It could not be said at Athens, nor was it ever contemplated by Plato, that all men, including metics and slaves, should be equal 'in the eye of the law.' There was some law for the slave, but not much; no adequate protection was given him against the cruelty of his

master. . . . It was a singular privilege granted, both by the Athenian and Magnesian law, to a murdered man, that he might, before he died, pardon his murderer, in which case no legal steps were afterwards to be taken against him (ix. 869 D). This law is the remnant of an age in which the punishment of offences against the person was the concern rather of the individual and his kinsmen than of the state. . . . Plato's division of crimes into voluntary and involuntary and those done from passion, only partially agrees with the distinction which modern law has drawn between murder and manslaughter; his attempt to analyze them is confused by the Socratic paradox, that 'All vice is involuntary' (cf. *supra*, cciv). . . . It is singular that both in the Laws and at Athens theft is commonly punished by a twofold restitution of the article stolen. The distinction between civil and criminal courts or suits was not yet recognized. . . . Possession gives a right of property after a certain time. . . . The religious aspect under which certain offences were regarded greatly interfered with a just and natural estimate of their guilt. . . . As among ourselves, the intent to murder was distinguished by Plato from actual murder (ix. 876 E). . . . We note that both in Plato and the laws of Athens, libel in the market-place and personality in the theatre were forbidden. . . . Both in Plato and Athenian law, as in modern times, the accomplice of a crime is to be punished as well as the principal. . . . Plato does not allow a witness in a cause to act as a judge of it. . . . Oaths are not to be taken by the parties to a suit. . . . Both at Athens and in Plato's Laws capital punishment for murder was not to be inflicted, if the offender was willing to go into exile. . . . Respect for the dead, duty towards parents, are to be enforced by the law as well as by public opinion. . . . Plato proclaims the noble sentiment that the object of all punishment is the improvement of the offender (ix. 854 D). . . . Finally, he repeats twice over, as with the voice of a prophet, that the crimes of the fathers are not to be visited upon the children (ix. 855 A, 856 C). In this respect he is nobly distinguished from the Oriental, and indeed from the spirit of Athenian law (cp. Telfy, 1012 — *δεῖ καὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τούτων τῖμους εἶναι*), as the Hebrew in the age of Ezekiel (c. xviii) is from the Jewish people of former ages.

Of all Plato's provisions the object is to bring the practice of the law more into harmony with reason and philosophy; to secure

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impartiality, and while acknowledging that every citizen has a right to share in the administration of justice, to counteract the tendency of the courts to become mere popular assemblies.

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Thus we have arrived at the end of the writings of Plato, and at the last stage of philosophy which was really his. For in what followed, which we chiefly gather from the uncertain intimations of Aristotle, the spirit of the master no longer survived. The doctrine of Ideas passed into one of numbers; instead of advancing from the abstract to the concrete, the theories of Plato were taken out of their context, and either asserted or refuted with a provoking literalism; the Socratic or Platonic element in his teaching was absorbed into the Pythagorean or Megarian. His poetry was converted into mysticism; his unsubstantial visions were assailed *secundum artem* by the rules of logic. His political speculations lost their interest when the freedom of Hellas had passed away. Of all his writings the Laws were the furthest removed from the traditions of the Platonic school in the next generation. Both his political and metaphysical philosophy are for the most part misinterpreted by Aristotle. The best of him—his love of truth, and his ‘contemplation of all time and all existence,’ was soonest lost; and some of his greatest thoughts have slept in the ear of mankind almost ever since they were first uttered.

We have followed him during his forty or fifty years of authorship, from the beginning when he first attempted to depict the teaching of Socrates in a dramatic form, down to the time at which the character of Socrates had disappeared, and we have the latest reflections of Plato’s own mind upon Hellas and upon philosophy. He, who was ‘the last of the poets,’ in his book of Laws writes prose only; he has himself partly fallen under the rhetorical influences which in his earlier dialogues he was combating. The progress of his writings is also the history of his life; we have no other authentic life of him. They are the true self of the philosopher, stripped of the accidents of time and place. The great effort which he makes is, first, to realize abstractions, secondly, to connect them. In the attempt to realize them, he was carried into a transcendental region in which he isolated them from experience, and we pass out of the range of science into



poetry or fiction. The fancies of mythology for a time cast a veil over the gulf which divides phenomena from ontology (Meno, Phaedrus, Symposium, Phaedo). In his return to earth Plato meets with a difficulty which has long ceased to be a difficulty to us. He cannot understand how these obstinate, unmanageable ideas, residing alone in their heaven of abstraction, can be either combined with one another, or adapted to phenomena (Parmenides, Philebus, Sophist). That which is the most familiar process of our own minds, to him appeared to be the crowning achievement of the dialectical art. The difficulty which in his own generation threatened to be the destruction of philosophy, he has rendered unmeaning and ridiculous. For by his conquests in the world of mind our thoughts are widened, and he has furnished us with new dialectical instruments which are of greater compass and power. We have endeavoured to see him as he truly was, a great original genius struggling with unequal conditions of knowledge, not prepared with a system nor evolving in a series of dialogues ideas which he had long conceived, but contradictory, enquiring as he goes along, following the argument, first from one point of view and then from another, and therefore arriving at opposite conclusions, hovering around the light, and sometimes dazzled with excess of light, but always moving in the same element of ideal truth. We have seen him also in his decline, when the wings of his imagination have begun to droop, but his experience of life remains, and he turns away from the contemplation of the eternal to take a last sad look at human affairs.

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And so having brought into the world 'noble children' (Phaedr. 61 A), he rests from the labours of authorship. More than two thousand two hundred years have passed away since he returned to the place of Apollo and the Muses. Yet the echo of his words continues to be heard among men, because of all philosophers he has the most melodious voice. He is the inspired prophet or teacher who can never die, the only one in whom the outward form adequately represents the fair soul within; in whom the thoughts of all who went before him are reflected and of all who come after him are partly anticipated. Other teachers of philosophy have dried up and withered, — after a few centuries they have become

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dust; but he is fresh and blooming, and is always begetting new ideas in the minds of men. They are one-sided and abstract; but he has many sides of wisdom. Nor is he always consistent with himself, because he is always moving onward, and knows that there are many more things in philosophy than can be expressed in words, and that truth is greater than consistency. He who approaches him in the most reverent spirit shall reap most of the fruit of his wisdom; he who reads him by the light of ancient commentators will have the least understanding of him.

We may see him with the eye of the mind in the groves of the Academy, or on the banks of the Ilissus, or in the streets of Athens, alone or walking with Socrates, full of those thoughts which have since become the common possession of mankind. Or we may compare him to a statue hid away in some temple of Zeus or Apollo, no longer existing on earth, a statue which has a look as of the God himself. Or we may once more imagine him following into another state of being the great company of heaven which he beheld of old in a vision (Phaedr. 248). So, 'partly trifling, but with a certain degree of seriousness' (Symp. 197 E), we linger around the memory of a world which has passed away (Phaedr. 250 C).

L A W S.





# L A W S.

## BOOK I.

### PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

An ATHENIAN STRANGER.      CLEINIAS, a Cretan.  
MEGILLUS, a Lacedaemonian.

*Athenian Stranger.* TELL me, Strangers, is a God or  
some man supposed to be the author of your laws?

*Cleinias.* A God, Stranger; in very truth a God: among  
us Cretans he is said to have been Zeus, but in Lacedae-  
mon, whence our friend here comes, I believe they would  
say that Apollo is their lawgiver: would they not, Megillus?

*Megillus.* Certainly.

*Ath.* And do you, Cleinias, believe, as Homer tells, that  
every ninth year Minos went to converse with his Olympian  
sire, and was inspired by him to make laws for your cities?

*Cle.* Yes, that is our tradition; and there was Rhada-  
manthus, a brother of his, with whose name you are familiar;  
he is reputed to have been the justest of men, and we  
Cretans are of opinion that he earned this reputation from  
his righteous administration of justice when he was alive.

*Ath.* Yes, and a noble reputation it was, worthy of a son  
of Zeus. As you and Megillus have been trained in these  
institutions, I dare say that you will not be unwilling to give  
an account of your government and laws; on our way we  
can pass the time pleasantly in talking about them, for I am  
told that the distance from Cnosus to the cave and temple of

*Laws I.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS,  
MEGILLUS.

Crete and  
Lacedaemon  
both received  
their laws  
from a God,  
Crete from  
Zeus,  
Lacedaemon  
from Apollo.

*Larus I.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

Zeus is considerable; and doubtless there are shady places under the lofty trees, which will protect us from this scorching sun. Being no longer young, we may often stop to rest beneath them, and get over the whole journey without difficulty, beguiling the time by conversation.

*Cle.* Yes, Stranger, and if we proceed onward we shall come to groves of cypresses, which are of rare height and beauty, and there are green meadows, in which we may repose and converse.

*Ath.* Very good.

*Cle.* Very good, indeed; and still better when we see them; let us move on cheerily.

*Ath.* I am willing.—And first, I want to know why the law has ordained that you shall have common meals and gymnastic exercises, and wear arms.

The Cretan institutions are designed with a view to war, which the lawgiver thought to be the natural state of man.

*Cle.* I think, Stranger, that the aim of our institutions is easily intelligible to any one. Look at the character of our country: Crete is not like Thessaly, a large plain; and for this reason they have horsemen in Thessaly, and we have runners—the inequality of the ground in our country is more adapted to locomotion on foot; but then, if you have runners you must have light arms,—no one can carry a heavy weight when running, and bows and arrows are convenient because they are light. Now all these regulations have been made with a view to war, and the legislator appears to me to have looked to this in all his arrangements:—the common meals, if I am not mistaken, were instituted by him for a similar reason, because he saw that while they are in the field the citizens are by the nature of the case compelled to take their meals together for the sake of mutual protection. He seems to me to have thought the world foolish in not understanding that all men are always at war with one another; and if in war there ought to be common meals and certain persons regularly appointed under others to protect an army, they should be continued in peace. For what men in general term peace would be said by him to be only a name; in reality every city is in a natural state of war with every other, not indeed proclaimed by heralds, but everlasting. And if you look closely, you will find that this was the intention of the Cretan legislator; all institutions, private as well as public, were

arranged by him with a view to war; in giving them he was under the impression that no possessions or institutions are of any value to him who is defeated in battle; for all the good things of the conquered pass into the hands of the conquerors.

*Laws I.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS,  
MEGILLUS.

*Ath.* You appear to me, Stranger, to have been thoroughly trained in the Cretan institutions, and to be well informed about them; will you tell me a little more explicitly what is the principle of government which you would lay down? You seem to imagine that a well-governed state ought to be so ordered as to conquer all other states in war: am I right in supposing this to be your meaning?

There is war,  
not only be-  
tween cities,

*Cle.* Certainly; and our Lacedaemonian friend, if I am not mistaken, will agree with me.

*Meg.* Why, my good friend, how could any Lacedaemonian say anything else?

*Ath.* And is what you say applicable only to states, or also to villages?

but between  
villages,

*Cle.* To both alike.

*Ath.* The case is the same?

*Cle.* Yes.

*Ath.* And in the village will there be the same war of family against family, and of individual against individual?

between  
families, be-  
tween indi-  
viduals and  
individuals.

*Cle.* The same.

*Ath.* And should each man conceive himself to be his own enemy:—what shall we say?

*Cle.* O Athenian Stranger,—inhabitant of Attica I will not call you, for you seem to deserve rather to be named after the goddess herself, because you go back to first principles,—you have thrown a light upon the argument, and will now be better able to understand what I was just saying,—that all men are publicly one another's enemies, and each man privately his own.

(*Ath.* My good sir, what do you mean?)—

*Cle.* . . . Moreover, there is a victory and defeat,—the first and best of victories, the lowest and worst of defeats,—which each man gains or sustains at the hands, not of another, but of himself; this shows that there is a war against ourselves going on within every one of us.

The best  
victory and  
the worst  
defeat.

7 *Ath.* Let us now reverse the order of the argument:



*Læzus 1.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS,  
MEGILLUS.

The state  
superior to  
itself when  
the better  
citizens win  
a victory  
over the mob;  
inferior when  
the mob wins  
a victory  
over them.

Seeing that every individual is either his own superior or his own inferior, may we say that there is the same principle in the house, the village, and the state?

*Cle.* You mean that in each of them there is a principle of superiority or inferiority to self?

*Ath.* Yes.

*Cle.* You are quite right in asking the question, for there certainly is such a principle, and above all in states; and the state in which the better citizens win a victory over the mob and over the inferior classes may be truly said to be better than itself, and may be justly praised, where such a victory is gained, or censured in the opposite case.

*Ath.* Whether the better is ever really conquered by the worse, is a question which requires more discussion, and may be therefore left for the present. But I now quite understand your meaning when you say that among citizens who are of the same race and belong to the same city, an unjust majority may sometimes conspire together and overcome and enslave the few just; and when they prevail, the state may be truly called its own inferior and therefore bad; and when they are defeated, its own superior and therefore good.

*Cle.* Your remark, Stranger, is a paradox, and yet we cannot possibly deny it.

The parallel  
of the family

*Ath.* Here is another case for consideration;—in a family there may be several brothers, who are the offspring of a single pair; very possibly the majority of them may be unjust, and the just may be in a minority.

*Cle.* Very possibly.

*Ath.* And you and I ought not to raise a question of words as to whether this family and household are rightly said to be inferior to themselves when the bad conquer; or again superior when they are conquered; for we are not now considering the fitness or unfitness of words judged by the standard of popular usage, but we are considering the natural principles of right and wrong in laws.

*Cle.* What you say, Stranger, is most true.

*Meg.* Quite excellent, in my opinion, as far as we have gone.

*Ath.* Again; might there not be a judge over these brethren, of whom we were speaking?



*Cle.* Certainly.

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ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Ath.* Now, which would be the better judge,—one who destroyed the bad and appointed the good to govern themselves; or one who, while allowing the good to govern, let the bad live, and made them voluntarily submit? Or third, I suppose, in the scale of excellence might be placed a judge, who, finding the family distracted, not only did not destroy any one, but reconciled them to one another for ever after, and gave them laws which they mutually observed, and was able to keep them friends.

*Cle.* The last would be by far the best sort of judge and legislator.

*Ath.* And yet the aim of all the laws which he gave would be the reverse of war.

*Cle.* Very true.

*Ath.* And will he who constitutes the state and orders the life of man have in view external war, or that kind of intestine war called civil, which no one, if he could prevent, would like to have occurring in his own state; and when occurring, every one would wish to be quit of as soon as possible?

transferred  
to the state.

*Cle.* He would have the latter chiefly in view.

*Ath.* And would he prefer that this civil war should be terminated by the destruction of one of the parties, and by the victory of the other, or that peace and friendship should be re-established, and that, being reconciled, they should give their attention to foreign enemies?

Is it better  
in civil war  
for one party  
to conquer  
the other, or  
for both to  
unite and  
conquer their  
enemies?

*Cle.* Every one would desire the latter in the case of his own state.

*Ath.* And would not that also be the desire of the legislator?

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* And would not every one always make laws for the sake of the best?

*Cle.* To be sure.

*Ath.* But war, whether external or civil, is not the best, and the need of either is to be deprecated; but peace with one another, and good will, are best. Nor is the victory of the state over itself to be regarded as a really good thing, but as a necessity; a man might as well say that the body was in the best state when sick and purged by medicine, forgetting that there is also a state of the body which needs no purge.

Peace better  
than victory  
in war, just  
as health is  
better than  
the cure of  
disease.

*Larus I.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS,  
MEGILLUS.

And in like manner no one can be a true statesman, whether he aims at the happiness of the individual or state, who looks only, or first of all, to external warfare; nor will he ever be a sound legislator who orders peace for the sake of war, and not war for the sake of peace.

*Cle.* I suppose that there is truth, Stranger, in that remark of yours; and yet I am greatly mistaken if war is not the entire aim and object of our own institutions, and also of the Lacedaemonian.

*Ath.* I dare say; but there is no reason why we should rudely quarrel with one another about your legislators, instead of gently questioning them, seeing that both we and they are equally in earnest. Please follow me and the argument closely:—And first I will put forward Tyrtaeus, an Athenian by birth, but also a Spartan citizen, who of all men was most eager about war: Well, he says,

‘I sing not, I care not, about any man,

even if he were the richest of men, and possessed every good (and then he gives a whole list of them), if he be not at all times a brave warrior.’ I imagine that you, too, must have heard his poems; our Lacedaemonian friend has probably heard more than enough of them.

*Meg.* Very true.

*Cle.* And they have found their way from Lacedaemon to Crete.

*Ath.* Come now and let us all join in asking this question of Tyrtaeus: O most divine poet, we will say to him, the excellent praise which you have bestowed on those who excel in war sufficiently proves that you are wise and good, and I and Megillus and Cleinias of Cnosus do, as I believe, entirely agree with you. But we should like to be quite sure that we are speaking of the same men; tell us, then, do you agree with us in thinking that there are two kinds of war; or what would you say? A far inferior man to Tyrtaeus would have no difficulty in replying quite truly, that war is of two kinds,—one which is universally called civil war, and is, as we were just now saying, of all wars the worst; the other, as we should all admit, in which we fall out with other nations who are of a different race, is a far milder form of warfare.

The praise  
of Tyrtaeus  
is bestowed  
on those who  
excel in war,

*Cle.* Certainly, far milder.

*Ath.* Well, now, when you praise and blame war in this high-flown strain, whom are you praising or blaming, and to which kind of war are you referring? I suppose that you must mean foreign war, if I am to judge from expressions of yours in which you say that you abominate those

‘Who refuse to look upon fields of blood, and will not draw near and strike at their enemies.’

And we shall naturally go on to say to him,—You, Tyrtaeus, as it seems, praise those who distinguish themselves in external and foreign war; and he must admit this.

*Cle.* Evidently.

*Ath.* They are good; but we say that there are still better men whose virtue is displayed in the greatest of all battles. And we too have a poet whom we summon as a witness, Theognis, citizen of Megara in Sicily:—

‘Cyrnus,’ he says, ‘he who is faithful in a civil broil is worth his weight in gold and silver.’

And such an one is far better, as we affirm, than the other in a more difficult kind of war, much in the same degree as justice and temperance and wisdom, when united with courage, are better than courage only; for a man cannot be faithful and good in civil strife without having all virtue. But in the war of which Tyrtaeus speaks, many a mercenary soldier will take his stand and be ready to die at his post, and yet they are generally and almost without exception insolent, unjust, violent men, and the most senseless of human beings. You will ask what the conclusion is, and what I am seeking to prove: I maintain that the divine legislator of Crete, like any other who is worthy of consideration, will always and above all things in making laws have regard to the greatest virtue; which, according to Theognis, is loyalty in the hour of danger, and may be truly called perfect justice. Whereas, that virtue which Tyrtaeus highly praises is well enough, and was praised by the poet at the right time, yet in place and dignity may be said to be only fourth-rate<sup>1</sup>.

*Cle.* Stranger, we are degrading our inspired lawgiver to a rank which is far beneath him.

*Lætus I.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIUS.

and by war  
he means  
foreign war.

But the civil  
strife of which  
Theognis  
speaks is a  
far higher  
test of a man's  
character,  
because it  
demands the  
other virtues  
as well as  
courage.

And the  
legislator  
must aim,  
not at one  
virtue only,  
but at virtue  
whole and  
complete.

<sup>1</sup> i. e., it ranks after justice, temperance, and wisdom.



*Laws I.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Ath.* Nay, I think that we degrade not him but ourselves, if we imagine that Lycurgus and Minos laid down laws both in Lacedaemon and Crete mainly with a view to war.

*Cle.* What ought we to say then?

*Ath.* What truth and what justice require of us, if I am not mistaken, when speaking in behalf of <sup>1</sup>divine excellence<sup>1</sup>; — that the legislator when making his laws had in view not a part only, and this the lowest part of virtue, but all virtue, and that he devised classes of laws answering to the kinds of virtue; not in the way in which modern inventors of laws make the classes, for they only investigate and offer laws whenever a want is felt, and one man has a class of laws about allotments and heiresses, another about assaults; others about ten thousand other such matters. But we maintain 6 that the right way of examining into laws is to proceed as we have now done, and I admired the spirit of your exposition; for you were quite right in beginning with virtue, and saying that this was the aim of the giver of the law, but I thought that you went wrong when you added that all his legislation had a view only to a part, and the least part of virtue, and this called forth my subsequent remarks. Will you allow me then to explain how I should have liked to have heard you expound the matter?

Virtue the  
foundation  
of law.

*Cle.* By all means.

*Ath.* Stranger, you ought to have said, the Cretan laws are with reason famous among the Hellenes; for they fulfil the object of laws, which is to make those who use them happy; and they confer every sort of good. Now goods are of two kinds: there are human and there are divine goods, and the human hang upon the divine; and the state which attains the greater, at the same time acquires the less, or, not having the greater, has neither. Of the lesser goods the first is health, the second beauty, the third strength, including swiftness in running and bodily agility generally, and the fourth is wealth, not the blind god [Pluto], but one who is keen of sight, if only he has wisdom for his companion. For wisdom is chief and leader of the divine class of goods, and next follows temperance; and from the union of these two with courage springs justice, and fourth in the scale of virtue

Two kinds  
of goods, (1)  
the lesser or  
human: (2)  
the greater or  
divine goods.

<sup>1</sup> Some word, such as ἀρετῆς or πολιτείας, seems to have fallen out.



is courage. All these naturally take precedence of the other goods, and this is the order in which the legislator must place them, and after them he will enjoin the rest of his ordinances on the citizens with a view to these, the human looking to the divine, and the divine looking to their leader mind. Some of his ordinances will relate to contracts of marriage which they make one with another, and then to the procreation and education of children, both male and female; the duty of the lawgiver will be to take charge of his citizens, in youth and age, and at every time of life, and to give them punishments and rewards; and in reference to all their intercourse with one another, he ought to consider their pains and pleasures and desires, and the vehemence of all their passions; he should keep a watch over them, and blame and praise them rightly by the mouth of the laws themselves. Also with regard to anger and terror, and the other perturbations of the soul, which arise out of misfortune, and the deliverances from them which prosperity brings, and the experiences which come to men in diseases, or in war, or poverty, or the opposite of these; in all these states he should determine and teach what is the good and evil of the condition of each. In the next place, the legislator has to be careful how the citizens make their money and in what way they spend it, and to have an eye to their mutual contracts and dissolutions of contracts, whether voluntary or involuntary: he should see how they order all this, and consider where justice as well as injustice is found or is wanting in their several dealings with one another; and honour those who obey the law, and impose fixed penalties on those who disobey, until the round of civil life is ended, and the time has come for the consideration of the proper funeral rites and honours of the dead. And the lawgiver reviewing his work, will appoint guardians to preside over these things,—some who walk by intelligence, others by true opinion only, and then mind will bind together all his ordinances and show them to be in harmony with temperance and justice, and not with wealth or ambition. This is the spirit, Stranger, in which I was and am desirous that you should pursue the subject. And I want to know the nature of all these things, and how they are arranged in the laws of Zeus, as they are termed, and in those of the Pythian

*Laws I.*

ATHENIAN.

The legislator will base the first on the second.

He will regulate all the relations and circumstances of life;

and will appoint guardians to take care that his regulations are observed.

*Laws I.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS,  
MEGILLUS.

Apollo, which Minos and Lycurgus gave; and how the order of them is discovered to his eyes, who has experience in laws gained either by study or habit, although they are far from being self-evident to the rest of mankind like ourselves.

*Cle.* How shall we proceed, Stranger?

*Ath.* I think that we must begin again as before, and first consider the habit of courage; and then we will go on and discuss another and then another form of virtue, if you please. In this way we shall have a model of the whole; and with these and similar discourses we will beguile the way. And when we have gone through all the virtues, we will show, by the grace of God, that the institutions of which I was speaking look to virtue.

*Meg.* Very good; and suppose that you first criticize this praiser of Zeus and the laws of Crete.

*Ath.* I will try to criticize you and myself, as well as him, for the argument is a common concern. Tell me,—were not first the syssitia, and secondly the gymnasia, invented by your legislator with a view to war?

*Meg.* Yes.

*Ath.* And what comes third, and what fourth? For that, I think, is the sort of enumeration which ought to be made of the remaining parts of virtue, no matter whether you call them parts or what their name is, provided the meaning is clear.

*Meg.* Then I, or any other Lacedaemonian, would reply that hunting is third in order.

*Ath.* Let us see if we can discover what comes fourth and fifth.

*Meg.* I think that I can get as far as the fourth head, which is the frequent endurance of pain, exhibited among us Spartans in certain hand-to-hand fights; also in stealing with the prospect of getting a good beating; there is, too, the so-called Crypteia, or secret service, in which wonderful endurance is shown,—our people wander over the whole country by day and by night, and even in winter have not a shoe to their foot, and are without beds to lie upon, and have to attend upon themselves. Marvellous, too, is the endurance which our citizens show in their naked exercises, contending against the violent summer heat; and there are

At Sparta the  
(1) common  
meals,  
(2) gym-  
nastic,  
(3) hunting,  
(4) Crypteia  
and other  
trials of en-  
durance, are  
all designed  
with a view  
to war, and  
to inure men  
against pain.

many similar practices, to speak of which in detail would be endless.

*Ath.* Excellent, O Lacedaemonian stranger. But how ought we to define courage? Is it to be regarded only as a combat against fears and pains, or also against desires and pleasures, and against flatteries; which exercise such a tremendous power, that they make the heart even of a respectable citizen to melt like wax?

*Meg.* I should say the latter.

*Ath.* In what preceded, as you will remember, our Cnosian friend was speaking of a man or a city being inferior to themselves:—Were you not, Cleinias?

*Cle.* I was.

*Ath.* Now, which is in the truest sense inferior, the man who is overcome by pleasure or by pain?

*Cle.* I should say the man who is overcome by pleasure; for all men deem him to be inferior in a more disgraceful sense, than the other who is overcome by pain.

*Ath.* But surely the lawgivers of Crete and Lacedaemon have not legislated for a courage which is lame of one leg, able only to meet attacks which come from the left, but impotent against the insidious flatteries which come from the right?

*Cle.* Able to meet both, I should say.

*Ath.* Then let me once more ask, what institutions have you in either of your states which give a taste of pleasures, and do not avoid them any more than they avoid pains; but which set a person in the midst of them, and compel or induce him by the prospect of reward to get the better of them? Where is an ordinance about pleasure similar to that about pain to be found in your laws? Tell me what there is of this nature among you:—What is there which makes your citizens equally brave against pleasure and pain, conquering what they ought to conquer, and superior to the enemies who are most dangerous and nearest home?

*Meg.* I was able to tell you, Stranger, many laws which were directed against pain; but I do not know that I can point out any great or obvious examples of similar institutions which are concerned with pleasure; there are some lesser provisions, however, which I might mention.

*Laws I.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS,  
MEGILLUS.

But courage  
is not merely  
endurance  
of pain;

it is also  
shown in re-  
sistance to  
pleasure.

There should  
be laws  
directed  
against the  
love of  
pleasure, as  
well as  
against the  
fear of pain.

Yet neither  
in Crete nor  
at Sparta are  
any of the  
former sort  
to be found.



*Laws I.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Cle.* Neither can I show anything of that sort which is at all equally prominent in the Cretan laws.

*Ath.* No wonder, my dear friends; and if, as is very likely, in our search after the true and good, one of us may have to censure the laws of the others, we must not be offended, but take kindly what another says.

*Cle.* You are quite right, Athenian Stranger, and we will do as you say.

*Ath.* At our time of life, Cleinias, there should be no feeling of irritation.

*Cle.* Certainly not.

*Ath.* I will not at present determine whether he who censures the Cretan or Lacedaemonian politics is right or wrong. But I believe that I can tell better than either of you what the many say about them. For assuming that you have reasonably good laws, one of the best of them will be the law forbidding any young men to enquire which of them are right or wrong; but with one mouth and one voice they must all agree that the laws are all good, for they came from God; and any one who says the contrary is not to be listened to. But an old man who remarks any defect in your laws may communicate his observation to a ruler or to an equal in years when no young man is present.

A well-governed state requires of young men an unhesitating belief in the goodness of her laws. But old men may be allowed to discuss them.

*Cle.* Exactly so, Stranger; and like a diviner, although not there at the time, you seem to me quite to have hit the meaning of the legislator, and to say what is most true.

*Ath.* As there are no young men present, and the legislator has given old men free licence, there will be no impropriety in our discussing these very matters now that we are alone.

*Cle.* True. And therefore you may be as free as you like in your censure of our laws, for there is no discredit in knowing what is wrong; he who receives what is said in a generous and friendly spirit will be all the better for it.

*Ath.* Very good; however, I am not going to say anything against your laws until to the best of my ability I have examined them, but I am going to raise doubts about them. For you are the only people known to us, whether Greek or barbarian, whom the legislator commanded to eschew all great pleasures and amusements and never to touch them; whereas in the



matter of pains or fears which we have just been discussing, he thought that they who from infancy had always avoided pains and fears and sorrows, when they were compelled to face them would run away from those who were hardened in them, and would become their subjects. Now the legislator ought to have considered that this was equally true of pleasure; he should have said to himself, that if our citizens are from their youth upward unacquainted with the greatest pleasures, and unused to endure amid the temptations of pleasure, and are not disciplined to refrain from all things evil, the sweet feeling of pleasure will overcome them just as fear would overcome the former class; and in another, and even a worse manner, they will be the slaves of those who are able to endure amid pleasures, and have had the opportunity of enjoying them, they being often the worst of mankind. One half of their souls will be a slave, the other half free; and they will not be worthy to be called in the true sense men and freemen. Tell me whether you assent to my words?

*Cle.* On first hearing, what you say appears to be the truth; but to be hasty in coming to a conclusion about such important matters would be very childish and simple.

*Ath.* Suppose, Cleinias and Megillus, that we consider the virtue which follows next of those which we intended to discuss (for after courage comes temperance), what institutions shall we find relating to temperance, either in Crete or Lacedaemon, which, like your military institutions, differ from those of any ordinary state.

*Meg.* That is not an easy question to answer; still I should say that the common meals and gymnastic exercises have been excellently devised for the promotion both of temperance and courage.

*Ath.* There seems to be a difficulty, Stranger, with regard to states, in making words and facts coincide so that there can be no dispute about them. As in the human body, the regimen which does good in one way does harm in another; and we can hardly say that any one course of treatment is adapted to a particular constitution. Now the gymnasia and common meals do a great deal of good, and yet they are a source of evil in civil troubles; as is shown in the case of the

*Laws I.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS,  
MEGILLUS.

The legislators of Sparta and Crete never reflected that he who cannot resist pleasure will be the slave of any bad man who has this power of endurance.

Enough of courage.

Next let us consider temperance.

The syssitia and gymnasia were intended to promote this virtue, but they have the effect of encouraging

*Larus I.*ATHENIAN,  
MEGILLUS.unnatural  
love.The story of  
Zeus and  
Ganymede  
invented in  
Crete.Yet surely  
the Spartan  
lawgiver  
was right.  
For Sparta  
is a most  
orderly city:  
there is no  
drunkenness  
such as is  
found at  
Athens or at  
Tarentum.

Milesian, and Boeotian, and Thurian youth, among whom these institutions seem always to have had a tendency to degrade the ancient and natural custom of love below the level, not only of man, but of the beasts. The charge may be fairly brought against your cities above all others, and is true also of most other states which especially cultivate gymnastics. Whether such matters are to be regarded jestingly or seriously, I think that the pleasure is to be deemed natural which arises out of the intercourse between men and women; but that the intercourse of men with men, or of women with women, is contrary to nature, and that the bold attempt was originally due to unbridled lust. The Cretans are always accused of having invented the story of Ganymede and Zeus because they wanted to justify themselves in the enjoyment of unnatural pleasures by the practice of the god whom they believe to have been their lawgiver. Leaving the story, we may observe that any speculation about laws turns almost entirely on pleasure and pain, both in states and in individuals: these are two fountains which nature lets flow, and he who draws from them where and when, and as much as he ought, is happy; and this holds of men and animals — of individuals as well as states; and he who indulges in them ignorantly and at the wrong time, is the reverse of happy.

*Meg.* I admit, Stranger, that your words are well spoken, and I hardly know what to say in answer to you; but still I think that the Spartan lawgiver was quite right in forbidding pleasure. Of the Cretan laws, I shall leave the defence to my Cnosian friend. But the laws of Sparta, in as far as they relate to pleasure, appear to me to be the best in the world; for that which leads mankind in general into the wildest pleasure and licence, and every other folly, the law has clear driven out; and neither in the country nor in towns which are under the control of Sparta, will you find revelries and the many incitements of every kind of pleasure which accompany them; and any one who meets a drunken and disorderly person, will immediately have him most severely punished and will not let him off on any pretence, not even at the time of a Dionysiac festival; although I have remarked that this may happen at your performances 'on the cart,' as they are called; and among our Tarentine colonists I have seen the

whole city drunk at a Dionysiac festival; but nothing of the sort happens among us.

*Ath.* O Lacedaemonian Stranger, these festivities are praiseworthy where there is a spirit of endurance, but are very senseless when they are under no regulations. In order to retaliate, an Athenian has only to point out the licence which exists among your women. To all such accusations, whether they are brought against the Tarentines, or us, or you, there is one answer which exonerates the practice in question from impropriety. When a stranger expresses wonder at the singularity of what he sees, any inhabitant will naturally answer him:—Wonder not, O stranger; this is our custom, and you may very likely have some other custom about the same things. Now we are speaking, my friends, not about men in general, but about the merits and defects of the lawgivers themselves. Let us then discourse a little more at length about intoxication, which is a very important subject, and will seriously task the discrimination of the legislator. I am not speaking of drinking, or not drinking, wine at all, but of intoxication. Are we to follow the custom of the Scythians, and Persians, and Carthaginians, and Celts, and Iberians, and Thracians, who are all warlike nations, or that of your countrymen, for they, as you say, altogether abstain? But the Scythians and Thracians, both men and women, drink unmixed wine, which they pour on their garments, and this they think a happy and glorious institution. The Persians, again, are much given to other practices of luxury which you reject, but they have more moderation in them than the Thracians and Scythians.

*Meg.* O best of men, we have only to take arms into our hands, and we send all these nations flying before us.

*Ath.* Nay, my good friend, do not say that; there have been, as there always will be, flights and pursuits of which no account can be given, and therefore we cannot say that victory or defeat in battle affords more than a doubtful proof of the goodness or badness of institutions. For when the greater states conquer and enslave the lesser, as the Syracusans have done the Locrians, who appear to be the best-governed people in their part of the world, or as the Athenians have done the Ceans (and there are ten thousand other

*Laws I.*

ATHENIAN,  
MEGILLUS.

Those are  
matters of  
custom.

But customs  
vary: for in-  
stance, in-  
toxication is  
encouraged  
among many  
warlike  
nations, and  
disallowed  
at Sparta.

The question  
is, which  
custom is the  
better?

'Give us  
arms, and we  
can conquer  
all other men.'

Victory may  
be a matter  
of chance.



*Laws I.*ATHENIAN,  
MEGILLUS.

instances of the same sort of thing), all this is not to the point; let us endeavour rather to form a conclusion about each institution in itself and say nothing, at present, of victories and defeats. Let us only say that such and such a custom is honourable, and another not. And first permit me to tell you how good and bad are to be estimated in reference to these very matters.

*Meg.* How do you mean?

*Ath.* All those who are ready at a moment's notice to praise or censure any practice which is matter of discussion, seem to me to proceed in a wrong way. Let me give you an illustration of what I mean:— You may suppose a person to be praising wheat as a good kind of food, whereupon another person instantly blames wheat, without ever enquiring into its effect or use, or in what way, or to whom, or with what, or in what state and how, wheat is to be given. And that is just what we are doing in this discussion. At the very mention of the word intoxication, one side is ready with their praises and the other with their censures; which is absurd. For either side adduce their witnesses and approvers, and some of us think that we speak with authority because we have many witnesses; and others because they see those who abstain conquering in battle, and this again is disputed by us. Now I cannot say that I shall be satisfied, if we go on discussing each of the remaining laws in the same way. And about this very point of intoxication I should like to speak in another way, which I hold to be the right one; for if number is to be the criterion, are there not myriads upon myriads of nations ready to dispute the point with you, who are only two cities?

No question  
can be  
determined  
by numbers.

*Meg.* I shall gladly welcome any method of enquiry which is right.

Fallacy of  
*a dicto se-*  
*cundum quid*  
*ad dictum*  
*simpliciter.*

*Ath.* Let me put the matter thus:— Suppose a person to praise the keeping of goats, and the creatures themselves a capital thing to have, and then some one who had seen goat feeding without a goatherd in cultivated spots, and doing mischief, were to censure a goat or any other animal who had no keeper, or a bad keeper, would there be any sense or justice in such censure?

*Meg.* Certainly not.



*Ath.* Does a captain require only to have nautical knowledge in order to be a good captain, whether he is sea-sick or not? What do you say?

*Laws I.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS,  
MEGILLUS.

*Meg.* I say that he is not a good captain if, although he have nautical skill, he is liable to sea-sickness.

*Ath.* And what would you say of the commander of an army? Will he be able to command merely because he has military skill if he be a coward, who, when danger comes, is sick and drunk with fear?

*Meg.* Impossible.

*Ath.* And what if besides being a coward he has no skill?

*Meg.* He is a miserable fellow, not fit to be a commander of men, but only of old women.

*Ath.* And what would you say of some one who blames or praises any sort of meeting which is intended by nature to have a ruler, and is well enough when under his presidency? The critic, however, has never seen the society meeting together at an orderly feast under the control of a president, but always without a ruler or with a bad one:—when observers of this class praise or blame such meetings, are we to suppose that what they say is of any value?

A feast should have a president to maintain order.

*Meg.* Certainly not, if they have never seen or been present at such a meeting when rightly ordered.

*Ath.* Reflect; may not banqueters and banquets be said to constitute a kind of meeting?

*Meg.* Of course.

*Ath.* And did any one ever see this sort of convivial meeting rightly ordered? Of course you two will answer that you have never seen them at all, because they are not customary or lawful in your country; but I have come across many of them in many different places, and moreover I have made enquiries about them wherever I went, as I may say, and never did I see or hear of anything of the kind which was carried on altogether rightly; in some few particulars they might be right, but in general they were utterly wrong.

Feasts are almost always disorderly.

*Cle.* What do you mean, Stranger, by this remark? Explain. For we, as you say, from our inexperience in such matters, might very likely not know, even if they came in our way, what was right or wrong in such societies.

*Ath.* Likely enough; then let me try to be your instructor:

*Laws I.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.As the leader  
of an army  
should be  
brave,

You would acknowledge, would you not, that in all gatherings of mankind, of whatever sort, there ought to be a leader?

*Cle.* Certainly I should.

*Ath.* And we were saying just now, that when men are at war the leader ought to be a brave man?

*Cle.* We were.

*Ath.* The brave man is less likely than the coward to be disturbed by fears?

*Cle.* That again is true.

*Ath.* And if there were a possibility of having a general of an army who was absolutely fearless and imperturbable, should we not by all means appoint him?

*Cle.* Assuredly.

so the ruler of  
a feast should  
be sober.

*Ath.* Now, however, we are speaking not of a general who is to command an army, when foe meets foe in time of war, but of one who is to regulate meetings of another sort, when friend meets friend in time of peace.

*Cle.* True.

*Ath.* And that sort of meeting, if attended with drunkenness, is apt to be unquiet.

*Cle.* Certainly; the reverse of quiet.

*Ath.* In the first place, then, the revellers as well as the soldiers will require a ruler?

*Cle.* To be sure; no men more so.

*Ath.* And we ought, if possible, to provide them with a quiet ruler?

*Cle.* Of course.

genial,

sociable,

*Ath.* And he should be a man who understands society; for his duty is to preserve the friendly feelings which exist among the company at the time, and to increase them for the future by his use of the occasion.

*Cle.* Very true.

sensible.

*Ath.* Must we not appoint a sober man and a wise to be our master of the revels? For if the ruler of drinkers be himself young and drunken, and not over-wise, only by some special good fortune will he be saved from doing some great evil.

*Cle.* It will be by a singular good fortune that he is saved.

*Ath.* Now suppose such associations to be framed in the best way possible in states, and that some one blames the

very fact of their existence—he may very likely be right. But if he blames a practice which he only sees very much mismanaged, he shows in the first place that he is not aware of the mismanagement, and also not aware that everything done in this way will turn out to be wrong, because done without the superintendence of a sober ruler. Do you not see that a drunken pilot or a drunken ruler of any sort will ruin ship, chariot, army—anything, in short, of which he has the direction?

*Cle.* The last remark is very true, Stranger; and I see quite clearly the advantage of an army having a good leader—he will give victory in war to his followers, which is a very great advantage; and so of other things. But I do not see any similar advantage which either individuals or states gain from the good management of a feast; and I want you to tell me what great good will be effected, supposing that this drinking ordinance is duly established.

*Ath.* If you mean to ask what great good accrues to the state from the right training of a single youth, or of a single chorus,—when the question is put in that form, we cannot deny that the good is not very great in any particular instance. But if you ask what is the good of education in general, the answer is easy—that education makes good men, and that good men act nobly, and conquer their enemies in battle, because they are good. Education certainly gives victory, although victory sometimes produces forgetfulness of education; for many have grown insolent from victory in war, and this insolence has engendered in them innumerable evils; and many a victory has been and will be suicidal to the victors; but education is never suicidal.

*Cle.* You seem to imply, my friend, that convivial meetings, when rightly ordered, are an important element of education.

*Ath.* Certainly I do.

*Cle.* And can you show that what you have been saying is true?

*Ath.* To be absolutely sure of the truth of matters concerning which there are many opinions, is an attribute of the Gods not given to man, Stranger; but I shall be very happy to tell you what I think, especially as we are now

*Laws I.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

He who has only seen feasts which have a bad ruler should not condemn those which have a good one.

The good of a well-ordered feast is great; for social meetings are an important part of education.



*Laws I.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS,  
MEGILLUS.I am afraid  
of bestowing  
upon you my  
Athenian  
tediousness;  
but the sub-  
ject runs up  
into music  
and educa-  
tion generally.

proposing to enter on a discussion concerning laws and constitutions.

*Cle.* Your opinion, Stranger, about the questions which are now being raised, is precisely what we want to hear.

*Ath.* Very good; I will try to find a way of explaining my meaning, and you shall try to have the gift of understanding me. But first let me make an apology. The Athenian citizen is reputed among all the Hellenes to be a great talker, whereas Sparta is renowned for brevity, and the Cretans have more wit than words. Now I am afraid of appearing to elicit a very long discourse out of very small materials. For drinking indeed may appear to be a slight matter, and yet is one which cannot be rightly ordered according to nature, without correct principles of music; these are necessary to any clear or satisfactory treatment of the subject, and music again runs up into education generally, and there is much to be said about all this. What would you say then to leaving these matters for the present, and passing on to some other question of law?

The Lacedaemonian  
is the  
Proxenus  
of Athens.

*Meg.* O Athenian Stranger, let me tell you what perhaps you do not know, that our family is the proxenus of your state. I imagine that from their earliest youth all boys, when they are told that they are the proxeni of a particular state, feel kindly towards their second country; and this has certainly been my own feeling. I can well remember from the days of my boyhood, how, when any Lacedaemonians praised or blamed the Athenians, they used to say to me,—‘See, Megillus, how ill or how well,’ as the case might be, ‘has your state treated us;’ and having always had to fight your battles against detractors when I heard you assailed, I became warmly attached to you. And I always like to hear the Athenian tongue spoken; the common saying is quite true, that a good Athenian is more than ordinarily good, for he is the only man who is freely and genuinely good by the divine inspiration of his own nature, and is not manufactured. Therefore be assured that I shall like to hear you say whatever you have to say.

*Cle.* Yes, Stranger; and when you have heard me speak, say boldly what is in your thoughts. Let me remind you of a tie which unites you to Crete. You must have heard here



the story of the prophet Epimenides, who was of my family, and came to Athens ten years before the Persian war, in accordance with the response of the Oracle, and offered certain sacrifices which the God commanded. The Athenians were at that time in dread of the Persian invasion; and he said that for ten years they would not come, and that when they came, they would go away again without accomplishing any of their objects, and would suffer more evil than they inflicted. At that time my forefathers formed ties of hospitality with you; thus ancient is the friendship which I and my parents have had for you.

*Laws I.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

The Cretan,  
too, is connected with  
Athens  
through  
Epimenides.

*Ath.* You seem to be quite ready to listen; and I am also ready to perform as much as I can of an almost impossible task, which I will nevertheless attempt. At the outset of the discussion, let me define the nature and power of education; for this is the way by which our argument must travel onwards to the God Dionysus.

*Cle.* Let us proceed, if you please.

*Ath.* Well, then, if I tell you what are my notions of education, will you consider whether they satisfy you?

What is  
education?

*Cle.* Let us hear.

*Ath.* According to my view, any one who would be good at anything must practise that thing from his youth upwards, both in sport and earnest, in its several branches: for example, he who is to be a good builder, should play at building children's houses; he who is to be a good husbandman, at tilling the ground; and those who have the care of their education should provide them when young with mimic tools. They should learn beforehand the knowledge which they will afterwards require for their art. For example, the future carpenter should learn to measure or apply the line in play; and the future warrior should learn riding, or some other exercise, for amusement, and the teacher should endeavour to direct the children's inclinations and pleasures, by the help of amusements, to their final aim in life. The most important part of education is right training in the nursery. The soul of the child in his play should be guided to the love of that sort of excellence in which when he grows up to manhood he will have to be perfected. Do you agree with me thus far?

Education is  
training for  
the work of  
after-life.

It should  
begin with  
the right  
direction of  
children's  
sports.

*Laws I.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.The true  
education fits  
men, not for  
mere success  
in life, but to  
be perfect  
citizens.*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* Then let us not leave the meaning of education ambiguous or ill-defined. At present, when we speak in terms of praise or blame about the bringing-up of each person, we call one man educated and another uneducated, although the uneducated man may be sometimes very well educated for the calling of a retail trader, or of a captain of a ship, and the like. For we are not speaking of education in this narrower sense, but of that other education in virtue from youth upwards, which makes a man eagerly pursue the ideal perfection of citizenship, and teaches him how rightly to rule and how to obey. This is the only education which, upon our view, deserves the name; that other sort of training, which aims at the acquisition of wealth or bodily strength, or mere cleverness apart from intelligence and justice, is mean and illiberal, and is not worthy to be called education at all. But let us not quarrel with one another about a word, provided that the proposition which has just been granted hold good: to wit, that those who are rightly educated generally become good men. Neither must we cast a slight upon education, which is the first and fairest thing that the best of men can ever have, and which, though liable to take a wrong direction, is capable of reformation. And this work of reformation is the great business of every man while he lives.

It is the first  
and fairest  
thing which  
the best of  
men can have.*Cle.* Very true; and we entirely agree with you.*Ath.* And we agreed before that they are good men who are able to rule themselves, and bad men who are not.*Cle.* You are quite right.*Ath.* Let me now proceed, if I can, to clear up the subject a little further by an illustration which I will offer you.*Cle.* Proceed.*Ath.* Do we not consider each of ourselves to be one?*Cle.* We do.*Ath.* And each one of us has in his bosom two counsellors, both foolish and also antagonistic; of which we call the one pleasure, and the other pain.*Cle.* Exactly.*Ath.* Also there are opinions about the future, which have the general name of expectations; and the specific name of

fear, when the expectation is of pain; and of hope, when of pleasure; and further, there is reflection about the good or evil of them, and this, when embodied in a decree by the State, is called Law.

*Larus I.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS,  
MEGILLUS.

*Cle.* I am hardly able to follow you; proceed, however, as if I were.

*Meg.* I am in the like case.

*Ath.* Let us look at the matter thus: May we not conceive each of us living beings to be a puppet of the Gods, either their plaything only, or created with a purpose — which of the two we cannot certainly know? But we do know, that these affections in us are like cords and strings, which pull us different and opposite ways, and to opposite actions; and herein lies the difference between virtue and vice. According to the argument there is one among these cords which every man ought to grasp and never let go, but to pull with it against all the rest; and this is the sacred and golden cord of reason, called by us the common law of the State; there are others which are hard and of iron, but this one is soft because golden; and there are several other kinds. Now we ought always to co-operate with the lead of the best, which is law. For inasmuch as reason is beautiful and gentle, and not violent, her rule must needs have ministers in order to help the golden principle in vanquishing the other principles. And thus the moral of the tale about our being puppets will not have been lost, and the meaning of the expression 'superior or inferior to a man's self' will become clearer; and the individual, attaining to right reason in this matter of pulling the strings of the puppet, should live according to its rule; while the city, receiving the same from some god or from one who has knowledge of these things, should embody it in a law, to be her guide in her dealings with herself and with other states. In this way virtue and vice will be more clearly distinguished by us. And when they have become clearer, education and other institutions will in like manner become clearer; and in particular that question of convivial entertainment, which may seem, perhaps, to have been a very trifling matter, and to have taken a great many more words than were necessary.

Man the  
puppet of  
the Gods.

He is pulled  
opposite ways  
by the strings  
of his affec-  
tions, but  
must himself  
pull against  
them with  
the golden  
cord of  
reason.

*Cle.* Perhaps, however, the theme may turn out not to be unworthy of the length of discourse.



*Law's I.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.*Ath.* Very good; let us proceed with any enquiry which really bears on our present object.*Cle.* Proceed.*Ath.* Suppose that we give this puppet of ours drink,— what will be the effect on him?*Cle.* Having what in view do you ask that question?When the  
puppet drinks,  
his desires  
increase in  
strength and  
his rational  
faculties  
diminish.*Ath.* Nothing as yet; but I ask generally, when the puppet is brought to the drink, what sort of result is likely to follow. I will endeavour to explain my meaning more clearly: what I am now asking is this — Does the drinking of wine heighten and increase pleasures and pains, and passions and loves?*Cle.* Very greatly.*Ath.* And are perception and memory, and opinion and prudence, heightened and increased? Do not these qualities entirely desert a man if he becomes saturated with drink?*Cle.* Yes, they entirely desert him.*Ath.* Does he not return to the state of soul in which he was when a young child?*Cle.* He does.*Ath.* Then at that time he will have the least control over himself?*Cle.* The least.*Ath.* And will he not be in a most wretched plight?*Cle.* Most wretched.He becomes  
a child again.*Ath.* Then not only an old man but also a drunkard becomes a second time a child?*Cle.* Well said, Stranger.*Ath.* Is there any argument which will prove to us that we ought to encourage the taste for drinking instead of doing all we can to avoid it?*Cle.* I suppose that there is; you, at any rate, were just now saying that you were ready to maintain such a doctrine.*Ath.* True, I was; and I am ready still, seeing that you have both declared that you are anxious to hear me.But, although  
drinking  
degrades both  
soul and body,  
it may be of  
use in some  
other way.*Cle.* To be sure we are, if only for the strangeness of the paradox, which asserts that a man ought of his own accord to plunge into utter degradation.*Ath.* Are you speaking of the soul?*Cle.* Yes.*Ath.* And what would you say about the body, my friend?



Are you not surprised at any one of his own accord bringing upon himself deformity, leanness, ugliness, decrepitude?

*Lævus I.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* Yet when a man goes of his own accord to a doctor's shop, and takes medicine, is he not quite aware that soon, and for many days afterwards, he will be in a state of body which he would die rather than accept as the permanent condition of his life? Are not those who train in gymnasia, at first beginning reduced to a state of weakness?

*Cle.* Yes, all that is well known.

*Ath.* Also that they go of their own accord for the sake of the subsequent benefit?

*Cle.* Very good.

*Ath.* And we may conceive this to be true in the same way of other practices?

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* And the same view may be taken of the pastime of drinking wine, if we are right in supposing that the same good effect follows?

*Cle.* To be sure.

*Ath.* If such convivialities should turn out to have any advantage equal in importance to that of gymnastic, they are in their very nature to be preferred to mere bodily exercise, inasmuch as they have no accompaniment of pain.

*Cle.* True; but I hardly think that we shall be able to discover any such benefits to be derived from them.

*Ath.* That is just what we must endeavour to show. And let me ask you a question:—Do we not distinguish two kinds of fear, which are very different?

*Cle.* What are they?

*Ath.* There is the fear of expected evil.

*Cle.* Yes.

*Ath.* And there is the fear of an evil reputation; we are afraid of being thought evil, because we do or say some dishonourable thing, which fear we and all men term shame.

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* These are the two fears, as I called them; one of which is the opposite of pain and other fears, and the opposite so of the greatest and most numerous sort of pleasures.

*Cle.* Very true.

Two kinds  
of fear:  
one, the  
expectation  
of pain and  
evil; the  
other, the  
dread of  
disgrace.

*Laws I.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.The latter  
is termed  
reverence.

*Ath.* And does not the legislator and every one who is good for anything, hold this fear in the greatest honour? This is what he terms reverence, and the confidence which is the reverse of this he terms insolence; and the latter he always deems to be a very great evil both to individuals and to states.

*Cle.* True.

*Ath.* Does not this kind of fear preserve us in many important ways? What is there which so surely gives victory and safety in war? For there are two things which give victory—confidence before enemies, and fear of disgrace before friends.

*Cle.* There are.

*Ath.* Then each of us should be fearless and also fearful; and why we should be either has now been determined.

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* And when we want to make any one fearless, we and the law bring him face to face with many fears.

*Cle.* Clearly.

Reverence is  
trained amid  
conflicts with  
shameless-  
ness, as  
courage is  
amid conflicts  
with danger.

*Ath.* And when we want to make him rightly fearful, must we not introduce him to shameless pleasures, and train him to take up arms against them, and to overcome them? Or does this principle apply to courage only, and must he who would be perfect in valour fight against and overcome his own natural character,—since if he be unpractised and inexperienced in such conflicts, he will not be half the man which he might have been,—and are we to suppose, that with temperance it is otherwise, and that he who has never fought with the shameless and unrighteous temptations of his pleasures and lusts, and conquered them, in earnest and in play, by word, deed, and act, will still be perfectly temperate?

*Cle.* A most unlikely supposition.

Suppose there  
were a potion  
which tested  
courage:

*Ath.* Suppose that some God had given a fear-potion to men, and that the more a man drank of this the more he regarded himself at every draught as a child of misfortune and that he feared everything happening or about to happen to him; and that at last the most courageous of men utterly lost his presence of mind for a time, and only came to himself again when he had slept off the influence of the draught.

*Cle.* But has such a draught, Stranger, ever really been known among men?

*Laws I.*

*Ath.* No; but, if there had been, might not such a draught have been of use to the legislator as a test of courage? Might we not go and say to him, 'O legislator, whether you are legislating for the Cretan, or for any other state, would you not like to have a touchstone of the courage and cowardice of your citizens?'

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

should we not  
employ it?

*Cle.* 'I should,' will be the answer of every one.

*Ath.* 'And you would rather have a touchstone in which there is no risk and no great danger than the reverse?'

*Cle.* In that proposition every one may safely agree.

*Ath.* 'And in order to make use of the draught, you would lead them amid these imaginary terrors, and prove them, when the affection of fear was working upon them, and compel them to be fearless, exhorting and admonishing them; and also honouring them, but dishonouring any one who will not be persuaded by you to be in all respects such as you command him; and if he underwent the trial well and manfully, you would let him go unscathed; but if ill, you would inflict a punishment upon him? Or would you abstain from using the potion altogether, although you have no reason for abstaining?'

*Cle.* He would be certain, Stranger, to use the potion.

*Ath.* This would be a mode of testing and training which would be wonderfully easy in comparison with those now in use, and might be applied to a single person, or to a few, or indeed to any number; and he would do well who provided himself with the potion only, rather than with any number of other things, whether he preferred to be by himself in solitude, and there contend with his fears, because he was ashamed to be seen by the eye of man until he was perfect; or trusting to the force of his own nature and habits, and believing that he had been already disciplined sufficiently, he did not hesitate to train himself in company with any number of others, and display his power in conquering the irresistible change effected by the draught — his virtue being such, that he never in any instance fell into any great unseemliness, but was always himself, and left off before he arrived at the last step, fearing that he, like all other men, might be overcome by the potion.

The drinker  
of the fear-  
potion might  
test his own  
quality, either  
alone or  
among other  
men.



*Laws I.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS,  
MEGILLUS.There is no  
such potion,  
but there is a  
potion which  
will test a  
man's self-  
control.

*Cle.* Yes, Stranger, in that last case, too, he might equally show his self-control.

*Ath.* Let us return to the lawgiver, and say to him:—  
'Well, lawgiver, there is certainly no such fear-potion which man has either received from the Gods or himself discovered: for witchcraft has no place at our board. But is there any potion which might serve as a test of overboldness and excessive and indiscreet boasting?'

*Cle.* I suppose that he will say, Yes,—meaning that wine is such a potion.

*Ath.* Is not the effect of this quite the opposite of the effect of the other? When a man drinks wine he begins to be better pleased with himself, and the more he drinks the more he is filled full of brave hopes, and conceit of his power, and at last the string of his tongue is loosened, and fancying himself wise, he is brimming over with lawlessness, and has no more fear or respect, and is ready to do or say anything.

*Cle.* I think that every one will admit the truth of your description.

*Meg.* Certainly.

*Ath.* Now, let us remember, as we were saying, that there are two things which should be cultivated in the soul: first, the greatest courage; secondly, the greatest fear—

*Cle.* Which you said to be characteristic of reverence, if I am not mistaken.

*Ath.* Thank you for reminding me. But now, as the habit of courage and fearlessness is to be trained amid fears, let us consider whether the opposite quality is not also to be trained among opposites.

*Cle.* That is probably the case.

*Ath.* There are times and seasons at which we are by nature more than commonly valiant and bold; now we ought to train ourselves on these occasions to be as free from impudence and shamelessness as possible, and to be afraid to say or suffer or do anything that is base.

*Cle.* True.

*Ath.* Are not the moments in which we are apt to be bold and shameless such as these?—when we are under the influence of anger, love, pride, ignorance, avarice, cowardice, or when wealth, beauty, strength, and all the intoxicating

A man's  
nature should  
be proved,  
not in the  
business of



workings of pleasure madden us? What is better adapted than the festive use of wine, in the first place to test, and in the second place to train the character of a man, if care be taken of the use of it? What is there cheaper, or more innocent? Or do but consider which is the greater risk:—Would you rather test a man of a morose and savage nature, which is the source of ten thousand acts of injustice, by making bargains with him at a risk to yourself, or by having him as a companion at the festival of Dionysus? Or would you, if you wanted to apply a touchstone to a man who is prone to vice, entrust your wife, or your sons, or daughters to him, sacrificing your dearest interests in order to have a view of the condition of his soul? I might mention numberless cases, in which the advantage would be manifest of getting to know a man's character in sport, and without paying dearly for experience. And I do not believe that either a Cretan, or any other man, will doubt that such a test is a fair test, and safer, cheaper, and speedier than any other.

*Laws I.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

life, but  
in festive  
intercourse.

*Cle.* That is certainly true.

*Ath.* And this knowledge of the natures and habits of men's souls will be of the greatest use in that art which has to do with the management of them; and that art, if I am not mistaken, is politics.

The know-  
ledge of man  
essential to  
the statesman.

*Cle.* Exactly so.

## BOOK II.

*Laws II.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Athenian Stranger.* AND now we have to consider whether the insight into human nature is the only benefit derived from well-ordered potations, or whether there are not other advantages great and much to be desired. The argument seems to imply that there are. But how and in what way these are to be attained, will have to be considered attentively, or we may be entangled in error.

*Cleinius.* Proceed.

*Ath.* Let me once more recall our doctrine of right education; which, if I am not mistaken, depends on the due regulation of convivial intercourse.

*Cle.* You talk rather grandly.

Our first  
impressions  
are of pleasure and pain:  
wisdom  
comes later.

Education  
is the right  
training  
of these  
impressions.

*Ath.* Pleasure and pain I maintain to be the first perceptions of children, and I say that they are the forms under which virtue and vice are originally present to them. As to wisdom and true and fixed opinions, happy is the man who acquires them, even when declining in years; and we may say that he who possesses them, and the blessings which are contained in them, is a perfect man. Now I mean by education that training which is given by suitable habits to the first instincts of virtue in children;—when pleasure, and friendship, and pain, and hatred, are rightly implanted in soul not yet capable of understanding the nature of them, and who find them, after they have attained reason, to be in harmony with her. This harmony of the soul, taken as a whole, is virtue; but the particular training in respect of pleasure and pain, which leads you always to hate what you ought to hate, and love what you ought to love from the

beginning of life to the end, may be separated off; and, in my view, will be rightly called education.

*Cle.* I think, Stranger, that you are quite right in all that you have said and are saying about education.

*Ath.* I am glad to hear that you agree with me; for, indeed, the discipline of pleasure and pain which, when rightly ordered, is a principle of education, has been often relaxed and corrupted in human life. And the Gods, pitying the toils which our race is born to undergo, have appointed holy festivals, wherein men alternate rest with labour; and have given them the Muses and Apollo, the leader of the Muses, and Dionysus, to be companions in their revels, that they may improve their education by taking part in the festivals of the Gods, and with their help. I should like to know whether a common saying is in our opinion true to nature or not. For men say that the young of all creatures cannot be quiet in their bodies or in their voices; they are always wanting to move and cry out; some leaping and skipping, and overflowing with sportiveness and delight at something, others uttering all sorts of cries. But, whereas the animals have no perception of order or disorder in their movements, that is, of rhythm or harmony, as they are called, so us, the Gods, who, as we say, have been appointed to be our companions in the dance, have given the pleasurable sense of harmony and rhythm; and so they stir us into life, and we follow them, joining hands together in dances and songs; and these they call choruses, which is a term naturally expressive of cheerfulness<sup>1</sup>. Shall we begin, then, with the acknowledgment that education is first given through Apollo and the Muses? What do you say?

*Cle.* I assent.

*Ath.* And the uneducated is he who has not been trained in the chorus, and the educated is he who has been well trained?

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* And the chorus is made up of two parts, dance and song?

*Cle.* True.

*Ath.* Then he who is well educated will be able to sing and dance well?

*Laws II.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

The Gods have appointed festivals for our improvement. They are our partners in the dance, and have given us the sense of harmony and rhythm.

The educated is he who can sing and dance well;

<sup>1</sup> χορός, erroneously connected with χαίρειν.

*Laws II.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.and who can  
sing and  
dance what  
is good.*Cle.* I suppose that he will.*Ath.* Let us see ; what are we saying?*Cle.* What?*Ath.* He sings well and dances well ; now must we add that he sings what is good and dances what is good?*Cle.* Let us make the addition.*Ath.* We will suppose that he knows the good to be good and the bad to be bad, and makes use of them accordingly : — he which now is the better trained in dancing and music — he who is able to move his body and to use his voice in what is understood to be the right manner, but has no delight in good or hatred of evil ; or he who is incorrect in gesture and voice, but is right in his sense of pleasure and pain, and welcomes what is good, and is offended at what is evil?*Cle.* There is a great difference, Stranger, in the two kinds of education.*Ath.* If we three know what is good in song and dance, then we truly know also who is educated and who is uneducated ; but if not, then we certainly shall not know wherein lies the safeguard of education, and whether there is any or not.*Cle.* True.What makes  
the beauty  
of figure,  
melody, song,  
dance?*Ath.* Let us follow the scent like hounds, and go in pursuit of beauty of figure, and melody, and song, and dance ; if these escape us, there will be no use in talking about true education, whether Hellenic or barbarian.*Cle.* Yes.*Ath.* And what is beauty of figure, or beautiful melody ? When a manly soul is in trouble, and when a cowardly soul is in similar case, are they likely to use the same figures and gestures, or to give utterance to the same sounds?*Cle.* How can they, when the very colours of their faces differ?*Ath.* Good, my friend ; I may observe, however, in passing that in music there certainly are figures and there are melodies : and music is concerned with harmony and rhythm so that you may speak of a melody or figure having good rhythm or good harmony — the term is correct enough ; but to speak metaphorically of a melody or figure having a 'good colour,' as the masters of choruses do, is not allowable.(Note that  
you cannot  
speak of the  
'colour' of  
a melody.)



although you can speak of the melodies or figures of the brave and the coward, praising the one and censuring the other. And not to be tedious, let us say that the figures and melodies which are expressive of virtue of soul or body, or of images of virtue, are without exception good, and those which are expressive of vice are the reverse of good.

*Cle.* Your suggestion is excellent; and let us answer that these things are so.

*Ath.* Once more, are all of us equally delighted with every sort of dance?

*Cle.* Far otherwise.

*Ath.* What, then, leads us astray? Are beautiful things not the same to us all, or are they the same in themselves, but not in our opinion of them? For no one will admit that forms of vice in the dance are more beautiful than forms of virtue, or that he himself delights in the forms of vice, and others in a muse of another character. And yet most persons say, that the excellence of music is to give pleasure to our souls. But this is intolerable and blasphemous; there is, however, a much more plausible account of the delusion.

*Cle.* What?

*Ath.* The adaptation of art to the characters of men. Choric movements are imitations of manners occurring in various actions, fortunes, dispositions,—each particular is imitated, and those to whom the words, or songs, or dances are suited, either by nature or habit or both, cannot help feeling pleasure in them and applauding them, and calling them beautiful. But those whose natures, or ways, or habits are unsuited to them, cannot delight in them or applaud them, and they call them base. There are others, again, whose natures are right and their habits wrong, or whose habits are right and their natures wrong, and they praise one thing, but are pleased at another. For they say that all these imitations are pleasant, but not good. And in the presence of those whom they think wise, they are ashamed of dancing and singing in the baser manner, or of deliberately lending any countenance to such proceedings; and yet, they have a secret pleasure in them.

*Cle.* Very true.

*Ath.* And is any harm done to the lover of vicious dances

*Laws II.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

Melodies  
which express  
virtue are  
good; those  
which express  
vice are the  
reverse.

But some  
blaspheme-  
mously say  
that the ex-  
cellence of  
music is to  
give pleasure;  
and so it be-  
comes a mat-  
ter of likes  
and dislikes.

*Laws II.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.The effect of  
good and bad  
music like  
that of good  
and bad  
company.

or songs, or any good done to the approver of the opposite sort of pleasure?

*Cle.* I think that there is.

*Ath.* 'I think' is not the word, but I would say, rather, 'I am certain.' For must they not have the same effect as when a man associates with bad characters, whom he likes and approves rather than dislikes, and only censures playfully because he has a suspicion of his own badness? In that case, he who takes pleasure in them will surely become like those in whom he takes pleasure, even though he be ashamed to praise them. And what greater good or evil can any destiny ever make us undergo?

*Cle.* I know of none.

*Ath.* Then in a city which has good laws, or in future ages is to have them, bearing in mind the instruction and amusement which are given by music, can we suppose that the poets are to be allowed to teach in the dance anything which they themselves like, in the way of rhythm, or melody, or words, to the young children of any well-conditioned parents? Is the poet to train his choruses as he pleases, without reference to virtue or vice?

*Cle.* That is surely quite unreasonable, and is not to be thought of.

*Ath.* And yet he may do this in almost any state with the exception of Egypt.

*Cle.* And what are the laws about music and dancing in Egypt?

*Ath.* You will wonder when I tell you: Long ago they appear to have recognized the very principle of which we are now speaking — that their young citizens must be habituated to forms and strains of virtue. These they fixed, and exhibited the patterns of them in their temples; and no painter or artist is allowed to innovate upon them, or to leave the traditional forms and invent new ones. To this day, no alteration is allowed either in these arts, or in music at all. And you will find that their works of art are painted or moulded in the same forms which they had ten thousand years ago; — this is literally true and no exaggeration, — their ancient paintings and sculptures are not a whit better or worse than 6 the work of to-day, but are made with just the same skill.

*Cle.* How extraordinary!

*Laws II.*

*Ath.* I should rather say, How statesmanlike, how worthy of a legislator! I know that other things in Egypt are not so well. But what I am telling you about music is true and deserving of consideration, because showing that a lawgiver may institute melodies which have a natural truth and correctness without any fear of failure. To do this, however, must be the work of God, or of a divine person; in Egypt they have a tradition that their ancient chants which have been preserved for so many ages are the composition of the Goddess Isis. And therefore, as I was saying, if a person can only find in any way the natural melodies, he may confidently embody them in a fixed and legal form. For the love of novelty which arises out of pleasure in the new and weariness of the old, has not strength enough to corrupt the consecrated song and dance, under the plea that they have become antiquated. At any rate, they are far from being corrupted in Egypt.

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

The Egyptian chants were originally composed by the Goddess Isis, and their sacred character preserves them.

*Cle.* Your arguments seem to prove your point.

*Ath.* May we not confidently say that the true use of music and of choral festivities is as follows: We rejoice when we think that we prosper, and again we think that we prosper when we rejoice?

*Cle.* Exactly.

*Ath.* And when rejoicing in our good fortune, we are unable to be still?

*Cle.* True.

*Ath.* Our young men break forth into dancing and singing, and we who are their elders deem that we are fulfilling our part in life when we look on at them. Having lost our agility, we delight in their sports and merry-making, because we love to think of our former selves; and gladly institute contests for those who are able to awaken in us the memory of our youth.

Music begins in rejoicing; our young men sing and dance, and the elders look on and remember their own youth.

*Cle.* Very true.

*Ath.* Is it altogether unmeaning to say, as the common people do about festivals, that he should be adjudged the wisest of men, and the winner of the palm, who gives us the greatest amount of pleasure and mirth? For on such occasions, and when mirth is the order of the day, ought not

Who will be first in the contest?

He who gives the greatest



*Laws II.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

pleasure to  
the greatest  
number?—

Suppose  
that there  
are divers  
exhibitions:

an Homeric  
rhapsody, a  
performance  
on the lute,  
a tragedy,  
a comedy, a  
puppet-show.

Small children  
will decide for  
the puppet-  
show: older  
children for  
comedy: edu-  
cated women  
and young  
men and  
people in  
general for  
tragedy:

he to be honoured most, and, as I was saying, bear the palm, who gives most mirth to the greatest number? Now is this a true way of speaking or of acting?

*Cle.* Possibly.

*Ath.* But, my dear friend, let us distinguish between different cases, and not be hasty in forming a judgment: One way of considering the question will be to imagine a festival at which there are entertainments of all sorts, including gymnastic, musical, and equestrian contests: the citizens are assembled; prizes are offered, and proclamation is made that any one who likes may enter the lists, and that he is to bear the palm who gives the most pleasure to the spectators — there is to be no regulation about the manner how; but he who is most successful in giving pleasure is to be crowned victor, and deemed to be the pleasantest of the candidates: What is likely to be the result of such a proclamation?

*Cle.* In what respect?

*Ath.* There would be various exhibitions: one man, like Homer, will exhibit a rhapsody, another a performance on the lute; one will have a tragedy, and another a comedy. Nor would there be anything astonishing in some one imagining that he could gain the prize by exhibiting a puppet-show. Suppose these competitors to meet, and not these only, but innumerable others as well — can you tell me who ought to be the victor?

*Cle.* I do not see how any one can answer you, or pretend to know, unless he has heard with his own ears the several competitors; the question is absurd.

*Ath.* Well, then, if neither of you can answer, shall I answer this question which you deem so absurd?

*Cle.* By all means.

*Ath.* If very small children are to determine the question, they will decide for the puppet-show.

*Cle.* Of course.

*Ath.* The older children will be advocates of comedy; educated women, and young men, and people in general, will favour tragedy.

*Cle.* Very likely.

*Ath.* And I believe that we old men would have the greatest pleasure in hearing a rhapsodist recite well the Iliad and



Odyssey, or one of the Hesiodic poems, and would award the victory to him. But, who would really be the victor?—that is the question.

*Cle.* Yes.

*Ath.* Clearly you and I will have to declare that those whom we old men adjudge victors ought to win; for our ways are far and away better than any which at present exist anywhere in the world.

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* Thus far I too should agree with the many, that the excellence of music is to be measured by pleasure. But the pleasure must not be that of chance persons; the fairest music is that which delights the best and best educated, and especially that which delights the one man who is pre-eminent in virtue and education. And therefore the judges must be men of character, for they will require both wisdom and courage; the true judge must not draw his inspiration from the theatre, nor ought he to be unnerved by the clamour of the many and his own incapacity; nor again, knowing the truth, ought he through cowardice and unmanliness carelessly to deliver a lying judgment, with the very same lips which have just appealed to the Gods before he judged. He is sitting not as the disciple of the theatre, but, in his proper place, as their instructor, and he ought to be the enemy of all pandering to the pleasure of the spectators. The ancient and common custom of Hellas, which still prevails in Italy and Sicily, did certainly leave the judgment to the body of spectators, who determined the victor by show of hands. But this custom has been the destruction of the poets; for they are now in the habit of composing with a view to please the bad taste of their judges, and the result is that the spectators instruct themselves;—and also it has been the ruin of the theatre; they ought to be having characters put before them better than their own, and so receiving a higher pleasure, but now by their own act the opposite result follows. What inference is to be drawn from all this? Shall I tell you?

*Cle.* What?

*Ath.* The inference at which we arrive for the third or fourth time is, that education is the constraining and directing of youth towards that right reason, which the law affirms, and

*Laws II.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS,

older men  
will say,  
'Give us  
Homer and  
Hesiod.'

The criterion  
of excellence  
should be  
pleasure, but  
not the plea-  
sure of chance  
persons.

The judge  
should be the  
instructor, not  
the disciple, of  
the theatre.

The souls of  
the young  
should be  
charmed by

*Laws II.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.song into  
harmony  
with the law.

which the experience of the eldest and best has agreed to be truly right. In order, then, that the soul of the child may not be habituated to feel joy and sorrow in a manner at variance with the law, and those who obey the law, but may rather follow the law and rejoice and sorrow at the same things as the aged—in order, I say, to produce this effect, chants appear to have been invented, which really enchant, and are designed to implant that harmony of which we speak. And, because the mind of the child is incapable of enduring serious training, they are called plays and songs, and are performed in play; just as when men are sick and ailing in their bodies, their attendants give them wholesome diet in pleasant meats and drinks, but unwholesome diet in disagreeable things, in order that they may learn, as they ought, to like the one, and to dislike the other. And similarly the true legislator will persuade, and, if he cannot persuade, will compel the poet to express, as he ought, by fair and noble words, in his rhythms, the figures, and in his melodies, the music of temperate and brave and in every way good men.

But all this  
is an ideal.  
No fixed  
principles of  
music except  
among  
Cretans and  
Lacedaemo-  
nians.

*Cle.* But do you really imagine, Stranger, that this is the way in which poets generally compose in States at the present day? As far as I can observe, except among us and among the Lacedaemonians, there are no regulations like those of which you speak; in other places novelties are always being introduced in dancing and in music, generally not under the authority of any law, but at the instigation of lawless pleasures; and these pleasures are so far from being the same, as you describe the Egyptian to be, or having the same principles, that they are never the same.

*Ath.* Most true, Cleinias; and I dare say that I may have expressed myself obscurely, and so led you to imagine that I was speaking of some really existing state of things, whereas I was only saying what regulations I would like to have about music; and hence there occurred a misapprehension on your part. For when evils are far gone and irremediable, the task of censuring them is never pleasant, although at times necessary. But as we do not really differ, will you let me ask you whether you consider such institutions to be more prevalent among the Cretans and Lacedaemonians than among the other Hellenes?

*Cle.* Certainly they are.

*Laws II.*

*Ath.* And if they were extended to the other Hellenes, would it be an improvement on the present state of things?

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Cle.* A very great improvement, if the customs which prevail among them were such as prevail among us and the Lacedaemonians, and such as you were just now saying ought to prevail.

*Ath.* Let us see whether we understand one another:—Are not the principles of education and music which prevail among you as follows: you compel your poets to say that the good man, if he be temperate and just, is fortunate and happy; and this whether he be great and strong or small and weak, and whether he be rich or poor; and, on the other hand, if he have a wealth passing that of Cinyras or Midas, and be unjust, he is wretched and lives in misery? As the poet says, and with truth: I sing not, I care not about him who accomplishes all noble things, not having justice; let him who 'draws near and stretches out his hand against his enemies be a just man.' But if he be unjust, I would not have him 'look calmly upon bloody death,' nor 'surpass in swiftness the Thracian Boreas;' and let no other thing that is called good ever be his. For the goods of which the many speak are not really good: first in the catalogue is placed health, beauty next, wealth third; and then innumerable others, as for example to have a keen eye or a quick ear, and in general to have all the senses perfect; or, again, to be a tyrant and do as you like; and the final consummation of happiness is to have acquired all these things, and when you have acquired them to become at once immortal. But you and I say, that while to the just and holy all these things are the best of possessions, to the unjust they are all, including even health, the greatest of evils. For in truth, to have sight, and hearing, and the use of the senses, or to live at all without justice and virtue, even though a man be rich in all the so-called goods of fortune, is the greatest of evils, if life be immortal; but not so great, if the bad man lives only a very short time. These are the truths which, if I am not mistaken, you will persuade or compel your poets to utter with suitable accompaniments of harmony and rhythm, and in these they must train up your youth. Am I not right?

Tyrtaeus will  
not have a  
man a brave  
warrior unless  
he be a just  
man.



*Lætus II.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

For I plainly declare that evils as they are termed are goods to the unjust, and only evils to the just, and that goods are truly good to the good, but evil to the evil. Let me ask again, Are you and I agreed about this?

*Cle.* I think that we partly agree and partly do not.

He who has  
external  
goods only  
is miserable.

*Ath.* When a man has health and wealth and a tyranny which lasts, and when he is pre-eminent in strength and courage, and has the gift of immortality, and none of the so-called evils which counter-balance these goods, but only the injustice and insolence of his own nature — of such an one you are, I suspect, unwilling to believe that he is miserable rather than happy.

*Cle.* That is quite true.

Injustice  
naturally  
base, and  
also evil  
and painful.

*Ath.* Once more: Suppose that he be valiant and strong, and handsome and rich, and does throughout his whole life whatever he likes, still, if he be unrighteous and insolent, 6 would not both of you agree that he will of necessity live basely? You will surely grant so much?

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* And an evil life too?

*Cle.* I am not equally disposed to grant that.

*Ath.* Will he not live painfully and to his own disadvantage?

*Cle.* How can I possibly say so?

Men are not  
always agreed  
in their opin-  
ions; but the  
Gods and the  
legislator will  
never cease  
to affirm that  
the just is also  
the pleasant.

*Ath.* How! Then may Heaven make us to be of one mind, for now we are of two. To me, dear Cleinias, the truth of what I am saying is as plain as the fact that Crete is an island. And, if I were a lawgiver, I would try to make the poets and all the citizens speak in this strain; and I would inflict the heaviest penalties on any one in all the land who should dare to say that there are bad men who lead pleasant lives, or that the profitable and gainful is one thing, and the just another; and there are many other matters about which I should make my citizens speak in a manner different from the Cretans and Lacedaemonians of this age, and I may say, indeed, from the world in general. For tell me, my good friends, by Zeus and Apollo tell me, if I were to ask these same Gods who were your legislators,— Is not the most just life also the pleasantest? or are there two lives, one of which is the justest and the other the pleasantest?— and they



were to reply that there are two; and thereupon I proceeded to ask, (that would be the right way of pursuing the enquiry), Which are the happier — those who lead the justest, or those who lead the pleasantest life? and they replied, Those who lead the pleasantest — that would be a very strange answer, which I should not like to put into the mouth of the Gods. The words will come with more propriety from the lips of fathers and legislators, and therefore I will repeat my former questions to one of them, and suppose him to say again that he who leads the pleasantest life is the happiest. And to that I rejoin:— O my father, did you not wish me to live as happily as possible? And yet you also never ceased telling me that I should live as justly as possible. Now, here the giver of the rule, whether he be legislator or father, will be in a dilemma, and will in vain endeavour to be consistent with himself. But if he were to declare that the justest life is also the happiest, every one hearing him would enquire, if I am not mistaken, what is that good and noble principle in life which the law approves, and which is superior to pleasure. For what good can the just man have which is separated from pleasure? Shall we say that glory and fame, coming from Gods and men, though good and noble, are nevertheless unpleasant, and infamy pleasant? Certainly not, sweet legislator. Or shall we say that the not-doing of wrong and there being no wrong done is good and honourable, although there is no pleasure in it, and that the doing wrong is pleasant, but evil and base?

*Cle.* Impossible.

*Ath.* The view which identifies the pleasant and the just and the good and the noble has an excellent moral and religious tendency. And the opposite view is most at variance with the designs of the legislator, and is, in his opinion, infamous; for no one, if he can help, will be persuaded to do that which gives him more pain than pleasure. But as distant prospects are apt to make us dizzy, especially in childhood, the legislator will try to purge away the darkness and exhibit the truth; he will persuade the citizens, in some way or other, by customs and praises and words, that just and unjust are shadows only, and that injustice, which seems opposed to justice, when contemplated by the

*Laws II.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

The different  
points of view  
taken by the  
lower and the  
higher soul.

*Laws II.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

unjust and evil man appears pleasant and the just most unpleasant; but that from the just man's point of view, the very opposite is the appearance of both of them.

*Cle.* True.

*Ath.* And which may be supposed to be the truer judgment — that of the inferior or of the better soul?

*Cle.* Surely, that of the better soul.

*Ath.* Then the unjust life must not only be more base and depraved, but also more unpleasant than the just and holy life?

*Cle.* That seems to be implied in the present argument.

Even if the higher soul did not speak the truth about the unpleasantness of injustice, it would be a useful lie, and much more credible than the tale of Cadmus.

*Ath.* And even supposing this were otherwise, and not as the argument has proven, still the lawgiver, who is worth anything, if he ever ventures to tell a lie to the young for their good, could not invent a more useful lie than this, or one which will have a better effect in making them do what is right, not on compulsion but voluntarily.

*Cle.* Truth, Stranger, is a noble thing and a lasting, but a thing of which men are hard to be persuaded.

*Ath.* And yet the story of the Sidonian Cadmus, which is so improbable, has been readily believed, and also innumerable other tales.

*Cle.* What is that story?

*Ath.* The story of armed men springing up after the sowing of teeth, which the legislator may take as a proof that he can persuade the minds of the young of anything; so that he has only to reflect and find out what belief will be of the greatest public advantage, and then use all his efforts to make the whole community utter one and the same word in their songs and tales and discourses all their life long. But if you do not agree with me, there is no reason why you should not argue on the other side.

*Cle.* I do not see that any argument can fairly be raised by either of us against what you are now saying.

That the holiest life is the happiest, — this is the strain to be sung by all the three choruses of

*Ath.* The next suggestion which I have to offer is, that all our three choruses shall sing to the young and tender souls of children, reciting in their strains all the noble thoughts of which we have already spoken, or are about to speak; and the sum of them shall be, that the life which is by the Gods deemed to be the happiest is also the best; — we shall affirm this to be a most certain truth; and the minds of our young

disciples will be more likely to receive these words of ours than any others which we might address to them. *Laws II.*

*Cle.* I assent to what you say.

*Ath.* First will enter in their natural order the sacred choir composed of children, which is to sing lustily the heaven-taught lay to the whole city. Next will follow the choir of young men under the age of thirty, who will call upon the God Paeon to testify to the truth of their words, and will pray him to be gracious to the youth and to turn their hearts. Thirdly, the choir of elder men, who are from thirty to sixty years of age, will also sing. There remain those who are too old to sing, and they will tell stories, illustrating the same virtues, as with the voice of an oracle. *ATHENIAN, CLEINIAS.*  
children,  
young men,  
old men.

*Cle.* Who are those who compose the third choir, Stranger? for I do not clearly understand what you mean to say about them.

*Ath.* And yet almost all that I have been saying has been said with a view to them.

*Cle.* Will you try to be a little plainer?

*Ath.* I was speaking at the commencement of our discourse, as you will remember, of the fiery nature of young creatures: I said that they were unable to keep quiet either in limb or voice, and that they called out and jumped about in a disorderly manner; and that no other animal attained to any perception of order, but man only. Now the order of motion is called rhythm, and the order of the voice, in which high and low are duly mingled, is called harmony; and both together are termed choric song. And I said that the Gods had pity on us, and gave us Apollo and the Muses to be our playfellows and leaders in the dance; and Dionysus, as I dare say that you will remember, was the third. *Recapitulation. Apollo and the Muses our play-fellows; also Dionysus. The cries and movements of children are converted into harmony and rhythm.*

*Cle.* I quite remember.

*Ath.* Thus far I have spoken of the chorus of Apollo and the Muses, and I have still to speak of the remaining chorus, which is that of Dionysus.

*Cle.* How is that arranged? There is something strange, at any rate on first hearing, in a Dionysiac chorus of old men, if you really mean that those who are above thirty, and may be fifty, or from fifty to sixty years of age, are to dance in his honour. *The Dionysiac chorus of old men.*



*Laws II.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.*Ath.* Very true; and therefore it must be shown that there is good reason for the proposal.*Cle.* Certainly.*Ath.* Are we agreed thus far?*Cle.* About what?

The whole  
city will break  
out into sing-  
ing, and the  
songs will be  
varied to  
avoid same-  
ness.

*Ath.* That every man and boy, slave and free, both sexes, and the whole city, should never cease charming themselves with the strains of which we have spoken; and that there should be every sort of change and variation of them in order to take away the effect of sameness, so that the singers may always receive pleasure from their hymns, and may never weary of them?*Cle.* Every one will agree.

Least of all  
can the chorus  
of old men be  
excused; for  
they will give  
us the best and  
fairest strains.

*Ath.* Where, then, will that best part of our city which, by reason of age and intelligence, has the greatest influence, sing these fairest of strains, which are to do so much good? Shall we be so foolish as to let them off who would give us the most beautiful and also the most useful of songs?*Cle.* But, says the argument, we cannot let them off.*Ath.* Then how can we carry out our purpose with decorum? Will this be the way?*Cle.* What?*Ath.* When a man is advancing in years, he is afraid and reluctant to sing;—he has no pleasure in his own performances; and if compulsion is used, he will be more and more ashamed, the older and more discreet he grows;—is not this true?*Cle.* Certainly.*Ath.* Well, and will he not be yet more ashamed if he has to stand up and sing in the theatre to a mixed audience?—and if moreover when he is required to do so, like the other choirs who contend for prizes, and have been trained under a singing master, he is pinched and hungry, he will certainly have a feeling of shame and discomfort which will make him very unwilling to exhibit.*Cle.* No doubt.

But they must  
be encouraged  
by the use  
of wine.

*Ath.* How, then, shall we reassure him, and get him to sing? Shall we begin by enacting that boys shall not taste wine at all until they are eighteen years of age; we will tell them that fire must not be poured upon fire, whether in the



body or in the soul, until they begin to go to work — this is a precaution which has to be taken against the excitableness of youth; — afterwards they may taste wine in moderation up to the age of thirty, but while a man is young he should abstain altogether from intoxication and from excess of wine; when, at length, he has reached forty years, after dinner at a public mess, he may invite not only the other Gods, but Dionysus above all, to the mystery and festivity of the elder men, making use of the wine which he has given men to lighten the sourness of old age; that in age we may renew our youth, and forget our sorrows; and also in order that the nature of the soul, like iron melted in the fire, may become softer and so more impressible. In the first place, will not any one who is thus mellowed be more ready and less ashamed to sing, — I do not say before a large audience, but before a moderate company; nor yet among strangers, but among his familiars, and, as we have often said, to chant, and to enchant?

*Laws II.*  
ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Cle.* He will be far more ready.

*Ath.* There will be no impropriety in our using such a method of persuading them to join with us in song.

*Cle.* None at all.

*Ath.* And what strain will they sing, and what muse will they hymn? The strain should clearly be one suitable to them.

What will  
they sing?

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* And what strain is suitable for heroes? Shall they sing a choric strain?

*Cle.* Truly, Stranger, we of Crete and Lacedaemon know no strain other than that which we have learnt and been accustomed to sing in our chorus.

At Sparta  
and Crete  
only martial  
strains are  
heard.

*Ath.* I dare say; for you have never acquired the knowledge of the most beautiful kind of song, in your military way of life, which is modelled after the camp, and is not like that of dwellers in cities; and you have your young men herding and feeding together like young colts. No one takes his own individual colt and drags him away from his fellows against his will, raging and foaming, and gives him a groom to attend to him alone, and trains and rubs him down privately, and gives him the qualities in education which will make

*Larus II.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

him not only a good soldier, but also a governor of a state and of cities. Such an one, as we said at first, would be a greater warrior than he of whom Tyrtæus sings; and he would honour courage everywhere, but always as the fourth, and not as the first part of virtue, either in individuals or states.

*Cle.* Once more, Stranger, I must complain that you depreciate our lawgivers.

The common  
forms of song  
are not the  
highest.

*Ath.* Not intentionally, if at all, my good friend; but whither the argument leads, thither let us follow; for if there be indeed some strain of song more beautiful than that of the choruses or the public theatres, I should like to impart it to those who, as we say, are ashamed of these, and want to have the best.

*Cle.* Certainly

*Ath.* When things have an accompanying charm, either the best thing in them is this very charm, or there is some rightness or utility possessed by them;—for example, I should say that eating and drinking, and the use of food in general, have an accompanying charm which we call pleasure; but that this rightness and utility is just the healthfulness of the things served up to us, which is their true rightness.

*Cle.* Just so.

Many things  
have an ac-  
companying  
charm, but  
this is no  
criterion of  
their excel-  
lence, if  
there be any  
higher one.

*Ath.* Thus, too, I should say that learning has a certain accompanying charm which is the pleasure; but that the right and the profitable, the good and the noble, are qualities which the truth gives to it.

*Cle.* Exactly.

*Ath.* And so in the imitative arts,—if they succeed in making likenesses, and are accompanied by pleasure, may not their works be said to have a charm?

*Cle.* Yes.

*Ath.* But equal proportions, whether of quality or quantity, and not pleasure, speaking generally, would give them truth or rightness.

*Cle.* Yes.

*Ath.* Then that only can be rightly judged by the standard of pleasure, which makes or furnishes no utility or truth or likeness, nor on the other hand is productive of any hurtful quality, but exists solely for the sake of the accompanying

charm; and the term 'pleasure' is most appropriately applied to it when these other qualities are absent.

*Laws II.*

*Cle.* You are speaking of harmless pleasure, are you not?

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Ath.* Yes; and this I term amusement, when doing neither harm nor good in any degree worth speaking of.

*Cle.* Very true.

*Ath.* Then, if such be our principles, we must assert that imitation is not to be judged of by pleasure and false opinion; and this is true of all equality, for the equal is not equal or the symmetrical symmetrical, because somebody thinks or likes something, but they are to be judged of by the standard of truth, and by no other whatever.

The goodness  
of an imitation  
is to be  
determined  
by its truth,

*Cle.* Quite true.

*Ath.* Do we not regard all music as representative and imitative?

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* Then, when any one says that music is to be judged of by pleasure, his doctrine cannot be admitted; and if there be any music of which pleasure is the criterion, such music is not to be sought out or deemed to have any real excellence, but only that other kind of music which is an imitation of the good.

not by the  
pleasure  
which it gives.

*Cle.* Very true.

*Ath.* And those who seek for the best kind of song and music ought not to seek for that which is pleasant, but for that which is true; and the truth of imitation consists, as we were saying, in rendering the thing imitated according to quantity and quality.

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* And every one will admit that musical compositions are all imitative and representative. Will not poets and spectators and actors all agree in this?

*Cle.* They will.

*Ath.* Surely then he who would judge correctly must know what each composition is; for if he does not know what is the character and meaning of the piece, and what it represents, he will never discern whether the intention is true or false.

*Cle.* Certainly not.

*Ath.* And will he who does not know what is true be able



*Larus II.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

to distinguish what is good and bad? My statement is not very clear; but perhaps you will understand me better if I put the matter in another way.

*Cle.* How?*Ath.* There are ten thousand likenesses of objects of sight?*Cle.* Yes.

But to know whether an imitation is faithful, we must know, (1) of what it is the imitation; (2) whether it is true;

*Ath.* And can he who does not know what the exact object is which is imitated, ever know whether the resemblance is truthfully executed? I mean, for example, whether a statue has the proportions of a body, and the true situation of the parts; what those proportions are, and how the parts fit into one another in due order; also their colours and conformations, or whether this is all confused in the execution: do you think that any one can know about this, who does not know what the animal is which has been imitated?

*Cle.* Impossible.

(3) whether it is beautiful or well executed.

*Ath.* But even if we know that the thing pictured or sculptured is a man, who has received at the hand of the artist all his proper parts and colours and shapes, must we not also know whether the work is beautiful or in any respect deficient in beauty?

*Cle.* If this were not required, Stranger, we should all of us be judges of beauty.

*Ath.* Very true; and may we not say that in everything imitated, whether in drawing, music, or any other art, he who is to be a competent judge must possess three things;—he must know, in the first place, of what the imitation is; secondly, he must know that it is true; and thirdly, that it has been well executed in words and melodies and rhythms?

*Cle.* Certainly.

Injurious influence of some kinds of music.

*Ath.* Then let us not faint in discussing the peculiar difficulty of music. Music is more celebrated than any other kind of imitation, and therefore requires the greatest care of them all. For if a man makes a mistake here, he may do himself the greatest injury by welcoming evil dispositions, and the mistake may be very difficult to discern, because the poets are artists very inferior in character to the Muses themselves, who would never fall into the monstrous error of assigning to the words of men the gestures and songs of women; nor after combining the melodies with the gestures



of freemen would they add on the rhythms of slaves and men of the baser sort; nor, beginning with the rhythms and gestures of freemen, would they assign to them a melody or words which are of an opposite character; nor would they mix up the voices and sounds of animals and of men and instruments, and every other sort of noise, as if they were all one. But human poets are fond of introducing this sort of inconsistent mixture, and so make themselves ridiculous in the eyes of those who, as Orpheus says, 'are ripe for true pleasure.' The experienced see all this confusion, and yet the poets go on and make still further havoc by separating the rhythm and the figure of the dance from the melody, setting bare words to metre, and also separating the melody and the rhythm from the words, using the lyre or the flute alone. For when there are no words, it is very difficult to recognize the meaning of the harmony and rhythm, or to see that any worthy object is imitated by them. And we must acknowledge that all this sort of thing, which aims only at swiftness and smoothness and a brutish noise, and uses the flute and the lyre not as the mere accompaniments of the dance and song, is exceedingly coarse and tasteless. The use of either instrument, when unaccompanied, leads to every sort of irregularity and trickery. This is all rational enough. But we are considering not how our choristers, who are from thirty to fifty years of age, and may be over fifty, are not to use the Muses, but how they are to use them. And the considerations which we have urged seem to show in what way these fifty years' old choristers who are to sing, may be expected to be better trained. For they need to have a quick perception and knowledge of harmonies and rhythms; otherwise, how can they ever know whether a melody would be rightly sung to the Dorian mode, or to the rhythm which the poet has assigned to it?

*Cle.* Clearly they cannot.

*Ath.* The many are ridiculous in imagining that they know what is in proper harmony and rhythm, and what is not, when they can only be made to sing and step in rhythm by force; it never occurs to them that they are ignorant of what they are doing. Now every melody is right when it has suitable harmony and rhythm, and wrong when unsuitable.

*Laws II.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

Incongruous  
unions of  
gestures,  
styles, melo-  
dies, rhythms,  
sounds.

Absurdity of  
song without  
rhythm and  
figure, and of  
instrumental  
music and  
rhythm with-  
out words.

Only learned  
and experi-  
enced judges,  
like our fifty  
years' old  
choristers, can  
see their way  
through  
all this.

*Laws II.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.*Cle.* That is most certain.*Ath.* But can a man who does not know a thing, as we were saying, know that the thing is right?*Cle.* Impossible.

They will have a far more complete knowledge of the art of music than the people and even than the poets themselves.

*Ath.* Then now, as would appear, we are making the discovery that our newly-appointed choristers, whom we hereby invite and, although they are their own masters, compel to sing, must be educated to such an extent as to be able to follow the steps of the rhythm and the notes of the song, that they may know the harmonies and rhythms, and be able to select what are suitable for men of their age and character to sing; and may sing them, and have innocent pleasure from their own performance, and also lead younger men to welcome with dutiful delight good dispositions. Having such training, they will attain a more accurate knowledge than falls to the lot of the common people, or even of the poets themselves. For the poet need not know the third point, viz. whether the imitation is good or not, though he can hardly help knowing the laws of melody and rhythm. But the aged chorus must know all the three, that they may choose the best, and that which is nearest to the best; for otherwise they will never be able to charm the souls of young men in the way of virtue. And now the original design of the argument which was intended to bring eloquent aid to the Chorus of Dionysus, has been accomplished to the best of our ability, and let us see whether we were right:—I should imagine that a drinking assembly is likely to become more and more tumultuous as the drinking goes on: this, as we were saying at first, will certainly be the case.

The drinking assembly is apt to be tumultuous. Every man grows light-headed.

*Cle.* Certainly.*Ath.* Every man has a more than natural elevation; his heart is glad within him, and he will say anything and will be restrained by nobody at such a time; he fancies that he is able to rule over himself and all mankind.*Cle.* Quite true.

At such times the soul may be easily fashioned by the legislator who

*Ath.* Were we not saying that on such occasions the souls of the drinkers become like iron heated in the fire, and grow softer and younger, and are easily moulded by him who knows how to educate and fashion them, just as when they were young, and that this fashioner of them is the same who

prescribed for them in the days of their youth, viz. the good legislator; and that he ought to enact laws of the banquet, which, when a man is confident, bold, and impudent, and unwilling to wait his turn and have his share of silence and speech, and drinking and music, will change his character into the opposite — such laws as will infuse into him a just and noble fear, which will take up arms at the approach of insolence, being that divine fear which we have called reverence and shame?

*Cle.* True.

*Ath.* And the guardians of these laws and fellow-workers with them are the calm and sober generals of the drinkers; and without their help there is greater difficulty in fighting against drink than in fighting against enemies when the commander of an army is not himself calm; and he who is unwilling to obey them and the commanders of Dionysiac feasts who are more than sixty years of age, shall suffer a disgrace as great as he who disobeys military leaders, or even greater.

*Cle.* Right.

*Ath.* If, then, drinking and amusement were regulated in this way, would not the companions of our revels be improved? they would part better friends than they were, and not, as now, enemies. Their whole intercourse would be regulated by law and observant of it, and the sober would be the leaders of the drunken.

*Cle.* I think so too, if drinking were regulated as you propose.

*Ath.* Let us not then simply censure the gift of Dionysus as bad and unfit to be received into the State. For wine has many excellences, and one pre-eminent one, about which there is a difficulty in speaking to the many, from a fear of their misconceiving and misunderstanding what is said.

*Cle.* To what do you refer?

*Ath.* There is a tradition or story, which has somehow crept about the world, that Dionysus was robbed of his wits by his stepmother Here, and that out of revenge he inspires Bacchic furies and dancing madresses in others; for which reason he gave men wine. Such traditions concerning the

*Laws II.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

should pre-  
scribe rules  
of behaviour.

But there  
must be sober  
generals of the  
feast under  
whose com-  
mand men  
will fight  
against drink.

There is a  
good as well  
as a bad  
tradition  
about Dio-  
nysus. He  
is not only



*Laws II.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.said to have  
given men  
wine to make  
them mad,  
but also as  
a balm.

Gods I leave to those who think that they may be safely uttered<sup>1</sup>; I only know that no animal at birth is mature or perfect in intelligence; and in the intermediate period, in which he has not yet acquired his own proper sense, he rages and roars without rhyme or reason; and when he has once got on his legs he jumps about without rhyme or reason; and this, as you will remember, has been already said by us to be the origin of music and gymnastic<sup>2</sup>.

*Cle.* To be sure, I remember.

*Ath.* And did we not say that the sense of harmony and rhythm sprang from this beginning among men, and that Apollo and the Muses and Dionysus were the Gods whom we had to thank for them?

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* The other story implied that wine was given man out of revenge, and in order to make him mad; but our present doctrine, on the contrary, is, that wine was given him as a balm, and in order to implant modesty in the soul, and health and strength in the body.

*Cle.* That, Stranger, is precisely what was said.

*Ath.* Then half the subject may now be considered to have been discussed; shall we proceed to the consideration of the other half?

*Cle.* What is the other half, and how do you divide the subject?

*Ath.* The whole choral art is also in our view the whole of education; and of this art, rhythms and harmonies form the part which has to do with the voice.

*Cle.* Yes.

*Ath.* The movement of the body has rhythm in common with the movement of the voice, but gesture is peculiar to it, whereas song is simply the movement of the voice.

*Cle.* Most true.

*Ath.* And the sound of the voice which reaches and educates the soul, we have ventured to term music.

*Cle.* We were right.

*Ath.* And the movement of the body, when regarded as an amusement, we termed dancing; but when extended and

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Euthyph. 6, ff.; Rep. ii. 378; iii. 388, 408 C.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*, 653 D, E.

Harmony  
and rhythm,  
which form  
one part of  
the choral  
art, have been  
already dis-  
cussed.



pursued with a view to the excellence of the body, this scientific training may be called gymnastic.

*Cle.* Exactly.

*Ath.* Music, which was one half of the choral art, may be said to have been completely discussed. Shall we proceed to the other half or not? What would you like?

*Cle.* My good friend, when you are talking with a Cretan and Lacedaemonian, and we have discussed music and not gymnastic, what answer are either of us likely to make to such an enquiry?

*Ath.* An answer is contained in your question; and I understand and accept what you say not only as an answer, but also as a command to proceed with gymnastic.

*Cle.* You quite understand me; do as you say.

*Ath.* I will; and there will not be any difficulty in speaking intelligibly to you about a subject with which both of you are far more familiar than with music.

*Cle.* There will not.

*Ath.* Is not the origin of gymnastics, too, to be sought in the tendency to rapid motion which exists in all animals; man, as we were saying, having attained the sense of rhythm, created and invented dancing; and melody arousing and awakening rhythm, both united formed the choral art?

*Cle.* Very true.

*Ath.* And one part of this subject has been already discussed by us, and there still remains another to be discussed<sup>1</sup>?

*Cle.* Exactly.

*Ath.* I have first a final word to add to my discourse about drink, if you will allow me to do so.

*Cle.* What more have you to say?

*Ath.* I should say that if a city seriously means to adopt the practice of drinking under due regulation and with a view to the enforcement of temperance, and in like manner, and on the same principle, will allow of other pleasures, designing to gain the victory over them—in this way all of them may be used. But if the State makes drinking an amusement only, and whoever likes may drink whenever he likes, and with whom he likes, and add to this any other indulgences,

*Laws II.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

Gymnastic,  
the other,  
still remains.

The final word. Drinking should only be allowed with a view to the promotion of temperance.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *infra*, vii. 813, 814.

*Larus II.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.The law of  
the Cartha-  
ginians about  
drinking.

I shall never agree or allow that this city or this man should practise drinking. I would go farther than the Cretans and Lacedaemonians, and am disposed rather to the law of the Carthaginians, that no one while he is on a campaign should be allowed to taste wine at all, but that he should drink water during all that time, and that in the city no slave, male or female, should ever drink wine; and that no magistrates should drink during their year of office, nor should pilots of vessels or judges while on duty taste wine at all, nor any one who is going to hold a consultation about any matter of importance; nor in the day-time at all, unless with a view to training or as a medicine; nor again at night, when any one, either man or woman, is minded to get children. There are numberless other cases also in which those who have good sense and good laws ought not to drink wine, so that if what I say is true, no city will need many vineyards. Their husbandry and their way of life in general will follow an appointed order, and their cultivation of the vine will be the most limited and the least common of their employments. And this, Stranger, shall be the crown of my discourse about wine, if you agree.

*Cle.* Excellent: we agree.

## BOOK III.

*Athenian Stranger.* ENOUGH of this. And what, then, is to be regarded as the origin of government? Will not a man be able to judge of it best from a point of view in which he may behold the progress of states and their transitions to good or evil?

*Law's III.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

The point of  
view of time.

*Cleinius.* What do you mean?

*Ath.* I mean that he might watch them from the point of view of time, and observe the changes which take place in them during infinite ages.

*Cle.* How so?

*Ath.* Why, do you think that you can reckon the time which has elapsed since cities first existed and men were citizens of them?

*Cle.* Hardly.

Innumerable  
forms of  
government  
have arisen  
in the course  
of ages:

*Ath.* But you are sure that it must be vast and incalculable?

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* And have not thousands and thousands of cities come into being during this period and as many perished? And has not each of them had every form of government many times over, now growing larger, now smaller, and again improving or declining?

*Cle.* To be sure.

*Ath.* Let us endeavour to ascertain the cause of these changes; for that will probably explain the first origin and development of forms of government.

*Laws III.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Cle.* Very good. You shall endeavour to impart your thoughts to us, and we will make an effort to understand you.

*Ath.* Do you believe that there is any truth in ancient traditions?

*Cle.* What traditions?

and many  
destructions  
of mankind  
have taken  
place through  
deluges and  
plagues.

*Ath.* The traditions about the many destructions of mankind which have been occasioned by deluges and pestilences, and in many other ways, and of the survival of a remnant?

*Cle.* Every one is disposed to believe them.

*Ath.* Let us consider one of them, that which was caused by the famous deluge.

*Cle.* What are we to observe about it?

A few  
survivors.

*Ath.* I mean to say that those who then escaped would only be hill shepherds,—small sparks of the human race preserved on the tops of mountains.

*Cle.* Clearly.

*Ath.* Such survivors would necessarily be unacquainted with the arts and the various devices which are suggested to the dwellers in cities by interest or ambition, and with all the wrongs which they contrive against one another.

*Cle.* Very true.

*Ath.* Let us suppose, then, that the cities in the plain and on the sea-coast were utterly destroyed at that time.

*Cle.* Very good.

The arts  
perished.

*Ath.* Would not all implements have then perished and every other excellent invention of political or any other sort of wisdom have utterly disappeared?

The last  
recovery of  
civilization  
quite recent.  
Famous dis-  
coveries;  
Daedalus, &c.

*Cle.* Why, yes, my friend; and if things had always continued as they are at present ordered, how could any discovery have ever been made even in the least particular? For it is evident that the arts were unknown during ten thousand times ten thousand years. And no more than a thousand or two thousand years have elapsed since the discoveries of Daedalus, Orpheus and Palamedes,—since Marsyas and Olympus invented music, and Amphion the lyre,—not to speak of numberless other inventions which are but of yesterday.

*Ath.* Have you forgotten, Cleinias, the name of a friend who is really of yesterday?



*Cle.* I suppose that you mean Epimenides<sup>1</sup>.

*Laws 111.*

*Ath.* The same, my friend; he does indeed far overleap the heads of all mankind by his invention; for he carried out in practice, as you declare, what of old Hesiod<sup>2</sup> only preached.

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

Hesiod and  
Epimenides.

*Cle.* Yes, according to our tradition.

*Ath.* After the great destruction, may we not suppose that the state of man was something of this sort:—In the beginning of things there was a fearful illimitable desert and a vast expanse of land; a herd or two of oxen would be the only survivors of the animal world; and there might be a few goats, these too hardly enough to maintain the shepherds who tended them?

Growth of  
society.  
A few poor  
shepherds  
left with their  
scanty flocks

*Cle.* True.

*Ath.* And of cities or governments or legislation, about which we are now talking, do you suppose that they could have any recollection at all?

*Cle.* None whatever.

*Ath.* And out of this state of things has there not sprung all that we now are and have: cities and governments, and arts and laws, and a great deal of vice and a great deal of virtue?

have de-  
veloped into  
governments  
and cities.

*Cle.* What do you mean?

*Ath.* Why, my good friend, how can we possibly suppose that those who knew nothing of all the good and evil of cities could have attained their full development, whether of virtue or of vice?

*Cle.* I understand your meaning, and you are quite right.

*Ath.* But, as time advanced and the race multiplied, the world came to be what the world is.

*Cle.* Very true.

*Ath.* Doubtless the change was not made all in a moment, but little by little, during a very long period of time.

*Cle.* A highly probable supposition.

*Ath.* At first, they would have a natural fear ringing in their ears which would prevent their descending from the heights into the plain.

*Cle.* Of course.

*Ath.* The fewness of the survivors at that time would have

<sup>1</sup> Cp. i. 642 D.

<sup>2</sup> Works and Days, ll. 40, 41.

## Laws III.

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.After the  
deluge no  
arts or metals  
or implements  
or means of  
transit.

made them all the more desirous of seeing one another; but then the means of travelling either by land or sea had been almost entirely lost, as I may say, with the loss of the arts, and there was great difficulty in getting at one another; for iron and copper and all metals were jumbled together and had disappeared in the chaos; nor was there any possibility of extracting ore<sup>1</sup>; and they had scarcely any means of felling timber. Even if you suppose that some implements might have been preserved in the mountains, they must quickly have worn out and vanished, and there would be no more of them until the art of metallurgy had again revived.

*Cle.* There could not have been.

*Ath.* In how many generations would this be attained?

*Cle.* Clearly, not for many generations.

*Ath.* During this period, and for some time afterwards, all the arts which require iron and copper and the like would disappear.

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* Faction and war would also have died out in those days, and for many reasons.

*Cle.* How would that be?

Isolation;  
friendliness:no wants;  
no wars:plastic and  
weaving arts:

*Ath.* In the first place, the desolation of these primitive men would create in them a feeling of affection and goodwill towards one another; and, secondly, they would have no occasion to quarrel about their subsistence, for they would have pasture in abundance, except just at first, and in some particular cases; and from their pasture-land they would obtain the greater part of their food in a primitive age, having plenty of milk and flesh; moreover they would procure other food by the chase, not to be despised either in quantity or quality. They would also have abundance of clothing, and bedding, and dwellings, and utensils either capable of standing on the fire or not; for the plastic and weaving arts do not require any use of iron: and God has given these two arts to man in order to provide him with all such things, that, when reduced to the last extremity, the human race may still grow and increase. Hence in those days mankind were not very poor; nor was poverty a cause of difference among them; and rich they could not have

<sup>1</sup> Or translating μεταλλεία 'mines': "there was no possibility of getting the mines clear."

been, having neither gold nor silver :—such at that time was their condition. And the community which has neither poverty nor riches will always have the noblest principles ; in it there is no insolence or injustice, nor, again, are there any contentions or envyings. And therefore they were good, and also because they were what is called simple-minded ; and when they were told about good and evil, they in their simplicity believed what they heard to be very truth and practised it. No one had the wit to suspect another of a falsehood, as men do now ; but what they heard about Gods and men they believed to be true, and lived accordingly ; and therefore they were in all respects such as we have described them.

*Laws III.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIUS.

simplicity  
of life and  
character.

*Cle.* That quite accords with my views, and with those of my friend here.

*Ath.* Would not many generations living on in a simple manner, although ruder, perhaps, and more ignorant of the arts generally, and in particular of those of land or naval warfare, and likewise of other arts, termed in cities legal practices and party conflicts, and including all conceivable ways of hurting one another in word and deed ;—although inferior to those who lived before the deluge, or to the men of our day in these respects, would they not, I say, be simpler and more manly, and also more temperate and altogether more just ? The reason has been already explained.

Men were  
ruder, but  
also better,  
than a later  
generation.

*Cle.* Very true.

*Ath.* I should wish you to understand that what has preceded and what is about to follow, has been, and will be said, with the intention of explaining what need the men of that time had of laws, and who was their lawgiver.

No laws.

*Cle.* And thus far what you have said has been very well said.

*Ath.* They could hardly have wanted lawgivers as yet ; nothing of that sort was likely to have existed in their days, for they had no letters at this early period ; they lived by habit and the customs of their ancestors, as they are called.

No letters.

*Cle.* Probably.

*Ath.* But here we have already a form of government.

*Cle.* What is it ?

*Ath.* One which, if I am not mistaken, is generally termed a lordship, and this still remains in many places, both among Hel-

The oldest  
form of  
government  
a lordship :



## Laws III.

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS,  
MEGILLUS.

men lived by  
custom, like  
the Cyclopes.  
(Homer un-  
known in  
Crete, but  
well known  
at Sparta.)

The Homeric  
way of life  
Ionian rather  
than Spartan.

lenes and barbarians<sup>1</sup>, and is the government which is declared by Homer to have prevailed among the Cyclopes:—

‘They have neither councils nor judgments, but they dwell in hollow caves on the tops of high mountains, and every one gives law to his wife and children, and they do not busy themselves about one another<sup>2</sup>.’

*Cle.* That seems to be a charming poet of yours; I have read some other verses of his, which are very clever; but I do not know much of him, for foreign poets are very little read among the Cretans.

*Meg.* But they are in Lacedaemon, and he appears to be the prince of them all; the manner of life, however, which he describes is not Spartan, but rather Ionian, and he seems quite to confirm what you are saying, when he traces up the ancient state of mankind by the help of tradition to barbarism.

*Ath.* Yes, he does confirm it; and we may accept his witness to the fact that such forms of government sometimes arise.

*Cle.* We may.

*Ath.* And were not such states composed of men who had been dispersed in single habitations and families by the poverty which attended the devastations; and did not the eldest then rule among them, because with them government originated in the authority of a father and a mother, whom, like a flock of birds, they followed, forming one troop under the patriarchal rule and sovereignty of their parents, which of all sovereignties is the most just?

*Cle.* Very true.

*Ath.* After this they came together in greater numbers, and increased the size of their cities, and betook themselves to husbandry, first of all at the foot of the mountains, and made enclosures of loose walls and works of defence, in order to keep off wild beasts; thus creating a single large and common habitation.

*Cle.* Yes; at least we may suppose so.

*Ath.* There is another thing which would probably happen.

*Cle.* What?

*Ath.* When these larger habitations grew up out of the lesser original ones, each of the lesser ones would survive in

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Arist. Pol. i. 2, §§ 6, 7.

<sup>2</sup> Odyss. ix. 112, ff.

The origin  
of society  
patriarchal.

The second  
stage:—larger  
settlements at  
the foot of the  
mountain;  
beginning of  
agriculture.

The lesser  
settlements  
bring with



the larger; every family would be under the rule of the eldest, and, owing to their separation from one another, would have peculiar customs in things divine and human, which they would have received from their several parents who had educated them; and these customs would incline them to order, when the parents had the element of order in their nature, and to courage, when they had the element of courage. And they would naturally stamp upon their children, and upon their children's children, their own likings<sup>1</sup>; and, as we are saying, they would find their way into the larger society, having already their own peculiar laws.

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* And every man surely likes his own laws best, and the laws of others not so well.

*Cle.* True.

*Ath.* Then now we seem to have stumbled upon the beginnings of legislation.

*Cle.* Exactly.

*Ath.* The next step will be that these persons who have met together, will select arbiters, who will review the laws of all of them, and will present those which they approve as being to the public advantage to the chiefs who lead the tribes, and who are in a manner their kings, allowing them to choose any which they think best. These persons will themselves be called legislators, and will appoint the magistrates, framing some sort of aristocracy, or perhaps monarchy, out of the dynasties or lordships, and in this altered state of the government they will live.

*Cle.* Yes, that would be the natural order of things.

*Ath.* Then, now let us speak of a third form of government, in which all other forms and conditions of polities and cities concur.

*Cle.* What is that?

*Ath.* The form which in fact Homer indicates as following the second. This third form arose when, as he says, Dardanus founded Dardania:—

'For not as yet had the holy Ilium been built on the plain to be a city of speaking men; but they were still dwelling at the foot of many-founded Ida<sup>2</sup>.'

*Laws III.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

them into the larger society family customs peculiar to themselves.

Then arises the need of the legislator.

The third stage: the city finally settled in the plain.

<sup>1</sup> Reading αἰρέσεις: but?

<sup>2</sup> Il. xx. 216, ff.

*Lawus III.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

For indeed, in these verses, and in what he said of the Cyclopes, he speaks the words of God and nature; for poets are a divine race<sup>1</sup>, and often in their strains, by the aid of the Muses and the Graces, they attain truth.

*Cle.* Yes.

*Ath.* Then now let us proceed with the rest of our tale, which will probably be found to illustrate in some degree our proposed design:— Shall we do so?

*Cle.* By all means.

*Ath.* Ilium was built, when they had descended from the mountain, in a large and fair plain, on a sort of low hill, watered by many rivers descending from Ida.

*Cle.* Such is the tradition.

*Ath.* And we must suppose this event to have taken place many ages after the deluge?

*Cle.* Yes; many ages must have elapsed.

The deluge is  
now forgotten.

*Ath.* A marvellous forgetfulness of the former destruction would appear to have come over them, when they placed their town right under numerous streams flowing from the heights, trusting for their security to not very high hills, either.

*Cle.* There must have been a long interval, clearly.

*Ath.* And, as population increased, many other cities would begin to be inhabited.

*Cle.* Doubtless.

*Ath.* Those cities made war against Troy — by sea as well as land — for at that time men were ceasing to be afraid of the sea.

*Cle.* Clearly.

*Ath.* The Achaeans remained ten years, and overthrew Troy.

*Cle.* True.

*Ath.* And during the ten years in which the Achaeans were besieging Ilium, the homes of the besiegers were falling into an evil plight. Their youth revolted; and when the soldiers returned to their own cities and families, they did not receive them properly, and as they ought to have done, and numerous deaths, murders, exiles, were the

<sup>1</sup> Omitting ἐνθεαστικόν.

consequence. The exiles came again, under a new name, no longer Achaeans, but Dorians,—a name which they derived from Dorieus; for it was he who gathered them together. The rest of the story is told by you Lacedaemonians as part of the history of Sparta.

*Meg.* To be sure.

*Ath.* Thus, after digressing from the original subject of laws into music and drinking-bouts, the argument has, providentially, come back to the same point, and presents to us another handle. For we have reached the settlement of Lacedaemon; which, as you truly say, is in laws and in institutions the sister of Crete. And we are all the better for the digression, because we have gone through various governments and settlements, and have been present at the foundation of the first, second, and third state, succeeding one another in infinite time. And now there appears on the horizon a fourth state or nation which was once in process of settlement and has continued settled to this day. If, out of all this, we are able to discern what is well or ill settled, and what laws are the salvation and what are the destruction of cities, and what changes would make a state happy, O Megillus and Cleinias, we may now begin again, unless we have some fault to find with the previous discussion.

*Meg.* If some God, Stranger, would promise us that our new enquiry about legislation would be as good and full as the present, I would go a great way to hear such another, and would think that a day as long as this — and we are now approaching the longest day of the year — was too short for the discussion.

*Ath.* Then I suppose that we must consider this subject?

*Meg.* Certainly.

*Ath.* Let us place ourselves in thought at the moment when Lacedaemon and Argos and Messene and the rest of the Peloponnesus were all in complete subjection, Megillus, to your ancestors; for afterwards, as the legend informs us, they divided their army into three portions, and settled three cities, Argos, Messene, Lacedaemon.

*Meg.* True.

*Ath.* Temenus was the king of Argos, Cresphontes of Messene, Procles and Eurysthenes of Lacedaemon.

*Laws III.*

ATHENIAN,  
MEGILLUS.

The return of  
the Achaeans  
under the  
new name  
of Dorians.

Settlement of  
Lacedaemon,  
the sister  
settlement  
of Crete.

The fourth  
stage: a  
nation or  
federation.

The time of  
the conquest.



*Larus III.*ATHENIAN,  
MEGILLUS.*Meg.* Certainly.*Ath.* To these kings all the men of that day made oath that they would assist them, if any one subverted their kingdom.*Meg.* True.*Ath.* But can a kingship be destroyed, or was any other form of government ever destroyed, by any but the rulers themselves? No indeed, by Zeus. Have we already forgotten what was said a little while ago<sup>1</sup>?*Meg.* No.*Ath.* And may we not now further confirm what was then mentioned? For we have come upon facts which have brought us back again to the same principle; so that, in resuming the discussion, we shall not be enquiring about an empty theory, but about events which actually happened. The case was as follows:—Three royal heroes made oath to three cities which were under a kingly government, and the cities to the kings, that both rulers and subjects should govern and be governed according to the laws which were common to all of them: the rulers promised that as time and the race went forward they would not make their rule more arbitrary; and the subjects said that, if the rulers observed these conditions, they would never subvert or permit others to subvert those kingdoms; the kings were to assist kings and peoples when injured, and the peoples were to assist peoples and kings in like manner. Is not this the fact?*Meg.* Yes.*Ath.* And the three states to whom these laws were given, whether their kings or any others were the authors of them, had therefore the greatest security for the maintenance of their constitutions?*Meg.* What security?*Ath.* That the other two states were always to come to the rescue against a rebellious third.*Meg.* True.*Ath.* Many persons say that legislators ought to impose such laws as the mass of the people will be ready to receive;The three  
Dorian king-  
doms were to  
be governed  
by common  
laws, and to  
help one an-  
other in case  
of need.<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, 682 D, E.



but this is just as if one were to command gymnastic masters or physicians to treat or cure their pupils or patients in an agreeable manner.

*Laws III.*  
*ATHENIAN,*  
*MEGILLUS.*

*Meg.* Exactly.

*Ath.* Whereas the physician may often be too happy if he can restore health, and make the body whole, without any very great infliction of pain.

*Meg.* Certainly.

*Ath.* There was also another advantage possessed by the men of that day, which greatly lightened the task of passing laws<sup>1</sup>.

And besides this close alliance there was another advantage. The early legislators had a clear stage.

*Meg.* What advantage?

No debts or vested interests.

*Ath.* The legislators of that day, when they equalized property, escaped the great accusation which generally arises in legislation, if a person attempts to disturb the possession of land, or to abolish debts, because he sees that without this reform there can never be any real equality. Now, in general, when the legislator attempts to make a new settlement of such matters, every one meets him with the cry, that 'he is not to disturb vested interests,'—declaring with imprecations that he is introducing agrarian laws and cancelling of debts, until a man is at his wits' end; whereas no one could quarrel with the Dorians for distributing the land,—there was nothing to hinder them; and as for debts, they had none which were considerable or of old standing.

*Meg.* Very true.

*Ath.* But then, my good friends, why did the settlement and legislation of their country turn out so badly?

Yet the Dorian settlement turned out badly, and the laws originally given to the three kingdoms were only retained by Sparta.

*Meg.* How do you mean; and why do you blame them?

*Ath.* There were three kingdoms, and of these, two quickly corrupted their original constitution and laws, and the only one which remained was the Spartan.

*Meg.* The question which you ask is not easily answered.

*Ath.* And yet must be answered when we are enquiring about laws, this being our old man's sober game of play, whereby we beguile the way, as I was saying when we first set out on our journey<sup>2</sup>.

*Meg.* Certainly; and we must find out why this was.

*Ath.* What laws are more worthy of our attention than

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *infra*, v. 736 C.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. *supra*, i. 625.

*Laws III.*ATHENIAN,  
MEGILLUS.

The Dorian  
confederacy  
was designed  
to protect  
the Hellenes  
against the  
Assyrian  
Empire.

those which have regulated such cities? or what settlements of states are greater or more famous?

*Meg.* I know of none.

*Ath.* Can we doubt that your ancestors intended these institutions not only for the protection of Peloponnesus, but of all the Hellenes, in case they were attacked by the barbarian? For the inhabitants of the region about Ilium, when they provoked by their insolence the Trojan war, relied upon the power of the Assyrians and the Empire of Ninus, which still existed and had a great prestige; the people of those days fearing the united Assyrian Empire just as we now fear the Great King. And the second capture of Troy was a serious offence against them, because Troy was a portion of the Assyrian Empire. To meet the danger the single army was distributed between three cities by the royal brothers, sons of Heracles,—a fair device, as it seemed, and a far better arrangement than the expedition against Troy. For, firstly, the people of that day had, as they thought, in the Heraclidae better leaders than the Pelopidae; in the next place, they considered that their army was superior in valour to that which went against Troy; for, although the latter conquered the Trojans, they were themselves conquered by the Heraclidae—Achaeans by Dorians. May we not suppose that this was the intention with which the men of those days framed the constitutions of their states?

*Meg.* Quite true.

Why, with its  
great prestige  
and many  
advantages,  
did it fall  
to pieces?

*Ath.* And would not men who had shared with one another many dangers, and were governed by a single race of royal brothers, and had taken the advice of oracles, and in particular of the Delphian Apollo, be likely to think that such states would be firmly and lastingly established?

*Meg.* Of course they would.

*Ath.* Yet these institutions, of which such great expectations were entertained, seem to have all rapidly vanished away; with the exception, as I was saying, of that small part of them which existed in your land. And this third part has never to this day ceased warring against the two others; whereas, if the original idea had been carried out, and they had agreed to be one, their power would have been invincible in war.

*Meg.* No doubt.

*Ath.* But what was the ruin of this glorious confederacy? Here is a subject well worthy of consideration.

*Meg.* Certainly, no one will ever find more striking instances of laws or governments being the salvation or destruction of great and noble interests, than are here presented to his view.

*Ath.* Then now we seem to have happily arrived at a real and important question.

*Meg.* Very true.

*Ath.* Did you never remark, sage friend, that all men, and we ourselves at this moment, often fancy that they see some beautiful thing which might have effected wonders if any one had only known how to make a right use of it in some way; and yet this mode of looking at things may turn out after all to be a mistake, and not according to nature, either in our own case or in any other?

*Meg.* To what are you referring, and what do you mean?

*Ath.* I was thinking of my own admiration of the aforesaid Heracleid expedition, which was so noble, and might have had such wonderful results for the Hellenes, if only rightly used; and I was just laughing at myself.

*Meg.* But were you not right and wise in speaking as you did, and we in assenting to you?

*Ath.* Perhaps; and yet I cannot help observing that any one who sees anything great or powerful, immediately has the feeling that—'If the owner only knew how to use his great and noble possession, how happy would he be, and what great results would he achieve!'

8 *Meg.* And would he not be justified?

*Ath.* Reflect; in what point of view does this sort of praise appear just: First, in reference to the question in hand:—If the then commanders had known how to arrange their army properly, how would they have attained success? Would not this have been the way? They would have bound them all firmly together and preserved them for ever, giving them freedom and dominion at pleasure, combined with the power of doing in the whole world, Hellenic and barbarian, whatever they and their descendants desired. What other aim would they have had?

*Laws III.*

ATHENIAN,  
MEGILLUS.

The confederates did not understand how to keep together. Had they only been united, they might have done anything.



*Laws III.*ATHENIAN,  
MEGILLUS.*Meg.* Very good.*Ath.* Suppose any one were in the same way to express his admiration at the sight of great wealth or family honour, or the like, he would praise them under the idea that through them he would attain either all or the greater and chief part of what he desires.*Meg.* He would.*Ath.* Well, now, and does not the argument show that there is one common desire of all mankind?*Meg.* What is it?*Ath.* The desire which a man has, that all things, if possible,—at any rate, things human,—may come to pass in accordance with his soul's desire.*Meg.* Certainly.Men desire  
things which  
are not for  
their good.*Ath.* And having this desire always, and at every time of life, in youth, in manhood, in age, he cannot help always praying for the fulfilment of it.*Meg.* No doubt.*Ath.* And we join in the prayers of our friends, and ask for them what they ask for themselves.*Meg.* We do.*Ath.* Dear is the son to the father—the younger to the elder.*Meg.* Of course.*Ath.* And yet the son often prays to obtain things which the father prays that he may not obtain.*Meg.* When the son is young and foolish, you mean?*Ath.* Yes; or when the father, in the dotage of age or the heat of youth, having no sense of right and justice, prays with fervour, under the influence of feelings akin to those of Theseus when he cursed the unfortunate Hippolytus, do you imagine that the son, having a sense of right and justice, will join in his father's prayers?*Meg.* I understand you to mean that a man should not desire or be in a hurry to have all things according to his wish, for his wish may be at variance with his reason. But every state and every individual ought to pray and strive for wisdom.The states-  
man in  
making*Ath.* Yes; and I remember, and you will remember, what I said at first, that a statesman and legislator ought to ordain



laws with a view to wisdom ; while you were arguing that the good lawgiver ought to order all with a view to war. And to this I replied that there were four virtues, but that upon your view one of them only was the aim of legislation ; whereas you ought to regard all virtue, and especially that which comes first, and is the leader of all the rest — I mean wisdom and mind and opinion, having affection and desire in their train. And now the argument returns to the same point, and I say once more, in jest if you like, or in earnest if you like, that the prayer of a fool is full of danger, being likely to end in the opposite of what he desires. And if you would rather receive my words in earnest, I am willing that you should ; and you will find, I suspect, as I have said already, that not cowardice was the cause of the ruin of the Dorian kings and of their whole design, nor ignorance of military matters, either on the part of the rulers or of their subjects ; but their misfortunes were due to their general degeneracy, and especially to their ignorance of the most important human affairs. That was then, and is still, and always will be the case, as I will endeavour, if you will allow me, to make out and demonstrate as well as I am able to you who are my friends, in the course of the argument.

*Cle.* Pray go on, Stranger ;— compliments are troublesome, but we will show, not in word but in deed, how greatly we prize your words, for we will give them our best attention ; and that is the way in which a freeman best shows his approval or disapproval.

*Meg.* Excellent, Cleinias ; let us do as you say.

*Cle.* By all means, if Heaven wills. Go on.

*Ath.* Well, then, proceeding in the same train of thought, I say that the greatest ignorance was the ruin of the Dorian power, and that now, as then, ignorance is ruin. And if this be true, the legislator must endeavour to implant wisdom in states, and banish ignorance to the utmost of his power.

*Cle.* That is evident.

*Ath.* Then now consider what is really the greatest ignorance. I should like to know whether you and Megillus would agree with me in what I am about to say ; for my opinion is —

*Cle.* What?

*Laws III.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS,  
MEGILLUS.

laws should  
have in view  
all the four  
virtues, and  
not one only.

Ignorance  
of the highest  
things the  
ruin of the  
Dorian power.

*Laws III.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.The greatest  
ignorance  
is to know  
and not to  
do the good  
and noble.

*Ath.* That the greatest ignorance is when a man hates that which he nevertheless thinks to be good and noble, and loves and embraces that which he knows to be unrighteous and evil. This disagreement between the sense of pleasure and the judgment of reason in the soul is, in my opinion, the worst ignorance; and also the greatest, because affecting the great mass of the human soul; for the principle which feels pleasure and pain in the individual is like the mass or populace in a state. And when the soul is opposed to knowledge, or opinion, or reason, which are her natural lords, that I call folly, just as in the state, when the multitude refuses to obey their rulers and the laws; or, again, in the individual, when fair reasonings have their habitation in the soul and yet do no good, but rather the reverse of good. All these cases I term the worst ignorance, whether in individuals or in states. You will understand, Stranger, that I am speaking of something which is very different from the ignorance of handicraftsmen.

*Cle.* Yes, my friend, we understand and agree.

*Ath.* Let us, then, in the first place declare and affirm that the citizen who does not know these things ought never to have any kind of authority entrusted to him: he must be stigmatized as ignorant, even though he be versed in calculation and skilled in all sorts of accomplishments, and feats of mental dexterity; and the opposite are to be called wise, even although, in the words of the proverb, they know neither how to read nor how to swim; and to them, as to men of sense, authority is to be committed. For, O my friends, how can there be the least shadow of wisdom when there is no harmony? There is none; but the noblest and greatest of harmonies may be truly said to be the greatest wisdom; and of this he is a partaker who lives according to reason; whereas he who is devoid of reason is the destroyer of his house and the very opposite of a saviour of the state: he is utterly ignorant of political wisdom. Let this, then, as I was saying, be laid down by us.

*Cle.* Let it be so laid down.

*Ath.* I suppose that there must be rulers and subjects in states?

*Cle.* Certainly.

No wisdom  
where there is  
no harmony.

*Ath.* And what are the principles on which men rule and obey in cities, whether great or small; and similarly in families? What are they, and how many in number? Is there not one claim of authority which is always just,—that of fathers and mothers and in general of progenitors to rule over their offspring?

*Cle.* There is.

*Ath.* Next follows the principle that the noble should rule over the ignoble; and, thirdly, that the elder should rule and the younger obey?

*Cle.* To be sure.

*Ath.* And, fourthly, that slaves should be ruled, and their masters rule?

*Cle.* Of course.

*Ath.* Fifthly, if I am not mistaken, comes the principle that the stronger shall rule, and the weaker be ruled?

*Cle.* That is a rule not to be disobeyed.

*Ath.* Yes, and a rule which prevails very widely among all creatures, and is according to nature, as the Theban poet Pindar once said; and the sixth principle, and the greatest of all, is, that the wise should lead and command, and the ignorant follow and obey; and yet, O thou most wise Pindar, as I should reply to him, this surely is not contrary to nature, but according to nature, being the rule of law over willing subjects, and not a rule of compulsion.

*Cle.* Most true.

*Ath.* There is a seventh kind of rule which is awarded by lot, and is dear to the Gods and a token of good fortune: he on whom the lot falls is a ruler, and he who fails in obtaining the lot goes away and is the subject; and this we affirm to be quite just.

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* 'Then now,' as we say playfully to any of those who lightly undertake the making of laws, 'you see, legislator, the principles of government, how many they are, and that they are naturally opposed to each other. There we have discovered a fountain-head of seditions, to which you must attend. And, first, we will ask you to consider with us, how and in what respect the kings of Argos and Messene violated these our maxims, and ruined themselves and the great and

*Laws III.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

The various  
kinds of au-  
thority :—  
(1) of parents  
over children ;

(2) of noble  
over ignoble ;  
(3) of elder  
over younger ;

(4) of master  
over slave ;

(5) of stronger  
over weaker ;

(6) of wise  
over ignorant ;

(7) of the  
winner of  
the lot over  
the loser.

The kings of  
Argos and  
Messene did



*Laws III.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS,  
MEGILLUS.not know  
that 'the  
half is often  
more than  
the whole.'

famous Hellenic power of the olden time. Was it because they did not know how wisely Hesiod spoke when he said that the half is often more than the whole? His meaning was, that when to take the whole would be dangerous, and to take the half would be the safe and moderate course, then the moderate or better was more than the immoderate or worse.'

*Cle.* Very true.

*Ath.* And may we suppose this immoderate spirit to be more fatal when found among kings than when among peoples?

*Cle.* The probability is that ignorance will be a disorder especially prevalent among kings, because they lead a proud and luxurious life.

*Ath.* Is it not palpable that the chief aim of the kings of that time was to get the better of the established laws, and that they were not in harmony with the principles which they had agreed to observe by word and oath? This want of harmony may have had the appearance of wisdom, but was really, as we assert, the greatest ignorance, and utterly overthrew the whole empire by dissonance and harsh discord.

*Cle.* Very likely.

*Ath.* Good; and what measures ought the legislator to have then taken in order to avert this calamity? Truly there is no great wisdom in knowing, and no great difficulty in telling, after the evil has happened; but to have foreseen the remedy at the time would have taken a much wiser head than ours.

*Meg.* What do you mean?

*Ath.* Any one who looks at what has occurred with you Lacedaemonians, Megillus, may easily know and may easily say what ought to have been done at that time.

*Meg.* Speak a little more clearly.

*Ath.* Nothing can be clearer than the observation which I am about to make.

*Meg.* What is it?

*Ath.* That if any one gives too great a power to anything, too large a sail to a vessel, too much food to the body, too much authority to the mind, and does not observe the mean, everything is overthrown, and, in the wantonness of excess,

Too much  
of anything  
is fatal to  
any man,  
especially



runs in the one case to disorders, and in the other to injustice, which is the child of excess. I mean to say, my dear friends, that there is no soul of man; young and irresponsible, who will be able to sustain the temptation of arbitrary power — no one who will not, under such circumstances, become filled with folly, that worst of diseases, and be hated by his nearest and dearest friends: when this happens his kingdom is undermined, and all his power vanishes from him. And great legislators who know the mean should take heed of the danger. As far as we can guess at this distance of time, what happened was as follows:—

*Meg.* What?

*Ath.* A God, who watched over Sparta, seeing into the future, gave you two families of kings instead of one; and thus brought you more within the limits of moderation. In the next place, some human wisdom mingled with divine power, observing that the constitution of your government was still feverish and excited, tempered your inborn strength and pride of birth with the moderation which comes of age, making the power of your twenty-eight elders equal with that of the kings in the most important matters. But your third saviour, perceiving that your government was still swelling and foaming, and desirous to impose a curb upon it, instituted the Ephors, whose power he made to resemble that of magistrates elected by lot; and by this arrangement the kingly office, being compounded of the right elements and duly moderated, was preserved, and was the means of preserving all the rest. Since, if there had been only the original legislators, Temenus, Cresphontes, and their contemporaries, as far as they were concerned not even the portion of Aristodemus would have been preserved; for they had no proper experience in legislation, or they would surely not have imagined that oaths would moderate a youthful spirit invested with a power which might be converted into a tyranny. Now that God has instructed us what sort of government would have been or will be lasting, there is no wisdom, as I have already said, in judging after the event; there is no difficulty in learning from an example which has already occurred. But if any one could have foreseen all this at the time, and had been able to moderate the govern-

*Larus III.*

ATHENIAN,  
MEGILLUS.

too much  
power to  
a despot.

Sparta was  
saved by  
the dual  
monarchy  
and the  
institution  
of Elders  
and Ephors.

*Laws III.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

The Athenians were assisted against the Persians by the Spartans alone. Disgraceful conduct of Messene and Argos.

ment of the three kingdoms and unite them into one, he might have saved all the excellent institutions which were then conceived; and no Persian or any other armament would have dared to attack us, or would have regarded Hellas as a power to be despised.

*Cle.* True.

*Ath.* There was small credit to us, Cleinias, in defeating them; and the discredit was, not that the conquerors did not win glorious victories both by land and sea, but what, in my opinion, brought discredit was, first of all, the circumstance that of the three cities one only fought on behalf of Hellas, and the two others were so utterly good for nothing that the one was waging a mighty war against Lacedaemon, and was thus preventing her from rendering assistance, while the city of Argos, which had the precedence at the time of the distribution, when asked to aid in repelling the barbarian, would not answer to the call, or give aid. Many things might be told about Hellas in connexion with that war which are far from honourable; nor, indeed, can we rightly say that Hellas repelled the invader; for the truth is, that unless the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, acting in concert, had warded off the impending yoke, all the tribes of Hellas 6 would have been fused in a chaos of Hellenes mingling with one another, of barbarians mingling with Hellenes, and Hellenes with barbarians; just as nations who are now subject to the Persian power, owing to unnatural separations and combinations of them, are dispersed and scattered, and live miserably. These, Cleinias and Megillus, are the reproaches which we have to make against statesmen and legislators, as they are called, past and present, if we would analyze the causes of their failure, and find out what else might have been done. We said, for instance, just now, that there ought to be no great and unmixed powers; and this was under the idea that a state ought to be free and wise and harmonious, and that a legislator ought to legislate with a view to this end. Nor is there any reason to be surprised at our continually proposing aims for the legislator which appear not to be always the same; but we should consider when we say that temperance is to be the aim, or wisdom is to be the aim, or friendship is to be the aim, that all

these aims are really the same; and if so a variety in the modes of expression ought not to disturb us.

*Laws III.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Cle.* Let us resume the argument in that spirit. And now, speaking of friendship and wisdom and freedom, I wish that you would tell me at what, in your opinion, the legislator should aim.

*Ath.* Hear me, then: there are two mother forms of states from which the rest may be truly said to be derived; and one of them may be called monarchy and the other democracy: the Persians have the highest form of the one, and we of the other; almost all the rest, as I was saying, are variations of these. Now, if you are to have liberty and the combination of friendship with wisdom, you must have both these forms of government in a measure; the argument emphatically declares that no city can be well governed which is not made up of both<sup>1</sup>.

Two original  
types of  
states:—  
monarchy,  
like that of  
the Persians;  
democracy, as  
at Athens.

*Cle.* Impossible.

*Ath.* Neither the one, if it be exclusively and excessively attached to monarchy, nor the other, if it be similarly attached to freedom, observes moderation; but your states, the Lacedæmonian and Cretan, have more of it; and the same was the case with the Athenians and Persians of old time, but now they have less. Shall I tell you why?

*Cle.* By all means, if it will tend to elucidate our subject.

*Ath.* Hear, then:—There was a time when the Persians had more of the state which is a mean between slavery and freedom. In the reign of Cyrus they were freemen and also lords of many others: the rulers gave a share of freedom to the subjects, and being treated as equals, the soldiers were on better terms with their generals, and showed themselves more ready in the hour of danger. And if there was any wise man among them, who was able to give good counsel, he imparted his wisdom to the public; for the king was not jealous, but allowed him full liberty of speech, and gave honour to those who could advise him in any matter. And the nation waxed in all respects, because there was freedom and friendship and communion of mind among them.

The Persians  
under Cyrus  
had a good  
deal of  
freedom  
which they  
lost under  
Cambyses.

*Cle.* That certainly appears to have been the case.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *infra*, vi. 756 E; Arist. Pol. ii. 6, § 18.



*Laws III.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Ath.* How, then, was this advantage lost under Cambyses, and again recovered under Darius? Shall I try to divine?

*Cle.* The enquiry, no doubt, has a bearing upon our subject.

*Ath.* I imagine that Cyrus, though a great and patriotic general, had never given his mind to education, and never attended to the order of his household.

*Cle.* What makes you say so?

Cyrus himself  
had been  
brought up  
well, but he  
neglected the  
education of  
his children.

*Ath.* I think that from his youth upwards he was a soldier, and entrusted the education of his children to the women; and they brought them up from their childhood as the favourites of fortune, who were blessed already, and needed no more blessings. They thought that they were happy enough, and that no one should be allowed to oppose them in any way, and they compelled every one to praise all that they said or did. This was how they brought them up.

*Cle.* A splendid education truly!

*Ath.* Such an one as women were likely to give them, and especially princesses who had recently grown rich, and in the absence of the men, too, who were occupied in wars and dangers, and had no time to look after them.

*Cle.* What would you expect?

*Ath.* Their father had possessions of cattle and sheep, and many herds of men and other animals; but he did not consider that those to whom he was about to make them over were not trained in his own calling, which was Persian; for the Persians are shepherds — sons of a rugged land, which is a stern mother, and well fitted to produce a sturdy race able to live in the open air and go without sleep, and also to fight, if fighting is required<sup>1</sup>. He did not observe that his sons were trained differently; through the so-called blessing of being royal they were educated in the Median fashion by women and eunuchs, which led to their becoming such as people do become when they are brought up unreprieved. And so, after the death of Cyrus, his sons, in the fulness of luxury and licence, took the kingdom, and first one slew the other because he could not endure a rival; and, afterwards, the slayer himself, mad with wine and brutality, lost his kingdom through the Medes and the Eunuch, as they called him, who despised the folly of Cambyses.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Arist. Pol. vii. 2, § 10.



*Cle.* So runs the tale, and such probably were the facts.

*Laws III.*

*Ath.* Yes; and the tradition says, that the empire came back to the Persians, through Darius and the seven chiefs.

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Cle.* True.

*Ath.* Let us note the rest of the story. Observe, that Darius was not the son of a king, and had not received a luxurious education. When he came to the throne, being one of the seven, he divided the country into seven portions, and of this arrangement there are some shadowy traces still remaining; he made laws upon the principle of introducing universal equality in the order of the state, and he embodied in his laws the settlement of the tribute which Cyrus promised,—thus creating a feeling of friendship and community among all the Persians, and attaching the people to him with money and gifts. Hence his armies cheerfully acquired for him countries as large as those which Cyrus had left behind him. Darius was succeeded by his son Xerxes; and he again was brought up in the royal and luxurious fashion. Might we not most justly say: ‘O Darius, how came you to bring up Xerxes in the same way in which Cyrus brought up Cambyses, and not to see his fatal mistake?’ For Xerxes, being the creation of the same education, met with much the same fortune as Cambyses; and from that time until now there has never been a really great king among the Persians, although they are all called Great. And their degeneracy is not to be attributed to chance, as I maintain; the reason is rather the evil life which is generally led by the sons of very rich and royal persons; for never will boy or man, young or old, excel in virtue, who has been thus educated. And this, I say, is what the legislator has to consider, and what at the present moment has to be considered by us. Justly may you, O Lacedaemonians, be praised, in that you do not give special honour or a special education to wealth rather than poverty, or to a royal rather than to a private station, where the divine and inspired lawgiver has not originally commanded them to be given. For no man ought to have pre-eminent honour in a state because he surpasses others in wealth, any more than because he is swift of foot or fair or strong, unless he have some virtue in him; nor even if he have virtue, unless he have this particular virtue of temperance.

Darius, too,  
was an excellent prince:

but, like  
Cyrus, he  
took no care  
about his  
children's  
education.

*Laws III.*ATHENIAN,  
MEGILLUS.*Meg.* What do you mean, Stranger?*Ath.* I suppose that courage is a part of virtue?*Meg.* To be sure.*Ath.* Then, now hear and judge for yourself:— Would you like to have for a fellow-lodger or neighbour a very courageous man, who had no control over himself?*Meg.* Heaven forbid!*Ath.* Or an artist, who was clever in his profession, but a rogue?*Meg.* Certainly not.*Ath.* And surely justice does not grow apart from temperance?*Meg.* Impossible.*Ath.* Any more than our pattern wise man, whom we exhibited as having his pleasures and pains in accordance with and corresponding to true reason, can be intemperate<sup>1</sup>?*Meg.* No.*Ath.* There is a further consideration relating to the due and undue award of honours in states.*Meg.* What is it?*Ath.* I should like to know whether temperance without the other virtues, existing alone in the soul of man, is rightly to be praised or blamed?*Meg.* I cannot tell.*Ath.* And that is the best answer; for whichever alternative you had chosen, I think that you would have gone wrong.*Meg.* I am fortunate.*Ath.* Very good; a quality, which is a mere appendage of things which can be praised or blamed, does not deserve an expression of opinion, but is best passed over in silence.*Meg.* You are speaking of temperance?*Ath.* Yes; but of the other virtues, that which having this appendage is also most beneficial, will be most deserving of honour, and next that which is beneficial in the next degree; and so each of them will be rightly honoured according to a regular order.*Meg.* True.Temperance  
not a virtue,  
but rather an  
appendage  
or condition  
of the virtues.  
Not much  
to be said  
about it.<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, 689 D.

*Ath.* And ought not the legislator to determine these classes? *Laws III.*

*Meg.* Certainly he should.

ATHENIAN,  
MEGILLUS.

*Ath.* Suppose that we leave to him the arrangement of details. But the general division of laws according to their importance into a first and second and third class, we who are lovers of law may make ourselves.

*Meg.* Very good.

*Ath.* We maintain, then, that a State which would be safe and happy, as far as the nature of man allows, must and ought to distribute honour and dishonour in the right way. And the right way is to place the goods of the soul first and highest in the scale, always assuming temperance to be the condition of them; and to assign the second place to the goods of the body; and the third place to money and property. And if any legislator or state departs from this rule by giving money the place of honour, or in any way preferring that which is really last, may we not say, that he or the state is doing an unholy and unpatriotic thing?

The order in which the law should arrange goods:  
— (1) goods of the soul;  
(2) goods of the body;  
(3) money and property.

*Meg.* Yes; let that be plainly declared.

*Ath.* The consideration of the Persian governments led us thus far to enlarge. We remarked that the Persians grew worse and worse. And we affirm the reason of this to have been, that they too much diminished the freedom of the people, and introduced too much of despotism, and so destroyed friendship and community of feeling. And when there is an end of these, no longer do the governors govern on behalf of their subjects or of the people, but on behalf of themselves; and if they think that they can gain ever so small an advantage for themselves, they devastate cities, and send fire and desolation among friendly races. And as they hate ruthlessly and horribly, so are they hated; and when they want the people to fight for them, they find no community of feeling or willingness to risk their lives on their behalf; their untold myriads are useless to them on the field of battle, and they think that their salvation depends on the employment of mercenaries and strangers whom they hire, as if they were in want of more men. And they cannot help being stupid, since they proclaim by their actions that the ordinary distinctions of right and wrong which are

The growth of despotism among the Persians was the ruin of their nationality.



*Laws III.*

ATHENIAN,

MEGILLUS.

made in a state are a trifle, when compared with gold and silver.

*Meg.* Quite true.

*Ath.* And now enough of the Persians, and their present mal-administration of their government, which is owing to the excess of slavery and despotism among them.

*Meg.* Good.

The Athenian constitution was excellent at the time of the Persian invasion.

*Ath.* Next, we must pass in review the government of Attica in like manner, and from this show that entire freedom and the absence of all superior authority is not by any means so good as government by others when properly limited, which was our ancient Athenian constitution at the time when the Persians made their attack on Hellas, or, speaking more correctly, on the whole continent of Europe. There were four classes, arranged according to a property census, and reverence was our queen and mistress, and made us willing to live in obedience to the laws which then prevailed. Also the vastness of the Persian armament, both by sea and on land, caused a helpless terror, which made us more and more the servants of our rulers and of the laws; and for all these reasons an exceeding harmony prevailed among us. About ten years before the naval engagement at Salamis, Datis came, leading a Persian host by command of Darius, which was expressly directed against the Athenians and Eretrians, having orders to carry them away captive; and these orders he was to execute under pain of death. Now Datis and his myriads soon became complete masters of Eretria, and he sent a fearful report to Athens that no Eretrian had escaped him; for the soldiers of Datis had joined hands and netted the whole of Eretria. And this report, whether well or ill founded, was terrible to all the Hellenes, and above all to the Athenians, and they dispatched embassies in all directions, but no one was willing to come to their relief, with the exception of the Lacedaemonians; and they, either because they were detained by the Messenian war, which was then going on, or for some other reason of which we are not told, came a day too late for the battle of Marathon. After a while, the news arrived of mighty preparations being made, and innumerable threats came from the king. Then, as time went on, a rumour



reached us that Darius had died, and that his son, who was young and hot-headed, had come to the throne and was persisting in his design. The Athenians were under the impression that the whole expedition was directed against them, in consequence of the battle of Marathon; and hearing of the bridge over the Hellespont, and the canal of Athos, and the host of ships, considering that there was no salvation for them either by land or by sea, for there was no one to help them, and remembering that in the first expedition, when the Persians destroyed Eretria, no one came to their help, or would risk the danger of an alliance with them, they thought that this would happen again, at least on land; nor, when they looked to the sea, could they descry any hope of salvation; for they were attacked by a thousand vessels and more. One chance of safety remained, slight indeed and desperate, but their only one. They saw that on the former occasion they had gained a seemingly impossible victory, and borne up by this hope, they found that their only refuge was in themselves and in the Gods. All these things created in them the spirit of friendship; there was the fear of the moment, and there was that higher fear, which they had acquired by obedience to their ancient laws, and which I have several times in the preceding discourse called reverence, of which the good man ought to be a willing servant, and of which the coward is independent and fearless. If this fear had not possessed them, they would never have met the enemy, or defended their temples and sepulchres and their country, and everything that was near and dear to them, as they did; but little by little they would have been all scattered and dispersed.

*Meg.* Your words, Athenian, are quite true, and worthy of yourself and of your country.

*Ath.* They are true, Megillus; and to you, who have inherited the virtues of your ancestors, I may properly speak of the actions of that day. And I would wish you and Cleinias to consider whether my words have not also a bearing on legislation; for I am not discoursing only for the pleasure of talking, but for the argument's sake. Please to remark that the experience both of ourselves and the Persians was, in a certain sense, the same; for as they led

*Laws III.*

ATHENIAN,  
MEGILLUS.

Renewal of  
the attack  
by Xerxes.

The Athenians, though unsupported, conquered, because they were a united people, and trusted to themselves and God.

Their habit of obedience to law inspired in them the fear of disgrace.

Too much rule the ruin of the Persians, too much liberty of the Athenians.

*Laws III.*ATHENIAN,  
MEGILLUS.

their people into utter servitude, so we too led ours into all freedom. And now, how shall we proceed? for I would like you to observe that our previous arguments have a good deal to say for themselves.

*Meg.* True; but I wish that you would give us a fuller explanation.

*Ath.* I will. Under the ancient laws, my friends, the people was not as now the master, but rather the willing servant of the laws.

*Meg.* What laws do you mean?

Ancient  
simplicity  
and good  
order of  
music.

*Ath.* In the first place, let us speak of the laws about music,—that is to say, such music as then existed,—in order that we may trace the growth of the excess of freedom from the beginning. Now music was early divided among us into certain kinds and manners. One sort consisted of prayers to the Gods, which were called hymns; and there was another and opposite sort called lamentations, and another termed paeans, and another, celebrating the birth of Dionysus, called, I believe, ‘dithyrambs.’ And they used the actual word ‘laws,’ or νόμοι, for another kind of song; and to this they added the term ‘citharoedic.’ All these and others were duly distinguished, nor were the performers allowed to confuse one style of music with another. And the authority which determined and gave judgment, and punished the disobedient, was not expressed in a hiss, nor in the most unmusical shouts of the multitude, as in our days, nor in applause and clapping of hands. But the directors of public instruction insisted that the spectators should listen in silence to the end; and boys and their tutors, and the multitude in general, were kept quiet by a hint from a stick. Such was the good order which the multitude were willing to observe; they would never have dared to give judgment by noisy cries. And then, as time went on, the poets themselves introduced the reign of vulgar and lawless innovation. They were men of genius, but they had no perception of what is just and lawful in music; raging like Bacchanals and possessed with inordinate delights—mingling lamentations with hymns, and paeans with dithyrambs; imitating the sounds of the flute on the lyre, and making one general confusion; ignorantly affirming that

The reign of  
misrule intro-  
duced by  
the poets.

music has no truth, and, whether good or bad, can only be judged of rightly by the pleasure of the hearer<sup>1</sup>. And by composing such licentious works, and adding to them words as licentious, they have inspired the multitude with lawlessness and boldness, and made them fancy that they can judge for themselves about melody and song. And in this way the theatres from being mute have become vocal, as though they had understanding of good and bad in music and poetry; and instead of an aristocracy, an evil sort of teatrocracy has grown up<sup>2</sup>. For if the democracy which judged had only consisted of educated persons, no fatal harm would have been done; but in music there first arose the universal conceit of omniscience and general lawlessness;—freedom came following afterwards, and men, fancying that they knew what they did not know, had no longer any fear, and the absence of fear begets shamelessness. For what is this shamelessness, which is so evil a thing, but the insolent refusal to regard the opinion of the better by reason of an over-daring sort of liberty?

*Lazus III.*

ATHENIAN,  
MEGILLUS.

The conceit  
of omniscience  
led to law-  
lessness.

*Meg.* Very true.

*Ath.* Consequent upon this freedom comes the other freedom, of disobedience to rulers<sup>3</sup>; and then the attempt to escape the control and exhortation of father, mother, elders, and when near the end, the control of the laws also; and at the very end there is the contempt of oaths and pledges, and no regard at all for the Gods,—herein they exhibit and imitate the old so-called Titanic nature, and come to the same point as the Titans when they rebelled against God, leading a life of endless evils. But why have I said all this? I ask, because the argument ought to be pulled up from time to time, and not be allowed to run away, but held with bit and bridle, and then we shall not, as the proverb says, fall off our ass. Let us then once more ask the question, To what end has all this been said?

*Meg.* Very good.

*Ath.* This, then, has been said for the sake ——

*Meg.* Of what?

*Ath.* We were maintaining that the lawgiver ought to

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. iii. 397 foll.    <sup>2</sup> Cp. Ar. Pol. viii. 6.    <sup>3</sup> Cp. Rep. iv. 424 E.



*Laws III.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS,  
MEGILLUS.

Three chief  
objects of  
legislation:—  
freedom,  
harmony,  
good sense.

have three things in view: first, that the city for which he legislates should be free; and secondly, be at unity with herself; and thirdly, should have understanding;—these were our principles, were they not?

*Meg.* Certainly.

*Ath.* With a view to this we selected two kinds of government, the one the most despotic, and the other the most free; and now we are considering which of them is the right form: we took a mean in both cases, of despotism in the one, and of liberty in the other, and we saw that in a mean they attained their perfection; but that when they were carried to the extreme of either, slavery or licence, neither party were the gainers.

*Meg.* Very true.

*Ath.* And that was our reason for considering the settlement of the Dorian army, and of the city built by Dardanus at the foot of the mountains, and the removal of cities to the seashore, and of our mention of the first men, who were the survivors of the deluge. And all that was previously said about music and drinking, and what preceded, was said with the view of seeing how a state might be best administered, and how an individual might best order his own life. And now, Megillus and Cleinias, how can we put to the proof the value of our words?

*Cle.* Stranger, I think that I see how a proof of their value may be obtained. This discussion of ours appears to me to have been singularly fortunate, and just what I at this moment want; most auspiciously have you and my friend Megillus come in my way. For I will tell you what has happened to me; and I regard the coincidence as a sort of omen. The greater part of Crete is going to send out a colony, and they have entrusted the management of the affair to the Cnosians; and the Cnosian government to me and nine others. And they desire us to give them any laws which we please, whether taken from the Cretan model or from any other; and they do not mind about their being foreign if they are better. Grant me then this favour, which will also be a gain to yourselves:—Let us make a selection from what has been said, and then let us imagine a State of which we will suppose ourselves to be the original founders.

A lucky omen.

Cleinias and  
nine other  
Cnosians have  
been em-  
powered by  
the Cretan  
states to  
superintend  
the arrange-  
ments of a  
colony.



Thus we shall proceed with our enquiry, and, at the same time, I may have the use of the framework which you are constructing, for the city which is in contemplation.

*Ath.* Good news, Cleinias; if Megillus has no objection, you may be sure that I will do all in my power to please you.

*Cle.* Thank you.

*Meg.* And so will I.

*Cle.* Excellent; and now let us begin to frame the State.

*Laws III.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS,  
MEGILLUS.

The three  
proceed to  
make laws  
for it.

## BOOK IV.

*Laws IV.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

The situation  
of the new  
colony:

*Athenian Stranger.* AND now, what will this city be? I do not mean to ask what is or will hereafter be the name of the place; that may be determined by the accident of locality or of the original settlement,—a river or fountain, or some local deity may give the sanction of a name to the newly-founded city; but I do want to know what the situation is, whether maritime or inland.

*Cleinias.* I should imagine, Stranger, that the city of which we are speaking is about eighty stadia distant from the sea.

*Ath.* And are there harbours on the seaboard?

*Cle.* Excellent harbours, Stranger; there could not be better.

*Ath.* Alas! what a prospect! And is the surrounding country productive, or in need of importations?

*Cle.* Hardly in need of anything.

*Ath.* And is there any neighbouring State?

*Cle.* None whatever, and that is the reason for selecting the place; in days of old, there was a migration of the inhabitants, and the region has been deserted from time immemorial.

*Ath.* And has the place a fair proportion of hill, and plain, and wood?

*Cle.* Like the rest of Crete in that.

*Ath.* You mean to say that there is more rock than plain?

*Cle.* Exactly.

near the sea,  
and therefore  
favourable  
to virtue:

*Ath.* Then there is some hope that your citizens may be virtuous: had you been on the sea, and well provided with harbours, and an importing rather than a producing country,

same mighty saviour would have been needed, and lawgivers more than mortal, if you were ever to have a chance of preserving your state from degeneracy and discordance of manners<sup>1</sup>. But there is comfort in the eighty stadia; although the sea is too near, especially if, as you say, the harbours are so good. Still we may be content. The sea is pleasant enough as a daily companion, but has indeed also a bitter and brackish quality; filling the streets with merchants and shopkeepers, and begetting in the souls of men uncertain and unfaithful ways — making the state unfriendly and unfaithful both to her own citizens, and also to other nations. There is a consolation, therefore, in the country producing all things at home; and yet, owing to the ruggedness of the soil, not providing anything in great abundance. Had there been abundance, there might have been a great export trade, and a great return of gold and silver; which, as we may safely affirm, has the most fatal results on a State whose aim is the attainment of just and noble sentiments: this was said by us, if you remember, in the previous discussion<sup>2</sup>.

*Larus IV.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

self-sup-  
porting:

*Cle.* We remember, and are of the same opinion still.

*Ath.* Well, but let me ask, how is the country supplied with timber for ship-building?

*Cle.* There is no fir of any consequence, nor pine, and not much cypress; and you will find very little stone-pine or plane-wood, which shipwrights always require for the interior of ships.

deficient in  
timber;

*Ath.* These are also natural advantages.

*Cle.* Why so?

*Ath.* Because no city ought to be easily able to imitate its enemies in what is mischievous.

*Cle.* How does that bear upon any of the matters of which we have been speaking?

*Ath.* Remember, my good friend, what I said at first<sup>3</sup> about the Cretan laws, that they looked to one thing only, and this, as you both agreed, was war; and I replied that such laws, in so far as they tended to promote virtue, were good; but in that they regarded a part only, and not the whole of virtue, I disapproved of them. And now I hope that you in your

and therefore  
not adapted  
for maritime  
warfare, which  
is an ad-  
vantage.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Ar. Pol. vii. 6, §§ 1-4.    <sup>2</sup> *sup.* iii. 679 B.    <sup>3</sup> Cp. i. 625 D.

*Laws IV.*

ATHENIAN.

For maritime  
warfare often  
teaches men  
to be cowards.

Illustration  
of this from  
Homer.

turn will follow and watch me if I legislate with a view to anything but virtue, or with a view to a part of virtue only. For I consider that the true lawgiver, like an archer, aims only at that on which some eternal beauty is always attending, and dismisses everything else, whether wealth or any other benefit, when separated from virtue. I was saying that the imitation of enemies was a bad thing; and I was thinking of a case in which a maritime people are harassed by enemies, as the Athenians were by Minos (I do not speak from any desire to recall past grievances); but he, as we know, was a great naval potentate, who compelled the inhabitants of Attica to pay him a cruel tribute; and in those days they had no ships of war as they now have, nor was the country filled with ship-timber, and therefore they could not readily build them. Hence they could not learn how to imitate their enemy at sea, and in this way, becoming sailors themselves, directly repel their enemies. Better for them to have lost many times over the seven youths, than that heavy-armed and stationary troops should have been turned into sailors, and accustomed to be often leaping on shore, and again to come running back to their ships; or should have fancied that there was no disgrace in not awaiting the attack of an enemy and dying boldly; and that there were good reasons, and plenty of them, for a man throwing away his arms, and betaking himself to flight,—which is not dishonourable, as people say, at certain times. This is the language of naval warfare, and is anything but worthy of extraordinary praise. For we should not teach bad habits, least of all to the best part of the citizens. You may learn the evil of such a practice from Homer, by whom Odysseus is introduced, rebuking Agamemnon, because he desires to draw down the ships to the sea at a time when the Achaeans are hard pressed by the Trojans,—he gets angry with him, and says:—

‘Who, at a time when the battle is in full cry, biddest to drag the well-benched ships into the sea, that the prayers of the Trojans may be accomplished yet more, and high ruin fall upon us. For the Achaeans will not maintain the battle, when the ships are drawn into the sea, but they will look behind and will cease from strife; in that the counsel which you give will prove injurious.’

You see that he quite knew triremes on the sea, in the neigh-



bourhood of fighting men, to be an evil;—lions might be trained in that way to fly from a herd of deer. Moreover, naval powers which owe their safety to ships, do not give honour to that sort of warlike excellence which is most deserving of it. For he who owes his safety to the pilot and the captain, and the oarsman, and all sorts of rather inferior persons, cannot rightly give honour to whom honour is due. But how can a state be in a right condition which cannot justly award honour?

*Cle.* It is hardly possible, I admit; and yet, Stranger, we Cretans are in the habit of saying that the battle of Salamis was the salvation of Hellas.

*Ath.* Why, yes; and that is an opinion which is widely spread both among Hellenes and barbarians. But Megillus and I say rather, that the battle of Marathon was the beginning, and the battle of Plataea the completion, of the great deliverance, and that these battles by land made the Hellenes better; whereas the sea-fights of Salamis and Artemisium—for I may as well put them both together—made them no better, if I may say so without offence about the battles which helped to save us. And in estimating the goodness of a state, we regard both the situation of the country and the order of the laws, considering that the mere preservation and continuance of life is not the most honourable thing for men, as the vulgar think, but the continuance of the best life, while we live; and that again, if I am not mistaken, is a remark which has been made already<sup>1</sup>.

*Cle.* Yes.

*Ath.* Then we have only to ask, whether we are taking the course which we acknowledge to be the best for the settlement and legislation of states.

*Cle.* The best by far.

*Ath.* And now let me proceed to another question: Who are to be the colonists? May any one come out of all Crete; and is the idea that the population in the several states is too numerous for the means of subsistence? For I suppose that you are not going to send out a general invitation to any Hellene who likes to come. And yet I observe that to your country settlers have come from Argos and

*Laws IV.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

The victories of Marathon and Plataea, not those of Salamis and Artemisium, the salvation of Hellas.

Not the mere preservation of life, but the continuance of the best life, the true end of the state.

Who are to be the colonists?

<sup>1</sup> Cp. ii. 661.

*Laws IV.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

They are to  
be drawn from  
all Crete.  
Of other  
Hellenes  
Peloponne-  
sians will be  
specially  
acceptable.

Aegina and other parts of Hellas. Tell me, then, whence do you draw your recruits in the present enterprise?

*Cle.* They will come from all Crete; and of other Hellenes, Peloponnesians will be most acceptable. For, as you truly observe, there are Cretans of Argive descent; and the race of Cretans which has the highest character at the present day is the Gortynian, and this has come from Gortys in the Peloponnesus.

*Ath.* Cities find colonization in some respects easier if the colonists are one race, which like a swarm of bees is sent out from a single country, either when friends leave friends, owing to some pressure of population or other similar necessity, or when a portion of a state is driven by factions to emigrate. And there have been whole cities which have taken flight when utterly conquered by a superior power in war. This, however, which is in one way an advantage to the colonist or legislator, in another point of view creates a difficulty. There is an element of friendship in the community of race, and language, and laws, and in common temples and rites of worship; but colonies which are of this homogeneous sort are apt to kick against any laws or any form of constitution differing from that which they had at home; and although the badness of their own laws may have been the cause of the factions which prevailed among them, yet from the force of habit they would fain preserve the very customs which were their ruin, and the leader of the colony, who is their legislator, finds them troublesome and rebellious. On the other hand, the conflux of several populations might be more disposed to listen to new laws; but then, to make them combine and pull together, as they say of horses, is a most difficult task, and the work of years. And yet there is nothing which tends more to the improvement of mankind than legislation and colonization.

*Cle.* No doubt; but I should like to know why you say so.

*Ath.* My good friend, I am afraid that the course of my speculations is leading me to say something depreciatory of legislators; but if the word be to the purpose, there can be no harm. And yet, why am I disquieted, for I believe that the same principle applies equally to all human things?

Should colo-  
nists be of one  
or of many  
races?

*Cle.* To what are you referring?

*Laws IV.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

It sometimes  
appears as  
if man  
never legis-  
lated, but that  
everything  
were left to  
chance.

*Ath.* I was going to say that man never legislates, but accidents of all sorts, which legislate for us in all sorts of ways. The violence of war and the hard necessity of poverty are constantly overturning governments and changing laws. And the power of disease has often caused innovations in the state, when there have been pestilences, or when there has been a succession of bad seasons continuing during many years. Any one who sees all this, naturally rushes to the conclusion of which I was speaking, that no mortal legislates in anything, but that in human affairs chance is almost everything. And this may be said of the arts of the sailor, and the pilot, and the physician, and the general, and may seem to be well said; and yet there is another thing which may be said with equal truth of all of them.

*Cle.* What is it?

The truth is  
that God di-  
rects all,  
chance work-  
ing with Him.  
Art too is  
a cause.

*Ath.* That God governs all things, and that chance and opportunity co-operate with Him in the government of human affairs. There is, however, a third and less extreme view, that art should be there also; for I should say that in a storm there must surely be a great advantage in having the aid of the pilot's art. You would agree?

*Cle.* Yes.

*Ath.* And does not a like principle apply to legislation as well as to other things: even supposing all the conditions to be favourable which are needed for the happiness of the state, yet the true legislator must from time to time appear on the scene?

*Cle.* Most true.

*Ath.* In each case the artist would be able to pray rightly for certain conditions, and if these were granted by fortune, he would then only require to exercise his art?

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* And all the other artists just now mentioned, if they were bidden to offer up each their special prayer, would do so?

All artists  
must desire  
favourable  
conditions;  
and so the  
legislator.

*Cle.* Of course.

*Ath.* And the legislator would do likewise?

*Cle.* I believe that he would.

*Ath.* 'Come, legislator,' we will say to him; 'what are the conditions which you require in a state before you can organize



*Lawus IV.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.He would  
say :—‘ Let  
there be a  
tyrant who  
has every  
virtue,

it?’ How ought he to answer this question? Shall I give his answer?

*Cle.* Yes.*Ath.* He will say — ‘ Give me a state which is governed by a tyrant, and let the tyrant be young and have a good memory ; let him be quick at learning, and of a courageous and noble nature ; let him have that quality which, as I said before, is the inseparable companion of all the other parts of virtue, if there is to be any good in them.’*Cle.* I suppose, Megillus, that this companion virtue of which the Stranger speaks, must be temperance?and tem-  
perance as the  
condition of  
all the rest.’*Ath.* Yes, Cleinias, temperance in the vulgar sense ; not that which in the forced and exaggerated language of some philosophers is called prudence, but that which is the natural gift of children and animals, of whom some live continently and others incontinently, but when isolated, was, as we said, hardly worth reckoning in the catalogue of goods<sup>1</sup>. I think that you must understand my meaning.*Cle.* Certainly.*Ath.* Then our tyrant must have this as well as the other qualities, if the state is to acquire in the best manner and in the shortest time the form of government which is most conducive to happiness ; for there neither is nor ever will be a better or speedier way of establishing a polity than by a tyranny.*Cle.* By what possible arguments, Stranger, can any man persuade himself of such a monstrous doctrine?*Ath.* There is surely no difficulty in seeing, Cleinias, what is in accordance with the order of nature?*Cle.* You would assume, as you say, a tyrant who was young, temperate, quick at learning, having a good memory, courageous, of a noble nature?The tyrant  
must be the  
contemporary  
of a great  
legislator.*Ath.* Yes ; and you must add fortunate ; and his good fortune must be that he is the contemporary of a great legislator, and that some happy chance brings them together. When this has been accomplished, God has done all that He ever does for a state which He desires to be eminently prosperous ; He has done second best for a state in which there are two such rulers, and third best for a state in which<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, iii. 696 D.



there are three. The difficulty increases with the increase, and diminishes with the diminution of the number.

*Laws IV.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Cle.* You mean to say, I suppose, that the best government is produced from a tyranny, and originates in a good lawgiver and an orderly tyrant, and that the change from such a tyranny into a perfect form of government takes place most easily; less easily when from an oligarchy; and, in the third degree from a democracy: is not that your meaning?

*Ath.* Not so; I mean rather to say that the change is best made out of a tyranny; and secondly, out of a monarchy; and thirdly, out of some sort of democracy: fourth, in the capacity for improvement, comes oligarchy, which has the greatest difficulty in admitting of such a change, because the government is in the hands of a number of potentates. I am supposing that the legislator is by nature of the true sort, and that his strength is united with that of the chief men of the state; and when the ruling element is numerically small, and at the same time very strong, as in a tyranny, there the change is likely to be easiest and most rapid.

The perfect state may be formed,  
(1) most easily from a tyranny:  
(2) less so from a monarchy:  
(3) still less from a democracy:  
(4) least easily from an oligarchy.

*Cle.* How? We neither of us understand.

*Ath.* And yet we have repeated what I am saying a good many times; but I suppose that you have never seen a city which is under a tyranny?

*Cle.* No, and for my part I never wish to see such a sight.

*Ath.* And yet, where there is a tyranny, you might certainly see that of which I am now speaking.

*Cle.* What do you mean?

*Ath.* I mean that you might see how, without trouble and in no very long period of time, the tyrant, if he wishes, can change the manners of a state: he has only to go in the direction of virtue or of vice, whichever he prefers, he himself indicating by his example the lines of conduct, praising and rewarding some actions and reproving others, and degrading those who disobey.

The change is speedily effected by the example and by the power of a tyrant.

*Cle.* But how can we imagine that the citizens in general will at once follow the example set to them; and how can he have this power both of persuading and of compelling them?

*Ath.* Let no one, my friends, persuade us that there is any quicker and easier way in which states change their laws than

*Laws IV.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

when the rulers lead: such changes never have, nor ever will, come to pass in any other way. The real impossibility or difficulty is of another sort, and is rarely surmounted in the course of ages; but when once it is surmounted, ten thousand or rather all blessings follow.

*Cle.* Of what are you speaking?

Rare is the  
combination  
of power and  
wisdom.

*Ath.* The difficulty is to find the divine love of temperate and just institutions existing in any powerful forms of government, whether in a monarchy or oligarchy of wealth or of birth. You might as well hope to reproduce the character of Nestor, who is said to have excelled all men in the power of speech, and yet more in his temperance. This, however, according to the tradition, was in the times of Troy; in our own days there is nothing of the sort; but if such an one either has or ever shall come into being, or is now among us, blessed is he and blessed are they who hear the wise words that flow from his lips. And this may be said of power in general: When the supreme power in man coincides with the greatest wisdom and temperance, then the best laws and the best constitution come into being; but in no other way. And let what I have been saying be regarded as a kind of sacred legend or oracle, and let this be our proof that, in one point of view, there may be a difficulty for a city to have good laws, but that there is another point of view in which nothing can be easier or sooner effected, granting our supposition.

*Cle.* How do you mean?

*Ath.* Let us try to amuse ourselves, old boys as we are, by moulding in words the laws which are suitable to your state<sup>1</sup>.

*Cle.* Let us proceed without delay.

*Ath.* Then let us invoke God at the settlement of our state; may He hear and be propitious to us, and come and set in order the State and the laws!

*Cle.* May He come!

*Ath.* But what form of polity are we going to give the city?

What is to  
be the gov-  
ernment of  
the colony?

*Cle.* Tell us what you mean a little more clearly. Do you mean some form of democracy, or oligarchy, or aristocracy, or monarchy? For we cannot suppose that you would include tyranny.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. v. 746 A.

Laws IV.

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIÄS,  
MEGILLUS.

What are  
your own  
governments?  
Sparta seems  
to be a mix-  
ture of  
tyranny,  
monarchy,  
aristocracy,  
democracy.

So too Cnosus.

Most states  
named after  
the ruling  
power.

The perfect  
state should  
be called  
the City of  
God.

*Ath.* Which of you will first tell me to which of these classes his own government is to be referred?

*Meg.* Ought I to answer first, since I am the elder?

*Cle.* Perhaps you should.

*Meg.* And yet, Stranger, I perceive that I cannot say, without more thought, what I should call the government of Lacedaemon, for it seems to me to be like a tyranny,—the power of our Ephors is marvellously tyrannical; and sometimes it appears to me to be of all cities the most democratical; and who can reasonably deny that it is an aristocracy<sup>1</sup>? We have also a monarchy which is held for life, and is said by all mankind, and not by ourselves only, to be the most ancient of all monarchies; and, therefore, when asked on a sudden, I cannot precisely say which form of government the Spartan is.

*Cle.* I am in the same difficulty, Megillus; for I do not feel confident that the polity of Cnosus is any of these.

*Ath.* The reason is, my excellent friends, that you really have polities, but the states of which we were just now speaking are merely aggregations of men dwelling in cities who are the subjects and servants of a part of their own state, and each of them is named after the dominant power; they are not polities at all. But if states are to be named after their rulers, the true state ought to be called by the name of the God who rules over wise men.

*Cle.* And who is this God?

*Ath.* May I still make use of fable to some extent, in the hope that I may be better able to answer your question: shall I?

*Cle.* By all means.

*Ath.* In the primeval world, and a long while before the cities came into being whose settlements we have described, there is said to have been in the time of Cronos a blessed rule and life, of which the best-ordered of existing states is a copy<sup>2</sup>.

*Cle.* It will be very necessary to hear about that.

*Ath.* I quite agree with you; and therefore I have introduced the subject.

*Cle.* Most appropriately; and since the tale is to the point, you will do well in giving us the whole story.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Ar. Pol. ii. 6, § 17.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Statesman 271.



*Laws IV.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.In the days  
of Cronos  
men were  
governed  
by demigods,who were  
to mankind  
what shep-  
herds are  
to animals.To the divine  
rule we must  
return, as far  
as we can.

*Ath.* I will do as you suggest. There is a tradition of the happy life of mankind in days when all things were spontaneous and abundant. And of this the reason is said to have been as follows:—Cronos knew what we ourselves were declaring<sup>1</sup>, that no human nature invested with supreme power is able to order human affairs and not overflow with insolence and wrong. Which reflection led him to appoint not men but demigods, who are of a higher and more divine race, to be the kings and rulers of our cities; he did as we do with flocks of sheep and other tame animals. For we do not appoint oxen to be the lords of oxen, or goats of goats; but we ourselves are a superior race, and rule over them. In like manner God, in His love of mankind, placed over us the demons, who are a superior race, and they with great ease and pleasure to themselves, and no less to us, taking care of us and giving us peace and reverence and order and justice never failing, made the tribes of men happy and united. And this tradition, which is true, declares that cities of which some mortal man and not God is the ruler, have no escape from evils and toils. Still we must do all that we can to imitate the life which is said to have existed in the days of Cronos, and, as far as the principle of immortality dwells in us, to that we must hearken, both in private and public life, and regulate our cities and houses according to law, meaning by the very term 'law,' the distribution of mind<sup>2</sup>. But if either a single person or an oligarchy or a democracy has a soul eager after pleasures and desires—wanting to be filled with them, yet retaining none of them, and perpetually afflicted with an endless and insatiable disorder; and this evil spirit, having first trampled the laws under foot, becomes the master either of a state or of an individual,—then, as I was saying, salvation is hopeless. And now, Cleinias, we have to consider whether you will or will not accept this tale of mine.

*Cle.* Certainly we will.

*Ath.* You are aware,—are you not?—that there are often said to be as many forms of laws as there are of governments and of the latter we have already mentioned<sup>3</sup> all those which are commonly recognized. Now you must regard this a

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*, iii. 691.<sup>2</sup> νόμος = νοῦ διανομή.<sup>3</sup> *Supra*, 712 C.



a matter of first-rate importance. For what is to be the standard of just and unjust, is once more the point at issue. Men say that the law ought not to regard either military virtue, or virtue in general, but only the interests and power and preservation of the established form of government; this is thought by them to be the best way of expressing the natural definition of justice.

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ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

Men commonly define justice to be the interest of the stronger,

*Cle.* How?

*Ath.* Justice is said by them to be the interest of the stronger<sup>1</sup>.

*Cle.* Speak plainer.

*Ath.* I will:—‘Surely,’ they say, ‘the governing power makes whatever laws have authority in any state’?

meaning by this the security and continuance of the ruling class.

*Cle.* True.

*Ath.* ‘Well,’ they would add, ‘and do you suppose that tyranny or democracy, or any other conquering power, does not make the continuance of the power which is possessed by them the first or principal object of their laws’?

*Cle.* How can they have any other?

*Ath.* ‘And whoever transgresses these laws is punished as an evil-doer by the legislator, who calls the laws just’?

*Cle.* Naturally.

*Ath.* ‘This, then, is always the mode and fashion in which justice exists.’

*Cle.* Certainly, if they are correct in their view.

*Ath.* Why, yes, this is one of those false principles of government to which we were referring<sup>2</sup>.

*Cle.* Which do you mean?

*Ath.* Those which we were examining when we spoke of who ought to govern whom. Did we not arrive at the conclusion that parents ought to govern their children, and the elder the younger, and the noble the ignoble? And there were many other principles, if you remember, and they were not always consistent. One principle was this very principle of might, and we said that Pindar considered violence natural and justified it.

*Cle.* Yes; I remember.

*Ath.* Consider, then, to whom our state is to be entrusted. For there is a thing which has occurred times without number in states——

But the forms of government which are

<sup>1</sup> Rep. i. 338, ii. 367.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*, iii. 690 B.

*Laws IV.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.based on  
this prin-  
ciple are not  
governments  
at all.Rule should  
be given, not  
to the richest  
or the  
strongest,  
but to him  
who is most  
obedient to  
the law.The keen  
sight of the  
aged.Address to  
the colonists.God moves  
in a straight*Cle.* What thing?

*Ath.* That when there has been a contest for power, those who gain the upper hand so entirely monopolize the government, as to refuse all share to the defeated party and their descendants — they live watching one another, the ruling class being in perpetual fear that some one who has a recollection of former wrongs will come into power and rise up against them. Now, according to our view, such governments are not polities at all, nor are laws right which are passed for the good of particular classes and not for the good of the whole state. States which have such laws are not polities but parties, and their notions of justice are simply unmeaning. I say this, because I am going to assert that we must not entrust the government in your state to any one because he is rich, or because he possesses any other advantage, such as strength, or stature, or again birth: but he who is most obedient to the laws of the state, he shall win the palm; and to him who is victorious in the first degree shall be given the highest office and chief ministry of the gods; and the second to him who bears the second palm; and on a similar principle shall all the other offices be assigned to those who come next in order. And when I call the rulers servants or ministers of the law, I give them this name not for the sake of novelty, but because I certainly believe that upon such service or ministry depends the well- or ill-being of the state. For that state in which the law is subject and has no authority, I perceive to be on the highway to ruin; but I see that the state in which the law is above the rulers, and the rulers are the inferiors of the law, has salvation, and every blessing which the Gods can confer.

*Cle.* Truly, Stranger, you see with the keen vision of age<sup>1</sup>.

*Ath.* Why, yes; every man when he is young has that sort of vision dullest, and when he is old keenest.

*Cle.* Very true.

*Ath.* And now, what is to be the next step? May we not suppose the colonists to have arrived, and proceed to make our speech to them?

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* 'Friends,' we say to them, — 'God, as the old tradition

<sup>1</sup> Or: — 'for a man of your age you have a keen sight.'

declares, holding in His hand the beginning, middle, and end of all that is, travels according to His nature in a straight line towards the accomplishment of His end. Justice always accompanies Him, and is the punisher of those who fall short of the divine law. To justice, he who would be happy holds fast, and follows in her company with all humility and order; but he who is lifted up with pride, or elated by wealth or rank, or beauty, who is young and foolish, and has a soul hot with insolence, and thinks that he has no need of any guide or ruler, but is able himself to be the guide of others, he, I say, is left deserted of God; and being thus deserted, he takes to him others who are like himself, and dances about, throwing all things into confusion, and many think that he is a great man, but in a short time he pays a penalty which justice cannot but approve, and is utterly destroyed, and his family and city with him. Wherefore, seeing that human things are thus ordered, what should a wise man do or think, or not do or think?

*Cle.* Every man ought to make up his mind that he will be one of the followers of God; there can be no doubt of that.

*Ath.* Then what life is agreeable to God, and becoming in His followers? One only, expressed once for all in the old saying that 'like agrees with like, with measure measure,' but things which have no measure agree neither with themselves nor with the things which have. Now God ought to be to us the measure of all things, and not man<sup>1</sup>, as men commonly say (Protagoras): the words are far more true of Him. And he who would be dear to God must, as far as is possible, be like Him and such as He is. Wherefore the temperate man is the friend of God, for he is like Him; and the intemperate man is unlike Him, and different from Him, and unjust. And the same applies to other things; and this is the conclusion, which is also the noblest and truest of all sayings,—that for the good man to offer sacrifice to the Gods, and hold converse with them by means of prayers and offerings and every kind of service, is the noblest and best of all things, and also the most conducive to a happy life, and very fit and meet. But with the bad man, the opposite of

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ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

path according to a divine law, and those who would be happy should hold fast to that law.

Seeing these things, what should we do or be.

God is the measure of all things; and they who are like Him conform to His measure. They are His friends and He accepts their offerings.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Crat. 386 A foll.; Theaet. 152 A.




*Laws IV.*

ATHENIAN.

this is true: for the bad man has an impure soul, whereas the good is pure; and from one who is polluted, neither a good man nor God can without impropriety receive gifts. Wherefore the unholy do only waste their much service upon the Gods, but when offered by any holy man, such service is most acceptable to them. This is the mark at which we ought to aim. But what weapons shall we use, and how shall we direct them? In the first place, we affirm that next after the Olympian Gods and the Gods of the State, honour should be given to the Gods below; they should receive everything in even numbers, and of the second choice, and ill omen, while the odd numbers, and the first choice, and the things of lucky omen, are given to the Gods above, by him who would rightly hit the mark of piety. Next to these Gods, a wise man will do service to the demons or spirits, and then to the heroes, and after them will follow the private and ancestral Gods, who are worshipped as the law prescribes in the places which are sacred to them. Next comes the honour of living parents, to whom, as is meet, we have to pay the first and greatest and oldest of all debts, considering that all which a man has belongs to those who gave him birth and brought him up, and that he must do all that he can to minister to them, first, in his property, secondly, in his person, and thirdly, in his soul, in return for the endless care and travail which they bestowed upon him of old, in the days of his infancy, and which he is now to pay back to them when they are old and in the extremity of their need. And all his life long he ought never to utter, or to have uttered, an unbecoming word to them; for of light and fleeting words the penalty is most severe; Nemesis, the messenger of justice, is appointed to watch over all such matters. When they are angry and want to satisfy their feelings in word or deed, he should give way to them; for a father who thinks that he has been wronged by his son may be reasonably expected to be very angry. At their death, the most moderate funeral is best, neither exceeding the customary expense, nor yet falling short of the honour which has been usually shown by the former generation to their parents. And let a man not forget to pay the yearly tribute of respect to the dead, honouring them chiefly by omitting nothing that

The first honour is to be given to the Gods of Olympus and of the state; the second to the Gods below; the third honour to demons, heroes, ancestral Gods; next comes the honour of parents, living or dead.





8 conduces to a perpetual remembrance of them, and giving a reasonable portion of his fortune to the dead. Doing this, and living after this manner, we shall receive our reward from the Gods and those who are above us [i. e. the demons]; and we shall spend our days for the most part in good hope. And how a man ought to order what relates to his descendants and his kindred and friends and fellow-citizens, and the rites of hospitality taught by Heaven, and the intercourse which arises out of all these duties, with a view to the embellishment and orderly regulation of his own life — these things, I say, the laws, as we proceed with them, will accomplish, partly persuading, and partly when natures do not yield to the persuasion of custom, chastising them by might and right, and will thus render our state, if the Gods co-operate with us, prosperous and happy. But of what has to be said, and must be said by the legislator who is of my way of thinking, and yet, if said in the form of law, would be out of place — of this I think that he may give a sample for the instruction of himself and of those for whom he is legislating; and then when, as far as he is able, he has gone through all the preliminaries, he may proceed to the work of legislation. Now, what will be the form of such prefaces? There may be a difficulty in including or describing them all under a single form, but I think that we may get some notion of them if we can guarantee one thing.

*Cle.* What is that?

*Ath.* I should wish the citizens to be as readily persuaded to virtue as possible; this will surely be the aim of the legislator in all his laws.

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* The proposal appears to me to be of some value; and I think that a person will listen with more gentleness and good-will to the precepts addressed to him by the legislator, when his soul is not altogether unprepared to receive them. Even a little done in the way of conciliation gains his ear, and is always worth having. For there is no great inclination or readiness on the part of mankind to be made as good, or as quickly good, as possible. The case of the many proves the wisdom of Hesiod, who says that the road to wickedness

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ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

Hospitality  
and the other  
duties of  
social life  
will also be  
regulated  
by law.

And the laws  
will have pre-  
faces, which  
may be  
summed up  
in a general  
preface, or  
preparation  
for virtue;

*Laws IV.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.for the way  
is difficult, as  
Hesiod says.

is smooth and can be travelled without perspiring, because it is so very short:—

‘But before virtue the immortal Gods have placed the sweat of labour, and long and steep is the way thither, and rugged at first; but when you have reached the top, although difficult before, it is then easy<sup>1</sup>.’

*Cle.* Yes; and he certainly speaks well.

*Ath.* Very true: and now let me tell you the effect which the preceding discourse has had upon me.

*Cle.* Proceed.

*Ath.* Suppose that we have a little conversation with the legislator, and say to him — ‘O, legislator, speak; if you know what we ought to say and do, you can surely tell.’

*Cle.* Of course he can.

*Ath.* ‘Did we not hear you just now saying<sup>2</sup>, that the legislator ought not to allow the poets to do what they liked? For that they would not know in which of their words they went against the laws, to the hurt of the state.’

*Cle.* That is true.

*Ath.* May we not fairly make answer to him on behalf of the poets?

*Cle.* What answer shall we make to him?

The poet may  
contradict  
himself as  
often as he  
pleases, but  
the legislator  
must be  
definite and  
consistent.

*Ath.* That the poet, according to the tradition which has ever prevailed among us, and is accepted of all men, when he sits down on the tripod of the muse, is not in his right mind; like a fountain, he allows to flow out freely whatever comes in, and his art being imitative, he is often compelled to represent men of opposite dispositions, and thus to contradict himself; neither can he tell whether there is more truth in one thing that he has said than in another. But this is not the case in a law; the legislator must give not two rules about the same thing, but one only. Take an example from what you have just been saying<sup>3</sup>. Of three kinds of funerals, there is one which is too extravagant, another is too niggardly, the third in a mean; and you choose and approve and order the last without qualification. But if I had an extremely rich wife, and she bade me bury her and describe her burial in a poem, I should praise the extravagant sort; and a poor miserly man, who had not much money to spend, would approve of the niggardly; and the man of

<sup>1</sup> Works and Days, 287 sqq.    <sup>2</sup> ii. 656 foll.    <sup>3</sup> Cp. *supra*, 717 E.

moderate means, who was himself moderate, would praise a moderate funeral. Now you in the capacity of legislator must not barely say 'a moderate funeral,' but you must define what moderation is, and how much; unless you are definite, you must not suppose that you are speaking a language that can become law.

*Cle.* Certainly not.

*Ath.* And is our legislator to have no preface to his laws, but to say at once Do this, avoid that — and then holding the penalty in terrorem, to go on to another law; offering never a word of advice or exhortation to those for whom he is legislating, after the manner of some doctors? For of doctors, as I may remind you, some have a gentler, others a ruder method of cure; and as children ask the doctor to be gentle with them, so we will ask the legislator to cure our disorders with the gentlest remedies. What I mean to say is, that besides doctors there are doctors' servants, who are also styled doctors.

*Cle.* Very true.

*Ath.* And whether they are slaves or freemen makes no difference; they acquire their knowledge of medicine by obeying and observing their masters; empirically and not according to the natural way of learning, as the manner of freemen is, who have learned scientifically themselves the art which they impart scientifically to their pupils. You are aware that there are these two classes of doctors?

*Cle.* To be sure.

*Ath.* And did you ever observe that there are two classes of patients in states, slaves and freemen; and the slave doctors run about and cure the slaves, or wait for them in the dispensaries — practitioners of this sort never talk to their patients individually, or let them talk about their own individual complaints? The slave-doctor prescribes what mere experience suggests, as if he had exact knowledge; and when he has given his orders, like a tyrant, he rushes off with equal assurance to some other servant who is ill; and so he relieves the master of the house of the care of his invalid slaves. But the other doctor, who is a freeman, attends and practises upon freemen; and he carries his enquiries far back, and goes into the nature of the disorder; he

*Laws IV.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

Ambiguous terms, such as 'moderate,' should be defined.

Illustration taken from doctors and their assistants.

The slave-doctor a very peremptory and tyrannical person; the doctor who attends freemen is courteous and persuasive.



*Laws IV.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

enters into discourse with the patient and with his friends, and is at once getting information from the sick man, and also instructing him as far as he is able, and he will not prescribe for him until he has first convinced him; at last, when he has brought the patient more and more under his persuasive influences and set him on the road to health, he attempts to effect a cure. Now which is the better way of proceeding in a physician and in a trainer? Is he the better who accomplishes his ends in a double way, or he who works in one way, and that the ruder and inferior?

*Cle.* I should say, Stranger, that the double way is far better.

*Ath.* Should you like to see an example of the double and single method in legislation?

*Cle.* Certainly I should.

*Ath.* What will be our first law? Will not the legislator, observing the order of nature, begin by making regulations for states about births? 72

*Cle.* He will.

*Ath.* In all states the birth of children goes back to the connexion of marriage?

*Cle.* Very true.

*Ath.* And, according to the true order, the laws relating to marriage should be those which are first determined in every state?

*Cle.* Quite so.

*Ath.* Then let me first give the law of marriage in a simple form; it may run as follows:—A man shall marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five, or, if he does not, he shall pay such and such a fine, or shall suffer the loss of such and such privileges. This would be the simple law about marriage. The double law would run thus:—A man shall marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five, considering that in a manner the human race naturally partakes of immortality, which every man is by nature inclined to desire to the utmost; for the desire of every man that he may become famous, and not lie in the grave without a name, is only the love of continuance. Now mankind are coeval with all time, and are ever following, and will ever follow, the course of time; and so they are immortal, because they leave children's children

The double method, which includes both persuasion and command, is the better both in medicine and in legislation.

Simple

and double law of marriage.



behind them, and partake of immortality in the unity of generation. And for a man voluntarily to deprive himself of this gift, as he deliberately does who will not have a wife or children, is impiety. He who obeys the law shall be free, and shall pay no fine; but he who is disobedient, and does not marry, when he has arrived at the age of thirty-five, shall pay a yearly fine of a certain amount, in order that he may not imagine his celibacy to bring ease and profit to him; and he shall not share in the honours which the young men in the state give to the aged. Comparing now the two forms of the law, you will be able to arrive at a judgment about any other laws — whether they should be double in length even when shortest, because they have to persuade as well as threaten, or whether they shall only threaten and be of half the length.

*Laws IV.*  
ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS,  
MEGILLUS.

*Meg.* The shorter form, Stranger, would be more in accordance with Lacedaemonian custom; although, for my own part, if any one were to ask me which I myself prefer in the state, I should certainly determine in favour of the longer; and I would have every law made after the same pattern, if I had to choose. But I think that Cleinias is the person to be consulted, for his is the state which is going to use these laws.

The shorter form would be preferred by the Lacedaemonians.

*Cle.* Thank you, Megillus.

*Ath.* Whether, in the abstract, words are to be many or few, is a very foolish question; the best form, and not the shortest, is to be approved; nor is length at all to be regarded. Of the two forms of law which have been recited, the one is not only twice as good in practical usefulness as the other, but the case is like that of the two kinds of doctors, which I was just now mentioning. And yet legislators never appear to have considered that they have two instruments which they might use in legislation — persuasion and force; for in dealing with the rude and uneducated multitude, they use the one only as far as they can; they do not mingle persuasion with coercion, but employ force pure and simple. Moreover, there is a third point, sweet friends, which ought to be, and never is, regarded in our existing laws.

Legislators should use persuasion as well as force;

*Cle.* What is it?

*Laws IV.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

and the law  
should contain  
a preamble or  
exhortation as  
well as a  
command.

The preamble  
is intended to  
create good-  
will towards  
the law, and  
to make it  
more ac-  
ceptable.

*Ath.* A point arising out of our previous discussion, which comes into my mind in some mysterious way. All this time, from early dawn until noon, have we been talking about laws in this charming retreat: now we are going to promulgate our laws, and what has preceded was only the prelude of them. Why do I mention this? For this reason:—Because all discourses and vocal exercises have preludes and overtures, which are a sort of artistic beginnings intended to help the strain which is to be performed; lyric measures and music of every other kind have preludes framed with wonderful care. But of the truer and higher strain of law and politics, no one has ever yet uttered any prelude, or composed or published any, as though there was no such thing in nature. Whereas our present discussion seems to me to imply that there is;—these double laws, of which we were speaking, are not exactly double, but they are in two parts, the law and the prelude of the law. The arbitrary command, which was compared to the commands of doctors, whom we described as of the meaner sort, was the law pure and simple; and that which preceded, and was described by our friend here as being hortatory only, was, although in fact, an exhortation, likewise analogous to the preamble of a discourse<sup>1</sup>. For I imagine that all this language of conciliation, which the legislator has been uttering in the preface of the law, was intended to create good-will in the person whom he addressed, in order that, by reason of this good-will, he might more intelligently receive his command, that is to say, the law. And therefore, in my way of speaking, this is more rightly described as the preamble than as the matter of the law. And I must further proceed to observe, that to all his laws, and to each separately, the legislator should prefix a preamble; he should remember how great will be the difference between them, according as they have, or have not, such preambles, as in the case already given.

*Cle.* The lawgiver, if he asks my opinion, will certainly legislate in the form which you advise.

*Ath.* I think that you are quite right, Cleinias, in affirming that all laws have preambles, and that throughout the whole of this work of legislation every single law should

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, 718.

have a suitable preamble at the beginning; for that which is to follow is most important, and it makes all the difference whether we clearly remember the preambles or not. Yet we should be wrong in requiring that all laws, small and great alike, should have preambles of the same kind, any more than all songs or speeches; although they may be natural to all, they are not always necessary, and whether they are to be employed or not has in each case to be left to the judgment of the speaker or the musician, or, in the present instance, of the lawgiver.

*Cle.* That I think is most true. And now, Stranger, without delay, let us return to the argument, and, as people say in play, make a second and better beginning, if you please, with the principles which we have been laying down, which we never thought of regarding as a preamble before, but of which we may now make a preamble, and not merely consider them to be chance topics of discourse. Let us acknowledge, then, that we have a preamble. About the honour of the Gods and the respect of parents, enough has been already said; and we may proceed to the topics which follow next in order, until the preamble is deemed by you to be complete; and after that you shall go through the laws themselves.

*Ath.* I understand you to mean that we have made a sufficient preamble about Gods and demigods, and about parents living or dead; and now you would have us bring the rest of the subject into the light of day?

*Cle.* Exactly.

*Ath.* After this, as is meet and for the interest of us all, I the speaker, and you the listeners, will try to estimate all that relates to the souls and bodies and properties of the citizens, as regards both their occupations and amusements, and thus arrive, as far as in us lies, at the nature of education. These then are the topics which follow next in order.

*Cle.* Very good.

*Laws IV.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

Preambles are natural, but not always necessary.

The principles already laid down about the honour of the Gods and the respect of parents are a part of our preamble.



## BOOK V

*Laws V.*

ATHENIAN.

Next to the  
Gods, a man  
should honour  
his own soul.

False ways of  
honouring  
the soul:—

(1) by praise;

(2) by excuse;

*Athenian Stranger.* LISTEN, all ye who have just now heard the laws about Gods, and about our dear forefathers:— Of all the things which a man has, next to the Gods, his soul is the most divine and most truly his own. Now in every man there are two parts: the better and superior, which rules, and the worse and inferior, which serves; and the ruling part of him is always to be preferred to the subject. Wherefore I am right in bidding every one next to the Gods, who are our masters, and those who in order follow them [i. e. the demons], to honour his own soul, which every one seems to honour, but no one honours as he ought; for honour is a divine good, and no evil thing is honourable; and he who thinks that he can honour the soul by word or gift, or any sort of compliance, without making her in any way better, seems to honour her, but honours her not at all. For example, every man, from his very boyhood fancies that he is able to know everything, and thinks that he honours his soul by praising her, and he is very ready to let her do whatever she may like. But I mean to say that in acting thus he injures his soul, and is far from honouring her; whereas, in our opinion, he ought to honour her as second only to the Gods. Again, when a man thinks that others are to be blamed, and not himself, for the errors which he has committed from time to time, and the many and great evils which befell him in consequence, and is always fancying himself to be exempt and innocent, he is under the idea that he is honouring his soul; whereas the very reverse is the fact, for he is really injuring her. And when, di



regarding the word and approval of the legislator, he indulges in pleasure, then again he is far from honouring her; he only dishonours her, and fills her full of evil and remorse; or when he does not endure to the end the labours and fears and sorrows and pains which the legislator approves, but gives way before them, then, by yielding, he does not honour the soul, but by all such conduct he makes her to be dishonourable; nor when he thinks that life at any price is a good, does he honour her, but yet once more he dishonours her; for the soul having a notion that the world below is all evil, he yields to her, and does not resist and teach or convince her that, for aught she knows, the world of the Gods below, instead of being evil, may be the greatest of all goods. Again, when any one prefers beauty to virtue, what is this but the real and utter dishonour of the soul? For such a preference implies that the body is more honourable than the soul; and this is false, for there is nothing of earthly birth which is more honourable than the heavenly, and he who thinks otherwise of the soul has no idea how greatly he undervalues this wonderful possession; nor, again, when a person is willing, or not unwilling, to acquire dishonest gains, does he then honour his soul with gifts—far otherwise; he sells her glory and honour for a small piece of gold; but all the gold which is under or upon the earth is not enough to give in exchange for virtue. In a word, I may say that he who does not estimate the base and evil, the good and noble, according to the standard of the legislator, and abstain in every possible way from the one and practise the other to the utmost of his power, does not know that in all these respects he is most foully and disgracefully abusing his soul, which is the divinest part of man; for no one, as I may say, ever considers that which is declared to be the greatest penalty of evil-doing—namely, to grow into the likeness of bad men, and growing like them to fly from the conversation of the good, and be cut off from them, and leave to and follow after the company of the bad. And he who is joined to them must do and suffer what such men by nature do and say to one another,—a suffering which is not justice but retribution; for justice and the just are noble, whereas retribution is the suffering which waits upon in-

*Law V.*

ATHENIAN.

(3) by self-indulgence;

(4) by want of endurance;

(5) by excessive love of life;

(6) by preferring beauty to virtue;

(7) by making dishonest gains.

The penalty of yielding to evil is to grow into its likeness.

*Larus V.*

ATHENIAN.

justice; and whether a man escape or endure this, he is miserable,—in the former case, because he is not cured; while in the latter, he perishes in order that the rest of mankind may be saved.

The honour of the body comes next after the honour of the soul; the mean, not the excess, of bodily excellence is best.

Speaking generally, our glory is to follow the better and improve the inferior, which is susceptible of improvement, as far as this is possible. And of all human possessions, the soul is by nature most inclined to avoid the evil, and track out and find the chief good; which when a man has found, he should take up his abode with it during the remainder of his life. Wherefore the soul also is second [or next to God] in honour; and third, as every one will perceive, comes the honour of the body in natural order. Having determined this, we have next to consider that there is a natural honour of the body, and that of honours some are true and some are counterfeit. To decide which is which is the business of the legislator; and he, I suspect, would intimate that they are as follows:—Honour is not to be given to the fair body, or to the strong or the swift or the tall, or to the healthy body (although many may think otherwise), any more than to their opposites; but the mean states of all these habits are by far the safest and most moderate; for the one extreme makes the soul braggart and insolent, and the other, illiberal and base; and money, and property, and distinction all go to the same tune. The excess of any of these things is apt to be a source of hatreds and divisions among states and individuals; and the defect of them is commonly a cause of slavery. And, therefore, I would not have any one fond of heaping up riches for the sake of his children, in order that he may leave them as rich as possible. For the possession of great wealth is of no use, either to them or to the state. The condition of youth which is free from flattery, and at the same time not in need of the necessities of life, is the best and most harmonious of all, being in accord and agreement with our nature, and making life to be most entirely free from sorrow. Let parents, then, bequeath to their children not a heap of riches, but the spirit of reverence. We, indeed fancy that they will inherit reverence from us, if we rebuke them when they show a want of reverence. But this quality is not really imparted to them by the present style of admo

Parents should bequeath to their children, not money, but the spirit of reverence.

nition, which only tells them that the young ought always to be reverential. A sensible legislator will rather exhort the elders to reverence the younger, and above all to take heed that no young man sees or hears one of themselves doing or saying anything disgraceful; for where old men have no shame, there young men will most certainly be devoid of reverence. The best way of training the young is to train yourself at the same time; not to admonish them, but to be always carrying out your own admonitions in practice. He who honours his kindred, and reveres those who share in the same Gods and are of the same blood and family, may fairly expect that the Gods who preside over generation will be propitious to him, and will quicken his seed. And he who deems the services which his friends and acquaintances do for him, greater and more important than they themselves deem them, and his own favours to them less than theirs to him, will have their good-will in the intercourse of life. And surely in his relations to the state and his fellow-citizens, he is by far the best, who rather than the Olympic or any other victory of peace or war, desires to win the palm of obedience to the laws of his country, and who, of all mankind, is the person reputed to have obeyed them best through life. In his relations to strangers, a man should consider that a contract is a most holy thing, and that all concerns and wrongs of strangers are more directly dependent on the protection of God, than wrongs done to citizens; for the stranger, having no kindred and friends, is more to be pitied by Gods and men. Wherefore, also, he who is most able to avenge him is most zealous in his cause; and he who is most able is the genius and the god of the stranger, who follow in the train of Zeus, the god of strangers. And for this reason, he who has a spark of caution in him, will do his best to pass through life without sinning against the stranger. And of offences committed, whether against strangers or fellow-countrymen, that against suppliant is the greatest. For the God who witnessed to the agreement made with the suppliant, becomes in a special manner the guardian of the sufferer; and he will certainly not suffer unavenged.

Thus we have fairly described the manner in which a man is to act about his parents, and himself, and his own affairs;

*Laws V.*

ATHENIAN.

The younger should reverence the elder; the elder the younger.

The best way of training the young is to train yourself.

Honour kindred, that you may have offspring.

Esteem others more than yourself.

Obey the laws.

Respect strangers and suppliants.



*Laws V.*

ATHENIAN.

and in relation to the state, and his friends, and kindred, both in what concerns his own countrymen, and in what concerns the stranger. We will now consider what manner of man he must be who would best pass through life in respect of those other things which are not matters of law, but of praise and blame only; in which praise and blame educate a man, and make him more tractable and amenable to the laws which are about to be imposed.

Truth the  
beginning  
of every good.

Truth is the beginning of every good thing, both to Gods and men; and he who would be blessed and happy, should be from the first a partaker of the truth, that he may live a true man as long as possible, for then he can be trusted; but he is not to be trusted who loves voluntary falsehood, and he who loves involuntary falsehood is a fool. Neither condition is enviable, for the untrustworthy and ignorant has no friend, and as time advances he becomes known, and lays up in store for himself isolation in crabbed age when life is on the wane: so that, whether his children or friends are alive or not, he is equally solitary.—Worthy of honour is he who does no injustice, and of more than twofold honour, if he not only does no injustice himself, but hinders others from doing any; the first may count as one man, the second is worth many men, because he informs the rulers of the injustice of others. And yet more highly to be esteemed is he who co-operates with the rulers in correcting the citizens as far as he can—he shall be proclaimed the great and perfect citizen, and bear away the palm of virtue. The same praise may be given about temperance and wisdom, and all other goods which may be imparted to others, as well as acquired by a man for himself; he who imparts them shall be honoured as the man of men, and he who is willing, yet is not able, may be allowed the second place; but he who is jealous and will not, if he can help, allow others to partake in a friendly way of any good, is deserving of blame: the good, however, which he has, is not to be undervalued by us because it is possessed by him, but must be acquired by us also to the utmost of our power. Let every man, then, freely strive for the prize of virtue, and let there be no envy. For the unenvious nature increases the greatness of states—he himself contends in the race, blasting the fair fame of no man; but

The misery  
of being ig-  
norant and  
untrust-  
worthy.

Justice is to  
be honoured  
and vindi-  
cated.

To impart  
the good  
more than  
only to  
possess it.

The con-  
trast of the  
envious and  
unenvious  
natures.



the envious, who thinks that he ought to get the better by defaming others, is less energetic himself in the pursuit of true virtue, and reduces his rivals to despair by his unjust slanders of them. And so he makes the whole city to enter the arena untrained in the practice of virtue, and diminishes her glory as far as in him lies. Now every man should be valiant, but he should also be gentle. From the cruel, or hardly curable, or altogether incurable acts of injustice done to him by others, a man can only escape by fighting and defending himself and conquering, and by never ceasing to punish them; and no man who is not of a noble spirit is able to accomplish this. As to the actions of those who do evil, but whose evil is curable, in the first place, let us remember that the unjust man is not unjust of his own free will. For no man of his own free will would choose to possess the greatest of evils, and least of all in the most honourable part of himself. And the soul, as we said, is of a truth deemed by all men the most honourable. In the soul, then, which is the most honourable part of him, no one, if he could help, would admit, or allow to continue the greatest of evils<sup>1</sup>. The unrighteous and vicious are always to be pitied in any case; and one can afford to forgive as well as pity him who is curable, and refrain and calm one's anger, not getting into a passion, like a woman, and nursing ill-feeling. But upon him who is incapable of reformation and wholly evil, the vials of our wrath should be poured out; wherefore I say that good men ought, when occasion demands, to be both gentle and passionate.

*Laws V.*

ATHENIAN.

The incurable must be punished.

But the unjust are always to be pitied, and when curable may be forgiven.

Of all evils the greatest is one which in the souls of most men is innate, and which a man is always excusing in himself and never correcting; I mean, what is expressed in the saying that 'Every man by nature is and ought to be his own friend.' Whereas the excessive love of self is in reality the source to each man of all offences; for the lover is blinded about the beloved, so that he judges wrongly of the just, the good, and the honourable, and thinks that he ought always to prefer himself to the truth. But he who would be a great man ought to regard, not himself or his interests, but what is just, whether the just act be his own or that of another.

Selfishness the greatest of evils.

A great man should be above his own interests.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. ii. 382.

*Laws V.*

ATHENIAN.

Every man  
should be  
willing to  
follow another  
who is wiser  
or better  
than himself.

The neces-  
sity of self-  
control.

The consol-  
ation of hope.

There must  
be a true  
sense or taste  
of pleasure  
and pain.

Through a similar error men are induced to fancy that their own ignorance is wisdom, and thus we who may be truly said to know nothing, think that we know all things; and because we will not let others act for us in what we do not know, we are compelled to act amiss ourselves. Wherefore let every man avoid excess of self-love, and condescend to follow a better man than himself, not allowing any false shame to stand in the way. There are also minor precepts which are often repeated, and are quite as useful; a man should recollect them and remind himself of them. For when a stream is flowing out, there should be water flowing in too; and recollection flows in while wisdom is departing. Therefore I say that a man should refrain from excess either of laughter or tears, and should exhort his neighbour to do the same; he should veil his immoderate sorrow or joy, and seek to behave with propriety, whether the genius of his good fortune remains with him, or whether at the crisis of his fate, when he seems to be mounting high and steep places, the Gods oppose him in some of his enterprises. Still he may ever hope, in the case of good men, that whatever afflictions are to befall them in the future God will lessen, and that present evils He will change for the better; and as to the goods which are the opposite of these evils, he will not doubt that they will be added to them, and that they will be fortunate. Such should be men's hopes, and such should be the exhortations with which they admonish one another, never losing an opportunity, but on every occasion distinctly reminding themselves and others of all these things, both in jest and earnest.

Enough has now been said of divine matters, both as touching the practices which men ought to follow, and as to the sort of persons who they ought severally to be. But of human things we have not as yet spoken, and we must; for to men we are discoursing and not to Gods. Pleasures and pains and desires are a part of human nature, and on them every mortal being must of necessity hang and depend with the most eager interest. And therefore we must praise the noblest life, not only as the fairest in appearance, but as being one which, if a man will only taste, and not, while still in his youth, desert for another, he will find to

33 surpass also in the very thing which we all of us desire,—I mean in having a greater amount of pleasure and less of pain during the whole of life. And this will be plain, if a man has a true taste of them, as will be quickly and clearly seen. But what is a true taste? That we have to learn from the argument,—the point being what is according to nature, and what is not according to nature. One life must be compared with another, the more pleasurable with the more painful, after this manner:—We desire to have pleasure, but we neither desire nor choose pain; and the neutral state we are ready to take in exchange, not for pleasure but for pain; and we also wish for less pain and greater pleasure, but less pleasure and greater pain we do not wish for; and an equal balance of either we cannot venture to assert that we should desire. And all these differ or do not differ severally in number and magnitude and intensity and equality, and in the opposites of these when regarded as objects of choice, in relation to desire. And such being the necessary order of things, we wish for that life in which there are many great and intense elements of pleasure and pain, and in which the pleasures are in excess, and do not wish for that in which the opposites exceed; nor, again, do we wish for that in which the elements of either are small and few and feeble, and the pains exceed. And when, as I said before, there is a balance of pleasure and pain in life, this is to be regarded by us as the balanced life; while other lives are preferred by us because they exceed in what we like, or are rejected by us because they exceed in what we dislike. All the lives of men may be regarded by us as bound up in these, and we must also consider what sort of lives we by nature desire. And if we wish for any others, I say that we desire them only through some ignorance and inexperience of the lives which actually exist.

*Laws V.*

ATHENIAN.

Men choose the life which has great pleasures and pains, and in which the pleasure exceeds the pain.

Now, what lives are they, and how many in which, having searched out and beheld the objects of will and desire and their opposites, and making of them a law, choosing, I say, the dear and the pleasant and the best and noblest, a man may live in the happiest way possible? Let us say that the temperate life is one kind of life, and the rational another, and the courageous another, and the healthful another; and

The most pleasant and the noblest lives are  
(1) the temperate;  
(2) the rational;



*Lævus V.*

ATHENIAN.

(3) the  
courageous;  
(4) the  
healthful;

The pleasures  
of the tem-  
perate, wise,  
courageous  
and healthy  
life are greater  
than those of  
the intem-  
perate, foolish,  
cowardly and  
diseased life.  
How then  
can a man  
voluntarily  
choose the  
latter?

to these four let us oppose four other lives,—the foolish, the cowardly, the intemperate, the diseased. He who knows the temperate life will describe it as in all things gentle, having gentle pains and gentle pleasures, and placid desires and loves not insane; whereas the intemperate life is impetuous in all things, and has violent pains and pleasures, and vehement and stinging desires, and loves utterly insane; and in the temperate life the pleasures exceed the pains, but in the intemperate life the pains exceed the pleasures in greatness and number and frequency. Hence one of the two lives is naturally and necessarily more pleasant and the other more painful, and he who would live pleasantly cannot possibly choose to live intemperately. And if this is true, the inference clearly is that no man is voluntarily intemperate; but that the whole multitude of men lack temperance in their lives, either from ignorance, or from want of self-control, or both. And the same holds of the diseased and healthy life; they both have pleasures and pains, but in health the pleasure exceeds the pain, and in sickness the pain exceeds the pleasure. Now our intention in choosing the lives is not that the painful should exceed, but the life in which pain is exceeded by pleasure we have determined to be the more pleasant life. And we should say that the temperate life has the elements both of pleasure and pain fewer and smaller and less frequent than the intemperate, and the wise life than the foolish life, and the life of courage than the life of cowardice; one of each pair exceeding in pleasure and the other in pain, the courageous surpassing the cowardly, and the wise exceeding the foolish. And so the one class of lives exceeds the other class in pleasure; the temperate and courageous and wise and healthy exceed the cowardly and foolish and intemperate and diseased lives; and generally speaking, that which has any virtue, whether of body or soul, is pleasanter than the vicious life, and far superior in beauty and rectitude and excellence and reputation, and causes him who lives accordingly to be infinitely happier than the opposite.

Enough of the preamble; and now the laws should follow; or, to speak more correctly, an outline of them. As, then, in the case of a web or any other tissue, the warp and the



woof cannot be made of the same materials<sup>1</sup>, but the warp is necessarily superior as being stronger, and having a certain character of firmness, whereas the woof is softer and has a proper degree of elasticity;—in a similar manner those who are to hold great offices in states, should be distinguished truly in each case from those who have been but slenderly proven by education. Let us suppose that there are two parts in the constitution of a state—one the creation of offices, the other the laws which are assigned to them to administer.

*Laws V.*

ATHENIAN.

As in a web the warp is firmer than the woof, so in the state the magistrates should be stronger than the people.

But, before all this, comes the following consideration:—The shepherd or herdsman, or breeder of horses or the like, when he has received his animals will not begin to train them until he has first purified them in a manner which befits a community of animals; he will divide the healthy and unhealthy, and the good breed and the bad breed, and will send away the unhealthy and badly bred to other herds, and tend the rest, reflecting that his labours will be vain and have no effect, either on the souls or bodies of those whom nature and ill nurture have corrupted, and that they will involve in destruction the pure and healthy nature and being of every other animal, if he should neglect to purify them. Now the case of other animals is not so important—they are only worth introducing for the sake of illustration; but what relates to man is of the highest importance; and the legislator should make enquiries, and indicate what is proper for each one in the way of purification and of any other procedure. Take, for example, the purification of a city—there are many kinds of purification, some easier and others more difficult; and some of them, and the best and most difficult of them, the legislator, if he be also a despot, may be able to effect; but the legislator, who, not being a despot, sets up a new government and laws, even if he attempt the mildest of purgations, may think himself happy if he can complete his work. The best kind of purification is painful, like similar cures in medicine, involving righteous punishment and inflicting death or exile in the last resort. For in this way we commonly dispose of great sinners who are

There are incurable and curable diseases in a state.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *Statesman* 309 A, B.

*Laws V.*

ATHENIAN.

The first are  
purged away  
by exile or  
death; the  
second by  
colonization.

But in our  
state, no  
purgation will  
be needed;  
for we shall  
only admit  
good citizens;

nor shall we  
require a  
division of  
lands or the  
abolition of  
debts.

incurable, and are the greatest injury of the whole state. But the milder form of purification is as follows:—when men who have nothing, and are in want of food, show a disposition to follow their leaders in an attack on the property of the rich—these, who are the natural plague of the state, are sent away by the legislator in a friendly spirit as far as he is able; and this dismissal of them is euphemistically termed a colony. And every legislator should contrive to do this at once. Our present case, however, is peculiar. For there is no need to devise any colony or purifying separation under the circumstances in which we are placed. But as, when many streams flow together from many sources, whether springs or mountain torrents, into a single lake, we ought to attend and take care that the confluent waters should be perfectly clear, and in order to effect this, should pump and draw off and divert impurities, so in every political arrangement there may be trouble and danger. But, seeing that we are now only discoursing and not acting, let our selection be supposed to be completed, and the desired purity attained. Touching evil men, who want to join and be citizens of our state, after we have tested them by every sort of persuasion and for a sufficient time, we will prevent them from coming; but the good we will to the utmost of our ability receive as friends with open arms.

Another piece of good fortune must not be forgotten, which, as we were saying<sup>1</sup>, the Heraclid colony had, and which is also ours,—that we have escaped division of land and the abolition of debts; for these are always a source of dangerous contention, and a city which is driven by necessity to legislate upon such matters can neither allow the old ways to continue, nor yet venture to alter them. We must have recourse to prayers, so to speak, and hope that a slight change may be cautiously effected in a length of time. And such a change can be accomplished<sup>2</sup> by those who have abundance of land, and having also many debtors, are willing, in a kindly spirit, to share with those who are in want, sometimes remitting and sometimes giving, holding fast in a path of moderation, and deeming poverty to be

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, iii. 684 D, E.

<sup>2</sup> Reading *ὑπάρχει*.

the increase of a man's desires and not the diminution of his property. For this is the great beginning of salvation to a state, and upon this lasting basis may be erected afterwards whatever political order is suitable under the circumstances; but if the change be based upon an unsound principle, the future administration of the country will be full of difficulties. That is a danger which, as I am saying, is escaped by us, and yet we had better say how, if we had not escaped, we might have escaped; and we may venture now to assert that no other way of escape, whether narrow or broad, can be devised but freedom from avarice and a sense of justice — upon this rock our city shall be built; for there ought to be no disputes among citizens about property. If there are quarrels of long standing among them, no legislator of any degree of sense will proceed a step in the arrangement of the state until they are settled. But that they to whom God has given, as He has to us, to be the founders of a new state as yet free from enmity — that they should create themselves enmities by their mode of distributing lands and houses, would be superhuman folly and wickedness.

How then can we rightly order the distribution of the land? In the first place, the number of the citizens has to be determined, and also the number and size of the divisions into which they will have to be formed; and the land and the houses will then have to be apportioned by us as fairly as we can. The number of citizens can only be estimated satisfactorily in relation to the territory and the neighbouring states. The territory must be sufficient to maintain a certain number of inhabitants in a moderate way of life — more than this is not required; and the number of citizens should be sufficient to defend themselves against the injustice of their neighbours, and also to give them the power of rendering efficient aid to their neighbours when they are wronged. This matter we will hereafter determine, in fact as well as in theory, when we have actually seen the country, and who our neighbours are. But for the present let the argument pass on to legislation, that we may complete the form and outline of our state. The number of our citizens shall be 5040 — this will be a convenient number; and these shall be owners of the land and protectors of the allotment. The houses and the land will

*Laws V.*

ATHENIAN.

That is a danger which our colony has escaped; and which in another can only be escaped by inspiring contentment among the citizens.

The citizens must be sufficiently numerous to protect themselves, and to assist their neighbours in the hour of need.



*Lætus V.*

ATHENIAN.

5040 is a very good number because it has so many divisions.

Ancient religious traditions and customs should be retained.

The country to be divided into districts, and to each of these is to be assigned a God or hero.

be divided in the same way, so that every man may correspond to a lot. Let the whole number be first divided into two parts, and then into three; and the number is further capable of being divided into four or five parts, or any number of parts up to ten. Every legislator ought to know so much arithmetic as to be able to tell what number is most likely to be useful to all cities; and we are going to take that number which contains the greatest and most regular and unbroken series of divisions. The whole of number has every possible division, and the number 5040 can be divided by exactly fifty-nine divisors, and ten of these proceed without interval from one to ten: this will furnish numbers for war and peace, and for all contracts and dealings, including taxes and divisions of the land. These properties of number should be ascertained at leisure by those who are bound by law to know them; for they are true, and should be proclaimed at the foundation of the city, with a view to use. Whether the legislator is establishing a new state or restoring an old and decayed one, in respect of Gods and temples,—the temples which are to be built in each city, and the Gods or demigods after whom they are to be called,—if he be a man of sense, he will make no change in anything which the oracle of Delphi, or Dodona, or the God Ammon, or any ancient tradition has sanctioned in whatever manner, whether by apparitions or reputed inspiration of Heaven, in obedience to which mankind have established sacrifices in connexion with mystic rites, either originating on the spot, or derived from Tyrrhenia or Cyprus or some other place, and on the strength of which traditions they have consecrated oracles and images, and altars and temples, and portioned out a sacred domain for each of them. The least part of all these ought not to be disturbed by the legislator; but he should assign to the several districts some God, or demigod, or hero, and, in the distribution of the soil, should give to these first their chosen domain and all things fitting, that the inhabitants of the several districts may meet at fixed times, and that they may readily supply their various wants, and welcome each other in a kindly spirit at sacrifices, and become friends and acquaintances; for there is no greater good in a state than that the citizens should be known to one another.



When not light but darkness and ignorance of each other's characters prevails among them, no one will receive the honour of which he is deserving, or the power or the justice to which he is fairly entitled: wherefore, in every state, above all things, every man should take heed that he have no deceit in him, but that he be always true and simple; and that no deceitful person take any advantage of him.

*Laws V.*

ATHENIAN.

The citizens should know and trust one another.

The next move in our pastime of legislation, like the withdrawal of the stone from the holy line in the game of draughts, being an unusual one, will probably excite wonder when mentioned for the first time. And yet, if a man will only reflect and weigh the matter with care, he will see that our city is ordered in a manner which, if not the best, is the second best. Perhaps also some one may not approve this form, because he thinks that such a constitution is ill adapted to a legislator who has not despotic power. The truth is, that there are three forms of government, the best, the second and the third best, which we may just mention, and then leave the selection to the ruler of the settlement. Following this method in the present instance, let us speak of the states which are respectively first, second, and third in excellence, and then we will leave the choice to Cleinias now, or to any one else who may hereafter have to make a similar choice among constitutions, and may desire to give to his state some feature which is congenial to him and which he approves in his own country.

The form of constitution not the best, but the second best.

The first and highest form of the state and of the government and of the law is that in which there prevails most widely the ancient saying, that 'Friends have all things in common.' Whether there is anywhere now, or will ever be, this communion of women and children and of property, in which the private and individual is altogether banished from life, and things which are by nature private, such as eyes and ears and hands, have become common, and in some way see and hear and act in common, and all men express praise and blame and feel joy and sorrow on the same occasions, and whatever laws there are unite the city to the utmost<sup>1</sup>,—whether all this is possible or not, I say that no man, acting upon any other principle, will ever constitute a state which

The best is that in which there is absolute community.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. v. 462 foll.

*Laws V.*

ATHENIAN.

This is our pattern.

The establishment of the second-best state.

Distribution of land and houses.

The heir of the lot.

What is to be done with the other children?

will be truer or better or more exalted in virtue. Whether such a state is governed by Gods or sons of Gods, one, or more than one, happy are the men who, living after this manner, dwell there; and therefore to this we are to look for the pattern of the state, and to cling to this, and to seek with all our might for one which is like this. The state which we have now in hand, when created, will be nearest to immortality and the only one which takes the second place; and after that, by the grace of God, we will complete the third one. And we will begin by speaking of the nature and origin of the second.

Let the citizens at once distribute their land and houses, and not till the land in common, since a community of goods goes beyond their proposed origin, and nurture, and education. But in making the distribution, let the several possessors feel that their particular lots also belong to the whole city; and seeing that the earth is their parent, let them tend her more carefully than children do their mother. For she is a goddess and their queen, and they are her mortal subjects. Such also are the feelings which they ought to entertain to the Gods and demigods of the country. And in order that the distribution may always remain, they ought to consider further that the present number of families should be always retained, and neither increased nor diminished. This may be secured for the whole city in the following manner:—Let the possessor of a lot leave the one of his children who is his best beloved, and one only, to be the heir of his dwelling, and his successor in the duty of ministering to the Gods, the state and the family, as well the living members of it as those who are departed when he comes into the inheritance; but of his other children, if he have more than one, he shall give the females in marriage according to the law to be hereafter enacted<sup>1</sup>, and the males he shall distribute as sons to those citizens who have no children, and are disposed to receive them; or if there should be none such, and particular individuals have too many children, male or female, or too few, should barrenness be prevalent—in all these cases let the highest and most honourable magistracy created by us judge and determine what is to be done

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *infra*, xi. 923–926.

*Laws V.*

ATHENIAN.

Regulation  
of redundant  
or deficient  
population.

with the redundant or deficient, and devise a means that the number of 5040 houses shall always remain the same. There are many ways of regulating numbers; for they in whom generation is affluent may be made to refrain<sup>1</sup>, and, on the other hand, special care may be taken to increase the number of births by rewards and stigmas, or we may meet the evil by the elder men giving advice and administering rebuke to the younger—in this way the object may be attained. And if after all there be very great difficulty about the equal preservation of the 5040 houses, and there be an excess of citizens, owing to the too great love of those who live together, and we are at our wits' end, there is still the old device often mentioned by us of sending out a colony, which will part friends with us, and be composed of suitable persons. If, on the other hand, there come a wave bearing a deluge of disease, or a plague of war, and the inhabitants become much fewer than the appointed number by reason of bereavement, we ought not to introduce citizens of spurious birth and education, if this can be avoided; but even God is said not to be able to fight against necessity.

Honour  
equality and  
observe the  
number 5040.

Wherefore let us suppose this 'high argument' of ours to address us in the following terms:—Best of men, cease not to honour according to nature similarity and equality and sameness and agreement, as regards number and every good and noble quality. And, above all, observe the aforesaid number 5040 throughout life; in the second place, do not disparage the small and modest proportions of the inheritances which you received in the distribution, by buying and selling them to one another. For then neither will the God who gave you the lot be your friend, nor will the legislator; and indeed the law declares to the disobedient that these are the terms upon which he may or may not take the lot. In the first place, the earth as he is informed is sacred to the Gods; and in the next place, priests and priestesses will offer up prayers over a first, and second, and even a third sacrifice, that he who buys or sells the houses or lands which he has received, may suffer the punishment which he deserves; and these their prayers they shall write down in the temples, on tablets of cypress-wood, for the instruction of

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Arist. Pol. vii. 16, § 15.



*Law V.*

ATHENIAN.

posterity. Moreover they will set a watch over all these things, that they may be observed;—the magistracy which has the sharpest eye shall keep watch that any infringement of these commands may be discovered and punished as offences both against the law and the God. How great is the benefit of such an ordinance to all those cities, which obey and are administered accordingly, no bad man can ever know, as the old proverb says; but only a man of experience and good habits. For in such an order of things there will not be much opportunity for making money; no man either ought, or indeed will be allowed, to exercise any ignoble occupation, from the vulgarity of which the spirit of a freeman shrinks; nor should he deign to acquire riches by any such means.

No man  
should possess  
gold and  
silver except  
in money.

Foreign and  
domestic  
currency.

Further, the law enjoins that no private man shall be allowed to possess gold and silver, but only coin for daily use, which is almost necessary in dealing with artisans, and for payment of hirelings, whether slaves or immigrants, by all those persons who require the use of them. Wherefore our citizens, as we say, should have a coin passing current among themselves, but not accepted among the rest of mankind; with a view, however, to expeditions and journeys to other lands,—for embassies, or for any other occasion which may arise of sending out a herald, the state must also possess a common Hellenic currency. If a private person is ever obliged to go abroad, let him have the consent of the magistrates and go; and if when he returns he has any foreign money remaining, let him give the surplus back to the treasury, and receive a corresponding sum in the local currency. And if he is discovered to appropriate it, let it be confiscated, and let him who knows and does not inform be subject to curse and dishonour equally with him who brought the money, and also to a fine not less in amount than the foreign money which has been brought back. In marrying and giving in marriage, no one shall give or receive any dowry at all; and no one shall deposit money with another whom he does not trust as a friend, nor shall he lend money upon interest; and the borrower should be under no obligation to repay either capital or interest. That these principles are best, any one may see who compares them with the first

No dowries,

or lending  
money upon  
interest.



principle and intention of a state. The intention, as we affirm, of a reasonable statesman, is not what the many declare to be the object of a good legislator, namely, that the state for the true interests of which he is advising should be as great and as rich as possible, and should possess gold and silver, and have the greatest empire by sea and land;—this they imagine to be the real object of legislation, at the same time adding, inconsistently, that the true legislator desires to have the city the best and happiest possible. But they do not see that some of these things are possible, and some of them are impossible; and he who orders the state will desire what is possible, and will not indulge in vain wishes or attempts to accomplish that which is impossible. The citizen must indeed be happy and good, and the legislator will seek to make him so; but very rich and very good at the same time he cannot be, not, at least, in the sense in which the many speak of riches. For they mean by 'the rich' the few who have the most valuable possessions, although the owner of them may quite well be a rogue. And if this is true, I can never assent to the doctrine that the rich man will be happy—he must be good as well as rich. And good in a high degree, and rich in a high degree at the same time, he cannot be. Some one will ask, why not? And we shall answer,—Because acquisitions which come from sources which are just and unjust indifferently, are more than double those which come from just sources only; and the sums which are expended neither honourably nor disgracefully, are only half as great as those which are expended honourably and on honourable purposes. Thus, if the one acquires double and spends half, the other who is in the opposite case and is a good man cannot possibly be wealthier than he. The first—I am speaking of the saver and not of the spender—is not always bad; he may indeed in some cases be utterly bad, but, as I was saying, a good man he never is. For he who receives money unjustly as well as justly, and spends neither justly nor unjustly, will be a rich man if he be also thrifty. On the other hand, the utterly bad is in general profligate, and therefore very poor; while he who spends on noble objects, and acquires wealth by just means only, can hardly be remarkable for riches, any more than he can be very poor.

*Laws V.*

ATHENIAN.

The state to be good rather than rich; since neither state nor individual can be both.

The good man gains half as much as the bad and spends twice as much; so that he cannot easily be rich.

*Laws V.*

ATHENIAN.

The making  
of money  
not to be  
allowed to  
interfere with  
education.

Our statement, then, is true, that the very rich are not good, and, if they are not good, they are not happy. But the intention of our laws was, that the citizens should be as happy as may be, and as friendly as possible to one another. And men who are always at law with one another, and amongst whom there are many wrongs done, can never be friends to one another, but only those among whom crimes and lawsuits are few and slight. Therefore we say that gold and silver ought not to be allowed in the city, nor much of the vulgar sort of trade which is carried on by lending money, or rearing the meaner kinds of live stock; but only the produce of agriculture, and only so much of this as will not compel us in pursuing it to neglect that for the sake of which riches exist,—I mean, soul and body, which without gymnastics, and without education, will never be worth anything; and therefore, as we have said not once but many times, the care of riches should have the last place in our thoughts. For there are in all three things about which every man has an interest; and the interest about money, when rightly regarded, is the third and lowest of them: midway comes the interest of the body; and, first of all, that of the soul; and the state which we are describing will have been rightly constituted if it ordains honours according to this scale. But if, in any of the laws which have been ordained, health has been preferred to temperance, or wealth to health and temperate habits, that law must clearly be wrong. Wherefore, also, the legislator ought often to impress upon himself the question—‘What do I want?’ and ‘Do I attain my aim, or do I miss the mark?’ In this way, and in this way only, he may acquit himself and free others from the work of legislation.

Let the allottee then hold his lot upon the conditions which we have mentioned <sup>1</sup>.

The citizens  
to be arranged  
in classes ac-  
cording to  
their census.

It would be well that every man should come to the colony having all things equal; but seeing that this is not possible, and one man will have greater possessions than another, for many reasons and in particular in order to preserve equality in special crises of the state, qualifications of property

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*, 740, 741.

must be unequal, in order that offices and contributions and distributions may be proportioned to the value of each person's wealth, and not solely to the virtue of his ancestors or himself, nor yet to the strength and beauty of his person, but also to the measure of his wealth or poverty; and so by a law of inequality, which will be in proportion to his wealth, he will receive honours and offices as equally as possible, and there will be no quarrels and disputes. To which end there should be four different standards appointed according to the amount of property: there should be a first and a second and a third and a fourth class, in which the citizens will be placed, and they will be called by these or similar names: they may continue in the same rank, or pass into another in any individual case, on becoming richer from being poorer, or poorer from being richer. The form of law which I should propose as the natural sequel would be as follows:—In a state which is desirous of being saved from the greatest of all plagues—not faction, but rather distraction—there should exist among the citizens neither extreme poverty, nor, again, excess of wealth, for both are productive of both these evils. Now the legislator should determine what is to be the limit of poverty or wealth. Let the limit of poverty be the value of the lot; this ought to be preserved, and no ruler, nor any one else who aspires after a reputation for virtue, will allow the lot to be impaired in any case. This the legislator gives as a measure, and he will permit a man to acquire double or triple, or as much as four times the amount of this<sup>1</sup>. But if a person have yet greater riches, whether he has found them, or they have been given to him, or he has made them in business, or has acquired by any stroke of fortune that which is in excess of the measure, if he give back the surplus to the state, and to the Gods who are the patrons of the state, he shall suffer no penalty or loss of reputation; but if he disobeys this our law, any one who likes may inform against him and receive half the value of the excess, and the delinquent shall pay a sum equal to the excess out of his own property, and the other half of the excess shall belong to the Gods. And let every possession of every man, with the exception of the lot, be publicly

*Laws V.*

ATHENIAN.

There are to be four such classes, the lowest not falling below the lot, and the highest not exceeding five times the lot.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Arist. Pol. ii. 6, § 15.



*Laws V.*

ATHENIAN.

Twelve-fold  
division of  
city and  
country.The land to  
be distributed  
into 5040 lots.  
Each lot to  
be divided,  
— half to be  
near the city,  
half more  
distant.Less of good  
land to be  
given, more  
of inferior.Twelve tribes,  
named after  
twelve Gods.Every citizen  
to have a  
town and a  
country  
house.But this is  
only a dream.

registered before the magistrates whom the law appoints, so that all suits about money may be easy and quite simple.

The next thing to be noted is, that the city should be placed as nearly as possible in the centre of the country; we should choose a place which possesses what is suitable for a city, and this may easily be imagined and described. Then we will divide the city into twelve portions, first founding temples to Hestia, to Zeus and to Athene, in a spot which we will call the Acropolis, and surround with a circular wall, making the division of the entire city and country radiate from this point. The twelve portions shall be equalized by the provision that those which are of good land shall be smaller, while those of inferior quality shall be larger. The number of the lots shall be 5040, and each of them shall be divided into two, and every allotment shall be composed of two such sections; one of land near the city, the other of land which is at a distance<sup>1</sup>. This arrangement shall be carried out in the following manner: The section which is near the city shall be added to that which is on the borders, and form one lot, and the portion which is next nearest shall be added to the portion which is next farthest; and so of the rest. Moreover, in the two sections of the lots the same principle of equalization of the soil ought to be maintained; the badness and goodness shall be compensated by more and less. And the legislator shall divide the citizens into twelve parts, and arrange the rest of their property, as far as possible, so as to form twelve equal parts; and there shall be a registration of all. After this they shall assign twelve lots to twelve Gods, and call them by their names, and dedicate to each God their several portions, and call the tribes after them. And they shall distribute the twelve divisions of the city in the same way in which they divided the country; and every man shall have two habitations<sup>2</sup>, one in the centre of the country, and the other at the extremity. Enough of the manner of settlement.

Now we ought by all means to consider that there can never be such a happy concurrence of circumstances as we have described; neither can all things coincide as they are wanted. Men who will not take offence at such a mode

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Arist. Pol. vii. 10, § 11.<sup>2</sup> Cp. *ibid.* ii. 6, § 15.



of living together, and will endure all their life long to have their property fixed at a moderate limit, and to beget children in accordance with our ordinances, and will allow themselves to be deprived of gold and other things which the legislator, as is evident from these enactments, will certainly forbid them; and will endure, further, the situation of the land with the city in the middle and dwellings round about;—all this is as if the legislator were telling his dreams, or making a city and citizens of wax. There is truth in these objections, and therefore every one should take to heart what I am going to say. Once more, then, the legislator shall appear and address us:—‘O my friends,’ he will say to us, ‘do not suppose me ignorant that there is a certain degree of truth in your words; but I am of opinion that, in matters which are not present but future, he who exhibits a pattern of that at which he aims, should in nothing fall short of the fairest and truest; and that if he finds any part of this work impossible of execution he should avoid and not execute it, but he should contrive to carry out that which is nearest and most akin to it; you must allow the legislator to perfect his design, and when it is perfected, you should join with him in considering what part of his legislation is expedient and what will arouse opposition; for surely the artist who is to be deemed worthy of any regard at all, ought always to make his work self-consistent.’

*Laws V.*

ATHENIAN.

The legislator should first be allowed to perfect his design, and then we may consider how far it can be executed.

Having determined that there is to be a distribution into twelve parts, let us now see in what way this may be accomplished. There is no difficulty in perceiving that the twelve parts admit of the greatest number of divisions of that which they include, or in seeing the other numbers which are consequent upon them, and are produced out of them up to 5040; wherefore the law ought to order phratries and demes and villages, and also military ranks and movements, as well as coins and measures, dry and liquid, and weights, so as to be commensurable and agreeable to one another. Nor should we fear the appearance of minuteness, if the law commands that all the vessels which are in use among the citizens should have a common measure, when we consider generally that the divisions and variations of numbers have a use in respect of all the variations of which they are susceptible, both in

*Larus V.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

The study of arithmetic the most powerful instrument of education. But it may also encourage meanness, as among the Egyptians and Phoenicians.

Effects of soil and climate on national character.

themselves and as measures of height and depth, and in all sounds, and in motions, as well those which proceed in a straight direction, upwards or downwards, as in those which go round and round. The legislator is to consider all these things and to bid the citizens, as far as possible, not to lose sight of numerical order; for no single instrument of youthful education has such mighty power, both as regards domestic economy and politics, and in the arts, as the study of arithmetic. Above all, arithmetic stirs up him who is by nature sleepy and dull, and makes him quick to learn, retentive, shrewd, and aided by art divine he makes progress quite beyond his natural powers<sup>1</sup>. All such things, if only the legislator, by other laws and institutions, can banish meanness and covetousness from the souls of men, so that they can use them properly and to their own good, will be excellent and suitable instruments of education. But if he cannot, he will unintentionally create in them, instead of wisdom, the habit of craft, which evil tendency may be observed in the Egyptians and Phoenicians, and many other races, through the general vulgarity of their pursuits and acquisitions, whether some unworthy legislator of theirs has been the cause, or some impediment of chance or nature. For we must not fail to observe, O Megillus and Cleinias, that there is a difference in places, and that some beget better men and others worse; and we must legislate accordingly. Some places are subject to strange and fatal influences by reason of diverse winds and violent heats, some by reason of waters; or, again, from the character of the food given by the earth, which not only affects the bodies of men for good or evil, but produces similar results in their souls. And in all such qualities those spots excel in which there is a divine inspiration, and in which the demigods have their appointed lots, and are propitious, not adverse, to the settlers in them. To all these matters the legislator, if he have any sense in him, will attend as far as man can, and frame his laws accordingly. And this is what you, Cleinias, must do, and to matters of this kind you must turn your mind since you are going to colonize a new country.

*Cleinias.* Your words, Athenian Stranger, are excellent, and I will do as you say.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. vii. 526 B.

## BOOK VI.

I *Athenian Stranger.* AND now having made an end of the preliminaries we will proceed to the appointment of magistracies. *Laws VI.*  
*ATHENIAN,*  
*CLEINIAS.*

*Cleinias.* Very good.

*Ath.* In the ordering of a state there are two parts: first, the number of the magistracies, and the mode of establishing them; and, secondly, when they have been established, laws again will have to be provided for each of them, suitable in nature and number. But before electing the magistrates let us stop a little and say a word in season about the election of them.

*Cle.* What have you got to say?

*Ath.* This is what I have to say;—every one can see, that although the work of legislation is a most important matter, yet if a well-ordered city superadd to good laws unsuitable offices, not only will there be no use in having the good laws,—not only will they be ridiculous and useless, but the greatest political injury and evil will accrue from them.

*Cle.* Of course.

*Ath.* Then now, my friend, let us observe what will happen in the constitution of our intended state. In the first place, you will acknowledge that those who are duly appointed to magisterial power, and their families, should severally have given satisfactory proof of what they are, from youth upward until the time of election; in the next place, those who are to elect should have been trained in habits of law, and be well educated, that they may have a right judgment, and may be

The appointment of officials a matter too important to be left to chance uneducated persons who are brought together for the first time.



*Laws VI.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

able to select or reject men whom they approve or disapprove, as they are worthy of either. But how can we imagine that those who are brought together for the first time, and are strangers to one another, and also uneducated, will avoid making mistakes in the choice of magistrates?

*Cle.* Impossible.

*Ath.* The matter is serious, and excuses will not serve the turn. I will tell you, then, what you and I will have to do, since you, as you tell me, with nine others, have offered to settle the new state on behalf of the people of Crete, and I am to help you by the invention of the present romance. 75 I certainly should not like to leave the tale wandering all over the world without a head;—a headless monster is such a hideous thing.

*Cle.* Excellent, Stranger.

*Ath.* Yes; and I will be as good as my word.

*Cle.* Let us by all means do as you propose.

*Ath.* That we will, by the grace of God, if old age will only permit us.

*Cle.* But God will be gracious.

*Ath.* Yes; and under His guidance let us consider a further point.

*Cle.* What is it?

*Ath.* Let us remember what a courageously mad and daring creation this our city is.

*Cle.* What had you in your mind when you said that?

The first  
magistrates  
must be  
elected by  
some already  
existing  
authority.

*Ath.* I had in my mind the free and easy manner in which we are ordaining that the inexperienced colonists shall receive our laws. Now a man need not be very wise, Cleinias, in order to see that no one can easily receive laws at their first imposition. But if we could anyhow wait until those who have been imbued with them from childhood, and have been nurtured in them, and become habituated to them, take their part in the public elections of the state; I say, if this could be accomplished, and rightly accomplished by any way or contrivance,—then, I think that there would be very little danger, at the end of the time, of a state thus trained not being permanent.

*Cle.* A reasonable supposition.

*Ath.* Then let us consider if we can find any way out of the



difficulty; for I maintain, Cleinias, that the Cnosians, above all the other Cretans, should not be satisfied with barely discharging their duty to the colony, but they ought to take the utmost pains to establish the offices which are first created by them in the best and surest manner. Above all, this applies to the selection of the guardians of the law, who must be chosen first of all, and with the greatest care; the others are of less importance.

*Larus VI.*  
ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Cle.* What method can we devise of electing them?

*Ath.* This will be the method:—Sons of the Cretans, I shall say to them, inasmuch as the Cnosians have precedence over the other states, they should, in common with those who join this settlement, choose a body of thirty-seven in all, nineteen of them being taken from the settlers, and the remainder from the citizens of Cnosus. Of these latter the Cnosians shall make a present to your colony, and you yourself shall be one of the eighteen, and shall become a citizen of the new state; and if you and they cannot be persuaded to go, the Cnosians may fairly use a little violence in order to make you.

The Cnosians, acting in concert with the new colonists, should appoint a body of 37 guardians of the law.

*Cle.* But why, Stranger, do not you and Megillus take a part in our new city?

*Ath.* O, Cleinias, Athens is proud, and Sparta too; and they are both a long way off. But you and likewise the other colonists are conveniently situated as you describe. I have been speaking of the way in which all these matters may be best managed under present circumstances; but in after-ages, if the city continues to exist, let the election be on this wise: All who are horse or foot soldiers, or have seen military service at the proper ages when they were severally fitted for it<sup>1</sup>, shall share in the election of magistrates; and the election shall be held in whatever temple the state deems most venerable, and every one shall carry his vote to the altar of the God, writing down on a tablet the name of the person for whom he votes, and his father's name, and his tribe, and ward; and at the side he shall write his own name in like manner. Any one who pleases may take away any tablet which he does not think properly filled up, and exhibit it in the Agora for a period of

In after-ages they shall be elected by the military class.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Arist. Pol. ii. 6, § 16.

*Laws VI.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.Manner of  
election.

not less than thirty days. The tablets which are judged to be first, to the number of 300, shall be shown by the magistrates to the whole city, and the citizens shall in like manner select from these the candidates whom they prefer; and this second selection, to the number of 100, shall be again exhibited to the citizens; in the third, let any one who pleases select whom he pleases out of the 100, walking through the parts of victims, and let them choose for magistrates and proclaim the seven-and-thirty who have the greatest number of votes. But who, Cleinias and Megillus, will order for us in the colony all this matter of the magistrates, and the scrutinies of them? If we reflect, we shall see that cities which are in process of construction like ours must have some such persons, who cannot possibly be elected before there are any magistrates<sup>1</sup>; and yet they must be elected in some way, and they are not to be inferior men, but the best possible. For as the proverb says, 'a good beginning is half the business;' and 'to have begun well' is praised by all, and in my opinion is a great deal more than half the business, and has never been praised by any one 75 enough.

*Cle.* That is very true.

*Ath.* Then let us recognize the difficulty, and make clear to our own minds how the beginning is to be accomplished. There is only one proposal which I have to offer, and that is one which, under our circumstances, is both necessary and expedient.

*Cle.* What is it?

Cnosus, the  
parent state,  
should take  
an interest in  
her offspring.

*Ath.* I maintain that this colony of ours has a father and mother, who are no other than the colonizing state. Well I know that many colonies have been, and will be, at enmity with their parents. But in early days the child, as in a family, loves and is beloved; even if there come a time later when the tie is broken, still, while he is in want of education, he naturally loves his parents and is beloved by them, and flies to his relatives for protection, and finds in them his only natural allies in time of need; and this parental feeling already exists in the Cnosians, as is shown by their care of the new city; and there is a similar feeling on the part of the

<sup>1</sup> Reading *πρὸ πασῶν*.

young city towards Cnosus. And I repeat what I was saying — for there is no harm in repeating a good thing — that the Cnosians should take a common interest in all these matters, and choose, as far as they can, the eldest and best of the colonists, to the number of not less than a hundred; and let there be another hundred of the Cnosians themselves. These, I say, on their arrival, should have a joint care that the magistrates should be appointed according to law, and that when they are appointed they should undergo a scrutiny. When this has been effected, the Cnosians shall return home, and the new city do the best she can for her own preservation and happiness. I would have the seven-and-thirty now, and in all future time, chosen to fulfil the following duties:— Let them, in the first place, be the guardians of the law; and, secondly, of the registers in which each one registers before the magistrate the amount of his property, excepting four minae which are allowed to citizens of the first class, three allowed to the second, two to the third, and a single mina to the fourth. And if any one, despising the laws for the sake of gain, be found to possess anything more which has not been registered, let all that he has in excess be confiscated, and let him be liable to a suit which shall be the reverse of honourable or fortunate. And let any one who will, indict him on the charge of loving base gains, and proceed against him before the guardians of the law. And if he be cast, let him lose his share of the public possessions, and when there is any public distribution, let him have nothing but his original lot; and let him be written down a condemned man as long as he lives, in some place in which any one who pleases can read about his offences. The guardian of the law shall not hold office longer than twenty years, and shall not be less than fifty years of age when he is elected; or if he is elected when he is sixty years of age, he shall hold office for ten years only; and upon the same principle, he must not imagine that he will be permitted to hold such an important office as that of guardian of the laws after he is seventy years of age, if he live so long.

These are the three first ordinances about the guardians of the law; as the work of legislation progresses, each law in turn will assign to them their further duties. And now we

*Laws VI.*

ATHENIAN.

She should appoint a constituent body of 200 which will see to the first elections.

The 37 to be the guardians of the law and of the registers of property.

They should be between the ages of 50 and 70.



*Laws VI.*

ATHENIAN.

Generals to  
be taken from  
a list formed  
by them, three  
in number, by  
those who are  
or have been  
soldiers.

The generals  
shall appoint  
12 brigadiers.

The election  
of cavalry  
officers.

may proceed in order to speak of the election of other officers; for generals have to be elected, and these again must have their ministers, commanders, and colonels of horse, and commanders of brigades of foot, who would be more rightly called by their popular name of brigadiers. The guardians of the law shall propose as generals men who are natives of the city, and a selection from the candidates proposed shall be made by those who are or have been of the age for military service. And if one who is not proposed is thought by somebody to be better than one who is, let him name whom he prefers in the place of whom, and make oath that he is better, and propose him; and whichever of them is approved by vote shall be admitted to the final selection; and the three who have the greatest number of votes shall be appointed generals, and superintendents of military affairs, after previously undergoing a scrutiny, like the guardians of the law. And let the generals thus elected propose twelve brigadiers, one for each tribe; and there shall be a right of counter-proposal as in the case of the generals, and the voting and decision shall take place in the same way. Until the prytanes and council are elected, the guardians of the law shall convene the assembly in some holy spot which is suitable to the purpose, placing the hoplites by themselves, and the cavalry by themselves, and in a third division all the rest of the army. All are to vote for the generals [and for the colonels of horse], but the brigadiers are to be voted for only by those who carry shields [i. e. the hoplites]. Let the body of cavalry choose phylarchs for the generals; but captains of light troops, or archers, or any other division of the army, shall be appointed by the generals for themselves. There only remains the appointment of officers of cavalry: these shall be proposed by the same persons who proposed the generals, and the election and the counter-proposal of other candidates shall be arranged in the same way as in the case of the generals, and let the cavalry vote and the infantry look on at the election; the two who have the greatest number of votes shall be the leaders of all the horse. Disputes about the voting may be raised once or twice; but if the dispute be raised a third time, the officers who preside at the several elections shall decide.



The council shall consist of  $30 \times 12$  members,—360 will be a convenient number for subdivision. If we divide the whole number into four parts of ninety each, we get ninety councillors for each class. First, all the citizens shall select candidates from the first class; they shall be compelled to vote, and, if they do not, shall be duly fined. When the candidates have been selected, some one shall mark them down; this shall be the business of the first day. And on the following day, candidates shall be selected from the second class in the same manner and under the same conditions as on the previous day; and on the third day a selection shall be made from the third class, at which every one may if he likes vote, and the three first classes shall be compelled to vote; but the fourth and lowest class shall be under no compulsion, and any member of this class who does not vote shall not be punished. On the fourth day candidates shall be selected from the fourth and smallest class; they shall be selected by all, but he who is of the fourth class shall suffer no penalty, nor he who is of the third, if he be not willing to vote; but he who is of the first or second class, if he does not vote shall be punished;—he who is of the second class shall pay a fine of triple the amount which was exacted at first, and he who is of the first class quadruple. On the fifth day the rulers shall bring out the names noted down, for all the citizens to see, and every man shall choose out of them, under pain, if he do not, of suffering the first penalty; and when they have chosen 180 out of each of the classes, they shall choose one-half of them by lot, who shall undergo a scrutiny:— These are to form the council for the year.

The mode of election which has been described is in a mean between monarchy and democracy, and such a mean the state ought always to observe; for servants and masters never can be friends, nor good and bad, merely because they are declared to have equal privileges. For to unequals equals become unequal, if they are not harmonised by measure; and both by reason of equality, and by reason of inequality, cities are filled with seditions. The old saying, that 'equality makes friendship,' is happy and also true; but there is obscurity and confusion as to what sort of equality is meant. For there are two equalities which are called by

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ATHENIAN.

The council to consist of 360 persons.

The penalty for not voting at elections to the council shall vary with the class.

Details of the mode of election.

The state to be in a mean between monarchy and democracy.

*Laws VI.*

ATHENIAN.

Two kinds of equality, simple, and proportionate—

that is, the distribution of more to the superior, and of less to the inferior.

Equality, like justice, is often used in a lax sense, as when applied to the lot: the less there is of chance the better.

the same name, but are in reality in many ways almost the opposite of one another; one of them may be introduced without difficulty, by any state or any legislator in the distribution of honours: this is the rule of measure, weight, and number, which regulates and apportions them. But there is another equality, of a better and higher kind, which is not so easily recognized. This is the judgment of Zeus; among men it avails but little; that little, however, is the source of the greatest good to individuals and states. For it gives to the greater more, and to the inferior less and in proportion to the nature of each; and, above all, greater honour always to the greater virtue, and to the less less; and to either in proportion to their respective measure of virtue and education. And this is justice, and is ever the true principle of states, at which we ought to aim, and according to this rule order the new city which is now being founded, and any other city which may be hereafter founded. To this the legislator should look,—not to the interests of tyrants one or more, or to the power of the people, but to justice always; which, as I was saying, is the distribution of natural equality among unequals in each case. But there are times at which every state is compelled to use the words, ‘just,’ ‘equal,’ in a secondary sense, in the hope of escaping in some degree from factions. For equity and indulgence are infractions of the perfect and strict rule of justice. And this is the reason why we are obliged to use the equality of the lot, in order to avoid the discontent of the people; and so we invoke God and fortune in our prayers, and beg that they themselves will direct the lot with a view to supreme justice. And therefore, although we are compelled to use both equalities, we should use that into which the element of chance enters as seldom as possible.

Thus, O my friends, and for the reasons given, should a state act which would endure and be saved. But as a ship sailing on the sea has to be watched night and day, in like manner a city also is sailing on a sea of politics, and is liable to all sorts of insidious assaults; and therefore from morning to night, and from night to morning, rulers must join hands with rulers, and watchers with watchers, receiving and giving up their trust in a perpetual succession.

Now a multitude can never fulfil a duty of this sort with anything like energy. Moreover, the greater number of the senators will have to be left during the greater part of the year to order their concerns at their own homes. They will therefore have to be arranged in twelve portions, answering to the twelve months, and furnish guardians of the state, each portion for a single month. Their business is to be at hand and receive any foreigner or citizen who comes to them, whether to give information, or to put one of those questions, to which, when asked by other cities, a city should give an answer, and to which, if she ask them herself, she should receive an answer; or again, when there is a likelihood of internal commotions, which are always liable to happen in some form or other, they will, if they can, prevent their occurring; or if they have already occurred, will lose no time in making them known to the city, and healing the evil. Wherefore, also, this which is the presiding body of the state ought always to have the control of their assemblies, and of the dissolutions of them, ordinary as well as extraordinary. All this is to be ordered by the twelfth part of the council, which is always to keep watch together with the other officers of the state during one portion of the year, and to rest during the remaining eleven portions.

Thus will the city be fairly ordered. And now, who is to have the superintendence of the country, and what shall be the arrangement? Seeing that the whole city and the entire country have been both of them divided into twelve portions, ought there not to be appointed superintendents of the streets of the city, and of the houses, and buildings, and harbours, and the agora, and fountains, and sacred domains, and temples, and the like?

*Cle.* To be sure there ought.

*Ath.* Let us assume, then, that there ought to be servants of the temples, and priests and priestesses. There must also be superintendents of roads and buildings, who will have care of men, that they may do no harm, and also of beasts, both within the enclosure and in the suburbs. Three kinds of officers will thus have to be appointed, in order that the city may be suitably provided according to her needs. Those who have the care of the city shall be called wardens of the

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ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

The council  
to be divided  
into twelve  
parts, each  
of which will  
serve for a  
month.

Their duties.

Three kinds  
of officers  
necessary  
for the city:—  
(1) Priests,  
Interpreters,  
and Temple-  
Treasurers:  
(2) Wardens



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of the city :  
 (3) Wardens  
 of the Agora.

Mixture of  
 classes in  
 election to  
 offices.

Election of  
 priests and  
 priestesses,

of interpreters,

and of temple-  
 treasurers.

city; and those who have the care of the agora shall be called wardens of the agora; and those who have the care of the temples shall be called priests. Those who hold hereditary offices as priests or priestesses, shall not be disturbed; but if there be few or none such, as is probable at the foundation of a new city, priests and priestesses shall be appointed to be servants of the Gods who have no servants. Some of our officers shall be elected, and others appointed by lot, those who are of the people and those who are not of the people mingling in a friendly manner in every place and city, that the state may be as far as possible of one mind. The officers of the temples shall be appointed by lot; in this way their election will be committed to God, that He may do what is agreeable to Him. And he who obtains a lot shall undergo a scrutiny, first, as to whether he is sound of body and of legitimate birth; and in the second place, in order to show that he is of a perfectly pure family, not stained with homicide or any similar impiety in his own person, and also that his father and mother have led a similar unstained life. Now the laws about all divine things should be brought from Delphi, and interpreters appointed, under whose direction they should be used. The tenure of the priesthood should always be for a year and no longer; and he who will duly execute the sacred office, according to the laws of religion, must be not less than sixty years of age,—the laws shall be the same about priestesses. As for the interpreters, they shall be appointed thus:—let the twelve tribes be distributed into groups of four, and let each group select four, one out of each tribe within the group, three times; and let the three who have the greatest number of votes [out of the twelve appointed by each group], after undergoing a scrutiny, nine in all, be sent to Delphi, in order that the God may return one out of each triad; their age shall be the same as that of the priests, and the scrutiny of them shall be conducted in the same manner; let them be interpreters for life, and when any one dies let the four tribes select another from the tribe of the deceased. Moreover, besides priests and interpreters there must be treasurers, who will take charge of the property of the several temples, and of the sacred domains and shall have authority over the produce and the letting of



hem; and three of them shall be chosen from the highest classes for the greater temples, and two for the lesser, and one for the least of all; the manner of their election and the scrutiny of them shall be the same as that of the generals<sup>1</sup>. This shall be the order of the temples.

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ATHENIAN.

Let everything have a guard as far as possible. Let the defence of the city be committed to the generals, and taxarchs, and hipparchs, and phylarchs, and prytanes, and the wardens of the city, and of the agora, when the election of them has been completed. The defence of the country shall be provided for as follows:—The entire land has been already distributed into twelve as nearly as possible equal parts, and let the tribe allotted to a division provide annually for it five wardens of the country and commanders of the watch; and let each body of five have the power of selecting twelve others out of the youth of their own tribe,—these shall be not less than twenty-five years of age, and not more than thirty. And let there be allotted to them severally every month the various districts, in order that they may all acquire knowledge and experience of the whole country. The term of service for commanders and for watchers shall continue during two years. After having had their stations allotted to them, they will go from place to place in regular order, changing every month,—making their round from left to right as their commanders direct them; (when I speak of going to the right, I mean that they are to go to the east). And at the commencement of the second year, in order that as many as possible of the guards may not only get a knowledge of the country at any one season of the year, but may also have experience of the manner in which different places are affected at different seasons of the year, their then commanders shall lead them again towards the left, from place to place in succession, until they have completed the second year. In the third year other wardens of the country shall be chosen and commanders of the watch, five for each division, who are to be the superintendents of the bands of twelve. While on service at each station, their attention shall be directed to the following points:—In the first place, they shall see that the country is well protected against

The wardens of the country.

Five to keep watch in each division with twelve young men appointed by them.

A different division to be taken every month, and the circuit of the land twice made in their two years' service.

Their duties:—Protection of the country;

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, 755 C.

*Laws VI.*

ATHENIAN.

road-making ;

the care of  
fountains  
and streams ;and of  
irrigation.Gymnasia  
for youth.Warm baths  
for the aged  
rustic, better  
than a doctor.The wardens  
of the country

enemies ; they shall trench and dig wherever this is required, and, as far as they can, they shall by fortifications keep off the evil-disposed, in order to prevent them from doing any harm to the country or the property ; they shall use the beasts of burden and the labourers whom they find on the spot : these will be their instruments whom they will superintend, taking them, as far as possible, at the times when they are not engaged in their regular business. They shall make every part of the country inaccessible to enemies, and as accessible as possible to friends<sup>1</sup> ; there shall be ways for man and beasts of burden and for cattle, and they shall take care to have them always as smooth as they can ; and shall provide against the rains doing harm instead of good to the land, when they come down from the mountains into the hollow dells ; and shall keep in the overflow by the help of works and ditches, in order that the valleys, receiving and drinking up the rain from heaven, and providing fountains and streams in the fields and regions which lie underneath, may furnish even to the dry places plenty of good water. The fountains of water, whether of rivers or of springs, shall be ornamented with plantations and buildings for beauty ; and let them bring together the streams in subterraneous channels, and make all things plenteous ; and if there be a sacred grove or dedicated precinct in the neighbourhood, they shall conduct the water to the actual temples of the Gods, and so beautify them at all seasons of the year. Everywhere in such places the youth shall make gymnasia for themselves, and warm baths for the aged, placing by them abundance of dry wood, for the benefit of those labouring under disease — there the weary frame of the rustic, worn with toil, will receive a kindly welcome<sup>2</sup>, far better than he would at the hands of a not over-wise doctor.

The building of these and the like works will be useful and ornamental ; they will provide a pleasing amusement, but they will be a serious employment too ; for the sixty wardens will have to guard their several divisions, not only with a view to enemies, but also with an eye to professing friends. When a quarrel arises among neighbours or citizens, and any one whether slave or freeman wrongs another, let the

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Arist. Pol. vii. 5, § 3.<sup>2</sup> Reading δέξιιν.

five wardens decide small matters on their own authority ; but where the charge against another relates to greater matters, the seventeen composed of the fives and twelves, shall determine any charges which one man brings against another, not involving more than three minae <sup>1</sup>. Every judge and magistrate shall be liable to give an account of his conduct in office, except those who, like kings, have the final decision. Moreover, as regards the aforesaid wardens of the country, if they do any wrong to those of whom they have the care, whether by imposing upon them unequal tasks, or by taking the produce of the soil or implements of husbandry without their consent ; also if they receive anything in the way of a bribe, or decide suits unjustly, or if they yield to the influences of flattery, let them be publicly dishonoured ; and in regard to any other wrong which they do to the inhabitants of the country, if the question be of a mina, let them submit to the decision of the villagers in the neighbourhood ; but in suits of greater amount, or in the case of lesser if they refuse to submit, trusting that their monthly removal into another part of the country will enable them to escape — in such cases the injured party may bring his suit in the common court, and if he obtain a verdict he may exact from the defendant, who refused to submit, a double penalty.

The wardens and the overseers of the country, while on their two years' service, shall have common meals at their several stations, and shall all live together ; and he who is absent from the common meal, or sleeps out, if only for one day or night, unless by order of his commanders, or by reason of absolute necessity, if the five denounce him and inscribe his name in the agora as not having kept his guard, let him be deemed to have betrayed the city, as far as lay in his power, and let him be disgraced and beaten with impunity by any one who meets him and is willing to punish him. If any of the commanders is guilty of such an irregularity, the whole company of sixty shall see to it, and he who is cognisant of the offence, and does not bring the offender to trial, shall be amenable to the same laws as the younger offender himself, and shall pay a heavier fine, and be incapable of ever commanding the young. The guardians of

*Law VI.*

ATHENIAN.

shall decide  
minor cases.

They should  
be careful of  
oppressing the  
inhabitants.

Common  
meals.

No sleeping  
out.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *infra*, viii. 843 D.



*Laws VI.*

ATHENIAN.

The service  
of the laws  
is the service  
of the Gods.

The wardens  
of the country  
are to wait  
on themselves.

A man should  
acquire an  
exact know-  
ledge of his  
own country.

The wardens  
of the city are  
to be three,  
the wardens  
of the agora  
to be five  
in number.

the law are to be careful inspectors of these matters, and shall either prevent or punish offenders. Every man should remember the universal rule, that he who is not a good servant will not be a good master; a man should pride himself more upon serving well than upon commanding well: first upon serving the laws, which is also the service of the Gods; in the second place, upon having served ancient and honourable men in the days of his youth. Furthermore, during the two years in which any one is a warden of the country, his daily food ought to be of a simple and humble kind. When the twelve have been chosen, let them and the five meet together, and determine that they will be their own servants, and, like servants, will not have other slaves and servants for their own use, neither will they use those of the villagers and husbandmen for their private advantage, but for the public service only; and in general they should make up their minds to live independently by themselves, servants of each other and of themselves. Further, at all seasons of the year, summer and winter alike, let them be under arms and survey minutely the whole country; thus they will at once keep guard, and at the same time acquire a perfect knowledge of every locality. There can be no more important kind of information than the exact knowledge of a man's own country; and for this as well as for more general reasons of pleasure and advantage, hunting with dogs and other kinds of sports should be pursued by the young. The service to whom this is committed may be called the secret police<sup>1</sup> or wardens of the country; the name does not much signify, but every one who has the safety of the state at heart will use his utmost diligence in this service.

After the wardens of the country, we have to speak of the election of wardens of the agora and of the city. The wardens of the country were sixty in number, and the wardens of the city will be three, and will divide the twelve parts of the city into three; like the former, they shall have care of the streets, and of the different high roads which lead out of the country into the city, and of the buildings, that they may be all made according to law;—also of the waters,

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, i. 633 C.



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ATHENIAN.

The manner  
of electing  
them.

Attendance  
at the as-  
sembly and  
general  
council.

Powers of  
the wardens  
of the city  
and agora.

which the guardians of the supply preserve and convey to them, care being taken that they may reach the fountains pure and abundant, and be both an ornament and a benefit to the city. These also should be men of influence, and at leisure to take care of the public interest. Let every man propose as warden of the city any one whom he likes out of the highest class, and when the vote has been given on them, and the number is reduced to the six who have the greatest number of votes, let the electing officers choose by lot three out of the six, and when they have undergone a scrutiny let them hold office according to the laws laid down for them. Next, let the wardens of the agora be elected in like manner, out of the first and second class, five in number: ten are to be first elected, and out of the ten five are to be chosen by lot, as in the election of the wardens of the city:—these when they have undergone a scrutiny are to be declared magistrates. Every one shall vote for every one, and he who will not vote, if he be informed against before the magistrates, shall be fined fifty drachmae, and shall also be deemed a bad citizen. Let any one who likes go to the assembly and to the general council; it shall be compulsory to go on citizens of the first and second class, and they shall pay a fine of ten drachmae if they be found not answering to their names at the assembly. But the third and fourth class shall be under no compulsion, and shall be let off without a fine, unless the magistrates have commanded all to be present, in consequence of some urgent necessity. The wardens of the agora shall observe the order appointed by law for the agora, and shall have the charge of the temples and fountains which are in the agora; and they shall see that no one injures anything, and punish him who does, with stripes and bonds, if he be a slave or stranger; but if he be a citizen who misbehaves in this way, they shall have the power themselves of inflicting a fine upon him to the amount of a hundred drachmae, or with the consent of the wardens of the city up to double that amount. And let the wardens of the city have a similar power of imposing punishments and fines in their own department; and let them impose fines by their own authority, up to a mina, or up to two minae with the consent of the wardens of the agora.

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## ATHENIAN.

Two kinds of directors of music and of gymnastic :—

- (1) instructors ;
- (2) judges.

The three judges of gymnastic shall judge of horses also. In music there shall be one judge of the solo singers, and one of the choruses.

The manner of electing the judges.

In the next place, it will be proper to appoint directors of music and gymnastic, two kinds of each — of the one kind the business will be education, of the other, the superintendence of contests. In speaking of education, the law means to speak of those who have the care of order and instruction in gymnasia and schools, and of the going to school, and of school buildings for boys and girls ; and in speaking of contests, the law refers to the judges of gymnastics and of music ; these again are divided into two classes, the one having to do with music, the other with gymnastics ; and the same who judge of the gymnastic contests of men, shall judge of horses ; but in music there shall be one set of judges of solo singing, and of imitation — I mean of rhapsodists, players on the harp, the flute and the like, and another who shall judge of choral song. First of all, we must choose directors for the choruses of boys, and men, and maidens, whom they shall follow in the amusement of the dance, and for our other musical arrangements ;—one director will be enough for the choruses, and he should be not less than 7  
forty years of age. One director will also be enough to introduce the solo singers, and to give judgment on the competitors, and he ought not to be less than thirty years of age. The director and manager of the choruses shall be elected after the following manner :—Let any persons who commonly take an interest in such matters go to the meeting, and be fined if they do not go (the guardians of the law shall judge of their fault), but those who have no interest shall not be compelled. The elector shall propose as director some one who understands music, and he in the scrutiny may be challenged on the one part by those who say he has no skill, and defended on the other hand by those who say that he has. Ten are to be elected by vote, and he of the ten who is chosen by lot shall undergo a scrutiny, and lead the choruses for a year according to law. And in like manner the competitor who wins the lot shall be leader of the solo and concert music for that year ; and he who is thus elected shall deliver the award to the judges. In the next place, we have to choose judges in the contests of horses and of men ; these shall be selected from the third and also from the second class of citizens, and the three first classes shall

be compelled to go to the election, but the lowest may stay away with impunity; and let there be three elected by lot out of the twenty who have been chosen previously, and they must also have the vote and approval of the examiners. But if any one is rejected in the scrutiny at any ballot or decision, others shall be chosen in the same manner, and undergo a similar scrutiny.

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There remains the minister of the education of youth, male and female; he too will rule according to law; one such minister will be sufficient, and he must be fifty years old, and have children lawfully begotten, both boys and girls by preference, at any rate, one or the other. He who is elected, and he who is the elector, should consider that of all the great offices of state this is the greatest; for the first shoot of any plant, if it makes a good start towards the attainment of its natural excellence, has the greatest effect on its maturity; and this is not only true of plants, but of animals wild and tame, and also of men. Man, as we say, is a tame or civilized animal; nevertheless, he requires proper instruction and a fortunate nature, and then of all animals he becomes the most divine and most civilized<sup>1</sup>; but if he be insufficiently or ill educated he is the most savage of earthly creatures. Wherefore the legislator ought not to allow the education of children to become a secondary or accidental matter. In the first place, he who would be rightly provident about them, should begin by taking care that he is elected, who of all the citizens is in every way best; him the legislator shall do his utmost to appoint guardian and superintendent. To this end all the magistrates, with the exception of the council and prytanes, shall go to the temple of Apollo, and elect by ballot him of the guardians of the law whom they severally think will be the best superintendent of education. And he who has the greatest number of votes, after he has undergone a scrutiny at the hands of all the magistrates who have been his electors, with the exception of the guardians of the law,—shall hold office for five years; and in the sixth year let another be chosen in like manner to fill his office.

The minister of the education of youth the greatest of the officers of state.

He is to be elected by the magistrates, and to hold office for five years.

If any one dies while he is holding a public office, and

<sup>1</sup> Arist. Pol. i. 2, §§ 15, 16.



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ATHENIAN.

more than thirty days before his term of office expires, let those whose business it is elect another to the office in the same manner as before. And if any one who is entrusted with orphans dies, let the relations both on the father's and mother's side, who are residing at home, including cousins, appoint another guardian within ten days, or be fined a drachma a day for neglect to do so.

A city which has no regular courts of law ceases to be a city; and again, if a judge is silent and says no more in preliminary proceedings than the litigants, as is the case in arbitrations, he will never be able to decide justly; wherefore a multitude of judges will not easily judge well, nor a few if they are bad. The point in dispute between the parties should be made clear; and time, and deliberation, and repeated examination, greatly tend to clear up doubts. For this reason, he who goes to law with another, should go first of all to his neighbours and friends who know best the questions at issue. And if he be unable to obtain from them a satisfactory decision, let him have recourse to another court; and if the two courts cannot settle the matter, let a third put an end to the suit.

Now the establishment of courts of justice may be regarded as a choice of magistrates, for every magistrate must also be a judge of some things; and the judge, though he be not a magistrate, yet in certain respects is a very important magistrate on the day on which he is determining a suit. Regarding then the judges also as magistrates, let us say who are fit to be judges, and of what they are to be judges, and how many of them are to judge in each suit. Let that be the supreme tribunal which the litigants appoint in common for themselves, choosing certain persons by agreement. And let there be two other tribunals: one for private causes, when a citizen accuses another of wronging him and wishes to get a decision; the other for public causes, in which some citizen is of opinion that the public has been wronged by an individual, and is willing to vindicate the common interests. And we must not forget to mention how the judges are to be qualified, and who they are to be. In the first place, let there be a tribunal open to all private persons who are trying causes one against another for the third time, and let this be

Disputes to be referred  
(1) to a council of friends and neighbours:

(2) to an ordinary court:  
(3) to a court of appeal.

Litigants may appoint their own tribunal.

There will be courts  
(1) for private, and (2) for public causes.



composed as follows:— All the officers of state, as well annual as those holding office for a longer period, when the new year is about to commence, in the month following after the summer solstice, on the last day but one of the year, shall meet in some temple, and calling God to witness, shall dedicate one judge from every magistracy to be their first-fruits, choosing in each office him who seems to them to be the best, and whom they deem likely to decide the causes of his fellow-citizens during the ensuing year in the best and holiest manner. And when the election is completed, a scrutiny shall be held in the presence of the electors themselves, and if any one be rejected another shall be chosen in the same manner. Those who have undergone the scrutiny shall judge the causes of those who have declined the inferior courts, and shall give their vote openly. The councillors and other magistrates who have elected them shall be required to be hearers and spectators of the causes; and any one else may be present who pleases. If one man charges another with having intentionally decided wrong, let him go to the guardians of the law and lay his accusation before them, and he who is found guilty in such a case shall pay damages to the injured party equal to half the injury; but if he shall appear to deserve a greater penalty, the judges shall determine what additional punishment he shall suffer, and how much more he ought to pay to the public treasury, and to the party who brought the suit.

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The court of appeal: the judges to be selected from each magistracy.

58 In the judgment of offences against the state, the people ought to participate, for when any one wrongs the state all are wronged, and may reasonably complain if they are not allowed to share in the decision. Such causes ought to originate with the people, and they ought also to have the final decision of them, but the trial of them shall take place before three of the highest magistrates, upon whom the plaintiff and the defendant shall agree; and if they are not able to come to an agreement themselves, the council shall choose one of the two proposed. And in private suits, too, as far as is possible, all should have a share; for he who has no share in the administration of justice, is apt to imagine that he has no share in the state at all. And for this reason there shall be a court of law in every tribe, and the judges shall be

Public suits should originate with the people, and should be decided by them. In private suits, too, all should share.

The courts of the tribes.

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CLEINIAS.

chosen by lot;—they shall give their decisions at once, and shall be inaccessible to entreaties. The final judgment shall rest with that court which, as we maintain, has been established in the most incorruptible form of which human things admit: this shall be the court established for those who are unable to get rid of their suits either in the courts of neighbours or of the tribes.

Thus much of the courts of law, which, as I was saying, cannot be precisely defined either as being or not being offices; a superficial sketch has been given of them, in which some things have been told and others omitted. For the right place of an exact statement of the laws respecting suits, under their several heads, will be at the end of the body of legislation;—let us then expect them at the end<sup>1</sup>. Hitherto our legislation has been chiefly occupied with the appointment of offices. Perfect unity and exactness, extending to the whole and every particular of political administration, cannot be attained to the full, until the discussion shall have proceeded from the beginning to the end and is complete in its second, middle, and in every other part. At present we have reached the election of magistrates, and this may be regarded as a sufficient termination of what has preceded. And now there need no longer be any delay or hesitation in beginning the work of legislation.

From magis-  
trates we  
proceed  
to laws.

*Cle.* I like what you have said, Stranger; and I particularly like your manner of tacking on the beginning of your new discourse to the end of the former one.

*Ath.* Thus far, then, the old men's rational pastime has gone off well.

*Cle.* You mean, I suppose, their serious and noble pursuit?

*Ath.* Perhaps; but I should like to know whether you and I are agreed about a certain thing.

*Cle.* About what thing?

Laws, like  
pictures, re-  
quire renewal  
in the course  
of ages.

*Ath.* You know the endless labour which painters expend upon their pictures—they are always putting in or taking out colours, or whatever be the term which artists employ; they seem as if they would never cease touching up their works, which are always being made brighter and more beautiful.

*Cle.* I know something of these matters from report, although I have never had any great acquaintance with the art.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *infra*, ix. 853 foll.; xii. 956 foll.

*Ath.* No matter; we may make use of the illustration notwithstanding:—Suppose that some one had a mind to paint a figure in the most beautiful manner, in the hope that his work instead of losing would always improve as time went on—do you not see that being a mortal, unless he leaves some one to succeed him who will correct the flaws which time may introduce, and be able to add what is left imperfect through the defect of the artist, and who will further brighten up and improve the picture, all his great labour will last but a short time?

*Cle.* True.

*Ath.* And is not the aim of the legislator similar? First, he desires that his laws should be written down with all possible exactness; in the second place, as time goes on and he has made an actual trial of his decrees, will he not find omissions? Do you imagine that there ever was a legislator so foolish as not to know that many things are necessarily omitted, which some one coming after him must correct, if the constitution and the order of government is not to deteriorate, but to improve in the state which he has established?

*Cle.* Assuredly, that is the sort of thing which every one would desire.

*Ath.* And if any one possesses any means of accomplishing this by word or deed, or has any way great or small by which he can teach a person to understand how he can maintain and amend the laws, he should finish what he has to say, and not leave the work incomplete.

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CLEINIAS.  
  
The guardians  
of the law  
should be also  
legislators.

*Cle.* By all means.

*Ath.* And is not this what you and I have to do at the present moment?

*Cle.* What have we to do?

*Ath.* As we are about to legislate and have chosen our guardians of the law, and are ourselves in the evening of life, and they as compared with us are young men, we ought not only to legislate for them, but to endeavour to make them not only guardians of the law but legislators themselves, as far as this is possible.

*Cle.* Certainly; if we can.

*Ath.* At any rate, we must do our best.



*Laws VI.**Cle.* Of course.ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Ath.* We will say to them,—O friends and saviours of our laws, in laying down any law, there are many particulars which we shall omit, and this cannot be helped; at the same time, we will do our utmost to describe what is important, and will give an outline which you shall fill up. And I will explain on what principle you are to act. Megillus and Cleinias and I have often spoken to one another touching these matters, and we are of opinion that we have spoken well. And we hope that you will be of the same mind with us, and become our disciples, and keep in view the things which in our united opinion the legislator and guardian of the law ought to keep in view. There was one main point about which we were agreed—that a man's whole energies throughout life should be devoted to the acquisition of the virtue proper to a man, whether this was to be gained by study, or habit, or some mode of acquisition, or desire, or opinion, or knowledge—and this applies equally to men and women, old and young—the aim of all should always be such as I have described; anything which may be an impediment, the good man ought to show that he utterly disregards. And if at last necessity plainly compels him to be an outlaw from his native land, rather than bow his neck to the yoke of slavery and be ruled by inferiors, and he has to fly, an exile he must be and endure all such trials, rather than accept another form of government, which is likely to make men worse. These are our original principles; and do you now, fixing your eyes upon the standard of what a man and a citizen ought or ought not to be, praise and blame the laws—blame those which have not this power of making the citizen better, but embrace those which have; and with gladness receive and live in them; bidding a long farewell to other institutions which aim at goods, as they are termed, of a different kind.

A man's  
whole energies  
to be devoted  
to virtue.

If the govern-  
ment of his  
country grows  
corrupt, he  
must go into  
exile.

The number  
5040 and its  
numerous  
divisors.

Let us proceed to another class of laws, beginning with their foundation in religion. And we must first return to the number 5040—the entire number had, and has, a great many convenient divisions, and the number of the tribes which was a twelfth part of the whole, being correctly formed by  $21 \times 20$  [ $5040 \div (21 \times 20)$ , i.e.  $5040 \div 420 = 12$ ], also has them.



And not only is the whole number divisible by twelve, but also the number of each tribe is divisible by twelve. Now every portion should be regarded by us as a sacred gift of Heaven, corresponding to the months and to the revolution of the universe<sup>1</sup>. Every city has a guiding and sacred principle given by nature, but in some the division or distribution has been more right than in others, and has been more sacred and fortunate. In our opinion, nothing can be more right than the selection of the number 5040, which may be divided by all numbers from one to twelve with the single exception of eleven, and that admits of a very easy correction; for if, turning to the dividend (5040), we deduct two families, the defect in the division is cured. And the truth of this may be easily proved when we have leisure. But for the present, trusting to the mere assertion of this principle, let us divide the state; and assigning to each portion some God or son of a God, let us give them altars and what pertains to them, and at the altars let us hold assemblies for sacrifice twice in the month — twelve assemblies for the tribes, and twelve for the city, according to their divisions; the first in honour of the Gods and divine things, and the second to promote friendship and 'better acquaintance,' as the phrase is, and every sort of good fellowship with one another. For people must be acquainted with those into whose families and whom they marry and with those to whom they give in marriage; in such matters, as far as possible, a man should deem it all important to avoid a mistake, and with this serious purpose let games be instituted<sup>2</sup> in which youths and maidens shall dance together, seeing one another and being seen naked, at a proper age, and on a suitable occasion, not transgressing the rules of modesty.

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Games to be instituted, at which youths and maidens will dance together in modest nakedness, as a preliminary to marriage.

The directors of choruses will be the superintendents and regulators of these games, and they, together with the guardians of the law, will legislate in any matters which we have omitted; for, as we said<sup>3</sup>, where there are numerous and minute details, the legislator must leave out something. And the annual officers who have experience, and know what is wanted, must make arrangements and improvements year by year, until such enactments and provisions are sufficiently

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Tim. 39, 47 A.<sup>2</sup> Cp. Rep. v. 459 E.<sup>3</sup> Cp. *supra*, 770 B.

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CLEINIAS.

When experience has determined what customs are desirable, there shall rarely, if ever, be any further change.

determined. A ten years' experience of sacrifices and dances, if extending to all particulars, will be quite sufficient; and if the legislator be alive they shall communicate with him, but if he be dead then the several officers shall refer the omissions which come under their notice to the guardians of the law, and correct them, until all is perfect; and from that time there shall be no more change, and they shall establish and use the new laws with the others which the legislator originally gave them, and of which they are never, if they can help, to change aught; or, if some necessity overtakes them, the magistrates must be called into counsel, and the whole people, and they must go to all the oracles of the Gods; and if they are all agreed, in that case they may make the change, but if they are not agreed, by no manner of means, and any one who dissents shall prevail, as the law ordains.

Whenever any one over twenty-five years of age, having seen and been seen by others, believes himself to have found a marriage connexion which is to his mind, and suitable for the procreation of children, let him marry if he be still under the age of five-and-thirty years; but let him first hear how he ought to seek after what is suitable and appropriate<sup>1</sup>. For, as Cleinias says<sup>2</sup>, every law should have a suitable prelude.

*Cle.* You recollect at the right moment, Stranger, and do not miss the opportunity which the argument affords of saying a word in season.

In marriage there should be a union of opposite qualities.

*Ath.* I thank you. We will say to him who is born of good parents,—O my son, you ought to make such a marriage as wise men would approve. Now they would advise you neither to avoid a poor marriage, nor specially to desire a rich one; but if other things are equal, always to honour inferiors, and with them to form connexions;—this will be for the benefit of the city and of the families which are united; for the equable and symmetrical tends infinitely more to virtue than the unmixed. And he who is conscious of being too headstrong, and carried away more than is fitting in all his actions, ought to desire to become the relation of orderly parents; and he who is of the opposite temper ought to seek the opposite alliance. Let there be one word concerning all marriages:—Every man shall

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, iv. 721, and Arist. Pol. vii. 16, § 9.    <sup>2</sup> *Supra*, iv. 723 C.

follow, not after the marriage which is most pleasing to himself, but after that which is most beneficial to the state. For somehow every one is by nature prone to that which is likeliest to himself, and in this way the whole city becomes unequal in property and in disposition; and hence there arise in most states the very results which we least desire to happen. Now, to add to the law an express provision, not only that the rich man shall not marry into the rich family, nor the powerful into the family of the powerful, but that the slower natures shall be compelled to enter into marriage with the quicker, and the quicker with the slower, may awaken anger as well as laughter in the minds of many; for there is a difficulty in perceiving that the city ought to be well mingled like a cup, in which the maddening wine is hot and fiery, but when chastened by a soberer God, receives a fair associate and becomes an excellent and temperate drink<sup>1</sup>. Yet in marriage no one is able to see that the same result occurs. Wherefore also the law must let alone such matters, but we should try to charm the spirits of men into believing the equability of their children's disposition to be of more importance than equality in excessive fortune when they marry; and him who is too desirous of making a rich marriage we should endeavour to turn aside by reproaches, not, however, by any compulsion of written law.

Let this then be our exhortation concerning marriage, and let us remember what was said before<sup>2</sup>—that a man should cling to immortality, and leave behind him children's children to be the servants of God in his place for ever. All this and much more may be truly said by way of prelude about the duty of marriage. But if a man will not listen, and remains unsocial and alien among his fellow-citizens, and is still unmarried at thirty-five years of age, let him pay a yearly fine;—he who is of the highest class shall pay a fine of a hundred drachmae, and he who is of the second class a fine of seventy drachmae; the third class shall pay sixty drachmae, and the fourth thirty drachmae, and let the money be sacred to Herè; he who does not pay the fine annually shall owe ten times the sum, which the treasurer of the goddess shall exact; and if he fails in doing so, let him be answerable and give an account

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In marriage every man should seek, not what is pleasantest to himself, but what is best for the state: the rich should marry the poor, the quicker natures the slower.

These principles can only be suggested; they cannot be enforced by law.

The unmarried shall be fined and dishonoured.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Statesman, 306 foll.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*, iv. 721.



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No one need  
marry for  
money.Marriage gar-  
ments to be  
inexpensive.

Betrothals.

Marriage  
festivals to be  
moderate.

of the money at his audit. He who refuses to marry shall be thus punished in money, and also be deprived of all honour which the younger show to the elder; let no young man voluntarily obey him, and, if he attempt to punish any one, let every one come to the rescue and defend the injured person, and he who is present and does not come to the rescue, shall be pronounced by the law to be a coward and a bad citizen. Of the marriage portion I have already spoken<sup>1</sup>; and again I say for the instruction<sup>2</sup> of poor men that he who neither gives nor receives a dowry on account of poverty, has a compensation; for the citizens of our state are provided with the necessities of life, and wives will be less likely to be insolent, and husbands to be mean and subservient to them on account of property. And he who obeys this law will do a noble action; but he who will not obey, and gives or receives more than fifty drachmae as the price of the marriage garments if he be of the lowest, or more than a mina, or a mina-and-a-half, if he be of the third or second classes, or two minae, if he be of the highest class, shall owe to the public treasury a similar sum, and that which is given or received shall be sacred to Herè and Zeus; and let the treasurers of these Gods exact the money, as was said before about the unmarried—that the treasurers of Herè were to exact the money, or pay the fine themselves.

The betrothal by a father shall be valid in the first degree, that by a grandfather in the second degree, and in the third degree, betrothal by brothers who have the same father; but if there are none of these alive, the betrothal by a mother shall be valid in like manner; in cases of unexampled fatality the next of kin and the guardians shall have authority. What are to be the rites before marriages, or any other sacred acts, relating either to future, present, or past marriages, shall be referred to the interpreters; and he who follows their advice may be satisfied. Touching the marriage festival, they shall assemble not more than five male and five female friends of both families, and a like number of members of the family of either sex, and no man shall spend more than his means will allow; he who is of the richest class may spend a mina,—he who is of the second, half a mina, and if

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, v. 742 C.<sup>2</sup> Reading with Stallbaum, διδάσκειν.



the same proportion as the census of each decreases: all men shall praise him who is obedient to the law; but he who is disobedient shall be punished by the guardians of the law as a man wanting in true taste, and uninstructed in the laws of bridal song. Drunkenness is always improper, except at the festivals of the God who gave wine; and peculiarly dangerous, when a man is engaged in the business of marriage; at such a crisis of their lives a bride and bridegroom ought to have all their wits about them — they ought to take care that their offspring may be born of reasonable beings; for on what day or night Heaven will give them increase, who can say? Moreover, they ought not to be begetting children when their bodies are dissipated by intoxication, but their offspring should be compact and solid, quiet and compounded properly; whereas the drunkard is all abroad in all his actions, and is beside himself both in body and soul. Wherefore, also, the drunken man is bad and unsteady in sowing the seed of increase, and is likely to beget offspring who will be unstable and untrustworthy, and cannot be expected to walk straight either in body or mind. Hence during the whole year and all his life long, and especially while he is begetting children, he ought to take care and not intentionally do what is injurious to health, or what involves insolence and wrong; for he cannot help leaving the impression of himself on the souls and bodies of his offspring, and he begets children in every way inferior. And especially on the day and night of marriage should a man abstain from such things. For the beginning, which is also a God dwelling in man, preserves all things, if it meet with proper respect from each individual. He who marries is further to consider, that one of the two houses in the lot is the nest and nursery of his young, and there he is to marry and make a home for himself and bring up his children, going away from his father and mother. For in friendships there must be some degree of desire, in order to cement and bind together diversities of character; but excessive intercourse not having the desire which is created by time, insensibly dissolves friendships from a feeling of satiety; wherefore a man and his wife shall leave to his and her father and mother their own dwelling-places, and themselves

*Laws VI.*

ATHENIAN.

A man should be sober when he is engaged in the business of marriage; for children receive the impress of their parents, both in body and soul.

'A man shall leave his father and mother, and cleave unto his wife.'

*Laws VI.*

ATHENIAN,  
MEGILLUS.

'Handing on  
the torch of  
life.'

Slaves the  
most trouble-  
some kind of  
property.

go as to a colony and dwell there, and visit and be visited by their parents; and they shall beget and bring up children, handing on the torch of life from one generation to another, and worshipping the Gods according to law for ever.

In the next place, we have to consider what sort of property will be most convenient. There is no difficulty either in understanding or acquiring most kinds of property, but there is great difficulty in what relates to slaves. And the reason is, that we speak about them in a way which is right and which is not right; for what we say about our slaves is consistent and also inconsistent with our practice about them.

*Meg.* I do not understand, Stranger, what you mean.

*Ath.* I am not surprised, Megillus, for the state of the Helots among the Lacedaemonians is of all Hellenic forms of slavery the most controverted and disputed about, some approving and some condemning it; there is less dispute about the slavery which exists among the Heracleots, who have subjugated the Mariandynians, and about the Thessalian Penestae. Looking at these and the like examples, what ought we to do concerning property in slaves? I made a remark, in passing, which naturally elicited a question about my meaning from you. It was this:—We know that all would agree that we should have the best and most attached slaves whom we can get. For many a man has found his slaves better in every way than brethren or sons, and many times they have saved the lives and property of their masters and their whole house—such tales are well known.

*Meg.* To be sure.

*Ath.* But may we not also say that the soul of the slave is utterly corrupt, and that no man of sense ought to trust them? And the wisest of our poets, speaking of Zeus, says:

'Far-seeing Zeus takes away half the understanding of men whom the day of slavery subdues.'

Different persons have got these two different notions of slaves in their minds—some of them utterly distrust their servants, and, as if they were wild beasts, chastise them with goads and whips, and make their souls three times, or rather many times, as slavish as they were before;—and others do just the opposite.

Two kinds of  
slaves.  
There are  
good slaves,  
'better than  
brethren or  
sons.'

Another class  
are like brute  
animals, or  
are made so  
by the treat-  
ment of their  
masters.

*Meg.* True.

*Cle.* Then what are we to do in our own country, Stranger, seeing that there are such differences in the treatment of slaves by their owners?

*Ath.* Well, Cleinias, there can be no doubt that man is a troublesome animal, and therefore he is not very manageable, nor likely to become so, when you attempt to introduce the necessary division of slave, and freeman, and master.

*Cle.* That is obvious.

*Ath.* He is a troublesome piece of goods, as has been often shown by the frequent revolts of the Messenians, and the great mischiefs which happen in states having many slaves who speak the same language, and the numerous robberies and lawless life of the Italian banditti, as they are called. A man who considers all this is fairly at a loss. Two remedies alone remain to us,—not to have the slaves of the same country, nor if possible, speaking the same language<sup>1</sup>; in this way they will more easily be held in subjection: secondly, we should tend them carefully, not only out of regard to them, but yet more out of respect to ourselves. And the right treatment of slaves is to behave properly to them, and to do to them, if possible, even more justice than to those who are our equals; for he who naturally and genuinely reverences justice, and hates injustice, is discovered in his dealings with any class of men to whom he can easily be unjust. And he who in regard to the natures and actions of his slaves is undefiled by impiety and injustice, will best sow the seeds of virtue in them; and this may be truly said of every master, and tyrant, and of every other having authority in relation to his inferiors. Slaves ought to be punished as they deserve, and not admonished as if they were freemen, which will only make them conceited. The language used to a servant ought always to be that of a command<sup>2</sup>, and we ought not to jest with them, whether they are males or females—this is a foolish way which many people have of setting up their slaves, and making the life of servitude more disagreeable both for them and for their masters.

*Cle.* True.

*Ath.* Now that each of the citizens is provided, as far as

*Laws VI.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS,  
MEGILLUS.

Slaves should  
not be of the  
same country;  
they should be  
tended care-  
fully and  
treated justly.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Arist. Pol. vii. 10, § 13.      <sup>2</sup> Cp. Arist. Pol. i. 13, § 14.



*Laws VI.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

possible, with a sufficient number of suitable slaves who can help him in what he has to do, we may next proceed to describe their dwellings.

*Cle.* Very good.

The houses  
should have  
come before  
marriages;  
but no matter.

*Ath.* The city being new and hitherto uninhabited, care ought to be taken of all the buildings, and the manner of building each of them, and also of the temples and walls. These, Cleinias, were matters which properly came before the marriages;—but, as we are only talking, there is no objection to changing the order. If, however, our plan of legislation is ever to take effect, then the house shall precede the marriage if God so will, and afterwards we will come to the regulations about marriage; but at present we are only describing these matters in a general outline.

*Cle.* Quite true.

The city to be  
placed on the  
heights, and  
the temples,  
near which  
are the law-  
courts, to be  
built round  
the Agora.

*Ath.* The temples are to be placed all round the agora, and the whole city built on the heights in a circle<sup>1</sup>, for the sake of defence and for the sake of purity. Near the temples are to be placed buildings for the magistrates and the courts of law; in these plaintiff and defendant will receive their due, and the places will be regarded as most holy, partly because they have to do with holy things, and partly because they are the dwelling-places of holy Gods: and in them will be held the courts in which cases of homicide and other trials of capital offences may fitly take place. As to the walls, Megillus, I agree with Sparta in thinking that they should be allowed to sleep in the earth, and that we should not attempt to disinter them<sup>2</sup>; there is a poetical saying, which is finely expressed, that 'walls ought to be of steel and iron, and not of earth;' besides, how ridiculous of us to be sending out our young men annually into the country to dig and to trench, and to keep off the enemy by fortifications, under the idea that they are not to be allowed to set foot in our territory, and then, that we should surround ourselves with a wall, which, in the first place, is by no means conducive to the health of cities, and is also apt to produce a certain effeminacy in the minds of the inhabitants, inviting men to run thither instead of repelling their enemies, and leading them to imagine that their safety is due not to their keeping guard day and night, but

The walls  
should slum-  
ber in the  
earth.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Arist. Pol. vii. 12, § 3.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Arist. Pol. vii. 11, § 8.



that when they are protected by walls and gates, then they may sleep in safety; as if they were not meant to labour, and did not know that true repose comes from labour, and that disgraceful indolence and a careless temper of mind is only the renewal of trouble. But if men must have walls, the private houses ought to be so arranged from the first that the whole city may be one wall, having all the houses capable of defence by reason of their uniformity and equality towards the streets<sup>1</sup>. The form of the city being that of a single dwelling will have an agreeable aspect, and being easily guarded will be infinitely better for security. Until the original building is completed, these should be the principal objects of the inhabitants; and the wardens of the city should superintend the work, and should impose a fine on him who is negligent; and in all that relates to the city they should have a care of cleanliness, and not allow a private person to encroach upon any public property either by buildings or excavations. Further, they ought to take care that the rains from heaven flow off easily, and of any other matters which may have to be administered either within or without the city. The guardians of the law shall pass any further enactments which their experience may show to be necessary, and supply any other points in which the law may be deficient. And now that these matters, and the buildings about the agora, and the gymnasia, and places of instruction, and theatres, are all ready and waiting for scholars and spectators, let us proceed to the subjects which follow marriage in the order of legislation.

*Cle.* By all means.

*Ath.* Assuming that marriages exist already, Cleinias, the mode of life during the year after marriage, before children are born, will follow next in order. In what way bride and bridegroom ought to live in a city which is to be superior to other cities, is a matter not at all easy for us to determine. There have been many difficulties already, but this will be the greatest of them, and the most disagreeable to the many. Still I cannot but say what appears to me to be right and true, Cleinias.

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Laws VI.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

If cities are to have walls, the private houses should form them.

The rain should be made to flow off easily.

Life after marriage.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Arist. Pol. vii. 11, § 6.

*Laws VI.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.As at Sparta  
and Crete,  
the bride-  
groom should  
continue to  
live at the  
common  
tables.

*Ath.* He who imagines that he can give laws for the public conduct of states, while he leaves the private life of citizens wholly to take care of itself; who thinks that individuals may pass the day as they please, and that there is no necessity of order in all things; he, I say, who gives up the control of their private lives, and supposes that they will conform to law in their common and public life, is making a great mistake. Why have I made this remark? Why, because I am going to enact that the bridegrooms should live at the common tables, just as they did before marriage. This was a singularity when first enacted by the legislator in your parts of the world, Megillus and Cleinias, as I should suppose, on the occasion of some war or other similar danger<sup>1</sup>, which caused the passing of the law, and which would be likely to occur in thinly-peopled places, and in times of pressure. But when men had once tried and been accustomed to a common table, experience showed that the institution greatly conduced to security; and in some such manner the custom of having common tables arose among you.

*Cle.* Likely enough.

*Ath.* I said that there may have been singularity and danger in imposing such a custom at first, but that now there is not the same difficulty. There is, however, another institution which is the natural sequel to this, and would be excellent, if it existed anywhere, but at present it does not. The institution of which I am about to speak is not easily described or executed; and would be like the legislator 'combing wool into the fire,' as people say, or performing any other impossible and useless feat.

*Cle.* What is the cause, Stranger, of this extreme hesitation?

*Ath.* You shall hear without any fruitless loss of time. That which has law and order in a state is the cause of every good, but that which is disordered or ill-ordered is often the ruin of that which is well-ordered; and at this point the argument is now waiting. For with you, Cleinias and Megillus, the common tables of men are, as I said, a heaven-born and admirable institution, but you are mistaken in leaving the women unregulated by law. They have no similar institution of public tables in the light of day, and just that part of the

Women  
should be  
drawn into

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, i. 625, 633.

human race which is by nature prone to secrecy and stealth on account of their weakness — I mean the female sex — has been left without regulation by the legislator, which is a great mistake. And, in consequence of this neglect, many things have grown lax among you, which might have been far better, if they had been only regulated by law; for the neglect of regulations about women may not only be regarded as a neglect of half the entire matter<sup>1</sup>, but in proportion as woman's nature is inferior to that of men in capacity for virtue, in that degree the consequence of such neglect is more than twice as important. The careful consideration of this matter, and the arranging and ordering on a common principle of all our institutions relating both to men and women, greatly conduces to the happiness of the state. But at present, such is the unfortunate condition of mankind, that no man of sense will even venture to speak of common tables in places and cities in which they have never been established at all; and how can any one avoid being utterly ridiculous, who attempts to compel women to show in public how much they eat and drink? There is nothing at which the sex is more likely to take offence. For women are accustomed to creep into dark places, and when dragged out into the light they will exert their utmost powers of resistance, and be far too much for the legislator. And therefore, as I said before, in most places they will not endure to have the truth spoken without raising a tremendous outcry, but in this state perhaps they may. And if we may assume that our whole discussion about the state has not been mere idle talk, I should like to prove to you, if you will consent to listen, that this institution is good and proper; but if you had rather not, I will refrain.

*Cle.* There is nothing which we should both of us like better, Stranger, than to hear what you have to say.

*Ath.* Very good; and you must not be surprised if I go back a little, for we have plenty of leisure, and there is nothing to prevent us from considering in every point of view the subject of law.

*Cle.* True.

*Ath.* Then let us return once more to what we were saying at first. Every man should understand that the human race

*Laws VI.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

the light of  
day, and not  
be left to  
themselves.

No one ventures to introduce common tables where they do not exist already; and women certainly will not submit to them.

Antiquity of  
mankind.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Arist. Pol. i. 13, §§ 15, 16.



*Laws VI.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

All sorts of  
changes have  
occurred in  
the course of  
ages.

The growth of  
vines, olives,  
corn.

Some nations  
still sacrifice  
human  
beings;  
others are  
said to have  
abstained from  
animal food.

either had no beginning at all, and will never have an end, but always will be and has been; or that it began an immense while ago<sup>1</sup>.

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* Well, and have there not been constitutions and destructions of states, and all sorts of pursuits both orderly and disorderly, and diverse desires of meats and drinks always, and in all the world, and all sorts of changes of the seasons in which animals may be expected to have undergone innumerable transformations of themselves?

*Cle.* No doubt.

*Ath.* And may we not suppose that vines appeared, which had previously no existence, and also olives, and the gifts of Demeter and her daughter, of which one Triptolemus was the minister, and that, before these existed, animals took to devouring each other as they do still?

*Cle.* True.

*Ath.* Again, the practice of men sacrificing one another still exists among many nations; while, on the other hand, we hear of other human beings who did not even venture to taste<sup>2</sup> the flesh of a cow and had no animal sacrifices, but only cakes and fruits dipped in honey, and similar pure offerings, but no flesh of animals; from these they abstained under the idea that they ought not to eat them, and might not stain the altars of the Gods with blood. For in those days men are said to have lived a sort of Orphic life, having the use of all lifeless things, but abstaining from all living things.

*Cle.* Such has been the constant tradition, and is very likely true.

*Ath.* Some one might say to us, What is the drift of all this?

*Cle.* A very pertinent question, Stranger.

*Ath.* And therefore I will endeavour, Cleinias, if I can, to draw the natural inference.

*Cle.* Proceed.

*Ath.* I see that among men all things depend upon three wants and desires, of which the end is virtue, if they are rightly led by them, or the opposite if wrongly. Now these are eating and drinking, which begin at birth — every animal

<sup>1</sup> Cp. iii. *supra*, 676.

<sup>2</sup> Reading *ὄτι* and *ἐτάρμων*.

Three great  
desires:—  
(1) of eating;  
(2) of drink-  
ing;



has a natural desire for them, and is violently excited, and rebels against him who says that he must not satisfy all his pleasures and appetites, and get rid of all the corresponding pains — and the third and greatest and sharpest want and desire breaks out last, and is the fire of sexual lust, which kindles in men every species of wantonness and madness. And these three disorders we must endeavour to master by the three great principles of fear and law and right reason; turning them away from that which is called pleasantest to the best, using the Muses and the Gods who preside over contests to extinguish their increase and influx.

*Laws VI.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

(3) of sexual  
intercourse.

Three counter-  
acting prin-  
ciples:—  
fear, law, and  
right reason.

But to return:— After marriage let us speak of the birth of children, and after their birth of their nurture and education. In the course of discussion the several laws will be perfected, and we shall at last arrive at the common tables. Whether such associations are to be confined to men, or extended to women also, we shall see better when we approach and take a nearer view of them; and we may then determine what previous institutions are required and will have to precede them. As I said before, we shall see them more in detail, and shall be better able to lay down the laws which are proper or suited to them.

*Cle.* Very true.

*Ath.* Let us keep in mind the words which have now been spoken; for hereafter there may be need of them.

*Cle.* What do you bid us keep in mind?

*Ath.* That which we comprehended under the three words — first, eating, secondly, drinking, thirdly, the excitement of love.

*Cle.* We shall be sure to remember, Stranger.

*Ath.* Very good. Then let us now proceed to marriage, and teach persons in what way they shall beget children, threatening them, if they disobey, with the terrors of the law.

*Cle.* What do you mean?

*Ath.* The bride and bridegroom should consider that they are to produce for the state the best and fairest specimens of children which they can. Now all men who are associated in any action always succeed when they attend and give their mind to what they are doing, but when they do not give their mind or have no mind, they fail; wherefore let the

The bride and  
bridegroom  
should attend  
to their busi-  
ness.

*Laws VI.*

ATHENIAN.

The women who are the overseers of marriage shall see that the provisions of the law are observed.

bridegroom give his mind to the bride and to the begetting of children, and the bride in like manner give her mind to the bridegroom, and particularly at the time when their children are not yet born. And let the women whom we have chosen be the overseers of such matters, and let them in whatever number, large or small, and at whatever time the magistrates may command, assemble every day in the temple of Eileithyia during a third part of the day, and being there assembled, let them inform one another of any one whom they see, whether man or woman, of those who are begetting children, disregarding the ordinances given at the time when the nuptial sacrifices and ceremonies were performed. Let the begetting of children and the supervision of those who are begetting them continue ten years and no longer, during the time when marriage is fruitful. But if any continue without children up to this time, let them take counsel with their kindred and with the women holding the office of overseer and be divorced for their mutual benefit. If, however, any dispute arises about what is proper and for the interest of either party, they shall choose ten of the guardians of the law and abide by their permission and appointment. The women who preside over these matters shall enter into the houses of the young, and partly by admonitions and partly by threats make them give over their folly and error: if they persist, let the women go and tell the guardians of the law, and the guardians shall prevent them. But if they too cannot prevent them, they shall bring the matter before the people; and let them write up their names and make oath that they cannot reform such and such an one; and let him who is thus written up, if he cannot in a court of law convict those who have inscribed his name, be deprived of the privileges of a citizen in the following respects:—let him not go to weddings nor to the thanksgivings after the birth of children; and if he go, let any one who pleases strike him with impunity; and let the same regulations hold about women: let not a woman be allowed to appear abroad, or receive honour, or go to nuptial and birthday festivals, if she in like manner be written up as acting disorderly and cannot obtain a verdict. And if, when they themselves have done begetting children according to the law, a man or woman have connexion with another man

or woman who are still begetting children, let the same penalties be inflicted upon them as upon those who are still having a family; and when the time for procreation has passed let the man or woman who refrains in such matters be held in esteem, and let those who do not refrain be held in the contrary of esteem—that is to say, disesteem. Now, if the greater part of mankind behave modestly, the enactments of law may be left to slumber; but, if they are disorderly, the enactments having been passed, let them be carried into execution. To every man the first year is the beginning of life, and the time of birth ought to be written down in the temples of their fathers as the beginning of existence to every child, whether boy or girl. Let every phratria have inscribed on a whited wall the names of the successive archons by whom the years are reckoned. And near to them let the living members of the phratria be inscribed, and when they depart life let them be erased. The limit of marriageable ages for a woman shall be from sixteen to twenty years at the longest,—for a man, from thirty to thirty-five years; and let a woman hold office at forty, and a man at thirty years. Let a man go out to war from twenty to sixty years, and for a woman, if there appear any need to make use of her in military service, let the time of service be after she shall have brought forth children up to fifty years of age; and let regard be had to what is possible and suitable to each.

*Laws VI.*

ATHENIAN.

Every phratry to have inscribed upon a wall the names of its living members.

The ages for marriage, for office, and for war.



## BOOK VII.

*Laws VII.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

Education  
comes next.

There are  
many small  
matters which  
cannot be  
legislated  
about, but  
need some  
other kind of  
regulation.

AND now, assuming children of both sexes to have been born, it will be proper for us to consider, in the next place, their nurture and education; this cannot be left altogether unnoticed, and yet may be thought a subject fitted rather for precept and admonition than for law. In private life there are many little things, not always apparent, arising out of the pleasures and pains and desires of individuals, which run counter to the intention of the legislator, and make the characters of the citizens various and dissimilar:—this is an evil in states; for by reason of their smallness and frequent occurrence, there would be an unseemliness and want of propriety in making them penal by law; and if made penal, they are the destruction of the written law because mankind get the habit of frequently transgressing the law in small matters. The result is that you cannot legislate about them, and still less can you be silent. I speak somewhat darkly, but I shall endeavour also to bring my wares into the light of day, for I acknowledge that at present there is a want of clearness in what I am saying.

*Cle.* Very true.

*Ath.* Am I not right in maintaining that a good education is that which tends most to the improvement of mind and body?

*Cle.* Undoubtedly.

*Ath.* And nothing can be plainer than that the fairest bodies are those which grow up from infancy in the best and straightest manner?

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* And do we not further observe that the first shoot of



every living thing is by far the greatest and fullest? Many will even contend that a man at twenty-five does not reach twice the height which he attained at five.

*Cle.* True.

*Ath.* Well, and is not rapid growth without proper and abundant exercise the source of endless evils in the body?

*Cle.* Yes.

*Ath.* And the body should have the most exercise when it receives most nourishment?

*Cle.* But, Stranger, are we to impose this great amount of exercise upon newly-born infants?

*Ath.* Nay, rather on the bodies of infants still unborn.

*Cle.* What do you mean, my good sir? In the process of gestation?

*Ath.* Exactly. I am not at all surprised that you have never heard of this very peculiar sort of gymnastic applied to such little creatures, which, although strange, I will endeavour to explain to you.

*Cle.* By all means.

*Ath.* The practice is more easy for us to understand than for you, by reason of certain amusements which are carried to excess by us at Athens. Not only boys, but often older persons, are in the habit of keeping quails and cocks<sup>1</sup>, which they train to fight one another. And they are far from thinking that the contests in which they stir them up to fight with one another are sufficient exercise; for, in addition to this, they carry them about tucked beneath their armpits, holding the smaller birds in their hands, the larger under their arms, and go for a walk of a great many miles for the sake of health, that is to say, not their own health, but the health of the birds; whereby they prove to any intelligent person, that all bodies are benefited by shakings and movements, when they are moved without weariness, whether the motion proceeds from themselves, or is caused by a swing, or at sea, or on horseback, or by other bodies in whatever way moving, and that thus they gain the mastery over food and drink, and attain beauty and health and strength. But admitting all this, what follows? Shall we make a ridiculous law that the pregnant woman shall walk about and fashion

*Laws VII.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

During the first years of life the body grows most rapidly, and therefore needs most exercise.

The Athenians and their quails and cocks.

The benefit of motion to health and digestion.

Pregnant women should

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. v. 459.

*Law VII.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

walk about,  
and infants  
should be  
carried in the  
arms of strong  
nurses, until  
they are three  
years old.

the embryo within as we fashion wax before it hardens, and after birth swathe the infant for two years? Suppose that we compel nurses, under penalty of a legal fine, to be always carrying the children somewhere or other, either to the temples, or into the country, or to their relations' houses, until they are well able to stand, and to take care that their limbs are not distorted by leaning on them when they are too young<sup>1</sup>,—they should continue to carry them until the infant has completed its third year; the nurses should be strong, and there should be more than one of them. Shall these be our rules, and shall we impose a penalty for the neglect of them? No, no; the penalty of which we were speaking<sup>7</sup> will fall upon our own heads more than enough.

*Cle.* What penalty?*Ath.* Ridicule, and the difficulty of getting the feminine and servant-like dispositions of the nurses to comply.*Cle.* Then why was there any need to speak of the matter at all?

Public law is  
based upon  
the customs of  
private life.

*Ath.* The reason is, that masters and freemen in states, when they hear of it, are very likely to arrive at a true conviction that without due regulation of private life in cities, stability in the laying down of laws is hardly to be expected<sup>2</sup>; and he who makes this reflection may himself adopt the laws just now mentioned, and, adopting them, may order his house and state well and be happy.*Cle.* Likely enough.*Ath.* And therefore let us proceed with our legislation until we have determined the exercises which are suited to the souls of young children, in the same manner in which we have begun to go through the rules relating to their bodies.*Cle.* By all means.

Motion is  
good for the  
soul as well as  
for the body.

*Ath.* Let us assume, then, as a first principle in relation both to the body and soul of very young creatures, that nursing and moving about by day and night is good for them all, and that the younger they are, the more they will need it<sup>1</sup>; infants should live, if that were possible, as if they were always rocking at sea. This is the lesson which we may gather from the experience of nurses, and likewise from the use of the remedy of motion in the rites of the Cory-<sup>1</sup> Cp. Arist. Pol. vii. 17, § 2.<sup>2</sup> Cp. Rep. v. 449 E.

bantes; for when mothers want their restless children to go to sleep they do not employ rest, but, on the contrary, motion — rocking them in their arms; nor do they give them silence, but they sing to them and lap them in sweet strains; and the Bacchic women are cured of their frenzy in the same manner by the use of the dance and of music.

*Cle.* Well, Stranger, and what is the reason of this?

*Ath.* The reason is obvious.

*Cle.* What?

*Ath.* The affection both of the Bacchantes and of the children is an emotion of fear, which springs out of an evil habit of the soul. And when some one applies external agitation to affections of this sort, the motion coming from without gets the better of the terrible and violent internal one, and produces a peace and calm in the soul, and quiets the restless palpitation of the heart, which is a thing much to be desired, sending the children to sleep, and making the Bacchantes, although they remain awake, to dance to the pipe with the help of the Gods to whom they offer acceptable sacrifices, and producing in them a sound mind, which takes the place of their frenzy. And, to express what I mean in a word, there is a good deal to be said in favour of this treatment.

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* But if fear has such a power we ought to infer from these facts, that every soul which from youth upward has been familiar with fears, will be made more liable to fear<sup>1</sup>, and every one will allow that this is the way to form a habit of cowardice and not of courage.

*Cle.* No doubt.

*Ath.* And, on the other hand, the habit of overcoming, from our youth upwards, the fears and terrors which beset us, may be said to be an exercise of courage.

*Cle.* True.

*Ath.* And we may say that the use of exercise and motion in the earliest years of life greatly contributes to create a part of virtue in the soul.

*Cle.* Quite true.

*Ath.* Further, a cheerful temper, or the reverse, may be

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. iii. 386 A.



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regarded as having much to do with high spirit on the one hand, or with cowardice on the other.

*Cle.* To be sure.

*Ath.* Then now we must endeavour to show how and to what extent we may, if we please, without difficulty implant either character in the young.

*Cle.* Certainly.

Luxury  
creates discontent in the  
young; constraint makes  
them sullen.

*Ath.* There is a common opinion, that luxury makes the disposition of youth discontented and irascible and vehemently excited by trifles; that on the other hand excessive and savage servitude makes men mean and abject, and haters of their kind, and therefore makes them undesirable associates.

*Cle.* But how must the state educate those who do not as yet understand the language of the country, and are therefore incapable of appreciating any sort of instruction?

*Ath.* I will tell you how:—Every animal that is born is wont to utter some cry, and this is especially the case with man, and he is also affected with the inclination to weep more than any other animal.

*Cle.* Quite true.

The infant  
manifests his  
dislikes by  
tears and  
cries; his  
likes by  
silence.

*Ath.* Do not nurses, when they want to know what an infant desires, judge by these signs?—when anything is brought to the infant and he is silent, then he is supposed to be pleased, but, when he weeps and cries out, then he is not pleased. For tears and cries are the inauspicious signs by which children show what they love and hate. Now the time which is thus spent is no less than three years, and is a very considerable portion of life to be passed ill or well.

*Cle.* True.

*Ath.* Does not the discontented and ungracious nature appear to you to be full of lamentations and sorrows more than a good man ought to be?

*Cle.* Certainly.

Very young  
children  
should be  
made happy.

*Ath.* Well, but if during these three years every possible care were taken that our nursling should have as little of sorrow and fear, and in general of pain as was possible, might we not expect in early childhood to make his soul more gentle and cheerful<sup>1</sup>?

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Arist. Pol. vii. 17, § 6.



*Cle.* To be sure, Stranger,—more especially if we could procure him a variety of pleasures. *Laws VII.*

*Ath.* There I can no longer agree, Cleinias: you amaze me. To bring him up in such a way would be his utter ruin; for the beginning is always the most critical part of education. Let us see whether I am right.

*Cle.* Proceed.

*Ath.* The point about which you and I differ is of great importance, and I hope that you, Megillus, will help to decide between us. For I maintain that the true life should neither seek for pleasures, nor, on the other hand, entirely avoid pains, but should embrace the middle state<sup>1</sup>, which I just spoke of as gentle and benign, and is a state which we by some divine presage and inspiration rightly ascribe to God. Now, I say, he among men, too, who would be divine ought to pursue after this mean habit—he should not rush headlong into pleasures, for he will not be free from pains; nor should we allow any one, young or old, male or female, to be thus given any more than ourselves, and least of all the newly-born infant, for in infancy more than at any other time the character is engrained by habit. Nay, more, if I were not afraid of appearing to be ridiculous, I would say that a woman during her year of pregnancy should of all women be most carefully tended, and kept from violent or excessive pleasures and pains, and should at that time cultivate gentleness and benevolence and kindness.

Seek not for pleasures, nor avoid pains; but embrace the middle state, which is divine.

Application of this precept to infants and to pregnant women.

*Cle.* You need not ask Megillus, Stranger, which of us has most truly spoken; for I myself agree that all men ought to avoid the life of unmingled pain or pleasure, and pursue always a middle course. And having spoken well, may I add that you have been well answered?

*Ath.* Very good, Cleinias; and now let us all three consider a further point.

*Cle.* What is it?

*Ath.* That all the matters which we are now describing are commonly called by the general name of unwritten customs, and what are termed the laws of our ancestors are all of similar nature. And the reflection which lately arose in our minds<sup>2</sup>, that we can neither call these things laws, nor yet

Custom fills up the interstices of laws,

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. x. 619 A.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. *supra*, 788 A.

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CLEINIAS.and is the  
supplement  
and prop of  
them.

leave them unmentioned, is justified; for they are the bonds of the whole state, and come in between the written laws which are or are hereafter to be laid down; they are just ancestral customs of great antiquity, which, if they are rightly ordered and made habitual, shield and preserve the previously existing written law; but if they depart from right and fall into disorder, then they are like the props of builders which slip away out of their place and cause a universal ruin—one part drags another down, and the fair superstructure falls because the old foundations are undermined. Reflecting upon this, Cleinias, you ought to bind together the new state in every possible way, omitting nothing, whether great or small, of what are called laws or manners or pursuits, for by these means a city is bound together, and all these things are only lasting when they depend upon one another; and, therefore, we must not wonder if we find that many apparently trifling customs or usages come pouring in and lengthening out our laws.

*Cle.* Very true: we are disposed to agree with you.

*Ath.* Up to the age of three years, whether of boy or girl, if a person strictly carries out our previous regulations and makes them a principal aim, he will do much for the advantage of the young creatures. But at three, four, five, and even six years the childish nature will require sports; now is the time to get rid of self-will in him, punishing him, but not so as to disgrace him. We were saying about slaves<sup>1</sup>, that we ought neither to add insult to punishment so as to anger them, nor yet to leave them unpunished lest they become self-willed; and a like rule is to be observed in the case of the free-born. Children at that age have certain natural modes of amusement which they find out for themselves when they meet. And all the children who are between the ages of three and six ought to meet at the temples of the villages, the several families of a village uniting on one spot. The nurses are to see that the children behave properly and orderly,—they themselves and all their companies are to be under the control of twelve matrons, one for each company, who are annually selected to inspect them from the women previously mentioned<sup>2</sup>, [i. e. the women who have authority

The age for  
amusement  
between 3  
and 6.

Between these  
ages, children  
should meet  
daily at the  
village tem-  
ples under  
the superin-  
tendence of  
matrons and  
nurses.

<sup>1</sup> vi. 777 D, E.

<sup>2</sup> Ib. 784 A.

over marriage], whom the guardians of the law appoint. These matrons shall be chosen by the women who have authority over marriage, one out of each tribe; all are to be of the same age; and let each of them, as soon as she is appointed, hold office and go to the temples every day, punishing all offenders, male or female, who are slaves or strangers, by the help of some of the public slaves; but if any citizen disputes the punishment, let her bring him before the wardens of the city; or, if there be no dispute, let her punish him herself. After the age of six years the time has arrived for the separation of the sexes,—let boys live with boys, and girls in like manner with girls. Now they must begin to learn—the boys going to teachers of horsemanship and the use of the bow, the javelin, and sling, and the girls too, if they do not object, at any rate until they know how to manage these weapons, and especially how to handle heavy arms; for I may note, that the practice which now prevails is almost universally misunderstood.

*Cle.* In what respect?

*Ath.* In that the right and left hand are supposed to be by nature differently suited for our various uses of them; whereas no difference is found in the use of the feet and the lower limbs; but in the use of the hands we are, as it were, maimed by the folly of nurses and mothers; for although our several limbs are by nature balanced, we create a difference in them by bad habit. In some cases this is of no consequence, as, for example, when we hold the lyre in the left hand, and the plectrum in the right, but it is downright folly to make the same distinction in other cases. The custom of the Scythians proves our error; for they not only hold the bow from them with the left hand and draw the arrow to them with their right, but use either hand for both purposes. And there are many similar examples in charioteering and other things, from which we may learn that those who make the left side weaker than the right act contrary to nature. In the case of the plectrum, which is of horn only, and similar instruments, as I was saying, it is of no consequence, but makes a great difference, and may be of very great importance to the warrior who has to use iron weapons, bows and javelins, and the like; above all, when in heavy armour, he

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CLEINIAS.

At six, boys and girls should be separated; and the boys, and the girls too, should learn the use of weapons.

They should be taught to use the left hand as well as the right.

This is very important for the warrior.



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has to fight against heavy armour. And there is a very great difference between one who has learnt and one who has not, and between one who has been trained in gymnastic exercises and one who has not been. For as he who is perfectly skilled in the Pancratium or boxing or wrestling, is not unable to fight from his left side, and does not limp and draggle in confusion when his opponent makes him change his position, so in heavy-armed fighting, and in all other things, if I am not mistaken, the like holds — he who has these double powers of attack and defence ought not in any case to leave them either unused or untrained, if he can help; and if a person had the nature of Geryon or Briareus he ought to be able with his hundred hands to throw a hundred darts. Now, the magistrates, male and female, should see to all these things, the women superintending the nursing and amusements of the children, and the men superintending their education, that all of them, boys and girls alike, may be sound hand and foot, and may not, if they can help, spoil the gifts of nature by bad habits.

Two branches of education, gymnastic and music; and two parts of gymnastic, dancing and wrestling.

Only those forms of wrestling which are useful in war to be practised.

Education has two branches,—one of gymnastic, which is concerned with the body, and the other of music, which is designed for the improvement of the soul<sup>1</sup>. And gymnastic has also two branches — dancing and wrestling; and one sort of dancing imitates musical recitation, and aims at preserving dignity and freedom, the other aims at producing health, agility, and beauty in the limbs and parts of the body, giving the proper flexion and extension to each of them, a harmonious motion being diffused everywhere, and forming a suitable accompaniment to the dance. As regards wrestling, the tricks which Antaeus and Cercyon devised in their systems out of a vain spirit of competition, or the tricks of boxing which Epeius or Amycus invented, are useless and unsuitable for war, and do not deserve to have much said about them; but the art of wrestling erect and keeping free the neck and hands and sides, working with energy and constancy, with a composed strength, and for the sake of health — these are always useful, and are not to be neglected, but to be enjoined alike on masters and scholars, when we reach that part of legislation; and we will desire the one to give

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. ii. 376 E; iii. 403, 410.



their instructions freely, and the others to receive them thankfully<sup>1</sup>. Nor, again, must we omit suitable imitations of war in our choruses; here in Crete you have the armed dances of the Curetes, and the Lacedaemonians have those of the Dioscuri. And our virgin lady, delighting in the amusement of the dance, thought it not fit to amuse herself with empty hands; she must be clothed in a complete suit of armour, and in this attire go through the dance<sup>2</sup>; and youths and maidens should in every respect imitate her, esteeming highly the favour of the Goddess, both with a view to the necessities of war, and to festive occasions: it will be right also for the boys, until such time as they go out to war, to make processions and supplications to all the Gods in goodly array, armed and on horseback, in dances and marches, fast or slow, offering up prayers to the Gods and to the sons of Gods; and also engaging in contests and preludes of contests, if at all, with these objects. For these sorts of exercises, and no others, are useful both in peace and war, and are beneficial alike to states and to private houses. But other labours and sports and exercises of the body are unworthy of freemen, O Megillus and Cleinias.

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CLEINIAS.

Imitations of  
war to be  
given also by  
dances in  
armour, &c.

I have now completely described the kind of gymnastic which I said at first ought to be described; if you know of any better, will you communicate your thoughts?

*Cle.* It is not easy, Stranger, to put aside these principles of gymnastic and wrestling and to enunciate better ones.

*Ath.* Now we must say what has yet to be said about the gifts of the Muses and of Apollo: before, we fancied that we had said all, and that gymnastic alone remained<sup>3</sup>; but now we see clearly what points have been omitted, and should be first proclaimed; of these, then, let us proceed to speak.

Music again.

*Cle.* By all means.

*Ath.* Let me tell you once more — although you have heard me say the same before — that caution must be always exercised, both by the speaker and by the hearer, about anything that is very singular and unusual. For my tale is one which many a man would be afraid to tell, and yet I have a confidence which makes me go on.

*Cle.* What have you to say, Stranger?

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *infra*, 814 D.    <sup>2</sup> Cp. Crit. 110 B.    <sup>3</sup> Cp. *supra*, ii. 673.

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CLEINIAS.The plays of  
children  
should be  
fixed that  
their cha-  
racters may  
become fixed.

*Ath.* I say that in states generally no one has observed that the plays of childhood have a great deal to do with the permanence or want<sup>1</sup> of permanence in legislation. For when plays are ordered with a view to children having the same plays, and amusing themselves after the same manner, and finding delight in the same playthings, the more solemn institutions of the state are allowed to remain undisturbed. Whereas if sports are disturbed, and innovations are made in them, and they constantly change, and the young never speak of their having the same likings, or the same established notions of good and bad taste, either in the bearing of their bodies or in their dress, but he who devises something new and out of the way in figures and colours and the like is held in special honour, we may truly say that no greater evil can happen in a state<sup>1</sup>; for he who changes the sports is secretly changing the manners of the young, and making the old to be dishonoured among them and the new to be honoured. And I affirm that there is nothing which is a greater injury to all states than saying or thinking thus. Will you hear me tell how great I deem the evil to be?

*Cle.* You mean the evil of blaming antiquity in states?

*Ath.* Exactly.

*Cle.* If you are speaking of that, you will find in us hearers who are disposed to receive what you say not unfavourably but most favourably.

*Ath.* I should expect so.

*Cle.* Proceed.

*Ath.* Well, then, let us give all the greater heed to one another's words. The argument affirms that any change whatever except from evil is the most dangerous of all things; this is true in the case of the seasons and of the winds, in the management of our bodies and the habits of our minds — true of all things except, as I said before, of the bad. He who looks at the constitution of individuals accustomed to eat any sort of meat, or drink any drink, or to do any work which they can get, may see that they are at first disordered by them, but afterwards, as time goes on, their bodies grow adapted to them, and they learn to know and like variety, and have good health and enjoyment of life; and if ever afterwards they are

Changes are  
generally  
dangerous,

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. iv. 424 C.

confined again to a superior diet, at first they are troubled with disorders, and with difficulty become habituated to their new food. A similar principle we may imagine to hold good about the minds of men and the natures of their souls. For when they have been brought up in certain laws, which by some Divine Providence have remained unchanged during long ages, so that no one has any memory or tradition of their ever having been otherwise than they are, then every one is afraid and ashamed to change that which is established. The legislator must somehow find a way of implanting this reverence for antiquity, and I would propose the following way:—People are apt to fancy, as I was saying before, that when the plays of children are altered they are merely plays, not seeing that the most serious and detrimental consequences arise out of the change; and they readily comply with the child's wishes instead of deterring him, not considering that these children who make innovations in their games, when they grow up to be men, will be different from the last generation of children, and, being different, will desire a different sort of life, and under the influence of this desire will want other institutions and laws; and no one of them reflects that there will follow what I just now called the greatest of evils to states. Changes in bodily fashions are no such serious evils, but frequent changes in the praise and censure of manners are the greatest of evils, and require the utmost prevision.

*Cle.* To be sure.

*Ath.* And now do we still hold to our former assertion, that rhythms and music in general are imitations of good and evil characters in men<sup>1</sup>? What say you?

*Cle.* That is the only doctrine which we can admit.

*Ath.* Must we not, then, try in every possible way to prevent our youth from even desiring to imitate new modes either in dance or song<sup>2</sup>? nor must any one be allowed to offer them varieties of pleasures.

*Cle.* Most true.

*Ath.* Can any of us imagine a better mode of effecting this object than that of the Egyptians?

*Cle.* What is their method?

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CLEINIAS.

for the mind  
as well as for  
the body.

Children who  
make innova-  
tion in their  
games will  
develope into  
revolutionists.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, ii. 655 D foll.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Rep. iv. 424.



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CLEINIAS.We, like the  
Egyptians,  
should conse-  
crate the  
forms of song  
and dance.

*Ath.* To consecrate every sort of dance or melody. First we should ordain festivals,—calculating for the year what they ought to be, and at what time, and in honour of what Gods, sons of Gods, and heroes they ought to be celebrated; and, in the next place, what hymns ought to be sung at the several sacrifices, and with what dances the particular festival is to be honoured. This has to be arranged at first by certain persons, and, when arranged, the whole assembly of the citizens are to offer sacrifices and libations to the Fates and all the other Gods, and to consecrate the several odes to Gods and heroes: and if any one offers any other hymns or dances to any one of the Gods, the priests and priestesses, acting in concert with the guardians of the law, shall, with the sanction of religion and the law, exclude him, and he who is excluded, if he do not submit, shall be liable all his life long to have a suit of impiety brought against him by any one who likes.

*Cle.* Very good.

*Ath.* In the consideration of this subject, let us remember what is due to ourselves.

*Cle.* To what are you referring?Before stating  
our paradoxical  
law about  
music, we  
should ponder  
and reflect.

*Ath.* I mean that any young man, and much more any old one, when he sees or hears anything strange or unaccustomed, does not at once run to embrace the paradox, but he stands considering, like a person who is at a place where three paths meet, and does not very well know his way—he may be alone or he may be walking with others, and he will say to himself and them, ‘Which is the way?’ and will not move forward until he is satisfied that he is going right. And this is what we must do in the present instance:—A strange discussion on the subject of law has arisen, which requires the utmost consideration, and we should not at our age be too ready to speak about such great matters, or be confident that we can say anything certain all in a moment.

*Cle.* Most true.

*Ath.* Then we will allow time for reflection, and decide when we have given the subject sufficient consideration. But that we may not be hindered from completing the natural arrangement of our laws, let us proceed to the conclusion of them in due order; for very possibly, if God will, the



exposition of them, when completed, may throw light on our present perplexity.

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*Cle.* Excellent, Stranger; let us do as you propose.

*Ath.* Let us then affirm the paradox that strains of music are our laws (*νόμοι*), and this latter being the name which the ancients gave to lyric songs<sup>1</sup>, they probably would not have very much objected to our proposed application of the word. Some one, either asleep or awake, must have had a dreamy suspicion of their nature. And let our decree be as follows:— No one in singing or dancing shall offend against public and consecrated models, and the general fashion among the youth, any more than he would offend against any other law. And he who observes this law shall be blameless; but he who is disobedient, as I was saying, shall be punished by the guardians of the laws, and by the priests and priestesses. Suppose that we imagine this to be our law.

The law.

*Cle.* Very good.

*Ath.* Can any one who makes such laws escape ridicule? Let us see. I think that our only safety will be in first framing certain models for composers. One of these models shall be as follows:—If when a private sacrifice has been performed, and the victims have been burnt according to law,—if, I say, a son or brother, standing by the altar and over the victims, horribly blasphemes, will not his words inspire despondency and evil omens and forebodings in the mind of his father and of his other kinsmen?

Rules according to which songs are to be composed:—

(1) Words of evil omen to be avoided.

*Cle.* Of course.

*Ath.* And yet this is just what takes place in almost all our cities. A magistrate offers a public sacrifice, and there come in not one but many choruses, who take up a position a little way from the altar, and from time to time pour forth all sorts of horrible blasphemies on the sacred rites, exciting the souls of the audience with words and rhythms and melodies most sorrowful to hear; and he who at the moment when the city is offering sacrifice makes the citizens weep most, carries away the palm of victory. Now, ought we not to forbid such strains as these? And if ever our citizens must hear such lamentations, then on some unblest and inauspicious day let there be choruses of foreign and hired minstrels, like those

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, iii. 700 B.

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hirelings who accompany the departed at funerals with barbarous Carian chants. That is the sort of thing which will be appropriate if we have such strains at all; and let the apparel of the singers be, not circlets and ornaments of gold, but the reverse. Enough of all this. I will simply ask once more whether we shall lay down as one of our principles of song —

*Cle.* What?

*Ath.* That we should avoid every word of evil omen; let that kind of song which is of good omen be heard everywhere and always in our state. I need hardly ask again, but shall assume that you agree with me.

*Cle.* By all means; that law is approved by the suffrages of us all.

(2) Prayers to  
be offered at  
sacrifices.

*Ath.* But what shall be our next musical law or type? Ought not prayers to be offered up to the Gods when we sacrifice?

*Cle.* Certainly.

(3) Good, and  
not evil, to be  
asked.

*Ath.* And our third law, if I am not mistaken, will be to the effect that our poets, understanding prayers to be requests which we make to the Gods, will take especial heed that they do not by mistake ask for evil instead of good. To make such a prayer would surely be too ridiculous.

*Cle.* Very true.

*Ath.* Were we not a little while ago quite convinced that no silver or golden Plutus should dwell in our state<sup>1</sup>?

*Cle.* To be sure.

*Ath.* And what has it been the object of our argument to show? Did we not imply that the poets are not always quite capable of knowing what is good or evil? And if one of them utters a mistaken prayer in song or words, he will make our citizens pray for the opposite of what is good in matters of the highest import; than which, as I was saying, there can be few greater mistakes. Shall we then propose as one of our laws and models relating to the Muses —

*Cle.* What?—will you explain the law more precisely?

The poets to  
express the  
ideas of the  
just, the

*Ath.* Shall we make a law that the poet shall compose nothing contrary to the ideas of the lawful, or just, or beautiful, or good, which are allowed in the state? nor shall

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, v. 741 E.

he be permitted to communicate his compositions to any private individuals, until he shall have shown them to the appointed judges and the guardians of the law, and they are satisfied with them. As to the persons whom we appoint to be our legislators about music<sup>1</sup> and as to the director of education<sup>2</sup>, these have been already indicated. Once more then, as I have asked more than once, shall this be our third law, and type, and model — What do you say?

*Cle.* Let it be so, by all means.

*Ath.* Then it will be proper to have hymns and praises of the Gods<sup>3</sup>, intermingled with prayers; and after the Gods prayers and praises should be offered in like manner to demigods and heroes, suitable to their several characters.

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* In the next place there will be no objection to a law, that citizens who are departed and have done good and energetic deeds, either with their souls or with their bodies, and have been obedient to the laws, should receive eulogies; this will be very fitting.

*Cle.* Quite true.

*Ath.* But to honour with hymns and panegyrics those who are still alive is not safe; a man should run his course, and make a fair ending, and then we will praise him; and let praise be given equally to women as well as men who have been distinguished in virtue. The order of songs and dances shall be as follows:—There are many ancient musical compositions and dances which are excellent, and from these the newly-founded city may freely select what is proper and suitable; and they shall choose judges of not less than fifty years of age, who shall make the selection, and any of the old poems which they deem sufficient they shall include; any that are deficient or altogether unsuitable, they shall either utterly throw aside, or examine and amend, taking into their counsel poets and musicians, and making use of their poetical genius; but explaining to them the wishes of the legislator in order that they may regulate dancing, music, and all choral strains, according to the mind of the judges; and not allowing them to indulge, except in some few

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beautiful,  
the good,  
which the  
state ap-  
proves.

(4) There shall  
be suitable  
hymns for  
Gods, demi-  
gods, and  
heroes.

(5) The good  
to be hon-  
oured after  
death.

The law  
respecting  
the order of  
songs and  
dances.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, vi. 764 C.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. *supra*, vi. 765 D.

<sup>3</sup> Cp. Rep. x. 607 A.



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matters, their individual pleasures and fancies. Now the irregular strain of music is always made ten thousand times better by attaining to law and order, and rejecting the honeyed Muse — not however that we mean wholly to exclude pleasure, which is the characteristic of all music. And if a man be brought up from childhood to the age of discretion and maturity in the use of the orderly and severe music, when he hears the opposite he detests it, and calls it illiberal; but if trained in the sweet and vulgar music, he deems the severer kind cold and displeasing<sup>1</sup>. So that, as I was saying before, while he who hears them gains no more pleasure from the one than from the other, the one has the advantage of making those who are trained in it better men, whereas the other makes them worse.

*Cle.* Very true.

To men  
should be  
assigned a  
grand rhythm,  
which is  
expressive of  
courage;

to women  
a moderate  
and temperate  
rhythm.

*Ath.* Again, we must distinguish and determine on some general principle what songs are suitable to women, and what to men, and must assign to them their proper melodies and rhythms. It is shocking for a whole harmony to be inharmonical, or for a rhythm to be unrhythmical, and this will happen when the melody is inappropriate to them. And therefore the legislator must assign to these also their forms. Now both sexes have melodies and rhythms which of necessity belong to them; and those of women are clearly enough indicated by their natural difference. The grand, and that which tends to courage, may be fairly called manly; but that which inclines to moderation and temperance, may be declared both in law and in ordinary speech to be the 80 more womanly quality. This, then, will be the general order of them.

Let us now speak of the manner of teaching and imparting them, and the persons to whom, and the time when, they are severally to be imparted. As the shipwright first lays down the lines of the keel, and thus, as it were, draws the ship in outline, so do I seek to distinguish the patterns of life, and lay down their keels according to the nature of different men's souls; seeking truly to consider by what means, and in what ways, we may go through the voyage of life best. Now human affairs are hardly worth considering in earnest,

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Arist. Pol. viii. 6, § 8; 7, § 7.



and yet we must be in earnest about them,—a sad necessity constrains us. And having got thus far, there will be a fitness in our completing the matter, if we can only find some suitable method of doing so. But what do I mean? Some one may ask this very question, and quite rightly, too.

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* I say that about serious matters a man should be serious, and about a matter which is not serious he should not be serious; and that God is the natural and worthy object of our most serious and blessed endeavours, for man, as I said before<sup>1</sup>, is made to be the plaything of God, and this, truly considered, is the best of him; wherefore also every man and woman should walk seriously, and pass life in the noblest of pastimes, and be of another mind from what they are at present.

*Cle.* In what respect?

*Ath.* At present they think that their serious pursuits should be for the sake of their sports, for they deem war a serious pursuit, which must be managed well for the sake of peace; but the truth is, that there neither is, nor has been, nor ever will be, either amusement or instruction in any degree worth speaking of in war, which is nevertheless deemed by us to be the most serious of our pursuits. And therefore, as we say, every one of us should live the life of peace as long and as well as he can<sup>2</sup>. And what is the right way of living? Are we to live in sports always? If so, in what kind of sports? We ought to live sacrificing, and singing, and dancing, and then a man will be able to propitiate the Gods, and to defend himself against his enemies and conquer them in battle. The type of song or dance by which he will propitiate them has been described, and the paths along which he is to proceed have been cut for him. He will go forward in the spirit of the poet<sup>3</sup>:—

‘Telemachus, some things thou wilt thyself find in thy heart, but other things God will suggest; for I deem that thou wast not born or brought up without the will of the Gods.’

And this ought to be the view of our alumni; they ought to think that what has been said is enough for them, and that

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, i. 644 D, E.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. *supra*, i. 628.

<sup>3</sup> Homer, *Odyss.* iii. 26 foll.

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ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

Human affairs  
are hardly  
serious, and  
yet we must  
be in earnest  
about them.

The best of  
man is that  
he is the  
plaything  
of the Gods.

The life of  
peace better  
than the  
life of war.

But what  
is the life  
of peace?—  
The life of  
dance and  
song.

*Laus VII.*ATHENIAN,  
MEGILLUS.

any other things their Genius and God will suggest to them—he will tell them to whom, and when, and to what Gods severally they are to sacrifice and perform dances, and how they may propitiate the deities, and live according to the appointment of nature; being for the most part puppets, but having some little share of reality.

*Meg.* You have a low opinion of mankind, Stranger.

*Ath.* Nay, Megillus, be not amazed, but forgive me:—I was comparing them with the Gods; and under that feeling I spoke. Let us grant, if you wish, that the human race is not to be despised, but is worthy of some consideration.

A new subject:—  
Gymnasia;  
schools,  
places for  
horse exercise;  
open spaces for  
archery.

The teachers  
to be foreigners  
and paid.

Education to  
be compulsory on  
both sexes.

The state is  
reduced to  
a half, if

Next follow the buildings for gymnasia and schools open to all; these are to be in three places in the midst of the city; and outside the city and in the surrounding country, also in three places, there shall be schools for horse exercise, and large grounds arranged with a view to archery and the throwing of missiles, at which young men may learn and practise. Of these mention has already been made<sup>1</sup>; and if the mention be not sufficiently explicit, let us speak further of them and embody them in laws. In these several schools let there be dwellings for teachers, who shall be brought from foreign parts by pay, and let them teach those who attend the schools the art of war and the art of music, and the children shall come not only if their parents please, but if they do not please; there shall be compulsory education, as the saying is, of all and sundry, as far as this is possible; and the pupils shall be regarded as belonging to the state rather than to their parents<sup>2</sup>. My law would apply to females as well as males; they shall both go through the same exercises. I assert without fear of contradiction that gymnastic and horsemanship are as suitable to women as to men<sup>3</sup>. Of the truth of this I am persuaded from ancient tradition, and at the present day there are said to be countless myriads of women in the neighbourhood of the Black Sea, called Sauromatides, who not only ride on horseback like men, but have enjoined upon them the use of bows and other weapons equally with the men. And I further affirm, that if these things are possible, nothing can be more absurd

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, vi. 764, 779.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Arist. Pol. viii. 1, §§ 3, 4.

<sup>3</sup> Cp. Rep. v. 451 foll.

than the practice which prevails in our own country, of men and women not following the same pursuits with all their strength and with one mind, for thus the state, instead of being a whole, is reduced to a half<sup>1</sup>, but has the same imposts to pay and the same toils to undergo; and what can be a greater mistake for any legislator to make than this?

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ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

the training  
of women  
be neglected.

*Cle.* Very true; yet much of what has been asserted by us, Stranger, is contrary to the custom of states; still, in saying that the discourse should be allowed to proceed, and that when the discussion is completed, we should choose what seems best, you spoke very properly<sup>2</sup>, and I now feel compunction for what I have said. Tell me, then, what you would next wish to say.

*Ath.* I should wish to say, Cleinias, as I said before, that if the possibility of these things were not sufficiently proven in fact, then there might be an objection to the argument, but the fact being as I have said, he who rejects the law must find some other ground of objection; and, failing this, our exhortation will still hold good, nor will any one deny that women ought to share as far as possible in education and in other ways with men. For consider;—if women do not share in their whole life with men, then they must have some other order of life.

It is a well-known fact that women are able to share men's pursuits. If they do not they must have an inferior life.

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* And what arrangement of life to be found anywhere is preferable to this community which we are now assigning to them? Shall we prefer that which is adopted by the Thracians and many other races who use their women to till the ground and to be shepherds of their herds and flocks, and to minister to them like slaves?—Or shall we do as we and people in our part of the world do—getting together, as the phrase is, all our goods and chattels into one dwelling, we entrust them to our women, who are the stewards of them, and who also preside over the shuttles and the whole art of spinning? Or shall we take a middle course, as in Lacedaemon, Megillus—letting the girls share in gymnastic and music, while the grown-up women, no longer employed in spinning wool, are hard at work weaving the web of life, which will be no cheap or mean employment, and in the

Lives of  
women in  
different  
countries.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, vi. 781 B; Arist. Pol. i. 13, §§ 15, 16.    <sup>2</sup> *Supra*, 799 C.



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CLEINIAS,  
MEGILLUS.The Spartan  
type falls  
short of the  
Sauromatid.

duty of serving and taking care of the household and bringing up children, in which they will observe a sort of mean, not participating in the toils of war; and if there were any necessity that they should fight for their city and families, unlike the Amazons, they would be unable to take part in archery or any other skilled use of missiles, nor could they, after the example of the Goddess, carry shield or spear, or stand up nobly for their country when it was being destroyed, and strike terror into their enemies, if only because they were seen in regular order? Living as they do, they would never dare at all to imitate the Sauromatides, who, when compared with ordinary women, would appear to be like men. Let him who will, praise your legislators, but I must say what I think. The legislator ought to be whole and perfect, and not half a man only; he ought not to let the female sex live softly and waste money and have no order of life, while he takes the utmost care of the male sex, and leaves half of life only blest with happiness, when he might have made the whole state happy.

*Meg.* What shall we do, Cleinias? Shall we allow a stranger to run down Sparta in this fashion?

*Cle.* Yes; for as we have given him liberty of speech we must let him go on until we have perfected the work of legislation.

*Meg.* Very true.

*Ath.* Then now I may proceed?

*Cle.* By all means.

Our citizens  
are not to live  
like cattle;  
they have a  
work to do.

*Ath.* What will be the manner of life among men who may be supposed to have their food and clothing provided for them in moderation, and who have entrusted the practice of the arts to others, and whose husbandry committed to slaves paying a part of the produce, brings them a return sufficient for men living temperately; who, moreover, have common tables in which the men are placed apart, and near them are the common tables of their families, of their daughters and mothers, which day by day, the officers, male and female, are to inspect — they shall see to the behaviour of the company, and so dismiss them; after which the presiding magistrate and his attendants shall honour with libations those Gods to whom that day and night are dedicated, and then go home? To



men whose lives are thus ordered, is there no work remaining to be done which is necessary and fitting, but shall each one of them live fattening like a beast? Such a life is neither just nor honourable, nor can he who lives it fail of meeting his due; and the due reward of the idle fatted beast is that he should be torn in pieces by some other valiant beast whose fatness is worn down by brave deeds and toil. These regulations, if we duly consider them, will never be exactly carried into execution under present circumstances, nor as long as women and children and houses and all other things are the private property of individuals; but if we can attain the second-best form of polity, we shall be very well off. And to men living under this second polity there remains a work to be accomplished which is far from being small or insignificant, but is the greatest of all works, and ordained by the appointment of righteous law. For the life which may be truly said to be concerned with the virtue of body and soul is twice, or more than twice, as full of toil and trouble as the pursuit after Pythian and Olympic victories<sup>1</sup>, which debars a man from every employment of life. For there ought to be no byework interfering with the greater work of providing the necessary exercise and nourishment for the body, and instruction and education for the soul. Night and day are not long enough for the accomplishment of their perfection and consummation; and therefore to this end all freemen ought to arrange the way in which they will spend their time during the whole course of the day, from morning till evening and from evening till the morning of the next sunrise. There may seem to be some impropriety in the legislator determining minutely the numberless details of the management of the house, including such particulars as the duty of wakefulness in those who are to be perpetual watchmen of the whole city; for that any citizen should continue during the whole of any night in sleep, instead of being seen by all his servants, always the first to awake and get up—this, whether the regulation is to be called a law or only a practice, should be deemed base and unworthy of a freeman; also that the mistress of the house should be awakened by her handmaidens instead of herself first awakening them, is what the

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ATHENIAN.

The perfect life can only be led by men who have all things in commo. Yet even when there is private property, the due ordering of home life is a more arduous task than the pursuit of Olympian victories.

The duty of wakefulness.

The citizens and their wives should rise early.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. v. 465 D, 466 A.

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ATHENIAN.

slaves, male and female, and the serving-boys, and, if that were possible, everybody and everything in the house should regard as base. If they rise early, they may all of them do much of their public and of their household business, as magistrates in the city, and masters and mistresses in their private houses, before the sun is up. Much sleep is not required by nature, either for our souls or bodies, or for the actions which they perform. For no one who is asleep is good for anything, any more than if he were dead; but he of us who has the most regard for life and reason keeps awake as long as he can, reserving only so much time for sleep as is expedient for health; and much sleep is not required, if the habit of moderation be once rightly formed. Magistrates in states who keep awake at night are terrible to the bad, whether enemies or citizens, and are honoured and revered by the just and temperate, and are useful to themselves and to the whole state.

At daybreak  
the boy is  
to be taken  
to school.

The nature of  
that animal.

A night which is passed in such a manner, in addition to all the above-mentioned advantages, infuses a sort of courage into the minds of the citizens. When the day breaks, the time has arrived for youth to go to their schoolmasters. Now neither sheep nor any other animals can live without a shepherd, nor can children be left without tutors, or slaves without masters. And of all animals the boy is the most unmanageable, inasmuch as he has the fountain of reason in him not yet regulated<sup>1</sup>; he is the most insidious, sharp-witted, and insubordinate of animals. Wherefore he must be bound with many bridles; in the first place, when he gets away from mothers and nurses, he must be under the management of tutors on account of his childishness and foolishness; then, again, being a freeman, he must be controlled by teachers, no matter what they teach, and by studies; but he is also a slave, and in that regard any freeman who comes in his way may punish him and his tutor and his instructor, if any of them does anything wrong; and he who comes across him and does not inflict upon him the punishment which he deserves, shall incur the greatest disgrace; and let the guardian of the law, who is the director of education, see to him who coming in the way of the offences which we have mentioned, does

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, vi. 766 A.

not chastise them when he ought, or chastises them in a way which he ought not; let him keep a sharp look-out, and take especial care of the training of our children, directing their natures, and always turning them to good according to the law.

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ATHENIAN.

But how can our law sufficiently train the director of education himself; for as yet all has been imperfect, and nothing has been said either clear or satisfactory? Now, as far as possible, the law ought to leave nothing to him, but to explain everything, that he may be an interpreter and tutor to others. About dances and music and choral strains, I have already spoken both as to the character of the selection of them, and the manner in which they are to be amended and consecrated. But we have not as yet spoken, O illustrious guardian of education, of the manner in which your pupils are to use those strains which are written in prose, although you have been informed what martial strains they are to learn and practice; what relates in the first place to the learning of letters, and secondly, to the lyre, and also to calculation, which as we were saying<sup>1</sup>, is needful for them all to learn, and any other things which are required with a view to war and the management of house and city, and, looking to the same object, what is useful in the revolutions of the heavenly bodies — the stars and sun and moon, and the various regulations about these matters which are necessary for the whole state — I am speaking of the arrangements of days in periods of months, and of months in years, which are to be observed, in order that seasons and sacrifices and festivals may have their regular and natural order, and keep the city alive and awake, the Gods receiving the honours due to them, and men having a better understanding about them<sup>2</sup>: all these things, O my friend, have not yet been sufficiently declared to you by the legislator. Attend, then, to what I am now going to say:— We were telling you, in the first place, that you were not sufficiently informed about letters, and the objection was to this effect,—that you were never told whether he who was meant to be a respectable citizen should apply himself in detail to that sort of learning, or not apply himself at all; and the same remark holds good of the study of the lyre.

The Director of Education is to proceed according to fixed rules.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, v. 747.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. *infra*, viii. 828.



*Laws VII.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

Three years  
(10-13) to  
be spent in  
learning to  
read and  
write: an-  
other three  
years in learn-  
ing music.

Dangerous  
tendency of  
many prose  
writings.

But now we say that he ought to attend to them. A fair time for a boy of ten years old to spend in letters is three years; the age of thirteen is the proper time for him to begin to handle the lyre, and he may continue at this for another three years, neither more nor less, and whether his father or himself like or dislike the study, he is not to be allowed to spend more or less time in learning music than the law allows. And let him who disobeys the law be deprived of those youthful honours of which we shall hereafter speak<sup>1</sup>. Hear, however, first of all, what the young ought to learn in the early years of life, and what their instructors ought to teach them. They ought to be occupied with their letters until they are able to read and write; but the acquisition of perfect beauty or quickness in writing, if nature has not stimulated them to acquire these accomplishments in the given number of years, they should let alone. And as to the learning of compositions committed to writing which are not set to the lyre, whether metrical or without rhythmical divisions, compositions in prose, as they are termed, having no rhythm or harmony—seeing how dangerous are the writings handed down to us by many writers of this class—what will you do with them, O most excellent guardians of the law? or how can the lawgiver rightly direct you about them? I believe that he will be in great difficulty.

*Cle.* What troubles you, Stranger? and why are you so perplexed in your mind?

*Ath.* You naturally ask, Cleinias, and to you and Megillus, who are my partners in the work of legislation, I must state the more difficult as well as the easier parts of the task.

*Cle.* To what do you refer in this instance?

*Ath.* I will tell you. There is a difficulty in opposing many myriads of mouths.

*Cle.* Well, and have we not already opposed the popular voice in many important enactments?

*Ath.* That is quite true; and you mean to imply that the road which we are taking may be disagreeable to some but is agreeable to as many others, or if not to as many, at any rate to persons not inferior to the others, and in company with them you bid me, at whatever risk, to proceed along the path of

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *infra*, viii. 829 C.



legislation which has opened out of our present discourse, and to be of good cheer, and not to faint.

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*Cle.* Certainly.

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Ath.* And I do not faint; I say, indeed, that we have a great many poets writing in hexameter, trimeter, and all sorts of measures — some who are serious, others who aim only at raising a laugh — and all mankind declare that the youth who are rightly educated should be brought up in them and saturated with them; some insist that they should be constantly hearing them read aloud, and always learning them, so as to get by heart entire poets; while others select choice passages and long speeches, and make compendiums of them, saying that these ought to be committed to memory, if a man is to be made good and wise by experience and learning of many things. And you want me now to tell them plainly in what they are right and in what they are wrong.

Practice of  
learning poets  
by heart.

*Cle.* Yes, I do.

*Ath.* But how can I in one word rightly comprehend all of them? I am of opinion, and, if I am not mistaken, there is a general agreement, that every one of these poets has said many things well and many things the reverse of well; and if this be true, then I do affirm that much learning is dangerous to youth.

We should  
discriminate;  
a selection  
should be  
made.

*Cle.* How would you advise the guardian of the law to act?

*Ath.* In what respect?

*Cle.* I mean to what pattern should he look as his guide in permitting the young to learn some things and forbidding them to learn others. Do not shrink from answering.

*Ath.* My good Cleinias, I rather think that I am fortunate.

*Cle.* How so?

*Ath.* I think that I am not wholly in want of a pattern, for when I consider the words which we have spoken from early lawn until now, and which, as I believe, have been inspired by Heaven, they appear to me to be quite like a poem. When I reflected upon all these words of ours, I naturally felt pleasure, or of all the discourses which I have ever learnt or heard, either in poetry or prose, this seemed to me to be the justest, and most suitable for young men to hear; I cannot imagine any better pattern than this which the guardian of the law

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CLEINIAS.

The Director  
of Education  
shall au-  
thorize the  
teachers to  
instruct their  
pupils in our  
laws and in  
works of a  
similar  
character.

who is also the director of education can have. He cannot do better than advise the teachers to teach the young these words and any which are of a like nature, if he should happen to find them, either in poetry or prose, or if he come across unwritten discourses akin to ours, he should certainly preserve them, and commit them to writing. And, first of all, he shall constrain the teachers themselves to learn and approve them, and any of them who will not, shall not be employed by him, but those whom he finds agreeing in his judgment, he shall make use of and shall commit to them the instruction and education of youth. And here and on this wise let my fanciful tale about letters and teachers of letters come to an end.

*Cle.* I do not think, Stranger, that we have wandered out of the proposed limits of the argument; but whether we are right or not in our whole conception, I cannot be very certain.

*Ath.* The truth, Cleinias, may be expected to become clearer when, as we have often said, we arrive at the end of the whole discussion about laws.

*Cle.* Yes.

The teaching  
of the lyre.

*Ath.* And now that we have done with the teacher of letters, the teacher of the lyre has to receive orders from us.

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* I think that we have only to recollect our previous discussions, and we shall be able to give suitable regulations touching all this part of instruction and education to the teachers of the lyre.

*Cle.* To what do you refer?

*Ath.* We were saying, if I remember rightly, that the sixty years old choristers of Dionysus were to be specially quick in their perceptions of rhythm and musical composition, that they might be able to distinguish good and bad imitation, that is to say, the imitation of the good or bad soul when under the influence of passion, rejecting the one and displaying the other in hymns and songs, charming the souls of youth, and inviting them to follow and attain virtue by the way of imitation<sup>1</sup>.

*Cle.* Very true.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, ii. 664 foll.

*Ath.* And with this view the teacher and the learner ought to use the sounds of the lyre, because its notes are pure, the player who teaches and his pupil rendering note for note in unison; but complexity, and variation of notes, when the strings give one sound and the poet or composer of the melody gives another,—also when they make concords and harmonies in which lesser and greater intervals, slow and quick, or high and low notes, are combined,—or, again, when they make complex variations of rhythms, which they adapt to the notes of the lyre<sup>1</sup>,—all that sort of thing is not suited to those who have acquired a speedy and useful knowledge of music in three years; for opposite principles are confusing, and create a difficulty in learning, and our young men should learn quickly, and their mere necessary acquirements are not few or trifling, as will be shown in due course. Let the director of education attend to the principles concerning music which we are laying down. As to the songs and words themselves which the masters of choruses are to teach and the character of them, they have been already described by us, and are the same which, when consecrated and adapted to the different festivals, we said were to benefit cities by affording them an innocent amusement<sup>2</sup>.

*Cle.* That, again, is true.

*Ath.* Then let him who has been elected a director of music<sup>3</sup> receive these rules from us as containing the very truth; and may he prosper in his office! Let us now proceed to lay down other rules in addition to the preceding about dancing and gymnastic exercise in general. Having said what remained to be said about the teaching of music, let us speak in like manner about gymnastic. For boys and girls ought to learn to dance and practise gymnastic exercises—ought they not?

*Cle.* Yes.

*Ath.* Then the boys ought to have dancing masters, and the girls dancing mistresses to exercise them.

*Cle.* Very good.

*Ath.* Then once more let us summon him who has the chief concern in the business, the superintendent of youth

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ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

Variety and complexity of notes and rhythms to be avoided.

The teaching of gymnastic.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. iii. 397.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. *supra*, 799.

<sup>3</sup> Cp. *supra*, vi. 764 C.



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CLEINIAS.

[i. e. the director of education]; he will have plenty to do, if he is to have the charge of music and gymnastic.

*Cle.* But how will an old man be able to attend to such great charges?

*Ath.* O my friend, there will be no difficulty, for the law has already given and will give him permission to select as his assistants in this charge any citizens, male or female, whom he desires; and he will know whom he ought to choose, and will be anxious not to make a mistake, from a due sense of responsibility, and from a consciousness of the importance of his office, and also because he will consider that if young men have been and are well brought up, then all things go swimmingly, but if not, it is not meet to say, nor do we say, what will follow, lest the regarders of omens should take alarm about our infant state. Many things have been said by us about dancing and about gymnastic movements in general; for we include under gymnastics all military exercises, such as archery, and all hurling of weapons, and the use of the light shield, and all fighting with heavy arms, and military evolutions, and movements of armies, and encampings, and all that relates to horsemanship. Of all these things there ought to be public teachers, receiving pay from the state, and their pupils should be the men and boys in the state, and also the girls and women, who are to know all these things. While they are yet girls they should have practised dancing in arms and the whole art of fighting — when grown-up women, they should apply themselves to evolutions and tactics, and the mode of grounding and taking up arms; if for no other reason, yet in case the whole military force should have to leave the city and carry on operations of war outside, that those who will have to guard the young and the rest of the city may be equal to the task; and, on the other hand, when enemies, whether barbarian or Hellenic, come from without with mighty force and make a violent assault upon them, and thus compel them to fight for the possession of the city, which is far from being an impossibility, great would be the disgrace to the state, if the women had been so miserably trained that they could not fight for their young, as birds will, against any creature however strong, and die or undergo any danger, but must

Gymnastics  
(under which,  
besides  
dancing, all  
military ex-  
ercises are  
included)  
are to be  
learned by  
women as  
well as by  
men.

Women, like  
birds, should  
be willing  
to fight for  
their young.



instantly rush to the temples and crowd at the altars and shrines, and bring upon human nature the reproach, that of all animals man is the most cowardly!

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ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Cle.* Such a want of education, Stranger, is certainly an unseemly thing to happen in a state, as well as a great misfortune.

*Ath.* Suppose that we carry our law to the extent of saying that women ought not to neglect military matters, but that all citizens, male and female alike, shall attend to them?

*Cle.* I quite agree.

*Ath.* Of wrestling we have spoken in part, but of what I should call the most important part we have not spoken, and cannot easily speak without showing at the same time by gesture as well as in word what we mean; when word and action combine, and not till then, we shall explain clearly what has been said, pointing out that of all movements wrestling is most akin to the military art, and is to be pursued for the sake of this, and not this for the sake of wrestling.

Wrestling  
most akin  
to the mili-  
tary art.

*Cle.* Excellent.

*Ath.* Enough of wrestling; we will now proceed to speak of other movements of the body. Such motion may be in general called dancing, and is of two kinds: one of nobler figures, imitating the honourable, the other of the more ignoble figures, imitating the mean; and of both these there are two further subdivisions. Of the serious, one kind is of those engaged in war and vehement action, and is the exercise of a noble person and a manly heart; the other exhibits a temperate soul in the enjoyment of prosperity and modest pleasures, and may be truly called and is the dance of peace. The warrior dance is different from the peaceful one, and may be rightly termed Pyrrhic; this imitates the modes of avoiding blows and missiles by dropping or giving way, or springing aside, or rising up or falling down; also the opposite postures which are those of action, as, for example, the imitation of archery and the hurling of javelins, and of all sorts of blows. And when the imitation is of brave bodies and souls, and the action is direct and muscular, giving for the most part a straight movement to the

Two forms  
of the dance,  
a noble and  
an ignoble.  
Of the former  
there are  
again two  
kinds:—

(1) the Pyrrhic dance,  
imitating  
the postures  
of attack  
and defence;

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(2) the dance of peace, Emmeleia, easy and graceful.

The Bacchic dance condemned.

The peaceful dance may express increase of good or escape from evil:

and has more or less of motion, as the pleasure is greater or less.

limbs of the body — that, I say, is the true sort; but the opposite is not right. In the dance of peace what we have to consider is whether a man bears himself naturally and gracefully, and after the manner of men who duly conform to the law. But before proceeding I must distinguish the dancing about which there is any doubt, from that about which there is no doubt. Which is the doubtful kind, and how are the two to be distinguished? There are dances of the Bacchic sort, both those in which, as they say, they imitate drunken men, and which are named after the Nymphs, and Pan, and Silenuses, and Satyrs; and also those in which purifications are made or mysteries celebrated,—all this sort of dancing cannot be rightly defined as having either a peaceful or a warlike character, or indeed as having any meaning whatever, and may, I think, be most truly described as distinct from the warlike dance, and distinct from the peaceful, and not suited for a city at all. There let it lie; and so leaving it to lie, we will proceed to the dances of war and peace, for with these we are undoubtedly concerned. Now the unwarlike muse, which honours in dance the Gods and the sons of the Gods, is entirely associated with the consciousness of prosperity; this class may be subdivided into two lesser classes, of which one is expressive of an escape from some labour or danger into good, and has greater pleasures, the other expressive of preservation and increase of former good, in which the pleasure is less exciting;—in all these cases, every man when the pleasure is greater, moves his body more, and less when the pleasure is less; and, again, if he be more orderly and has learned courage from discipline he moves less, but if he be a coward, and has no training or self- 85 control, he makes greater and more violent movements, and in general when he is speaking or singing he is not altogether able to keep his body still; and so out of the imitation of words in gestures the whole art of dancing has arisen. And in these various kinds of imitation one man moves in an orderly, another in a disorderly manner; and as the ancients may be observed to have given many names which are according to nature and deserving of praise, so there is an excellent one which they have given to the dances of men who in their times of prosperity are moderate in their pleasures — the giver

of names, whoever he was, assigned to them a very true, and poetical, and rational name, when he called them Emmeleiai, or dances of order, thus establishing two kinds of dances of the nobler sort, the dance of war which he called the Pyrrhic, and the dance of peace which he called Emmeleia, or the dance of order; giving to each their appropriate and becoming name<sup>1</sup>. These things the legislator should indicate in general outline, and the guardian of the law should enquire into them and search them out, combining dancing with music, and assigning to the several sacrificial feasts that which is suitable to them; and when he has consecrated all of them in due order, he shall for the future change nothing, whether of dance or song. Thenceforward the city and the citizens shall continue to have the same pleasures, themselves being as far as possible alike, and shall live well and happily.

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I have described the dances which are appropriate to noble bodies and generous souls. But it is necessary also to consider and know uncomely persons and thoughts, and those which are intended to produce laughter in comedy, and have a comic character in respect of style, song, and dance, and of the imitations which these afford. For serious things cannot be understood without laughable things, nor opposites at all without opposites, if a man is really to have intelligence of either; but he cannot carry out both in action, if he is to have any degree of virtue. And for this very reason he should learn them both, in order that he may not in ignorance do or say anything which is ridiculous and out of place — he should command slaves and hired strangers to imitate such things, but he should never take any serious interest in them himself, nor should any freeman or freewoman be discovered taking pains to learn them; and there should always be some element of novelty in the imitation. Let these then be laid down, both in law and in our discourse, as the regulations of laughable amusements which are generally called comedy. And, if any of the serious poets, as they are termed, who write tragedy, come to us and say — ‘O strangers, may we go to your city and country or may we not, and shall we bring with us our poetry — what is your will about these

Laughable things to be understood by our citizens as well as serious, but not to be imitated by them.

Comedies to be performed only by slaves and hirelings.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Crat. 388 E foll.



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CLEINIAS.The serious  
poet too is  
required to  
conform to  
our models.

matters? '—how shall we answer the divine men? I think that our answer should be as follows<sup>1</sup>:—Best of strangers, we will say to them, we also according to our ability are tragic poets, and our tragedy is the best and noblest; for our whole state is an imitation of the best and noblest life, which we affirm to be indeed the very truth of tragedy. You are poets and we are poets, both makers of the same strains, rivals and antagonists in the noblest of dramas, which true law can alone perfect, as our hope is. Do not then suppose that we shall all in a moment allow you to erect your stage in the agora, or introduce the fair voices of your actors, speaking above our own, and permit you to harangue our women and children, and the common people, about our institutions, in language other than our own, and very often the opposite of our own. For a state would be mad which gave you this licence, until the magistrates had determined whether your poetry might be recited, and was fit for publication or not. Wherefore, O ye sons and scions of the softer Muses, first of all show your songs to the magistrates, and let them compare them with our own, and if they are the same or better we will give you a chorus; but if not, then, my friends, we cannot. Let these, then, be the customs ordained by law about all dances and the teaching of them, and let matters relating to slaves be separated from those relating to masters, if you do not object.

*Cle.* We can have no hesitation in assenting when you put the matter thus.

*Ath.* There still remain three studies suitable for freemen. Arithmetic is one of them; the measurement of length, surface, and depth is the second; and the third has to do with the revolutions of the stars in relation to one another. Not every one has need to toil through all these things in a strictly scientific manner, but only a few, and who they are to be we will hereafter indicate at the end, which will be the proper place<sup>2</sup>; not to know what is necessary for mankind in general, and what is the truth, is disgraceful to every one: and yet to enter into these matters minutely is neither easy, nor at all possible for every one; but there is something in them which is necessary and cannot be set aside, and probably he

Three subjects  
of education  
remain:(1) Arith-  
metic;

(2) Geometry;

(3) Astro-  
nomy.Of all three  
there is a  
scientific  
knowledge  
for the few;  
a popular<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. iii. 398 A; x. 607 A.<sup>2</sup> Cp. *infra*, xii. 967.



who made the proverb about God originally had this in view when he said, that 'not even God himself can fight against necessity; '—he meant, if I am not mistaken, divine necessity; for as to the human necessities of which the many speak, when they talk in this manner, nothing can be more ridiculous than such an application of the words.

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ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

knowledge  
for the many.

*Cle.* And what necessities of knowledge are there, Stranger, which are divine and not human?

*Ath.* I conceive them to be those of which he who has no use nor any knowledge at all cannot be a God, or demigod, or hero to mankind, or able to take any serious thought or charge of them. And very unlike a divine man would he be, who is unable to count one, two, three, or to distinguish odd and even numbers<sup>1</sup>, or is unable to count at all, or reckon night and day, and who is totally unacquainted with the revolution of the sun and moon, and the other stars. There would be great folly in supposing that all these are not necessary parts of knowledge to him who intends to know anything about the highest kinds of knowledge<sup>2</sup>; but which these are, and how many there are of them, and when they are to be learned, and what is to be learned together and what apart, and the whole correlation of them, must be rightly apprehended first; and these leading the way we may proceed to the other parts of knowledge. For so necessity grounded in nature constrains us, against which we say that no God contends, or ever will contend.

(1) In arithmetic there is a divine necessity;

and it is a necessary preliminary to the higher kinds of knowledge.

*Cle.* I think, Stranger, that what you have now said is very true and agreeable to nature.

*Ath.* Yes, Cleinias, that is so. But it is difficult for the legislator to begin with these studies; at a more convenient time we will make regulations for them.

*Cle.* You seem, Stranger, to be afraid of our habitual ignorance of the subject: there is no reason why that should prevent you from speaking out.

*Ath.* I certainly am afraid of the difficulties to which you allude, but I am still more afraid of those who apply themselves to this sort of knowledge, and apply themselves badly. For entire ignorance is not so terrible or extreme an evil, and is far from being the greatest of all; too much cleverness

Cleverness  
ill-directed  
often more  
fatal than  
ignorance.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. vii. 522.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. *ibid.* 523, 524, 525, &c.

*Laws VII.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.Arithmetical  
games prac-  
tised by the  
Egyptians  
and their uses.

and too much learning, accompanied with an ill bringing up, are far more fatal <sup>1</sup>.

*Cle.* True.

*Ath.* All freemen, I conceive, should learn as much of these branches of knowledge as every child in Egypt is taught when he learns the alphabet. In that country arithmetical games have been invented for the use of mere children, which they learn as a pleasure and amusement. They have to distribute apples and garlands, using the same number sometimes for a larger and sometimes for a lesser number of persons; and they arrange pugilists and wrestlers as they pair together by lot or remain over, and show how their turns come in natural order. Another mode of amusing them is to distribute vessels, sometimes of gold, brass, silver, and the like, intermixed with one another, sometimes of one metal only; as I was saying they adapt to their amusement the numbers in common use, and in this way make more intelligible to their pupils the arrangements and movements of armies and expeditions, and in the management of a household they make people more useful to themselves, and more wide awake; and again in measurements of things which have length, and breadth, and depth, they free us from that natural ignorance of all these things which is so ludicrous and disgraceful <sup>2</sup>.

(2) Geometry.

*Cle.* What kind of ignorance do you mean?

*Ath.* O my dear Cleinias, I, like yourself, have late in life heard with amazement of our ignorance in these matters; to me we appear to be more like pigs than men, and I am quite ashamed, not only of myself, but of all Hellenes.

*Cle.* About what? Say, Stranger, what you mean.

*Ath.* I will; or rather I will show you my meaning by a question, and do you please to answer me: You know, I suppose, what length is?

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* And what breadth is?

*Cle.* To be sure.

*Ath.* And you know that these are two distinct things, and that there is a third thing called depth?

*Cle.* Of course.

Illustrations  
of the igno-  
rance of the  
Hellenes:  
(a) Their mis-  
taken notion  
that various  
dimensions  
are com-  
mensurable.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. vii. 519.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. *ibid.* 528.

*Ath.* And do not all these seem to you to be commensurable with themselves?

*Larus VII.*

*Cle.* Yes.

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Ath.* That is to say, length is naturally commensurable with length, and breadth with breadth, and depth in like manner with depth?

*Cle.* Undoubtedly.

*Ath.* But if some things are commensurable and others wholly incommensurable, and you think that all things are commensurable, what is your position in regard to them?

*Cle.* Clearly, far from good.

*Ath.* Concerning length and breadth when compared with depth, or breadth and length when compared with one another, are not all the Hellenes agreed that these are commensurable with one another in some way?

*Cle.* Quite true.

*Ath.* But if they are absolutely incommensurable, and yet all of us regard them as commensurable, have we not reason to be ashamed of our compatriots; and might we not say to them:—O ye best of Hellenes, is not this one of the things of which we were saying that not to know them is disgraceful, and of which to have a bare knowledge only is no great distinction?

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* And there are other things akin to these, in which there spring up other errors of the same family.

*Cle.* What are they?

*Ath.* The natures of commensurable and incommensurable quantities in their relation to one another. A man who is good for anything ought to be able, when he thinks, to distinguish them; and different persons should compete with one another in asking questions, which will be a far better and more graceful way of passing their time than the old man's game of draughts.

(b) Their inability to distinguish between the commensurable and the incommensurable.

*Cle.* I dare say; and these pastimes are not so very unlike a game of draughts.

*Ath.* And these, as I maintain, Cleinias, are the studies which our youth ought to learn, for they are innocent and not difficult; the learning of them will be an amusement,



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CLEINIAS.

and they will benefit the state. If any one is of another mind, let him say what he has to say.

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* Then if these studies are such as we maintain, we will include them; if not, they shall be excluded.

*Cle.* Assuredly: but may we not now, Stranger, prescribe these studies as necessary, and so fill up the lacunae of our laws?

*Ath.* They shall be regarded as pledges which may be hereafter redeemed and removed from our state, if they do not please either us who give them, or you who accept them.

*Cle.* A fair condition.

(3) Astro-  
nomy.

*Ath.* Next let us see whether we are or are not willing that the study of astronomy shall be proposed for our youth<sup>1</sup>.

*Cle.* Proceed.

*Ath.* Here occurs a strange phenomenon, which certainly cannot in any point of view be tolerated.

*Cle.* To what are you referring?

Enquiries  
respecting  
the nature of  
God and the  
universe,  
the reverse  
of impious.

*Ath.* Men say that we ought not to enquire into the supreme God and the nature of the universe, nor busy ourselves in searching out the causes of things, and that such enquiries are impious; whereas the very opposite is the truth.

*Cle.* What do you mean?

*Ath.* Perhaps what I am saying may seem paradoxical and at variance with the usual language of age. But when any one has any good and true notion which is for the advantage of the state and in every way acceptable to God he cannot abstain from expressing it.

*Cle.* Your words are reasonable enough; but shall we find any good or true notion about the stars?

At present  
the sun, moon,  
and other  
stars are blas-  
phemously  
said to be  
wanderers.

*Ath.* My good friends, at this hour all of us Hellenes tell lies, if I may use such an expression, about those great Gods, the Sun and the Moon.

*Cle.* Lies of what nature?

*Ath.* We say that they and divers other stars do not keep the same path, and we call them planets or wanderers.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. vii. 527 foll.



*Laws VII.*

ATHENIAN.  
CLEINIAS.

*Cle.* Very true, Stranger; and in the course of my life I have often myself seen the morning star and the evening star and divers others not moving in their accustomed course, but wandering out of their path in all manner of ways, and I have seen the sun and moon doing what we all know that they do.

*Ath.* Just so, Megillus and Cleinias; and I maintain that our citizens and our youth ought to learn about the nature of the Gods in heaven, so far as to be able to offer sacrifices and pray to them in pious language, and not to blaspheme about them.

*Cle.* There you are right, if such a knowledge be only attainable; and if we are wrong in our mode of speaking now, and can be better instructed and learn to use better language, then I quite agree with you that such a degree of knowledge as will enable us to speak rightly should be acquired by us. And now do you try to explain to us your whole meaning, and we, on our part, will endeavour to understand you.

*Ath.* There is some difficulty in understanding my meaning, but not a very great one, nor will any great length of time be required. And of this I am myself a proof; for I did not know these things long ago, nor in the days of my youth, and yet I can explain them to you in a brief space of time; whereas if they had been difficult I could certainly never have explained them all, old as I am, to old men like yourselves.

*Cle.* True; but what is this study which you describe as wonderful and fitting for youth to learn, but of which we are ignorant? Try and explain the nature of it to us as clearly as you can.

*Ath.* I will. For, O my good friends, that other doctrine about the wandering of the sun and the moon and the other stars is not the truth, but the very reverse of the truth. Each of them moves in the same path—not in many paths, but in one only, which is circular, and the varieties are only apparent. Nor are we right in supposing that the swiftest of them is the slowest, nor conversely, that the slowest is the quickest. And if what I say is true, only just imagine that we had a similar notion about horses running at Olympia, or

All the stars move in a circle; their wanderings are only apparent.

*Laws VII.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

about men who ran in the long course, and that we addressed the swiftest as the slowest and the slowest as the swiftest, and sang the praises of the vanquished as though he were the victor,—in that case our praises would not be true, nor very agreeable to the runners, though they be but men; and now, to commit the same error about the Gods which would have been ludicrous and erroneous in the case of men,—is not that ludicrous and erroneous?

*Cle.* Worse than ludicrous, I should say.

*Ath.* At all events, the Gods cannot like us to be spreading a false report of them.

*Cle.* Most true, if such is the fact.

*Ath.* And if we can show that such is really the fact, then all these matters ought to be learned so far as is necessary for the avoidance of impiety; but if we cannot, they may be let alone, and let this be our decision.

*Cle.* Very good.

Hunting.

*Ath.* Enough of laws relating to education and learning. But hunting and similar pursuits in like manner claim our attention. For the legislator appears to have a duty imposed upon him which goes beyond mere legislation. There is something over and above law which lies in a region between admonition and law, and has several times occurred to us in the course of discussion; for example, in the education of very young children there were things, as we maintain, which are not to be defined, and to regard them as matters of positive law is a great absurdity. Now, our laws and the whole constitution of our state having been thus delineated the praise of the virtuous citizen is not complete when he is described as the person who serves the laws best and obeys them most, but the higher form of praise is that which describes him as the good citizen who passes through life undefiled and is obedient to the words of the legislator, both when he is giving laws and when he assigns praise and blame. This is the truest word that can be spoken in praise of a citizen; and the true legislator ought not only to write his laws, but also to interweave with them all such things as seem to him honourable and dishonourable. And the perfect citizen ought to seek to strengthen these no less than the principles of law which are sanctioned by punishments.

The highest honour to be given to him who not only obeys the laws, but earns the praise of the legislator.

I will adduce an example which will clear up my meaning, and will be a sort of witness to my words. Hunting is of wide extent, and has a name under which many things are included, for there is a hunting of creatures in the water, and of creatures in the air, and there is a great deal of hunting of land animals of all kinds, and not of wild beasts only. The hunting after man is also worthy of consideration; there is the hunting after him in war, and there is often a hunting after him in the way of friendship, which is praised and also blamed; and there is thieving, and the hunting which is practised by robbers, and that of armies against armies. Now the legislator, in laying down laws about hunting, can neither abstain from noting these things, nor can he make threatening ordinances which will assign rules and penalties about all of them. What is he to do? He will have to praise and blame hunting with a view to the exercise and pursuits of youth. And, on the other hand, the young man must listen obediently; neither pleasure nor pain should hinder him, and he should regard as his standard of action the praises and injunctions of the legislator rather than the punishments which he imposes by law. This being premised, there will follow next in order moderate praise and censure of hunting; the praise being assigned to that kind which will make the souls of young men better, and the censure to that which has the opposite effect. And now let us address young men in the form of a prayer for their welfare: O friends, we will say to them, may no desire or love of hunting in the sea, or of angling or of catching the creatures in the waters, ever take possession of you, either when you are awake or when you are asleep, by hook or with weels, which latter is a very lazy contrivance; and let not any desire of catching men and of piracy by sea enter into your souls and make you cruel and lawless hunters. And as to the desire of thieving in town or country, may it never enter into your most passing thoughts; nor let the sordid fancy of catching birds, which is hardly worthy of free men, come into the head of any youth. There remains therefore for our athletes only the hunting and catching of land animals, of which the one sort is called hunting by sight, in which the hunters sleep in turn and are lazy; this

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ATHENIAN.

Forms of  
hunting which  
are approved,  
disapproved,  
and forbidden.



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CLEINIAS.

is not to be commended any more than that which has intervals of rest, in which the wild strength of beasts is subdued by nets and snares, and not by the victory of a laborious spirit. Thus, only the best kind of hunting is allowed at all — that of quadrupeds, which is carried on with horses and dogs and men's own persons, and they get the victory over the animals by running them down and striking them and hurling at them, those who have a care of godlike manhood taking them with their own hands. The praise and blame which is assigned to all these things has now been declared; and let the law be as follows:— Let no one hinder these who verily are sacred hunters from following the chase wherever and whithersoever they will; but the hunter by night, who trusts to his nets and gins, shall not be allowed to hunt anywhere. The fowler in the mountains and waste places shall be permitted, but on cultivated ground and on consecrated wilds he shall not be permitted; and any one who meets him may stop him. As to the hunter in waters, he may hunt anywhere except in harbours or sacred streams or marshes or pools, provided only that he do not pollute the water with poisonous juices. And now we may say that all our enactments about education are complete.

*Cle.* Very good.



## BOOK VIII.

*Athenian Stranger.* NEXT, with the help of the Delphian oracle, we have to institute festivals and make laws about them, and to determine what sacrifices will be for the good of the city, and to what Gods they shall be offered; but when they shall be offered, and how often, may be partly regulated by us.

*Cleinias.* The number — yes.

*Ath.* Then we will first determine the number; and let the whole number be 365 — one for every day,—so that one magistrate at least will sacrifice daily to some God or demigod on behalf of the city, and the citizens, and their possessions. And the interpreters, and priests, and priestesses, and prophets shall meet, and, in company with the guardians of the law, ordain those things which the legislator of necessity omits; and I may remark that they are the very persons who ought to take note of what is omitted<sup>1</sup>. The law will say that there are twelve feasts dedicated to the twelve Gods, after whom the several tribes are named; and that to each of them they shall sacrifice every month, and appoint choruses, and musical and gymnastic contests, assigning them so as to suit the Gods and seasons of the year. And they shall have festivals for women, distinguishing those which ought to be separated from the men's festivals, and those which ought not. Further, they shall not confuse the infernal deities and their rites with the Gods who are termed heavenly and their rites, but shall separate them, giving to Pluto his own in the twelfth month, which is sacred to him, according to the law. To such a deity warlike

*Laws VIII.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

Festivals and  
sacrifices.

There shall  
be daily  
sacrifices:

also a monthly  
feast to each  
of the twelve  
Gods of the  
tribes; and  
festivals set  
apart for  
women.

The rites of  
the Gods  
above and  
of the Gods  
below should  
be kept  
distinct.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, vi. 770, and Rep. v. 458 C.

*Laws VIII.*

ATHENIAN.

The God of  
Death the  
best friend  
of man.

Neither  
individual  
nor city can  
live happily  
if not per-  
fectly good.

With a view  
to war there  
should be  
military  
festivals.

The victors  
in these are  
to be cele-  
brated by  
poets who  
have them-  
selves done  
noble actions.

men should entertain no aversion, but they should honour him as being always the best friend of man<sup>1</sup>. For the connexion of soul and body is no way better than the dissolution of them, as I am ready to maintain quite seriously. Moreover, those who would regulate these matters rightly should consider, that our city among existing cities has no fellow, either in respect of leisure or command of the necessities of life, and that like an individual she ought to live happily. And those who would live happily should 8 in the first place do no wrong to one another, and ought not themselves to be wronged by others; to attain the first is not difficult, but there is great difficulty in acquiring the power of not being wronged. No man can be perfectly secure against wrong, unless he has become perfectly good; and cities are like individuals in this, for a city if good has a life of peace, but if evil, a life of war within and without. Wherefore the citizens ought to practise war — not in time of war, but rather while they are at peace. And every city which has any sense, should take the field at least for one day in every month, and for more if the magistrates think fit, having no regard to winter cold or summer heat; and they should go out *en masse*, including their wives and their children, when the magistrates determine to lead forth the whole people, or in separate portions when summoned by them; and they should always provide that there should be games and sacrificial feasts, and they should have tournaments, imitating in as lively a manner as they can real battles. And they should distribute prizes of victory and valour to the competitors, passing censures and encomiums on one another according to the characters which they bear in the contests and in their whole life, honouring him who seems to be the best, and blaming him who is the opposite. And let poets celebrate the victors,—not however every poet, but only one who in the first place is not less than fifty years of age; nor should he be one who, although he may have musical and poetical gifts, has never in his life done any noble or illustrious action; but those who are themselves good and also honourable in the state, creators of noble actions — let their poems be sung, even though they be not very musical. And

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *Crat.* 403; *Rep.* iii. 386.

let the judgment of them rest with the instructor of youth<sup>1</sup> and the other guardians of the laws, who shall give them this privilege, and they alone shall be free to sing; but the rest of the world shall not have this liberty. Nor shall any one dare to sing a song which has not been approved by the judgment of the guardians of the laws, not even if his strain be sweeter than the songs of Thamyras and Orpheus; but only such poems as have been judged sacred and dedicated to the Gods, and such as are the works of good men, in which praise or blame has been awarded and which have been deemed to fulfil their design fairly.

The regulations about war, and about liberty of speech in poetry, ought to apply equally to men and women. The legislator may be supposed to argue the question in his own mind: — Who are my citizens for whom I have set in order the city? Are they not competitors in the greatest of all contests<sup>2</sup>, and have they not innumerable rivals? To be sure, will be the natural reply. Well, but if we were training boxers, or pancratiasts, or any other sort of athletes, would they never meet until the hour of contest arrived; and should we do nothing to prepare ourselves previously by daily practice? Surely, if we were boxers, we should have been learning to fight for many days before, and exercising ourselves in imitating all those blows and wards which we were intending to use in the hour of conflict; and in order that we might come as near to reality as possible, instead of cestuses we should put on boxing-gloves, that the blows and the wards might be practised by us to the utmost of our power. And if there were a lack of competitors, the ridicule of fools would not deter us from hanging up a lifeless image and practising at that. Or if we had no adversary at all, animate or inanimate, should we not venture in the dearth of antagonists to spar by ourselves? In what other manner could we ever study the art of self-defence?

*Cle.* The way which you mention, Stranger, would be the only way.

*Ath.* And shall the warriors of our city, who are destined when occasion calls to enter the greatest of all contests, and to fight for their lives, and their children, and their property,

*Laws VIII.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

All songs to  
be approved  
by the  
guardians  
of the law.

Our citizens  
are competi-  
tors in the  
greatest of  
contests, and  
must enter  
it well-pre-  
pared.

<sup>1</sup> i. e. the director of education.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Rep. iii. 403 E.



*Laws VIII.*ATHENIAN.  
CLEINIAS.Gymnastics  
and military  
drill to be  
practised  
continually.

and the whole city, be worse prepared than boxers? And will the legislator, because he is afraid that their practising with one another may appear to some ridiculous, abstain from commanding them to go out and fight; will he not ordain that soldiers shall perform lesser exercises without arms every day, making dancing and all gymnastic tend to this end; and also will he not require that they shall practise some gymnastic exercises, greater as well as lesser, as often as every month; and that they shall have contests one with another in every part of the country, seizing upon posts and lying in ambush, and imitating in every respect the reality of war; fighting with boxing-gloves and hurling javelins, and using weapons somewhat dangerous, and as nearly as possible like the true ones, in order that the sport may not be altogether without fear, but may have terrors and to a certain degree show the man who has and who has not courage; and that the honour and dishonour which are assigned to them respectively, may prepare the whole city for the true conflict of life? If any one dies in these mimic contests, the homicide is involuntary, and we will make the slayer, when he has been purified according to law, to be pure of blood, considering that if a few men should die, others as good as they will be born; but that if fear is dead, then the citizens will never find a test of superior and inferior natures, which is a far greater evil to the state than the loss of a few.

*Cle.* We are quite agreed, Stranger, that we should legislate about such things, and that the whole state should practise them.

*Ath.* And what is the reason that dances and contests of this sort hardly ever exist in states, at least not to any extent worth speaking of? Is this due to the ignorance of mankind and their legislators?

*Cle.* Perhaps.

*Ath.* Certainly not, sweet Cleinias; there are two causes, which are quite enough to account for the deficiency.

*Cle.* What are they?

*Ath.* One cause is the love of wealth, which wholly absorbs men, and never for a moment allows them to think of anything but their own private possessions; on this the soul of

One of the  
reasons  
(1) why  
martial  
dances and  
contests are  
neglected  
is the love  
of money.



every citizen hangs suspended, and can attend to nothing but his daily gain; mankind are ready to learn any branch of knowledge, and to follow any pursuit which tends to this end, and they laugh at every other:—that is one reason why a city will not be in earnest about such contests or any other good and honourable pursuit. But from an insatiable love of gold and silver, every man will stoop to any art or contrivance, seemly or unseemly, in the hope of becoming rich; and will make no objection to performing any action, holy, or unholy and utterly base, if only like a beast he have the power of eating and drinking all kinds of things, and procuring for himself in every sort of way the gratification of his lusts.

*Laws VIII.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Cle.* True.

*Ath.* Let this, then, be deemed one of the causes which prevent states from pursuing in an efficient manner the art of war, or any other noble aim, but makes the orderly and temperate part of mankind into merchants, and captains of ships, and servants, and converts the valiant sort into thieves and burglars, and robbers of temples, and violent, tyrannical persons; many of whom are not without ability, but they are unfortunate<sup>1</sup>.

The orderly  
become  
traders, the  
valiant  
robbers.

The latter  
have often  
considerable  
natural gifts.

*Cle.* What do you mean?

*Ath.* Must not they be truly unfortunate whose souls are compelled to pass through life always hungering?

*Cle.* Then that is one cause, Stranger; but you spoke of another.

*Ath.* Thank you for reminding me.

*Cle.* The insatiable lifelong love of wealth, as you were saying, is one cause which absorbs mankind, and prevents them from rightly practising the arts of war:—Granted; and now tell me, what is the other?

*Ath.* Do you imagine that I delay because I am in a perplexity?

*Cle.* No; but we think that you are too severe upon the money-loving temper, of which you seem in the present discussion to have a peculiar dislike.

*Ath.* That, strangers, is a very fair rebuke; and I will now proceed to the second cause.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. vi. 491 E, 495 B.

*Laws VIII.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.(2) Bad governments  
are a second  
cause.Our state is  
free from both  
these evils.Military  
gymnastics  
to be alone  
encouraged.Contests of  
swiftness.*Cle.* Proceed.

*Ath.* I say that governments are a cause — democracy, oligarchy, tyranny, concerning which I have often spoken in the previous discourse<sup>1</sup>; or rather governments they are not, for none of them exercises a voluntary rule over voluntary subjects; but they may be truly called states of discord, in which while the government is voluntary, the subjects always obey against their will, and have to be coerced; and the ruler fears the subject, and will not, if he can help, allow him to become either noble, or rich, or strong, or valiant, or warlike at all<sup>2</sup>. These two are the chief causes of almost all evils, and of the evils of which I have been speaking they are notably the causes. But our state has escaped both of them; for her citizens have the greatest leisure, and they are not subject to one another, and will, I think, be made by these laws the reverse of lovers of money. Such a constitution may be reasonably supposed to be the only one existing which will accept the education which we have described, and the martial pastimes which have been perfected according to our idea.

*Cle.* True.

*Ath.* Then next we must remember, about all gymnastic contests, that only the warlike sort of them are to be practised and to have prizes of victory; and those which are not military are to be given up. The military sort had better be completely described and established by law; and first, let us speak of running and swiftness.

*Cle.* Very good.

*Ath.* Certainly the most military of all qualities is general activity of body, whether of foot or hand. For escaping or for capturing an enemy, quickness of foot is required; but hand-to-hand conflict and combat need vigour and strength.

*Cle.* Very true.

*Ath.* Neither of them can attain their greatest efficiency without arms.

*Cle.* How can they?

*Ath.* Then our herald at the contest, in accordance with the prevailing practice, will first summon the runner;—he will

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, iv. 712 E, 715 B.<sup>2</sup> Cp. Arist. Pol. v. 11, §§ 5, 13.

appear armed, for to an unarmed competitor we will not give a prize. And he shall enter first who is to run the single course bearing arms; next, he who is to run the double course; third, he who is to run the horse-course; and fourthly, he who is to run the long course; the fifth whom we start, shall be the first sent forth in heavy armour, and shall run a course of sixty stadia to some temple of Ares — and we will send forth another, whom we will style the more heavily armed, to run over smoother ground. There remains the archer; and he shall run in the full equipments of an archer a distance of 100 stadia over mountains, and across every sort of country, to a temple of Apollo and Artemis; this shall be the order of the contest, and we will wait for them until they return, and will give a prize to the conqueror in each.

*Cle.* Very good.

*Ath.* Let us suppose that there are three kinds of contests, — one of boys, another of beardless youths, and a third of men. For the youths we will fix the length of the contest at two-thirds, and for the boys at half of the entire course, whether they contend as archers or as heavy-armed. Touching the women, let the girls who are not grown up compete naked in the stadium and the double course, and the horse-course and the long course, and let them run on the race-ground itself; those who are thirteen years of age and upwards until their marriage shall continue to share in contests if they are not more than twenty, and shall be compelled to run up to eighteen; and they shall descend into the arena in suitable dresses. Let these be the regulations about contests in running both for men and women.

Respecting contests of strength, instead of wrestling and similar contests of the heavier sort, we will institute conflicts in armour of one against one, and two against two, and so on up to ten against ten. As to what a man ought not to suffer or do, and to what extent, in order to gain the victory — as in wrestling, the masters of the art have laid down what is fair and what is not fair, so in fighting in armour — we ought to call in skilful persons, who shall judge for us and be our assessors in the work of legislation; they shall say who deserves to be victor in combats of this sort, and what he is not to do or have done to him, and in like manner what rule

*Laws VIII.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

The seven  
courses of  
running in  
light or heavy  
armour.

Different  
courses for  
boys, for  
youths, and  
for men.

Women and  
girls to share  
in the contests.

Contests of  
strength.  
Men and  
women to  
contend in  
armour.



*Laws VIII.*

ATHENIAN.

The military  
pancratation.

determines who is defeated; and let these ordinances apply to women until they are married as well as to men. The pancratation shall have a counterpart in a combat of the light-armed; they shall contend with bows and with light shields and with javelins and in the throwing of stones by slings and by hand: and laws shall be made about it, and rewards and prizes given to him who best fulfils the ordinances of the law.

No prizes for  
chariot-races,  
but only for  
single horses,

Next in order we shall have to legislate about the horse contests. Now we do not need many horses, for they cannot be of much use in a country like Crete<sup>1</sup>, and hence we naturally do not take great pains about the rearing of them or about horse races. There is no one who keeps a chariot among us, and any rivalry in such matters would be altogether out of place; there would be no sense nor any shadow of sense in instituting contests which are not after the manner of our country. And therefore we give our prizes for single horses,—for colts who have not yet cast their teeth, and for those who are intermediate, and for the full-grown horses themselves; and thus our equestrian games will accord with the nature of the country. Let them have conflict and rivalry in these matters in accordance with the law, and let the colonels and generals of horse decide together about all courses and about the armed competitors in them. But we have nothing to say to the unarmed either in gymnastic exercises or in these contests. On the other hand, the Cretan bowman or javelin-man who fights in armour on horseback is useful, and therefore we may as well place a competition of this sort among our amusements. Women are not to be forced to compete by laws and ordinances; but if from previous training they have acquired the habit and are strong enough and like to take part, let them do so, girls as well as boys, and no blame to them.

and for  
mounted  
archers and  
spearmen.

Thus the competition in gymnastic and the mode of learning it have been described; and we have spoken also of the toils of the contest, and of daily exercises under the superintendence of masters<sup>2</sup>. Likewise, what relates to music has been, for the most part, completed. But as to rhapsodes and the like, and the contests of choruses which are to perform at feasts,

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, i. 625 D.    <sup>2</sup> Omitting *ἐν*, a conjecture of Winkelmann.



all this shall be arranged when the months and days and years have been appointed for Gods and demigods, whether every third year, or again every fifth year, or in whatever way or manner the Gods may put into men's minds the distribution and order of them. At the same time, we may expect that the musical contests will be celebrated in their turn by the command of the judges and the director of education and the guardians of the law meeting together for this purpose, and themselves becoming legislators of the times and nature and conditions of the choral contests and of dancing in general. What they ought severally to be in language and song, and in the admixture of harmony with rhythm and the dance, has been often declared by the original legislator; and his successors ought to follow him, making the games and sacrifices duly to correspond at fitting times, and appointing public festivals. It is not difficult to determine how these and the like matters may have a regular order; nor, again, will the alteration of them do any great good or harm to the state. There is, however, another matter of great importance and difficulty, concerning which God should legislate, if there were any possibility of obtaining from Him an ordinance about it. But seeing that divine aid is not to be had, there appears to be a need of some bold man who specially honours plainness of speech, and will say outright what he thinks best for the city and citizens,—ordaining what is good and convenient for the whole state amid the corruptions of human souls, opposing the mightiest lusts, and having no man his helper but himself standing alone and following reason only.

*Cle.* What is this, Stranger, that you are saying? For we do not as yet understand your meaning.

*Ath.* Very likely; I will endeavour to explain myself more clearly. When I came to the subject of education, I beheld young men and maidens holding friendly intercourse with one another. And there naturally arose in my mind a sort of apprehension—I could not help thinking how one is to deal with a city in which youths and maidens are well nurtured, and have nothing to do, and are not undergoing the excessive and servile toils which extinguish wantonness, and whose only cares during their whole life are sacrifices and

*Laws VIII.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

The arrangements for  
recitations  
and choruses.

How can men  
and women  
living at ease  
be saved from  
their lusts?

*Laws VIII.*

ATHENIAN.

The evil of unnatural loves.

Bad example set by Crete and Lacedaemon.

festivals and dances. How, in such a state as this, will they abstain from desires which thrust many a man and woman into perdition; and from which reason, assuming the functions of law, commands them to abstain? The ordinances already made may possibly get the better of most of these desires; the prohibition of excessive wealth is a very considerable gain in the direction of temperance, and the whole education of our youth imposes a law of moderation on them; moreover, the eye of the rulers is required always to watch over the young, and never to lose sight of them; and these provisions do, as far as human means can effect anything, exercise a regulating influence upon the desires in general. But how can we take precautions against the unnatural loves of either sex, from which innumerable evils have come upon individuals and cities? How shall we devise a remedy and way of escape out of so great a danger? Truly, Cleinias, here is a difficulty. In many ways Crete and Lacedaemon furnish a great help to those who make peculiar laws; but in the matter of love, as we are alone, I must confess that they are quite against us. For if any one following nature should lay down the law which existed before the days of Laius, and denounce these lusts as contrary to nature, adducing the animals as a proof that such unions were monstrous, he might prove his point, but he would be wholly at variance with the custom of your states. Further, they are repugnant to a principle which we say that a legislator should always observe; for we are always enquiring which of our enactments tends to virtue and which not<sup>1</sup>. And suppose we grant that these loves are accounted by law to be honourable, or at least not disgraceful, in what degree will they contribute to virtue? Will such passions implant in the soul of him who is seduced the habit of courage, or in the soul of the seducer the principle of temperance? Who will ever believe this?—or rather, who will not blame the effeminacy of him who yields to pleasures and is unable to hold out against them? Will not all men censure as womanly him who imitates the woman? And who would ever think of establishing such a practice by law? Certainly no one who had in his mind the image of true law.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. iii. 693 B; iv. 705 E; vi. 770; xii. 963 A.

*Laws VIII.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

How can we prove that what I am saying is true? He who would rightly consider these matters must see the nature of friendship and desire, and of these so-called loves, for they are of two kinds, and out of the two arises a third kind, having the same name; and this similarity of name causes all the difficulty and obscurity.

*Cle.* How is that?

*Ath.* Dear is the like in virtue to the like, and the equal to the equal; dear also, though unlike, is he who has abundance to him who is in want. And when either of these friendships becomes excessive, we term the excess love.

*Cle.* Very true.

*Ath.* The friendship which arises from contraries is horrible and coarse, and has often no tie of communion; but that which arises from likeness is gentle, and has a tie of communion which lasts through life. As to the mixed sort which is made up of them both, there is, first of all, a difficulty in determining what he who is possessed by this third love desires; moreover, he is drawn different ways, and is in doubt between the two principles; the one exhorting him to enjoy the beauty of youth, and the other forbidding him. For the one is a lover of the body, and hungers after beauty, like ripe fruit, and would fain satisfy himself without any regard to the character of the beloved; the other holds the desire of the body to be a secondary matter, and looking rather than loving and with his soul desiring the soul of the other in a becoming manner, regards the satisfaction of the bodily love as wantonness<sup>1</sup>; he reverences and respects temperance and courage and magnanimity and wisdom, and wishes to live chastely with the chaste object of his affection. Now the sort of love which is made up of the other two is that which we have described as the third. Seeing then that there are these three sorts of love, ought the law to prohibit and forbid them all to exist among us? Is it not rather clear that we should wish to have in the state the love which is of virtue and which desires the beloved youth to be the best possible; and the other two, if possible, we should hinder? What do you say, friend Megillus?

There is  
(1) a love  
of the body:  
(2) a love  
of the soul:  
(3) a mixed  
sort which  
is made up  
of both.

We approve  
only of the  
second.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *Phaedr.* 251.



*Laws VIII.*ATHENIAN,  
MEGILLUS.

*Meg.* I think, Stranger, that you are perfectly right in what you have been now saying.

*Ath.* I knew well, my friend, that I should obtain your assent, which I accept, and therefore have no need to analyze your custom any further. Cleinias shall be prevailed upon to give me his assent at some other time. Enough of this; and now let us proceed to the laws.

*Meg.* Very good.

*Ath.* Upon reflection I see a way of imposing the law, which, in one respect, is easy, but, in another, is of the utmost difficulty.

*Meg.* What do you mean?

An encouraging circumstance that the purity of the family is perfectly preserved.

*Ath.* We are all aware that most men, in spite of their lawless natures, are very strictly and precisely restrained from intercourse with the fair, and this is not at all against their will, but entirely with their will.

*Meg.* When do you mean?

*Ath.* When any one has a brother or sister who is fair; and about a son or daughter the same unwritten law holds, and is a most perfect safeguard, so that no open or secret connexion ever takes place between them. Nor does the thought of such a thing ever enter at all into the minds of most of them.

*Meg.* Very true.

The reason of this is that incestuous connexions have ever been deemed infamous.

*Ath.* Does not a little word extinguish all pleasures of that sort?

*Meg.* What word?

*Ath.* The declaration that they are unholy, hated of God, and most infamous; and is not the reason of this that no one has ever said the opposite, but every one from his earliest childhood has heard men speaking in the same manner about them always and everywhere, whether in comedy or in the graver language of tragedy? When the poet introduces on the stage a Thyestes or an Oedipus, or a Macareus having secret intercourse with his sister, he represents him, when found out, ready to kill himself as the penalty of his sin.

*Meg.* You are very right in saying that tradition, if no breath of opposition ever assails it, has a marvellous power.

*Ath.* Am I not also right in saying that the legislator who wants to master any of the passions which master man



may easily know how to subdue them? He will consecrate the tradition of their evil character among all, slaves and freemen, women and children, throughout the city:—that will be the surest foundation of the law which he can make.

*Meg.* Yes; but will he ever succeed in making all mankind use the same language about them?

*Ath.* A good objection; but was I not just now saying that I had a way to make men use natural love and abstain from unnatural, not intentionally destroying the seeds of human increase, or sowing them in stony places, in which they will take no root; and that I would command them to abstain too from any female field of increase in which that which is sown is not likely to grow? Now if a law to this effect could only be made perpetual, and gain an authority such as already prevents intercourse of parents and children—such a law, extending to other sensual desires, and conquering them, would be the source of ten thousand blessings. For, in the first place, moderation is the appointment of nature, and deters men from all frenzy and madness of love, and from all adulteries and immoderate use of meats and drinks, and makes them good friends to their own wives. And innumerable other benefits would result if such a law could only be enforced. I can imagine some lusty youth who is standing by, and who, on hearing this enactment, declares in scurrilous terms that we are making foolish and impossible laws, and fills the world with his outcry. And therefore I said that I knew a way of enacting and perpetuating such a law, which was very easy in one respect, but in another most difficult. There is no difficulty in seeing that such a law is possible, and in what way; for, as I was saying, the ordinance once consecrated would master the soul of every man, and terrify him into obedience. But matters have now come to such a pass that even then the desired result seems as if it could not be attained, just as the continuance of an entire state in the practice of common meals is also deemed impossible. And although this latter is partly disproven by the fact of their existence among you, still even in your cities the common meals of women would be regarded as unnatural and impossible. I was thinking of the rebelliousness of the

*Lærus VIII.*

ATHENIAN,  
MEGILLUS.

Other vile  
unions should  
be prevented  
in a similar  
manner.

Moderation  
in sexual  
delights the  
appointment  
of nature.

A law once  
enacted would  
master the  
evil, but such  
a law can  
no longer  
be passed.

*Laws VIII.*ATHENIAN,  
MEGILLUS,  
CLEINIAS.

human heart when I said that the permanent establishment of these things is very difficult.

*Meg.* Very true.

*Ath.* Shall I try and find some sort of persuasive argument which will prove to you that such enactments are possible, and not beyond human nature?

*Cle.* By all means.

*Ath.* Is a man more likely to abstain from the pleasures of love and to do what he is bidden about them, when his body is in a good condition, or when he is in an ill condition, and out of training?

*Cle.* He will be far more temperate when he is in training.

Iccus of  
Tarentum  
and other  
athletes have  
practised en-  
tire conti-  
nence to  
gain a prize  
at Olympia.

*Ath.* And have we not heard of Iccus of Tarentum, who, with a view to the Olympic and other contests, in his zeal for his art, and also because he was of a manly and temperate disposition, never had any connexion with a woman or a youth during the whole time of his training? And the same is said of Crison and Astylus and Diopompus and many others; and yet, Cleinias, they were far worse educated in their minds than your and my citizens, and in their bodies far more lusty.

*Cle.* No doubt this fact has been often affirmed positively by the ancients of these athletes.

And shall not  
our citizens  
endure that  
they may win  
the prize of a  
far nobler  
victory?

*Ath.* And had they the courage to abstain from what is ordinarily deemed a pleasure for the sake of a victory in wrestling, running, and the like; and shall our young men be incapable of a similar endurance for the sake of a much nobler victory, which is the noblest of all, as from their youth upwards we will tell them, charming them, as we hope, into the belief of this by tales and sayings and songs?

*Cle.* Of what victory are you speaking?

*Ath.* Of the victory over pleasure, which if they win, they will live happily; or if they are conquered, the reverse of happily. And, further, may we not suppose that the fear of impiety will enable them to master that which other inferior people have mastered?

*Cle.* I dare say.

The first  
law:—

*Ath.* And since we have reached this point in our legislation, and have fallen into a difficulty by reason of the vices of mankind, I affirm that our ordinance should simply run in

the following terms: Our citizens ought not to fall below the nature of birds and beasts in general, who are born in great multitudes, and yet remain until the age for procreation virgin and unmarried, but when they have reached the proper time of life are coupled, male and female, and lovingly pair together, and live the rest of their lives in holiness and innocence, abiding firmly in their original compact:—surely, we will say to them, you should be better than the animals. But if they are corrupted by the other Hellenes and the common practice of barbarians, and they see with their eyes and hear with their ears of the so-called free love everywhere prevailing among them, and they themselves are not able to get the better of the temptation, the guardians of the law, exercising the functions of lawgivers, shall devise a second law against them.

*Laws VIII.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

Our citizens should not be less innocent than the animals.

*Cle.* And what law would you advise them to pass if this one failed?

*Ath.* Clearly, Cleinias, the one which would naturally follow.

The second law:—

*Cle.* What is that?

*Ath.* Our citizens should not allow pleasures to strengthen with indulgence, but should by toil divert the aliment and exuberance of them into other parts of the body; and this will happen if no immodesty be allowed in the practice of love. Then they will be ashamed of frequent intercourse, and they will find pleasure, if seldom enjoyed, to be a less imperious mistress. They should not be found out doing anything of the sort. Concealment shall be honourable, and sanctioned by custom and made law by unwritten prescription; on the other hand, to be detected shall be esteemed dishonourable, but not, to abstain wholly. In this way there will be a second legal standard of honourable and dishonourable, involving a second notion of right. Three principles will comprehend all those corrupt natures whom we call inferior to themselves, and who form but one class, and will compel them not to transgress.

Labour should divert the aliment of passion into other parts of the body.

Concealment better than open vice.

Three corrective principles.

*Cle.* What are they?

*Ath.* The principle of piety, the love of honour, and the desire of beauty, not in the body but in the soul. These are, perhaps, romantic aspirations; but they are the noblest of



*Laws VIII.*ATHENIAN,  
MEGILLUS,  
CLEINIAS.No man shall  
touch a  
woman ex-  
cept his  
wedded wife.Prohibition  
of loves be-  
tween man  
and man.

aspirations, if they could only be realized in all states, and, God willing, in the matter of love we may be able to enforce one of two things — either that no one shall venture to touch any person of the freeborn or noble class except his wedded wife, or sow the unconsecrated and bastard seed among harlots, or in barren and unnatural lusts; or at least we may abolish altogether the connexion of men with men; and as to women, if any man has to do with any but those who come into his house duly married by sacred rites, whether they be bought or acquired in any other way, and he offends publicly in the face of all mankind, we shall be right in enacting that he be deprived of civic honours and privileges, and be deemed to be, as he truly is, a stranger. Let this law, then, whether it is one, or ought rather to be called two, be laid down respecting love in general, and the intercourse of the sexes which arises out of the desires, whether rightly or wrongly indulged.

*Meg.* I, for my part, Stranger, would gladly receive this law. Cleinias shall speak for himself, and tell you what is his opinion.

*Cle.* I will, Megillus, when an opportunity offers; at present, I think that we had better allow the Stranger to proceed with his laws.

*Meg.* Very good.

*Ath.* We had got about as far as the establishment of the common tables, which in most places would be difficult, but in Crete no one would think of introducing any other custom. There might arise a question about the manner of them — whether they shall be such as they are here in Crete, or such as they are in Lacedaemon, — or is there a third kind which may be better than either of them<sup>1</sup>? The answer to this question might be easily discovered, but the discovery would do no great good, for at present they are very well ordered.

Leaving the common tables, we may therefore proceed to the means of providing food. Now, in cities the means of life are gained in many ways and from divers sources, and in general from two sources, whereas our city has only one. For most of the Hellenes obtain their food from sea and land, but our citizens from land only. And this makes the

The way of  
providing  
food being  
more simple  
than in  
other states,  
the laws  
relating to

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Arist. Pol. vii. 10, § 10.



task of the legislator less difficult — half as many laws will be enough, and much less than half; and they will be of a kind better suited to free men. For he has nothing to do with laws about shipowners and merchants and retailers and inn-keepers and tax collectors and mines and moneylending and compound interest and innumerable other things — bidding good-bye to these, he gives laws to husbandmen and shepherds and bee-keepers, and to the guardians and superintendents of their implements; and he has already legislated for greater matters, as for example, respecting marriage and the procreation and nurture of children, and for education, and the establishment of offices — and now he must direct his laws to those who provide food and labour in preparing it.

Let us first of all, then, have a class of laws which shall be called the laws of husbandmen. And let the first of them be the law of Zeus, the god of boundaries. Let no one shift the boundary line either of a fellow-citizen who is a neighbour, or, if he dwells at the extremity of the land, of any stranger who is conterminous with him, considering that this is truly 'to move the immovable,' and every one should be more willing to move the largest rock which is not a landmark, than the least stone which is the sworn mark of friendship and hatred between neighbours; for Zeus, the god of kindred, is the witness of the citizen, and Zeus, the god of strangers, of the stranger, and when aroused, terrible are the wars which they stir up. He who obeys the law will never know the fatal consequences of disobedience, but he who despises the law shall be liable to a double penalty, the first coming from the Gods, and the second from the law. For let no one wilfully remove the boundaries of his neighbour's land, and if any one does, let him who will inform the landowners, and let them bring him into court, and if he be convicted of re-dividing the land by stealth or by force, let the court determine what he ought to suffer or pay. In the next place, many small injuries done by neighbours to one another, through their multiplication, may cause a weight of enmity, and make neighbourhood a very disagreeable and bitter thing. Wherefore a man ought to be very careful of committing any offence against his neighbour, and especially of encroaching on his neighbour's land; for any man may

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ATHENIAN.

this subject  
will also be  
more simple.

Laws concern-  
ing hus-  
bandmen:—

Let bound-  
aries not be  
disturbed.

Let no man  
encroach in  
any way.

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ATHENIAN.

easily do harm, but not every man can do good to another. He who encroaches on his neighbour's land, and transgresses his boundaries, shall make good the damage, and, to cure him of his impudence and also of his meanness, he shall pay a double penalty to the injured party. Of these and the like matters the wardens of the country shall take cognizance, and be the judges of them and assessors of the damage; in the more important cases, as has been already said<sup>1</sup>, the whole number of them belonging to any one of the twelve divisions shall decide, and in the lesser cases the commanders: or, again, if any one pastures his cattle on his neighbour's land, they shall see the injury, and adjudge the penalty. And if any one, by decoying the bees, gets possession of another's swarms, and draws them to himself by making noises, he shall pay the damage; or if any one sets fire to his own wood and takes no care of his neighbour's property, he shall be fined at the discretion of the magistrates. And if in planting he does not leave a fair distance between his own and his neighbour's land, he shall be punished, in accordance with the enactments of many lawgivers, which we may use, not deeming it necessary that the great legislator of our state should determine all the trifles which might be decided by anybody; for example, husbandmen have had of old excellent laws about waters, and there is no reason why we should propose to divert their course: He who likes may draw water from the fountain-head of the common stream on to his own land, if he do not cut off the spring which clearly belongs to some other owner; and he may take the water in any direction which he pleases, except through a house or temple or sepulchre, but he must be careful to do no harm beyond the channel. And if there be in any place a natural dryness of the earth, which keeps in the rain from heaven, and causes a deficiency in the supply of water, let him dig down on his own land as far as the clay, and if at this depth he finds no water, let him obtain water from his neighbours, as much as is required for his servants' drinking, and if his neighbours, too, are limited in their supply, let him have a fixed measure, which shall be determined by the wardens of the country. This he shall receive

The ancient laws about water quite sufficient.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, vi. 761 D, E.

each day, and on these terms have a share of his neighbours' water. If there be heavy rain, and one of those on the lower ground injures some tiller of the upper ground, or some one who has a common wall, by refusing to give them an outlet for water; or, again, if some one living on the higher ground recklessly lets off the water on his lower neighbour, and they cannot come to terms with one another, let him who will call in a warden of the city, if he be in the city, or if he be in the country, a warden of the country, and let him obtain a decision determining what each of them is to do. And he who will not abide by the decision shall suffer for his malignant and morose temper, and pay a fine to the injured party, equivalent to double the value of the injury, because he was unwilling to submit to the magistrates.

Now the participation of fruits shall be ordered on this wise. The goddess of Autumn has two gracious gifts: one, the joy<sup>1</sup> of Dionysus which is not treasured up; the other, which nature intends to be stored. Let this be the law, then, concerning the fruits of autumn: He who tastes the common or storing fruits of autumn, whether grapes or figs, before the season of vintage which coincides with Arcturus, either on his own land or on that of others,—let him pay fifty drachmae, which shall be sacred to Dionysus, if he pluck them from his own land; and if from his neighbour's land, a mina, and if from any others', two-thirds of a mina. And he who would gather the 'choice' grapes or the 'choice' figs, as they are now termed, if he take them off his own land, let him pluck them how and when he likes; but if he take them from the ground of others without their leave, let him in that case be always punished in accordance with the law which ordains that he should not move what he has not laid down<sup>2</sup>. And if a slave touches any fruit of this sort, without the consent of the owner of the land, he shall be beaten with as many blows as there are grapes on the bunch, or figs on the fig-tree. Let a metic purchase the 'choice' autumnal fruit, and then, if he pleases, he may gather it; but if a stranger is passing along the road, and desires to eat, let him take of the 'choice' grape or himself and a single follower without payment, as a tribute of hospitality. The law however forbids strangers from sharing

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ATHENIAN.

The citizen may not pluck the storing fruit anywhere, but he may pluck the choice grapes or figs on his own land.

A stranger may take of the choice grape, but not of the storing.

<sup>1</sup> Reading *παιδιάν*.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. *infra*, xi. 913.



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ATHENIAN.

Pears and apples may be taken secretly; but any one under thirty who is caught may be beaten off.

in the commoner sort which is not used for eating; and if any one, whether he be master or slave, takes of them in ignorance, let the slave be beaten, and the freeman dismissed with admonitions, and instructed to take of the other autumnal fruits which are unfit for making raisins and wine, or for laying by as dried figs. As to pears, and apples, and pomegranates, and similar fruits, there shall be no disgrace in taking them secretly; but he who is caught, if he be of less than thirty years of age, shall be struck and beaten off, but not wounded; and no freeman shall have any right of satisfaction for such blows. Of these fruits the stranger may partake, just as he may of the fruits of autumn. And if an elder, who is more than thirty years of age, eat of them on the spot, let him, like the stranger, be allowed to partake of all such fruits, but he must carry away nothing. If, however, he will not obey the law, let him run the risk of failing in the competition of virtue, in case any one takes notice of his actions before the judges at the time.

The penalty for polluting water.

Water is the greatest element of nutrition in gardens, but is easily polluted. You cannot poison the soil, or the sun, or the air, which are the other elements of nutrition in plants, or divert them, or steal them; but all these things may very likely happen in regard to water, which must therefore be protected by law. And let this be the law:—If any one intentionally pollutes the water of another, whether the water of a spring, or collected in reservoirs, either by poisonous substances, or by digging, or by theft, let the injured party bring the cause before the wardens of the city, and claim in writing the value of the loss; if the accused be found guilty of injuring the water by deleterious substances, let him not only pay damages, but purify the stream or the cistern which contains the water, in such manner as the laws of the interpreters<sup>1</sup> order the purification to be made by the offender in each case.

Regulations about harvesting.

With respect to the gathering in of the fruits of the soil, let a man, if he pleases, carry his own fruits through any place in which he either does no harm to any one, or himself gains three times as much as his neighbour loses. Now of these things the magistrates should be cognisant, as of all

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, vi. 759 C.



other things in which a man intentionally does injury to another or to the property of another, by fraud or force, in the use which he makes of his own property. All these matters a man should lay before the magistrates, and receive damages, supposing the injury to be not more than three minae; or if he have a charge against another which involves a larger amount, let him bring his suit into the public courts and have the evil-doer punished. But if any of the magistrates appear to adjudge the penalties which he imposes in an unjust spirit, let him be liable to pay double to the injured party. Any one may bring the offences of magistrates, in any particular case, before the public courts. There are innumerable little matters relating to the modes of punishment, and applications for suits, and summonses and the witnesses to summonses—for example, whether two witnesses should be required for a summons, or how many—and all such details, which cannot be omitted in legislation, but are beneath the wisdom of an aged legislator. These lesser matters, as they indeed are in comparison with the greater ones, let a younger generation regulate by law, after the patterns which have preceded, and according to their own experience of the usefulness and necessity of such laws; and when they are duly regulated let there be no alteration, but let the citizens live in the observance of them.

Now of artisans, let the regulations be as follows:—In the first place, let no citizen or servant of a citizen be occupied in handicraft arts; for he who is to secure and preserve the public order of the state, has an art which requires much study and many kinds of knowledge, and does not admit of being made a secondary occupation; and hardly any human being is capable of pursuing two professions or two arts rightly, or of practising one art himself, and superintending some one else who is practising another. Let this, then, be our first principle in the state:—No one who is a smith shall also be a carpenter, and if he be a carpenter, he shall not superintend the smith's art rather than his own, under the pretext that in superintending many servants who are working for him, he is likely to superintend them better, because more revenue will accrue to him from them than from his own art; but let every man in the state

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No citizen to  
be an artisan.No man  
should have  
more than  
one craft.

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have one art, and get his living by that. Let the wardens of the city labour to maintain this law, and if any citizen incline to any other art rather than the study of virtue, let them punish him with disgrace and infamy, until they bring him back into his own right course; and if any stranger profess to arts, let them chastise him with bonds and money penalties, and expulsion from the state, until they compel him to be one only and not many<sup>1</sup>.

But as touching payments for hire, and contracts of work, or in case any one does wrong to any of the citizens, or they do wrong to any other, up to fifty drachmae, let the wardens of the city decide the case; but if a greater amount be involved, then let the public courts decide according to law.

Free trade.

Let no one pay any duty either on the importation or exportation of goods; and as to frankincense and similar perfumes, used in the service of the Gods, which come from abroad, and purple and other dyes which are not produced in the country, or the materials of any art which have to be imported, and which are not necessary — no one should import them; nor, again, should any one export anything which is wanted in the country. Of all these things let there be inspectors and superintendents, taken from the guardians of the law; and they shall be the twelve next in order to the five seniors. Concerning arms, and all implements which are required for military purposes, if there be need of introducing any art, or plant, or metal, or chains of any kind, or animals for use in war, let the commanders of the horse and the generals have authority over their importation and exportation; the city shall send them out and also receive them, and the guardians of the law shall make fit and proper laws about them. But let there be no retail trade<sup>2</sup> for the sake of moneymaking, either in these or any other articles, in the city or country at all.

The produce of the land shall be divided into twelve portions, and each portion into three parts,—

With respect to food and the distribution of the produce of the country, the right and proper way seems to be nearly that which is the custom of Crete<sup>3</sup>; for all should be required to distribute the fruits of the soil into twelve parts, and in this way consume them. Let the twelfth portion of each (as for instance of wheat and barley, to which the rest of the

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. iii. 397 E. <sup>2</sup> Cp. Arist. Pol. vii. 9, § 7. <sup>3</sup> Cp. *ibid.* ii. 10, § 8.

fruits of the earth shall be added, as well as the animals which are for sale in each of the twelve divisions) be divided in due proportion into three parts; one part for free-men, another for their servants, and a third for craftsmen and in general for strangers, whether sojourners who may be dwelling in the city, and like other men must live, or those who come on some business which they have with the state, or with some individual. Let only this third part of all necessities be required to be sold; out of the other two-thirds no one shall be compelled to sell. And how will they be best distributed? In the first place, we see clearly that the distribution will be of equals in one point of view, and in another point of view of unequals.

*Cle.* What do you mean?

*Ath.* I mean that the earth of necessity produces and nourishes the various articles of food, sometimes better and sometimes worse.

*Cle.* Of course.

*Ath.* Such being the case, let no one of the three portions be greater than either of the other two;—neither that which is assigned to masters or to slaves, nor again that of the stranger; but let the distribution to all be equal and alike, and let every citizen take his two portions and distribute them among slaves and freemen, he having power to determine the quantity and quality. And what remains he shall distribute by measure and number among the animals who have to be sustained from the earth, taking the whole number of them.

In the second place, our citizens should have separate houses duly ordered; and this will be the order proper for men like them. There shall be twelve hamlets, one in the middle of each twelfth portion, and in each hamlet they shall first set apart a market-place, and the temples of the Gods, and of their attendant demigods; and if there be any local deities of the Magnetes, or holy seats of other ancient deities, whose memory has been preserved, to these let them pay their ancient honours<sup>1</sup>. But Hestia, and Zeus, and Athene will have temples everywhere together with the God who presides in each of the twelve districts<sup>2</sup>. And the first

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ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

one for free-  
men; another  
for slaves;  
another for  
strangers.

Twelve ham-  
lets, one in  
the middle  
of each of  
the twelve  
divisions,  
and temples  
in each.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, v. 738 C.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. *ibid.* 745.



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ATHENIAN.

Of the thirteen divisions of the craftsmen, one to be settled in the city, the rest in the country.

erection of houses shall be around these temples, where the ground is highest, in order to provide the safest and most defensible place of retreat for the guards. All the rest of the country they shall settle in the following manner:—They shall make thirteen divisions of the craftsmen; one of them they shall establish in the city, and this, again, they shall subdivide into twelve lesser divisions, among the twelve districts of the city, and the remainder shall be distributed in the country round about; and in each village they shall settle various classes of craftsmen, with a view to the convenience of the husbandmen. And the chief officers of the wardens of the country shall superintend all these matters, and see how many of them, and which class of them, each place requires; and fix them where they are likely to be least troublesome, and most useful to the husbandman. And the wardens of the city shall see to similar matters in the city.

Duties of the wardens of the agora.

Now the wardens of the agora ought to see to the details of the agora. Their first care, after the temples which are in the agora have been seen to, should be to prevent any one from doing any wrong in dealings between man and man; in the second place, as being inspectors of temperance and violence, they should chastise him who requires chastisement. Touching articles of sale, they should first see whether the articles which the citizens are under regulations to sell to strangers are sold to them, as the law ordains. And let the law be as follows:—On the first day of the month, the persons in charge, whoever they are, whether strangers or slaves, who have the charge on behalf of the citizens, shall produce to the strangers the portion which falls to them, in the first place, a twelfth portion of the corn;—the stranger shall purchase corn for the whole month, and other cereals, on the first market day; and on the tenth day of the month the one party shall sell, and the other buy, liquids sufficient to last during the whole month; and on the twenty-third day there shall be a sale of animals by those who are willing to sell to the people who want to buy, and of implements and other things which husbandmen sell, (such as skins and all kinds of clothing, either woven or made of felt and other goods of the same sort,) and which strangers are compelled to buy and purchase of others. As to the retail trade

The market days.



in these things, whether of barley or wheat set apart for meal and flour, or any other kind of food, no one shall sell them to citizens or their slaves, nor shall any one buy of a citizen; but let the stranger sell them in the market of strangers, to artisans and their slaves, making an exchange of wine and food, which is commonly called retail trade. And butchers shall offer for sale parts of dismembered animals to the strangers, and artisans, and their servants. Let any stranger who likes buy fuel from day to day wholesale, from those who have the care of it in the country, and let him sell to the strangers as much as he pleases and when he pleases. As to other goods and implements which are likely to be wanted, they shall sell them in the common market, at any place which the guardians of the law and the wardens of the market and city, choosing according to their judgment, shall determine; at such places they shall exchange money for goods, and goods for money, neither party giving credit to the other<sup>1</sup>; and he who gives credit must be satisfied, whether he obtain his money or not, for in such exchanges he will not be protected by law. But whenever property has been bought or sold, greater in quantity or value than is allowed by the law, which has determined within what limits a man may increase and diminish his possessions, let the excess be registered in the books of the guardians of the law; or in case of diminution, let there be an erasure made. And let the same rule be observed about the registration of the property of the metics. Any one who likes may come and be a metic on certain conditions; a foreigner, if he likes, and is able to settle, may dwell in the land, but he must practise an art, and not abide more than twenty years from the time at which he has registered himself; and he shall pay no sojourner's tax, however small, except good conduct, nor any other tax for buying and selling. But when the twenty years have expired, he shall take his property with him and depart. And if in the course of these years he should chance to distinguish himself by any considerable benefit which he confers on the state, and he thinks that he can persuade the council and assembly, either to grant him delay in leaving the country, or to allow him to

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ATHENIAN.

Prohibition of retail trade except among strangers.

Credit not to be recognized by law.

Metics may dwell in the land for twenty years;

(or longer, with special permission:)

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *infra*, xi. 915 D.

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ATHENIAN.

and their  
children for  
the same  
term, reck-  
oning from  
the age of  
fifteen.

remain for the whole of his life, let him go and persuade the city, and whatever they assent to at his instance shall take effect. For the children of the metics, being artisans, and of fifteen years of age, let the time of their sojourn commence after their fifteenth year; and let them remain for twenty years, and then go where they like; but any of them who wishes to remain, may do so, if he can persuade the council and assembly. And if he depart, let him erase all the entries which have been made by him in the register kept by the magistrates.

## BOOK IX.

NEXT to all the matters which have preceded in the natural order of legislation will come suits of law. Of suits those which relate to agriculture have been already described, but the more important have not been described. Having mentioned them severally under their usual names, we will proceed to say what punishments are to be inflicted for each offence, and who are to be the judges of them.

*Cle.* Very good.

*Ath.* There is a sense of disgrace in legislating, as we are about to do, for all the details of crime in a state which, as we say, is to be well regulated and will be perfectly adapted to the practice of virtue. To assume that in such a state there will arise some one who will be guilty of crimes as heinous as any which are ever perpetrated in other states, and that we must legislate for him by anticipation, and threaten and make laws against him if he should arise, in order to deter him, and punish his acts, under the idea that he will arise — this, as I was saying, is in a manner disgraceful. Yet seeing that we are not like the ancient legislators, who gave laws to heroes and sons of gods, being, according to the popular belief, themselves the offspring of the gods, and legislating for others, who were also the children of divine parents, but that we are only men who are legislating for the sons of men, there is no uncharitableness in apprehending that some one of our citizens may be like a seed which has touched the ox's horn, having a heart so hard that it cannot be softened any more than those seeds can be softened by fire. Among our citizens there may be those who cannot be subdued by all the strength of the laws; and for their sake, though an ungracious task, I will proclaim my

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ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

'It must be that offences come,' since we are legislating for men and not for heroes or demigods.



*Laws IX.*

ATHENIAN.

The pre-  
lude to the  
law about  
sacrilege:—

Sacrilege is  
an inherited  
malady,  
begotten of  
crime, which  
men should do  
their utmost  
to cure.

The law:—  
The slave or  
stranger who  
robs a temple  
shall be  
branded,  
beaten, and  
cast out of  
the land;—

first law about the robbing of temples, in case any one should dare to commit such a crime. I do not expect or imagine that any well-brought-up citizen will ever take the infection, but their servants, and strangers, and strangers' servants may be guilty of many impieties. And with a view to them especially, and yet not without a provident eye to the weakness of human nature generally, I will proclaim the law about robbers of temples and similar incurable, or almost incurable, criminals. Having already agreed that such enactments ought always to have a short prelude, we may speak to the criminal, whom some tormenting desire by night and by day tempts to go and rob a temple, the fewest possible words of admonition and exhortation:—O sir, we will say to him, the impulse which moves you to rob temples is not an ordinary human malady, nor yet a visitation of heaven, but a madness which is begotten in a man from ancient and unexpiated crimes of his race, an ever-recurring curse;—against this you must guard with all your might, and how you are to guard we will explain to you. When any such thought comes into your mind, go and perform expiations, go as a suppliant to the temples of the Gods who avert evils, go to the society of those who are called good men among you; hear them tell and yourself try to repeat after them, that every man should honour the noble and the just. Fly from the company of the wicked—fly and turn not back; and if your disorder is lightened by these remedies, well and good, but if not, then acknowledge death to be nobler than life, and depart hence.

Such are the preludes which we sing to all who have thoughts of unholy and treasonable actions, and to him who hearkens to them the law has nothing to say. But to him who is disobedient when the prelude is over, cry with a loud voice—He who is taken in the act of robbing temples, if he be a slave or stranger, shall have his evil deed engraven on his face and hands, and shall be beaten with as many stripes as may seem good to the judges, and be cast naked beyond the borders of the land. And if he suffers this punishment he will probably return to his right mind and be improved; for no penalty which the law inflicts is designed for evil, but always makes him who suffers either better or not so much



worse as he would have been<sup>1</sup>. But if any citizen be found guilty of any great or unmentionable wrong, either in relation to the gods, or his parents, or the state, let the judge deem him to be incurable, remembering that after receiving such an excellent education and training from youth upward, he has not abstained from the greatest of crimes<sup>2</sup>. His punishment shall be death, which to him will be the least of evils; and his example will benefit others, if he perish ingloriously, and be cast beyond the borders of the land. But let his children and family, if they avoid the ways of their father, have glory, and let honourable mention be made of them, as having nobly and manfully escaped out of evil into good. None of them should have their goods confiscated to the state, for the lots of the citizens ought always to continue the same and equal.

Touching the exaction of penalties, when a man appears to have done anything which deserves a fine, he shall pay the fine, if he have anything in excess of the lot which is assigned to him; but more than that he shall not pay. And to secure exactness, let the guardians of the law refer to the registers, and inform the judges of the precise truth, in order that none of the lots may go uncultivated for want of money. But if any one seems to deserve a greater penalty, let him undergo a long and public imprisonment and be dishonoured, unless some of his friends are willing to be surety for him, and liberate him by assisting him to pay the fine. No criminal shall go unpunished, not even for a single offence, nor if he have fled the country; but let the penalty be according to his deserts,—death, or bonds, or blows, or degrading places of sitting or standing, or removal to some temple on the borders of the land; or let him pay fines, as we said before. In cases where death is the penalty, let the judges be the guardians of the law, and a court selected by merit from the last year's magistrates. But how the causes are to be brought into court, how the summonses are to be served, and the like, these things may be left to the younger generation of legislators to determine; the manner of voting we must determine ourselves.

Let the vote be given openly; but before they come to the vote let the judges sit in order of seniority over against

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ATHENIAN.

the citizen shall be put to death; for he is incurable.

'The father and the children.'

No criminal to escape punishment.

Manner of procedure.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Protag. 323 D foll.; Gorg. 525.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Statesman 308 E.

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ATHENIAN.

plaintiff and defendant, and let all the citizens who can spare time hear and take a serious interest in listening to such causes. First of all the plaintiff shall make one speech, and then the defendant shall make another; and after the speeches have been made the eldest judge shall begin to examine the parties, and proceed to make an adequate enquiry into what has been said; and after the oldest has spoken, the rest shall proceed in order to examine either party as to what he finds defective in the evidence, whether of statement or omission; and he who has nothing to ask shall hand over the examination to another. And on so much of what has been said as is to the purpose all the judges shall set their seals, and place the writings on the altar of Hestia. On the next day they shall meet again, and in like manner 8 put their questions and go through the cause, and again set their seals upon the evidence; and when they have three times done this, and have had witnesses and evidence enough, they shall each of them give a holy vote, after promising by Hestia that they will decide justly and truly to the utmost of their power; and so they shall put an end to the suit.

The factious person is the greatest enemy of the state; and the magistrate who does not suppress him is nearly as bad.

Next, after what relates to the Gods, follows what relates to the dissolution of the state:—Whoever by promoting a man to power enslaves the laws, and subjects the city to factions, using violence and stirring up sedition contrary to law, him we will deem the greatest enemy of the whole state. But he who takes no part in such proceedings, and, being one of the chief magistrates of the state, has no knowledge of the treason, or, having knowledge of it, by reason of cowardice does not interfere on behalf of his country, such an one we must consider nearly as bad. Every man who is worth anything will inform the magistrates, and bring the conspirator to trial for making a violent and illegal attempt to change the government. The judges of such cases shall be the same as of the robbers of temples; and let the whole proceeding be carried on in the same way, and the vote of the majority condemn to death. But let there be a general rule, that the disgrace and punishment of the father is not to be visited on the children, except in the case of some one whose father, grandfather, and great-grandfather have suc-

He shall be punished with death.

cessively undergone the penalty of death. Such persons the city shall send away with all their possessions to the city and country of their ancestors, retaining only and wholly their appointed lot. And out of the citizens who have more than one son of not less than ten years of age, they shall select ten whom their father or grandfather by the mother's or father's side shall appoint, and let them send to Delphi the names of those who are selected, and him whom the God chooses they shall establish as heir of the house which has failed; and may he have better fortune than his predecessors!

*Cle.* Very good.

*Ath.* Once more let there be a third general law respecting the judges who are to give judgment, and the manner of conducting suits against those who are tried on an accusation of treason; and as concerning the remaining or departure of their descendants,—there shall be one law for all three, for the traitor, and the robber of temples, and the subverter by violence of the laws of the state. For a thief, whether he steal much or little, let there be one law, and one punishment for all alike: in the first place, let him pay double the amount of the theft if he be convicted, and if he have so much over and above the allotment;—if he have not, he shall be bound until he pay the penalty, or persuade him who has obtained the sentence against him to forgive him. But if a person be convicted of a theft against the state, then if he can persuade the city, or if he will pay back twice the amount of the theft, he shall be set free from his bonds<sup>1</sup>.

*Cle.* What makes you say, Stranger, that a theft is all one, whether the thief may have taken much or little, and either from sacred or secular places—and these are not the only differences in thefts:—seeing, then, that they are of many kinds, ought not the legislator to adapt himself to them, and impose upon them entirely different penalties?

*Ath.* Excellent. I was running on too fast, Cleinias, and you impinged upon me, and brought me to my senses, reminding me of what, indeed, had occurred to my mind already, that legislation was never yet rightly worked out, as I may say in passing.—Do you remember the image in which I likened the men for whom laws are now made to

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The law about  
traitors.

One law for  
thefts of all  
kinds; resti-  
tution of  
double the  
amount  
stolen.

The Athenian  
compares his

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *infra*, xi. 933 E; xii. 941.



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CLEINIAS.

own case to  
that of the  
scientific  
doctor, who  
talks to his  
patient so  
much that he  
seems to be  
educating  
rather than  
curing him.

slaves who are doctored by slaves<sup>1</sup>? For of this you may be very sure, that if one of those empirical physicians, who practise medicine without science, were to come upon the gentleman physician talking to his gentleman patient, and using the language almost of philosophy, beginning at the beginning of the disease and discoursing about the whole nature of the body, he would burst into a hearty laugh — he would say what most of those who are called doctors always have at their tongue's end:— Foolish fellow, he would say, you are not healing the sick man, but you are educating him; and he does not want to be made a doctor, but to get well.

*Cle.* And would he not be right?

*Ath.* Perhaps he would; and he might remark upon us, that he who discourses about laws, as we are now doing, is giving the citizens education and not laws; that would be rather a telling observation.

*Cle.* Very true.

*Ath.* But we are fortunate.

*Cle.* In what way?

*Ath.* Inasmuch as we are not compelled to give laws, but we may take into consideration every form of government, and ascertain what is best and what is most needful, and how they may both be carried into execution; and we may also, if we please, at this very moment choose what is best, or, if we prefer, what is most necessary — which shall we do?

*Cle.* There is something ridiculous, Stranger, in our proposing such an alternative, as if we were legislators, simply bound under some great necessity which cannot be deferred to the morrow. But we, as I may by the grace of Heaven affirm, like gatherers of stones or beginners of some composite work, may gather a heap of materials, and out of this, at our leisure, select what is suitable for our projected construction. Let us then suppose ourselves to be at leisure, not of necessity building, but rather like men who are partly providing materials, and partly putting them together. And we may truly say that some of our laws, like stones, are already fixed in their places, and others lie at hand.

*Ath.* Certainly, in that case, Cleinias, our view of law will

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, iv. 720.

The truth is  
that we are  
collecting  
materials.



be more in accordance with nature. For there is another matter affecting legislators, which I must earnestly entreat you to consider.

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CLEINIUS.

*Cle.* What is it?

*Ath.* There are many writings to be found in cities, and among them there are discourses composed by legislators as well as by other persons.

*Cle.* To be sure.

*Ath.* Shall we give heed rather to the writings of those others,—poets and the like, who either in metre or out of metre have recorded their advice about the conduct of life, and not to the writings of legislators? or shall we give heed to them above all?

Poets and others have laid down rules of life, but the precepts of legislators should be far superior.

*Cle.* Yes; to them far above all others.

*Ath.* And ought the legislator alone among writers to withhold his opinion about the beautiful, the good, and the just, and not to teach what they are, and how they are to be pursued by those who intend to be happy?

*Cle.* Certainly not.

*Ath.* And is it disgraceful for Homer and Tyrtæus and other poets to lay down evil precepts in their writings respecting life and the pursuits of men, but not so disgraceful for Lycurgus and Solon and others who were legislators as well as writers? Is it not true that of all the writings to be found in cities, those which relate to laws, when you unfold and read them, ought to be by far the noblest and the best? and should not other writings either agree with them, or if they disagree, be deemed ridiculous? We should consider whether the laws of states ought not to have the character of moving and wise parents, rather than of tyrants and masters, who command and threaten, and, after writing their decrees on walls, go their ways; and whether, in discoursing of laws, we should not take the gentler view of them which may or may not be attainable,—at any rate, we will show our readiness to entertain such a view, and be prepared to undergo whatever may be the result. And may the result be good, and if God be gracious, it will be good!

*Cle.* Excellent; let us do as you say.

*Ath.* Then we will now consider accurately, as we proposed, what relates to robbers of temples, and all kinds of

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thefts, and offences in general; and we must not be annoyed if, in the course of legislation, we have enacted some things, and have not made up our minds about some others; for as yet we are not legislators, but we may soon be. Let us, if you please, consider these matters.

*Cle.* By all means.

*Ath.* Concerning all things honourable and just, let us then endeavour to ascertain how far we are consistent with ourselves, and how far we are inconsistent, and how far the many, from whom at any rate we should profess a desire to differ, agree and disagree among themselves.

*Cle.* What are the inconsistencies which you observe in us?

*Ath.* I will endeavour to explain. If I am not mistaken, we are all agreed that justice, and just men and things and actions, are all fair, and, if a person were to maintain that just men, even when they are deformed in body, are still perfectly beautiful in respect of the excellent justice of their minds, no one would say that there was any inconsistency in this.

*Cle.* They would be quite right.

*Ath.* Perhaps; but let us consider further, that if all things which are just are fair and honourable, in the term 'all' we must include just sufferings which are the cor-relatives of just actions.

*Cle.* And what is the inference?

*Ath.* The inference is, that a just action in partaking of the just partakes also in the same degree of the fair and honourable.

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* And must not a suffering which partakes of the just principle be admitted to be in the same degree fair and honourable, if the argument is consistently carried out?

*Cle.* True.

*Ath.* But then if we admit suffering to be just and yet dishonourable, and the term 'dishonourable' is applied to justice, will not the just and the honourable disagree?

*Cle.* What do you mean?

*Ath.* A thing not difficult to understand; the laws which have been already enacted would seem to announce principles directly opposed to what we are saying.

We say—  
'the just is  
the honour-  
able': this  
is true of  
just actions,  
but not of  
just sufferings  
or punish-  
ments.

*Cle.* To what?

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*Ath.* We had enacted, if I am not mistaken, that the robber of temples, and he who was the enemy of law and order, might justly be put to death, and we were proceeding to make divers other enactments of a similar nature. But we stopped short, because we saw that these sufferings are infinite in number and degree, and that they are, at once, the most just and also the most dishonourable of all sufferings. And if this be true, are not the just and the honourable at one time all the same, and at another time in the most diametrical opposition?

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CLEINIAS.

*Cle.* Such appears to be the case.

*Ath.* In this discordant and inconsistent fashion does the language of the many rend asunder the honourable and just.

*Cle.* Very true, Stranger.

*Ath.* Then now, Cleinias, let us see how far we ourselves are consistent about these matters.

*Cle.* Consistent in what?

*Ath.* I think that I have clearly stated in the former part of the discussion, but if I did not, let me now state ——

*Cle.* What?

*Ath.* That all bad men are always involuntarily bad; and from this I must proceed to draw a further inference.

*Cle.* What is it?

*Ath.* That the unjust man may be bad, but that he is bad against his will. Now that an action which is voluntary should be done involuntarily is a contradiction; wherefore he who maintains that injustice is involuntary will deem that the unjust does injustice involuntarily. I too admit that all men do injustice involuntarily, and if any contentious or disputatious person says that men are unjust against their will, and yet that many do injustice willingly, I do not agree with him. But, then, how can I avoid being inconsistent with myself, if you, Cleinias, and you, Megillus, say to me,—Well, Stranger, if all this be as you say, how about legislating for the city of the Magnetes—shall we legislate or not—what do you advise? Certainly we will, I should reply. Then will you determine for them what are voluntary and what are involuntary crimes, and shall we make the punishments greater of voluntary errors and crimes and less for

All unjust acts are not voluntary, but involuntary: but how then can we punish them?



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the involuntary? or shall we make the punishment of all to be alike, under the idea that there is no such thing as 8  
voluntary crime?

*Cle.* Very good, Stranger; and what shall we say in answer to these objections?

*Ath.* That is a very fair question. In the first place, let us —

*Cle.* Do what?

*Ath.* Let us remember what has been well said by us already, that our ideas of justice are in the highest degree confused and contradictory. Bearing this in mind, let us proceed to ask ourselves once more whether we have discovered a way out of the difficulty. Have we ever determined in what respect these two classes of actions differ from one another? For in all states and by all legislators whatsoever, two kinds of actions have been distinguished — the one, voluntary, the other, involuntary; and they have legislated about them accordingly. But shall this new word of ours, like an oracle of God, be only spoken, and get away without giving any explanation or verification of itself? How can a word not understood be the basis of legislation? Impossible. Before proceeding to legislate, then, we must prove that they are two, and what is the difference between them, that when we impose the penalty upon either, every one may understand our proposal, and be able in some way to judge whether the penalty is fitly or unfitly inflicted.

All legislators have distinguished the voluntary from the involuntary.

*Cle.* I agree with you, Stranger; for one of two things is certain: either we must not say that all unjust acts are involuntary, or we must show the meaning and truth of this statement.

*Ath.* Of these two alternatives, the one is quite intolerable — not to speak what I believe to be the truth would be to me unlawful and unholy. But if acts of injustice cannot be divided into voluntary and involuntary, I must endeavour to find some other distinction between them.

If we discard this distinction, we must find another.

*Cle.* Very true, Stranger; there cannot be two opinions among us upon that point.

*Ath.* Reflect, then; there are hurts of various kinds done by the citizens to one another in the intercourse of life,



affording plentiful examples both of the voluntary and involuntary.

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* I would not have any one suppose that all these hurts are injuries, and that these injuries are of two kinds, —one, voluntary, and the other, involuntary; for the involuntary hurts of all men are quite as many and as great as the voluntary<sup>1</sup>. And please to consider whether I am right or quite wrong in what I am going to say; for I deny, Cleinias and Megillus, that he who harms another involuntarily does him an injury involuntarily, nor should I legislate about such an act under the idea that I am legislating for an involuntary injury. But I should rather say that such a hurt, whether great or small, is not an injury at all; and, on the other hand, if I am right, when a benefit is wrongly conferred, the author of the benefit may often be said to injure. For I maintain, O my friends, that the mere giving or taking away of anything is not to be described either as just or unjust; but the legislator has to consider whether mankind do good or harm to one another out of a just principle and intention. On the distinction between injustice and hurt he must fix his eye; and when there is hurt, he must, as far as he can, make the hurt good by law, and save that which is ruined, and raise up that which is fallen, and make that which is dead or wounded whole. And when compensation has been given for injustice, the law must always seek to win over the doers and sufferers of the several hurts from feelings of enmity to those of friendship.

*Cle.* Very good.

*Ath.* Then as to unjust hurts (and gains also, supposing the injustice to bring gain), of these we may heal as many as are capable of being healed, regarding them as diseases of the soul; and the cure of injustice will take the following direction.

*Cle.* What direction?

*Ath.* When any one commits any injustice, small or great, the law will admonish and compel him either never at all to do the like again, or never voluntarily, or at any rate in a far less degree; and he must in addition pay for the hurt.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Arist. N. E. iii. cc. 1-5; v. c. 8.

*Laws IX.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

For voluntary and involuntary injustice we must substitute injustice and hurt.

In judging of acts we should look to the intention.

The true aim of punishment is the reformation

*Lexis LX.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.of the  
offender.Death only  
for the  
incurable.Three causes  
of crime :—  
(1) Passion  
working by  
violence;(2) pleasure,  
by persuasion  
and deceit;(3) ignorance,  
of which there  
are two kinds,  
simple ignor-  
ance and  
conceit of  
wisdom; and  
the latter  
may be either  
powerful  
or weak.

Whether the end is to be attained by word or action, with pleasure or pain, by giving or taking away privileges, by means of fines or gifts, or in whatsoever way the law shall proceed to make a man hate injustice, and love or not hate the nature of the just,—this is quite the noblest work of law. But if the legislator sees any one who is incurable, for him he will appoint a law and a penalty. He knows quite well that to such men themselves there is no profit in the continuance of their lives, and that they would do a double good to the rest of mankind if they would take their departure, inasmuch as they would be an example to other men not to offend, and they would relieve the city of bad citizens. In such cases, and in such cases only, the legislator ought to inflict death as the punishment of offences.

*Cle.* What you have said appears to me to be very reasonable, but will you favour me by stating a little more clearly the difference between hurt and injustice, and the various complications of the voluntary and involuntary which enter into them?

*Ath.* I will endeavour to do as you wish :— Concerning the soul, thus much would be generally said and allowed, that one element in her nature is passion, which may be described either as a state or a part of her, and is hard to be striven against and contended with, and by irrational force overturns many things.

*Cle.* Very true.

*Ath.* And pleasure is not the same with passion, but has an opposite power, working her will by persuasion and by the force of deceit in all things:

*Cle.* Quite true.

*Ath.* A man may truly say that ignorance is a third cause of crimes. Ignorance, however, may be conveniently divided by the legislator into two sorts: there is simple ignorance, which is the source of lighter offences, and double ignorance, which is accompanied by a conceit of wisdom; and he who is under the influence of the latter fancies that he knows all about matters of which he knows nothing. This second kind of ignorance, when possessed of power and strength, will be held by the legislator to be the source of great and monstrous crimes, but when attended with weakness, will only result in

the errors of children and old men; and these he will treat as errors, and will make laws accordingly for those who commit them, which will be the mildest and most merciful of all laws.

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CLEINIAS.

*Cle.* You are perfectly right.

*Ath.* We all of us remark of one man that he is superior to pleasure and passion, and of another that he is inferior to them; and this is true<sup>1</sup>.

Passions and pleasures may be controlled, but not ignorance.

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* But no one was ever yet heard to say that one of us is superior and another inferior to ignorance.

*Cle.* Very true.

*Ath.* We are speaking of motives which incite men to the fulfilment of their will; although an individual may be often drawn by them in opposite directions at the same time.

*Cle.* Yes, often.

*Ath.* And now I can define to you clearly, and without ambiguity, what I mean by the just and unjust, according to my notion of them:—When anger and fear, and pleasure and pain, and jealousies and desires, tyrannize over the soul, whether they do any harm or not,—I call all this injustice. But when the opinion of the best, in whatever part of human nature states or individuals may suppose that to dwell, has dominion in the soul and orders the life of every man, even if it be sometimes mistaken, yet what is done in accordance therewith, and the principle in individuals which obeys this rule, and is best for the whole life of man, is to be called just; although the hurt done by mistake is thought by many to be involuntary injustice. Leaving the question of names, about which we are not going to quarrel, and having already delineated three sources of error, we may begin by recalling them somewhat more vividly to our memory:—One of them was of the painful sort, which we denominate anger and fear.

The unjust soul is mastered by passion and desire; the just soul follows the opinion of the best.

Recapitulation.

*Cle.* Quite right.

*Ath.* There was a second consisting of pleasures and desires, and a third of hopes, which aimed at true opinion about the best. The latter being subdivided into three, we now get five sources of actions, and for these five we will make laws of two kinds.

*Cle.* What are the two kinds?

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. iv. 430 E; *supra*, i. 626 E, foll.



*Laws IX.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.Two kinds  
of actions,  
and two kinds  
of laws.

*Ath.* There is one kind of actions done by violence and in the light of day, and another kind of actions which are done in darkness and with secret deceit, or sometimes both with violence and deceit; the laws concerning these last ought to have a character of severity.

*Cle.* Naturally.

*Ath.* And now let us return from this digression and complete the work of legislation. Laws have been already enacted by us concerning the robbers of the Gods, and concerning traitors, and also concerning those who corrupt the laws for the purpose of subverting the government. A man may very likely commit some of these crimes, either in a state of madness or when affected by disease, or under the influence of extreme old age, or in a fit of childish wantonness, himself no better than a child. And if this be made evident to the judges elected to try the cause, on the appeal of the criminal or his advocate, and he be judged to have been in this state when he committed the offence, he shall simply pay for the hurt which he may have done to another; but he shall be exempt from other penalties, unless he have slain some one, and have on his hands the stain of blood. And in that case he shall go to another land and country, and there dwell for a year; and if he return before the expiration of the time which the law appoints, or even set his foot at all on his native land, he shall be bound by the guardians of the law in the public prison for two years, and then go free.

Cases of  
involuntary  
homicide:—  
(1) He who  
kills another  
at the games  
must be puri-  
fied, but is  
guiltless;

so also is  
(2) the doctor  
whose pa-  
tient dies.

Having begun to speak of homicide, let us endeavour to lay down laws concerning every different kind of homicide; and, first of all, concerning violent and involuntary homicides. If any one in an athletic contest, and at the public games, involuntarily kills a friend, and he dies either at the time or afterwards of the blows which he has received; or if the like misfortune happens to any one in war, or military exercises, or mimic contests of which the magistrates enjoin the practice, whether with or without arms, when he has been purified according to the law brought from Delphi relating to these matters, he shall be innocent. And so in the case of physicians: if their patient dies against their will, they shall be held guiltless by the law. And if one slay another with his own hand, but unintentionally, whether he be un-



armed or have some instrument or dart in his hand; or if he kill him by administering food or drink, or by the application of fire or cold, or by suffocating him, whether he do the deed by his own hand, or by the agency of others, he shall be deemed the agent, and shall suffer one of the following penalties:— If he kill the slave of another in the belief that he is his own, he shall bear the master of the dead man harmless from loss, or shall pay a penalty of twice the value of the dead man, which the judges shall assess; but purifications must be used greater and more numerous than for those who committed homicide at the games;— what they are to be, the interpreters whom the God appoints<sup>1</sup> shall be authorized to declare. And if a man kills his own slave, when he has been purified according to law, he shall be quit of the homicide. And if a man kills a freeman unintentionally, he shall undergo the same purification as he did who killed the slave. But let him not forget also a tale of olden time, which is to this effect:— He who has suffered a violent end, when newly dead, if he has had the soul of a freeman in life, is angry with the author of his death; and being himself full of fear and panic by reason of his violent end, when he sees his murderer walking about in his own accustomed haunts, he is stricken with terror and becomes disordered, and this disorder of his, aided by the guilty recollection of the other, is communicated by him with overwhelming force to the murderer and his deeds. Wherefore also the murderer must go out of the way of his victim for the entire period of a year, and not himself be found in any spot which was familiar to him throughout the country. And if the dead man be a stranger, the homicide shall be kept from the country of the stranger during a like period. If any one voluntarily obeys this law, the next of kin to the deceased, seeing all that has happened, shall take pity on him, and make peace with him, and show him all gentleness. But if any one is disobedient, and either ventures to go to any of the temples and sacrifice unpurified, or will not continue in exile during the appointed time, the next of kin to the deceased shall proceed against him for murder; and if he be convicted, every part of his punishment shall be doubled.

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ATHENIAN.

(3) If a man kill another's slave, he must make restitution to the owner; and undergo purification, like him  
(4) who kills his own slave.

(5) The slayer of a freeman, whether citizen or stranger, must be purified and avoid the ghost of the sufferer for a year.

If he obeys the law he shall be forgiven by the next of kin, or if he disobey the law the next of kin shall prosecute him

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, vi 759.

*Laus IX.*

ATHENIAN.

for murder  
or be him-  
self prose-  
cuted for  
neglect.

(6) a metic  
who kills a  
stranger must  
be purified  
and go into  
exile for  
a year; but  
(7) a stranger  
who kills any  
one shall be  
banished for  
for life.

Homicide  
arising from  
passion, if  
premeditated,  
is the shadow  
of the volun-  
tary; if un-  
premeditated,  
of the in-  
voluntary.

And if the next of kin do not proceed against the perpetrator of the crime, then the pollution shall be deemed to fall upon his own head;—the murdered man will fix the guilt upon his kinsman, and he who has a mind to proceed against him may compel him to be absent from his country during five years, according to law. If a stranger unintentionally kill a stranger who is dwelling in the city, he who likes shall prosecute the cause according to the same rules. If he be a metic, let him be absent for a year, or if he be an entire stranger, in addition to the purification, whether he have slain a stranger, or a metic, or a citizen, he shall be banished for life from the country which is in possession of our laws. And if he return contrary to law, let the guardians of the law punish him with death; and let them hand over his property, if he have any, to him who is next of kin to the sufferer. And if he be wrecked, and driven on the coast against his will, he shall take up his abode on the sea-shore, wetting his feet in the sea, and watching for an opportunity of sailing; but if he be brought by land, and is not his own master, let the magistrate whom he first comes across in the city, release him and send him unharmed over the border.

If any one slays a freeman with his own hand, and the deed be done in passion, in the case of such actions we must begin by making a distinction. For a deed is done from passion either when men suddenly, and without intention to kill, cause the death of another by blows and the like on a momentary impulse, and are sorry for the deed immediately afterwards; or again, when after having been insulted in deed or word, men pursue revenge, and kill a person intentionally, and are not sorry for the act. And, therefore, we must assume that these homicides are of two kinds, both of them arising from passion, which may be justly said to be in a mean between the voluntary and involuntary; at the same time, they are neither of them anything more than a likeness or shadow of either. He who treasures up his anger, and avenges himself, not immediately and at the moment, but with insidious design, and after an interval, is like the voluntary; but he who does not treasure up his anger, and takes vengeance on the instant, and without malice

repense, approaches to the involuntary; and yet even he is not altogether involuntary, but is only the image or shadow of the involuntary; wherefore about homicides committed in not blood, there is a difficulty in determining whether in legislating we shall reckon them as voluntary or as partly involuntary. The best and truest view is to regard them respectively as likenesses only of the voluntary and involuntary, and to distinguish them accordingly as they are done with or without premeditation. And we should make the penalties heavier for those who commit homicide with angry premeditation, and lighter for those who do not premeditate, but smite upon the instant; for that which is like a greater evil should be punished more severely, and that which is like a less evil should be punished less severely: this shall be the rule of our laws.

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* Let us proceed:— If any one slays a freeman with his own hand, and the deed be done in a moment of anger, and without premeditation, let the offender suffer in other respects as the involuntary homicide would have suffered, and also undergo an exile of two years, that he may learn to school his passions. But he who slays another from passion, yet with premeditation, shall in other respects suffer as the former; and to this shall be added an exile of three instead of two years,—his punishment is to be longer because his passion is greater. The manner of their return shall be on this wise: and here the law has difficulty in determining exactly; for in some cases the murderer who is judged by the law to be the worse may really be the less cruel, and he who is judged the less cruel may be really the worse, and may have executed the murder in a more savage manner, whereas the other may have been gentler. But in general the degrees of guilt will be such as we have described them. Of all these things the guardians of the law must take cognizance):— When a homicide of either kind has completed his term of exile, the guardians shall send twelve judges to the borders of the land; these during the interval shall have informed themselves of the actions of the criminals, and they shall judge respecting their pardon and reception; and the homicides shall abide by their judgment. But if after they have returned home, any one of them in a moment

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ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

The former  
kind deserves  
a heavier punishment.

Cases of homicide done in passion:—

(1) If a man kills a freeman without premeditation, he shall be exiled for two years; (2) if with premeditation, for three years.

The return  
of the exiles.

The second  
offence.



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ATHENIAN.

(3) If a man kills his own slave, he shall be purified;

(4) if another's, pay to the owner double his value.

(5) The slave who kills a freeman to be punished with death.

(6) The parent who kills a child shall be exiled for three years and debarred from sharing in the family rites:

so too  
(7) the husband who kills his wife or the wife who kills her husband;

and (8) the brother or sister who kills a

of anger repeats the deed, let him be an exile, and return no more; or if he returns, let him suffer as the stranger was to suffer in a similar case. He who kills his own slave shall undergo a purification, but if he kills the slave of another in anger, he shall pay twice the amount of the loss to his owner. And if any homicide is disobedient to the law, and without purification pollutes the agora, or the games, or the temples, he who pleases may bring to trial the next of kin to the dead man for permitting him, and the murderer with him, and may compel the one to exact and the other to suffer a double amount of fines and purifications; and the accuser shall himself receive the fine in accordance with the law. If a slave in a fit of passion kills his master, the kindred of the deceased man may do with the murderer (provided only they do not spare his life) whatever they please, and they will be pure; or if he kills a freeman, who is not his master, the owner shall give up the slave to the relatives of the deceased, and they shall be under an obligation to put him to death, but this may be done in any manner which they please. And if (which is a rare occurrence, but does sometimes happen) a father or a mother in a moment of passion slays a son or daughter by blows, or some other violence, the slayer shall undergo the same purification as in other cases, and be exiled during three years; but when the exile returns the wife shall separate from the husband, and the husband from the wife, and they shall never afterwards beget children together, or live under the same roof, or partake of the same sacred rites with those whom they have deprived of a child or of a brother. And he who is impious and disobedient in such a case shall be brought to trial for impiety by any one who pleases. If in a fit of anger a husband kills his wedded wife, or the wife her husband, the slayer shall undergo the same purification, and the term of exile shall be three years. And when he who has committed any such crime returns, let him have no communication in sacred rites with his children, neither let him sit at the same table with them, and the father or son who disobey's shall be liable to be brought to trial for impiety by any one who pleases. If a brother or a sister in a fit of passion kills a brother or a sister, they shall undergo purification and exile, as was



the case with parents who killed their offspring: they shall not come under the same roof, or share in the sacred rites of those whom they have deprived of their brethren, or of their children. And he who is disobedient shall be justly liable to the law concerning impiety, which relates to these matters. If any one is so violent in his passion against his parents, that in the madness of his anger he dares to kill one of them, if the murdered person before dying freely forgives the murderer, let him undergo the purification which is assigned to those who have been guilty of involuntary homicide, and do as they do, and he shall be pure. But if he be not acquitted, the perpetrator of such a deed shall be amenable to many laws;—he shall be amenable to the extreme punishments for assault, and impiety, and robbing of temples, for he has robbed his parent of life; and if a man could be slain more than once, most justly would he who in a fit of passion has slain father or mother, undergo many deaths. How can he, whom, alone of all men, even in defence of his life, and when about to suffer death at the hands of his parents, no law will allow to kill his father or his mother who are the authors of his being, and whom the legislator will command to endure any extremity rather than do this—how can he, I say, lawfully receive any other punishment? Let death then be the appointed punishment of him who in a fit of passion slays his father or his mother. But if brother kills brother in a civil broil, or under other like circumstances, if the other has begun, and he only defends himself, let him be free from guilt, as he would be if he had slain an enemy; and the same rule will apply if a citizen kill a citizen, or a stranger a stranger. Or if a stranger kill a citizen or a citizen a stranger in self-defence, let him be free from guilt in like manner; and so in the case of a slave who has killed a slave; but if a slave have killed a freeman in self-defence, let him be subject to the same law as he who has killed a father; and let the law about the remission of penalties in the case of parricide apply equally to every other remission. Whenever any sufferer of his own accord emits the guilt of homicide to another, under the idea that his act was involuntary, let the perpetrator of the deed undergo purification and remain in exile for a year, according to law.

*Laws IX.*

ATHENIAN.

brother or  
sister.(9) The child  
who kills a  
parent to be  
punished with  
death, if not  
forgiven.Homicide  
in civil war  
or in self-  
defence (ex-  
cept when  
a slave kills  
a freeman) is  
free from guilt.A homicide,  
if forgiven by  
his victim, to  
be banished  
for a year.

*Laws IX.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

Enough has been said of murders violent and involuntary and committed in passion: we have now to speak of voluntary crimes done with injustice of every kind and with premeditation, through the influence of pleasures, and desires, and jealousies.

*Cle.* Very good.

Crimes  
committed  
voluntarily  
and with  
premeditation  
are due to  
three  
causes:—

(1) avarice :

*Ath.* Let us first speak, as far as we are able, of their various kinds. The greatest cause of them is lust, which gets the mastery of the soul maddened by desire; and this is most commonly found to exist where the passion reigns which is strongest and most prevalent among the mass of mankind: I mean where the power of wealth breeds endless desires of never-to-be-satisfied acquisition, originating in natural disposition, and a miserable want of education. Of this want of education, the false praise of wealth which is bruited about both among Hellenes and barbarians is the cause; they deem that to be the first of goods which in reality is only the third. And in this way they wrong both posterity and themselves, for nothing can be nobler and better than that the truth about wealth should be spoken in all states — namely, that riches are for the sake of the body, as the body is for the sake of the soul. They are good, and wealth is intended by nature to be for the sake of them, and is therefore inferior to them both, and third in order of excellence. This argument teaches us that he who would be happy ought not to seek to be rich, or rather he should seek to be rich justly and temperately, and then there would be no murders in states requiring to be purged away by other murders. But now, as I said at first, avarice is the chiefest cause and source of the worst trials for voluntary homicide.

(2) ambition :

A second cause is ambition: this creates jealousies, which are troublesome companions, above all to the jealous man himself, and in a less degree to the chiefs of the state. And a third cause is cowardly and unjust fear, which has been the occasion of many murders. When a man is doing or has done something which he desires that no one should know him to be doing or to have done, he will take the life of those who are likely to inform of such things, if he have no other means of getting rid of them. Let this be said as a prelude concerning crimes of violence in general; and I must not

(3) cowardly  
fear.

omit to mention a tradition which is firmly believed by many, and has been received by them from those who are learned in the mysteries: they say that such deeds will be punished in the world below, and also that when the perpetrators return to this world they will pay the natural penalty which is due to the sufferer, and end their lives in like manner by the hand of another. If he who is about to commit murder believes this, and is made by the mere prelude to dread such a penalty, there is no need to proceed with the proclamation of the law. But if he will not listen, let the following law be declared and registered against him:—Whoever shall wrongfully and of design slay with his own hand any of his kinsmen, shall in the first place be deprived of legal privileges; and he shall not pollute the temples, or the agora, or the harbours, or any other place of meeting, whether he is forbidden of men or not; for the law, which represents the whole state, forbids him, and always is and will be in the attitude of forbidding him. And if a cousin or nearer relative of the deceased, whether on the male or female side, does not prosecute the homicide when he ought, and have him proclaimed an outlaw, he shall in the first place be involved in the pollution, and incur the hatred of the Gods, even as the curse of the law stirs up the voices of men against him; and in the second place he shall be liable to be prosecuted by any one who is willing to inflict retribution on behalf of the dead. And he who would avenge a murder shall observe all the precautionary ceremonies of lavation, and any others which the God commands in cases of this kind. Let him have proclamation made, and then go forth and compel the perpetrator to suffer the execution of justice according to the law. Now the legislator may easily show that these things must be accomplished by prayers and sacrifices to certain Gods, who are concerned with the prevention of murders in states. But who these Gods are, and what should be the true manner of instituting such trials with due regard to religion, the guardians of the law, aided by the interpreters, and the prophets, and the God, shall determine, and when they have determined let them carry on the prosecution at law. The cause shall have the same judges<sup>1</sup> who are appointed to decide in the case of those who plunder

*Laws IX.*

ATHENIAN.

The punishments of the world below and when men return to earth.

The law:—  
Excommunication of slayers of kindred.

Duties of the nearest kinsmen, and the punishment of him who neglects them.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, 855 C.



*Lætes IX.*

ATHENIAN.

The murderer  
to be punished  
with death if  
convicted.

He may fly,  
but must not  
return.

The instigator  
of a murder is  
as guilty as  
the doer, and  
like him, shall  
suffer death.

Various cases  
of murder and  
their punish-  
ments.

temples. Let him who is convicted be punished with death, and let him not be buried in the country of the murdered man, for this would be shameless as well as impious. But if he fly and will not stand his trial, let him fly for ever; or, if he set foot anywhere on any part of the murdered man's country, let any relation of the deceased, or any other citizen who may first happen to meet with him, kill him with impunity, or bind and deliver him to those among the judges of the case who are magistrates, that they may put him to death. And let the prosecutor demand surety of him whom he prosecutes; three sureties sufficient in the opinion of the magistrates who try the cause shall be provided by him, and they shall undertake to produce him at the trial. But if he be unwilling or unable to provide sureties, then the magistrates shall take him and keep him in bonds, and produce him at the day of trial.

If a man do not commit a murder with his own hand, but contrives the death of another, and is the author of the deed in intention and design, and he continues to dwell in the city, having his soul not pure of the guilt of murder, let him be tried in the same way, except in what relates to the sureties; and also, if he be found guilty, his body after execution may have burial in his native land, but in all other respects his case shall be as the former; and whether a stranger shall kill a citizen, or a citizen a stranger, or a slave a slave, there shall be no difference as touching murder by one's own hand or by contrivance, except in the matter of sureties; and these, as has been said, shall be required of the actual murderer only, and he who brings the accusation shall bind them over at the time. If a slave be convicted of slaying a freeman voluntarily, either by his own hand or by contrivance, let the public executioner take him in the direction of the sepulchre, to a place whence he can see the tomb of the dead man, and inflict upon him as many stripes as the person who caught him orders, and if he survive, let him put him to death. And if any one kills a slave who has done no wrong, because he is afraid that he may inform of some base and evil deeds of his own, or for any similar reason, in such a case let him pay the penalty of murder, as he would have done if he had slain a citizen. There are things about which it is terrible and unpleasant to legislate, but impossible not to legislate.



If, for example, there should be murders of kinsmen, either perpetrated by the hands of kinsmen, or by their contrivance, voluntary and purely malicious, which most often happen in ill-regulated and ill-educated states, and may perhaps occur even in a country where a man would not expect to find them, we must repeat once more the tale which we narrated a little while ago, in the hope that he who hears us will be the more disposed to abstain voluntarily on these grounds from murders which are utterly abominable. For the myth, or saying, or whatever we ought to call it<sup>1</sup>, has been plainly set forth by priests of old; they have pronounced that the justice which guards and avenges the blood of kindred, follows the law of retaliation, and ordains that he who has done any murderous act should of necessity suffer that which he has done. He who has slain a father shall himself be slain at some time or other by his children,—if a mother, he shall of necessity take a woman's nature, and lose his life at the hands of his offspring in after ages; for where the blood of a family has been polluted there is no other purification, nor can the pollution be washed out until the homicidal soul which did the deed has given life for life, and has propitiated and laid to sleep the wrath of the whole family. These are the retributions of Heaven, and by such punishments men should be deterred. But if they are not deterred, and any one should be incited by some fatality to deprive his father, or mother, or brethren, or children, of life voluntarily and of purpose, for him the earthly lawgiver legislates as follows:—There shall be the same proclamations about outlawry, and there shall be the same sureties which have been enacted in the former cases. But in his case, if he be convicted, the servants of the judges and the magistrates shall slay him at an appointed place without the city where three ways meet, and there expose his body naked, and each of the magistrates on behalf of the whole city shall take a stone and cast it upon the head of the dead man, and so deliver the city from pollution; after that, they shall bear him to the borders of the land, and cast him forth unburied, according to law. And what shall he suffer who slays him who of all men, as they say, is his own best friend? I mean the suicide, who de-

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ATHENIAN.

The retribution of heaven on the slayers of kinsmen.

The earthly law.

The punishment and the manner of executing it.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, 870 D.

*Laws IX.*

ATHENIAN.

The suicide  
to be buried  
alone in no-  
man's-land.

Animals  
which take  
away life to  
be slain and  
cast forth.

Lifeless things  
also to be cast  
forth.

When a  
murderer is  
unknown, he  
shall still be  
tried, and if  
afterwards  
discovered,  
he shall die.

prives himself by violence of his appointed share of life, not because the law of the state requires him, nor yet under the compulsion of some painful and inevitable misfortune which has come upon him, nor because he has had to suffer from irremediable and intolerable shame, but who from sloth or want of manliness imposes upon himself an unjust penalty. For him, what ceremonies there are to be of purification and burial God knows, and about these the next of kin should enquire of the interpreters and of the laws thereto relating, and do according to their injunctions. They who meet their death in this way shall be buried alone, and none shall be laid by their side; they shall be buried ingloriously in the borders of the twelve portions of the land, in such places as are uncultivated and nameless, and no column or inscription shall mark the place of their interment. And if a beast of burden or other animal cause the death of any one, except in the case of anything of that kind happening to a competitor in the public contests, the kinsmen' of the deceased shall prosecute the slayer for murder, and the wardens of the country, such, and so many as the kinsmen appoint, shall try the cause, and let the beast when condemned be slain by them, and let them cast it beyond the borders. And if any lifeless thing deprive a man of life, except in the case of a thunderbolt or other fatal dart sent from the Gods,—whether a man is killed by lifeless objects falling upon him, or by his falling upon them, the nearest of kin shall appoint the nearest neighbour to be a judge, and thereby acquit himself and the whole family of guilt. And he shall cast forth the guilty thing beyond the border, as has been said about the animals.

If a man is found dead, and his murderer be unknown, and after a diligent search cannot be detected, there shall be the same proclamation as in the previous cases, and the same interdict on the murderer; and having proceeded against him, they shall proclaim in the agora by a herald, that he who has slain such and such a person, and has been convicted of murder, shall not set his foot in the temples, nor at all in the country of the murdered man, and if he appears and is discovered, he shall die, and be cast forth unburied beyond the border. Let this one law then be laid down by us about murder; and let cases of this sort be so regarded.

And now let us say in what cases and under what circumstances the murderer is rightly free from guilt:—If a man catch a thief coming into his house by night to steal, and he take and kill him, or if he slay a footpad in self-defence, he shall be guiltless. And any one who does violence to a free woman or a youth, shall be slain with impunity by the injured person, or by his or her father or brothers or sons. If a man find his wife suffering violence, he may kill the violator, and be guiltless in the eye of the law; or if a person kill another in warding off death from his father or mother or children or brethren or wife who are doing no wrong, he shall assuredly be guiltless.

Thus much as to the nurture and education of the living soul of man, having which, he can, and without which, if he unfortunately be without them, he cannot live; and also concerning the punishments which are to be inflicted for violent deaths, let thus much be enacted. Of the nurture and education of the body we have spoken before, and next in order we have to speak of deeds of violence, voluntary and involuntary, which men do to one another; these we will now distinguish, as far as we are able, according to their nature and number, and determine what will be the suitable penalties of each, and so assign to them their proper place in the series of our enactments. The poorest legislator will have no difficulty in determining that wounds and mutilations arising out of wounds should follow next in order after deaths. Let wounds be divided as homicides were divided—into those which are involuntary, and which are given in passion or from fear, and those inflicted voluntarily and with premeditation. Concerning all this, we must make some such proclamation as the following:—Mankind must have laws, and conform to them, or their life would be as bad as that of the most savage beast<sup>1</sup>. And the reason of this is that no man's nature is able to know what is best for human society; or knowing, always able and willing to do what is best. In the first place, there is a difficulty in apprehending that the true art of politics is concerned, not with private but with public good (for public good binds together states, but private only distracts them); and that both the public and private good

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ATHENIAN.

Cases of  
justifiable  
homicide.Prelude to the  
law about  
wounding:—<sup>1</sup> Cp. Arist. Pol. i. 2, § 15.



*Laws IX.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.Laws are  
necessary  
because of  
the selfishness  
of human  
nature.

as well of individuals as of states is greater when the state and not the individual is first considered. In the second place, although a person knows in the abstract that this is true, yet if he be possessed of absolute and irresponsible power, he will never remain firm in his principles or persist in regarding the public good as primary in the state, and the private good as secondary. Human nature will be always drawing him into avarice and selfishness, avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure without any reason, and will bring these to the front, obscuring the juster and better; and so working darkness in his soul will at last fill with evils both him and the whole city<sup>1</sup>. For if a man were born so divinely gifted that he could naturally apprehend the truth, he would have no need of laws to rule over him<sup>2</sup>; for there is no law or order which is above knowledge, nor can mind, without impiety, be deemed the subject or slave of any man, but rather the lord of all. I speak of mind, true and free, and in harmony with nature. But then there is no such mind anywhere, or at least not much; and therefore we must choose law and order, which are second best. These look at things as they exist for the most part only, and are unable to survey the whole of them. And therefore I have spoken as I have.

And now we will determine what penalty he ought to pay or suffer who has hurt or wounded another. Any one may easily imagine the questions which have to be asked in all such cases:—What did he wound, or whom, or how, or when? for there are innumerable particulars of this sort which greatly vary from one another. And to allow courts of law to determine all these things, or not to determine any of them, is alike impossible. There is one particular which they must determine in all cases — the question of fact. And then, again, that the legislator should not permit them to determine what punishment is to be inflicted in any of these cases, but should himself decide about all of them, small or great, is next to impossible.

*Cle.* Then what is to be the inference?

*Ath.* The inference is, that some things should be left to courts of law; others the legislator must decide for himself.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, iii. 691; iv. 711 E, 713 C, 716 A.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. *Statesman*, 297 A.



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ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

If the courts  
of law are bad  
they should  
have little or  
no power of  
determining  
penalties: to  
good courts  
much may be  
left.

Wounding  
with intent  
to kill to be  
deemed murder, but only  
when children  
wound their  
parents or one  
another, or a  
slave wounds  
a master, to

*Cle.* And what ought the legislator to decide, and what ought he to leave to the courts of law?

*Ath.* I may reply, that in a state in which the courts are bad and mute, because the judges conceal their opinions and decide causes clandestinely; or what is worse, when they are disorderly and noisy, as in a theatre, clapping or hooting in turn this or that orator — I say that then there is a very serious evil, which affects the whole state. Unfortunate is the necessity of having to legislate for such courts, but where the necessity exists, the legislator should only allow them to ordain the penalties for the smallest offences; if the state for which he is legislating be of this character, he must take most matters into his own hands and speak distinctly. But when a state has good courts, and the judges are well trained and scrupulously tested, the determination of the penalties or punishments which shall be inflicted on the guilty may fairly and with advantage be left to them. And we are not to be blamed for not legislating concerning all that large class of matters which judges far worse educated than ours would be able to determine, assigning to each offence what is due both to the perpetrator and to the sufferer. We believe those for whom we are legislating to be best able to judge, and therefore to them the greater part may be left. At the same time, as I have often said<sup>1</sup>, we should exhibit to the judges, as we have done, the outline and form of the punishments to be inflicted, and then they will not transgress the just rule. That was an excellent practice, which we observed before, and which now that we are resuming the work of legislation, may with advantage be repeated by us.

Let the enactment about wounding be in the following terms:—If any one has a purpose and intention to slay another who is not his enemy, and whom the law does not permit him to slay, and he wounds him, but is unable to kill him, he who had the intent and has wounded him is not to be pitied—he deserves no consideration, but should be regarded as a murderer and be tried for murder. Still having respect to the fortune which has in a manner favoured him, and to the providence which in pity to him and to the wounded man saved the one from a fatal blow, and the other from an

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, v. 734 E; vi. 770.

*Law* IX.

ATHENIAN.

be punished  
with death.Husband  
wounding  
wife or wife  
husband shall  
be exiled for  
life.When the lot  
becomes vac-  
cant through  
crime, the  
kinsmen and  
the guardians  
of the law  
shall select  
some one of  
a virtuous  
family to  
succeed.

accursed fate and calamity — as a thank-offering to this deity, and in order not to oppose his will — in such a case the law will remit the punishment of death, and only compel the offender to emigrate to a neighbouring city for the rest of his life, where he shall remain in the enjoyment of all his possessions. But if he have injured the wounded man, he shall make such compensation for the injury as the court deciding the cause shall assess, and the same judges shall decide who would have decided if the man had died of his wounds. And if a child intentionally wound his parents, or a servant his master, death shall be the penalty. And if a brother or a sister intentionally wound a brother or a sister, and is found guilty, death shall be the penalty. And if a husband wound a wife, or a wife a husband, with intent to kill, let him or her undergo perpetual exile; if they have sons or daughters who are still young, the guardians shall take care of their property, and have charge of the children as orphans. If their sons are grown up, they shall be under no obligation to support the exiled parent, but they shall possess the property themselves. And if he who meets with such a misfortune has no children, the kindred of the exiled man to the degree of sons of cousins, both on the male and female side, shall meet together, and after taking counsel with the guardians of the law and the priests, shall appoint a 5040th citizen to be the heir of the house, considering and reasoning that no house of all the 5040 belongs to the inhabitant or to the whole family, but is the public and private property of the state. Now the state should seek to have its houses as holy and happy as possible. And if any one of the houses be unfortunate, and stained with impiety, and the owner leave no posterity, but dies unmarried, or married and childless, having suffered death as the penalty of murder or some other crime committed against the Gods or against his fellow-citizens, of which death is the penalty distinctly laid down in the law; or if any of the citizens be in perpetual exile, and also childless, that house shall first of all be purified and undergo expiation according to law; and then let the kinsmen of the house, as we were just now saying, and the guardians of the law, meet and consider what family there is in the state which is of the highest repute for virtue and also

for good fortune, in which there are a number of sons; from that family let them take one and introduce him to the father and forefathers of the dead man as their son, and, for the sake of the omen, let him be called so, that he may be the continuer of their family, the keeper of their hearth, and the minister of their sacred rites with better fortune than his father had; and when they have made this supplication, they shall make him heir according to law, and the offending person they shall leave nameless and childless and portionless when calamities such as these overtake him.

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ATHENIAN.

Now the boundaries of some things do not touch one another, but there is a borderland which comes in between, preventing them from touching. And we were saying that actions done from passion are of this nature, and come in between the voluntary and involuntary. If a person be convicted of having inflicted wounds in a passion, in the first place he shall pay twice the amount of the injury, if the wound be curable, or, if incurable, four times the amount of the injury; or if the wound be curable, and at the same time cause great and notable disgrace to the wounded person, he shall pay fourfold. And whenever any one in wounding another injures not only the sufferer, but also the city, and makes him incapable of defending his country against the enemy, he, besides the other penalties, shall pay a penalty for the loss which the state has incurred. And the penalty shall be, that in addition to his own times of service, he shall serve on behalf of the disabled person, and shall take his place in war; or, if he refuse, he shall be liable to be convicted by law of refusal to serve. The compensation for the injury, whether to be twofold or threefold or fourfold, shall be fixed by the judges who convict him. And if, in like manner, a brother wounds a brother, the parents and kindred of either sex, including the children of cousins, whether on the male or female side, shall meet, and when they have judged the cause, they shall entrust the assessment of damages to the parents, as is natural; and if the estimate be disputed, then the kinsmen on the male side shall make the estimate, or if they cannot, they shall commit the matter to the guardians of the law. And when similar charges of wounding are brought by children against their parents, those who are more than

Punishments  
for wounds  
inflicted in  
passion.

The case of a  
brother who  
wounds a  
brother;

of parents  
who wound  
their children;



*Law* IX.

ATHENIAN.

of a slave who  
wounds a  
freeman.

Unintentional  
hurts not to  
be punished,  
but only com-  
pensated.

The law  
respecting  
assaults com-  
mitted by  
elders and  
strangers.

The elder, if  
he commits  
an assault,  
not to be  
struck in  
return;

sixty years of age, having children of their own, not adopted, shall be required to decide; and if any one is convicted, they shall determine whether he or she ought to die, or suffer some other punishment either greater than death, or, at any rate, not much less. A kinsman of the offender shall not be allowed to judge the cause, not even if he be of the age which is prescribed by the law. If a slave in a fit of anger wound a freeman, the owner of the slave shall give him up to the wounded man, who may do as he pleases with him, and if he do not give him up he shall himself make good the injury. And if any one says that the slave and the wounded man are conspiring together, let him argue the point, and if he is cast, he shall pay for the wrong three times over, but if he gains his case, the freeman who conspired with the slave shall be liable to an action for kidnapping. And if any one unintentionally wounds another he shall simply pay for the harm, for no legislator is able to control chance. In such a case the judges shall be the same as those who are appointed in the case of children suing their parents; and they shall estimate the amount of the injury.

All the preceding injuries and every kind of assault are deeds of violence; and every man, woman, or child ought to consider that the elder has the precedence of the younger in honour<sup>1</sup>, both among the Gods and also among men who would live in security and happiness. Wherefore it is a foul thing and hateful to the Gods to see an elder man assaulted by a younger in the city; and it is reasonable that a young man when struck by an elder should lightly endure his anger, laying up in store for himself a like honour when he is old. Let this be the law:—Every one shall reverence his elder in word and deed; he shall respect any one who is twenty years older than himself, whether male or female, regarding him or her as his father or mother; and he shall abstain from laying hands on any one who is of an age to have been his father or his mother, out of reverence to the Gods who preside over birth; similarly he shall keep his hands from a stranger, whether he be an old inhabitant or newly arrived; he shall not venture to correct such an one by blows, either as the aggressor or in self-defence. If he thinks that some

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. v. 465 A.



stranger has struck him out of wantonness or insolence, and ought to be punished, he shall take him to the wardens of the city, but let him not strike him, that the stranger may be kept far away from the possibility of lifting up his hand against a citizen, and let the wardens of the city take the offender and examine him, not forgetting their duty to the God of Strangers, and in case the stranger appears to have struck the citizen unjustly, let them inflict upon him as many blows with the scourge as he has himself inflicted, and quell his presumption. But if he be innocent, they shall threaten and rebuke the man who arrested him, and let them both go. If a person strikes another of the same age or somewhat older than himself, who has no children, whether he be an old man who strikes an old man or a young man who strikes a young man, let the person struck defend himself in the natural way without a weapon and with his hands only. He who, being more than forty years of age, dares to fight with another, whether he be the aggressor or in self-defence, shall be regarded as rude and ill-mannered and slavish;—this will be a disgraceful punishment, and therefore suitable to him. The obedient nature will readily yield to such exhortations, but the disobedient, who heeds not the prelude, shall have the law ready for him:—If any man smite another who is older than himself, either by twenty or by more years, in the first place, he who is at hand, not being younger than the combatants, nor their equal in age, shall separate them, or be disgraced according to law; but if he be the equal in age of the person who is struck or younger, he shall defend the person injured as he would a brother or father or still older relative. Further, let him who dares to smite an elder be tried for assault, as I have said, and if he be found guilty, let him be imprisoned for a period of not less than a year, or if the judges approve of a longer period, their decision shall be final. But if a stranger or metic smite one who is older by twenty years or more, the same law shall hold about the bystanders assisting, and he who is found guilty in such a suit, if he be a stranger but not resident, shall be imprisoned during a period of two years; and a metic who disobeys the laws shall be imprisoned for three years, unless the court assign him a longer term. And let him who was present in

*Laws IX.*

ATHENIAN.

the stranger  
to be taken  
before the  
wardens of  
the city.

Cases of  
assault (1) on  
equals in age;

(2) on elders,  
—by citizens:

and by  
strangers  
or metics.

*Laws IX.*

ATHENIAN.

any of these cases and did not assist according to law be punished, if he be of the highest class, by paying a fine of a mina; or if he be of the second class, of fifty drachmas; or if of the third class, by a fine of thirty drachmas; or if he be of the fourth class, by a fine of twenty drachmas; and the generals and taxiarchs and phylarchs and hipparchs shall form the court in such cases.

Laws partly  
for instruction,  
partly  
for those who  
will not  
listen to  
instruction.

Hardened  
criminals are  
not affected  
by the tales  
of the world  
below: and  
must therefore  
be punished  
on earth.

Law about  
striking a  
parent.

Laws are partly framed for the sake of good men, in order to instruct them how they may live on friendly terms with one another, and partly for the sake of those who refuse to be instructed, whose spirit cannot be subdued, or softened, or hindered from plunging into evil. These are the persons who cause the word to be spoken which I am about to utter; for them the legislator legislates of necessity, and in the hope that there may be no need of his laws. He who shall dare to lay violent hands upon his father or mother, or any still older relative, having no fear either of the wrath of the Gods above, or of the punishments that are spoken of in the world below, but transgresses in contempt of ancient and universal traditions as though he were too wise to believe in them, requires some extreme measure of prevention. Now death is not the worst that can happen to men; far worse are the punishments which are said to pursue them in the world below. But although they are most true tales, they work on such souls no prevention; for if they had any effect there would be no slayers of mothers, or impious hands lifted up against parents; and therefore the punishments of this world which are inflicted during life ought not in such cases to fall short, if possible, of the terrors of the world below. Let our enactment then be as follows:—If a man dare to strike his father or his mother, or their fathers or mothers, he being at the time of sound mind, then let any one who is at hand come to the rescue as has been already said, and the metic or stranger who comes to the rescue shall be called to the first place in the games; but if he do not come he shall suffer the punishment of perpetual exile. He who is not a metic, if he comes to the rescue, shall have praise, and if he do not come, blame. And if a slave come to the rescue, let him be made free, but if he do not come to the rescue, let him receive 100 strokes of the whip, by order of

the wardens of the agora, if the occurrence take place in the agora; or if somewhere in the city beyond the limits of the agora, any warden of the city who is in residence shall punish him; or if in the country, then the commanders of the wardens of the country<sup>1</sup>. If those who are near at the time be inhabitants of the same place, whether they be youths, or men, or women, let them come to the rescue and denounce him as the impious one; and he who does not come to the rescue shall fall under the curse of Zeus, the God of kindred and of ancestors, according to law. And if any one is found guilty of assaulting a parent, let him in the first place be for ever banished from the city into the country, and let him abstain from the temples; and if he do not abstain, the wardens of the country shall punish him with blows, or in any way which they please, and if he return he shall be put to death. And if any freeman eat or drink, or have any other sort of intercourse with him, or only meeting him have voluntarily touched him, he shall not enter into any temple, nor into the agora, nor into the city, until he is purified; for he should consider that he has become tainted by a curse. And if he disobeys the law, and pollutes the city and the temples contrary to law, and one of the magistrates sees him and does not indict him, when he gives in his account this omission shall be a most serious charge.

*Laws IX.*

ATHENIAN.

The punishment for the offence is perpetual exile from the city.

If a slave strike a freeman, whether a stranger or a citizen, let any one who is present come to the rescue, or pay the penalty already mentioned; and let the bystanders bind him, and deliver him up to the injured person, and he receiving him shall put him in chains, and inflict on him as many stripes as he pleases; but having punished him he must surrender him to his master according to law, and not deprive him of his property. Let the law be as follows:—The slave who strikes a freeman, not at the command of the magistrates, his owner shall receive bound from the man whom he has stricken, and not release him until the slave has persuaded the man whom he has stricken that he ought to be released. And let there be the same laws about women in relation to women, and about men and women in relation to one another.

The punishment of the slave who strikes a freeman.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, vi. 760 B.



## BOOK X.

*Laws X.*

ATHENIAN.

A general  
law about  
deeds of  
violence.

Insolence  
towards the  
Gods arises  
from irreligion,  
of which  
there are  
three forms.

AND now having spoken of assaults, let us sum up all acts of violence under a single law, which shall be as follows:—No one shall take or carry away any of his neighbour's goods, neither shall he use anything which is his neighbour's without the consent of the owner; for these are the offences which are and have been, and will ever be, the source of all the aforesaid evils. The greatest of them are excesses and insolences of youth, and are offences against the greatest when they are done against religion; and especially great when in violation of public and holy rites, or of the partly-common rites in which tribes and phratries share; and in the second degree great when they are committed against private rites and sepulchres, and in the third degree (not to repeat the acts formerly mentioned), when insults are offered to parents; the fourth kind of violence is when any one, regardless of the authority of the rulers, takes or carries away or makes use of anything which belongs to them, not having their consent; and the fifth kind is when the violation of the civil rights of an individual demands reparation. There should be a common law embracing all these cases. For we have already said in general terms what shall be the punishment of sacrilege, whether fraudulent or violent, and now we have to determine what is to be the punishment of those who speak or act insolently toward the Gods. But first we must give them an admonition which may be in the following terms:—No one who in obedience to the laws believed that there were Gods, ever intentionally did any unholy act, or uttered any unlawful word; but he who did must have supposed one of three things,—either that they did not exist,—which is the



first possibility, or secondly, that, if they did, they took no care of man, or thirdly, that they were easily appeased and turned aside from their purpose by sacrifices and prayers.

*Cle.* What shall we say or do to these persons?

*Ath.* My good friend, let us first hear the jests which I suspect that they in their superiority will utter against us.

*Cle.* What jests?

*Ath.* They will make some irreverent speech of this sort:— ‘O inhabitants of Athens, and Sparta, and Cnosus,’ they will reply, ‘in that you speak truly; for some of us deny the very existence of the Gods, while others, as you say, are of opinion that they do not care about us; and others that they are turned from their course by gifts. Now we have a right to claim, as you yourself allowed, in the matter of laws, that before you are hard upon us and threaten us, you should argue with us and convince us<sup>1</sup>—you should first attempt to teach and persuade us that there are Gods by reasonable evidences, and also that they are too good to be unrighteous, or to be propitiated, or turned from their course by gifts. For when we hear such things said of them by those who are esteemed to be the best of poets, and orators, and prophets, and priests, and by innumerable others, the thoughts of most of us are not set upon abstaining from unrighteous acts, but upon doing them and atoning for them<sup>2</sup>. When lawgivers profess that they are gentle and not stern, we think that they should first of all use persuasion to us, and show us the existence of Gods, if not in a better manner than other men, at any rate in a truer; and who knows but that we shall hearken to you? If then our request is a fair one, please to accept our challenge.’

*Cle.* But is there any difficulty in proving the existence of the Gods?

*Ath.* How would you prove it?

*Cle.* How? In the first place, the earth and the sun, and the stars and the universe, and the fair order of the seasons, and the division of them into years and months, furnish proofs of their existence; and also there is the fact that all Hellenes and barbarians believe in them.

*Ath.* I fear, my sweet friend, though I will not say that I

*Laws X.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

The unbelievers demand that they should be reasoned with before they are condemned.

The existence of the Gods is proved by the order of the universe.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, iv. 718 foll.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Rep. ii. 364.

*Laws X.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

much regard, the contempt with which the profane will be likely to assail us. For you do not understand the nature of their complaint, and you fancy that they rush into impiety only from a love of sensual pleasure.

*Cle.* Why, Stranger, what other reason is there?

*Ath.* One which you who live in a different atmosphere would never guess.

*Cle.* What is it?

Impiety arises  
out of conceit  
of wisdom.

*Ath.* A very grievous sort of ignorance which is imagined to be the greatest wisdom.

*Cle.* What do you mean?

Superstition  
of the an-  
cients; irrel-  
igion of the  
moderns.

*Ath.* At Athens there are tales preserved in writing which the virtue of your state, as I am informed, refuses to admit. They speak of the Gods in prose as well as verse, and the oldest of them tell of the origin of the heavens and of the world, and not far from the beginning of their story they proceed to narrate the birth of the Gods, and how after they were born they behaved to one another. Whether these stories have in other ways a good or a bad influence, I should not like to be severe upon them, because they are ancient; but, having regard to the duty and honour to be shown by children to their parents, I cannot praise them, or think that they are useful, or at all true<sup>1</sup>. Of the words of the ancients I have nothing more to say; and I should wish to say of them only what is pleasing to the Gods. But as to our younger generation and their wisdom, I cannot let them off when they do mischief. For do but mark the effect of their words: when you and I argue for the existence of the Gods, and produce the sun, moon, stars, and earth, claiming for them a divine being, if we would listen to the aforesaid philosophers we should say<sup>2</sup> that they are earth and stones only<sup>3</sup>, which can have no care at all of human affairs, and that all religion is a cooking up of words and a make-believe.

The latter say  
that the sun,  
moon and  
stars are earth  
and stone  
only.

*Cle.* One such teacher, O Stranger, would be bad enough, and you imply that there are many of them, which is worse.

*Ath.* Well, then; what shall we say or do?—Shall we assume that some one is accusing us among unholy men,

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. ii. 378 foll.

<sup>2</sup> Reading λέγομεν.

<sup>3</sup> Cp. Apology, 26 foll.

who are trying to escape from the effect of our legislation ; and what they say of us — How dreadful that you should legislate on the supposition that there are Gods! Shall we make a reference of ourselves? or shall we leave them and return to our laws, lest the prelude should become longer than the law? For the discourse will certainly extend to great length, if we are to treat the impiously disposed as they desire, partly demonstrating to them at some length the things of which they demand an explanation, partly making them afraid or dissatisfied, and then proceed to the requisite enactments.

*Laws X.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

The prelude  
will extend  
to a great  
length.

*Cle.* Yes, Stranger ; but then how often have we repeated already that on the present occasion there is no reason why brevity should be preferred to length<sup>1</sup>; for who is 'at our heels?'—as the saying goes, and it would be paltry and ridiculous to prefer the shorter to the better. It is a matter of no small consequence, in some way or other to prove that there are Gods, and that they are good, and regard justice more than men do. The demonstration of this would be the best and noblest prelude of all our laws. And therefore, without impatience, and without hurry, let us unreservedly consider the whole matter, summoning up all the power of persuasion which we possess.

It should be  
the best and  
noblest pre-  
lude of all.

*Ath.* Seeing you thus in earnest, I would fain offer up a prayer that I may succeed:—but I must proceed at once. Who can be calm when he is called upon to prove the existence of the Gods? Who can avoid hating and abhorring the men who are and have been the cause of this argument ; speak of those who will not believe the tales which they have heard as babes and sucklings from their mothers and nurses, repeated by them both in jest and earnest, like charms, who have also heard them in the sacrificial prayers, and seen sights accompanying them,—sights and sounds delightful to children,—and their parents during the sacrifices showing an intense earnestness on behalf of their children and of themselves, and with eager interest talking to the gods, and beseeching them, as though they were firmly convinced of their existence ; who likewise see and hear the demonstrations and invocations which are made by Hellenes

Can we  
suppose that  
all the prac-  
tices of re-  
ligion with  
which we  
have been  
familiar from  
childhood,  
and which  
are common  
to Greeks and  
Barbarians,  
have no  
meaning?

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, iv. 719 E foll. ; ix. 857-8.



*Laws X.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

We say to the  
young:—Do  
not meddle  
with things  
above you;  
but know that  
no one ever  
continues  
through life  
an unbeliever.

and barbarians at the rising and setting of the sun and moon, in all the vicissitudes of life, not as if they thought that there were no Gods, but as if there could be no doubt of their existence, and no suspicion of their non-existence; when men, knowing all these things, despise them on no real grounds, as would be admitted by all who have any particle of intelligence, and when they force us to say what we are now saying, how can any one in gentle terms remonstrate with the like of them, when he has to begin by proving to them the very existence of the Gods? Yet the attempt must be made; for it would be unseemly that one half of mankind should go mad in their lust of pleasure, and the other half in their indignation at such persons. Our address to these lost and perverted natures should not be spoken in passion; let us suppose ourselves to select some one of them, and gently reason with him, smothering our anger:—O my son, we will say to him, you are young, and the advance of time will make you reverse many of the opinions which you now hold. Wait awhile, and do not attempt to judge at present of the highest things; and that is the highest of which you now think nothing—to know the Gods rightly and to live accordingly. And in the first place let me indicate to you one point which is of great importance, and about which I cannot be deceived:—You and your friends are not the first who have held this opinion about the Gods. There have always been persons more or less numerous who have had the same disorder. I have known many of them, and can tell you, that no one who had taken up in youth this opinion, that the Gods do not exist, ever continued in the same until he was old; the two other notions certainly do continue in some cases, but not in many; the notion, I mean, that the Gods exist, but take no heed of human things, and the other notion that they do take heed of them, but are easily propitiated with sacrifices and prayers. As to the opinion about the Gods which may some day become clear to you, I advise you to wait and consider if it be true or not; ask of others, and above all of the legislator. In the meantime take care that you do not offend against the Gods. For the duty of the legislator is and always will be to teach you the truth of these matters.

*Cle.* Our address, Stranger, thus far, is excellent.



*Ath.* Quite true, Megillus and Cleinias, but I am afraid that we have unconsciously lighted on a strange doctrine.

*Læus X.*

*Cle.* What doctrine do you mean?

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Ath.* The wisest of all doctrines, in the opinion of many.

*Cle.* I wish that you would speak plainer.

*Ath.* The doctrine that all things do become, have become, and will become, some by nature, some by art, and some by chance.

*Cle.* Is not that true?

*Ath.* Well, philosophers are probably right; at any rate we may as well follow in their track, and examine what is the meaning of them and their disciples.

The doctrine  
of certain  
philosophers  
explained.

*Cle.* By all means.

*Ath.* They say that the greatest and fairest things are the work of nature and of chance, the lesser of art, which, receiving from nature the greater and primeval creations, moulds and fashions all those lesser works which are generally termed artificial.

*Cle.* How is that?

*Ath.* I will explain my meaning still more clearly. They say that fire and water, and earth and air, all exist by nature and chance, and none of them by art, and that as to the bodies which come next in order,—earth, and sun, and moon, and stars,—they have been created by means of these absolutely inanimate existences. The elements are severally moved by chance and some inherent force according to certain affinities among them—of hot with cold, or of dry with moist, or of soft with hard, and according to all the other accidental admixtures of opposites which have been formed by necessity. After this fashion and in this manner the whole heaven has been created, and all that is in the heaven, as well as animals and all plants, and all the seasons come from these elements, not by the action of mind, as they say, or of any God, or from art, but as I was saying, by nature and chance only. Art sprang up afterwards and out of these, mortal and of mortal birth, and produced in play certain images and very partial imitations of the truth, having an affinity to one another, such as music and painting create and their companion arts. And there are other arts which have a serious purpose, and these co-operate with nature,

They say that  
the elements  
exist, and the  
heavenly  
bodies are  
created out of  
them, by  
nature and  
chance. Art  
comes later,  
sometimes  
working  
alone, some-  
times co-  
operating  
with nature.

*Laws X.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

such, for example, as medicine, and husbandry, and gymnastic. And they say that politics co-operate with nature, but in a less degree, and have more of art; also that legislation is entirely a work of art, and is based on assumptions which are not true.

*Cle.* How do you mean?

They maintain further that religion and morality are a mere convention; and that 'The highest right is might.'

*Ath.* In the first place, my dear friend, these people would say that the Gods exist not by nature, but by art, and by the laws of states, which are different in different places, according to the agreement of those who make them; and that the honourable is one thing by nature and another thing by law, and that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature, but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering them; and that the alterations which are made by art and by law have no basis in nature, but are of authority for the moment and at the time at which they are made.—These, my friends, are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers, which find a way into the minds of youth. They are told by them that the highest right is might, and in this way the young fall into impieties, under the idea that the Gods are not such, as the law bids them imagine; and hence arise factions, these philosophers inviting them to lead a true life according to nature, that is, to live in real dominion over others, and not in legal subjection to them<sup>1</sup>.

*Cle.* What a dreadful picture, Stranger, have you given, and how great is the injury which is thus inflicted on young men to the ruin both of states and families!

The laws should persuade rather than threaten.

*Ath.* True, Cleinias; but then what should the lawgiver do when this evil is of long standing? should he only rise up in the state and threaten all mankind, proclaiming that if they will not say and think that the Gods are such as the law ordains (and this may be extended generally to the honourable, the just, and to all the highest things, and to all that relates to virtue and vice), and if they will not make their actions conform to the copy which the law gives them, then he who refuses to obey the law shall die, or suffer stripes and bonds, or privation of citizenship, or in some cases be punished by loss of property and exile? Should he not rather, when he is making laws, at the same

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Gorg. 483.

time infuse the spirit of persuasion into his words, and try to make mankind gentle as far as he can?

*Cle.* Why, Stranger, if such persuasion be at all possible, then a legislator who has anything in him ought never to weary of persuading men; he ought to leave nothing unsaid in support of the ancient opinion that there are Gods, and of all those other truths which you were just now mentioning; he ought to support the law and also art, and acknowledge that both alike exist by nature, and no less than nature, if they are the creations of mind in accordance with right reason, as you appear to me to maintain, and I am disposed to agree with you in thinking.

*Ath.* Yes, my enthusiastic Cleinias; but are not these things when spoken to a multitude hard to be understood, not to mention that they take up a dismal length of time?

*Cle.* Why, Stranger, shall we, whose patience failed not when drinking or music were the themes of discourse, weary now of discoursing about the Gods, and about divine things? And the greatest help to rational legislation is that the laws when once written down are always at rest; they can be put to the test at any future time, and therefore, if on first hearing they seem difficult, there is no reason for apprehension about them, because any man however dull can go over them and consider them again and again; nor if they are tedious but useful, is there any reason or religion, as it seems to me, in any man refusing to maintain the principles of them to the utmost of his power.

*Meg.* Stranger, I like what Cleinias is saying.

*Ath.* Yes, Megillus, and we should do as he proposes; for if impious discourses were not scattered, as I may say, throughout the world, there would have been no need for any vindication of the existence of the Gods—but seeing that they are spread far and wide, such arguments are needed; and who should come to the rescue of the greatest laws, when they are being undermined by bad men, but the legislator himself?

*Meg.* There is no more proper champion of them.

*Ath.* Well, then, tell me, Cleinias,—for I must ask you to be my partner,—does not he who talks in this way conceive fire and water and earth and air to be the first elements of all

*Laws X.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS,  
MEGILLUS.

The laws if  
once written  
down may  
in time be  
understood.

The error of  
the physical  
philosophers



Laws X.

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

is that they  
speak of the  
four elements  
as the first  
elements.

things<sup>1</sup>? these he calls nature, and out of these he supposes the soul to be formed afterwards; and this is not a mere conjecture of ours about his meaning, but is what he really means.

*Cle.* Very true.

*Ath.* Then, by Heaven, we have discovered the source of this vain opinion of all those physical investigators; and I would have you examine their arguments with the utmost care, for their impiety is a very serious matter; they not only make a bad and mistaken use of argument, but they lead away the minds of others: that is my opinion of them.

*Cle.* You are right; but I should like to know how this happens.

*Ath.* I fear that the argument may seem singular.

*Cle.* Do not hesitate, Stranger; I see that you are afraid of such a discussion carrying you beyond the limits of legislation. But if there be no other way of showing our agreement in the belief that there are Gods, of whom the law is said now to approve, let us take this way, my good sir.

*Ath.* Then I suppose that I must repeat the singular argument of those who manufacture the soul according to their own impious notions; they affirm that which is the first cause of the generation and destruction of all things, to be not first, but last, and that which is last to be first, and hence they have fallen into error about the true nature of the Gods.

*Cle.* Still I do not understand you.

*Ath.* Nearly all of them, my friends, seem to be ignorant of the nature and power of the soul, especially in what relates to her origin: they do not know that she is among the first of things, and before all bodies, and is the chief author of their changes and transpositions. And if this is true, and if the soul is older than the body, must not the things which are of the soul's kindred be of necessity prior to those which appertain to the body?

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* Then thought and attention and mind and art and law will be prior to that which is hard and soft and heavy and light; and the great and primitive works and actions will be works of art; they will be the first, and after them

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Tim. 46 D.

They put  
what is first  
last; they do  
not know that  
the soul is  
prior to the  
body.

Mind and art  
and law come  
first, and then  
the works



will come nature and works of nature, which however is a wrong term for men to apply to them; these will follow, and will be under the government of art and mind.

*Cle.* But why is the word 'nature' wrong?

*Ath.* Because those who use the term mean to say that nature is the first creative power; but if the soul turn out to be the primeval element, and not fire or air, then in the truest sense and beyond other things the soul may be said to exist by nature; and this would be true if you proved that the soul is older than the body, but not otherwise.

*Cle.* You are quite right.

*Ath.* Shall we, then, take this as the next point to which our attention should be directed?

*Cle.* By all means.

*Ath.* Let us be on our guard lest this most deceptive argument with its youthful looks, beguiling us old men, give us the slip and make a laughing-stock of us. Who knows but we may be aiming at the greater, and fail of attaining the lesser? Suppose that we three have to pass a rapid river, and I, being the youngest of the three and experienced in rivers, take upon me the duty of making the attempt first by myself; leaving you in safety on the bank, I am to examine whether the river is passable by older men like yourselves, and if such appears to be the case then I shall invite you to follow, and my experience will help to convey you across; but if the river is impassable by you, then there will have been no danger to anybody but myself,—would not that seem to be a very fair proposal? I mean to say that the argument in prospect is likely to be too much for you, out of your depth and beyond your strength, and I should be afraid that the stream of my questions might create in you who are not in the habit of answering, giddiness and confusion of mind, and hence a feeling of unpleasantness and unsuitableness might arise. I think therefore that I had better first ask the questions and then answer them myself while you listen in safety; in that way I can carry on the argument until I have completed the proof that the soul is prior to the body.

*Cle.* Excellent, Stranger, and I hope that you will do as you propose.

*Laws X.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

of nature,  
which are,  
however, so  
termed in  
error.

The Athenian  
is willing to  
undertake the  
entire risk of  
the argument  
in his own  
person.

*Laws X.*

ATHENIAN.

Some things  
are in motion;  
others at rest.Of motion  
there are  
ten kinds:—(1) Motion  
on an axis;(2) locomo-  
tion;(3) a combina-  
tion of these;(4) separa-  
tion;(5) composi-  
tion;

(6) growth;

(7) decay;

*Ath.* Come, then, and if ever we are to call upon the Gods, let us call upon them now in all seriousness to come to the demonstration of their own existence. And so holding fast to the rope we will venture upon the depths of the argument. When questions of this sort are asked of me, my safest answer would appear to be as follows:—Some one says to me, ‘O Stranger, are all things at rest and nothing in motion, or is the exact opposite of this true, or are some things in motion and others at rest?’—To this I shall reply that some things are in motion and others at rest. ‘And do not things which move move in a place, and are not the things which are at rest at rest in a place?’ Certainly. ‘And some move or rest in one place and some in more places than one?’ You mean to say, we shall rejoin, that those things which rest at the centre move in one place, just as the circumference goes round of globes which are said to be at rest? ‘Yes.’ And we observe that, in the revolution, the motion which carries round the larger and the lesser circle at the same time is proportionally distributed to greater and smaller, and is greater and smaller in a certain proportion. Here is a wonder which might be thought an impossibility, that the same motion should impart swiftness and slowness in due proportion to larger and lesser circles. ‘Very true.’ And when you speak of bodies moving in many places, you seem to me to mean those which move from one place to another, and sometimes have one centre of motion and sometimes more than one because they turn upon their axis; and whenever they meet anything, if it be stationary, they are divided by it; but if they get in the midst between bodies which are approaching and moving towards the same spot from opposite directions, they unite with them. ‘I admit the truth of what you are saying.’ Also when they unite they grow, and when they are divided they waste away,—that is, supposing the constitution of each to remain, or if that fails, then there is a second reason of their dissolution. ‘And when are all things created and how?’ Clearly, they are created when the first principle receives increase and attains to the second dimension, and from this arrives at the one which is neighbour to this, and after reaching the third becomes

perceptible to sense. Everything which is thus changing and moving is in process of generation; only when at rest has it real existence, but when passing into another state it is destroyed utterly. Have we not mentioned all motions that there are, and comprehended them under their kinds and numbered them with the exception, my friends, of two?

*Cle.* Which are they?

*Ath.* Just the two, with which our present enquiry is concerned.

*Cle.* Speak plainer.

*Ath.* I suppose that our enquiry has reference to the soul?

*Cle.* Very true.

*Ath.* Let us assume that there is a motion able to move other things, but not to move itself;—that is one kind; and there is another kind which can move itself as well as other things, working in composition and decomposition, by increase and diminution and generation and destruction,—that is also one of the many kinds of motion.

*Cle.* Granted.

*Ath.* And we will assume that which moves other, and is changed by other, to be the ninth, and that which changes itself and others, and is co-incident with every action and every passion, and is the true principle of change and motion in all that is,—that we shall be inclined to call the tenth.

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* And which of these ten motions ought we to prefer as being the mightiest and most efficient?

*Cle.* I must say that the motion which is able to move itself is ten thousand times superior to all the others<sup>1</sup>.

*Ath.* Very good; but may I make one or two corrections in what I have been saying?

*Cle.* What are they?

*Ath.* When I spoke of the tenth sort of motion, that was not quite correct.

*Cle.* What was the error?

*Ath.* According to the true order, the tenth was really the first in generation and power; then follows the second, which was strangely enough termed the ninth by us.

*Laws X.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

(8) destruction;

(9) external,  
and

(10) spontaneous,  
motion.

The last is  
superior to the  
other kinds,

and should  
rank first,  
being the  
ultimate  
source of  
all motion.

The ninth  
should rank  
second.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Tim. 89 A.



*Larus X.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.A demonstra-  
tion of the  
priority of  
spontaneous  
to external  
motion.*Cle.* What do you mean?

*Ath.* I mean this: when one thing changes another, and that another, of such will there be any primary changing element? How can a thing which is moved by another ever be the beginning of change? Impossible. But when the self-moved changes other, and that again other, and thus thousands upon tens of thousands of bodies are set in motion, must not the beginning of all this motion be the change of the self-moving principle<sup>1</sup>?

*Cle.* Very true, and I quite agree.

*Ath.* Or, to put the question in another way, making answer to ourselves:—If, as most of these philosophers have the audacity to affirm, all things were at rest in one mass, which of the above-mentioned principles of motion would first spring up among them?

*Cle.* Clearly the self-moving; for there could be no change in them arising out of any external cause; the change must first take place in themselves.

*Ath.* Then we must say that self-motion being the origin of all motions, and the first which arises among things at rest as well as among things in motion, is the eldest and mightiest principle of change, and that which is changed by another and yet moves other is second.

*Cle.* Quite true.*Ath.* At this stage of the argument let us put a question.*Cle.* What question?

*Ath.* If we were to see this power existing in any earthy, watery, or fiery substance, simple or compound — how should we describe it?

*Cle.* You mean to ask whether we should call such a self-moving power life?

*Ath.* I do.*Cle.* Certainly we should.

*Ath.* And when we see soul in anything, must we not do the same — must we not admit that this is life?

*Cle.* We must.

*Ath.* And now, I beseech you, reflect;—you would admit that we have a threefold knowledge of things?

*Cle.* What do you mean?<sup>1</sup> Cp. *Phaedr.* 245 D.The self-  
moving  
principle is  
life and soul.The know-  
ledge of things  
is threefold:—



*Ath.* I mean that we know the essence, and that we know the definition of the essence, and the name,—these are the three; and there are two questions which may be raised about anything.

*Cle.* How two?

*Ath.* Sometimes a person may give the name and ask the definition; or he may give the definition and ask the name. I may illustrate what I mean in this way.

*Cle.* How?

*Ath.* Number like some other things is capable of being divided into equal parts; when thus divided, number is named 'even,' and the definition of the name 'even' is 'number divisible into two equal parts'?

*Cle.* True.

*Ath.* I mean, that when we are asked about the definition and give the name, or when we are asked about the name and give the definition—in either case, whether we give name or definition, we speak of the same thing, calling 'even' the number which is divided into two equal parts.

*Cle.* Quite true.

*Ath.* And what is the definition of that which is named 'soul'? Can we conceive of any other than that which has been already given—the motion which can move itself?

*Cle.* You mean to say that the essence which is defined as the self-moved is the same with that which has the name soul?

*Ath.* Yes; and if this is true, do we still maintain that there is anything wanting in the proof that the soul is the first origin and moving power of all that is, or has become, or will be, and their contraries, when she has been clearly shown to be the source of change and motion in all things?

*Cle.* Certainly not; the soul as being the source of motion, has been most satisfactorily shown to be the oldest of all things.

*Ath.* And is not that motion which is produced in another, by reason of another, but never has any self-moving power at all, being in truth the change of an inanimate body, to be reckoned second, or by any lower number which you may prefer?

*Cle.* Exactly.

*Laws X.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIUS.

of the essence,  
the definition,  
and the name.

The soul may  
be defined  
as the self-  
moved, and is  
the source  
of motion in  
all things.

External  
motion is  
posterior to  
spontaneous,  
and therefore  
the body to  
the soul.

*Laws X.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Ath.* Then we are right, and speak the most perfect and absolute truth, when we say that the soul is prior to the body, and that the body is second and comes afterwards, and is born to obey the soul, which is the ruler?

*Cle.* Nothing can be more true.

And mental  
qualities are  
prior to the  
qualities of  
body.

*Ath.* Do you remember our old admission, that if the soul was prior to the body the things of the soul were also prior to those of the body?

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* Then characters and manners, and wishes and reasonings, and true opinions, and reflections, and recollections are prior to length and breadth and depth and strength of bodies, if the soul is prior to the body.

*Cle.* To be sure.

The soul (or  
two souls) of  
the world is  
the source of  
good and evil,

*Ath.* In the next place, must we not of necessity admit that the soul is the cause of good and evil, base and honourable, just and unjust, and of all other opposites, if we suppose her to be the cause of all things?

*Cle.* We must.

*Ath.* And as the soul orders and inhabits all things that move, however moving, must we not say that she orders also the heavens?

*Cle.* Of course.

*Ath.* One soul or more? More than one — I will answer for you; at any rate, we must not suppose that there are less than two — one the author of good, and the other of evil.

*Cle.* Very true.

and orders  
all things in  
heaven and  
earth.

*Ath.* Yes, very true; the soul then directs all things in heaven, and earth, and sea by her movements, and these are described by the terms — will, consideration, attention, deliberation, opinion true and false, joy and sorrow, confidence, fear, hatred, love, and other primary motions akin to these; which again receive the secondary motions of corporeal substances, and guide all things to growth and decay, to composition and decomposition, and to the qualities which accompany them, such as heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, hardness and softness, blackness and whiteness, bitterness and sweetness, and all those other qualities which the soul uses, herself a goddess, when truly receiving the divine mind she disciplines all things rightly to their

happiness; but when she is the companion of folly, she does the very contrary of all this. Shall we assume so much, or do we still entertain doubts? Laws X.

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Cle.* There is no room at all for doubt.

*Ath.* Shall we say then that it is the soul which controls heaven and earth, and the whole world?—that it is a principle of wisdom and virtue, or a principle which has neither wisdom nor virtue? Suppose that we make answer as follows:—

Is the world  
governed by  
the better of  
the two souls?

*Cle.* How would you answer?

*Ath.* If, my friend, we say that the whole path and movement of heaven, and of all that is therein, is by nature akin to the movement and revolution and calculation of mind, and proceeds by kindred laws, then, as is plain, we must say that the best soul takes care of the world and guides it along the good path.

*Cle.* True.

*Ath.* But if the world moves wildly and irregularly, then the evil soul guides it.

*Cle.* True again.

*Ath.* Of what nature is the movement of mind?—To this question it is not easy to give an intelligent answer; and therefore I ought to assist you in framing one.

Yes:—for its  
motion is akin  
to that of  
mind, which  
is circular.

*Cle.* Very good.

*Ath.* Then let us not answer as if we would look straight at the sun, making ourselves darkness at midday<sup>1</sup>,—I mean as if we were under the impression that we could see with mortal eyes, or know adequately the nature of mind;—it will be safer to look at the image only.

*Cle.* What do you mean?

*Ath.* Let us select of the ten motions the one which mind chiefly resembles; this I will bring to your recollection, and will then make the answer on behalf of us all.

*Cle.* That will be excellent.

*Ath.* You will surely remember our saying that all things are either at rest or in motion?

*Cle.* I do.

*Ath.* And that of things in motion some were moving in one place and others in more than one?

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. vii. 515.



*Larus X.**Cle.* Yes.ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Ath.* Of these two kinds of motion, that which moves in one place must move about a centre like globes made in a lathe, and is most entirely akin and similar to the circular movement of mind.

*Cle.* What do you mean?

*Ath.* In saying that both mind and the motion which is in one place move in the same and like manner, in and about the same, and in relation to the same, and according to one proportion and order, and are like the motion of a globe, we invented a fair image, which does no discredit to our ingenuity.

*Cle.* It does us great credit.

The irregular motion is the motion of senselessness and folly.

*Ath.* And the motion of the other sort which is not after the same manner, nor in the same, nor about the same, nor in relation to the same, nor in one place, nor in order, nor according to any rule or proportion, may be said to be akin to senselessness and folly?

*Cle.* That is most true.

*Ath.* Then, after what has been said, there is no difficulty in distinctly stating, that since soul carries all things round, either the best soul or the contrary must of necessity carry round and order and arrange the revolution of the heaven.

*Cle.* And judging from what has been said, Stranger, there would be impiety in asserting that any but the most perfect soul or souls carries round the heavens.

*Ath.* You have understood my meaning right well, Cleinias, and now let me ask you another question.

*Cle.* What are you going to ask?

The soul or mind carries round the whole;—does it carry round each of the heavenly bodies?

*Ath.* If the soul carries round the sun and moon, and the other stars, does she not carry round each individual of them?

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* Then of one of them let us speak, and the same argument will apply to all.

*Cle.* Which will you take?

e. g., the sun?

*Ath.* Every one sees the body of the sun, but no one sees his soul, nor the soul of any other body living or dead, and yet there is great reason to believe that this nature unperceived by any of our senses, is circumfused around



them all, but is perceived by mind; and therefore by mind and reflection only let us apprehend the following point.

*Larus X.*

*Cle.* What is that?

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Ath.* If the soul carries round the sun, we shall not be far wrong in supposing one of three alternatives.

*Cle.* What are they?

*Ath.* Either the soul which moves the sun this way and that, resides within the circular and visible body, like the soul which carries us about every way; or the soul provides herself with an external body of fire or air, as some affirm, and violently propels body by body; or thirdly, she is without such a body, but guides the sun by some extraordinary and wonderful power.

Either (1) the soul of the sun (like the soul in man) resides within it; or (2) propels it with, or (3) without the help of some external body.

*Cle.* Yes, certainly; the soul can only order all things in one of these three ways.

*Ath.* And this soul of the sun, which is therefore better than the sun, whether taking the sun about in a chariot to give light to men, or acting from without, or in whatever way, ought by every man to be deemed a God<sup>1</sup>.

*Cle.* Yes, by every man who has the least particle of sense.

*Ath.* And of the stars too, and of the moon, and of the years and months and seasons, must we not say in like manner, that since a soul or souls having every sort of excellence are the causes of all of them, those souls are Gods, whether they are living beings and reside in bodies, and in this way order the whole heaven, or whatever be the place and mode of their existence;—and will any one who admits all this venture to deny that all things are full of Gods?

The soul or souls, which are the causes of the stars and the seasons, are divine beings.

*Cle.* No one, Stranger, would be such a madman.

*Ath.* And now, Megillus and Cleinias, let us offer terms to him who has hitherto denied the existence of the Gods, and leave him.

*Cle.* What terms?

*Ath.* Either he shall teach us that we were wrong in saying that the soul is the original of all things, and arguing accordingly; or, if he be not able to say anything better, then he must yield to us and live for the remainder of his life in the belief that there are Gods.—Let us see, then, whether we

Enough of the disbeliever in the Gods.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *infra*, xii. 966, 967.

*Laws X.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

To those who believe that the Gods exist, but take no heed of man, we say:—‘You feel that you are the kindred of the Gods, and you cannot believe that the injustice of this world is to be ascribed to them.’

We will justify the ways of God to you.

The Gods are perfectly good:

have said enough or not enough to those who deny that there are Gods.

*Cle.* Certainly,—quite enough, Stranger.

*Ath.* Then to them we will say no more. And now we are to address him who, believing that there are Gods, believes also that they take no heed of human affairs: To him we say,—O thou best of men, in believing that there are Gods you are led by some affinity to them, which attracts you towards your kindred and makes you honour and believe in them. But the fortunes of evil and unrighteous men in private as well as public life, which, though not really happy, are wrongly counted happy in the judgment of men, and are celebrated both by poets and prose writers<sup>1</sup>—these draw you aside from your natural piety. Perhaps you have seen impious men growing old and leaving their children’s children in high offices, and their prosperity shakes your faith—you have known or heard or been yourself an eyewitness of many monstrous impieties, and have beheld men by such criminal means from small beginnings attaining to sovereignty and the pinnacle of greatness; and considering all these things you do not like to accuse the Gods of them, because they are your relatives; and so from some want of reasoning power, and also from an unwillingness to find fault with them, you have come to believe that they exist indeed, but have no thought or care of human things. Now, that your present evil opinion may not grow to still greater impiety, and that we may if possible use arguments which may conjure away the evil before it arrives, we will add another argument to that originally addressed to him who utterly denied the existence of the Gods. And do you, Megillus and Cleinias, answer for the young man as you did before; and if any impediment comes in our way, I will take the word out of your mouths, and carry you over the river as I did just now.

*Cle.* Very good; do as you say, and we will help you as well as we can.

*Ath.* There will probably be no difficulty in proving to him that the Gods care about the small as well as about the great. For he was present and heard what was said, that they are

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. ii. 364 A.

perfectly good, and that the care of all things is most entirely natural to them<sup>1</sup>. *Laws X.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Cle.* No doubt he heard that.

*Ath.* Let us consider together in the next place what we mean by this virtue which we ascribe to them. Surely we should say that to be temperate and to possess mind belongs to virtue, and the contrary to vice?

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* Yes; and courage is a part of virtue, and cowardice of vice?

*Cle.* True.

*Ath.* And the one is honourable, and the other dishonourable?

*Cle.* To be sure.

*Ath.* And the one, like other meaner things, is a human quality, but the Gods have no part in anything of the sort?

*Cle.* That again is what everybody will admit.

*Ath.* But do we imagine carelessness and idleness and luxury to be virtues? What do you think?

*Cle.* Decidedly not.

*Ath.* They rank under the opposite class?

*Cle.* Yes.

*Ath.* And their opposites, therefore, would fall under the opposite class?

*Cle.* Yes.

*Ath.* And any one who possessed all these bad qualities would be deemed by us to be luxurious and heedless and idle, like those whom the poet compares to stingless drones<sup>2</sup>? and therefore cannot be charged with idleness and carelessness.

*Cle.* And the comparison is a most just one.

*Ath.* But surely God must not be supposed to have a nature which He Himself hates?—he who dares to say this sort of thing must not be tolerated for a moment.

*Cle.* Of course not. How could He have such a nature?

*Ath.* Should we not on any principle be entirely mistaken in praising any one who has some special business entrusted to him, if he have a mind which takes care of great matters and no care of small ones? Reflect; he who acts in this way, whether he be God or man, must act from one of two principles.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, 899 B.

<sup>2</sup> Hesiod, Works and Days, 307.



*Laws X.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.*Cle.* What are they?

*Ath.* Either he must think that the neglect of the small matters is of no consequence to the whole, or if he knows that they are of consequence, and he neglects them, his neglect must be attributed to carelessness and indolence. Is there any other way in which his neglect can be explained? For surely, when it is impossible for him to take care of all, he is not negligent if he fails to attend to these things great or small, which a God or some inferior being might be wanting in strength or capacity to manage?

*Cle.* Certainly not.

We and our  
adversaries  
alike admit  
that the Gods  
see and know  
all things;  
that they  
have all  
power;

*Ath.* Now, then, let us examine the offenders, who both alike confess that there are Gods, but with a difference,—the one saying that they may be appeased, and the other that they have no care of small matters: there are three of us and two of them, and we will say to them,—In the first place, you both acknowledge that the Gods hear and see and know all things, and that nothing can escape them which is matter of sense and knowledge:—do you admit this?

*Cle.* Yes.

*Ath.* And do you admit also that they have all power which mortals and immortals can have?

*Cle.* They will, of course, admit this also.

and that they  
are good and  
perfect.

*Ath.* And surely we three and they two — five in all — have acknowledged that they are good and perfect?

*Cle.* Assuredly.

They cannot  
therefore  
neglect small  
matters from  
idleness;

*Ath.* But, if they are such as we conceive them to be, can we possibly suppose that they ever act in the spirit of carelessness and indolence? For in us inactivity is the child of cowardice, and carelessness of inactivity and indolence.

*Cle.* Most true.

*Ath.* Then not from inactivity and carelessness is any God ever negligent; for there is no cowardice in them.

*Cle.* That is very true.

but either  
they think  
them un-  
worthy of re-  
gard, or are  
ignorant:—

*Ath.* Then the alternative which remains is, that if the Gods neglect the lighter and lesser concerns of the universe, they neglect them because they know that they ought not to care about such matters — what other alternative is there but the opposite of their knowing?

*Cle.* There is none.



*Ath.* And, O most excellent and best of men, do I understand you to mean that they are careless because they are ignorant, and do not know that they ought to take care, or that they know, and yet like the meanest sort of men, knowing the better, choose the worse because they are overcome by pleasures and pains?

*Cle.* Impossible.

*Ath.* Do not all human things partake of the nature of soul? And is not man the most religious of all animals<sup>1</sup>?

*Cle.* That is not to be denied.

*Ath.* And we acknowledge that all mortal creatures are the property of the Gods, to whom also the whole of heaven belongs<sup>2</sup>?

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* And, therefore, whether a person says that these things are to the Gods great or small—in either case it would not be natural for the Gods who own us, and who are the most careful and the best of owners, to neglect us.—There is also a further consideration.

*Cle.* What is it?

*Ath.* Sensation and power are in an inverse ratio to each other in respect to their ease and difficulty.

*Cle.* What do you mean?

*Ath.* I mean that there is greater difficulty in seeing and hearing the small than the great, but more facility in moving and controlling and taking care of small and unimportant things than of their opposites.

*Cle.* Far more.

*Ath.* Suppose the case of a physician who is willing and able to cure some living thing as a whole,—how will the whole fare at his hands if he takes care only of the greater and neglects the parts which are lesser?

*Cle.* Decidedly not well.

*Ath.* No better would be the result with pilots or generals, or householders or statesmen, or any other such class, if they neglected the small and regarded only the great;—as the builders say, the larger stones do not lie well without the lesser.

*Cle.* Of course not.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Tim. 42 A.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Phaedo 62.

*Laws X.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

they cannot  
be ignorant,  
and they will  
not know-  
ingly neg-  
lect man  
who is their  
possession.

Small things  
harder to be  
seen, but  
more easily  
managed  
than great.

The physi-  
cian, the  
pilot, the  
general, &c.,  
take care of  
small things  
as well as  
great: will  
the all-wise  
God neglect  
them?

Larus X.

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Ath.* Let us not, then, deem God inferior to human workmen, who, in proportion to their skill, finish and perfect their works, small as well as great, by one and the same art; or that God, the wisest of beings, who is both willing and able to take care, is like a lazy good-for-nothing, or a coward, who turns his back upon labour and gives no thought to smaller and easier matters, but to the greater only.

*Cle.* Never, Stranger, let us admit a supposition about the Gods which is both impious and false.

*Ath.* I think that we have now argued enough with him who delights to accuse the Gods of neglect.

*Cle.* Yes.

*Ath.* He has been forced to acknowledge that he is in error, but he still seems to me to need some words of consolation.

*Cle.* What consolation will you offer him?

Words of consolation:—

*Ath.* Let us say to the youth:—The ruler of the universe has ordered all things with a view to the excellence and preservation of the whole, and each part, as far as may be, has an action and passion appropriate to it. Over these, down to the least fraction of them, ministers have been appointed to preside, who have wrought out their perfection with infinitesimal exactness. And one of these portions of the universe is thine own, unhappy man, which, however little, contributes to the whole; and you do not seem to be aware that this and every other creation is for the sake of the whole, and in order that the life of the whole may be blessed; and that you are created for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of you. For every physician and every skilled artist does all things for the sake of the whole, directing his effort towards the common good, executing the part for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of the part. And you are annoyed because you are ignorant how what is best for you happens to you and to the universe, as far as the laws of the common creation admit. Now, as the soul combining first with one body and then with another undergoes all sorts of changes, either of herself, or through the influence of another soul, all that remains to the player of the game is that he should shift the pieces; sending the better nature to the better place, and the worse to the worse, and so assigning to them their proper portion.

Let the youth remember that God created him for the whole, not the whole for the sake of him.

*Cle.* In what way do you mean?

*Law's X.*

*Ath.* In a way which may be supposed to make the care of all things easy to the Gods. If any one were to form or fashion all things without any regard to the whole<sup>1</sup>,—if, for example, he formed a living element of water out of fire, instead of forming many things out of one or one out of many in regular order attaining to a first or second or third birth<sup>2</sup>, the transmutation would have been infinite; but now the ruler of the world has a wonderfully easy task.

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Cle.* How so?

*Ath.* I will explain:—When the king saw that our actions had life, and that there was much virtue in them and much vice, and that the soul and body, although not, like the Gods of popular opinion, eternal, yet having once come into existence, were indestructible (for if either of them had been destroyed, there would have been no generation of living beings); and when he observed that the good of the soul was ever by nature designed to profit men, and the evil to harm them—he, seeing all this, contrived so to place each of the parts that their position might in the easiest and best manner procure the victory of good and the defeat of evil in the whole. And he contrived a general plan by which a thing of a certain nature found a certain seat and room. But the formation of qualities<sup>3</sup> he left to the wills of individuals. For every one of us is made pretty much what he is by the bent of his desires and the nature of his soul.

God assigns  
to human  
souls their  
places in such  
a manner as  
to ensure the  
defeat of evil.

The fashion-  
ing of men's  
characters  
he leaves to  
themselves.

*Cle.* Yes, that is probably true.

*Ath.* Then all things which have a soul change, and possess in themselves a principle of change, and in changing move according to the law and order of destiny: natures which have undergone a lesser change move less and on the earth's surface, but those which have suffered more change and have become more criminal sink into the abyss, that is to say, into Hades and other places in the world below, of which the very names terrify men, and which they picture to themselves as in a dream, both while alive and when released from the body. And whenever the soul receives more of good or evil from her own energy and the strong

<sup>1</sup> Reading *μη πρὸς τὸ ὅλον*.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Timaeus 42 B, C.

<sup>3</sup> Reading *τοῦ ποίου*.



*Laws X.*

ATHENIAN.

If a soul  
grows better,  
it goes to a  
better place;  
if worse, to a  
worse.

influence of others — when she has communion with divine virtue and becomes divine, she is carried into another and better place, which is perfect in holiness; but when she has communion with evil, then she also changes the place of her life.

'This is the justice of the Gods who inhabit Olympus<sup>1</sup>.'

O youth or young man, who fancy that you are neglected by the Gods, know that if you become worse you shall go to the worse souls, or if better to the better, and in every succession of life and death you will do and suffer what like may fitly suffer at the hands of like. This is the justice of heaven, which neither you nor any other unfortunate will ever glory in escaping, and which the ordaining powers have specially ordained; take good heed thereof, for it will be sure to take heed of you. If you say:—I am small and will creep into the depths of the earth, or I am high and will fly up to heaven, you are not so small or so high but that you shall pay the fitting penalty, either here or in the world below or in some still more savage place whither you shall be conveyed.

You complain  
of the pros-  
perity of the  
wicked, not  
seeing how  
all things  
work together  
for the good of  
the whole.

This is also the explanation of the fate of those whom you saw, who had done unholy and evil deeds, and from small beginnings had grown great, and you fancied that from being miserable they had become happy; and in their actions, as in a mirror, you seemed to see the universal neglect of the Gods, not knowing how they make all things work together and contribute to the great whole. And thinkest thou, bold man, that thou needest not to know this?—he who knows it not can never form any true idea of the happiness or unhappiness of life or hold any rational discourse respecting either. If Cleinias and this our reverend company succeed in proving to you that you know not what you say of the Gods, then will God help you; but should you desire to hear more, listen to what we say to the third opponent, if you have any understanding whatsoever. For I think that we have sufficiently proved the existence of the Gods, and that they care for men:—The other notion that they are appeased by the wicked, and take gifts, is what we must not concede to any one, and what every man should disprove to the utmost of his power.

We turn to  
him who be-  
lieves that the

<sup>1</sup> Hom. Odyss. xix. 43.



*Cle.* Very good; let us do as you say.

*Laws X.*

*Ath.* Well, then, by the Gods themselves I conjure you to tell me,—if they are to be propitiated, how are they to be propitiated? Who are they, and what is their nature? Must they not be at least rulers who have to order unceasingly the whole heaven?

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

Gods may be  
appeased.

*Cle.* True.

*Ath.* And to what earthly rulers can they be compared, or who to them? How in the less can we find an image of the greater? Are they charioteers of contending pairs of steeds, or pilots of vessels? Perhaps they might be compared to the generals of armies, or they might be likened to physicians providing against the diseases which make war upon the body, or to husbandmen observing anxiously the effects of the seasons on the growth of plants; or perhaps to shepherds of flocks. For as we acknowledge the world to be full of many goods and also of evils, and of more evils than goods, there is, as we affirm, an immortal conflict going on among us, which requires marvellous watchfulness; and in that conflict the Gods and demigods are our allies, and we are their property. Injustice and insolence and folly are the destruction of us, and justice and temperance and wisdom are our salvation; and the place of these latter is in the life of the Gods, although some vestige of them may occasionally be discerned among mankind. But upon this earth we know that there dwell souls possessing an unjust spirit<sup>1</sup>, who may be compared to brute animals, which fawn upon their keepers, whether dogs or shepherds, or the best and most perfect masters; for they in like manner, as the voices of the wicked declare, prevail by flattery and prayers and incantations, and are allowed to make their gains with impunity. And this sin, which is termed dishonesty, is an evil of the same kind as what is termed disease in living bodies or pestilence in years or seasons of the year, and in cities and governments has another name, which is injustice.

The Gods are  
our allies in  
the great con-  
flict which is  
going on  
between  
good and evil.

But some men  
fawn upon  
them in the  
belief that  
they can be  
flattered and  
bribed into  
the betrayal  
of justice.

*Cle.* Quite true.

*Ath.* What else can he say who declares that the Gods are always lenient to the doers of unjust acts, if they divide the spoil with them? As if wolves were to toss a portion of

<sup>1</sup> Reading *λῆμα*.

*Laws X.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

their prey to the dogs, and they, mollified by the gift, suffered them to tear the flocks<sup>1</sup>. Must not he who maintains that the Gods can be propitiated argue thus?

*Cle.* Precisely so.

*Ath.* And to which of the above-mentioned classes of guardians would any man compare the Gods without absurdity? Will he say that they are like pilots, who are themselves turned away from their duty by 'libations of wine and the savour of fat,' and at last overturn both ship and sailors?

*Cle.* Assuredly not.

*Ath.* And surely they are not like charioteers who are bribed to give up the victory to other chariots?

*Cle.* That would be a fearful image of the Gods.

*Ath.* Nor are they like generals, or physicians, or husbandmen, or shepherds; and no one would compare them to dogs who have been silenced by wolves.

*Cle.* A thing not to be spoken of.

*Ath.* And are not all the Gods the chiefest of all guardians, and do they not guard our highest interests?

*Cle.* Yes; the chiefest.

*Ath.* And shall we say that those who guard our noblest interests, and are the best of guardians, are inferior in virtue to dogs, and to men even of moderate excellence, who would never betray justice for the sake of gifts which unjust men impiously offer them?

*Cle.* Certainly not; nor is such a notion to be endured, and he who holds this opinion may be fairly singled out and characterized as of all impious men the wickedest and most impious.

*Ath.* Then are the three assertions—that the Gods exist, and that they take care of men, and that they can never be persuaded to do injustice, now sufficiently demonstrated? May we say that they are?

*Cle.* You have our entire assent to your words.

*Ath.* I have spoken with vehemence because I am zealous against evil men; and I will tell you, dear Cleinias, why I am so. I would not have the wicked think that, having the superiority in argument, they may do as they please and act

We cannot, however, suppose the Gods to be worse than even moderately good men.

A righteous zeal must excuse our warmth.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. ii. 365 E.

according to their various imaginations about the Gods; and this zeal has led me to speak too vehemently; but if we have at all succeeded in persuading the men to hate themselves and love their opposites, the prelude of our laws about impiety will not have been spoken in vain.

*Laws X.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Cle.* So let us hope; and even if we have failed, the style of our argument will not discredit the lawgiver.

*Ath.* After the prelude shall follow a discourse, which will be the interpreter of the law; this shall proclaim to all impious persons that they must depart from their ways and go over to the pious. And to those who disobey, let the law about impiety be as follows:—If a man is guilty of any impiety in word or deed, any one who happens to be present shall give information to the magistrates, in aid of the law; and let the magistrates who first receive the information bring him before the appointed court according to the law; and if a magistrate, after receiving information, refuses to act, he shall be tried for impiety at the instance of any one who is willing to vindicate the laws; and if any one be cast, the court shall estimate the punishment of each act of impiety; and let all such criminals be imprisoned. There shall be three prisons in the state: the first of them is to be the common prison in the neighbourhood of the agora for the safe-keeping of the generality of offenders; another is to be in the neighbourhood of the nocturnal council<sup>1</sup>, and is to be called the 'House of Reformation'; another, to be situated in some wild and desolate region in the centre of the country, shall be called by some name expressive of retribution. Now, men fall into impiety from three causes, which have been already mentioned, and from each of these causes arise two sorts of impiety, in all six, which are worth distinguishing, and should not all have the same punishment. For he who does not believe in the Gods, and yet has a righteous nature; hates the wicked and dislikes and refuses to do injustice, and avoids unrighteous men, and loves the righteous. But they who besides believing that the world is devoid of Gods are intemperate, and have at the same time good memories and quick wits, are worse; although both of them are unbelievers, much less injury is done by the one than by the

The law about  
impiety.

Method of  
procedure.

The three  
sorts of im-  
pious persons  
are either  
(1) honest, or  
(2) dishonest.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *infra*, xii. 951, 961.



*Laws X.*

ATHENIAN.

other. The one may talk loosely about the Gods and about sacrifices and oaths, and perhaps by laughing at other men he may make them like himself, if he be not punished. But the other who holds the same opinions and is called a clever man, is full of stratagem and deceit — men of this class deal in prophecy and jugglery of all kinds, and out of their ranks sometimes come tyrants and demagogues and generals and hierophants of private mysteries and the Sophists, as they are termed, with their ingenious devices. There are many kinds of unbelievers, but two only for whom legislation is required; one the hypocritical sort, whose crime is deserving of death many times over, while the other needs only bonds and admonition. In like manner also the notion that the Gods take no thought of men produces two other sorts of crimes, and the notion that they may be propitiated produces two more. Assuming these divisions, let those who have been made what they are only from want of understanding, and not from malice or an evil nature, be placed by the judge in the House of Reformation, and ordered to suffer imprisonment during a period of not less than five years. And in the meantime let them have no intercourse with the other citizens, except with members of the nocturnal council, and with them let them converse with a view to the improvement of their soul's health. And when the time of their imprisonment has expired, if any of them be of sound mind let him be restored to sane company, but if not, and if he be condemned a second time, let him be punished with death. As to that class of monstrous natures who not only believe that there are no Gods, or that they are negligent, or to be propitiated, but in contempt of mankind conjure the souls of the living<sup>1</sup> and say that they can conjure the dead and promise to charm the Gods with sacrifices and prayers, and will utterly overthrow individuals and whole houses and states for the sake of money — let him who is guilty of any of these things be condemned by the court to be bound according to law in the prison which is in the centre of the land, and let no freeman ever approach him, but let him receive the rations of food appointed by the guardians of the law from the hands of the public slaves; and when he is dead let him be cast beyond

The first class are to be placed in solitary confinement for five years; and, if they repent, at the end of that time they shall be restored to society.

If they again offend, they shall die.

The second class are to be imprisoned for life, and when dead to be cast beyond the border.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. ii. 364.



the borders unburied, and if any freeman assist in burying him, let him pay the penalty of impiety to any one who is willing to bring a suit against him. But if he leaves behind him children who are fit to be citizens, let the guardians of orphans take care of them, just as they would of any other orphans, from the day on which their father is convicted.

In all these cases there should be one law, which will make men in general less liable to transgress in word or deed, and less foolish, because they will not be allowed to practise religious rites contrary to law. And let this be the simple form of the law:—No man shall have sacred rites in a private house. When he would sacrifice, let him go to the temples and hand over his offerings to the priests and priestesses, who see to the due performance of such ceremonies, and let him pray himself, and let any one who pleases join with him in prayer. The reason is as follows:—Gods and temples are not easily instituted, and to establish them rightly is the work of a mighty intellect. And women especially, and men too, when they are sick or in danger, or in any sort of difficulty, or again on their receiving any good fortune, have a way of consecrating the occasion, vowing sacrifices, and promising shrines to Gods, demigods, and sons of Gods; and when they are awakened by terrible apparitions and dreams or remember visions, they find in altars and temples the remedies of them, and will fill every house and village with them, placing them in the open air, or wherever they may have had such visions; and with a view to all these cases we should obey the law. The law has also regard to the impious, and would not have them fancy that by the secret performance of these actions—by raising temples and by building altars in private houses, they can propitiate the God secretly with sacrifices and prayers, while they are really multiplying their crimes infinitely, bringing guilt from heaven upon themselves, and also upon those who permit them, and who are better men than they are; and the consequence is that the whole state reaps the fruit of their impiety, which, in a certain sense, is deserved. Assuredly God will not blame the legislator, who will enact the following law:—No one shall possess shrines of the Gods in private houses, and he who is found to possess them, and perform any sacred rites not publicly

*Laws X.*

ATHENIAN.

Their children to be cared for, like other orphans.

Men must not make a religion for themselves.

Only a great intelligence can establish Gods and temples.

Private rites to be transferred to temples under a penalty.

*Laws X.*

ATHENIAN.

authorized,—supposing the offender to be some man or woman who is not guilty of any other great and impious crime,—shall be informed against by him who is acquainted with the fact, which shall be announced by him to the guardians of the law; and let them issue orders that he or she shall carry away their private rites to the public temples, and if they do not persuade them, let them inflict a penalty on them until they comply. And if a person be proven guilty of impiety, not merely from childish levity, but such as grown-up men may be guilty of, whether he have sacrificed publicly or privately to any Gods, let him be punished with death, for his sacrifice is impure. Whether the deed has been done in earnest, or only from childish levity, let the guardians of the law determine, before they bring the matter into court and prosecute the offender for impiety.

## BOOK XI.

IN the next place, dealings between man and man require to be suitably regulated. The principle of them is very simple:—Thou shalt not, if thou canst help, touch that which is mine, or remove the least thing which belongs to me without my consent; and may I be of a sound mind, and do to others as I would that they should do to me. First, let us speak of treasure-trove:—May I never pray the Gods to find the hidden treasure, which another has laid up for himself and his family, he not being one of my ancestors, nor lift, if I should find, such a treasure. And may I never have any dealings with those who are called diviners, and who in any way or manner counsel me to take up the deposit entrusted to the earth, for I should not gain so much in the increase of my possessions, if I take up the prize, as I should grow in justice and virtue of soul, if I abstain; and this will be a better possession to me than the other in a better part of myself; for the possession of justice in the soul is preferable to the possession of wealth. And of many things it is well said,—‘Move not the immovables,’ and this may be regarded as one of them. And we shall do well to believe the common tradition which says, that such deeds prevent a man from having a family. Now as to him who is careless about having children and regardless of the legislator, taking up that which neither he deposited, nor any ancestor of his, without the consent of the depositor, violating the simplest and noblest of laws which was the enactment of no mean man:—‘Take not up that which was not laid down by thee,’—of him, I say, who despises these two legislators, and takes up, not some small matter which he has not deposited, but perhaps a great heap of treasure,

*Laws XI.*

ATHENIAN.

Dealings  
between man  
and man: the  
principles  
which should  
regulate them.

Treasure-  
trove.



*Law XI.*

ATHENIAN.

The punish-  
ment of a man  
who removes  
treasure to be  
fixed by the  
God of  
Delphi.

The penalties  
of the law for  
those who  
take away  
what others  
leave behind.

How cases of  
disputed own-  
ership are to be  
determined.

what he ought to suffer at the hands of the Gods, God only knows; but I would have the first person who sees him go and tell the wardens of the city, if the occurrence has taken place in the city, or if the occurrence has taken place in the agora he shall tell the wardens of the agora, or if in the country he shall tell the wardens of the country and their commanders<sup>1</sup>. When information has been received the city shall send to Delphi, and, whatever the God answers about the money and the remover of the money, that the city shall do in obedience to the oracle; the informer, if he be a free-man, shall have the honour of doing rightly, and he who informs not, the dishonour of doing wrongly; and if he be a slave who gives information, let him be freed, as he ought to be, by the state, which shall give his master the price of him; but if he do not inform he shall be punished with death. Next in order shall follow a similar law, which shall apply equally to matters great and small:—If a man happens to leave behind him some part of his property, whether intentionally or unintentionally, let him who may come upon the left property suffer it to remain, reflecting that such things are under the protection of the Goddess of ways, and are dedicated to her by the law. But if any one defies the law, and takes the property home with him, let him, if the thing is of little worth, and the man who takes it a slave, be beaten with many stripes by him who meets him, being a person of not less than thirty years of age. Or if he be a freeman, in addition to being thought a mean person and a despiser of the laws, let him pay ten times the value of the treasure which he has moved to the leaver. And if some one accuses another of having anything which belongs to him, whether little or much, and the other admits that he has this thing, but denies that the property in dispute belongs to the other, if the property be registered with the magistrates according to law, the claimant shall summon the possessor, who shall bring it before the magistrates; and when it is brought into court, if it be registered in the public registers, to which of the litigants it belonged, let him take it and go his way. Or if the property be registered as belonging to some one who is not present, whoever will offer sufficient surety on behalf of

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, vi. 760.



the absent person that he will give it up to him, shall take it away as the representative of the other. But if the property which is deposited be not registered with the magistrates, let it remain until the time of trial with three of the eldest of the magistrates; and if it be an animal which is deposited, then he who loses the suit shall pay the magistrates for its keep, and they shall determine the cause within three days.

*Laws XI.*

ATHENIAN.

Any one who is of sound mind may arrest his own slave, and do with him whatever he will of such things as are lawful; and he may arrest the runaway slave of any of his friends or kindred with a view to his safe-keeping. And if any one takes away him who is being carried off as a slave, intending to liberate him, he who is carrying him off shall let him go; but he who takes him away shall give three sufficient sureties; and if he give them, and not without giving them, he may take him away, but if he take him away after any other manner he shall be deemed guilty of violence, and being convicted shall pay as a penalty double the amount of the damages claimed to him who has been deprived of the slave. Any man may also carry off a freedman, if he do not pay respect or sufficient respect to him who freed him. Now the respect shall be, that the freedman go three times in the month to the hearth of the person who freed him, and offer to do whatever he ought, so far as he can; and he shall agree to make such a marriage as his former master approves. He shall not be permitted to have more property than he who gave him liberty, and what more he has shall belong to his master. The freedman shall not remain in the state more than twenty years, but like other foreigners<sup>1</sup> shall go away, taking his entire property with him, unless he has the consent of the magistrates and of his former master to remain. If a freedman or any other stranger has a property greater than the census of the third class, at the expiration of thirty days from the day on which this comes to pass, he shall take that which is his and go his way, and in this case he shall not be allowed to remain any longer by the magistrates. And if any one disobeys this regulation, and is brought into court and convicted, he shall be punished with death, and his property shall be confiscated. Suits about these

A man may carry off his own slave, the runaway slave of a friend, or a disloyal freedman.

The duties and conditions of freedmanship.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, viii. 850.

*Laws XI.*

ATHENIAN.

Disputed  
possessions.Goods to be  
sold at a fixed  
place: no  
credit to be  
given.There will be  
no laws about  
contributions.Precaution  
against  
fraudulent  
sale.When restitu-  
tion is or is  
not to be  
made.

matters shall take place before the tribes, unless the plaintiff and defendant have got rid of the accusation either before their neighbours or before judges chosen by them. If a man lay claim to any animal or anything else which he declares to be his, let the possessor refer to the seller or to some honest and trustworthy person, who has given, or in some legitimate way made over the property to him; if he be a citizen or a metic, sojourning in the city, within thirty days, or, if the property have been delivered to him by a stranger, within five months, of which the middle month shall include the summer solstice<sup>1</sup>. When goods are exchanged by selling and buying, a man shall deliver them, and receive the price of them, at a fixed place in the agora, and have done with the matter; but he shall not buy or sell anywhere else, nor give credit. And if in any other manner or in any other place there be an exchange of one thing for another, and the seller give credit to the man who buys from him, he must do this on the understanding that the law gives no protection in cases of things sold not in accordance with these regulations<sup>2</sup>. Again, as to contributions, any man who likes may go about collecting contributions as a friend among friends, but if any difference arises about the collection, he is to act on the understanding that the law gives no protection in such cases. He who sells anything above the value of fifty drachmas shall be required to remain in the city for ten days, and the purchaser shall be informed of the house of the seller, with a view to the sort of charges which are apt to arise in such cases, and the restitutions which the law allows. And let legal restitution be on this wise:—If a man sells a slave who is in a consumption, or who has the disease of the stone, or of strangury, or epilepsy, or some other tedious and incurable disorder of body or mind, which is not discernible to the ordinary man, if the purchaser be a physician or trainer, he shall have no right of restitution; nor shall there be any right of restitution if the seller has told the truth beforehand to the buyer. But if a skilled person sells to another who is not skilled, let the buyer appeal for restitution within six months, except in the case of epilepsy, and then the appeal may be made within a year. The cause shall be determined

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *infra*, xii. 952 E.<sup>2</sup> Cp. *supra*, viii. 849 E.

by such physicians as the parties may agree to choose; and the defendant, if he lose the suit, shall pay double the price at which he sold. If a private person sell to another private person, he shall have the right of restitution, and the decision shall be given as before, but the defendant, if he be cast, shall only pay back the price of the slave. If a person sells a homicide to another, and they both know of the fact, let there be no restitution in such a case, but if he do not know of the fact, there shall be a right of restitution, whenever the buyer makes the discovery; and the decision shall rest with the five youngest guardians of the law, and if the decision be that the seller was cognisant of the fact, he shall purify the house of the purchaser, according to the law of the interpreters, and shall pay back three times the purchase-money.

*Laws XI.*

ATHENIAN.

If a man exchanges either money for money, or anything whatever for anything else, either with or without life, let him give and receive them genuine and unadulterated, in accordance with the law. And let us have a prelude about all this sort of roguery, like the preludes of our other laws. Every man should regard adulteration as of one and the same class with falsehood and deceit, concerning which the many are too fond of saying that at proper times and places the practice may often be right. But they leave the occasion, and the when, and the where, undefined and unsettled, and from this want of definiteness in their language they do a great deal of harm to themselves and to others. Now a legislator ought not to leave the matter undetermined; he ought to prescribe some limit, either greater or less. Let this be the rule prescribed:—No one shall call the Gods to witness, when he says or does anything false or deceitful or dishonest, unless he would be the most hateful of mankind to them. And he is most hateful to them who takes a false oath, and pays no heed to the Gods; and in the next degree, he who tells a falsehood in the presence of his superiors. Now better men are the superiors of worse men, and in general elders are the superiors of the young; wherefore also parents are the superiors of their offspring, and men of women and children, and rulers of their subjects; for all men ought to reverence any one who is in any position of

Prelude to the law about adulteration:—Adulteration is a kind of falsehood and perjury.



*Laws XI.*

ATHENIAN.

The law :—  
One price to  
be asked ; no  
puffing, or  
taking of  
oaths.

Penalties for  
adulteration.

authority, and especially those who are in state offices. And this is the reason why I have spoken of these matters. For every one who is guilty of adulteration in the agora tells a falsehood, and deceives, and when he invokes the Gods, according to the customs and cautions of the wardens of the agora, he does but swear without any respect for God or man. Certainly, it is an excellent rule not lightly to defile the names of the Gods, after the fashion of men in general, who care little about piety and purity in their religious actions. But if a man will not conform to this rule, let the law be as follows :—He who sells anything in the agora shall not ask two prices for that which he sells, but he shall ask one price, and if he do not obtain this, he shall take away his goods ; and on that day he shall not value them either at more or less ; and there shall be no praising of any goods, or oath taken about them. If a person disobeys this command, any citizen who is present, not being less than thirty years of age, may with impunity chastise and beat the swearer, but if instead of obeying the laws he takes no heed, he shall be liable to the charge of having betrayed them. If a man sells any adulterated goods and will not obey these regulations, he who knows and can prove the fact, and does prove it in the presence of the magistrates, if he be a slave or a metic, shall have the adulterated goods ; if he be a citizen, and do not pursue the charge, he shall be called a rogue, and deemed to have robbed the Gods ; but if he secure a conviction, he shall dedicate the goods to the Gods of the agora. He who is proved to have sold any adulterated goods, in addition to losing the goods themselves, shall be beaten with stripes,—a stripe for a drachma, according to the price of the goods ; and the herald shall proclaim in the agora the offence for which he is going to be beaten. The wardens of the agora and the guardians of the law shall obtain information from experienced persons about the rogueries and adulterations of the sellers, and shall write up what the seller ought and ought not to do in each case ; and let them inscribe their laws on a column in front of the court of the wardens of the agora, that they may be clear instructors of those who have business in the agora. Enough has been said in what has preceded about the wardens of the city, and if anything



seems to be wanting, let them communicate with the guardians of the law, and write down the omission, and place on a column in the court of the wardens of the city the primary and secondary regulations which are laid down for them about their office.

*Laws XI.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

After the practices of adulteration naturally follow the practices of retail trade. Concerning these, we will first of all give a word of counsel and reason, and the law shall come afterwards. Retail trade in a city is not by nature intended to do any harm, but quite the contrary; for is not he a benefactor who reduces the inequalities and incommensurabilities of goods to equality and common measure? And this is what the power of money accomplishes, and the merchant may be said to be appointed for this purpose. The hireling and the tavern-keeper, and many other occupations, some of them more and others less seemly—all alike have this object;—they seek to satisfy our needs and equalize our possessions<sup>1</sup>. Let us then endeavour to see what has brought retail trade into ill-odour, and wherein lies the dishonour and unseemliness of it, in order that if not entirely, we may yet partially, cure the evil by legislation. To effect this is no easy matter, and requires a great deal of virtue.

Retail trade.

Its objects are  
laudable:

why, then,  
is it so  
despised?

*Cle.* What do you mean?

*Ath.* Dear Cleinias, the class of men is small—they must have been rarely gifted by nature, and trained by education,—who, when assailed by wants and desires, are able to hold out and observe moderation, and when they might make a great deal of money are sober in their wishes, and prefer a moderate to a large gain. But the mass of mankind are the very opposite: their desires are unbounded, and when they might gain in moderation they prefer gains without limit; wherefore all that relates to retail trade, and merchandise, and the keeping of taverns, is denounced and numbered among dishonourable things. For if what I trust may never be and will not be, we were to compel, if I may venture to say a ridiculous thing, the best men everywhere to keep taverns for a time, or carry on retail trade, or do anything of that sort; or if, in consequence of some fate or necessity, the best women were compelled to follow similar callings, then we

Because it  
encourages  
the love of  
gain.

If good men  
and women  
only kept  
shops and  
taverns,  
retail trade  
would be

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Arist. Pol. i. 9, §§ 1–11.

*Laws XI.*

ATHENIAN.

thought a  
beneficent  
occupation.

The extortion-  
ate practices  
now-a-days  
have brought  
it into ill-  
repute.

The remedy :  
— Retailers to  
be few, of the  
meaner sort,  
and well  
looked after.

The law :—  
Retail traders  
to be, not  
citizens, but  
metics or  
strangers.

should know how agreeable and pleasant all these things are ; and if all such occupations were managed on incorrupt principles, they would be honoured as we honour a mother or a nurse. But now that a man goes to desert places and builds houses which can only be reached by long journeys, for the sake of retail trade, and receives strangers who are in need at the welcome resting-place, and gives them peace and calm when they are tossed by the storm, or cool shade in the heat ; and then instead of behaving to them as friends, and showing the duties of hospitality to his guests, treats them as enemies and captives who are at his mercy, and will not release them until they have paid the most unjust, abominable, and extortionate ransom,—these are the sort of practices, and foul evils they are, which cast a reproach upon the succour of adversity. And the legislator ought always to be devising a remedy for evils of this nature. There is an ancient saying, which is also a true one — ‘To fight against two opponents is a difficult thing,’ as is seen in diseases and in many other cases. And in this case also the war is against two enemies — wealth and poverty ; one of whom corrupts the soul of man with luxury, while the other drives him by pair into utter shamelessness. What remedy can a city of sense find against this disease? In the first place, they must have as few retail traders as possible ; and in the second place they must assign the occupation to that class of men whose corruption will be the least injury to the state ; and in the third place, they must devise some way whereby the followers of these occupations themselves will not readily fall into habits of unbridled shamelessness and meanness.

After this preface let our law run as follows, and may fortune favour us :— No landowner among the Magnetes, whose city the God is restoring and resettling — no one, that is, of the 5040 families, shall become a retail trader either voluntarily or involuntarily ; neither shall he be a merchant, or do any service for private persons unless they equally serve him except for his father or his mother, and their fathers and mothers ; and in general for his elders who are freemen<sup>1</sup> and whom he serves as a freeman. Now it is difficult to determine accurately the things which are worthy or un-

<sup>1</sup> Placing a comma after ἐλεύθεροι.

worthy of a freeman, but let those who have obtained the prize of virtue give judgment about them in accordance with their feelings of right and wrong. He who in any way shares in the illiberality of retail trades may be indicted for dishonouring his race by any one who likes, before those who have been judged to be the first in virtue; and if he appear to throw dirt upon his father's house by an unworthy occupation, let him be imprisoned for a year and abstain from that sort of thing; and if he repeat the offence, for two years; and every time that he is convicted let the length of his imprisonment be doubled. This shall be the second law:—He who engages in retail trade must be either a metic or a stranger. And a third law shall be:—In order that the retailer who dwells in our city may be as good or as little bad as possible, the guardians of the law shall remember that they are not only guardians of those who may be easily watched and prevented from becoming lawless or bad, because they are well-born and bred; but still more should they have a watch over those who are of another sort, and follow pursuits which have a very strong tendency to make men bad. And, therefore, in respect of the multifarious occupations of retail trade, that is to say, in respect of such of them as are allowed to remain, because they seem to be quite necessary in a state,—about these the guardians of the law should meet and take counsel with those who have experience of the several kinds of retail trade, as we before commanded concerning adulteration (which is a matter akin to this), and when they meet they shall consider what amount of receipts, after deducting expenses, will produce a moderate gain to the retailer, and they shall fix in writing and strictly maintain what they find to be the right percentage of profit; this shall be seen to by the wardens of the agora, and by the wardens of the city, and by the wardens of the country. And so retail trade will benefit every one, and do the least possible injury to those in the state who practise it.

When a man makes an agreement which he does not fulfil, unless the agreement be of a nature which the law or a vote of the assembly does not allow, or which he has made under the influence of some unjust compulsion, or which he is

*Laws XI.*

ATHENIAN.

The punishment for citizens who disobey.

The guardians of the law shall determine the rate of profit.

Breaches of contract to be actionable.



*Laws XI.*

ATHENIAN.

Punishment  
for not fulfil-  
ling a contract  
within the  
appointed  
time.

No over-  
charge.

The price, if  
not paid at  
the time  
agreed,

prevented from fulfilling against his will by some unexpected chance, the other party may go to law with him in the courts of the tribes, for not having completed his agreement, if the parties are not able previously to come to terms before arbiters or before their neighbours. The class of craftsmen who have furnished human life with the arts is dedicated to Hephaestus and Athene; and there is a class of craftsmen who preserve the works of all craftsmen by arts of defence, the votaries of Ares and Athene, to which divinities they too are rightly dedicated. All these continue through life serving the country and the people; some of them are leaders in battle; others make for hire implements and works, and they ought not to deceive in such matters, out of respect to the Gods who are their ancestors. If any craftsman through indolence omit to execute his work in a given time, not reverencing the God who gives him the means of life, but considering, foolish fellow, that he is his own God and will let him off easily, in the first place, he shall suffer at the hands of the God, and in the second place, the law shall follow in a similar spirit. He shall owe to him who contracted with him the price of the works which he has failed in performing, and he shall begin again and execute them gratis in the given time. When a man undertakes a work, the law gives him the same advice which was given to the seller, that he should not attempt to raise the price, but simply ask the value; this the law enjoins also on the contractor; for the craftsman assuredly knows the value of his work. Wherefore, in free states the man of art ought not to attempt to impose upon private individuals by the help of his art, which is by nature a true thing; and he who is wronged in a matter of this sort, shall have a right of action against the party who has wronged him. And if any one lets out work to a craftsman, and does not pay him duly according to the lawful agreement, disregarding Zeus the guardian of the city and Athene, who are the partners of the state, and overthrows the foundations of society for the sake of a little gain, in his case let the law and the Gods maintain the common bonds of the state. And let him who, having already received the work in exchange, does not pay the price in the time agreed, pay double the price; and if a year has elapsed,



although interest is not to be taken on loans, yet for every drachma which he owes to the contractor let him pay a monthly interest of an obol. Suits about these matters are to be decided by the courts of the tribes; and by the way, since we have mentioned craftsmen at all, we must not forget that other craft of war, in which generals and tacticians are the craftsmen, who undertake voluntarily or involuntarily the work of our safety, as other craftsmen undertake other public works;—if they execute their work well the law will never tire of praising him who gives them<sup>1</sup> those honours which are the just rewards of the soldier; but if any one, having already received the benefit of any noble service in war, does not make the due return of honour, the law will blame him. Let this then be the law, having an ingredient of praise, not compelling but advising the great body of the citizens to honour the brave men who are the saviours of the whole state, whether by their courage or by their military skill;—they should honour them, I say, in the second place; for the first and highest tribute of respect is to be given to those who are able above other men to honour the words of good legislators.

The greater part of the dealings between man and man have been now regulated by us with the exception of those that relate to orphans and the supervision of orphans by their guardians. These follow next in order, and must be regulated in some way. But to arrive at them we must begin with the testamentary wishes of the dying and the case of those who may have happened to die intestate. When I said, Cleinias, that we must regulate them, I had in my mind the difficulty and perplexity in which all such matters are involved. You cannot leave them unregulated, for individuals would make regulations at variance with one another, and repugnant to the laws and habits of the living and to their own previous habits, if a person were simply allowed to make any will which he pleased, and this were to take effect in whatever state he may have been at the end of his life; for most of us lose our senses in a manner, and feel crushed when we think that we are about to die.

*Cle.* What do you mean, Stranger?

<sup>1</sup> Reading, according to Schneider, ὅς τοῦτοις αὐ.

*Laws XI.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

shall be  
doubled.

Soldiers and  
generals, also,  
like other  
craftsmen,  
should have  
their reward,  
though not  
the highest;—  
this is reserved  
for men who  
honour the  
law.

The wishes of  
the dying to  
be made  
subject to the  
interests of  
the living.

*Laws XI.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Ath.* O Cleinias, a man when he is about to die is an intractable creature, and is apt to use language which causes a great deal of anxiety and trouble to the legislator.

*Cle.* In what way?

*Ath.* He wants to have the entire control of all his property, and will use angry words.

*Cle.* Such as what?

The fretful  
complaints of  
the dying  
man;

*Ath.* O ye Gods, he will say, how monstrous that I am not allowed to give, or not to give, my own to whom I will — less to him who has been bad to me, and more to him who has been good to me, and whose badness and goodness have been tested by me in time of sickness or in old age and in every other sort of fortune!

*Cle.* Well, Stranger, and may he not very fairly say so?

*Ath.* In my opinion, Cleinias, the ancient legislators were too good-natured, and made laws without sufficient observation or consideration of human things.

*Cle.* What do you mean?

*Ath.* I mean, my friend, that they were afraid of the testator's reproaches, and so they passed a law to the effect that a man should be allowed to dispose of his property in all respects as he liked; but you and I, if I am not mistaken, will have something better to say to our departing citizens.

*Cle.* What?

and the  
legislator's  
answer to  
them.

*Ath.* O my friends, we will say to them, hard is it for you, who are creatures of a day, to know what is yours, — hard too, as the Delphic oracle says, to know yourselves at this hour. Now I, as the legislator, regard you and your possessions, not as belonging to yourselves, but as belonging to your whole family, both past and future, and yet more do I regard both family and possessions as belonging to the state; wherefore, if some one steals upon you with flattery, when you are tossed on the sea of disease or old age, and persuades you to dispose of your property in a way that is not for the best, I will not, if I can help, allow this; but I will legislate with a view to the whole, considering what is best both for the state and for the family, esteeming as I ought the feelings of an individual at a lower rate; and I hope that you will depart in peace and kindness towards us,

as you are going the way of all mankind; and we will impartially take care of all your concerns, not neglecting any of them, if we can possibly help. Let this be our prelude and consolation to the living and dying, Cleinias, and let the law be as follows:—He who makes a disposition in a testament, if he be the father of a family, shall first of all inscribe as his heir any one of his sons whom he may think fit; and if he gives any of his children to be adopted by another citizen, let the adoption be inscribed. And if he has a son remaining over and above who has not been adopted upon any lot, and who may be expected to be sent out to a colony according to law, to him his father may give as much as he pleases of the rest of his property, with the exception of the paternal lot and the fixtures on the lot. And if there are other sons, let him distribute among them what there is more than the lot in such portions as he pleases. And if one of the sons has already a house of his own, he shall not give him of the money, nor shall he give money to a daughter who has been betrothed, but if she is not betrothed he may give her money. And if any of the sons or daughters shall be found to have another lot of land in the country, which has accrued after the testament has been made, they shall leave the lot which they have inherited to the heir of the man who has made the will. If the testator has no sons, but only daughters, let him choose the husband of any one of his daughters whom he pleases, and leave and inscribe him as his son and heir. And if a man have lost his son, when he was a child, and before he could be reckoned among grown-up men, whether his own or an adopted son, let the testator make mention of the circumstance and inscribe whom he will to be his second son in hope of better fortune. If the testator has no children at all, he may select and give to any one whom he pleases the tenth part of the property which he has acquired; but let him not be blamed if he gives all the rest to his adopted son, and makes a friend of him according to the law. If the sons of a man require guardians, and the father when he dies leaves a will appointing guardians, those who have been named by him, whoever they are and whatever their number be, if they are able and willing to take charge of the children, shall be recognized

*Laws XI.*

ATHENIAN.

The father may leave the lot to any of his sons, and distribute what remains to such of his other children as are unprovided for.

Other regulations respecting inheritance, adoption, orphanhood.



*Laws XI.*

ATHENIAN.

according to the provisions of the will. But if he dies and has made no will, or a will in which he has appointed no guardians, then the next of kin, two on the father's and two on the mother's side, and one of the friends of the deceased, shall have the authority of guardians, whom the guardians of the law shall appoint when the orphans require guardians. And the fifteen eldest guardians of the law shall have the whole care and charge of the orphans, divided into threes according to seniority,—a body of three for one year, and then another body of three for the next year, until the cycle of the five periods is complete; and this, as far as possible, is to continue always. If a man dies, having made no will at all, and leaves sons who require the care of guardians, they shall share in the protection which is afforded by these laws.

The principles  
on which the  
daughters of  
persons dying  
intestate shall  
be given in  
marriage.

And if a man dying by some unexpected fate leaves daughters behind him, let him pardon the legislator if when he gives them in marriage, he have a regard only to two out of three conditions,—nearness of kin and the preservation of the lot, and omits the third condition, which a father would naturally consider, for he would choose out of all the citizens a son for himself, and a husband for his daughter, with a view to his character and disposition—the father, I say, shall forgive the legislator if he disregards this, which to him is an impossible consideration. Let the law about these matters where practicable be as follows:—If a man dies without making a will, and leaves behind him daughters, let his brother, being the son of the same father or of the same mother, having no lot, marry the daughter and have the lot of the dead man. And if he have no brother, but only a brother's son, in like manner let them marry, if they be of a suitable age; and if there be not even a brother's son, but only the son of a sister, let them do likewise, and so in the fourth degree, if there be only the testator's father's brother, or in the fifth degree, his father's brother's son, or in a sixth degree, the child of his father's sister. Let kindred be always reckoned in this way: if a person leaves daughters the relationship shall proceed upwards through brothers and sisters, and brothers' and sisters' children, and first the males shall come, and after them the females in the same family. The judge shall consider and determine the suitability or unsuitability of



age in marriage; he shall make an inspection of the males naked, and of the women naked down to the navel. And if there be a lack of kinsmen in the family extending to grandchildren of a brother, or to the grandchildren of a grandfather's children, the maiden may choose with the consent of her guardians any one of the citizens who is willing and whom she wills, and he shall be the heir of the dead man, and the husband of his daughter. Circumstances vary, and there may sometimes be a still greater lack of relations within the limits of the state; and if any maiden has no kindred living in the city, and there is some one who has been sent out to a colony, and she is disposed to make him the heir of her father's possessions, if he be indeed of her kindred, let him proceed to take the lot according to the regulation of the law; but if he be not of her kindred, she having no kinsmen within the city, and he be chosen by the daughter of the dead man, and empowered to marry by the guardians, let him return home and take the lot of him who died intestate. And if a man has no children, either male or female, and dies without making a will, let the previous law in general hold; and let a man and a woman go forth from the family and share the deserted house, and let the lot belong absolutely to them; and let the heiress in the first degree be a sister, and in a second degree a daughter of a brother, and in the third, a daughter of a sister, in the fourth degree the sister of a father, and in the fifth degree the daughter of a father's brother, and in a sixth degree of a father's sister; and these shall dwell with their male kinsmen, according to the degree of relationship and right, as we enacted before. Now we must not conceal from ourselves that such laws are apt to be oppressive and that there may sometimes be a hardship in the lawgiver commanding the kinsmen of the dead man to marry his relation; he may be thought not to have considered the innumerable hindrances which may arise among men in the execution of such ordinances; for there may be cases in which the parties refuse to obey, and are ready to do anything rather than marry, when there is some bodily or mental malady or defect among those who are bidden to marry or be married. Persons may fancy that the legis-

*Laws XI.*

ATHENIAN.

If a childless man dies intestate, he shall be succeeded by his nearest kinsman and kinswoman.

*Laws XI.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

The legislator  
is well aware  
that his law  
may be op-  
pressive, but  
he must  
sometimes  
sacrifice  
individuals  
for the state.

lator never thought of this, but they are mistaken; wherefore let us make a common prelude on behalf of the lawgiver and of his subjects, the law begging the latter to forgive the legislator, in that he, having to take care of the common weal, cannot order at the same time the various circumstances of individuals, and begging him to pardon them if naturally they are sometimes unable to fulfil the act which he in his ignorance imposes upon them.

*Cle.* And how, Stranger, can we act most fairly under the circumstances?

*Ath.* There must be arbiters chosen to deal with such laws and the subjects of them.

*Cle.* What do you mean?

Hard cases  
may be con-  
sidered by  
fifteen of the  
guardians of  
the law, or  
tried before  
the select  
judges.

*Ath.* I mean to say, that a case may occur in which the nephew, having a rich father, will be unwilling to marry the daughter of his uncle; he will have a feeling of pride, and he will wish to look higher. And there are cases in which the legislator will be imposing upon him the greatest calamity, and he will be compelled to disobey the law, if he is required, for example, to take a wife who is mad, or has some other terrible malady of soul or body, such as makes life intolerable to the sufferer. Then let what we are saying concerning these cases be embodied in a law:—If any one finds fault with the established laws respecting testaments, both as to other matters and especially in what relates to marriage, and asserts that the legislator, if he were alive and present, would not compel him to obey,—that is to say, would not compel those who are by our law required to marry or be given in marriage, to do either,—and some kinsman or guardian dispute this, the reply is that the legislator left fifteen of the guardians of the law to be arbiters and fathers of orphans, male or female, and to them let the disputants have recourse, and by their aid determine any matters of the kind, admitting their decision to be final. But if any one thinks that too great power is thus given to the guardians of the law, let him bring his adversaries into the court of the select judges, and there have the points in dispute determined. And he who loses the cause shall have censure and blame from the legislator, which, by a man of sense, is felt to be a penalty far heavier than a great loss of money. .

Thus will orphan children have a second birth. After their first birth we spoke of their nurture and education, and after their second birth, when they have lost their parents, we ought to take measures that the misfortune of orphanhood may be as little sad to them as possible. In the first place, we say that the guardians of the law are lawgivers and fathers to them, not inferior to their natural fathers. Moreover, they shall take charge of them year by year<sup>1</sup> as of their own kindred; and we have given both to them and to the children's own guardians a suitable admonition concerning the nurture of orphans. And we seem to have spoken opportunely in our former discourse<sup>2</sup>, when we said that the souls of the dead have the power after death of taking an interest in human affairs, about which there are many tales and traditions, long indeed, but true; and seeing that they are so many and so ancient, we must believe them, and we must also believe the lawgivers, who tell us that these things are true, if they are not to be regarded as utter fools. But if these things are really so, in the first place men should have a fear of the Gods above, who regard the loneliness of the orphans; and in the second place of the souls of the departed, who by nature incline to take an especial care of their own children, and are friendly to those who honour, and unfriendly to those who dishonour them. Men should also fear the souls of the living who are aged and high in honour; wherever a city is well ordered and prosperous, their descendants cherish them, and so live happily; old persons are quick to see and hear all that relates to them, and are propitious to those who are just in the fulfilment of such duties, and they punish those who wrong the orphan and the desolate, considering that they are the greatest and most sacred of trusts. To all which matters the guardian and magistrate ought to apply his mind, if he has any, and take heed of the nurture and education of the orphans, seeking in every possible way to do them good, for he is making a contribution<sup>3</sup> to his own good and that of his children. He who obeys the tale which precedes the law, and does no wrong to an orphan, will never experience the wrath of the legislator.

*Laws XI.*

ATHENIAN.

The guardians of the law to be the second fathers of orphans.

The Gods and the souls of the departed look upon them, and aged and venerable persons have a care of them.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, 924 C.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. *supra*, ix. 865 E.

<sup>3</sup> Or, 'as if he were making a contribution.'



*Laws XI.*

ATHENIAN.

The guardian shall educate the orphan and manage his property as if he were his own child.

Punishment of the fraudulent or negligent trustee or magistrate.

But he who is disobedient, and wrongs any one who is bereft of father or mother, shall pay twice the penalty which he would have paid if he had wronged one whose parents had been alive. As touching other legislation concerning guardians in their relation to orphans, or concerning magistrates and their superintendence of the guardians, if they did not possess<sup>1</sup> examples of the manner in which children of free-men should be brought up in the bringing up of their own children, and of the care of their property in the care of their own, or if they had not just laws fairly stated about these very things,—there would have been reason in making laws for them, under the idea that they were a peculiar class, and we might distinguish and make separate rules for the life of those who are orphans and of those who are not orphans. But as the case stands, the condition of orphans with us is not different from the case of those who have a father, though in regard to honour and dishonour, and the attention given to them, the two are not usually placed upon a level. Wherefore, touching the legislation about orphans, the law speaks in serious accents, both of persuasion and threatening, and such a threat as the following will be by no means out of place:—He who is the guardian of an orphan of either sex, and he among the guardians of the law to whom the superintendence of this guardian has been assigned, shall love the unfortunate orphan as though he were his own child, and he shall be as careful and diligent in the management of his possessions as he would be if they were his own, or even more careful and diligent. Let every one who has the care of an orphan observe this law. But any one who acts contrary to the law on these matters, if he be a guardian of the child, may be fined by a magistrate, or, if he be himself a magistrate, the guardian may bring him before the court of select judges, and punish him, if convicted, by exacting a fine of double the amount of that inflicted by the court. And if a guardian appears to the relations of the orphan, or to any other citizen, to act negligently or dishonestly, let them bring him before the same court, and whatever damages are given against him, let him pay fourfold, and let half belong to the orphan and half to him who procured the con-

<sup>1</sup> Reading *εἰ μὲν μή*.



viction. If any orphan arrives at years of discretion, and thinks that he has been ill-used by his guardians, let him within five years of the expiration of the guardianship be allowed to bring them to trial; and if any of them be convicted, the court shall determine what he shall pay or suffer. And if a magistrate shall appear to have wronged the orphan by neglect, and he be convicted, let the court determine what he shall suffer or pay to the orphan, and if there be dishonesty in addition to neglect, besides paying the fine, let him be deposed from his office of guardian of the law, and let the state appoint another guardian of the law for the city and for the country in his room.

*Laws XI.*  
ATHENIAN.

Greater differences than there ought to be sometimes arise between fathers and sons, on the part either of fathers who will be of opinion that the legislator should enact that they may, if they wish, lawfully renounce their son by the proclamation of a herald in the face of the world, or of sons who think that they should be allowed to indict their fathers on the charge of imbecility when they are disabled by disease or old age. These things only happen, as a matter of fact, where the natures of men are utterly bad; for where only half is bad, as, for example, if the father be not bad, but the son be bad, or conversely, no great calamity is the result of such an amount of hatred as this. In another state, a son disowned by his father would not of necessity cease to be a citizen, but in our state, of which these are to be the laws, the disinherited must necessarily emigrate into another country, for no addition can be made even of a single family to the 5040 households; and, therefore, he who deserves to suffer these things must be renounced not only by his father, who is a single person, but by the whole family, and what is done in these cases must be regulated by some such law as the following:—He who in the sad disorder of his soul has a mind, justly or unjustly, to expel from his family a son whom he has begotten and brought up, shall not lightly or at once execute his purpose; but first of all he shall collect together his own kinsmen, extending to cousins, and in like manner his son's kinsmen by the mother's side, and in their presence he shall accuse his son, setting forth that he deserves at the hands of them all to be dismissed from the

Quarrels  
between  
fathers and  
sons.

A son can  
only be  
renounced  
by a father  
with the  
consent of  
the family.  
When re-  
nounced, he  
may be  
adopted by  
another citi-  
zen: but if  
he be not  
adopted  
within ten  
years, he must  
emigrate.

*Laws XI.*

ATHENIAN.

The characters of young men are subject to many changes.

An imbecile father may be deprived of the control of his affairs.

If husband and wife do not agree, let them separate and find other partners.

family; and the son shall be allowed to address them in a similar manner, and show that he does not deserve to suffer any of these things. And if the father persuades them, and obtains the suffrages of more than half of his kindred, exclusive of the father and mother and the offender himself — I say, if he obtains more than half the suffrages of all the other grown-up members of the family, of both sexes, the father shall be permitted to put away his son, but not otherwise. And if any other citizen is willing to adopt the son who is put away, no law shall hinder him; for the characters of young men are subject to many changes in the course of their lives. And if he has been put away, and in a period of ten years no one is willing to adopt him, let those who have the care of the superabundant population which is sent out into colonies, see to him, in order that he may be suitably provided for in the colony. And if disease or age or harshness of temper, or all these together, makes a man to be more out of his mind than the rest of the world are,—but this is not observable, except to those who live with him,—and he, being master of his property, is the ruin of the house, and his son doubts and hesitates about indicting his father for insanity, let the law in that case ordain that he shall first of all go to the eldest guardians of the law and tell them of his father's misfortune, and they shall duly look into the matter, and take counsel as to whether he shall indict him or not. And if they advise him to proceed, they shall be both his witnesses and his advocates; and if the father is cast, he shall henceforth be incapable of ordering the least particular of his life; let him be as a child dwelling in the house for the remainder of his days. And if a man and his wife have an unfortunate incompatibility of temper, ten of the guardians of the law, who are impartial<sup>1</sup>, and ten of the women who regulate marriages<sup>2</sup>, shall look to the matter, and if they are able to reconcile them they shall be formally reconciled; but if their souls are too much tossed with passion, they shall endeavour to find other partners. Now they are not likely to have very gentle tempers; and, therefore, we must

<sup>1</sup> *Or*, 'who are intermediate in age':—i. e. who are neither the youngest nor the oldest guardians of the law.

<sup>2</sup> *Cp. supra*, vi. 784 A foll.; vii. 794.

endeavour to associate with them deeper and softer natures. Those who have no children, or only a few, at the time of their separation, should choose their new partners with a view to the procreation of children; but those who have a sufficient number of children should separate and marry again in order that they may have some one to grow old with and that the pair may take care of one another in age. If a woman dies, leaving children, male or female, the law will advise rather than compel the husband to bring up the children without introducing into the house a stepmother. But if he have no children, then he shall be compelled to marry until he has begotten a sufficient number of sons to his family and to the state. And if a man dies leaving a sufficient number of children, the mother of his children shall remain with them and bring them up. But if she appears to be too young to live virtuously without a husband, let her relations communicate with the women who superintend marriage, and let both together do what they think best in these matters; if there is a lack of children, let the choice be made with a view to having them; two children, one of either sex, shall be deemed sufficient in the eye of the law. When a child is admitted to be the offspring of certain parents and is acknowledged by them, but there is need of a decision as to which parent the child is to follow,—in case a female slave have intercourse with a male slave, or with a freeman or freedman, the offspring shall always belong to the master of the female slave. Again, if a free woman have intercourse with a male slave, the offspring shall belong to the master of the slave; but if a child be born either of a slave by her master, or of his mistress by a slave—and this be proven—the offspring of the woman and its father shall be sent away by the women who superintend marriage into another country, and the guardians of the law shall send away the offspring of the man and its mother.

Neither God, nor a man who has understanding, will ever advise any one to neglect his parents. To a discourse concerning the honour and dishonour of parents, a prelude such as the following, about the service of the Gods, will be a suitable introduction:—There are ancient customs about the Gods which are universal, and they are of two kinds: some

*Laws XI.*

ATHENIAN.

Regulations  
respecting  
widowers and  
widows.

The custody  
of children of  
whom one or  
both parents  
are slaves.



*Laws XI.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

A father or mother stricken in years is as potent to grant a request as any lifeless image.

The curses of parents upon their children are heard by the Gods, and so are the prayers which they offer for their welfare.

The worship of a living ancestor higher than of a lifeless image.

of the Gods we see with our eyes and we honour them, of others we honour the images, raising statues of them which we adore; and though they are lifeless, yet we imagine that the living Gods have a good will and gratitude to us on this account. Now, if a man has a father or mother, or their fathers or mothers treasured up in his house stricken in years, let him consider that no statue can be more potent to grant his requests than they are, who are sitting at his hearth, if only he knows how to show true service to them.

*Cle.* And what do you call the true mode of service?

*Ath.* I will tell you, O my friend, for such things are worth listening to.

*Cle.* Proceed.

*Ath.* Oedipus, as tradition says, when dishonoured by his sons, invoked on them curses which every one declares to have been heard and ratified by the Gods, and Amyntor in his wrath invoked curses on his son Phoenix, and Theseus upon Hippolytus, and innumerable others have also called down wrath upon their children, whence it is clear that the Gods listen to the imprecations of parents; for the curses of parents are, as they ought to be, mighty against their children as no others are. And shall we suppose that the prayers of a father or mother who is specially dishonoured by his or her children, are heard by the Gods in accordance with nature; and that if a parent is honoured by them, and in the gladness of his heart earnestly entreats the Gods in his prayers to do them good, he is not equally heard, and that they do not minister to his request? If not, they would be very unjust ministers of good, and that we affirm to be contrary to their nature.

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* May we not think, as I was saying just now, that we can possess no image which is more honoured by the Gods, than that of a father or grandfather, or of a mother stricken in years? whom when a man honours, the heart of the God rejoices, and he is ready to answer their prayers. And, truly, the figure of an ancestor is a wonderful thing, far higher than that of a lifeless image. For the living, when they are honoured by us, join in our prayers, and when they are dishonoured, they utter imprecations against us; but



lifeless objects do neither. And therefore, if a man makes a right use of his father and grandfather and other aged relations, he will have images which above all others will win him the favour of the Gods.

*Cle.* Excellent.

*Ath.* Every man of any understanding fears and respects the prayers of parents, knowing well that many times and to many persons they have been accomplished. Now these things being thus ordered by nature, good men think it a blessing from heaven if their parents live to old age and reach the utmost limit of human life, or if taken away before their time they are deeply regretted by them; but to bad men parents are always a cause of terror. Wherefore let every man honour with every sort of lawful honour his own parents, agreeably to what has now been said. But if this prelude be an unmeaning sound in the ears of any one, let the law follow, which may be rightly imposed in these terms:— If any one in this city be not sufficiently careful of his parents, and do not regard and gratify in every respect their wishes more than those of his sons and of his other offspring or of himself,—let him who experiences this sort of treatment either come himself, or send some one to inform the three eldest guardians of the law, and three of the women who have the care of marriages; and let them look to the matter and punish youthful evil-doers with stripes and bonds if they are under thirty years of age, that is to say, if they be men, or if they be women, let them undergo the same punishment up to forty years of age. But if, when they are still more advanced in years, they continue the same neglect of their parents, and do any hurt to any of them, let them be brought before a court in which every single one of the eldest citizens shall be the judges, and if the offender be convicted, let the court determine what he ought to pay or suffer, and any penalty may be imposed on him which a man can pay or suffer. If the person who has been wronged be unable to inform the magistrates, let any freeman who hears of his case inform, and if he do not, he shall be deemed base, and shall be liable to have a suit for damage brought against him by any one who likes. And if a slave inform, he shall receive freedom; and if he be the slave of the injurer or injured party, he shall be set free

*Laws XI.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

The penalty for the neglect of parents in the case of the young will be bonds and stripes;

if they persist they shall be brought before a court of elders and punished more severely.

*Lex XI.*

ATHENIAN.

by the magistrates, or if he belong to any other citizen, the public shall pay a price on his behalf to the owner; and let the magistrates take heed that no one wrongs him out of revenge, because he has given information.

Two kinds of poisoning:  
(1) by meats and drinks;  
(2) by magic.

Men cannot be taught to despise sorcery, and therefore the practice of it must be punished.

The physician who employs poison, and the professional sorcerer,

Cases in which one man injures another by poisons, and which prove fatal, have been already discussed<sup>1</sup>; but about other cases in which a person intentionally and of malice harms another with meats, or drinks, or ointments, nothing has as yet been determined. For there are two kinds of poisons used among men, which cannot clearly be distinguished. There is the kind just now explicitly mentioned which injures bodies by the use of other bodies according to a natural law; there is also another kind which persuades the more daring class that they can do injury by sorceries and incantations, and magic knots, as they are termed, and makes others believe that they above all persons are injured by the powers of the magician. Now it is not easy to know the nature of all these things; nor if a man do know can he readily persuade others to believe him. And when men are disturbed in their minds at the sight of waxen images fixed either at their doors, or in a place where three ways meet, or on the sepulchres of parents, there is no use in trying to persuade them that they should despise all such things because they have no certain knowledge about them. But we must have a law in two parts, concerning poisoning, in whichever of the two ways the attempt is made, and we must entreat, and exhort, and advise men not to have recourse to such practices, by which they scare the multitude out of their wits, as if they were children, compelling the legislator and the judge to heal the fears which the sorcerer arouses, and to tell them in the first place, that he who attempts to poison or enchant others knows not what he is doing, either as regards the body (unless he has a knowledge of medicine), or as regards his enchantments (unless he happens to be a prophet or diviner). Let the law, then, run as follows about poisoning or witchcraft:—He who employs poison to do any injury, not fatal, to a man himself, or to his servants, or any injury whether fatal or not, to his cattle or his bees, if he be a physician, and be convicted of poisoning, shall be punished

<sup>1</sup> i. e. they are cases of murder: cp. *supra*, ix. 870 foll.

with death; or if he be a private person, the court shall determine what he is to pay or suffer. But he who seems to be the sort of man who injures others by magic knots, or enchantments, or incantations, or any of the like practices, if he be a prophet or diviner, let him die; and if, not being a prophet, he be convicted of witchcraft, as in the previous case, let the court fix what he ought to pay or suffer.

*Laws XI.*

ATHENIAN.

shall be put to death.

When a man does another any injury by theft or violence, for the greater injury let him pay greater damages to the injured man, and less for the smaller injury; but in all cases, whatever the injury may have been, as much as will compensate the loss. And besides the compensation of the wrong, let a man pay a further penalty for the chastisement of his offence: he who has done the wrong instigated by the folly of another<sup>1</sup>, through the lightheartedness of youth or the like, shall pay a lighter penalty; but he who has injured another through his own folly, when overcome by pleasure or pain, in cowardly fear, or lust, or envy, or implacable anger, shall endure a heavier punishment. Not that he is punished because he did wrong, for that which is done can never be undone, but in order that in future times, he, and those who see him corrected, may utterly hate injustice, or at any rate abate much of their evil-doing. Having an eye to all these things, the law, like a good archer, should aim at the right measure of punishment, and in all cases at the deserved punishment. In the attainment of this the judge shall be a fellow-worker with the legislator, whenever the law leaves to him to determine what the offender shall suffer or pay; and the legislator, like a painter, shall give a rough sketch of the cases in which the law is to be applied. This is what we must do, Megillus and Cleinias, in the best and fairest manner that we can, saying what the punishments are to be of all actions of theft and violence, and giving laws of such a kind as the Gods and sons of Gods would have us give.

He who does an injury shall not only make compensation, but suffer punishment.

Punishment not vindictive, but preventive.

If a man is mad he shall not be at large in the city, but his family shall keep him at home in any way which they can; or if not, let them pay a penalty,—he who is of the highest class shall pay a penalty of one hundred drachmas, whether he be a slave or a freeman whom he neglects; and

A madman must be kept at home by his relations.

<sup>1</sup> Putting the comma after ἀλλοτρίᾳ.



*Laws XI.*

ATHENIAN.

The madness  
(1) of disease,  
(2) of passion.

The law  
respecting  
abuse.

He who ridi-  
cules another  
misses virtue  
and loses the  
better half of  
greatness.

The punish-  
ment of the  
offender.

he of the second class shall pay four-fifths of a mina ; and he of the third class three-fifths ; and he of the fourth class two-fifths. Now there are many sorts of madness, some arising out of disease, which we have already mentioned ; and there are other kinds, which originate in an evil and passionate temperament, and are increased by bad education ; out of a slight quarrel this class of madmen will often raise a storm of abuse against one another, and nothing of that sort ought to be allowed to occur in a well-ordered state. Let this, then, be the law about abuse, which shall relate to all cases :— No one shall speak evil of another ; and when a man disputes with another he shall teach and learn of the disputant and the company, but he shall abstain from evil-speaking ; for out of the imprecations which men utter against one another, and the feminine habit of casting aspersions on one another, and using foul names, out of words light as air, in very deed the greatest enmities and hatreds spring up. For the speaker gratifies his anger, which is an ungracious element of his nature ; and nursing up his wrath by the entertainment of evil thoughts, and exacerbating that part of his soul which was formerly civilized by education, he lives in a state of savageness and moroseness, and pays a bitter penalty for his anger. And in such cases almost all men take to saying something ridiculous about their opponent, and there is no man who is in the habit of laughing at another who does not miss virtue and earnestness altogether, or lose the better half of greatness. Wherefore let no one utter any taunting word at a temple, or at the public sacrifices, or at the games, or in the agora, or in a court of justice, or in any public assembly. And let the magistrate who presides on these occasions chastise an offender, and he shall be blameless ; but if he fails in doing so, he shall not claim the prize of virtue ; for he is one who heeds not the laws, and does not do what the legislator commands. And if in any other place any one indulges in these sort of revilings, whether he has begun the quarrel or is only retaliating, let any elder who is present support the law, and control with blows those who indulge in passion, which is another great evil ; and if he do not, let him be liable to pay the appointed penalty. And we say now, that he who deals in reproaches against others



cannot reproach them without attempting to ridicule them ; and this, when done in a moment of anger, is what we make matter of reproach against him. But then, do we admit into our state the comic writers<sup>1</sup> who are so fond of making mankind ridiculous, if they attempt in a good-natured manner to turn the laugh against our citizens? or do we draw the distinction of jest and earnest, and allow a man to make use of ridicule in jest and without anger about any thing or person ; though as we were saying, not if he be angry and have a set purpose? We forbid earnest — that is unalterably fixed ; but we have will to say who are to be sanctioned or not to be sanctioned by the law in the employment of innocent humour. A comic poet, or maker of iambic or satirical lyric verse, shall not be permitted to ridicule any of the citizens, either by word or keenness, either in anger or without anger. And if any one is disobedient, the judges shall either at once expel him from the country, or he shall pay a fine of three minae, which shall be dedicated to the God who presides over the contests. Those only who have received permission shall be allowed to write verses at one another, but they shall be without anger and in jest ; in anger and in serious earnest they shall not be allowed. The decision of this matter shall be left to the superintendent of the general education of the young, and whatever he may license, the writer shall be allowed to produce, and whatever he rejects let not the poet himself exhibit, or ever teach anybody else, slave or freeman, under the penalty of being dishonoured, and held disobedient to the laws.

Now he is not to be pitied who is hungry, or who suffers any bodily pain, but he who is temperate, or has some other virtue, or part of a virtue, and at the same time suffers from misfortune ; it would be an extraordinary thing if such an one, whether slave or freeman, were utterly forsaken and fell into the extremes of poverty in any tolerably well-ordered city or government. Wherefore the legislator may safely make a law applicable to such cases in the following terms :— Let there be no beggars in our state ; and if anybody begs, seeking to pick up a livelihood by unavailing prayers, let the guardians of the agora turn him out of the agora, and the

*Laws XI.*

ATHENIAN.

Jesting in verse without anger may be allowed, if approved by the minister of education, but not serious or ill-natured satire, or ridicule of the the citizens.

Beggars are not to be tolerated in our state.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. iii. 394 ; x. 606 ; Arist. Pol. vii. 17, § 11.

*Laws XI.*

ATHENIAN.

wardens of the city out of the city, and the wardens of the country send him out of any other parts of the land across the border, in order that the land may be cleared of this sort of animal.

The owner of a slave or an animal responsible for any harm done by them.

If a slave of either sex injure anything, which is not his or her own, through inexperience, or some improper practice, and the person who suffers damage be not himself in part to blame, the master of the slave who has done the harm shall either make full satisfaction, or give up the slave who has done the injury. But if the master argue that the charge has arisen by collusion between the injured party and the injurer, with the view of obtaining the slave, let him sue the person, who says that he has been injured, for malpractices. And if he gain a conviction, let him receive double the value which the court fixes as the price of the slave; and if he lose his suit, let him make amends for the injury, and give up the slave. And if a beast of burden, or horse, or dog, or any other animal, injure the property of a neighbour, the owner shall in like manner pay for the injury.

Regulations respecting witnesses.

If any man refuses to be a witness, he who wants him shall summon him, and he who is summoned shall come to the trial; and if he knows and is willing to bear witness, let him bear witness, but if he says he does not know let him swear by the three divinities Zeus, and Apollo, and Themis, that he does not, and have no more to do with the cause. And he who is summoned to give witness and does not answer to his summoner, shall be liable for the harm which ensues according to law. And if a person calls up as a witness any one who is acting as a judge, let him give his witness, but he shall not afterwards vote in the cause. A free woman may give her witness and plead, if she be more than forty years of age, and may bring an action if she have no husband; but if her husband be alive she shall only be allowed to bear witness. A slave of either sex and a child shall be allowed to give evidence and to plead, but only in cases of murder; and they must produce sufficient sureties that they will certainly remain until the trial, in case they should be charged with false witness. And either of the parties in a cause may bring an accusation of perjury against witnesses, touching their evidence in whole or in part, if he asserts that

False witness.

such evidence has been given; but the accusation must be brought previous to the final decision of the cause. The magistrates shall preserve the accusations of false witness, and have them kept under the seal of both parties, and produce them on the day when the trial for false witness takes place. If a man be twice convicted of false witness, he shall not be required, and if thrice, he shall not be allowed to bear witness; and if he dare to witness after he has been convicted three times, let any one who pleases inform against him to the magistrates, and let the magistrates hand him over to the court, and if he be convicted he shall be punished with death. And in any case in which the evidence is rightly found to be false, and yet to have given the victory to him who wins the suit, and more than half the witnesses are condemned, the decision which was gained by these means shall be rescinded, and there shall be a discussion and a decision as to whether the suit was determined by that false evidence or not; and in whichever way the decision may be given, the previous suit shall be determined accordingly.

Larus XI.

ATHENIAN.

Penalties for  
false witness.

There are many noble things in human life, but to most of them attach evils which are fated to corrupt and spoil them. Is not justice noble, which has been the civilizer of humanity? How then can the advocate of justice be other than noble? And yet upon this profession which is presented to us under the fair name of art has come an evil reputation<sup>1</sup>. In the first place, we are told that by ingenious pleas and the help of an advocate the law enables a man to win a particular cause, whether just or unjust; and that both the art, and the power of speech which is thereby imparted, are at the service of him who is willing to pay for them. Now in our state this so-called art, whether really an art<sup>2</sup> or only an experience and practice destitute of any art, ought if possible never to come into existence, or if existing among us should listen to the request of the legislator and go away into another land, and not speak contrary to justice. If the offenders obey we say no more; but for those who disobey, the voice of the law is as follows:—If any one thinks that he will pervert the power of justice in the minds of the judges, and unseasonably

Good and  
evil lie near  
together in  
human life.  
The ends of  
the law apt to  
be defeated  
by the ingenu-  
ity of lawyers.

<sup>1</sup> The text is probably corrupt.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Gorg. 463 A.



*Laws XI.*

ATHENIAN.

The punishment of unscrupulous advocacy, which in certain cases is to be death.

litigate or advocate, let any one who likes indict him for malpractices of law and dishonest advocacy, and let him be judged in the court of select judges; and if he be convicted, let the court determine whether he may be supposed to act from a love of money or from contentiousness. And if he is supposed to act from contentiousness, the court shall fix a time during which he shall not be allowed to institute or plead a cause; and if he is supposed to act as he does from love of money, in case he be a stranger, he shall leave the country, and never return under penalty of death; but if he be a citizen, he shall die, because he is a lover of money, in whatever manner gained; and equally, if he be judged to have acted more than once from contentiousness, he shall die.



## BOOK XII.

IF a herald or an ambassador carry a false message from our city to any other, or bring back a false message from the city to which he is sent, or be proved to have brought back, whether from friends or enemies, in his capacity of herald or ambassador, what they have never said, let him be indicted for having violated, contrary to the law, the commands and duties imposed upon him by Hermes and Zeus, and let there be a penalty fixed, which he shall suffer or pay if he be convicted.

*Laws XII.*

ATHENIAN.

Misconduct  
of heralds or  
ambassadors.

Theft is a mean, and robbery a shameless thing; and none of the sons of Zeus delight in fraud and violence, or ever practised either. Wherefore let no one be deluded by poets or mythologers into a mistaken belief of such things, nor let him suppose, when he thieves or is guilty of violence, that he is doing nothing base, but only what the Gods themselves do. For such tales are untrue and improbable; and he who steals or robs contrary to the law, is never either a God or the son of a God; of this the legislator ought to be better informed than all the poets put together<sup>1</sup>. Happy is he and may he be for ever happy, who is persuaded and listens to our words; but he who disobeys shall have to contend against the following law:—If a man steal anything belonging to the public, whether that which he steals be much or little, he shall have the same punishment. For he who steals a little steals with the same wish as he who steals much, but with less power, and he who takes up a greater amount, not having deposited it, is wholly unjust. Wherefore the law is not disposed to inflict a less penalty on the one than on the other

No God or  
son of a God  
ever was a  
thief.

Punishment  
for theft of  
public  
property.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. iii. 388 C, 391 D.

*Laws XII.*

ATHENIAN.

The stranger  
or slave, as  
curable, to be  
dealt with  
leniently; the  
citizen, as  
incurable, to  
suffer death.

because his theft is less, but on the ground that the thief may possibly be in one case still curable, and may in another case be incurable. If any one convict in a court of law a stranger or a slave of a theft of public property, let the court determine what punishment he shall suffer, or what penalty he shall pay, bearing in mind that he is probably not incurable. But the citizen who has been brought up as our citizens will have been, if he be found guilty of robbing his country by fraud or violence, whether he be caught in the act or not, shall be punished with death; for he is incurable<sup>1</sup>.

Obedience  
the great  
military  
virtue.

Now for expeditions of war much consideration and many laws are required; the great principle of all is that no one of either sex should be without a commander<sup>2</sup>; nor should the mind of any one be accustomed to do anything, either in jest or earnest, of his own motion, but in war and in peace he should look to and follow his leader, even in the least things being under his guidance; for example, he should stand or move, or exercise, or wash, or take his meals, or get up in the night to keep guard and deliver messages when he is bidden; and in the hour of danger he should not pursue and not retreat except by order of his superior; and in a word, not teach the soul or accustom her to know or understand how to do anything apart from others. Of all soldiers the life should be always and in all things as far as possible in common and together; there neither is nor ever will be a higher, or better, or more scientific principle than this for the attainment of salvation and victory in war. And we ought in time of peace from youth upwards to practise this habit of commanding others, and of being commanded by others; anarchy should have no place in the life of man or of the beasts who are subject to man. I may add that all dances ought to be performed with a view to military excellence<sup>3</sup>; and agility and ease should be cultivated for the same object, and also endurance of the want of meats and drinks, and of winter cold and summer heat, and of hard couches; and, above all, care should be taken not to destroy the peculiar qualities of the head and the feet by surrounding them with extraneous

Soldiers  
to have a  
common life.

Agility and  
endurance  
to be cultivated.

<sup>1</sup> This passage is not consistent with ix. 857 A, where theft of public property is punished by imprisonment.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Thucyd. v. 66.

<sup>3</sup> Cp. *supra*, vii. 796 B.

coverings, and so hindering their natural growth of hair and soles. For these are the extremities, and of all the parts of the body, whether they are preserved or not is of the greatest consequence; the one is the servant of the whole body, and the other the master, in whom all the ruling senses are by nature set. Let the young man imagine that he hears in what has preceded the praises of the military life; the law shall be as follows:—He shall serve in war who is on the roll or appointed to some special service, and if any one is absent from cowardice, and without the leave of the generals, he shall be indicted before the military commanders for failure of service when the army comes home; and the soldiers shall be his judges; the heavy-armed, and the cavalry, and the other arms of the service shall form separate courts; and they shall bring the heavy-armed before the heavy-armed, and the horsemen before the horsemen, and the others in like manner before their peers; and he who is found guilty shall never be allowed to compete for any prize of valour, or indict another for not serving on an expedition, or be an accuser at all in any military matters. Moreover, the court shall further determine what punishment he shall suffer, or what penalty he shall pay. When the suits for failure of service are completed, the leaders of the several kinds of troops shall again hold an assembly, and they shall adjudge the prizes of valour; and he who likes shall give judgment in his own branch of the service, saying nothing about any former expedition, nor producing any proof or witnesses to confirm his statement, but speaking only of the present occasion. The crown of victory shall be an olive wreath which the victor shall offer up at the temple of any war-god whom he likes, adding an inscription for a testimony to last during life, that such an one has received the first, the second, or the third prize. If any one goes on an expedition, and returns home before the appointed time, when the generals have not withdrawn the army, he shall be indicted for desertion before the same persons who took cognizance of failure of service, and if he be found guilty, the same punishment shall be inflicted on him. Now every man who is engaged in any suit ought to be very careful of bringing false witness against any one, either intentionally or unintentionally.

*Laws XII.*

ATHENIAN.

Care of the extremities.

The manner of trial and punishment of those who fail to serve.

The award of prizes of valour.

Desertion to receive the same punishment as refusal to serve.



*Laws XII.*

ATHENIAN.

Witnesses to  
be careful not  
to confound  
the losing and  
the throwing  
away of arms.

tionally, if he can help; for justice is truly said to be an honourable maiden<sup>1</sup>, and falsehood is naturally repugnant to honour and justice. A witness ought to be very careful not to sin against justice, as for example in what relates to the throwing away of arms—he must distinguish the throwing them away when necessary, and not make that a reproach, or bring an action against some innocent person on that account. To make the distinction may be difficult; but still the law must attempt to define the different kinds in some way. Let me endeavour to explain my meaning by an ancient tale:—If Patroclus had been brought to the tent still alive but without his arms (and this has happened to innumerable persons), the original arms, which the poet says were presented to Peleus by the Gods as a nuptial gift when he married Thetis, remaining in the hands of Hector, then the base spirits of that day might have reproached the son of Menoetius with having cast away his arms. Again, there is the case of those who have been thrown down precipices and lost their arms; and of those who at sea, and in stormy places, have been suddenly overwhelmed by floods of water; and there are numberless things of this kind which one might adduce by way of extenuation, and with the view of justifying a misfortune which is easily misrepresented. We must, therefore, endeavour to divide to the best of our power the greater and more serious evil from the lesser. And a distinction may be drawn in the use of terms of reproach. A man does not always deserve to be called the thrower away of his shield; he may be only the loser of his arms. For there is a great or rather absolute difference between him who is deprived of his arms by a sufficient force, and him who voluntarily lets his shield go. Let the law then be as follows:—If a person having arms is overtaken by the enemy and does not turn round and defend himself, but lets them go voluntarily or throws them away, choosing a base life and a swift escape rather than a courageous and noble and blessed death—in such a case of the throwing away of arms let justice be done, but the judge need take no note of the case just now mentioned; for the bad man ought always to be punished, in the hope that he may be improved, but not

The law  
respecting  
cowardice.

<sup>1</sup> Reading *αἰδοίη*.



the unfortunate, for there is no advantage in that. And what shall be the punishment suited to him who has thrown away his weapons of defence? Tradition says that Caeneus, the Thessalian, was changed by a God from a woman into a man; but the converse miracle cannot now be wrought, or no punishment would be more proper than that the man who throws away his shield should be changed into a woman<sup>1</sup>. This however is impossible, and therefore let us make a law as nearly like this as we can — that he who loves his life too well shall be in no danger for the remainder of his days, but shall live for ever under the stigma of cowardice. And let the law be in the following terms:— When a man is found guilty of disgracefully throwing away his arms in war, no general or military officer shall allow him to serve as a soldier, or give him any place at all in the ranks of soldiers; and the officer who gives the coward any place, shall suffer a penalty which the public examiner shall exact of him; and if he be of the highest class, he shall pay a thousand drachmae; or if he be of the second class, five minae; or if he be of the third, three minae; or if he be of the fourth class, one mina. And he who is found guilty of cowardice, shall not only be dismissed from manly dangers, which is a disgrace appropriate to his nature, but he shall pay a thousand drachmae, if he be of the highest class, and five minae if he be of the second class, and three if he be of the third class, and a mina, like the preceding, if he be of the fourth class.

What regulations will be proper about examiners, seeing that some of our magistrates are elected by lot, and for a year, and some for a longer time and from selected persons? Of such magistrates, who will be a sufficient censor or examiner, if any of them, weighed down by the pressure of office or his own inability to support the dignity of his office, be guilty of any crooked practice? It is by no means easy to find a magistrate who excels other magistrates in virtue, but still we must endeavour to discover some censor or examiner who is more than man. For the truth is, that there are many elements of dissolution in a state, as there are also in a ship, or in an animal; they all have their cords, and girders, and

*Laws XII.*

ATHENIAN.

Would that the coward could be changed into a woman!

Since such a punishment is impossible, let him not be allowed to serve, and let him incur a fine.

Examiners to be better men than the other magistrates.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Tim. 90 E.

*Laws XII.*

ATHENIAN.

Importance of  
the office.Three men  
pre-eminent  
in virtue to  
be elected  
annually from  
among the  
citizens.Honours to be  
paid to them.

sinews,—one nature diffused in many places, and called by many names; and the office of examiner is a most important element in the preservation and dissolution of states. For if the examiners are better than the magistrates, and their duty is fulfilled justly and without blame, then the whole state and country flourishes and is happy; but if the examination of the magistrates is carried on in a wrong way, then, by the relaxation of that justice which is the uniting principle of all constitutions, every power in the state is rent asunder from every other; they no longer incline in the same direction, but fill the city with faction, and make many cities out of one<sup>1</sup>, and soon bring all to destruction. Wherefore the examiners ought to be admirable in every sort of virtue. Let us invent a mode of creating them, which shall be as follows:—Every year, after the summer solstice, the whole city shall meet in the common precincts of Helios and Apollo, and shall present to the God three men out of their own number in the manner following:—Each citizen shall select, not himself, but some other citizen whom he deems in every way the best, and who is not less than fifty years of age. And out of the selected persons who have the greatest number of votes, they shall make a further selection until they reduce them to one-half, if they are an even number; but if they are not an even number, they shall subtract the one who has the smallest number of votes, and make them an even number, and then leave the half which have the greater number of votes. And if two persons have an equal number of votes, and thus increase the number beyond one-half, they shall withdraw the younger of the two and do away the excess; and then including all the rest they shall again vote, until there are left three having an unequal number of votes. But if all the three, or two out of the three, have equal votes, let them commit the election to good fate and fortune, and separate off by lot the first, and the second, and the third; these they shall crown with an olive wreath and give them the prize of excellence, at the same time proclaiming to all the world that the city of the Magnetes, by the providence of the Gods, is again preserved, and presents to the Sun and to Apollo her three best men as first-fruits, to be a common

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. iv. 422 E.

offering to them, according to the ancient law, as long as their lives answer to the judgment formed of them. And these shall appoint in their first year twelve examiners, to continue until each has completed seventy-five years, to whom three shall afterwards be added yearly; and let these divide all the magistracies into twelve parts, and prove the holders of them by every sort of test to which a freeman may be subjected; and let them live while they hold office in the precinct of Helios and Apollo, in which they were chosen, and let each one form a judgment of some things individually, and of others in company with his colleagues; and let him place a writing in the agora about each magistracy, and what the magistrate ought to suffer or pay, according to the decision of the examiners. And if a magistrate does not admit that he has been justly judged, let him bring the examiners before the select judges, and if he be acquitted by their decision, let him, if he will, accuse the examiners themselves; if, however, he be convicted, and have been condemned to death by the examiners, let him die (and of course he can only die once):—but any other penalties which admit of being doubled let him suffer twice over.

And now let us pass under review the examiners themselves; what will their examination be, and how conducted? During the life of these men, whom the whole state counts worthy of the rewards of virtue, they shall have the first seat at all public assemblies, and at all Hellenic sacrifices and sacred missions, and other public and holy ceremonies in which they share. The chiefs of each sacred mission shall be selected from them, and they only of all the citizens shall be adorned with a crown of laurel; they shall all be priests of Apollo and Helios; and one of them, who is judged first of the priests created in that year, shall be high priest; and they shall write up his name in each year to be a measure of time as long as the city lasts; and after their death they shall be laid out and carried to the grave and entombed in a manner different from the other citizens. They shall be decked in a robe all of white, and there shall be no crying or lamentation over them; but a chorus of fifteen maidens, and another of boys, shall stand around the bier on either side, hymning the praises of the departed priests in alternate

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ATHENIAN.

Examiners to be appointed by them, who shall have power to punish the magistrates.

The magistrates may appeal against them to the court of select judges.

The honours during life and after death of the examiners, if they pass the scrutiny.



*Laws XII.*

ATHENIAN.

responses, declaring their blessedness in song all day long; and at dawn a hundred of the youths who practise gymnastic exercises, and whom the relations of the departed shall choose, shall carry the bier to the sepulchre, the young men marching first, dressed in the garb of warriors,—the cavalry with their horses, the heavy-armed with their arms, and the others in like manner. And boys near the bier and in front of it shall sing their national hymn, and maidens shall follow behind, and with them the women who have passed the age of child-bearing; next, although they are interdicted from other burials, let priests and priestesses follow, unless the Pythian oracle forbid them; for this burial is free from pollution. The place of burial shall be an oblong vaulted chamber underground, constructed of tufa, which will last for ever, having stone couches placed side by side. And here they will lay the blessed person, and cover the sepulchre with a circular mound of earth and plant a grove of trees around on every side but one; and on that side the sepulchre shall be allowed to extend for ever, and a new mound will not be required. Every year they shall have contests in music and gymnastics, and in horsemanship, in honour of the dead. These are the honours which shall be given to those who at the examination are found blameless; but if any of them, trusting to the scrutiny being over, should, after the judgment has been given, manifest the wickedness of human nature, let the law ordain that he who pleases shall indict him, and let the cause be tried in the following manner. In the first place, the court shall be composed of the guardians of the law, and to them the surviving examiners shall be added, as well as the court of select judges; and let the pursuer lay his indictment in this form—he shall say that so-and-so is unworthy of the prize of virtue and of his office; and if the defendant be convicted let him be deprived of his office, and of the burial, and of the other honours given him. But if the prosecutor do not obtain the fifth part of the votes, let him, if he be of the first class, pay twelve minae, and eight if he be of the second class, and six if he be of the third class, and two minae if he be of the fourth class.

But if after  
the scrutiny  
they do  
wrong, they  
shall be  
deprived of  
their honours.

The oath of  
Rhadaman-  
thus

The so-called decision of Rhadamanthus is worthy of all admiration. He knew that the men of his own time believed



and had no doubt that there were Gods, which was a reasonable belief in those days, because most men were the sons of Gods<sup>1</sup>, and according to tradition he was one himself. He appears to have thought that he ought to commit judgment to no man, but to the Gods only, and in this way suits were simply and speedily decided by him. For he made the two parties take an oath respecting the points in dispute, and so got rid of the matter speedily and safely. But now that a certain portion of mankind do not believe at all in the existence of the Gods, and others imagine that they have no care of us, and the opinion of most men, and of the worst men, is that in return for a small sacrifice and a few flattering words they will be their accomplices in purloining large sums and save them from many terrible punishments, the way of Rhadamanthus is no longer suited to the needs of justice; for as the opinions of men about the Gods are changed, the laws should also be changed;—in the granting of suits a rational legislation ought to do away with the oaths of the parties on either side—he who obtains leave to bring an action should write down the charges, but should not add an oath; and the defendant in like manner should give his denial to the magistrates in writing, and not swear; for it is a dreadful thing to know, when many lawsuits are going on in a state, that almost half the people who meet one another quite unconcernedly at the public meals and in other companies and relations of private life are perjured. Let the law, then, be as follows:—A judge who is about to give judgment shall take an oath, and he who is choosing magistrates for the state shall either vote on oath or with a voting tablet which he brings from a temple; so too the judge of dances and of all music, and the superintendents and umpires of gymnastic and equestrian contests, and any matters in which, as far as men can judge, there is nothing to be gained by a false oath; but all cases in which a denial confirmed by an oath clearly results in a great advantage to the taker of the oath, shall be decided without the oath of the parties to the suit, and the presiding judges shall not permit either of them to use an oath for the sake of persuading, nor to call down curses on himself and his race, nor to use unseemly supplications or

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suited to a God-fearing age, but not to our own.

Oaths are not to be taken by the parties to a suit.

Judges, however, and citizens when electing magistrates, and the umpires of contests, shall take an oath.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Tim. 40 D.

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ATHENIAN.

Note;—the prohibition of oaths does not extend to strangers.

Penalty for neglect of certain public duties.

Admission of foreigners, and foreign travel,

are evils in a well-ordered state, but of no consequence in an ordinary state.

womanish laments. But they shall ever be teaching and learning what is just in auspicious words; and he who does otherwise shall be supposed to speak beside the point, and the judges shall again bring him back to the question at issue. On the other hand, strangers in their dealings with strangers shall as at present have power to give and receive oaths, for they will not often grow old in the city or leave a fry of young ones like themselves to be the sons and heirs of the land.

As to the initiation of private suits, let the manner of deciding causes between all citizens be the same as in cases in which any freeman is disobedient to the state in minor matters, of which the penalty is not stripes, imprisonment, or death. But as regards attendance at choruses or processions or other shows, and as regards public services, whether the celebration of sacrifice in peace, or the payment of contributions in war—in all these cases, first comes the necessity of providing a remedy for the loss; and by those who will not obey, there shall be security given to the officers whom the city and the law empower to exact the sum due; and if they forfeit their security, let the goods which they have pledged be sold and the money given to the city; but if they ought to pay a larger sum, the several magistrates shall impose upon the disobedient a suitable penalty, and bring them before the court, until they are willing to do what they are ordered.

Now a state which makes money from the cultivation of the soil only, and has no foreign trade, must consider what it will do about the emigration of its own people to other countries, and the reception of strangers from elsewhere. About these matters the legislator has to consider, and he will begin by trying to persuade men as far as he can. The intercourse of cities with one another is apt to create a confusion of manners; strangers are always suggesting novelties to strangers<sup>1</sup>. When states are well governed by good laws the mixture causes the greatest possible injury; but seeing that most cities are the reverse of well-ordered, the confusion which arises in them from the reception of strangers, and from the citizens themselves rushing off into other cities, when any one either young or old desires to travel any-

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, iv. 704 E.

where abroad at whatever time, is of no consequence. On the other hand, the refusal of states to receive others, and for their own citizens never to go to other places, is an utter impossibility, and to the rest of the world is likely to appear ruthless and uncivilized; it is a practice adopted by people who use harsh words, such as xenelasia or banishment of strangers, and who have harsh and morose ways, as men think. And to be thought or not to be thought well of by the rest of the world is no light matter; for the many are not so far wrong in their judgment of who are bad and who are good, as they are removed from the nature of virtue in themselves. Even bad men have a divine instinct which guesses rightly, and very many who are utterly depraved form correct notions and judgments of the differences between the good and bad. And the generality of cities are quite right in exhorting us to value a good reputation in the world, for there is no truth greater and more important than this—that he who is really good (I am speaking of the man who would be perfect) seeks for reputation with, but not without, the reality of goodness. And our Cretan colony ought also to acquire the fairest and noblest reputation for virtue from other men; and there is every reason to expect that, if the reality answers to the idea, she will be one of the few well-ordered cities which the sun and the other Gods behold. Wherefore, in the matter of journeys to other countries and the reception of strangers, we enact as follows:—In the first place, let no one be allowed to go anywhere at all into a foreign country who is less than forty years of age; and no one shall go in a private capacity, but only in some public one, as a herald, or on an embassy, or on a sacred mission. Going abroad on an expedition or in war is not to be included among travels of the class authorized by the state. To Apollo at Delphi and to Zeus at Olympia and to Nemea and to the Isthmus, citizens should be sent to take part in the sacrifices and games there dedicated to the Gods; and they should send as many as possible, and the best and fairest that can be found, and they will make the city renowned at holy meetings in time of peace, procuring a glory which shall be the converse of that which is gained in war; and when they come home they shall teach the young that the institutions of other states

*Laws XII.*

ATHENIAN.

Inhospitality condemned by the many; the good opinion of mankind to be desired,

both by cities, and individuals, but it should be also deserved.

The law:—

No one to travel in a foreign country under forty years of age, or in a private capacity.



*Laws XII.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.The state to  
send out men  
to be specta-  
tors of the  
world.Saints and  
sages are to  
be found even  
in ill-governed  
cities.

are inferior to their own. And they shall send spectators of another sort, if they have the consent of the guardians, being such citizens as desire to look a little more at leisure at the doings of other men; and these no law shall hinder. For a city which has no experience of good and bad men or intercourse with them, can never be thoroughly and perfectly civilized, nor, again, can the citizens of a city properly observe the laws by habit only, and without an intelligent understanding of them<sup>1</sup>. And there always are in the world a few inspired men whose acquaintance is beyond price, and who spring up quite as much in ill-ordered as in well-ordered cities. These are they whom the citizens of a well-ordered city should be ever seeking out, going forth over sea and over land to find him who is incorruptible—that he may establish more firmly institutions in his own state which are good already, and amend what is deficient; for without this examination and enquiry a city will never continue perfect any more than if the examination is ill-conducted.

*Cle.* How can we have an examination and also a good one?

The spectator  
to be a model  
citizen of his  
own city.He shall  
report to the  
assembly  
which revises  
the laws.The assembly  
to consist of  
elders and of  
younger men  
co-opted by  
them:

*Ath.* In this way:—In the first place, our spectator shall be of not less than fifty years of age; he must be a man of reputation, especially in war, if he is to exhibit to other cities a model of the guardians of the law, but when he is more than sixty years of age he shall no longer continue in his office of spectator. And when he has carried on his inspection during as many out of the ten years of his office as he pleases, on his return home let him go to the assembly of those who review the laws. This shall be a mixed body of young and old men, who shall be required to meet daily between the hour of dawn and the rising of the sun. They shall consist, in the first place, of the priests who have obtained the rewards of virtue<sup>2</sup>; and, in the second place, of guardians of the law, the ten eldest being chosen; the general superintendent of education shall also be a member, as well the last appointed as those who have been released from the office; and each of them shall take with him as his companion a young man, whomsoever he chooses, between

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. x. 619.<sup>2</sup> Cp. *supra*, 947.



the ages of thirty and forty. These shall be always holding conversation and discourse about the laws of their own city or about any specially good ones which they may hear to be existing elsewhere; also about kinds of knowledge which may appear to be of use and will throw light upon the examination, or of which the want will make the subject of laws dark and uncertain to them. Any knowledge of this sort which the elders approve, the younger men shall learn with all diligence; and if any one of those who have been invited appear to be unworthy, the whole assembly shall blame him who invited him. The rest of the city shall watch over those among the young men who distinguish themselves, having an eye upon them, and especially honouring them if they succeed, but dishonouring them above the rest if they turn out to be inferior. This is the assembly to which he who has visited the institutions of other men, on his return home shall straightway go, and if he have discovered any one who has anything to say about the enactment of laws or education or nurture, or if he have himself made any observations, let him communicate his discoveries to the whole assembly. And if he be seen to have come home neither better nor worse, let him be praised at any rate for his enthusiasm; and if he be much better, let him be praised so much the more; and not only while he lives but after his death let the assembly honour him with fitting honours. But if on his return home he appear to have been corrupted, pretending to be wise when he is not, let him hold no communication with any one, whether young or old; and if he will hearken to the rulers, then he shall be permitted to live as a private individual; but if he will not, let him die, if he be convicted in a court of law of interfering about education and the laws. And if he deserve to be indicted, and none of the magistrates indict him, let that be counted as a disgrace to them when the rewards of virtue are decided.

Let such be the character of the person who goes abroad, and let him go abroad under these conditions. In the next place, the stranger who comes from abroad should be received in a friendly spirit. Now there are four kinds of strangers, of whom we must make some mention — the first is he who

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ATHENIAN.

The city to have an eye for young men distinguished in the assembly.

The rewards and punishments of spectators accordingly as they return home better or worse.

Regulations about strangers.

Four kinds:—

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ATHENIAN.

(1) the bird of passage, who comes in the summer to trade;

(2) the visitor of festivals;

(3) the representative of a foreign country;

(4) the official spectator.

comes and stays throughout the summer<sup>1</sup>; this class are like birds of passage, taking wing in pursuit of commerce, and flying over the sea to other cities, while the season lasts; he shall be received in market-places and harbours and public buildings, near the city but outside<sup>2</sup>, by those magistrates who are appointed to superintend these matters; and they shall take care that a stranger, whoever he be, duly receives justice; but he shall not be allowed to make any innovation. They shall hold the intercourse with him which is necessary, and this shall be as little as possible. The second kind is just a spectator who comes to see with his eyes and hear with his ears the festivals of the Muses; such ought to have entertainment provided them at the temples by hospitable persons, and the priests and ministers of the temples should see and attend to them. But they should not remain more than a reasonable time; let them see and hear that for the sake of which they came, and then go away, neither having suffered nor done any harm. The priests shall be their judges, if any of them receive or do any wrong up to the sum of fifty drachmae, but if any greater charge be brought, in such cases the suit shall come before the wardens of the agora. The third kind of stranger is he who comes on some public business from another land, and is to be received with public honours. He is to be received only by the generals and commanders of horse and foot, and the host by whom he is entertained, in conjunction with the Prytanes, shall have the sole charge of what concerns him. There is a fourth class of persons answering to our spectators, who come from another land to look at ours. In the first place, such visits will be rare, and the visitor should be at least fifty years of age; he may possibly be wanting to see something that is rich and rare in other states, or himself to show something in like manner to another city. Let such an one, then, go unbidden to the doors of the wise and rich, being one of them himself: let him go, for example, to the house of the superintendent of education, confident that he is a fitting guest of such a host, or let him go to the house of some of those who have gained the prize of virtue and hold discourse with them, both learning from them, and also teaching them; and

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, xi. 915 D.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Arist. Pol. vii. 6, § 5.

when he has seen and heard all, he shall depart, as a friend taking leave of friends, and be honoured by them with gifts and suitable tributes of respect. These are the customs, according to which our city should receive all strangers of either sex who come from other countries, and should send forth her own citizens, showing respect to Zeus, the God of hospitality, not forbidding strangers at meals and sacrifices, as is the manner which prevails among the children of the Nile, nor driving them away by savage proclamations<sup>1</sup>.

When a man becomes surety, let him give the security in a distinct form, acknowledging the whole transaction in a written document, and in the presence of not less than three witnesses if the sum be under a thousand drachmae, and of not less than five witnesses if the sum be above a thousand drachmae. The agent of a dishonest or untrustworthy seller shall himself be responsible; both the agent and the principal shall be equally liable. If a person wishes to find anything in the house of another, he shall enter naked, or wearing only a short tunic and without a girdle, having first taken an oath by the customary Gods that he expects to find it there; he shall then make his search, and the other shall throw open his house and allow him to search things both sealed and unsealed. And if a person will not allow the searcher to make his search, he who is prevented shall go to law with him, estimating the value of the goods after which he is searching, and if the other be convicted he shall pay twice the value of the article. If the master be absent from home, the dwellers in the house shall let him search the unsealed property, and on the sealed property the searcher shall set another seal, and shall appoint any one whom he likes to guard them during five days; and if the master of the house be absent during a longer time, he shall take with him the wardens of the city, and so make his search, opening the sealed property as well as the unsealed, and then, together with the members of the family and the wardens of the city, he shall seal them up again as they were before. There shall be a limit of time in the case of disputed things, and he who has had possession of them during a certain time shall no longer be liable to be dis-

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ATHENIAN.

The manner  
of giving  
security.

The right of  
searching  
houses  
allowed.

Penalty for  
refusing.

Statute of  
limitation as  
affecting  
disputed

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, 950 A, B.



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ATHENIAN.

property other  
than land or  
houses.

turbed. As to houses and lands there can be no dispute in this state of ours; but if a man has any other possessions which he has used and openly shown in the city and in the agora and in the temples, and no one has put in a claim to them, and some one says that he was looking for them during this time, and the possessor is proved to have made no concealment, if they have continued for a year, the one having the goods and the other looking for them, the claim of the seeker shall not be allowed after the expiration of the year; or if he does not use or show the lost property in the market or in the city, but only in the country, and no one offers himself as the owner during five years, at the expiration of the five years the claim shall be barred for ever after; or if he uses them in the city but within the house, then the appointed time of claiming the goods shall be three years, or ten years if he has them in the country in private. And if he has them in another land, there shall be no limit of time or prescription, but whenever the owner finds them he may claim them.

Penalty for  
preventing  
the appear-  
ance of a  
person in the  
courts or at  
contests.

If any one prevents another by force from being present at a trial, whether a principal party or his witnesses; if the person prevented be a slave, whether his own or belonging to another, the suit shall be incomplete and invalid; but if he who is prevented be a freeman, besides the suit being incomplete, the other who has prevented him shall be imprisoned for a year, and shall be prosecuted for kidnapping by any one who pleases. And if any one hinders by force a rival competitor in gymnastic or music, or any other sort of contest, from being present at the contest, let him who has a mind inform the presiding judges, and they shall liberate him who is desirous of competing; and if they are not able, and he who hinders the other from competing wins the prize, then they shall give the prize of victory to him who is prevented, and inscribe him as the conqueror in any temples which he pleases; and he who hinders the other shall not be permitted to make any offering or inscription having reference to that contest, and in any case he shall be liable for damages, whether he be defeated or whether he conquer.

The receiver  
as bad as  
the thief.

If any one knowingly receives anything which has been stolen, he shall undergo the same punishment as the thief,



and if a man receives an exile he shall be punished with death. Every man should regard the friend and enemy of the state as his own friend and enemy; and if any one makes peace or war with another on his own account, and without the authority of the state, he, like the receiver of the exile, shall undergo the penalty of death. And if any fraction of the city declare war or peace against any, the generals shall indict the authors of this proceeding, and if they are convicted death shall be the penalty. Those who serve their country ought to serve without receiving gifts, and there ought to be no excusing or approving the saying, 'Men should receive gifts as the reward of good, but not of evil deeds'; for to know which we are doing, and to stand fast by our knowledge, is no easy matter. The safest course is to obey the law which says, 'Do no service for a bribe,' and let him who disobeys, if he be convicted, simply die. With a view to taxation, for various reasons, every man ought to have had his property valued: and the tribesmen should likewise bring a register of the yearly produce to the wardens of the country, that in this way there may be two valuations; and the public officers may use annually whichever on consideration they deem the best, whether they prefer to take a certain portion of the whole value, or of the annual revenue, after subtracting what is paid to the common tables.

Touching offerings to the Gods, a moderate man should observe moderation in what he offers. Now the land and the hearth of the house of all men is sacred to all Gods; wherefore let no man dedicate them a second time to the Gods. Gold and silver, whether possessed by private persons or in temples, are in other cities provocative of envy, and ivory, the product of a dead body, is not a proper offering; brass and iron, again, are instruments of war; but of wood let a man bring what offering he likes, provided it be a single block, and in like manner of stone, to the public temples; of woven work let him not offer more than one woman can execute in a month. White is a colour suitable to the Gods, especially in woven works, but dyes should only be used for the adornments of war. The most divine of gifts are figures of birds and images, and they should be such as one

*Laws XII.*

ATHENIAN.

Death to be the punishment of those who (1) receive exiles, or who (2) make war or peace on their own account, or who (3) take bribes.

Registration of property with a view to income-tax.

Offerings to the Gods to be simple and inexpensive.

*Laws XII.*

ATHENIAN.

Private suits  
to be tried,(1) before  
arbiters:(2) there may  
be an appeal  
from their  
decision to the  
tribal courts:and (3) from  
the tribal  
courts to the  
court of select  
judges; in the  
two last cases  
with an  
increase of  
the penalty.The younger  
legislator will  
arrange minor  
matters.

painter can execute in a single day. And let all other offerings follow a similar rule.

Now that the whole city has been divided into parts of which the nature and number have been described, and laws have been given about all the most important contracts as far as this was possible, the next thing will be to have justice done. The first of the courts shall consist of elected judges, who shall be chosen by the plaintiff and the defendant in common: these shall be called arbiters rather than judges. And in the second court there shall be judges of the villages and tribes corresponding to the twelvefold division of the land, and before these the litigants shall go to contend for greater damages, if the suit be not decided before the first judges; the defendant, if he be defeated the second time, shall pay a fifth more than the damages mentioned in the indictment; and if he find fault with his judges and would try a third time, let him carry the suit before the select judges, and if he be again defeated, let him pay the whole of the damages and half as much again. And the plaintiff, if when defeated before the first judges he persist in going on to the second, shall if he wins receive in addition to the damages a fifth part more, and if defeated he shall pay a like sum; but if he is not satisfied with the previous decision, and will insist on proceeding to a third court, then if he win he shall receive from the defendant the amount of the damages and, as I said before, half as much again, and the plaintiff, if he lose, shall pay half of the damages claimed. Now the assignment by lot of judges to courts and the completion of the number of them, and the appointment of servants to the different magistrates, and the times at which the several causes should be heard, and the votings and delays, and all the things that necessarily concern suits, and the order of causes, and the time in which answers have to be put in and parties are to appear—of these and other things akin to these we have indeed already spoken<sup>1</sup>, but there is no harm in repeating what is right twice or thrice:—All lesser and easier matters which the elder legislator has omitted may be supplied by the younger one. Private courts will be sufficiently regulated in this way, and the public and state courts, and those which

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, vi. 766; ix. 853 foll.

the magistrates must use in the administration of their several offices, exist in many other states. Many very respectable institutions of this sort have been framed by good men, and from them the guardians of the law may by reflection derive what is necessary for the order of our new state, considering and correcting them, and bringing them to the test of experience, until every detail appears to be satisfactorily determined; and then putting the final seal upon them, and making them irreversible, they shall use them for ever afterwards. As to what relates to the silence of judges and the abstinence from words of evil omen and the reverse, and the different notions of the just and good and honourable which exist in our own as compared with other states, they have been partly mentioned already, and another part of them will be mentioned hereafter as we draw near the end. To all these matters he who would be an equal judge shall justly look, and he shall possess writings about them that he may learn them. For of all kinds of knowledge the knowledge of good laws has the greatest power of improving the learner; otherwise there would be no meaning in the divine and admirable law possessing a name akin to mind (*νοῦς, νόμος*). And of all other words, such as the praises and censures of individuals which occur in poetry and also in prose, whether written down or uttered in daily conversation, whether men dispute about them in the spirit of contention or weakly assent to them, as is often the case — of all these the one sure test is the writings of the legislator<sup>1</sup>, which the righteous judge ought to have in his mind as the antidote of all other words, and thus make himself and the city stand upright, procuring for the good the continuance and increase of justice, and for the bad, on the other hand, a conversion from ignorance and intemperance, and in general from all unrighteousness, as far as their evil minds can be healed, but to those whose web of life is in reality finished, giving death, which is the only remedy for souls in their condition, as I may say truly again and again. And such judges and chiefs of judges will be worthy of receiving praise from the whole city.

When the suits of the year are completed the following laws shall regulate their execution:—In the first place, the

*Laws XII.*

ATHENIAN.

The judge should study the writings of the legislator and test all other writings by their standard, and then he will give righteous judgment.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, vii. 811 D.



*Laws XII.*

## ATHENIAN.

The goods of the losing party in a suit to be handed over to the gainer if the damages are not paid within a month.

Contempt of court to be punished with death.

The end of life.

The dead are to be buried in some barren region, where they will do least harm to the living.

judge shall assign to the party who wins the suit the whole property of him who loses, with the exception of mere necessities<sup>1</sup>, and the assignment shall be made through the herald immediately after each decision in the hearing of the judges; and when the month arrives following the month in which the courts are sitting, (unless the gainer of the suit has been previously satisfied,) the court shall follow up the case, and hand over to the winner the goods of the loser; but if they find that he has not the means of paying, and the sum deficient is not less than a drachma, the insolvent person shall not have any right of going to law with any other man until he have satisfied the debt of the winning party; but other persons shall still have the right of bringing suits against him. And if any one after he is condemned refuses to acknowledge the authority which condemned him, let the magistrates who are thus deprived of their authority bring him before the court of the guardians of the law, and if he be cast, let him be punished with death, as a subverter of the whole state and of the laws.

Thus a man is born and brought up, and after this manner he begets and brings up his own children, and has his share of dealings with other men, and suffers if he has done wrong to any one, and receives satisfaction if he has been wronged, and so at length in due time he grows old under the protection of the laws, and his end comes in the order of nature. Concerning the dead of either sex, the religious ceremonies which may fittingly be performed, whether appertaining to the Gods of the under-world or of this, shall be decided by the interpreters with absolute authority. Their sepulchres are not to be in places which are fit for cultivation, and there shall be no monuments in such spots, either large or small, but they shall occupy that part of the country which is naturally adapted for receiving and concealing the bodies of the dead with as little hurt as possible to the living. No man, living or dead, shall deprive the living of the sustenance which the earth, their foster-parent, is naturally inclined to provide for them. And let not the mound be piled higher than would be the work of five men completed in five days; nor shall the stone which is placed over the spot be larger than would be sufficient to receive the praises of the dead included in

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, ix. 855 B.



four heroic lines. Nor shall the laying out of the dead in the house continue for a longer time than is sufficient to distinguish between him who is in a trance only and him who is really dead, and speaking generally, the third day after death will be a fair time for carrying out the body to the sepulchre. Now we must believe the legislator when he tells us that the soul is in all respects superior to the body, and that even in life what makes each one of us to be what we are is only the soul; and that the body follows us about in the likeness of each of us, and therefore, when we are dead, the bodies of the dead are quite rightly said to be our shades or images; for the true and immortal being of each one of us which is called the soul goes on her way to other Gods<sup>1</sup>, before them to give an account—which is an inspiring hope to the good, but very terrible to the bad, as the laws of our fathers tell us; and they also say that not much can be done in the way of helping a man after he is dead. But the living—he should be helped by all his kindred, that while in life he may be the holiest and justest of men, and after death may have no great sins to be punished in the world below. If this be true, a man ought not to waste his substance under the idea that all this lifeless mass of flesh which is in process of burial is connected with him; he should consider that the son, or brother, or the beloved one, whoever he may be, whom he thinks he is laying in the earth, has gone away to complete and fulfil his own destiny, and that his duty is rightly to order the present, and to spend moderately on the lifeless altar of the Gods below. But the legislator does not intend moderation to be taken in the sense of meanness<sup>2</sup>. Let the law, then, be as follows:—The expenditure on the entire funeral of him who is of the highest class, shall not exceed five minae; and for him who is of the second class, three minae, and for him who is of the third class, two minae, and for him who is of the fourth class, one mina, will be a fair limit of expense. The guardians of the law ought to take especial care of the different ages of life, whether childhood, or manhood, or any other age. And at the end of all, let there be some one guardian of the law presiding, who shall be chosen by the friends of the deceased to superintend, and let it be glory

Laws XII.

ATHENIAN.

The body is our shadow: the soul or true being goes to judgment after death.

Burials should be simple. The living need the help of kindred more than the dead.

The law:—  
The cost of funerals.

The funeral ceremonies to be superintended by some guardian of the law.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Phaedo 63 B.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. *supra*, iv. 717 E, 719.

*Laws XII.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

Ostentatious  
grief to be  
repressed, but  
some allow-  
ance to be  
made for  
human  
weakness.

We have still  
to provide for  
the continu-  
ance of our  
laws.

We want  
some power,  
like Atropos  
among the  
fates, to make  
them irrevers-  
ible.

to him to manage with fairness and moderation what relates to the dead, and a discredit to him if they are not well managed. Let the laying out and other ceremonies be in accordance with custom, but to the statesman who adopts custom as his law we must give way in certain particulars. It would be monstrous for example that he should command any man to weep or abstain from weeping over the dead; but he may forbid cries of lamentation, and not allow the voice of the mourner to be heard outside the house; also, he may forbid the bringing of the dead body into the open streets, or the processions of mourners in the streets, and may require that before daybreak they should be outside the city. Let these, then, be our laws relating to such matters, and let him who obeys be free from penalty; but he who disobeys even a single guardian of the law shall be punished by them all with a fitting penalty. Other modes of burial, or again the denial of burial, which is to be refused in the case of robbers of temples and parricides and the like, have been devised and are embodied in the preceding laws, so that now our work of legislation is pretty nearly at an end; but in all cases the end does not consist in doing something or acquiring something or establishing something,—the end will be attained and finally accomplished, when we have provided for the perfect and lasting continuance of our institutions; until then our creation is incomplete.

*Cle.* That is very good, Stranger; but I wish you would tell me more clearly what you mean.

*Ath.* O Cleinias, many things of old time were well said and sung; and the saying about the Fates was one of them.

*Cle.* What is it?

*Ath.* The saying that Lachesis or the giver of the lots is the first of them, and that Clotho or the spinster is the second of them, and that Atropos or the unchanging one is the third of them<sup>1</sup>; and that she is the preserver of the things which we have spoken, and which have been compared in a figure to things woven by fire, they both (i. e. Atropos and the fire) producing<sup>2</sup> the quality of unchangeableness. I am speaking

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. x. 620 E.

<sup>2</sup> Reading ἀπεργαζομένων with the MSS. and as in the text, not as in the notes of Stallbaum. The construction is harsh; but ἀπεικασμένα may be

of the things which in a state and government give not only health and salvation to the body, but law, or rather preservation of the law, in the soul; and, if I am not mistaken, this seems to be still wanting in our laws: we have still to see how we can implant in them this irreversible nature.

*Cle.* It will be no small matter if we can only discover how such a nature can be implanted in anything.

*Ath.* But it certainly can be; so much I clearly see.

*Cle.* Then let us not think of desisting until we have imparted this quality to our laws; for it is ridiculous, after a great deal of labour has been spent, to place a thing at last on an insecure foundation.

*Meg.* I approve of your suggestion, and am quite of the same mind with you.

*Cle.* Very good: And now what, according to you, is to be the salvation of our government and of our laws, and how is it to be effected?

*Ath.* Were we not saying that there must be in our city a council which was to be of this sort:—The ten oldest guardians of the law, and all those who have obtained prizes of virtue, were to meet in the same assembly, and the council was also to include those who had visited foreign countries in the hope of hearing something that might be of use in the preservation of the laws, and who, having come safely home, and having been tested in these same matters, had proved themselves to be worthy to take part in the assembly;—each of the members was to select some young man of not less than thirty years of age, he himself judging in the first instance whether the young man was worthy by nature and education, and then suggesting him to the others, and if he seemed to them also to be worthy they were to adopt him; but if not, the decision at which they arrived was to be kept a secret from the citizens at large, and, more especially, from the rejected candidate. The meeting of the council was to be held early in the morning, when everybody was most at leisure from all other business, whether public or private — was not something of this sort said by us before?

*Cle.* True.

taken as if in apposition with the previous sentence. With τῇ may be supplied *ὀννάμει*, and ἀπεργαζομένων may be regarded as a 'genitive absolute.'

*Laws XII.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS,  
MEGILLUS.

The nocturnal council will be such a preserving power in our state.



*Laws XII.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Ath.* Then, returning to the council, I would say further, that if we let it down to be the anchor of the state, our city, having everything which is suitable to her, will preserve all that we wish to preserve.

*Cle.* What do you mean?

*Ath.* Now is the time for me to speak the truth in all earnestness.

*Cle.* Well said, and I hope that you will fulfil your intention.

*Ath.* Know, Cleinias, that everything, in all that it does, has a natural saviour, as of an animal the soul and the head are the chief saviours.

*Cle.* Once more, what do you mean?

*Ath.* The well-being of those two is obviously the preservation of every living thing.

*Cle.* How is that?

*Ath.* The soul, besides other things, contains mind, and the head, besides other things, contains sight and hearing; and the mind, mingling with the noblest of the senses, and becoming one with them, may be truly called the salvation of all.

*Cle.* Yes, quite so.

*Ath.* Yes, indeed; but with what is that intellect concerned which, mingling with the senses, is the salvation of ships in storms as well as in fair weather? In a ship, when the pilot and the sailors unite their perceptions with the piloting mind, do they not save both themselves and their craft?

*Cle.* Very true.

*Ath.* We do not want many illustrations about such matters:—What aim would the general of an army, or what aim would a physician propose to himself, if he were seeking to attain salvation?

*Cle.* Very good.

*Ath.* Does not the general aim at victory and superiority in war, and do not the physician and his assistants aim at producing health in the body?

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* And a physician who is ignorant about the body, that is to say, who knows not that which we just now called health, or a general who knows not victory, or any others who are ignorant of the particulars of the arts which we mentioned,

Mind and sense uniting are the salvation of all things.

As the general and the physician must know the aim of their arts:



cannot be said to have understanding about any of these matters.

*Cle.* They cannot.

*Ath.* And what would you say of the state? If a person proves to be ignorant of the aim to which the statesman should look, ought he, in the first place, to be called a ruler at all; and further, will he ever be able to preserve that of which he does not even know the aim?

*Cle.* Impossible.

*Ath.* And therefore, if our settlement of the country is to be perfect, we ought to have some institution, which, as I was saying, will tell what is the aim of the state, and will inform us how we are to attain this, and what law or what man will advise us to that end. Any state which has no such institution is likely to be devoid of mind and sense, and in all her actions will proceed by mere chance.

*Cle.* Very true.

*Ath.* In which, then, of the parts or institutions of the state is any such guardian power to be found? Can we say?

*Cle.* I am not quite certain, Stranger; but I have a suspicion that you are referring to the assembly which you just now said was to meet at night.

*Ath.* You understand me perfectly, Cleinias; and we must assume, as the argument implies, that this council possesses all virtue; and the beginning of virtue is not to make mistakes by guessing many things, but to look steadily at one thing, and on this to fix all our aims.

*Cle.* Quite true.

*Ath.* Then now we shall see why there is nothing wonderful in states going astray — the reason is that their legislators have such different aims; nor is there anything wonderful in some laying down as their rule of justice, that certain individuals should bear rule in the state, whether they be good or bad, and others that the citizens should be rich, not caring whether they are the slaves of other men or not. The tendency of others, again, is towards freedom; and some legislate with a view to two things at once,— they want to be at the same time free and the lords of other states; but the wisest men, as they deem themselves to be, look to all these and similar aims,

*Laws XII.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

so too the  
nocturnal  
council must  
know the aim  
of the state,

which is not  
privilege,  
wealth, or  
freedom,

*Laws XII.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

and there is no one of them which they exclusively honour, and to which they would have all things look.

but virtue.

*Cle.* Then, Stranger, our former assertion will hold, for we were saying that laws generally should look to one thing only; and this, as we admitted, was rightly said to be virtue.

*Ath.* Yes.

*Cle.* And we said that virtue was of four kinds?

*Ath.* Quite true.

*Cle.* And that mind was the leader of the four, and that to her the three other virtues and all other things ought to have regard?

We have seen  
the end of the  
mind of the  
general and  
the physician;  
—but what is  
the end of  
mind  
political?

*Ath.* You follow me capitally, Cleinias, and I would ask you to follow me to the end, for we have already said that the mind of the pilot, the mind of the physician and of the general look to that one thing to which they ought to look; and now we may turn to mind political, of which, as of a human creature, we will ask a question:—O wonderful being, and to what are you looking? The physician is able to tell his single aim in life, but you, the superior, as you declare yourself to be, of all intelligent beings, when you are asked are not able to tell. Can you, Megillus, and you, Cleinias, say distinctly what is the aim of mind political, in return for the many explanations of things which I have given you?

*Cle.* We cannot, Stranger.

*Ath.* Well, but ought we not to desire to see it, and to see where it is to be found?

*Cle.* For example, where?

The four  
virtues are  
distinct,  
yet one.

*Ath.* For example, we were saying that there are four kinds of virtue, and as there are four of them, each of them must be one.

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* And further, all four of them we call one; for we say that courage is virtue, and that prudence is virtue, and the same of the two others, as if they were in reality not many but one, that is, virtue.

*Cle.* Quite so.

It is easy to  
see how they  
differ;

*Ath.* There is no difficulty in seeing in what way the two differ from one another, and have received two names, and so of the rest. But there is more difficulty in explaining why

we call these two and the rest of them by the single name of virtue. *Laws XII.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Cle.* How do you mean?

*Ath.* I have no difficulty in explaining what I mean. Let us distribute the subject into questions and answers.

*Cle.* Once more, what do you mean?

*Ath.* Ask me what is that one thing which I call virtue, and then again speak of as two, one part being courage and the other wisdom. I will tell you how that occurs:—One of them has to do with fear; in this the beasts also participate<sup>1</sup>, and quite young children,—I mean courage; for a courageous temper is a gift of nature and not of reason. But without reason there never has been, or is, or will be a wise and understanding soul; it is of a different nature.

e.g. how courage differs from wisdom;

*Cle.* That is true.

*Ath.* I have now told you in what way the two are different, and do you in return tell me in what way they are one and the same. Suppose that I ask you in what way the four are one, and when you have answered me, you will have a right to ask of me in return in what way they are four; and then let us proceed to enquire whether in the case of things which have a name and also a definition to them, true knowledge consists in knowing the name only and not the definition. Can he who is good for anything be ignorant of all this without discredit where great and glorious truths are concerned?

but how are they all one?

*Cle.* I suppose not.

*Ath.* And is there anything greater to the legislator and the guardian of the law, and to him who thinks that he excels all other men in virtue, and has won the palm of excellence, than these very qualities of which we are now speaking,—courage, temperance, wisdom, justice?

*Cle.* How can there be anything greater?

*Ath.* And ought not the interpreters, the teachers, the lawgivers, the guardians of the other citizens, to excel the rest of mankind, and perfectly to show him who desires to learn and know or whose evil actions require to be punished and reproved, what is the nature of virtue and vice? Or shall some poet who has found his way into the city, or some

The nature of virtue must be taught by lawgivers and guardians, not by the poets.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *Laches* 196 D.



*Laws XII.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

chance person who pretends to be an instructor of youth, show himself to be better than him who has won the prize for every virtue? And can we wonder that when the guardians are not adequate in speech or action, and have no adequate knowledge of virtue, the city being unguarded should experience the common fate of cities in our day?

*Cle.* Wonder! no.

*Ath.* Well, then, must we do as we said? Or can we give our guardians a more precise knowledge of virtue in speech and action than the many have? or is there any way in which our city can be made to resemble the head and senses of rational beings because possessing such a guardian power?

*Cle.* What, Stranger, is the drift of your comparison?

The younger guardians are the eyes of the city, and they tell what they have seen to the elders, who are the mind of the city.

*Ath.* Do we not see that the city is the trunk, and are not the younger guardians, who are chosen for their natural gifts, placed in the head of the state, having their souls all full of eyes, with which they look about the whole city? They keep watch and hand over their perceptions to the memory, and inform the elders of all that happens in the city; and those whom we compared to the mind, because they have many wise thoughts — that is to say, the old men — take counsel, and making use of the younger men as their ministers, and advising with them,—in this way both together truly preserve the whole state:—Shall this or some other be the order of our state? Are all our citizens to be equal in acquirements, or shall there be special persons among them who have received a more careful training and education?

*Cle.* That they should be equal, my good sir, is impossible.

*Ath.* Then we ought to proceed to some more exact training than any which has preceded.

*Cle.* Certainly.

The guardians should have a special training,

*Ath.* And must not that of which we are in need be the one to which we were just now alluding?

*Cle.* Very true.

*Ath.* Did we not say that the workman or guardian, if he be perfect in every respect, ought not only to be able to see the many aims, but he should press onward to the one<sup>1</sup>? this he should know, and knowing, order all things with a view to it.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. vii. 537 B.



*Cle.* True.

*Laws XII.*

*Ath.* And can any one have a more exact way of considering or contemplating anything, than the being able to look at one idea gathered from many different things?

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Cle.* Perhaps not.

*Ath.* Not 'Perhaps not,' but 'Certainly not,' my good sir, is the right answer. There never has been a truer method than this discovered by any man.

*Cle.* I bow to your authority, Stranger; let us proceed in the way which you propose.

*Ath.* Then, as would appear, we must compel the guardians of our divine state to perceive, in the first place, what that principle is which is the same in all the four — the same, as we affirm, in courage and in temperance, and in justice and in prudence, and which, being one, we call as we ought, by the single name of virtue. To this, my friends, we will, if you please, hold fast, and not let go until we have sufficiently explained what that is to which we are to look, whether to be regarded as one, or as a whole, or as both, or in whatever way. Are we likely ever to be in a virtuous condition, if we cannot tell whether virtue is many, or four, or one? Certainly, if we take counsel among ourselves, we shall in some way contrive that this principle has a place amongst us; but if you have made up your mind that we should let the matter alone, we will.

which will  
enable them  
to see the  
unity as well  
as plurality of  
virtue,

*Cle.* We must not, Stranger, by the God of strangers I swear that we must not, for in our opinion you speak most truly; but we should like to know how you will accomplish your purpose.

56 *Ath.* Wait a little before you ask; and let us, first of all, be quite agreed with one another that the purpose has to be accomplished.

*Cle.* Certainly, it ought to be, if it can be.

*Ath.* Well, and about the good and the honourable, are we to take the same view? Are our guardians only to know that each of them is many, or also how and in what way they are one?

and of the  
good and  
honourable.

*Cle.* They must consider also in what sense they are one.

*Ath.* And are they to consider only, and to be unable to set forth what they think?

*Laws XII.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.*Cle.* Certainly not; that would be the state of a slave.*Ath.* And may not the same be said of all good things — that the true guardians of the laws ought to know the truth about them, and to be able to interpret them in words, and carry them out in action, judging of what is and of what is not well, according to nature?*Cle.* Certainly.They must  
also know  
about the  
Gods.*Ath.* Is not the knowledge of the Gods which we have set forth with so much zeal one of the noblest sorts of knowledge; — to know that they are, and know how great is their power, as far as in man lies? We do indeed excuse the mass of the citizens, who only follow the voice of the laws, but we refuse to admit as guardians any who do not labour to obtain every possible evidence that there is respecting the Gods; our city is forbidden and not allowed to choose as a guardian of the law, or to place in the select order of virtue, him who is not an inspired man, and has not laboured at these things.*Cle.* It is certainly just, as you say, that he who is indolent about such matters or incapable should be rejected, and that things honourable should be put away from him.*Ath.* Are we assured that there are two things which lead men to believe in the Gods, as we have already stated?*Cle.* What are they?Two argu-  
ments for the  
existence of  
Gods:—(1) the priority  
of the soul;(2) the order of  
the universe.*Ath.* One is the argument about the soul, which has been already mentioned — that it is the eldest and most divine of all things, to which motion attaining generation gives perpetual existence<sup>1</sup>; the other was an argument from the order of the motion of the stars, and of all things under the dominion of the mind which ordered the universe<sup>2</sup>. If a man look upon the world not lightly or ignorantly, there was never any one so godless who did not experience an effect opposite to that which the many imagine. For they think that those who handle these matters by the help of astronomy, and the accompanying arts of demonstration, may become godless, because they see, as far as they can see, things happening by necessity, and not by an intelligent will accomplishing good.*Cle.* But what is the fact?*Ath.* Just the opposite, as I said, of the opinion which once<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, x. 893 A.<sup>2</sup> Cp. *ib.* 896 C.Astronomy  
need not tend  
to Atheism, as  
the many  
think.

prevailed among men, that the sun and stars are without soul. Even in those days men wondered about them, and that which is now ascertained was then conjectured by some who had a more exact knowledge of them — that if they had been things without soul, and had no mind, they could never have moved with numerical exactness so wonderful; and even at that time some ventured to hazard the conjecture that mind was the orderer of the universe. But these same persons again mistaking the nature of the soul, which they conceived to be younger and not older than the body, once more overturned the world, or rather, I should say, themselves; for the bodies which they saw moving in heaven all appeared to be full of stones, and earth, and many other lifeless substances, and to these they assigned the causes of all things. Such studies gave rise to much atheism and perplexity, and the poets took occasion to be abusive,—comparing the philosophers to she-dogs uttering vain howlings, and talking other nonsense of the same sort. But now, as I said, the case is reversed<sup>1</sup>.

*Cle.* How so?

*Ath.* No man can be a true worshipper of the Gods who does not know these two principles—that the soul is the eldest of all things which are born, and is immortal and rules over all bodies; moreover, as I have now said several times, he who has not contemplated the mind of nature which is said to exist in the stars, and gone through the previous training, and seen the connexion of music with these things, and harmonized them all with laws and institutions, is not able to give a reason of such things as have a reason<sup>2</sup>. And he who is unable to acquire this in addition to the ordinary virtues of a citizen, can hardly be a good ruler of a whole state; but he should be the subordinate of other rulers. Wherefore, Cleinias and Megillus, let us consider whether we may not add to all the other laws which we have discussed this further one,—that the nocturnal assembly of the magistrates, which has also shared in the whole scheme of education proposed by us, shall be a guard set according to law for the salvation of the state. Shall we propose this?

*Cle.* Certainly, my good friend, we will if the thing is in any degree possible.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. x. 607.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Rep. vii. 531 foll.

*Laws XII.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

Long ago it was suspected that mind was the orderer of the heavens. But mankind went wrong by putting body before mind.

The true ruler must have grasped true principles, and have gone through the previous training and seen the connexion of the sciences.

The nocturnal council the guard of the state.



*Laws XII.*ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS.

*Ath.* Let us make a common effort to gain such an object; for I too will gladly share in the attempt. Of these matters I have had much experience, and have often considered them, and I dare say that I shall be able to find others who will also help.

*Cle.* I agree, Stranger, that we should proceed along the road in which God is guiding us; and how we can proceed rightly has now to be investigated and explained.

We can proceed no further in determining either the powers of the council,

*Ath.* O Megillus and Cleinias, about these matters we cannot legislate further until the council is constituted; when that is done, then we will determine what authority they shall have of their own; but the explanation of how this is all to be ordered would only be given rightly in a long discourse.

*Cle.* What do you mean, and what new thing is this?

or the qualifications and education of the guardians.

*Ath.* In the first place, a list would have to be made out of those who by their ages and studies and dispositions and habits are well fitted for the duty of a guardian. In the next place, it will not be easy for them to discover themselves what they ought to learn, or become the disciple of one who has already made the discovery. Furthermore, to write down the times at which, and during which, they ought to receive the several kinds of instruction, would be a vain thing; for the learners themselves do not know what is learned to advantage until the knowledge which is the result of learning has found a place in the soul of each. And so these details, although they could not be truly said to be secret, might be said to be incapable of being stated beforehand, because when stated they would have no meaning.

*Cle.* What then are we to do, Stranger, under these circumstances?

We must stake everything on the successful establishment of the council. To its care we will then hand over the new city,

*Ath.* As the proverb says, the answer is no secret, but open to all of us:—We must risk the whole on the chance of throwing, as they say, thrice six or thrice ace, and I am willing to share with you the danger by stating and explaining to you my views about education and nurture, which is the question coming to the surface again. The danger is not a slight or ordinary one, and I would advise you, Cleinias, in particular, to see to the matter; for if you order rightly the city of the Magnetes, or whatever name God may give it, you



will obtain the greatest glory; or at any rate you will be thought the most courageous of men in the estimation of posterity. Dear companions, if this our divine assembly can only be established, to them we will hand over the city; none of the present company of legislators, as I may call them, would hesitate about that. And the state will be perfected and become a waking reality, which a little while ago we attempted to create as a dream<sup>1</sup> and in idea only, mingling together reason and mind in one image, in the hope that our citizens might be duly mingled and rightly educated; and being educated, and dwelling in the citadel of the land, might become perfect guardians, such as we have never seen in all our previous life, by reason of the saving virtue which is in them.

*Laws XII.*

ATHENIAN,  
CLEINIAS,  
MEGILLUS.

and so our  
dream will  
become a  
reality.

*Meg.* Dear Cleinias, after all that has been said, either we must detain the Stranger, and by supplications and in all manner of ways make him share in the foundation of the city, or we must give up the undertaking.

The Athenian  
must give his  
help.

*Cle.* Very true, Megillus; and you must join with me in detaining him.

*Meg.* I will.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rep. ix. 592.

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- Anaxagoras, of Clazomenae, a friend of Pericles, Phaedr. 270 A; 1 Alcib. 118 C;—his books and opinions, Apol. 26 D (cp. Laws 10. 886 D); Socrates heard some one reading out of one of his books, Phaedo 97 B, D, 98 B;—the ‘mind’ of, Crat. 400 A; Phaedr. 270 A; Phaedo 97 C (cp. Laws 12. 967); his definition of

- justice as mind, Crat. 413 B;—the 'Chaos' of, Phaedo 72 C; Gorg. 465 D;—his discovery that the moon receives her light from the sun, Crat. 409 B;—disciples of, *ibid.*
- [Anaximenes], his principle of growth, Phaedo 96 C.
- Ancestors, every man must have had thousands of, Theaet. 175 A (cp. 1 Alcib. 120 E);—reputation given by noble ancestors, Menex. 247 A (cp. Gorg. 512 C).
- 'Ancient story,' the, Statesm. 269 foll.
- Ancients, the, spoke in parables, Theaet. 180 D; did not rightly distinguish genera and species, Soph. 267 D; nearer the Gods than ourselves, Phil. 16 C (cp. Tim. 40 D; Statesm. 271 A; Laws 12. 948 B); were excellent givers of names, Laws 7. 816 A.
- Andromache, Ion 535 B.
- Andron, with Hippias, Protag. 315 C; studied with Callicles, Gorg. 487 C.
- Andros, Phanosthenes of, Ion 541 D.
- Androtion, father of Andron, Protag. 315 C; Gorg. 487 C.
- Anger, stirred by injustice, Rep. 4. 440; origin of, Tim. 42 A; righteous, a pleasure mingled with pain, Phil. 47 E; 'an ungracious element of our nature,' Laws 11. 935 A.
- Angler and Sophist, Soph. 219 foll.
- Angling, an acquisitive art, Soph. 219; defined, *ib.* 221; regulations respecting, Laws 7. 823, 824.
- Animal, the world an, Tim. 30 E, 32 D:—the ideal animal, *ib.* 39 E:—animals not to be called courageous, Laches 196 E (*but* cp. Laws 12. 693 E); love their offspring, Symp. 207 A; liberty enjoyed by, in a democracy, Rep. 8. 562 E, 563 C; choose their destiny in the next world, *ib.* 10. 620 D (cp. Phaedr. 249 B); four kinds of, Tim. 40 foll.; creation of, *ib.* 91; division of, Soph. 220, 222; Statesm. 262; subject to man, Statesm. 271 E; held converse with men in the days of Cronos, *ib.* 272 C; destroyed by the reversal of the universe, *ib.* 273 (cp. Laws 3. 677 E); breeding of, Laws 5. 735 (cp. Rep. 5. 459); have undergone many transformations in the course of ages, Laws 6. 782 A; not sacrificed or eaten in primitive times, *ib.* C; an example to men, *ib.* 8. 840 E; blemished animals offered to the Gods by the Lacedaemonians, 2 Alcib. 149 A:—animals which have caused death, to be slain, Laws 9. 873 E; animals as property, *ib.* 11. 914 D, 915 C; injury done by, *ib.* 936 E.
- Antaeus, famous (in mythology) for his skill in wrestling, Theaet. 169 B; Laws 7. 796 A.
- Antenor, may have been like Pericles, Symp. 221 C.
- Anthemion, father of Anytus, a wealthy and wise man, Meno 90 A.
- Anticipations of pleasure and pain, Rep. 9. 584 D.
- Antilochus, son of Nestor, Ion 537 A.
- Antimoerus of Mende, most famous of the disciples of Protagoras, Protag. 315 A.
- Antiochis, the tribe to which Socrates belonged, Apol. 32 B.
- Antiphon, (1) half-brother of Ademantus, Parm. 126 B foll.:—(2) father of Pyrilampes, *ib.* C:—(3) of Cephisus, present at the trial of Socrates, Apol. 33 E:—(4) of Rhamnus, the orator, Menex. 236 A.
- Antiquarianism, a pursuit which is only followed in cities where men have wealth and leisure, Crit. 110 A.
- Antiquity, to be revered, Soph. 243 A; Laws 7. 798 A;—tales of antiquity, *see* Tradition.

- Antisthenes, present at the death of Socrates, *Phaedo* 59 B.
- Anytus, a friend of Meno, *Meno* 90 A; takes part in the dialogue *Meno*, *ib.* 90 B–95 A; his advice to Socrates, *ib.* 94 E; in a rage, *ib.* 95 A; representative of the craftsmen against Socrates, *Apol.* 23 E, 25 B; not the destruction of Socrates, *ib.* 28 A; wishes for Socrates to be put to death, *ib.* 29 B, 31 A; a bad man, *ib.* 30 D, 36 A (cp. 34 B).
- Apaturia, *Tim.* 21 A.
- Apemantus, father of Eudicus, *Hipp. Min.* 363 A, 373 A.
- Aphidnè, Tisander of, *Gorg.* 487 C.
- Aphroditè, meaning of the name, *Crat.* 406 B, C; mother of Eros, *Phaedr.* 242 E; her inspiration, *ib.* 265 B; Aristophanes always in her company, *Symp.* 177 E; two goddesses of this name, *ib.* 180 D, C; her love of Ares, *ib.* 196 D; why attended by Love, *ib.* 203 C; bound by Hephaestus, *Rep.* 3. 390 C; goddess of peace and friendship, *Soph.* 243 A; goddess of pleasure, *Phil.* 12 B.
- Apodyterium, *Lysis* 206 E.
- Apollo, the father of Ion, *Euthyd.* 302 D; meaning of his name, *Crat.* 404, 405; inventor of music, *ib.* 405 A; called 'Ἀπλῶς by the Thessalians, *ib.* D; his followers, *Phaedr.* 253 B; his inspiration, *ib.* 265 B; discovered the arts of medicine, archery, and divination, *Symp.* 197 A; his declaration with regard to Socrates, *Apol.* 21 B; Theseus' vow to, *Phaedo* 58 B; hymn to, composed by Socrates, *ib.* 60 D; swans sacred to, *ib.* 85 A; his song at the nuptials of Thetis, *Rep.* 2. 383 A; Apollo and Achilles, *ib.* 3. 391 A; Chryses' prayer to, *ib.* 394 A; lord of the lyre, *ib.* 399 E; father of Asclepius, *ib.* 408 C; the God of Delphi, *ib.* 4. 427 A; invoked, *Crit.* 108 C; law-giver of Lacedaemon, *Laws* 1. 624, 632 D; 2. 662 B; his presence at festivals, *ib.* 2. 653 D, 665 A; 7. 796 E; education first given through Apollo and the Muses, *ib.* 2. 654 A, 665 A, 672 C; his oracle consulted by the Heraclidae, *ib.* 3. 686 A; the Director of Education elected in his temple, *ib.* 6. 766 C; temple of Apollo and Artemis, *ib.* 8. 833 B; oath by, *ib.* 11. 936 E; the citizens to meet in his precincts at the election of censors, *ib.* 12. 945 E; the three best men of the state dedicated to his service, *ib.* 946 C, D, 947 A; sacrifice to, at Delphi, *ib.* 950 E:—the inscriptions in his temple at Delphi, *Charm.* 164 D; *Protag.* 343 B; *Phaedr.* 229 E; *Phil.* 48 C; *Laws* 12. 923 A; 1 Alcib. 124 B, 129 A, 132 C. Cp. Delphi.
- Apollodorus, brother of Aeantodorus, present at the trial of Socrates, *Apol.* 34 A, 38 B.
- Apollodorus of Cyzicus, general of the Athenians, *Ion* 541 C.
- Apollodorus, father of Hippocrates, *Protag.* 310 A, 316 B, 328 E.
- Apollodorus of Phalerum, narrates the *Symposium*, *Symp.* 172 A; his acquaintance with Socrates, *ib.* E; the 'madman,' *ib.* 173 D, E (cp. *Phaedo* 59 A); present at the death of Socrates, *Phaedo* 59 A, B; his passionate grief, *ib.* 117 D.
- Apparitions, *Phaedo* 81 D; *Laws* 5. 738 C; 10. 910 A (cp. *Tim.* 72 A).
- Appeal, court of (in the Model City), *Laws* 6. 767 A, C; 11. 926 D, 928 B, 938; 12. 946 E, 948 A, 956 C, D.
- Appearance, deceptiveness of, *Protag.* 356 D; power of, *Rep.* 2. 365, 366 C;—appearance and perception, *Theaet.* 152, 158 E foll., 162, 170 A;—appearance in art, *Soph.* 236.



- Appetite, good and bad, Rep. 5. 475 C.
- Appetites, Rep. 8. 559; 9. 571 (cp. 4. 439).
- Appetitive element of the soul, Rep. 4. 439; must be subordinate to passion and reason, *ib.* 442 A; 9. 571 D (cp. Phaedr. 253 foll.; Tim. 70 A; Laws 3. 687, 689); may be described as the love of gain, Rep. 9. 581 A; seat of, Tim. 70 E; compared to the mass of people in the state, Laws 3. 689 A.
- Arbiters, Laws 6. 766 D; the Court of Neighbours (in the Model City) to act as arbiters rather than judges, *ib.* 12. 956 C.
- Arcadia, temple of Lycaean Zeus in, Rep. 8. 565 D:—Arcadians dispersed into villages by the Lacedaemonians, Symp. 193 A.
- Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, ruler of Macedonia, Gorg. 470 D (cp. 2 Alcib. 141 E); his crimes, Gorg. 471 A, 479 A, E; thought happy by the Sophist Polus, *ib.* 470 D, 472 D; will be found punished in the next world, *ib.* 525 D.
- Archepolis, meaning of the name, Crat. 394 C.
- Archers in Crete, Laws 1. 625 D; races for archers, *ib.* 8. 833 C;—the Sauromatides or Amazons famous as archers, *ib.* 7. 804 E, 806 A;—archery, teaching of (in the Model City), *ib.* 804 D, 813 D.
- Archidamus, King of Sparta, 1 Alcib. 124 A.
- Archilochus, not included in the rhapsode's art, Ion 531 A; inferior to Homer, *ib.* 532 A:—quoted, Rep. 2. 365 C; Eryx. 397 E.
- Archinus, an Athenian orator, Menex. 234 B.
- Architecture, Rep. 4. 438 C; Statesm. 259 E, 280 C; necessity of pure taste in, Rep. 3. 401; instruments required in, Phil. 56 B;—architecture of Atlantis, Crit. 116.
- Archon; King Archon a priest, Statesm. 290 E; represents the ancient king, Menex. 238 D; Porch of the King Archon, Charm. 153 A; Euthyph. 2 A; Theaet. 210;—golden images set up by the nine Archons at Delphi, Phaedr. 235 D:—Archons (in the Model City), lists of, Laws 6. 785 (cp. Guardians of the Law, Model City).
- Arcturus brings the vintage, Laws 8. 844 D.
- Ardiaeus, tyrant of Pamphylia, his endless punishment in Hades, Rep. 10. 615 C, E.
- Areopagus, scene of the rape of Orithyia, Phaedr. 229 D.
- Ares, meaning of his name, Crat. 407 C, D; effect of love on his companions, Phaedr. 252 C; conquered by love, Symp. 196 D; Ares and Aphrodite, Rep. 3. 390 C; temples of, Laws 8. 833 B; his votaries a class of craftsmen, *ib.* 11. 920 D.
- Arginusae, condemnation of the generals after, Apol. 32 B.
- Argos, Agamemnon, king of, Rep. 3. 393 E; subject to the Dorians, Laws 3. 683 D; ruin of the kings of, *ib.* 690 D; kings of, 1 Alcib. 121 A:—the Argive oath, Phaedo 89 C:—Argive colonists in Crete, Laws 4. 708 A:—Argives took no part in the Persian war, *ib.* 3. 692 E; defended by the Athenians, Menex. 239 B; assisted by the Athenians, *ib.* 244 D; willing to give up the Asiatic allies, *ib.* 245 C.
- Argument, apt to end in a quarrel, Gorg. 457 D; the longer and the shorter method of, Rep. 4. 435; 6. 504; misleading nature of (Adeimantus), *ib.* 6. 487 (cp. Eryx. 395 A); youthful love of, Rep. 7. 539 (cp. Phil. 15 E); the right



- and the wrong way of, *Theaet.* 167 E; courtesy required in, *Soph.* 246 D (cp. *Laws* 1. 629 A, 634 C, 635 A):—arguments (in rhetoric), *Phaedr.* 271, 272, 277. For the personification of the argument, *see* Personification.
- Argumentation, i. e. Eristic, *Soph.* 225 D.
- Arion, *Rep.* 5. 453 E.
- Ariphron, teacher of Cleinias, *Protag.* 320 A.
- Aristides, son of Lysimachus, failed in training his son Lysimachus, *Meno* 94 A (cp. *Laches* 179 C); famous for his virtue, *Gorg.* 526 B.
- Aristides the younger, *Laches* 179 A; did not profit by converse with Socrates, *Theaet.* 150 E.
- Aristippus of Cyrenæ, not present at the death of Socrates, *Phaedo* 59 C.
- Aristippus of Larisa, lover of Meno, *Meno* 70 B.
- Aristocracy (i. e. the ideal state or government of the best), *Rep.* 4. 445 C (cp. 8. 544 E, 545 D); mode of its decline, *ib.* 8. 546;—the aristocratical man, *ib.* 7. 541 B; 8. 544 E (*see* Guardians, Philosopher, Ruler):—(in the ordinary sense), *ib.* 1. 338 D; Statesm. 291 E, 301 A, 302 D; origin of, *Laws* 3. 681; in ancient Attica, *Menex.* 238 C. Cp. Constitution.
- Aristocrates, son of Scellius, his offering at Delphi, *Gorg.* 472 B.
- Aristodemus, his portion in Peloponnesus, *Laws* 3. 692 B.
- Aristodemus, of the deme of Cydathenaeum, an admirer of Socrates, *Symp.* 173 B; narrates the dialogue *Symposium*, *ib.* 174 A; a 'weak head,' *ib.* 176 C (cp. *ib.* 233 C).
- Aristogeiton overthrew the tyrants, *Symp.* 182 C.
- Ariston, father of Adeimantus, Glaucon, (and Plato), *Apol.* 34 A; *Rep.* 1. 327 A; 2. 368 A.
- Aristonymus, father of Cleitophon, *Rep.* 1. 328 B.
- Aristophanes, the comic poet, unwilling to drink, *Symp.* 176 A; the constant servant of Dionysus and Aphroditè, *ib.* 177 E; has a hiccough, *ib.* 185 C, E; his speech in honour of love, *ib.* 189 B foll.; a lover of jokes, *ib.* 213 C; his description of Socrates, *ib.* 221 B; converses with Socrates, *ib.* 223 C; satirized Socrates, *Apol.* 18 D, 19 C.
- Aristophon, son of Aglaophon, a painter, *Gorg.* 448 B.
- Aristoteles, one of the Thirty, *Parm.* 127 D; a friend of Socrates, *ib.* 135 D; respondent in the dialogue *Parmenides*, *ib.* 136 E.
- Arithmetic, invented by Theuth, *Phaedr.* 274 C; defined, *Gorg.* 451; must be learnt by the rulers (in the best state), *Rep.* 7. 522, 526 (cp. *Laws* 7. 818, 819); use of in forming ideas, *Rep.* 7. 525; spirit in which it should be pursued, *ib.* D; common notions about, mistaken, *ib.* E; an excellent instrument of education, *ib.* 526; *Laws* 5. 747; 7. 809 C, 819 C; employed, in order to express the interval between the king and the tyrant, *Rep.* 9. 587; taught to mankind by the movements of the heavenly bodies, *Tim.* 39, 47 A (cp. *Laws* 6. 771 B); abstract nature of, Statesm. 258 D; in the arts, *Phil.* 55 E; two kinds of, *ib.* 56 D; useful to the legislator, *Laws* 5. 737 E:—puzzles in, *Phaedo* 96 E, 101 D; *Laws* 7. 819:—classes of roots, *Theaet.* 147:—arithmetical notions perceived by a faculty of the soul, *ib.* 185 D (cp. *Rep.* 6. 511 C):—nature of the process of calculation, *Theaet.* 198, 199. Cp. Mathematics.

Armenius, father of Er, the Pamphylian, Rep. 10. 614 B.

Armour, fighting in, Laches 178 A, 179 E, 181 D foll.; Euthyd. 272 A, 273 D, E; not practised by the Lacedaemonians, and useless, Laches 183 foll.; requires the use of both hands, Laws 7. 795 B; women to learn, *ib.* 813 E; conflicts in armour for men and women, *ib.* 8. 833 E;—dances in armour, *ib.* 7. 796 B.

Arms, of Hellenes not to be offered as trophies in the temples, Rep. 5. 470 A; worn in daily life by the Cretans, Laws 1. 625 C;—importation and exportation of arms, *ib.* 8. 847 D;—throwing away of, disgraceful, Rep. 5. 468 A; Laws 12. 943 E foll.; permitted in naval warfare, Laws 4. 706 C;—use of, taught by the Goddess Athene, Tim. 24 B; Crit. 110 C (cp. Laws 7. 796 B; Menex. 238 B); to be learnt by women, Laws 7. 794 D, 804, 813 E (*see* War).

Army needed in a state, Rep. 2. 374. *See* Soldiers.

Art, requires knowledge, Ion 532, 540; criticism of, *ib.* 532 foll.; Laws 2. 667–669; is piety an art? Euthyph. 13; influence of, on character, Rep. 3. 400 foll.; illusion in, Soph. 235 E; creation and imitation in, *ib.* 266 D (cp. Rep. 10. 596 A foll.); selects good material on which to work, Statesm. 308 C; a true thing, Laws 11. 921 C:—art and chance, *ib.* 4. 709; 10. 889; art and the conditions of art, Phaedr. 268, 269 (cp. Laws 4. 709 C); art and experience, Gorg. 448 C, 501; art and language, Statesm. 277 (cp. Rep. 9. 588 D); art and nature, Laws 10. 889, 890, 892 (cp. Soph. 265); art and politics, Laws 10. 889:—art of agriculture, Soph. 219 B; Laws 10. 889 D (*v. sub voce*); angling,

Soph. 219–221; Laws 7. 823; bird-catching, Soph. 220 B; Laws 7. 823; boxing, Gorg. 456 D; Rep. 4. 422; Laws 7. 795 C, 796 A; 8. 830 A, E; building, Euthyph. 13 D; Rep. 3. 401 A; 4. 438 C; Soph. 266 D; Phil. 56 B; Eryx. 403 D; calculation, Gorg. 451; Rep. 7. 524–526; 10. 602 D; Theaet. 198; Statesm. 259 D; carding, Statesm. 281 A, 282 B; carpentry, Ion 537 B; Rep. 4. 428 C; Phil. 56 B; chariot driving, Ion 537 A; the choral art, Gorg. 501 E; Laws 2. 672; 1 Alcib. 125 D; command, Statesm. 260 C, 292; cookery, Gorg. 462 foll., 465, 501 A, 518; Rep. 1. 332 D; disputation, Phaedr. 261; Soph. 225, 232; dyeing, Rep. 4. 429 D; embroidery, *ib.* 3. 401 A; enchantment, Euthyd. 290 A; Laws 11. 933; exchange, Rep. 2. 369 C; Soph. 219 D, 223; fence; Laches 178 A, 179 E, 181 D foll.; Euthyd. 272 A, 273 D, E; Gorg. 456 D; Laws 7. 795; 8. 833 E; flattery, Gorg. 463 foll., 501, 502; Soph. 222 E; flute-playing, Protag. 327 B; Meno 90 E; Gorg. 501 E; Phil. 56 A; Laws 3. 700 E; fulling, Statesm. 281 B, 282 A; gem-engraving, Hipp. Min. 368 B; 1 Alcib. 128 C, E; of the general, Euthyd. 290; Soph. 219; Statesm. 304 E, 305 A; Phil. 56 A; harp-playing, Gorg. 502 A; herdtending, Statesm. 261 D foll., 275 foll.; horsemanship, Euthyph. 13 A; Eryx. 396 A, 403 C; hunting; Euthyd. 290; Soph. 219 foll.; Laws 7. 823 (*v. sub voce*); imitation, Soph. 219, 267 (*v. sub voce*); the kingly art, Protag. 321, 322; Statesm. 260, 276, 289–293, 295 B, 300 E, 305 A, 308, 311; measurement, Protag. 356; Rep. 10. 602; Statesm. 283–285; 1 Alcib. 126 C; medicine (*v. sub voce*); memory, Hipp. Min. 368 E, 369 A;

mimicry, Soph. 267; money-making, Gorg. 452 B; Rep. 1. 330 B; 8. 556; Laws 5. 741 E, 743 D; 8. 842 D, 847 E; 11. 918; painting, Crat. 423 D; Ion 532 E; Gorg. 450 D; Soph. 234, 235 E (*v. sub voce*); payment, Rep. 1. 346; persuasion, Soph. 222 C; Phil. 58 A (cp. Phaedr. 267 A; Gorg. 452 foll.); phantasy, Soph. 236, 260 E, 265-267; of the pilot, Ion 537 B; Gorg. 511 D; Phil. 56 A; pottery, Soph. 219 A; Laws 3. 679 A; purification, Soph. 226, 227; retail trade, Soph. 223 D; Statesm. 260 C; rhapsody, Ion 531 foll.; riding, Laches 193 B (*v. sub voce*); shoemaking, Theaet. 146 D, 147 B; 1 Alcib. 125 A, 128, 129; of sophistry, Euthyd. 274 E; Gorg. 449 (*v. sub voce*); speech-making, Euthyd. 290 A (*v. sub voce*); statuary, Gorg. 450 D; Statesm. 277 A; tactics, Rep. 7. 522 E, 525 B; Statesm. 304 E; Laws 4. 706; weaving, Gorg. 449 C; Rep. 3. 401 A; 5. 455 D; Statesm. 279-283; Laws 3. 679 A; 5. 734 E; 1 Alcib. 128 D; weighing, Charm. 166 A; Rep. 10. 602 D; Phil. 55 E; woolworking, Statesm. 282:—the arts stolen from Athene and Hephaestus by Prometheus, Protag. 321 D:—the plastic and weaving arts require no use of iron, Laws 3. 679 A:—the arts divided accordingly as they use or do not use words, Gorg. 450; productive arts, Rep. 3. 401 A; Soph. 219, 265 A; Phil. 55 E; acquisitive, Soph. 219, 265 A; subdivided, *ib.* 219 foll., 223 C; practical and intellectual, Statesm. 258 E; co-operative and causal, *ib.* 281, 282, 287 B; of composition and division, *ib.* 283; three arts concerned with all things, Rep. 10. 601; the handicraft arts a re-

proach, *ib.* 9. 590 C (cp. Gorg. 512 C; Rep. 7. 522 B; Laws 7. 806 E; 8. 846 D):—the lesser arts (*τεχνύδρια*), Rep. 5. 475 D; (*τέχνια*), *ib.* 6. 495 D:—the arts unequally distributed among men, Protag. 322; exercised for the good of their subject, Euthyph. 13; Rep. 1. 342, 345-347; not to be confused with their conditions, Phaedr. 269 A; correlative to their subject-matter, Ion 537; not to be abused, Gorg. 456 D, 460 D; not commonly practised with a view to moral improvement, *ib.* 501, 502; training required in, *ib.* 513; interested in their own perfection, Rep. 1. 342; differ according to their functions, *ib.* 346; full of grace, *ib.* 3. 401 A; must be subject to a censorship, *ib.* B; causes of the deterioration of, *ib.* 4. 421; employment of children in, *ib.* 5. 467 A; ideals in, *ib.* 472 D; chiefly useful for practical purposes, *ib.* 7. 533 A; depend on a mean, Statesm. 284; differ in exactness, Phil. 55 E foll.; based upon opinion, *ib.* 59; in relation to the good, *ib.* 66; no alteration allowed in, by the Egyptians, Laws 2. 656 E; unknown for many centuries, *ib.* 3. 677 (cp. Tim. 22 E; Crit. 109 E; Statesm. 274); no one to practise two arts, Laws 8. 846 D; the arts are wealth, Eryx. 402 C:—the arts and experience, Gorg. 448, 462, 501; the arts and knowledge, Theaet. 146 foll.; the arts and moral qualities, Hipp. Min. 373; 1 Alcib. 125; the arts and philosophy, Rep. 6. 495 E, 496 (cp. 5. 475 D, 476 A); the arts and politics, analogy of, 1 Alcib. 107 foll. For the analogy of the arts and virtues cp. Analogy.

Art. [*No dialogue of Plato contains a discussion upon art in the*



general sense of the term. In Hellas, as in all countries where art has most flourished, the age of creation preceded the age of criticism and analysis. Plato knows nothing of 'schools' or of the history of art, nor does he select any building or statue for condemnation or admiration. Pheidias is only twice mentioned, once casually as the typical sculptor (Protag. 311 C), and again in the *Meno* (91 D), where Socrates says that Pheidias, 'although he wrought such exceedingly noble works,' did not make nearly so much money by them as Protagoras did by his wisdom. Equally slight are the references to painters: the names of Zeuxippus (Protag. 318 B), Polygnotus (Ion 532 E), and Zeuxis (Gorg. 453 C) occur; but we hear nothing of any masterpiece of theirs, nor is the attempt made to point out their several characteristics. Art, according to the conception of Plato, is not a collection of canons of criticism, but rather a subtle influence which pervades all things animate as well as inanimate (Rep. 3. 400, 401). He judges art by one test, 'simplicity,' but under this he includes moderation, purity, and harmony of proportion; and, in the *Republic* at least, he places sculpture and architecture under the same rigid censorship which he applies to poetry and music (Rep. 3. 401 A). He dislikes the 'illusions' of painting (Rep. 10. 602), and the 'false proportions' given by sculptors to their subjects (Soph. 235, 236): both these he classes as a sort of magic. He has observed that excessive devotion to art is apt to produce effeminacy of character (Rep. 3. 411; 5. 475); but he hopes to preserve the

guardians of his state from this evil by the severe discipline and training of their early years. Thus in art as in many other respects Plato combines the reactionary and the reforming spirit. He is willing to follow the Egyptian fashion and consecrate the forms of art which have received the sanction of the authorities (Laws 2. 657 A). But he will banish from the state all that is base and impure, and surround his citizens with an atmosphere of grace and beauty which will instil noble and true ideas into their minds.]

Artemis, meaning of the name, Crat. 406 B; goddess of childbirth, Theaet. 149 B:—temple of [Artemis] Agra, Phaedr. 229 C. Artemisium, battle of, Laws 4. 707 C; Menex. 241 A.

Artisans, not wise, Apol. 22 D; necessary in the state, Rep. 2. 370; have no time to be ill, *ib.* 3. 406 D:—[in the Model City] no citizen to be an artisan, Laws 8. 846; rules concerning, *ib.* 846–848. Cp. Craftsmen.

Artist, the, must be inspired by love, Symp. 197 A; ought not to abuse his strength, Gorg. 456 D, 460 D; does not work for his own benefit, Rep. 1. 346, 347; must imitate the good only, *ib.* 3. 401 C; requires favourable conditions, Laws 4. 709 D; ought to make his work self-consistent, *ib.* 5. 746 D (cp. Gorg. 503 E); has regard to the whole, Laws 10. 903 D; must not use his art to deceive an unskilled person, *ib.* 11. 921 C; difference between the clever artist and the wise man, 2 Alcib. 145 E:—the Great Artist, Rep. 10. 596 (cp. Laws 10. 902 E):—artists and dialecticians, Phil. 59.

Art-seller, the, Soph. 224.

Asclepiadae, Rep. 4. 405 D, 406 B,



- C; 10. 599 C; Hippocrates of Cos, an Asclepiad, Protag. 311 B (cp. Phaedr. 270 C); Eryximachus, an Asclepiad, Symp. 186 E.
- Asclepiaea at Epidaurus, Ion 530 A.
- Asclepius, father of physicians, Symp. 186 E; patron of gymnastic and husbandry, *ibid.*; his sons at Troy, Rep. 3. 406 A, 408 A; not ignorant of the lingering treatment, *ib.* 406 D; a statesman, *ib.* 407 E; said by the poets to have been bribed to restore a rich man to life, *ib.* 408 B; son of Apollo, *ib.* C; left disciples, 10. 599 C:—‘we owe a cock to,’ Phaedo 118 A:—festival in honour of, at Epidaurus (Asclepiaea), Ion 530 A.
- Ashes, applied to sore eyes, Lysis 210 A.
- Asia, Charm. 158 A; Tim. 24 B, E; Crit. 108 E, 112 E.
- Asia, Prince of, Lysis 209 D (cp. 1 Alcib. 121 C).
- Asopus, the ancient boundary of Attica, Crit. 110 E.
- Aspasia, her speech, Menex. 236 A foll. (cp. 249 D); her eloquence, *ib.* 235 E.
- Assaults, Rep. 5. 464 E; Laws 9. 879–882; on strangers, Laws 9. 879; on elders, *ib.* 880; in self-defence, *ibid.*; on parents, *ib.* 881; by slaves, *ib.* 882.
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- Carelessness, not to be ascribed to the gods, Laws 10. 900 foll. Cp. God.
- Carian (proverbial), Laches 187 B; Euthyd. 285 B; Carian wailers, Laws 7. 800 E.
- Carpentry, Ion 537 B; Rep. 4. 428 C; an exact art, Phil. 56 B.
- ' Cart,' performances on the (at Athens), Laws 1. 637 B.
- Carthaginians, given to intoxication, Laws 1. 637 D; restrictions on drinking among, *ib.* 2. 674 B; use pieces of leather for money, Eryx. 400 A.
- Carving, an image of the dialectical process, Phaedr. 265 E; Statesm. 287 B. Cp. Dialectic.
- Casks, image of the, Gorg. 493.
- Caste, in Egypt, Tim. 24; in ancient Athens, *ibid.*; Crit. 110, 112.
- Castor and Pollux, Euthyd. 293 A; games in honour of (at Lacedaemon), Laws 7. 796 B.
- Causal arts, Statesm. 281, 282, 287 B. Cp. Art.
- Cause, the idea of the; cause and effect, Euthyph. 10; Phil. 26, 27; ' the tie of the cause,' Meno 98 A; cause and condition distinguished, Phaedo 99; the good denied by some to be a cause, *ibid.*; a cause necessary to creation, Tim. 28 A; the power of the cause, Phil. 30 :— God the best of causes, Tim. 29 A :— final



- causes, *Phaedo* 97, 98; argument from, applied to justice, *Rep.* 1. 352; second causes, *Tim.* 46 (cp. 76 E); two kinds of causes, *ib.* 68 E; creative causes, *Phil.* 27; the causes of things, ought to be enquired into by men, *Laws* 7. 821 A; first causes, *ib.* 10. 891 E:—causes of crimes, *Rep.* 8. 552 D; 9. 575 A; *Laws* 8. 831 E, 832 D; 9. 863, 870.
- Cavalry, *Laches* 191;—cavalry officers, election of, *Laws* 6. 755 E.
- Cave, the image of the, *Rep.* 7. 514 foll., 532 (cp. 539 E).
- Cebes of Thebes, willing to provide money for Socrates' escape, *Crito* 45 B; present at the death of Socrates, and taking part in the dialogue *Phaedo*, *Phaedo* 59 B; a friend of Philolaus, *ib.* 61 D; his native speech, *ib.* 62 A; his earnestness, *ib.* 63 A; his incredulity, *ib.* 70 A foll., 77 B; he compares the soul to a weaver's coat, *ib.* 87 B foll.; apt to be disconcerted, *ib.* 103 C.
- Cecrops, *Crit.* 110 A.
- Celibacy, fines on, *Laws* 4. 721 D; 6. 774 A.
- Celts given to intoxication, *Laws* 1. 637 D.
- Censors of magistrates, *Laws* 12. 945–947; creation of censors, *ib.* 946; burial of, *ib.* 947; trial of, *ib.* E.
- Censorship of fiction, *Rep.* 2. 377; 3. 386 foll.; 10. 595 foll.;—of the arts, *ib.* 3. 401;—of poetry, *Laws* 7. 801, 817 D; 8. 829 D. Cp. Fiction, Poets.
- Centaur, *Phaedr.* 229 D; chorus of (sophist-politicians), *Statesm.* 291 A, 303 D.
- Ceos, subject to Athens, *Laws* 1. 638 B;—Prodicus of Ceos, *Protag.* 314 C; *Apol.* 19 E; *Rep.* 10. 600 C; Eryx. 397 C; Pythocleides of, *Protag.* 316 E:—Cean, use of the word *χαλεπόν*, *Protag.* 341
- A:—character of the Cean, *ib.* E.
- Cephalus of Clazomenae, *Rep.* 1. 330 B; *Parm.* 126 A foll.
- Cephalus, father of Lysias, *Phaedr.* 227 A, 263 D; father of Polemarchus, *Rep.* 1. 327 B; offers sacrifice, *ib.* 328 B, 331 D; his views on old age, *ib.* 328 E; his views on wealth, *ib.* 330 A foll.
- Cephisus, Antiphon of, *Apol.* 33 E.
- Cepis, father of Adeimantus, *Protag.* 315 E.
- Cerameis, deme of, *Protag.* 315 E.
- Ceramicus, outside the wall of Athens, *Parm.* 127 C.
- Cerberus, two natures in one, *Rep.* 9. 588 C.
- Cercyon, famous (in mythology) for his skill in wrestling, *Laws* 7. 796 A.
- Chaeredemus, father of Patrocles, half-brother to Socrates, *Euthyd.* 297 E, 298 A, B.
- Chaerephon, a person in the dialogue *Charmides*, *Charm.* 153 A foll.; a kind of madman, *ib.* B (cp. *Apol.* 21 A); consulted the oracle at Delphi concerning Socrates, *Apol.* 20 E; dead at the time of the *Apology*, *ib.* 21 A; goes with Socrates to Gorgias, *Gorg.* 447 A foll.
- Chalcis, name of a bird in Homer, *Crat.* 392 A.
- Χαλεπόν*, use of the word, *Protag.* 341.
- Chance in war, *Rep.* 5. 467 E; blamed by men for their misfortunes, *ib.* 10. 619 C (cp. *Laws* 5. 727 B); the great legislator, *Laws* 4. 709; together with God, *ibid.*; and art, *ibid.*; 10. 889; and nature, *ib.* 10. 889.
- Change, in music, not to be allowed, *Rep.* 4. 424; *Laws* 7. 799; in the laws, *Statesm.* 295 foll.; evil of, *Laws* 7. 797, 798; the principles of change, *ib.* 10. 893, 894:—changes of the soul, *ib.* 903 E, 904 D; changes in the character of

- young men, *ib.* 11. 929 C; changes in body and mind during life, Symp. 207 D.
- Chaos, Tim. 53 A, 69 B; Theaet. 153 D; Statesm. 273:—the 'Chaos' of Anaxagoras, Phaedo 72 C; Gorg. 465 D.
- Character, differences of, in men, Statesm. 307; Rep. 1. 329 D; in women, Rep. 5. 456; affected by the imitation of unworthy objects, *ib.* 3. 395; Laws 2. 668; 7. 798 E; formed in infancy, Laws 7. 791, 792; character and will, *ib.* 10. 904; character of young men, apt to change, *ib.* 11. 929 C (cp. Symp. 207 D):—national character, Rep. 4. 435; affected by climate and soil, Laws 5. 747:—great characters may be ruined by bad education, Rep. 6. 491 E, 495 B; 7. 519 (cp. Laws 8. 831 E):—faults of character, Theaet. 144 B; Rep. 6. 503.
- Chariot driving, Lysis 208 A; Ion 537 A.
- Charioteer of the soul, Phaedr. 246, 253, 254.
- Chariots, not kept in Crete, Laws 8. 834 B.
- Charmantides, the Paeanian, present at the *Republic*, Rep. 1. 328 B.
- Charmers, punishment of, Laws 10. 909 (cp. Rep. 2. 364; Laws 11. 933 A).
- Charmides, the son of Glaucon, Protag. 315 A; a person in the dialogue *Charmides* (see Temperance); the most beautiful youth of his time, Charm. 154 A, C, 157 C, 175 E; his disposition, *ib.* 154 E, 157 C, D; Critias his guardian and cousin, *ib.* 155 A, 156 A, 157 C, 176 C; greatness of his ancestors, *ib.* 157 E (cp. Tim. 20 E); Socrates' influence on him, Symp. 222 B.
- Charondas, lawgiver of Italy and Sicily, Rep. 10. 599 E.
- Chastisement of the soul, Gorg. 505.
- Chastity, Laws 1. 636; 8. 835 foll.
- Cheerfulness, usually accompanied by a high spirit, Laws 7. 791 C.
- Cheese, Rep. 2. 372 C; 3. 405 E.
- Cheiron, teacher of Achilles, Rep. 3. 391 C; Hipp. Min. 371 C.
- Chene, Myson of, Protag. 343 A.
- Child, the new-born, carried round the hearth, Theaet. 160 E:—'the child within us,' Phaedo 77 E:—Children, the greatest riches of their parents, Laches 185 A (cp. Lysis 219 D); have spirit, but not reason, Rep. 4. 441 A (cp. Laws 12. 963 E); why under authority, Rep. 9. 590 E; instincts of, Laws 2. 653; conceive virtue and vice under the forms of pleasure and pain, *ib.* A; prefer comedy to tragedy, *ib.* 658 (cp. Rep. 3. 397 D); a means of immortality, Laws 4. 721; 6. 773 E, 776 B (cp. Symp. 207, 208); fear and courage in, Laws 7. 791 (cp. Laches 197 A); loss of, consoled, Menex. 247, 248; often bring unhappiness on their parents, 2 Alcib. 142:—in the state, Rep. 3. 416; 5. 449 E, 457 foll.; 8. 543; Tim. 18; must not hear improper stories, Rep. 2. 377; 4. 408 C (cp. Laws 12. 941 B); must be reared amid fair sights and sounds, Rep. 3. 401; transfer of children from one class to another, *ib.* 415; 4. 423 D; must receive education even in their games, *ib.* 4. 425 A; 7. 537 A; Laws 1. 643 B; must learn to ride, Rep. 5. 467 (cp. Laws 7. 804 C); must go with their fathers and mothers into war, Rep. 5. 467; 7. 537 A; exposure of children allowed, *ib.* 5. 460 C, 461 C; illegitimate children, *ib.* 5. 461 A; children greatly influenced by song, Laws 2. 659 D; easily persuaded of anything by the legislator, *ib.* 664 A; ought not to touch wine,

- ib.* 666 A; must honour and reverence their parents, *ib.* 4. 717 C; 11. 931, 932; are happiest when only possessed of a moderate fortune, *ib.* 5. 729 A; 6. 773 E; great care necessary in the education of, *ib.* 6. 766 A; 7. 788, 808, 809; procreation of, *ib.* 6. 775, 784, 785 (cp. 2. 674 B); registration of, *ib.* 6. 785; must have experience of pain as well as pleasure, *ib.* 7. 792 A; sports of, *ib.* 793 E; to meet at the village temples, *ib.* 794 A; innovation in the games of, forbidden, *ib.* 797, 798; belong to the state rather than to their parents, *ib.* 804 E; must take part in military exercises, *ib.* 8. 829 C; not to suffer for the sins of their fathers, *ib.* 9. 855 A, 856 D; may not defend themselves against their parents, *ib.* 869 B (cp. Crito 51 C); denied to the treasure taker, *ib.* 11. 913 (cp. Rep. 2. 363 D); number of, recognized by the law as sufficient, Laws 11. 930:—chastisement of, *ib.* 7. 808 E:—quarrels between children and parents, *ib.* 11. 928 foll.:—children in Egypt, *ib.* 7. 819:—children of slaves, *ib.* 11. 930:—provision for the children of citizens fallen in battle at Athens, Menex. 248 E:—‘children of the mind,’ Symp. 209 (cp. Phaedr. 258 C); arguments compared to children, Phaedr. 261 A.
- Chilo, the Lacedaemonian, one of the Seven Wise Men, Protag. 343 A.
- Chimaera, two natures in one, Phaedr. 229 D; Rep. 9. 588 C.
- Chines, presented to the brave warrior, Rep. 5. 468 C.
- Chios, home of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, Euthyd. 271 C, 288 A.
- Cholarges, Nausicydes of, Gorg. 487 C.
- Choral art, Gorg. 501 E; 1 Alcib. 125 D; co-extensive with education, Laws 2. 653 D, 664 E, 672.
- Chorus, divided into two parts, dance and song, Laws 2. 654; the word derived from *χαρά*, *ib.* A; imitates actions of virtue and vice, *ib.* 7. 798 (cp. 2. 655 E; 7. 812 B);—chorus of Apollo and the Muses, *ib.* 2. 664, 665; of Dionysus, *ib.* 665 B, 670 A; 7. 812 B; of the aged, *ib.* 2. 664 D;—the three choruses, *ib.* 664;—choruses of boys and girls, *ibid.*; 6. 772 A;—choruses in Egypt, *ib.* 7. 799 A (cp. 2. 656 D, 660 B);—attendance at choruses, *ib.* 12. 949 C; contests of choruses, *ib.* 8. 834 E; judges of choruses, to take an oath, *ib.* 12. 949 A; leaders and masters of choruses, Ion 536 A; Laws 2. 655 A; 6. 764 E foll., 772 A; 7. 812 E:—choric song, Laws 2. 665; at Crete and Lacedaemon, *ib.* 666 D.
- Chryses, the priest of Apollo (Il. i. 11 foll.), Rep. 3. 392 E foll.
- Chrysippus murdered by Atreus, Crat. 395 B.
- Cimon, a good man in common opinion, Gorg. 503 C, 515 D; ostracized, *ib.* 516 D; real author of the Athenian calamities, *ib.* 519 A.
- Cinesias, a dithyrambic poet, Gorg. 501 E.
- Cinyras, his wealth, Laws 2. 660 E.
- Cithaeron, Crit. 110 D.
- Cithara, (harp), used in contests, Gorg. 501 E (cp. Rep. 3. 399 D). Cp. Harp.
- Citizen, the, owes his first duty to his fatherland, Crito 51; must know both how to rule and how to obey, Laws 1. 643 E (cp. 6. 762 E; 12. 942 C); requires more than a mere military education, *ib.* 2. 666 E; must possess true wisdom, *ib.* 3. 689; must aid the rulers by giving information of the faults of others, *ib.* 5. 730 D, 742 B; 6.



- 762 D (cp. Informer); must be virtuous, *ib.* 6. 770; must not be praised until after death, *ib.* 7. 801 E; the true praise of, *ib.* 822 E; must practise no art but politics, *ib.* 8. 846 D (cp. Rep. 8. 551 E):—the good citizens separated from the bad by the royal science, Statesm. 308, 309:—the citizens [in the best state], compared to a garrison of mercenaries (Adeimantus), Rep. 4. 419 (cp. 8. 543; Tim. 18 B); will form one family, Rep. 5. 462 foll. (cp. Guardians):—[in the Model City], number of citizens, Laws 5. 737, 738; 6. 771; 9. 877 D; 11. 919 D, 929 A; the citizens must not quarrel, *ib.* 5. 737 A; must know and be friends of each other, *ib.* 738 E, 743 C; 6. 759 B, 771 E; to be happy rather than rich, *ib.* 5. 743; divided into four classes, *ib.* 744 C; 6. 754 E; must not lead an idle life, *ib.* 7. 807; not to take part in comic performances, *ib.* 816 E; competitors in the greatest of all contests, *ib.* 830 A, C; must not be lovers of money, *ib.* 832 D; must be able to control their passions, *ib.* 840; must not practise handicraft arts, *ib.* 846 D; not to be retail traders, *ib.* 11. 919 (cp. 8. 842 D, 847 E).
- City, a, compared to a ship, Laws 6. 758; must have experience of the world, *ib.* 12. 951 A:—(the imaginary city), situation of, Rep. 3. 415 D; Laws 5. 745; purification of, Laws 5. 735, 736; divisions of, *ib.* 745; must be well mingled, *ib.* 6. 773 D; manner of its building, *ib.* 778 (cp. 8. 848 D); happiness of, *ib.* 8. 829 A; compared to a man, *ib.* 12. 964 E foll. (cp. Model City):—the heavenly city, Rep. 9. 592:—the 'city of pigs,' *ib.* 2. 372:—the good city leads a life of peace, Laws 8. 829 A:—cities generally divided between rich and poor, Rep. 4. 422 E; 8. 551 E; most cities many in one, *ib.* 4. 422 E; Laws 12. 945 E; maritime cities unstable, Laws 4. 705 A (cp. 12. 949 E); early cities, Protag. 322 B; Laws 3. 680, 681; names of cities, whence derived, Laws 4. 704 A; most cities not polities, but mere aggregations of citizens, *ib.* 713 A. Cp. Constitution, State.
- Clans, Laws 3. 680 E.
- 'Class' and 'part,' Statesm. 262, 263; names of classes (in the Heraclitean philosophy), Theaet. 157 C; division into classes, Soph. 253; Statesm. 258, 262 B, 285, 287 (cp. Phaedr. 265 E foll.); classes of being, Soph. 254, 255:—classes, in the state, to be kept distinct, Rep. 2. 374; 3. 397 E, 415 A; 4. 421, 433, 434, 441 E, 443; 5. 453; Tim. 17 C; Laws 8. 846 E (cp. Rep. 8. 552 A); distinction of, in Egypt, Tim. 24 A; in ancient Attica, Crit. 110 D;—all classes should be protected by law, Laws 4. 715 B; the four classes in the Model City, *ib.* 5. 744 C; 6. 754 E.
- Classification (in rhetoric), Phaedr. 271 B.
- Clazomenae, Anaxagoras of, Apol. 26 D; Cephalus of, Parm. 126 A, B; Heracleides of, Ion 541 D.
- Cleinias, father of Alcibiades, Protag. 309 C; Gorg. 481 D; 1 Alcib. 103 A, 105 D, 113 B; fell at Coronea, 1 Alcib. 112 C.
- Cleinias, younger brother of Alcibiades, ward of Pericles, Protag. 320 A; 1 Alcib. 104 B; a madman, 1 Alcib. 118 E.
- Cleinias, son of Axiochus, Euthyd. 271 A, 273 A; his education, *ib.* 275 A foll.; joins in the conversation in the dialogue *Euthydemus*, *ib.* 275 D—282 D, 288 D—290 E.
- Cleinias, of Cnosus in Crete, a person in the *Laws*, Laws 1. 624



- foll. (cp. 3. 702 C; 6. 753 A); does not agree in the condemnation of unnatural love, *ib.* 8. 837 E, 842 A.
- Cleito, the nymph, Crit. 113 D, 116 C.
- Cleitophon, the son of Aristonymus, Rep. 1. 328 B; interposes on behalf of Thrasymachus, *ib.* 340 A.
- Cleobulus of Lindus, one of the Seven Wise Men, Protag. 343 A.
- Cleombrotus, absent at the time of Socrates' death, Phaedo 59 C.
- Cleopatra, mother of Perdiccas, Gorg. 471 C.
- Cleophrantus, son of Themistocles, a famous horseman, Meno 93 C.
- Cleverness, no match for honesty, Rep. 3. 409 C (cp. 10. 613 C); needs an ideal direction, *ib.* 7. 519; Laws 1. 643 E; 5. 747 C; true cleverness, Theaet. 176 C; cleverness in excess, Laws 7. 819 A (cp. 10. 908 C):—clever persons usually volatile and changeable, Theaet. 144 B (cp. Rep. 6. 503).
- Climate, influence of, on men, Laws 5. 747 D.
- Clotho, second of the Fates, Rep. 10. 617 C, 620 E; Laws 12. 960 C; sings of the present, Rep. 10. 617 C; the souls brought to her, *ib.* 620 E.
- Clownishness, Phil. 48 B.
- Cnosus, a city in Crete, Laws 1. 625 A; 6. 752 E, 754 D; form of government in, *ib.* 4. 712 E:—Cleinius a Cnosian, *ib.* 1. 629 C:—Colony from Cnosus and other Cretan states, *ib.* 3. 702 C; 4. 707 E; 6. 752 D, E, 754 B, C, D (cp. 12. 950 D, 969).
- Cocks, training of, Laws 7. 789:—cock-fighting, Theaet. 164 D.
- Cocytus, Phaedo 113 C; Rep. 3. 387 B; homicides cast forth by, Phaedo 114 A.
- Codrus, died to preserve the kingdom for his sons, Symp. 208 D.
- Coinage (in the Model City), Laws 5. 742 A, 746 E. *See* Money.
- Cold, Phaedo 103 C; Tim. 62 B; Phil. 32 A; the sense of, in the Heraclitean philosophy, Theaet. 156 B.
- Collusion, Laws 11. 936 D.
- Colonization, Laws 4. 708 C; 5. 736 A, 740 E.
- Colony, Cretan or Cnosian, Laws 3. 702 C; 4. 707 E; 6. 752 D, E, 754 B, C, D; 12. 950 D, 969 (cp. Model City):—colonies, foundation of, and purgation of the state, *ib.* 5. 736 A (cp. 4. 708 C; 5. 740 E); relation of, to their parent states, *ib.* 6. 754 B; disinherited and younger sons sent into, *ib.* 11. 923, 925, 929.
- Colour, Tim. 67, 68; a common notion, Meno 74; defined, *ib.* 76; origin of, Theaet. 153, 156; colour and colours, Phil. 12 E; pleasures of colour, *ib.* 51:—employment of colours by painters, Crat. 424 E; indelible colours, Rep. 4. 429 D; comparison of colours, *ib.* 9. 585 A; contrast of colours, *ib.* 586 C; not to be employed in offerings to the Gods, Laws 12. 956 A:—colours of the earth, Phaedo 110:—'colours' in music, Laws 2. 655:—'colours' of poetry, Rep. 10. 601 A.
- Column, the, of light, Rep. 10. 616 B; — columns, [*στήλαι*], with figures on them, Symp. 193 A; with laws written on them, Crit. 119 C, E, 120 A (cp. Laws 11. 917 E).
- Comedy, can it be allowed in the state? Rep. 3. 394 (cp. Laws 7. 816 D; 11. 935); accustoms the mind to vulgarity, Rep. 10. 606; produces both pleasure and pain in the spectator, Phil. 48 A; preferred to tragedy by children, Laws 2. 658 (cp. Rep. 3. 397 D); the amusement of slaves, Laws 7. 816 D foll.:—same poet can write both comedy and tragedy, Symp.

- 223; same actors cannot act both, Rep. 3. 395.
- Comic poets, Laws 11. 935; the enemies of Socrates, Apol. 18, 19; Phaedo 70 B.
- Command and obedience, Laws 1. 643 E; 6. 762 E; 12. 942 C:—art of command, Statesm. 260 C, 292.
- Commensurable things, Laws 7. 819, 820 (cp. Parm. 140).
- Common life in the state, Rep. 5. 458, 464 foll. (cp. Laws 5. 739):—common meals of the guardians, Rep. 3. 416 (cp. 8. 543 C):—common meals (*συσσίτια*) at Lacedaemon, Laws 1. 633 A; 6. 780 B foll.; 8. 842 B; in Crete, *ib.* 1. 625, 633; 6. 780 B foll., 8. 842 B; in the Model City, *ib.* 6. 780, 783 B; 7. 806 E; 8. 842 B; designed with a view to war, *ib.* 1. 625, 633; 6. 780 B (cp. 12. 942 B); evil of, *ib.* 1. 636:—common meals of the wardens of the country, *ib.* 6. 762:—common meals for women, Rep. 5. 458 D; Laws 6. 781; 7. 806 E; 8. 839 D:—common property (among the guardians), Rep. 3. 416; 4. 420 A, 422 D; 5. 464; 8. 543; Tim. 18 C; in ancient Attica, Crit. 110 D; in the days of Cronos, Statesm. 272 A; the ideal of the legislator, Laws 5. 739 (cp. 7. 807 B).
- Common notions, Meno 74; Theaet. 185, 208 D:—common places, Phaedr. 236 A.
- Communion of things with one another, Soph. 252, 254, 259 A.
- Communism, highest form of, Laws 5. 739 (cp. 7. 807 B).
- Community of feeling, Gorg. 481 D; Rep. 5. 464; Laws 3. 694 B, 697 D; 5. 739 C:—of property, Rep. 3. 416; 4. 420, 422 D; 5. 464; 8. 543; Tim. 18 C; Laws 5. 739; 7. 807 B; in ancient Attica, Crit. 110 D; in the days of Cronos, Statesm. 272 A; not proposed for the second-best state, Laws 5. 740 A:—of women and children, Rep. 3. 416; 5. 449 E foll., 457 foll., 461 E foll.; 8. 543 A; Tim. 18; Statesm. 272 A; Laws 5. 739; 7. 807 B.
- Community. [*The communism upon which Plato has based his ideal polity seems to have been suggested by his desire for the unity of the state* (Rep. 5. 462 foll.: and cp. Arist. Pol. ii. 2-4). 'If those two small pestilent words "meum" and "tuum," which have engendered so much strife among men and created so much mischief in the world,' could be banished from the lips and thoughts of mankind, the dream of the philosopher would soon be realized. The citizens would have parents, wives, children, and property in common; they would rejoice in each other's prosperity and sorrow at each other's misfortune; they would call their rulers, not 'lords' and 'masters,' but 'friends' and 'saviours.' Plato was aware that such a conception could hardly be carried out in this world; and he evades or adjourns rather than solves the difficulty by the assertion of the famous 'paradox' that only when the philosopher rules in the city will the ills of human life find an end [cp. Introduction to Republic, p. clxxiii]. In the Critias, where the ideal state, as Plato himself intimates to us, is to some extent reproduced in an imaginary description of ancient Attica, property is common, but there is no mention of a community of wives and children. Finally in the Laws (5. 739), Plato, while still maintaining the blessings of communism, recognizes the impossibility of its

- realization, and sets about the construction of a 'second-best state' in which the rights of property are conceded; although, according to Aristotle (Pol. ii. 6, § 5), he gradually reverts to the ideal constitution in all except a few unimportant particulars. See s. v. State.]*
- Comparison, difficulties occasioned by, Theaet. 154, 155.
- Compassionateness of Athens to the weak, Menex. 244, 245.
- Compensation for injury, Laws 9. 877, 878.
- Competitors, obstruction of, Laws 12. 955 A. *See* Contests.
- Compound and simple, Phaedo 78.
- Conceit, the cure of, Soph. 230 (cp. Theaet. 211 E). *See* Self-conceit.
- Conception, in love, Symp. 206; in thought, Theaet. 148 E (cp. 160 E, 211 E); of truth, Rep. 6. 490 A;—union of conceptions, Soph. 259 E;—conception and generation of man, an imitation of the earth, Menex. 238 A.
- Conciliation, spirit of, always desirable, Laws 4. 718 E, 723 A (cp. 10. 885 E).
- Condemnation of Socrates, Apol. 38, 39.
- Confidence and courage, Laches 197 B; Protag. 349 C foll., 351, 359 foll.; Meno 88 A (cp. Rep. 4. 430 B); confidence and reverence, Laws 1. 647 A.
- Confiscation of the property of the rich in democracies, Rep. 8. 565; of goods (of citizens), not allowed in the Model City, Laws 9. 855 A.
- Conflagrations, great periodical, signified by the myth of Phaëthon, Tim. 22 C.
- Conflict, the, of reason with desire, Phaedr. 253 foll.; Rep. 4. 439–442; 9. 571 D; Tim. 69 E foll.; Laws 3. 687, 689:—the immortal conflict of good and evil, Laws 10. 906.
- Connexion (in style), Phaedr. 264 B.
- Connus, son of Metrobius, music-master of Socrates, a harp-player, Euthyd. 272 C (cp. Menex. 235 E); disliked opposition, Euthyd. 295 D.
- Consciousness, Phil. 34, 43.
- Consonants, Crat. 424 C; Theaet. 203 B; Soph. 253 A; Phil. 18 C.
- Constitution, the aristocratic, is the ideal state sketched in Rep. bk. 4 (cp. 8. 544 E, 545 D; Laws 5. 739);—the 'Laws' the 'second-best' constitution, Laws 5. 739; 7. 807 B;—the 'third-best,' *ib.* 5. 739:—defective forms of constitution, Rep. 4. 445 B; 8. 544; Statesm. 291 foll., 301 foll.; 'timocracy' or Spartan polity, Rep. 8. 545 foll.; aristocracy (in the ordinary sense), *ib.* 1. 338 D; Statesm. 291 E, 301 A, 302 D; Laws 3. 681; Menex. 238 C; oligarchy, Rep. 8. 550 foll., 554 E; Statesm. 291, 301, 302; democracy, Rep. 8. 555 foll., 557 D; Statesm. 291, 301; tyranny, Rep. 8. 544 C, 562; 9. 576; Statesm. 276 E, 291 E, 302;—ordinary constitutions not to be called 'polities,' Laws 4. 713 A, 715 A. Cp. Government (forms of), State.
- Constitution, the bodily, different in different individuals, Laws 1. 636 A. Cp. Body.
- Contentiousness, a characteristic of timocracy, Rep. 8. 546.
- Contest, the, of virtue, Laws 5. 731:—various kinds of contests, *ib.* 2. 658; training for contests, Rep. 3. 404 A; 6. 503 E; 7. 535 B; Laws 1. 646 D; 7. 807 C; 8. 830, 839 E, 840 A (cp. Training);—contests of rhapsodes, Ion 530; Laws 2. 658;—the cithara in contests, Gorg. 501 E;—funeral contests at Athens, Menex. 249 B:—(in the Model City), gymnastic contests, Laws 6. 764 C foll.; 8. 828 C, 830, 834; 12.



- 947 E;—contests of horses, *ib.* 6. 764 E; 8. 834 B; 12. 947 E;—musical, *ib.* 2. 658 A; 6. 764 D foll.; 8. 828 C, 834 E; 12. 947 E; judges of, *ib.* 2. 659; 6. 764 D; 12. 948 E;—in running, *ib.* 8. 833 D;—in strength, *ib.* C; umpires of, *ib.* E; 12. 949 A;—contests in honour of the dead, *ib.* 12. 947 E;—homicide at contests, *ib.* 8. 831 A; 9. 865 A; no abuse to be allowed at, *ib.* 11. 935; law against the obstruction of competitors, *ib.* 955 A.
- Contracts, sometimes not protected by law, Rep. 8. 556 A; are holy, Laws 5. 729 E; laws concerning, *ib.* 8. 847; 11. 920, 921.
- Contradiction, proved impossible, Euthyd. 285 D foll.; nature of, Rep. 4. 436; 10. 602 E; power of, *ib.* 5. 454 A.
- Contributions (friendly), collection of, Laws 11. 915 E; (in time of war), *ib.* 12. 949 D.
- Controversy, kinds of, Soph. 225.
- Convention in morals, Gorg. 482 E; convention and nature, Laws 10. 88 E:—the conventional theory of justice (Glaucón), Rep. 2. 359 A; (Protagoras), Theaet. 172 A, 177 C. Cp. Names.
- Conversation, should not be personal, Rep. 6. 500 B (cp. Theaet. 174 C).
- Conversion of the soul, Rep. 7. 518, 521, 525 (cp. Laws 12. 957 E).
- Convivial meetings, should be under a ruler, Laws 1. 639 foll.; 2. 671 E; a kind of education, *ib.* 1. 641; bring out character, *ib.* 650. For a description of a Greek banquet, cp. the *Symposium*, and references under 'Greek Life.'
- Cook and physician, Gorg. 521 E; the cook a better judge than the guest, Theaet. 178 D.
- Cookery, how far an art, Gorg. 462 foll.; art of, *ib.* 465, 518; cookery and medicine, *ib.* 501 A;—analogy of, employed in the definition of justice, Rep. 1. 332 D.
- Co-operative arts, Statesm. 281, 282, 287 B.
- Copper, Tim. 59 C.
- Corinth, battle of, Theaet. 142 A; Menex. 245 E:—Corinthian courtezans, Rep. 3. 404 D:—Corinthians, the, ask aid of Athens, Menex. 244 D; willing to betray the Asiatic Greeks, *ib.* 245 C:—*ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος*, Euthyd. 292 E.
- Coronea, battle of, 1 Alcib. 112 C.
- Corpses, not to be spoiled, Rep. 5. 469:—corpses of criminals, outside the north wall of Athens, *ib.* 4. 439 E; to be cast beyond the border, Laws 9. 855 A, 873 B; 10. 909 B.
- Correction, art of, Soph. 229 A.
- Correlations, Phil. 53 E.
- Correlative and relative, qualifications of, Gorg. 476; Rep. 4. 437 foll.; how corrected, Rep. 7. 524.
- Corruptio optimi pessima*, Rep. 6. 491.
- Corruption, the, of youth, laid to Socrates' charge, Euthyph. 2, 3, 5; Apol. 24 foll.; not the work of the Sophists, but of public opinion, Rep. 6. 492 A. Cp. Sophist.
- Corruption and generation, Phaedo 96; corruption in pleasures and pains, Phil. 41 A.
- Corybantes, Symp. 215 E; at the mysteries, Euthyd. 277 D; not in their right mind, Ion 534 A; remedial effects of their dances, Laws 7. 790 D.
- Cos, Hippocrates of, Protag. 311 B.
- Cosmos, Statesm. 273 B; meaning of the name, Gorg. 508 A; a body, because composed of the same elements as the human body, Phil. 29 E. Cp. Universe.
- Council, the, at Athens, Menex. 234 B:—in the Model City, Laws 6. 756; division of, *ib.* 758; duties of, *ibid.*;—the Nocturnal Council,



*ib.* 10. 908 A, 909 A; 12. 951, 961, 968, 969.

Counsellors, the two, of man (pleasure and pain), Laws 1. 644 C.

Country, arrangements for the defence of the, Laws 6. 760, 778 E (cp. Wardens of the Country):—a man's country to be served without taking of rewards, *ib.* 12. 955 C.

Courage, a part of virtue, Laches 190, 199; Protag. 349, 350, 353, 359; Laws 1. 631 D foll.; 3. 688 A, 696 B; 12. 963; fourth in the scale of virtue, Laws 1. 630 C, 631 D; 2. 667 A: = staying at one's post, Laches 190 E; = endurance of the soul, *ib.* 192; = knowledge of that which inspires fear or confidence, *ib.* 195 (cp. Rep. 2. 376; 4. 429 C, 442 B); = knowledge of that which is not dangerous, Protag. 360;—courage not to be ascribed to children or animals, Laches 196 E (*but* cp. Rep. 4. 430 B; Laws 12. 963 E); distinguished from fearlessness, Laches 197 B (cp. Protag. 349 C foll., 351, 359 foll.; Meno 88 A; Rep. 4. 430 B); concerned with the good and evil of all time, Laches 199; may exist in bad men, Protag. 349 D, 359 B; Laws 1. 630 B; springs in many cases merely from dread, Phaedo 68; inconsistent with the fear of death, *ibid.*; Rep. 3. 386; 6. 486 A; one of the philosopher's virtues, Phaedo 68; Rep. 6. 486 A, 490 E, 495 A; required in the guardians, Rep. 2. 375; 3. 386; 4. 429; 6. 503 E; a good, 1 Alcib. 115;—courage and temperance opposed, Statesm. 307, 308; to be blended, *ib.* 310 (cp. Laws 1. 630 A; 3. 696 A);—courage and wisdom, Protag. 350, 360 (cp. Laches 194 D; Gorg. 491, 495; Laws 12. 963);

—the courage which resists pleasure, Laws 1. 633:—the courageous life, *ib.* 5. 733 E:—the courageous temper averse to intellectual toil, Rep. 6. 503 D (cp. Tim. 88 D); dangerous to the state, when in excess, Statesm. 308 A; apt to make men brutal, *ib.* 309 D; a gift of nature, Laws 12. 963 E.

Courage. [*In treating of courage Plato shows a tendency, as in the case of the virtues generally, to connect or even identify it with knowledge. The subject is first discussed in the Laches, of which it forms the main topic. A series of definitions is there given, which are all found to be inadequate, but which exhibit the progression from a lower to a higher conception of courage. Laches begins by saying that courage is the quality which makes a man stand to his post; but this is refuted by the observation that courage may also be displayed in flight. A second definition, according to which courage is the same as endurance, is equally futile: for endurance may be mere persistence in a wrong course. Nicias then interposes:—Courage is a species of wisdom, which teaches us the true grounds of hope and fear. It is thus distinguished from confidence or fearlessness, which causes men and animals to be bold because they are ignorant of danger. Socrates answers that such a knowledge, like any other, must include the future and the past as well as the present, if it is to be of any use to us. But then courage, which is the 'knowledge of all,' will be identical with 'all virtue,' and we have gained, not a definition of courage, but of virtue in general.*]

— *A similar identification of courage and wisdom is found in the Protagoras, and is there left unrefuted, although Socrates is made to intimate that the argument is inconclusive.—In the Republic, where courage, like the other virtues, is regarded principally in relation to the state, it is declared to be the especial virtue of the 'spirited element' in the soul which is represented by the warrior class among the citizens. But it is also (as in the Phaedo) a virtue of the philosopher, who alone of men fears neither death nor the life to come.—The Statesman contains an interesting contrast between temperance and courage. The courageous man is all fire and energy; he neither rests himself nor suffers others to rest. The orderly and moderate character on the contrary is long-suffering and patient, nor has he any inclination to interfere with his neighbours. The two dispositions are rarely or never united in the same person; and both when in excess are the cause of great evils (cp. the similar remarks in Rep. 6. 503 C and Theaet. 144 B, and v. s. v. Temperance).—In the Laws, of which one main thesis is 'that peace is better than war,' courage is placed fourth and lowest in the scale of virtues. Courage is a mere gift of nature, and may be shown even by children and the brutes. This is a fact which has been overlooked by the legislators of Crete and Sparta. They have tried to make their citizens courageous and enduring, but they have only regarded courage of the vulgar sort, and have neglected that nobler kind which teaches men to resist the insidious temptations of pleasure and desire. The*

*Spartans boast that they are superior to all other men in battle; but war is a matter of chance, and victory does not always prove the goodness or badness of institutions. (V. s. v. Virtue.)]*

Courtesans, Phaedr. 240 B; Rep. 3. 404 D.

Courts of Law, at Athens, Apol. 34;—in the Model City, Laws 5. 766; 9. 876. *See* Law courts.

Covetousness, not found in the philosopher, Rep. 6. 485 E; characteristic of timocracy and oligarchy, *ib.* 8. 548, 553; = the appetitive element of the soul, *ib.* 9. 581 A.

Cowardice, Protag. 359 foll.; Menex. 246; 1 Alcib. 115 D; in war, to be punished, Rep. 5. 468 A; Laws 12. 944 E; not found in the philosopher, Rep. 6. 486 B; alien to the nature of God, Laws 10. 901 E.

Craftsmen, dedicated to the Gods, Laws 11. 920 D; regulations for (in the Model City), *ib.* 920, 921. Cp. Artisans.

Cranes, proverbial for cleverness, Statesm. 263 D; nurseries of, *ib.* 264 C.

Cratylus, a person in the dialogue *Cratylus*, Crat. 383 A, 427 E foll.; his name, *ib.* 383 B; on names, *ib.* 383 A, 428 B foll.; Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, *ib.* 432 B.

Creation, myth of, Protag. 320 D foll.; Statesm. 269 foll. :—reason of, Tim. 29; species of, *ib.* 39, 40; divine and human creation, Soph. 265, 266 (cp. Rep. 10. 596 foll.); physical theories of creation, Laws 10. 889; origin of creation, *ib.* 893, 894.

Creator of the world, Protag. 320 foll.; Tim. 28; Soph. 265; Statesm. 269 foll.; Laws 10. 886 foll. Cp. God.

Credit, not to be recognized by

- law, Laws 8. 849 E; 11. 915 D.
- Creon, a Thessalian, father of Scopas, Protag. 339 A.
- Creophylus, 'the child of flesh,' companion of Homer, Rep. 10. 600 B.
- Cresphontes, King of Messene, Laws 3. 683 D; an inexperienced legislator, *ib.* 692 B.
- Crete, Theseus' voyage to, Phaedo 58 A; scenery of, Laws 1. 625 B; evil effect of gymnasia in, *ib.* 636 B; 'as plain as that Crete is an island,' *ib.* 2. 662 B; Crete and Lacedaemon akin, *ib.* 3. 683 A, 693 E; rocky nature of Crete, *ib.* 4. 704 C; not suitable for horses, *ib.* 8. 834 B:—armed dances in Crete, *ib.* 7. 796 B:—common tables, *ib.* 1. 625, 633 A; 6. 780 B, 781 A; 8. 842 B:—Cretan constitution generally applauded, Crito 52 E; Rep. 8. 544 C; a timocracy, Rep. 8. 545 B; designed with a view to war, Laws 1. 625 foll.; 4. 705 E; has a certain moderation, *ib.* 3. 693 E; hardly to be called by any definite name, *ib.* 4. 712 E; helpful to lawgivers, *ib.* 8. 836 B:—Cretan laws, given to Minos by Zeus, *ib.* 1. 624 A; 2. 662 B; famous among the Hellenes, *ib.* 1. 631 B; give no experience in pleasure, *ib.* 635 B foll.; imperfect, *ib.* 2. 662 C:—Cretan treatment of love, *ib.* 1. 636 C; 8. 836 B; estimation of gymnastic, *ib.* 2. 673 B; drinking regulations, *ib.* 674 A (cp. 1. 639 D); mode of distributing produce, *ib.* 8. 847 E:—Cretan and Lacedaemonian philosophy, Protag. 342 A:—the Cretan colony, Laws 3. 702 C; 4. 707 E; 6. 752 D, E, 754 B, C, D; 12. 950 D, 969:—Cretan young men not allowed to go into other cities, Protag. 342 D:—Cretan women, noted for their cultivation, *ibid.*:—Cretan mounted archers and javelin-men, Laws 8. 834 D:—Cretans, like the Lacedaemonians, exercise naked, Rep. 5. 452 C; call their country 'motherland,' *ib.* 9. 575 E; think that Rhadamanthus was the justest of men, Laws 1. 625 A; know the poems of Tyrtaeus, *ib.* 629 B; invented the tale of Ganymede, *ib.* 636 C; have more wit than words, *ib.* 641 E; conservative in music, *ib.* 2. 660 B; their education that of a camp, *ib.* 666 E; not much acquainted with Homer, *ib.* 3. 680 C; suppose that Salamis was the salvation of Hellas, *ib.* 4. 707 B; partly descendants of colonists from the Peloponnesus, *ib.* 708 A.
- Cretic rhythm, Rep. 3. 400 B.
- Crime, a madness begotten of some ancient and unexpiated sin, Laws 9. 854 B:—crimes, great and small, differently estimated by mankind, Rep. 1. 344 (cp. 348 D); causes of, *ib.* 6. 491 E, 495 B; 8. 552 D; 9. 575 A; Laws 8. 832 D; 9. 863, 870; divided into voluntary and involuntary, Laws 9. 860 foll.; pleas in extenuation of, *ib.* 864 D; crimes caused by unbelief, *ib.* 10. 908, 909.
- Criminals, great, chiefly come from the class of kings and tyrants, Gorg. 525 E (cp. Rep. 10. 615 E); are usually men of strong character spoiled by bad education, Rep. 6. 491 E, 495 B; numerous in oligarchies, *ib.* 8. 552 D; may exist even in a well-ordered state, Laws 9. 853, 872 D:—children of criminals, *ib.* 855 A, 856 D:—criminal law, *ib.* 853 foll.
- Crison of Himera, a famous runner, Protag. 336 A; his abstinence during training, Laws 8. 840 A.



- Critias, the elder, son of Dropidas, Charm. 157 E; Tim. 20 E, 21 A; Crit. 113 B.
- Critias, the younger, son of Callaechrus, a descendant of Solon, Charm. 153 C, 155 A; Tim. 20 E; Crit. 113 B; guardian and cousin of Charmides, Charm. 155 A, 156 A, 157 C, 176 C; a friend of Socrates, Charm. 156 A; a wise man, *ib.* 161 B; present at the *Protagoras*, Protag. 316 A foll.; well acquainted with politics, Tim. 20 A; tells the 'ancient tale,' *ib.* 21 A, B; Crit. 108 C foll. Critias takes part in the dialogues *Charmides*, *Timaeus*, and *Critias*.
- Critias, a person in the *Eryxias*, Eryx. 392 A, *et passim*.
- Criticism, applies to good and bad equally, Ion 531; implies knowledge of the whole, *ib.* 532; difficult, without knowledge of the subject, Crit. 107; value of, in science, Statesm. 298:—qualities necessary for criticism of the soul, Gorg. 487:—friendly criticism, valuable, Laws 1. 635 A:—criticism of painting, sculpture, and music, Ion 533 (cp. Crit. 107 C); of poetry, Ion 532; of sophistry, Euthyd. 303, 304; of speeches, Phaedr. 262 foll.; verbal criticism, Protag. 343 foll.
- Crito, willing to go to Euthydemus with Socrates, Euthyd. 272 E; joins in the dialogue *Euthydemus*, *ib.* 290 E–292 E, 304 C–307 B; doubts the value of philosophy, *ib.* 305 B; anxious about the education of his son, *ib.* 306 D; of the same age and deme as Socrates, Apol. 33 D; offers to be one of the sureties, *ib.* 38 B (cp. Phaedo 115 E); comes to Socrates in prison, Crito 43 A, etc.; urges Socrates to escape, *ib.* 45 A foll.; his means, *ib.* 45 A (cp. Euthyd. 304 C); his friends in Thessaly, Crito 45 B, 53 D; with Socrates at the last, Phaedo 59 B, 60 A, 63 D; Socrates entrusts Xanthippe to his care, *ib.* 60 A; receives the last commands, *ib.* 115 A, 118 D.
- Critobulus, son of Crito, Apol. 33 E; his appearance as a boy, Euthyd. 271 B; needs a teacher, *ib.* 306 D; offers to be one of the sureties, Apol. 38 B; present at the death of Socrates, Phaedo 59 B.
- Croesus, Rep. 2. 359 C; 'as the oracle said to Croesus,' *ib.* 8. 566 C.
- Crommyonian sow, not to be called courageous, Laches 196 E.
- Cronos, ill treated by Zeus, Euthyph. 6 A, 8 B; Rep. 2. 377 E; etymology of his name, Crat. 396 B; his stupidity, *ibid.* (cp. Euthyd. 287 B; old-fashioned days of, Crat. 402 A; his chains, *ib.* 404 A (cp. Symp. 195 C); love not older than, Symp. 195 C; judgment of men under, Gorg. 523 A, B; his treatment of Uranus, Rep. 2. 377 E; the son of Oceanus and Tethys, Tim. 40 E; kingdom of, Statesm. 269 A (cp. 271 C); life in the days of, *ib.* 272 A, B; Laws 4. 713 A foll. (cp. Statesm. 276 A).
- Crypteia, Laws 1. 633 C.
- Ctesippus, the Paeanian, Lysis 203 A foll.; the friend of Menexenus, *ib.* 206 D; takes part in the dialogue *Euthydemus*, Euthyd. 283 foll.; well-bred, but wild, *ib.* 273 A (cp. Lysis 204, 205); the friend of Cleinias, Euthyd. 274 B, C, 283 E, etc.; eager for virtue, *ib.* 285 C; his passionate character, *ib.* 283 E, 288 A, 294 C, 300 E; present at the death of Socrates, Phaedo 59 B.
- Cunning man, the, no match for the virtuous, Rep. 3. 409 D.
- Cupping-glasses, Tim. 80 A.



Curetes, the, in Crete, Laws 7. 796 B.  
 Currency (in the Model City), Laws 5. 742 A, 746 E. Cp. Money.  
 Curse arising from ancient crime, Laws 9. 854 B:—the curses of a parent terrible, *ib.* 11. 931 (cp. 3. 687; 2 Alcib. 138, 141 A);—curses, not to be uttered during a suit, Laws 12. 949 A, 957 B:—cursing and swearing, forbidden, *ib.* 11. 934 E.  
 Custom, in language, Crat. 434 E (cp. Names); an excuse for improper practices, Laws 1. 637 D; the law of primitive society, *ib.* 3. 680 A; varieties of, *ib.* 681 B; 6. 782; custom and law, *ib.* 7. 793; 8. 822 E, 841 B (cp. Statesm. 295 A, 298 D; Laws 12. 959 E).  
 Cycles, recurrence of, in nature, Rep. 8. 546 A; Tim. 22 C; Statesm. 269 fol.; Laws 3. 677 (cp. Crit. 109 D).  
 Cyclopes, Homer's picture of the (Od. ix. 112–115), Laws 3. 680 B (cp. *ib.* 682 A).  
 Cydathenaeum, the deme of, Symp. 173 B.  
 Cydias quoted on love, Charm. 155 D.  
 Cymindis, name of a bird in Homer, Crat. 392 A.  
 Cypress, groves of, near Cnosus, Laws 1. 625 B:—cypress-wood, *ib.* 4. 705 C; Eryx. 394 E; cypress-wood tablets, Laws 5. 741 C.  
 Cyprus, the expedition to, Menex. 241 E:—Cypriote rites, Laws 5. 738 C.  
 Cypselids, their offerings at Olympia, Phaedr. 236 B.  
 Cyrene, Theodorus of, Theaet. 143 C; Ammon, the God of, Statesm. 257 B.  
 Cynus, Laws 1. 630 A.  
 Cyrus, never had any real education, Laws 3. 694 A foll.; his

sons not well brought up, *ib.* 695 B foll.; an object of emulation to Alcibiades, 1 Alcib. 105 C, D; freed the Persians, Menex. 239 D.  
 Cyzicus, Apollodorus of, Ion 541 C.

## D.

Dactylic metre, Rep. 3. 400 C.  
 Daedalus, son of Metion, the famous sculptor of antiquity, Ion 533 A; ancestor of Socrates, Euthyph. 11 B; 1 Alcib. 121 A; his date, Laws 3. 677 D:—moving figures of, Meno. 97 D foll.; arguments compared to them, Euthyph. 11 B. foll., 15 B; beauty of his works, Rep. 7. 529 E.  
 Damages, actions for, Laws 8. 846 A; 12. 956 C.  
 Damon, tutor of the sons of Nicias, recommended by Socrates, Laches 180 C; a friend of Socrates, always with Prodicus, *ib.* 197 D; his wisdom, *ib.* 200 A, B; an authority on rhythm, Rep. 3. 400 B (cp. *ib.* 4. 424 C); tutor of Pericles, 1 Alcib. 118 C.  
 Danaus, descendants of, Menex. 245 D.  
 Dancing, in education, Rep. 3. 412; Laws 2. 655; 7. 813; origin of, due to a sense of rhythm, Laws 2. 654 A, 672, 673; consecrated in Egypt, *ib.* 656 E; 7. 799 A; novelties in, not allowed in Crete or at Lacedaemon, *ib.* 2. 660 B; dancing and gymnastic, *ib.* 673; 7. 795 E, 813; effect of, on the soul, *ib.* 7. 791 A; two kinds of, *ib.* 795 E, 814 E; imitative nature of, *ib.* 796, 798, 814; innovation in, forbidden, *ib.* 799, 800, 802, 809 B, 816 C; to be made part of the training for war, *ib.* 796; 8. 830 D; 12. 942 C:—dances of youths and

- maidens, *ib.* 6. 771 E; military dances, *ib.* 7. 796; 12. 942 C; dances in propitiation of the Gods, *ib.* 7. 804 A; Pyrrhic dances, *ib.* 815, 816; dances of peace, *ibid.*:—dancers, Ion 536 A; Rep. 2. 373 B:—dancing girls, Protag. 347 C.
- Dardania, founding of, Laws 3. 681 E, 702 A.
- Darius, his wealth, Lysis 211 E; an author (by his laws), Phaedr. 258 C; his expedition against the Scythians, Gorg. 483 E; his parentage, Laws 3. 695 C; laws enacted by him, *ibid.*; his invasion of Hellas, *ib.* 698; his conquests, Menex. 239 E.
- Datis, commander of the Persian army, Laws 3. 698 C; Menex. 240 A.
- Day and night, Tim. 39:—*dies fasti et nefasti*, Laws 7. 800 E:—Days of festival, *ib.* 8. 828, 834 E; days for selling and buying, *ib.* 849.
- Day-dreams, Rep. 5. 458 A, 476 C.
- Dead, the, judgment of, Gorg. 523; Rep. 10. 615 (cp. Hades, World below); condition of, Gorg. 524; souls of, take an interest in human affairs, Laws 11. 927 A (cp. 9. 870 E, 872 E); not pleased by the grief of their relations, Menex. 249 B:—the dead in battle, not to be stripped, Rep. 5. 469; honour paid to, at Athens, Menex. 234 C, 249 A:—eulogies over, Laws 7. 801; contests in honour of, *ib.* 12. 947 E; Menex. 249 B; sepulchres of, Laws 12. 958 C; laying out of, *ib.* 959.
- Death, Tim. 81. D; Apol. 37; is not feared by the wise man, *ib.* 29, 35; Phaedo 62–68; either a sleep or a migration, Apol. 40; philosophic desire of, Phaedo 61, 64, 67, 80; nature of, *ib.* 64; necessary to pure knowledge, *ib.* 66; fears of, *ib.* 77 E (cp. Rep. 1. 330 E; 3. 386; Laws 10. 904 C); such fears natural, Phaedo 95; death, not the end of all, *ib.* 107 E; nature of, Gorg. 524 B; must not be feared by the guardians, Rep. 3. 386, 387 (cp. 6. 486 C); preferable to slavery, *ib.* 3. 386 A; death or life, which is better? Laws 8. 828 E (cp. Phaedo 62 A; Laws 12. 944 D):—(as a punishment) the only remedy for the wicked, Laws 12. 957 E (cp. Gorg. 512 A; Rep. 3. 410 A; Statesm. 308 E; Laws 5. 735 E; 9. 854 C, E, 862 E); cases in which it ought to be inflicted, Laws 9. 854, 859–863, 880 E; 12. 957 E (cp. Statesm. 297 D);—judges in cases of death, Laws 9. 855 C, 866 C, 868 E, 871 C; 12. 958 C (cp. 11. 916 C);—death the penalty of temple-robbing, etc., *ib.* 9. 854 E; of treason, *ib.* 856 D; of homicide (in the case of the stranger who returns after the crime), *ib.* 866 C; (where the criminal is a slave), *ib.* 868 C; of parricide, matricide, etc., *ib.* 869, 873; of murder, *ib.* 871; in certain cases of wounding with intent, *ib.* 877; of wilful unbelief, *ib.* 10. 908, 909;—incurred by the slave who kills a freeman, *ib.* 9. 872 B; by the citizen who kills a slave informer, *ibid.*; by a murderer who remains undiscovered, *ib.* 874; by the slave who does not inform, *ib.* 11. 914 A; by the freedman who possesses more than the legal amount of property, *ib.* 915 B; by the physician who administers poison and the diviner who practises magic, *ib.* 933 D; by the perjurer, *ib.* 937 D; by the citizen who advocates an unjust cause, *ib.* 938 B; by the thief who robs public property, *ib.* 12. 941 E (*but* cp. *ib.* 9.

- 857 A); by magistrates who are guilty of any serious breach of trust, *ib.* 12. 946 E; by the spectator of foreign countries, who endeavours after his return to alter the laws, *ib.* 952 D; by him who receives an exile, *ib.* 955 B; by him who declares war or peace on his own account, *ibid.*; by him who takes a bribe, *ib.* C; by the criminal who impedes a court of justice, *ib.* 958 C.
- Debts, abolition of, proclaimed by the would-be tyrant, Rep. 8. 565 E, 566 E; a favourite cry against the legislator who attempts to regulate property, Laws 3. 684 D; a source of contention, *ib.* 5. 736 D.
- Decenvirs for founding a Cretan colony, Laws 3. 702; 6. 751 E.
- Deception in art, Rep. 10. 602 C; Soph. 235 E (*v. s. v.* Art):—in trade, Protag. 313 D; Laws 11. 916, 917.
- Defence, arrangements for (in the Model City), Laws 6. 760 (cp. 778 E).
- Definition, necessary in writing, Phaedr. 263; definition by enumeration, Meno 71, 72; Euthyph. 6; definition and common notions, Meno 74 foll.; a definition not to be given in terms unexplained, *ib.* 79; difficulty of obtaining a definition, Euthyph. 10; definition or explanation, Theaet. 202, 206; definition and names, Soph. 218; Laws 10. 895 C.
- Deformity and vice, Soph. 228, 229. *See* Disease.
- Δεινός, use of the word as a term of praise, Protag. 341 A.
- Delium, Socrates at, Laches 181 B, 188 E; Apol. 28 E; Symp. 221 A.
- Delos, the mission-ship to, Crito 43 D; Phaedo 58 A, B, 59 E.
- Delphi, the God of, a witness to the wisdom of Socrates, Apol. 20 E, 21 A; religion left to, Rep. 4. 427 B; Laws 5. 738 B; 6. 759 C, D; 8. 828 A (cp. Rep. 5. 461 E, 469 A; 7. 540 B; Laws 9. 865 B, 871 C; 11. 914 A; 12. 947 D); election of interpreters referred to, Laws 6. 759 E; consulted when a new citizen is to be introduced, *ib.* 9. 856 E; an authority in removing deposits, *ib.* 11. 914 A:—golden images at, Phaedr. 235 E (cp. Euthyph. 299 B); offering of Aristocrates at, Gorg. 472 B:—inscriptions in the temple at, Charm. 164 D foll.; Protag. 343 B; Phaedr. 229 E; Phil. 45 E, 48 C; Laws 11. 923 A; 1 Alcib. 124 B, 129 A, 132 C:—Delphian oracle consulted by the Heracleidae, Laws 3. 686 A:—Delphian priestess, mad, Phaedr. 244 A.
- Delta, the Egyptian, Tim. 21 E.
- Deluge, the, of Deucalion, Tim. 22 A; Crit. 112 A; traditions of deluges, Laws 3. 677, 678, 702 A (cp. Crit. 109, 111 B, 112 A).
- Demagogues, Rep. 8. 564, 565; Laws 10. 908 D.
- Demeter, etymology of the name, Crat. 404 B; her gifts to men, Laws 6. 782 B.
- Demigods, Apol. 27; Tim. 41 E foll.; Statesm. 271 D; Laws 4. 713 D, 717 B; 5. 727 A, 738 B, D, 740 A; 7. 801 E; 8. 848 D; 9. 853 C; 10. 906 A, 910 A. *Cp.* Demons.
- Democracy, Rep. 1. 338 D; spoken of under the parable of the captain and the mutinous crew, *ib.* 6. 488; philosophy and democracy, *ib.* 494, 500; the third form of imperfect state, *ib.* 8. 544; Statesm. 291, 292; detailed account of, Rep. 8. 555 foll.; characterized by freedom, *ib.* 557 B, 561–563; Statesm. 292 A; a bazaar of constitutions, Rep. 8. 557 D; the humours of democracy, *ib.* E, 561; liberty enjoyed by the



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- Democrates, father of Lysis, Lysis 204 E, 209 A; his wealth, *ib.* 205 C, 208.
- Demodocus, father of Paralus, Apol. 33 E.
- Demon (spirit, genius, *δαίμων*); etymology of the word, Crat. 397; Love a great demon (spirit), Symp. 202 E; every man has a demon (attendant genius), Phaedo 107 E, 108 B, 113 D; the genius of good fortune, Laws 5. 732 C:—Socrates' denial of the existence of demons, Apol. 27 foll.; the demons intermediate between God and man, Symp. 202 E; Statesm. 271 D (cp. Rep. 4. 427 B; Laws 4. 713 D, 717 B; 5. 727 A, 738 B, D, 740 A; 7. 801 E; 8. 848 D; 9. 853 C; 10. 906 A, 910 A); the agents under God in the creation of the universe, Tim. 41 foll.; assist in the government of the world, Statesm. 271 foll.
- Demophon, father of Menexenus, Lysis 207 B.
- Demus, the Athenian, Gorg. 481 D, E, 513 B (cp. 1. Alcib. 132 A).
- Demus, son of Pyrilampes, Gorg. 481 E, 513 B.
- Denial and affirmation, Soph. 264 A.
- Dependents as day-labourers, Euthyph. 4 C.
- Depletion, Tim. 81 A.
- Deposits, law respecting, Laws 11. 913.
- Desertion, indictment for, Laws 12. 943 D.
- Desire, a stronger tie than necessity, Crat. 403; nature of, Symp. 192, 200, 201 (cp. Phaedr. 237, 251); has a relaxing effect on the soul, Rep. 4. 430 A; conflict of desire and reason, *ib.* 439–442; 9. 571 (cp. Phaedr. 253 foll.; Tim. 69 E foll.; Laws 3. 687, 689); is of the soul only, Phil. 34, 35; a mingled pain and pleasure, *ib.* 47 E; the sense of (in the Heraclitean philosophy), Theaet. 156 B;—desire and friendship, Laws 6. 776 A:—the desires, should they be regulated? Gorg. 491 E foll., 505; painful, *ib.* 496 D; divided into simple and qualified, Rep. 4. 437 foll.; into necessary and unnecessary, *ib.* 8. 559; make men immoderate, Laws 11. 918 C:—desires of men, *ib.* 6. 782, 783; control of, *ibid.*; 8. 835, 836 (cp. Gorg. 505 B). Cp. Love.
- Despotism, evils of, Laws 3. 697, 701 E.
- Despots (masters), Rep. 5. 463 A. *See* Tyrants.
- Dessert, Rep. 2. 372 C; Crit. 115 B.
- Destiny, the, of man in his own power, Rep. 10. 617 E; the order of destiny, Laws 10. 904.
- Destiny, [the Goddess], Phaedr. 248 C; Rep. 5. 451 A.
- Destructions of mankind in past ages, Tim. 22 C; Statesm. 269 foll.; Laws 3. 677 (cp. Crit. 109 D).
- Deucalion, the deluge of, Tim. 22 A; Crit. 112 A.
- Diagnosis, Greek method of, Protag. 352. Cp. Medicine.
- Diagonal, *see* Mathematics.
- Dialect, Old Attic, *δαίμονες*, Crat. 398 B; *ἑστία*, *ib.* 401 C; *ἔρα*, *ib.* 410 C; *ο* = *ω*, *ibid.*, 420 B; use of



ι and δ for η or ε and ζ, *ib.* 418 B; ε = η, *ib.* 426 C:—Cean, Protag. 341 A:—Doric, Phaedo 62 A; Crat. 409 A:—Eretrian, Crat. 434:—Thessalian, *ib.* 405 C.

Dialectic, distinguished from eristic, Euthyd. 275 foll., 293 foll.; Meno 75 D, 80 E; Phaedo 101 E; Rep. 5. 454 A; 6. 499 A; 7. 539; Theaet. 167 E; Soph. 216 E; Phil. 17 A; divides things into their classes, Phaedr. 277; Soph. 253; Statesm. 286 (cp. Soph. 264 E); leads from earthly to heavenly conceptions, Symp. 210; aids to define ideas, Phaedo 75–79;—the most difficult branch of philosophy, Rep. 6. 498; proceeds by a double method, *ib.* 511; objects of, *ibid.*; 7. 537 D; compared to sight, *ib.* 7. 532 A; capable of attaining to the idea of good, *ibid.*; gives firmness to hypotheses, *ib.* 533; the copingstone of the sciences, *ib.* 534; must be studied by the rulers (in the best state), *ib.* 537; dangers of the study, *ibid.*; years to be spent in, *ib.* 539; despised by the many, Parm. 135 D; useless, if ‘man is the measure of all things,’ Theaet. 161 E; regardless of fine names, Soph. 227; needed, because ideas have no sensible image or form, Statesm. 285 E; a gift of the Gods, Phil. 16 C; first among all learning, *ib.* 57 (cp. Rep. 7. 534); wrongly employed by physical philosophers, Laws 10. 891 D; Athenian skill in, *ib.* 892:—the dialectical method of argument, Parm. 135; compared to carving, Phaedr. 265 E; Statesm. 287 B; has no place in the arts, Phil. 59; ‘no respecter of persons,’ Statesm. 266 D:—synthetic and analytic method, Phaedr. 265:—division,

Statesm. 258, 262, 265 (cp. 261–268):—dichotomy, *ib.* 262:—the ‘dialectical net,’ Soph. 235 (cp. Theaet. 165 E):—dialectic and the doctrine of recollection, Meno 81 E foll. (cp. Recollection):—dialectic and rhetoric, Phaedr. 266, 270 (cp. Gorg. 448 E, 471 E); dialectic and writing, Phaedr. 277.

Dialectic. [*Dialectic, the ‘copingstone of knowledge,’ is everywhere distinguished by Plato from eristic, i. e. argument for argument’s sake, but takes various shapes with the changing forms of his philosophy. In the Symposium, where the lover and the philosopher are shown by Socrates to be one and the same, dialectic is the gradual process by the aid of which we pass from the sensible to the ideal, and the earthly love is refined into the ‘birth in beauty.’ A like conception is found in the Republic. There it is the means by which we learn to employ the hypotheses of science, not as final results, but as points from which the mind may rise into the higher heaven of ideas and behold truth and being (Rep. 6. 510, 511). This vague and magnificent conception was, perhaps, scarcely clearer to Plato himself at the time when he wrote than it is to us [cp. Introduction to Republic, p. xcii]. When Glaucon asks Socrates for an explanation, the latter gives an evasive reply:—Glaucon cannot follow him because he has never studied the preliminary sciences (Rep. 7. 533; and cp. Symp. 210 A). In the Sophist and Statesman dialectic assumes a more definite and less ideal form, and appears as a combination of analysis and synthesis by which we arrive at a*

- true notion of things, and are enabled to penetrate the many disguises of the Sophist and to distinguish the true statesman from his imitators and rivals.* [Cp. Phaedrus 265 E, where the dialectician is compared to a skilful carver because he understands the art of 'division into species.' So also Aristotle in the Politics (I. 1, § 3; 8, § 1) speaks of a 'customary method' (*ὑφηγημένη μέθοδος*) by the aid of which he resolves the whole into its parts or elements.] *In the Laws dialectic no longer occupies a prominent place; it is the 'old man's harmless amusement' (7. 820 C), or, regarded more seriously, the method of discussion by question and answer, which is abused by the natural philosophers to disprove the existence of the Gods (10. 891).]*
- Dialectician, the, user of names, Crat. 390; gardener of the soul, Phaedr. 276 E; has a conception of essence, Rep. 7. 534 (cp. Phaedo 75 D); cares only for truth, Statesm. 287 A:—enthusiasm of the youthful dialectician, Phil. 15, 16.
- Diaprepes, son of Poseidon, Crit. 114 C.
- Dice (*ἀσπράγαλοι*), Lysis 206 E; 1 Alcib. 110 B;—(*κύβοι*), Rep. 10. 604 C; Theaet. 154 C, 155 B; the game of dice (*κυβεία*) invented by Theuth, Phaedr. 274 C;—'thrice six or thrice ace,' (the highest and the lowest throw), Laws 12. 968 E;—skill required in dice-playing, Rep. 2. 374 C.
- Dictation in schools, Euthyd. 276 C, 277 A.
- Diet, Rep. 3. 404 foll.; 8. 559 C; Tim. 89; Laws 2. 659 E; effects of change of, Laws 7. 797 E.
- Differences in natural inclination explained, Phaedr. 252:—differences and likenesses in things, *ib.* 261 E, 262 A; accidental and essential differences, Rep. 5. 454. Difficult (*χαλεπόν*), = 'evil' in the Cean dialect, Protag. 341 A.
- Dinomachè, mother of Alcibiades, 1 Alcib. 105 D; her wardrobe not worth fifty minae, *ib.* 123 D.
- Diocles, father of Euthydemus, Symp. 222 B.
- Diomede, Symp. 218 E; his command to the Greeks (Il. iv. 412), Rep. 3. 389 E.
- Dion, an orator, Menex. 234 B.
- Dionè, mother of Aphroditè Pandemus, Symp. 180 E.
- Dionysodorus, comes to Athens, Euthyd. 271 B; his disciples, *ib.* 273 A, 274 B, 276 C; in a large way of wisdom, *ib.* 273 C; a Sophist instead of a Pancratiast, *ib.* D; elder of the 'Thurian brothers,' *ib.* 283 A; converses with Ctesippus, *ib.* E, 285 D foll., 298 D; converses with Socrates, *ib.* 293 E foll., 297 A foll.
- Dionysus, meaning of the name, Crat. 406 B; his influence on Bacchic maidens, Ion 534 A; Aristophanes always in his company, Symp. 177 E; the god of mixing, Phil. 61 C; the partner of our revels, Laws 2. 653 D, 665 A, 672 B; may be invited by men over forty years of age, *ib.* 2. 666 B; his gift not to be censured, *ib.* 672 A; robbed of his wits by his stepmother Herè, *ib.* B; his birth, celebrated in dithyrambs, *ib.* 3. 700 C; choristers of, *ib.* 2. 665 B foll., 670 A; 7. 812 B; the joy of, *ib.* 8. 844 E:—temple of (at Athens), Gorg. 472 A:—the Dionysia, Rep. 5. 475 D; drunkenness at, Laws 1. 637 B.
- Diopompus, his abstinence, Laws 8. 840 A.
- Dioscuri, Euthyd. 293 A; games

- in honour of (at Lacedaemon), Laws 7. 796 B.
- Diotima, the wise woman of Mantinea, Symp. 201 D-212 A.
- Director, the, of education (*ὁ περὶ τῆς παιδείας πάσης ἐπιμελητής*), Laws 6. 765 D foll.; 7. 801 D; 11. 936 A; 12. 951 E, 953 D; (*ὁ τῶν νομοφυλάκων ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν παίδων ἀρχὴν ἡρμημένος*), *ib.* 7. 809; (*ὁ παιδευτῆς*), *ib.* 811 D, 812 E; 8. 829 D, 835 A; (*ὁ τῶν παίδων ἐπιμελητής*), *ib.* 7. 813 C:—director of music (*ὁ περὶ τὴν Μοῦσαν*), *ib.* A;—directors of music (*οὗς εἰλόμεθα νομοθέτας περὶ τὰ μουσικά*), *ib.* 801 D;—directors of music and gymnastic (*ἄρχοντες μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς*), *ib.* 6. 764.
- Discerning, art of (*διακριτική*), subdivided, Soph. 226.
- Discipline, importance and necessity of, Laws 12. 942 A (cp. 6. 762 B foll.).
- Discord, causes of, Rep. 5. 462; 8. 547 A, 556 E; the ruin of states, *ib.* 5. 462 (cp. Laws 3. 686 B); distinguished from war, Rep. 5. 470 (cp. Laws 1. 628, 629);—discord and disease, Soph. 228;—discord and vice, *ibid.*
- Discourse, love of, Protag. 317 E, 335 D, 347; Apol. 23, 33; Gorg. 458 C; Rep. 1. 328 A; 5. 450 B; Theaet. 218 A; pleasure of, in the other world, Apol. 41; Rep. 6. 498 D; exemplified in Phaedrus, Phaedr. 228, 242 A, 243 D, 258 E, 276 E; in Socrates, *ib.* 227 B, 230, 236 (cp. Phil. 67 C); increases in old age, Rep. 1. 328 D:—the art with which rhetoric is concerned, Gorg. 450 (cp. Rhetoric); nature of, Soph. 260 foll.; = connexion of verbs and nouns, *ib.* 262; length of, not always to be regarded, Statesm. 283, 286, 287; Laws 10. 887 B (cp. Rep. 5. 450 C; Laws 4. 721 E; 10. 890 E); Prodicus' rule of discourse, Phaedr. 267 B;—the 'music of discourse,' Theaet. 176 A;—false discourse, Soph. 263:—the discourses of the legislator to be learnt by the young, Laws 7. 811.
- Discussion, not the same as speech-making, Protag. 336 A.
- Disease, not essential, but accidental to the body, Lysis 217; origin of, Symp. 188; Rep. 3. 404; Tim. 81, 82 foll.; the right treatment of, Rep. 3. 405 foll.; the physician must have experience of, *ib.* 408; inherent in everything, *ib.* 10. 609; akin to the living being, Tim. 89 B; made an argument against the truth of perception, Theaet. 157 E; pleasures arising from, Phil. 46 A, 51 D (cp. Gorg. 494 C; Tim. 86); a cause of revolution, Laws 4. 709 A; a cause of crime, *ib.* 9. 864 D:—disease in life, Laws 5. 734:—disease of body and soul compared, Crito 47; disease and vice compared, Rep. 4. 444; 10. 609 foll.; Soph. 228; Laws 10. 906 (cp. Statesm. 296 D):—disease and discord, Soph. 228:—diseases of the soul, Tim. 44 C, 86.
- Disease, the 'sacred' (epilepsy), Tim. 85 A; Laws 11. 916 A.
- Dishonour and justice inconsistent, Laws 9. 859, 860.
- Disinheritance of children, Laws 11. 928 E foll.
- Display, art of, Soph. 224.
- Dispositions, difference of, Theaet. 144; Statesm. 306 foll. Cp. Character.
- Disputation, art of, Phaedr. 261; Soph. 232; kinds of, Soph. 225; Greek love of, Gorg. 458 (cp. Discourse).
- Dissolution and replenishment, Phil. 31, 32.
- Dithyrambic poetry, seeks pleasure only, Gorg. 502 A; nature of,



- Rep. 3. 394 B; sacred to Bacchus, Laws 3. 700 B.
- Diversities of natural gifts, Rep. 2. 370 A; 5. 455; 7. 535 A.
- Divine beauty, wisdom, goodness, etc., Phaedr. 247.
- Divination and love, Symp. 188 B; of the dying, Apol. 39 C; *μαντική*, Phaedr. 244; *οἰωνιστική*, *ibid.*; Phil. 67 C; divination by the liver, Tim. 71.
- Diviners, Ion 534; Euthyph. 4; Tim. 71 E; Statesm. 290; Phil. 67; Laws 11. 913, 933.
- Division (in Arithmetic), puzzles of, Phaedo 101:—(in style), Phaedr. 265; logical method of, Soph. 219; Phil. 16; division and predication, Soph. 253 (cp. Dialectic); division into classes, *ibid.*; Statesm. 258, 262 B, 285, 287; of sciences, Statesm. 258; of knowledge, *ib.* 259, 260; of objects of production, *ib.* 261; of the art of command, *ibid.*; of the breeding of living creatures, *ibid.*; process of, *ib.* 262; of animals, *ib.* D, 263; of herds, *ib.* 264, 265; process of, illustrated by weaving, *ib.* 279; division into members, *ib.* 287 (cp. Phaedr. 265 E).
- Division of labour, Rep. 2. 370, 374 A; 3. 394 E, 395 B, 397 E; 4. 423 E, 433 A, 435 A, 441 E, 443; 5. 453 B; Laws 8. 846 D; a part of justice, Rep. 4. 433, 435 A, 441 E (cp. 1. 332, 349, 350).
- Division of land, proclaimed by the would-be tyrant, Rep. 8. 565 E, 566 E; a source of contention, Laws 3. 684 E; 5. 736 D; how it may be carried out, *ib.* 5. 736; in the model state, *ib.* 737.
- Divorce, allowed in case of childlessness, Laws 6. 784 B; 11. 930 A; of incompatibility of temper, *ib.* 11. 929 E.
- Doctors, flourish when luxury increases in the state, Rep. 2. 373 C; 3. 405 A; two kinds of, *ib.* 5. 459 C; Laws 4. 720, 722 C, 723 A; 9. 857 D; inutility of, Laws 6. 761 C; doctors' assistants, slaves, *ib.* 4. 720; 9. 857 D. Cp. Acusilaus, Eryximachus, Herodiscus, Medicine, Physician.
- Dodona, the priestesses of, mad, Phaedr. 244 B; the oaks of, *ib.* 275 B; oracle of, Laws 5. 738 C.
- Dog, Socrates' oath by the, Charm. 172 E; Lysis 211 E; Phaedr. 228 B; Apol. 21 E; Phaedo 99 A; Crat. 411 B; Gorg. 461 A, 466 C, 482 B; Rep. 3. 399 E; 8. 567 E; 9. 592 A:—Ctesippus' dog, Euthyd. 298:—art of attending to dogs, Euthyph. 13; dogs are philosophers, Rep. 2. 376; breeding of dogs, *ib.* 5. 459; hunting with dogs, Laws 7. 824 A:—the auxiliaries the watch-dogs of the state, Rep. 2. 376; 4. 440 D; 5. 451 D.
- Doing and making distinguished, Charm. 163; Euthyd. 284.
- Dolphin, Arion's, Rep. 5. 453 D:—the Nereids represented as riding on dolphins, Crit. 116 E.
- Dorian dialect, Phaedo 62 A; Crat. 409 A:—Dorian harmony, Laws 2. 670 B; the true Hellenic mode, Laches 188 D; a harmony of words and deeds, *ib.* 193 D; allowed (with the Phrygian) in the best state, Rep. 3. 399 A:—Dorians, the, origin of, Laws 3. 682 E; distribution of land by, *ib.* 684 E; = Heraclidae, *ib.* 685 E; settlement of the army, *ib.* 702 A.
- Dowries, not allowed (in the Model City), Laws 5. 742 C; 6. 774 C.
- Dragon's teeth, story of the, Laws 2. 663 E (cp. Soph. 247 C). *See* Cadmus.
- Draughts, Charm. 174 B; Gorg. 450 D; Rep. 1. 333 A; Laws 7. 820 C; 1 Alcib. 110 E; invented by Theuth, Phaedr. 274 D; skill



- required in, Rep. 2. 374 C;—the 'move from the holy line' (proverbial), Laws 5. 739 A;—comparison of an argument to a game of draughts, *ib.* 6. 487 C (cp. Laws 7. 820 C; Eryx. 395 A):—draught-players more plentiful than statesmen, Statesm. 292 E.
- Dreadful (*δεινός*), not to be used as a term of praise, Protag. 341 B.
- Dream of the reign of knowledge, Charm. 173; that existence cannot be predicated of the elements, Theaet. 201 E:—dreams of Socrates; ('the third day hence'), Crito 44; ('compose music'), Phaedo 60 E:—dreams an indication of the bestial element in human nature, Rep. 9. 571, 574 E; cause of dreams, Tim. 46 A; interpretation of, *ib.* 72 A; disprove the truth of perception, Theaet. 157 E; dreams and realities, *ib.* 158; superstitions aroused by dreams, Laws 10. 910 A.
- Drinking bad for the health, Symp. 176 D; drinking and music, Laws 1. 642; effect of drinking on the passions, *ib.* 645 D; regulations on, *ib.* 2. 671–674; the law of Carthage respecting, *ib.* 674 (cp. Intoxication):—pleasure of drinking (and eating), *ib.* 667; 6. 782 E, 783 C (cp. Rep. 8. 559).
- Drones, the, Rep. 8. 552, 554 C, 555 E, 559 C, 564 B, 567 E; 9. 573 A (cp. Laws 10. 901 A).
- Dropidas, great-grandfather of Critias, Charm. 157 E; Tim. 20 E; Crit. 113 A.
- Drunkenness, Phaedr. 238 A; in heaven, Rep. 2. 363 D; forbidden in the guardians, *ib.* 3. 398 E, 403 E; not allowed at Lacedaemon, Laws 1. 637 B; injury caused by, *ib.* 640 E; at marriages unlawful, *ib.* 6. 775:—the drunken man apt to be tyrannical, Rep. 8. 573 C; is in a second childhood, Laws 1. 645 E, 646 A; fancies himself able to rule the whole world, *ib.* 2. 671 B.
- Duty not to be paid on imports or exports (in the Model City), Laws 8. 847.
- Dyeing, Rep. 4. 429 D.
- Dyes, not to be imported, Laws 8. 847 C:—dyed work not to be employed in the service of the Gods, *ib.* 12. 956 A.
- Dynasties (or lordships), the form of government in ancient times, Laws 3. 680 B, 681 D.
- Dysentery in the army at Corinth, Theaet. 142 B.

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- Early man, Laws 3. 678, 679 (cp. Statesm. 274);—early rising, Laws 7. 808;—early society, Rep. 2. 359.
- Earth, the, mother of Oceanus, Tim. 40 E; a goddess, Laws 5. 740 A; 10. 886 A;—the mother of the female sex, Symp. 190 B; the mother-deity of Athens, Tim. 23 E; the mother of the human race, Laws 5. 740 A; 12. 958 E;—the earth sacred to the Gods, *ib.* 12. 955 E;—the guardians supposed to be earth-born, Rep. 3. 414; the Athenians children of the soil, Crit. 109; Menex. 237 E (cp. 245 D); the first men sprung from, Statesm. 269 A, 271 (cp. Symp. 191; Crit. 113 C):—the earth the eldest of the created and visible gods, Tim. 40 C; creation of, *ib.* 33 foll.; origin of, Laws 10. 889:—the earth, according to some philosophers, in the form of a trough, Phaedo 99 B; description of, *ib.* 109–114; why made in a spherical form, Tim. 34:—earth, one of the four elements, *ib.* 32, 49, 53; Soph. 266 B; Phil. 29 A; Laws 10. 889 B, 891 C foll. (cp. Elements); its

- form, Tim. 55 E; earth and fire, the source of the universe, *ib.* 31; compounds of earth and water, *ib.* 60, 61.
- Eating, pleasure accompanying, Rep. 8. 559; Laws 2. 667 B; 6. 782 E, 783 C.
- Echecrates of Phlius, Phaedo 57 A, 88 C, 102 A.
- Education, commonly divided into music for the soul and gymnastic for the body, Rep. 2. 376 E; 3. 403 (cp. Crito 50 D; Laws 2. 672, 673; 7. 795 E); both music and gymnastic really designed for the soul, Rep. 3. 410 (cp. Tim. 88: *and see* Gymnastic and Music):—a matter of the most serious importance, Laches 185, 186; Protag. 313; Euthyd. 306 E; Laws 6. 766; 7. 808, 809; what advice to be taken about, Laches 186; a life-long process, Protag. 325 D (cp. Rep. 6. 498 B); good manners a branch of, Protag. 325 E; poetry the principal part of, [Protagoras], *ib.* 339 A (cp. Laws 7. 810 E); difficulty of finding a teacher, Apol. 20; use of fiction in education, Rep. 2. 377 foll.; 3. 391; the poets bad educators, *ib.* 2. 377; 3. 391, 392, 408 B; 10. 600, 606 E, 607 B; Laws 10. 886 C, 890 A (cp. Laws 7. 810, 811); must be simple, Rep. 3. 397, 404 E; melody in, *ib.* 398 foll.; mimetic art in, *ib.* 399; importance of good surroundings, *ib.* 401; influence of, on manners and customs, *ib.* 4. 424, 425; innovation in, dangerous, *ibid.*; should be given in infancy through amusement, *ib.* 425 A; 7. 536 E; Laws 1. 643 B; should be the same for men and women, Rep. 5. 451 foll., 466; Laws 7. 804 E; dangerous when ill directed, Rep. 6. 491 (cp. *ib.* 7. 518 E; Laws 7. 819); not a process of acquisition, but the use of powers already existing in us, Rep. 7. 518; value of arithmetic in, *ib.* 526; Laws 5. 747; 7. 809 C, 819 C; ought not to be compulsory, Rep. 7. 537 A (*but* cp. Laws 7. 804 E); makes the life of man perfect, Tim. 44 C; intended to promote virtue, *ib.* 87 (cp. Laws 1. 643 E; 7. 788 C); the two methods of, Soph. 229, 230; gives victory, Laws 1. 641 C; convivial meetings, an element of, *ib.* D; 2. 653, 657; aims at ideals, *ib.* 1. 643, 644; is the first and fairest thing, *ib.* 644 A (cp. Rep. 2. 377 A); in temperance, Laws 1. 647; = training of instincts in children, *ib.* 2. 653, 659 C; first given through Apollo and the Muses, *ib.* 654; inculcates conformity with reason and the laws, *ib.* 659; relation of, to the choral art, *ib.* 672 E; should begin even before birth, *ib.* 7. 788 foll.; use of exercise and motion in, *ib.* 791 foll.;—carelessness about, at Athens, 1 Alcib. 122; education in Crete and at Lacedaemon, Laws 2. 660 E, 666 E; in Egypt, *ib.* 656; 7. 819; of the Persian Kings, *ib.* 3. 694 foll.; 1 Alcib. 121 E;—of the sons of good and great men often neglected, Laches 179, 180; Protag. 320, 324, 325; Meno 93 (cp. Laws 3. 694 D; 1 Alcib. 118 E):—subjects of, in Greek schools, Protag. 325, 326; Euthyd. 276; Laws 7. 810 foll.; 1 Alcib. 106 E; dictation and grammar, Euthyd. 276 C, 277 A; music, Charm. 159 C, 160 A; Protag. 326 B; Euthyd. 276 C; Crito 50 D; Laws 2. 654, 660; 7. 810, 812; 1 Alcib. 106 E; poetry learnt by heart, Protag. 326 A; Laws 7. 810 C, 811 A; reading and writing, Charm. 159 C, 160 A, 161 D; Protag. 326 C; Laws 7. 810 B;

1 Alcib. 106 E (cp. Lysis 209 B; Theact. 206, 207 E); Greek not taught, Protag. 328 (cp. 1 Alcib. 111 A):—[in the best state]; the preliminary, Rep. 2. 376 foll.; 4. 429, 430; 7. 521; the higher or philosophic education, *ib.* 6. 498, 503 E; 7. 537 foll.; 'the longer way,' *ib.* 6. 504 (cp. *ib.* 4. 435); 'the prelude or preamble,' 7. 532 E (cp. Guardians, Rulers):—[in the Model City]; the preliminary, Laws 7. 788 foll., 808 foll.; the higher, *ib.* 817 E; 12. 967;—Director or Minister of Education, *ib.* 6. 765 D. foll.; 7. 801 D, 809, 811 D, 812 E, 813 C; 8. 829 D, 835 A; 11, 936 A; 12. 951 E, 953 D (cp. Director).

Education. [The subject of education is incidentally treated in many of the Dialogues of Plato; for Socrates is the especial friend of youth, and takes the greatest interest in their growth and progress. Melesias and Lysimachus come to him for advice about the training of their sons: the youthful Hippocrates entreats him for an introduction to Protagoras: Theaetetus submits himself gladly to the treatment of the skilful practitioner. Plato's own views are given at length in the Republic and in the Laws, and form a main part of their contents. The Greek philosophers were profoundly convinced of the necessity and importance of education: in this respect their views were in advance of those which have been entertained in modern countries until quite recent times. [Cp. Arist. Pol. viii. 1, § 3; 3, § 10.] The system of education which Plato has sketched in the Republic appears to be nearly the same with that which is contained in the Laws: their principal features may be

summed up as follows:—There is the common education of the (i) citizens; (ii) the special education of the rulers. (i) The first, beginning with childhood in the plays of the children, is the old Hellenic education, [the *καταβεβλημένα παιδεύματα* of Aristotle, Pol. viii. 2, § 6], 'music for the mind and gymnastic for the body.' But, according to Plato, both are really intended for the benefit of the soul (cp. Tim. 88): and under 'music' he includes literature (*λόγοι*), i. e. humane culture as distinguished from scientific knowledge. Music precedes gymnastic: both are not to be learned together; only the simpler kinds of either are tolerated. Boys and girls share equally in both. The most careful attention must be paid to good surroundings; nothing mean or vile must meet the eye or strike the ear of the young scholar. The fairy tales of childhood and the fictions of the poets are alike placed under censorship. [Cp. the Politics of Aristotle, vii. 17, and see s. v. Poetry.] Gentleness is to be united with manliness; beauty of form and activity of mind are to mingle in perfect and harmonious accord.—The ages at which children should commence their various studies are not stated in the Republic; but in the VIIth Book of the Laws, where the subject is treated more in detail, the children begin going to school at ten, and spend three years in learning to read and write, and another three years in music (Laws 7. 810). This agrees very fairly with the selection of the most promising youth at the age of twenty (Rep. 7. 537), as it would allow a corresponding period of three years for gymnastic training.—



- (ii) *The special education is scarcely more than alluded to in the Laws (7. 817 E; 12. 967), but is described at length in the Republic. According to the latter the selected students are to spend ten years in the acquisition of the higher branches of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, harmony, which are not to be pursued in a scientific spirit or for utility only, but rather with a view to their combination by means of dialectic into an ideal of all knowledge (see s. v. Dialectic). At thirty a further selection is made: those selected spend five years in the study of philosophy, are then sent into active life for fifteen years, and finally after fifty return to philosophy, which for the remainder of their days is to form their chief occupation.]*
- Effect and cause, Euthyph. 10; Phil. 26, 27.
- Effluences of existence, Meno 76.
- Egypt, embalmment in, Phaedo 80 C; passage money from, to Athens, = two drachmae, Gorg. 511 D; tale brought by Solon from, Tim. 21 C; Crit. 108 D, 113; kings of, priests, Statesm. 290 E; conquered by the Persians, Menex. 239 E; Athenian expedition to, *ib.* 241 E:—Egyptian Delta, Tim. 21 E:—Egyptian deities; Neith, *ibid.*, 23 E; Theuth, Phaedr. 274 C, 275 C; Phil. 18 B:—‘Egyptian tales,’ Phaedr. 275 B:—the Egyptian wizard (Proteus), Euthyd. 288 B:—Egyptians characterized by the love of money, Rep. 4. 435 E; consecrate every form of art, Laws 2. 656 D, 660 B; 7. 799 A; cunning and crafty, *ib.* 5. 747 C; teach their children arithmetic by means of games, *ib.* 7. 819 B; inhospitable, *ib.* 12. 953 E.
- Egyptus, descendants of, Menex. 245 D.
- Eileithyia, women to assemble in the temple of, Laws 6. 784 A; (goddess of parturition) = beauty, Symp. 206 C.
- Elasippus, son of Poseidon, Crit. 114 C.
- Elder, the, to bear rule in the state, Rep. 3. 412 B; Laws 3. 690 A; 4. 714 E (cp. Laws 3. 680 E); to be over the younger, Rep. 5. 465 A; Laws 4. 721 D; 9. 879 C; 11. 917 A; held in honour both by Gods and men, Laws 9. 879 C; the eldest the king of the family, Laws 3. 680 E, 681 B.
- Elders, the, of Sparta, Laws 3. 691 E.
- Elea, Soph. 216 A.
- Eleatic philosophy criticized, Soph. 241 E foll.; —Eleatic stranger, *ib.* 216 A; —the Eleatic Palamedes (Zeno), Phaedr. 261 D.
- Election of magistrates (in the Model City), Laws 6. 753 foll.; of generals, etc., *ib.* 755; of the council, *ib.* 756; of priests, interpreters, and temple officers, *ib.* 759; of the wardens of the country, *ib.* 760; of the wardens of the city and the agora, *ib.* 763; of the choregus and the judges of contests, *ib.* 765; of the judges of appeals, *ib.* 767; of censors, *ib.* 12. 945 foll.; —the mixed mode of election, *ib.* 6. 753, 756, 763, 767; such a mode, a mean between monarchy and democracy, *ib.* 756 E.
- Elements, the four in creation, Tim. 32; Soph. 266 B; Laws 10. 889 B, 891 C foll.; nature of, Tim. 49, 51; origin of, *ib.* 52, 53; their forms, *ib.* 55, 56; their passage into one another, *ib.* 56; their degrees of penetration, *ib.* 58 A; their various kinds, *ib.* C; are names only, Theaet. 201 E (cp.



- Tim. 51 C); in man and in the cosmos, Phil. 29.
- Elephants in Atlantis, Crit. 115 A.
- Eleusis, war against the tyrants in, Menex. 243 E.
- Elis, Hippias of, Protag. 314 C, 315 C; Apol. 19 E; Hipp. Min. 363 C, 364 A;—treatment of love at, Symp. 182 B.
- Embroidery, the art of, Rep. 3. 401 A.
- Emigration, rules concerning, Laws 12. 949 E foll.
- Emmelciai, or 'dances of order,' Laws 7. 816 B.
- Empedocles, Meno 76 C; Theaet. 152 E.
- Empiricism in the arts, Phil. 55 E.
- Emulation, a mingled pain and pleasure, Phil. 47 E.
- Enchanter, the speech-maker an, Euthyd. 290 A; the sophist, Soph. 235 A; the sophist-politician, Statesm. 291 C, 303 C.
- Enchantment, art of, Euthyd. 290 A; Laws 11. 933. Cp. Magic, Sorcery.
- Enchantments, used by mendicant prophets, Rep. 2. 364 B;—law against, Laws 11. 933:—enchantments, i. e. tests to which the guardians are to be subjected, Rep. 3. 413 (cp. 6. 503 A; 7. 539 E).
- End, the, distinguished from the means, Laches 185:—end and use of the soul, Rep. 1. 353; end of life, Laws 7. 807:—Ends as final causes, Lysis 219, 220; as causes, Gorg. 467:—ends and excellences (*âperai*) of things, Rep. 1. 353; things distinguished by their ends, *ib.* 5. 478.
- Endurance must be inculcated on the young, Rep. 3. 390 C; of pain, shown by the Lacedaemonians, Laws 1. 633; 1 Alcib. 122 C; the habit of, must be acquired by the soldier, Laws 12. 742 D (cp. 6. 762 E).
- Endymion, Phaedo 72 C.
- Enemies, treatment of, Rep. 5. 469.
- Engine-makers, Gorg. 512.
- Enquiry, sophistical limitation of, Meno 80; into things unknown is possible, *ib.* 81 foll.; duty of, *ib.* 86; Phaedo 85; roused by some objects of sense, Rep. 7. 523;—enquiry into the nature of God, not impious, Laws 7. 821 (cp. 12. 966).
- Envy, a mingled pain and pleasure, Phil. 47 E, 49, 50; evil of, Laws 5. 731; begotten by jealousy, Menex. 242 A.
- Epeius, son of Panopeus, works of sculpture attributed to, Ion 533 A; his soul turns into a woman, Rep. 10. 620 C; invented tricks of boxing, Laws 7. 796 A.
- Ephesus, the native city of Ion, Ion 530 A, 533 C; subject to Athens, *ib.* 541 C; 'no mean city,' *ib.* D:—Ephesians, originally Athenians, *ibid.*; mad about Heracleitus, Theaet. 179 E.
- Ephialtes, Symp. 190 B.
- Ephors, their power, Laws 3. 692 A; 4. 712 D; watch over the queens of Sparta, 1 Alcib. 121 B.
- Epic poetry, a combination of imitation and narration, Rep. 3. 394 B, 396 E;—epic poets, recitations from, at festivals, Ion 530, 535; Laws 2. 658; 8. 834 E (cp. Rhapsodes); imitators in the highest degree, Rep. 10. 602 C.
- Epicharmus, quoted, Gorg. 505 D; the 'prince of comedy,' Theaet. 152 E.
- Epicrates, Lysias with, Phaedr. 227 B.
- Epidauros, Festival of Asclepius at, Ion 530 A:—Epidaurians have contests of rhapsodes, *ibid.*
- Epigenes, a pupil of Socrates, Apol. 33 E; present in the prison, Phaedo 59 B.
- Epilepsy, Tim. 85 A; Laws 11. 916 A.

- Epimenides, at Athens, Laws 1. 642 D; his ingenuity, *ib.* 3. 677 D.
- Epimetheus, Protag. 320 D, 321 B foll.
- Epitaph, on the tomb of Midas, Phaedr. 264 D:—epitaphs, not to exceed four lines, Laws 12. 958 E.
- Equality distinguished from impartiality, Protag. 337 A; equality and friendship, Phaedr. 240 B; Laws 6. 757 A; absolute equality, Phaedo 74, 75; Parm. 131 D; equality only desired by the inferior, Gorg. 483 D; is between greatness and smallness, Parm. 161; the especial characteristic of democracy, Rep. 8. 557 B, 561–563 (cp. Democracy); equality and inequality in the state, Laws 5. 744; 6. 757; the two kinds of equality, *ib.* 6. 757; equality at Athens, Menex. 238 E.
- Equity, an infraction of perfect justice, Laws 6. 757 E.
- Er, myth of, Rep. 10. 614 B foll.
- Erasistratus, son of Phaeax, Eryx. 392 A, *et passim*.
- Erato, muse of lovers, Phaedr. 259 D.
- Erchiaë, Alcibiades owned 300 acres there, 1 Alcib. 123 C.
- Erectheus, prior to Theseus, Crit. 110 A:—demus of, (the Athenians), 1 Alcib. 132 A.
- Eretria, invaded by Persians, Laws 3. 698 C, 699 A; Menex. 240 B, C:—Eretrian dialect, Crat. 434 C:—Eretrians and Darius, Laws 3. 698 C, D; Menex. 240 A, C.
- Erichthonius, Crit. 110 A.
- Eridanus, hill of the Acropolis once extended to the, Crit. 112 A.
- Erineus, in Attica, Theaet. 143 B.
- Eriphyle, Rep. 9. 590 A.
- Eristic, distinguished from dialectic, Euthyd. 275 foll., 293 foll.; Meno 75, 80 E; Phaedo 101 E; Rep. 5. 454 A; 6. 499 A; 7. 539; Theaet. 167 E; Soph. 216 E; Phil. 17 A; subdivisions, Soph. 225; nature of, *ib.* 259;—Eristic arguments, Theaet. 165. Cp. Dialectic.
- Eros, a 'mighty God,' Phaedr. 242 E; Symp. 201 E; Socrates prays to, Phaedr. 257 A; his inspiration, *ib.* 265 B; lord of Phaedrus and Socrates, *ib.* C; his nature, Symp. 201 E foll.;—Eros and Pteros, Phaedr. 252 B;—the word 'hero' derived from Eros, Crat. 398 D; meaning of the name, *ib.* 420 A. Cp. Love.
- Error, not possible in the skilled person (Thrasymachus), Rep. 3. 340 D; three kinds of, Laws 9. 863, 864; three erroneous opinions about the Gods, *ib.* 10. 885.
- Erysichthon, prior to Theseus, Crit. 110 A.
- Eryxias, the Steirian, Eryx. 392 A, *et passim*.
- Eryximachus, son of Acumenus, a physician, Protag. 315 C; Phaedr. 268 A; with Hippias, Protag. 315 C; objects to drinking, Symp. 176 A; cures Aristophanes of the hiccough, *ib.* 185 D; his speech in praise of love, *ib.* 186 foll.
- Essence (*οὐσία*), perceived by the mind, Phaedr. 247; Phaedo 79; nature of, Phaedo 75 D, 78; in early philosophy, Soph. 246:—essence and accident, Lysis 217; Rep. 5. 454; Soph. 247; essence and attribute, Euthyph. 11 A; essence and generation, Soph. 248, 249; Phil. 54; essence and the good, Rep. 6. 509; essence and the soul, Laws 10. 895, 896 (cp. Phaedr. 245 C–E; Phaedo 78; Soph. 246):—essence of things, Rep. 6. 507 B; Theaet. 186; apprehended by the dialectician, Rep. 7. 534 B; of things and names, Crat. 423:—essence of the soul, Tim. 35:—essence of the invariable, Rep. 9. 585:—separated essence, Tim. 36:—

- eternal essence, *ib.* 37:—intelligible essence, *ib.* 51 C:—absolute essence, *Phaedo* 65; *Parm.* 135 A. Cp. Being.
- Eternity, contrasted with human life, *Rep.* 10. 608 D (cp. *Phaedo* 107 C).
- Ethiopia, engraved stones used as money in, *Eryx.* 400 B.
- Ethonoe (= Athene), *Crat.* 407 B.
- Etymology, argument from (*μανία*, *μαντική*, etc.), *Phaedr.* 244; (*νοῦς*, *νόμος*), *Laws* 4. 714 A; 7. 800 A; 12. 957 C (cp. *Rep.* 7. 532 E); (*χορός*, *χαιρεῖν*), *Laws* 2. 654 A; change of accents, *Crat.* 399; influence of euphony, *ib.* 404 E, 412 E, 414 C, 418 B; use of letters in, *ib.* 414, 426, 427; insertion of *κ*, *ib.* 412 E; change of letters, *ib.* 418; *Phaedr.* 244; addition of letters, *Crat.* 414; *Phaedr.* 244.
- Etymology of—
- ἀβουλία*, *Crat.* 420 D.
- ἀγαθός*, *ib.* 412 B, 422 A.
- Ἀγαμέμνων*, *ib.* 395 A.
- Ἄγης*, *ib.* 394 B.
- Ἄδης*, *ib.* 404 B.
- ἄήρ*, *ib.* 410 B.
- ἄητης*, *ibid.*
- Ἀθηνᾶ*, *ib.* 407 A.
- Ἀθηναῖος*, *Laws* 1. 626 D.
- αἰθήρ*, *Crat.* 410 B.
- αἰπόλος*, *ib.* 408 C.
- αἰσθήσεις*, *Tim.* 43 C.
- αἰσχρόν*, *Crat.* 416 B.
- Ἀκεσίμβροτος*, *ib.* 394 C.
- ἀκολασία*, *ib.* 437 C.
- ἀλγηδών*, *ib.* 419 C.
- ἀλήθεια*, *ib.* 421 B.
- ἄλιος*, *ib.* 409 A.
- ἀμαθία*, *ib.* 437 B.
- ἀμαρτία*, *ibid.*
- ἀναγκαῖον*, *ib.* 420 D.
- ἀνδρεία*, *ib.* 413 E.
- ἄνῆρ*, *ib.* 414 A.
- ἄνθρωπος*, *ib.* 399 B.
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- ἀσπαλιεντική*, *Soph.* 221 B.
- ἄστρο*, *Crat.* 409 C.
- Ἀστυάναξ*, *ib.* 392 D.
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- Ἀφροδίτη*, *ib.* 406 C.
- ἄχθηδών*, *ib.* 419 C.
- βέβαιον*, *ib.* 437 A.
- βλαβερόν*, *ib.* 417 D.
- βλάπτον*, *ibid.*
- βούλεσθαι*, *ib.* 420 C.
- βουλή*, *ibid.*
- γαῖα*, *ib.* 410 B.
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- γλίσχρον*, *ib.* 427 B.
- γλοιῶδες*, *ibid.*
- γλυκύ*, *ibid.*
- γνώμη*, *ib.* 411 D.
- γογγύλος*, *ib.* 427 C.
- γυνή*, *ib.* 414 A.
- δαίμονες*, *ib.* 397 E.
- δειλία*, *ib.* 415 B.
- δέον*, *ib.* 418 B, E.
- δεσμός*, *ib.* E.
- Δημήτηρ*, *ib.* 404 B.
- διαῖόν*, *ib.* 412 E.
- δίκαιος*, *ibid.* 413.
- δικαιοσύνη*, *ib.* 412 C.
- Διόνυσος*, *ib.* 406 B.
- Δίφιλος*, *ib.* 399 B.
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- εἶρειν*, *ib.* 398 D, 408 A.
- Ἐκτωρ*, *ib.* 393 A.
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- ἐνδον*, *ib.* 427 C.
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- ἐρείκειν*, *ib.* 426 E.
- Ἑρμῆς*, *ib.* 407 E.
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- Gentleness of the just, Gorg. 516 C; characteristic of the philosopher, Rep. 2. 375, 376; 3. 410; 6. 486 C; ought to be found in every man, Laws 5. 731 B.
- Geographers, mistaken in their notions about the earth, Phaedo 108 C.
- Geometry, invented by Theuth, Phaedr. 274 C; must be learnt by the rulers in the best state, Rep. 7. 526 foll. (cp. Laws 7. 817 E); erroneously supposed to serve for practical purposes only, Rep. 7. 527:—geometry of plane surfaces, Laws 7. 819, 820; of solids, Meno 82; Rep. 7. 528; Theaet. 147 D foll.:—geometry in the division of species, Statesm. 266:—geometrical diagrams, Crat. 436 D:—geometrical figures, beauty of, Phil. 51 C:—geometrical hypotheses, Meno 87 B:—geometrical necessity, Rep. 5. 458 D:—geometrical notions apprehended by a faculty of the soul, *ib.* 6. 511 C (cp. Theaet. 185 D, E):—geometrical ratios, Statesm. 257.
- Gerousia, the, at Lacedaemon, Laws 3. 691 E.
- Geryon, Euthyd. 299 C; Gorg. 484 B; Laws 7. 795 C.
- Gestation and nursing, Laws 7. 789.
- Ghosts, Phaedo 81 D; Laws 5. 738 C; 10. 910 A (cp. Tim. 72 A).
- Giants, battles of the, Rep. 2. 378 B; Soph. 246 A (cp. Euthyph. 6 B, C; Symp. 190 B).
- Gifts given to victors, Rep. 3. 414 A; 5. 460 B, 468:—gifts of nature, Phaedr. 269 E; Rep. 2. 370 A; 5. 455; 7. 535 A; may be perverted, Rep. 6. 491 E, 495 A; 7. 519 (cp. Laws 5. 747; 7. 819 A; 10. 908 C).
- Girls, education of, Laws 7. 794 D, 804 E, 813; contests of, *ib.* 8. 833 C, 834 D. Cp. Women.
- Givers of names, Crat. 389, 393 E, 404 A, 408 A, 414 B, 427 D, 429 E, 431 E, 436, 437 E; Laws 7. 816 B. Cp. Names.
- Glass, Tim. 61 C.
- Glaucon, son of Ariston, Rep. 1. 327 A; takes up the discourse, *ib.* 347 A; 2. 357, 372 C; 3. 398 B; 4. 427 D; 5. 450 A; 6. 506 D; 9. 576 B; anxious to contribute money for Socrates, *ib.* 1. 337 E; the boldest of men, *ib.* 2. 357 A; his genius, *ib.* 368 A; distinguished at the battle of Megara, *ibid.*; a musician, *ib.* 3. 398 D; 7. 531 A; desirous that Socrates should discuss the subject of women and children, *ib.* 5. 450 A; breeds dogs and birds, *ib.* 459 A; a lover, *ib.* 474 D (cp. 3. 402 E; 5. 458 E); not a dialectician, *ib.* 7. 533; his contentiousness, *ib.* 8. 548 E; not acquainted with the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, *ib.* 10. 608:—mentioned, Parm. 126 A.
- Glaucon, father of Charmides, Charm. 154 B, 158 B; Protag. 315 A; Symp. 222 B.
- Glaucon, a famous rhapsode, Ion 530 D.
- Glaucon, the *Symposium* narrated



- to, by Apollodorus, Symp. 172 B.
- Glaucus, the sea-god, Rep. 10. 611 C:— 'the art of Glaucus,' [? the Chian artist], Phaedo 108 D.
- Gluttony, Phaedr. 238 A; Rep. 9. 586 A; Tim. 72 E.
- Goats, keeping of, Laws 1. 639 A:— 'the goat of tragedy,' Crat. 408 C.
- God, the Great Artist, Rep. 10. 596 (cp. Laws 10. 902 E); the Maker of all things, Rep. 10. 597 C; the best of causes, Tim. 29 A; the Creator, *ib.* 30 foll.; Soph. 265; Statesm. 269, 270 (cp. Laws 10. 886 foll.); assisted in His work by subordinate deities, Tim. 41 A; the Shepherd, Crit. 109; Statesm. 271, 275;—alone is wise, Phaedr. 278 D (cp. Tim. 51 E); not the author of evil, Rep. 2. 379, 380 A; 3. 391 C (cp. 2. 364; Laws 2. 672 B); never changes, Rep. 2. 380; will not lie, *ib.* 382; alone able to combine the many into one or dissolve the one into many, Tim. 68 D; alone has absolute knowledge, Parm. 134 D; is perfect righteousness, Theact. 176 C; aided by chance and art in the government of the world, Laws 4. 709 (cp. 10. 889); moves in a straight line towards His end, *ib.* 4. 716 A; the measure of all things, *ib.* D; will not receive the gifts of the wicked, *ib.* E; watches over the stranger and the suppliant, *ib.* 5. 729 E; cannot fight against necessity, *ib.* 741 A; 7. 818 A (cp. Protag. 345 D); approves of the middle state, Laws 7. 792 D; the nature of, a fit subject of enquiry, *ib.* 821 (cp. 12. 966); has no cowardice, *ib.* 10. 901 E; exercises thought for all, *ib.* 902 B;—takes away the mind of the poet, Ion 534 (cp. Laws 3. 682 A; 4. 719 B; 2 Alcib. 147 C).
- Gods, the, Socrates' belief in, Apol. 26; human ignorance of, Crat. 400 E, 425 C (cp. Rep. 2. 365 E; Crit. 107; Parm. 134 E); disbelief in, Rep. 2. 365; Laws 10. 885 foll., 887, 909; 12. 948; existence of, proved, Laws 10. 886–900; 12. 966; said to exist by convention, *ib.* 10. 889 E; supposed to take no heed of human affairs, *ib.* 885 C, 888 E foll.; 12. 948 (cp. Rep. 2. 365 E; Parm. 134 E); not careless or ignorant, Laws 10. 900; eternal, but the soul and body indestructible, *ib.* 904 A; not to be appeased by gifts, *ib.* 905, 908 E (cp. Rep. 2. 364; Laws 4. 716 E; 10. 885 C, 888 D; 12. 948 C, D; 2 Alcib. 149 E); hate falsehood, Laws 11. 917 A; belief in, not universal, *ib.* 12. 948:—common stories about the gods, not to be received, Euthyph. 6, 8; Rep. 2. 378 foll.; 3. 388 foll., 408 C; Laws 10. 886 C; 12. 941 (cp. Symp. 195 C; Crit. 109 B; Laws 2. 672 B; and see Menex. 237 C); the Gods ought not to be represented grieving or laughing, Rep. 3. 388; have neither joy nor sorrow, Phil. 33 B, C:—sun and moon are gods, Apol. 26; Laws 7. 821 (cp. 10. 886); the gods of Hades, Phaedo 63 C; Laws 12. 958 C; gods of the natural world, Crat. 408 E; gods who 'wander about at night in the disguise of strangers,' Rep. 2. 381 D; the earth the first and oldest of gods in heaven, Tim. 40 C; genealogy of the gods, *ib.* E (cp. Crat. 402); the gods divided into the Olympian gods, gods of the state, gods of the world below, ancestral and private gods, Laws 4. 417 A; gods of generation, *ib.* 5. 729 C; 9. 879 D; the twelve, in the Model City, *ib.* 5. 745; 6.

771; 8. 828 B, 848 D; the gods who preside over contests, (*ἀγώνιοι θεοί*), *ib.* 6. 783 A; the gods to whom the several days and nights are dedicated, *ib.* 7. 807 A; heavenly and infernal gods, *ib.* 8. 828 D; the gods who avert evils, (*ἀποτροπαίοι θεοί*), *ib.* 9. 854 B; the gods who are concerned with the prevention of murder, *ib.* 871 C; the gods of the Agora, *ib.* 11. 917 D:—procession of the gods, *Phaedr.* 246 E foll.:—names of the gods, *Crat.* 397, 400 foll.:—war of the gods and giants, *Rep.* 2. 378 B; *Soph.* 246 A (cp. *Euthyph.* 6 B, C; *Symp.* 190 B):—strife of the gods respecting Attica, *Menex.* 237 C (cp. *Crit.* 109 B):—sacrifices to the gods below at places where three ways meet, *Phaedo* 108 A; laws about the gods, *Laws* 4. 716, 717; arrangements for their worship in a new state, *ib.* 5. 738; ancient local deities, to be honoured, *ib.* B; 8. 848 C; gods and temples not easily established, *ib.* 11. 909 C; invocation of gods at sales, *ib.* 916 E, 917 B; law respecting offerings to, *ib.* 12. 955 E:—the gods love a joke, *Crat.* 406 C; have each their appointed work, *Phaedr.* 247 A; influence of, on love, *ib.* 252, 253; the givers of good, *Euthyph.* 14, 15 (cp. 2 *Alcib.* 148 C); our guardians and masters, *Phaedo* 62 (cp. *Laws* 5. 727 A; 1 *Alcib.* 124); are thought to favour the unjust, *Rep.* 2. 362 B, 364 (cp. *Laws* 10. 899 E); share in immortality by the will of the Creator, *Tim.* 41 A; visit the good and evil among men, *Soph.* 216 A; their gifts to men, *Statesm.* 274 (cp. *Protag.* 320 D); excuse the perjuries of lovers, *Phil.* 65 C (cp. *Symp.* 183 B); unlike men, have absolute knowledge, *Laws* 1. 641 E; have appointed festivals

as a relief to men, *ib.* 2. 653 D, 665 A; cease to be revered when anarchy prevails, *ib.* 3. 701 C; a man's most precious possession, *ib.* 5. 726, 727; sometimes oppose men, *ib.* 732; exist in all things, *ib.* 10. 899; are our kindred, *ib.* 900 A (cp. *Protag.* 322 A); have care of orphans, *Laws* 11. 927 B; the aged bear their likeness, *ib.* 930 E foll.; listen to the imprecations of parents, *ib.* 931 B (cp. 2 *Alcib.* 138).

God. [*The dialogues of Plato show us the ancient religious system of Hellas in a state of disintegration and transition. Old ideas were passing away:—Homer had ceased to be a sufficient guide to men who had sat at the feet of the Sophists: the traditional conceptions of right and wrong were made topics of debate in the schools. Amid this chaos of opinion Plato strove to separate the truer and more permanent elements of religion and to give a new sanction to them. The ancient mythology was intolerable to him; the stories of the gods 'were lies, and, what is more, bad lies.' How could the guardians be the 'virtuous rulers of a virtuous state' if they were taught in the impressible days of their childhood that the gods were the authors of evil, or would accept the gifts of the wicked, or show favour to the unjust? Would they not be tempted to make the crimes which the poets impute to the gods an excuse for their own transgressions? Accordingly Plato lays down in the second book of the Republic two canons of religion: 'God is perfect and unchangeable,' and 'God is true and the author of truth.' These opinions must be held and acted upon by all the citizens of the*

perfect state; and they also serve as a test by which to try poetry and the poets (see s. v. Poetry). Homer and the tragedians represent the gods as changing their forms and deceiving men by lying dreams; and therefore they must be expelled from the state.—A similar spirit characterizes the Laws; but some differences may be noted. A more austere temper is shown in the later treatise; the question of the existence of the gods is debated with the greatest earnestness, and the unbeliever who remains impenetrable to argument is threatened with bonds and death. The Laws is also more pessimistic in tone than the Republic; the thought of the insignificance of man and the shortness of human life is constantly present to Plato's mind and forms a background to the whole work. Human affairs are not worth much consideration: we are but the puppets of the gods, playing our parts for a brief while in the tragi-comedy of life.—The conception of God as the Demiurgus or Creator of the universe, which is prominent in the *Timaeus*, the *Statesman*, and to a lesser degree in the *Sophist* (265 foll.), hardly appears in the *Republic* or *Laws* (cp. *Rep.* 10. 596 foll.; *Laws* 10. 886 foll.). The *Timaeus* is remarkable for the manner in which Plato attempts to solve the problem of the existence of evil. The Maker first creates the universe, and then delegates the creation of man and the animals to an inferior order of gods, of whom He is 'the Father and Artificer.' They receive from Him the divine and immortal element, i. e. the soul, and combine it in due proportion with the

material and perishable. Thus man, 'the most religious of animals,' comes into being, but evil is born within him by reason of his composite nature. Yet with the aid of education he can struggle against his passions and desires, and pass through the pilgrimage of life unharmed. If he yields to temptation, he himself and not his Creator is responsible for his evil state (cp. *Rep.* 10. 617 E).—In the *Statesman* the riddle of the universe receives a somewhat different solution. There was a time when the Creator Himself presided over the revolutions of the world. This was the so-called 'age of Cronos,' during which men lived the life of nature in peace and innocence. But in the fulness of time He withdrew His hand from the helm, and the world turned back in its course with a mighty shock which caused the destruction of all living creatures. A new race then succeeded, and at first things went fairly well. But gradually the evil which was inherent in matter reasserted itself, and the world was ready to fall into chaos again. The Creator once more took the helm and restored order to creation. At the same time He made the world immortal and self-creating: men and animals no longer grew out of the earth, but reproduced their species, each after their kind. In the beginning the human race was poor and helpless, but gradually by the aid of the gods they acquired the arts of life and learnt to form social communities (cp. *Laws* 3. 677 foll.). In this manner Plato sets forth under a mythical disguise both the origin of evil and the growth of civilization among men.]



Goddess of ways, Laws 11. 914 B.  
 Gold (and silver), not allowed to the guardians, Rep. 3. 416 E; 4. 419, 422 D; 5. 464 C; Tim. 18 B; mingled by the God in those who are to rule, Rep. 3. 415 A (cp. 8. 546 E); nature of, Tim. 59; not used in ancient Attica, Crit. 112 C; unknown to primitive society, Laws 3. 679 B; not to be possessed in the Model City, *ib.* 5. 742 A, 743 D, 746 A; not to be offered to the gods, *ib.* 12. 955 E:—refining of gold, Statesm. 303 D.

Golden age, Statesm. 271, 272; Laws 4. 713 (cp. Cronos):—the golden race, Crat. 398 A.

Good, the saving element, Rep. 10. 609:—the good = the beautiful, Lysis 216; Symp. 201 B, 204 E foll.; Rep. 5. 452 (cp. Euthyd. 301 A; Crat. 439; Phaedo 100); how far identical with the expedient, Protag. 333 E foll. (cp. Theaet. 177 D); hard to know, Crat. 384 B; confers happiness on the possessor, Symp. 204 E; the object of desire in love, *ib.* 206; the end of action, Gorg. 468, 499; the cause of the good, *ib.* 497 E; Phil. 22; the good and pleasure, Gorg. 497; Rep. 6. 505, 509 A; Phil. 11, 22 E, 60 A (cp. Protag. 358); the good superior to essence, Rep. 6. 509; the brightest and best of being, *ib.* 7. 518 E; neither wisdom nor pleasure, Phil. 20 B foll., 60 (cp. Rep. 6. 505 B); universally desired, Phil. 20 D; sufficient, *ib.* 20, 60; needs no addition, *ib.* 21; in the mixed life, *ib.* 61, 65; mixture of, *ib.* 62 foll., 64; measure an ingredient in, *ib.* 64; the cause of, is in mind only, *ib.* 65 foll.:—absolute good, Rep. 6. 507 B; 7. 540 A:—the idea of good, *ib.* 6. 505, 508; 7. 517, 534; is the highest knowledge, *ib.* 6. 505; 7. 526 E; nature of,

*ib.* 6. 505, 506:—the ‘child of the good,’ *ib.* 506 E:—good in relation to pleasure, Protag. 354, 356; Phil. 11, 20 foll., 55, 60, 63 foll.; Laws 2. 662, 663, 667; ‘*corruptio optimi pessima*,’ Euthyd. 281; good and honourable, Gorg. 474; Laws 12. 966 A; 1 Alcib. 116; good and order, Gorg. 504; meaning of ‘good’ as applied to law, Theaet. 177 D; good and false, Hipp. Min. 367:—good and evil alike originate in the soul, Charm. 156 E; explained by the hypothesis of a twofold nature of the soul, Laws 10. 896 E (*v. s. v.* Soul):—good fortune = wisdom, Euthyd. 279:—good things least liable to change, Rep. 2. 381; doing good things a work of human agency, Eryx. 398:—Goods classified, Protag. 334; Gorg. 451 E; Rep. 2. 357, 367 D; Phil. 66; Laws 1. 631; 2. 661 A; 3. 697 (cp. Laws 9. 870 A); enumerated, Euthyd. 279; Meno 78; remedial goods, Protag. 354 A; goods an object of desire to all, Euthyd. 279; use of, depends on knowledge, *ib.* 287; Meno 88; goods of the soul, Meno 88; the goods of life often a temptation, Rep. 6. 491 E, 495 A (cp. Laws 5. 729 A); goods not to be over-estimated, Crit. 120; wrongly judged by the many, Laws 2. 661 A; 5. 742 E; an evil to the evil, *ib.* 2. 661 (cp. Eryx. 396 E foll.).

Good man, the, no evil can happen to, Apol. 30 D, 41 (cp. Rep. 3. 387 C); like the good artist, has a view to the best, Gorg. 503 E; will disdain to imitate ignoble actions, Rep. 3. 396:—Good men are like and friends to one another, Lysis 214 C (cp. Phaedr. 255 A); self-sufficient, Lysis 215 A; Rep. 3. 387 (cp. Menex. 247 E); not good by



- nature, Meno 89; hated by the world, Apol. 28 A; enjoy happiness in the life to come, *ib.* 41; Phaedo 63, 107, 114; Gorg. 526 C, 527 D; why they take office, Rep. I. 347; = the wise, *ib.* 350; I Alcib. 124, 125; unfortunate (Adeimantus), Rep. 2. 364; will not give way to sorrow, *ib.* 3. 387; 10. 603 E (cp. Laws 5. 732 B; 7. 792 B, 800 D; Menex. 247 D); appear simple from their inexperience of evil, Rep. 3. 409 A; hate the tyrant, *ib.* 8. 568 A; able to rule themselves, Laws I. 626, 627, 644 B; the friends of God, and like Him, *ib.* 4. 716 D (cp. Symp. 212 A; Rep. 2. 383 C; 10. 613 A; Theaet. 176 B; Phil. 39 E); ought to impart their virtue, Laws 5. 730 E; ought to be both gentle and passionate, *ib.* 731 D (cp. Rep. 3. 410); will prefer exile to an unjust form of government, Laws 6. 770 E; are the enemies of the evil, *ib.* 10. 908 B; are found even in ill-ordered states, *ib.* 12. 951 B (cp. Phaedo 78 A); best able to tell a falsehood, Hipp. Min. 367 foll.:—sons of good men not good, Laches 179, 180; Protag. 320, 324, 325; Meno 93 (cp. Laws 3. 694 D; I Alcib. 118 E).
- Goods, community of, Rep. 3. 416; 5. 464; 8. 543 A; Laws 5. 739; 7. 807 B; in ancient Attica, Crit. 110 D; in the days of Cronos, Statesm. 272 A. Cp. Community.
- Gorgias, a great master of rhetoric, Phaedr. 261 C; Symp. 198 C; well aware that probability is superior to truth, Phaedr. 267 A; his influence at Larisa, Meno 70; his style of answer, *ibid.* (cp. 76 C); his influence on Meno, *ib.* 71 E; his definition of virtue, *ib.* 73 D; does not profess to teach virtue, *ib.* 95 C; has failed to educate Meno, *ib.* 96 E; goes the round of the cities, Apol. 19 E; the guest of Calicles, Gorg. 447 B; converses with Socrates, *ib.* 449 A–461 A; accustomed to go with his brother Herodicus to persuade patients to take medicine, *ib.* 456 B; his deference to opinion, *ib.* 482 D, 487 A, 494 D; used to maintain that the art of persuasion was superior to every other art, Phil. 58 B foll. Cp. Rhetoric.
- Gorgons, Phaedr. 229 E.
- Gortys, in Crete, colonized from Gortys in Peloponnesus, Laws 4. 708 A.
- Gout, 2 Alcib. 139 E, 140 A.
- Government, the art of, slowly grew up among mankind, Protag. 322 B; a science, Statesm. 292, 293; good government possible without laws, *ib.* 294; science of government attained by few, *ib.* 292, 300; government without knowledge, a source of misery, *ib.* 301 E; origin of government, Laws 3. 676 foll.
- Government, forms of, should they be administered in the interest of the rulers? Rep. I. 338 D, 343, 346 (cp. Statesm. 295 E); have undergone many changes in the course of ages, Laws 3. 676 B (cp. 6. 782 A); no form can be destroyed except by the fault of the rulers, *ib.* 3. 683 C;—the patriarchal form the oldest of all, *ib.* 680; gradual development of the earlier forms, *ib.* 680, 681;—the two mother forms, democracy and monarchy, *ib.* 693 C;—the five [or four] imperfect forms, Rep. 4. 445 B; 8. 544; Statesm. 291 foll., 301 foll. (cp. Laws 4. 712 B, C); arise from unwillingness to accept the rule of the one best man, Statesm. 301 D; their order in capacity for improvement, Laws 4. 711;—succession of changes in states, Rep.

8. 545 foll.;—present forms of government in an evil condition, *ib.* 6. 492 E, 496; none of them adapted to philosophy, *ib.* 497; are 'states of discord,' Laws 8. 832 C; all depend upon a principle of justice, *ib.* 12. 945 D (cp. Rep. 1. 338 E); based on the supremacy of certain classes, Laws 12. 962 E (cp. 4. 714):—peculiar barbarian forms, Rep. 8. 544 D;—the Persian Government in the days of Cyrus, Laws 3. 694 foll.;—the ancient Athenian constitution, *ib.* 698 foll. (cp. Menex. 238 C);—the elements of all forms combined in the Lacedaemonian and Cretan governments, Laws 4. 712:—the first, second, and third forms of the ideal state, *ib.* 5. 739; 7. 807 B. Cp. Constitution, Model City, State.

Government, forms of. [*The three dialogues of Plato which more especially deal with political science,—the Republic, the Statesman, and the Laws,—all contain discussions of the different forms of government and the manner in which they should be classified; and in each of them somewhat different conclusions are reached.—In the Republic the series commences with the perfect state which may be either monarchy or aristocracy, accordingly as 'the one best man' bears rule or many who are all 'perfect in virtue' [cp. Arist. Pol. iv. 2, § 1]. The further succession is then somewhat fancifully connected with the divisions of the soul. The rule of reason [i. e. the perfect state] passes into timocracy, in which the 'spirited element' is predominant; timocracy into three governments in turn, which represent the 'appetitive principle,'—first, oligarchy, in which the desire of wealth is*

*supreme; secondly, democracy, characterized by an unbounded lust for freedom; thirdly, tyranny, in which all evil desires grow unchecked, and the tyrant becomes 'the waking reality of what he once was in his dreams only.' Each of these inferior forms is illustrated in the individual who corresponds to the state and is 'set over against it.'—In the Statesman, after the government of the one or many good has been separated, the remaining forms are classified accordingly as the government has or has not regard to law, and democracy is said to be 'the worst of lawful and the best of lawless governments' (an expression to which Aristotle takes objection, Pol. iv. 2, § 3).—In the Laws the subject is differently treated: monarchy and democracy are considered to be the 'two mother forms,' which must be combined in order to produce a good state, and the Spartan and Cretan constitutions are therefore praised as polities in which every form of government is represented. But the majority of existing states are mere class-governments and have no regard to virtue.—These various ideas are nearly all reproduced or criticized by Aristotle in the Politics, who, however, does not there employ the term 'timocracy,' and adds one great original conception, the μεσὴ πολιτεία, or government of the middle class. He divides existing governments into three true forms and three 'perversions,' accordingly as the state is or is not ruled with a view to the common interest: the true forms are monarchy, aristocracy, 'polity,' and the 'perversions,' tyranny, oligarchy, democracy (iii. 7).*

- All alike, good and bad, may also be considered perversions of the perfect state* (iv. 8, § 1). *In the Ethics* (viii. 10) he speaks of the 'timocratic state, which is usually called polity'; but he derives the name from *τιμήμα* (*ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων πολιτεία*,— 'that government which is based upon a property qualification'), not, as Plato does, from *τιμή* (*ἡ φιλότιμος πολιτεία*,— 'the government of honour').]
- Governments, sometimes bought and sold, Rep. 8. 544 D.
- Grace (*εὐσχημοσύνη*), the effect of good rhythm accompanying good style, Rep. 3. 400 D; all life and every art full of grace, *ib.* 401 A.
- Grammar, in education, Euthyd. 276; taught by Prodicus, Crat. 384 B; the art which teaches the proper combination of letters, Soph. 253 A; the invention of Theuth, Phil. 18 (cp. Phaedr. 274 D):— 'a copulativus,' Crat. 405 D; change of letters in Greek, *ib.* 410 C, 418 B, 420 B, 426 C:— Cean dialect, Protag. 341 A;— Doric, Phaedo 62 A; Crat. 409 A;— Eretrian, Crat. 434 C;— Thessalian, *ib.* 405. Cp. Dialect, Etymology.
- Grapes, regulations about the gathering of, Laws 8. 844 E.
- Grasshoppers, the story of the, Phaedr. 259.
- Gratification, distinct from pleasure, Protag. 337 C.
- Gratitude, most felt by the needy, Phaedr. 233 E.
- Great men, sons of, commonly receive a bad education, Laws 3. 696. Cp. Good man.
- Greatness and smallness, Phaedo 96 E, 101 A, 102 C; Rep. 5. 479 B; Parm. 149 E, 161; Statesm. 283; absolute and relative, Rep. 4. 438 B; 7. 523, 524; 9. 575 C; 10. 602 D, 605 C; Parm. 131, 132.
- Greek life; procession at the Panathenaea, Euthyph. 6 B; the holy season at Athens, Crito 43; Phaedo 58 B, C; procession in honour of Artemis, Rep. 1. 327 A; intoxication at Athens during the Dionysia, Laws 1. 637 C:— athletes, Rep. 3. 404 A (*see* Athlete); naked exercises, *ib.* 5. 452 A, B (*see* Exercises):— amusements of boys, Lysis 206 C; 1 Alcib. 110 B; Greek games, Theaet. 146 A (*see* Games):— slaves as tutors of boys, Lysis 223; 1 Alcib. 122 A:— lovers, Lysis 204 B; Euthyd. 273 A; Rep. 5. 474 E (*see* Lovers):— young men at Athens, Apol. 23 C:— delight in intellectual exhibitions, Protag. 335 D; Euthyd. 274 D, E, 303 B; Apol. 33 B; love of discourse, Apol. 23; Gorg. 458 C; Rep. 5. 450 D (*see* Discourse):— practical joking, Euthyd. 278 C:— wit, Meno 77 A:— incidents of a dinner, Symp. 174, 175, 176, 212 foll., 223; drinking, *ib.* 176, 223; Rep. 5. 475 A; flute girls, Symp. 212 E (cp. Protag. 347 C; Symp. 176 E); conversation, Symp. 177 A; after-dinner amusements, Protag. 347 C; dessert, Rep. 2. 372 C; Crit. 115 B; Syracusan dinners and Athenian confectionary, Rep. 3. 404 D, E:— female occupations, Lysis 208 E; Rep. 5. 455 C; Laws 7. 805 E; hours of rising, Protag. 310 A, 311 A (cp. Laws 7. 808 A); door-keepers, Protag. 314 D; house of Callias, *ib.* 315 D, 337 E; house of Agathon, Symp. 174; sacrifices in houses, Rep. 1. 328 C (cp. Laws 10. 909 D foll.);— the mistress and the servants, Laws 7. 808 A:— courts of justice at Athens, Apol. 34 C:— Greeks and barbarians, Rep. 5. 469 B; 6. 494 C; Statesm. 262



C foll.; Laws 1. 635 B; 1 Alcib. 105 C; 2 Alcib. 141 C (cp. Hellas). For the characters of Greek youth, *see* Alcibiades, Charmides, Cleinias, Ctesippus, Lysis; and cp. Phaedr. 238 E foll.

Greek states, causes of the ruin of, Rep. 8. 564; Laws 1. 636 B; 3. 684 D; 5. 736 C; 8. 839.

Grief, not to be indulged, Rep. 3. 387; 10. 603-606; Laws 5. 732 B; 7. 792 B, 800 D; Menex. 247 D (cp. Laws 5. 727 D). Cp. Sorrow.

Guard, the tyrant's request for a, Rep. 8. 566 B, 567 E:— Guards of the country, Laws 6. 760 foll., 778 E; 8. 843 D, 848 D (cp. Wardens [of the Country]).

Guardians of orphans, Laws 6. 766 D; 10. 909 C; 11. 922 A, 924-928. Cp. Orphans.

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Holiness (ὁσιότης), one of the five virtues, Protag. 329 C, 359 A; nature of, Euthyph. 10 foll.;—accepted of God, Laws 4. 716;—holiness and justice, Protag. 330, 331; Euthyph. 12. *See* Piety.  
Holiness. [*Holiness is enumerated as one of the virtues only in the Protagoras and Euthyphro.*—*In the Protagoras it is cursorily men-*

tioned in the discussion upon the unity of virtue (v. s. v. Virtue), and is there said to have an especial affinity to justice.—In the *Euthyphro* the nature of holiness is the principal theme. Socrates, who is just going to stand his trial on a charge of impiety, meets the soothsayer *Euthyphro* and takes the opportunity of having a lesson upon holiness from him. *Euthyphro* first suggests that holiness is doing as he is doing, prosecuting his father for homicide. But this is clearly an example, not a definition, of piety. Another endeavour is made:—‘Piety is that which is dear to the Gods, and impiety that which is hateful to them.’ The Gods, however, may differ, like men, about what is just or unjust, and the action which pleases one God may displease another. And if, by way of correction, we affirm that what all the Gods love is pious, and what they all hate is impious, still this only gives us an attribute of the Gods; it does not show the real nature of piety. Again *Euthyphro* attempts a definition:—‘Piety is that part of justice which gives to the Gods their due.’ But piety thus becomes merely a way of doing business with the Gods. They give us various good things, and receive in return gratitude from us. Once more then, piety is, not what is beneficial, but what is dear or grateful to the Gods. The argument has gone round in a circle: but *Euthyphro* is in a hurry and cannot stay to explain his meaning.—The subject is not elsewhere resumed by Plato, nor is holiness reckoned among the virtues in his later dialogues. Probably, if we may judge from the indications which he has sup-

plied in the *Protagoras* and the *Euthyphro*, he regarded holiness as a part of justice, and thought, therefore, that it did not require further discussion apart from the virtue under which it was included.]

Holiness of marriage, Rep. 5. 458 E foll.; Laws 6. 775. Cp. Marriage.

Homer, a sophist, Protag. 316 D; the best and most divine of poets, Ion 530 B, 531; 2 Alcib. 147 C; the principal study of the rhapsodes, Ion 531 A; subjects of his poetry, *ib.* C; like a magnetic ring, *ib.* 536 A, B; his knowledge of the arts, *ib.* 537 A foll. (cp. Rep. 10. 598 E); quoted on names, Crat. 391 D foll.; had not the wit to discover why he was blind, Phaedr. 243 A; his children (poems), Symp. 209 D; supports the theory that justice is a thief, Rep. 1. 334 B; his rewards of justice, *ib.* 2. 363 B; 10. 612 A; his stories not approved for youth, *ib.* 2. 377 D foll. (cp. 10. 595); his mode of narration, *ib.* 3. 393 A foll.; feeds his heroes on campaigners’ fare, *ib.* 404 C; Socrates’ feeling of reverence for him, *ib.* 10. 595 C (cp. 3. 391 A); the captain and teacher of the tragic poets, *ib.* 10. 595 B, 598 D, E (cp. Theaet. 152 E); not a legislator, Rep. 10. 599 E; or a general, *ib.* 600 A; or inventor, *ibid.*; or teacher, *ibid.*; no educator, *ib.* 600, 606 E, 607 B; not much esteemed in his lifetime, *ib.* 600 B foll.; went about as a rhapsode, *ibid.*; his “golden chain,” Theaet. 153 C; a supporter of the notion that all is flux, *ib.* 160 D, 179 E; his poems pleasing to age, Laws 2. 658 E; not much read by the Cretans, *ib.* 3. 680 B; appears to describe an Ionian mode of life, *ib.* C; ‘the



wisest of our poets,' *ib.* 6. 777 A (cp. Theaet. 194 E). Passages quoted or referred to:—

Iliad i.

- l. 11 foll., Rep. 3. 392 E foll.
- l. 131, *ib.* 6. 501 B.
- l. 169 foll., Hipp. Min. 370 D.
- l. 225, Rep. 3. 389 E.
- l. 343, Crat. 428 D.
- l. 590 foll., Rep. 2. 378 D.
- l. 599 foll., *ib.* 3. 389 A.

Iliad ii.

- l. 361, Phaedr. 260 A.
- l. 408, Symp. 174 C.
- l. 547, 1 Alcib. 132 A.
- l. 623, Rep. 6. 501 C.
- l. 813, Crat. 392 A.
- l. 851, Theaet. 194 D.

Iliad iii.

- l. 8, Rep. 3. 389 E.
- l. 109, Crat. 428 D.
- l. 172, Theaet. 183 E.

Iliad iv.

- l. 50 foll., Rep. 2. 379 E.
- l. 218, *ib.* 3. 408 A.
- l. 412, *ib.* 389 E.
- l. 431, *ibid.*
- l. 453, Phil. 62 D.

Iliad v.

- l. 127, 2 Alcib. 150 D.
- l. 221, Crat. 407 D.
- l. 223, Laches 191 A.
- l. 845, Rep. 10. 612 B.

Iliad vi.

- l. 211, Soph. 268 D.
- l. 265, Crat. 415 A.
- l. 402, *ib.* 392 B.
- l. 403, *ibid.* E.

Iliad vii.

- l. 321, Rep. 5. 468 D.

Iliad viii.

- l. 13, Phaedo 112 A.
- l. 19, Theaet. 153 D.
- l. 108, Laches 191 A.
- l. 162, Rep. 5. 468 E.
- l. 281, Phaedr. 264 A.
- l. 548, 2 Alcib. 149 D.

Iliad ix.

- 'Prayers,' Crat. 428 B; Hipp. Min. 364 E.

- l. 308 foll., Hipp. Min. 365 A, 370 A.

- l. 357 foll., *ib.* 370 B.

- l. 363, Crito 44 B.

- l. 441, Gorg. 485 D.

- l. 447, Laws 11. 931 B.

- l. 493 foll., Rep. 2. 364 D.

- l. 500, Laws 10. 906 D.

- l. 513 foll., Rep. 3. 390 E.

- l. 644 foll., Crat. 428 B.

- l. 650 foll., Hipp. Min. 371 B.

Iliad x.

- l. 224, Protag. 348 C; Symp. 174 D; 2 Alcib. 140 A.

- l. 482, Symp. 179 A.

Iliad xi.

- l. 514, *ib.* 214 B.

- l. 576, Rep. 3. 405 E.

- l. 624, *ibid.*

- l. 638, 630, Ion 538 C.

- l. 844, Rep. 3. 406 A.

Iliad xii.

- 'Battle at the Wall,' Ion 539 A.

- l. 200 foll., *ibid.*

- l. 311, Rep. 5. 468 E.

Iliad xiv.

- l. 96, Laws 4. 706 E.

- l. 201, Theaet. 152 E (cp. Crat. 402 B).

- l. 291, Crat. 392 A.

- l. 294 foll., Rep. 3. 390 C.

- l. 302, Theaet. 152 E (cp. Crat. 402 B).

Iliad xv.

- l. 187 foll., Gorg. 523 A.

- l. 262, Symp. 179 A.

Iliad xvi.

- l. 433, Rep. 3. 388 C.

- l. 554, Theaet. 194 D.

- l. 776, Rep. 8. 566 D.

- l. 856 foll., *ib.* 3. 386 E.

Iliad xviii.

- l. 23 foll., *ib.* 388 A.

- l. 54, *ibid.* B.

- l. 84 foll., Laws 12. 944 A.

- l. 96 foll., Apol. 28 C.

- l. 108 foll., Phil. 47 E.

Iliad xix.

- l. 92 foll., Symp. 195 D.

- l. 278 foll., Rep. 3. 390 D.



- Iliad xx.  
 l. 4 foll., *ib.* 2. 379 E.  
 l. 64 foll., *ib.* 3. 386 C.  
 l. 74 foll., Crat. 391 E.  
 l. 216 foll., Laws 3. 681 E.
- Iliad xxi.  
 l. 222 foll., Rep. 3. 391 B.  
 l. 308, Protag. 340 A.
- Iliad xxii.  
 ll. 15, 20, Rep. 3. 391 A.  
 l. 168 foll., *ib.* 388 C.  
 l. 362 foll., *ib.* 386 E.  
 l. 414, *ib.* 388 B.  
 l. 507, Crat. 392 E.
- Iliad xxiii.  
 l. 100 foll., Rep. 3. 387 A.  
 l. 103 foll., *ib.* 386 D.  
 l. 151, *ib.* 391 B.  
 l. 175, *ibid.*  
 l. 335, Ion 537 A.
- Iliad xxiv.  
 l. 10 foll., Rep. 3. 388 A.  
 l. 80 foll., Ion 538 D.  
 l. 348, Protag. 309 A.  
 l. 527, Rep. 2. 379 D.
- Odyssey i.  
 l. 32, 2 Alcib. 142 E.  
 l. 351 foll., Rep. 4. 424 B.
- Odyssey iii.  
 l. 26 foll., Laws 7. 803 E.
- Odyssey iv.  
 l. 252, Symp. 220 C.
- Odyssey v.  
 l. 193, Phaedr. 266 B.
- Odyssey viii.  
 l. 22, Theaet. 183 E.  
 l. 266 foll., Rep. 3. 390 D.
- Odyssey ix.  
 l. 9 foll., *ib.* B.  
 l. 91 foll., *ib.* 8. 560 C.  
 l. 112 foll., Laws 3. 680 B.
- Odyssey x.  
 l. 279, Protag. 309 A.  
 l. 495, Rep. 3. 386 E.
- Odyssey xi.  
 l. 489 foll., *ib.* C; 7. 516 D.  
 l. 569, Gorg. 526 D.  
 l. 576 foll., *ib.* 525 E.  
 l. 582, Protag. 315 D.  
 l. 601, *ib.* B.  
 l. 633 foll., Symp. 198 C.
- Odyssey xii.  
 l. 342, Rep. 3. 390 B.
- Odyssey xiv.  
 l. 234, Theaet. 183 E.
- Odyssey xvi.  
 l. 121, *ib.* 170 E.
- Odyssey xvii.  
 l. 218, Lysis 214 A.  
 l. 322, Laws 6. 777 A.  
 l. 347, Charm. 161 A; Laches 201 B.  
 l. 383 foll., Rep. 3. 389 D.  
 l. 485 foll., *ib.* 2. 381 D.
- Odyssey xix.  
 l. 43, Laws 10. 904 E.  
 l. 109 foll., Rep. 2. 363 B.  
 l. 163, Apol. 34 D.  
 l. 174 foll., Laws 1. 624 B.  
 l. 395, Rep. 1. 334 B.  
 l. 563, Charm. 173 B.
- Odyssey xx.  
 l. 17, Phaedo 94 E; Rep. 3. 390 D; 4. 441 B.  
 l. 351 foll., Ion 539 A.
- Odyssey xxiv.  
 l. 6, Rep. 3. 387 A.  
 l. 40, *ib.* 8. 566 D.
- Homer, allusions to:—Euthyd. 288 B; Phaedr. 275 C; Ion 535 B; Symp. 179 A, 180 A, 216 A, 219 A; Phaedo 95 B; Gorg. 516 C; Rep. 1. 328 E; 2. 381 D; 3. 390 E; 8. 544 E; Theaet. 194 C; Soph. 216 B; 1 Alcib. 132 A; 2 Alcib. 140 A.
- Homeric Apocrypha quoted, Phaedr. 252 B.
- Homeridae, Ion 530 E; Rep. 10. 599 E.
- Homicide, the, exiled, Laws 9. 864 D, E; return of, *ib.* 867 D foll.; the disobedient, *ib.* 868; the slave who has committed homicide not to be sold unless his crime is known to the purchaser, *ib.* 11. 916 C:—involuntary homicide, *ib.* 9. 865–869; homicide in contests, *ib.* 8. 831 A; 9. 865 A; of a slave,

- ib.* 9. 865; of a freeman, *ibid.*; of a stranger, *ib.* 866; of a metic, *ibid.*; by a stranger, *ibid.*; manslaughter. *ib.* 866 E foll.; with premeditation, *ib.* 867; by a slave, *ib.* 868; by a father or mother, *ibid.*; by a husband or wife, *ibid.*; by a brother or sister, *ibid.*; by a child, *ib.* 869; by brothers, citizens, strangers, slaves, *ibid.*; voluntary, *ib.* 870-874; causes of, *ib.* 870; homicide of a kinsman, *ib.* 871; punishment of homicide, *ibid.*; indirect homicide, *ib.* 872; homicide of slaves, *ibid.*; of father, mother, &c., *ib.* 873; by beasts, *ibid.*; by inanimate objects, *ib.* 873 E; by persons unknown, *ib.* 874 A; justifiable homicide, *ib.* C.
- Honest man, the, a match for the rogue, Rep. 3. 409 C (cp. 10. 613 C).
- Honey, Tim. 60 B.
- Honour, where to be given, Laws 3. 696 A, E; 4. 707 A, 715; 5. 730, 743 E; 6. 757; 11. 921 E; must be rightly distributed, *ib.* 5. 738 E;—to be given to the different classes of Gods, *ib.* 4. 717 A;—paid to the aged, *ib.* 721 D; of parents, *ib.* 11. 930 E foll.;—due to the soul, *ib.* 5. 727, 728; to the body, *ib.* 728, 729;—honour and justice, *ib.* 9. 859;—pleasure enjoyed by the lover of honour, Rep. 9. 581 C, 586 E;—the honourable said to be a matter of convention, Laws 10. 889 E (cp. 12. 957 B); different ideas of the honourable and the dishonourable, Eryx. 400 C;—the honourable and the good, Gorg. 474; Laws 12. 966 A; 1 Alcib. 116; the honourable and the just, Laws 9. 859, 860.
- Hope, the comfort of the righteous in old age, Rep. 1. 331; their consolation in the hour of misfortune, Laws 5. 732 C; = the expectation of pleasure, *ib.* 1. 644 D;—pleasures of hope, Phil. 39.
- Horse contests, Laws 6. 765 D; 8. 834; horse racing in the isle of Atlantis, Crit. 117 C;—Horses of the soul, Phaedr. 246, 253, 254;—horses in Thessaly, Laws 1. 625 D; not much used in Crete, *ib.* 8. 834 B.
- Horsemanship, art of, Laches 193 B; Apol. 27 C; Euthyph. 13; Eryx. 396 A; 403 C; suitable to women, Laws 7. 804 C foll., 813 D, E; 8. 834 E. See Riding.
- Hospices, Laws 11. 919 A. Cp. Inns.
- Hospitality, enjoined by Heaven, Laws 4. 718 A; in the Model City, *ib.* 12. 952 E foll.
- Hours (*ᾠραι*), derivation of the name, Crat. 410 C.
- 'House of Correction,' Laws 10. 908;—'House of Retribution,' *ibid.*
- Household and state compared, Statesm. 259; the household must all rise early, Laws 7. 808 A; the childless household, *ib.* 9. 877 C; 11. 924, 925;—household cares, Rep. 5. 465 C (cp. Euthyd. 306 E).
- Houses, division of the men's and women's apartments in, Tim. 70 A (cp. Symp. 176 E);—arrangement of Greek houses, Protag. 314, 315; Symp. 174, 175;—sacrifices in houses, Rep. 1. 328 B, 331 D (cp. Laws 10. 909 D foll.):—[in the Model City], two houses for each citizen, Laws 5. 745; the houses in the country, *ib.* 8. 848.
- Human affairs, not wholly governed by accident, Laws 4. 709 A;—body, growth of, *ib.* 7. 788 D (cp. Body);—character, differences in, Rep. 6. 503; Theaet. 144 A; Statesm. 307;—grandeur, despised by the philosopher, Theaet. 174 E;—interests, unimportance of, Rep. 10. 604 B (cp. 6. 486 A); Theaet. 173 E; Laws 1. 644 E;

7. 803:—life, full of evils, Rep. 2. 379 C; shortness of, *ib.* 10. 608 D (cp. Phaedo 107 C); not much to be valued, Statesm. 299 E; a scene of mingled pleasure and pain, Phil. 50 A; requires the empirical arts (music, &c.), *ib.* 62 (cp. Life):—nature, incapable of doing many things well, Rep. 3. 395 B; rebellious, Laws 8. 839 D; its weakness, *ib.* 9. 854 A, 875 B:—race, has always existed, *ib.* 6. 781 E:—sacrifices, Rep. 8. 565 D; Laws 6. 782 C.
- Hunger, Rep. 4. 437 E, 439; Phil. 31E, 34 D; an inanition (*κένωσις*) of the body, Rep. 9. 585 A.
- Hunting, one of the acquisitive arts, Soph. 219 (cp. Rep. 2. 373 B); divisions of, Soph. 220 foll. (cp. Euthyd. 290; Laws 7. 823 A); considered by the Lacedaemonians a training for war, Laws 1. 633 B (cp. Protag. 322 B; Soph. 219 C, 222); valuable to the young, Laws 6. 763 B; law respecting, *ib.* 7. 823.
- Hurts, voluntary and involuntary, Laws 9. 861 E foll.; hurts and injustice, *ib.* 862.
- Husbandmen, needed in the state, Rep. 2. 369 C foll.; formed a separate caste in ancient Attica, Crit. 110 C, 111 E; laws concerning, Laws 8. 842 D foll.; to be slaves, *ib.* 7. 806 E.
- Husbandry, origin of, Laws 3. 681 A; an empirical art, Phil. 56 A:—husbandry of the soul, Phaedr. 276 (cp. Theaet. 167 B). *See* Agriculture.
- Hydra, Heracles and the, Euthyd. 297 C.
- Hymn to Apollo, composed by Socrates, Phaedo 60 D:—the national hymn (*τὸ πάτριον μέλος*), Laws 12. 947 C:—Hymns to the Gods, may be allowed in the state, Rep. 10. 607 A (cp. Laws 3. 700 A; 7. 801 E); to follow a fixed type, Laws 7. 799, 801:—marriage-hymns, Rep. 5. 459:—funeral-hymns, Laws 7. 800 E; 12. 947 B.
- Hyperborean, Abaris the, Charm. 158 B.
- Hypothesis, use of, Meno 86, 87; Phaedo 100; in mathematics and in the intellectual world, Rep. 6. 510; in method, Parm. 136; in the sciences, Rep. 7. 533:—hypotheses of the one, Parm. 137 foll. (cp. One):—hypothetical case at law, Phaedr. 273.

## I.

- Iambic measure, Rep. 3. 400 C:—Iambic poets, Laws 11. 935 E.
- Iapetus, Symp. 195 B.
- Iatrocles, name of a physician, Crat. 394 C.
- Iberians, given to intoxication, Laws 1. 637 D.
- Ibis, the bird sacred to Theuth, Phaedr. 274 C.
- Ibycus; 'like Ibycus I was troubled,' Phaedr. 242 C; fell in love in his old age, Parm. 136 E.
- Iccus of Tarentum, a gymnastic master and sophist, Protag. 316 D; his self-restraint, Laws 8. 839 E.
- Ice, Tim. 59 E.
- Ida, altar of the gods on, Rep. 3. 391 E; dwellers at the foot of, Laws 3. 681 E.
- Idea, the, prior to the reality, Phaedo 75:—idea of beauty, Euthyd. 301 A:—idea of good the source of truth, Rep. 6. 508 (cp. 505); a cause like the sun, *ib.* 6. 508; 7. 516, 517; must be apprehended by the lover of knowledge, *ib.* 7. 534 (cp. Phil. 65 foll.; Laws 12. 965):—doctrine of ideas, Lysis 217 foll.; innate ideas, Euthyd. 296; recollection of ideas, Meno 81, 86; Phaedo 75; Phaedr. 249 (cp.



Recollection); ideas and names, Crat. 389; existence of ideas, *ib.* 439; knowledge connected with ideas, *ib.* 440; loveliness of, Phaedr. 250; the cause of love, *ib.* 251; progress toward, Symp. 211; absolute ideas, Phaedo 65, 74; Rep. 5. 476; Parm. 133; association of ideas, Phaedo 73 D, 76 A; knowledge of, must precede particular knowledge, *ib.* 75; ideas and immortality, *ib.* 76; the ideas unchangeable, *ib.* 78; a kind of stepping stones, *ib.* 100; are causes, *ibid.*; names of ideas, *ib.* 103; ideas and phenomena, Rep. 5. 476; 6. 507; ideas and hypotheses, *ib.* 6. 510; origin of abstract ideas, *ib.* 7. 523; nature of ideas, *ib.* 10. 596; singleness of, *ib.* 597 (cp. Tim. 28, 51); ideas in the creation of the world, Tim. 30 foll. (cp. 37); ideas of likeness and unlikeness, Parm. 129; ideas distinguished from the things which partake of them, *ibid.*; ideas and moral qualities, *ib.* 130; one and many in, *ib.* 131; participation of things in, *ib.* 131-133, 135; infinite, *ib.* 132; exist in the mind, *ibid.*; are patterns, *ibid.*; necessary to philosophy, *ib.* 135; = common notions, Soph. 240; ideas and being, *ib.* 246; general ideas, *ib.* 254; require examples, Statesm. 277; difficulties in the way of ideas, Phil. 15 foll.; ideas in individuals, *ib.* 16; knowledge and ideas, Laws 12. 965.

Idea. [*The Idea of Good is an abstraction, which, under that name at least, does not occur in any other of Plato's writings except the Republic. But it is probably not essentially different from another abstraction, 'the true being of things,' which is mentioned in many of his dialogues. He has nowhere given*

*an explanation of his meaning, not because he was 'regardless whether we understood him or not,' but rather, perhaps, because he was himself unable to state in precise terms the ideal which floated before his mind. He belonged to an age in which men felt too strongly the first pleasure of metaphysical speculation to be able to estimate the true value of the ideas which they conceived (cp. his own picture of the effect of dialectic on the youthful intellect, Rep. 7. 539). To him, as to the Schoolmen of the Middle Ages, an abstraction seemed truer than a fact: he was impatient to shake off the shackles of sense and rise into the purer atmosphere of ideas. Yet in the allegory of the cave (Republic vii), whose inhabitants must go up to the light of perfect knowledge, but descend again into the obscurity of opinion, he has shown that he was not unaware of the necessity of finding a firm starting-point for these flights of metaphysical imagination (cp. Rep. 6. 510). A passage in the Philebus (65 A) will give the best insight into his meaning: 'If we are not able to hunt the good with one idea only, with three we may take our prey,—Beauty, Symmetry, Truth.' The three were inseparable to the Greek mind, and no conception of perfection could be formed in which they did not unite (cp. Introduction to Rep. p. lxix).]*

Ideas. [*No part of Plato's philosophy has been more commonly associated with his name than 'the doctrine of ideas.' But his meaning has been often misunderstood, or he has been supposed to be formulating a system when he is only 'guessing at truth.' His*



opinions did not always remain the same, and in his later works the ideas are not so prominent as in the *Phaedo* or *Phaedrus*. He is his own best critic in the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist*, and has there shown how fully he appreciates the difficulties of the argument.—The ideas are one phase of a conception which he has expressed in many forms in his various writings:—That there is a truth which is beyond sense, and which is perceived by the mind alone when freed from the ‘disturbing element’ of the body (*Phaedo* 65; *Tim.* 51; and *cp.* *Theaet.* 185 foll.). In this spirit the subjects of the higher education are discussed in the *Republic* (Book vii), and the sciences are declared to be valuable only in proportion as they enable us to attain true being. The ideas may be gained by association, which Plato calls ‘the reminiscence of knowledge acquired in a previous state,’ when we beheld them ‘shining in brightness’ (*Phaedr.* 250), and makes a proof of immortality (*Phaedo* 73, 76): or they may be reached by the ‘gracious aid’ of dialectic, which uses the objects of sense as steps by which we are able to mount to the sphere of the absolute (*Symp.* 211, and *cp.* *Rep.* 5. 476; 6. 510). They are unchangeable and invisible, and therefore akin to the divine element in us, that is, the soul (*Phaedo* 78 E). By participation in them things are what they are: the beautiful is beautiful because it shares in the idea of beauty, that which is just is just because it partakes of the nature of justice (*Phaedo* 100–105; *Parm.* 130). Nor could names ever have been found for things, unless the

legislator, who was the original name giver, had been acquainted with the ideas which they represent (*Crat.* 389). Again, the ideas afford an argument against the Heraclitean doctrine of flux: for that which is absolute and true cannot change, but must always abide and exist (*ib.* 439, 440). The ideas are the work of God, and the artist only imitates them at second- or even third-hand: for there cannot be two or more ideas of the same thing (*Rep.* 10. 596 foll.; *Tim.* 28). The Creator when the worlds were made had such a single, perfect idea of the universe, in accordance with which He contrived all His work (*Tim.* 31). They are almost unintelligible to human apprehension, unless they are expressed by examples, or translated into the language of facts (*Statesm.* 277).—In the *Philebus* Plato begins to discuss the ‘troublesome questions’ which are raised by the doctrine of ideas. How can the one be predicated of the many? Have the ideas real existence? His reply is somewhat crude and unsatisfactory:—There are four categories, the infinite, the finite, that which is intermediate between them, and the cause which unites them. The intermediate element is ‘law’ or ‘order’ or ‘proportion’; and since all things share in it, the finite is thus joined with the infinite, the one with the many, and ideas are proved to be real and connected with phenomena. The cause of union is explained to be mind or God.—In the *Parmenides* the criticism of the ideas is carried still further; nor can Plato apparently provide a sufficient answer to his own objections. He is applying the

test of logic to the vague thoughts and dreams which had filled his mind at an earlier period; and we cannot wonder that they are not always able to endure the trial. He does not know how to prove to the sceptic the existence of the ideas, which seem to dwell apart in the sphere of the absolute; or how these unknown, unknowable conceptions can be brought from heaven to earth.—Zeno has denied the 'being of many'; for if being is many, it must be both like and unlike, which is impossible. And when Socrates in reply distinguishes between the idea and the object, and says that the two ideas of likeness and unlikeness, which are incompatible, may yet inhere in the same individual, he is met by the 'inevitable question':—What is the nature of this participation in the idea:—does the individual share in the whole of the idea or in a part only? Socrates replies that the idea may be like the day, which is one and the same in many places and yet continuous with itself, or like a sail which covers several persons and still is one. But he cannot meet the objection that the idea, which is in itself an inseparable whole, is thus regarded also as divisible into parts.—Another difficulty is then started. Ideas are formed by abstractions made from some class of objects: e. g. the idea of greatness is drawn from the contemplation of a number of things which have greatness. But then the idea of greatness must itself be added to the class of great things, and a new idea which embraces them all will be required, and this process will go on *ad infinitum*.—Although Plato cannot find a reply to these

and similar objections, he is still convinced that without abstract ideas thought and reasoning are impossible, and he hints by the mouth of Parmenides that a more searching analysis of them both from the negative and the positive side will at last conduct us to a sound doctrine of ideas (*cp. Soph. 259*).—In the *Sophist* he once more seeks to prove the connexion of ideas. He is attacking the Eleatic doctrine that there is no such thing as falsehood, because not-being is not and therefore cannot exist. He shows that the entire separation of the spheres of the absolute and the relative, of being and not-being, cannot be maintained. It is not true that all ideas are incompatible, although some are. And it is the business of dialectic, which is the art of division into classes, to teach us under what category a particular idea is included. Being, for instance, has communion with rest and motion; but rest and motion are inconsistent. Not-being is only the negation of being, just as not-motion or rest is the negation of motion.—In the *Statesman* and the *Laws* the doctrine of ideas occupies a subordinate place, and seems to have lost its former attractiveness to Plato. Yet at the very end of the *Laws* he exhibits a trace of the old feeling in the final injunction that the guardians must be men who are able to see 'the one in many' and to order all things accordingly (12. 965 B).]

Ideal state, the, difficulty of, *Rep.* 5. 472; 6. 502 E; *Laws* 4. 711; is it possible? *Rep.* 5. 471, 473; 6. 499; 7. 540 (*cp. ib.* 7. 520; *Laws* 4. 711 E; 5. 739; 12. 968 A); how to be commenced, *Rep.* 6.



- 501; 7. 540:—Ideals, value of, *ib.* 5. 472; use of, in education, Laws 1. 643; in legislation, *ib.* 5. 746:—Idealists, Soph. 246, 248 (cp. Phaedo 100; Rep. 6. 505 A). For the Ideal State of the Republic, *see* City, Constitution, Education, Guardians, Rulers, etc.
- Idleness, the mother of wantonness, Laws 8. 835 E; not to be attributed to God, *ib.* 10. 900 E foll.
- Ignorance, the source of evil, Protag. 345, 353 foll. (cp. Meno 77); ignorance and pleasure, Protag. 357; impossible, Euthyd. 286; ignorance about the soul disgraceful to the rhetorician, Phaedr. 277 E; ignorance self-satisfied, Symp. 204 A; excludes knowledge, Meno 80; nature of, Rep. 5. 477, 478; an inanition (*κένωσις*) of the soul, *ib.* 9. 585; = slowness of perception, Theaet. 194 E; ignorance and false opinion, *ib.* 199 E; involuntary, Soph. 228, 230 A; an evil of the soul, *ib.* 228 (cp. Tim. 86 B, 88 B; Statesm. 296 D; Phil. 48 B); divisions of, Soph. 229; ignorance of self, Phil. 48; having the conceit of knowledge, *ib.* 49 A; Laws 9. 863 B; 1 Alcib. 117 foll. (cp. Apol. 29); either ridiculous or mischievous, Phil. 48; 1 Alcib. 118; is ruin, Laws 3. 688; the worst, to know the evil and refuse the good, *ib.* 689; ignorance a prevalent disorder among kings, *ib.* 691; complete ignorance not so bad as misapplied knowledge, *ib.* 7. 819 A; ignorance a cause of crimes, *ib.* 9. 863 B; twofold, *ibid.*; ignorance of statesmen, 1 Alcib. 118, 119; ignorance sometimes better than knowledge, 2 Alcib. 143 foll.:—ignorance of the world, Phaedo 89:—the ignorant ought to submit to the wise, Laws 3. 690 B.
- Iliad, the style of, illustrated, Rep. 3. 392 E foll.; mentioned, *ib.* 393 A; Laws 2. 658 E; 1 Alcib. 112 A; heroes of, Hipp. Min. 363 B. Cp. Homer, Odyssey.
- Ilion (Troy), Rep. 3. 393 E; Laws 3. 685 B; foundation of, Laws 3. 681 E foll. *See* Troy.
- Ilissus, the, Socrates and Phaedrussit beside, Phaedr. 229 A, B; hill of the Acropolis once extended to, Crit. 112 A.
- Illegitimate children, Rep. 5. 461 A; Laws 11. 930.
- Ill-health destroys the profit of life, Gorg. 505 A. *See* Disease, Invalids.
- Illusion in art, Soph. 235 E:—illusions of hearing, Theaet. 157 E (cp. Phaedo 65 A);—of hope, Phil. 40 A;—of pleasure, *ib.* D, 42;—of sight, Rep. 7. 523; 10. 602; Theaet. 157 E; Phil. 38 D, 42 A (cp. Phaedo 65 A).
- Image-making, Soph. 236, 260 E, 265, 266.
- Images (*i. e.* reflections of visible objects), Rep. 6. 510; Tim. 52 D (cp. Rep. 10. 596); a proof that not-being exists, Soph. 240; no images of the highest thoughts, Statesm. 285 E:—golden images at Delphi, Phaedr. 235 E; at Olympia, *ib.* 236 B:—images made by shepherds, Phil. 38 D:—images set up in fulfilment of vows, Laws 10. 909 E; as offerings to the Gods, *ib.* 12. 956 A:—waxen images (used in sorcery), *ib.* 11. 933 B.
- Imagination, = the union of sense and opinion, Soph. 264 A.
- Ἰμπερος*, Phaedr. 251 C.
- Imitation, in dancing, Laws 2. 655, 668; 7. 796, 798, 814 E;—in language, Crat. 423, 426, 427;—in music, *ib.* 423; Laws 2. 655, 668 foll.; 7. 798 E, 812 C (cp. Rep. 3. 397; Laws 10. 889 D);—in painting, Crit. 107 (cp. Tim. 19 D;

- Laws 10. 889 D);—in science, Soph. 266;—in style, Rep. 3. 393, 394; 10. 596 foll., 600 E foll.; Laws 4. 719 C:—affects the character, Rep. 3. 395; Laws 2. 668; 7. 798 E; thrice removed from the truth, Rep. 10. 596–598, 602 B; concerned with the weaker part of the soul, *ib.* 604; Tim. 19; Soph. 234, 235; of appearances, Soph. 267; pleasure accompanying, Laws 2. 667; criteria of, *ib.* 667, 668:—the art of, Soph. 219; a kind of creation, *ib.* 265; parts of, *ib.* 266 (cp. 235).
- Imitative arts, inferior, Rep. 10. 605; divisions of them, Soph. 235; —imitative gestures, Crat. 423; —imitative poetry, Rep. 10. 595.
- Imitators ignorant, Rep. 10. 602; the two kinds of, Soph. 268.
- Immortality and love, Symp. 206–209;—the prospect of immortality, delightful to the good man, Apol. 40 E; no great boon to the wicked, Laws 2. 661;—immortality of the soul, and the principle of self-motion, Phaedr. 245 (cp. Laws 10. 894 foll.; 12. 966 E); connected with the doctrine of recollection, Meno 81, 86; Phaedo 73–76 (cp. Symp. 208); arguments in favour of, Phaedo 70; arguments against, (Simmius), *ib.* 86; (Cebes), 87; the arguments answered, *ib.* 91 foll.; the proof of, *ib.* 105 foll.; Rep. 10. 608 foll. (cp. 6. 498); given to man by the Creator, Tim. 41 foll., 69; belief in, must be possessed by the true worshipper of God, Laws 12. 967 E:—immortality by children, Symp. 207, 208; Laws 4. 721; 6. 773 E, 776 B:—immortality of fame, Symp. 208 C:—immortality of the Gods, Tim. 41 B:—‘the principle of immortality within us,’ Laws 4. 713 E. Cp. Soul.
- Impartiality and equality, not the same, Protag. 337 A.
- Impatience, uselessness of, Rep. 10. 604 C.
- Impetuosity, Rep. 6. 503 C (cp. Theaet. 144 A; Statesm. 307 C).
- Impiety towards the gods, Laws 10. 885, 907; causes of, *ib.* 900; punishment of, *ib.* 907 E:—suits for impiety, *ib.* 7. 799 B; 10. 910:—the law concerning impiety, *ib.* 9. 868 E.
- Imports and Exports, law respecting (in the Model City), Laws 8. 847.
- Inachus, Herè asks alms for the daughters of, Rep. 2. 381 D.
- Inanimate objects which have caused death, Laws 9. 873 E.
- Inanitions (*κενώσεις*) of the body and soul, Rep. 9. 585 A.
- Incantations, Laws 11. 932 E foll.; in medicine, Charm. 155; Rep. 4. 426 A; Theaet. 149 D; used by mendicant prophets, Rep. 2. 364 B. Cp. Enchantment.
- Incense, Tim. 61 C; not to be imported, Laws 8. 847 C.
- Incest, universal horror of, Laws 8. 838.
- Income Tax, Rep. 1. 343 D.
- Incommensurable things, Laws 7. 819, 820 (cp. Parm. 140).
- Incompatibility of temper, a ground for divorce, Laws 11. 929 E.
- Incontinence in the soul, Gorg. 493.
- Incurable criminals, death the fitting penalty for, Laws 9. 853 foll.; —in the world below, Gorg. 525 (cp. Phaedo 113 E; Rep. 10. 615 D).
- Indestructibility of the soul and body, Laws 10. 904 A (cp. Tim. 41, and *v. s. v.* Soul).
- Indifference to money, characteristic of those who inherit a fortune, Rep. 1. 330 B.
- ‘Indifferent’ things, Gorg. 468.
- Individual, inferior types of the, Rep. 8. 545;—individual and



- state, *ib.* 2. 368; 4. 434, 441; 5. 462; 8. 544; 9. 577 B; Laws 3. 689; 5. 739; 8. 828 E; 9. 875, 877 C; 11. 923, 925 E, 930 B;—the individual and the idea, Parm. 133 D:—individuals and things, Crat. 386.
- Indolence, evils of, Laws 6. 788 E; not to be attributed to God, *ib.* 10. 903 A.
- Induction, the source of knowledge, Laws 12. 965.
- Infantry, to be preferred to sailors, Laws 4. 706.
- Infants, have spirit, but not reason, Rep. 4. 441 A (cp. Laws 12. 963 E); to be exercised, Laws 7. 789, 790. Cp. Child.
- Inferiors, ought to be treated with special regard to justice by their superiors, Laws 6. 777 E.
- Infidels, advice to, Laws 10. 888; are in ignorance of the nature of the soul, *ib.* 892. Cp. Atheists.
- Infinite, nature of, Phil. 15, 16, 23, 24 foll.; comprises what admits of degrees, *ib.* 25, 31, 32.
- Inflammations, Tim. 85.
- Informers, the, held in honour in the Model City, Laws 5. 730 E, 742 B; 11. 914 A, 932 B (cp. 6. 762 D; 9. 872 B; 10. 907 E; 11. 917 D); to receive half the fine, *ib.* 5. 745 A; 9. 868 B; 11. 928 B;—Informers, Crito 45 A; Rep. 9. 575 B.
- Inheritance, laws of (in the Model City), Laws 5. 740. Cp. Lots.
- Initiation in the mysteries, Euthyd. 277 E; Phaedo 69 C (cp. Meno 76 E).
- Injury done by slaves and animals, law concerning, Laws 11. 936 C; 'injuries' and 'hurts,' *ib.* 9. 862.
- Injustice, why punished, Protag. 323 E (cp. Gorg. 476, 477); injustice and temperance, Protag. 333; injustice an evil to the unjust, Crito 49; to do, worse than to suffer, Gorg. 469 foll., 475, 489, 508, 509, 522 C; the most disgraceful of evils, *ib.* 477 C; advantage of, Rep. 1. 343; defined by Thrasymachus as discretion, *ib.* 348 D; injustice and vice, *ibid.*; suicidal to states and individuals, *ib.* 351 E (cp. Laws 10. 906 A); in perfection, Rep. 2. 360; eulogists of, *ib.* 361, 366, 367; 3. 392 B (cp. 8. 545 A; 9. 588; Laws 2. 662 B); only blamed by those who have not the power to be unjust, Rep. 2. 366 C; in the state, *ib.* 4. 434; = anarchy in the soul, *ib.* 444 B (cp. Soph. 228; Laws 10. 906 A); brings no profit, Rep. 9. 589, 590; 10. 613; Laws 2. 662 B; injustice and justice, Laws 2. 663; 5. 730; curable and incurable, *ib.* 5. 731; involuntary, *ibid.*; 9. 860, 864 A (cp. Evil); to be pitied, *ib.* 5. 731;—injustice and disease, *ib.* 10. 906 C (*see* Disease);—injustice and hurt, *ib.* 9. 862.
- Innkeeping, Laws 11. 918 E.
- Innovation, in education dangerous, Rep. 4. 424; Laws 2. 656, 660 A; in the sports of children, leads to a change in manners, Laws 7. 797 C. Cp. Education, Gymnastic, Music.
- Insanity, as a hindrance to marriage, Laws 11. 925 E, 926 B; in a parent, *ib.* 929. *See* Madness.
- Inscriptions, at Delphi, Charm. 164 D foll.; Protag. 343 B; Phaedr. 229 E; Phil. 45 E, 48 C; Laws 11. 923 A; 1 Alcib. 124 B, 129 A, 132 C:—over the dead, Laws 12. 958 E.
- Insolence [*ὑβρις*], engendered by conquest, Laws 1. 641 C; [*ἀναιδεια*], a great evil both to individuals and states, *ib.* 647 B.
- Inspectors of Exports and Imports, Laws 8. 847 C.
- Inspiration of the philosopher, Phaedr. 249;—of the poet, *ib.*

- 245 A, 265 B; Ion 534; Meno 99 C, D; Apol. 22 A; Laws 3. 682 A; 4. 719 B (cp. 2 Alcib. 147 C);—of the prophet, Meno 99 C, D; Phaedr. 265 B;—of the rhapsode, Ion 536, 541;—of the statesman, Meno 99:—the gods of inspiration, Phaedr. 265 B.
- Instruction, the art of, Soph. 229.
- Instrument and user distinguished, 1 Alcib. 129.
- Intellect; objects of opinion and intellect classified, Rep. 7. 534 (cp. 5. 476); relation of the intellect and the good, *ib.* 6. 508; intellect and true opinion, Tim. 51. Cp. Mind.
- Intellectual world, divisions of, Rep. 6. 510 foll.; 7. 517; compared to the visible, *ib.* 6. 508, 509; 7. 532 A:—intellectual pursuits, not to be carried to excess, Tim. 88.
- Intemperance, *see* Drunkenness, Intoxication:—intemperance of love, Tim. 86.
- Intemperate life, the, not to be preferred to the temperate, Gorg. 493, 494; Laws 5. 733 E foll.; no man voluntarily intemperate, Laws 5. 734 B.
- Intercourse between the sexes, Rep. 5. 458 foll.; Laws 8. 835 E, 839–841; in a democracy, Rep. 8. 563 A:—unnatural, condemned, Laws 1. 636; 8. 836 foll. (cp. Symp. 181).
- Interest forbidden, Laws 5. 742 C; 11. 921 D (cp. Rep. 8. 556 A).
- Intermediates, Protag. 346 D; Euthyd. 306; Rep. 9. 583; Phil. 33, 36, 43 (cp. Laws 9. 879 B).
- Interpreters of sacred rites, Laws 6. 759 C, 774 E; 8. 828 B, 845 E; 9. 865 D, 871 C, 873 D; 11. 916 C; 12. 958 D, 964 C; election of, *ib.* 6. 759 D.
- Intestate, children of the, Laws 11. 924. Cp. Orphans.
- Intimations, the, given by the senses, imperfect, Rep. 7. 523 foll.; 10. 602; of the mind, reflected in the liver, Tim. 71.
- Intoxication, not allowed in the state, Rep. 3. 398 E, 403; forbidden at Lacedaemon, Laws 1. 637; common at Athens during the Dionysia, *ib.* C; permitted among the Scythians, etc., *ibid.*; nature of, discussed, *ibid.* foll.; use of, *ib.* 645, 646; only to be allowed to the old, *ib.* 2. 666 B. *See* Drinking, Festivities.
- Intuition, Phaedo 66, 79.
- Invalids, Gorg. 504 E; Rep. 3. 406, 407; 4. 425 E. Cp. Medicine.
- Invention, divisions of, Soph. 266.
- Involuntary and voluntary actions, Laws 9. 861, 878 B;—involuntary falsehood, *ib.* 5. 730 C; Hipp. Min. 371 E foll.;—involuntary and voluntary homicide, Laws 9. 865–869 (*see* Homicide);—involuntary nature of evil and injustice, Protag. 345 foll., 352, 355; Tim. 86; Laws 5. 731 C; 9. 860, 864 A; Hipp. Min. 372 (cp. Apol. 25 E; Gorg. 468, 509 E; Soph. 228).
- Iolaus and Heracles, Euthyd. 297 D; Phaedo 89 C.
- Ion (of Ephesus), knows Homer better than any one, Ion 530 D, 533 D; cannot speak equally well about other poets, *ib.* 533 D foll., 536; inspired, *ib.* 533 D foll., 536 C; professes to speak well on all Homer, *ib.* 536 E; quotes Homer, *ib.* 537 A foll.; why not chosen general, *ib.* 541 B; a Proteus, *ib.* E; inspired rather than dishonest, *ib.* 542.
- Ion, son of Apollo, Euthyd. 302 D.
- Ionia, progress of the doctrine of Protagoras in, Theaet. 179 D:—Ionian harmony, Laches 188 D; must be rejected, Rep. 3. 399 A:—life described by Homer, Laws 3. 680 C:—philosophy, Soph.

- 242; philosophers, Theaet. 179 D:  
—Ionian soldiers in Athenian service, Symp. 220 D:—Ionians have no ancestral Zeus, Euthyd. 302 C; averse to the love of boys, Symp. 182 B.
- Iphicles, brother of Heracles, Euthyd. 297 E.
- Iris, meaning of the name, Crat. 408 B; daughter of Thaumas, Theaet. 155 D.
- Iron (and brass), mingled by the God in the craftsmen and husbandmen, Rep. 3. 415 A (cp. 8. 547 A); iron not needed in the plastic and weaving arts, Laws 3. 679 A; not to be offered to the Gods, *ib.* 12. 956 A; pieces of iron employed as money at Lacedaemon, Eryx. 400 B:—the iron race, Crat. 398 A.
- Irrigation works, to be provided, Laws 6. 761 B; in ancient Attica, Crit. 111; in Atlantis, *ib.* 117, 118.
- Isis, Egyptian chants are the composition of, Laws 2. 657 B.
- Ismenias, the Theban, his wealth, Meno 90 A; a 'rich and mighty man,' Rep. 1. 336 A.
- Isocrates, Socrates prophesies of him, Phaedr. 279 A, B.
- Isolochus, father of Pythodorus, 1 Alcib. 119 A.
- Isthmus, the, ancient boundary of Attica fixed at, Crit. 110 D:—Isthmian games, Lysis 205 D; once visited by Socrates, Crito 52 B; citizens (of the Model City) to be sent to, Laws 12. 950 E.
- Italy, 'can tell of Charondas as a law-giver,' Rep. 10. 599 E; in Italy the spectators are judges of theatrical performances, Laws 2. 659 B:—Italian banditti, *ib.* 6. 777 C.
- Ithaca, Ion 533 C, 535 C.
- Ivory, not to be offered to the Gods, Laws 12. 955 E.
- J.**
- Jealousy, excited by love, Phaedr. 232; unknown to the Gods, *ib.* 247 A (cp. Tim. 29 E); hatefulness of, Laws 5. 731 A; engendered by prosperity, Menex. 242 A.
- Jesting, with slaves, unwise, Laws 6. 778 A.
- Joints, the, Tim. 74 E.
- Joy, should not be immoderate, Laws 5. 732 B.
- Judge, the, ought not to be influenced by compassion, Apol. 35 (cp. Laws 12. 949 A); a physician of the soul, Gorg. 478, 480 A; must himself be virtuous, Rep. 3. 409; his virtue, only to decide according to the standard fixed by the legislator, Statesm. 305; distinguished from the statesman, *ibid.*; should aim at reconciling the contending parties, Laws 1. 627 E; should co-operate with the legislator, *ib.* 11. 934 B; must take the writings of the legislator as his guide, *ib.* 12. 957:—Judges ought not to drink wine, *ib.* 2. 674 A; must give an account of their office, *ib.* 6. 761 E; must supply the omissions of the legislator, *ib.* 9. 876; 11. 934 B; must keep the speakers to the point, *ib.* 12. 949 B:—laws concerning, *ib.* 6. 766 E foll.; 9. 855–857; 12. 956:—election of, *ib.* 6. 767; 12. 956:—judges in cases of death, *ib.* 9. 855 C, 856 C, 866 C, 867 E, 871 C; 12. 958 C (cp. 11. 916 C); in cases of wounding, *ib.* 9. 877 B, 878 D, 879 B, E; in cases where assistance has not been rendered, *ib.* 880 D; where a son has neglected his parents, *ib.* 11. 932 C (cp. Guardians of the Laws):—select judges, *ib.* 9. 855 C; 11. 926 D, 928, 938; 12. 946, 948 A, 956:—judges of art, must have



- knowledge, *ib.* 2. 669;—of contests in armour, *ib.* 8. 833 E;—of gymnastic contests, *ib.* 6. 765 C; 8. 835 A; 11. 935 E;—of horse races, *ib.* 8. 834 B;—of music, *ib.* 6. 765 C; 7. 802; 12. 949 A;—of the theatre, ought not to yield to clamour, *ib.* 2. 659.
- Judgment, final, Phaedo 108; Gorg. 523; Rep. 10. 614 foll.; Laws 12. 959. Cp. Hades.
- Juggling, Rep. 10. 602 D.
- Juices, vegetable, Tim. 60 B.
- 'Just,' defined, Laws 9. 863, 864;—just and unjust, their opposition dimly discerned by mankind, *ib.* 2. 663; how distinguished, 1 Alcib. 109; their nature, learned from the many, *ib.* 110; a frequent cause of dispute, *ib.* 111 E foll. (cp. Euthyph. 7);—the just and the gainful, Laws 2. 662;—the just and the honourable, *ib.* 9. 859, 860.
- Just life, the, ought to be considered the pleasantest and happiest, Laws 2. 662.
- Just man, the, is gentle, Gorg. 516 C; at a disadvantage compared with the unjust (Thrasymachus), Rep. 1. 343; happy, *ib.* 354; Laws 1. 660 E; attains harmony in his soul, Rep. 4. 443; proclaimed the happiest, *ib.* 9. 580 foll.; is especially careful towards his inferiors, Laws 6. 777 E;—the just, friends of the Gods, Gorg. 507 E; Rep. 10. 613; Phil. 39 E; Laws 4. 716 D;—just and unjust are at heart the same (Glaucón), Rep. 2. 360.
- Justice, popular definitions of, Crat. 413; = to speak the truth and pay one's debts, Rep. 1. 331 foll.; = the interest of the stronger, *ib.* 338; 2. 367 (cp. Gorg. 489; Laws 4. 714 B); = honour among thieves, Rep. 1. 352; = the excellence of the soul, *ib.* 353; = the opinion of the best, Laws 9. 864; = power of knowledge, Hipp. Min. 375; = doing one's own work, 1 Alcib. 127 (cp. Rep. 4. 443);—a part of virtue, Meno 73 E, 79 (cp. Rep. 1. 350); the art which gives good and evil to friends and enemies, Rep. 1. 332 foll., 336; is a thief, *ib.* 334; the proper virtue of man, *ib.* 335; 'sublime simplicity,' *ib.* 348; does not aim at excess, *ib.* 349; identical with wisdom and virtue, *ib.* 351; a principle of harmony, *ibid.* (cp. 9. 591 D); in the highest class of goods, *ib.* 2. 357, 367 D (cp. Euthyd. 279; Laws 1. 631 C); the union of temperance, wisdom, and courage, Rep. 4. 433; Laws 1. 631 C; a division of labour, Rep. 4. 433 foll. (cp. 1. 332, 349, 350); 'an honourable maiden,' Laws 12. 943 E;—given by Zeus to mankind, Protag. 322 C, 329 C; love the cause of, Symp. 196; nature and origin of (Glaucón), Rep. 2. 358, 359; conventional, *ib.* 359 A; Theaet. 172 A, 177 C; Laws 10. 889 E; praised for its consequences only (Adeimantus), Rep. 2. 362 E, 366; a matter of appearance, *ib.* 365;—essential to states, Protag. 322 D (cp. Phaedo 82 B); supposed to exist to some degree in every man, Protag. 323 B; acquired by habit, Phaedo 82 B; happiness dependent upon, Gorg. 470; useful alike in war and peace, Rep. 1. 333; can do no harm, *ib.* 335; more precious than gold, *ib.* 336 E (cp. Laws 11. 913 B); toilsome, Rep. 1. 364 (cp. Protag. 340 C; Laws 4. 718 E); follows after God, Laws 4. 716 A; worthy of honour, *ib.* 5. 730 D; the administration of, ought to be shared in by all the citizens, *ib.* 6. 768; especially necessary towards slaves and inferiors, *ib.*



777 E; the salvation of men, *ib.* 10. 906 B; the civilizer of humanity, *ib.* 11. 937 E; found to some extent in every constitution, *ib.* 12. 945 D (cp. Rep. 1. 338 E):—compared to health, Rep. 4. 444:—the poets on, *ib.* 2. 363, 364, 365 E:—in perfection, *ib.* 361:—justice and equity, Laws 6. 757;—justice and expediency, 1 Alcib. 113, 116;—justice and holiness, Protag. 330, 331; Euthyph. 12;—justice and politics, Gorg. 464;—justice and retribution, Laws 5. 728;—justice and virtue, Rep. 1. 348:—justice more profitable than injustice, *ib.* 4. 445; 9. 589 foll.; superior to injustice, *ib.* 9. 589; final triumph of, *ib.* 580; 10. 612, 613:—in the state, *ib.* 2. 369; 4. 431, 433; the same in the individual and the state, *ib.* 4. 435 foll., 441 foll.:—absolute justice, *ib.* 5. 479 E; 6. 501 B; 7. 517 E:—natural justice, Gorg. 483, 484, 488, 492; Laws 10. 890 A (cp. *ib.* 3. 690 B):—‘the justice of the Gods,’ Laws 10. 904.

Justice. [*The happiness which is conferred by justice is one of the main theses of the Gorgias. The young Sophist, Polus, and Callicles, the man of the world, agree in thinking that the unjust is happy so long as he is able to escape punishment. But Socrates maintains a higher view, which he sets forth under a paradoxical form. The wicked man is unhappy because he is wicked, and still more unhappy when he is not punished for his evil deeds. On the other hand the just and innocent are happy even on earth and amidst the greatest sufferings; and in the world to come all the advantages are on their side. The argument is confirmed in Plato's fashion by a myth.*

*Once upon a time the judgment of souls took place upon the day of death while both the judges and the judged were alive. The result was unsatisfactory: the veil of the body hid the soul from the glance of the judge, who was himself hindered by a like impediment. In order to remedy this, evil Zeus made his sons judges in the world below, and the souls were tried after death. There was no more escape for the wicked: the judges beheld his soul stained and corrupted by lust and wickedness and pronounced the fitting penalty.—The argument of the Gorgias is in a manner resumed and completed in the Republic. In the first Book several definitions of justice are attempted, all of which fall before the dialectic of Socrates. Glaucon and Adeimantus then intervene:—mankind regard justice as a necessity, not as a good in itself, or at best as only to be practised because of the temporal benefits which flow from it: can Socrates prove that it belongs to a higher class of goods? Socrates in reply proposes to construct an ideal state in which justice will be more easily recognized than in the individual. Justice is thus discovered to be the essential virtue of the state (a thesis afterwards enlarged upon by Aristotle [Pol. i. 2. 16; iii. 13, § 3]), the bond of the social organization, and, like temperance in the Laws (3. 696, 697; 4. 709 E), rather the accompaniment or condition of the virtues than a virtue in itself. Expressed in an outward or political form it becomes the great principle which has been already enunciated (Rep. 1. 332), ‘that every man shall do his own*

work'; on this Plato bases the necessity of the division into classes which underlies the whole fabric of the ideal state (Rep. 4. 433 foll.; Tim. 17 C). Thus we are led to acknowledge the happiness of the just; for he alone reflects in himself this vital principle of the state (Rep. 4. 445). The final proof is supplied by a comparison of the perfect state with actual forms of government. These, like the individuals who correspond to them, become more and more miserable as they recede further from the ideal, and the climax is reached (Rep. 9. 587) when the tyrant is shown by the aid of arithmetic to have '729 times less pleasure than the king' [i. e. the perfectly just ruler]. Lastly, the happiness of the just is proved to extend also into the next world, where men appear before the judgment-seat of heaven and receive the due reward of their deeds in this life. — In the Laws, no less than in the Republic, justice is assigned a high place among the virtues. Every constitution, however imperfect, must share in justice to some degree; for no association, even of the bad, can be formed unless regard is had to justice (cp. Lysis 214). It is the virtue which makes men civilized, and fits them to dwell together in the state. But injustice is the disease of cities and governments, corresponding to sickness in the bodily frame. Again, the just man shows his justice especially in his dealings with slaves and inferiors, whom he endeavours to train in virtue [cp. Arist. Pol. i. 13, § 14]. He alone enjoys true happiness; for to him the good and the pleasant are one and the same. He has God always as his

friend and guide, whereas the unjust passes through life in wild confusion and soon comes to the end of his seeming prosperity.]

Justice, courts of; see Law Courts.

## K.

Kindred, honour of, Laws 5. 729;—marriages of kindred, *ib.* 11. 924 E.

King, the, pleasures of, compared with those of the tyrant, Rep. 9. 587 foll.; art of, Statesm. 260, 276, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 295 B, 300 E, 305 A, 308, 311 (cp. Protag. 321, 322);—king and statesman, Statesm. 259;—king and shepherd, *ib.* 261, 276 (cp. Theaet. 174 D; Laws 5. 735);—king and tyrant, Statesm. 301, 302:—Kings and philosophers, Rep. 5. 473 (cp. 6. 487 E, 498 foll., 501 E foll.; 7. 540; 8. 543; 9. 592);—ignorance common among kings, Laws 3. 691;—kings of ancient Attica, Menex. 238 C; of Egypt, always priests, Statesm. 290 E; of Persia, Laws 3. 694; 1 Alcib. 121, 122; of Sparta, Laws 3. 691, 696 A; 1 Alcib. 121; of Thrace, Charm. 156 C.

King, the Great, Lysis 209 C; Euthyd. 274 A; Meno 78 D; Gorg. 470 E; Rep. 8. 553 D; Soph. 230 E; Statesm. 264 C; 1 Alcib. 120.

King Archon; see Archon.

Kingship, in primitive society, Laws 3. 681.

Kinsmen, to prosecute for murder, Laws 9. 866, 868, 871, 873 E; not to be judges, *ib.* 879 A; duties of, towards orphans, *ib.* 6. 766 D; 11. 923–925; to decide whether a son may be disinherited, *ib.* 929.

Kisses, the reward of the brave warrior, Rep. 5. 468 C.

Knots, magical, Laws 11. 933 B, D.  
 Knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη, γινώσκειν*);  
 'know thyself' at Delphi, Charm.  
 164 D foll.; Protag. 343 B;  
 Phaedr. 229 E; Phil. 48 C;  
 Laws 11. 923 A; 1 Alcib. 124 A,  
 129 A, 132 C; knowledge of self,  
 not = knowing what you know  
 and what you do not know,  
 Charm. 169; the proper study  
 of mankind, Phaedr. 230 A:  
 —knowing and not knowing,  
 Theaet. 197; knowing and pos-  
 sessing knowledge, *ibid.*; know-  
 ing and being known, Soph. 248  
 E; knowing and communica-  
 ting knowledge, 1 Alcib. 118:—  
 knowledge = knowledge of ideas,  
 Rep. 6. 484; = the sciences,  
 Theaet. 146; = perception, *ib.*  
 151, 160 E, 163 foll., 179, 182 E,  
 183; = true opinion with a reason,  
*ib.* 201 foll.; = power of divi-  
 sion and composition, Phil. 17;  
 = knowledge of the soul, 1 Alcib.  
 130, 131, 133:—source of, Phaedr.  
 247; distinguished from belief,  
 Gorg. 454; nature of, Rep. 5. 477,  
 478; classed among faculties, *ib.*  
 477; 6. 511 E; 7. 533 E; origin  
 of, Tim. 37; consists in reasoning  
 about sensations, Theaet. 186; is  
 true opinion, *ib.* 187 foll.:—divi-  
 sions of, Statesm. 260, 267; parts  
 of, Phil. 55 D; threefold, Laws  
 10. 895:—previous to birth,  
 Phaedo 75; Rep. 7. 518 C; a  
 process of recollection, Meno 81,  
 98 A; Phaedo 73, 75, 92; Phil.  
 34; Laws 5. 732 (cp. Recollec-  
 tion):—how far given by the  
 senses, Phaedo 65 E, 75; Theaet.  
 184 foll. (cp. Rep. 7. 529); its  
 relation to sight, Theaet. 163,  
 164, 165 B (cp. Phil. 38 C):—  
 creates trust, Lysis 209, 210;  
 must decide a question, Laches  
 184; the food of the soul, Protag.  
 313 D; more valuable than food,  
*ib.* 314; peril of buying, *ibid.*;

the deprivation of, the only real  
 evil, *ib.* 345 B; highest of human  
 things, *ib.* 352; source of true  
 pleasure and good, *ib.* 356 foll.;  
 must use as well as make, Euthyd.  
 289; the only good, *ib.* 292 B;  
 difficulty of, Crat. 384 A; not  
 given by names, *ib.* 436, 440;  
 the conceit of, Phaedr. 237 C;  
 Apol. 22, 29; Soph. 230; Phil. 49  
 A; Laws 3. 701 A; 5. 727 B,  
 732 A; 9. 863 C; 10. 886 B; ne-  
 cessary to right actions, Meno 97;  
 hindered by the body, Phaedo 66:  
 to be obtained after death, *ib.* E  
 foll.; should not be acquired under  
 compulsion, Rep. 7. 536 E (*but*  
 cp. Laws 7. 810); desire of, in  
 the soul, Tim. 90; gives the  
 right of command, Theaet. 170  
 B, 178 (cp. 1 Alcib. 134 C); plea-  
 sures of, Phil. 52; differences  
 of clearness in, *ib.* 57 B; the  
 supreme law, Laws 9. 875; makes  
 free, 1 Alcib. 135; not to be  
 divorced from justice, Menex.  
 246 E; not always better than  
 ignorance, 2 Alcib. 143 foll.:—  
 knowledge and courage, Laches  
 193, 197; Protag. 350, 360 (cp.  
 Gorg. 490 foll., 495; Rep. 4. 429;  
 Laws 12. 963):—knowledge and  
 definition, Theaet. 202, 208:—  
 knowledge and good, Euthyd.  
 281:—knowledge and happi-  
 ness, Charm. 173; Euthyd. 281;  
 Meno 88; 1 Alcib. 134:—know-  
 ledge and justice, Hipp. Min.  
 375:—knowledge and learning,  
 Euthyd. 278 A:—knowledge and  
 opinion, Meno 96–98; Phaedr.  
 247, 248; Rep. 5. 476–478; 6. 508  
 D, 510 A; 7. 534; Theaet. 187,  
 201 foll. (*v. s. v.* Opinion):—  
 knowledge and pleasure, Rep. 6.  
 505:—knowledge and rhetoric,  
 Phaedr. 262:—knowledge and  
 success, Euthyd. 281:—know-  
 ledge and virtue, Protag. 356 foll.;  
 Euthyd. 274 E; Meno 87–89:—



knowledge and wisdom, Rep. 4. 428 (cp. Laws 3. 689 C):—abstract and relative knowledge, Charm. 170:—absolute knowledge, Phaedr. 247 E; Parm. 134:—knowledge of absolute ideas, Phaedo 75 (cp. Parm. 134, 136):—the highest knowledge, the Idea of Good, Rep. 6. 504; 7. 514 foll. (cp. Laws 12. 965):—the best knowledge, to discern between good and evil, Rep. 10. 618:—knowledge of the good implies knowledge of the bad, Ion 531, 532 (cp. Rep. 1. 334):—knowledge of the just and unjust, 1 Alcib. 109 foll.:—unity of knowledge, Phaedo 101; Rep. 5. 479; Soph. 257:—knowledge which is superhuman only, ridiculous, Phil. 62 B:—universal knowledge (of the Sophists), impossible, Euthyd. 293, 294; Soph. 233, 234:—knowledge of shadows, Rep. 6. 511 D; 7. 534 A:—knowledge of the Gods, unattainable, Crat. 400 E, 425 C; Rep. 2. 365 E; Crit. 107; Parm. 134 E; noble, Laws 12. 966:—knowledge of the world, *ib.* 1. 640 C:—love of knowledge, characteristic of the Hellenes, Rep. 4. 435 E; peculiar to the rational element of the soul, *ib.* 9. 581 B.

### L.

Labour, blessings of, Laws 6. 779 A; the enemy of lust, *ib.* 8. 841 A:—division of, Rep. 2. 370, 374 A; 3. 394 E, 395 B, 397 E; 4. 423 E, 433 A, 435 A, 441 E, 443, 453 B (cp. Laws 8. 846 C foll.).  
Labourers, free, Euthyph. 4 C.  
Lacedaemon, early history of, Laws 3. 682 E, 683 D foll.; owes its good order to Lycurgus, Rep. 10. 599 E; in laws and institutions the sister of Crete, Laws 3. 683 A; Tyrtaeus made a citizen of, *ib.* 1.

629 A;—fencing masters do not visit, Laches 183 B:—Lacedaemonian and Cretan philosophy, Protag. 342 A foll.:—Lacedaemonian brevity and sententiousness, *ibid.*; Laws 1. 642 A; 4. 721 E:—Lacedaemonian use of *θεῖος ἄνθρωπος*, Meno 99 D; the Lacedaemonian word *Σοῦς*, Crat. 412 B:—Lacedaemonian constitution commonly extolled, Rep. 8. 544 C (cp. Crito 52 E); a timocracy, Rep. 8. 545 B; designed with a view to superiority in war, Laws 1. 626 C, 628 E, 630 D (cp. Laches 183 A); akin to the Cretan, Laws 3. 683 A; balance of powers in, *ib.* 691 E; (like the Cretan) in a mean between democracy and monarchy, *ib.* 693 E; combines the elements of all forms of government, *ib.* 4. 712:—Lacedaemonian laws said to have been derived by Lycurgus from Apollo, *ib.* 1. 624 A, 632 D; do not make the citizens equally brave against pleasure and pain, *ib.* 634; not allowed to be criticized by the young, *ib.* D; laws concerning paederastia, Symp. 182 A; Laws 8. 836 B:—the double monarchy intended to be a check on the state, Laws 3. 691 E; the most ancient of monarchies, *ib.* 4. 712 E; the kings descended from Zeus, 1 Alcib. 120 E foll.; their wives, *ib.* 121 B; compared to the Persian kings, *ibid.*; their wealth, *ibid.*, 122 D foll.:—the Gerousia, Laws 3. 691 E:—the Ephors, *ib.* 692 A; 4. 712 D; watch over the queens, 1 Alcib. 121 C:—Crypteia, Laws 1. 633 B:—Games in honour of the Dioscuri, *ib.* 7. 796 B:—Gymnasia; Lacedaemonians first after the Cretans to strip in, Rep. 5. 452 D (cp. Theaet. 162 B, 169 B); moral



effect of, Laws 1. 636 B foll.; virgins take part in gymnastic exercises, *ib.* 7. 806 A; spectators bidden to take part or go, Theaet. 162 B, 169 B:—*syssitia*, Laws 1. 633 A; 6. 780 C foll.; 8. 842 B:—training, *ib.* 1. 633 foll.:—Lacedaemonians at Plataea, Laches 191 C; came to Marathon a day too late, Laws 3. 698 E; Menex. 240 C; at Tanagra, 1 Alcib. 112 C; Menex. 242 A; at Coronea, 1 Alcib. 112 C; obliged to surrender to the Athenians at Sphagia, Menex. 242 C; driven by the Athenians from the sea, *ib.* 246 A; their conquest and division of Arcadia, Symp. 193 A;—take the greatest interest in war of all Hellenes, Laches 183 A; fond of the poems of Tyrtaeus, Laws 1. 629; consider hunting a training for war, *ib.* 633 B; their endurance of pain, *ibid.*; 1 Alcib. 122 D; restraint laid upon, Laws 1. 635 B, 636 E; absence of intoxication among, *ib.* 637 A foll.; licence of women among, *ib.* B; 6. 781 foll.; superior to all other men in war, *ib.* 1. 638 A; conservative in music, *ib.* 2. 660 B; their education that of a camp, *ib.* 666 E; better at gymnastic than music, *ib.* 673 C; well acquainted with Homer, *ib.* 3. 680 D; have preserved the ancient institutions of the Heraclidae, *ib.* 685 A; constantly at war with the sister states, *ib.* 686 B; defenders of Hellas, *ib.* 692 D; equality of society among, *ib.* 696 A; their treatment of the Helots, *ib.* 6. 776 C; think that a brave city has no need of walls, *ib.* 778 D; mode of life among their women, *ib.* 7. 806 D; their temperance and discipline, 1 Alcib. 122 D; their ambitious character, *ibid.* (cp. Rep. 8. 545 A, 548 C); use pieces of iron instead

of coined money, Eryx. 400 A:—the prayer of the Lacedaemonians, 2 Alcib. 148; offer blemished animals to the Gods, *ib.* 149 A.

Laches, a person in the dialogue *Laches*, Laches 180 A foll.; a public man, *ib.* 180 B, 187 A; was with Socrates at Delium, *ib.* 181 B (cp. 188 E; Symp. 221 A); his view of fighting in armour, Laches 182 D foll.; his wealth, *ib.* 186 C; his feeling about an argument, *ib.* 188 C foll.; discusses courage with Socrates and Nicias, *ib.* 190 B foll.

Lachesis, eldest of the fates, Laws 12. 960 C; turns the spindle of Necessity together with Clotho and Atropos, Rep. 10. 617 C; daughter of Necessity, her speech, *ib.* D; apportions a genius to each soul, *ib.* 620 D.

Laconizers, 'who go about with their ears bruised,' Protag. 342 B; Gorg. 515 E.

Laius, Laws 8. 836 D.

Lamachus, the Athenian general, Laches 197 C.

Lamentation, to be checked, Rep. 3. 387; 10. 603 E (cp. Laws 7. 792 B; 12. 949 B);—at sacrifices, Laws 7. 800;—over the dead, Rep. 3. 387 D; Laws 12. 959 E:—Lamentations (*θρήνοι*), a division of music, Laws 3. 700 A.

Lampido, mother, daughter, and wife of a king, 1 Alcib. 124 A.

Lamprus, a musician, Menex. 236 A.

Lampsacus, Metrodorus of, Ion 530 D.

Land, division of, proclaimed by the would-be tyrant, Rep. 8. 565 E, 566 D; difficulty of legislating about, Laws 3. 684; 5. 736 D;—(in the Model City), distribution of, *ib.* 5. 737-740, 745; not to be sold or bought, *ib.* 741. Cp. Model City.

Landmarks, not to be moved, Laws 8. 843 A.

Language, invention of, Protag. 322 A; analysis of, Crat. 421, 422; of the deaf and dumb, *ib.* 422 E; origin of, *ib.* 425, 426; scientific construction of, *ib.* 425; ancient framers of, *ibid.*; complete analysis of, impossible, *ibid.*; greatness of, *ib.* 427 E; pliability or plastic power of, Rep. 9. 588 D (cp. Statesm. 277 B; Laws 4. 712 B; 5. 746 A); proper use of, Theaet. 165 A, 168 B, 184 C, 196 E; analysis of, Soph. 261 foll.;—distinctions of language, Laws 12. 944 B; invented by Prodicus, Charm. 163 D; Laches 197 D; Protag. 337 A, 340 A, 358 A, D; Euthyd. 277 E; Meno 75 E;—languages altered by time, Crat. 418, 421:—‘the long and difficult language of facts,’ Statesm. 278 D.

Larisa, Meno 97 A:—Larisaeans given to philosophy, *ib.* 70 B.

Laughter, not to be allowed in the guardians, Rep. 3. 388 E (cp. Laws 5. 732 B; 11. 935 B); nor represented in the Gods, Rep. 3. 389 A.

Laurel, wreath of, to be worn by the censors of magistrates, Laws 12. 947 A.

Lavation, ceremonies of, Laws 9. 871 B.

Law, in some Greek states, that capital causes should not be decided in one day, Apol. 37 A; law at Athens respecting the maintenance of the children of citizens slain in battle, Menex. 249; at Carthage, respecting drinking, Laws 2. 674:—ancient laws, often excellent, *ib.* 8. 844 A:—Laws of Atlantis, Crit. 119, 120;—of Crete, Laws 1. 625, 626, 631, 633 foll.;—of Egypt, similar to those of ancient Attica, Tim. 24;—of Lacedaemon, Laws 1. 626;—of Persia (Darius), *ib.* 3.

695 D:—Laws engraved on tablets, Statesm. 298 D; inscribed on columns, Laws 11. 917 E, 918 A (cp. Crit. 119 C, E, 120 A). Cp. Legislator, Model City. Law, the tyrant of mankind, Protag. 337 D (cp. Statesm. 294 B); unwritten in ancient times, Statesm. 295 A; Laws 2. 680 A; 7. 793 C; defined, Laws 1. 644 D; the ‘sacred and golden cord,’ *ib.* 645 A; etymology of the word (*νόμος* = *νόῦ διανομή*), *ib.* 4. 714 A; 12. 957 D (cp. Rep. 7. 532 E); the noblest work of, to make men hate injustice, Laws 9. 862 E; inferior to mind, *ib.* 875 D:—should the law or the monarch rule? Statesm. 294 foll.:—the law and the prelude, Laws 4. 718, 722, 723; 6. 772 E; 9. 880 A; 10. 887 A:—Laws a species of written composition, Phaedr. 257, 258, 278 D (cp. Laws 9. 858 C; 12. 957 C); the ‘lords of the city,’ Symp. 196 C; are teachers of youth, Apol. 24 (cp. Protag. 326 D); are for punishment, not instruction, Apol. 26 A; plead their cause against Socrates, Crito 50 foll.; are powerful in the next world, *ib.* 54; made by the majority in the interest of the weak, Gorg. 483 D, 488 E; may be given in error, Rep. 1. 339 E; supposed to arise from a convention among mankind, *ib.* 2. 359 A; Laws 10. 890 A; cause of, Rep. 3. 405; on special subjects of little use, *ib.* 4. 425, 426; Laws 7. 788 (cp. Statesm. 295 A); treated with contempt in democracies, Rep. 8. 563 E; bring help to all in the state, *ib.* 9. 590; when to be called ‘good,’ Theaet. 177 D; cannot comprehend all particulars, Statesm. 294, 295, 299; how far to be changed, *ib.* 295, 296; Laws 6. 769, 772; in ordinary constitutions, must be obeyed by all, Statesm. 297–300;

- are for the sake of the best, Laws 1. 628 C; should regard all virtue and not a part only, *ib.* 630 E; 4. 705 E; intended to make men happy, *ib.* 1. 631 B; young men are not to criticize, *ib.* 634; the proper tests of, *ib.* 638; unknown in primitive society, *ib.* 3. 680 A; aim at virtue only, *ib.* 693 B; 12. 963 A; may be divided into three classes, *ib.* 3. 697; must be enforced by the example of the rulers, *ib.* 4. 711 C; wrongly supposed to regard only the interest of the existing government, *ib.* 714 B; supremacy of, is the salvation of the state, *ib.* 715; obedience to, *ib.* C; 5. 729; 6. 762 E; must be definite, *ib.* 4. 719; may have a longer or a shorter form, *ib.* 720; useless unless the rulers are good, *ib.* 6. 751; not easily received at their first imposition, *ib.* 752 B; the service of, the service of God, *ib.* 762 E; require correction from experience, *ib.* 769 D, 772; 8. 846 C; compared to music, *ib.* 7. 800 (cp. 3. 700 B); should they threaten or persuade? *ib.* 9. 859 A (cp. 4. 718 E; 10. 890); necessity of, *ib.* 9. 859 A, 875; object of, *ib.* 880 E; value of, when written down, *ib.* 10. 890 E; should be understood by the citizens, *ib.* 12. 951 B; knowledge of, most valuable, *ib.* 957 D.
- Law, the divine, of justice, Laws 4. 716 A:—the law of nature (the 'natural justice' of Pindar), Gorg. 484 B, 488 B; Laws 3. 690 B; 4. 715 A (cp. 10. 890 A).
- Laws of the banquet, Laws 2. 671 (cp. Ruler of the Feast).
- Laws, reviewers of, Laws 12. 951. Cp. Spectator.
- 'Laws,' the, a romance, Laws 6. 752 A; a model for the Director of Education, *ib.* 7. 811 D; a collection of materials for legislation, *ib.* 9. 858;—the constitution described in, the second-best, *ib.* 5. 739; 7. 807 B.
- Laws (*νόμοι*), the old name for particular kinds of music, Laws 3. 700 B; 7. 800 A (cp. Crat. 417 E);—'laws' and 'strains,' Laws 7. 800 A (cp. Rep. 7. 532 E; Laws 4. 722 E; 6. 772 E).
- Lawcourts (at Athens), in the Porch of the King Archon, Euthyph. 2; Theaet. 210;—attempts to influence the dicasts, Apol. 34, 35; fine imposed on the plaintiff, if unsuccessful, *ib.* 36 A; fixing of the penalty by the accused, *ib.* 37, 38:—(in the Model City), position of, Laws 6. 778 C;—three kinds of, *ib.* 767; 12. 956 (cp. Judges); popular courts, *ib.* 6. 768 B; courts of the tribes, *ibid.*; 11. 915 C; court of appeal, *ib.* 9. 855 C; 11. 926 D, 928, 938; 12. 946, 948 A, 956;—the court of the eldest citizens, *ib.* 11. 932 C;—to be open to the public, *ib.* 6. 767 E; proceedings in, *ib.* 9. 855 E; must supply the omission of the legislator (in regard to penalties, &c.), *ib.* 876:—Lawcourts, a place of punishment, not of education, Apol. 26 A; importance of their good arrangement, Laws 9. 876.
- Lawgiver, *see* Legislator.
- Lawlessness, begins in music, Rep. 4. 424 E; Laws 3. 701 A.
- Lawsuits, will be almost unknown in the Model City, Laws 5. 743 C.
- Lawyer, the, Theaet. 173-175;—Lawyers increase when wealth abounds, Rep. 3. 405 A.
- 'Learn,' double sense of the word, Euthyph. 278 A.
- Learning, pleasure accompanying, Laws 2. 667 C (cp. Rep. 6. 486 C; 9. 581, 586 E); is recollecting, Meno 81; distinguished from belief, Gorg. 454. Cp. Knowledge.



Leather, pieces of, used as money at Carthage, Eryx. 400 A.

Lechaëum, Athenians defeated at, Menex. 245 E.

Legislation, a subdivision of the art of politics, Gorg. 464; requires the help of God, Rep. 4. 425 E; principle of, Statesm. 297; legislation and education, Laws 2. 659 D foll.; origin of, *ib.* 3. 680; early legislation, a simple matter, *ib.* 684 C (cp. 9. 853); conditions of legislation, *ib.* 4. 709; order of, *ib.* 721; imperfection of, *ib.* 6. 769, 772; 9. 876; aim of, *ib.* 6. 770 (cp. 3. 693 B); cannot include minute details, *ib.* 7. 788, 807 E (cp. Rep. 4. 425, 426; Statesm. 295 A); necessity of permanence in, Laws 7. 797; may conform to a higher or a lower standard, *ib.* 8. 841 B; has never been rightly worked out, *ib.* 9. 857 D; sometimes thought to be wholly a work of art, *ib.* 10. 889 D. Cp. Laws.

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- virtue, Protag. 327 B; ignorant about the Gods, Crat. 400 E, 425 C (cp. Rep. 2. 365 E; Crit. 107; Parm. 134 E); better teachers than nature, Phaedr. 230 E; are not generally very good or very bad, Phaedo 90 A (cp. Crat. 386); have a community of feeling, Gorg. 481 D; are not just of their own will, Rep. 2. 366 C; unite in the state in order to supply each other's wants, *ib.* 369; cannot follow two occupations, *ib.* 370; Laws 8. 846 D; are always full of hope, Phil. 39 E; ever at war with one another, Laws 1. 625 E; have in themselves a conflict of good and evil, *ib.* 626 E; are slow to believe the truth, *ib.* 2. 663 E; desire to have their wishes fulfilled, whether wise or foolish, *ib.* 3. 687 (cp. 2 Alcib. 138, 141 foll.); cannot be entrusted with arbitrary power, Laws 3. 691; 4. 713 D; have no particular desire for virtue, *ib.* 4. 718 E; always think others to blame and not themselves, *ib.* 5. 727 B (cp. Rep. 10. 619 C; 2 Alcib. 142 E); must neither joy nor sorrow overmuch, Laws 5. 732 C; are not voluntarily intemperate, *ib.* 734 B; not willing to receive laws at their first imposition, *ib.* 6. 752; will commit any meanness in order to gain wealth, *ib.* 8. 831 D; do evil involuntarily, *ib.* 9. 860 D (cp. Evil); the kindred of the Gods, *ib.* 10. 899 E; saved by virtue, *ib.* 906 B; unbounded in their desires, *ib.* 11. 918 D; are all a little out of their minds, *ib.* 929 D.
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- Money, needed in the state, Rep. 2. 371 B; not necessary in order to carry on war, *ib.* 4. 422; two kinds of, in the Model City, Laws 5. 742; a medium, *ib.* 11. 918 B; the different kinds of, in different countries, Eryx. 400:—love of, among the Egyptians and Phoenicians, Rep. 4. 435 E; characteristic of timocracy and oligarchy, *ib.* 8. 548 A, 553, 562 A; referred to the appetitive element of the soul, *ib.* 9. 580 E; despicable, *ib.* 589 E, 590 C (cp. 3. 390 E; Laws 5. 741 E; 8. 832 A).
- Money-changers, Hipp. Min. 368 B.
- Money-lending, in oligarchies, Rep. 8. 555, 556.
- Money-maker, the, Gorg. 452 B, C.
- Money-making, art of, in Cephalus' family, Rep. 1. 330 B; evil of, *ib.* 8. 556; pleasure of, *ib.* 9. 581 C, 586 E; forbidden in the Model City, Laws 5. 741 E, 743 D; 8. 842 D, 847 E; why regarded as dishonourable, *ib.* 11. 918.
- Money-qualifications in oligarchies, Rep. 8. 551 B (cp. Laws 3. 698 B); in the Model City, Laws 5. 744.
- Monuments, Laws 12. 958 E.
- Moon, a goddess, Apol. 26 D; Laws 7. 821 B; 10. 886, 887; reputed mother of Orpheus, Rep. 2. 364 E:—Anaxagoras on the nature of, Apol. 26 D (cp. Laws 10. 886 E); creation of, Tim. 38 C; orbit of, *ib.* D; Laws 7. 822 A; has a soul, Laws 10. 899 B; 12. 967 A.
- Moral qualities and arts, Hipp. Min. 373;—moral differences the cause of war, Euthyph. 7; 1 Alcib. 112, 113:—different standards of morals, Eryx. 400 C.
- More and less, Phil. 24 foll., 52.
- Morychus, house of, Phaedr. 227 B.
- Mothers in the state, Rep. 5. 460;—mother country, Menex. 237, 238 (cp. Rep. 9. 575 E).
- Motion and rest, Rep. 4. 436; Tim. 57 foll.; Theaet. 153, 181; Soph. 250, 255 foll.; Laws 10. 893 foll.:—Motion, expressed by the letter  $\rho$ , Crat. 426 B, 434 B; six kinds of, Tim. 36 D, 38 C, 43 B; philosophy of, Theaet. 181; two kinds of, Parm. 138 C; Theaet. 156 A, 181; ten kinds of motion, Laws 10. 893 foll.:—motion and being, Theaet. 153 A; Soph. 249; motion and generation, Tim. 38 A; Laws 10. 893, 894; 12. 966 E; motion and mind, Soph. 249; Laws 10. 897, 898; motion and the senses, Theaet. 156, 182:—motion of the same and other, Tim. 36 foll.:—motion of the universe, Statesm. 269, 270; of the planets, Tim. 38; of the stars, Rep. 7. 529, 530; 10. 616 E; Tim. 40 C; Laws 7. 821, 822; 12. 966 E:—motion in the soul, Phaedr. 245; Tim. 89 E; Laws 10. 894:—the various motions of the body, Tim. 88, 89:—motion beneficial to children, Laws 7. 789, 791.
- Mourners, Laws 7. 800 D (cp. 12. 960 A):—hair cut in mourning, Phaedo 89.
- Mouth, Tim. 75 D.
- 'Move not the immovable,' Laws 11. 913.
- Multitude, the, the great Sophist, Rep. 6. 492; their madness, *ib.* 496 C; used to be the judges in the theatre, Laws 2. 659 B; obliged to keep silence in ancient Athens, *ib.* 3. 700; not able to manage a state, *ib.* 6. 758 A (cp. Statesm. 292 E, 297 B). *See* Many.
- Murder, Euthyph. 4, 8; Laws 9. 869 E–874. Cp. Homicide.



Murderers, Euthyph. 4; punishment of, in a future existence, Laws 9. 870 E, 872 D. Cp. Homicide.

Musaeus, a sophist, Protag. 316 D; a source of inspiration, Ion 536 B; in the other world, Apol. 41 A; his pictures of a future life, Rep. 2. 363 D, E, 364 E.

Muses, invocation to the, Euthyd. 275 D; Phaedr. 237 A; Crit. 108 C; the name (*ἀπὸ τοῦ μῶσθαι*), Crat. 406 A; inspire madness in the poet, Phaedr. 245 A, 265 B; Ion 534; Laws 3. 682 A; 4. 719 B (cp. Apol. 22 A); the Muses and the grasshoppers, Phaedr. 259 A; names and attributes of the Muses, *ib.* D; the Muses compared to a magnet, Ion 533 E, 536 A; their melody due to love, Symp. 197 B; Musaeus and Orpheus, children of the Muses, Rep. 2. 364 E; use of the Muses, Tim. 47 E; Laws 2. 670 A; the Muses, the daughters of Memory, Theaet. 191 D; partners in our revels, Laws 2. 653 D, 665 A, 672 C; give education, *ib.* 654 A; source of the sense of harmony, *ib.* 672 D (cp. Tim. 47 E); aid men to control their desires, Laws 6. 783 A; their gifts, *ib.* 7. 796 E; patronesses of art, 1 Alcib. 108 C;—‘the hymeneal Muses,’ Laws 6. 775 B.

Music, Socrates recommended in a dream to compose, Phaedo 60 E;—music an art of imitation, Crat. 423; Laws 2. 655, 668; 7. 798 E, 812 C (cp. Rep. 3. 397; Laws 10. 889 D); music and love, Symp. 187, 197 A; the end of music the love of beauty, Rep. 3. 403 C; the simpler kinds of, foster temperance in the soul, *ib.* 404 E, 410 A (cp. Laws 7. 802 E); effect of excessive, Rep. 3. 410, 411; license in, leads to anarchy in

the state, *ib.* 4. 424 E; Laws 3. 701 B (cp. Laws 7. 798 E); not intended to give pleasure, Tim. 47 E; Laws 2. 655 D, 668 A; 3. 700 E (*but* cp. Laws 2. 658 E; 7. 802 D); correspondence of strings and notes in, Theaet. 206 B (cp. Laws 7. 812); music and predication, Soph. 253 B; sounds and tones in, *ibid.*; Phil. 17; empirical, Phil. 56, 62 C; origin of, Laws 2. 653, 654, 672 (cp. Tim. 47 E); figures and gestures in, Laws 2. 655; ‘colours’ in, *ibid.*; right and wrong use of, *ib.* 655, 656; importance and difficulty of forming a correct judgment about, *ib.* 669; music corrupted by the poets, *ibid.*; 3. 700; the three kinds of music, *ib.* 3. 700 A; the excellence of music, 1 Alcib. 108 D:—Music in education, Protag. 326 B; Crito 50 D; Rep. 2. 398 foll.; 7. 522 A; Laws 2. 654, 660 (cp. Poetry, Poets); includes literature (*λόγοι*), Rep. 2. 376 E; to be taught before gymnastic, *ibid.* (cp. 3. 403 B); like gymnastic, should be studied throughout life, *ib.* 3. 403 C; ancient forms of, not to be altered, *ib.* 4. 424; Laws 2. 657; 7. 799, 801 (cp. Laws 7. 816 C); must be taught to women, Rep. 5. 452 (cp. Laws 7. 804 D); designed to give a wholesome discipline in a pleasant form, Laws 2. 659 D; the severe and the vulgar sort, *ib.* 7. 802 (cp. Rep. 3. 397); time to be spent in learning, Laws 7. 810, 812; complex kinds of, to be rejected, *ib.* 812 D (cp. Rep. 3. 397);—ministers or directors of music, Laws 6. 764 C; 7. 801 D, 813 A; 12. 949 A;—solo singing, *ib.* 6. 764 E;—choruses, *ibid.*;—laws (or types) of music, *ib.* 7. 800;—songs for men and women, *ib.* 802:—music in ancient Athens not judged by the people, *ib.* 3.

700; strictly regulated in Crete and at Lacedaemon, *ib.* 2. 660; unchangeable in Egypt, *ib.* 657; 7. 799 A.

Music. [*Music to the ancients had a far wider significance than it has to us. It was opposed to gymnastic as 'mental' to 'bodily' training, and included equally reading and writing, mathematics, harmony, poetry, and music strictly speaking: drawing, as Aristotle tells us (Pol. viii. 3, § 1), was sometimes made a separate division.*

I. Music (in the wider sense), Plato says, should precede gymnastic; and, according to a remarkable passage in the Protagoras (325 C), the pupils in a Greek school were actually instructed in reading and writing, made to learn poetry by heart, and taught to play on the lyre before they went to the gymnasium. In the Republic Plato does not enter into the details of elementary education, but confines himself to the discussion of general principles. He is more explicit in the Laws. The children will begin to attend school at the age of ten, and will spend three years in learning to read and write (Laws 7. 810 foll.; and see s. v. Education). This seems to us a short time for the purpose; but Plato expressly says that only a moderate standard of proficiency will be required. He also wishes the children to commit to memory compositions in prose and verse; but they are to learn nothing which has not received the sanction of the Director of Education;—his own discourses in the Laws will be an excellent model. Arithmetic and elementary mathematics ought in his opinion to be acquired by

means of object lessons, as was the custom among the Egyptians, an idea which would be approved by many modern educators.

[Aristotle in the Politics appears to think that education should commence at seven (vii. 17, § 7), and should continue for seven years; but his language is obscure, and we cannot gather in what order he intends that the different subjects should be taken (*cp.* viii. 4, §§ 7–9).] II. Music, strictly so called, plays a great part in Plato's scheme of education. He hopes by its aid to make the lives of his youthful scholars harmonious and gracious, and to implant in their souls true conceptions of good and evil. Music is a gift of the Gods to men, and was never intended, 'as the many foolishly and blasphemously suppose,' merely to give us an idle pleasure. Neither should a freeman aim at attaining perfect execution [*cp.* Arist. Pol. viii. 6, §§ 7, 15]: in the Laws (7. 810) we are told that every one must go through the three years' course of music, 'neither more nor less, whether he like or whether he dislike the study.' Both instruments and music are to be of a simple character: in the Republic only the lyre, the pipe, and the flute are tolerated, and the Dorian and Phrygian harmonies [*cp.* Laws 7. 815, and the criticisms of Aristotle, Pol. viii. 7]. No change in the fashions of music is permitted; for where there is license in music there will be anarchy in the state. In this desire for simplicity and fixity in music Plato was probably opposed to the tendencies of his own age. The severe harmony which had once distin-

guished Hellenic art was passing out of favour: alike in architecture, sculpture, painting, literature, and music, richer and more ornate styles prevailed. We regard the change as inevitable, and not perhaps wholly to be regretted: to Plato it was a cause rather than a sign of the decline of Hellas.]

Music-masters, Charm. 160 A; Laws 7. 812. Cp. Connus, Damon.

Musical amateurs, Rep. 5. 475;—contests, Laws 2. 657 E; 6. 764 D foll.; 8. 828 C, 834 E; 12. 947 E;—education, Theaet. 206 B; effect of, Protag. 326 B; Rep. 2. 377; 3. 401 E-403; 7. 522 A; Tim. 47 E; Laws 2. 654, 660; 7. 810;—instruments, the more complex kinds of, to be rejected, Rep. 3. 399 (cp. Laws 7. 812 D);—modes, Laches 188 D; Rep. 3. 397-399; changes in, involve changes in the laws, Rep. 4. 424 C.

Myrrhina, tomb of (Batiaea), Crat. 392 A.

Myrrhinusian, Phaedrus the, Protag. 315 C; Phaedr. 244 A; Symp. 176 D.

Myrtilus, the murder of, Crat. 395 C.

Mysian, a term of reproach, Gorg. 521 B; Theaet. 209 B.

Myson the Chenian, one of the Seven Wise Men, Protag. 343 A.

Mysteries, Phaedr. 250 B; Meno 76 E; Crito 54 C; Phaedo 69 C; Gorg. 497 C; Rep. 2. 365 A, 366 A, 378 A; 8. 560 E; accompanied by sport, Euthyd. 277 E; celebrated in Bacchic dances, Laws 7. 815 C; their teaching about the murder of kindred, *ib.* 9. 870 D, E, 872 E.

Myth, more interesting than argument, Protag. 320 C:—myth of Zamolxis, Charm. 156; of the creation of man, Protag. 320 C foll.; of the soul, Phaedr. 245-257; of the grasshoppers, *ib.*

259; of Theuth, *ib.* 274; of the origin of love, Symp. 191, 192; of the lower and the upper world, Phaedo 107 foll.; of Er, the son of Armenius, Rep. 10. 614 foll.; of Atreus and Thyestes, Statesm. 268 E; of Cadmus, Rep. 3. 414 C; Soph. 247 C; Laws 2. 663 E;—the legend of Atlantis, Tim. 21-26; Crit. 106 foll.;—the Sicilian tale, Gorg. 493; parable of the casks, *ibid.*; Socrates' tale, *ib.* 523 foll.; the 'ancient story,' Statesm. 269 foll.:—myths of the ancient philosophers, Soph. 242 D.

Mythology, in family pedigrees, Lysis 205 C; 1 Alcib. 120 E (cp. Euthyph. 11 B); Socrates disbelieves in, Euthyph. 6; Phaedr. 229 C; misrepresentations of the Gods in, Euthyph. 6, 8; Rep. 2. 378 foll.; 3. 388 foll., 408 C; Laws 10. 886 C; 12. 941 (cp. Crit. 109 B; Laws 2. 672 B); attempts to rationalize, valueless, Phaedr. 229 C; Socrates' use of, *ib.* 265, 275; only studied when men have leisure, Crit. 109 E; like poetry, has an imitative character, Rep. 3. 392 D foll.

## N.

Nails, Tim. 76 E.

Name, authority of a great, Phaedr. 270 C.

Names, natural truth of, Crat. 383; conventional theory of, *ib.* 384, 385 foll., 434 E, 435; are parts of propositions, *ib.* 385; things have an essence, *ib.* 386; actions have an essence, *ib.* E foll.; naming a kind of action, *ib.* 387; names the instruments of naming, *ib.* 388; defined, *ibid.*; the work of the legislator, *ib.* 388 E foll., 404 A, 408 A, 414 B, 427 D, 429 B, 431 E, 436, 437 E; Laws 7. 816 B; formed on an ideal, Crat. 389; speech must be natural, *ibid.*; names differ in syl-



- lables, *ib.* 390; used by the dialectician, *ibid.*; barbarian and Hellenic names, *ib.* 385 E, 390 A; syllables of names, *ib.* 393; names of Greek letters, *ibid.*; meaning and form of names, *ib.* 394; reason in, *ib.* 393, 394; names of men and heroes, *ib.* 394 foll.; of Gods, *ib.* 400 foll.; the imposers of names, *ib.* 401, 411; foreign names, *ib.* 401 C (cp. 416 A); foreign origin of names, *ib.* 409 D; the cause of, *ib.* 416; primary and secondary, *ib.* 422; names indicate nature of things, *ibid.*; are vocal imitations, *ib.* 423; sophistical view of, *ib.* 428 foll.; names and pictures compared, *ib.* 429, 430, 434; how true, *ib.* 431; how related to things, *ib.* 432; when good, *ib.* 433; theories of names, *ib.* 433, 434; knowledge given by, *ib.* 436; consistency in, *ibid.*; rest rather than motion signified by, *ib.* 437; more than human, *ib.* 438; in education, *ib.* 440; names and things, Parm. 148 D; names and definitions, Soph. 218; Laws 10. 895; have no real existence, Soph. 244; connexion of, *ib.* 261; not to be pressed, Statesm. 261 E (cp. Rep. 7. 533 E); ancient names excellent, Laws 7. 816 A:—distinctions of names ascribed to Prodicus, Charm. 163 D; Laches 197 D; Protag. 337 A, 340 A, 358 A, D; Euthyd. 277 E; Meno 75 E;—generic names, Phaedo 104;—names of ideas, *ibid.*;—names of classes, Theaet. 157 C:—children sometimes called by their fathers' names, Lysis 204 D.
- Narration, styles of, Rep. 3. 392, 393, 396.
- National qualities, Rep. 4. 435 E; national characteristics, Laws 1. 641 E; 5. 747.
- Natural gifts, Phaedr. 269 E; Rep. 2. 370 A; 5. 455; 6. 491 E, 495 A; 7. 519, 535; Laws 7. 819 A; 10. 908 C;—justice, Gorg. 483–485; Laws 10. 890 A; Callicles' view of, Gorg. 492;—philosophers, teach that 'like loves like,' Lysis 214 A; deny pleasure, Phil. 44; are not godless, Laws 12. 966, 967;—philosophy, Phaedo 97; Laws 10. 889 (cp. Apol. 26);—scenery, Greek feeling for, Phaedr. 230 (cp. Laws 1. 625 A, B);—science, Socrates disappointed in, Phaedo 96 foll.
- Nature, no incompleteness in, Phaedo 71 E; nature in names, Crat. 387, 390, 393, 394, 422, 423; nature and convention in morals, Gorg. 483; Laws 10. 889 E; Eryx. 400 C; nature and creation, Soph. 265; the true nature of things seen in their extreme forms, Phil. 44 E, 45; nature and habit, Laws 2. 655; nature, art, and chance, *ib.* 10. 889; in politics, *ibid.*; life according to, *ib.* 890 B; meaning of the word, *ib.* 892.
- Nature, recurrent cycles in, Rep. 8. 546 A; Statesm. 269 foll.;—divisions of, Rep. 9. 584; Phil. 23;—upper and lower in, Tim. 62 foll.;—universal nature, *ib.* 50.
- Naucratis, the home of Theuth, in Egypt, Phaedr. 274 C.
- Nausicydes, of the deme of Cholarges, a student of philosophy, Gorg. 487 C.
- Nautical population, evil of, Laws 4. 705.
- Naval warfare, not to be commended, Laws 4. 706.
- Naxos, Euthyph. 4 C.
- Necessities, the, of life, Rep. 2. 369, 373 A.
- Necessity, the mother of the Fates, Rep. 10. 616, 617, 621 A.
- Necessity, not so strong a tie as desire, Crat. 403; not even God can fight against, Laws 5. 741 A; 7. 818 A;—'the necessity



- which lovers know,' Rep. 5. 458 E;—'the necessity of Diomedes,' *ib.* 6. 493 D.
- Nectar, drunk by the horses of the Gods, Phaedr. 247 D; the drink of the Gods, Symp. 203 B.
- Negation and opposition, Soph. 257;—negation of pain, not = pleasure, Phil. 43, 44.
- Neighbours not to be injured, Laws 8. 843;—court of neighbours, *ib.* 6. 766 E; 12. 956 C.
- Neith=Athene, Tim. 21 E, 23 E.
- Nemea, Lysis 205 C;—citizens (of the Model City) to be sent to, Laws 12. 950 E.
- Nemesis, Rep. 5. 451 A; the messenger of justice, Laws 4. 717 D.
- Nereids, Crit. 116 E.
- Nestor, counsel of, to Antilochus, Ion 537 A; his concubine, *ib.* 538 C; like Pericles, Symp. 221 C; excelled all men in speech and temperance, Laws 4. 711 E; wisest of those who went to Troy, Hipp. Min. 364 C (cp. Eryx. 394):—the rhetoric of Nestor [Gorgias], Phaedr. 261 C.
- Neutral state, Phil. 33.
- Niceratus, father of Nicias, Gorg. 472 A.
- Niceratus, son of Nicias, Laches 200 D; Rep. 1. 327 C.
- Nicias, Gorg. 472 A; Rep. 1. 327 C; a person in the dialogue *Laches*, Laches 178 A, etc.; a public man, *ib.* 180 B, 187 A, 197 D; his opinion on the art of fighting in armour, *ib.* 182 A foll.; his wealth, *ib.* 186 C; used to cross-examination by Socrates, *ib.* 188 A, B; his opinion on courage, *ib.* 195 A foll.; a philosopher, *ib.* 200 C.
- Nicostratus, a pupil of Socrates, Apol. 33 E.
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- People, the, in ancient Attica were, not the masters, but the servants of the law, Laws 3. 700 A; ought to have a share in the administration of justice, *ib.* 6. 768 B. Cp. Many, Multitude.
- Peparethians, the 'ignoble,' 1 Alcib. 116 D.
- Perception (*αἰσθησις*), Phaedo 65, 79; Rep. 6. 508 foll.; Theaet. 151 foll.; Phil. 33 D, 38, 39; contradictions of, Theaet. 154; theory of motion in relation to, *ib.* 156; may be false, *ib.* 157 E; relativity of, *ib.* 159, 160; perception and understanding, *ib.* 160; perception and the memory of perception, *ib.* 163, 166, 191 B; Heraclitean theory of, *ib.* 182 (cp. 160); perception and knowledge, *ib.* 151 foll., 163 foll., 165, 179, 184, 192 foll.; organs of perception, *ib.* 184, 185; perception of universals, *ib.* 185; medium of, *ibid.* Cp. Pleasure, Sensation.
- Perdiccas, father of Archelaus, Gorg. 470 D (cp. 471 A, B); Rep. 1. 336 A.
- Perfect state, difficulty of, Rep. 5. 472; 6. 502 E; Laws 4. 711; possible, Rep. 5. 471, 473; 6. 499; 7. 540 (cp. *ib.* 7. 520; Laws 4. 711 E; 5. 739; 12. 968 A); manner of its decline, Rep. 8. 546 (cp. Crit. 120, 121). *See* Ideal state.
- Perfection, given partly by nature, partly by art, Phaedr. 269 D, E.
- Perfumes, Tim. 65 A; not to be imported, Laws 8. 847 C.
- Pergama, the citadel of Troy, Phaedr. 243 B.
- Periander, the tyrant, Rep. 1. 336 A.
- Pericles, Protag. 329 A; guardian of Alcibiades and Cleinias, *ib.* 320 A; 1 Alcib. 104 B; 2 Alcib. 144 A; what he would have said about rhe-



- toric, Phaedr. 269 A; learned philosophy from Anaxagoras, *ib.* 270 (cp. 1 Alcib. 118 C, D); not equal to Socrates as an orator, Symp. 215 E; compared to Nestor and Antenor, *ib.* 221 C; 'magnificent in his wisdom,' Meno 94 A; long walls partly built by his counsel, Gorg. 455 E; his family, *ib.* 472 B; mentioned as 'lately dead,' *ib.* 503 C; a good man in common estimation, *ibid.*; first to give the people pay, *ib.* 515 D, E; effect of his administration, *ibid.*; convicted of theft, *ib.* 516 A; his badness, *ibid.*; one of the real authors of the calamities of Athens, *ib.* 519 A; Pericles and Aspasia, Menex. 235 E; his funeral oration, *ib.* 236 B;—the sons of, Protag. 314 E; inferior to their father, *ib.* 320 A, 328 C; Meno 94 B; 1 Alcib. 118 E.
- Perjury, Laws 11. 916 E, 937; 12. 943 E, 948, 949; perjuries of lovers, Symp. 183 A; Phil. 65 C.
- Persephone, sends souls back to the light in the ninth year, Meno 81 C; meaning of the name, Crat. 404 C; daughter of Demeter, Laws 6. 782 B.
- Perseus, ancestor of the Achæmenids, 1 Alcib. 120 E.
- Persia, a rugged land, Laws 3. 695 A:—Persian fabrics, Hipp. Min. 368 D;—Persian government, Laws 3. 694 A foll., 697 C;—Persian kings, *ib.* 694; represent the highest form of monarchy, *ib.* 693 D; their education, *ib.* 694 foll.; 1 Alcib. 121 D foll.; Persian invasion, Laws 3. 692 C foll., 698 B foll.; 4. 707 B, C; Menex. 239; prophecies concerning, Laws 1. 642 D, E;—history of the Persians, Menex. 239 D foll. (cp. Laws 3. 694 A foll.);—Persians at the battle of Plataea, Laches 191 C; their reputation as sailors destroyed by the battle of Salamis, Menex. 241 B; their policy towards subject nations, Laws 3. 693 A;—moderate drinkers, *ib.* 1. 637 D; their luxury, *ib.* E; 1 Alcib. 122 C; are shepherds, Laws 3. 695 A.
- Personal identity, Symp. 207 D; Theaet. 154.
- Personalities, avoided by the philosopher, Rep. 6. 500 B; Theaet. 174 C.
- Personification: the argument, like a bird which slips from our grasp, Euthyd. 291 B; like a horse, must be given the rein, Protag. 338 A; must be pulled up, Laws 3. 701 C:—compared to a troublesome road, Lysis 213 E; to an ocean of words, Protag. 338 A; Parm. 137 A (cp. Phaedr. 264 A; Rep. 4. 441 B; 5. 453 D); to a physician, Gorg. 475 D; to a search or chase, Rep. 2. 368 C; 4. 427 C, 432 (cp. Lysis 218 C; Laches 194 B; Tim. 64 B; Soph. 235; Phil. 65 A; Laws 2. 654 E); to a game of draughts, Rep. 6. 487 B (cp. Laws 7. 820 C; Eryx. 395 A); to a journey, Rep. 7. 532 E; to a charm, *ib.* 10. 608 A; to a river which has to be forded, Laws 10. 892 E, 900 B; to a vesture, 1 Alcib. 113 E:—says 'No' to us, Charm. 175 C; supposed to take a human voice, Protag. 361 A (cp. Phaedr. 274 A; Phaedo 87 A); addresses an oration to us, Laws 5. 741 A:—like to die, Phaedo 89 B; gives way to an attack, *ib.* 95 B; must not wander about without a head, Gorg. 505 D (cp. Laws 6. 752 A); 'has travelled a long way,' Rep. 6. 484 A; veils her face, *ib.* 503 A; a servant who waits our leisure, Theaet. 173 C (cp. Laws 6. 781 E); in danger of being drowned by digressions, Theaet. 177 C; should not be allowed to

- trample us under foot, *ib.* 191 A; likely to be blown away, Phil. 13 C; to suffer shipwreck, *ib.* 14 A; strikes a deadly blow, *ib.* 23 A (cp. Euthyd. 303 A; Phaedo 89 A); has to be wrestled with, Phil. 41 B (cp. Soph. 241 D); is in play, Phil. 53 E:—‘we are tossing on the waves of the argument,’ Laches 194 C; the three waves, Rep. 5. 457 C, 472 A, 473 C (cp. Euthyd. 293 A):—‘following the footsteps of the argument,’ Rep. 2. 365 C:—‘whither the argument may blow, thither we go,’ *ib.* 3. 394 D (cp. Laws 2. 667 A):—‘a swarm of words,’ Rep. 5. 450 B:—the argument presents to us another handle, Laws 3. 682 E:—the taste of the argument, 1 Alcib. 114 B:—new arguments appear as witnesses, Phaedr. 260 E; come crowding in like unbidden guests, Theaet. 184 A:—arguments from probabilities, apt to be impostors, Phaedo 92 D.
- Persuasion, comes from opinion, not truth, Phaedr. 260; produced by the art of rhetoric, Gorg. 453 E; Theaet. 201 A; Statesm. 304 C; two kinds of, Gorg. 454; the art of, Soph. 222 C; Phil. 58 A; persuasion and force, the two instruments of the legislator, Laws 4. 719 E, 722 (cp. 10. 885 D); the power of persuasion given by knowledge, 1 Alcib. 114:—persuasion [or faith] one of the faculties of the soul, Rep. 6. 511 D; 7. 533 E.
- Pestilence, a cause of revolution, Laws 4. 709 A.
- Phaedo, narrates the *Phaedo* to Echecrates of Phlius, Phaedo 57 A foll.; present at Socrates’ death, *ib.* 57 A, 117 D; Socrates plays with his hair, *ib.* 89 B; Phaedo and Simmias, *ib.* 102 B.
- Phaedondes, present at the death of Socrates, Phaedo 59 C.
- Phaedrus, the Myrrhinusian, Protag. 315 C; Symp. 176 D; Phaedr. 244 A; with Hippias, Protag. 315 C; his eagerness, Phaedr. 228 A, B, 236 D, E; a lover of discourse, *ib.* 228, 242 A, 243 D, 258 E, 276 E; son of Vain Man, *ib.* 244 A; a ‘weak head,’ Symp. 176 D; complains that love has no encomiast, *ib.* 177 A; his speech in honour of love, *ib.* 178 A foll.
- Phaenaretè, mother of Socrates, 1 Alcib. 131 E; a midwife, Theaet. 149 A.
- Phaethon, story of, Tim. 22 C.
- Phalerum, Apollodorus of, Symp. 172 A.
- Phanosthenes of Andros, a foreigner, chosen general by the Athenians, Ion 541 C.
- Phantastic art, Soph. 236, 260 E, 265; divisions of, *ib.* 266, 267.
- Pharmacia and Orithyia, Phaedr. 229 C.
- Phasis, eastern extremity of the Hellenic world, Phaedo 109 B.
- Phason, brother of Hippocrates, Protag. 310 A.
- Pheidias, an Athenian, the statuary, Protag. 311 C; did not make so much money as Protagoras, Meno 91 D.
- Pelleus, plains of, Crit. 111 C.
- Pemius, the rhapsode of Ithaca, Ion 533 C.
- Pherecrates, exhibited savages at the Lenaeon festival, Protag. 327 D.
- Pherephatta, meaning of the name, Crat. 404 C.
- Philebus, a person in the dialogue *Philebus*, Phil. 11 A, etc.; maintains that enjoyments and pleasures are a good to every living being, *ib.* 11 (cp. 12 A, 60 A, 66 D); his ‘boys,’ *ib.* 16 B; joins

- in the conversation, *ib.* 18 A, 20 A, 28 A.
- Philippides, son of Philomelus, Protag. 315 A.
- Philippus (Philip), father of Phoenix, Symp. 172 B.
- Philolaus, Phaedo 61 D.
- Philomelus, father of Philippides, Protag. 315 A.
- Philosopher, the, is inspired, Phaedr. 249; will not repine at death, Phaedo 63 E foll., 68 A (cp. Rep. 6. 486 A); his virtues, Phaedo 68 A; unlike the partisan, cares only for truth, *ib.* 91 A; supposed to be helpless in a court of law, Gorg. 484, 485; Theaet. 172, 174 B; has the quality of gentleness, Rep. 2. 375, 376; 3. 410; 6. 486; 'the spectator of all time and all existence,' *ib.* 6. 486; Theaet. 173 E; should have a good memory, Rep. 6. 486 D, 490 D; 7. 535 B; has his mind fixed upon true being, *ib.* 6. 484, 485, 486 E, 490, 500 C, 501 D; 7. 521, 537 D; 9. 581 E, 582 C (cp. Phaedr. 249; Phaedo 65, 82; Rep. 5. 475 E; 7. 520 B, 525; Theaet. 173 E; Soph. 249 D, 254 A); his qualifications and excellences, Rep. 6. 485 foll., 490 E, 491 B, 495 A; corruption of the philosopher, *ib.* 494; is apt to retire from the world, *ib.* 496 (cp. Theaet. 173); does not delight in personal conversation, Rep. 6. 500 B (cp. Theaet. 174 C); must be an arithmetician, Rep. 7. 525 B; pleasure of the philosopher, *ib.* 9. 581 E; must be trained in dialectic, Parm. 135 D; picture of the philosopher, Theaet. 173 C foll.; thinks lightly of human greatness, *ib.* 174 E; the only professor of the dialectic art, Soph. 253 E; distinguished from the sophist, *ib.* 268:—Philosophers, popular view of, Euthyd. 304 D foll.; Phaedo 64; the original givers of names, Crat. 401; philosophers and lovers, Phaedr. 248 D, E; Symp. 184; follow in the train of Zeus, Phaedr. 250; philosophers and authors, *ib.* 278 D; common charges against philosophers, Apol. 23 D; desire death, Phaedo 61, 64, 67; will not commit suicide, *ib.* 61; averse to pleasure, *ib.* 64, 82; Gorg. 495 foll.; are the true mystics, Phaedo 69 C; are not defenceless, Gorg. 508, 509 (cp. Rep. 7. 517 E); their view of life, Gorg. 512; are to be kings, Rep. 5. 473 (cp. 6. 487 E, 498 foll., 501 E foll.; 7. 540; 8. 543; 9. 592); are lovers of all knowledge, *ib.* 5. 475; 6. 486 A, 490; true and false philosophers, *ib.* 5. 475 foll.; 6. 484, 491, 494, 496 A, 500; 7. 535; philosophers to be guardians, *ib.* 2. 375 (*see* Guardians); why they are useless, 6. 487 foll.; few in number, *ib.* 487 D, 496, 499 B, 503 B (cp. Phaedo 69 C); will frame the state after the heavenly pattern, Rep. 6. 501; 7. 540 A; 9. 592; education of, *ib.* 6. 503; philosophers and poets, *ib.* 10. 607; Laws 12. 967; divine, Soph. 216 B; thought by the many to be mad, *ib.* C; philosophers and the multitude, *ib.* 254 B; magnify themselves in praising mind, Phil. 28 C; despise religion, Laws 10. 886 E;—the ancient philosophers did not take much trouble to explain themselves, Soph. 242 D;—philosophers of the Heraclitean school, Crat. 411; Theaet. 179 D foll. (*see* Heraclitus);—materialistic philosophers, Theaet. 155 E; Soph. 246 foll.;—natural philosophers teach that 'like loves like,' Lysis 214 A; confuse conditions and causes, Phaedo 99 A; deny



- pleasure, Phil. 44; invite men to live according to nature, Laws 10. 890 A; are not godless, *ib.* 12. 966 E;—philosopher-politicians, Euthyd. 305 C (cp. Gorg. 484 E).
- Philosophic nature, the, rarity of, Rep. 6. 491; causes of the ruin of, *ibid.*
- Philosophy, secretly cultivated in Lacedaemon and Crete, Protag. 342; censured, Euthyd. 304 D; confused with sophistry at Athens, *ib.* 305; defended by Socrates, *ib.* 307; philosophy and love, Phaedr. 256; the madness of philosophy, Symp. 218 A; philosophy the noblest and best of music, Phaedo 61 A; a purification, *ib.* 67 B, 82 D; the practice of death, *ib.* 80; effect of, on the soul, *ib.* 83; the noblest kind of music, *ib.* 90 E; the love of Socrates, Gorg. 481; an elegant accomplishment, not to be carried too far (Callicles), *ib.* 484, 487 (cp. Menex. 234 A); every headache ascribed to, Rep. 3. 407 C; = love of real knowledge, *ib.* 6. 485; the corruption of, *ib.* 491; philosophy and the world, *ib.* 494; the desolation of, *ib.* 495; philosophy and the arts, *ib.* E, 496 C (cp. 5. 475 D, 476 A); true and false philosophy, *ib.* 6. 496 E, 498 E; philosophy and governments, *ib.* 497; time set apart for, *ib.* 498; 7. 539; commonly neglected in after life, *ib.* 6. 498; prejudice against, *ib.* 500, 501; why it is useless, *ib.* 7. 517, 535, 539; the guardian and saviour of virtue, *ib.* 8. 549 B; philosophy and poetry, *ib.* 10. 607 (cp. Laws 12. 967 D); aids a man to make a wise choice in the next world, Rep. 10. 618; impossible without ideas, Parm. 135; begins in wonder, Theaet. 155 D (cp. Rep. 5. 475 C); the uninitiated in, Theaet. 155 E; philosophy and leisure, *ib.* 172;—natural philosophy, Socrates disappointed in, Phaedo 97 foll.;—philosophy of relativity, Theaet. 152 foll., 157 B, 160, 166, 170 A.
- Phlegm, Tim. 83, 84.
- Phlius, Phaedo 57 A.
- Phocylides, his saying, 'that as soon as a man has a livelihood he should practise virtue,' Rep. 3. 407 B.
- Phoenician tale, the, Rep. 3. 414 C foll. (cp. Laws 2. 663 E).
- Phoenicians, their love of money, Rep. 4. 436 A (cp. Laws 5. 747 C).
- Phoenix, tutor of Achilles, Rep. 3. 390 E; cursed by Amyntor, his father, Laws 11. 931 B.
- Phoenix, son of Philip, Symp. 172 B, 173 B.
- Phorcys, son of Oceanus and Tethys, Tim. 40 E.
- Phoroneus, called 'the first,' Tim. 22 A.
- Phrygian harmony, Laches 188 D; Rep. 3. 399;—Phrygian words [*κύων, πῆρ, ὕδωρ*], Crat. 409 E;—Midas the Phrygian, Phaedr. 264 D;—Phrygians, Statesm. 262 E.
- Phrynonidas, a notorious villain, Protag. 327 D.
- Phthia, 'The third day hence to Phthia shalt thou go' (Il. ix. 363), Crito 44 B (cp. Hipp. Min. 370 C).
- Phylarchs, election of, Laws 6. 756 A.
- Physical philosophy, Phaedo 97 foll.; Laws 10. 889. Cp. Philosophy.
- Physician, the, ought to have regard to the whole, Charm. 156, 157 (cp. Laws 10. 902 E, 903 D); not a mere money-maker, Rep. 1. 341 C, 342 D; the good physician, *ib.* 3. 408; the wise man a physician, Theaet. 167 B; the physician and his patients, Laws 9.



- 865 B;—comparison of the physician and the judge, Gorg. 478, 480 A; of the physician and the sophist, Theaet. 167 A; of the physician and the true educator, Soph. 230; of the physician and the true statesman or legislator, Statesm. 293, 295, 296;—physician *v.* cook, Gorg. 521 E (cp. 464 E):—physicians in the state, Rep. 3. 408; find employment when luxury increases, *ib.* 2. 373 C; 3. 405 A; have sometimes played their patients false, Statesm. 298 A;—names for physicians, Crat. 394 B. Cp. Doctors, Medicine.
- Piety defined, = prosecuting the guilty, Euthyph. 5 E; = that which is dear to the gods, *ib.* 9; further defined, *ibid.*; a part of justice, *ib.* 12; a ministration, *ib.* 13; an art, *ibid.*; a science of praying and sacrificing, *ib.* 14. See Holiness.
- Pigs, sacrificed at the Mysteries, Rep. 2. 378 A; 'not even such a big pig as the Crommyonian sow could be called courageous,' Laches 196 D.
- Pilot, the, and the just man, Rep. 1. 332 (cp. 341); the true pilot, *ib.* 6. 488 E; pilot and legislator compared, Statesm. 297 A; evil practices of pilots, *ib.* 298 B;—pilot's art, Ion 537 B; Gorg. 511 D; empirical, Phil. 56 A;—the philosophic pilot, Gorg. 511 E. Cp. Captain.
- Pindar, his natural justice, Gorg. 484 B, 488 B; Laws 3. 690 B; 4. 714 E; on the hope of the righteous, Rep. 1. 331 A; on Asclepius, *ib.* 3. 408 B; believed the soul immortal, Meno 81 B:—Quoted; Euthyph. 304 B; Phaedr. 227 B, 236 D; Meno 76 D, 81 B; Rep. 2. 365 B; Theaet. 173 E.
- Pipe, the (ὄπιγξ), one of the musical instruments permitted to be used, Rep. 3. 399 D.
- Piracy, Soph. 222 C; Statesm. 298 C (cp. Laws 7. 823 B).
- Piraeus, Gorg. 511 E; Rep. 1. 327 A; 4. 439 E; Socrates seldom goes there, 1. 328 C:—reconciliation of those who came from Piraeus with the rest of the city (B.C. 403), Menex. 243 E.
- Pittacus of Mitylene, one of the Seven Wise Men, Protag. 343 A; a saying of his criticized, *ib.* 339 C; a sage, Rep. 1. 335 E.
- Pitthis, deme of, Euthyph. 2 B.
- Pity, only felt for involuntary evils, Protag. 323 E.
- Plague, the, at Athens, delayed by Diotima for ten years, Symp. 201 D.
- Planets, the, Laws 7. 821; orbits of, Tim. 36 (cp. Rep. 10. 616 E); creation of, Tim. 38.
- Planting, laws respecting, Laws 8. 843 E.
- Plants, Tim. 77 A.
- Plataea, battle of, Laws 4. 707 C; Menex. 241 C, 245 A; manner in which the Lacedaemonians fought at, Laches 191 C.
- Plato, present at the trial of Socrates, Apol. 34 A; offers to be one of Socrates' securities, *ib.* 38 B; was ill at the time of Socrates' death, Phaedo 59 B.
- Plays, the, of children, should be made a means of instruction, Rep. 4. 425 A; 7. 537 A; Laws 1. 643 B; not to be altered, Laws 7. 797, 798. Cp. Games.
- Pleasure, sometimes defined as knowledge, Rep. 6. 505 B; = the good, Phil. 11, 60 A (cp. Protag. 358; Gorg. 495 foll.; Rep. 6. 505 B);—nature of pleasure, Tim. 64; pleasure a replenishment, Phil. 31 B, 42 D;—pleasure not akin to virtue, Rep. 3. 402 E; a motion of the soul, *ib.* 9. 583 E; not the object of music, Tim. 47 E; Laws 2. 655 D, 668 A; 3. 700 E (*but* cp. Laws 2. 658 E;

7. 802 D); 'the greatest incitement of evil,' Tim. 69 D; varieties of, Phil. 12; how far one, *ibid.*; needs addition, *ib.* 21; is infinite, *ib.* 27, 28, 31 A, 41 E; belongs to the mixed class, *ib.* 31 B, 41 E; admits of qualities, *ib.* 37; existence of, denied by natural philosophers, *ib.* 44; a generation, *ib.* 53; Socrates' view of, *ib.* 60; insufficient without the addition of wisdom, *ibid.* foll.; devoid of reason, *ib.* 65 foll.; one of the first perceptions of children, Laws 2. 653 A; no criterion of rightness, *ib.* 667; the love of, natural, *ib.* 5. 732 E; desired by all men, *ib.* 733; moderate pleasure to be preferred, *ib.* 7. 792; pleasure not to be allowed to young children, *ibid.*; the desire of, a cause of crime, *ib.* 9. 863;—pleasure caused by the cessation of pain, Phaedo 60 A; Phaedr. 258 E; Rep. 9. 583 D (*but* cp. Phil. 51 A); pleasure and pain simultaneous, Gorg. 496; Phil. 31, 41 D; pleasure not = negation of pain, Phil. 43, 44 A; pleasure and pain in alternation, *ib.* 46; coalescing, *ib.* 47; in the mind, *ib.* 50 (cp. Laws 1. 633 D); pleasure without pain, Phil. 52; Laws 5. 733 A; 6. 782 E; pleasure and pain, the two counsellors of man, Laws 1. 644:—pleasure and desire, Phaedr. 237, 238; pleasure and good, Gorg. 498 foll.; Phil. 66, 67; pleasure and gratification, Protag. 337 B; pleasure and happiness, Gorg. 494 E; Phil. 47; Laws 2. 662; pleasure and love, Rep. 3. 402, 403; pleasure and opinion, Phil. 37 foll.; pleasure and reason, Laws 3. 689; pleasure and the soul, *ib.* 5. 727; pleasure and temperance, *ib.* 734:—'overcome by pleasure,' Protag. 353–357; Phaedo 69 A (cp. Laws

1. 633 E; 8. 836 E);—the victory over pleasure, Laws 8. 840;—degrees of pleasure, Protag. 356;—the sense of pleasure (in the Heraclitean philosophy), Theaet. 156 B; pleasure and the theory of flux, Phil. 43;—pleasure arising from a diseased state, *ib.* 46 A, 51 D (cp. Gorg. 494 C; Tim. 86);—pleasure and the philosopher, Phaedo 64; Gorg. 495 foll.; the highest pleasure that of the wise man, Rep. 9. 583; the just life the pleasantest, Laws 1. 662;—real pleasure unknown to the tyrant, Rep. 9. 587;—no Spartan or Cretan laws which train men to resist pleasure, Laws 1. 634, 635; pleasure forbidden at Sparta, *ib.* 637 A:—pleasure of drinking, Laws 2. 667; 6. 782 E, 783 C; pleasure of eating, Rep. 8. 559; Laws 2. 667; 6. 782 E, 783 C; of hope, Phil. 40 A; given by the imitative arts, Laws 2. 667 C; of learning, *ibid.* (cp. Rep. 6. 486 C); of memory, Phil. 35; of replenishment, Tim. 65 A;—arts of pleasure, Gorg. 501;—sensual pleasure, Rep. 7. 519; 9. 586; a solvent of the soul, *ib.* 4. 430 A (cp. Laws 1. 633 E); not desired by the philosopher, Rep. 6. 485 E:—Pleasures, division of, into necessary and unnecessary, Rep. 8. 558, 559, 561 A; 9. 572, 591 E; honourable and dishonourable, *ib.* 8. 561 C;—three classes of, *ib.* 9. 581;—criterion of, *ib.* 582;—classification of, *ib.* 583;—connexion of pleasures with good and evil, Protag. 351–354 foll.; pleasures fasten the body to the soul, Phaedo 83; are pleasures false? Phil. 36, 40, 41; mixed, *ib.* 46, 47; unmixed, *ib.* 51; true, *ibid.*, 63 E; true, belong to the idea of measure, *ib.* 52; pure and impure, *ib.* 53;—pleasures of knowledge, *ib.* 52;

— of sight, smell, beauty, *ib.* 51; of smell, Rep. 9. 584 B;—pleasures of the many, *ib.* E foll. (cp. Phil. 52 B); of the passionate, Rep. 9. 586; of the philosopher, *ib.* 586, 587;—pleasures of the body, *ib.* 6. 485 E; Phil. 45; of the soul, Rep. 6. 485 E; Phil. 47 E.

Plurality in unity, Phil. 17 A.

Pluto, meaning of the name (πλούτος), Crat. 402 D foll.; a great Sophist, *ib.* 403 E; his complaint to Zeus, Gorg. 523 A, B; the blind God, Rep. 8. 554 B (cp. Laws 1. 631 C); = riches, Laws 7. 801 B; the twelfth month sacred to, *ib.* 8. 828 C; the best friend of man, *ib.* D. Cp. Hades.

Pnyx, included in the Acropolis in early times, Crit. 112 A.

Poetry, place of, in Greek education, Protag. 325 E foll., 339; Laws 2. 659 (cp. Education); learnt by heart in schools, Protag. 326 A; Laws 7. 810 C, 811 A; poetry and inspiration, Phaedr. 245 A, 265 B; Ion 533–535; Apol. 22 B; Laws 3. 682 A; 4. 719 B; poetry a whole, Ion 532; complex and manifold, Symp. 205 B; a sort of rhetoric, Gorg. 502; made up of song, rhythm, metre, speech, *ibid.*; styles of, Rep. 3. 392–394, 398; in the state, *ib.* 398; 8. 568 B; 10. 595 foll., 607 A (cp. Laws 7. 817); effect of, Rep. 10. 605; feeds the passions, *ib.* 606; poetry and philosophy, *ib.* 607 (cp. Laws 12. 967); poetry and prose, Laws 7. 811;—‘colours’ of poetry, Rep. 10. 601 A;—Tragic poetry native to Athens, Laches 183.

Poetry. [*Poetry held a far greater place in Hellenic life than it has ever done in modern times, and, like the kindred art of music, exercised an influence which it is difficult for us to understand. A*

*large part of elementary education consisted in learning poetry by heart (Protag. 326 A; Laws 7. 810 C); the rhapsode moved the crowds to laughter and tears at the festivals (Ion 535); the theatres were free, or almost free, to all, ‘costing but a drachma at the most’ (Apol. 26 D); the intervals of a banquet were filled up by conversation about the poets (Protag. 347 C). The ancient philosopher, therefore, who proposed to construct an ideal state was obliged to consider whether the poet could be allowed to practise his art without any restrictions in a city which was designed to be ‘an imitation of the best and noblest life’ (Laws 7. 817 A). But there was ‘an ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry,’ which had found its first expression in the attacks of Xenophanes (538 B.C.) and Heraclitus (508 B.C.) upon the popular mythology. And Plato, though he had himself a double portion of the poetic spirit, fully shares in this hostile feeling. Even in the earlier dialogues there is often an antagonism to the poets which is only slightly veiled by the ironical courtesy of the language. They are ‘winged and holy beings’ (Ion 534 B), who sing by inspiration without knowing the meaning of what they utter, ‘for not by art can a man enter into the temple of the Muses’ (Phaedr. 245 A); but at the same time they are the worst possible critics of their own writings and the most self-conceited of mortals (Apol. 22 D).—In the Republic (II. and III.) Plato grows more in earnest and brings poetry to a formal trial. Are the tales and legends, he asks, which the tragic and epic*



poets relate, either true in themselves or likely to furnish good examples to the citizens of the model state? They cannot be true for they are contrary to the nature of God (see s. v. God), and they are certainly not proper lessons for youth. There must be a censorship of poetry, and all objectionable passages expunged; suitable rules and regulations will be laid down, and to these the poets must conform. In the Tenth Book the argument takes a still deeper tone. The poet is proved to be an impostor thrice removed from the truth; a wizard who steals the hearts of the unwary by his spells and enchantments. Men easily fall into the habit of imitating what they admire, and the lamentations and woes of the tragic hero and the unseemly buffoonery of the comedian are equally bad models for the citizens of a free and noble state. The poets must therefore be banished, unless, Plato adds, the lovers of poetry can persuade us of her innocence of the charges laid against her.—In the Laws the subject is treated more shortly, but a similar conclusion is reached. The poet is the rival of the legislator, who is striving to set the noblest of dramas in action (cp. Tim. 19 A); and he cannot be allowed to address the citizens in a manner which is not in accord with the institutions of the state. The magistrates must maintain a censorship of poetry, and see that the injunctions of the legislator are obeyed. Nor must any poet be licensed by them unless he be a man of years and good repute, and he must only sing of noble thoughts and deeds: it will not matter if his strains are a little inharmonious. (The

expulsion of the poets from Plato's commonwealth is not mentioned by Aristotle in the Politics. He may have thought that such a topic was one of the 'digressions' of which he complains (ii. 6, § 3); or the omission may be due to the fragmentary nature of his observations on education.)]

Poets, the, quoted on friendship, Lysis 212; fathers and authors of wisdom, *ib.* 214 A; their works learnt in schools, Protag. 326 A; Laws 7. 810 C, 811 A; talk about, commonplace, Protag. 347 C; sing by inspiration, Phaedr. 245 A, 265 B; Ion 534; Apol. 22 A; Laws 3. 682 A; 4. 719 B (cp. Meno 81 A, 99 D); first in the chain of persons who derive inspiration from the Muses, Ion 533 E, 535 E; winged and holy, *ib.* 534; various kinds of, *ibid.*; each good in his own kind only, *ibid.*; how distinguished from other makers, Symp. 205; create conceptions of wisdom and virtue, *ib.* 209 A; their children (i. e. works), *ib.* C (cp. Rep. I. 330 C); bear witness to the immortality of the soul, Meno 81; not wise, Apol. 22; speak in parables, Rep. I. 332 B (cp. 3. 413 B; 2 Alcib. 147 C); on justice, Rep. 2. 363, 364, 365 E; bad teachers of youth, *ib.* 377; 3. 391, 392, 408 C; 10. 600, 606 E, 607 B; Laws 10. 886 C, 890 A; 12. 941 B; must be restrained by certain rules, Rep. 2. 379 foll.; 3. 398 A (cp. Laws 2. 656, 660 A; 4. 719; 7. 817 D; 8. 829 D; 11. 936 A); banished from the state, Rep. 3. 398 A; 8. 568 B; 10. 595 foll., 605 A, 607 A (cp. Laws 7. 817); poets and tyrants, Rep. 8. 568; thrice removed from the truth, *ib.* 10. 596, 597, 598 E, 602 B, 605 C; imitators only, *ib.* 600 E; Tim. 19 (cp. Rep. 3. 393;



- Laws 4. 719 C); poets and painters, Rep. 10. 601, 603, 605; ought to be controlled by law, Laws 2. 656, 660, 661 C, 662 B; 4. 719 A; 7. 801, 802, 811, 817; 8. 829 D; degraded by the applause of the theatre, *ib.* 2. 659; their corrupt use of music, *ib.* 669, 670 E; 3. 700; need not know whether their imitations are good or not, *ib.* 2. 670 E; 4. 719 C; often attain truth, *ib.* 3. 682 A; when they make prayer for the state, must be careful that they ask only what is good, *ib.* 7. 801; to celebrate the victors in contests (in the Model City), *ib.* 8. 829; poets and legislators, *ib.* 9. 858; 12. 957, 964 D; poets and philosophers, *ib.* 12. 967 (cp. Rep. 10. 607);—‘the poets who were children and prophets of the gods’ (? Orpheus and Musaeus), Rep. 2. 366 A (cp. *ib.* 364 E);—comic and iambic poets, regulations respecting (in the Model City), Laws 11. 935; the comic poets the enemies of Socrates, Apol. 18, 19; Phaedo 70 B;—the lyric poets set to music in schools, Protag. 326 B;—tragic poets, all come to Athens, Laches 183.
- Poison, its action hindered by exercise, Phaedo 63 E; operation of, *ib.* 117; employed in the capture of fish, Laws 7. 824:—Poisoning, *ib.* 11. 932 E.
- Polemarchus, brother of Lysias, a student of philosophy, Phaedr. 257 B; the son of Cephalus, Rep. 1. 327 B; ‘the heir of the argument,’ *ib.* 331 C foll.; intervenes in the discussion, *ib.* 340 A; wishes Socrates to speak in detail about the community of women and children, *ib.* 5. 449:—meaning of the name, Crat. 394 C.
- Politician, the honest, always in danger of his life, Apol. 32 E;—Socrates the only politician, Gorg. 521 D:—Politicians, not wise, Meno 99; Apol. 21; politicians and philosophers, Euthyd. 305, 306; politicians and sophists, Statesm. 291, 303; politicians in democracies, Rep. 8. 564.
- Politics, = management of the voluntary, Statesm. 298 (cp. 292); = the art of managing men’s nature and habits, Laws 1. 650 B;—art of politics, Gorg. 464; Statesm. 304, 305; 1 Alcib. 107 foll., 124; its subdivisions, Gorg. 464;—Protagoras professes to teach, Protag. 319; Socrates denies that they can be taught, *ibid.*; do not require special knowledge, *ib.* 322, 323 (*but* cp. Laws 8. 846 D); politics and the good, Euthyd. 291, 292; limits of expediency in politics, Theaet. 172 A; want of science in, Statesm. 298 (cp. 292); politics and states, Laws 4. 715; the only art which may be practised by the citizen, *ib.* 8. 846 D; regards public, not private good, *ib.* 9. 875 A; nature and art in politics, *ib.* 10. 889; politics and art, 1 Alcib. 107 foll.;—politics of Athens, *ib.* 120:—political virtue may be taught, Protag. 324; political wisdom, not given by the Gods to man, *ib.* 321 E.
- Polity, the name, incorrectly applied to ordinary states, Laws 4. 712 B, 715 B; Crete and Sparta the only examples, *ib.* 713 A.
- Pollution of families, Laws 9. 872 E; incurred by murder, Euthyph. 4 B; Laws 8. 831 A; 9. 865, 869 E, 871 A, 873 A; by burial, Laws 12. 947 D.
- Pollux, Euthyd. 293 A.
- Polus, his schools of rhetoric, Phaedr. 267 B; a speaker in the dialogue *Gorgias*, Gorg. 461 B foll. – 481; his rudeness, *ib.* 448 A, 461 B; more of a rhetorician than a dialectician, *ib.* 448

- E; like a young colt apt to run away, *ib.* 463 E; Callicles and Polus, *ib.* 482 C; too modest, *ib.* 482 E, 487 A (cp. *ib.* 494 D).
- Polycleitus of Argos, the statuary, Protag. 311 C; the sons of, very inferior to their father, *ib.* 328 C.
- Polycrates, his wealth, Meno 90 A.
- Polydamas, the pancratiast, Rep. 1. 338 C.
- Polygnotus, son of Aglaophon, the painter, Ion 532 E; Gorg. 448 B.
- Polyhymnia, Symp. 187 E.
- Polytion, proverbial for his wealth, Eryx. 394, 400 C.
- Pontus (Black Sea), Laws 7. 804 E; voyage from, to Athens, for two drachmae, Gorg. 511 D.
- Poor, the, have no leisure to be ill, Rep. 3. 406 E; everywhere hostile to the rich, *ib.* 4. 423 A; 8. 551 E (cp. Laws 5. 736 A); very numerous in oligarchies, Rep. 8. 552 E; not despised by the rich in time of danger, *ib.* 556 C.
- Population, to be regulated, Rep. 5. 460; Laws 5. 740.
- Porch of the King Archon, Charm. 153 A; Euthyph. 2 A; Theaet. 210.
- Poros (Plenty), son of Metis (Discretion), Symp. 203 B, C.
- Poseidon, meaning of the name, Crat. 402 D, E; divided the empire with Zeus and Pluto, Gorg. 523 A; the god of Atlantis, Crit. 113 C; his sons by the nymph Clyto, *ibid.* foll.; temple of Poseidon and Clyto, *ib.* 116 C; grove of, *ib.* 117 B; the laws of Poseidon, *ib.* 119 C, D; 'the earth-shaker,' Hipp. Min. 370 C.
- 'Possessing' and 'having,' Theaet. 197.
- Possession, right given by, Laws 12. 954 C.
- Potidaea, battle of, Charm. 153 B; Socrates at, *ib.* A; Symp. 219 E, 221 A; Apol. 28 E.
- Pottery, Tim. 60 D; making of, one of the productive arts, Soph. 219 A; does not need the use of iron, Laws 3. 679 A.
- Poverty, prejudicial to the arts, Rep. 4. 421; poverty and crime, *ib.* 8. 552; poverty not a cause of contention among primitive mankind, Laws 3. 679; a motive of revolution, *ib.* 4. 708 C, 709 A (cp. 5. 736 A, 744 D); not the loss of property, but the increase of desires, *ib.* 5. 736 D; limit of, in the state, *ib.* 744 D; poverty and wealth, alike injurious, *ibid.*; 11. 919 B; poverty, not disgraceful at Athens, Menex. 238 E.
- Power, a good to the possessor, Gorg. 466; useless without knowledge, *ib.* 467; the struggle for power, Rep. 7. 520 C; Laws 4. 715 A; arbitrary power a temptation, Laws 3. 691; 4. 714 D, 716 A; 9. 875 B; 1 Alcib. 135; not often conjoined with temperance and justice, Laws 4. 711 E; meaning of the word, Hipp. Min. 366.
- Practice for war necessary, Laws 8. 830;—homicide in the practice for war, *ib.* 831 A.
- Praise, Protag. 337; Symp. 198 E;—'easy to praise the Athenians among the Athenians,' Menex. 235 D, 236 A;—praises of the Gods, Laws 7. 801 E.
- Pramnian wine, Ion 538 C; Rep. 3. 405 E, 408 A.
- Prayer, offered to the Gods at the beginning of every enterprise, Tim. 27; may be misdirected, Laws 3. 687; 7. 801 B; of the fool, dangerous, *ib.* 3. 688; the nature of prayer, 2 Alcib. 138 *et passim* (cp. Eryx. 398);—prayer of Timaeus, Crit. 106:—prayers, phraseology of, Crat. 400 E; at sacrifice, Laws 7. 801 A:—'Prayers' (Iliad ix), Crat. 428 C; Hipp. Min. 364 E.

- Preambles to laws, Laws 4. 719 E, 722 E, 723; 6. 772 E; 9. 880 A; 10. 887 A.
- Predication, Soph. 251; denial of, *ib.* 251, 252; universal, *ibid.*; partial, *ibid.*; compared to the combination of letters, *ib.* 253; to music, *ibid.*
- Pregnancy, Laws 7. 789 D, 792 E.
- Preludes to laws, Laws 4. 719 E, 722 E, 723; 6. 772 E; 9. 880 A; 10. 887 A.
- Pre-Socratic philosophy, Soph. 242 foll.
- Priam, sorrows of, Ion 535 B; Homer's delineation condemned, Rep. 3. 388 B.
- Prices in the Agora, Laws 11. 917; to be fixed by the magistrates, *ib.* 920.
- Priene, Bias of, Protag. 343 A.
- Priests, Statesm. 290; priests and priestesses (in the Model City), Laws 6. 759; 7. 799 B, 800 B; the priests to take care of foreign guests, *ib.* 12. 953;—the priests of Apollo and Helios, *ib.* 946, 947; to be members of the nocturnal council, *ib.* 951 E (cp. 961 A).
- Primary names, Crat. 424.
- Primitive man, Symp. 190; Tim. 22 D; Crit. 109 D; Statesm. 269–271, 274; Laws 3. 677, 680 foll. (cp. Man):—primitive forms of government, Laws 3. 690.
- Prince of Asia, Lysis 209 D (cp. 1 Alcib. 121 C).
- Principal and agent, law of, Laws 12. 954 A.
- Principles, importance of first, Crat. 436; Phaedo 107; principles of existence, Phil. 23.
- Prison-attendant of Socrates, Crito 43 A; Phaedo 63 D, 116 B.
- Prisoners in war, Rep. 5. 468–470.
- Prisons, Laws 10. 908.
- Private life to be controlled, Laws 6. 780 foll.; 7. 788 foll., 790 A:—private persons, not represented by the poets as suffering everlasting punishment, Gorg. 525 E:—private property not allowed to the guardians, Rep. 3. 416 E; 4. 420 A, 422 D; 5. 464 C; 8. 543 (*v. s. v.* Common [property]):—private rites forbidden, Laws 10. 909 D.
- Prize of valour, awarded to Alcibiades at Potidaea, Symp. 220 E;—prizes of valour, Rep. 5. 468; Laws 8. 829 C; 12. 943 C; of virtue, Laws 3. 689; 4. 715 C; 5. 729 D, 730 E; 8. 845 C; 11. 919 E, 935 C; 12. 946 B, 948 A, 952 D, 953 D, 961 A, 964 B.
- Probability, thought superior to truth in Rhetoric, Phaedr. 259 E, 267 A, 272 E, 273; Tisias' definition of, *ib.* 273; arguments from, not to be trusted, Phaedo 92; Theaet. 162 E;—the language of probability, Tim. 29 E, 30 B, 48 E, 55 C, 59 C, 72 E.
- Probation, states of, in the future life, Phaedr. 248.
- Procles, king of Lacedaemon, Laws 3. 683 D.
- Procuresses, Theaet. 150 A.
- Prodicus of Ceos, a person in the dialogue *Protagoras*, Protag. 314 C, 315 D, etc.; a friend of Damon, Laches 197 D; description of, Protag. 315 C; lodged in the house of Callias, *ib.* D; Socrates' opinion of, *ib.* E; his powerful voice, *ib.* 316 A; begs Socrates and Protagoras to continue the discussion, *ib.* 337; a countryman of Simonides, *ib.* 339 E; 'has a more than human wisdom,' *ib.* 340 E (cp. Theaet. 151 B); corrects Socrates for using *δεδνδς* as a term of praise, Protag. 341 A; on the Cean Dialect, *ib.* B; describes the professional speech-makers as a class between philosophers and statesmen, Euthyd. 305 C; his 'fifty drachma' and 'single drachma' courses, Crat. 384 B; his rule of art, Phaedr. 267 B; his dis-



- course on Heracles, Symp. 177 B; a tutor of Socrates, Meno 96 D; goes the round of the cities, Apol. 19 E (cp. Rep. 10. 600 C); receives pupils from Socrates, Theaet. 151 B; beaten in argument by an impertinent youth, Eryx. 397 foll.;—his distinctions of words, Charm. 163 D; Laches 197 D; Protag. 337 A, 340 A, 358 A, D; Euthyd. 277 E; Meno 75 E.
- Produce, division of, in Crete, Laws 8. 847 E; in the Model City, *ib.* 848 A; register of, *ib.* 12. 955 D.
- Production, division of, Soph. 265, 266; Statesm. 261.
- Prometheus, myth of, Protag. 320 D–321 E; commanded by Zeus to deprive men of the foreknowledge of death, Gorg. 523 D; fire given by, Statesm. 274 C; Phil. 16 C.
- Proper names, etymology of, Crat. 392.
- Property, to be common, Rep. 3. 416 E; 4. 420 A, 422 D; 5. 464 C; 8. 543; community of property abandoned in the second-best state, Laws 5. 740 A:—restrictions on the disposition of property, Rep. 8. 556 A; Laws 11. 923; classes of property, Statesm. 287–289; difficulty of regulating, Laws 3. 684 E; 5. 736 D; property the basis of the state, *ib.* 5. 736 E; registered in the Model City, *ib.* 745 A; 6. 754 E; 8. 850 A; 9. 855 B; 11. 914 C; property in slaves, *ib.* 6. 776 C; principle of property, *ib.* 11. 913; property left behind or in dispute, *ib.* 914–916; valuation of property, *ib.* 12. 955 D:—property qualifications in oligarchies, Rep. 8. 551 B; in the old Athenian state, Laws 3. 698 B; in the Model City, *ib.* 5. 744.
- Proportion, akin to truth, Rep. 6. 486 E; in the universe, Tim. 32; between body and soul, *ib.* 87; in sculpture and painting, Soph. 235 E; an element in the Good, Phil. 64 foll.
- Propositions, Crat. 385.
- Prophecy, the gift of, possessed by the soul, Phaedr. 242 C; a kind of madness, *ib.* 244 A; Tim. 71 E;—prophecy of Socrates, Apol. 39 C;—mendicant prophets, Rep. 2. 364 B;—prophetic art in Homer, Ion 538 E. Cp. Diviners.
- Prose writers on justice, Rep. 2. 364 A;—compositions, Laws 7. 810; 12. 957 D.
- Prosecution for murder, Euthyph. 4. Cp. Homicide.
- Prosphaltian deme, Crat. 396 D.
- Prosperity, creates jealousy, Menex. 242 A.
- Protagoras of Abdera, Protag. 309 B; excitement on his arrival at Athens, *ib.* 310 B, C, D; will teach for money, *ib.* 310 E (cp. Theaet. 161 D); stays at the house of Callias, Protag. 311 A, 314 C; a sophist, *ib.* 311 E; like Orpheus, *ib.* 315 B; desires a display, *ib.* 317 C; differs from other sophists—teaches politics, etc., *ib.* 318 D, E; his myth, *ib.* 320 D foll.; his views of punishment, *ib.* 324 A foll.; his scale of payment, *ib.* 328 B; displeased with the course of the argument, *ib.* 333 E; he objects to Socrates' method, *ib.* 338 A, 348 A; his thesis that 'Man is the measure of all things,' Crat. 386 A foll.; Theaet. 152 A, 160 D, 161, 162 C, 164 D (the 'Protagorean fable'), 166 D, 168, 170 E, 171 C, 178 B, 183 B (cp. Laws 4. 716 D); his rules of correctness, Phaedr. 267 D; his fame as a teacher, Meno 91 D, E; Rep. 10. 600 C; his theories in regard to perception, Theaet. 151 E foll., 170 (cp. Per-



- ception); his work on Truth, Theaet. 152 C, 161, 166 A, 167, 168 C, 171 C (cp. Crat. 391 C); a wonderfully wise man, Theaet. 152 C; his measure applies to gods as well as men, *ib.* 162 C; not applicable to the future, *ib.* 178 B, E; more truly applies to God than to man, Laws 4. 716 D;—his conventional theory of justice, Theaet. 172 A, 177 C; his skill in rhetoric, *ib.* 178 E; his precepts about wrestling, Soph. 232 D;—his disciples deny the possibility of falsehood, Euthyd. 286 (cp. Theaet. 152 A).
- Protarchus, a person in the dialogue *Philebus*, Phil. 11 A–18 B; son of Callias, *ib.* 19 B; continues the conversation, *ib.* 21 A; a hearer of Gorgias, *ib.* 58 A.
- Proteus, Euthyph. 15 D; the Egyptian wizard, Euthyd. 288 B; Ion compared to, Ion 541 E; not to be slandered, Rep. 2. 381 D.
- Proverbs:—‘Know thyself,’ Charm. 164 D foll.; Protag. 343 B; Phaedr. 229 E; Phil. 48 C; Laws 11. 923 A; 1 Alcib. 124 A, 129 A, 132 C; ‘nothing too much,’ Charm. 165 A; Protag. 343 B; Phil. 45 E; ‘give a pledge and evil is nigh at hand,’ Charm. 165 A; τῷ Σωτήρι τὸ τρίτον (the third or lucky time), *ib.* 167 B; Rep. 9. 583 B; ‘friends have all things in common,’ Lysis 207 C; Rep. 5. 449 C; Laws 5. 739 (cp. Crit. 112 E); ‘the beautiful is the friend,’ Lysis 216; ‘we have gained but a dream’ (ὄναρ πεπλουτηκέναι), *ib.* 218 C; Carian (proverbial), Laches 187 B; Euthyd. 285 B; ‘break the large vessel in learning to make pots,’ Laches 187 B; Gorg. 514 E; ‘a thing which every pig would know,’ Laches 196 D; Διὸς Κόρινθος (‘why here is iteration’), Euthyd. 292 E; οὐ λίνον λίνω σνάπτεις (‘you answer beside the point’), *ib.* 295 C; ‘putting on the lion’s skin,’ Crat. 411 A; ‘over the barriers,’ *ib.* 414 B; Gorg. 494 C (cp. Laws 8. 847 A); ‘excuses will not serve,’ Crat. 421 D; Laws 6. 751 D; ‘birds of a feather’ (‘like to like’), Phaedr. 240 B; Symp. 195 B; Gorg. 510 B; Rep. 1. 329 A; 4. 425 C; Laws 8. 837 A; ‘in the turning of an oyster shell,’ Phaedr. 241 B; ‘sweet elbow’ (= ‘sour grapes’), *ib.* 257 E; ‘wolf may claim a hearing,’ *ib.* 272 D; ‘writing in water,’ *ib.* 276 C; ‘to the feasts of lesser men,’ etc., Symp. 174 B; ‘at lovers’ perjuries,’ *ib.* 183 B; Phil. 65 C; ‘in vino veritas,’ Symp. 217 E; ‘invulnerable as Ajax,’ *ib.* 219 D; ‘fools learn by experience,’ *ib.* 222 B; ‘many are the thyrsus-bearers, but few the initiated,’ Phaedo 69 D; τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν (‘the second best’), *ib.* 99 D; ‘ready to start at one’s own shadow,’ *ib.* 101 D; the art of Glaucus, *ib.* 108 D; ‘the wise man is late for a fray,’ etc., Gorg. 447 A; ‘the good may be repeated twice or thrice,’ *ib.* 498 E; Phil. 60 A; Laws 6. 754 C; 12. 956 E; ‘make the best of a bad business,’ Gorg. 499 C; Mysian (proverbial), *ib.* 521 B; Theaet. 209 B; ‘shave a lion,’ Rep. 1. 341 C; ‘let brother help brother,’ *ib.* 2. 362 D; ‘wolf and flock,’ *ib.* 3. 415 D; ‘one great thing,’ *ib.* 4. 423 E; ‘hard is the good,’ *ib.* 435 C; ‘the useful is the noble,’ *ib.* 457 B; ‘the wise must go to the doors of the rich,’ *ib.* 6. 489 B (cp. 2. 364 B; Laws 12. 953 C); ‘what is more than human,’ Rep. 6. 492 E; ‘the necessity of Diomedes,’ *ib.* 493 D; ‘the she-dog as good as her mistress,’ *ib.* 8. 563 D; ‘out of the smoke into the fire,’ *ib.* 569 B; ‘does not come within a thousand miles,’

- (οὐδ' ἵκταρ βάλλει), *ib.* 9. 575 D; 'faint heart never took a city,' Crit. 108 B; Soph. 261 B; 'your will is my will,' Theaet. 162 B; 'caught in a well,' *ib.* 165 B; *χόρες θαλάσσης* (a trifle), *ib.* 173 E; 'the experiment will show,' *ib.* 200 E; 'when every way is blocked,' Soph. 231 C; 'what any blind man could see,' *ib.* 241 E; 'too much haste too little speed,' Statesm. 264 B; 'land ahead,' Phil. 29 A; 'suicidal victory' (*Καθμεία νίκη*), Laws 1. 641 C; 'second childhood,' *ib.* 646 A; 'they know neither how to read nor swim,' *ib.* 3. 689 D; 'fall off an ass,' *ib.* 701 D; 'make a second beginning,' *ib.* 4. 723 D; 'every man is his own best friend,' *ib.* 5. 731 E; 'not even God can fight against necessity,' *ib.* 741 A; 7. 818 E; 'no bad man can ever know,' *ib.* 5. 741 E; 'equality makes friendship,' *ib.* 757 A; 8. 837 A (cp. 'birds of a feather'); 'well begun is half done,' *ib.* 6. 753 E; 'combing wool into the fire,' *ib.* 780 E; 'move not the immovable,' *ib.* 8. 843 A; 12. 913; 'hard to fight against two antagonists,' *ib.* 11. 919 B (cp. Euthyd. 297 C; Phaedo 89 C); *ἐν κοινῷ καὶ μέσῳ κείσθαι*, Laws 12. 968 E; 'thrice six or thrice ace,' *ibid.*; 'neither rejoicing too much nor grieving too much,' Menex. 248 A; 'boiling a stone,' Eryx. 405 C.
- Proxeni, Laws 1. 642:—Meno the hereditary friend of the Great King, Meno 78 D.
- Prytaneum, maintenance in, Apol. 36 E:—Socrates a Prytanis, *ib.* 32 B; Gorg. 473 E;—the Prytanen (in the Model City), Laws 6. 755 E, 758, 766 B; to take care of strangers who come on public business, *ib.* 12. 953 C.
- Public, the, the great Sophist, Rep. 6. 492 A; compared to a beast, *ib.* 6. 493; cannot be philosophic, *ib.* 494 (cp. Statesm. 292 D);—admitted to the law courts, Laws 6. 767 E (cp. Many, Multitude):—Public executioner (at Athens), Rep. 4. 439 E; (in the Model City), Laws 9. 872 B, 873 A:—public games, *ib.* 12. 950 E:—public men should improve the citizens, Gorg. 515; neglect their own children, Laches 179 C, 180 A; Protag. 320 A, 326 E; Meno 93, 94; 1 Alcib. 118.
- Punishment, nature and office of, Protag. 323 D–324 B; Gorg. 476 foll., 525 A; Statesm. 308 E; Laws 5. 735 E; 9. 854 E, 863 A; 11. 934 A; 12. 944 D, 964 C (cp. Gorg. 480, 507 E, 525 A, 527 C; Rep. 2. 380 A); paradox concerning, Gorg. 472, 473; punishment compared to medicine, *ib.* 479; Laws 5. 735 E; the true punishment = likeness to evil, Laws 5. 728 (cp. Theaet. 176 E); the punishment of the father not to be visited on the children, Laws 9. 855 A, 856 D; principles of punishment, *ib.* 860:—punishment of death, *see* Death:—punishment of slaves, Laws 7. 777 E, 793 E (cp. Slaves):—punishment of the wicked, Phaedr. 249 A; Meno 81 B; Phaedo 107 E, 114; Gorg. 523, 525; Rep. 2. 363; 10. 614; Theaet. 176; Laws 9. 870 E, 880 E; 10. 905 A; 12. 959 A (cp. Hades):—punishments good when just, Gorg. 470 (cp. Statesm. 293). Cp. Retribution.
- Puppets, the moral tale of the, Laws 1. 644 E; 7. 803;—puppet shows, Rep. 7. 514; Laws 2. 658.
- Purgation, Tim. 89;—purgation of mythological error (Socrates in imitation of Stesichorus), Phaedr. 243 A (cp. Crat. 396 E);—purgation of the luxurious state, Rep. 3. 399 E;—of the city by the tyrant,

- ib.* 8. 567 D;—of the soul by the tyrannical man, *ib.* 573 A;—of the state by the legislator, Laws 5. 735 D;—of sin in the other world, *see* Hades.
- Purification, art of, Soph. 226, 230; divisions of, *ib.* 226, 227;—purification of the soul by philosophy after death, Phaedo 67 B, 82 D; of a city, Laws 5. 735, 736; in dances, *ib.* 7. 815 C; for homicide, *ib.* 8. 831 A; 9. 865, 868, 869 A, E, 871 B; 11. 916 C; for contact with the striker of a parent, *ib.* 9. 881.
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- Soul, the, has the gift of prophecy, Phaedr. 242 C (cp. Tim. 71 E); knowledge of, the basis of rhetoric, Phaedr. 271, 273, 277; has ends and excellences, Rep. 1. 353 D; beauty in the soul, *ib.* 3. 401; conversion of the soul from darkness to light, *ib.* 7. 518, 521 (cp. Laws 12. 957 E); the soul requires the aid of calculation and intelligence in order to interpret the intimations of sense, Rep. 7. 523, 524; 10. 602; has more truth and essence than the body, *ib.* 9. 585 D; better in motion than at rest, Theaet. 153 B; in relation to the senses, *ib.* 184; perceives universals by a faculty of her own, *ib.* 185; merchandise of the soul, Soph. 224; food of, *ibid.*; evil in, *ib.* 227, 228; false opinion



in, Statesm. 278; memory and perception in the soul, Phil. 34, 38; ignorance in, Laws 3. 689; a precious possession, *ib.* 5. 726, 727; honour of, *ibid.*; pleasure and the soul, *ibid.*; the soul must attain harmony, *ib.* 729; the most honourable part of man, *ib.* 731 D, 743 D; passion in the soul, *ib.* 9. 863; the soul the origin of all things, *ib.* 10. 892 A, 895 C, 899; influence of the soul on character, *ib.* 904; soul and mind, *ib.* 12. 961; soul and man, 1 Alcib. 130; the soul requires the knowledge of the best, 2 Alcib. 147 A:—the soul self-moved, Phaedr. 245 E; Laws 10. 896; 12. 966 E; uncompounded and unchanging, Phaedo 78; origin of the soul, Phil. 30; wrongly supposed by some to be formed out of the four elements, Laws 10. 891; = life, *ib.* 895 (cp. Phaedo 71); = the cause of moral qualities, Laws 10. 896; = the principle of change, *ib.* 904:—better and worse principles in the soul, Rep. 4. 431; the soul divided into reason, spirit, appetite, *ib.* 435–442; 6. 504 A; 8. 550 A; 9. 571, 580 E, 581; Tim. 69 E–72, 89 E (cp. Laws 9. 863); faculties of the soul, Rep. 6. 511 E; 7. 533 E (cp. Theaet. 185 D, E); oppositions in the soul, Rep. 10. 603 D; Soph. 228 A; Laws 10. 896 D:—two souls, a good and evil, Laws 10. 896 E:—disease in the soul, worse than disease in the body, Gorg. 479; the lame soul, Rep. 3. 402; 7. 535; Tim. 44 (cp. Tim. 87 E; Soph. 228); the soul marred by meanness, Rep. 6. 495 E (cp. Gorg. 524 E); diseases of the soul, Tim. 86; Soph. 228 E:—immortality of the soul, Phaedr. 245; Meno 81, 86; Phaedo 86, 87, 92 foll., 105 foll.; Rep. 10. 608 foll. (cp. 6. 498 C); Tim.

41, 43, 69; Laws 12. 959 B, 967 E; doubted, Phaedo 70; proved from the nature of opposites, *ib.* 71, 103 foll.; is a process of revival or successive birth, *ib.* 71 E, 72; the argument of recollection, *ib.* 73–76 (cp. Recollection); immortality dependent on existence of general ideas, *ib.* 76; immortality *ex parte post*, *ib.* 77 foll.; the soul unchangeable, and therefore akin to the divine and eternal, *ib.* 79 foll.; a harmony and so perishable (Simmias), *ib.* 86; figure of the weaver's coat, *ib.* 87; the soul *not* like a harmony, because it does not admit of degrees, *ib.* 93; number of souls does not increase, Rep. 10. 611 A; the soul not eternal but indestructible, Laws 10. 904 A:—condition of the soul after death, Crat. 403; Phaedr. 249; Phaedo 107, 108, 113, 114; Gorg. 523–525; Rep. 10. 614 foll.; Laws 10. 904 D; 12. 959;—transmigration of souls, Phaedr. 248, 249; Meno 81 foll.; Phaedo 70, 81; Rep. 10. 617; Tim. 42, 91 D foll.; Laws 10. 903 E, 904 E:—the soul incorporate in the body, Phaedr. 246 C; Soph. 247; must see true being before it can take a human form, Phaedr. 248–250; imprisoned or entombed in the body, *ib.* 250; Phaedo 81, 82, 83 (cp. Crat. 400 C, 403 E); opposition of soul and body, Phaedo 80, 94; the soul superior and prior to the body, *ibid.*, *ibid.*; Tim. 34 E; Laws 10. 892 A, 896; 12. 959 A, 966 E, 967 B, E; 1 Alcib. 130 A; when impure does not wholly lose the corporal element, Phaedo 81 foll. (cp. Rep. 10. 611); the fair soul in the fair body, Rep. 3. 402 D; Tim. 87 E; sympathy of soul and body, Rep. 5. 462 D, 464 B; symmetry of soul and body, Tim. 87 E; the connexion of soul and body not

better than the dissolution of them, Laws 8. 828 E:—the soul compared to a charioteer and pair of horses, Phaedr. 246 foll.; to a vessel, Gorg. 493; to a many-headed monster, Rep. 9. 588; to the images of the sea-god Glaucus, *ib.* 10. 611:—like the eye, *ib.* 6. 508; 7. 518:—like a book, in which the feelings and perceptions are written, Phil. 38 E:—harmony of the soul, produced by temperance, Rep. 4. 430, 442, 443 (cp. 9. 591 D; Laws 2. 653 B):—eye of the soul, Phaedr. 99 E; Rep. 7. 518 D, 527 E, 533 D, 540 A:—the soul's wings, Phaedr. 251:—the soul's horses, *ib.* 253 D foll.:—the soul's painter, Phil. 39:—five forms of the state and soul, Rep. 4. 445; 5. 449; 9. 577:—procession of the souls, Phaedr. 247; order of, *ib.* 248:—creative souls, Symp. 209:—the world-soul, Tim. 30 B, 34 E; soul and universe, *ib.* 90 (cp. Phil. 30; Laws 10. 896–898):—souls of the sun and stars, Tim. 41; Laws 10. 899; 12. 967 A.

Soul. [*The psychology of Plato, like the rest of his philosophical teaching, is not to be regarded as a formal system to which he always adhered. The progress of thought in his mind is reflected in the Dialogues, while their dramatic form and tentative character cause some difficulty in distinguishing the opinions which he himself would have maintained. Allowing for this element of uncertainty, his conclusions may be summed up as follows:—*(1) *The soul is prior to the body, both in creation and in order of thought, although in our 'random way of talking' we sometimes invert the relation between them (Tim. 34 E). The body is intended by nature to be its servant,*

*and to listen to its commands and admonitions. It is immaterial, not made, 'as the physical philosophers say,' after the four elements and by their aid (Laws 10. 891); and, being akin to the divine, it is ever desirous to escape from the body in which it is 'encaged' or 'entombed,' and to go to its home with God.—*(2) *'There are two souls,' Plato says in the Laws, 'a good and an evil.' Such a dualism is not found elsewhere in his writings, and it is not easy to apprehend his precise meaning. But he probably wishes in this manner to account for the existence of evil in the world, just as in the Timaeus he explains the wickedness of man by the hypothesis of a 'mortal soul' which is the work of the inferior Gods, and in which the passions and desires have their seat (see s. v. God).—*(3) *The division of the soul into three elements, reason, spirit, appetite, is first clearly stated in the Republic, where it is made the means of classifying the different forms of government. Virtue is the harmony or accord of these elements, when the dictates of reason are enforced by passion against the appetites, while vice is the anarchy or discord of the soul when passion and appetite join in rebellion against reason.—*(4) *Regarded from the intellectual side the soul may be analyzed into four faculties, reason, understanding, faith, knowledge of shadows. They correspond to the four divisions of knowledge, two for intellect and two for opinion; and thus arises the Platonic 'proportion,' being : becoming : : intellect : opinion, and science : belief : : understanding : knowledge of shadows. These divisions are partly real, partly formed by*

a logical process, which, as in so many distinctions of ancient philosophers, has outrun fact, and are further explained by the allegory of the cave (Rep. Book vii).—(5) The pre-existence of the soul is especially dwelt upon in the *Meno*, *Phaedo*, and *Phaedrus*, in the two former of which the 'remembrance of a previous existence' (ἀνάμνησις) is made a proof of immortality (*Meno* 86; *Phaedo* 73). It is apparently alluded to in the myth of *Er* (Rep. 10. 621 A), where we are told that 'the pilgrims drank the waters of Unmindfulness; the foolish took too deep a draught, but the wise were more moderate.' In the later dialogues it is nowhere mentioned.—(6) The immortality of the soul is chiefly discussed in the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*, but it occupies a considerable place in many of Plato's other writings. In the *Phaedo* the two Thebans, *Simmi* and *Cebes*, admit that the soul has pre-existence, but doubt that it is immortal. *Simmi* affirms that the soul and the body are related as the harmony is to the lyre: the harmony is invisible and incorporeal, yet it does not survive the lyre, which is visible and corporeal. *Cebes* fears that the soul, although she may outlive many bodies, may be worn out in the end, like a garment, which, after belonging to many owners, at last perishes and decays. Socrates denies the assumption that the soul is a harmony: for (1) it is a cause, not an effect: (2) it leads the body, but harmony follows the instrument: (3) it does not admit of degrees: (4) it allows of discord, as when reason is arrayed against passion. Against *Cebes* he urges the

doctrine of the exclusion of opposites. Life, which is the essential attribute of the soul, excludes death, and therefore death cannot be predicated of the soul.—In the *Republic* (10. 608), *Glauc*on hears with amazement Socrates' confident belief in immortality, although a previous allusion to another state of existence has fallen unheeded (6. 498 D); and in earlier parts of the discussion (e. g. 2. 362; 3. 386) the censure which is passed on the common representations of *Hades* implies in itself some belief in a future life. The argument by which Socrates seeks to prove the immortality of the soul is of a purely verbal character:—All things which perish are destroyed by some inherent evil, but the soul is not destroyed by sin, which is the evil proper to her, and must therefore be immortal.—In the *Phaedrus* and the *Laws* the soul is said to be self-moved and a cause of motion; and upon this assertion the proof of immortality is made to rest. But there is a curious passage in the *Laws* (10. 904 B), which is not apparently in accord with the opinions which Plato elsewhere maintains. 'The King [i. e. the Creator] . . . saw that the soul and body, although not, like the Gods whom the laws recognize, eternal, were indestructible; for if either of them had been destroyed, there would have been no generation of living beings.'—(7) The condition of the soul after death is described by Plato in several dialogues under the form of myths, for which he is careful not to demand entire credence. These representations agree in their main features. The soul on her release from the body goes to give account of herself



- before the judgment seat. The righteous are sent to the Isles of the Blessed; the wicked go to Tartarus, and there suffer punishment, not hopeless or eternal, but duly proportioned to their offences. (In the *Phaedo* (113 E) and the *Gorgias* (525), however, a few great sinners, chiefly kings and potentates, are kept in Hades as a salutary terror to others.) When the penalty has been paid, the soul must choose a new life: the responsibility of choice rests on herself, and if she has learnt wisdom in her travail she secures a better lot; but if she persists in folly and chooses unwisely, she takes an inferior life or even assumes the form of some lower animal. There is also a limit to the blessedness of the righteous, and when the appointed time comes, they too must make a new choice. This at least is Plato's usual statement (cp. *Phaedr.* 249; *Rep.* 10. 619 C); but in the *Phaedo*, Socrates, who is so soon to die, consoles himself with the thought that the soul of the philosopher will live after death 'altogether without the body' (114 C).—(8) The doctrine of the transmigration of souls was probably adopted by Plato because it agreed, or could be made to agree, with the conviction which he everywhere expresses of the remedial nature of punishment. It was in all likelihood derived by him from Oriental sources, but through Pythagorean channels.]
- Sounds, *Tim.* 80 A;—in music, *Rep.* 7. 531 A; *Phil.* 17.
- Sous (Rush), *Crat.* 412 B.
- Space, *Tim.* 52.
- Sparta, proud, *Laws* 6. 753 A; walls not approved of there, *ib.* 778 D; licence of women at, *ib.* 7. 806 C (cp. 1. 637 C):—Spartan rhetoric, *Phaedr.* 260 E:—Spartans call men 'divine,' *Meno* 99 D; drunkenness not allowed among them, *Laws* 1. 637 A. Cp. *Lacedaemon*.
- Speaking, first rule of, *Phaedr.* 260.
- Species, *Statesm.* 262, 286 E; *Phil.* 17;—species and genera not rightly distinguished by the ancients, *Soph.* 267 D (cp. *Classes*).
- Spectator, the, last in the chain of persons who derive inspiration from the Muses, *Ion* 533 E, 535 E; unconsciously influenced by what he sees and hears, *Rep.* 10. 605, 606; *Laws* 2. 656 A, 659 C;—the philosopher the spectator of all time and existence, *Rep.* 6. 486 A; *Theaet.* 173 E;—spectators used to determine the victors by show of hands, *Laws* 2. 659 B; obliged to keep silence in ancient Athens, *ib.* 3. 700:—travelling spectators (in the Model City), *ib.* 12. 951, 952, 961 A.
- Speech, *Tim.* 47, 75 E; speech and thought, *Soph.* 263 (cp. *Language, Names*):—liberty of speech among the ancient Persians, *Laws* 3. 694 A; at Athens, *Protag.* 319 A; *Gorg.* 461 E.
- Speech, of Lysias, *Phaedr.* 231–234; criticized, *ib.* 235 foll., 263, 264;—of Socrates, *ib.* 237–241; of Socrates again, *ib.* 244–257;—speech-writing of politicians, *ib.* 258;—speeches of Socrates and Lysias compared, *ib.* 262 foll.;—speeches ought to be duly arranged, *ib.* 264; motive of the good man in, *ib.* 273 D; written speeches condemned, *ib.* 275; the true art of writing speeches, *ib.* 276; the place of writing in speeches, *ib.* 277 E:—Speech of Phaedrus, *Symp.* 178–180; of Pausanias, *ib.* 180–185; of Eryximachus, *ib.* 186–188; of Aristophanes, *ib.*



- 189-193; of Agathon, *ib.* 195-198; of Socrates, *ib.* 201-212; of Alcibiades, *ib.* 214-222 (cp. Love):—professional composers of speeches, Euthyd. 305:—Speechmaking, compared to conversation, like the beating of brazen pots, Protag. 329 A (cp. Phaedr. 275 E); art of, a kind of enchantment, Euthyd. 290 A. Cp. Rhetoric, Writing.
- Spendthrifts, in Greek states, Rep. 8. 564.
- Spercheius, the river god, Rep. 3. 391 B.
- Sphagia, Spartans at, Menex. 242 C.
- Sphettus, Lysanias of, Apol. 33 E.
- Spirit, must be combined with gentleness in the guardians, Rep. 2. 376; 3. 410; 6. 503; Tim. 18 A (cp. Laws 5. 731 B); characteristic of northern nations, Rep. 4. 435 E; found in quite young children, *ib.* 441 A (cp. Laws 12. 963 E):—the spirited (or passionate) element in the soul, Rep. 4. 440 foll.; 6. 504 A; 8. 550 A; 9. 572 A, 580 E; Tim. 70 A, 89 E; Laws 9. 863 A; must be subject to the rational part, Rep. 4. 441 E; Tim. 30 C, 70 A, 89 D; predominant in the timocratic state and man, Rep. 8. 548, 550 B; characterized by ambition, *ib.* 9. 581 B; its pleasures, *ib.* 586 D; the favourite object of the poet's imitation, *ib.* 10. 604, 605; its seat, Tim. 70 A.
- Spleen, the, Tim. 72 C.
- Square, the, *see* Mathematics.
- Stars, motions of the, Rep. 7. 529, 530; 10. 616 E; Tim. 40 C; Laws 7. 821, 822; 12. 966 E; seven stars created (sun, moon, and planets), Tim. 38; the fixed stars, *ib.* 40: stars and souls, *ib.* 41; Laws 10. 899; 12. 967 A; orbits of the stars, Laws 7. 821, 822.
- Stasinus quoted, Euthyph. 12 B.
- State, the, distinguished from the act, Euthyph. 10:—intermediate states, Protag. 346 D; Euthyd. 306; Rep. 9. 583; Phil. 33, 36, 43.
- State, the, existence of, depends on virtue, Protag. 322, 325, 326, 327 (cp. 1 Alcib. 134); relation of, to the individual, Rep. 2. 368; 4. 434, 441; 5. 462; 8. 544; 9. 577 B; Laws 3. 689; 5. 739; 8. 828 E; 9. 875, 877 C; 11. 923, 925 E, 930 B; origin of, Rep. 2. 369 foll.; Laws 3. 678 foll.; should be in unity, Rep. 4. 422; 5. 463 (cp. Laws 5. 739; 8. 832 C); place of the virtues in, Rep. 4. 428 foll.; virtue of state and individual, *ib.* 441; 6. 498 E; family life in, *ib.* 5. 449; Laws 5. 740; compared to a household, Statesm. 259; designed, not for war, but for peace, Laws 1. 625 foll.; ought to be in a mean between poverty and wealth, *ib.* 3. 679 B; 5. 742 E, 744; importance of friendship in, *ib.* 3. 694 A; 5. 738 D, 743 C; 6. 759 B, 771 E (cp. 1 Alcib. 126); honours in, must be given to merit, Laws 3. 696 E; 4. 707 A, 715; 5. 738 E, 743; 6. 757; 11. 921 E; requires friendship and freedom for its preservation, *ib.* 3. 694 B, 697 D, 701 D; must give the last place to wealth, *ib.* 697 C; 5. 743 E (cp. 4. 705 A; 7. 801 B; 9. 870 A, B); cannot be saved unless the law is above the rulers, *ib.* 4. 715 D; is based on a right regulation of property, *ib.* 5. 736 E; must be self-sufficient, *ib.* 737 D; is not great by reason of wealth or empire, *ib.* 742 C; must have good rulers as well as good laws, *ib.* 6. 751; 'is sailing on a sea of politics,' *ib.* 758 A (cp. Statesm. 302 A; Laws 12. 945 C); cannot be happy without proper regulation of women, Laws 6. 781 B; 7. 805; is an imitation of the best and noblest life, *ib.* 7. 817 B; must be capable of self-defence,

*ib.* 8. 829, 830 (cp. 7. 814 A); is preserved by friendship and agreement among the citizens, 1 Alcib. 126; must have the knowledge of the best, 2 Alcib. 145;—the luxurious state, Rep. 2. 372 D foll.;—[the best state] classes in, must be kept distinct, *ib.* 2. 374; 3. 397 E, 415 A; 4. 421, 433 A, 434, 441 E, 443; 5. 453 (cp. 8. 552 A; Laws 8. 846 E); the rulers must be philosophers, Rep. 2. 376; 5. 473; 6. 484, 497 foll., 501, 503 B; 7. 520, 521, 525 B, 540; 8. 543 (cp. Rulers); will be free from quarrels and lawsuits, *ib.* 2. 378; 5. 464, 465; the government must have the monopoly of lying, *ib.* 2. 382; 3. 389 A, 414 C; 5. 459 D (cp. Laws 2. 663 E); the poets to be banished, Rep. 3. 398 A; 8. 568 B; 10. 595 foll., 605 A, 607 A (cp. Laws 7. 817); the older must bear rule, the younger obey, Rep. 3. 412; Laws 3. 690 A; 4. 714 E; women, children, and goods to be common, Rep. 3. 416; 5. 450 E, 457 foll., 462, 464; 8. 543 A; Tim. 18 (cp. Laws 5. 739; 7. 807 B); must be happy as a whole, Rep. 4. 420; 5. 466 A; 7. 519 E; will easily master other states in war, *ib.* 4. 422; must be of a size which is not inconsistent with unity, *ib.* 423 (cp. Laws 5. 737); composed of three classes, traders, auxiliaries, counsellors, Rep. 4. 441 A; may be either a monarchy or an aristocracy, *ib.* 445 C (cp. 9. 576 D); will form one family, *ib.* 5. 463 (cp. Statesm. 259); is it possible? Rep. 5. 471, 473; 6. 499; 7. 540 (cp. 7. 520; Laws 4. 711 E; 5. 739; 12. 968 A); framed after the heavenly pattern, Rep. 6. 500 E; 7. 540 A; 9. 592; how to be commenced, *ib.* 6. 501; 7. 540; manner of its decline, *ib.* 8. 546 (cp. Crit. 120); briefly re-de-

scribed, Tim. 17, 18;—the best state that in which the rulers least desire office, Rep. 7. 520, 521; in which the rulers regard, not the wishes, but the true interests of the citizens, Statesm. 293–301, 303 A; will be most easily produced out of a tyranny, Laws 4. 709 E (cp. 5. 739 A); is that which is most completely one, *ib.* 5. 739;—the ‘second-best’ state, Laws 5. 739; 7. 807 B;—the four imperfect forms of states, Rep. 4. 445 B; 8. 544; Statesm. 291 foll., 301 foll. (cp. Government, forms of); succession of states, Rep. 8. 545 foll.; causes of revolution in states, Laws 4. 709 A; 5. 744 D; 6. 757 A; 12. 945 D; how they may be preserved from change, *ib.* 12. 960 foll.;—existing states, not one but many, Rep. 4. 423 A; nearly all corrupt, *ib.* 6. 496; 7. 519, 520; 9. 592 (cp. Laws 12. 950 A); based upon wrong principles, Laws 12. 962 D;—states can only perish by the fault of their rulers, *ib.* 3. 683 E; are ruined by ignorance, *ib.* 688 E; goodness of, to be estimated by the situation of the country and the order of the laws, *ib.* 4. 707 D; states in which the laws regard the interest of particular classes, not politics but parties, *ib.* 715 B; ‘states of discord,’ *ib.* 8. 832 C; even bad states are not without good men, *ib.* 12. 951 B; states are well administered in which individuals do their own work, 1 Alcib. 127;—state offences, Laws 6. 768; 9. 856.

State. [Plato has left us in the *Republic* and the *Laws* two companion pictures of the ‘best’ and the ‘second-best’ state. The one is confessedly an ideal, which will only be accepted, if ever, when men see the true philosopher

ruling the state in righteousness and justice: the other is supposed to be more adapted to ordinary circumstances, and might be set up without any considerable difficulty by a benevolent tyrant or a legislator who had despotic power.—[I.] The polity of which Plato 'sketches the outline' in the *Republic* may be analyzed into two principal elements:—(i) an Hellenic state of the older or Spartan type, with some traits borrowed from Athens; (ii) an ideal city in which the citizens have all things in common, and the government is carried on by a class of philosopher rulers who are selected by merit. These two elements are not perfectly combined; and, as Aristotle complains (*Pol.* ii. 5, § 18), very much is left ill-defined and uncertain.—(i) Like Hellenic cities in general, the number of the citizens is not to be great. The size of the state is limited by the requirement that 'it shall not be larger or smaller than is consistent with unity.' Again, the individual is subordinate to the state. When Adeimantus complains of the hard life which the citizens will lead, 'like mercenaries in a garrison' (4. 419), he is answered by Socrates that if the happiness of the whole is secured, the happiness of the parts will inevitably follow. Once more, war is conceived to be the normal condition of the state, and military service is imposed upon all. Trade is regarded as dishonourable;—'those who are good for nothing else sit in the Agora buying and selling' (2. 371 D): the warrior can spare no time for such an employment.—In these respects, as well as in the introduction of common meals,

Plato was probably influenced by the traditional ideal of Sparta. The Athenian element appears in the intellectual training of the citizens, and generally in the atmosphere of grace and refinement which they are to breathe (see s. v. Art). The restless energy of the Athenian character is perhaps reflected in the discipline imposed upon the ruling class, who when they have reached fifty are dispensed from continual public service, but must then devote themselves to abstract study, and also be willing to take their turn when necessary at the helm of state [*cp.* Thucyd. i. 70; ii. 40].—(ii) The most peculiar features of Plato's state are (1) the community of property, (2) the position of women, (3) the government of philosophers. The first (see s. v.), though suggested in some measure by the example of Sparta or Crete [*cp.* Arist. *Pol.* ii. 5, § 6], is not known to have been actually practised anywhere in Hellas, unless possibly among such a body as the Pythagorean brotherhood. (2) Nothing in all the *Republic* was probably stranger to the contemporaries of Plato than the place assigned by him to women in the state. The community of wives and children, though carefully guarded by him from the charge of licentiousness, would appear worse in Athenian eyes than the traditional 'licence' of the Spartan women [*cp.* Arist. *Pol.* ii. 9, § 5]. Again, the equal share in education, in war, and in administration which is enjoyed by the women in Plato's state was, if not so revolting, quite as contrary to common Hellenic sentiment [*cp.* Thucyd. ii. 45]. The Spartan women



exercised a great influence on public affairs, but this was mainly indirect [*cp.* Laws 7. 806; Arist. Pol. ii. 9, § 8]: they did not hold office or learn the use of arms. At Athens the women, of the upper classes at least, lived in an almost Oriental seclusion, and were wholly absorbed in household duties. (3) Finally, the government of philosophers had no analogy in the Hellenic world of Plato's time. The suggestion may have been taken from the stories of the Pythagorean rule in Magna Graecia; but we cannot doubt that Plato was chiefly indebted to his own imagination for his kingdom of philosophers, or that it remained to himself an ideal, rather than a state which would ever 'play her part in actual life' (Tim. 19, 20). It is at least significant that he never finished the Critias, as though he were unable to embody, even in a mythical form, the 'city of which the pattern is laid up in heaven.'—[II.] The state which is portrayed in the Laws is said by Aristotle to be 'a mixture of oligarchy and democracy, leaning rather to oligarchy' (Pol. ii. 6, § 18). The description is an inaccurate one; for the only democratic characteristic which Aristotle mentions is the use of the lot in elections, and this, he himself admits, is neutralized by other regulations. Plato's 'second-best state' is in fact an aristocratical government of a narrow and exclusive type, in which wealth plays an important part. The administration is in the hands of the higher classes, and the mode of election is so contrived that they always have a preponderance. The chief magistrates are the thirty-seven guard-

ians of the law, who combine executive and judicial functions in the manner common to Hellenic states. There is also a nocturnal council, composed of the ten oldest guardians, of all those who have gained the prize of virtue, of the Director and the ex-Directors of Education, and of those who have travelled to see the institutions of other countries, besides an equal number of younger colleagues between thirty and forty, appointed, one by each of the seniors. This council seems only to exercise powers of advice and revision, and not to have the initiative in legislation, which was probably intended to be restricted to the guardians. Further, there is a Senate of 360 members, of which a twelfth part sits each month in succession, and a General Assembly. Of the latter very little is said, but we cannot suppose that Plato intended it to have much authority.—The greatest departure from the ideal state is the abandonment of communism, which, as Plato reluctantly confesses, will hardly be accepted by mankind in general (see s. v. Community). On the other hand, the common meals are extended to women, who are thus brought from the retirement of domestic life into the organization of the state.—In two points there is an advance on the Republic:—(i) Plato has discovered that peace is nobler than war, and passes a severe censure on the military states of which Sparta is the typical example. Yet he has himself given a warlike character to the whole commonwealth, and the 5040 citizens would have formed with their wives an armed force such as was hardly possessed by Sparta



at the time of her greatest power.  
(ii) *Although in an earlier part of the work (4. 705 A) Plato repeats the old idea that trade exerts a corrupting influence on men and cities, he exhibits towards the end a more liberal spirit (11. 918). He recognizes the necessity of commerce, and even speculates on the possibility of redeeming trade from reproach by compelling some of the best citizens to open a shop or keep a tavern. [Cp. the discussion of the question by Aristotle, Pol. vii. 6.]—In most respects, however, Plato's political speculations in the Laws have a reactionary cast, akin to the pessimism by which his view of human life is coloured. The energy and enterprize of Athens are exchanged for a rigid and monotonous existence in which every thought and action must conform to the word of the legislator. Plato had shown in the Statesman (293 foll.) that the law was only a general rule which must be modified by circumstances, and he would therefore set the 'one best man' above the law. But he seems, like Aristotle, to have afterwards come to the conclusion that there was no one to be found among mankind 'thus immeasurably superior to his fellows' (Pol. v. 10, § 37). He is still unwilling, however, to allow the citizens at large to control the destinies of the commonwealth, and seeks to ensure stability by the imitation of an antiquated and unprogressive polity like that of Egypt (2. 657 A), or by the institution of the Nocturnal Council, which he expects to be 'the anchor of the whole state' (12. 961 B).]*  
Statesman, the, vocation of, Gorg. 515; Laws 12. 963; has science,

Statesm. 258, 259; must he always follow the laws? *ib.* 293 foll.; will implant in his citizens true opinions about the just and the good, *ib.* 309; will combine courage and temperance, *ib.* 311; the true statesman aims at peace rather than war, Laws 1. 629 D (cp. Legislator);—distinguished from the orator, Soph. 268; from the politician, Statesm. 291, 292, 303; from the general or judge, *ib.* 304, 305; will preserve the state by the aid of mind, Laws 12. 961;—statesman and king, Statesm. 259, statesman and herdsman, *ib.* 261, 265, 275;—art of the statesman, *ib.* 260, 276, 289, 290, 292, 293, 295 B, 300 E, 305 A, 308, 311 (cp. Gorg. 517); a division of the art of command, Statesm. 267:—Statesmen are afraid to leave written speeches, Phaedr. 257 D; are not teachers of virtue, Meno 93; have right opinion, not knowledge, *ib.* 99; act by inspiration, *ibid.*; true statesmen rarer than good draught-players, Statesm. 292 E;—statesmen in their own imagination, Rep. 4. 426 (cp. Statesm. 302 A); statesmen at Athens, Gorg. 515, 519; 1 Alcib. 119, 122.

Statuary, art of, Gorg. 450 D;—statuaries, Statesm. 277. Cp. Sculpture.

Statues of Daedalus, Euthyph. 11 C, 15 B; Meno 97 D foll.; Rep. 7. 529 E (cp. Daedalus):—statues polished for a decision, Rep. 2. 361 D; painted statues, *ib.* 4. 420 D; Laws 2. 668 E.

Steadiness of character, apt to be accompanied by stupidity, Rep. 6. 503; Theaet. 144 B.

Stealing, permitted at Lacedaemon, Laws 1. 633 C. *See* Theft.

Stephanus, son of Thucydides, a famous wrestler, Meno 94 C.

Stepmothers, Laws 11. 930 B.

- Stesichorus, his Recantation, Phaedr. 243 A (cp. Rep. 9. 586 C); Socrates compares himself to, Phaedr. 244 A.
- Stesilaus, his invention of the scythe-spear, Laches 183 C.
- Stesimbrotus, of Thasos, a rhapsode, Ion 530 D.
- Stone, Tim. 60 C.
- Stories, improper, not to be told to children, Rep. 2. 377; 3. 391; 4. 408 C; Laws 12. 941 B. Cp. Children, Education.
- Stork, the, proverbial affectionateness of, 1 Alcib. 135 E.
- Strangers, under the protection of God, Laws 5. 729, 730; 8. 843 A; 9. 879 D; may partake of fruits, *ib.* 8. 845; provision for their support, *ib.* 848 A, 849; murder of, *ib.* 9. 866, 872 A; reverence for, *ib.* 879; permitted to take oaths, *ib.* 12. 949 B; regulations for the reception of strangers, *ib.* 950 (cp. 6. 758 C); strangers on travel, *ib.* 12. 949 E, 952, 953.
- Strength, like virtue, the same quality in all, Meno 72 D;—the rule of strength, Gorg. 483, 484, 489; Rep. 1. 338; Laws 1. 627; 3. 690; 10. 890 A. Cp. Might.
- Strife, principle of, in the universe, Soph. 242 E.
- Style, of poetry, Rep. 3. 392;—(in prose)—repetition, Phaedr. 235 A; common-places, *ib.* 236 A; necessity of connexion, *ib.* 264 B; definition and division, *ib.* 265 D; generalization, *ib.* 266 A;—various styles, Rep. 3. 397. Cp. Rhetoric.
- Styx, Phaedo 113 B; Rep. 3. 387 B.
- Subject of the sentence, Soph. 262.
- Substances, assimilation of, Lysis 217.
- Suffering, is it honourable when connected with justice? Laws 9. 859.
- Suicide, Phaedo 61 foll.;—philosophic disregard of life, *ib.* 62;—burial of the suicide, Laws 9. 873.
- Suits, will be unknown in the best state, Rep. 5. 464 E;—decision of, in the Model City, Laws 6. 761 D; suits at law, *ib.* 766 D; 9. 853; 12. 956; penalty for using force in order to prevent a suit being heard, *ib.* 12. 954 E; execution of suits, *ib.* 958.
- Summonses, Laws 8. 846 C; 9. 855 D.
- Sumptuary laws, Rep. 4. 423 E, 425. Cp. Laws.
- Sun, the, compared with the idea of good, Rep. 6. 508; not sight, but the author of sight, *ib.* 509; creation of, Tim. 38; motion of, the condition of all existence, Theaet. 153 D; orbit of, Laws 7. 822; a god, *ib.* 821; 10. 899 A; 12. 950 D (cp. Apol. 26); has a soul, Laws 10. 898 E; 12. 967; contemplation of the sun and stars, ought not to produce Atheism, *ib.* 12. 967;—'the sun of Heracleitus,' Rep. 6. 498 A.
- Sunium, Crito 43 D;—Euphronius the Sunian, Theaet. 144 C.
- Superintendents of music and gymnastics, *see* Director:—Superintendents of exports and imports, Laws 8. 847 C.
- Superior, the, and the stronger, are they the same? Gorg. 489 (cp. Laws 1. 627); superiors must be just towards those subject to them, Laws 6. 777 E.
- Suppliants, under the special care of God, Laws 5. 730 A.
- Supposititious son, parable of the, Rep. 7. 538.
- Surety, rules about, Laws 9. 871 E, 873 A; 11. 914 D, E; 12. 953 E.
- Swallowing, Tim. 80.
- Swans, their death-song not a lament, Phaedo 84 E.

Sweetness, Theaet. 159 D.  
 Swimming, the art of, Gorg. 511 C.  
 Syllables and letters, Tim. 48;  
   Theaet. 202 foll.; Statesm. 278 A.  
 Symmetry, Soph. 228; an element  
   of the good, Phil. 65, 66;—sym-  
   metries in nature, Tim. 87. Cp.  
   Measure.  
 Sympathy of soul and body, Rep.  
   5. 462 D; aroused by poetry, *ib.*  
   10. 605 D. Cp. Feeling.  
 Synonyms, Prodicus' 'charming  
   philosophy' of, Protag. 340. Cp.  
   Prodicus.  
 Synthesis, Statesm. 285. Cp. Dia-  
   lectic.  
 Syracusan dinners, Rep. 3. 404 D  
   (cp. Gorg. 518 B):—conquest of  
   Locri by the Syracusans, Laws  
   1. 638 A; their hostility to the  
   Athenians, Eryx. 392 A.

## T.

Tablets for writing, Protag. 326 D;  
   —laws engraved on tablets, [an  
   allusion to the laws of Solon],  
   Statesm. 298 E;—prayers written  
   on tablets of cypress wood in  
   temples, Laws 5. 741 C;—use of  
   tablets in voting, *ib.* 6. 753 (cp.  
   12. 948 E):—the 'waxen tablet'  
   of the mind, Theaet. 191 D, 194  
   C.  
 Tactics, use of arithmetic in, Rep. 7.  
   522 E, 525 B; a science, Statesm.  
   304 E;—naval tactics, dishonour-  
   able, Laws 4. 706:—tacticians  
   and generals, *ib.* 11. 921 D.  
 Tanagra, battle of, 1 Alcib. 112 B;  
   Menex. 242 A.  
 Tantalus ('my eyes beheld Tanta-  
   lus'=Prodicus), Protag. 315 C;  
   his wealth, Euthyph. 11 D; his  
   name, Crat. 395 D, E; suffers  
   in the world below, Gorg. 525 E.  
 Tarentum, Iccus of, Protag. 316 D;  
   intoxication at, Laws 1. 637 B.  
 Tartarus, a chasm piercing through  
   the whole world, Phaedo 112 A,  
   D (cp. 113 B, E, 114 A); (=hell),  
   Rep. 10. 616 A; Gorg. 523 A.  
   Cp. Hades.  
 Taste, good, importance of, Rep. 3.  
   401, 402; innovations in, danger-  
   ous, Laws 7. 797:—the sense of  
   taste, Tim. 65.  
 Taureas, the palaestra of, Charm.  
   153 A.  
 Taverns, Laws 11. 918 D foll.  
 Taxation, Laws 12. 955 D.  
 Taxes, heavy, imposed by the  
   tyrant, Rep. 8. 567 A, 568 E; on  
   sojourners, Laws 8. 850 B.  
 Taxiarchs, Laws 6. 755 D.  
 Teachers, not to be blamed if their  
   disciples abuse their instruction,  
   Gorg. 456 D, 460 E:—in the  
   Model City, Laws 7. 804 D, 808  
   C, 813 E; patterns to be fol-  
   lowed by them, *ib.* 811;—teachers  
   of music, *ib.* 812;—teachers of  
   gymnastic, *ib.* 813;—the guard-  
   ians to be teachers of virtue in  
   the state, *ib.* 12. 964.  
 Tears, Tim. 68 A.  
 Teiresias, alone has understanding  
   among the dead (Od. x. 495),  
   Meno 100 A; Rep. 3. 386 E;  
   Teiresias and Creon (Eurip.  
   Phoenissae 865, 866), 2 Alcib.  
   151 C.  
 Telamon, Crat. 428 C; Apol. 41 B;  
   Rep. 10. 620 B.  
 Telemachus, Laws 7. 804 A.  
 Telephus of Aeschylus, (fr. 222),  
   Phaedo 108 A.  
 Temenus, king of Argos, Laws 3.  
   683 D; an inexperienced legis-  
   lator, *ib.* 692 B.  
 Temper, incompatibility of, a ground  
   of divorce, Laws 11. 930.  
 Temperance (*σωφροσύνη*), defined  
   as quietness, Charm. 159; as  
   modesty, *ib.* 160; as doing one's  
   own business, *ib.* 161; as doing  
   good actions, *ib.* 163 E; as  
   self-knowledge, *ib.* 165; as know-  
   ing what we know and do not  
   know, *ib.* 167; = the health of the



soul, Gorg. 504, 507; wrongly defined as prudence, Laws 4. 710 A;—a part of virtue, Meno 73;—one of the virtues of the philosopher, Phaedo 68; Rep. 6. 485 E, 490 E, 491 B, 494 B;—a social virtue, Phaedo 82 B;—not a virtue, but a condition of virtue, Laws 3. 696, 697 A; 4. 709 E;—the victory over desire, Phaedr. 237 E; the order of the soul, Gorg. 507, 508; a harmony of the soul, Rep. 4. 430, 441 E, 442 D, 443; 9. 591 D; Laws 2. 653 B;—the science of itself and of other sciences, Charm. 170;—is a good, *ib.* 159, 160, 169; how far possible or advantageous, *ib.* 167, 170; acquired by habit, Phaedo 82 B; fostered in the soul by the simple kind of music, Rep. 3. 404 E, 410 A (cp. Laws 7. 802 E); ought to be blended with courage, Statesm. 309, 310 (cp. Laws 3. 696 A); promoted by common meals and gymnastic exercises, Laws 1. 636 A; requires experience of pleasure, *ib.* 647 D, 649; worthy of praise, *ib.* 5. 730 E; principles to support, *ib.* 8. 841;—temperance and courage, Statesm. 306; temperance and love, Rep. 3. 403 A; Laws 8. 839, 840; temperance and pleasure, Phil. 45 D; temperance and wisdom, Charm. 165, 170; Protag. 332; Symp. 209 A;—the 'foolish temperance' of the many, Phaedo 68, 69; temperance an invention of the weak to protect themselves against the strong [Callicles], Gorg. 492, 494;—temperance in the state, Rep. 3. 389; 4. 430 foll.; Laws 3. 696;—in the tyrant, Laws 4. 710 (cp. 712 A).

Temperance. [*The virtue of 'temperance,'—σωφροσύνη, a word for which there is no exact equivalent in English,—may perhaps be best*

*explained as a conception by which the Greek carried his favourite idea of moderation into the moral sphere, and which found expression in 'the wise man's aphorism,—Nothing too much' (Phil. 45 E). It marked the line at which indulgence passed into excess; the unjust man is intemperate because his desires have no limit, but the just restrains himself and is sober and moderate in all his ways. It was liable to be confused with wisdom, for prudence and temperance are naturally allied, and the confusion was aided by a false etymology which connected φρόνησις with σωφρονεῖν (Laws 4. 710 A).—One of the earliest Platonic Dialogues, the Charmides, is devoted to the examination of the question, 'What is temperance?' Several definitions are offered:—Temperance is 'Quietness': 'Modesty': 'Doing one's own business': 'Doing good': 'Self-knowledge': 'Knowing what we know and what we do not know.' But all these prove inadequate, and the result is, as usual, only a negative one.—In the Gorgias an advance is made. When Callicles maintains that happiness depends upon the indulgence of the desires, Socrates, in order to confute this immoral doctrine, shows that temperance in the soul corresponds to health in the body, and that, just as the sick man is in want of restraint and direction, so the diseased or intemperate soul needs chastisement and reproof. But he who is temperate knows his duty both to Gods and men and lives in happiness and freedom, because he does not require to be restrained by punishment.—In the Republic temper-*



ance is said to be, in the individual, the accord or agreement of the three elements of the soul, and, in the state, the arrangement which allows those who are superior by nature to rule over the inferior, and thus produces a perfect harmony of the different classes. It is therefore, unlike wisdom or courage, not the exclusive possession of one portion of the citizens, but a virtue which is common to all.—In the Statesman one of the definitions of the Charmides is revived, and temperance is explained to be quietness. Now there are two varieties of character among men, the quiet or temperate and the active or courageous, and these stand in natural opposition to each other (cp. s. v. Courage). It is the work of the 'royal science' to effect a union of these dispositions, both in the soul of the individual and in the state at large. Thus the warp and the woof of the state will be fitly woven 'into one smooth and even web.'—In the Laws temperance is the quality which gives control over self. By this Plato would have us understand, not that 'lame and one-sided virtue' which enables us to retain our self-possession in time of danger or to endure physical suffering, but a higher kind which arms us also against the enchantments of pleasure. This virtue, as he afterwards tells us, can hardly be said to have a separate existence, but is rather the ground or accompaniment of all virtue. If it is conjoined with wisdom in the mind of the ruler, the ideal state may be easily realized in action, and it must equally exist among the citizens, or they cannot hope to live the life of true

happiness in the political community.]

Temperate life, the, better than the intemperate, Gorg. 493 foll.; Laws 5. 733 E foll.;—the temperate man the friend of God, Laws 4. 716 D.

Temples in a new state, Laws 5. 738; not easily established, *ib.* 10. 909 E;—their situation in the Model City, *ib.* 6. 778 C;—temples of Hestia, Zeus, and Athene, *ib.* 5. 745; 8. 848;—officers of temples, *ib.* 6. 759;—water-supply for temples, *ib.* 761 C;—temple-robbing, Rep. 9. 574 D, 575 B; Laws 8. 831 E; 9. 854.

Terpsichore, Phaedr. 259 C.

Terpsion, present at the death of Socrates, Phaedo 59 C (cp. Theaet. 142 A–143 C).

Territory, devastation of Hellenic, not to be allowed, Rep. 5. 470;—unlimited, not required by the good state, *ib.* 4. 423; Laws 5. 737.

Terror, to be distinguished from fear, Protag. 358 D. *See* Fear.

Testamentary disposition, Laws 11. 923, 924.

Tetanus, Tim. 84 E.

Tethys and Oceanus, parents of all, Crat. 402 B, C, D; Tim. 40 E; Theaet. 152 E, 180 D; meaning of the name, Crat. 402 C.

Thales, one of the Seven Wise Men, Protag. 343 A; his inventions, Rep. 10. 600 A; story of Thales and the Thracian maid, Theaet. 174 A, C, 175 D.

Thamus, Phaedr. 274 D–275 B.

Thamyras, Ion 533 B; his soul chooses the life of a nightingale, Rep. 10. 620 A; the sweet singer, Laws 8. 829 E.

Thasos, Stesimbrotus of, Ion 530 D.

Thaumas; Iris is the child of Thaumas (wonder), Theaet. 155 D.

Theaetetus, a person in the dialogue

- Theaetetus*, Theaet. 144 E foll.; wounded at Corinth, *ib.* 142 A; his appearance and mental powers, *ib.* 143 E (cp. Statesm. 257 E); his studies in mathematics, Theaet. 147 C; Statesm. 266 A; the friend of the younger Socrates, Theaet. 147 C; Soph. 218 B; a person in the dialogue *Sophist*, Soph. 218 A foll. (cp. Statesm. 257 A).
- Theaetetus*, time of the dialogue, Theaet. 142 E (cp. 209 E); the dialogue written down by Euclid, *ib.* 143 A.
- Theages, the brother of Paralus, Apol. 33 E; the bridle of, Rep. 6. 496 B.
- Thearion, the baker, Gorg. 518 B.
- Theatre, the, price of admission to, Apol. 26 E; audience at, Gorg. 502; Laws 2. 658; 7. 817; decline of, Laws 2. 659; 3. 700.
- 'Theatrocracy,' at Athens, Laws 3. 701 A.
- Thebes, a well-governed city, Crito 53 B; home of Philolaus, Phaedo 61 E;—Orthagoras the Theban, Protag. 318 C; Simmias the Theban, Crito 45 B; Phaedo 59 C, 92 A;—Cadmus the Theban, Phaedo 95 A;—Harmonia the Theban goddess, *ibid.*
- Thebes (in Egypt), Phaedr. 274 D.
- Theft, Laws 8. 831 E; 9. 857, 874 C; 11. 933 E; 12. 941; (against the state), punished with death, *ib.* 12. 941 (*but* cp. 9. 857 A); not to be ascribed to the Gods, *ib.* 12. 941;—receiving stolen goods, *ib.* 955;—Prometheus' theft of fire, Protag. 321.
- Themis, did not instigate the strife of the gods, Rep. 2. 379 E;—the oath by Zeus, Apollo, and Themis, Laws 11. 936 E.
- Themistocles, failed in training his son Cleophantus, Meno 93; a good man in common opinion, Gorg. 503 C, 515 C (cp. Meno 93 B); real author of Athenian calamities, Gorg. 519 A (cp. Meno 98 B); originator in part of the docks and walls, Gorg. 455 E; exiled, *ib.* 516 D; story of his answer to the Seriphian, Rep. 1. 330 A.
- Theoclymenus (the seer in Homer), Ion 538 E.
- Theodorus, of Byzantium, Phaedr. 266 E; compared to Odysseus, *ib.* 261 C.
- Theodorus, of Cyrene, a geometrician, Theaet. 143 B, 165 A; joins in the conversation, *ib.* 168 C foll. (cp. Soph. 216 A; Statesm. 257 A).
- Theodorus, of Samos, a sculptor, Ion 533 A.
- Theodotus, dead at the time of Socrates' trial, Apol. 33 E.
- Theognis, quoted, Meno 95 D, E; his definition of virtue, Laws 1. 630 A, C.
- Theology of Plato, Rep. 2. 379 foll. Cp. God.
- Theonoe, meaning of the name, Crat. 407 B.
- Theophilus, meaning of the name, Crat. 394 E, 397 B.
- Theosdotides, father of Nicostratus, Apol. 33 E.
- Thersites, in the world below, Gorg. 525 E; puts on the form of a monkey, Rep. 10. 620 C.
- Theseus, his expedition to Crete, Phaedo 58 A; cursed his son, Laws 3. 687 E; 11. 931 B;—the tale of Theseus and Peirithous not permitted, Rep. 3. 391 C;—names recorded prior to the time of Theseus, Crit. 110 A;—a Theseus of argument, Theaet. 169 B.
- Thessaly, Crito has friends in, Crito 45 C, 53 D; disordered state of, *ib.* 53 D; nurseries of geese in, Statesm. 264 C; a large plain, Laws 1. 625 D;—Thessalian dialect, Crat. 405 D; Thessalian enchantresses, Gorg. 513 A; Thessalian

- Penestae, Laws 6. 776 D;—Caeneus the Thessalian, *ib.* 12. 944 D, E;—Creon the Thessalian, Protag. 339 A;—Thessalians, once famous for riches and riding, now for wisdom, Meno 70 A; willing to receive Socrates, Crito 45 C.
- Thetis, mother of Achilles, Symp. 180 A; Apol. 28 C; Hipp. Min. 371 C; not to be slandered, Rep. 2. 381 D; her accusation of Apollo, *ib.* 383 A; marriage of Peleus and Thetis, Laws 12. 944 A.
- Theuth, Phaedr. 274 C, 275 C; Phil. 18 B.
- Things and individuals, Crat. 386;—things and the ideas which partake of them, Parm. 129, 131–133, 135;—things and names, Soph. 244.
- Thinking, = the soul's conversation with herself, Theaet. 187 A, 190; Soph. 263 E, 264 A.
- Thirst, Rep. 4. 437 E, 439; Phil. 32 A, 34 E; an inanition (*κένωσις*) of the soul, Rep. 9. 585 A.
- Thirty, the, tyranny of, Apol. 32 C; Aristoteles, one of the Thirty, Parm. 127 C.
- Tholus, the, at Athens, Apol. 32 C, D.
- Thorax, Tim. 69 E.
- Thought, when best, Phaedo 65; aided by generalization, Phaedr. 266 B; thought and the ideas, Parm. 132, 135 E; thought a motion of the soul, Theaet. 153 B; thought and speech, Soph. 263; the only expression of immaterial things, Statesm. 286 A.
- Thracians, their procession in honour of Bendis, Rep. 1. 327 A; characterized by spirit or passion, *ib.* 4. 435 E; drink unmixed wine, Laws 1. 637 D, E; employ their women to till the ground, etc., *ib.* 7. 805 D;—the Thracian Zamolxis, Charm. 156 D, E (cp. 175 E);—the Thracian handmaid and Thales, Theaet. 174 A, C, 175 D;—Zopyrus the Thracian, tutor of Alcibiades, 1 Alcib. 122 B;—the Thracian Boreas, Laws 2. 661 A (cp. Phaedr. 229).
- Thrasymachus, the Chalcedonian, Phaedr. 267 E; a person in the *Republic*, Rep. 1. 328 B; breaks in on the discussion, *ib.* 336 B; will be paid, *ib.* 337 D; defines justice, *ib.* 338 C foll.; his rudeness, *ib.* 343 A; his views of government, *ibid.* (cp. 9. 590 D); his encomium on injustice, *ib.* 1. 343 A; his manner of speech, *ib.* 345 B; his paradox about justice and injustice, *ib.* 348 B foll.; he blushes, *ib.* 350 D; is pacified and retires from the argument, *ib.* 354 (cp. 6. 498 C); would have Socrates discuss the subject of women and children, *ib.* 5. 450 A, —his rhetoric, Phaedr. 261 C, 269 E, 271 A.
- Thucydides, the Athenian statesman, Laches 178; Meno 94 C; his sons, Laches 179; Meno 94 C.
- Thucydides, the younger, Laches 179 A.
- Thunderbolts, Tim. 80 C; Laws 9. 873 E.
- Thurii, Euthyd. 271 C, 283 E, 288 A;—Thurian youth degrade love, Laws 1. 636 B.
- Thyestes, cruelty of Atreus to, Crat. 395 B; Thyestes and the golden lamb, Statesm. 268 E; Thyestes on the stage, Laws 8. 838 C.
- Timaeus, the principal speaker in the dialogue *Timaeus*, 17 A foll.; begins his discourse, 27 C; prayer of, Crit. 106 A, B.
- Timber, formerly abundant in Attica, Crit. 111 C; required in shipbuilding, Laws 4. 705 C.
- Time, created, Tim. 37–39; ex-



- pressions of time, Parm. 141, 152 B; time and the one, *ibid.*, *ibid.* (see One); changes brought about by time, Laws 3. 676;—prescription of time (legal), *ib.* 12. 954 C.
- Timocracy, Rep. 8. 545 foll.; origin of, *ib.* 547:—the timocratical man described, *ib.* 549; his origin, *ibid.*
- Tinker, the prosperous, Rep. 6. 495, 496.
- Tiring, art of, Gorg. 463 B.
- Tisander, of Aphidnae, a student of philosophy, Gorg. 487 C.
- Tisias, aware that probability is superior to truth, Phaedr. 267 A; his definition of probability, *ib.* 273 A foll.
- Titanic nature, the old, Laws 3. 701 C.
- Tityus, suffers punishment in Tartarus, Gorg. 525 E.
- Topography of Athens, Charm. 153; Lysis 203; Phaedr. 227, 229. Cp. Athens.
- Tops, Rep. 4. 436.
- Torch race, an equestrian, Rep. 1. 328 A.
- Torpedo fish, Socrates compared to a, Meno 80 A.
- Touch, Rep. 7. 523 E.
- Touchstones, Gorg. 486 E.
- Tournaments, Laws 8. 829 B.
- Trade, one of the acquisitive arts, Soph. 219; divisions of, Statesm. 260 C:—injuriously effects of, Laws 4. 705 A; 5. 741 E, 743 D; no one to profess two trades, *ib.* 8. 846 D.
- Traders, praise their goods in order to deceive customers, Protag. 313 D; necessary in the state, Rep. 2. 371; Laws 11. 918 (*but* cp. Laws 4. 705 A).
- Tradition, power of, Laws 8. 838; 11. 913; the ancient tradition about the slayer of kindred, *ib.* 9. 870 D, 872 E; tradition of deluges, *ib.* 3. 677, 702 A (cp. Tim. 22; Crit. 109, 111 B, 112 A);—traditions of ancient times, their truth not certainly known to us, Phaedr. 274 C; Rep. 2. 382 C; 3. 414 C; Tim. 40 D; Crit. 107; Statesm. 271 A; Laws 4. 713 E; 6. 782 D; 11. 927 A; ancient traditions about the world below despised by the wicked, Laws 10. 881 A.
- Tragedy, = the goat song, Crat. 408 C; seeks pleasure only, Gorg. 502 A; produces a mingled feeling of pleasure and pain, Phil. 48 A; the favourite entertainment of most persons, Laws 2. 658:—tragedy and comedy the same as to genius, Symp. 223 (*but* cp. Ion 534);—tragedy and comedy in the state, Rep. 3. 394 (cp. Laws 7. 817).
- Tragic poets, the, fond of having recourse to a 'Deus ex Machinâ,' Crat. 425 E; eulogizers of tyranny, Rep. 8. 568 A; imitators, *ib.* 10. 597, 598; their representations of Oedipus, etc., Laws 8. 838 D. Cp. Poets.
- Training, of body and soul, Gorg. 513 D;—dangers of training, Rep. 3. 404 A; not so severe a test as intense study, *ib.* 7. 535 B; the same amount prescribed for all the pupils in the gymnasia, Statesm. 294 D; at first injurious, Laws 1. 646 D; conducive to temperance, *ib.* 8. 839 E;—training of boxers, *ib.* 830;—training for the games, Rep. 6. 504 A; Laws 7. 807 C; 8. 840 A.
- Transfer of children from one class in the state to another, Rep. 3. 415; 4. 423 D.
- Transmigration of souls, Phaedr. 248, 249; Meno 81 foll.; Phaedo 70, 81; Rep. 10. 617; Tim. 42, 91 D foll.; Laws 10. 903 E, 904 E. See Soul.
- Travel, value of, Laws 12. 950, 951.
- Treason, Laws 9. 856 E.
- Treasure-trove, Laws 11. 913 (cp. 8. 844 E).



- Treasurers of temples (in the Model City), Laws 6. 759 E.
- Trees, Tim. 77 A.
- Trials, conduct of, Laws 9. 855.
- Triangles in bodies, Tim. 54 foll., 81; perfect forms of triangles, *ib.* 54.
- Tribes, twelve in the Model City, Laws 5. 745 (cp. 6. 771):—courts of the tribes, *ib.* 6. 768 B; 11. 915 C.
- Tribunals, Laws 6. 767. *See* Law Courts.
- Triptolemus, one of the judges in Hades, Apol. 41 A; minister of Demeter, Laws 6. 782 B.
- Trochaic rhythms, Rep. 3. 400 B.
- Troy, Rep. 3. 393 E; heroes at, Ion 535 C; Apol. 28 C; Hipp. Min. 364; Helen never at, Rep. 9. 586 C (cp. Phaedr. 243 B); overthrown after ten years, Laws 3. 682 D; a part of the Assyrian Empire, *ib.* 685 C, D;—Trojan horse, Theaet. 184 D;—Trojan War, Apol. 41 C; Rep. 2. 380 A; Laws 3. 682 C, 685 C; 1 Alcib. 112 B; treatment of the wounded in, Rep. 3. 405 E, 408 A; the army numbered by Palamedes, *ib.* 7. 522 D;—Trojans, press hard on the Achaeans (Il. xiv. 96), Laws 4. 706 D, E.
- True men and false, the same, Hipp. Min. 365–369.
- Truth, = the right assignment of names, Crat. 385, 431; the basis of good speaking and writing, Phaedr. 260, 278; truth and persuasion, *ib.* 260; the power of, Apol. 17 A; how obtained, Phaedo 65; the discovery of, a common good, Gorg. 505 E; is not lost by men of their own will, Rep. 3. 413 A; the aim of the philosopher, *ib.* 6. 484, 485, 486 E, 490, 500 C, 501 D; 7. 521, 537 D; 9. 581, 582 C (cp. Phaedr. 249; Phaedo 82; Rep. 5. 475 E; 7. 520, 525; Theaet. 173 E; Soph. 249, 254 A); akin to wisdom, Rep. 6. 485 D; to proportion, *ib.* 486 E; no partial measure of, sufficient, *ib.* 504; love of, essential in this world and the next, *ib.* 10. 618; only to be attained by a lengthened process of dialectic, Parm. 136; akin to the eternal, Phil. 59 C (cp. Rep. 9. 585); an element of the good, Phil. 64; unknown to pleasure, *ib.* 65; not readily believed by men, Laws 2. 663 E; the beginning of goods, *ib.* 5. 730 C; duty of speaking the truth, *ib.* 9. 861 D;—truth in the state, *ib.* 5. 738 E;—absolute truth, Phil. 58 D;—the vision of truth, Phaedr. 248;—Protagoras on Truth, Crat. 391 C; Theaet. 152 C, 161 E, 166 A, 167, 168 C, 171 C.
- Tunnels, Crit. 116 A.
- Tutelary deities of craftsmen, Laws 11. 920, 921.
- Tutors, Lysis 208 C, 223; Symp. 183 D; Laws 7. 808 D; 1 Alcib. 122 B.
- Tynnichus of Chalcis, author of one famous poem, Ion 534 D.
- Types (or models) in legislation, Laws 7. 800.
- Typho, the serpent, Phaedr. 230 A.
- Tyranny, Rep. 1. 338 D; = injustice on the grand scale, Gorg. 469; Rep. 1. 344; the wretchedest form of government, Rep. 8. 544 C; 9. 576; Statesm. 302 E; origin of, Rep. 8. 562; a kind of hunting by force, Soph. 222 C; = the management of violent rulers, Statesm. 276 E; = the rule of one over involuntary subjects, *ib.* 291 E; opposed to the government of the one best man, *ib.* 302; the readiest way of establishing a polity, Laws 4. 710 C; not reckoned among constitutions, *ib.* 712 C;—the tyrannical man, Rep. 9. 571 foll.; life of, *ib.* 573; his treatment of his parents, *ib.*

- 574 foll. ; most miserable, *ib.* 576, 578; has the soul of a slave, *ib.* 577.
- Tyrant, the, paradox concerning, Gorg. 468; origin of, Rep. 8. 565; happiness of, *ib.* 566 foll. ; 9. 576 foll. ; Laws 2. 661 B (cp. 2 Alcib. 141 E); his rise to power, Rep. 8. 566; his taxes, *ib.* 567 A, 568 E; his army, *ib.* 567 A, 569; his purgation of the city, *ib.* 567 B; misery of, *ib.* 9. 579; Laws 2. 661, 662; has no real pleasure, Rep. 9. 587; how far distant from pleasure, *ibid.*; compared to a tender of animals, Theaet. 174 C; the opposite of the one best man or true monarch, Statesm. 301; his influence on the manners of the citizens, Laws 4. 711 B;—the young tyrant, *ib.* 709:—Tyrants have no power, Gorg. 466; Laws 4. 714; punishment of, in the world below, Gorg. 525; Rep. 10. 615; have no friends, Rep. 8. 568; 9. 576 (cp. Gorg. 510 C); tyrants and poets, Rep. 8. 568.
- Tyrrhenia, Tim. 25 B (cp. Crit. 114 C);—Tyrrhenic rites, Laws 5. 738 C.
- Tyrtaeus, Laws 9. 858 E; 'of all men most eager about war,' *ib.* 1. 629 A foll. (cp. 2. 667 A):—alluded to (τὸν μελίγηρυν Ἄδραστον), Phaedr. 269 A.
- U.**
- Umpires, Laws 8. 833 E (cp. Rep. 9. 580 A, and see Judges).
- Unbelievers, punishment of, Laws 10. 908, 909.
- Unconsciousness, Phil. 34.
- Understanding, a faculty of the soul, Rep. 6. 511 D; = science, *ib.* 7. 533 E:—differences in the understandings of men, Theaet. 170, 171.
- Union impossible among the bad, Lysis 214 (cp. Phaedr. 255 A; Rep. 1. 351);—union of friends after death, Phaedo 68 (cp. Apol. 41).
- Unison in music, Laws 7. 812 D.
- Unity of the state, Rep. 4. 422, 423; 5. 462, 463; Laws 5. 739;—absolute unity, Rep. 7. 524 E, 525 E; Soph. 245 A;—unity and infinity, Rep. 7. 525 A; Phil. 15, 16; unity and being, Soph. 245;—pleasantness of unity, Statesm. 260 B;—the unity of things, *ib.* 285 B.
- Universals, Meno 74; Theaet. 185; Soph. 253.
- Universe, the, body of, Tim. 31, 32 (cp. Phil. 30 A); motion of, Tim. 34; pattern of, *ib.* 48; bound together by friendship and justice, Gorg. 508 A; partakes of a bodily nature, Statesm. 269; revolutions of, *ib.* 270 foll. ; ruled by mind, Phil. 28, 30, 31 (cp. Laws 1. 631, 632 C; 10. 897; 12. 963 A, 966 E, 967 B); a body, because composed of the same elements as the human body, Phil. 29 E; has in itself an infinite, a limit, and a cause, *ib.* 30 C; may be enquired into, Laws 7. 821; soul in, *ib.* 10. 898 (cp. Tim. 90 D; Phil. 30 A); whole and parts of, Laws 10. 903; man and the universe, *ibid.*
- Unjust man, the, happy (Polus), Gorg. 470 foll. ; (Thrasymachus), Rep. 1. 343, 344; his unhappiness finally proved, *ib.* 9. 580; 10. 613 (cp. Laws 2. 661); not unjust of his own free-will, Laws 5. 731 C; 9. 860;—'unjust' defined, *ib.* 9. 863;—injustice = private profit, Rep. 1. 344. See Evil.
- Unwritten laws, Laws 7. 822 D. See Custom, Laws.
- Urania, Phaedr. 259 D; Symp. 187 E.
- Uranus, so called ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀραῖν τὰ ἄνω, Crat. 396 B; father of the heavenly Aphrodite, Symp. 180 D, E; immoral stories about, Rep. 2. 377 E (cp. Euthyph. 6 A,

- 8 B); son of Oceanus, Tim. 40 E.
- User, the, a better judge than the maker, Crat. 390; Phaedr. 274 E; Rep. 10. 601 C; user and instrument distinguished, 1 Alcib. 129.
- Usury, forbidden (in the Model City), Laws 5. 742 C (cp. Rep. 8. 556 A); except in the case of overdue accounts, Laws 11. 921 D.
- V.**
- Vacuum, Tim. 80 C.
- Valetudinarianism, Rep. 3. 406; 4. 426 A.
- Valour, prizes of, Rep. 5. 468; Laws 8. 829 C; 12. 943 C.
- Valuation of property (in the Model City), Laws 12. 955 D.
- Vapour, Tim. 49 C.
- Vegetarians, Laws 6. 782 D.
- Veins, Tim. 77 D.
- Ventriloquism, Soph. 252 C.
- Verbal distinctions; 'making' and 'doing,' Charm. 163;— 'being' and 'becoming,' Protag. 340, 344;— 'learning' and 'knowing,' Euthyd. 278;— 'having' and 'possessing,' Theaet. 197;— 'willing' and 'wishing,' Gorg. 467;— distinctions attributed to Prodicus, Charm. 163 D; Laches 197 D; Protag. 337 A, 340 A, 358 A, D; Euthyd. 277 E; Meno 75 E:— verbal discussions, Euthyd. 276 foll., 284 foll., 293 foll.:— verbal fallacy, 'justice dishonourable,' Laws 9. 860:— verbal quibbles of sophists, Rep. 1. 340:— Socrates' use of the word *deivós*, Protag. 341. Cp. Sophists.
- Verbs, Soph. 261, 262.
- Vested interests, Laws 3. 684.
- Vice, the disease of the soul, Rep. 4. 444; 10. 609 foll.; Soph. 228 (cp. Statesm. 296 D; Laws 10. 906 A); is many, Rep. 4. 445; the proper object of ridicule, *ib.* 5. 452 E; =virtue out of place, Statesm. 307; inferior to virtue in pleasure, Laws 5. 733; the destruction of men, *ib.* 10. 906 D (cp. Rep. 1. 351 E); slavish, 1 Alcib. 135;— fine names for the vices, Rep. 8. 560 E. Cp. Injustice.
- Victory in battle, no proof of the goodness or badness of institutions, Laws 1. 638 A; often suicidal to the victors, *ib.* 641 C; the two things which give victory, *ib.* 647 B; bestowed by the Gods on those who propitiate them rightly, *ib.* 7. 803 E;— victory in civic life, the prize of obedience to the laws, *ib.* 4. 715 C; 5. 729 D; 8. 840 B, 845 D:— Olympian victories, glory conferred by, Laws 5. 729 D; 7. 807 C (*see* Olympia).
- Vine, the, only to be cultivated on a moderate scale, Laws 2. 674 B;— first appearance of the vine, *ib.* 6. 782 B.
- Vintage, the season of, Laws 8. 844 E.
- Violence, laws concerning, Laws 9. 874 C; 10. 884, 885.
- Virtue, divided into many parts, Laches 190, 198 A; five virtues enumerated (wisdom, temperance, courage, justice, holiness), Protag. 349, 359 A; four virtues, wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice, Rep. 4. 428 foll., 433; Laws 1. 631 D; 3. 688 A; 12. 963, 965:— virtue = the power of governing mankind, Meno 73; = the love and attainment of the honourable, *ib.* 77; = the power of attaining good, *ib.* 78;— the health of the soul, Rep. 4. 444 (cp. 10. 609 foll.; Soph. 228; Statesm. 296 D; Laws 10. 906 A);— a harmony of the soul, Laws 2. 653;— whether one or many, Protag. 329; Meno 71 E foll., 74 (cp. Statesm. 306; Laws 12. 963 C, 965); unity of, restated,



Protag. 349; is one, Rep. 4. 445;— virtue and courage, Laches 190 foll.; Protag. 349, 350, 353, 359; Laws 1. 631 D foll.; 2. 667 A; 3. 688 A, 696 B; 12. 963 E; virtue and justice, Meno 73 E, 79 (cp. Rep. 1. 350); virtue and temperance, Laws 3. 696;— virtue and knowledge, Protag. 356 foll.; Euthyd. 274 E; Meno 87, 89; virtue and mind, Laws 10. 900 C (cp. 12. 961–963); virtue and wisdom, Meno 88; Phaedo 69; Rep. 3. 409 E;— is it given by instruction? Meno 70, 86, 89 (cp. Protag. 323, 361; Euthyd. 274; Laws 5. 730 E); innate or acquired? Eryx. 398; no teachers of, Meno 89 foll., 96; comes by the gift of God, *ib.* 100 A; ought to be freely imparted by men to each other, Laws 5. 730, 731; the magistrates to be teachers of virtue in the state, *ib.* 12. 964;— virtue and the desires, *ib.* 6. 782 E;— virtue and good, Gorg. 506;— virtue and harmony, Rep. 3. 401 A (cp. 7. 522 A);— virtue and pleasure, *ib.* 3. 402 E (cp. Pleasure);— virtue not a private possession, but a common interest of mankind, Protag. 325 foll.; not perceived by our bodily senses, Phaedr. 250; always the same, Meno 73; the ordinary views of, paradoxical, Phaedo 68; true motives of, *ib.* 83, 84; thought by mankind to be toilsome, Rep. 2. 364 A (cp. Laws 7. 807 D); not promoted by excessive care of the body, Rep. 3. 407; may be a matter of habit, *ib.* 7. 518 E; 10. 619 D; impeded by wealth, *ib.* 8. 550 E; Laws 5. 742; 8. 831 C, 836 A; misplaced = vice, Statesm. 307; is the greatest of goods, Laws 2. 661; the object of the legislator, *ib.* 3. 693, 701 D; 4. 705 E; 6. 770; 8. 835 D; 12. 962, 963; more to be esteemed than riches, *ib.* 5. 728

A; gives more pleasure than vice, *ib.* 733; the chief business of life, *ib.* 7. 807; the salvation of men, *ib.* 10. 906 A; the attribute of a freeman, 1 Alcib. 135; the prize of life, Menex. 246, 247;— virtue according to Simonides, Protag. 339; according to Theognis, Laws 1. 630 (cp. Poets);— virtue in the individual and in the state, Rep. 4. 435 foll., 441 (cp. Justice):— absolute virtue, seen by the soul, Phaedr. 247;— political virtue, unlike the arts, common to all men, Protag. 322, 323;— nature of the virtues, *ib.* 330 foll. (cp. Laches 199); the virtues numberless, Meno 72; place of the several virtues in the state, Rep. 4. 427 foll.; the virtues (except wisdom) akin to the body and attained by habit, *ib.* 7. 518 E (cp. Phaedo 82 B); are they invisible and incorporeal? Soph. 247 (cp. Phaedr. 250); honour to be assigned to the several virtues, Laws 3. 696;— the social virtues (temperance and justice), Phaedo 82 B;— virtues of the philosopher, *ib.* 68 A; Rep. 6. 485 foll., 490 E, 491 B, 495 A (*see* Philosopher).

Virtue. [*The nature of virtue is a subject which is frequently treated by Plato. In the earlier dialogues the Socratic thesis that 'virtue is knowledge' appears under various forms and is brought to bear on almost every argument, nor does it lose its hold over Plato's mind until we reach the very latest stages of his philosophy. At the outset he is especially beset with two questions, 'Can virtue be taught?' and, 'Is virtue one or many?'— The Protagoras and the Meno contain a discussion of these points. In the former the great Sophist endeavours to prove that*



virtue can be imparted by man to men. He shows, in the form of an apologue, that virtue, unlike the arts, is the common property of all, and remarks that, if we did not believe that we could improve those with whom we come in contact, we should not consent to the employment of punishment.—The question is next asked whether virtue is a whole of which the separate virtues are parts, or whether virtue and the virtues are to be identified. Protagoras inclines to the former view, but is met by an application of the doctrine of opposites. Every quality has one opposite; but justice is not opposed to holiness, nor wisdom to temperance: how then can there be a difference between them? The reply is, that although these four virtues are similar, the fifth, courage, is of another kind. But courage is identical with confidence, and confidence rests on knowledge. Knowledge, again, is the basis of the other virtues: a man is temperate because he knows that temperance will bring him greater pleasure and less pain than intemperance; and he is just or holy for a similar reason. Vice is ignorance, and evil comes only by want of knowledge. From this point of view the virtues appear to be one, and, as virtue has been shown to be knowledge, there is no doubt that it can be taught.—In the *Meno*, when Socrates asks for a definition of virtue, Meno is with difficulty brought to understand the nature of general notions. At last he answers that 'virtue is to delight in things honourable and to have the power of getting them.' But the words must be added 'with justice,' and the definition thus becomes,

'Virtue is the power of getting good with a part of virtue.' As the absurdity of this is manifest a new attempt is made. Socrates, starting with the hypothesis that, if virtue is knowledge, it can be taught, argues that virtue is a good: and all goods, whether of the body or the soul, must be used with knowledge or they become unprofitable. But if so, virtue may be taught. Yet who are the teachers? Certainly not the world in general (for how then could good men have bad sons?), and the Sophists, who make it their business to teach virtue, are themselves good for nothing. The conclusion is that ordinary virtue is founded, not on knowledge, but on true opinion, and therefore cannot be taught; but that there is a higher virtue which could be taught, if any one could be found to possess it.—In the *Phaedo* the virtues are idealized. The philosopher alone has true virtue: he does not act, like other men, from a balance of motives or from a consideration of what he is likely to gain or lose by the indulgence of his passions; but he is desirous to keep his soul pure from the contaminations of the body and ready when the hour of departure arrives to fly away to God.—A similar transcendentalism is found in the *Phaedrus*. The earthly virtues are feeble copies of the absolute qualities which are beheld by the soul when she accompanies the Gods in their pilgrimage (cp. *Laws* 10. 906 B). Most men remember little from their previous existence; but the philosopher, who has a better memory, is filled with rapture when he contemplates the earthly copies of the virtues shining in some noble soul.—In the *Republic*

the virtues are considered chiefly with a view to the state. Four virtues are enumerated, wisdom, courage, temperance, justice: 'holiness,' which makes the fifth in the Protagoras, is not mentioned, being regarded, probably, as a part of justice (cp. Euthyph. 12). Each of these virtues has an appropriate place in the state. Wisdom resides in the governing class, who typify the rule of reason in the soul: courage is peculiar to the warriors, the representatives of the 'spirited element'; temperance is the harmony of the state, an agreement by which superiors rule and inferiors obey. Justice, finally, is the virtue of the state, the cause or condition of the other virtues, and may be summed up in the formula that 'every man must do his own work.'—In the *Laws* the four virtues of the Republic reappear. They are declared to have a common principle, which is the guide of the legislator in all his enactments, and which the guardians must be especially trained to recognize. Virtue is no longer identified with knowledge, though the companion paradox with which this is usually associated by Plato, 'that no man does evil of his own will,' is not given up; and he is still inclined to assign wisdom or 'mind' the highest place in the state. In the same spirit, too, he remarks (v. 730 E) that the good man should not be churlish of his virtue, but freely impart it to his fellow-citizens. On the whole, however, the conception of virtue in the *Laws* takes, in accordance with the more serious tone which marks the later writings of Plato, a religious or theological rather than an intellectual character.

(See s. vv. Courage, Holiness, Justice, Temperance, Wisdom.)]  
 Visible world, divisions of, Rep. 6. 510 foll.; 7. 517; compared to the intellectual, *ib.* 6. 508, 509; 7. 532 A;—visible things and ideas, Parm. 130, 135 E.  
 Vision, Charm. 167; Euthyd. 300; Rep. 5. 477; 6. 508; 7. 517; Tim. 45; Theaet. 153 E, 156. Cp. Sight.  
 Voluntary and involuntary, Hipp. Min. 373, 374; in actions, Laws 9. 861, 878 B; voluntary and involuntary homicide, *ib.* 866 E.  
 Vowels, Crat. 424 C; Theaet. 203 C; Soph. 253 A; Phil. 18 C.

### W.

Waking and sleeping, Theaet. 158.  
 Walls injurious, Laws 6. 778, 779.  
 War, an art, Rep. 2. 374 A (cp. 4. 422; Statesm. 304 E; Laws 11. 921 E);—the art of war, a part of government, Protag. 322 B; one of the acquisitive arts, Soph. 219; hunting a part of, *ib.* 222; Laws 1. 633 B; 7. 823 B;—causes of war, Euthyph. 7; Phaedo 66 C; Rep. 2. 373; 4. 422 foll.; 8. 547 A; 1 Alcib. 111 foll.;—distinction between internal and external war, Rep. 5. 470 A; Laws 1. 628; civil worse than external war, Laws 1. 629 D;—war, a favourite theme of poets, Ion 531 C; a matter of chance, Rep. 5. 467 E; Laws 1. 638 A; the guilt of, always confined to a few persons, Rep. 5. 471 B; the natural state of mankind, Laws 1. 625 E; the object of, not conquest, but peace and reconciliation, *ib.* 626–628; inferior to peace, *ib.* 628; 7. 803; 8. 829 A; a cause of revolutions, *ib.* 4. 708 C, 709 A; a serious thing, *ib.* 7. 814 E;—love of war, dangers of, Statesm. 308 A; especially characteristic of timocracy, Rep.

8. 547 E;—war, not easily waged by an oligarchy, *ib.* 551 E; the rich and the poor in war, *ib.* 556 C; war, a favourite resource of the tyrant, *ib.* 567 A;—men, women, and children to take part in war, *ib.* 5. 452 foll., 467, 471 E; 7. 537 A (cp. Crit. 110 B, 112 D; Laws 6. 785; 7. 805, 806, 813 E; and see Women); regulations concerning, Rep. 5. 467–471; ought to be practised in time of peace, Laws 8. 829, 830; 12. 942; why not practised, *ib.* 8. 831, 832;—dances of war, *ib.* 7. 796 C, 815, 816; 12. 942 C; dancing and wrestling a preparation for war, *ib.* 7. 796 (cp. *ib.* 813 D; 12. 942 D);—war not to be declared without the authority of the state, *ib.* 12. 955 B;—war and peace, the chief subject of the politician's knowledge, 1 Alcib. 107 E foll. (cp. Statesm. 304 E).
- Wardens of the Agora, Laws 6. 759 A, B, 763; 11. 913 E, 917 A, E, 920; their duties, *ib.* 6. 764 B; 8. 849; 9. 881 C; 11. 936 C; 12. 953 B:—of the City, *ib.* 6. 759 A, B, 763, 764 B, 779 C; 7. 794 B; 8. 849 E; 11. 913 E, 918 A, 920 C, 936 C; 12. 954 B; to decide in questions about water, *ib.* 8. 844 C, 845 C; in matters relating to artisans, *ib.* 847, 849 A; in cases where a stranger wounds a citizen, *ib.* 9. 879 E; to punish slaves who do not assist according to law, *ib.* 881 C:—of the Country, *ib.* 6. 760, 761; 11. 913 E, 920 C, 936 C; 12. 955 E; punishment of, for neglect of duty, *ib.* 6. 761 E; to have common meals, *ib.* 762; to have no servants, *ib.* 763 A; to know every part of the country, *ibid.*; to decide in disputes respecting boundaries, *ib.* 8. 843 D; in questions about water, *ib.* 844 C; to settle the craftsmen in the different villages, *ib.* 849 A; to try cases in which an animal has killed a man, *ib.* 9. 873 E; to punish slaves who do not assist according to law, *ib.* 881 C; to restrain the striker of a parent from sacred rites, *ib.* D.
- Wares of the soul, Soph. 224.
- Warp, the, and the woof, Crat. 388 A; Statesm. 281, 282;—in the political science, Statesm. 306 foll.; rulers and subjects compared to, Laws 5. 734 E.
- Warrior, the brave, rewards of, Rep. 5. 468; Laws 12. 943; his burial, Rep. 5. 468 E;—the warrior must know how to count, *ib.* 7. 522 E, 525; must be a geometrician, *ib.* 526; must be ambidextrous, Laws 7. 794 E. Cp. Guardians, Soldiers.
- Watchfulness, necessity of, in the state, Laws 6. 758 A; 7. 807 E, 808 C.
- Water, laws concerning, Laws 8. 844; pollution of, *ib.* 845:—one of the elements, Tim. 32, 53; nature of, *ib.* 49; form of, *ib.* 56; kinds of, *ib.* 58 D; compounds of water and earth, *ib.* 60, 61.
- Waves, the three, Rep. 5. 457 C, 472 A, 473 C.
- Wax, block of, in the mind, Theaet. 191 D, 193–196, 200 C.
- Wax, Tim. 61 C:—waxen images (in sorcery), Laws 11. 933 B.
- Ways, the goddess of (*prob.* Hecaté), Laws 11. 914 B.
- Weak, the, make the laws as a protection to themselves, Gorg. 483; by nature subject to the strong, Rep. 1. 338; Laws 3. 690 B; 4. 715 A (cp. Gorg. 483 E, 489); not capable of much, either for good or evil, Rep. 6. 491 E, 495.
- Wealth, the advantage of, in old age, Rep. 1. 329, 330; the greatest blessing of, *ib.* 330, 331; the destruction of the arts, *ib.* 4. 421; influence of, on the State, *ib.* 422 A (cp. Laws 4. 705; 5. 729 A);



- 'the sinews of war,' Rep. 4. 422 A; all-powerful in timocracies and oligarchies, *ib.* 8. 548 A, 551 B, 553, 562 A; an impediment to virtue, *ib.* 550 E; Laws 5. 728 A, 742 E; 8. 831 C, 836 A; should only be acquired to a moderate amount, Rep. 9. 591 E; Laws 9. 870 B; not to be considered in forming a marriage connexion, Statesm. 310 B; Laws 6. 773, 774 D; not unduly honoured at Sparta, Laws 3. 696 A; must have the last place in the state, *ib.* 697 C; 5. 743 E (cp. 7. 801 B; 9. 870 A, B); evils of, *ib.* 4. 705 B; 5. 742, 743; 8. 831 C; 9. 870; not to be amassed for the sake of one's children, *ib.* 5. 729; wealth and happiness, *ib.* 743; 9. 870; Eryx. 393 E; excessive wealth, a cause of revolution, Laws 5. 744 D; limit of, in the state, *ib.* E (cp. Property); the love of, prevents the practice of war, *ib.* 8. 831 C; a cause of crime, *ib.* 9. 870; not so valuable a possession as justice, *ib.* 11. 913 B (cp. Apol. 29 D, 41 E); wealth and poverty alike injurious, Laws 11. 919 (cp. 5. 744 D); the nature of wealth, Eryx. 393 *et passim*; wealth less esteemed by men than health, *ib.* 393 C; bad for some men, *ib.* 395 E foll.; made the standard of our judgment of others, *ib.* 396 B; defined as a quantity of money, *ib.* 399 E; must be useful, *ib.* 400 E; implies many wants, *ib.* 405, 406;—wealth of the Persians, 1 Alcib. 122 B, 123; of the Lacedaemonian kings, *ib.* 121 B, 123 A; of Alcibiades, *ib.* 123:—the blind god of wealth (Pluto), Rep. 8. 554 B (cp. Laws 1. 631 C; 7. 801 B).
- Wealthy, the, everywhere hostile to the poor, Rep. 4. 423 A; 8. 551 E (cp. Laws 5. 736 A); flattered by them, Rep. 5. 465 C; the wealthy and the wise, *ib.* 6. 489 B; the wealthy plundered by the multitude in democracies, *ib.* 8. 564, 565; are not happy, Laws 5. 743; 9. 870 (cp. Rep. 1. 329, 330; Eryx. 405, 406); evil life led by the sons of the wealthy, Laws 3. 695 E.
- Weaver's coat, the, Phaedo 87.
- Weaving, the art of, Gorg. 449 C; 1 Alcib. 128 D; one of the creative arts, Rep. 3. 401 A; an art in which women excel, *ib.* 5. 455 D; divisions of, Statesm. 279–283; the warp and the woof in, *ib.* 281, 282, 309 A; Laws 5. 734 E; defined, Statesm. 283; does not require the use of iron, Laws 3. 679 A.
- Web, the political, Statesm. 309, 310.
- Weeping, to be discouraged in the guardians, Rep. 3. 387 C (cp. 10. 603 E; Laws 7. 792 B, 800 D); characteristic of men rather than of animals, Laws 7. 791 E.
- Weighing, art of, Charm. 166 A; corrects the illusions of sight, Rep. 10. 602 D;—weighing in the arts, Phil. 55 E.
- Weights and measures, in the Model City, Laws 5. 746 E.
- White, a colour suitable to the Gods, Laws 12. 956 A;—colours produced by an admixture of white, Tim. 68.
- White lead, Lysis 217 C.
- Whiteness, Lysis 217; Meno 74 C; Theaet. 153 E, 156 D, 182; Phil. 53, 58 D.
- Whole and parts, Ion 532; Theaet. 204; in medicine, Charm. 156 E; Phaedr. 270 C (cp. Laws 10. 902 E, 903 D); of virtue, Protag. 329 D, 349 foll. (cp. Laws 1. 630 E; 12. 965); in propositions, Crat. 385; in regard to the happiness of the state, Rep. 4. 420; 5. 466; 7. 519 E; Laws 7. 806 C; in love, Rep. 5. 474 C, 475 B; 6. 485 B; in the one, Parm. 137, 138 E, 142, 144, 145, 147 B, 150, 153 C,



- 157 C, 158, 159 D; Soph. 245; in the universe, Tim. 30 E; Laws 10. 903, 905; in legislation, Laws 1. 630 E.
- Whorl, the great, Rep. 10. 616.
- Wicked, the, punishment of, in the world below, Phaedr. 249 A; Phaedo 108 B, 114; Gorg. 523 B, 525; Rep. 2. 363; 10. 614; Theaet. 177 A; Laws 9. 870 E, 881 B; 10. 904 C; 12. 959; miserable in this life, Gorg. 470 foll.; 1 Alcib. 134 B; thought by men to be happy, Rep. 1. 354; 2. 364 A; 3. 392 B; Laws 2. 661; 10. 899 E, 905 A (cp. Gorg. 470); their gifts not received by God, Rep. 2. 365 E; Laws 4. 716 E; 10. 885 C, 888 E, 905, 908 E; 12. 948 C; 2 Alcib. 149 E.
- Wild animals, creation of, Tim. 91.
- Will, freedom of the, Laws 10. 904 C.
- 'Willing' and 'wishing,' Gorg. 467.
- Wills, freedom in making, restricted, Laws 11. 922; regulations concerning, *ib.* 923.
- Wine, Tim. 60 A; a cure for drinking hemlock, Lysis 219 E; makes men think they have a mind, Crat. 406 D; = fear potion, Laws 1. 647 foll.; in education, *ibid.*; use of, *ib.* 2. 666; forbidden to children, *ib.* A; why given to men, *ib.* 672; when and by whom it may be drunk, *ib.* 674;—lovers of wine, Rep. 5. 475 A.
- Wings of the soul, Phaedr. 246, 251.
- Wisdom (*σοφία, φρόνησις*), = good fortune, Euthyd. 282; = true thought, Theaet. 170;—the true wisdom, to know God, *ib.* 176; to have harmony in the soul, Laws 3. 689;—wisdom, the highest of human things, Protag. 352 D; the most valuable of treasures, Euthyd. 282; Eryx. 394 A; can it be taught? Euthyd. 282 (cp. Virtue); loveliness of, Phaedr. 250; unseen, *ibid.*; to be ascribed to God only, *ib.* 278 (cp. Apol. 23 A); the one true coin for which all things ought to exchange, Phaedo 69; the communion of the soul with the unchanging, *ib.* 79; the only release from evil, *ib.* 107; akin to truth, Rep. 6. 485 D; the power of, *ib.* 7. 518, 519; the only virtue which is innate in us, *ib.* 518 E; a real thing, Theaet. 166 E; a good, Phil. 11, 66 (cp. Laws 1. 631 C); not wholly to be severed from pleasure, Phil. 21, 60 foll.; occupied in the contemplation of true being, *ib.* 59; to be prayed for both by states and men, Laws 3. 688; first among virtues, *ib.* A; after the event, an easy matter, *ib.* 691 B, 692 B; the source of happiness, 1 Alcib. 134 (cp. Charm. 173; Meno 88);—wisdom and courage, Laws 12. 963 (cp. Protag. 350, 360; Gorg. 495);—wisdom and false opinion, Statesm. 278;—wisdom and friendship, Lysis 210;—wisdom and goodness, 1 Alcib. 124;—wisdom and injustice, Rep. 1. 349;—wisdom and knowledge, Theaet. 145 E;—wisdom and science, Charm. 165;—wisdom and self-conceit, Phil. 48 D (cp. Laws 5. 727 B, 732 A; 9. 863);—wisdom and temperance, Charm. 165 C, 170, 171; Protag. 332; Symp. 209 A;—wisdom and virtue, Meno 88;—wisdom in the state, Rep. 4. 428 (cp. Laws 3. 689; 12. 964, 965); the fairest wisdom that which is concerned with the ordering of states, Symp. 209 A.
- Wisdom. [*Wisdom is the equivalent in English of two Greek words, σοφία and φρόνησις, between which, however, there is a slight difference of meaning. By the former is intended 'wisdom' in the wider sense, i. e. the highest combination of virtue and intelligence. The latter has the*

narrower signification of 'prudence' or 'forethought,' and contains less of the moral element.—Like temperance, wisdom is with difficulty distinguished as a separate virtue, and may be regarded rather as the culmination or perfection of all virtue, under which the other virtues are included (Meno 88; Phaedo 69; Symp. 209 A). It is the virtue which purges the soul from error (Phaedo 79, 107), or, to use another metaphor, which effects her conversion from darkness to light and enables her to behold true being (Rep. 7. 518). Unlike most of the other virtues it is not a matter of habit, but innate and the gift of God, of whom it is the peculiar attribute and prerogative (Phaedr. 278 D; Rep. 7. 519 A; Theaet. 176). Yet it is also the virtue which 'every man from his very boyhood' fancies that he possesses, and this universal self-conceit leads us into all kinds of error and folly (Phil. 49 A; Laws 5. 727 A). Again, it is more akin to the good than pleasure, because it has a larger share of the three elements of the good,—beauty, symmetry, truth (Philebus passim).—Finally, in the state wisdom is the virtue which more especially belongs to the legislator and the ruler. Those who have it will form the smallest class among the citizens, and may be fitly called the 'mind' of the state, because they are the guiding or directing faculty of the whole community (Rep. 4. 428; Laws 12. 964). And, just as in the soul the commands of reason ought to be obeyed by the desires, so in the state the mandates of the rulers and the laws should be accepted without question by the mass of the citizens (Laws 3. 689 A).]

Wise man, the, the friend and kindred of all, Lysis 210 C; does not fear death, Apol. 29, 35 A; Phaedo 62–68; = the good, Rep. 1. 350; 1 Alcib. 124, 125; definition of, Rep. 4. 442 C; alone has true pleasure, *ib.* 9. 583 B; life of, *ib.* 591; according to Protagoras' philosophy, Theaet. 166 E; the only 'measure of all things,' *ib.* 183 B; different from the clever artist, 2 Alcib. 145 E;—'the wise to go to the doors of the rich,' Rep. 6. 489 B (*see s. v.* Proverbs);—wise men *δαίμονες*, Crat. 398; said to be the friends of the tyrant, Rep. 8. 568; compared to physicians and husbandmen, Theaet. 167 B; are those whose impressions are acute, *ib.* 194 D; ought to rule over the ignorant, Laws 3. 690 B;—the seven wise men, Protag. 343;—Socrates the wisest of men, Apol. 21 A.

Witchcraft, Laws 1. 649 A; 10. 909 B; 11. 933.

Witness, false, Laws 11. 937 B; 12. 943 E;—value of character in a witness, Eryx. 398 B;—witnesses, Laws 8. 846 C; 11. 937; obstruction of witnesses, *ib.* 12. 954 E.

Wives to be common in the state, Rep. 5. 457 foll.; 8. 543; Tim. 18; Laws 5. 739; apt to be insolent when possessed of property, Laws 6. 774 C. Cp. Community of Women.

Wizard, comparison of the speech-maker to a, Euthyd. 290 A; of the sophist, Soph. 235 A; of the sophist-politician, Statesm. 291 C, 303 C:—punishment of wizards, Laws 10. 909; 11. 933:—'no room for the wizard at our feast,' *ib.* 1. 649 A.

Wolf, the, a bad likeness of the dog, Soph. 231 A:—wolves and tyrants akin, Phaedo 82 A; men changed into wolves, Rep. 8. 565 D:—(proverbial) 'wolf may

- claim a hearing,' Phaedr. 272 D;  
'wolf and flock,' Rep. 3. 415 D.
- Women, creation of, Tim. 91;—employments of, Lysis 208; Rep. 5. 455; Laws 7. 805 E; conservative in language, Crat. 418 B; differences of taste in, Rep. 5. 456; fond of complaining, *ib.* 8. 549 D; bad educators of children, Laws 3. 694 F, 695 B; given to concealment, *ib.* 6. 781; cowardly in time of danger, *ib.* 7. 814 A;—in ancient Attica shared in military pursuits, Crit. 110 B, 112 D; in Crete, highly cultivated, Protag. 342 E; at Lacedaemon, *ibid.*; Laws 1. 637; 6. 780; 7. 806; in Thrace, Laws 7. 805 E; of the Sauromatides, *ib.* 804 E, 806 B; in Hellas, *ibid.*;—supposed to differ in nature from men, Rep. 5. 453 (cp. Laws 7. 802 E); inferior to men, Rep. 5. 455; Tim. 42; Laws 6. 781; ought to be trained like men, Rep. 5. 451, 466; Laws 7. 805; 8. 829 E;—in the gymnasia, Rep. 5. 452, 457; Laws 7. 813, 814; 8. 833; in war, Rep. 5. 453 foll., 466 E, 471 E; Laws 6. 785; 7. 805, 806, 813 E; to be guardians, Rep. 5. 456, 458, 466; 7. 540 C; (and children) to be common, *ib.* 5. 450 E, 457 foll., 462, 464; 8. 543; Tim. 18; Laws 5. 739 (cp. Community of Women); to have common meals, Laws 6. 781; to learn martial exercises, *ib.* 7. 794 D, 804 foll., 813; 8. 829 B; music for, *ib.* 7. 802 E; women's festivals, *ib.* 8. 828; races for, *ib.* 833 D; contests in armour, *ib.* E;—controllers of marriage, *ib.* 6. 784; 7. 794; 11. 930 A, 932 B.
- Wonder, philosophy begins in, Theaet. 155 D (cp. Rep. 5. 475 C).
- Wooden objects, may be offered to the Gods, Laws 12. 956 A.
- Woods, firing of, Laws 8. 843 E.
- Woof, Crat. 388 A; Statesm. 281, 282, 309 A; Laws 5. 734 E.
- Wool-working, Statesm. 282.
- Words without music, Laws 2. 669 (cp. Gorg. 502).
- Work honourable, Charm. 163.
- World, the, the natural enemy of good men, Apol. 28 A; cannot be a philosopher, Rep. 6. 494 A; knowledge of, necessary in the ruler of the feast, Laws 1. 640 C; always more or less out of its mind, *ib.* 11. 929 D; its judgment not to be despised, *ib.* 12. 950 B.
- World, the, creation of, Tim. 28 foll.; patterns of, *ib.* 29; soul of, *ib.* 30, 34, 90; Phil. 30; Laws 10. 896–898; an animal, Tim. 31; free from disease and old age, *ib.* 33 A; figure of, *ib.* B; a god, *ib.* 34; motion of, *ib.* 36; Statesm. 269, 270:—are there more worlds than one? Tim. 55 C (cp. 31 B).
- World above, the, Phaedo 110 A foll.
- World below, the, seems very near to the aged, Rep. 1. 330 E; not to be reviled, *ib.* 3. 386 foll. (cp. Crat. 403; Laws 5. 727 E; 8. 828 D); pleasure of discourse in, Apol. 41; Rep. 6. 498 D; punishment of the wicked in, Phaedr. 249 A; Phaedo 108 B, 114; Gorg. 523 B, 525; Rep. 2. 363; 10. 614; Theaet. 177 A; Laws 9. 870 E, 881 B; 10. 904 C; 12. 959; sex in, Rep. 10. 618 B;—[heroes] who have ascended from the world below to the Gods, *ib.* 7. 521 C. Cp. Hades.
- Wounding, voluntary and involuntary, Laws 9. 874, 875; enactments concerning, *ib.* 876–882.
- Wounds, a question of fact, Laws 9. 875 E.
- Woven work, may be offered (in certain quantities) to the Gods, Laws 12. 956 A.
- Wrestling, Meno 94; Euthyd. 277; Theaet. 162 A; Laws 7. 795, 796, 814 D; 1 Alcib. 108; precepts of



Protagoras about, *Soph.* 232 E;—  
laws of wrestling, *Laws* 8. 833 E.  
Cp. *Gymnastic*.

Writing, the art of, taught in schools,  
*Protag.* 326 C; *Laws* 7. 810 B;  
invented by Theuth, *Phaedr.* 274;  
injurious to the memory, *ib.* E:—  
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aid of dialectic, *ib.* 276; ought to  
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E; inferior to the thoughts and  
aspirations of the soul, *ib.* 278  
A:—the 'writings of our minds,'  
*Phil.* 39 A.

Writing masters, *Charm.* 159 C, 160  
A, 161 D; *Protag.* 326 C.

### X.

Xanthias, a famous wrestler, *Meno*  
94 C.

Xanthippe, wife of Socrates, *Phaedo*  
60 A (cp. 116 A).

Xanthippus, father of Pericles, 1  
*Alcib.* 104 B; *Menex.* 235 E.

Xanthippus, son of Pericles, *Protag.*  
315 A; very inferior to his father,  
*ib.* 320 A, 328 C; *Meno* 94 B; 1  
*Alcib.* 118 E.

Xanthus, a river of Troy (= Sca-  
mander), *Crat.* 391 E.

Xenelasia, *Protag.* 342; *Laws* 12.  
950 (cp. *ib.* 953 E).

Xenophanes of Elea, *Soph.* 242 D.

Xerxes, invaded Hellas, *Gorg.* 483  
E; perhaps author of the maxim  
that justice = doing good to your  
friends and harm to your enemies,  
*Rep.* 1. 336 A; brought up in the  
royal and luxurious fashion, *Laws*  
3. 695 E; Xerxes and Alcibiades,  
1 *Alcib.* 105 C; father of Arta-  
xerxes, *ib.* 121 B, 123 C.

### Y.

Year, the perfect, *Tim.* 39.

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2. 365; cannot understand alle-

gory, *ib.* 378 E; must be subject  
in the state, *ib.* 3. 412; *Laws* 3.  
690 A; 4. 714 E (cp. *Laws* 3. 680  
E); must submit to their elders,  
*Rep.* 5. 465 A; *Laws* 4. 721 D;  
9. 879 C; 11. 917 A; must not  
criticize the laws, *Laws* 1. 634 E;  
restlessness of young creatures,  
*ib.* 2. 653 E, 664 E; the young  
easily persuaded by the legislator  
to believe anything, *ib.* 664 (cp.  
2. 671 C); best way of training,  
*ib.* 5. 729 C; made morose and  
irascible by luxury, *ib.* 7. 791 D;  
must keep their old sports and  
ways, *ib.* 797; must be obedient  
to the legislator, *ib.* 823 D:—  
the younger men to be the ad-  
ministrators, and the older the  
counsellors of the state, *ib.* 12.  
965 A. Cp. *Children, Education*.  
Youthful body, the, *Tim.* 81.

Youths, contests of, *Laws* 8. 833 C;  
to attend the burial of the censor  
of magistrates, *ib.* 12. 947:—  
youthful character, apt to change,  
*ib.* 11. 929 C;—youthful corrup-  
tion, to be attributed, not to the  
Sophists, but to public opinion,  
*Rep.* 6. 492 A;—youthful en-  
thusiasm for metaphysics, *ib.* 7.  
539 B; *Phil.* 15 E;—youthful  
regard for authority, *Parm.* 130  
E;—youthful scepticism, not of  
long continuance, *Laws* 10. 888 B  
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### Z.

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menides*, 128 A–130, 136 D, E;  
well paid for teaching, 1 *Alcib.*  
119 A.

Zethus, in the play of Euripides,  
*Gorg.* 485 E, 489 E, 506 B.



Zeus, son of Cronos, *Tim.* 41 A; his treatment of his father, *Euthyph.* 6 A, 8 B; *Rep.* 3. 377 E;—the father of Aphrodite Pandemus, *Symp.* 180 E;—the sons of, *Laws* 12. 941 B;—Achilles descended from, *Rep.* 3. 391 C;—ancestor of Lysis, *Lysis* 205 D; of the Lacedaemonian and Persian kings, 1 *Alcib.* 120 E; of Alcibiades and Socrates, *ib.* 121 A;—divided men into halves, *Symp.* 190 C foll.; his love for Ganymede, *Phaedr.* 255 C; makes his sons judges in the world below, *Gorg.* 523 A foll.; author of the laws of Crete, *Laws* 1. 624 A, 632 D; 2. 662 B;—the tale of his throwing Hephaestus out of heaven not to be received in the state, *Rep.* 2. 378 D; did not cause the violation of the treaty in the Trojan War, or the strife of the Gods, *ib.* 379 E; or send the lying dream to Agamemnon, *ib.* 383 A; or lust for Herè, *ib.* 3. 390 B; ought not to have been described by Homer as lamenting for Achilles and Sarpedon, *ib.* 388 C; the tale of his love for Ganymede invented by the Cretans, *Laws* 1. 636 C;—Zeus the Saviour, *Charm.* 167 B; *Rep.* 9. 583 A, B; Eryx. 392 A; guardian of the phratry, *Euthyd.* 302 C,

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THE END.


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